

Elements of self-knowledge intended to lead youth into an early acquaintance with the nature of man, by an anatomical display of the human frame, a concise view of the mental faculties, and an inquiry into the genuine nature of the passions / Compiled, arranged, and partly written by R.C. Dallas.

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
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



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
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




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A representation of several of the EXTERNAL MUSCLES, the contents of the CHEST, &c.

ELEMENTS



OF

SELF-KNOWLEDGE:

INTENDED TO LEAD YOUTH

INTO AN EARLY ACQUAINTANCE WITH

THE NATURE OF MAN,

BY AN

ANATOMICAL DISPLAY OF THE HUMAN FRAME,

A CONCISE VIEW OF THE

MENTAL FACULTIES,

AND AN INQUIRY INTO THE GENUINE NATURE OF THE

PASSIONS.

COMPILED, ARRANGED, AND PARTLY WRITTEN,

By R. C. DALLAS, Esq.

Γνωθι Σεαυτον.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR MURRAY AND HIGHLEY, FLEET STREET.

1802.



*Printed by S. ROUSSEAU,
Wood Street, Spa Fields.*

TO

MATTHIAS WRIGHT, ESQ.

DEAR SIR,

WRITERS are guided in their Dedications by various motives: the hope of patronage, the glow of affection, the incitement of gratitude. I am induced to trust the patronage of this volume to the public at large by the utility it promises, and to indulge my mind in yielding to the two latter motives. As long as I retain the faculty of remembrance, I can never forget how great a portion of my time you converted from gloom and unhappiness to the cheering comforts of domestic enjoyments. This remembrance, however, does not satisfy my gratitude and affection, I wish to transmit my feelings to my chil-

dren, for whose use I originally made this book, and who have participated the effects of your friendship. This volume will probably accompany them in their progress through life, and will constantly present to their imagination two pleasing ideas; the gratitude of their father's heart, and the goodness of his friend's.

When I thought of dedicating these pages to you, I not only yielded to my feelings, but saw the propriety of it in another view. It is true, that they are intended for young learners, and are but the rudiments of the knowledge they propose: yet the father who has the happiness of having before his eyes a child successfully passing into that stage of life in which learning advances to action, happily evincing a heart and a head already well formed,

formed, and early meriting and receiving public honours, cannot review these Elements without pleasure, and to no man can they be with more propriety dedicated. May you long enjoy the happiness you deserve, and may this small mark of esteem and gratitude be productive of pleasing recollections to your mind.

I am,

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate Servant,

R. C. DALLAS.

Dec. 5, 1801.

P R E F A C E.

THE objects of this publication are so fully stated in the title page that I have little to add in that respect. My purpose was to collect in one volume a considerable degree of knowledge relating to the nature of man, for the instruction of youth, and of such persons as have not leisure to pursue these interesting and useful studies at large. The subjects are of the highest importance to thinking beings, and I hope I have so arranged them as to impress them in an agreeable manner upon the mind.

In drawing out the first part I was a little alarmed at the Nomenclature of Anatomy, fearing it might be thought not adapted to the ladies, to whom I equally wished to render the volume acceptable:

but I was encouraged on recollecting the scientific terms of one of their favourite studies, and my alarm subsided, when reason assured me that the same words could not be more difficult in one science than in another. As young ladies have not been afraid to encounter with *Claviculæ*, *Gandulæ*, *Fauces*, *Cuspidatum*, *Ensiformis*, *Deltoides*, *Medulla*, &c. in their study of vegetative bodies, they may boldly venture upon the study of her own animated ones, for they will only meet such and similar terms.

The fair may have another objection to Anatomy, which is, that it is of a disgusting nature; and so indeed it would be to them were it studied practically, but the knowledge gained by words has not such disgusting effects. The study of their interior structure will never injure their outward form. Their smiles will not be the less enchanting that they know the nature of their lips, nor the grace of their shape be injured by a knowledge of the prop-work
that

that supports it: and I cannot but think that it will prove at least as interesting to them to be acquainted with their own fine eyes, as with any *Gymnospermian* nettle in the hedges. I promise that they shall find no indelicacy to offend modesty; and on the other hand, I protest against that squeamishness which sickens at the mention of muscles, nerves; veins, &c. and which prefers ignorance to strength of mind. This part, however, is but short, and intended more to give general ideas, than to pursue minute investigations, and a Glossary of the technical terms used in it is prefixed, except the Muscles, which are explained in the Table given of them. One hint may not be amiss here: knowledge and pedantry are perfectly distinct. Terms of art must be used to convey the former, but the female who shall introduce them into conversation will hardly escape a charge of the latter. Let her get acquainted with her heart, and she may venture to talk of its expansion, but she must
never

never form her tongue to the pronunciation of its diastole and systole.

I think it necessary here to state what to some may appear an omission. When Hunter wrote, the office of the lungs was unknown, as we shall see in page 14 of this volume, but the late improvements in chemistry have developed the nature and necessity of respiration. "In the lungs the blood comes into contact with atmospheric air, and work many chemical alterations in it. It is in the lungs that the dark blood, throwing off attenuated charcoal, forms with the vital air of the atmosphere, *fixed air*. It is in the lungs that the purple blood parts with its hydrogen, which uniting with the vital air, forms the *humid vapour* that issues from the mouth. And it is in the lungs that the purple blood, having thrown off hydrogen and charcoal, *imbibes* the vital air, which changes its colour to a brilliant red, rendering it the spur to the action of the heart and arteries, the
source

source of animal heat, and the causes of sensibility, irritability, and motion.”

This passage is taken from the ingenious work intitled, *Medical Extracts*, in which the proofs of the doctrine are stated. The knowledge of it will but render the ingenuity of the reasoning in chapter IX. the more interesting: I should perhaps have introduced it in that place, but as the system is novel, it will, I hope, be thought sufficient that I mention it here.

Having announced this volume as a compilation, and claiming no praise but what may be due to the hope of being useful, I might stand discharged of any obligation to mention the sources from which I have drawn; but as the knowledge of them must be productive of recommendation from all acquainted with them, it is a duty I owe to the interest of the publishers to mention the names of Cheselden, Hunter, Watts, Burlamaqui, and Adam Smith. I have dared to interweave a small treatise of my own:

if

if Critics shall easily detect it by its comparative feebleness, I trust they will still allow its tendency to my *object*, and that their penetration will be no obstacle to its **UTILITY.**

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ANATOMICAL GLOSSARY.

ABDOMEN. Lat. from *abdo* to hide; as it conceals the viscera.

Abductor. Lat. from *ab* from, and *duco* to draw.

A name given to muscles which pull back the parts of the body where they are inserted.

Adductor. Lat. from *ad* to, and *duco* to draw.

Muscles that bring forward or draw together the parts to which they are annexed.

Adiposa. Lat. from *adeps* fat. The adipose membrane.

Aggregate glands. Lat. from *aggrego* to assemble.

Alæ. Lat. *Ala*, a wing. It is frequently applied to parts that have any resemblance to wings.

Amphiarthrosis. Greek. from *αμφι* both, and *αρθρωσις*, articulation. It means a certain connexion of bones, admitting an obscure motion.

Anasarca. Greek. *ἄνα* though, and *σαρξ* flesh. A sort of dropsy.

Anatomy. Greek. *ανατομία*: from *ανα*, and *τεμνω* to cut up.

Anchylōsis. Greek. *αγκυλομαι* to bend. The uniting of bones.

Antagonist. Greek. *αντι* against, and *αγωνιζω*, to strive. Muscles, that act in opposition to others are so called.

Aorta. Greek. *αορτη*, literally a vessel. The great artery of the body.

Apex. Lat. The pointed extremity of a part.

Aranea. Lat. a fine web, covering the crystalline humour of the eye.

Articulation. Lat. *Articulatio*. The juncture of bones.

Arteria emulgens dextra. Lat. The right emulgent artery.

Aspera arteria. Lat. The windpipe, called also Trachea.

Attolens. Lat. From *attollo* to lift up.

Auricles. Lat. From *auricula* the ear. The cavities at the base of the heart so called from a resemblance to the ear.

Auditorius. Lat. from *audio* to hear. See *Meatus*.

Axilla. Lat. The armpit.

Axillary. Lat. Passing the armpit.

Axis. Lat. the quiescent right line of a vessel at equal distance from the sides.

Azygos. Greek. *αζυγος*, without a fellow. A vein branching from the Cava.

Basilica. Greek. *βασιλικος* royal.

Basis. When in anatomy applied to the heart,

Basis

- Basis is the upper and broader part of it, opposite to the *micro* or pointed end, considering it as an inverted cone.
- Biceps. Lat. Having two heads.
- Biventer. Lat. Two bellied muscles.
- Bronchos. Greek. *βρογχος*, the throat.
- Cæcum. Lat. *cæcum*, blind: so called from being open only at one end. It is supposed by some to perform a further digestion, separating more chyle.
- Callus. Lat. A hard swelling without pain.
- Canalis. Lat. A canal: as *canalis arteriosus*, a passage to the aorta.
- Canini. Lat. *canis* a dog; the dog-teeth.
- Capillary. Lat. *capillus*, a little hair. Very slender vessels.
- Cardia, Greek. *καρδια*, the heart, now applied to the left and superior opening of the stomach.
- Carotid. Greek. *καρος*, sleep: arteries supposed to be concerned in sleep.
- Carpus. Greek. *καρπος*, the wrist.
- Cartilage. Lat. *cartilago*, gristle.
- Caruncle. Lat. A small fleshy excrescence.
- Cava. Lat. The great vein that returns the blood into the left auricle of the heart.
- Cephalica. Greek. from *κεφαλη* the head.
- Ceratoglossus. Greek. *κερας* a horn, and *γλώσσα* the tongue; a muscle of the tongue, in shape of a horn.
- Cerebrum. Lat. the brain.

- Cerebellum. Lat. dim. The little brain.
- Cerumen. Lat. wax.
- Cervicales. Lat. *cervix*, the hind part of the neck : appertaining to the neck.
- Choledochus. Greek. *χολη*, bile, and *δεχομαι*, to receive :—the common biliary duct is called *Ductus communis choledochus*.
- Chorda. Lat. a string.
- Choroides. Greek. of a twisted shape or fold.
- Chyle. Greek. *χυλος*, juice. The nutritious juice into which food is converted.
- Ciliares, Lat. from *cilium*, the eye-lid.
- Clavicle. Lat. *clavicula*. The collar bone.
- Cochlea. Greek. *κοχλιας*, a spiral shell : a cavity of the ear.
- Cœliac. Greek. *κοιλια*, the belly ; an artery so named from its position.
- Colon. Greek. *κωλον*, from *κωλυω* to hinder. One of the intestines, having a valve to prevent the fæces returning to the Ilium.
- Columniæ. Lat. pillars of the heart.
- Cornea. Lat. horny. See Sclerotis.
- Coronariæ cordis. Lat. from *corona*, a crown and *cor*, the heart.
- Corpora. Lat. bodies.
- Costæ. Lat. the ribs.
- Chrystaline. Lat. glassy.
- Cruralis. Lat. from *crus* the leg.
- Cubitus. Lat. *cubitus*, the arm, from *cubo* to lie

- lie down, because the ancients used to lie down on that part at their meals.
- Cuticula. Lat. The scarf skin : dim. from *cutis*.
- Cutis. Lat. The true skin.
- Cysticus. Greek. *κυστις*, a bladder, a duct from the gall bladder.
- Conglobate. Lat. like a ball.
- Conglomerate. Lat. heaped together.
- Conjunctiva. Lat. A smooth membrane lining the inside of the eyelids, and joining the globe edges of the orbit ; it spreads over the forepart of the globe, and is vulgarly called there the white of the eye.
- Compāges. Lat. a collection of slender bodies closely united.
- Deltoides. Greek. *δελτα* the letter Δ, and *ειδος* likeness ; a muscle of that shape.
- Diaphragm. Greek. from *διαφράσσω*, to hedge or wall in.
- Dentes sapientes. Lat. the teeth of wisdom.
- Diarthrōsis. Greek. *διαρθρω*, to articulate ; a moveable connexion of bones.
- Diaſtole. Greek. from *δια* with, and *στελλω* to stretch. The dilatation of the heart and arteries.
- Digitus. Lat. a finger.
- Dorsum. Lat. the back.
- Ductus. Lat. a duct, or canal ; as Ductus alimentalis, the passage of the food. See Choledochus, and Thoracicus.

- Duodenum.** Lat. from *duodenus*, consisting of twelve; so called from the length, being about 12 fingers breadth.
- Dura mater.** Lat. from *durus*, hard, and *mater*, a mother: called *dura*, from its comparative hardness with the *pia mater*, and *mater*, from its being supposed to be the source of the other membranes.
- Emulgent.** Lat. from *emulgeo*, to milk out. Vessels that pierce the kidneys.
- Emunctory.** Lat. from *emungo*, to drain off.
- Enarthrōsis.** Greek. from *εν* in, and *αρθρον* a joint. The ball and socket joint.
- Encephalon.** Greek. *εν* in, and *κεφαλη* the head. The contents of the cranium.
- Eniformes.** Lat. *ensis*, a sword and *forma* resemblance; shaped like a sword.
- Epidermis.** Greek. *επι* upon, and *δερμα* the true skin. The scarf-skin.
- Epigastrium.** Greek, *επι* upon, and *γαστηρ* the stomach. That part of the abdomen that lies over the stomach.
- Epiglottis.** Greek. *επι* and *λωττις* the tongue. A cartilage at the roof of the tongue.
- Epiphyfis.** Greek. *επι* and *φυω* to grow. The growing of one bone upon another.
- Ethmoides.** Greek. *εθμος* a sieve, and *ειδος* form. A bone of the head, so called from its being perforated like a sieve.

Excre-

Extensores. Lat. Applied to various muscles that extend to different parts of the body.

Externus. Lat. outer.

Excretory. Lat. throwing off.

Fascia. Lat. from *fascis*, a bundle; a bandage.

Facialis. Lat. a membranous muscle binding others together.

Fasciculus. Lat. a bundle.

Fauciales. Lat. from *fauces*, the jaws. Glands of the jaws.

Femur, femoris. Lat. the thigh.

Fenestra. Lat. a window. Used to signify an inlet.

Fibra. Lat. a very fine simple filament.

Fibula. Lat. the outer and smaller bone of the leg.

Flexors. Lat. muscles that bend the parts where they are inserted.

Forāmen. Lat. from *foro* to pierce. A little opening.

Frontis. Lat. *frons*, the forehead.

Gangliorn. Greek. γαγγλιον a knot.

Gastric. Greek. γαστήρ the stomach. Of the stomach.

Gingivæ. Lat. the gums.

Ginglymus. Greek. γιγγλυμος a hinge. A hinge-like joint.

Gland. Lat. *glans* a gland.

Glandulæ Miliare. Lat. small glands resembling millet.

Globulæ. Lat. *globules*.

- Glutēus. Greek. *γλατος*, the buttock; a muscle of the thigh.
- Gomphōsis. Greek. from *γομφω*, to drive in a nail. The fixing of a bone in another bone like a nail in a board, as teeth in the sockets of the jaws.
- Hepaticus. Greek. *ἥπαρ*, the liver; a canal from the liver to the cysticus.
- Hepatic. Greek. *ἥπαρ*, any thing belonging to the liver.
- Humeralis. Lat. *humerus*, the shoulder; appertaining to the shoulder.
- Hyoides. Greek. from the letter *Υ*, and *ειδος* likeness; a bone so named from its resemblance to the Greek letter *Υ*.
- Hypochondrium. *ὑπο* under, and *χονδρος* a cartilage. The regions on each side of the ensiformis cartilage, one containing the liver, and the other the spleen.
- Hypogastrium. Greek. *ὑπο* under, and *γαστηρ* the stomach. The lower region of the abdomen.
- Ileum. Greek. from *ειλεω* to roll about. One of the intestines, so called from its circunyolutions.
- Inguinalis. Lat. *inguen*, the groin; about the groin.
- Innominata. Lat. without a name. Bones not named in former times.

Inter-

Intercostales. Lat. *inter* among, and *costa* a rib.

Situated between the ribs.

Iris. Lat. a rainbow; a membrane of the eye, so called from the variety of its colours.

Incus. Lat. an anvil.

Internus. Lat. inner.

Iter. Lat. way. As *iter ad palatum*, the way to the palate.

Jējūnum. Lat. *jejūnus*, empty. One of the intestines usually found empty.

Labiales. Lat. *labium*, a lip. The glands of the lips.

Lachrymal. Lat. *lachryma*, a tear; relating to tears.

Lacteals. Lat. *lac*, milk. Absorbent vessels that convey the chyle to the Thoracic Duct.

Lacteæ primi generis. Lat. lacteals of the first kind.

Lacteæ secundi generis. Lat. lacteals of the second kind.

Lamdoidal. Greek. from Λ and *ειδος* resemblance; a future resembling the letter Λ .

Lamellæ. }
Laminæ. } Lat. plates; lying in plates.

Larynx. Greek. *λαρυγξ*, the throat.

Lens. Lat. a glass, or humour that throws the rays of vision into a focus.

Linguales. Lat. *lingua*, the tongue; belonging to the tongue.

Lum-

Lumbales. Lat. *lumbus*, the loin; relative to the loins.

Lymph. Lat. *lympha* a clear fluid.

Lymphæducts } Lat. Slender pellucid tubes which
Lymphatics } convey lymph.

Malleus. Lat. *malleus* a mallet. A bone of the internal ear, so called from its likeness to a little hammer.

Mammæ. The breasts.

Maxillaris. Lat. *maxilla*, the jaw; belonging to the jaw.

Meatus. Lat. a passage.

Materia perspirabilis. Lat. Perspirable matter, is what goes off by perspiration.

Mediaſtinum. Lat. *in medio stare*; a membrane dividing the cavity of the chest.

Medulla. Lat. marrow.

Medulla oblongata. Lat. the part of the brain where begins the spinal marrow.

Medulla spinalis. Lat. the spinal marrow.

Medullary. Lat. marrow-like substance.

Mesentery. Greek. *μεσος* middle, and *εντερον* an intestine. A membrane to which the intestines adhere.

Metacarpus. Greek. *μετα* after, and *καρπος* the wrist. The part of the hand between the fingers and wrist.

Metatarsus. Greek. *μετα* after, and *ταρσος* the tarsus; the part of the foot between the tarsus and toes.

Molares.

- Molares. Lat. *molaris* a grindstone. The double teeth.
- Moleculæ. Lat. small particles.
- Mitrales. Lat. *mitra*, a turban; valves so called from their shape.
- Musculus. Lat. a muscle.
- Nates. Lat. the fleshy parts on which we sit.
- Nasi. Lat. *nasus*, the nose. Of the nose.
- Nictitans. Lat. from *nicto*, to wink; a thin membrane which some creatures have to cover their eyes—it is thin enough to be seen through.
- Obliquus. Lat. oblique.
- Occipitis. Lat. *occiput*, the back part of the head.
- Œsophagus. Greek. *οισος* a wicker basket, which it is said to resemble, or from *οιω* to carry, and *φαγω* to eat, because, it carries the food into the stomach. The gullet.
- Olfactory. Lat. *olfactus*, the sense of smelling.
- Olivaria. Lat. *corpora olivaria*. Olive-like bodies.
- Omentum. Lat. the caul.
- Orbicularis. Lat. shaped like a ring.
- Organ. Greek. *οργανον*. An organical part is that part of animal and vegetable body which is designed for the performance of some particular action, in opposition to non-organical, which cannot of itself perform an action: thus the organ of sight is the eye with all its parts; the organ of hearing, the ear, &c.
- Os. Lat. A bone.
- Offa. Lat. bones. The plural of *os*.

Offa innominata. Lat. unnamed bones. See *Innominata*.

Officula auditus. Lat. the small bones of the ear.

Ossify. Lat. to become bony.

Palatinæ. Lat. from *palatum* the palate; glands of the palate.

Pancreas. Greek. *παν* all, and *κρεας* flesh. A viscus of the abdomen, so called from its fleshy consistence.

Papillæ. Lat. the nipple. It is also applied to fine terminations of nerves.

Parietalia. Lat. from *paries*, a wall.

Parotis. Greek. from *παρα* about, and *εξ* the ear; the glands behind the ear.

Pelvis. Lat. *pelvis*, a basin. The cavity below the belly, containing the bladder, &c.

Penniform. Lat. *penna* a feather, and *forma*, shape; resembling a feather.

Pericardium. Greek. from *περι* about, and *καρδια* the heart. The membranous bag that surrounds the heart.

Pericranium. Greek. from *περι* about, and *κρανιον* the cranium; the membrane about the skull.

Periosteum. Greek. from *περι* about, and *οσσειον* a bone; the membrane that covers the bones.

Peristaltic. Greek. *περιστρελλω* to contract. The vermicular motion of the intestines, by which they contract and propel their contents.

Peri-

- Peritoneum.** Greek. *περιτεινω* to extend round: the membrane that covers the viscera.
- Phrenicæ.** Greek. *φρενες*, the diaphragm. Vessels of the diaphragm.
- Pia Mater.** Latin. the good mother; a membrane so called, because it embraces the brain as a good mother folds her child. See *Dura Mater*.
- Pinealis.** Lat. a small gland in the brain.
- Pleura.** Greek. *πλευρα*, a membrane lining the Thorax.
- Polypus.** Greek. *πολυς* many, and *πους* a foot. Anatomists give their name to some concretions or blood from some imaginary resemblance.
- Poplitea.** Lat. *poples*, the ham; belonging to the ham.
- Primæ Viæ.** Lat. the first passages. The stomach and the intestinal tube are so called, and the lacteals the *secundæ viæ*, or second passages.
- Processus.** Lat. from *procedo*, to go before. Prominent parts of the bones and other parts of the body.
- Prostratæ.** Lat. glands of the neck of the bladder.
- Pterygoides.** Greek. *πτερον* a wing, and *ειδος* resemblance. Wing-shaped muscles.
- Pulmonary.** Lat. *pulmo* the lungs; of the lungs.
- Punctum.** Lat. a point. In the plural *puncta*.
- Pylorus.** Greek. *πυλη* a gate, and *ωρσω* to guard. The inferior orifice of the stomach.

- Pyriformis.** Lat. from *pyrus* a pear, and *forma* a shape. Shaped like a pear.
- Radius.** Lat. a staff. One of the bones of the arm.
- Receptaculum Chyli.** Lat. the receptacle of the chyle.
- Rectum.** Lat. strait. An intestine called from its strait position.
- Regio.** Lat. region.
- Rete.** Lat. a net.
- Reticulum.** Lat. Net-work.
- Retina.** Lat. from *rete*, a net. A membrane of the eye.
- Rotunda.** Lat. round.
- Rotulæ.** Lat. the knee-pans.
- Saccus chyliferus.** Lat. *saccus* a bag. The same as receptaculum chyli; which see.
- Salivary.** Lat. *saliva*, spittle. The glands that secrete this fluid are called salivary glands.
- Saphæna.** Greek. σαφης visible, the large vein of the leg.
- Scapula.** Lat. The shoulder blade.
- Sclerotis.** Greek. σκληρωω to harden. The outer-hard coat of the eye.
- Scrobiculus Cordis.** Lat. the pit of the stomach.
- Secretion.** Lat. *secretio*. A function by which different organs separate from the blood substances destined for particular uses; as the bile in the liver, saliva in the mouth, &c.
- Semilunares.** Lat. *femi*, half, *luna* the moon; valves in form of a half moon.
- Senso-

- Sensorium. Lat. the brain; where the nerves meet and cause sensation.
- Septum. Lat. a partition.
- Sefamoid. Greek. *σησαμη* an Indian grain, and *ειδος* likeness. This term is applied to the little bones at the first joint of the great toes, and thumbs, from their resemblance to the grains of Indian corn.
- Sigmoidoles. Greek. Σ and *ειδος*; valves so called from their resemblance to the old Greek letter Sigma written as C.
- Sinus. Lat. a cavity, or depression.
- Skeleton. Greek. *σκελλω*, to dry. When the bones of the body are preserved in their natural situation, and deprived of the flesh, the assemblage is called, a skeleton.
- Sphenoides. Greek. *σφην* a wedge, and *ειδος* likeness. Wedge-shaped bones.
- Sphincter. Greek. *σφιγγω* to shut up. The name of muscles whose office is to close the aperture around which they are placed.
- Spine. Lat. *spina*, a thorn; so called from the processes of the vertebræ.
- Stapes. Lat. a stirrup; resembling a stirrup.
- Sternum. Lat. the breast bone.
- Subclavian. Lat. from *sub* under, and *clavis* a key, because the clavicles were supposed to resemble the key of the ancients. The arteries, nerves, &c. under the collar bone.

Sublin-

Sublinguales. Lat. from *sub* under, and *lingua* the tongue ; glands under the tongue.

Suture. Lat. *futura* a joining ; the union of bones in a dentiform manner. See *Lamdoidal*.

Synarthrosis. Greek. *συν* together, and *αρθρον* a joint.

Synchondrosis. Greek. *συν* together, and *χονδρος* a cartilage.

Systole. Greek. from *συστῆλλω*, to contract. The contraction of the heart.

Tarsus. Greek. *ταρσος*, a part of the foot.

Temporum. Lat. of the temples.

Tendon. Lat. from *tendo* to stretch. The white and glittering extremity of a muscle.

Teres umbilicale. Lat. *teres* long and round, *umbilicus* the navel. A ligament at the navel.

Thoracicus. Greek. from *θωραξ*. The thoracic duct, so called from ascending the thorax.

Thorax. Greek. *θωραξ*, from *θωρεω* to leap, because the heart leaps in it. The chest.

Thymus. Greek. *θυμα*, an odour, a gland so called from its fragrant smell.

Thyroidæ. Greek. *θυρος* a shield, and *ειδος* resemblance. A cartilage of the throat resembling a shield.

Tibia. Lat. *tibia*, a pipe or flute. A bone of the leg.

Tonfillæ. Lat. glands at the basis of the tongue : the almonds.

Trachæa. Greek. from *τραχος* rough. The wind-pipe.

Trephina

Trephina or Trepan. Greek. *τρυφανον*, from *τρυπαω* to bore. An instrument to pierce bone.

Tricuspides. Lat. three-pointed.

Triquetra. Lat. triangular.

Trochanter. Greek. from *τρεχω* to run. Two processes of the thigh bone.

Trochlearis. Greek. *τροχλια* a pulley. As if drawn by a pulley.

Tuberculum Loweri. Lat. an eminence of the heart, first noticed by Dr. Lower.

Tunica. Lat. a coat, or covering.

Tympanum. Greek. *τυμπανον* a drum. The drum of the ear.

Ulna. Greek. *ωλενη* the ulna, or cubit; a bone of the arm. See Cubit.

Umbilicalis. Lat. of the navel.

Unguis. Lat. the nails.

Uvea. Lat. *uva* a grape. A coat of the eye. It is so called from its resemblance in beasts to unripe grapes.

Uvulares. Lat. glands of the uvula.

Uvula. Lat. *uvula*, dim. of *uva* a grape. The small conical fleshy substance over the root of the tongue.

Vaginalis Gulæ. Lat. the case or sheath of the gullet.

Vascular. Lat. from *vas* a vessel. Consisting of vessels.

Vena portæ. Lat. *vena*, a vein, and *porto* to

carry ; the great vein at the entrance of the liver, which carries the blood into it.

Vena sine pari. Lat. the vein without a companion : the same as azygos ; which see.

Venter. Lat. the cavity of the belly.

Ventricles. Lat. from *venter* ; cavities of the heart and brain.

Ventriculus. Lat. the stomach.

Vermiform. Lat. *vermis*, a worm, and *forma* shape ; resembling the contortions of worms.

Vertebræ. Lat. from *verto* to turn ; the bones of the spine.

Vesica. Lat. dim. of *vas* a vessel ; the bladder : a muscular sack situated in the cavity of the pelvis, to receive the urine from the kidneys.

Vesicles. Lat. small bladders.

Vestigium. Lat. the track :

Vestibulum. Lat. an entrance.

Via lactea. Lat. *via* way, and *lactea* lacteal ;
The receptacle of the chyle.

Villosa. Lat. shaggy.

Viscus.	}	Lat. <i>viscus</i> , the bowels ; it is ge-
Viscera.		nerally applied to all those organs
	}	of life, situated in the thorax and
		abdomen.

Vitrious. Lat. *vitrum*, glass ; glassy.

Vomer. Lat. a plough-share ; a bone of the nose so called from its resemblance.

ELEMENTS
OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

PART I.

ANATOMICAL DISPLAY
OF THE
HUMAN FRAME.

INTRODUCTION.

THE design of this treatise being to give youth just notions respecting their corporeal frame, and the structure of their mind, I shall set out with a concise definition of our species, as given by a very learned and amiable philosopher, whose writings on the principles of natural law have been universally received on the classic shelf.

A human creature is an animal endowed with understanding and reason; a being composed of an organized body, and a rational soul.

With regard to his body he is pretty similar to other animals, having the same organs,

B

properties,

properties, and wants. It is a living body, organized, and composed of several parts; a body that moves of itself, and, feeble in the commencement, increases gradually in its progress by the help of nourishment, till it arrives to a certain period, in which it appears in its flower and vigour, whence it insensibly declines to old age, which conducts it at length to dissolution. This is the ordinary course of human life, unless it happens to be abridged either by malady or accident.

With regard to his soul, he is eminently distinguished from other animals. It is by this noble part that he thinks, and is capable of forming just ideas of the different objects that occur to him; of comparing them together; of inferring from known principles unknown truths; of passing a solid judgment on the mutual agreement of things, as well as on the relations they bear to us; of deliberating on what is proper or improper to be done; and of determining consequently to act one way or other. The mind recollects what is past, joins it with the present, and extends its views to futurity. It is capable of penetrating into the causes, progress, and consequence of things, and of discovering, as it were,

were, at one glance, the entire course of life, which enables it to lay in a store of such things as are necessary for making a happy career. Besides, in all this, it is not subject to a constant series of uniform and invariable operations, but finds itself at liberty to act or not to act, to suspend its actions and motions, and to direct and manage them as it thinks proper.

Such is the general idea we are to form of the nature of man; of that being of the species of which we are individuals, and which we are now to analyze more particularly, in order to ground us in the most useful of sciences, self-knowledge.

In treating both of the body and of the mind I shall adopt the analytical method, because I consider the understanding of my readers to be sufficiently mature to comprehend a whole and its parts, and because it is the method nature herself prescribes for investigating her works.

To begin then with the corporeal frame; an animal body is a compages of vessels, variously disposed to form certain parts of different figures, for different uses.

It has been discovered by the assistance of glasses that all the parts of the body exist in

B 2 miniature

miniature from the earliest formation that can be traced, and that the encrease of those parts is only the extension and thickening of their vessels, and that no part owes its existence to another: the two most essential ones, however, are the brain and the heart.

The constituent parts of the animal body are, fibres, membranes, arteries, veins, lymphæducts, nerves, glands, excretory vessels, muscles, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, and bones; to these may be added the hair and nails, though they seem to have only a vegetative kind of life.

Fibres, as they appear to the naked eye, are simple threads of the minutest blood vessels, which enter into the composition of every part.

Membranes, are formed by a compact union of fibres, and are expanded to cover, or line any other part.

Arteries, are tubes that arise in two trunks from two cavities in the heart, called the ventricles of it, and thence dividing into branches, distribute the blood to every part of the body.

Veins, are tubes to return the blood from the extremities of the arteries to the heart.

Lymphæducts, are pellucid tubes to carry lymph from all parts, especially the glands, which they discharge into the larger veins, and
into

into the lacteal vessels, *vasa lactea*, which we shall see are those that convey the fluid from the digested aliment called chyle.

Nerves, are bundles of cylindrical fibres, which arise in the brain and spinal marrow, and terminate in all the sensitive parts. They are the immediate organs of sensation.

A gland, is a smooth substance, composed of an artery, vein, lymphatic, excretory duct, and nerve. The use of glands is to secrete fluids from the blood for several uses.

Excretory vessels, are either tubes from glands to convey the secreted fluids to their respective places, or vessels from the small guts, to carry the chyle to the blood vessels: these last are the lacteals, called *vasa lactea*.

Muscles, are distinct portions of flesh, made up of a number of small fibres, which, by contracting, perform the motions of the body.

Tendons, are the same fibres of which the muscles are composed; but white and more closely connected, that they may possess less space in a limb, and be inserted in less room into a bone.

Ligaments, are strong membranes, or bodies of fibres closely united, either to bind down the tendons, or give origin to the

muscle, or tie together such bones as have motion.

Cartilages, or gristles, are hard, elastic bodies, smooth and insensible: their use is to cover the ends of the bones that have motion, to prevent their attrition, &c.

Bones, originally composed of soft fibres, are firm parts to sustain, and give shape to the body.

The *hair* and *nails*, are well known: the former seems to be nourished from the perspirable matter, and the latter from a mucus between the outer and lower skin, contained in the reticulum mucosum.



CHAPTER I.

The Necessity for the Variety of Parts in the Body.

FOR what purpose is there such a variety of parts in the human body? Why such a complication of nice and tender machinery? Why was there not rather a more simple, less delicate, and less expensive frame? That beginners in the study of anatomy may acquire a satisfactory and general idea of their subject, we shall furnish them with clear answers to all such questions. Let us then, in our imagination, make a MAN: in other words, let us suppose that the mind, or immaterial part, is to be placed in a corporeal fabric, to hold correspondence with other material beings by the intervention of the body: and then consider, *à priori*, what will be wanted for her accommodation. In this enquiry we shall plainly see the necessity or advantage, and therefore, the final cause of most of the parts which we actually find in the human body. And if we consider, that, in order to answer some of the *requisites*, human wit and invention would be very insufficient, we need not be surpris'd if we meet with some

parts of the human body, the use of which we cannot yet make out, and some operations or functions which we cannot explain. We can see, and comprehend, that the whole bears the strongest characters of excelling wisdom and ingenuity: but the imperfect senses and capacity of man cannot pretend to reach every part of a machine, which nothing less than the intelligence and power of the Supreme Being could contrive and execute. To proceed, then:—

In the first place; the mind, the thinking, immaterial agent, must be provided with a place of immediate residence, which shall have all the requisites for the union of spirit and body: accordingly, she is provided with the brain, where she dwells as governess and superintendent of the whole fabric.

In the second place; as she is to hold a correspondence with all the material beings which surround her, she must be supplied with organs fitted to receive the different kind of impressions that they will make. In fact, therefore, we see that she is provided with the organs of sense, as we call them: the eye is adapted to light; the ear to sound; the nose to smell; the mouth to taste; and the skin to touch.

In the third place; she must be provided with organs of communication between herself, in the brain, and those organs of sense, to give her information of all the impressions that are made upon
on

on them; and she must have organs between herself, in the brain, and every other part of the body, fitted to convey her commands and influence over the whole. For these purposes the nerves are actually given. They are chords which arise from the brain, the immediate residence of the mind, and disperse themselves in branches through all parts of the body. They convey all the different kinds of sensation to the mind, in the brain; and likewise carry out from thence all her commands or influence to the other parts of the body. They are intended to be occasional monitors against all such impressions as might endanger the well-being of the whole, or of any particular part; which vindicates the Creator of all things in having actually subjected us to those many disagreeable and painful sensations which we are exposed to from a thousand accidents in life.

Further: the mind, in this corporeal system must be endued with the power of moving from place to place, that she may have intercourse with a variety of objects; that she may fly from such as are disagreeable, dangerous, or hurtful, and pursue such as are pleasant or useful to her: and accordingly, she is furnished with limbs, and with muscles and tendons, the instruments of motion, which are found in every part of the fabric where motion is necessary.

But to support, to give firmness and shape to the
fabric;

fabric; to keep the softer parts in their proper places; to give fixed points for, and proper directions to, its motions; as well as to protect some of the more important and tender organs from external injuries;—there must be some firm prop-work interwoven through the whole; and, in fact, for such purposes the bones are intended.

The prop-work must not be made into one rigid fabric, for that would prevent motion; therefore, there are a number of bones. These pieces must be firmly bound together to prevent their dislocation; and, in fact, this end is perfectly well answered by the ligaments.

The extremities of these bony pieces, where they move, and rub upon one another, must have smooth and slippery surfaces, for easy motion: this is most happily provided for, by the cartilages and mucus of the joints.

The interstices of all these parts must be filled up with some soft and ductile matter, which shall keep them in their places, unite them, and, at the same time, allow them to move a little upon one another: this end is accordingly answered by the cellular membrane, or adipose substance.

There must be an outward covering over the whole apparatus, both to give it a firm compactness, and to defend it from a thousand injuries; which in fact, are the very purposes of the skin and other integuments. And as she is made for
society

society and intercourse with beings of her own kind, she must be endued with powers of expressing and communicating her thoughts, by some sensible marks or signs, which shall be both easy to herself, and admit of great variety: accordingly, she is provided with the organs and faculty of speech; by which she can throw out signs with amazing facility, and vary them without end.

Thus we have built up an animal body, which would seem to be pretty complete; but we have not yet made any provision for its duration: and, as it is the nature of matter to be altered and worked upon by matter; so, in a very little time, such a living creature must be destroyed, if there is no provision for repairing the injuries which she must commit upon herself, and the injuries to which she must be exposed from without. Therefore a treasure of blood is actually provided in the heart and vascular system, full of nutritious and healing particles, fluid enough to penetrate into the minutest part of the animal: impelled by the heart, and conveyed by the arteries, it washes every part, builds up what was broken down, and sweeps away the old and useless materials: Hence we see the necessity or advantage of the heart and arterial system.

What more there is of this blood, than enough to repair the present damages of the machine, must not be lost, but should be returned again

to the heart: and for this purpose the venal system is actually provided. These requisites in the animal, explain, *à priori*, the circulation of the blood.

The old materials which were become uselefs, and are swept off by the current of blood, must be separated and thrown out of the system: therefore, glands, the organs of secretion, are given for straining whatever is redundant, vapid, or noxious, from the mass of blood; and when strained, they are thrown out by emunctories, called Excretories.

Now as the fabric must be constantly wearing, the separation must be carried on without intermission, and the strainers must be always employed: therefore, there is actually a perpetual circulation of the blood, and the secretions are always going on.

But even all this provision would not be sufficient; for that store of blood would soon be consumed, and the fabric would break down, if there were not a provision made for fresh supplies. These, we observe, are, in fact, profusely scattered around her, in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; and she is provided with hands, the finest instruments that could have been contrived, for gathering them, and for preparing them in a variety of different ways for the mouth. These supplies, which we call food, must be considerably changed; they must be converted into
blood:

blood: therefore she is provided with teeth for cutting and bruising the food, and with a stomach for melting it down; in short, with all the organs subservient to digestion. The finer parts of the aliments only can be useful in the constitution: these must be taken up, and conveyed into the blood, and the dregs must be thrown off. With this view the intestinal canal is actually given. It separates the nutritious part, which we call chyle, to be conveyed into the blood, by the system of absorbent vessels; and the fæces pass downward to be conducted out of the body.

Now we have gotten our animal not only furnished with what is wanting for its immediate existence; but, also, with the power of spinning out that existence to an indefinite length of time; but its duration, we may presume, must necessarily be limited: for as it is nourished, grows, and is raised up to its full strength and utmost perfection; so it must, in time, in common with all material beings, begin to decay, and then hurry on to final ruin. Hence we see the necessity of or a scheme of renovation: accordingly, wise Providence, to self-perpetuate, as well as preserve his work, besides giving a strong appetite for life and preservation, has made animals male and female, and given them such organs and passions, as will secure the propagation of the species to the end of the world.

Thus

Thus we see, that by the very imperfect survey which human reason is able to take of the subject, the animal man, must necessarily be complex in his corporeal system, and operations.

He must have one great and general system; the vascular—branching through the whole—for circulation; another, the nervous—with its appendages, the organs of sense—for every kind of feeling; and a third, for the union and connection of all those parts.

Besides these primary and general systems, he requires others, which may be more local or confined: one—for strength, support, and protection—the bony compages; another—for the requisite motions of the parts among themselves, as well as for moving from place to place—the muscular parts of the body; another—to prepare nourishment for the daily recruit of the body—the digestive organs; and one—for propagating the species—the organs of generation.

And, in taking this general survey of what appears, *à priori*, to be necessary for adapting an animal to the situations of humanity, we observe, with great satisfaction, that man is accordingly, in fact, made of such systems, and for such purposes. He has them all; and he has nothing more, except the organs of respiration. Breathing we cannot account for, *à priori*; we only know that it is, in fact, essential and necessary to life. Notwithstanding this—when we see all the
other

other parts of the body, and their functions, so well accounted for, and so wisely adapted to their several purposes—we cannot doubt that respiration is so likewise. And if ever we should be happy enough to find out clearly the object of this function, we shall, doubtless, as clearly see, that the organs are wisely contrived for an important office, as we now see the purpose and importance of the heart and vascular system; which, till the circulation of the blood was discovered, was wholly concealed from us.

The use and necessity of all the different systems in a man's body are not more apparent, than the wisdom and contrivance which have been exerted in putting them all into the most compact and convenient form; and in disposing them that they shall mutually receive and give helps to one another; and that all, or many of the parts, shall not only answer their principal end or purpose, but operate successfully and usefully in many secondary ways.

If we understand and consider the whole animal machine in this light, and compare it with any machine, in which human art has exerted its utmost—suppose the best constructed ship that ever was built—we shall be convinced, beyond the possibility of doubt, that there is intelligence and power far surpassing what humanity can boast of.

In making such a comparison, there is a peculiarity

liarity and superiority in the natural machine, which cannot escape observation; it is this:— in machines of human contrivance or art, there is no internal power, no principal in the machine itself, by which it can alter and accommodate itself to any injury which it may suffer; or make up any injury which is reparable: but in the natural machine, the animal body, this is most wonderfully provided for, by internal powers in the machine itself; many of which are not more certain and obvious in their effects, than they are above all human comprehension as to the manner and means of their operation. Thus, a wound heals up of itself; a broken bone is made firm again by a callus; a dead part is separated and thrown off; noxious juices are driven out by some of the emunctories; a redundancy is removed by some spontaneous bleeding; a bleeding naturally stops of itself; and a great loss of blood, and from any cause, is, in some measure, compensated by a contracting power in the vascular system, which accommodates the capacity of the vessels to the quantity contained: the stomach gives information when the supplies have been expended; represents with great exactness the quantity and the quality of what is wanted in the present state of the machine; and, in proportion as she meets with neglect, rises in her demand, urges her petition in a louder voice, and with more forcible arguments: for its protection, an
animal

animal body resists heat and cold in a very wonderful manner, and preserves an equal temperature in a burning and a freezing atmosphere.

There is a further excellence or superiority in the natural machine, if possible, more astonishing, more beyond all human comprehension, than what we have been speaking of. Besides those internal powers of self-preservation in each individual, where two of them co-operate, or act in concert, they are endued with powers of making other animals, or machines, like themselves; which again are possessed of the same powers of producing others, and so of multiplying the species without end.

These are powers which mock all human invention or imitation: they are characteristics of the DIVINE ARCHITECT.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Brain.

THE brain is a medullary substance enclosed in a box of bones, admirably suited for its defence, and the whole of it is divided into two parts: that which is in the upper or fore part of the skull is called the Cerebrum, and that which lies in the back part just under the Cerebrum is called the Cerebellum. They are both enveloped in two membranes named Dura Mater and Pia Mater.

The Dura Mater, is a very compact strong membrane, lining the inside of the skull, and it has three processes or parts, serving as partitions for certain portions of the brain to keep it steady.

The Pia Mater is an exceedingly fine membrane immediately investing the brain even between its lobes, hemispheres, and folds. It serves to contain the brain, and support its blood vessels, which run here in great numbers, that the blood may not enter the brain too impetuously, and the veins unite upon it.

There is a medullary production from the under part of the Cerebrum and Cerebellum, which

which is called Medulla Oblongata. The production of this through the great opening of the skull, and down the channel of the spine is the Medulla Spinalis.

Wounds in the Cerebrum, though very dangerous, are not mortal; but in the Cerebellum and Medulla Oblongata they cause sudden death; and in the Medulla Spinalis, loss of sense, in all the parts which receive nerves from below the wound.

The brain is the organ of thought, and the nerves which arise from the brain and spine, are the organs by which the body and soul act one on the other; but before we treat of the nerves, the order we have adopted requires us to take a view of the organs of sense.

CHAP. III.

*Of the Organs of Sense.**Of the Eye.*

THE figure, situation, and use of the eyes, together with the eye-brows, eye-lashes, and eye-lids, being well known, I need only describe what is usually shewn by dissecting. The orbit of the eye, or cavity in which it is contained, is in all the vacant places filled with a loose fat, which is a proper medium for the eye to rest in, and serves as a socket for it to be moved in. In the upper and outer part of the orbit, is seated the lacrymal gland. Its use is to furnish at all times water enough to wash off dust and to keep the outer surface of the eye moist, without which the tunica cornea would be less pellucid, and the rays of light would be disturbed in their passage; and that this liquor may be rightly disposed of, we frequently close the eye-lids to spread it equally, even when we are not conscious of doing it. At the inner corner of the eye, between the eye-lids, stands a caruncle, which seems to be placed to keep that corner of the eye-lids from being totally closed, that any tears or gum-

my matter may flow from under the eye-lids, when we sleep, or into the *Puncta Lacrymalia*, which are little holes, one in each eye-lid, near this corner, to carry off into the *Ductus ad Nasum*, any superfluous tears.

The first membrane of the eye is called *Conjunctiva*, it covers so much of the eye as is called the white, and being reflected all round, it lines the two eye-lids; it being thus returned from the eye to the inside of the eye-lids; it effectually hinders any extraneous bodies, from getting behind the eye, into the orbit, and smooths the parts it covers, which makes the friction less between the eye and the eye-lids. This coat is very full of blood vessels, as appears upon any inflammation.

Tunica Sclerotis, and *Cornea*, make together one firm case of a proper form, for the use of the other coats and humours. The fore part of this strong coat being transparent, and like horn, is called *Cornea*, and the rest *Sclerotis*. Under the *Cornea* lies the *Iris* which is an opaque membrane, like the *Tunica Choroides*, but of different colours in different eyes, such as the eye appears, as grey, black, or hazel, for it being seated under the *Tunica Cornea*, it gives such an appearance to that as it has itself. The middle of it is perforated for the admission of the rays of light, and is called the pupil. Immediately under the *Iris* lie the *Processus Ciliares*, like radial lines from a lesser circle

to a greater. When these processes contract they dilate the pupil to suffer more rays of light to enter into the eye; and the contrary is done by the circular fibres of the Iris, which act as a sphincter muscle: But these changes are not made with great quickness, as appears from the eyes being oppressed with a strong light, for some time after we come out of a dark place, and from the contrary effect in going suddenly from a light place to a dark one. And as the pupil always dilates in darker places, to receive more rays of light, so when any disease makes some of those rays ineffectual, which pass through the pupil, it dilates as in dark places to admit more light; therefore a dilated pupil is a certain sign of a bad eye, and this may be discerned usually sooner than the patient discerns any defect in vision. In men the pupil is round, which fits them to see every way alike; it is also round in animals that are the prey both of birds and beasts. But graminivorous brutes that are too large to be the prey of birds, have it oblong horizontally, which fits them to view a large space upon the earth; while animals of the cat kind, who climb trees, and prey indifferently on birds or animals that hide in the earth, have their pupils oblong the contrary way, which fits them best to look upward and downward at once. Besides these there are other animals whose pupils are in these forms, but in less proportions, so as best to fit their ways of life. Immediately
under

under Sclerotis, is a membrane of little firmness called Choroides; in men it is of a rusty dark colour, such as will bury almost all the rays of light, that pass through the Tunica Retina, which if it were of a bright colour, would reflect many of the rays upon the Retina, and make a second image upon the first somewhat less, and less distinct, but both together stronger; which is the case of brutes of prey, where a great part of this coat is perfectly white, which makes them see bodies of all colours in the night better than men, for white reflects all colours: But brutes that feed only on grass, have the same parts of this membrane of a bright green, which enables them also to see with less light, and makes grass an object that they can discern with greatest strength: But these advantages in brutes, necessarily destroy great accuracy in vision, which is of little or no use to them, but to men of great consequence. This green part of the Tunica Choroides, in animals that graze, may properly be called Membrana Uvea, from its resemblance in colour, to an unripe grape. But in men's eyes, only a white circle round the back side of the Choroides near the cornea, is called Uvea.

Immediately under the Tunica Choroides, lies the Tunica Retina, which is the optic nerve expanded and co-extended with the Choroides. Rays of light striking upon this membrane, the sensation is conveyed by the optic nerves, to the

common Sensorium, the brain : these nerves do not enter at the middle of the bottom of the eyes, but nearer the nose ; for those rays of light being ineffectual for vision that fall upon the entrance of the optic nerves, it is fit they should so enter, as that the same object, or part of any object, should not be unperceived in both eyes, as would have been the case, had they been otherwise inserted ; which appears from a common experiment of part of an object being lost to one eye, when we are looking towards it with the other shut. The two optic nerves soon after they arise out of the brain join and seem perfectly united ; yet I am inclined to think that their fibres are preserved distinct, and that the nerve of each eye, arises wholly from the opposite side of the brain, or else that the other nerves throughout the body arise from the brain, and Medulla Oblongata on the sides opposite to those they come out of. In fish these nerves arise distinct from the opposite sides of the brain, and cross without uniting ; but as these animals have their eyes so placed, as not to see the same object with both eyes at once, whereas animals whose optic nerves seem to unite, do see the same object with both eyes at once, one would suspect that in one they were joined to make the object not appear double, and in the other distinct, to make their two eyes (as they are to view different objects at the same time) independent of each other ; and yet from the following cases, the
seeing

seeing objects single seems not to depend upon any such union, nor from the light striking upon corresponding fibres of the nerves, as others have believed, but upon a judgment from experience, all objects appearing single to both eyes in the manner we are most used to observe them, but in other cases double; for though we have a distinct image from each eye sent to the brain, yet while both these images are of an object seen in one and the same place, we conceive of them as one, so when one image appears to the eyes, when they are distorted or wrong directed in two different places, it gives the idea of two; and when two bodies are seen in one place, as two candles rightly placed, through one hole in a board, they appear one. But cases of this kind being too numerous, I will conclude with one very remarkable, and, I think, much in favour of this opinion. A gentleman who, from a blow on the head, had one eye distorted, found every object appear double, but by degrees the most familiar ones became single, and in time all objects became so, without any amendment of the distortion.

The inside of the eye is filled with three humours, called aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous. The aqueous lies foremost, and seems chiefly of use to prevent the crystalline from being easily bruised by rubbing or a blow, and perhaps it serves for the crystalline humour to move forward in while we view near objects, and backward for remoter objects; without which mechanism,

ism, or in the place of it a greater convexity in the crystalline humour in the former case, and a less convexity in the latter, I do not imagine, according to the laws of optics, how we could so distinctly see objects at different distances. However it be in land animals, I think we may plainly see, that fish move their crystalline humour, nearer the bottom of the eye when they are out of water, and the contrary way in water; because light is less refracted from water through the crystalline humour than from air. Some have said, that amphibious animals have a membrane like the Membrana Nictitans of birds, which serves them as a Lens in the water. On examining the eye of a crocodile, which Sir Hans Sloan kept in spirits, this membrane was found equally thick and dense, and consequently unfit for this purpose, or, I believe, any other except that obvious one, of defending the eye from the water. Next behind the aqueous humour lies the crystalline; its shape is a depressed spheroid, it is distinctly contained in a very fine membrane called Aranea. The use of this humour is to refract the rays of light which pass through it, so that each pencil of rays from the same point of any object, may be united upon the Retina (as in a Camera Obscura) to make the stronger impression; and though by this union of the rays a picture inverted is made upon the Retina, yet surely it is the impulse only of the rays upon the Retina, that is the cause of vision; for

had

had the colour of the Retina been black, and consequently unfit to receive such a picture, would not the impulse of light upon it have been sufficient for vision? Or would such a picture, if it could have been made without any impulse, have ever conveyed any sensation to the brain? Then if the impulse of light upon the Retina, and not the image upon the Retina, is the cause of vision; when we enquire why an image inverted in the eye appears otherwise to the mind, might we not expect to find the true cause from considering the directions in which the rays strike the Retina, as we judge of above and below from a like experience, when any thing strikes upon any part of our bodies; nevertheless in viewing an object through a lens, we conceive of it as inverted, whereas in receiving the impulses of light in the same manner, and having the picture on the Retina in the same attitude, when we stand on our heads without the lens, we have not the same, but the contrary idea of the position of the object. Though I have considered this humour only a refraction of light, yet the first and greatest refraction is undoubtedly made in the Cornea; but it being Concavo-convex, like glasses of that kind, while one side makes the rays of light converge, the other diverges them again. The same thing also may be observed of the aqueous humour, which is indeed more concave than convex; but when the crystalline humour is removed in the couching a
cataract

cataract the aqueous possesses its place and becomes a lens ; but that refracting light less than the crystalline, whose place and shape it partly takes, the patient needs a convex glass to see accurately. In some eyes either this humour being too convex or too distant from the Retina, the rays unite too soon unless the object is held very near to the eye, which fault is remediable by a concave glass, as the contrary fault (common to old persons) is by a convex glass. Here it may not be improper to observe, how wisely Providence has fixed the distance, at which we ordinarily see objects best ; for if the eye had been formed for a nearer view, the object would often obstruct the light ; if it had been much farther, light enough would not commonly have been produced from the object to the eye. In fish the crystalline humour seems a perfect sphere, which is necessary for them, because light being less refracted from water through the crystalline humour than from air, that defect is compensated by a more convex lens. The vitreous humour lies behind the crystalline, and fills up the greatest part of the eye : Its fore side is concave for the crystalline humour to lodge in, and its back side, being convex, the Tunica Retina is spread over it ; it serves as a medium to keep the crystalline humour and the Retina at a due distance.

The larger animals having larger eyes, their organs of vision (like a microscope with a large lens)

lens) are fit to take in a greater view, but in that view things are not so much magnified; so in the lesser animals a small space is discerned, such as is their sphere of action, but that greatly magnified, not really so in either case, but comparatively; for visions shews not the real magnitude of objects, but their proportions one to another. Fish have their eyes, and particularly their pupils, larger than land animals, because there is less light, and that not so far distributed in water as in the air.

The organs of sense are here treated anatomically; for the knowledge of vision and sound, the student must apply to the sciences of optics and acoustics.

Of the Ear.

THE figure and situation of the outer ear, needs no description. Its inner substance is cartilage, which preserves its form without being liable to break: Its use is to collect sounds, and direct them into the Meatus Auditorius, which is the passage that leads to the drum; this passage is lined with a glandular membrane, in which also is some hair; the Cerumen which is separated by these glands, being spread all over this membrane, and its hair, serve to defend the membrane from the outer air, and to entangle any insect that might otherwise get into the ear. Sometimes this wax being separated in too great quantity, it
fills

fills up the passage, and causes deafness; and those great discharges of matter from the Meatus Auditorius, which are commonly called impostumes in the ear, are probably nothing else than ulcerations, or great secretions from these glands. At the farther end of the Meatus Auditorius lies the tympanum or drum, which is extended upon a bony ridge almost circular: its situation in men and brutes is nearly horizontal, inclined towards the Meatus Auditorius, which is the best position to receive sounds; the greatest part of which being ordinarily reverberated from the earth. In its common situation in men and brutes, it is concave outward, but in birds it is convex outward, so as to make the upper side of it nearly perpendicular to the horizon, which serves them better to hear each other's sounds when they are high in the air, where they can receive but little reverberated sound. This membrane does not entirely close the passage, but has on one side a small aperture covered with a valve. In very young children I have always found this membrane covered with Mucus, which seems necessary to prevent sounds from affecting them too much, there being no provision to shut the ears, as there is for the eyes. A gentleman, having had four children born deaf, was advised to lay blisters upon the heads of the next children he might have, which he did to three which were born afterward, and every one of them heard well.

It

It seems not unreasonable to suppose that too great a quantity of this Mucus upon the drum, might be the cause of deafness in the four children, and that the discharge made by the blisters in the latter cases, was the cause of their escaping the same misfortune.

Into the middle of the Tympanum is extended a small bone called Malleus, whose other end is articulated to a bone called Incus, which is also articulated by the intervention of an exceedingly small one called Orbiculare, to a fourth bone called Stapes. These bones are contained in that cavity behind the Tympanum, which is called the barrel of the ear; but some anatomists call the barrel only Tympanum, and the membrane Membrana Tympani. The Malleus being moved inward by the Musculus Obliquus Internus, or Trochlearis, it extends the Tympanum that it may be the more affected by the impulse of sounds when they are too weak. This muscle arises from the cartilaginous part of the Eustachian tube, and passing from thence in a proper groove, it is reflected under a small process, and thence passes on perpendicular to the Tympanum, to be inserted into the handle of the Malleus, sometimes with a double tendon. Parallel to this muscle lies another Extensor of the Tympanum, called Obliquus Externus; it arises from the outer and upper part of the Eustachian tube, and, passing through the same hole with the Corda Tympani, which is a branch
of

of the fifth pair of nerves, it is inserted into a long process of the Malleus: This is not so obvious an Extensor as to be known to be so, without an experiment. The muscle which relaxes this membrane is called *Externus Tympani*; it arises from the upper part of the auditory passage under the membrane which lines this passage, and is inserted into the upper process of the Malleus. The relaxation of the Tympanum is made by this muscle, without our knowledge, when sounds are too strong; and as the pupil of the eye is contracted, when we have too much light, and dilated where there is too little, from what cause soever, so when sounds are too low, or the sense of hearing imperfect, from whatever cause, the Extensors of the Tympanum stretch it, to make the impulse of sounds more effectual upon it, just as in the case of the common drum, and the cords of any musical instrument. From the cavity behind the Tympanum, which is called the barrel of the ear, goes the Eustachian tube, or *Iter ad Palatum*; it ends cartilaginous behind the palate. This passage seems to be exactly of the same use with the hole in the side of the common drum, that is to let the air pass in and out from the barrel of the ear, to make the membrane vibrate the better, and perhaps in the ear (which is closer than a common drum) to let air in or out as it alters in density, and if any fluid should be separated in the barrel of the ear to give it a passage out. This passage being obstructed,

structed, as it is sometimes, by a large Polypus behind the Uvula, it causes great difficulty of hearing, and sometimes, when the Meatus Auditorius is obstructed, a man opening his mouth wide, will hear pretty well through this passage, which is often so open as that syringing water through the nose, it shall pass through into the barrel of the ear and cause deafness for some time. If any one would try how he can hear this way, let him stop his ears, and take between his teeth the end of a wire, or cord that will vibrate well, and holding the other end, strike it, and the sound that he hears will be through this passage. To the stapes there is one muscle called *Musculus Stapedis*; it lies in a long channel, and ending in the stapes, it serves to pull the stapes off of the *Fenestra Ovalis*, which otherwise it covers. Besides the *Fenestra Ovalis*, there is another near it somewhat less, called *Rotunda*; these two holes lead to a cavity called *Vestibulum*, which leads into other cavities aptly called *Cochlea*, and three semicircular canals or altogether the labyrinth, in which are spread the auditory nerves to receive and convey the impulse of sounds, to the common Sensorium the brain; and the *Chorda Tympani*, which is a branch of the fifth pair of nerves, may also convey these sensations to the brain. The two holes called *Fenestra Ovalis* and *Rotunda*, are closed with a fine membrane like the membrane called the drum,

and the larger being occasionally covered and uncovered by the Stapes, sounds are thereby made to influence more or less, as best serves for hearing, and this advantage, being added to that of a lax or tense Tympanum, the effect of sounds may be greatly increased or lessened upon the auditory nerves, expanded in the labyrinth. In the strongest sounds, the Tympanum may be lax, and the Fenestra Ovalis covered; and for the lowest the Tympanum tense and the Fenestra uncovered. If sounds propagated in the air were heard less, we might often be in danger before we were apprized of it, and if the organs of hearing were much more perfect, unless our understandings were so too, we should commonly hear more things at once than we could attend to.

Of the Senses of Smelling, Tasting, and Feeling.

The sense of smelling is made by the Effluvia which are conveyed by the air to the nerves, ending in the membranes which line the nose and its Lamellæ. In men these Lamellæ are few, and the passage through the nose not difficult; hence fewer Effluvia will strike the nerves, than in animals of more exquisite smell, whose noses being full of Lamellæ, and the passage for the air narrow and crooked, few of the Effluvia escape one place or another, besides their Olfactory nerves may be more sensible. Fish, though they have no noses, yet in their mouths they may taste Effluvia

fluvia in the water, as surely those fish do, who seek their prey in the darkeſt nights, and in great depths of water, there being more nerves diſpoſed in their mouths, than through their whole bodies beſide, the optic excepted; and it looks as if it was done for this purpoſe; for the mere ſenſe of taſting, is ordinarily leſs curious in them, than in land animals; in baiting eel baſkets, if the bait has lain long in water, it is ſeldom taken, but upon ſcarifying it aſreſh, which will make it emit new effluvia, it ſerves as a freſh bait.

The ſenſe of taſting is made in the like manner upon the nerves, which line the mouth, and ſo is that of feeling upon the nerves, diſtributed throughout the body; which will be treated more largely in the next chapter on the nerves.

CHAPTER IV.

*Of the Nerves, or Organs of Communication
with the Brain.*

FROM the medullary part of the Cerebrum, Cerebellum, and Medulla Spinalis, a vast number of small medullary white fibres are sent out, which, at their first egress, seem easily to separate, but as they pass forward are somewhat more, but still loosely connected, by the coat which they obtain from the Pia Mater, and at last piercing the Dura Mater, are straitly braced by that membrane which covers them in their progress; whence they become white, firm, strong cords, and are so well known by the name of nerves. To these coats an infinite number of vessels, both arteries and veins are distributed; so that after a nice, lucky injection the whole cord is tinged with the colour of the injected liquor; but when the fibrils are examined, even with the best microscope, they appear only like so many small distinct threads running parallel, without any cavity observable in them, though some incautious observers, mistaking the cut orifices of the arterious and venous vessels, just now mentioned, for

nervous

nervous tubes, have affirmed their cavities to be visible. The nerves, which if all joined, hardly make a cord of an inch diameter, would seem, from their exerting themselves every where, to be distributed to each, even the smallest part of the body. In their course to the places for which they are destined they generally run as strait, as the the part over which they are to pass, and their own safety from external injuries will allow, sending off their branches at very acute angles, and consequently running more parallel than the blood vessels. Their distribution is seldom different in the opposite sides of the same subject, nor indeed in any two subjects is there considerable variety found. Frequently nerves which come out distinct or separate, afterwards conjoin into one Fasciculus, under the same common covering; and though the nervous fibrils probably do not communicate (the reason of which opinion shall immediately be given) yet because the coats, at the conjoined part are common, and these strong coats may have great effects on the soft pulpy nerves, it is evident all such will have a considerable sympathy with one another. In some parts where there are such conjunctions, the bulk of the nerves seems much increased, and these knotty oval bodies, called by Fallopius, Corpora Olivaria, and generally now named ganglions, are formed; the coats of these knots are stronger, thicker, and

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made by Bellini, and related by Bohn and Pitcairn, which I have often done with exact good success; it is this: after opening the Thorax of a living dog, catch hold of, and compress, the phrenick nerve, immediately the diaphragm ceases to act; remove the compressing force, that muscle again contracts; gripe the nerve with one hand some way above the diaphragm, that Septum is unactive; then with the other hand strip down the nerve from the first hand to the diaphragm, this muscle again contracts; after once or twice having stripped the nerve thus down, or exhausted the liquid contained in it, the muscle no more acts, squeeze as you will, till the first hand is taken away or removed higher, and the nerve stripped, *i. e.* the liquids in the superior part of the nerve have free access to the diaphragm, or are forced down to it, when it again will move. Now if this liquid should be granted us, I am afraid we shall be still as much at a loss to account for sensation and motion as ever; and therefore all I assume is what is founded on experiments, that these two actions do depend on the nerves; that sensations are pleasant as long as the nerves are only gently affected without any violence offered them; but as soon as any force applied goes beyond this, and threatens a solution of union, it creates that uneasy sensation, pain; that the nerves, their source, or their coats being vitiated, either convulsion or palsy of the muscles may ensue.

The nerves are distinguished into two classes, of the Encephalon and Medulla Spinalis; of the first there are generally ten pair reckoned, of the last thirty. It is not necessary here to go into a minute description of each nerve, it is enough at present to know that they run from their origin to all parts of the body. The nerves seem, when examined with a microscope, to be bundles of straight fibres not communicating with one another: And I am inclined to think that every the minutest nerve, terminating in any part, is a distinct cord from its origin in the brain, or spinal marrow; or else I do not see how they could produce distinct sensations in every part; and the distinct points of sensation throughout the body are so very numerous, that the whole body of nerves (which taken together would not make a cord of an inch diameter) must be divided into such a number, to afford one for every part that has a distinct sensation, that surely such a nerve would be too small to be seen by the best microscope. They all pass in as direct courses to the places they serve as is possible, never separating nor joining with one another but at very acute angles, unless where they unite in those knots which are called Ganglions, the use of which I do not pretend to know; they make what appears to be a communication of most of the nerves on the same side, but never join nerves of opposite sides.

That

That the nerves are instruments of sensation, is clearly proved from experiments, but how they convey those sensations to the brain is, matter of great dispute. The most general opinion, is that they are tubes to contain animal spirits, by whose motions these sensations are conveyed: and diligent enquiry has been made to discover their cavities, but hitherto in vain; and if each nerve is distinct from its origin, as I have endeavoured to shew, and too small to be the object of the best microscope, I do not see how such cavities are like to be discovered. However, I think the nerves may be tubes, and that a fluid, whose cohesion is very little, and whose parts are perhaps no finer than light, may move very freely in them. Those who deny animal spirits in the nerves, suppose that the sensation is conveyed by a vibration. To which it is objected, that they are slack, moist, and surrounded with soft parts, and are therefore unfit for vibrations, as indeed they are for such as are made on the strings of a musical instrument; but the minutest vibrations, such as they cannot be without, may be as sufficient for this end, as the impulse of light upon the Retina, is for the sense of seeing. So that for ought that I can discern, sensations may be conveyed either, or both ways, though the advocates for each opinion, have chiefly insisted upon the improbability or impossibility of the other opinion.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Instruments of Motion; Muscles and Tendons.

THE muscles are moving powers, applied to perform the several motions of the body; which they do by contracting their length, and thereby bringing the parts to which they are fixed nearer together. The immovable or least moved part any muscle is fixed to, is usually called its origin, and the other its insertion; but muscles that have their two ends equally liable to be moved, may have either called their origins or insertions.

Each muscle is made up of a number of small fibres, and are of two sorts, viz. rectilineal and penniform. The former have their fibres almost parallel in the same or near the same direction, with the Axis of the muscle; and the latter have their fibres joined in an oblique direction, to a tendon passing in or near the axis, or on their outside.

The rectilineal muscles, if their origins and insertions are in little compass, are never of any considerable thickness, unless they are very long,
because

because the outward fibres would compress the inner ones, and make them almost useless; and therefore every rectilinear muscle, whose inner fibres are compressed by the outer, have their inner fibres longer than the external, that they may be capable of equal quantity of contraction.

The Penniform muscles, though they are in a manner free from the inconvenience of one fibre compressing another, and though by the obliquity of their fibres, nothing is abated of their moment, as has been clearly demonstrated by experiments, by which it is shewn, that in all cases, just so much more weight as rectilinear fibres will raise than oblique ones, the oblique will move their weight with just so much greater velocity than the rectilinear; which is making their moments equal: so that, in the structure of an animal, like all mechanic engines, whatever is gained in strength is lost in velocity, and whatever is gained in velocity is lost in strength. Yet the fibres of the penniform muscles becoming more and more oblique as they contract, their strength decreases, and their velocity increases, which makes them less uniform in their actions than the rectilinear muscles; wherefore it seems that nature never uses a penniform muscle where a rectilinear muscle can be used; and the cases in which a rectilinear muscle cannot be used, are where the shape of a muscle

is

is such as that the inward fibres would be too much compressed, or where rectilinear fibres could not have a lever to act with, suitable to their quantity of contraction, which is the case of all the long muscles of the fingers and toes; for every muscle must be inserted or pass over the centre of motion of the joint it moves, at a distance proportionable to its quantity of contraction, and the quantity of motion in the joint moved; for if it was inserted too near, then the motion of the joint would be performed before the muscle is contracted all that it can; if too far off, the muscle will have done contracting before the whole motion of the joint is made; and though the quickness and quantity of motion in a muscle will be, *cæteris paribus*, as the length of its fibres; for if a fibre four inches long will contract one inch in a given time, a fibre eight inches long will contract two inches in the same time; and the strength of a muscle or power to raise a weight, *cæteris paribus*, will be as the number of its fibres; for if one fibre will raise a grain weight, twenty fibres will raise twenty grains. Nevertheless, two muscles of equal magnitude, one long, and the other short, will both move the same weight with the same velocity when applied to a bone; because the levers they act with must be as their lengths, and therefore the penniform and short thick muscles are never applied to a bone for the sake of strength, nor
long

long fibred muscles for quickness: for whatever is gained by the form of the muscle, whether strength or quickness, must be lost by their insertions into the bone, or else the muscles must not act all they can, or the bones have less motion than they are fitted for.

In the limbs several muscles pass over two joints, both of which they are liable to move at once, with force proportionable to the levers they act with upon each joint; but either joint being fixed by an antagonist muscle, the whole force of such muscles will be exerted upon the other joint; which, in that case, may be moved with a velocity equal to what is in both joints, when these muscles act upon both at once. This mechanism is of great use in the limbs.

That only we call the proper use and action of any muscle which it has without the necessary assistance of any other muscle, and what that is in a muscle moving a joint we may always know, and with what force it acts, *cæteris paribus*, by dropping a line from the center of motion of the joint, it moves perpendicular into the axis of the muscle in any situation; but in a joint which admits only of flexion and extension, this line must also be perpendicular to the axis of motion in that joint, and the action of the muscles will be in the direction of that perpendicular line, and the force with which it acts in any situation will
be

be, *cæteris paribus*, as the length of that perpendicular line.

Each muscle, so far as it is distinct, and is moved against any part, is covered with a smooth membrane, to make the friction easy; but where they are externally tendinous, those tendons are often smooth enough to make such a covering needless. Besides this membrane there is another, known by the name of *Fascia Tendinosa*, which deserves to be particularly considered. The strong one on the outside of the thigh, which belongs to the *Fascialis* and *Gluteus* muscles is of great use in raising the *Gluteus* farther from the centre of motion of the joint it moves, to increase its force: in like manner, the *Fascia* detached from the tendon of the *Biceps Cubiti* alters its direction for the same purpose, but those on the outside of the *Tibia* and *Cubit*, &c. are only flat tendons from which the fibres of the muscles arise as from the bones. There are also in many places such tendons between the muscles, from which each muscle arises in like manner, for the bones themselves are not sufficient to give origin to half the fibres of the muscles that belong to them; besides, if all the fibres had rise from the bones they must have been liable to compress one another very inconveniently.

A TABLE OF THE MUSCLES.

The Muscles of the Forehead are one pair.

FRONTALES,	They pull the skin of the forehead upwards.
OCCIPITALES,	They pull the skin of the hindhead upwards.

Of the Hindhead, one pair.

ATTOLLENS	} AURICU-
DEPRIMENS	

Of the Ears, six pair.

INTERNUS MALLEOLI,	It distends the Tympanum.
EXTERNUS MALLEOLI,	It relaxes the Tympanum.
OBLIQUUS MALLEOLI.	

Of the Eye-brows, one pair.

MUSCULUS STAPIDIS,	It moves the stirrup.
CORRUGATOR SUPER-	
CILII.	

Eye-lids, two pair.

RECTUS PALPEBRÆ	It lifts up the upper eye-
SUPERIORIS,	

ORBICULARIS

ORBICULARIS PALPEBRARUM. It shuts both eye-lids.

Eyes, six pair.

ATTOLLENS }
 DEPRIMENS } OCCULARIS
 ABDUCTOR }
 ADDUCTOR }

OBLIQUUS MAJOR. It pulls the eye forwards, and obliquely downwards.

OBLIQUUS MINOR, It pulls the eye forwards, and obliquely upwards.

Nose, three pair.

ATTOLLENS }
 DILATANS } NARES.
 DEPRIMENS }

Lips, six pair, and one single one.

INCISIVUS, It pulls the upper lip upwards.

TRIANGULARIS, It pulleth it downwards.

CANNIUS }
 ELEVATOR LABII INFERIORIS, } They pull the lower lip upwards.

QUADRATUS, It pulleth it downwards.

ZYGOMATICUS,

- ZYGOMATICUS, It draws both lips obliquely to either side.
- ORBICULARIS, It draws both lips together.

Of the Cheeks, one pair.

- BUCCINATOR, It thrusts the meat between our teeth.
- TEMPORALIS, } They pull the jaw upwards.
- MASSETER, }

Lower Jaw, six pair.

- PTERIGOIDÆUS IN- It draws the jaw to either side.
- TERNUS,
- PTERIGOIDÆUS EX- It draws the jaw forwards.
- TERNUS,
- QUADRATUS, It pulleth the jaw and the cheeks downwards.

Uvula, two pair.

- DIGASTRICUS, It pulleth the jaw downwards.
- PERISTAPHYLINUS IN- It pulls the Uvula forwards.
- TERNUS,
- PERISTAPHYLINUS EX- It pulls the Uvula backwards.
- TERNUS,

Tongue, three pair.

- STYLOGLOSSUS, It draws the tongue upwards.
- GENIOGLOSSUS, It pulls it out of the mouth.
- CERATOGLOSSUS, It pulls it into the mouth.

Os Hyoides, five pair.

- GENIHYOIDÆUS, It pulls Os Hyoides and tongue upwards and forwards.
- STERNOHYOIDÆUS, It pulleth the Os Hyoides downwards.
- MYLOHYODÆUS, It pulls it obliquely upwards.
- CORACOHYOIDÆUS, It pulls it obliquely downwards.
- STYLOHYOIDÆUS, It pulls it to either side, and somewhat upwards.

Of the Pharynx, two pair.

- STYLO-PHARYNGÆUS, It pulleth up and dilateth the Pharynx.
- OESOPHAGUS, It straitens the Pharynx.

Larynx,

Larynx, seven pair.

STERNOTHYROIDÆUS,	It pulls the Thyroides downwards.
THYOTHYROIDÆUS,	It pulls the Thyroides upwards.
CRICOTHYROIDÆUS,	
CRICOARYTÆNOIDÆUS POSTICUS,	
CRICOARYTÆNOIDÆUS LATERALIS,	
THYROARYTÆNOIDÆUS,	It dilates the Glottis.
ARYTÆNOIDÆUS,	It contracts the Glottis.

Head, two pair.

SPLENIUS,	} They move the head backwards.
COMPLEXUS,	
RECTUS MAJOR,	} They nod the head backwards.
RECTUS MINOR,	
OBLIQUUS INFERIOR,	} They perform the femi-circular motion of the head.
OBLIQUUS SUPERIOR,	
MASTOIDÆUS,	
RECTUS INTERNUS MAJOR,	} They nod the head forwards.
RECTUS INTERNUS MINOR,	
RECTUS LATERALIS,	It nods the head to one side.

Of the Thorax, twenty-nine pair.

INTERCOSTALES IN- TERNI ET EXTERNI, SUBCLAVIUS, SERRATUS ANTICUS MAJOR, SERRATUS POSTICUS SUPERIOR, TRIANGULARIS,	}	They pull the ribs up- wards in inspiration.
SERRATUS POSTICUS INFERIOR, SACROLUMBARIS,		
DIAPHRAGMA,		Its use is both in inspira- tion, and expiration.

Lower Belly, five pair.

OBLIQUUS EXTERNUS, OBLIQUUS INTERNUS, TRANSVERSALIS, RECTUS, PYRAMIDALIS,	}	They compress all the parts contained in the lower belly; as- sist the motion of the ribs downwards in expiration, and help to bend the Vertebræ of the loins forwards.

Of the Vertebrae, seven pair.

LONGISSIMUS DORSI,	It keeps the body erect.
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TRANS-

- TRANSVERSALIS DORSI, It moves the body obliquely backwards.
- INTERSPINALIS, It draws the acute processes nearer one another.
- QUADRATUS LUMBORUM, It draws the Vertebrae of the loins to one side.
- LONGUS, } They bend the Vertebrae of the neck.
- SCALENUS, }
- PSOAS PARVUS, It helps to bend the Vertebrae of the loins.
- CREMASTER,
- ERECTORIS PENIS,
- TRANSVERSALIS PENIS,
- ACCELERATORES URINÆ,
- ERECTORES CLITORIDIS,

One single Muscle of the Bladder.

- SPHINCTER VESICÆ, It contracts the neck of the bladder, that the urine may not run continually.

Of the Anus, three single Muscles.

- LEVATORES ANI, They draw up the Anus.
- SPHINCTER ANI, It shuts the Anus.

Of the Shoulder-blades.

SERRATUS	ANTICUS	It draws the shoulder-
MINOR,		blade forwards.
TRAPEZIUS,		It moves it upwards,
		backwards, and down-
		wards.
RHOMBOIDES,		It pulls it backwards.
LEVATOR SCAPULÆ,		It pulls the shoulder-
		blade upwards.

Of the Shoulder-bones, nine pair.

DELTOIDES,	}	They lift the arm upwards.
SUPRA SPINATUS,		
CORACOBRACHIALIS,		
TERES MAJOR,	}	They pull the arm down-
LATISSIMUS DORSI,		
PECTORALIS,		It moves the arm forwards.
INFRA SPINATUS,	}	They draw the arm back-
TRANSVERSALIS,		
SUBSCAPULARIS,		

Cubiti, six pair.

BICEPS,	}	They bend the fore arm.
BRACHIÆUS INTER-		
NUS,	}	They extend the fore
LONGUS,		
BREVIS,		
BRACHIÆUS EXTER-		
NUS,		
ANCONÆUS,		arm.

of

Of the Radii, four pair.

ROTUNDUS,	}	They perform the motion of Pronation, or they turn the palm of the hand downwards.
QUADRATUS,		
LONGUS,	}	They perform the motion of Supination, or they turn the palm of the hand upwards.
BREVIS,		

Wrists, four pair.

CUBITÆUS EXTER-	}	They bend the wrist.
NUS,		
RADIÆUS EXTERNUS,	}	They extend the wrist.
CUBITÆUS INTER-		
NUS,	}	
RADIÆUS INTERNUS,		

Of the Palms of the Hands, two pair.

PALMARIS,	It helps the hand to grasp any thing closely.
PALMARIS BREVIS,	It makes the palm of the hand concave.

Of the Fingers, fifteen pair.

SUBLIMIS,	}	They bend the fingers.
PROFUNDUS,		

EXTENSOR DIGITORUM

COMMUNIS,

LUMBRICALES,

They assist in bending
the first joint of the
fingers.

INTEROSSEI INTERNI, They draw the fingers to
the thumb.

INTEROSSEI EXTERNI, They draw the fingers
from the thumb.

*The Particular Muscles of the Thumbs are
Seven.*

FLEXOR POLLICIS LONGUS,

GUS,

FLEXOR POLLICIS BRE-

VIS,

EXTENSOR PRIMI,

———— SECUNDI,

———— TERTII IN-

TERNODII, POLLI-

CIS,

TENAR,

It draws the thumb from
the fingers.

ANTITENAR,

It draws the thumb to
the fingers.

Of the Fore-fingers, two.

ABDUCTOR INDICIS,

EXTENSOR INDICIS,

Of

Of the Little-fingers, two pair.

HYPOTENAR, It draws the little finger
from the rest.

EXTENSOR AURICU-
LARIS,

The Muscles of the Thighs, are thirteen pair.

PSOAS,
ILIACUS,
PECTINÆUS, } They bend the thigh.

GLUTÆUS MAJOR,
GLUTÆUS MEDIUS,
GLUTÆUS MINOR, } They extend the thigh.

TRICEPS, It pulls the thigh in-
wards.

PYRIFORMIS,
GEMINI,
QUADRATUS, } They move the thigh
outwards.

OBTURATOR INTER-
NUS,
OBTURATOR EXTER-
NUS, } They help to move the
thigh obliquely, and
circularly.

Of the Legs, eleven pair.

SEMI-NERVOSUS,
SEMI-MEMBRANO-
SUS,
BICEPS, } They bend the leg.

GRACILLIS,

GRACILIS,	
RECTUS,	
VASTUS EXTERNUS,	} They extend the leg.
VASTUS INTERNUS,	
CRURÆUS,	
SARTORIUS,	It makes the legs cross one another.
POPLITÆUS,	It turns the leg some- what inwards.
MEMBRANOSUS,	It turns it a little out- wards.

Of the Feet, eight pair.

TIBIALIS ANTICUS,	} They bend the foot.
PERONÆUS ANTICUS,	
GASTROCNEMI,	} They extend the foot.
SOLEUS,	
PLANTARIS,	
TIBIALIS POSTICUS,	It moveth the foot in wards.
PERONÆUS POSTICUS,	It moveth the foot out- wards.

Of the Toes, twenty-four.

PROFUNDUS,	} They bend the four lesser toes.
SUBLIMIS,	
LUMBRICALIS,	
LONGUS,	} They extend the four lesser toes.
BREVIS,	

FLEXOR

FLEXOR POLLICIS, EXTENSOR POLLICIS, TENAR,	It draws the great toe from the rest.
ANTITENAR, FLEXOR POLLICIS LONGUS,	It draws it to the rest.
———— BREVIS, ABDUCTOR MINIMI DIGITI,	
INTEROSSEI INTERNI,	They draw the toes to the great toe.
INTEROSSEI EXTERNI,	They draw them from the great toe.
TRANSVERSALIS,	It brings all the toes close to one another.

In all 466 single muscles in the body.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Prop-Work; Bones, Ligaments, Cartilages.

THE use of the bones is to give shape and firmness to the body, to be levers for the muscles to act upon, and to defend those parts from external injuries that are of greatest consequence to be preserved, as the brain, heart, &c.

They are in their first state very soft fibres, till by the addition of a matter, which is separated from the blood into them, they grow by degrees to the hardness of a cartilage, and then perfect bone: but this great change is neither effected in a very short time, nor begun in all the parts of the same bone at once. Flat bones, that have their fibres directed to all sides, begin to ossify in a middle point; but those that have their fibres nearly parallel, begin in a transverse middle line, that is in the middle of each fibre; and so the cylindrical bones in a middle ring, from which they shoot forth to their extremities. By the continual addition of this ossifying matter, the bones increase, till their hardness resists a farther extension, and because their hardness is always increasing while they

they are growing, the increase of their growth becomes slower and slower, till they cease to grow at all; and at length in old or weak persons, if I am not mistaken in my observations, they decrease as well as the fleshy parts, though not so fast, by reason of their hardness. And though I think it would be difficult to prove this, yet the possibility of it at least will sufficiently appear from the following case: A soldier, from a shot in his left groin, had the head of the Os Femoris broken, part of which came away through the wound, upon which the limb wasted, and he dying of an Anasarca about a year after, the Os Femoris was found wasted about an inch in length, but so much in its thickness, that when they were both dried and sawed lengthways through their middles, the emaciated bone weighed thirty grains less than half the weight of the other thigh bone: from the appearance of this man, and the firm connection of all the bones with their Epiphyses, he must have done growing before he received this wound; therefore, unless he was taken lame into the service, which cannot be supposed, this bone must have wasted about thus much in that time. The ossifying matter of the bones is so well directed to them by some wise law, that I have seen but one instance of a bone in an adult body unossified, which was so much of one side of the lower jaw as is beyond the teeth; but bony excrescences
upon

upon the bones are frequent, and even the fleshy parts, especially in old persons, are sometimes ossified. In an old man that died of a mortification in his leg, I found all the arteries of the legs bony, especially between the divisions of the branches, and many parts of the Aorta. But the most considerable instance of this kind that I have ever found, was in the part of the muscular fibres of the heart of a man, nearer its vertex than the base, as large as a six-pence, which was perfectly ossified. And though it might seem that the bones, while they appear cartilaginous, differ from perfect bones only in hardness, yet in a subject two years old that was kept in vinegar, all the bones grew nearly as soft and pliable as the fleshy parts, though the skin in several places was not taken off; yet the cartilages and cartilaginous Epiphyses of the bones were but little altered.

Bones that are without motion, as those of the skull, the *Ossa Innominata*, &c. also bones with their Epiphyses, when they meet, press into each other, and form sutures, which soon disappear in those that join, while their ossific matter is soft; but those that grow harder before they meet, press more rudely into each other, and make more uneven sutures, some of which in the skull endure to the greatest age; and very often the ossific matter not flowing far enough to complete a bone, the part uncompleted has an ossification begun in its center, and is formed into a distinct bone,

bone, which may happen to be of any figure. These bones are ofteneft found in the lambdoidal future, and are called *Ossa Triquetra*. But the ends or fides of bones that are intended for motion, are hindered from uniting, by the cartilages which cover them; for when these cartilages are destroyed they very readily unite, and become a diftemper called *Ancylofis*.

The ends of all the bones that are articulated for very manifefit motions, or that are not placed againft other bones, are tipped with *Epiphyfes*, or additional bones, which in fome meafure determine their growth and figure; for if they had nothing to give bounds to them, they would fhoot out like the *Callus* from the broken ends of a bone that is not fet, and grow more ragged than the edges of bones which are joined by futures; and fometimes *Epiphyfes* are made ufe of to raife proceffes upon bones for the infertions of mufcles, as the *Trochanters* of the thigh bones, where it would weaken the bones too much to have proceffes raifed out of their fubftance.

The fibres of bones, for ought that we can difcover from experiments or microfcopical obfervations, appear to be connected to each other by the fame means that the feveral parts of a fibre are connected, that is, by that ftrong attraction which belongs to particles of matter in contact: but this cohefion of fibre to fibre is not equal to that in the parts of a fibre, though very nearly.

Indeed,

Indeed, if it was, a bone would not be a structure of fibres, but one uniform mass, like that of any pure metal, the cohesion of the parts of which are every way alike: nor are the parts of bones disposed into Lamellæ, stratum super stratum, as some have painted; for though young bones may in some places be split into Lamellæ, yet they not only appear one solid, uniform mass to the naked eye, but even with a microscope, till we come to their inner spongy texture, which also appears uniform.

The texture of the bones when first formed, is every where loose and spongy, but, as they increase, they become in many places very compact and dense, which results in a great measure from the pressure of the bellies of the muscles, and other incumbent parts; as appears from the impressions which are made on the surfaces of the bones, and the rough spines that rise on the bones in the interstices of the muscles, which are very remarkable in the bones of men who have been bred up in hard labour. In those parts of the flat bones that receive but little pressure, the outer Laminae only become compact and dense, and the middle part remains spongy; but where the pressure is great, they become one dense body or table; and this pressure is so effectual, that some parts of the Scapula, and the middle of the Ilium, are usually thinner in an adult body than in a child before it is born. The cylindrical or
round

round bones being pressed most in their middle, become there very hard and strong, while their extremities grow spongy, and dilate into large heads, which make stronger joints, and give more room for the origins and insertions of the muscles, and increase the power of the muscles, by removing their axis farther from the center of motion of any joint they move.

All the bones, except so much of the teeth as are out of the sockets, and those parts of other bones, which are either covered with cartilage, or where muscles or ligaments arise or are inserted, or are covered with a fine membrane, which, upon the skull, is called Pericranium, elsewhere Periosteum: one use of which is for the muscles to slide easily upon, and to hinder them from being lacerated by the roughness and hardness of the bones. This membrane is said to be exceedingly sensible of pain, which, I suppose, is imagined from the pain that a blow on the shin gives: but it should be considered how much greater the contusion is in that case, from its lying upon a hard body; for this is certain, that when this membrane is cut, or separated from the bone, to prepare for the operation of the Trephine, the patient never discovers any extraordinary uneasiness, and that great pain which is sometimes felt at the sawing the bones or a bone in an amputation, is when the teeth of the saw touch the great nerves that always lie near the bones, and not

from the Periosteum ; for, if it proceeded from that, this complaint would be more constant, and at least as great at the first setting on of the saw, or at the last stroke, as at any other time.

Every cylindrical bone has a large middle cavity, which contains an oily marrow, and a great number of smaller cells towards their extremities, which contain a bloody marrow ; this bloody marrow is also found in all spongy cells of bones. The use of the first kind of marrow is to soften, and render less brittle the harder fibres of bones among which it is seated ; and the other marrow is to be of the same use to the less compact fibres, for an oily marrow might have made them too soft ; and for this reason, there is less of the oily marrow, and more of the bloody in young bones than in old ones. Every one of these cells is lined with a fine membrane, and the marrow in the larger cells is also contained in thin membranous vesicles, in which membranes, I suppose, those vessels lie that secrete the marrow. If the bones had been formed of the same quantity of matter without any cavities, they would, if they were straight, be able to sustain the same weight that they now can : but they being made hollow, their strength, so as to resist breaking transversely, is increased as much as their diameters are increased, without increasing their weights, which mechanism being yet more convenient for birds, the bones of their wings, and, for the same reason, their

their quills, have very large cavities. But the bones of the legs of all animals are more solid, being formed to support weight; and men's bodies, being supported but by two limbs, the bones of their limbs, are therefore made more solid than those of quadrupeds. But in a fractured bone, in which the same kind of matter that ossified the bones at first, is thrown out from the ends of the broken bone, there is made a mass of callous matter, of equal solidity with any part of the bone, and of equal or greater diameter; which will make the strength of the bone in that place greater than it was before: and if we consider, we shall find this a very wise provision; for bones, when broken, are seldom or never set in so good a direction as that in which they were first formed, and therefore they would be more liable to be broken in the same place again, and would be reunited with greater difficulty, and sometimes not at all, because the callus not being vascular, would scarce admit the ossific matter to flow through it to form a new callus.

The names of the articulations of the bones being variously used by authors, and being but of small consequence, I give the shortest account that I can of them. An articulation for manifest motion, is called *Diarthrosis*; for obscure motion, *Synchondrosis*; and that kind which is without motion, *Synarthrosis*.

Diarthrosis, is divided into two kinds, viz.

F 2

Enarthrosis

Enarthrosis and Ginglymus. Enarthrosis is where a round head is received into a round cavity, which mechanics call the ball and socket; though none of the articulations in a human body fully resemble that, unless the upper end of the thigh bone, with the *Os Innominatum*. Ginglymus is always described by authors to be where a bone receives, and is received, which is right, where they are joined somewhat like hinges, as the oblique processes of the *Vertebræ* of the loins, where authors usually take two joints to make a Ginglymus, that it may answer their descriptions, though any one of those joints is a true Ginglymus. But in the other *Vertebræ*, and in the articulation of the *Ulna*, with *Os Humeri*, and that of the *Radius* with the *Ulna*, there being only the motion of hinges, without the form to give these joints this denomination; we may, for the same reason, call every joint a Ginglymus, whose property is only to bend and extend, as the knee, ankle, &c. And what makes it more necessary to bring these joints under this head, is, that they are reducible to no other.

Synchondrosis, is by intervening cartilages or ligaments, as between the bodies of the *Vertebræ*; but the truest Synchondrosis is the joining of the ribs to the bone of the sternum.

Synarthrosis, is of two sorts, viz. *Sutura* and *Gomphosis*. The first kind is the mutual indentation

tation of one bone with another, as is eminently seen in the scull, and the other the fastening of the teeth in their sockets, like a nail in wood.

The Bones of the Head.

ANATOMISTS divide the bones into those of the head, those of the trunk, those of the upper limbs, and those of the lower limbs.

The scull is composed of ten bones which contain the brain. In various parts of these there are passages and small holes for the communication of the nerves, arteries, and veins with the other parts of the body. The other bones of the head compose the face, the orbits of the eyes, and the jaws, in which the teeth are fixed. There are seldom more than sixteen in each jaw; the four first in each are called incisors or cutters, the two next canine, and all the rest molares or grinders. The four last of the molares are called *Dentes Sapientiæ*, because they do not appear till men arrive at years of discretion. The incisors and canine have only a single root each, but the molares more. Each of these fangs or roots has a hole; through which pass an artery, vein, and nerve, which are expanded in a fine membrane lining a cavity in each root of a tooth. This membrane is the seat of the tooth-ach. The teeth of children cast off; and the succeeding teeth rise in new sockets, and larger than the former.

The Bones of the Trunk,

Are those which compose the spine, or chain of bones from the head down to the rump, the ribs, and the sternum, or breast bone.

The spine is composed of twenty-four vertebræ or joints besides the terminating bones; seven belong to the neck, twelve to the back, and five to the loins. If this chain had been composed of fewer bones, they must either have been incapable of bending so much as they do, or bent at sharper angles, which would have pressed the spiral marrow. The bodies of the vertebræ are all connected by strong intervening ligaments or cartilages, and every bone of the spine has a large hollow, which together make a channel through the spine, in which is contained the Medulla Spinalis, or spinal marrow; and in each space between the vertebræ are two large holes for the nerves to pass out.

The ribs are twelve in number on each side; the seven uppermost are called true ribs, because their cartilages reach the sternum; and the five lowest are called bastard ribs. They are articulated to the bodies of the twelve vertebræ of the back. They defend the parts contained in the breast, and when they are drawn upwards, the cavity of the breast is enlarged for inspiration, and so the contrary.

The breast bone, or sternum, is generally made
up

up of three spongy bones, sometimes more: to this the true ribs are articulated by their cartilages.

The Bones of the Upper Limbs,

Are all those that form and are more particularly connected with the arms and hands. The collar-bone fixes the blade bone, which receives in a shallow cavity the round head of the shoulder-bone, into which are articulated the arm-bones, called Ulna and Radius. Radius at the lower end receives the lower part of Ulna, and the wrist or carpus. The wrist is composed of eight bones of irregular figure; they are distinguished into four of the first order, and four of the second. The bones that form the hand, are metacarpus, consisting of four bones articulated to the wrist, the thumb which has three bones, and the fingers each also composed of three.

The Bones of the Lower Limbs,

Are those of the hips, thighs, and legs. The knee-pan protects the ligaments that connect the thigh-bone with the shin-bone, or Tibia; the lower end of the Tibia forms the inner ankle. There is a small long bone called Fibula, the upper end of which is articulated to the outside of the Tibia, and inch below the joint, and the lower end makes the outer ankle, and part of that

joint; its chief use is for origins of muscles; for it has no share in supporting the body. The Tarsus, which forms the union of the feet with the bones of the leg, is made up of seven bones, which have the same kind of elastic structure with those of the wrist or carpus, and for the same ends, but in a much greater degree, because here the whole body is sustained. There are four bones running from the Tarsus to the toes; they are called Metatarsus. All the toes have three bones each.

The Bones of a Skeleton, are,

The Os Frontis	1	Molares	20
Occipitis	1	Os Hyoides	1
Offa Parietalia	2		—
Temporum	2		61
Officula Auditus	8	Vertebræ Cervicis	7
Os Ethmoides	1	Dorsi	12
Sphænoides	1	Lumborum	5
Mali	2	Offis Sacri	6
Maxillare	2	Os Coccigis	3
Unguis	2	Scapulæ	2
Nasi	2	Claviculæ	2
Palati	2	Costæ	24
Vomer	1	Sternum	1
Maxilla Inferior	1	Offa Innominata	2
Dentes incisivi	8		—
Canini	4		64

The

The Humerus	2	The Os Femoris	2
Ulna	2	Rotulæ	2
Radius	2	Tibia	2
Offa Corpi	16	Fibula	2
Metacarpi	8	Offa Tarfi	14
Digitorum	30	Metatarfi	10
	—	Digitorum	28
	60		—
	—		60

In all 245

Besides the Offa Sefamoidæa, which are said to be found to the number 48.

Of the Cartilages, Ligaments, and lubricating Glands of the Joints.

EVERY part of a bone which is articulated to another bone for a sliding motion is covered or lined with a cartilage, as far as it moves upon, or is moved upon by another bone in any action; for cartilage being smoother and softer than bone, it renders the motions more easy than they would have been, and prevents the bones wearing each other in their actions. These cartilages in the largest joints, are as thick as a shilling, and in the smallest, as thin as paper.

There are other cartilages which serve to give shape to parts. Of this sort are the eye-lids, the outer ears, and the lower part of the nose, which have

have this particular advantage in these places, that they support and shape the parts as well as bones do, and without being liable to be broken.

The ribs have cartilages of a considerable length, which articulate the seven uppermost to the breast-bone. These cartilages being very pliable, suffer the ribs to move easily in respiration, and the body to twist or bend to either side without difficulty. There is a cartilage at the bottom of the breast-bone, called *Enfiformis* from its usual shape.

The wind-pipe is composed of cartilages, and there are other parts called by some cartilages, which ought rather to be ranked with ligaments.

Every bone that is articulated to another for motion, is tied to that it moves upon by a ligament, the thickness and strength of which always bears a proportion to the quantity of motion in the joint, and the force with which it is liable to be moved; and the length of the ligament is no more than sufficient to allow a proper quantity of motion.

The bones of the limbs that move to all sides, have ligaments like purses, which arise from or near the edges of the sockets of the receiving bones, a little below their heads.

All the bones of the *Vertebræ*, and every joint that is without motion, and not joined by a suture,

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CHAPTER VII.

*Of the External Parts, common Integuments,
and Fat.*

THE vulgar names of the external parts of the human body being sufficiently known for the description of any disease or operation; I shall only describe those which anatomists have given for the better understanding of the sub-contained parts.

The hollow on the middle of the Thorax, under the breasts, is called Scrobiculus Cordis. The middle of the Abdomen for about three fingers breadth above and below the navel, is called Regio Umbilicalis. The middle part above this, Epigastrium. On each side of the Epigastrium, under the cartilages of the lower ribs, Hypochondrium; and from below the Regio Umbilicalis down to the Ossa Iliæ, and Ossa Pubis, Hypogastrium.

Cuticula or Scarf-skin, is that thin insensible membrane which is raised by blisters in living bodies: It is extended over every part of the true skin, unless where the nails are. It appears in a microscope a very fine, smooth membrane,

brane, only unequal where the Reticulum Mucosum adheres to it. Lewenhoeck and others, say, it appears scaly, and compute that a grain of sand of the hundredth part of an inch diameter, will cover two hundred and fifty of these scales, and that each scale has about five hundred pores; so that, according to them, a grain of sand will cover one hundred and twenty-five thousand pores, through which we perspire. Its use is to defend the true skin that it may not be exposed to pain from whatever it touches; and also to preserve it from wearing: It is thickest on those parts of the bottom of the foot which sustain the body; and in hands much used to labour, being so contrived as to grow the thicker, the more those parts are used.

Between this and the true skin, is a small quantity of slimy matter, which was supposed, by Malpighi, and others, to be contained in proper vessels, interwoven with one another, and therefore by them named Reticulum Mucosum. It is most considerable where the cuticula is thickest, and is black, white, or dusky, such as is the complexion; the colour of this, and the cuticula, being the only difference between Europeans, and Africans or Indians, the fibres of the true skin being white in all men; but the florid colour of the cheeks, is owing to the blood in the minute vessels of the skin, as that in the lips to the vessels in the muscular flesh; for the Cuticula (as I imagine) being made of excrementitious matter has no blood vessels.

Cutis or True Skin, is a very compact, strong, and sensible membrane extended over all the other parts of the body, having nerves terminating so plentifully in all its superficies, for the sense of touching, that the finest pointed instrument can prick no where without touching some of them. These nerves are said by Malpighi, and others, who have examined them carefully, to terminate in small pyramidal Papillæ; nevertheless to me it seems, that a plain superficies of the skin (I do not mean mathematically plain) is much fitter and more agreeable to what we experience of this sensation; for a plain superficies exposing all the nerves alike, I think, would give a more equal sensation, while nerves ending in a pyramidal Papilla would be exceedingly sensible at the Vertex of that Papilla; and those at the sides and round the base, which would be far the greatest part, would be the least useful.

Glandulæ Miliæres, are small bodies like millet seeds, seated immediately under the skin in the Axillas; and are said to have been found under all other parts of the skin, where they have been looked for with microscopes. These glands are supposed to separate sweat; which fluid was formerly thought to be only the Materia Perspirabilis flowing in a greater quantity, and condensed; but Sanctorius has assured us, that it is not so, and that more of the Materia Perspirabilis is separated in equal times than of sweat; of the

the former, he says, usually fifty ounces a day in Italy, where his experiments were made, and of the latter not near so much in the most profuse sweats; which, I think, favours the opinion of the existence of these glands, unless the sweat being once condensed upon the skin, prevents a greater effusion of that matter. Now that the whole body, every part of which is surely perspirable (or how else could extravasated blood or matter ever be dissipated, unless it could be absorbed into the vessels, which seems impossible, seeing that the fluids which are in motion in the vessels must out-balance those which are extravasated) should perspire fifty two ounces in a natural day, is not at all incredible: but that these glands, if there are such under all the skin, should be able to make so large secretions, appears not very probable.

'*Membrana Adiposa*, is all that membrane immediately under the skin, which contains the fat in cells; it is thickest on the Abdomen and buttocks, and thinnest nearest the extremities; and where the muscles adhere to the skin none. It contributes to keep the inner parts warm, and by filling the interstices of the muscles, renders the surface of the body smooth and beautiful, and may perhaps serve to lubricate their surfaces, and whether the decrease of fat which often follows labour or sickness, proceeds from its being reabsorbed into the blood vessels, or whether it is constantly

stantly perspiring through the skin, and the lessening of its quantity is from the want of a supply equal to its consumption, is a matter of doubt with some, though the former opinion generally prevails.

Mammæ, the breasts, seem to be of the same structure in both sexes, but larger in women. Each breast is a conglomerate gland to separate milk, seated in the Membrana Adiposa, with its excretory ducts, (which are capable of very great distention,) tending toward the nipple, where, as they approach, they unite, and make but a few ducts at their exit. There are to be met with in authors, instances sufficiently attested of men's giving suck, when they have been excited by a vehement desire of doing it: and it is a common observation, that milk will flow out of the breasts of new-born children, both male and female.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Membranes.

EVERY distinct part of the body is covered, every cavity is lined with a single membrane, whose thickness and strength is as the bulk of the part it belongs to, and as the friction to which it is naturally exposed.

Those membranes that contain distinct parts, keep the parts they contain together, and render their surfaces smooth, and less subject to be lacerated by the actions of the body. And those which line cavities, serve to render the cavities smooth, and fit for the parts they contain to move against.

The membranes of all the cavities that contain solid parts, are studded with glands, or are provided with vessels, which separate a Mucus to make the parts contained move glibly against one another, and not grow together. And those cavities which are exposed to the air, as the nose, ears, mouth, and Trachea Arteria, have their membranes beset with glands, which separate matter to defend them from the outer air.

I shall here give a brief description of the principal membranes of the body.

Membrana adiposa, we have just seen, is a membrane immediately under the skin which contains the fat. *See the last Chapter.*

Peritoneum, is a membrane which lines the whole cavity of the abdomen. It contains the liver, spleen, omentum, stomach, guts, and mesentery, with all their vessels and glands.

Omentum, or cawl, is a fine membrane larded with fat, something like net-work. It is situated on the surface of the small guts. Its use is to lubricate the guts that they may the better perform their peristaltic motion.

Mesentery, is a membrane beginning loosely upon the loins, and is thence produced to all the guts: it preserves the jejunum and ileum from twisting in their peristaltic or vermicular motion, and confines the rest. It sustains all the vessels going to and from the guts, viz. arteries, veins, lymphæducts, lacteals, and nerves, and also contains many glands.

Pleura, is a fine membrane which lines the whole cavity of the thorax, except on the diaphragm, which is covered with no other than its own membrane. It serves to make the inside of the thorax smooth and equal.

Mediaſtinum, divides the thorax lengthways, from the sternum to the pericardium and pleura, not

not exactly in the middle, but towards the left side. It hinders one lobe of the lungs from incommoding the other, as in lying on one side the uppermost would frequently do, and prevents the disorders of one lobe of the lungs from affecting the other.

Pericardium, or heart purse, is a thick membrane furrounding the heart.

Periofteum, the fine membrane which covers the bones in general, taking the name of Pericranium on the skull, has been mentioned in the chapter on the bones.

Dura Mater, and Pia Mater, have been mentioned in the chapter on the brain.

not exactly in the middle but towards the left side. It hinders one lobe of the lungs from intruding upon the other, as in lying on one side the upper part of the chest is raised and prevents the disorders of one lobe of the lungs from affecting the other.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Organs of Speech; Lungs, Respiration.

THE voice is that sound which animals make by proper organs in consequence of some sensation or inward pulse.

The voice of man, and, it should seem, of all other animals, is formed by certain organs between the mouth and the lungs, and which organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The lungs furnish air, out of which the voice is formed; and the mouth, when the voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these vocal organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by philosophers and anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and simple voice is completely formed, before ever it reaches the mouth*, and can therefore, as well as breathing, find a passage through the nose, when the mouth is so far stopped, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple* voice, being thus produced, is, as before was observed, *transmitted to the mouth*. Here then by means of certain *different* organs, which do not change its primary qualities,

qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the *form* or *character* of ARTICULATION. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else than *that form or character acquired to simple voice, by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, &c.* The voice is not by articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft, which are its primary qualities, but it acquires to these characters certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted *to exist along with them.*

The *simplest* of these new characters are those acquired through *mere openings of the mouth*, as these openings differ in giving the voice a passage. It is the variety of configurations in these openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several vowels; and hence it is they derive their name, by being thus *eminently vocal, and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.*

There are *other articulate forms*, which the mouth makes not by mere openings, but by *different contacts of its different parts*; such, for instance, as it makes by the junction of the two lips, of the tongue with the teeth, of the tongue with the palate, and the like.

Now as all these several contacts, unless some opening of the mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion silence, than produce a voice; hence it is, that

with some such opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *articulation so produced* are called CONSONANT, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel*.

There are other subordinate distinctions of these primary articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common name of ELEMENT, in as much as every articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* combinations they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables, properly combined, produce a *Word*; Words, properly combined, produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences, properly combined, produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

And thus it is, that to principles *apparently* so trivial, as about twenty plain elementary sounds, we owe that variety of articulate voices, which have been sufficient to explain the sentiments of so innumerable a multitude, as all the present and past generations of men.

The lungs, are composed of two lobes, one seated on each side of a membrane called the *Mediaſtinum*, that divides the thorax lengthways, each of which lobes are subdivided into two or three lobules, which are most distinctly divided in such animals as have most motion in their
backs,

backs, for the same end that the liver is in the same animals; they are each composed of very small cells, which are the extremities of the *Aspera Arteria* or *Bronchos*. The figure of these cells is irregular; yet they are fitted to each other, so as to have common sides, and leave no void space. In the membranes of these cells are distributed the branches of the pulmonary artery and vein. The known uses of the air's entering the lungs, are to be instrumental in speech, and to convey effluvia into the nose, as it passes, for the sense of smelling; but the great use of it by which life is preserved, I think, we do not understand. By some the force of the air is thought to separate the *Globuli* of the blood, that have cohered in the slow circulation through the veins; and this opinion seems to be favoured by the many instances of *Polypusses* (which are large concretions of the *Globuli* of the blood) found in the veins near the heart, and in the right auricle and ventricle of the heart, and their being so seldom found in the pulmonary veins, or in the left auricle or ventricle of the heart, or in any of the arteries; but if it is true that, while the blood passes through the lungs, many cohering *Globuli* are separated, yet it remains to be proved that these separations are made by the force of the air. Dr. Keil has computed the force of the air in the strongest expirations against the sides of all the vesicles, to be equal to fifty thousand pounds

weight, yet if we consider we shall still find the moment of the air in the lungs exceedingly small in any small space. For the velocity with which the air moves in the lungs, is as much less than that with which it moves in the wind pipe, as the square of a section of the cells in the lungs is greater than the square of a section of the wind-pipe; and therefore if the square of all the extreme blood vessels in the lungs, do not bear a greater proportion to the square of the large pulmonary vessels than the square of the cells do to the wind-pipe, and if the blood in these large vessels moves as fast as the air in the wind-pipe; (all which I think may be granted) then the blood moving in the smallest vessels of the lungs with a velocity equal to that of the air in the cells, the blood will have as much more pressure from the power that moves it in its own vessels than the air can give upon them, as blood is heavier than air. Besides, air pressing equally to all sides, and the Globuli of the blood swimming in a fluid; this pressure, be it what it will, I think, can be of little use to make such separations. Indeed it may be objected that the greatest pressure is in expiration, yet that surely cannot be much greater, while the air has so free a passage out of them. Others have thought that the air enters the blood vessels from the cells in the lungs, and mixes with the blood; but this opinion, however probable, wants sufficient experiments to prove it;

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air being found in the blood, as there certainly is, is no proof of its entering this way, because it may enter with the chyle: Nor is the impossibility which has been urged of its entering at the lungs without the blood being liable to come out the same way into the vesicles of the lungs, a good argument to the contrary; for if a pliable duct passes between the membranes of a vessel, through a space greater than the square of its orifice, no fluid can return, because the pressure which should force it back will be greater against the sides of that duct than its orifice; which is the case of the bile duct entering the Duodenum, and the ureters entering the bladder. I think the best arguments for the air's entering into the blood by the lungs, or rather some particular part of the air, may be drawn from what the learned Dr. Halley, and others have observed of a man's wanting in a diving bell, near a gallon of fresh air in a minute, for if nothing but pressure had been wanted from the air in the lungs, there may be thrice as much pressure without any supply of fresh air, as upon the surface of the earth; and animals dying so soon in air that has been burnt, and their being so easily intoxicated by breathing air much impregnated with spirituous liquors, are also, in my opinion, arguments of a passage this way into the blood. Besides, if pressure of the air in the cells of the lungs is the only use of it, I do not see but enough of that may be had while a
man

man is hanging, if the muscles of the thorax do but act upon the air which was left in the thorax, when the rope was first fixed, and yet death is brought about by hanging no other way than by interrupting of the breath, as I have found by certain experiments. Dr. Drake has endeavoured to shew, that the use of respiration is to assist the Systole of the heart; but this use requires that the Systole and Diastole of the heart, should keep time with expiration and inspiration, which is contrary to experience: besides, if his hypothesis were true, it could only serve the right ventricle of the heart. The lungs of animals before they have been dilated with air, are specifically heavier than water, but upon inflation they become specifically lighter and swim in water.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Blood, Heart, Arteries, and Veins.

THE blood is a compound fluid, consisting of red and white globules, fibrous particles, and a great deal of clear water which serves as a vehicle to the other substances circulating through the body by means of the heart, arteries, and veins.

The heart is a muscle of a conic figure inclosed in the Pericardium or heart-purse, which is an exceedingly strong membrane, the side of which next the great vessels is partly connected to them, and partly to the basis of the heart; but, I think, not properly perforated by those vessels, and its lower side is inseparable from the tendinous part of the diaphragm; but not so in brutes, in some of which there is a membranous bag between it and the diaphragm, which contains a lobule of the lungs. It encloses all the heart to its basis; its uses are to keep the heart in its place, without interrupting its office, to keep it from having any friction with the lungs, and to contain a liquor to lubricate the surface of the heart, and abate its friction against the Pericardium.

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The heart has two cavities or ventricles; its basis is fixed by the vessels going to and from it, upon the fourth and fifth Vertebrae of the Thorax; its Apex, or point is inclined downward and to the left side, where it is received in a cavity of the left lobe of the lungs, as may be observed, the lungs being extended with air: this incumbrance on the left lobe of the lungs, I imagine, is the cause of that side's being most subject to those pains which are usually called pleuritic, which, I think, are for the most part inflammations in the lungs.

At the basis of the heart, on each side, are situated the two auricles to receive the blood; the right from the two cavas, and the left from the pulmonary veins: in the right, at the meeting of the cavas, is an eminence called Tuberculum Loweri, which directs the blood into the auricle; immediately below this tubercle, in the ending of the Cava Ascendens, is the Vestigium of the Foramen Ovale; and near this, in the auricle, is the mouth of the coronary-veins. The left auricle is abundantly less than the right; but the difference is supplied by a large muscular cavity, which the veins from the lungs afford in that place; the sides of this muscular cavity are thicker than the sides of the right auricle, in about that proportion in which the left ventricle of the heart is stronger than the right; their uses being to receive blood from the veins that lead to the heart, and

and to press it into the ventricles, a strength in each auricle proportionable to the strength of the ventricle that it is to fill with blood, seems necessary: and this different thickness of the coats of the auricles makes the blood in the left, which is thickest, appear through it of a paler red; but when it is let out of the auricles it appears alike from both; which they would do well to examine, who affirm the blood returns from the lungs of a more florid colour than it went in; and offer it as an argument, of the blood's being mixed with air in the lungs: in both auricles are muscular Columnæ, like those in the ventricles, but smaller.

The ventricles or cavities in the heart which receive the blood, are hollow muscles, or two cavities in one muscle, whose fibres intersect one another, so as to make the pressure of the heart upon the blood more effectual, and are also less liable to be separated than they would have been if they had lain parallel; both these cavities receiving the same quantities of blood in the same times, and always acting together, must be equal in size if they equally discharge what they contain at every Systole, as I doubt not but they do; nevertheless the left appears less than the right, it being found empty in dead bodies, and the right usually full of blood, which made the ancients think the veins and the right ventricle only were for the blood to move in, and that the left
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and the arteries contained only animal spirits. The left ventricle is much the thickest and strongest, its office being to drive the blood through the whole body while the right propels it through the lungs only. Over the entrance of the auricles in each ventricle, are placed valves to hinder a return of blood while the heart contracts. Those in the right ventricle are named Tricuspides, those in the left Mitrales. One of these last seem to do further service, by covering the mouth of the Aorta while the ventricle fills; which suffering none of the blood to pass out of this ventricle into the Aorta before the ventricle acts, it will be able to give greater force to the blood than it otherwise might have done; because a great quantity of blood more fully distending the ventricle, and making the greater resistance, it will be capable of receiving the greater impressed force from the ventricle, and if the blood is no way hindered in the right ventricle from getting into the pulmonary artery, while the ventricle dilates as it is in the left, the left then must be somewhat bigger than the right, if they both empty themselves alike in every systole. Though the auricles of the heart are equal to each other, and the two ventricles also equal, or nearly equal, yet the auricles are not so large as the ventricles; for the ventricles contain not only all the blood which flowed from the veins into the auricles, during the contraction of the

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the heart, but also that which flows (which will be directly into the heart) while the auricles contract, and the ventricles dilate; which leads us to the exact knowledge of the use of the auricles. If the systole and diastole of the heart are performed in equal times, then the auricles must be half the size of the ventricles; or whatever proportion the space of time of the systole of the heart, bears to the space of time in which the systole and diastole are both performed, that proportion will the cavities of the auricles bear to the cavities of the ventricles.

The inner fibres of each ventricle are disposed into small cords, which are called Columnæ: from some of these stand small portions of flesh called Papillæ; these Papillæ are tied to the valves by slender fibres, whereby they keep the valves from being pressed into the auricles, by the action of the blood against them in the systole of the heart, and when that is over, the blood flowing in between them opens them, as the pressure of blood on the other side shut them in the systole.

In the beginning of each artery from the heart are placed three valves, which look forward, and close together to hinder a regress of blood into the ventricles. Those in the pulmonary-artery, are named Sigmoidales, those in the Aorta, Semilunares, Canalis Arteriosus.

Of the Arteries and Veins.

FROM the right ventricle of the heart arises the pulmonary artery, which soon divides into two branches, one to each lobe of the lungs, and then they sub-divide into smaller and smaller branches until they are distributed through every part of the lungs. From the extreme branches of the pulmonary artery, arise the small branches of the pulmonary veins; which as they approach the left auricle of the heart, unite in such a manner as the pulmonary artery divides going from the heart, only that the veins enter the muscular appendix of the left auricle in several branches, and the blood being brought back from the lungs by these vessels to the left auricle and ventricle of the heart, it is from the left ventricle of the heart thrown into the Aorta.

Aorta, or great artery, arises from the left ventricle of the heart, and deals out branches to every part of the body. The first part of this vessel, is called Aorta Ascendens; it passes over the left pulmonary artery, and veins and branch of the *Aspera Arteria*, and being reflected under the left lobe of the lungs, it commences Aorta Descendens; which name it keeps through the Thorax and Abdomen, where it passes on the left side of the spine, till its division into the iliac arteries between the third and fourth Vertebrae of the loins.

From

From under two of the femilunar valves of the Aorta, which is before it leaves the heart, arise two branches (sometimes but one) which are bestowed upon the heart, and are called *Coronariæ Cordis*. From the curved part of the Aorta, which is about two or three inches above the heart, arise the subclavian and carotid arteries; the right subclavian and carotid in one trunk, but the left single. By some authors these vessels have been described in a different manner, but, I believe, their descriptions were, for want of human bodies, taken from brutes; for I have never yet seen any variety in these vessels in human bodies, though I have in the veins nearer the heart: and indeed there seems to me to be a mechanical necessity for their going off in the manner here described in human bodies; for the right subclavian and carotid arteries necessarily going off from the Aorta at a much larger angle than the left, the blood would move more freely into the left than the right, if the right did not go off in one trunk, which gives less friction to the blood, than two branches equal in capacity to that one; so that the advantage the left have by going off from the Aorta, at much acuter angles than the right, is made up to the right by their going off at first in but one branch.

The carotid arteries run on both sides the Larynx to the sixth foramina of the skull, through

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which

which they enter to the brain ; but as they pass through the neck, they detach branches to every part about them, which branches are called by the names of the parts they are bestowed upon. The internal carotids, send two branches to the back part of the nose, and several branches through the first and second foramina of the skull to the face and parts contained within the orbits of the eyes, and then piercing the Dura Mater, they each divide into two branches, one of which they send under the falx of the Dura Mater, between the two hemispheres of the brain, and the other between the anterior and posterior lobes. These branches take a great many turns, and divide into very small branches in the Pia Mater before they enter the brain, as if large trunks would make by their pulse too violent an impression on so tender and delicate a part. And perhaps it may be from an increase of the impulse of the arteries in the brain, which strong liquors produce, that the nerves are so much interrupted in their uses throughout the whole body, when a man is intoxicated with drinking ; and it may also be from a like cause, that men are delirious in fevers. Besides these two arteries, viz. the carotids, the brain has two more, called Cervicales, which arise from the subclavian arteries, and ascend to the head through the foramina, in the transverse processes of the cervical vertebræ, and into the skull through the
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tenth or great foramen; these two arteries uniting soon after their entrance, give off branches to the cerebellum, and then passing forward, divide and communicate with the carotids; and the carotid arteries communicating with each other there is an entire communication between them all; and these communicant branches are so large that every one of these four great vessels, with all their branches may be filled with wax injected through any one of them.

The subclavian arteries, are each continued to the cubit in one trunk, which is called *Axillaris* as it passes the arm-pits, and *Humeralis* as it passes by the inside of the *Os Humeri*, between the muscles that bend and extend the cubit. From the subclavians within the breast arise the *Arteriæ Mammariæ*, which run on the inside of the *Sternum* and lower than the *Cartilago Eniformis*. As soon as the *Arteria Humeralis* has passed the joint of the cubit, it divides into two branches, called *Cubitalis Superior* and *Cubitalis Inferior*; which latter soon sends off a branch, called *Cubitalis Media*, which is bestowed upon the muscles seated about the cubit. The *Cubitalis Superior* passes near the *Radius*, and round the root of the thumb, and gives one branch to the back of the hand, and two to the thumb, one to the first finger, and a branch to communicate with the *Cubitalis Inferior*. The *Cubitalis Infe-*

rior passes near the Ulna to the palm of the hand, where it takes a turn, and sends one branch to the out-side of the little finger, another between that and the next finger dividing to both, another in the same manner to the two middle fingers, and another to the two fore-fingers. These branches which are bestowed on the fingers, run one on each side of each finger internally to the top, where they have small communications, and very often there is a branch of communication between the humeral and inferior cubital arteries.

From the descending Aorta on each side is sent a branch under every rib, called *Intercostalis*, and about the fourth *Vertebræ* of the back, it sends off two branches to the lungs, called *Bronchiales*, which are sometimes both given off from the Aorta, sometimes one of them from the intercostal of the fourth rib on the right side; and as the Aorta passes under the diaphragm, it sends two branches into the diaphragm, called *Arteriæ Phrenicæ*, which sometimes rise in one trunk from the Aorta, and sometimes from the *Cœliaca*; but oftener the right from the Aorta, and the left from the *cœliac*. Immediately below the diaphragm arises the *cœliac* artery from the Aorta; it soon divides into several branches, which are bestowed upon the liver, pancreas, spleen, stomach, omentum, and duodenum. These branches are named from the parts they are bestowed

flowed on, except two that are bestowed upon the stomach, which are called Coronaria Superior and Inferior, and the branch bestowed upon the Duodenum, which is named Intestinalis. At a very small distance below the Arteria Cœliaca from the Aorta, arises the Mesenterica Superior, whose branches are bestowed upon all the Intestinum Jejunum and Ileum, part of the Colon, and sometimes one branch upon the liver. A little lower than the superior mesenteric artery, arise the emulgents which are the arteries of the kidneys. Lower laterally, the Aorta sends branches to the loins called Lumbales, and one forward, to the lower part of the Colon and the Rectum, called Mesenterica Inferior. Between the Arteria Cœliaca Mesenterica Superior, and Inferior, and the branches of each near the guts, there are large communicant branches to convey the blood from one to another when they are either compressed in any posture, or frightened by being stretched out in ruptures, or from any other cause.

As soon as the Aorta divides upon the loins, it sends off an artery into the Pelvis upon the Os Sacrum, called Arteria Sacra, and the branches the Aorta divides into, are called Iliacæ, which in about two inches space divide into external and internal. The Iliacæ Internæ first send off the umbilical arteries which are dried up in adult bodies, except at their beginnings, which are

kept open for the collateral branches on each side : the rest of these branches are bestowed upon the buttocks, and upper parts of the thighs. The Iliacæ Externæ, run over the *Ossa Pubis* into the thighs ; and as they pass out of the Abdomen, they send off branches, called *Epigastricæ*, to the fore part of the integuments of the Abdomen under the *Recti* muscles. And the epigastrick arteries send each a branch into the Pelvis and through the Foramina of the *Ossa Innominata* to the muscles thereabouts. As soon as the iliac artery is passed out of the Abdomen into the groin, it is called *Inguinalis*, and in the thigh *Cruralis*, where it sends a large branch to the back part of the thigh ; but the great trunk is continued internally between the flexors and extensors of the thigh, and passing through the insertion of the *Triceps* muscle into the ham, it is there called *Poplitea* ; then below the joint it divides into two branches one of which is called *Tibialis Antica* ; it passes between the *Tibia* and *Fibula* to the fore part of the leg, and is bestowed upon the great toe, and one branch to the next toe to the great one, and another between these toes to communicate with the *Tibialis Postica* ; which artery soon after it is divided from the *Antica*, sends off the *Tibialis Media*, which is bestowed upon the muscles of the leg, while the *Tibialis Postica* goes to the bottom of the foot and all the lesser toes. The *Tibialis Antica* is disposed

disposed like the *Cubitalis Superior*; the *Postica*, like the *Cubitalis Inferior*; and the *Media* in each, have also like uses. These arteries which I have described are uniform in most bodies, but the lesser branches are distributed like the branches of trees, and in so different a manner in one body from another, that these vessels, it is highly probable, are in no two bodies alike, nor the two sides in any one body.

The veins arise from the extremities of the arteries, and make up trunks which accompany the arteries in almost every part of the body, and have the same names in the several places which the arteries have, which they accompany. The veins of the brain unload themselves into the *Sinuses*, and the sinuses into the internal jugulars and cervicals, and the internal jugulars and cervicals into the subclavians, which joining, make the *Cava Descendens*. The internal jugulars are seated by the carotid arteries and receive the blood from all the parts which the carotids serve, except the hairy scalp and part of the neck, whose veins enter into the external jugulars, which run immediately under the *Musculus Quadratus Genæ*, often two on each side. The cervical veins, descend two through the foramina in the transverse processes of the cervical vertebræ, and two through the great foramen of the spine, and one on each side the spinal marrow; these join at the lowest vertebræ of the neck, and then empty into the subclavians, and

at the interstices of all the vertebræ communicate with another.

The veins of the arm are more than double the number of the arteries, there being one on each side each artery, even to the smallest branches that we can trace, besides the veins which lie immediately under the skin. Those which accompany the arteries have the same names with the arteries; those which run immediately under the skin on the back of the hand have no proper names: they run from thence to the inside of the elbow; where the uppermost is called Cephalica, the next Mediana, the next Basilica. These all communicate near the joint of the elbow, and then send one branch which is more directly from the Cephalica, and bears that name, until it enters the subclavian vein; it passes immediately under the skin, in most bodies, between the flexors and extensors of the cubit, on the upper side of the arm. The other branches joining, and receiving those which accompany the arteries of the cubit, they pass with them by the artery of the arm into the subclavian vein. The external veins have frequent communications with the internal, and are always fullest when we use the most exercise; because the blood being expanded by the heat which exercise produces, it requires the vessels to be distended, and the inner vessels, being compressed by the actions of the muscles, they cannot dilate enough, but these vessels
being

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flower than in the arteries hereabouts; and this slow circulation being supposed necessary, I think, there could be no other way so fit to procure it; for if an artery had been employed for this use, and been thus much dilated in so short a passage, the blood would not have moved uniformly in it, but much faster through its axis than near its sides; and besides it is very probable that the blood in this vein having been first employed in nourishing several parts, and having through a long space moved slowly, may be made much fitter for the separation of bile than blood carried by an artery, dilated to procure a circulation of the same velocity with that in this vein.

In the leg the veins accompany the arteries in the same manner as in the arm, the external veins of the foot being on the upper side, and from them is derived one called Saphœna, which is continued on the inside of the limb its whole length, and has several names given it from the several places through which it passes.

Borelli has computed the force which the heart exerts at every systole, to be equal to three thousand pounds weight, and the force which all the arteries exert at every systole, to be equal to sixteen thousand pounds weight, and that they together overcome a force equal to a hundred and thirty-six thousand pounds weight; and Dr. Keill has computed that the heart in every systole, exerts a force not exceeding eight ounces:
but

but in both these accounts a weight in motion is compared to a weight at rest. The first computation was made by comparing the heart with other muscles, whose power to sustain a weight could be best determined; and the latter was made from the velocity of the blood moving in an artery: therefore if we consider that Borelli's way of computing led him to find out the absolute force of the heart, and Dr. Keill's the force which the heart usually exerts, perhaps these very different computations may be accounted for; for if the force of the heart, which is constantly exerted, should, compared with any other muscle, be but in a reciprocal proportion to the frequency of their actions, and the importance of their uses; may not the heart very fitly have a force vastly greater than it usually exerts, because it is always in action, and must be able to exert a certain force in the lowest state of health? What force the heart ever exerts in a grown man, I cannot say; but it must be less in each ventricle than is sufficient to burst the valves, which hinder the blood from returning into the auricles out of the ventricles, or than is sufficient to break those threads by which these valves are tied to the papillæ.

As to the velocity of the blood, is it not in all animals proportionable to their quantity of action? and is not their necessity of food also in proportion to their quantity of action? If so, we
may

may see how it comes to pass, that animals which use no exercise, and whose blood moves extremely slow in the winter, can subsist without any fresh supply of food, while others that use a little more exercise, require a little more food, and those who use equal exercise winter and summer, require equal quantities of food at all times, the end of eating and drinking, being to repair what exercise and the motion of the blood has destroyed or made useless; and the less velocity of the blood in some animals than in others, may be the reason why wounds and bruises in those animals do not so soon destroy life, as they do in animals whose blood moves swifter.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Glands and Excretory Ducts.

MODERN anatomists have reduced all the glands of the body to two sorts, viz. the *Glandulæ Conglobatæ*, and the *Glandulæ Conglomeratæ*.

A conglobate gland is a little smooth body, wrapped up in a fine skin, by which it is separated from all other parts, only admitting an artery and nerve to pass in, and giving way to a vein and excretory canal to come out. Of this sort are the glands of the brain, the labial glands, &c.

A conglomerate gland is composed of many little conglobate glands all tied together, and wrapped up in one common tunicle, or membrane. Sometimes all their excretory ducts unite, and make one common pipe, through which the liquor of all of them runs, as the pancreas and the parotides do. Sometimes the ducts uniting, form several pipes, which only communicate with one another, by cross canals, and such are the *Mammæ*. Others again have several pipes, without any communication with one another; of which sort are the *Glandulæ Lachrymales*, and *Prostratæ*. And a fourth sort is, when each little gland
has

has its own excretory duct, through which it transmits its liquor in a common basin, as the kidneys.

A gland is chiefly composed of a convolution of one or more arteries of a considerable length, from whose sides arise vast numbers of excretory ducts, as the lacteals arise from the guts, and for the same reason; for the passages into the excretory ducts of a gland, being such as that only one sort of fluid may pass into them, the want of largeness is compensated by their number; and in a great length of an artery, as in the guts those proper fluids which escape one duct may pass into another; and from what has been said, it does not appear but that excretory ducts may arise from the vessels that form membranes without being convolved at all. And this way, I imagine, secretions are made from all the membranes that line cavities, and some others. There also arise from these arteries lymphatic vessels, whose use seems to be to take of the thinnest part of the blood, where a thick fluid is to be secreted, seeing they are found in greatest plenty in such glands as separate the thickest fluids, as in the liver; and it is observable that where the thickest secretions are made, the velocity of the blood is the least, as if it was contrived to give those seemingly more tenacious parts more time to separate from the blood. The arteries that compose different glands are convolved in different manners,

ners, but whether or not their different secretions depend upon that, I doubt will be difficult to discover. The excretory ducts arise from the arteries, and unite in their progress as the roots of trees do from the earth, and as different trees, plants, fruits, and even different minerals, in their growing, often derive their distinct proper juices from the same kind of earth; so the excretory ducts in different glands, separate from the same blood their different juices: but what these different secretions depend upon, whether the structure of the parts or different attractions, are what we have no certainty about, though this subject has employed several of the best writers. For my own part, from the great simplicity and uniformity usually seen in Nature's works, I am most inclined to think different secretions arise from different attractions, seeing that in plants and minerals there seems to be no other way.

Some of the principal glands will be mentioned in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the Conversion of Food into Blood: Mastication, the Salivary Glands, the Ductus Alimentalis, Digestion, Formation of Chyle, and the Organs conducive to it.

THE aliment being received into the mouth is there masticated by the teeth, and impregnated with saliva, which is pressed out of the salivary glands by the motions of the jaw and the muscles that move it and the tongue.

The salivary glands are situated about the jaws and the tongue. Parotis, or Maxillaris Superior, is the largest, and is situated behind the lower jaw, under the ear. It has its Saliva promoted by the motions of the lower jaw. Maxillaris inferior is situated between the lower jaw and the tendon of the Digastric muscle. [See the table of Muscles.] Sublinguali, is a small gland under the tongue between the jaw and the Arataglossus muscle. Tonfilla is a globular gland about the bigness of a hazel nut, situated upon the Pterygoideus Internus muscle, between the root of the tongue and the Uvula. This gland, with its fellow, directs the masticated aliment into the Pharynx, and they
serve

serve for the Uvula to shut down upon when we breathe through the nose. They are compressed by the tongue and the aliment, when the former raises the latter over its root, and thereby opportunely emit their saliva to lubricate the food for its easier descent through the Pharynx.

Pressure upon the surface of a gland very much promoting the secretion that is made in it, these glands are so seated as to be pressed by the lower jaw, and its muscles, which will be chiefly at the time when their fluid is wanted; and the force with which the jaw must be moved, being as the dryness and hardness of the food masticated, the secretion from the glands depending very much upon that force; it will also be in proportion to the dryness and hardness of that food which is necessary; for all food, being to be reduced to a pulp, by being mixed with saliva before it can be swallowed fit for digestion, the dryer and harder foods needing more of this matter, will, from this mechanism, be supplied with more than moister foods in about that proportion in which they are dryer and harder; and the dryer foods needing more saliva than moister, is the reason why we can eat less and digest less of these than those. What quantity of saliva these glands can separate from the blood, in a given time, will be hard to determine, but in eating of dry bread it cannot be less than the weight of bread; and many men, in a little time, can eat more dry
I bread

bread than twice the size of all these glands; and some men that are used to smoking, can spit half a pint in the smoking one pipe of tobacco; and some men in a salivation, have spit, for days or weeks together, a gallon in four and twenty hours; and, yet I believe, all these glands put together, do not weigh more than four ounces.

The membrane which lines the mouth and palate, and covers the tongue, is every where beset with small glands, to afford saliva in all parts of the mouth to keep it moist; for those more remote are chiefly concerned in time of mastication. These small glands have names given them according to their respective situations, as Buccales, Labiales, Linguales, Fauciales, Palatinæ, Gingivarum, and Uvulares.

The aliment thus prepared descends through the Pharynx into the stomach, where it is digested by the juices of the stomach, which are what is thrown out of the glands of its inmost coat with saliva out of the mouth, and a moderate warmth and attrition.

It is here necessary to take a view of the Ductus Alimentalis, or Alimentary Canal, which consists of the Œsophagus, Stomach, and Guts.

Œsophagus or gullet, is the beginning of the alimentary duct; its upper part is called Pharynx; it is a wide and open space spread behind the tongue to receive the masticated aliment; it begins from the basis of the skull near the Processus
Pterygoïdes

Pterygoides of the sphenoidal bone, then descending becomes round, and is called Vaginalis Gulæ; it runs from the tongue close to the spine, under the left Subclavian blood vessels, into and through the Thorax on the left side, then piercing the diaphragm, it immediately enters the stomach. It is composed of a thin outer coat, which is no more than a proper membrane to the middle or muscular coat. The middle coat is composed of longitudinal and circular muscular fibres, but chiefly circular, abundantly thicker than the same coat in the guts; because this has no foreign power to assist it, as the guts have, and because it is necessary the food should make a shorter stay here than there. The inner coat, is a pretty smooth membrane, beset with many glands, which secrete a mucilaginous matter, to defend this membrane, and render the descent of the aliment easy.

Ventriculus, the stomach, is situated under the left side of the diaphragm, its left side touching the spleen, and its right is covered by the thin edge of the liver; its figure nearly resembles the pouch of a bag-pipe, its left end being most capacious, the upper side concave, and the lower convex; it has two orifices, both on its upper part; the left (through which the aliment passes into the stomach) is named Cardia; and the right (through which it is conveyed out of the stomach into the Duodenum) is named Pylorus; where

there is a circular valve which hinders a return of the aliment out of the gut, but does not wholly hinder the gall from flowing into the stomach.

The coats of the stomach are but three; the external membranous, the middle muscular, whose fibres are chiefly longitudinal and circular, the inner membranous, and beset with glands, which separate a Mucus. This last coat is again divided by anatomists into a fourth, which they call *Villofa*. As the muscular coat of the stomach contracts, the inner coat falls into folds, which encrease as the stomach lessens, and consequently retard the aliment most when the stomach is nearest being empty.

The manner in which digestion is performed has been matter of great controversy. The ancients generally supposed the food concocted by a fermentation in the stomach: but the moderns more generally attribute it to the muscular force of the stomach. In granivorous birds, where digestion is made by muscular force, their second stomach is plainly contrived for comminuting or digesting their food that way; for, besides that, it is one of the strongest muscles in their bodies, its inside is defended with a hard and strong membrane, that it may not be torn; and these birds always eat with their grain the roughest and hardest little stones they can find, which are necessary for grinding their food, notwithstanding it is first soaked in another stomach, and is also food of very easy digestion. In serpents, some birds, and several

veral kinds of fish, which swallow whole animals, and retain them long in their stomachs, digestion seems to be performed by a menstruum; for we frequently find in their stomachs animals so totally digested, before their form is destroyed, that their very bones are made soft. In horses and oxen, digestion is but little more than extracting a tincture; for in their excrements when voided, we see the texture of their food is not totally destroyed, though grass, in particular, seems to be of as easy digestion as any food whatever, and the corn they eat is often voided entire: and in the excrements of men, are often seen the skins of fruits undigested, and small fruits, such as currants, unbroken, and worms also continue unhurt, both in the stomach and guts. Therefore, by comparing our stomachs with those here mentioned, it appears to me, that our digestion is performed by a menstruum, which is chiefly saliva, assisted by the action of the stomach, and the abdominal muscles, and by that principle of corruption which is in all dead bodies. For digestion is no other than corruption of our food; and, therefore, quantities of hot spirits, which hinder the corruption of animal bodies, also hinder digestion.

Though the intestines be one continued pipe, which by several circumvolutions, and turnings, reaches from the Pylorus to the Anus, they are divided by the anatomists into six parts, viz. Duodenum, Jejunum, Ileum, Colon, Cæcum, and Rectum, the three first which are nearest the sto-

mach are the small guts, and the three last are the great guts.

They all have in their inner membranes an almost infinite number of very small glands. The length of the guts to that of the body is as five to one in a middle sized man; in taller men the proportion is usually less, and in short men greater. It is not necessary to repeat the use of the mesentery to the intestines. [*See the chapter on Membranes.*]

Let us now return to the progress of the aliment. Being digested in the stomach it is thrown through the Pylorus or right orifice of the stomach into the Duodenum, where it is mixed with bile from the gall-bladder and liver, and the pancreatic juice from the pancreatic gland. These fluids serve further to attenuate and dilute the digested aliment, and probably to make the fluid part separate better from the fæces. After this it is continually moved by the peristaltic or vermicular motion of the guts, and the compression of the diaphragm and abdominal muscles, by which the fluid parts are pressed into the lacteals, and the gross parts through the guts as excrement.

Having followed the aliment to the separation of the nutritious and excrementitious parts of it, we must make some enquiry into the other auxiliary organs, by which the operation is carried into effect. Those are, the Liver, Gall-bladder, Pancreas, Spleen, Lacteals, and Lymphatics.

The

The liver is the largest gland in the body; of a dusky red colour. It is situated immediately under the diaphragm in the right hypochondrium; its exterior side is convex, and interior concave; backward towards the ribs it is thick, and thin on its fore-part, where it covers the upper side of the stomach, and some of the guts; the upper side of it adheres to the diaphragm, and is also tied to it and the sternum by a thin ligament, which is described commonly as two. It is also tied to the navel by a round ligament called Teres or Umbilicale, which is the umbilical vein degenerated into a ligament; it is inserted into the liver at a small fissure in its lower edge. Dogs, cats, and other animals, that have a great deal of motion in their backs, have their livers divided into many distinct lobules; which by moving one upon another, comply with those motions, which else would break their livers to pieces.

The gall-bladder is a receptacle of bile, seated in the hollow side of the liver; it is composed of one dense coat somewhat muscular, which is covered with a membrane like that of the liver; and is also lined with another, that cannot easily be separated. From the gall-bladder towards the duodenum runs a duct called Cysticus; and from the liver to this duct one called Hepaticus, which carries off the gall this way, when the gall-bladder is full; then the ductus cysticus and hepaticus being united, commence ductus communis

choledochus, which enters the duodenum obliquely about four inches below its beginning. The orifice of this duct in the gut is somewhat eminent, but has no caruncle, as is commonly said. As the liver, from its situation in the same cavity with the stomach, will be most pressed, and consequently separate most gall when the stomach is fullest, which is the time when it is most wanted; so the gall-bladder, being seated against the duodenum, it will have its fluid pressed out by the aliment passing through that gut, and consequently at a right time and in due proportion; because the greater that quantity of aliment is, the greater will be the compression; and so the contrary.

Pancreas, the sweet-bread, is a large gland of the salivary kind, lying across the upper and back part of the abdomen, near the duodenum; it is what the ancients call a conglomerate gland, appearing so to the naked eye; it has a short excretory duct, about half as large as a crow quill, though it is commonly painted as large as the ductus communis choledochus: it always enters the duodenum together with the bile duct; but in dogs some distance from it; and, I think, always in two ducts distant from one another. The juice of this gland, together with the bile, serves to compleat the digestion of the aliment, and renders it fit to enter the lacteal vessels.

The

The Lacteals are the Venæ Lactææ, Receptaculum Chyli, and Ductus Thoracicus.

Venæ Lactææ, &c. are a vast number of very fine pellucid tubes, beginning from the small guts, and proceeding thence through the mesentery; they frequently unite, and form fewer and larger vessels, which first pass through the mesenteric glands, and then into the Receptaculum Chyli: these vessels before they arrive at the mesenteric glands, are called Venæ Lactææ primi Generis; and thence to their entrance into the Receptaculum Chyli, Venæ Lactææ secundi Generis. The office of these veins, is to receive the fluid part of the digested aliment, which is called chyle, and convey it to the Receptaculum Chyli, that it may be thence carried through the Ductus Thoracicus into the blood-vessels.

Receptaculum Chyli, is a membranous somewhat pyriform bag, two-thirds of an inch long, one-third of an inch over in its largest part, when collapsed; situated on the first Vertebra Lumborum, to the right of the Aorta, a little higher than the Arteria Emulgens Dextra, under the right inferior muscle of the diaphragm; it is formed by the union of three tubes, one from under the Aorta, the second from the interstice of the Aorta and Cava, the third from under the emulgents of the right side. The Saccus Chyliferus at its superior part becoming gradually smaller is contracted into a slender membranous
pipe

pipe of about a line diameter, well known by the name of *Ductus Thoracicus*.

The *Ductus Thoracicus* ascends into the Thorax, behind the great artery; and, about the heart, it frequently divides into two or three branches which immediately unite again into one; and, creeping all along the gullet, it marches to the left subclavian vein, where it opens at one or two orifices, which are covered with a semi-lunar valve, that the blood may pass over them, and the chyle run from underneath it, and mix with the blood in the veins. The *Ductus Thoracicus* has valves at several distances, which hinder the chyle that has once passed them, from falling back. It receives the lymphæducts from the several parts in the chest, as it passes along to the subclavian vein. By its running up the left side, the chyle receives a new impetus, from the pulsation of the great artery: whereas, on the right side, it must have ascended only by the pressure of the Diaphragm and muscles of the lower belly upon the receptacle, which it equally enjoys in its present situation.

Supposing there ordinarily passes five pounds of chyle in a day through the lacteals, and that four ounces of this only is added to the blood, (though it may be any other quantity for ought I know) and that a man neither decreases nor increases during this time, then all the separations from the fluids and solids must be just five pounds;

pounds; four ounces of which must be those fluids and particles of solids, which are become unprofitable; and the remaining four pounds twelve ounces, will serve as a vehicle to carry the four ounces off: so that we see for what reason more fluids are carried into the blood than are to be retained there, and how the body is by the same means both nourished and preserved in health.

The chyle is diluted in its passage by the lymph.

Of the Lymphæducts.

Lymphæducts are small pellucid cylindrical tubes which arise invisible from the extremities of the arteries throughout the whole body, but more plentifully in glands than other parts, and in greatest number from such glands as separate the most viscid fluids, as may be observed in the liver and elsewhere. They all terminate in the Via Lactea, or in the large veins. All that rise in the Abdomen empty into the Venæ Lactææ secundi Generis and Receptaculum Chyli: those in the cavity of the Thorax into the Ductus Thoracicus and the subclavian veins. Their uses are to carry lymph to dilute the chyle to make it incorporate more readily with the blood (but not to make it flow the better in the Lacteals, as appears sufficiently from their not entering into the minutest lacteals) and to carry off
so

so much lymph as is necessary to leave the blood in fit temper to flow through the veins ; for it is always observed that in such persons as have their blood too thin, the Globulæ cohere and form Moleculæ or Polypuses.

Of the Lymphatic Glands.

The glands accompanying the lymphatics, are situated in the three cavities, in the interstices of the muscles, where the lymphatics lie with the large blood vessels, and in the four emunctories, viz. the arm-pits and groins. In the brain is seated the Glandula Pinealis, which is judged to be of this sort. In the neck are situated a great many of these by the sides of the carotid arteries and internal jugular veins, and two, or a sort of double one upon the Larynx immediately below the thyroid cartilage, from which situation they derive the name of Thyroidæ, and just within the Thorax is seated another called Thy-mus. Under the basis of the heart, and at the sides of the lungs, where the great vessels enter, are many of these glands from the size of a pea to that of a hazel nut. In the Abdomen upon the loins near the kidneys, and by the sides of the iliac vessels are many of these glands, which are called Lumbales, and there are some at the hollow side of the liver, named Hepaticæ : and the mesentery is full of glands of a like appearance, but they seem to belong only to the lacteal
veins,

veins, unless some of them which are seated at the basis of the mesentery among the *Venæ Lactææ secundi Generis*, belong to the lymphatics that come from the liver, where the hepatic lymphatics pass in their way to the *Receptaculum Chyli*. The glands which accompany the blood vessels in the limbs are few, and distributed in no certain order; except those in the four emunctories, i. e. in the arm-pits and groins, named *Axillares* and *Inguinales*.

The Chyle or thin milky part of the aliment, being received into the lacteals from all the small guts, they carry it into the *Receptaculum Chyli*, and thence the *Ductus Thoracicus* carries it into the left Subclavian vein, where it mixes with the blood, and passes with it to the heart.

All the veins being emptied into two branches, viz. the ascending and descending Cava, they empty into the right auricle of the heart; the right auricle unloads into the right ventricle, which throws the blood through the pulmonary artery into the lungs; from the lungs, the blood is brought by the pulmonary veins into the left auricle, and from that into the left ventricle, by which it is thrown into the aorta, and distributed through the body. From the extremities of the arteries arise the veins and lymphatics, the veins to collect the blood, and bring it back to the heart, and the lymphatics to return the lymph or thinner part of the blood, from the arteries, to the veins
and

and the Via Lactea, where it mixes with the chyle, and then passes with it into the left subclavian vein and to the heart. [See Chap. X.]

The urine is separated from the blood by the kidneys. The kidneys of men are like those of a hog, the two weigh about twelve ounces; they are seated towards the upper part of the loins upon the two last ribs, the right under the liver, and a little lower than the other, and the left under the spleen.

All the fluids that pass into the stomach and guts being carried into the blood-vessels, the greatest part of them are separated and carried off by proper vessels, viz. urine from the kidneys, bile from the liver, &c. and these juices carry along with them whatever might be injurious to the animal economy.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of continuing the Species.

AS every animal is subject to death, and must at last perish by old age, disease, or casualty, the whole animal creation would soon come to an end, if there were not a constant supply, therefore the Author of nature has given to every animal an instinct to propagate its species, and for this purpose has created a distinction of sex. The nature of generation is enveloped in mystery, which anatomists have endeavoured in vain to explain; instead therefore of examining their unsettled theories, I shall only observe, that mankind differ in this particular essentially from the rest of the animal creation, the attachment of the male and the female being founded on the passion of love, of which brutes know nothing. As I shall speak of this passion at large in the last part of this treatise, I shall here conclude our anatomical elements. The subject is a very copious one, and deserves to be studied at length, but youth who have other studies, and perhaps men who have other pursuits, will not be sorry to take this glance of the human frame, divested of the abstruse minuteness necessary to the professional student.

CHAPTER

Every animal is subject to a certain amount of growth by old age, which, on ordinary occasions, animal creation would have to an end. It is not a constant supply of matter, but a supply of nature has given to every animal an amount, to preserve its species, and for this purpose has created a distinction of sex. The nature of propagation is explained in the following manner: the female has been provided with a certain number of eggs, which she will only deliver, that number being in the female essentially from the fall of the animal creation, the attachment of the male and the female being founded on the passion of love, which nature has made known. As I shall speak of the passion or large in the last part of this volume, I shall here conclude our anatomical disquisitions. The subject is a very copious one, and deserves to be studied in length, but I shall here have to content myself with a few general remarks, and perhaps you will have more particular views on the history of the human system of the human frame, directed of the spirit's mind, and necessity to the professional student.

ELEMENTS
OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

PART II.

A CONCISE VIEW

OF THE

MENTAL FACULTIES.

CHAPTER I.

*General View of the Mind. Advantage of
Analyzing.*

HAVING analyzed our corporeal frame, and made my young readers acquainted with the component parts of it, at least so far as is necessary to contribute to the knowledge of its nature; for it was not my design to give them the information proper for a surgeon; let us now proceed to the investigation of the nobler part of human nature;
THE MIND.

What do we mean by the word *Mind*? The intelligent or conscious part of our nature, consisting of certain faculties or powers, by which the operations of knowledge, of virtue, and of

vice are conducted, just as we have seen the operations of the body are conducted by the conformation of muscles, nerves, glands, &c. producing health, strength, and agility, the grand effects of corporeal structure.

In making ourselves acquainted with the MIND, let us pursue the same method we adopted with the BODY, let us see of what it consists in the whole, and then let us analyze each faculty, and emotion separately. In the Mind we discover the following faculties and properties :

The Faculties of the Mind.

Perception.	Reasoning.
Attention.	Judgment.
Retention, or Memory.	Invention.
Recollection.	Will.
Imagination.	Design.
The Power of Comparing.	Forefight.
Discernment, or Intuition.	Liberty.
The Power of Abstracting.	Conscience.
The Power of Compound- ing.	

This collection of terms can at first produce but very confused notions, and it brings to my mind a comparison which, in illustrating the nature of analysis, will both amuse and instruct. Let us suppose a villa, overlooking an extensive, fertile country, where nature has been bountiful

in

in variety, and where her bounty has been still more varied and adorned by art. Let us arrive at this villa in the night time. Let the windows be opened just as the sun begins to gild the horizon, and as soon as we have looked through them, let them be instantly shut again.

Although this beautiful country appeared but an instant to us, it is certain that we saw all that it contains. A second and a third glimpse would leave but the same impressions made by the objects in the first, and of course had not the windows been shut again, we should have continued to see only what we saw at first.

But the first view is not enough to give us a knowledge of the country, that is to say, to enable us to distinguish the objects it contains, and therefore on the shutting of the windows none of us would be able to give an account of what we had seen. Thus one may see many things and learn nothing.

Now let us suppose the windows opened for the whole day, and that we have before us for a long time all that we had seen at first. If lost, like some men, in extacy, we continue viewing as before, this multitude of different objects all at once, we should know no more when night came on than we did when the windows were first suddenly shut in the morning.

In order to acquire a knowledge of this country it is not enough to view the whole together; we

must look at every part of it one after the other, and instead of taking in the extent with a single look, we must carry our eyes in succession from object to object. All are taught this by nature. She has not only endowed us with the power of looking at a multitude of things at once, but also with the power of looking at but one, that is to say, of fixing our eyes on them separately and singly; and to this faculty it is that we owe all the knowledge which we acquire by the sight.

This is a faculty of which all men are possessed; yet if we should afterwards speak of this country, it would be found that we are not all equally well acquainted with it. The paintings of some would be more or less accurate, in which many things would be found as they are in reality; while those of others would be every where confused, and in which it would be impossible to make out any thing. We all, however, saw the same objects; with this difference, that the looks of some were guided by chance, and those of others directed in a certain order.

Now, what is that order? Nature herself points it out; it is that in which she presents objects. There are some which attract our eyes more than others; they are more striking, and more prominent, around which the rest seem to be arranged as appendages. It is these that are first observed, and when their respective situations are fixed, the rest fill the intervals, each in its place.

We

We begin therefore with the principal objects : we observe them successively, and compare them, in order to judge of their relative states. When by this means we have made ourselves acquainted with their respective situations, we observe successively all those that fill the intervals, we compare each with the principal object nearest it, and settle its position.

We now distinguish all the objects, the form and situation of which we have learned, and we see them all at one look. The order that reigns among them is no longer successive, but co-existent : it is that in which they really lie before us, and we see them all at once distinctly.

It is the same with the mind as with the eye : it sees at once a multitude of things, and both the mental and corporeal sight improve with exercise. The eyes of a good painter instantly decry in a landscape, a multitude of things which we look at with him, and which escape us.

We may, by going from villa to villa, study other prospects, and trace them like the first. In this case it will happen that we shall prefer one, or feel that each possesses a peculiar charm : but we only judge of them by comparing them, and we cannot compare them but by tracing them at the same time in our memory. The mind therefore sees more than the eye can see.

To analyze then, is nothing more than to observe the qualities of an object in successive order,

for the purpose of giving that co-existent order they possess. This is done naturally by every one.

Although in a prospect which we have studied we observe a multitude of objects at one glance, still the view is never so distinct as when it is circumscribed, and we look but at a small number of objects at once; for we always discern fewer of them than we see.

As I said before, it is with the mind as with the sight: a great number of ideas which are become familiar to us are present to our minds at once; they are all perceived, but not all equally distinguished. In order to perceive, in a distinct manner, the ideas or images that come at once into our minds, we must decompose them as we did the objects of our sight; we must analyze our thoughts.

Before we proceed to a separate view of our faculties or mental powers, let us observe that the end of their operations is the attainment of knowledge.

KNOWLEDGE is the perception or formation of ideas, or the discovery of some agreement or disagreement, connexion or repugnance between ideas we have perceived or formed.

AN IDEA is *the representation of a thing in the mind* raised there by means of an impression made through our senses, or by an operation of the mind itself.

Ideas

Ideas that represent *material* forms are generally called *images*: *immaterial* thoughts are more properly called *notions*. The former are *sensible* or *corporeal ideas*, derived originally from our senses, and from the communication which the soul has with the body; such are the notions we frame of all *colours, sounds, tastes, figures, or shapes*: the latter are *intellectual ideas*, gained by reflecting on the nature of our own souls, turning our thoughts within ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our own minds; such are the notions we have of *thought, judgment, reason, knowledge, will, love, fear, hope*.

By *sensation* the soul contemplates things, as it were, out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas: by *reflexion*, the soul contemplates itself, and things within itself, and by this means gains spiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.

Our organs of sensation are commonly reckoned to be five, namely those of feeling, seeing, hearing, tasting, and smelling. The organ of feeling is spread not only over the whole of the external parts of the body, but over many of the internal. The other four are each of them placed but in two particular parts of the body; that of seeing in the eyes, that of hearing in the ears, that of tasting in the tongue and palate, and that of smelling in the nostrils: as we saw in the former part of these elements.

As to the qualities or faculties of the mind, the ideas of which we can receive only by reflexion upon what passes within us, men have been accurate in distinguishing them, and giving proper names to each, though those names are seldom properly and distinctly applied. We will now investigate them,

CHAPTER

CHAPTER II.

Of Perception.

PERCEPTION is that quality or that act of the mind whereby it becomes conscious of any thing. In looking upon a house, a tree, a rose, or any other external object, we find that each of them raises several ideas in us, by what we call the sense of seeing: a musical instrument when played upon in the room where we are, raises several ideas in us by the sense of hearing: a nose-gay held near the nose raises several ideas in us by what we call the sense of smelling: by drinking a glass of wine an idea is raised in us by what we call the sense of tasting; and if we touch any of these objects it raises in us an idea by what we call the sense of feeling. Then by reflecting, and considering this quality with which we find ourselves endowed, we receive an idea of the quality itself, to which idea we give the name *Perception*, or the perceptive quality. Now this idea, called perception, is as positive an idea, and as different from any of the ideas communicated by sensation, as any of those ideas is positive, or as any of them is different from another. We may as positively

tively say we perceive, as that we see, hear, smell, taste, or feel; and the perceiving quality is as different from those, as they from one another.

The origin of corporeal sensibility, and mental perception has given rise to various theories. As sensibility relates to the body merely, the enquiry belongs to anatomy, and we have seen that it is produced by the connexion of the nerves with the brain; but this bodily sensibility is by some said to be also the cause of mental perception, either by vibrations through the brain, or the passing of a subtle fluid, called animal spirits. These are difficult questions, and I believe are in the number of those placed out of the reach of mortal knowledge. Materialists refer all to the formation of the brain. It is highly probable, that our ideas by sensation proceed from, or are occasioned by, the different motion into which the constituent parts of our brain are put by the application of external objects to some part of our body: but I am not inclined to admit that the brain is the chief mover of reflexion, or director of the faculties, though it may be the medium of mental operations. The faculties of the brute creation ought to be as exalted as those of men, were those faculties entirely directed by the motions of the medullary substance, in which anatomists have discovered no peculiar distinction, and surely so great a difference in character would have required a very distinct and visible conformation of this organ.

organ. The Power, the incomprehensible Power, that guides man to the knowledge of his nature, that directs him to attend to the operations of his mind, to investigate his faculties, to trace the finger of his Creator, is surely no motion or disposition of the brain, but must be inherent in something superior to material substances—of that something I pretend not to have any peculiar or decided knowledge, but I am not only willing, I am eager to call it, spirit, soul, and to hope and to believe that it is the seed of immortality. To go at large into these questions is not my intention, for in these elements I merely mean to give easy lessons in the rudiments of Self-knowledge, and leaving them for the discussion of curiosity at some future period of your lives, I shall continue the description of the faculties of the Mind.

The faculty of *Perception*, which has been just explained to you, is a passive faculty; for with regard to all the ideas communicated to us either by sensation or reflexion, it is entirely passive. If we open our eyes we cannot help receiving the ideas which external objects communicate to us: if we reflect upon what passes within, we cannot help receiving the ideas which the faculties and operations of our own mind communicate to us.

Let us observe that this *perceptive faculty* is of two sorts; one of which we call *Sensation*, whereby we receive all our simple ideas of external objects; and the other we call *Reflexion*, by which

we

we receive all the simple ideas of the faculties and operations of our own minds. The first sort is common to us with brute animals, all of whom have it in some degree, as we may discover by their actions and motions, and some of them seem to have it in greater perfection than we have: but the last sort seems to be peculiar to mankind; for, as far as we know, no other kind of animal on this globe ever received an idea of its own mind, or of any of the faculties or operations of it.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER III.

Of the attentive or contemplative Faculty.

AFTER we have received an idea into our mind, either by Sensation or Reflection, we have a faculty of continuing that idea in our mind, or of keeping it in our view for some time, without allowing it to be displaced by any other idea. This faculty we call *Attention*, or the attentive faculty, and when long continued, we call it *Contemplation*, or the contemplative faculty; for, in all civilized nations, mankind have been very exact in distinguishing, and giving proper names to the several faculties and operations of the Mind, though in common discourse those names are promiscuously and sometimes very improperly used. However as to its energies this faculty may be subsequent to sense, yet is it truly prior to it both in dignity and use: for this it is which *retains the fleeting forms of things* when things are gone and all sensation at an end. The use of it is so necessary that we cannot properly be said to have any idea in the mind until we have attended to it so as to fix it there; for we may, with our eyes wide open, stare upon a house, a horse, or
any

any other object; or the clock in my room may strike twelve without our having properly any idea communicated to us either by our eyes or ears, though these external objects had certainly the usual natural effect upon them; but our mind was so intent upon contemplating some particular idea, or meditating upon some particular subject, that we did not attend to, or take notice of, that effect, and consequently had no idea thereby communicated to the mind; so that even when we do contemplate, we do not properly contemplate the external object, but only the ideas or idea communicated by that external object. Hence the least reflection must convince us, that this faculty, called Attention, and consequently the contemplative faculty are qualities of the spiritual and not of the material part of our compound being, because they are employed solely about preceptions or ideas which can exist or inhere only in the Mind, though many of them proceed originally from impressions made upon the body by external objects; for we have perfect notions of things that are gone and extinct which cannot be made the objects of sensation. We have an easy command over the objects in our mind, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our sensations are necessary when their objects are present, nor can we controul them but by removing either the objects or ourselves.

It

It must likewise appear that both these faculties are generally active faculties of the mind, though some ideas strike our minds so strongly that we cannot help attending to them, such as the ideas of exquisite pleasure or pain; and some so very strongly, that it is not in our power for some time to displace them, as may be instanced by the passions of Love and Grief. They possess our minds so fully, that for some time no other idea can get access, even though assisted by our utmost endeavours. As to ideas of that kind both these faculties may be said to be passive; and as to such only, they seem to belong to some brute creatures.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the retentive Faculty, or Memory.

BY attending to, or contemplating any idea which we have received by Sensation or Reflection, it becomes so fixed in our mind that it remains there for a considerable time; whence we discover another faculty of the Mind, which we call the *retentive Faculty* or *Memory*, and this must also be a quality of the spirit, because it is employed only about ideas; for we can remember nothing but what we attend to, and as we attend to, or contemplate only our own ideas, we cannot be properly said to remember any thing but our own ideas; we do not remember the external objects themselves, but only those ideas they raised in our mind; and as perceptions or ideas come all by the perceptive faculty, which is a quality of the Mind only, and cannot exist or inhere in our body, or in any part thereof, nor naturally depend on, or proceed from, any modification or motion of the parts thereof, the ideas themselves cannot exist but in the Mind; consequently the faculty of retaining them, or of having their existence continued in the mind for
some

some considerable time, must be a quality of the Mind, and of the Mind only.

As to this quality we find that those ideas which strike the mind most strongly, or which we contemplate longest, fix themselves the most deeply, and remain the longest in our mind, whence it is, that people of lively imaginations and quick fancies have generally short memories, for they have so many different ideas occurring every instant, that they have not time to contemplate long any one idea or set of ideas. This faculty is entirely passive, and we find that brutes as well as men are endued with it.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Recollective Faculty.

AFTER we have so closely attended to, or so long contemplated any idea, as to fix it in our memory, we have, we find a power of recalling that idea and placing it again in our view, generally, whenever we please, though several very different ideas have in the mean time intervened; and this we can do by a series of ideas, however connected or casual, without the intervention of, or any assistance from, the object that at first raised or produced such an idea in our mind. This faculty we call *Recollection*, or *the recollective Faculty*; and it is so like preception by Reflection that it often goes by the name of Reflection; but the former is the proper name for it.

As every recollection of any idea is a new contemplation of it, the oftener we do recollect any idea the more firmly will it be rooted in our memory: whence it is, that people of lively imaginations and quick fancies have but short memories, for the same reason as just before given, because they have every instant new ideas occurring to them and therefore have not time to recollect

collect very often any former idea or set of ideas. This Faculty must certainly be a quality of the Spirit or Soul only, because it is employed only about ideas; and it is generally an active faculty, but is sometimes passive, for one idea, or set of ideas, makes us sometimes recollect others whether we will or not; and so far only as it is passive, it seems to belong to brutes as well as men.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the Imagination.

THE imagination is a faculty by which we also call our ideas into our view, but though nearly allied to the two preceding faculties, it ought carefully to be distinguished from them.

When we view some reliet of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible object, this is *Fancy* or *Imagination*.

When we view some such reliet, and refer it withal to that sensible object, which in time past was its cause and original, this is *Memory*.

Lastly, the road which leads to memory through a series of ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is *Recollection*. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a garment, I think of its owner; thence of his habitation; ships, sea-fights, admirals, &c.

If the distinction between memory and fancy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a portrait. When we contemplate a portrait, without thinking of whom it is the portrait, such contemplation

templation is analogous to *Fancy*. When we view it with reference to the original, whom it represents, such contemplation is analogous to *Memory*.

We may go farther. *Imagination* or *Fancy* may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It is here that hope and fear paint all their pleasant, and all their painful pictures of futurity. But *Memory* is confined in the strictest manner to the past.

CHAPTER VII.

The Comparative Faculty.

WE likewise find, that we have a faculty or power, not only of continuing in our mind, and contemplating any one single idea we receive or form, but also of continuing in our view for some time, and contemplating two, three, or more ideas at one and the same time, by which we set them as it were by one another, in order to consider wherein they agree or disagree. This is an active faculty which we call *comparing*, or the *comparative faculty*; and must certainly be a proper quality of the *Mind*, because it is employed only about ideas. This quality too several brutes are endued with, so far as they have ideas, but as their ideas are but few, none of them seem to have any great share of it.

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we call intuitive knowledge, which is the most certain and evident sort of knowledge we are capable of.

By this Faculty we discover that the two or more ideas we have in view are not the same, but are two different ideas. This Faculty as well as the former must be a quality of the Spirit because it is employed only about ideas. Thus, after we have seen a red and a white rose, and from them acquired and retained two ideas of colour, we can afterwards, when they are not present in our view, recollect these two ideas of colour, and by comparing discern, that they are not the same, but that they are two different ideas; and even when the two roses are both present in our view, we cannot discern that the two ideas of colour are different, until we have contemplated and compared these two ideas together, which process of the mind is still more evident when we see a red rose to-day, and compare it with the idea of colour communicated to our mind by a red rose we saw yesterday; for though the ideas are different as to time, yet if the roses be of the same kind, we conclude, or rather discern, that the ideas are the same, that is to say, of the same kind of colour. Indeed, upon the sight of two roses at the same time, we form an idea of difference, from the different places they are in, so naturally and so quickly, that we do not take notice of the progress of the Mind in receiving

receiving the two ideas, comparing them together and discerning the difference, unless we advert to it very narrowly; and this progress we do not take notice of, because it is so instantaneous that we cannot easily distinguish between the beginning and the end of the time in which it is made, therefore we are apt to conclude, that the Mind makes no progress, but that it sees or perceives by sight, compares and discerns all at once, though when we come to consider exactly our ideas of these three faculties of the Mind, we must conclude, that it must see or perceive before it can compare, and that it must compare before it can discern.

It is by means of this faculty of discerning that we form the ideas of Identity and Diversity, which are two words that have much perplexed some philosophers. It is likewise by means of these two faculties of comparing and discerning that we form all those ideas of Relation which we get by Intuition, and which may be called natural ideas, because both the comparison and discernment are so quick and necessary, that the Mind seems to be entirely passive, though, in comparing, it must always be in some degree active. This faculty of discerning most brutes are endued with, though it seems only to be with respect to their natural ideas: whereas in mankind this faculty extends not only to all our natural, but to many of our artificial ideas, and even to many propositions,

propositions, which for that reason are called Axioms, and are the secondary foundation of our knowledge in every Science; on which account they have by many been supposed to be innate, though it be the faculty of discerning only that is innate, and not the ideas or propositions themselves, just as our powers of Seeing and Hearing are innate, yet no one ever supposed that our ideas of colours or sounds were innate; and as these senses may be more perfect in one man than another, so we find that the discerning faculty is much more perfect in some men than in others.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Abstracting Faculty.

AS we have before hinted, all the ideas we receive by Sensation, and many of those we receive by Reflection, present themselves to our mind in knots or bundles; and with every knot or bundle of ideas which we receive by sensation, the ideas of time and place always present themselves. But we have a power to separate the ideas in any one of those bundles, not only from the ideas of time and place, but from one another; and to consider any one of them by itself alone, without any of the others that came along with it. For example, the general idea of existence never offered itself to our Sensation or Reflection, without some thing that did exist; yet we find we have a power of separating and considering this idea by itself alone, without having respect to any of these ideas that came at first along with it, and from this idea so separated and considered by itself alone, we form that general idea which we call Existence, being an idea which of all others is most general, since we intuitively perceive that it must belong to every object that ever did, or
 ever

ever can present itself to our mind, or even to our imagination: for even an imaginary object must have an imaginary existence. Again the idea we call Impenetrability or Solidity was never communicated to the Mind without being accompanied with some other ideas; but we have a power of separating and considering this idea by itself alone, and thereby forming that general idea which we call by this name. So likewise the idea we call Motion was never communicated to our mind without something that did move; yet we can separate and consider this idea by itself alone, and without attending to any of the other ideas that accompanied it into our mind; by which means we form the general idea to which we give the name Motion. This faculty therefore we call the *abstracting Faculty*, which is an active faculty, and must be a quality of the Spirit only, as it is employed only about ideas, and that too about forming ideas which never did exist in any object by themselves alone, or any where but in the Mind. This Faculty is one of the richest fountains of our knowledge, and one of the chief faculties by which our spirits are distinguished from and excel the spirits of the brute creation; for it is by this faculty we form all our general ideas, which ought therefore to be called artificial ideas, and no brute seems to have ever formed any such ideas.

CHAPTER X.

Of the compounding Faculty.

IT has been already observed, that as all the knowledge we are, or can be masters of, depends upon, or proceeds originally from those simple or natural ideas which we receive by Sensation or Reflexion, and as those ideas which we receive by Sensation, always present themselves to our mind in knots or bundles, to every one of which bundles the ideas of time and place are always annexed. Now by the former faculty we abstract from, or leave out of, those knots or bundles the ideas of time and place, and we find we have a faculty or power of considering all the rest as always existing together in the same object, where or whenever it presents itself to our view, and of uniting them together in our mind, so as to form a new idea, to which we give a particular or a proper name. Thus we observe that the sight of any particular man, wherever or whenever we see him, always communicates to our mind a certain bundle of ideas, besides the ideas of time and place; therefore after abstracting or bearing out the ideas of time and place, we unite all the other ideas together, and of these ideas so united we

form

form anew ideas, to which we give the name Papa, Father, John, or Thomas. In the same manner we find, that every particular man, or horse, always presents to our mind a certain bundle of ideas, therefore from every bundle we abstract the ideas of time and place, and also all those particular ideas by which we distinguish one man, or horse, from another, and the ideas remaining in the bundle we unite together into a new idea, to which we give the name of Man or Horse. This Faculty we call the *Compounding Faculty*, which is an active faculty, and being employed only about ideas, it must consequently be a quality of the spirit only. It is by this faculty we form all our ideas of substances, to some sorts of which we give proper names, but to most we give only a general name, by which we mean to signify the general or abstract compound idea we have formed of all the substances of that sort; and whether we give a proper or a general name, it is evident that all the ideas thus formed are artificial ideas. We much doubt if brutes have any great degree of this faculty; for although a dog very well knows his master, yet it may be by some particular sensation, for example the smell, and not by any compound idea he has formed of him.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the reasoning Faculty.

BESIDES our faculty of comparing two, three, or more ideas together, in order to discern their agreement or disagreement, connection or repugnance, we find we have another faculty which we are obliged to make use of when we cannot fet two ideas together in our mind so as to discern, or to discover by intuition, whether there be any agreement or disagreement, connection or repugnance between them; for in such a case we call to our assistance a third idea, and we first compare one of the two ideas with this third idea, then we compare the other two ideas with this third idea, and often discern or discover by intuition an evident agreement or disagreement between each of the two ideas and this third idea, therefore we necessarily conclude, or thus intuitively discover an agreement or disagreement between the two ideas themselves. This Faculty we call the *Reasoning Faculty*, which is an active faculty; and our idea of this faculty occurs so often, and makes so strong an impressiion upon our minds, that we often talk of it as if it were
a being

a being existing by itself. As it is employed only about ideas, it must be a quality of the spirit, and of the spirit alone, although whilst the spirit continues united with the body, the exercise of it depends, by the appointment of the great Author of both, upon a proper state and disposition of some certain parts of the body; and the case we find to be the very same with respect to every other spiritual quality we are endued with, which is an evident proof of its being the will and the design of the Author of nature, that the spirit should take as much care as possible of the body to which it is by his appointment united.

We likewise find, that by this our Reasoning Faculty we can pursue an enquiry through several intermediate ideas, and by discerning or intuitively discovering the progressive agreement or disagreement of all the intermediate ideas, we become almost as certain of the agreement or disagreement of the two extreme ideas as if we could have set them together, and immediately by intuition discerned their agreement or disagreement, connection or repugnance; in all which cases the discovery we make is called *Demonstration*, which is the third step towards knowledge; and the knowledge this way acquired is almost as certain and evident, as the knowledge acquired by intuition.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the judging Faculty.

THE faculty we have just described, called Reasoning, we are often obliged to make use of in another way, and that is, when we cannot find out such intermediate ideas as can certainly and intuitively shew us the agreement or disagreement between any two ideas which we intend to compare; we then compare them with other ideas which do not certainly and intuitively shew us an agreement or disagreement between these two ideas, but produce a *Probability* of their agreeing or disagreeing, and our discernment or conclusion we in this case call *Judgment*, or *the Judging Faculty*; which is absolutely passive, and the judgment we thereby form may be called the fourth step towards knowledge: but it is much more uncertain than any of the former, for it admits of several degrees of certainty, from what we call almost certain to what we call possible or barely possible, and is often very different, and sometimes contrary in different men. By this and the preceding faculty it is, that we form all the rest of our ideas of Relation, all of which

must be artificial ideas; and the Faculty itself must be a quality of the spirit only, as it is employed only about ideas; for we can judge of nothing until after we have received or formed an idea of it, and according to those ideas only we can and must judge, if we judge at all, for we may suspend, or forbear to make use of this faculty, during which time we say we are in *Suspence* or *Doubt*.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of the inventing Faculty.

BY considering the two preceding faculties, we cannot avoid discovering another faculty with which we find ourselves endued ; for in order to discover the certainty or the probability of the agreement or disagreement, connection or repugnance, of any two ideas which we intend to compare together, we find we have a faculty of searching through our whole magazine of ideas for those that are most proper for our purpose. This Faculty we call *the Inventing Faculty* ; which being employed only about ideas must be a quality of the Spirit only. This is properly an active faculty of the Mind ; for though we often discover such intermediate ideas, as it were by chance, yet unless the mind were intent upon the contemplation of the two ideas it resolves to compare together, and attending to, and examining every idea that occurs to its memory, in order to discover and apply such as may be fit for its purpose, it could not discover the use of that intermediate idea, which thus offers itself, as it were, by chance. This faculty, therefore, as it is employed

only about ideas, must be a quality of the Spirit; and those three faculties of reasoning, judging, and inventing, some of the brute creation seem to have a share of, but not in any thing like an equal degree to that which mankind are generally endowed with.

As there is no confining mankind in common conversation to a strict and metaphysical use of words, we usually apply the name of reason to the faculties of inventing, reasoning, and discerning, or judging: For example, we say, a man is a man of strong reason, when we find he is apt at inventing the proper intermediate ideas, at ranging them in their proper order, and at discerning or judging of their progressive agreement or disagreement; whereas that of ranging them in their proper order is what ought only to be called reasoning; and when a man can at once contemplate, compare, and discern, or judge of a great number of such progressive ideas, we say he is a man of a quick and strong comprehension.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the faculty of Volition.

WE find we have not only a faculty or power of self-motion, and of moving or forbearing to move our body, and several of the members thereof, when and which way we please; but we likewise have the same power or faculty of governing and applying or exercising all the active faculties of our mind. We can, generally speaking, contemplate, recollect, compare, abstract, compound, or reason, whenever we please, respecting what ideas we please, and as long or short while as we have a mind; and we change the object about which we have employed those faculties of our mind, as often as we please. And all this without any external cause, or external motive, but merely a choice or preference of the mind ordering and commanding such change. This faculty with which we so evidently find ourselves endued, I call *Volition* or the *Will*. It is to be observed also, that this faculty occurs to our observation so often, and produces such a strong idea of itself in our mind, that we often look upon it not as a mere quality of another being, but as a being

subsisting by itself; for if we did not, it would be ridiculous to apply to it those qualities which we call necessary and free.

As the term Free-will is often made use of, we must observe, that it then is, or ought always to be put in opposition to that sort of will by which a man acts when he is compelled to act by the fear of being subjected to some great evil, if he refuse to act. In this case indeed the Will cannot be said to be absolutely free, because it is forced; but even in this case he cannot be said to have acted necessarily, because he might have chosen to have undergone the threatened evil, rather than act as directed, of which we have in history many celebrated examples. This faculty of Volition is therefore an active faculty, and is certainly a proper quality of the Spirit or Soul, as it depends upon, and proceeds from, the spirit or soul, and from that alone; for, although the motions of the body, and some of the members thereof, be directed by this faculty, yet its directing these motions does not ultimately depend upon, nor is necessarily caused by, all or any one of the senses, but by the spirit alone, which is absolute master of this its own faculty. For example, the sense of pain, though it be generally the occasion or motive, yet it is not the cause, of our moving our body, or any part of our body, from that which raises in us the idea or sense of pain; because we know, that we have it in our
power

power to remain steady and unmoved against the utmost efforts of the most racking torments, as happened in the case of Mucius Scævola, that brave Roman, and also in the deplorable case of many of the first martyrs to Christianity, and often does happen in every age and every country. On the contrary, therefore, we must admit, that all the motions of the body, and of such members thereof as are under the dominion of the Will, ultimately depend upon, and are caused by, the Spirit or Soul, which, by means of this its faculty, called Volition, directs and orders those motions when and which way it pleases. The Spirit therefore is the first mover, and the sole and ultimate cause of all its own determinations, and of all the voluntary motions of the body committed by the Author of nature to its care. It is true, the Spirit seldom acts without a motive; but as there are generally several, and often contrary motives for every determination of the Will, the Spirit has in itself the power to chuse which motive its Will shall be directed by upon every particular occasion; and the Spirit of man seems, in this respect, to have a more absolute power than we can observe in any brute; as we are not so much directed by our passions and affections as they are by their instincts and appetites.

This power of chusing which motive we are to be directed by, is what we properly call the

faculty of Volition, and every man who reflects upon what he feels within, must be intuitively convinced, that he is endued with such a faculty or power, however much he may endeavour to deceive himself and others by metaphysical and sophistical arguments, especially by that of confounding the cause with the motive, which are two words meant to express very different ideas, and consequently are far from being synonymous. Nay, so absolutely free is the Will of the human Spirit, that it may chuse to be directed by that which it judges to be the worst motive; or it may chuse to act contrary to every motive, or without any motive at all; and this last manner of acting is so well known, and so common, that we have dignified it with a particular name, by calling it Whim.

CHAPTER XV.

Of the designing Faculty.

FROM the consideration of the last faculty we discover another faculty with which we find ourselves endued, and which may, properly enough, be called *future Volition*; but it is generally called by the name of *Design*. We determine to do such an action, or to think upon and consider such a subject to-morrow, next day, or at any future time, and find we have a power or faculty of thus determining. This faculty we call *the designing Faculty*, which is an active faculty, and must be a faculty of the Spirit, as it proceeds solely from the Will, and is, as we have said, a future volition; for determining and designing are only two modes of willing, the former whereof relates to the present time, and the latter to the future.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of the foreseeing Faculty.

BY the last mentioned faculty we come naturally to discover another faculty which we call *the foreseeing faculty*. In forming a design, or in considering the actions and incidents of life, we find, we have a power or faculty to examine and discover something of what may be necessary for our success, and of what may probably be the consequences, which is often of great use to us in any present undertaking, but of still more in our future designs: for, after having formed any design, we contemplate and consider what may be proper or necessary for putting our design into execution, and what may prevent it; the latter of which we endeavour to obviate, or avoid, and the former we pursue. This faculty must be a faculty of the Spirit, because it is employed wholly about ideas of things and actions which have not yet happened, which exist no where but in the mind, and which consequently cannot possibly be the object of any of our Senses. With respect to these three last faculties, all brutes seem to be endued with some sort of Will; but as to Design or Forefight,

Forefight, it is probable that all the testimonies they exhibit of either, proceed chiefly from instinct: and even as to their Will, it is in most of them very much under the dominion of their instincts and appetites, for which reason they never act, as men do, from mere *whim*, or against every motive that can be suggested.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of Liberty.

I Cannot dismiss this important faculty without investigating the subject more maturely than I have done in the chapter on Volition. Such is the nature of the soul that the Will not only acts always spontaneously, that is, by its own proper motion, of its own accord, and by an internal principle; but likewise that its determinations are generally accompanied with liberty.

We give the name of Liberty to that force or power of the soul, whereby it modifies and regulates its operations as it pleases, so as to be able to suspend, continue, or alter its deliberations and actions; in a word, so as to be capable of determining

mining and acting with choice, according as it thinks proper. It is by this excellent faculty, that man has a kind of command over himself and his actions; and he is hereby rendered also capable of conforming to rule, and answerable for his conduct; it is therefore necessary to give a further explication of the nature of this faculty.

Will and Liberty being faculties of the soul, they cannot be blind, or destitute of knowledge; but necessarily suppose the operation of the understanding. How is it possible, in fact, to determine, suspend, or alter our resolutions, unless we know what is proper for us to chuse? It is contrary to the nature of an intelligent and rational being to act without intellection and reason. This reason may be either superficial or bad; yet it has some appearance, at least, some glimmering, that makes us give it a momentary approbation. Wherever there is election or choice, there must be a comparison; and a comparison implies, at least, a confused reflexion, a kind of deliberation, though of a quick and almost imperceptible nature, on the subject before us.

The end of our deliberations is to procure us some advantage. For the will tends generally towards good, that is, to whatsoever is really or apparently proper for rendering us happy; inasmuch that all actions depending on man, and that are any way relative to his end, are, for this very reason, subject to the Will. And as truth, or the know-
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ledge of things, is agreeable to man, and in this signification truth is also a good, it follows therefore that truth forms one of the principal objects of the Will.

Liberty, like the Will, has goodness and truth for its object; but it has less extent with regard to actions; for it does not exercise itself in all the acts of the Will, but only in those which the soul has a power of suspending or altering as she pleases.

But if any one should enquire, which are those acts wherein Liberty displays itself? We answer, that they are easily known by attending to what passes within us, and to the manner, in which the mind conducts itself in the several cases that daily occur: as in the first place in our judgments concerning true and false; secondly, in our determinations in relation to good and evil; and finally, in indifferent matters. These particulars are necessary in order to be acquainted with the nature, use, and extent of Liberty.

With regard to truth, we are formed in such a manner, that as soon as evidence strikes the mind, we are no longer at liberty to suspend our judgment. Vain would be the attempt to resist this sparkling light; it absolutely forces our assent. Who, for example, could pretend to deny that the whole is greater than its part, or that harmony and peace are preferable, either in a family or state, to discord, tumult, and war.

The same cannot be affirmed in regard to things,
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that have less perspicuity and evidence ; for in these the use of liberty displays itself in its full extent. It is true our mind inclines naturally to that side which seems the most probable ; but this does not debar it from suspending its assent in order to seek for new proofs, or to refer the whole inquiry to another opportunity. The obscurer things are, the more we are at liberty to hesitate, to suspend, or defer our determinations. This is a point sufficiently evinced by experience. Every day, and at every step, as it were, disputes arise, in which the arguments on both sides leaves us, by reason of our limited capacity, in a kind of doubt and equilibrium, which permits us to suspend our judgment, to examine the thing anew, and to incline the balance at length to one side more than the other. We find, for example, that the mind can hesitate a long time, and forbear determining itself, even after a mature inquiry, in respect to the following questions : Whether an oath extorted by violence is obligatory ? Whether the murder of Cæsar was lawful ? Whether the Roman senate could with justice refuse to confirm the promise made by the consuls to the Samnites, in order to extricate themselves from the *Caudine Forks* ; or whether they ought to have ratified and given it the force of a public treaty ? &c.

Though there is no exercise of liberty in our judgments, when things present themselves to us
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in a clear and a distinct manner ; still we must not imagine that the entire use of this faculty ceases in respect to things that are evident. For in the first place, it is always in our power to apply our minds to the consideration of those things, or else to divert them from it by transferring somewhere else our attention. This first determination of the will, by which it is led to consider, or not to consider, the objects that occur to us, merits particular notice, because of the natural influence it must have on the very determination, by which we conclude to act or not to act, in consequence of our thoughts and judgments. Secondly, we have it likewise in our power to create, as it were, evidence in some cases, by dint of attention and inquiry ; whereas at first setting out we had only some glimmerings, sufficient to give us an adequate knowledge of the state of things. In fine, when we have attained this evidence, we are still at liberty to dwell more or less on the consideration thereof ; which is also of great consequence, because on this depends its greater or less degree of impression.

These remarks lead us to an important reflexion, which may serve for answer to an objection raised against Liberty. “ It is not in our power, say they, to perceive things otherwise than as they offer themselves to our mind ; now our judgments are formed on this perception of things ; and it is by these judgments that the will is determined ;

mined : the whole is therefore necessary and independent of Liberty."

But this difficulty carries little more with it than an empty appearance. Let people say what they will, we are always at liberty to open or shut our eyes to the light ; to sustain, or relax our attention. Experience shews, that when we view an object in different lights, and determine to search into the bottom of matters, we descry several things that escaped us at first sight. This is sufficient to prove, that there is an exercise of Liberty in the operations of the understanding, as well as in the several actions thereon depending.

The second question we have to examine is, whether we are equally free in our determinations, in regard to good and evil.

To decide this point we need not stir out of our selves ; for here also by facts and even by our internal experience the question may be determined. Certain it is, that in respect to good and evil considered in general, and as such, we cannot, properly speaking, exercise our Liberty, by reason that we feel ourselves drawn towards the one by an invincible propensity, and estranged from the other by a natural and insuperable aversion. Thus it has been ordered by the Author of our being, whilst man has no power in this respect to change his nature. We are formed in such a manner, that good of necessity allures us ; whereas evil, by an opposite effect, repels us, as it were, and deters us from attempting to pursue it.

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But this strong tendency to good, and natural aversion to evil in general, do not debar us from being perfectly free in respect to good and evil particularly considered; and though we cannot help being sensible of the first impressions which the objects make on us, yet this does not invincibly determine us to pursue or shun those objects. Let the most beautiful and most fragrant fruit, replenished with exquisite and delicious juice, be unexpectedly set before a person oppressed with thirst and heat; he will find himself instantly inclined to seize on the blessing that is offered to him, and to ease his inquietude by a salutary refreshment. But he can also stop, and suspend his action, in order to examine whether the good he proposes to himself by eating this fruit, will not be attended with evil; in short, he is at liberty to weigh and deliberate, in order to embrace the safest side of the question. Besides, we are not only capable, with the assistance of reason, to deprive ourselves of a thing, whose flattering idea invites us; but moreover we are able to expose ourselves to a chagrin or pain, which we dread and would willingly avoid, were we not induced by superior considerations to support it. Can any one desire a stronger proof of Liberty?

True it is notwithstanding, that the exercise of this faculty never displays itself more than in indifferent things. I find, for instance, that it de-

pende entirely on myself to stretch out or draw back my hand ; to sit down or to walk ; to direct my steps to the right or left, &c. On these occasions, where the soul is left entirely to itself, either for want of external motives, or by reason of the opposition, and, as it were, the equilibrium of these motives, if it determines one side, this may be said to be the pure effect of its pleasure and good will, and of the command it has over its own actions.

Let us stop here a while to inquire, how comes it that the exercise of this power is limited to particular goods and non-evident truths, without extending itself to good in general, or to such truths as are perfectly clear. Should we happen to discover the reason thereof, it will furnish us with a new subject to admire the wisdom of the Creator in the constitution of man, and with a means at the same time of being better acquainted with the end and true use of Liberty.

And first, we hope there is no body but will admit, that the end of God in creating man was to render him happy. Upon this supposition, it will be soon agreed that man cannot attain happiness any other way than by the knowledge of truth, and by the possession of real good. Let us therefore direct our reflexions towards this prospect. When things, that are the object of our researches, present themselves to our minds with a feeble light, and
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are not accompanied with that splendor and clearness, which enables us to know them perfectly, and to judge of them with full certainty; it is proper and even necessary for us to be invested with a power of suspending our judgments; to the end that not being necessarily determined to acquiesce in the first impressions, we should be still at liberty to carry on our inquiry, till we arrive to a higher degree of certainty, and, if possible, as far as evidence itself. Were not this the case, we should be exposed every moment to error, without any possibility of being undeceived. It was therefore extremely useful and necessary to man, that under such circumstances he should have the use and exercise of his Liberty.

But when we happen to have a clear and distinct view of things and their relations, that is, when evidence strikes us, it would be of no manner of signification to have the use of Liberty in order to suspend our judgments. For certainty being then in its very highest degree, what benefit should we reap by a new examen or inquiry, were it in our power? We have no longer occasion to consult a guide, when we see distinctly the end we are tending to, and the road we are to take. It is therefore an advantage to man to be unable to refuse his assent to evidence.

Let us reason pretty nearly in the same manner on the use of Liberty with respect to good and evil. Man designed for happiness, should cer-

tainly have been formed in such a manner, as to find himself under an absolute necessity of desiring and pursuing good, and of shunning on the contrary evil in general. Were the nature of these faculties such, as to leave him in a state of indifference, so as to be at liberty in this respect to suspend or alter his desires, plain it is that this would be esteemed a very great imperfection in him; an imperfection that would imply a want of wisdom in the Author of his being, as a thing directly opposite to the end he proposed in giving him life.

No less an inconveniency would it be on the other hand, were the necessity which man is under of pursuing good and avoiding evil to be such as would insuperably determine him to act or not to act, in consequence of the impressions made on him by each object. Such is the state of human things, that we are frequently deceived by appearances; it is very rare that good or evil presents itself to us pure and without mixture; but there is almost always a favourable and adverse side, an inconveniency mixed with utility. In order to act therefore with safety, and not to be mistaken in our account, it is generally incumbent upon us to suspend our first motions, to examine more closely into things, to make distinctions, calculations, and compensations; all which requires the use of Liberty. Liberty is therefore, as it were, a subsidiary faculty, which supplies the deficiencies
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of the other powers, and whose office ceaseth as soon as it has redressed them.

Hence let us conclude, that man is provided with all the necessary means for attaining to the end for which he is designed ; and that in this, as in every other respect, the Creator has acted with wonderful wisdom.

After what has been said concerning the nature, operations, and use of Liberty, it may seem perhaps unnecessary to attempt here to prove that man is indeed a free agent, and that we are as really invested with this as with any other faculty.

Nevertheless as it is an essential principle, and one of the fundamental supports of our edifice, it is proper to make the reader sensible of the indubitable proof with which we are furnished by daily experience. Let us therefore consult only ourselves. Every one finds that he is master, for instance, to walk or sit, to speak or hold his tongue. Do not we also experience continually, that it depends intirely on ourselves to suspend our judgments, in order to proceed to a new inquiry ? Can any one seriously deny, that in the choice of good and evil our resolves are unconstrained ; that notwithstanding the first impressions, we have it in our power to stop of a sudden, to weigh the arguments on both sides, and to do, in short, whatever can be expected from the freest agent ? Were I invincibly drawn towards one particular good rather than another, I should feel then

the same impression as that which inclines me to good in general, that is, an impression that would necessarily drag me, an impression which there would be no possibility of resisting. Now experience makes me feel no such violence with respect to any particular good. I find I can abstain from it; I can defer using it; I can prefer something else to it; I can hesitate in my choice; in short, I am my own master to chuse, or which is the same thing, I am *free*.

Should we be asked, how comes it, that not being free in respect to good in general, yet we are at liberty with regard to particular goods? My answer, is that the natural desire of happiness does not insuperably draw us towards any particular good, because no particular good includes that happiness for which we have a necessary inclination.

Sensible proofs, like these, are superior to all objections, and productive of the most inward conviction, because it is impossible that when the soul is modified after a certain manner, it should not feel this modification and the state which consequently attends it. What other certainty have we of our existence? And how is it we know that we think, we act, but by our inward sense?

This sense of Liberty is so much the less equivocal, as it is not momentary or transient. It is a sense that never leaves us, and of which we have daily and continual experience.

Thus

Thus we see there is nothing better established in life, than the strong persuasion which all mankind have of Liberty. Let us consider the system of humanity, either in general or particular, we shall find that the whole is built upon this principle. Reflexions, deliberations, researches, actions, judgments: all suppose the use of Liberty. Hence the ideas of good and evil, of vice and virtue: hence, as a natural consequence, arises praise or blame, the censure or approbation of our own, or other people's conduct. The same may be said of the affections and natural sentiments of men towards one another; as friendship, benevolence, gratitude, hatred, anger, complaints, and reproaches: none of these sentiments could take place, unless we were to admit of Liberty. In fine, as this prerogative is in some measure the key of the human system, he that does not allow it to man, subverts all order, and introduces a general confusion.

It is natural here to inquire, how it was ever possible for any body seriously to doubt, whether man is master of his actions, whether he is free? I should be less surprized at this doubt, where it concerning a strange or remote fact, a fact that was not transacted within ourselves. But the question is in regard to a thing, of which we have an internal immediate feeling, a constant and daily experience. Strange, that any one should call in question a faculty of the soul! May not

we as well doubt of the understanding and will, as of the Liberty of man? For if we are content to abide by our inward sense, there is no more room to dispute of one than of the other. But some too subtle philosophers, by considering this subject in a metaphysical light, have stripped it, as it were, of its nature; and finding themselves at a loss to solve a few difficulties, they have given a greater attention to these difficulties than to the positive proofs of the thing; which insensibly led them to imagine that the notion of Liberty was all an illusion. I own it is necessary, in the research of truth, to consider an object on every side, and to balance equally the arguments for and against; nevertheless we must take care we do not give to those objections more than their real weight. We are informed by experience that in several things, which in respect to us are invested with the highest degree of certainty, there are many difficulties notwithstanding, which we are incapable of resolving to our satisfaction: and this is a natural consequence of the limits of the mind. Let us hence, conclude therefore *that when a truth is sufficiently evinced by solid reasons, whatever can be objected against it, ought not to stagger or weaken our conviction, as long as they are such difficulties only as embarrass or puzzle the mind, without invalidating the proofs themselves.* This rule is so very useful in the study of the sciences, that one should keep it always in sight.

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There is a wide difference between seeing that a thing is absurd, and not knowing all that regards it; between an unanswerable question in relation to a truth, and an unanswerable objection against it; though a great many confound these two sorts of difficulties. Those only of the last order are able to prove, that what was taken for a known truth cannot be true, because otherwise some absurdity must ensue. But the others prove nothing but the ignorance we are under in relation to several things that regard a known truth. Let us resume now the thread of our reflexions.

The denomination of voluntary or human actions in general is given to all those that depend on the will; and that of free, to such as come within the jurisdiction of Liberty, which the soul can suspend or turn as it pleases. The opposite of voluntary is involuntary; and the contrary of free is necessary, or whatever is done by force or constraint. All human actions are voluntary, inasmuch as there are none but what proceed from ourselves, and of which we are the authors. But if violence, used by an external force, which we are incapable to resist, hinders us from acting, or makes us act without the consent of our will; as when a person stronger than ourselves lays hold of our arm to strike or wound another person, the action resulting thence being involuntary, is not, properly speaking, our deed or action, but that of the agent from whom we suffer this violence.

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The same cannot be said of actions that are forced and constrained, only as we are determined to commit them through fear of a great and imminent evil with which we are menaced: As, for instance, were an unjust and cruel prince to oblige a judge to condemn an innocent person, by menacing to put him to death if he did not obey his orders. Actions of this sort, though forced in some sense, because we commit them with reluctance, and would never consent to them were it not for a very pressing necessity; such actions, I say, are ranked nevertheless among the number of voluntary actions, because after all, they are produced by a deliberation of the will, which chuses between two inevitable evils, and determines to prefer the least to the greatest. This will become more intelligible by a few examples.

A person gives alms to a poor man, who exposes his wants and misery to him; this action is at the same time both voluntary and free. But suppose a man that travels alone and disarmed, falls into the hands of robbers, and that these miscreants menace him with instant death, unless he gives them all he has; the surrender which this traveller makes of his money in order to save his life, is indeed a voluntary action, but constrained at the same time, and void of Liberty. For which reason there are some that distinguish these actions by the name of mixt, as partaking of the voluntary and involuntary. They are voluntary, because the principle
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that produces them is in the agent itself, and the will determines to commit them as the least of two evils: but they partake of the involuntary, because the will executes them contrary to its inclination, which it would never do, could it find any other expedient to clear itself of the dilemma.

Another necessary elucidation is, that we are to suppose that the evil with which we are menaced, is considerable enough to make a reasonable impression upon a prudent or wise man, so far as to intimidate him; and besides that, the person who compels us has no right to restrain our liberty; in so much that we do not lie under an obligation of bearing with any hardship or inconveniency, rather than displease him. Under these circumstances, reason would have us determine to suffer the lesser evil, supposing at least that they are both inevitable. This kind of constraint lays us under what is called a moral necessity; whereas when we are absolutely compelled to act, without being able, in any shape whatsoever, to avoid it, this is termed a physical necessity.

It is therefore a necessary point of philosophical exactness to distinguish between voluntary and free. In fact it is easy to comprehend, by what has been now said, that all free actions are indeed voluntary, but all voluntary actions are not free. Nevertheless, the common and vulgar way of speaking frequently confounds those two terms, of which we ought to take particular notice, in order to avoid all ambiguity.

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We give likewise the name of manners sometimes to free actions, inasmuch as the mind considers them as susceptible of rule. Hence we call morality the art which teaches those rules of conduct, and the method of conforming thereto our actions.

We shall finish what relates to the faculties of the soul by some remarks, which will help us to understand better their nature and use.

1. Our faculties assist one another in their operations, and when they are all united in the same subject, they act always jointly. We have already observed that the will supposes the understanding, and that the light of reason serves for a guide to liberty. Thus the understanding, the will, and liberty; the senses, the imagination, and memory; the instincts, inclinations, and passions, are like so many different springs, which concur all to produce a particular effect; and it is by this united concurrence we at length attain the knowledge of truth, and the possession of solid good, on which our perfection and happiness depend.

2. But in order to procure to ourselves those advantages, it is not only necessary that our faculties be well constituted in themselves, but moreover we ought to make a good use of them, and maintain the natural subordination there is between them and the different motions, which lead us towards, or divert us from, certain objects. It is not therefore sufficient to know the common and natural state of our faculties; we should likewise be acquainted

acquainted with their state of perfection, and know in what their real use consists. Now truth being the proper object of the understanding, the perfection of this faculty is to have a distinct knowledge of truth; at least of those important truths, which concern our duty and happiness. For such a purpose, this faculty should be formed to a close attention, a just discernment, and solid reasoning. The understanding thus perfected, and considered as having actually the principles which enable us to know and to distinguish the true and the useful, is what is properly called reason; and hence it is that we are apt to speak of reason as of a light of the mind, and as of a rule by which we ought always to be directed in our judgments and actions.

If we consider in like manner the will in its state of perfection, we shall find it consists in the force and habit of determining always right, that is, not to desire any thing but what reason dictates, and not to make use of our liberty but in order to chuse the best. This sage direction of the will is properly called Virtue, and sometimes goes by the name of Reason. And as the perfection of the soul depends on the mutual succours which the faculties, considered in their most perfect state, lend to one another; we understand likewise sometimes by reason, taken in a more vague, and more extensive sense, the soul itself, considered with all its faculties, and as making actually a good use of them.

them. Thus the term *reason* carries with it always an idea of perfection, which is sometimes applied to the soul in general, and at other times to some of the faculties in particular.

3. The faculties of which we are treating, are common to all mankind ; but they are not found always in the same degree, neither are they determined after the same manner. Besides, they have their periods in every man ; that is, their increase, perfection, enfeebling, and decay, in the same manner almost as the organs of the body. They vary likewise exceedingly in different men : one has a brighter understanding ; another a quicker sensation ; this man has a strong imagination ; while another is swayed by violent passions. And all this is combined and diversified an infinite number of ways, according to the difference of temperaments, education, examples, and occasions that furnish an opportunity for exercising certain faculties or inclinations rather than others ; for it is the exercise that strengthens them more or less. Such is the source of that prodigious variety of geniuses, tastes, and habits, which constitutes what we call the characters and manners of men ; a variety which, considered in general, very far from being unserviceable, is of great use in the views of Providence.

But whatever strength may be attributed to the inclinations, passions, and habits, still it is necessary to observe, that they have never enough to
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impel man invincibly to act contrary to reason. Reason has it always in her power to preserve her superiority and rights. She is able, with care and application, to correct vicious dispositions, to prevent and even to extirpate bad habits; to bridle the most unruly passions by sage precautions, to weaken them by degrees, and finally to destroy them entirely, or to reduce them within their proper bounds. This is sufficiently proved by the inward sense, that every man has of the liberty with which he determines to follow this sort of impressions; proved by the secret reproaches we make to ourselves, when we have been too much swayed by them; proved, in fine, by an infinite variety of examples. True it is, that there is some difficulty in surmounting these obstacles; but this is richly compensated by the glory attending so noble a victory, and by the solid advantages thence arising.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of Conscience.

CONSCIENCE is properly no more than reason itself considered as instructed in regard to the *rule we ought to follow*, or to the law of nature ; and judging of the morality of our own actions, and of the obligations we are under in this respect, by comparing them to this rule, pursuant to the ideas we entertain thereof.

Conscience is also very frequently taken for the very judgment we pass on the morality of actions ; a judgment which is the result of perfect reasoning, or the consequence we infer from two express or tacit premises. A person compares two propositions, one of which includes the law, and the other the action ; and thence he deduces a third, which is the judgment he makes of the quality of his action. Such was the reasoning of Judas : *Whosoever delivers up an innocent man to death, commits a crime ; here is the law. Now this is what I have done ; here is the action. I have therefore committed a crime ; this is the consequence, or judgment which his conscience passed on the action he committed.*

Conscience

Conscience supposes therefore a knowledge of the law; and particularly of the law of nature, which being the primitive source of justice, is likewise the supreme rule of conduct. And as the laws cannot serve us for rules, but inasmuch as they are known, it follows therefore, that conscience becomes thus the immediate rule of our actions: for it is evident we cannot conform to the law, but so far as we have notice of it.

This being premised, the *first rule* we have to lay down concerning this matter is, that we must enlighten our conscience, as well as consult it, and follow its counsels.

We must enlighten our conscience; that is, we must spare no care or pains to be exactly instructed with regard to the will of the legislator, and the disposition of his laws, in order to acquire just ideas of whatever is commanded, forbidden, or permitted. For plain it is, that were we in ignorance or error in this respect, the judgment we should form of our actions would be necessarily vicious, and would consequently lead us astray. But this is not enough. We must join to this first knowledge, the knowledge also of the action. And for this purpose, it is not only necessary to examine this action in itself; but we ought likewise to be attentive to the particular circumstances that accompany it, and the consequences that from thence may follow. Otherwise we should run a risk of being mistaken in the application of

the laws, whose general decisions admit of several modifications, according to the different circumstances that accompany our actions; which necessarily influences their morality, and of course our duties. Thus it is not sufficient for a judge to be well acquainted with the tenor and purport of the law, before he pronounces sentence; he should likewise have an exact knowledge of the fact and all its different circumstances.

But it is not merely with a view of enlightening our reason, that we ought to acquire all this knowledge; it is principally in order to apply it occasionally to the direction of our conduct. We should therefore, whenever it concerns us to act, consult previously our conscience, and be directed by its counsels. This is properly an indispensable obligation. For, in fine, conscience being, as it were, the minister and interpreter of the will of the legislator, the counsels it gives us, have all the force and authority of a law, and ought to produce the same effect upon us.

It is only therefore by enlightening our conscience, that it becomes a sure rule of conduct, whose dictates may be followed with a perfect confidence of exactly fulfilling our duty. For we should be grossly mistaken, if, under a notion that conscience is the immediate rule of our actions, we were to believe that every man may lawfully do whatever he imagines the law commands or permits. We ought first to know whether this
notion

notion or persuasion is justly founded. For, as Puffendorf observes, conscience has no share in the direction of human actions, but inasmuch as it is instructed concerning the law, whose office it properly is to direct our actions. If we have therefore a mind to determine and act with safety, we must, on every particular occasion, observe the two following rules, which are very simple of themselves, easy to practise, and naturally follow our first rule, of which they are only a kind of elucidation.

Second rule. Before we determine to follow the dictates of conscience, we should examine thoroughly whether we have the necessary lights and helps to judge of the things before us. If we happen to want these lights and helps, we can neither decide, nor much less undertake any thing, without an inexcusable and dangerous temerity. And yet nothing is more common than to transgress against this rule. What multitudes, for example, determine on religious disputes, or difficult questions concerning morality or politics, though they are no way capable of judging or reasoning about them?

Third rule. Supposing that in general we have necessary lights and helps to judge of the affair before us, we must afterwards see whether we have actually made use of them; insomuch, that without a new enquiry we may follow what our conscience suggests. It happens every day that

for want of attending to this rule, we let ourselves be quietly prevailed upon to do a great many things, which we might easily discover to be unjust, had we given heed to certain clear principles, the justice and necessity of which are universally acknowledged.

When we have made use of the rules here laid down, we have done whatever we could and ought; and it is morally certain, that by thus proceeding we can be neither mistaken in our judgment, nor wrong in our determinations. But if, notwithstanding all these precautions, we should happen to be mistaken, which is not absolutely impossible; this would be a fault of infirmity, inseparable from human nature, and would carry its excuse along with it in the eyes of the supreme legislator.

We judge of our actions either before, or after we have done them; wherefore there is an antecedent and a subsequent conscience.

This distinction gives us an opportunity to lay down a *fourth rule*; which is, that a prudent man ought to consult his conscience before and after he has acted.

To determine to act, without having previously examined, whether what we are going to do be good or evil, manifestly indicates an indifference to our duty, which is a most dangerous state in respect to man; a state capable of throwing him into the most fatal excesses. But as, in this first judgment,

judgment, we may happen to be determined by passion with precipitation, or upon a very slight investigation; it is therefore necessary to reflect again on what we have done, either in order to be confirmed in the right side, if we have embraced it; or to correct our mistake, if possible, and to guard against the like faults for the future. This is so much the more important, as experience shews us, that we frequently judge quite differently of a past and of a future transaction; and that the prejudices or passions which may lead us astray, when we are to take our resolution, often disappear either in the whole or part, when the action is over; and leave us then more at liberty to judge rightly of the nature and consequences of the action.

The habit of making this double examination, is the essential character of an honest man; and indeed nothing can be a better proof of our being seriously inclined to discharge our several duties.

The effect resulting from this revival of our conduct, is very different, according as the judgment we pass on it, absolves or condemns us. In the first case, we find ourselves in a state of satisfaction and tranquillity, which is the surest and sweetest recompence of virtue. A pure and untainted pleasure accompanies always those actions that are approved by reason; and reflection renews the sweets we have tasted, together with their remembrance. And indeed what greater

happinefs is there than to be inwardly fatisfied, and to be able with a juft confidence to promife ourfelves the approbation and benevolence of the fovereign Lord, on whom we depend? If, on the contrary, confcience condemns us, this condemnation muft be accompanied with inquietude, trouble, reproaches, fear, and remorse; a ftate fo difmal, that the ancients have compared it to that of a man tormented by the furies. “Every crime,” fays the fatyriſt, “is difapproved by the very perſon that commits it; and the firſt puniſhment the criminal feels, is, that he cannot avoid being ſelf-condemned, were he even to find means of being acquitted before the prætor’s tribunal.

“*Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipſi Diſplicet auctori: prima hæc eſt ultio, quod, ſe Judice, nemo nocens abſolvitur, improba quamvis Gratia fallaci prætoris vicerit urnâ.*”

JUV. SAT. 13. ver. 1.

“He that commits a ſin, ſhall quickly find
The preſſing guilt lie heavy on his mind;
Though bribes or favour ſhall aſſert his cauſe,
Pronounce him guiltleſs, and elude the laws:
None quits himſelf; his own impartial thought
Will damn, and confcience will record the fault.”

CREECH.

Hence the ſubſequent confcience is ſaid to be quiet or uneaſy, good or bad.

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The judgment we pass on the morality of our actions is likewise susceptible of several different modifications that produce new distinctions of conscience, which we should here point out. These distinctions may, in general, be equally applied to the first two species of conscience above-mentioned; but they seem more frequently and particularly to agree with the antecedent conscience.

Conscience is therefore either decisive or dubious, according to the degree of persuasion a person may have concerning the quality of the action.

When we pronounce decisively, and without any hesitation, that an action is conformable or opposite to the law, or that it is permitted, and consequently we ought to do or omit it, or else that we are at liberty in this respect; this is called a decisive conscience. If, on the contrary, the mind remains in suspense, through the conflict of reasons we see on both sides, and which appear to us of equal weight, insomuch that we cannot tell to which side we ought to incline; this is called a dubious conscience. Such was the doubt of the Corinthians, who did not know whether they could eat things sacrificed to idols, or whether they ought to abstain from them. On the one side, the evangelical liberty seemed to permit it; on the other, they were restrained through apprehension of seeming to give thereby a kind of consent to idolatrous acts. Not knowing what reso-

lution to take, they wrote to St. Paul to remove their doubt.

This distinction makes room also for some rules.

Fifth rule. We do not entirely discharge our duty, by doing with a kind of difficulty and reluctance, what the decisive conscience ordains; we ought to set about it readily, willingly, and with pleasure. On the contrary, to determine without hesitation or repugnance, against the motions of such conscience, is shewing the highest degree of depravation and malice, and renders a person incomparably more criminal than if he were impelled by a violent passion or temptation.

Sixth rule. With regard to a dubious conscience, we ought to use all endeavours to get rid of our uncertainty, and to forbear acting, so long as we do not know whether we do good or evil. To behave ourselves otherwise, would indicate an indirect contempt of the law, by exposing one's self voluntarily to the hazard of violating it, which is a very bad conduct. The rule now mentioned ought to be attended to, especially in matters of great importance.

Seventh rule. But if we find ourselves in such circumstances as necessarily oblige us to determine to act, we must then, by a new attention, endeavour to distinguish the safest and most probable side, and of which the consequences are least dangerous. Such is generally the opposite side to passion; it being the safest way, not to listen too much

much to our inclinations. In like manner, we run very little risk of being mistaken in a dubious case, by following rather the dictates of charity than the suggestions of self love.

Besides the dubious conscience, properly so called, and which we may likewise distinguish by the name of irresolute, there is a scrupulous conscience, produced by slight and frivolous difficulties that arise in the mind, without seeing any solid reason for doubting.

Eighth rule. Such scruples as these ought not to hinder us from acting, if it be necessary; and as they generally arise either from a false delicacy of conscience, or from gross superstition, we should soon get rid of them, were we to examine the thing with attention.

Let us observe, that the decisive conscience, according as it determines good or evil, is either right or erroneous.

Those, for example, who imagine we ought to abstain from strict revenge, though the law of nature permits a legitimate defence, have a right conscience. On the other hand, those who think that the law which requires us to be faithful to our engagements, is not obligatory towards heretics, and that we may lawfully break through it in respect to them, have an erroneous conscience.

But what must we do in case of an erroneous conscience?

Ninth

Ninth rule. I answer, that we ought always to follow the dictates of conscience, even when it is erroneous, and whether the error be vincible or invincible.

This rule may appear strange at first sight, since it seems to prescribe evil; because there is no manner of question, but that a man who acts according to an erroneous conscience, espouses a bad cause. Yet this is not so bad, as if we were to determine to do a thing, with a firm persuasion of its being contrary to the decision of the law; for this would denote a direct contempt of the legislator and his orders, which is a most vicious disposition. Whereas the first resolution, though bad in itself, is nevertheless the effect of a laudable disposition to obey the legislator, and conform to his will.

But it does not thence follow, that we are always excusable in being guided by the dictates of an erroneous conscience; this is true only when the error happens to be invincible. If on the contrary it is surmountable, and we are mistaken in respect to what is commanded or forbidden, we sin either way, whether we act according to, or against the decisions of conscience. This shews (to mention it once more) what an important concern it is to enlighten our conscience, because, in the case just now mentioned, the person with an erroneous conscience is actually under a melancholy necessity of doing ill, whichever side he takes.

takes. But if we should happen to be mistaken with regard to an indifferent thing, which we are erroneously persuaded is commanded or forbidden, we do not sin in that case, but when we act contrary to the light of our own conscience.

In fine, there are two sorts of right conscience; the one clear and demonstrative, and the other merely probable.

The clear and demonstrative conscience is that which is founded on certain principles, and on demonstrative reasons, so far as the nature of moral things will permit; inasmuch that one may clearly and distinctly prove the rectitude of a judgment made on such or such an action. On the contrary, though we are convinced of the truth of a judgment, yet if it be founded only on verisimilitude, and we cannot demonstrate its certainty in a methodical manner, and by incontestible principles, it is then only a probable conscience.

The foundations of probable conscience are in general authority and example, supported by a confused notion of a natural fitness, and sometimes by popular reasons, which seem drawn from the very nature of things. It is by this kind of conscience that the greatest part of mankind are conducted, there being very few who are capable of knowing the indispensable necessity of their duties, by deducing them from their first sources by a methodical train of consequences; especially
when

when the point relates to maxims of morality, which being somewhat remote from the first principles, require a longer chain of reasonings. This conduct is far from being unreasonable. For those who have not sufficient light of themselves to judge properly of the nature of things, cannot do better than recur to the judgment of enlightened persons; this being the only resource left them to act with safety. We might in this respect compare the persons now mentioned, to young people, whose judgment has not yet acquired its full maturity, and who ought to listen and conform to the counsels of their superiors. The authority therefore, and example of sage and enlightened men, may in some cases, in default of our own lights, prove a reasonable principle of determination and conduct.

But, in fine, since those foundations of probable conscience are not so solid as to permit us absolutely to build upon them, we must therefore establish, as a *Tenth rule*, that we ought to use all our endeavours to increase the degree of verisimilitude in our opinions, in order to approach as near as possible to the clear and demonstrative conscience; and we must not be satisfied with probability, but when we can do no better.

CHAPTER XIX.

Of Immortality.

LET us conclude this view of the mental faculties with the most important of all enquiries to man; whether death be really the last term of our existence, and the dissolution of the body be necessarily followed with the annihilation of the soul; or whether the soul is immortal, that is, whether it subsists after the death of the body?

Now the immortality of the soul is so far from being in itself impossible, that reason supplies us with the strongest conjectures, that this is in reality the state for which it was designed.

§. 1. The observations of the ablest philosophers distinguish absolutely the soul from the body, as being of a nature essentially different. 1. In fact, we do not find that the faculties of the soul, the understanding, the will, liberty, with all the operations they produce, have any relation to those of extension, figure and motion, which are the properties of matter. 2. The idea we have of an extended substance as purely passive, seems to be absolutely incompatible with that proper and internal

ternal activity which distinguishes a thinking being. The body is not thrown into motion of itself; but the mind finds inwardly the principle of her own movements: she acts, she thinks, she wills, she moves the body; she turns its operations as she pleases; she stops, proceeds, or returns the way she went. 3. We observe likewise, that our thinking part is a simple, single, and indivisible being; because it collects all our ideas and sensations, as it were, into one point, by understanding, feeling, and comparing them, &c. which cannot be done by a being composed of various parts.

§. 2. The soul seems therefore to be of a particular nature, to have nothing in common with gross and material beings, but to be a pure spirit, that participates in some measure of the nature of the supreme Being. This has been very elegantly expressed by Cicero: "We cannot find, says he *, on earth the least trace of the origin of the soul. For there is nothing mixed or compound in
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* " Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest: nihil enim in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terrâ natum atque fictum esse videatur: nihil ne aut humidum quidem aut stabile aut igneum. His enim naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti possit præsentia: quæ sola divina sunt; nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a Deo. Singularis est igitur
quædam

the mind; nothing that seems to proceed from the earth, water, air, or fire. These elements have nothing productive of memory, understanding, reflexion; nothing that is able to recall the past, to foresee the future, and to embrace the present. We shall never find the source from whence man has derived those divine qualities, but by tracing them up to God. It follows therefore, that the soul is endowed with a singular nature, which has nothing in it common with those known and familiar elements. Hence, let the nature of a being that has sensation, understanding, will, and principle of life, be what it will, this being is surely heavenly, divine, and consequently immortal."

This conclusion is very just. For if the soul is essentially distinct from the body, the destruction of the one is not necessarily followed with the annihilation of the other; and thus far nothing hinders the soul from subsisting notwithstanding the destruction of its ruinous habitation.

§. 3. Should it be said, that we are not sufficiently acquainted with the intrinsic nature of substances, to determine that God could not

quædem natura atque vis animi, sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, cœleste et divinum ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est." Cic. Tuscul. disput. lib. 1. cap. 27.

communicate

communicate thought to some portion of matter? I should answer, that we cannot however judge of things but according to their appearance and our ideas; otherwise, whatever is not founded on a strict demonstration, must be uncertain in the sciences; which would terminate in a kind of pyrrhonism. All that reason requires here of us, is, that we distinguish properly between what is dubious, probable, or certain; and as all we know in relation to matter, does not seem to have any affinity with the faculties of the soul; and as we even find in one and the other, qualities that seem incompatible; it is not prescribing limits to the Divine Power, it is rather following the notions that reason has furnished us, to affirm that it is highly probable, the thinking part of man is essentially distinct from the body.

§. 4. But let the nature of the soul be what it will, and be it even, though contrary to all appearance, supposed corporeal; still it would no ways follow, that the death of the body must necessarily bring on the annihilation of the soul. For we do not find an instance of any annihilation properly so called. The body itself, how inferior soever to the soul, is not annihilated by death. It receives, indeed, a great alteration; but its substance remains always essentially the same, and admits only a change of modification or form. Why therefore should the soul be annihilated? It will undergo, if you please, a great
mutation;

mutation ; it will be loosed from the bonds that fasten it to the body, and will be incapable of operating in conjunction with it : but is this an argument that it cannot exist separately, or that it loses its essential quality, which is that of understanding ? This does not at all appear, for one does not follow from the other.

Were it therefore impossible for us to determine the intrinsic nature of the soul, yet it would be carrying the thing too far, and concluding beyond what we are authorized by fact to maintain, that death is necessarily attended with a total destruction of the soul. The question is therefore reducible to this point : is God willing to annihilate, or to preserve the soul ? But if what we know in respect to the nature of the soul, does not incline us to think it is destined to perish by death ; we shall see likewise, that the consideration of its excellency is a very strong presumption in favour of its immortality.

§. 5. And indeed it is not at all probable, that an intelligent being, capable of knowing such a multitude of truths, of making so many discoveries, of reasoning upon an infinite number of things, of discerning their proportions, fitness, and beauties ; of contemplating the works of the Creator, of tracing them up to him, of observing his designs, and penetrating into their causes ; of raising himself above all sensible things, to the knowledge of spiritual and divine subjects ; that

has a power to act with liberty and discernment, and to array itself with the most beautiful virtues; it is not, I say, at all probable, that a being adorned with qualities of so excellent a nature, and so superior to those of brute animals, should have been created only for the short space of this life. These considerations made a lively impression upon the ancient philosophers. "When I consider," says Cicero *, "the surprizing activity of the mind, so great a memory of what is past, and such an insight into futurity; when I behold such a number of arts and sciences, and such a multitude of discoveries thence arising; I believe, and am firmly persuaded, that a nature which contains so many things within itself, cannot be mortal."

§. 6. Again: such is the nature of the human mind, that it is always capable of improvement, and of perfecting its faculties. Though our knowledge is actually confined within certain limits, yet we see no bounds to that which we are capable of acquiring, to the inventions we are able to make, to the progress of our judgment, prudence, and virtue. Man is in this respect always susceptible of some new degree of perfection

* "Quid multa? Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat, esse mortalem." Cic. de Senec. cap. 2.

and maturity. Death overtakes him before he has finished, as it were, his progress, and when he was capable of proceeding a great deal farther. "How can it enter," says a celebrated English writer *, "into the thoughts of man, that the soul, which is capable of such immense perfections, and of receiving new improvements to all eternity, shall fall away into nothing almost as soon as it is created? Are such abilities made for no purpose? A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass: in a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more, would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full blown, and incapable of further enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being that is in a perpetual progress of improvements, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of its Creator, and made a few discoveries of his infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the very beginning of her enquiries?"

§. 7. True it is, that most men debase themselves in some measure to an animal life, and have

* Spectator, Vol. II. No. 3.

very little concern about the improvement of their faculties. But if those people voluntarily degrade themselves, this ought to be no prejudice to such as chuse to support the dignity of their nature; neither does it invalidate what we have been saying in regard to the excellency of the soul. For, to judge rightly of things, they ought to be considered in themselves, and in their most perfect state.

§. 8. It is undoubtedly in consequence of the natural sense of the dignity of our being, and of the grandeur of the end we are designed for, that we naturally extend our views to futurity; that we concern ourselves about what is to happen after our death; that we seek to perpetuate our name and memory, and are not insensible to the judgment of posterity. These sentiments are far from being an illusion of self-love or prejudice. The desire and hope of immortality is an impression we receive from nature. And this desire is so very reasonable in itself, so useful, and so closely connected with the system of humanity, that we may at least infer thence a very probable induction in favour of a future state. How great soever the vivacity of this desire may be in itself, still it increases in proportion as we take more care to cultivate our reason, and as we advance in the knowledge of truth and the practice of virtue. This sentiment becomes the surest principle of noble, generous, and public-spirited actions;

actions; and we may affirm, that, were it not for this principle, all human views would be low, mean, and fordid.

All this seems to point out to us clearly, that by the institution of the Creator, there is a kind of natural proportion and relation between the soul and immortality. For it is not by deceit and illusions that the Supreme Wisdom conducts us to his proposed end: a principle so reasonable and necessary; a principle that cannot but be productive of good effects, that raises man above himself, and renders him capable of the sublimest things, superior to the most delicate temptations and such as are most dangerous to virtue; such a principle, I say, cannot be chimerical*.

Thus every thing concurs to persuade us that the soul must subsist after death. The knowledge we have of the nature of the mind; its excellence, and faculties always susceptible of a higher degree of perfection; the disposition which

* Cicero gives an admirable picture of the influence which the desire and hope of immortality has had in all ages, to excite men to great and noble actions. "Nemo unquam," says he, "sine magna spe immortalitatis se pro patria offeret ad mortem. Licuit esse otioso Themistocli; licuit Epaminondæ; licuit, ne et vetera et externa quaeram, mihi: sed nescio quo modo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis existit maxime, et apparet facillimè. Quo quidem dempto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret?" *Tuscul. Quæst. lib.1. cap.15.*

prompts us to raise ourselves above the present life, and to desire immortality; are all so many natural indications, and the strongest presumptions, that such indeed is the intention of the Creator.

§. 9. The clearing up of this first point is of great importance in regard to our principal question, and solves already in part the difficulty we are examining. For once the soul is supposed to subsist after the dissolution of the body, nothing can hinder us from saying, that whatever is wanting in the present state to complete the sanction of natural laws, will be executed hereafter, if it be agreeable to the Divine Wisdom.

We come now from considering man on the physical side, which opens us already a passage towards finding the object of our present pursuit. Let us see now whether by viewing man on the moral side, that is, as a being capable of rule, who acts with knowledge and choice, and raising ourselves afterwards to God, we cannot discover new reasons and still stronger presumptions of a future life, of a state of rewards and punishments.

Here we cannot avoid repeating part of those things which have been already mentioned in this work, because we are going to take their entire result; the truth we intend here to establish being, as it were, the conclusion of the whole system. It is thus a painter, after having worked separately
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upon each part of his piece, thinks it necessary to retouch them all together, in order to produce what is called the *total effect and harmony*.

§. 10. Man, we have seen is a rational and free agent, who distinguishes justice and honesty, who finds within himself the principles of conscience, who is sensible of his dependance on the Creator, and born to fulfil certain duties. His greatest ornament is reason and virtue; and his chief task in life is to advance on that side, by laying hold of all the occasions that offer, to learn, to reflect, and to do good. The more he practises and confirms himself in such laudable occupations, the more he accomplishes the views of the Creator, and proves himself worthy of the existence he has received. He is sensible he can be reasonably called to an account for his conduct, and he approves or condemns himself according to his different manner of acting.

By all these circumstances it evidently appears, that man is not confined, like other animals, to a mere physical economy, but that he is included in a moral one, which raises him much higher, and is attended with greater consequences. For what appearance or probability is there, that a soul which advances daily in wisdom and virtue, should tend to annihilation, and that God should think proper to extinguish this light when most it blazes? Is it not more reasonable to think, that the good or bad use we have made of our

faculties will be attended with future consequences; that we shall be accountable to him from whom we have had them, and that from him we shall receive the just retribution we have merited? Since therefore this judgment of God does not display itself sufficiently in this world, it is natural to presume, that the plan of the Divine Wisdom, with regard to us, embraces a duration of a much greater extent.

§. 11. Let us ascend from man to God, and we shall be still further convinced, that such in reality is the plan he formed.

If God is willing (a point we have already proved), that man should observe the rules of right reason, in proportion to his faculties and the circumstances he is under; this must be a serious and positive will. It is the will of the Creator, the Governor of the world, the sovereign Lord of all things. It is therefore a real command, which lays us under an obligation of obeying. It is moreover the will of a Being supremely powerful, wise, and good, who proposing always, both with respect to himself and his creatures, the most excellent ends, cannot fail to establish the means which, in the order of reason, and pursuant to the nature and state of things, are necessary for the execution of his designs. No one can reasonably contest these principles; but let us see what consequences may be drawn from them.

1. If it actually became the Divine Wisdom to give laws to man, this same wisdom requires that these laws should be accompanied with necessary motives to determine rational and free agents to conform thereto in all cases. Otherwise we should be obliged to say, either that God does not really and seriously desire the observance of the laws he has given, or that he wants power or wisdom to procure it.

2. If through an effect of his goodness, he has not thought proper to let men live at random, or to abandon them to the capriciousness of their passions; if he has given them a torch to light them; this same goodness must undoubtedly induce him to annex a perfect and durable happiness to the good use that every man makes of this light.

3. Reason informs us afterwards, that an all-powerful, all-wise, and all-bountiful Being is infinitely fond of order; that these perfections make him desire that this order should reign among his intelligent and free creatures, and that it was for this very reason he subjected them to laws. The same reasons that induced him to establish a moral order, engage him likewise to procure their observance. It must be therefore his satisfaction and glory, to render all men sensible of the difference he makes between those who disturb, and those who conform to order. He cannot be indifferent in this respect: on the contrary,

trary, he is determined, by the love he has for himself and his perfections, to invest his commands with all the efficacy necessary to render his authority respected: This imports an establishment of future rewards and punishments; either to keep man within rule, as much as possible, in the present state, by the potent motives of hope and fear; or to give afterwards an execution worthy of his justice and wisdom to his plan, by reducing every thing to the primitive order he has established.

4. The same principle carries us yet further. For if God is infinitely fond of the order he has established in the moral world, he cannot but approve of those, who with a sincere and constant attachment to this order, endeavour to please him by concurring in the accomplishment of his views; and he cannot but disapprove of such as observe an opposite conduct: for the former are, as it were, his friends, and the latter declare themselves his enemies. But the approbation of God imports his protection, benevolence, and love; whereas his disapprobation cannot but be attended with quite contrary effects. If so, how can any one imagine, that God's friends and enemies will be confounded, and no difference made between them? Is it not much more consonant to reason to think, that the Divine Justice will manifest at length, some way or other, the extreme difference he places between virtue and vice, by rendering
finally

finally and perfectly happy those, who by a submission to his will are become the objects of his benevolence; and, on the contrary, by making the wicked feel a just severity?

§. 12. This is what our clearest notions of the perfections of the supreme Being induce us to judge concerning his views, and the plan he has formed. Were not virtue to meet surely and inevitably with a final recompence, and vice with a final punishment, and this in a general and complete manner, exactly proportioned to the degree of merit or demerit of each person; the plan of natural laws would never answer our expectation from a supreme legislator, whose prescience, wisdom, power, and goodness, are without bounds. This would be leaving the laws divested of their principal force, and reducing them to the quality of simple counsels; it would be subverting, in fine, the fundamental part of the system of intelligent creatures, namely, that of being induced to make a reasonable use of their faculties, with a view and expectation of happiness. In short, the moral system would fall into a state of imperfection, which could be reconciled neither with the nature of man, nor with the state of society, nor with the moral perfections of God. It is otherwise, when we acknowledge a future life. The moral system is thereby supported, connected, and finished, so as to leave nothing wanting to render it complete: It is then a plan really worthy of God, and useful
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to man. God does all he ought to do with free and rational creatures, to induce them to behave as they should; the laws of nature are thus established on the most solid foundations; and nothing is wanting to bind men by such motives as are most proper to make an impression.

Wherefore if this plan is without comparison, the most beautiful and the best; if it be likewise the most worthy of God, and the most connected with what we know of the nature, wants, and state of man; how can any one doubt of its being that which the Divine Wisdom has actually chosen?

§. 13. I acknowledge, indeed, that could we find in the present life a sufficient sanction of the laws of nature, in the measure and plenitude above mentioned, we should have no right to press this argument; for nothing could oblige us to search into futurity for an entire unravelling of the Divine plan. But, though, by the nature of things, and even by the various establishments of man, virtue has already its reward, and vice its punishment; yet this excellent and just order is accomplished only in part, and we find a great number of exceptions to this rule in history, and the experience of human life. Hence arises a very puzzling objection against the authority of natural laws. But as soon as mention is made of another life, the difficulty disappears; every thing

is cleared up and set to rights; the system appears connected, finished, and supported; the Divine Wisdom is justified: we find all the necessary supplements and compensations to redress the present irregularities; virtue acquires a firm and unshaken prop, by furnishing the honest man with a motive capable to support him in the most dangerous difficulties, and to render him triumphant over the most delicate temptations.

Were this only a simple conjecture, it might be considered rather as a convenient than solid supposition. But we have seen that it is founded also on the nature and excellence of the soul; on the instinct that inclines us to raise ourselves above the present life; and on the nature of man considered on the moral side, as a creature accountable for his actions, and obliged to conform to a certain rule. When, besides all this, we behold that the same opinion serves to support, and perfectly crowns the whole system of natural laws, it must be allowed to be no less probable than it is beautiful and engaging.

§. 14. Hence this opinion has been received more or less at all times, and by all nations, according as reason has been more or less cultivated, or as people have enquired closer into the origin of things. It would be an easy matter to alledge divers historical proofs, and to produce also several beautiful passages of philosophers, in order to shew, that the reasons which strike us, made
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the like impressions on the wisest of the Pagans. But we shall be satisfied with observing, that these testimonies, which have been collected by other writers, are not indifferent on this subject: because this shews, either the vestiges of a primitive tradition, or the voice of reason and nature, or both; which adds a considerable weight to our arguments.

CHAPTER XX.

Continuation of the Subject of Immortality.

§. 1. **WE** have seen how far our natural lights are capable of conducting us with regard to the important question of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments. Each of the proofs we have alledged, has, without doubt, its particular force; but coming up to the assistance of one another, and acquiring a greater strength by their union, they are certainly capable of making an impression on every attentive and unprejudiced mind, and ought to appear sufficient
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to establish the authority and sanction of natural laws in as full an extent as we desire.

§. 2. If any one should say, that all our reasonings on this subject are only probabilities and conjectures, and are properly reducible to a plausible reason or fitness, which leaves the thing still at a great distance from demonstration; I shall agree, if he pleases, that we have not here a complete evidence, yet the probability, methinks, is so very strong, and the fitness so great, and so well established, that this is sufficient to make it prevail over the contrary opinion, and consequently to determine us.

For we should be strangely embarrassed, if in every question that arises, we should refuse to be determined by any thing but a demonstrative argument. Most commonly we are obliged to be satisfied with an assemblage of probabilities, which, united and carried to a certain point, very seldom deceive us, and ought to supply the place of evidence in subjects that are most susceptible thereof. It is thus that in natural philosophy, in physic, criticism, history, politics, commerce, and generally in all the affairs of life, a prudent man is determined by a concurrence of reasons, which, every thing considered, he judges superior to the opposite arguments.

§. 3. In order to render the strength of this kind of proof more easy to be understood, it will not be amiss to explain here at first what we mean
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by a *plausible reason or fitness*; to enquire afterwards into the general principle on which this sort of reasoning is founded; and to see, in particular, what constitutes its force when applied to the law of nature. This will be the right way to know the just value of our proofs, and what weight they ought to have in our determinations.

A *plausible reason or fitness* is that which is drawn from the necessity of admitting a thing as certain, for the perfection of a system in other respects solid, useful, and well connected; but which would be defective without this point; though there is no reason to suppose that it has any essential defect. For example: upon beholding a great and magnificent palace, we remark an admirable symmetry and proportion; where all the rules of art, which form the solidity, convenience, and beauty of a building, are strictly observed. In short, all that we see of the building denotes an able architect. May it not therefore be reasonably supposed, that the foundation which we do not see is equally solid and proportioned to the great mass it bears? Can it be imagined that the architect's ability and knowledge should have forsaken him in so important a point? In order to form such a supposition, we should have certain proofs of this deficiency, or have seen that in fact the foundation is imperfect; otherwise we could not presume so improbable a thing. Who is it, that on a mere metaphysical possibility
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of the architect's having neglected to lay the foundation, would venture to wager that the thing is really so?

§. 4. Such is the nature of fitness. The general foundation of this manner of reasoning is, that we must not consider only what is possible, but what is probable; and that a truth of itself very little known, acquires a probability by its natural connection with other truths that are better known. Thus natural philosophers do not question but that they have discovered the truth, when an hypothesis happily explains all the phenomena; and an event very little known in history, appears no longer doubtful, when we see it serves for a key and basis to many other indubitable events. It is on this principle, in a great measure, that moral certainty is founded, which is so much used in most sciences, as well as in the conduct of life, and in things of the greatest importance to individuals, families, and to the whole of society.

§. 5. But if this manner of judging and reasoning takes place so frequently in human affairs, and is in general founded on so solid a principle; it is still much surer when we are to reason on the works of God, to discover his plan, and to judge of his views and designs. For the whole universe, with the several systems that compose it, and particularly the system of man and society, are the work of a supreme understanding. Nothing has been done by chance; nothing depends on a blind, ca-

precious, or impotent cause; every thing has been calculated and measured with a profound wisdom. Here therefore, more than any where else, we have a right to judge, that so powerful and so wise an author, has omitted nothing necessary for the perfection of his plan; and that consistent with himself he has fitted it with all the essential parts, for the design he proposed. If we ought to presume reasonably such a care in an able architect, who is nothing more than a man subject to error; how much more ought we to presume it in a being of supreme understanding?

§. 6. What we have been now saying, shews that this fitness is not always of the same weight, but may be more or less strong, in proportion to the greater or less necessity on which it is established. And to lay down rules on this subject, we may say in general, 1. That the more we know the views and designs of the author; 2. The more we are assured of his wisdom and power; 3. The more this power and wisdom are perfect; 4. The more considerable are the inconveniences that result from the opposite system; the more they border upon the absurd; and the more pressing we find the consequences drawn from this sort of considerations. For then we have nothing to set in opposition to them by way of counterbalance; and consequently it is on that side we are determined by right reason.

§. 7. These

§. 7. These principles are of themselves applicable to our subject, and this in so just and complete a manner, that the reason drawn from probability or fitness cannot be carried any farther. After what has been said in the preceding chapters, it would be entering into useless repetitions, to attempt to prove here all the particulars: the thing sufficiently proves itself. Let us be satisfied with observing, that the fitness in favour of the sanction of natural laws, is so much the stronger and more pressing, as the contrary opinion throws into the system of humanity an obscurity and confusion, which borders very much upon the absurd, if it does not come quite up to it. The plan of the Divine Wisdom becomes in respect to us an insoluble enigma; we are no longer able to account for any thing; and we cannot tell why so necessary a thing should be wanting in a plan so beautiful in other respects, so useful, and so perfectly connected.

§. 8. Let us draw a comparison between the two systems, to see which is most conformable to order, most suitable to the nature and state of man, and, in short, most reasonable and worthy of God.

Suppose, on one side, that the Creator proposed the perfection and felicity of his creatures, and in particular the good of man and society. That for this purpose, having invested man with understanding and liberty, and rendered him ca-

pable of knowing his end, of discovering and following the road that can alone conduct him to it: he lays him under a strict obligation of walking constantly in this road, and of never losing sight of the torch of reason, which ought always to enlighten his steps. That in order to guide him better, he has given him all the senses and principles necessary to serve him as a rule. That this direction, and these principles, coming from a powerful, wise, and good superior, have all the characters of a real law. That this law carries already along with it, even in this life, its reward and punishment; but that this first sanction being insufficient, God, in order to give to a plan so worthy of his wisdom and goodness, its full perfection, and to furnish men in all possible cases with necessary motives and helps, has moreover established a proper sanction in respect to natural laws, which will be manifested in a future life: and that, attentive to the conduct of man, he proposes to make him give an account of his actions, to recompence virtue, and to punish vice, by a retribution exactly proportioned to the merit or demerit of each person.

Let us set now in opposition to this first system the other, which supposes that every thing is limited, in respect to man, to the present life, and that he has nothing to hope or fear beyond this term: that God after having created man and instituted society, concerns himself no more about
them:

them: that after giving us a power of discerning good and evil by the help of reason, he takes no manner of notice of the use we make thereof, but leaves us in such a manner to ourselves, that we are absolutely at liberty to do as we please: that we shall have no account to give our Creator, and that notwithstanding the unequal and irregular distribution of the goods and evils of this life, notwithstanding the disorders caused by the malice or injustice of man, we have no redress or compensation ever to expect from God.

§. 9. Can any one say that this last system is comparable to the first? Does it set the divine perfections in so great a light? Is it as worthy of the Divine wisdom, bounty, and justice? Is it as proper to stem the torrent of vice and to support virtue, in delicate and dangerous conjunctures? Does it render the structure of society as solid, and invest the laws of nature with such an authority as the glory of the supreme Legislator and the good of humanity require? Were we to chuse between two societies, one of which admitted the first system, while the other acknowledged only the second, is there a prudent man but would highly prefer to live in the former of those societies?

There is, certainly, no comparison between these two systems, in respect to beauty and fitness: the first is a work of the most perfect reason; the second is defective, and provides no manner of

remedy against a great many disorders. Now even this alone points out sufficiently on what side the truth lies; because the business is to judge and reason of the designs and works of God, who does every thing with infinite wisdom.

§. 10. Let no one say, that, limited as we are, it is temerity to decide after this manner; and that we have too imperfect ideas of the divine nature and perfections, to be able to judge of his plan and designs with any certainty. This reflexion, which is in some measure true, and in some cases just, proves too much, if applied to our subject, and consequently has no weight. Let us but reflect a little, and we shall find that this thought leads us insensibly to a kind of pyrrhonism, which would be the subversion of human life, and of all social economy. For in fine, there is no medium; we must chuse one of the two systems above explained. To reject the first is admitting the second with all its inconveniencies. This remark is of some importance, and alone is almost sufficient to shew us the force of fitness in this case; because not to acknowledge the solidity of this reason, is to lay one's self under a necessity of receiving a defective system; a system loaded with inconveniences, and of which consequences are very far from being reasonable.

§. 11. Such is the nature and force of the fitness, on which the proofs of the sanction of natural laws are established. All that remains now, is to
see

see what impressiion these proofs united, ought to have over our minds, and what influences they should have over our conduct. This is the capital point in which the whole ought to end.

1. In the first place, I observe, that, though all that can be said in favour of the sanction of natural laws, were still to leave the question undecided; yet it would be always reasonable even in this very uncertainty to act, as if it had been determined in the affirmative. For it is evidently the safest side, namely, that in which there is less at all events to lose and more to gain. Let us state the thing as dubious. If there be a future state, it is not only an error not to believe it, but likewise a dangerous irregularity to act as if there were no such thing: an error of this kind is attended with pernicious consequences; whereas if there is no such thing, the mistake in believing it, produces in general none but good effects; it is not subject to any inconveniences hereafter, nor does it, generally speaking, expose us to any great difficulties for the time present. Be it therefore as it will, and let the case be ever so unfavourable to natural laws, a prudent man will never hesitate which side he is to embrace, whether the observance, or the violation of those laws; virtue will certainly have the preference of vice.

2. But if this side of the question is the most prudent and eligible, even under a supposition of doubt and uncertainty, how much more will it be

so, if we acknowledge, as we cannot avoid, that this opinion is at least more probable than the other? A first degree of verisimilitude, or a simple though slight probability, becomes a reasonable motive of determination, in respect to every man that calculates and reflects. And if it be prudent to conduct ourselves by this principle in the ordinary affairs of life, does prudence permit us to deviate from this very road in the most important affairs, such as essentially interest our felicity?

3. But in fine, if proceeding still further, and reducing the thing to its true point, it is agreed that we have here actually, if not a strict demonstration of a future life, at least a probability founded on so many reasonable presumptions, and so great a fitness as borders very near upon certainty; it is still more evident, that in the present state of things, we ought to act on this footing, and are not reasonably allowed to form any other rule of conduct.

§. 12. Nothing, indeed, is more worthy of a rational being, than to seek evidence in every thing, and to be determined only by clear and certain principles. But as all subjects are not susceptible thereof, and yet we are obliged to determine; where should we be, if we were always to wait for a rigorous demonstration? In failure of the highest degree of certainty, we embrace the next to it; and a great probability become

comes a sufficient reason of acting, when there is none of an equal weight to oppose it. If this side of the question be not in itself evidently certain, it is at least an evident and certain rule, that in the present state of things, it ought to have the preference.

This is a necessary consequence of our nature and state. As we have only limited lights, and yet are under a necessity of determining and acting; were it requisite for this purpose to have a complete certainty, and were we to refuse to accept of probability as a principle of determination; we should be either obliged to determine in favour of the least probable side, and contrary to verisimilitude, (which no body, methinks, will attempt to maintain,) or we should be forced to spend our days in dubiousness and uncertainty, to fluctuate continually in a state of irresolution, and to remain always in suspense, without acting, without resolving upon any thing, or without having any fixed rule of conduct; which would be a total subversion of the system of humanity.

§. 13. But if it be reasonable in general to admit of fitness and probability as the rule of conduct, for want of evidence; this rule becomes still more necessary and just, in particular cases, in which, as has been already observed, a person runs no risk in following it. When there is nothing to lose, if we are mistaken, and a great deal to win,
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if we are not; what can we desire more to determine us reasonably? Especially when the opposite side exposes you, on the contrary, to very great danger, in case of error, and affords you no manner of advantage, supposing you are right. Under these circumstances there is no room for balancing the choice; reason requires us to embrace the safest side; it lays us under an obligation of so doing; and this obligation is so much the stronger, as it is produced by a concurrence of reasons to which nothing can be opposed that is capable of weakening them.

In short, if it be reasonable to embrace this side, even in case of an entire uncertainty, it is still more so when there is some probability in its favour; it becomes necessary if these probabilities are cogent and numerous; and in fine, the necessity still increases, if at all events this is the safest and most advantageous party.

§. 14. Again. This internal and primitive obligation is confirmed by the Divine Will itself, and is consequently rendered as strong as possible. In fact, this manner of judging and acting being, as we have seen, in consequence of our constitution, such as the Creator has formed it; this alone is a certain proof, that it is the will of God we should be directed by these principles, and consider it as a point of duty. For whatever is in the nature of man, whatever is a consequence of his original constitution and state, acquaints us
clearly

clearly and distinctly with the will of the Creator, with the use he expects we should make of our faculties, and the obligations to which he has thought proper to subject us. This is a point that merits great attention. For if we may affirm, without fear of mistake, that God is actually willing that man should conduct himself in this life on the foundation of the belief of a future state, and as having every thing to hope or to fear on his side, according as he has done well or ill; does not there arise thence a more than probable proof of the reality of this state, and of the certainty of rewards and punishments? Otherwise we should be obliged to say, that God himself deceives us, because this error was necessary for the execution of his designs, being an essential principle to the plan he had formed in respect to man and society. But to speak after this manner of the most perfect Being, of a Being, whose power, wisdom, and goodness, know no bounds, would be using a language as absurd as indecent. For this very reason that this article of belief is necessary to man, and enters into the views of the Creator, it cannot be an error. Whatever he sets before us as a duty, or as a reasonable principle of conduct, must be certainly true.

§. 15. Thus every thing concurs to establish the authority of natural laws. 1. The approbation
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tion they receive from reason. 2. The express command of God. 3. The real advantages which their observance procures us in this world ; and, in fine, the great hopes and just fears we ought to have in respect to futurity, according as we have observed or despised those laws. Thus it is that God binds us to the practice of virtue by such strong and numerous ties, that every man who consults and listens to reason, finds himself under an indispensable obligation of invariably directing his conduct by it.

§. 16. Some perhaps will object, that we have been too diffusive in respect to the sanction of natural laws. True it is, that most of those who have written concerning the law of nature, are more concise on this article, and Puffendorf himself does not say much about it. This author, without absolutely excluding only the consideration of a future life from this science, seems nevertheless to confine the law of nature within the bounds of the present life, as tending only to render us sociable. And yet he acknowledges that man is naturally desirous of immortality, and that this has induced heathens to believe the soul immortal ; that this belief is likewise authorized by an ancient tradition concerning the goddesses of revenge ; to which he adds, that, in fact, it is very probable God will punish the violation of the laws of nature ; but that there is still a great obscurity in

in this respect, and nothing but revelation can put the thing out of doubt.

But were it even true, that reason affords us nothing but probabilities on this question, yet we must not exclude from the law of nature all considerations of a future state; especially if these probabilities are so very great, as to border upon certainty. This article enters necessarily into the system of this science, and forms thereof a part so much the more essential, that were it not for this, the authority of natural laws would be weakened, as we have already shewn; and it would be difficult (to say nothing more) to establish on any solid grounds several important duties, which oblige us to sacrifice our greatest advantages to the good of society, or to the support of equity and justice. Necessary therefore it was, to examine with some care, how far our natural light may lead us in respect to this question, and to shew the force of the proofs that our reason affords us, and the influence those proofs ought to have over our conduct.

True it is, as we have already observed, that the best way to know in this respect the will of God, would be an express declaration on his part. But if reasoning, as mere philosophers, we have not been able to make use of so decisive a proof, nothing can hinder us, as Christian philosophers, to avail ourselves of the advantage we have from revelation,

velation, in order to strengthen our conjectures. Nothing, indeed, can be a better argument that we have reasoned and conjectured right, than the positive declaration of God on this important point. For since, it appears by fact that God is willing to recompense virtue, and to punish vice in another life, it is no longer possible to doubt of what we have been saying, namely, that this is extremely conformable to his wisdom, goodness, and justice. The proofs we have drawn from the nature of man, from God's designs in his favour, from the wisdom and equity with which he governs the world, and from the present state of things, are not a work of the imagination, or an illusion of self-love; no, they are reflections dictated by right reason: and when revelation comes up to their assistance, it sets then in full evidence what already had been rendered probable by the sole light of nature.

It is to us a great pleasure to see that the principles we have laid down, are exactly those that the Christian religion adopts for its basis, and on which the whole structure of religion and morality is raised. If on one side this remark serves to confirm us in these principles, by assuring us that we have hit upon the true system of nature; on the other, it ought to dispose us to have an infinite esteem for a revelation which perfectly confirms the law of nature, and converts moral philosophy
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into a religious and popular doctrine ; a doctrine founded on facts, and in which the authority and promises of God manifestly intervene in the fittest manner to make an impresson upon man. This happy agreement between natural and revealed light, is equally honourable to both.

END OF PART II.

into a religious and political doctrine, a doctrine
founded on fact, and in which the authority and
preference of God manifestly intervenes in the
matter to make an impression upon the
happy agreement between natural and revealed
truth is equally honorable to both.

It is not only a doctrine, but a system
of government, which is founded on the
principles of justice and equity, and which
is adapted to the interests of the people
and the glory of God.

The principles of this system are
the principles of the Christian religion,
and the principles of the natural law,
which are the principles of justice and equity.

The principles of this system are
the principles of the Christian religion,
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ELEMENTS
OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

PART III.

AN ENQUIRY
INTO THE
GENUINE NATURE OF THE PASSIONS.

— the Passions all
Have burst their bounds ; and Reason, half extinct,
Or impotent, or else approving, sees
The foul disorder.

THOMSON.

*Introductory Observations, with a Table of the
Passions analyzed.*

HAVING examined the anatomical system of the human frame, and taken a view of the mental faculties, I have now to direct the attention of my Readers to an enquiry into the genuine nature of the passions, those grand sources of the happiness and of the misery of mankind.

For promoting and inciting us to the performance of our duties and to the due enjoyment of our being, all the passions and affections of the human mind were certainly designed by the Author

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of nature, and were necessary for the end for which he intended them. This end he has given us a capacity, if we will be at the pains to exercise it, to discover, and, by our reason, if we make a right use of it, we may govern and direct every one of them to its true and proper end. As all the passions and affections of the human mind were planted there by him who gave it a being, we cannot but suppose that every one of them was ordained for a wise and good end ; consequently we must conclude, that they are all in themselves good and useful, and never can have a bad effect if properly applied, and duly kept under the government of our reason according to his appointment. By the term Passion, however, we often mean not properly any passion itself, but the violence, extravagance, and depravation of the passion ; and to this violence, extravagance, or depravation of the passion a particular and distinct name having been given by mankind, we are led by it to suppose it to be a particular, distinct, and wicked passion, which the minds of some men have been indued with by nature, whence we often seek to excuse the irregularity and rashness of our conduct to ourselves as well as to others. Thus cruelty, for example, is often thought to be a passion with which the minds of some men are indued by Nature ; whereas cruelty is not a genuine passion, but only an unbridled violence or wrong direction of some natural passion or affection, in itself good
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and useful, as we shall see in the course of our enquiry. So, whenever we meet with a name or term, which seems to signify a passion that can serve for no good purpose, we may be assured, and on strict examination we shall discover, that it does not really mean any genuine passion, but a wrong direction, or extravagant stretch of a passion. It will not be amiss to observe here that all the passions and affections of the human mind may be trained to subjection by a constant check, or strengthened and rendered almost ungovernable by continued indulgence : therefore Reason, like a good centinel, should be always awake and alert upon his post.

The passions then are the springs of virtue, and they are in their nature and origin good, and intended for the benefit of mankind ; but it is the channels into which they diverge that render them pernicious, and form them also into the springs of vice. Even envy and avarice, the most odious of our emotions, are to be traced up to untainted sources ; the former in general, arising from the desire of excellence, and the latter from the wish of estimation. Secure the stream where it first threatens deviation, teach it to flow within the bounds originally prescribed by nature, it will then run with a clear and smooth current, and bear along with it both pleasure and virtue.

Passion may be defined a movement of the mind occasioned by some strong impression made upon it, either by external objects through the senses,

or by the power of imagination. Let us consider the passions in the following manner: first, the source of each; secondly, its natural branches; and, thirdly, its deviations, by which means we shall be able to distinguish at once the genuine emotions of human nature from those that have been the consequence of its depravity. For the sake of precision I will treat of them alphabetically and according to the following sketch, or

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS.

SOURCES.	VARIETIES.	DEVIATIONS.
AMBITION.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { <i>Desire of Power.</i> { <i>Desire of Fame.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { Avarice. { Envy. { Retaliation. { Revenge. { Rage. { Fury.
ANGER.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { <i>Indignation.</i> { <i>Resentment.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { Fretfulness. { Moroseness. { Surlyness. { Hastiness. { Sullenness. { Hatred. { Malevolence.
ANTIPATHY, OR AVERSION.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { <i>Natural Repug-</i> { <i>nance.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { Rancour. { Spite. { Misanthropy.
		CURIOSITY.

SOURCES.	VARIETIES.	DEVIATIONS.
CURIOSITY.	<i>Desire of Information.</i>	{ Futile Curiosity. Dishonourable Curiosity.
FEAR.	{ <i>Timidity.</i> <i>Terror.</i> <i>Horror.</i> <i>Awe.</i>	Cowardice.
HOPE.	<i>Rational Hope.</i>	Chimerical Hope.
JOY.	{ <i>Cheerfulness.</i> <i>Mirth.</i>	{ Exultation. False spirits, fictitiously procured. Malignant Joy.
LOVE.	{ <i>Self Love.</i> <i>Sexual Love.</i> <i>Storgé.</i> <i>Esteem.</i> <i>Friendship.</i> <i>Patriotism.</i> <i>Philanthropy.</i> <i>Benevolence.</i> <i>Charity.</i> <i>Gratitude.</i> <i>Piety.</i>	{ Pride. Arrogance. Haughtiness. Vain-glory. Vanity. Jealousy.
SHAME.	{ <i>Bashfulness.</i> <i>Diffidence.</i>	Shame of doing right.

SORROW, or GRIEF.	{ Melancholy. Contrition. Remorse.	Despair.
SYMPATHY.	{ Pity. Terror.	Vicious Sympathy.
WONDER.	{ Admiration. Astonishment.	

CHAPTER I.

AMBITION.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

THIS passion is the desire of great things; or rather of those things which transcend our present state or attainments. It is an essential quality in man to aspire; it marks the superiority of his spirit above the rest of animals; and, in no slight degree, indicates his immortality. Aspire, my children! but let your ambition be fixed on those objects that legalize the passion. Whatever tends to the exaltation of your nature is the legal object of Ambition. Cast your eyes to the summits of intellect, and virtue; and strain every faculty to accomplish the ascent.

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The passion flows regularly, and purely, while it runs towards real greatness; it deviates into a turbid stream when attracted by imaginary grandeur. How far the desire of power, of popularity, of fame, of wealth, are deviations, can only be known from actions; they are not necessarily corrupt. The ambition of Cicero induced him to be the support and the father of his country; that of Cæsar impelled him to its destruction. Personal aggrandizement, with no ulterior view to the will of God, cannot be the end of a laudable passion; but every wish to rise, should be accompanied with the desire of moral improvement, and extended utility. The tendency of native Ambition is the melioration of the soul, which is true greatness; and every step we take we advance nearer to the Father of all grandeur. The tendency of false Ambition, is the depravation of the soul: power is sought, for the gratification of vice; and no means are rejected, however base or horrid.

SECT. II. *The Desire of Power.*

IN every situation of life THE DESIRE OF POWER is visible. To be able to undertake, and, to do well, what is undertaken, is a laudable AMBITION. It is from this passion, generally associated with the hope of profit, that every man strives to be excellent in his calling. But the desire of

power, which has obtained a peculiar title to the name of Ambition, is that which has political greatness in view. To be a main prop in supporting, and an active instrument in conducting a State, is an eminence well worthy this passion. Without this, society would be dissolved, or left to the random influences of the other passions. The statesman is an honourable character, and stands foremost among the benefactors of mankind; but it is a character which requires, more than any other, the most transcendent talents accompanied with the greatest virtues. The military character is connected with the State, and the ambition of defending one's country, is equally laudable with that of guarding and regulating its laws. But the moment the good of the State ceases to be the grand object of the passion, when personal aggrandizement supercedes patriotism, and military ardour becomes a fever of conquests and triumphs, the stream of Ambition runs foul. Tully, and the Scipios, Aristides, and Epaminondas, were statesmen, and generals; Sylla, Dionysius of Syracuse, and Alexander of Macedon, were conquerors and tyrants.

The genuine gratification of pre-eminence is the good of others. Let a man of the most extensive power exert the whole, or rather all he can of it, upon his own individual pleasures; in what narrow limits will it be confined! Unloving and unloved, the senses may be acted upon

upon for a while, but the heart can know no joy. On the other hand, he who uses his means in diffusing happiness, is soon conscious that his enjoyments are unbounded; and not only where he does good, but where he fails, he is equally beloved.

The power arising from wealth, may prove to be one of the most rational blessings of life; and it is not, therefore, a wonder that it should be the universal pursuit. It enables a man to improve his own faculties, and to diffuse knowledge and delight around him. It is only to be lamented, that he can do evil as well as good; and that in the pursuit of them the sight of their true use is too often lost; that they are spent on vices, made the means of parade, ostentation, and luxury; or hoarded, to manifest the very impotence of power.

It seems that inequality of conditions is necessary to those modes of life now marked out for the human species: at present, the very word Society implies inequality. It is one of the ends of society to secure to individuals those advantages, which have been honestly obtained, either by their own labours, or by those of their friends and families. But for this, where should men look for any terrestrial happiness, which is the chief end of association? These advantages secured, nothing can be clearer than that inequality must follow. I put this out of the question as
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being a decided axiom. I wish it were as clear an axiom that the inequality was a chief source of social happiness, which, I think, it ought to be. It depends entirely upon those who gain the vantage ground; for wherever Nature bestows power, she bestows it for service.

To expel disease, injustice, and impiety, belongs, peculiarly to physicians, lawyers, and the ministers of God: the power is in their hands, and in making use of it they spread comfort and happiness. The grand distempers of a State, are poverty and vice; and, to eradicate these, is the peculiar province of the rich. All power proceeds from the treasury of Nature; and those to whom she dispenses it are the ministers of her will. Resolve to obey her will, and no man can be too ambitious.

SECT. III. *The Desire of Fame.*

THE DESIRE OF FAME is almost as general as that of power, and is also a laudable^x AMBITION. ^{God} Men desire to be known, and to be spoken of; and as the desire of being well spoken of is an incentive to virtue; this passion should not be extinguished, but regulated. Cicero assures us, that the desire of glory is the chief passion of the best men;—*trahimur omnes laudis studio, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur.* Fame for use-
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less and trifling qualities is absurd and ridiculous; for talents, without virtue and piety, odious; for virtue and piety, though unaccompanied with great talents, delightful; and for talents, virtue, and piety united, is the summit of human glory.

Although the desire of extensive reputation be a fair passion, it is to be considered that its very existence depends upon the exclusion of far the greater part of mankind; and that therefore the genuine incentives to talents, virtue, and piety, are to be fought elsewhere than in mortal voices. Out of the terrestrial sphere there is, perhaps, no such thing as fame. The book of nature contains the registry of all things that are passing: beyond the limits of this world they are seen at once, and seen for ever; and the sigh of pity, that rises from the village, is as extensively perceived, as the blow given by Brutus in the capitol. ^x The little stream of fame runs meandering along this globe, but is lost in the ocean of eternal intuition, where every heart will appear under its real colours, and the reward of the good be love.

But as the love of praise is allowed to be one of the best passions of man, let us take a more extensive view of it, in its origin and operation in the human breast. Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but

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but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He desires not only praise, but praise-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise. He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame.

The love of praise-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another.

The love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose character and conduct we approve of, necessarily dispose us to desire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable sentiments, and to be as amiable and as admirable as those whom we love and admire the most. Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be satisfied with being merely admired for what other people are admired. We must at least believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. But, in order to attain this satisfaction, we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct. We must endeavour

deavour to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. When seen in this light, if they appear to us as we wish, we are happy and contented. But it greatly confirms this happiness and contentment when we find that other people, viewing them with those very eyes with which we, in imagination only, were endeavouring to view them, see them precisely in the same light in which we ourselves had seen them. Their approbation necessarily confirms our own self-approbation. Their praise necessarily strengthens our own sense of our own praise-worthiness. In this case, so far is the love of praise-worthiness from being derived altogether from that of praise; that the love of praise seems, at least in a great measure, to be derived from that of praise-worthiness.

The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness. It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us. If we are conscious that we do not deserve to be so favourably thought of, and that if the truth were known, we should be regarded with very different sentiments, our satisfaction is far from being complete. The man who applauds us either for actions which we did not perform, or for motives which had no sort of influence upon our conduct, applauds not us, but

but another person. We can derive no sort of satisfaction from his praises. To us they would be more mortifying than any censure, and should perpetually call to our minds, the most humbling of all reflexions, the reflexion of what we ought to be, but what we are not. A woman who paints, could derive, one should imagine, but little vanity from the compliments that are paid to her complexion. These, we should expect, ought rather to put her in mind of the sentiments which her real complexion would excite, and mortify her the more by the contrast. To be pleased with such groundless applause is a proof of the most superficial levity and weakness. It is a degree of vanity, one of the spurious offsprings of self love, and is the foundation of the most ridiculous and contemptible vices, the vices of affectation and common lying; follies, which, if experience did not teach us how common they are, one should imagine the least spark of common sense would save us from. The foolish liar, who endeavours to excite the admiration of the company by the relation of adventures which never had any existence; the important coxcomb, who gives himself airs of rank and distinction which he well knows he has no just pretensions to; are both of them, no doubt, pleased with the applause which they fancy they meet with. But their vanity arises from so gross an illusion of the imagination, that it is difficult to conceive how any rational creature should

should be imposed upon by it. When they place themselves in the situation of those whom they fancy they have deceived, they are struck with the highest admiration for their own persons. They look upon themselves, not in that light in which they know they ought to appear to their companions, but in that in which they believe their companions actually look upon them. Their superficial weakness and trivial folly hinder them from ever turning their eyes inwards, or from seeing themselves in that despicable point of view in which their own consciences must tell them that they would appear to every body, if the real truth should ever come to be known.

As ignorant and groundless praise can give no solid joy, no satisfaction that will bear any serious examination, so, on the contrary, it often gives real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be bestowed upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it, and has been in every respect suitable to those measures and rules by which praise and approbation are naturally and commonly bestowed. We are pleased not only with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy. We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of approbation, though no approbation should ever actually be bestowed upon us, and we are mortified to reflect that we have justly merited the blame of those we live with, though that senti-
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ment should never actually be exerted against us. The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour. When he views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it. He looks back upon every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better informed. He anticipates the applause and admiration which in this case would be bestowed upon him, and he applauds and admires himself by sympathy with sentiments, which do not indeed actually take place, but which the ignorance of the public alone hinders from taking place, which he knows are the natural and ordinary effects of such conduct which his imagination strongly connects with it, and which he has acquired a habit of conceiving as something that naturally and in propriety ought to follow from it. Men have voluntarily thrown away life to acquire after death a renown which they could no longer enjoy. Their imagination, in the mean time, anticipated the fame which was in future times bestowed upon them.

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Those applauses which they were never to hear rung in their ears; the thoughts of that admiration, whose effects they were never to feel, played about their hearts, banished from their breasts the strongest of all natural fears, and transported them to perform actions which seem almost beyond the reach of human nature. But in point of reality there is surely no great difference between that approbation which is not to be bestowed till we can no longer enjoy it, and that which, indeed, is never to be bestowed, but which would be bestowed, if the world was ever made to understand properly the real circumstances of our behaviour. If the one often produces such violent effects, we cannot wonder that the other should always be highly regarded.

Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.

But this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being

what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in other men. The first desire could only have made him wish to appear to be fit for society. The second was necessary in order to render him anxious to be really fit. The first could only have prompted him to the affectation of virtue, and to the concealment of vice. The second was necessary in order to inspire him with the real love of virtue, and with the real abhorrence of vice. In every well-formed mind this second desire seems to be the stronger of the two. It is only the weakest and most superficial of mankind who can be much delighted with that praise which they themselves know to be altogether unmerited. A weak man may sometimes be pleased with it, but a wise man rejects it upon all occasions. But, though a wise man feels little pleasure from praise where he knows there is no praise-worthiness, he often feels the highest in doing what he knows to be praise-worthy, though he knows equally well that no praise is ever to be bestowed upon it. To obtain the approbation of mankind, where no approbation is due, can never be an object of any importance to him. To obtain that approbation where it is really due, may sometimes be an object of no great importance to him. But to be that thing which deserves approbation, must always be an object of the highest.

To desire or even to accept of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible

contemptible vanity. To desire it where it is really due, is to desire no more than that a most essential act of justice should be done to us. The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man. He sometimes, however, neglects, and even despises it; and he is never more apt to do so than when he has the most perfect assurance of the perfect propriety of every part of his own conduct. His self-approbation, in this case, stands in need of no confirmation from this approbation of other men. It is alone sufficient, and he is contented with it. This self-approbation, if not the only, is at least the principal object, about which he can or ought to be anxious. The love of it, is the love of virtue.

As the love and admiration which we naturally conceive for some characters, dispose us to wish to become ourselves the proper objects of such agreeable sentiments; so the hatred and contempt which we as naturally conceive for others, dispose us, perhaps still more strongly, to dread the very thought of resembling them in any respect. Neither is it, in this case too, so much the thought of being hated and despised that we are afraid of, as that of being hateful and despicable. We dread the thought of doing any thing which can render us the just and proper objects of the hatred and contempt of our fellow-creatures; even

though we had the most perfect security that those sentiments were never actually to be exerted against us. The man who has broken through all those measures of conduct, which can alone render him agreeable to mankind, though he should have the most perfect assurance that what he had done was for ever to be concealed from every human eye, it is all to no purpose. When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the impartial Spectator would view it, he finds that he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. He is abashed and confounded at the thoughts of it, and necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to, if his actions should ever come to be generally known. His imagination, in this case too, anticipates the contempt and derision from which nothing saves him but the ignorance of those he lives with. He still feels that he is the natural object of these sentiments, and still trembles at the thought of what he would suffer, if they were ever actually exerted against him. But if what he had been guilty of was not merely one of those improprieties which are the objects of simple disapprobation, but one of those enormous crimes which excite detestation and resentment, he could never think of it, as long as he had any sensibility left, without feeling all the agony of horror and remorse; and though he could be assured that no man was ever to know it, and could
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even bring himself to believe that there was no God to revenge it, he would still feel enough of both these sentiments to embitter the whole of his life : he would still regard himself as the natural object of the hatred and indignation of all his fellow creatures ; and if his heart was not grown callous by the habit of crimes, he could not think without terror and astonishment even of the manner in which mankind would look upon him, of what would be the expression of their countenance and of their eyes, if the dreadful truth should ever come to be known. These natural pangs of an affrighted conscience are the demons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the guilty, which allow them neither quiet nor repose, which often drive them to despair and distraction, from which no assurance of secrecy can protect them, from which no principles of irreligion can entirely deliver them, and from which nothing can free them but the vilest and most abject of all states, a complete insensibility to honour and infamy, to vice and virtue. Men of the most detestable characters, who, in the execution of the most dreadful crimes, had taken their measures so coolly as to avoid even the suspicion of guilt, have sometimes been driven, by the horror of their situation, to discover, of their own accord, what no human sagacity could ever have investigated. By acknowledging their guilt, by submitting themselves to the resentment of their of-

fended fellow-citizens, and, by thus satiating that vengeance of which they were sensible that they had become the proper objects, they hoped, by their death to reconcile themselves, at least in their own imagination, to the natural sentiments of mankind: to be able to consider themselves as less worthy of hatred and resentment; to atone, in some measure, for their crimes, and, by thus becoming the objects, rather of compassion than of horror, if possible to die in peace and with the forgiveness of all their fellow-creatures. Compared to what they felt before the discovery, even the thought of this, it seems, was happiness.

In such cases, the horror of blame-worthiness seems, even in persons who cannot be suspected of any extraordinary delicacy or sensibility of character, completely to conquer the dread of blame. In order to allay that horror, in order to pacify, in some degree, the remorse of their own consciences, they voluntarily submitted themselves both to the reproach and to the punishment which they knew were due to their crimes, but which, at the same time, they might easily have avoided.

They are the most frivolous and superficial of mankind only who can be much delighted with that praise which they themselves know to be altogether unmerited. Unmerited reproach, however, is frequently capable of mortifying very severely

verely even men of more than ordinary constancy. Men of the most ordinary constancy, indeed, easily learn to despise those foolish tales which are so frequently circulated in society, and which, from their own absurdity and falsehood, never fail to die away in the course of a few weeks, or of a few days. But an innocent man, though of more than ordinary constancy, is often, not only shocked, but most severely mortified by the serious, though false, imputation of a crime; especially when that imputation happens unfortunately to be supported by some circumstances which give it an air of probability. He is humbled to find that any body should think so meanly of his character as to suppose him capable of being guilty of it. Though perfectly conscious of his own innocence, the very imputation seems often, even in his own imagination to throw a shadow of disgrace and dishonour upon his character. His just indignation, too, at so very gross an injury, which, however, it may frequently be improper, and sometimes even impossible to revenge, is itself a very painful sensation. There is no greater tormentor of the human breast than violent resentment which cannot be gratified. An innocent man, brought to the scaffold by the false imputation of an infamous or odious crime, suffers the most cruel misfortune which it is possible for innocence to suffer. The agony of his mind may

in this case, frequently be greater than that of those who suffer for the like crimes, of which they have been actually guilty. Profligate criminals, such as common thieves and highwaymen, have frequently little sense of the baseness of their own conduct, and consequently no remorse. Without troubling themselves about the justice or injustice of the punishment, they have always been accustomed to look upon the gibbet as a lot very likely to fall to them. When it does fall to them, therefore, they consider themselves only as not quite so lucky as some of their companions, and submit to their fortune, without any other uneasiness than what may arise from the fear of death; a fear which, even by such worthless wretches, we frequently see, can be so easily, and so very completely conquered. The innocent man, on the contrary, over and above the uneasiness which that fear may occasion, is tormented by his own indignation at the injustice which has been done to him. He is struck with horror at the thoughts of the infamy which the punishment may shed upon his memory, and foresees, with the most exquisite anguish, that he is hereafter to be remembered by his dearest friends and relations, not with regret and affection, but with shame, and even with horror of his supposed disgraceful conduct: and the shades of death appear to close round him
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with a darker and more melancholy gloom than naturally belongs to them. Such fatal accidents, for the tranquillity of mankind, it is to be hoped, happen very rarely in any country; but they happen sometimes in all countries, even in those where justice is in general very well administered. The unfortunate Calas, a man of much more than ordinary constancy (broken upon the wheel and burnt at Thoulouse for the supposed murder of his own son, of which he was perfectly innocent), seemed, with his last breath, to deprecate, not so much the cruelty of the punishment, as the disgrace which the imputation might bring upon his memory. After he had been broken, and was just going to be thrown into the fire, the monk who attended the execution, exhorted him to confess the crime for which he had been condemned. "My Father," said Calas, "can you bring yourself to believe that I am guilty?"

To persons in such unfortunate circumstances, that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation. Every thing that could render either life or death respectable is taken from them. They are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them, that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of
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another world; a world of more candour, humanity, and justice, than the present; where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue to be finally rewarded: and the same great principle which can alone strike terror into triumphant vice, affords the only effectual consolation to disgraced and insulted innocence.

In smaller offences, as well as in greater crimes, it frequently happens that a person of sensibility is much more hurt by the unjust imputation, than the real criminal is by the actual guilt. A woman of gallantry laughs even at the well-founded surmises which are circulated concerning her conduct. The worst founded surmise of the same kind is a mortal stab to an innocent virgin. The person who is deliberately guilty of a disgraceful action, we may lay it down, I believe, as a general rule, can seldom have much sense of the disgrace; and the person who is habitually guilty of it, can scarce ever have any.

When every man, even of middling understanding, so readily despises unmerited applause, how it comes to pass that unmerited reproach should often be capable of mortifying so severely men of the soundest and best judgment, may, perhaps, deserve some consideration.

Pain is, in almost all cases, a more pungent sensation than the opposite and correspondent pleasure. The one, almost always, depresses as much more below the ordinary, or what may be called
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the natural state of our happiness, than the other ever raises us above it. A man of sensibility is apt to be more humiliated by just censure than he is elevated by just applause. Unmerited applause a wise man rejects with contempt upon all occasions; but he often feels very severely the injustice of unmerited censure. By suffering himself to be applauded for what he has not performed, by assuming a merit which does not belong to him, he feels that he is guilty of a mean falsehood, and deserves, not the admiration, but the contempt of those very persons who, by mistake, had been led to admire him. It may, perhaps, give him some well-founded pleasure to find that he has been, by many people, thought capable of performing what he did not perform. But, though he may be obliged to his friends for their good opinion, he would think himself guilty of the greatest baseness if he did not immediately undeceive them. It gives him little pleasure to look upon himself in the light in which other people actually look upon him, when he is conscious that, if they knew the truth, they would look upon him in a very different light. A weak man, however, is often much delighted with viewing himself in this false and delusive light. He assumes the merit of every laudable action that is ascribed to him, and pretends to that of many which nobody ever thought of ascribing to him. He pretends to have done what he never did, to
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have written what another wrote, to have invented what another discovered; and is led into all the miserable vices of plagiarism and common lying. But though no man of middling good sense can derive much pleasure from the imputation of a laudable action which he never performed, yet a wise man may suffer great pain from the serious imputation of a crime which he never committed. Nature, in this case, has rendered the pain, not only more pungent than the opposite and correspondent pleasure, but she has rendered it so in a much greater than the ordinary degree. A denial rids a man at once of the foolish and ridiculous pleasure; but it will not always rid him of the pain. When he refuses the merit which is ascribed to him, nobody doubts his veracity. It may be doubted when he denies the crime which he is accused of. He is at once enraged at the falsehood of the imputation, and mortified to find that any credit should be given to it. He feels that his character is not sufficient to protect him. He feels that his brethren, far from looking upon him in that light in which he anxiously desires to be viewed by them, think him capable of being guilty of what he is accused of. He knows perfectly what he has done; but, perhaps, scarce any man can know perfectly what he himself is capable of doing. What the peculiar constitution of his own mind may or may not admit of, is, perhaps, more or less a matter of doubt to every
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every man. The trust and good opinion of his friends and neighbours, tend more than any thing to relieve him from this most disagreeable doubt; their distrust and unfavourable opinion to increase it. He may think himself very confident that their unfavourable judgment is wrong: but this confidence can seldom be so great as to hinder that judgment from making some impression upon him; and the greater his sensibility, the greater his delicacy, the greater his worth in short, this impression is likely to be the greater.

The agreement or disagreement both of the sentiments and judgments of other people with our own, is, in all cases, it must be observed, of more or less importance to us, exactly in proportion as we ourselves are more or less uncertain about the propriety of our own sentiments, about the accuracy of our own judgments.

A man of sensibility may sometimes feel great uneasiness lest he should have yielded too much even to what may be called an honourable passion; to his just indignation, perhaps, at the injury which may have been done either to himself or to his friend. He is anxiously afraid lest, meaning only to act with spirit, and to do justice, he may, from the too great vehemence of his emotion, have done a real injury to some other person; who, though not innocent, may not have been altogether so guilty as he at first apprehended. The opinion of other people becomes, in
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this case, of the utmost importance to him. Their approbation is the most healing balsam; their disapprobation, the bitterest and most tormenting poison that can be poured into his uneasy mind. When he is perfectly satisfied with every part of his own conduct, the judgment of other people is often of less importance to him.

There are some very noble and beautiful arts, in which the degree of excellence can be determined only by a certain nicety of taste, of which the decisions, however, appear always, in some measure, uncertain. There are others, in which the success admits, either of clear demonstration, or very satisfactory proof. Among the candidates for excellence in those different arts, the anxiety about the public opinion is always much greater in the former than in the latter.

The beauty of poetry is a matter of such nicety, that a young beginner can scarce ever be certain that he has attained it. Nothing delights him so much, therefore, as the favourable judgments of his friends and of the public; and nothing mortifies him so severely as the contrary. The one establishes, the other shakes, the good opinion which he is anxious to entertain concerning his own performances. Experience and success may in time give him a little more confidence in his own judgment. He is at all times, however, liable to be most severely mortified by the unfavourable judgments of the public. Racine was
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so disgusted by the indifferent success of his *Phædra*, one of the finest tragedies extant in any language, that, though in the vigour of his life, and at the height of his abilities, he resolved to write no more for the stage. That great poet used frequently to tell his son, that the most paltry and impertinent criticism had always given him more pain, than the highest and justest eulogy had ever given him pleasure. The extreme sensibility of Voltaire to the slightest censure of the same kind is well known to every body. The *Dunciad* of Mr. Pope is an everlasting monument of how much the most correct, as well as the most elegant and harmonious of all the English poets, had been hurt by the criticisms of the lowest and most contemptible authors. Gray (who joins to the sublimity of Milton the elegance and harmony of Pope, and to whom nothing is wanting to render him, perhaps, the first poet in the English language, but to have written a little more) is said to have been so much hurt, by a foolish and impertinent parody of two of his finest odes, that he never afterwards attempted any considerable work. Those men of letters who value themselves upon what is called fine writing in prose, approach somewhat to the sensibility of poets.

Mathematicians, on the contrary, who may have the most perfect assurance, both of the truth and of the importance of their discoveries, are frequently very indifferent about the reception
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which they may meet with from the public. The two greatest mathematicians of their age, Dr. Robert Simpson of Glasgow, and Dr. Matthew Stewart of Edinburgh, never seemed to feel even the slightest uneasiness from the neglect with which the ignorance of the public received some of their most valuable works. The great work of Sir Isaac Newton, his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, I have been told, was for several years neglected by the public. The tranquillity of that great man, it is probable, never suffered, upon that account, the interruption of a single quarter of an hour. Natural philosophers, in their independence upon the public opinion, approach nearly to mathematicians, and, in their judgments concerning the merit of their own discoveries and observations, enjoy some degree of the same security and tranquillity.

The morals of those different classes of men of letters are, perhaps, sometimes somewhat affected by this very great difference in their situation with regard to the public.

Mathematicians and natural philosophers, from their independence upon the public opinion, have little temptation to form themselves into factions and cabals, either for the support of their own reputation, or for the depression of that of their rivals. They are almost always men of the most amiable simplicity of manners, who live in good harmony with one another, are the friends of one
another's

another's reputation, enter into no intrigue in order to secure the public applause, but are pleased when their works are approved of, without being either much vexed or very angry when they are neglected.

It is not always the same case with poets, or with those who value themselves upon what is called fine writing. They are very apt to divide themselves into a sort of literary factions; each cabal being often avowedly and almost always secretly, the mortal enemy of the reputation of every other, and employing all the mean arts of intrigue and solicitation to pre-occupy the public opinion in favour of the works of its own members, and against those of its enemies and rivals. In France, Despreaux and Racine did not think it below them to set themselves at the head of a literary cabal in order to depress the reputation, first of Quinault and Perrault, and afterwards of Fontenelle and La Motte, and even to treat the good La Fontaine with a species of the most disrespectful kindness. In England, the amiable Mr. Addison did not think it unworthy of his gentle and modest character to set himself at the head of a little cabal of the same kind, in order to keep down the rising reputation of Mr. Pope. Mr. Fontenelle, in writing the lives and characters of the members of the academy of sciences, a society of mathematicians and natural philosophers, has frequent opportunities of celebrating the amiable simplicity of their manners; a quality which, he observes,

was so universal among them as to be characteristic rather of that whole class of men of letters, than of any individual. M. D'Alembert, in writing the lives and characters of the members of the French academy, a society of poets and fine writers, or of those who are supposed to be such, seems not to have had such frequent opportunities of making any remark of this kind, and no where pretends to represent this amiable quality as characteristic of that class of men of letter whom he celebrates.

Our uncertainty concerning our own merit, and our anxiety to think favourably of it, should together naturally enough make us desirous to know the opinion of other people concerning it; to be more than ordinarily elevated when that opinion is favourable, and to be more than ordinarily mortified when it is otherwise: but they should not make us desirous either of obtaining the favourable, or of avoiding the unfavourable opinion, by intrigue and cabal. When a man has bribed all the judges, the most unanimous decision of the court, though it may gain him his law-suit, cannot give him any assurance that he was in the right: and had he carried on his law-suit merely to satisfy himself that he was in the right, he never would have bribed the judges. But though he wished to find himself in the right, he wished likewise to gain his law-suit; and therefore he bribed the judges. If praise were of no consequence to us, but as a proof of our own praiseworthiness,

worthiness, we never should endeavour to obtain it by unfair means. But, though to wise men it is, at least in doubtful cases, of principal consequence upon this account; it is likewise of some consequence upon its own account: and therefore (we cannot, indeed, upon such occasions, call them wise men, but) men very much above the common level have sometimes attempted both to obtain praise and to avoid blame, by very unfair means.

Praise and blame express what actually are; praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness, what naturally ought to be the sentiments of other people with regard to our character and conduct. The love of praise is the desire of obtaining the favourable sentiments of our brethren. The love of praise-worthiness is the desire of rendering ourselves the proper objects of those sentiments. So far those two principles resemble and are akin to one another. The like affinity and resemblance take place between the dread of blame and that of blame-worthiness.

The man who desires to do, or who actually does, a praise-worthy action, may likewise desire the praise which is due to it, and sometimes, perhaps, more than is due to it. The two principles are in this case blended together. How far his conduct may have been influenced by the one, and how far by the other, may frequently be unknown even to himself. It must almost always be so to other people. They who are disposed to

lessen the merit of his conduct, impute it chiefly or altogether to the mere love of praise, or to what they call mere vanity. They who are disposed to think more favourably of it, impute it chiefly or altogether to the love of praise-worthiness; to the love of what is really honourable and noble in human conduct; to the desire not merely of obtaining, but of deserving the approbation and applause of his brethren. The imagination of the spectator throws upon it either the one colour or the other, according either to his habits of thinking, or to the favour or dislike which he may bear to the person whose conduct he is considering.

Some splenetic philosophers, in judging of human nature, have done as peevish individuals are apt to do in judging of the conduct of one another, and have imputed to the love of praise, to or what they call vanity, every action which ought to be ascribed to that of praise-worthiness.

Very few men can be satisfied with their own private consciousness that they have attained those qualities, or performed those actions, which they admire and think praise-worthy in other people; unless it is, at the same time, generally acknowledged that they possess the one, or have performed the other; or, in other words, unless they have actually obtained that praise which they think due both to the one and to the other. In this respect, however, men differ considerably from

from one another. Some seem indifferent about the praise, when, in their own minds, they are perfectly satisfied that they have attained the praise-worthiness. Others appear much less anxious about the praise-worthiness than about the praise.

No man can be completely, or even tolerably satisfied, with having avoided every thing blame-worthy in his conduct; unless he has likewise avoided the blame or the reproach. A wise man may frequently neglect praise, even when he has best deserved it; but, in all matters of serious consequence, he will most carefully endeavour so to regulate his conduct, as to avoid, not only blame-worthiness, but, as much as possible, every probable imputation of blame. He will never, indeed, avoid blame by doing any thing which he judges blame-worthy; by omitting any part of his duty, or by neglecting any opportunity of doing any thing which he judges to be really and greatly praise-worthy. But, with these modifications, he will most anxiously and carefully avoid it. To shew much anxiety about praise, even for praise-worthy actions, is seldom a mark of great wisdom, but generally of some degree of weakness. But, in being anxious to avoid the shadow of blame or reproach, there may be no weakness, but frequently the most praise-worthy prudence.

“Many people,” says Cicero, “despise glory, who are yet most severely mortified by unjust reproach; and that most inconsistently.” This in-

T 3 consistency,

consistency, however, seems to be founded in the unalterable principles of human nature.

The all-wise Author of Nature has, in this manner, taught man to respect the sentiments and judgments of his brethren; to be more or less pleased when they approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of it. He has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind; and has in this respect, as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him his vicegerent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren. They are taught by nature, to acknowledge that power and jurisdiction which has thus been conferred upon him, and to be more or less humbled and mortified when they have incurred his censure, and to be more or less elated when they have obtained his applause.

But though man has, in this manner, been rendered the immediate judge of mankind, he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct. The jurisdictions of those two tribunals are founded upon principles which, though in some respects resembling and akin, are, however, in reality different and distinct. The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the desire of
actual

actual praise, and in the aversion to actual blame. The jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in the desire of praise-worthiness; and in the aversion to blame-worthiness; in the desire of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we love and admire in other people; and in the dread of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people. If the man without should applaud us, either for actions which we have not performed, or for motives which had no influence upon us; the man within can immediately humble that pride and elevation of mind which such groundless acclamations might otherwise occasion, by telling us, that as we know that we do not deserve them, we render ourselves despicable by accepting them. If, on the contrary, the man without should reproach us, either for actions which we never performed, or for motives which had no influence upon those which we may have performed; the man within may immediately correct this false judgment, and assure us, that we are by no means the proper objects of that censure which has so unjustly been bestowed upon us. But in this and in some other cases, the man within seems sometimes, as it were, astonished and confounded by the vehemence and clamour of the man without. The violence and loudness, with which blame is sometimes poured out upon us, seem to stupify and benumb our natural sense of praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness; and the

judgments of the man within, though not, perhaps, absolutely altered or perverted, are, however, so much shaken in their steadiness and firmness of their decision, that their natural effect, in securing the tranquillity of the mind, is frequently in a great measure destroyed. We scarcely dare to absolve ourselves, when all our brethren appear loudly to condemn us. The supposed impartial spectator of our conduct seems to give his opinion in our favour with fear and hesitation, when that of all the real spectators, when that of all those with whose eyes, and from whose station he endeavours to consider it, is unanimously and violently against us. In such cases, this demi-god within the breast appears, like the demi-gods of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal extraction. When his judgments are steadily and firmly directed by the sense of praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness, he seems to act suitably to his divine extraction: but when he suffers himself to be astonished and confounded by the judgments of ignorant and weak man, he discovers his connexion with mortality, and appears to act suitably, rather to the human, than to the divine, part of his origin.

In such cases, the only effectual consolation of humbled and afflicted man lies in an appeal to a still higher tribunal, to that of the all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be deceived, and whose judgments can never be perverted.

verted. A firm confidence in the unerring rectitude of this great tribunal, before which his innocence is in due time to be declared, and his virtue to be finally rewarded, can alone support him under the weakness and deipendency of his own mind, under the perturbation and astonishment of the man within the breast, whom nature has set up as, in this life, the great guardian, not only of his innocence, but of his tranquillity. Our happiness in this life is thus, upon many occasions, dependent upon the humble hope and expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature; which can alone support its lofty ideas of its own dignity; can alone illumine the dreary prospect of its continually approaching mortality, and maintain its cheerfulness under all the heaviest calamities to which, from the disorders of this life, it may sometimes be exposed. That there is a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, where every man will be ranked with those who, in the moral and intellectual qualities, are really his equals; where the owner of those humble talents and virtues which, from being depressed by fortune, had, in this life, no opportunity of displaying themselves; which were unknown, not only to the public, but which he himself could scarcely be sure that he possessed, and for which even the man within the breast could scarcely venture to afford him any distinct and clear testimony; where that
modest,

modest, silent, and unknown merit will be placed upon a level with, and sometimes above those who, in this world, had enjoyed the highest reputation, and who, from the advantage of their situation, had been enabled to perform the most splendid and dazzling actions; is a doctrine in every respect so venerable, so comfortable to the weakness, so flattering to the grandeur of human nature, that the virtuous man who has the misfortune to doubt of it, cannot possibly avoid wishing most earnestly and anxiously to believe it.

SECT. IV. *Avarice.*

I Judge AVARICE to be a deviation of the passion of Ambition. The desire of power and esteem lurks at the bottom of the love of gold. To no other spring is it possible to trace this propensity; as the fear of want itself must arise from the desire of possessing what we dread to lose. It is, however, unnatural and disgraceful to the mind of man. "A covetous disposition," says Tully, "is to be avoided: for nothing more strongly marks a narrow soul than to love riches: or an honourable and noble one than to despise money if poor, and to use it beneficially and liberally if rich. Be cautious too," says he, "of coveting even glory, for to desire any thing too eagerly is to endanger independence, the grand object of every wise man's ambition." "*Pecuniæ fugienda cupiditas;*

cupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi, tamque parvi, quam amare divitias: nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas; si habeas ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre. Cavenda est etiam gloriæ cupiditas; eripit enim libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio." Did we not know it to be a fact, we should hardly be able to credit, that there are men, whose only enjoyment of money is to hoard it. If, as I verily believe it to be in the present state of the world, it is the intention of Providence, that the rich should be the stewards of the poor, and are appointed by God to soften the rigours of their condition, what will the miser have to say for himself? Yet in stamping Avarice with the odium due to it, let us be careful not to infringe upon the respect due to those virtues, which prodigals would fain confound with it. Economy and frugality, are as distant from Avarice, as beneficence and liberality, and indeed may be called the handmaids of the latter. On the other side, let not the miser deceive himself under their names. By the following characteristics he shall know himself, and be fully enabled to distinguish the vicious passions from those virtues.

Wholesome and agreeable food, fuel, good cloaths, a convenient house well furnished, servants; nay, farther, horses and carriages, are all either necessaries, or desirable comforts. I think I allow
a full

a full scope to the virtues of economy and frugality, when I say he is not a miser, who, in order to attain these comforts, is sedulous in the amassment of money. Nor is he a miser who, already possessing these, still amasses, with the view of providing them for his offspring. But he is a miser, who having more than will supply these, holds the filthy dirt within his gripe instead of scattering it with profusion: he is a miser, who out of his permitted economy, contrives not frequently to rob himself largely, in order to solace the woes of beings no otherwise related to him than as they are the children of God,

SECT. V. *Envy.*

ENVY I judge also to be a deviation of the passion of Ambition. It is that uneasy emotion which is felt on the advantages, be they what they may, that are in possession of others. The genuine nature of Ambition is to aim at the attainment of excellence, for the sake of its beauty and utility; it becomes spurious when it struggles, comparatively, through the mere desire of superiority: and thus we see, it is the quality of great minds to love and to praise their competitors; while sordid spirits hate and defame them. From the eagerness for superiority, first engendered in the spirit of Lucifer, sprang this diabolical depravity

pravity of the passion. It is a foul and disgraceful disorder of the soul : let it be detected and crushed. While we desire, and pursue real advantages, we only obey the voice of Nature ; but the moment we are irritated at those of another, we attend no longer to her ; we resign ourselves to ENVY.

ENVY is a shame-faced monster, that assumes a variety of disguises, and, in general, passes unexamined ; but may be easily discovered. As for the heart it seizes upon, from that it shall not be concealed : however ingenious it may be in deceiving others and itself, let it be sensible of the dominion of ENVY from this unequivocal character ; that it excites uneasiness at the advantages of others.

The mind that is so ignoble as to become the prey of this passion, readily yields to its malignant suggestions. Its aim is to detract and to degrade ; and there is no degree of crime to which it will not impel, from the sneer of malice to the perpetration of murder.

To know the baseness of Envy, we have only to reflect upon its operations. It does not, like most of the other passions, propose to itself either profit or pleasure ; but solely grieves that others should be possessed of their enjoyment, and exists by constant depredations on virtue, on beauty, and on every species of happiness. It is a striking inconsistency of this passion, that it proclaims in
fact

fact what it denies by insinuation and slander; for no one envies an inferior, and to envy is to confess superiority in the object envied.

It has been remarked that those who have personal, and other adventitious defects, are envious: "Because," says Bacon, "he that cannot possibly mend his own case, will do what he can to impair that of others, excepting these defects light upon a very brave and heroical nature, that shall dispose a man to make them additional sources of honour, by achieving excellence in their despite."

If the remark be just, it seems to urge in those cases a double care in providing a proper support for the mind, which, like the body, must have something to sustain it. "It will," says the same great genius, "either feed upon its own good or upon other's evil; who wants the one will prey upon the other; and who is hopeless of attaining to another's virtue, will seek the level by depressing another's fortune." From these remarks it is evident, that this unnatural pursuit of detraction and degradation, this disease of the soul may be prevented or cured, by supplying the mind with a lasting fund of its own virtues, to satisfy itself. Begin soon, my children, to do such things as memory may dwell upon with pleasure; obtain early the desire of making others happy, establish the habit of attending to the innocent wishes of those with whom you live; and let your words and actions be ever ready to promote the good of all!

all! Knowledge, and accomplishments, entertain and delight; but a conduct that produces happiness to others is the food that fills the soul, and generates that celestial health which cannot be affected with the corroding humours of ENVY.

Are we then never to blame? Is the daw to be suffered to strut in the feathers of the peacock, and not a plume to be extracted from his train? Detection and censure are the weapons of just indignation; but unless the former clearly precede the latter, it may be suspected to arise from malevolence. To a good heart censure is ever painful: it belongs properly to the understanding, and is a part of its duty. It is the office of reason to discriminate between virtue and vice, in all their degrees; and to be just in dealing respective praise and blame: but it should be the quality of the heart to open its avenues to praise, and carefully to question blame before it receives so noxious a guest. It should endeavour, too, to attach odium upon guilt, which is unchangeable, and to be lenient, as far as can be, where vice is not inherent, and where it is possible it may give place to virtue.

Sluggish commendation is a prominent mark of an envious mind. They who praise decided merit with a *but*, and *if it were not for*, and a *yet*, may be rather said obliquely to condemn than honestly to extol.

As

As ambition deviates into false conceptions of what is great, Envy pursues the imaginary train. There is no ideal object of petty ambition on which it does not work: equipage, furniture, dress, table; nay, even defects, if they be fashionable, the diminutive shoe of a Belle, or the slender calves of a Beau.

Children are not early subject to envy. The first emotions of an infant are peevish or complacent. This is according to the treatment it receives. Its first cries proceed from unpleasant sensations, felt by its corporeal organs; its first smiles are at the breast, and are the effects of those that are pleasant. When, from repeated observation, it has become acquainted with the person who fetters it in swaddling cloaths, and the person that nourishes it with milk, it begins to be angry or to love.

But children do not begin to be envious till they are praised and rewarded for excelling others, and are treated contemptuously for being excelled. We may say what we will in favour of emulation, it is the foster-mother of Envy; and it is greatly to be wished that youth could be inspired with the desire of excellence rather than of superiority: for I cannot bring my mind to believe, that Ambition is so odious a thing as it has been represented, though under brilliant colours, by Mr. Burke; who, I think, has too hastily ascribed

ascribed to the Deity, the planting in man the love of comparative excellence *. That it does exist in man, and very generally, there is no denying, though I cannot but think it a deviation, and that the love of positive excellence is a much superior passion, which, added to the imitative faculty is a means of forwarding the improvement of the human race more worthy of the Supreme Being. I do not believe that the solution of a single problem of Euclid was the result of this vain ambition; or that Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries sprung from a desire of his excelling Leibnitz or Des Cartes. Did emulation excite us to love as well as to admire the person, and to wish to attain his excellences, yet love him for surpassing us, there would be nothing different in it from the love of positive excellence; but when it excites competition only to produce in man the satisfaction of excelling his fellows, and to give "a sort of swelling triumph to his mind," I think it, even though it does not proceed to the length of Envy, a deviation of pure Ambition, and am willing to hope that the attainment of excellence, particularly in sublimer objects, more naturally arises from the love of excellence itself; for I will be bold to say, that it is more acceptable and congenial to the great and adorable Source of all excellence.

* See his Sublime and Beautiful.

Children seldom envy one another their enjoyments, and never till they have been taught by example. The boy who breaks the most tops, wins the most marbles, has the most pocket-money, or largest cake, is not envied; if he tyrannize or vaunt, he is hated or despised. But children are taught at home to compare the situation of their parents with that of the parents of their companions; to fix imaginary value on things, and to hate all superiority. Envy is thus sown. It is a passion from which the human heart might be more generally exempted, if care were taken to inform children of its nature, and to inculcate early, that the happiness of others is a genuine source of delight, while selfishness provokes universal disgust, and terminates in misery.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER II.

A N G E R.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

ANGER is a turbulent emotion of the mind, arising from something that offends us. This passion affects in various manners and degrees. Like every other passion, its source is natural and pure, and it is only in its deviations that it becomes vicious.

Seneca, who, upon this subject is to be carefully studied, says, that Anger proposes revenge or punishment. But as I take it in its most simple signification, to be that state of the mind when it is affected by an offending object, I conceive the disposition to revenge or punishment, is only to be imputed to it in some of its varieties. It is not unusual to be angry with a person, whom far from intending to punish, or to injure in any degree, we would guard from the slightest pain.

It is an involuntary emotion, indicating disapprobation; and it is so, I understand, that *we may be angry without sin.* As an uneasy emotion, it

might be the boast of the old philosophy to subdue it entirely; but I doubt whether it would be true wisdom; for, as its tendency is to prevent future offence, the manifestation of it may, by deterring provocations, correct the faults of others. In one point of view, Anger appears amiable, when it is provoked by any act tending to the injury of virtue. Whoever, without comparative exultation, is sincerely angry at vice, gives a proof of goodness, and his anger will be mingled with a degree of scorn, which, in some measure, by degrading the object, relieves the pain of the emotion. This species of Anger is termed
INDIGNATION.

What a beautiful subject for the canvass does this pure emanation of the passion afford! "Be-gone," said Olivia to her pretended lover, on discovering the impurity of his views, "you shall see me no more. I am grateful to nature for having guarded my heart against the villain I was to despise." Throw this emotion into a lovely face and a graceful form, contrast it with the seducer, finish your work with a masterly hand, and you may place your picture beside the most interesting pieces of art.

So far this passion proves at once the testimony and guard of virtue, and appears to have been implanted in us for those purposes. It is both useful and beautiful; and therefore, the eradication

cation of it should not, by any means, be included in the system of ethics.

Here a caution naturally occurs, not to give way readily to anger against any one, on the representation of others, with the purity of whose testimony we are not thoroughly satisfied. The hope of exciting indignation and thereby of vilifying character, is the food of slander; that monster, engendered at the bottom of the foulest currents of a deviated and vicious passion. The tongue that traduces, and the heart that easily yields its anger to an uncertain tale, are instruments that are made the scourge of virtue, and which clog her steps in her progress to heaven.

I have mentioned Anger as merely indicative of disapprobation, or attended with scorn; but not as accompanied with RESENTMENT: which I judge to be, not a simple manifestation of Anger, but an active propensity to put the offender to confusion, for individual gratification: and here the passion begins to deviate. I should be sorry to think, that the *pleasure of punishment* was natural to the mind, however common it may be found. The sovereign contempt of the stoics, or rather, the mild forbearance of christianity,—for stoicism is apathy,—seems more congenial to the nature of our race. Punishment cannot be the gratification of a noble mind; it is simply a duty, and a very painful one. It may be a duty to

ourselves, to our family, to our friends, or to society; but if any one find a pleasure in it, let him suspect his spirit to have swerved from its constitution, and to be now most vitiated and depraved.

The clown, whose quarrels are decided by his fists or his cudgel, is impelled by a brutal instinct; and the courtier, who uses his pistol or his sword, sacrifices to a point of honour. The former would be ashamed but to think of way-laying his adversary, and the latter politely requests him to take the first shot. These resentments arise, in a great measure, from the laws of self-preservation, and are commonly unpremeditated: but it is the part of man to regulate his finer instincts, and wholly subdue the coarser ones. His resentments are rational, just, and perhaps indispensable, when they tend to the future prevention of crimes, of injuries, or of insults; but are coarse instincts when flowing from the precipitation of the blood. As for the impulse which instigates men to draw their swords in single combat, it appears to me, that nineteen duels out of twenty, are fought chiefly in order to support the reputation of personal courage, which is necessary to the character of a gentleman, and that its effect may be traced more frequently to Pride than to Anger.

But Repentment, so far as it leads only to reparation, when that can be obtained by moral means,

means, is natural, and thence arises pleasure; but not from the punishment of the offender; for, when a good man says he is glad to hear that a villain has been punished, the gladness he expresses, does not consist in the thought of the pain the villain has suffered, but of the reparation that has been made to individuals, or the benefit that has accrued to society.

We cannot, however, watch *Repentment* too closely, for besides that it is a mixture of pride, it forms an essential part of a deeper deviation of the passion of *Anger*—it is the corner stone of *Revenge*.

SECT. II. *Revenge.*

REVENGE is that degree of *Anger* that rankles at the heart, and breeds malignity and vengeance. It returns injury for injury—it goes further, it sets no bounds to its vengeance, and, like misplaced *Ambition*, refuses no means that offer to gratify it. Is *Revenge* a natural passion? If so it is not a deviation, and I lose my aim in supporting the original purity of all the passions.

I conceive it to be a maxim that our judgment concerning the nature of any thing is to be formed from its perfect state. Music is the perfect harmony of sounds: an apple is the perfect fruit of a certain tree:—now, though music and ap-

ples may be bad, yet if we do not judge of them as they are good, we shall form a wrong notion of their natures. Nor does the preponderance of quantity signify : a single chord shows harmony to be the nature of music, and one good apple is proof that the tree would naturally bear others, were it not from *some extrinsic cause*. By the same rule we are to form our judgment of the heart. If we meet with revengeful men in the world, we, also, meet with men endowed with a forgiving benevolence, and we have only to establish which is the more lovely in the sight of God ; that which is lovely must be the perfection, and the other must be degeneracy. The inference is, that Revenge is not natural to the breast of man, but a degeneracy arising from those mysterious extrinsic causes which have given birth to other evils that have invaded the earth.

However mysterious the cause, it is evident that human nature has received a hurt ; for as disease cannot be the natural state of the body, vice cannot be that of the mind ; and we may lay it down as a rule that whatever is not lovely, is not in its origin natural ; for virtue may be called the health of the soul. Of the nature of incorporeal spirits we can say little, except from analogy ; but if there are beings that can deliberately return evil for good, there must be such spirits as devils ; if there are beings that return good for evil, there must

must be angels. The nature of man, as we have seen in the article of Ambition, is to aspire; every return of evil sinks him towards the diabolical standard; every act of good exalts him; and in proportion as he is superior to the desire of retaliation, he approaches the original purity of his nature.

There is an action related of the unfortunate Savage, the son of the cruel lady Macclesfield, which does honour to the world, and sets the principle of forbearance in a strong light. He had been brought to a trial, on the issue of which his life depended. A woman, who had been present at the transaction for which he was tried, and who was suspected to be suborned by his unnatural mother, was produced as an evidence, and swore roundly against him; the jury gave a verdict of guilty, but the prerogative of the crown was exerted, and Savage was saved. Some time afterwards he accidentally found this woman in the deepest distress; and afforded her the immediate relief she wanted, by giving her the half of the only guinea he had in the world, accompanied with a very gentle rebuke for her conduct towards him: compare this with the proscribing spirit of the Triumviri, on the overturn of the Roman Commonwealth, and your sensations will decide upon it.

Are we, then, tamely to submit to injuries and to insults, and to suffer villainy and arrogance to triumph?

triumph? By no means. Our very peace frequently depends upon showing that we will resist: but SPIRIT differs widely from Revenge. Some offences deserve only our scorn; while to prevent the consequences of others, it is our duty to bring the offender to punishment; but punishment properly understood is the result of justice, not of vengeance. It is the province of SPIRIT to secure dignity to virtue by genuine anger, by animated resistance, and reproof; not to enjoy a malignant delight from the effects of retaliation.

SECT. III. *Rage.*

RAGE is the extreme of the passion, breaking tumultuously over its bounds. It is both disgraceful and dangerous. It overwhelms the faculties, and impels to the commission of absurdities and horrors. Alexander stabbing Clitus for not flattering him, is a full comment. In its excesses it approaches to madness, and is termed FURY.

SECT. IV. *Fretfulness.*

FRETFULNESS is a frequent tendency to a slight degree of Anger, on trivial occasions. Peevishness and petulance are synonymous to it.

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This disposition, if not criminal, is extremely unamiable, as it tends to interrupt the pleasure of our associates.

SECT. V. *Moroseness.*

MOROSENESS is an habitual disposition to be angry or displeas'd, on all occasions. It is less active than its brother sullenness, which is apt to growl a little more.

SECT. VI. *Hastiness, and Sullenness.*

THERE are two other deviations of this passion, the opposite of each other, HASTINESS and SULLENNESS. Hastiness is quick anger, rises soon, and is soon dispell'd; and so far it has the advantage over the other irregularities of anger: but it is nevertheless dangerous, and leads to mistakes that are attended with shame. Sullenness is an obstinate prolongation of petty anger, it preys upon the heart of the angry person, and is very disgusting to every observer.

CHAPTER III.

ANTIPATHY, OR AVERSION.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

ANTIPATHY, or AVERSION, is an emotion produced by a natural and insurmountable repugnance to some things. It is the reverse of SYMPATHY, which is that affection of the mind, by which we are interested in objects from some natural similarity. We may conjecture, that, prior to the introduction of evil, the sensation of aversion was universally unknown: but no sooner was there an idea or perception to which the term offensive could be applied, than it became natural. We feel a natural repugnance to pain, to fetid smells, to nauseous drugs, to harsh and discordant sounds, to horrid objects—and good minds feel no less repugnance to vice. Thus far the passion runs pure, and keeps its bounds. But, as it is provoked by what is dissimilar, it follows, alas! that corrupt hearts will have antipathies to what is good: as there are some diseases of the body, in which the purest viands become loathsome, and the appetite craves only trash.

SECT. II. *Hatred.*

SECT. II. *Hatred.*

WITH Antipathy, HATRED is closely connected ; and can hardly be said to branch from it, while excited through the organs of corporeal sensation, or by the proper objects of intellectual detestation ; the fixed hatred we feel to pain on the one hand, and to wickedness on the other, are well-founded and natural antipathies, but at the point where HATRED joins MALEVOLENCE a deviation takes place, and boundless devastation ensues.

As we are aware of the influence of habits, and know that the strongest reason is generally worsted by those sturdy tyrants ; it is the indispensable duty of the guardians of young minds, to fortify them with such as enlist on the side of nature ; and to plant the weightiest artillery they are masters of, against all those that are her enemies. In the present state of things, the true objects of Hatred and of Love may, as children grow up, be easily misconceived, and habitual antipathies be mistaken for natural repugnances. Mr. Pennant, in his Zoology, has given a curious history of a toad, to shew that the prejudice which custom has excited against that inoffensive animal, is ill-founded : and, I think, it will appear, that such dislikes are usually bequeathed, as the defects of the person are not uncommonly transmitted from sire to son.

son. Of the tribe of habitual antipathies, I shall only observe, that they are of themselves the objects of a just odium ; and particularly after that period of life, when we are supposed to have placed ourselves under the dominion of reason.

Hatred, when it deviates from the natural repugnance of antipathy and is directed towards persons instead of things, is generally accompanied with ill-will, and is a deplorable passion. If LOVE be the most delightful emotion, what must HATRED be, which is its reverse ? I admit the difficulty of attaining the celestial perfection of loving an enemy ; but so painful is MALEVOLENCE, that the wonder is, how any well-disposed mind can give it room. We may be displeased, angry, and sometimes bound to resent ; but from the malignity of HATRED the bosom of man must be free, or he must be miserable. Yet, how many are slaves to this passion ! What trifles become causes of the most inveterate animosities ! It generally invades the breast that is already the prey of Pride, or of Envy ; and, sad to tell ! those who cultivate virtues and talents are too often doomed to be its objects. Let not him, however, who desires to be beloved, and finds himself frequently disappointed, be dismayed ; let him deserve to be beloved, let him covet only the love of amiable minds, and if he find but one sincere and affectionate friend, let him bless God for his share, and patiently submit to the aversion of sordid spirits.

RANCOUR

RANCOUR is a fixed malignant degree of Hatred: and SPITE is the mischievous hatred of a paltry mind.

SECT. III, *Misanthropy.*

MISANTHROPY is a hatred of the human race generally. That man should be man-hater is surely unnatural; yet the Misanthrope has something to say for himself. He is usually a disappointed philosopher; one who has set out in search of the virtues, but has unfortunately stumbled over crimes and vices. A race of hardened criminals, of beings selfish and insensible, must be odious; such has he found those with whom he has mixed; such has he read of in the history of his species; such he judges the whole mass of mortals, and detests them. His own frailties he has found magnified, and his virtues disregarded; while gold, almighty gold, is set upon the altar, and every man bends his knee to the massy god.

This is the specious ground of the Misanthropist, from which I think it is not difficult to dislodge him, and to drive him to his citadel of PRIDE or of ENVY. The envious are consistently Misanthropes, for it is their nature to detest every superior. The proud, even where their pride is of the the purest kind, arising from the consciousness of virtue and of talents, are apt to expect a
deference

deference from all mankind : but as all mankind are in pursuit of their own happiness, it is possible for many in the hurry and bustle of the pursuit, to forget to include in their attention some who deserve it. The proud man, who places his bliss on the respect of the world, will hate them for their neglect ; whereas, the genuine philosopher, who has made up his happiness within himself, expects no homage, and sees not the faults of mankind with hatred, but with concern. He mingles with men for their sakes more than for his own ; and ten to one he finds among them, or makes, some amiable countenances, and sympathetic hearts, to feast and rejoice his soul.

CHAPTER IV.

CURIOSITY.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

CURIOSITY is one of the passions with which Nature spurs on mankind in the road of knowledge. Hence proceed the many improvements we have made for the use, the ornament, and the convenience

niency of our species, by which our welfare and happiness are considerably increased, and human knowledge extended so far beyond that of any other animal upon this globe. Curiosity is the desire of being informed; its object is novelty. It is a principle which very early discovers itself in the infant mind, and in that state cannot be too diligently watched, or too cautiously directed. Although in an advanced state of the understanding, innocence and ignorance are very different qualities; in the early progress of the intellect, the latter may often protect the former. This passion is of a craving nature, and will if possible, be satisfied: if it find not wholesome food, it will feed upon trash; and therefore to supply it properly, is one of the secrets of education, by which an able and respectable tutor expedites his task in the improvement of his pupil, and affords that knowledge which is the wholesome food of Curiosity.

SECT. II. *Futile Curiosity.*

FUTILE CURIOSITY is a deplorable imbecility of the heart. You shall see gossips thrusting their noses into every filthy corner, to see what is lying there, merely for the pleasure of imparting the important discovery to a neighbour gossip.

But filthy and contemptible as is Futile Curiosity, it is loveliness itself when compared to Dis-

HONOURABLE CURIOSITY. Obtaining information by unwarrantable and base means, prying into secrets, listening in private, opening letters or peeping into them, and attempting to corrupt and sift those in whom confidence has been placed, are strong proofs of a degraded nature.

CHAPTER V.

FEAR.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

FEAR may be defined, a painful emotion impressed upon the mind by the perception, or conception, of any kind of danger. A person enjoying the utmost tranquillity, shall, by a slight turn of the head, be thrown into the most tumultuous perturbation. You are walking alone in the fields, and calmly enjoying the serenity of the weather: you have gone past a stile, and before you perceive it are half over a meadow, where a large bull is grazing: your eyes unexpectedly meet his, in which you discover a savage fierceness; the wild monster rounds his neck and moves
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towards you; he bellows, he quickens his pace. The fight, by the inexplicable magic of nature, throws your blood into quicker circulation; your eyes dilate, your heart palpitates, and your limbs tremble; your mind is affected and put into great commotion: the commotion of the mind is passion, and the passion you now feel is Fear. Again, a beloved person lies dangerously ill: you think of the probability of death; your mind is agitated by the thought: this agitation is also the passion of Fear, but it is the Fear set in motion by imagination; for your friend recovers.

This is a passion that pervades animated nature, and, as it respects personal safety, is instinctive; being one of the guards of self-preservation. I believe that the most courageous and furious monsters are susceptible of it, if taken unawares; but, in men, there are many instances of a constitutional intrepidity, that has set it at defiance. When a ball burst through the ceiling of an apartment, where Charles XII. was dictating to his secretary, the latter involuntarily laid down his pen; the king, unmoved, asked what he meant, and ordering him to resume it, continued coolly to dictate. I do not apprehend that Charles's courage was that amiable valour, which is consistent with the finer feelings of the heart, but rather a wonderful insensibility that excites admiration,

ration, unmixed with either esteem or affection. He was the

“Unconquer'd lord of pleasure and of pain.”

That noble presence of mind which is attained by surveying danger on every side, and preparing to oppose it, is the result of habit rather than the gift of nature, and distinguishes the hero from the madman. The king of Sweden would have taken a bull by the horns, and been gored to death, sooner than have thought of casting his cloke over them, to blind the animal and secure his retreat. This is evidently a passion as natural to the human race as to all other creatures, and he who does not obey its dictates, to secure his personal safety, when he may do so without prejudice to his virtues, acts not as he ought to do.

FEAR is not COWARDICE, but COWARDICE is vitiated FEAR. The emotion that I say is natural, is not the *timidity* of a hare, but the alarm of a lion; it is the instinct that warns him of danger. To avoid danger ignobly is not the characteristic of man. He is not a timid animal, and all the fear he knows is readily dissipated by his finer passions and his virtues. Friendship, love, gratitude, pity, honour, patriotism, are beams that dispel the terrors which envelope pain and death, and danger then becomes the sunshine of his existence.

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But personal safety is, perhaps, the narrowest province in which the dominion of this passion is exerted. There are a thousand real goods, and ten thousand imaginary ones, which in desiring to obtain, we dread to lose. And there is a multitude of evils, the anticipation of which creates the agitations of Fear. These anxieties respecting uncertain events are some of the chief sources of misery; and it is the part of wisdom to subdue or regulate them. Such as tend to awaken foresight, and to instil prudence, are by no means to be repressed, but rather reduced, as nearly as possible, to calm meditation; while the perturbation that arises from idle and ill-founded apprehensions, about events not essentially concerned in the real interests of happiness, should be discarded, as unworthy the bosom of a rational creature.

SECT. II. *Terror.*

TERROR is excess of Fear: and it is also the term given to the passion when thrown upon the mind by the agency of Sympathy; to which I refer it.

SECT. III. *Horror.*

HORROR is produced when **TERROR** is accompanied with detestation. The action of Virginius, in stabbing his daughter, produces Ter-

ror ; it was an act of exalted virtue : the action of Alexander, in stabbing Clytus, produces Horror ; it was a detestable action. The murder of Duncan is doubly horrible ; for it was perpetrated by him,

“ Who 'gainst his murderer should have shut the door,
Not borne the knife himself.”

Whatever is against nature produces Horror ; because, to natural beings it must be detestable.

SECT. IV. *Awe.*

AWE is almost the reverse of Horror, being a degree of FEAR accompanied with, or rather proceeding from Reverence. What notions of Terror accompany the contemplation of unlimited power ! When we lift ourselves above, and consider the world on which we tread as a great ball, twirled through a space at the rate of near 70,000 miles an hour ; how terrible does it appear to the imagination, and how insupportable would it be to the senses, were they not adapted to the confines of the atmosphere ! The Terror so produced is changed into AWE, when with unlimited power we combine the thought of unlimited goodness. We know that the power of God could unhinge, and annihilate the system : we know, also, that his goodness is the source of felicity ; and whether felicity be ultimately affected by a continuation of
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this globe, or by its destruction, the mind rests in security on Omnipotence, in which it cannot be deceived. Its apprehensions are mingled with gratitude and with admiration; and terror is lost in love and in awe.

A degree of Awe is justly inspired by very eminent and virtuous characters. But the sensation of uneasiness which is felt by some minds, in the company of men distinguished for birth or wealth, is not AWE, though often termed so; for it may possibly be mingled with contempt or indignation; neither of which can be blended with the deference of respect. It is rather the secret anguish of pride.

The reverence attached to places devoted to worship, and especially when aided by the sublimity of magnitude, and the solemnity of the appropriate architecture, will also excite this emotion. We naturally have a respect and affection for whatever belongs to, or is connected with, one we love or revere: if so, the respect for places of worship should be universal, and the violation of them be held a breach of the law of *Nature*. Perhaps I should have said of *Religion*; but as I allude only to human nature, I think the phrase justified; for were I to define man, I should certainly not omit his religious propensity in my definition.

SECT. V. *Cowardice.*

COWARDICE deviates from natural FEAR; and is that torrent of the passion which neither Honour, Virtue, nor Religion, can stem. No man is contemptible for shunning danger; but to seek personal safety at the expence of any noble mark of nature; to be so frozen to life, or to ease, that the beams of the better passions cannot warm the blood into that genial flow of courage, which is given to man for the protection of his just happiness, both individual and social, and for the support of his dignity; is indeed a vile and contemptible degradation of *Fear*.

Cowardice includes not only the fear of death, but the apprehension of any disadvantage whatever, which it scruples not to avoid, by means vicious or dishonourable. I would not be understood to allude particularly to dwelling; which I have already slightly mentioned: the avoiding of a duel may, or may not, be Cowardice, according to the circumstances attending it; and it may be even bravery; but Cowardice is generally the want of that courage, which true Honour, Virtue, or Religion, should inspire.

SECT. VI. *Timidity.*

TIMIDITY is a disposition to be easily frightened, or alarmed; but it has no affinity to Cowardice,

ardice, for it is not inconsistent with Honour and Virtue; nay, it is sometimes amiable, as in the fair sex, when not carried to an absurdity; but it cannot be laudable in men, as it is a want of firmness.

CHAPTER VI.

HOPE.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

THIS panacea of the soul, if not the most lively, is the most flattering emotion of the mind. It is raised by contemplating the probability of attaining a desirable good: the probability, however, being such as to leave the event in some suspense; for the nearer we approach to certainty, the nearer is the destruction of Hope: when we no longer doubt, we no longer hope.

Hope has been long considered as in possession of the best anchor for the voyage of life: and on a sea so spread with shoals, where the weather often proves too boisterous for the pilot, it is happy for us, that she is ever ready to cast anchor

chor and to keep us from total wreck, till gentler gales succeed to waft us to the shore of bliss, to which we shape our course. So far Hope is friendly, is rational, and we may with confidence engage her in our service. He that hopes wisely will seldom have his expectations balked; or if balked, the disappointment itself will prove the foundation of still better hope.

SECT. II. *Chimerical Hope.*

CHIMERICAL Hope, however, should be early brought under subjection, and the mind taught to reject all those visionary schemes of imaginary joys and advantages, with which the brain of inexperienced youth is too apt to be infested. Much grief, error, and disappointment would be prevented, if care were taken in youth to regulate the imagination; which, employed properly, is a valuable and delightful faculty; but misemployed, leads to discontent, to horrors, and to madness.

The nature of life, its extent, its enjoyments, should be clearly displayed. What ought to be hoped, what may reasonably be hoped, and what it would be folly to hope, or some of the most serious considerations of education; and it is the indispensable task of every parent and guardian, to impress them early on those minds that are committed to their care. He who

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is left to pursue through life hopes that are not likely to be realized, will travel from stage to stage of misery, and conclude his journey in despair: whereas he who hopes rationally prepares for disappointment, and extends his views beyond the temporary relays of sublunary expectation:

Sperat infestis, metuit secundis
Alteram fortem bene preparatum
Pectus,

HORACE.

CHAPTER VII.

J O Y.

SECT. I. *Its Varities and Deviations.*

JOY is the emotion felt on happy occurrences. It is always a delightful, and, when excited by proper events, an amiable passion. It is in some degree disgustful to observers when rising from trivial and low causes, or when it appears immoderate; for, in the former instance, it is the mark of weakness; and in the latter, it borders upon

upon EXULTATION. Till the understanding, however, has had time to ripen, it is otherwise ; for it is never disgusting in children. When Joy is the effect of the happiness of others, it is the most amiable of the passions. It is the reverse of envy ; and as that has been called a diabolical, this may be termed a celestial passion.

SECT. II. *Chearfulness.*

CHEARFULNESS is a mild, even Joy, not called forth on any uncommon occasion, but proceeding from a smooth tenour of life, and from a mind that is not a slave to any of its passions. Its chief foes are vice and misfortune ; there cannot be any kind of true Joy, where there is vice, and where there is virtue, even misfortune may be borne with a degree of cheerful patience.

SECT. III. *Mirth.*

MIRTH is a talkative kind of Joy, usually attended with laughter, and is the natural result of man's sociable disposition. If it flow from genuine spirits, from true wit, or comic humour, it is a desirable emotion ; but FALSE SPIRITS fictitiously procured, the noise of infective laughter, and the turbulent merriment of wine, are joys ill suited to noble minds.

SECT. IV. *Malignity.*

SECT. IV. *Malignant Joy.*

THAT there should be a deviation of this Passion, and that a very foul one, bespeaks the sad depth of depravity to which the human soul may sink. All malignant pleasure, all malevolent delight, if pleasure and delight they can be, diverge so abruptly and so oppositely to the pure source of Joy, that we can scarcely be led to trace them thither. I am inclined to think that we confound terms in giving complacent phrases to sensations produced by horrors, and to believe it impossible that the gratification enjoyed by vicious spirits has the slightest claim to the distinction of happiness. Who for example, can allow the name of pleasure to be associated with cruelty, or grant to the heart of a tyrant the possession of delight? Such, however, is the state of language, that very different perceptions and sensations receive the same appellations; and he who triumphs at the torture of a fellow-creature has a lexicographic title to a word, fit only for the philanthropic bosom of a Howard.

There is a stimulus attending all the depraved Passions, how or why arising I pretend not now to enquire, which, for want of another word, perhaps for want of an appropriate idea, we call the pleasure of each. But he who reflects, cannot fail to observe, that there is no analogy whatever
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between the stimulus of a villain, and the bliss of a noble heart.

Some of the common amusements of life appear to be attended with this depravity, though, in truth, it is otherwise. Hunting, shooting, and fishing, to a nervous habit of body, and to a scrupulous delicacy of mind, seem to be cruel sports. The weakness and disproportion of the animals pursued, the spilling of their blood, the agonies of death, and the deprivation of life, take the shape of horrors to a tender heart: but when reflexion assures us that they are proper food, when observation has shown the means of obtaining them to be curious, and habit has rendered it agreeable; when we find the exercise conducive to health, and are conscious that we are not offending the Creator, the idea of cruelty vanishes, and we find these diversions consonant to reason as well as pleasing to our sensations. I argue generally, however, and by no means intend to cast an imputation on the scrupulous and tender heart, which, on the contrary, I own I prefer, admire, and love.

All infliction of unnecessary pain for gratification; the stimulants of slander, of envy, and of every vitiated passion, are the most lamentable of all deviations; and we can scarcely trace them to the clear, and exquisite fountain of Joy. This obscurity, however, is owing to the black streams of malignant emotions, that mingle with, and corrupt its purity.

CHAPTER VIII.

L O V E.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

LOVE is that noble, genial, and warm affection of mind, excited by amiable objects, that, while it exalts the soul, communicates inexpressible delight to every part of the human frame. It is the soul of Virtue, "the divinity that stirs within us," the grand enjoyment of superior natures, a great portion of which mankind is suffered to participate: it was the spring of creation, and continues to support it. From this source an infinite variety of streams branches forth. It is piety, devotion, philanthropy, charity, benevolence, friendship; and, in fine, it is that Passion peculiar to the human species, which, from its superior liveliness, obtains the every name of Love. On this passion I will first make some observations, and then proceed to the other branches that stream from the source.

Love then, in this view, is a passion of the mind, existing by the distinction of sex, and is the emotion that is raised by qualities in the object
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which excite the highest pleasurable sensations. It is sometimes a pure, but oftener a mixed passion. It is nobler when it is pure, but not culpable when it is mixed. In the former, the happiness of its object is the highest gratification; in the latter, selfish desires predominate. The mixed passion is so agreeable to the mixed nature of mankind, and so attractive, that the purer being with difficulty distinguishable, becomes the object of suspicion, and indeed the existence of it is nearly banished from the belief of polite society.

That susceptibility of our nature, which leads us to be pleased with objects at first sight, cannot deserve the name of Love. An animated countenance graced with smiles, a just symmetry of body, and a marked attention, cannot fail to engage the heart by the pleasure they give it; and though it be not Love may be its foundation. The further discovery of amiable qualities, and more particular attentions, produce the sparks, and sighs blow them to a flame. But imagine this object, so pleasing at first sight, to be a mere picture, an outside; the mind, on examination, finding nothing beyond what struck the eye, cannot give room to a passion: what glittered was a dying ember, and from the ashes no flame can be produced.

Beauty excites an emotion, but it is not Love: Love must spring from Love; that is to say, kindnesses, and unwavering attentions must fore-run,
and

and prepare the necessary sympathy. It is worthy of observation, that kindness and attention are generally concomitants of beauty, whereas spleen and reserve too often go hand in hand with deformity: so comes it that it is usually at the shrine of the former that the heart is found devoted. When ordinary persons create love, the triumph is that of amiable manners and the appearance of pleasing emotions.

The instances that abound with lovers persevering in their courtship in defiance of rejection, or even in the face of avowed dislike; and a few examples of madness and of suicide, may appear to disprove the necessity of a previous sympathy. But the passion in these instances must have proceeded originally in its usual train, and some subsequent turn must have been the cause of the hopeless perseverance, the madness or suicide; for it is by no means contended that Love is altogether a voluntary passion, and that the heart can love, or not love, as the will or reason shall direct. An amiable object manifesting kindness may conquer the heart in spite of all argument; in which case the passion is involuntary; and should any serious obstacles arise in opposition to it, to struggle with, and overcome it, becomes one of the most important, and most difficult tasks of virtue. The obstinate lover, who, to the beauty of his mistress adds the remembrance of some kindness that had raised a hope, will not

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easily

easily subdue that hope. The disappointed lover, who makes his passion the chief object of his imagination, will be apt to admit irregular ideas, and unregulated imagination is the field of madness. Melancholy and gloom lead to suicide.

With respect to that precipitate kind of conquest of the heart told of in novels, called *falling in love*; it cannot be allowed among intellectual beings: but, if ever it does take place, must be the effect, not the cause, of madness; and be nearly allied to that kind of derangement which a beggar betrays who falls in love with a princess. A story is told of a celebrated comedian, that one night, after playing Felix in the Wonder, he was followed to his house by a middle aged ordinary woman, who desired to speak with him apart, said she had three questions to ask him, and having obtained his promise to answer sincerely, she requested to know whether he was married or single? He answered he was single. Was he engaged to any person? He was not. Were his affections free? Most certainly. She thanked him, and he allowed her, at her earnest solicitation, to retire without further explanation. He laughed, and concluded that some lady had *fallen in love* with him; but a considerable time having passed without his having heard of his incognita, the affair became mysterious. One evening, at a place of public amusement, he recognized, in a party of ladies, the person who had put the questions

tions to him. She endeavoured to avoid him, but emboldened by his curiosity, he addressed her:—"You must certainly allow, Madam, that I have a right to put one question, at least, to you, and to expect a sincere reply." "Certainly." "Pray then what was the motive of the questions you put to me, since I was never more to hear from you?" Her answer was, "A beautiful young woman of large fortune, whose time had been chiefly spent in the country, was at the theatre when you performed Don Felix, she was enraptured, *fell in love* with you, and directed me to put those questions. While she was contriving the means of forming an acquaintance with you, the bills announced your appearance in the character of Scrub. She saw you, and was cured of her passion: she could have united herself to a Felix, but not to a Scrub." If this anecdote be true, the lady, beyond a doubt, had, by the magic of fancy, transferred all the fondness of Felix for Violante to herself; and she was much obliged to Scrub for teaching her the folly of *falling in love*. And so doubtless it will ever be: the lady who *falls in love*, and finds not the man her imagination has painted in the object of her caprice, for caprice it is, not love, will look elsewhere, and turn with contempt from the worthless thing that made her heart vibrate for a moment. To pursue the metaphor: Love is not the melody but the

harmony of minds—not that pleasant modulation of successive tones that catches the ear, but the full united vibration of concords that swells the heart to rapture.

This is the Love which both sides of our nature, intellectual and animal, heighten into inexpressible bliss. Separate intellect from animal, and the former will be that pure Love alluded to in the beginning of this Essay, but the latter will not be Love at all.

Let us, however, remember, that we are formed for a more certain, and a more lasting happiness than this mixed passion, how exquisite soever it be; that we are formed for that bliss which arises from pure affection, and for the enjoyment of continuing through endless ages to heap knowledge upon knowledge. Love, whether wholly pure or mixed, is assuredly grateful to the Author of all good, who thought proper to fashion us as we are, a compound of two natures. It is clearly our business on earth to exalt ourselves to our superior relationship: and real love will never prove a clog to the exaltation of the ethereal principle.

It will not be improper to conclude this Section with some maxims and aphorisms for the service of the fair sex, which if impressed upon their minds, may prove of the highest importance to the rising generation—and, therefore, deserve to be

be called the **GOLDEN RULES OF LOVE.** Let them be got by heart, and quoted by both single and married.

Golden Rules of Love.

THE virtues are necessary to Love, and the more they are exerted the more are its delights encreased.

As general kindness is necessary to the character of a good disposition, and is also the avenue to Love, there the barrier ought to be kept. The man who offers unusual kindness rings for further admiffion. On this alarum a good girl will consider two things, the one for her own sake; namely, what are the virtues and accomplishments of this man? the other for his sake; shall she give birth to a hope she is likely to disappoint? Continue at the barrier and no harm can ensue.

Though it behoves every young woman to be cautious from whom she receives kindness, and by no means to admit any particular mark of it from a man of whose character she is ignorant; on the other hand, let her not be backward in a general interchange of regard with all liberal men of her acquaintance.

When the barrier is passed, happiness is placed in a critical situation. A man of sensibility will

not risk a refusal; much less will a delicate woman commit herself. Here nature has established a mode of intelligence, by which the most scrupulous may understand each other, and this is the sympathy prepared by kindness.

When the passion is ascertained to be mutually agreeable, it is the part of the man to be ostensibly the courtier of a happiness, which both are satisfied is reciprocally coveted.

The allurements to Love, are Virtue, Beauty, and Accomplishments, uniting with Kindness.

The emotion that is excited by certain intelligible movements of the eye is not Love. Yet the eyes speak its most harmonious periods.

Infatuation is not in the vocabulary of Love. To infatuate signifies to make foolish; the very reverse of Love, which refines and exalts. When it is said—

That women, born to be controul'd,
Yield to the forward and the bold;

let it be remembered that Love is not understood.—The sentiment is that of a libertine expressing his opinion of female frailty, and against such an opinion, Love and Virtue should muster all their forces.

The woman, who, having raised hope in the bosom of a lover, disappoints him without very good reason, is a jilt; a base character.

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The man who uses kindness to incite sympathy, and sympathy for the gratification of appetite, without respect to love and honour, is a seducer; the basest of characters.

The flame of Love, once raised, will burn long, if fanned by both its votaries, but will inevitably expire, if left to the care of one.

Mutual constancy, and unbounded confidence, are chief ingredients in Love.

A disposition to gallantry is unfit for Love.

Chastity, by which is understood the exclusive appropriation of person and inclination to the object of affection, is one of the chief props of Love, which, unsupported by it, totters and falls.

A woman cannot sincerely love the man to whose infidelities she can be indifferent.

Infidelities are injuries; inattention is insult: they create the torture of jealousy, and the pain of mortification.

Jealousy is said to be attendant on Love. It may be so; but then it is only as diseases are attendant on life—a good constitution escapes the one, and true love the other.

A kiss is the link of union between mental affection, and animal sense; it is at first brittle, and needs the aid of a solemn engagement to secure the chain entire.

The end of Love is melioration of the heart, the invigoration of family affections, and the security of domestic happiness.

SECT. II.

HAVING now particularly treated of the passion as it exists between the sexes, I shall at present confine myself to throwing out such hints for consideration, as relate to the other branches of this divine emotion. And first of

Self-love.

SELF-LOVE, is defined by Rochefoucault, to be the love of self, and of every thing for its sake; but, “nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.” I shall take leave to define it, the love of self for the pleasures which it is in the power of consciousness to bestow. It has been generally understood, that the opinions of that celebrated author, on this subject, have fixed an odium upon the nature of man. It is no wonder that Swift, and others, who took pleasure in contemplating the deformities and nausea of the world, should join in receiving and propagating the odium. Nature in corruption is all the nature they see, and then

As Rochefoucault his maxims drew
From nature, they believe them true:
They argue no corrupted mind
In him; the fault is in mankind. SWIFT.

Rochefoucault and Swift were not among the
first

first discoverers of the corruption that had taken place in man; but they are among the foremost who delight in making him so corrupt, that even his virtues become contemptible. So much has been said upon this famous topic, that it is hardly possible to throw it into any new light. Indeed, I think the whole question determined by a single sentence of the author of the Maxims himself. "Self love," says he, "just as it happens to be well or ill conducted, constitutes virtue or vice." And what is this but saying, that the odium, or amiability of self-love, depends upon the state of the mind? All that can be granted to Rochefoucault is, that Self-love is a base and detestable principle in base and detestable bosoms; and we accept in turn his concession, that it is a genuine, pure, and amiable principle, in genuine, pure, and amiable breasts. He who loves virtue, because it gives him pleasure, takes a pleasure in virtue; the terms are convertible, and it is a play of words to say we love every thing for the sake of Self-love.

Self-love, in good minds, is more dependent upon the other affections, than those are upon this supposed *primum mobile* of the heart.

If it be said, that there are more corrupt than genuine spirits, which, however, I am not inclined to admit, I answer as before, that the nature of any thing is not marked by its quantity, but by its quality; and that too the best.

SECT. III. *Pride, Vain-glory, and Vanity.*

SELF-LOVE has its deviations, which it is our business to observe, to avoid, and to float our bark down the genuine stream. The chief vicious emotions that take their rise from it are, PRIDE, VAIN-GLORY, VANITY, and JEALOUSY.

PRIDE, as it teaches us to value ourselves on qualities that really exalt us, and keep at due distance those that really degrade us, is a noble virtue; but when it assimilates with arrogance and haughtiness, it is vicious and contemptible.

VAIN-GLORY is that value we derive from spurious causes, and vanity is an over-eager self-approbation, whether the cause be just or spurious, important or trivial.

But as to the principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, it seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the like judgments concerning the conduct of other people. We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place our-
selves

felves in the fituation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes, and from his ftation, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and fympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it. We can never furvey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them; unlefs we remove ourfelves, as it were, from our own natural ftation, and endeavour to view them as at a certain diftance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly, muft always bear fome feeret reference, either to what is, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial fpectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourfelves in his fituation, we thoroughly enter into all the paffions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by fympathy with the approbation of this fupposed equitable judge. If otherwife, we enter into his difapprobation, and condemn it.

Were it poffible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in fome folitary place, without any communication with his own fpecies, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety

propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. To a man who, from his birth, was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the external bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately present to him, could scarcely ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive consideration. The consideration of his joy could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his sorrow any new sorrow, though the consideration of the causes of those passions might often excite both. Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe, that mankind approve of some of them, and
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are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other; his desires and aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the causes of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they will now, therefore, interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive consideration.

Our first ideas of personal beauty and deformity, are drawn from the shape and appearance of others, not from our own. We soon become sensible, however, that others exercise the same criticism upon us. We are pleased when they approve of our figure, and are disobligeed when they seem to be disgusted. We become anxious to know how far our appearance deserves either their blame or approbation. We examine our persons limb by limb, and by placing ourselves before a looking-glass, or by some such expedient, endeavour, as much as possible, to view ourselves at the distance and with the eyes of other people. If, after this examination, we are satisfied with our own appearance, we can more easily support the most disadvantageous judgments of others. If, on the contrary, we are sensible that we are the natural objects of distaste, every appearance of their disapprobation mortifies us beyond all measure. A man who is tolerably handsome, will allow you to laugh at any little irregularity in his person; but all such jokes are commonly insupportable to one who is really deformed.

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It is evident, however, that we are anxious about our own beauty and deformity, only upon account of its effect upon others. If we had no connexion with society, we should be altogether indifferent about either.

In the same manner, our first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people; and we are all very forward to observe how each of these affects us. But we soon learn, that other people are equally frank with regard to our own. We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause, and whether to them we must necessarily appear those agreeable or disagreeable creatures which they represent us. We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. If in this view it pleases us, we are tolerably satisfied. We can be more indifferent about the applause, and, in some measure, despise the censure of the world; secure that, however misunderstood or misrepresented, we are the natural and proper objects of approbation. On the contrary, if we
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are doubtful about it, we are often upon that very account, more anxious to gain their approbation, and provided we have not already, as they say, shaken hands with infamy, we are altogether distracted at the thoughts of their censure, which then strikes us with double severity.

When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into, and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of. But that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect.

To be amiable and to be meritorious; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of Virtue; and to be odious and punishable,

punishable, of vice. But all these characters have an immediate reference to the sentiments of others. Virtue is not said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but because it excites those sentiments in other men. The consciousness that it is the object of such favourable regards, is the source of that inward tranquillity and self-satisfaction with which it is naturally attended, as the suspicion of the contrary, gives occasion to the torments of vice. What so great happiness as to be beloved, and to know that we deserve to be beloved? What so great misery as to be hated, and to know that we deserve to be hated?

SECT. IV. *Jealousy.*

JEALOUSY is evidently a deviation of SELF-LOVE. It is the pain felt on apprehending the diminution of the affection of one dear to us, attended with displeasure at the cause. To be loved by the woman we love, is so delightful to the heart, that whatever has the appearance of rivalry is a dagger to us, and as we fancy the favoured object to gain on the affection we would appropriate, our reflections are tortured by the loss we sustain. In the love that exists between the sexes, it is impossible to admit a communion of affection:

Che

Che chiascun per te fospiri,
 Bella Nice, io son contento :
 Ma per altri, oh Dio, pavento
 Che tu impari a fospirar.

METASTASIO.

To be happy, the lover must reign supreme, must triumph in the heart of the object beloved. On the slightest appearance of a rival, that is, of one to whom the most distant hope is given, even though never to be realized, of being admitted to a participation of that mixed affection treated of in the first section of this chapter, Jealousy must ensue : and the reason is obvious, for such a hope involves a notion of the breach of the virtues of fidelity and chastity.

The continuation of doubt increases the emotion, but certainty puts an end to it, and indifference or despair takes its place. This jealousy seems to be a natural effect of the delinquency of one of the lovers, and can seldom happen in a union of true love : but that ready Jealousy, which is the offspring of a suspicious disposition, is a compound of selfishness and conscious unworthiness.

Friendship partakes in some degree of this passion ; but then it arises only from neglect of the friend, and not from rivalry ; for friendship freely admits that communion of affection which would be the destruction of love.

I have said that children learn early to be jealous, but it is the fault of those about them. In the class of parental duties there is not a more important one than that of impartiality, and of manifesting an equal degree of affection for every child; or making each sensible that love can only lean most to where there is most goodness. The effect of showing personal or other capricious distinctions, is more pernicious than can be calculated. Envy, hatred, strife, despondence, are the deplorable fruits of parental partiality; but by an equal disposition of love, not only Jealousy may be kept from the bosoms of children, but they may be made soon to see the beauty of preferring one another to themselves, and to gain habits of mutual attention, that will strengthen fraternal attachment.

SECT. V. *Storgé.*

I HAVE placed SELE-LOVE foremost in the family of LOVE, but I doubt whether the NATURAL AFFECTION OF MAN AS A PARENT, should not have had the precedence. It is the fashion of modern philosophy to resolve this affection into SELF-LOVE: in which case the latter will be often found opposed to itself; for if Self-preservation be the first law of Nature, and to course of Self-love, how

how shall we reconcile with it, that prompt devotion of oneself to danger, and even to death, for the sake of children, which we see effected by the Storgé? I leave it to be reconciled by the disciples of the Gallic Duke. If it be said, that there are few parents in whom it prevails so far; if I am told of Lady Macclesfield (the mother of Savage) and some others, who were strangers to this emotion, who were even unmindful of the principle so beautifully inculcated by one of the most engaging writers of the last century, one so thoroughly acquainted with the heart, who speaking of children says, that, "whether they are maimed or perfect, sickly or robust, each of them is a sacred deposit, of which the parent is to give an account to him of whom he received it; marriage being a contract made with a nature as well as between the parties"--I have only to observe, that for these deviations we may be sorry, but that Nature herself is pure; and that the Storgé, to the height I have mentioned, is consonant to her laws. Do we not see it carried to this height even by many of the lower order of animals? And though in them the interest abates with the maturity of the offspring, in man it rises, or should rise, into that consummate friendship that naturally impels parent and child to devote self to the safety and happiness of each other.

This delightful disposition of the mind is, indeed, too often destroyed by the fangs of selfish-

ness. The habit of pleasures, inconsistent with it, prevails against Nature, whose ties are broken; and we see persons, in whom the same blood flows, more careless and indifferent to the felicity of each other, than to the care of a favourite brute; and even mothers forsaking their daughters with the apathy of an ostrich.

This kindred Love spreads from the parents, and becomes the source of attachment among brothers and sisters, descending to their children, and branching through the various degrees of relation, as far as the blood can be traced. What a pity it is, that this pure and delightful affection should ever be interrupted: and that paltry interest, or envy, is allowed to creep into the soul to disturb it! Oh! my children! cherish the blessings Nature lays before you. Love one another; support one another; and to your affection add virtue; then there is no situation in life that you will not find replete with comfort; but, be assured, if ever you become careless of the fate of each other, that your best spring of joy will be dried up. Other friendships are fragile; and to gain or to preserve the esteem and respect of what is called the world will often require sacrifices, which you will deem infamous. Keep, then, this refuge of fraternal affection ever in store, and the frowns and scoffs of the world shall never have power to pierce through the consciousness of innocence, and the smiles of fraternal Love.

SECT. VI.

SECT. VI. *Esteem and Friendship.*

ESTEEM is a mild affection founded on the virtues and abilities of its object, and is the chief basis of Friendship; an affection which ranks in the family of Love, and is the Love we feel for another, independent of motives arising either from blood or sex. It may be formed with relations, nevertheless, and between persons of a different sex: in the latter, it is very easily distinguished from Love; but in the former they become inseparably blended. It has this superiority over natural affection and sexual Love, that it is less dependent upon instinct, and more essentially founded upon ESTEEM; a virtuous disposition being a necessary quality in Friendship.

I mean not to be among the number who say that it is only a name; but, with Tully, to place it next to Virtue in the scale of good, *virtute excepta, nihil amicitia præstabilius*: yet I allow, that what commonly goes by its name is nothing more than an implied contract of mutual flattery; of which Self-love, Wealth, and Power, are the undoubted sources. I conceive that such a mockery of Friendship may be pleasant enough to those whose understandings are not blessed with much discrimination; and a very tolerable substitute as long as the deception lasts: but to such as have penetration, this species of mummery will pass

for just what it is ; and a man in possession of very superior power and fortune, who is, at the same time, a man of sense, will have to regret in general the difficulty of finding a real friend, and be driven to other consolations, which his riches may afford. However, in every situation of life, the seeds of Friendship are sown with the seeds of Virtue ; and where the latter take root, the former *may* be matured.

Real Friendship, once formed, must be supported by confidence and sincerity. Distrust and dissimulation are its deadliest poison. The odious maxim of living so guardedly, as to be prepared for perfidy, is wholly inconsistent with this affection. Friends may prove perfidious, but the baseness of suspicion must not contaminate the fountain of Friendship. It is, indeed, a lamentable case, where an open, ingenuous, and warm temper, reposing in full confidence all its feelings and its secrets in the bosom of a base spirit, finds itself betrayed. Corrupt, however, as the nature of man may have become, there cannot be many so truly diabolical : and, when it does happen, the beings that perpetrate such horrors, can scarcely be considered of our species ; but rather as infernals permitted to assume the form of mankind for inscrutable purposes. “ We are commanded,” said the great Cosmo, Duke of Florence, “ to forgive our enemies, but we are nowhere commanded to forgive our friends.” If,
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by this, Cosmo meant that God does not require us ever again to confide in, or associate with these spirits, I agree in his opinion; but if he supposed them left open to his revenge, I dissent from him: because revenge is itself a Satanic passion, and devils are a kind of enemy whom we cannot safely combat with their own weapons, which are double-edged, and cannot be handled but to our own destruction.

SECT. VII. *Patriotism.*

PATRIOTISM is an affection extended to, and bounded by the states of which we are members. It is founded on the impracticability of an universal community. That the division of men into separate states arose from the will of our Creator, is fully manifested, among other proofs, by the variety of languages on the earth. This division, however, may have been the result of events originating in the corruption of man; and therefore Patriotism is, perhaps, more an artificial than a natural passion.

When great advantages are to be derived to a portion of mankind from a union of the efforts of a circumscribed number of men, exclusive of the rest of the world; and when these advantages cannot be obtained but by such union and exclu-

sion; a just and well founded patriotifm takes place. It is in fact the love of community, and not of place, nor of foil; it is an attachment to the regulations, the laws, and the virtues that pervade the country, and not to the country itself; and we love our countryman because he unites in supporting thofe regulations, laws, and virtues, not because he drew his first breath within certain limits of the globe, where we first drew our own.

As on the efforts of individuals depend the safety and happiness of the whole, it becomes the duty of every man to give his particular assistance to the general weal. He who performs his duty with alacrity, nobly facrificing all private interest to the public welfare, whether he be a monarch or a subject, a prime minister or a parish boy, is a patriot; and the difinterested facrifice he makes of his time and talents, merits all the glory deservedly bestowed on patriotifm. Although I have described this paffion as having little reference to foil, I do not mean to asperfe local attachments: for

Dear is the fhed to which the foul conforms,
And dear that hill which lifts him to the fforms.

GOLDSMITH.

SECT. VIII. *Philanthropy.*

PHILANTHROPY, BENEVOLENCE, and the gospel CHARITY, are nearly synonymous terms; and signify an active affection for the human race in general. The Philanthropist takes an impartial view both of virtue and vice: considers the original nature of man with admiration, and his degradation with concern. He cannot love the vicious as the virtuous; but he loves them so much as to wish for their reformation, and to do all in his power to effect it. There is a similitude in his affection to that of the Storgé of a parent, who loves even those of his children whom he cannot esteem. It is a celestial principle; and of the proofs of the divine mission of our Saviour, none is more convincing than the universal philanthropy that pervaded his life and his doctrines.

SECT. IX. *Gratitude.*

GRATITUDE is a warm affection, by which we are prompted to acknowledge kind offices, and to delight in praising and serving the person from whom we have received them. In this sense, it is an emotion, of which none but degenerate spirits can fail to be susceptible.

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When gratitude is merely a duty, arising from obligations that are so conferred as to be rendered painful, it is not of the family of Love. He who desires to repay a benefit because it is burdensome to him, is actuated by a wounded and a laudable pride : and to a good heart the inability of discharging such a benefit is intolerably painful. We cannot satisfy our hearts by reflecting, that the person who has conferred an obligation of this sort is an unworthy spirit, and that, therefore, the obligation carries no duty ; which, in the sight of God, I believe to be the truth : with the feelings of a man, however, it is hardly possible to be easy until an adequate return is made.

The difference between genuine GRATITUDE, and this painful desire of disburdening ourselves of obligations, is very great. The former, though ever ready to return its services, never contemplates a discharge of the affection excited by kind offices ; for, besides that the emotion is a very pleasing one, it never can be discharged ; whereas the latter thinks only of repaying the obligation, in order to get rid of a burdensome duty.

He who lends his money, and boasts of it, has served, and therefore conferred an obligation ; but it is that kind of obligation, which the repayment of the money totally discharges. It is a strong observation of Lavater's, whose knowledge
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of the face and of the heart, seems to be concurrent, that, "The creditor, whose appearance gladdens the heart of a debtor, may hold his head in the sun-beams, and his foot on storms," which is as much as to say, that he resembles the Deity, who in actions of beneficence produces that species of gratitude that flows with love, and charms the heart; while it infers, that it is a common, paltry soul, whose selfish benevolence attempts to extract gratitude from the pangs of sensibility.

God forbid that I should have the slightest appearance of being the advocate of ingratitude; the blackest of vices! but in discriminating the Passions, we must point out the genuine from the spurious, and must distinguish those that exalt virtue, from those that puff up vice and folly. Indeed Gratitude is so natural and so strong an affection, that in a breast not completely degenerate, it cannot be easily suppressed, but by the conduct of the benefactor.

Antipathy and genuine Gratitude can never mingle. Actions that create disgust and destroy this affection: and there are some that dissolve it even as a duty, removing at once every painful sense of the obligation. "I can owe nothing," says Seneca, "to the villain, who having lent me some money, afterwards sets my house on fire, or poisons my child." What Gratitude can survive the malice of slander, the malignant plans of undermining

dermining domestic felicity, the diabolical attempt of sowing disrespect and hatred in the bosom of a daughter, and jealousy in the heart of a beloved wife? What Gratitude is due to one who benefits you for selfish ends, and in benefiting tyrannizes? And what Gratitude can outlive an infamous breach of confidence, a treachery, that after the repose of years, betrays and magnifies the frailties of youth?

I can forgive
A foe, but not a mistress, or a friend.
Treason is there in its most horrid shape
Where trust is greatest, and the soul resign'd
Is stabb'd by its own guards. DRYDEN.

To defend, however, the mind from ingratitude, it is to be observed, that on this, as indeed on every occasion, truth and sincerity are the foundations of right and wrong. I address the recesses of the heart: every one knows what passes in his own, and he, in whom kind offices excite no Gratitude, may prepare to swear allegiance to the prince and fire of Gratitude;

—— in whom all good proved ill,
And wrought but malice. MILTON.

SECT. X. *Piety.*

PIETY is reverential affection; let us take a view of it as it relates to the Deity.

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In tracing the works of God from a lifeless atom to his own infinity, short must be his fight, who bounds creation at the link formed by the race of man. The existence of angels and arch-angels, of spirits rising gradually, yet infinitely, in faculties and power, is consonant to reason, as well as established by revelation. If we are ready to give ear to the wonderful suggestion of astronomy, that the whole of our Planetary System is, with many other Planetary Systems, and their Suns, thrown round a common centre, and so on for ever, why is it to be doubted, that there are ascending ranks of spiritual existence continued without bound? When once the faculties of man are able to form some judgment of God's power by a review of the material system, there is a total end to limitation. Let the mind admit that this globe was created, and the foundation is laid for pursuing grandeur in all its sublimity. If the material system be grand, the spiritual system must be grander; and to say that it is dependent upon matter is not only to limit, but to place that lowest which reason places highest. In man, matter and spirit are so blended, and the separation so difficult to be comprehended, that the investigation, if not carried on with simplicity and purity of mind, leads to mazes and error. Allowing that there are, beyond the mortal state superior beings possessing minds highly sublimed, is it necessary, that such beings should

should have bodies as solid as those which strike our senses? This again would be to limit. If there are beings independent of such gross bodies as appear on earth, the union of the two is possible, and from analogy probable. It is much easier, too, to believe the immortality of such a compound being than of one wholly material; the modern philosophy of which has no solid arguments in its favour. To him who can solace his mind in the mediation of spirits, the path of happiness is open, and he is among the most independent of his species. Our real acquaintance with these superior orders is, indeed, very circumscribed. Reason introduces us but a very little way into their everlasting abodes, and imagination is not to be trusted. Reason does, however, teach us, that we are, in some degree, related to those orders; and as inferior creatures have several privileges in common with us, we enjoy others in common with our superiors; one particularly, to think of and to adore the Supreme Being. Of their modes of existence, of the peculiar pleasures and pursuits of their natures we know nothing clearly, but we must believe that they extol and glorify their Creator.

The enjoyment of adoring is of an exalted nature. Brutes know nothing of it: Man is but incompletely formed for it: Angels must partake of it with rapture. What pleasure fills the
breast

breast while we praise the person who deserves it, and especially if that person be our friend! We are the more sensible of this pleasure because connected with our senses. The nearer then that spirits approach to God, the more exquisite will be the enjoyment of praising him. Adoration is the highest praise attended with the highest love; and the man who delights to praise the Deity has an earnest in his delight that he is drawing nearer to him.

It is not here intended to speak of Adoration as a duty, but as a pleasure, pure, animated, sublime, and most delightful, to such as possess souls conscious of their relation to superior beings.

Every mind that has been habituated to spiritualize, is formed to enjoy in private that communion with the Divinity which he has allowed to our nature; in which the soul is fully laid open, those attributes within our comprehension are dwelt upon, and the heart secretly swells in glorifying the Creator.

But all enjoyment is heightened by participation. Could men discard their passions, leave behind them envy, emulation, and vanity, and a disposition to look with sincere affection in the faces of each other, and to catch that sympathy, without which there cannot be united ardour, then no assembly, that a voice could reach, would be too numerous; and public worship would stand foremost not only as a duty, which it must
ever

ever do, but as a pleasure, in which it yields to Domestic Adoration.

Let a father teach his children to repeat the praises of the Deity, sometimes in succession, sometimes by responses, and sometimes with united voices; let him join with them, then repeat himself particular parts; let him watch their cheerful, open, and smiling countenances as they thank God, through him, for their existence: let him look upon their mother participating, and his domestics uniting in the act of adoration: lastly, let him reflect that he is thus adding, how awful, yet how soothing a truth! to the enjoyment of the Almighty; and then, if he can, let him doubt that he is himself in the enjoyment of the most refined, the most exalted of human pleasures.

While others practice devotion by rote, while it is enjoined from the pulpit as a duty, such a man feels himself swayed by a rapture beyond the bounds of prescription: he adores, not because he ought, but because adoration is his delight; not because he fears, but because he loves.

Does not a devotion of this nature border upon enthusiasm? and do not the effects of enthusiasm appear, from experience, to be prejudicial to sincerity and true religion? Such a devotion not only borders upon enthusiasm, but is supported by it. There is little mental energy to be hoped without enthusiasm. It is the Sun which matures

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the nobler exertions of the mind, that, were it removed, would be bound in impenetrable and eternal frost. Minds not prepared by the love of Virtue or Truth, and where sincerity never had root, may, when wrought upon by its influence, send forth the noxious exhalations of Hypocrisy; but who knows not, that the fairest fruits are ripened by the same source which raises from the impurities of stagnation all the *miasmata* of Pestilence? The devotion here extolled must be supported by those rays of enthusiasm that fall upon it through the medium of sincerity; and the only personal mark of it is a cheerful countenance. Sighs, throwing the sight upwards, and all extortions are foreign to its nature. It cannot be enjoyed by the wicked, and in its full extent only by noble minds.

Besides the actual pleasure arising from family adoration, there are consequential ones of high importance. It greatly contributes to form the morals and manners of children and servants; the former will not fail to add esteem and veneration to their natural love for their parents; and the latter will be regular, honest, and industrious from principle; while, at the same time, a respect for the example constantly before them begets an attachment and affection for their employers, which, becoming mutual, heightens domestic felicity.

If this adoration be really so delightful, and attended with such advantageous consequences, how comes it to be neglected?

There are two great causes of this neglect: pride, and the too eager pursuit of sensual gratifications. The gay, the ignorant, and the pretended philosopher, conspire to cast sneers upon him who bends his knee and says his prayers. Let us get rid of the cause, and the effect will cease.

The man who values himself only for a conduct that screens him from the laughter of fools, neglects the enjoyments of the wife. It is the part of wisdom to despise fools, but whoever wishes to be wise must also learn to bear the scorn of folly, for it is no less the part of fools to condemn the wise.

The eager pursuit of sensual gratifications either leaves no time, or disqualifies for the delights of devotion. That the senses were bestowed upon us as the means of pleasure as well as of knowledge, during this life, is as clear as the growth and decay of the body, of which they form the system. That they are not the only, or the chief means, of our pleasures, is as evident as the superiority of mind to matter. It is an error to teach that the senses are foes to Religion, whence they derive their highest relish. Do not the works of God yield an inexhaustible fund of pleasure

pleasure to the eye and to the ear of man? and who can enjoy them like him who communes with, and adores the Almighty Giver? does he not shed perfumes around us, and is not thankfulness sweeter than odour? Experience evinces that abstinence and moderation are caterers to the palate, while the wretched epicure, who gluttons away the organ of taste, becomes impotent of the sweets that are crowded on his table. Nor is it less certain, that the libertine destroys at once animal power and intellectual faculty; whereas the united and temperate enjoyments of mind and of person give a durability of rapture to wedlock, which, joined to the pleasure of rearing, training, and maturing the fruits of hallowed love, sets man on the summit of terrestrial bliss; whence, rising on the tip-toe of Hope, he is ready to believe he can discern faint lines of scenes beyond.

Free to make friendship with the senses, man must, however, accomplish dominion over the passions, or consent to forego all the superior privileges of humanity; not only virtue, but intellect may be lost, and our pretensions to be angels totally sunk in the lower half of our nature. It is they who are so sunk, or so sinking, that are disqualified for the pleasure of Piety; not they who wisely participate of both, crowning, like our first parents before their fall, the enjoyment

of the good things prepared for them, with the incense of adoration :

“ They at their shady lodge arriv’d, both stood,
Both turn’d, and under open sky ador’d
The God that made both sky, air, earth, and heav’n,
Which they beheld, the moon’s resplendent globe,
And starry pole : Thou also mad’st the night,
Maker omnipotent, and thou the day,
Which we in our appointed works employ’d
Have finished, happy in our mutual help,
And mutual love, the crown of all our bliss
Ordain’d by Thee ; and this delicious place,
For us too large, where thy abundance wants
Partakers, and uncropt falls to the ground.
But Thou hast promis’d from us two a race
To fill the earth, who shall with us extol
Thy goodness infinite, both when we wake,
And when we seek, as now, thy gift of sleep.”

PAR. LOST.

Let us now return to Piety, as it relates to filial love : and in this view it is a mixture of natural affection, gratitude, and esteem.

It is a common remark, that the instinctive, or natural love of children towards their parents, is not so powerful as that of parents towards their children ; and the reason given is, that it is more necessary in the one than in the other, the preservation of the offspring being greatly dependent upon the strength of parental love. I believe this to be true at first, yet I should be sorry to conclude, that the affection remains al-

ways

ways unequal; or that a child, as it grows up, does not love its parent as ardently as it is loved. To make amends for the deficiency of filial storgé, gratitude early comes in aid of it. Children begin to be grateful at the breast, and a fondness takes place, that grows with their growth.

It is, perhaps, owing to the substitution of nurses, that ever the remark above alluded to was made; for it is evident that an infant prefers its nurse to its mother. Did young mothers know what inexpressible delight there is in suckling their children, and at the same time did they consider, that this infantine gratitude is the substitution which Nature appoints to raise filial affection to a par with parental storgé, few, I believe, in comparison to the present number, would be found ready to resign the delight. They would not suffer dissipation, vanity, or the ill-grounded apprehension of destroying the beauty of their bosoms, to prevail upon them to neglect so sweet a task. The joys of the mother would repay the hours of confinement, and their very nurses can instruct them how to preserve that beauty they fear to lose, till Time convinces them that every personal charm must yeild to him.

As children advance in years, their love naturally attaches to those from whom they receive instruction, when it is given with affection and mildness. The early separation from their parents

to be sent to schools, would certainly be another great cause of the imperfection of the filial *storgé*, were not their impatience excited for the vacations by comparing the indulgences of home with the restraints of their schools. The gratitude, therefore, which takes place in infancy, will be, if not wholly suspended, at least enfeebled, in the subsequent stage of life, if much is not done on the part of the parent in proofs of kindness. As they grow nearer to maturity, esteem must perfect the work of instinct and gratitude, in order to complete the equality, or mutual energy of the emotion.

I conceive, that in a child thus raised, the natural affection would be nearly, if not altogether, equal to the *storgé* of the parent. However this be, the instinctive affection is very strongly implanted in both, where nature is not degenerate. Personal defects on the one hand, and incapacity of intellect on the other, rather tend to excite compassionate affection; but the deficiency of nature, the depravation of the heart, produces abhorrence. It is to be hoped, and I believe, that there are few instances of parental depravity, similar to that recorded of the mother of the unfortunate Savage, or of a want of filial piety in general, as a duty: but still as an affectionate emotion, it can, when infancy is past, and reason sways, spring only from gratitude and esteem; and

and where these causes do exist, the deficiency of piety in the breast of a child, is a sure mark of a most deplorable depravation of nature.

CHAPTER IX.

SHAME.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

SHAME is an emotion arising from the consciousness of guilt, defects, or misconduct, real or imaginary. It is a genuine feeling, but must, like some others, have been unknown, antecedent to the introduction of evil. Whatever we ought not to do, we ought to be ashamed of doing. The degree of uneasiness attached to this passion, will be proportioned by sensibility to the nature of the guilt, defect, or misconduct. Habitual vice has, at times, totally eradicated Shame from some minds; while, on the other hand, there is a constitutional quickness, which renders some sensible of this emotion, not only without just

reason, but even on occasions that are extremely honourable.

The BASHFULNESS of a young woman springs from her respect to purity: and DIFFIDENCE, which in itself is amiable, will often create a perplexity very similar to Shame. An ingenuous mind also feels a considerable degree of this emotion, on being over-valued; for if we would be what we are thought to be, we blush at the deficiency. In this view, Shame is very amiable; and Sir Harry Beaumont, in his elegant Dialogue upon Beauty, mentions it as capable of adding much interest to a lovely face. In no view, indeed, is well-grounded Shame other than laudable, it always marks a sense of wrong, or of deficiency; and at the same time, an openness to conviction, and a desire of perfection. The mind that feels it, is prepared to retrieve its errors; to atone for guilt; or to aim at excellence:—but we may justly set him down upon the scale of demons, who can knowingly do wrong without remorse; can injure a fellow-creature without compunction; and offend his Maker without contrition.

SECT. II. *Shame of doing Right.*

THERE is such a deviation of this passion.—
A false education, by which the prejudices in favour of a number of vices, far from having been
rooted

rooted out, are confirmed, is the means by which this salutary emotion is forced from its natural channel. The virtues opposite to fashionable vices, bring blushes into the faces of many.

Fashion is nothing more than the opinion and practice of a multitude; to defy which, indeed, requires considerable courage. But an early habit of discriminating between prejudice and rational conduct, will give that courage. This habit it should be the grand aim of education to instil; and they who have been taught to estimate the right will blush only at doing wrong.

CHAPTER X.

SORROW OR GRIEF.

SECT. I. *Its Varieties and Deviations.*

SORROW is the passion we feel upon calamities: consequently it has a variety of avenues to the heart; and the degree in which it affects, depends not only on its causes, but on the sensibility of the mind. Of sensibility it is difficult to determine the portion, without which virtue
itself

itself would be less amiable; but as indifference reduces the soul below even animal life, I think it were better to err in cultivating sensibility of the heart, than to run a risk of blunting it into apathy.

Venti inquieti

Son nel mar della vita

Gli affetti, anch' io lo so; ma senza venti

Non si naviga in mar.

METAS.

As we find the state of things at present, Sorrow is a natural attendant on humanity. Like Antipathy or Shame, it is the child of evil. Misfortune is nothing but the deprivation of some good, or the occurrence of some positive evil; between which, indeed, there is scarcely a distinction; the deprivation of good being an evil, and positive evil a deprivation of good. If we rejoice at the acquisition of what is agreeable, we as naturally grieve at its loss. It does not come within my present plan to investigate the difference of real and imaginary good; but it is evident how much the dignity of all the Passions depends upon their just discrimination. Whether real or imaginary, however, Sorrow is proportioned to the degree of attachment bestowed upon the object we lament: and on trivial or absurd occasions, it becomes disgusting or ridiculous.

Grief, in the best minds, is not easily allayed; for, while we "bear as men we must also feel as men," and the most wholesome advice can go no further,

further, I think, than to moderate it with reflections on the quick lapse of life ; at the conclusion of which, we have every reason to hope ; and Sorrow, patiently borne, and especially if suffered in the cause of virtue, will be repaid with double joy. There are many wise modes of alleviation, to which we are bound to resort ; but none so soothing as in communicating our feelings to a friend ; to one who we believe loves us and on whose fidelity we have a perfect reliance. By concealment, grief corrodes the heart, and friendship is the balm that soothes and heals.

Time usually impairs the force of this Passion ; but not always. A strong imagination will sometimes feed it so long with the most flattering views of the object, that grief will fix upon the habit and settle into MELANCHOLY ; for Melancholy is but habitual Sorrow, which often proceeds so far as to derange the understanding. The indulgence of Grief is therefore dangerous ; and its excess ought to be guarded against by the united power of religion and philosophy. “ *Dolores autem si qui incurrent nunquam vim tantam habent, ut non plus habeat sapiens quod gaudeat quam quod angetur.*” That is, there is no Sorrow which may not be made the ally of wisdom. And in this spirit the poet says,

Smitten friends

Are angels sent on errands full of love.

YOUNG.

SECT. II.

SECT. II. *Despair.*

THE loss of HOPE, which, according to its object, is a more or less serious misfortune, is attended with an emotion, which, on trivial occasions, can hardly be termed a passion, being merely a belief of the improbability of an event taking place : but when the event is of importance, the emotion on the loss of hope is violent grief, emphatically styled DESPAIR.

SECT. III. *Contrition, Remorse.*

SORROW, as it relates solely to our own actions, is termed REPENTANCE, PENITENCE, CONTRITION, or REMORSE. To a thinking being, the consciousness of bad actions must inevitably be a source of remorse. Whatever those actions be, whether they have been committed against virtue, or against piety, both reason and revelation teach us to atone for them by the sincerity of repentance; and by reparation, where that remains possible. Actions once committed to the registry of time cannot possibly be cancelled, what a strong guard against crimes and vice would this reflection prove, were not reason so often swept from its post, by the overflowing torrents of deviated passions! But though they cannot

cannot be recalled, they may be atoned for, and even turned to advantage; "for that single effort, by which we stop short in the down-hill path to perdition, is itself a greater exertion of virtue than a hundred acts of justice*." This is a soothing, but a dangerous doctrine; for it is to be feared, that present temptations will be aided by the anticipation of future penitence. Of one thing, however, we may be assured, that the penitence, necessary to atonement, must be a Sorrow deeply sincere and bitter.

CHAPTER XI.

SYMPATHY,

Including PITY and TERROR.

SECT. I.

OUR Creator having formed us with passions, and evidently intended those passions to be the means or security of happiness, an unnatural at-

* Goldsmith.

tempt to eradicate them, in order to attain the negative ease of apathy, or a state of indifference, cannot but be sinful. In phlegmatic constitutions, how degraded does the nature of man appear! It is true, that sensibility equally subjects the heart to pain as to pleasure; but the pains that arise from sensibility are enviable pains, because they generally spring from the most amiable motives, and raise the affections of great and good spirits: while apathy, however convenient to a paltry, listless set of nerves, is contemptible and odious.

I have no doubt that the spurious philosophy of Apathy, which was maintained by the Stoics, is a deviation from that pure ambition by which we are excited to elevate our nature. It was a maxim among them, that the fewer their wants, the more they resembled the gods; and that not to be moved by sublunary pains and pleasures was the proof of a great soul. By the way, it is very striking that their gods were gifted with all the vilest of the human passions.

How far superior spirits may be endowed with feelings, or some mode of affections analagous to our feelings, is a metaphysical enquiry, which must terminate in conjecture; but probable conjecture is a good ground for Reason. Joy, which is a passion, is itself the principle of bliss; and from Love, the very thought of creation seems to have sprung. It is highly probable, that together with refined faculties, refined affections constitute
a part

a part of superior natures: and that their happiness, far from consisting in the paucity of wants, is supported by infinite desires and infinite gratifications. The nature of the bliss enjoyed by an eternal self-existing Being is infinitely beyond the contemplation of human faculties. It is in vain to attempt the subject: yet we may be allowed to say, what appears so evident, that love and communicated bliss mingle in the divine nature.

Apathy may produce the ease, if the expression may be used, of a stone; but sensibility must be the means of all pleasure: and, with respect to eradicating it, lest it should be the means too of misery, I should think it just as natural to cut off a limb to prevent an occasional finger ache.

Studiansi, è ver, l'umane

Passioni a destar: ma chi voleffe

Estinguerle nell' uomo; un tronco, un fasso

Dell uom faria.

MET.

It is Sensibility, and not Apathy, which truly exalts Nature: but not a sensibility, however, that opposes Reason; and therefore, though it is to be cultivated, its luxuriances and weaknesses are to be pruned and tempered by fortitude on the one hand, and by a discrimination of just delight on the other.

All the passions, more or less, depend upon Sensibility; but SYMPATHY, as it is rather the means by which Nature reverberates an emotion, than

an

an original emotion, is doubly dependant upon it. SYMPATHY, as I have already had occasion to mention, is that affection of the mind, by which we are interested in objects from some natural similarity. Men of similar pursuits, of similar habits, of similar joys and griefs, readily sympathize; and the general resemblance of the species is the foundation of general sympathy, by which we are excited to feel what others feel, whether pleasing or painful.

SECT. II.

IT is the pride of the intellect to investigate causes: and it often leaves the plain road, to shew its dexterity in discoveries. No difficulty has attended the causes of our participating the pleasures, but our promptness to enter into, and fond participation of, the distress of others, and the interest we take in things of a terrible nature, have been variously accounted for.

PITY, according to Hobbes and Rochefoucault, is a sense of our own misfortunes in those of other people. We assist others, says the latter, that they may assist us on like occasions. Burke says, we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others: while Johnson, in his preface to Shakspeare, decides that they can only please while fictitious, and shewn as images; for, says he, if we thought
murders

murders and treason real, they would please no more. Burke's argument is, that as we are induced to approach and to dwell upon sad objects, if we do not shun them, they must give us pleasure: that we enjoy the authentic calamities of history as well as the fictitious ones of romance: and he puts a case, in which he supposes that the finest tragedy, performed by the best actors, would be forsaken on a report of a state criminal of *high rank* being on the point of being executed, in an adjoining square. He argues also, that numbers would crowd to see the ruins of a city after a conflagration, who never would have thought of going near it before. I have the highest respect for the genius of Mr. Burke, and of all his productions, more particularly for that which I have now in view: but I feel so great a disinclination to the doctrine of receiving pleasure from the real calamities of others, that I cannot admit it without stronger grounds of conviction.

We often willingly approach what is productive only of pain. We are chained to the death-bed of a friend; by the pang of a lasting separation; and grief *at that moment* cannot be attended with pleasing sensations, however it may be afterwards mingled with the pleasurable views of the object. If ever a good mind has a gratification in approaching real distress, surely it must arise from a hope of assisting to alleviate; for I cannot

but think it natural to shun the sad objects of real life, when there is no hope whatever of contributing in any shape to relieve, unless impelled by admiration: and that this, far from meriting the reproach of indolence which Mr. Burke throws upon it, is, in fact, but obeying the dictates of humanity and reason. It is to be apprehended that he who can feel pleasure in the pain of others, will be excited, not only to find, but to make occasions of gratification; than which, what can be more diabolical? I conceive it to be no reproach to have shunned the Greve while a criminal was upon the wheel; and am inclined to believe that the crouds generally attending executions, are gathered by motives wholly unconnected with sympathy. Some attend through curiosity, others with no view but that of being in the croud, and some barbarians, perhaps, for *positive*, not sympathetic pleasure; for that kind of pleasure enjoyed by the Roman emperor when he fired the city; or when he ordered it to be lighted up with with the persons of the Christians, anointed with a combustibile preparation for the easier admission of the flames.

As to authentic calamities;—when they are long past they rank with respect to the production of emotions, little, if at all, above fictitious ones; for we are no more acquainted with the personages of the one than of the other. In either case, the energy of our sympathy depends
rather

rather upon the powers of the historian, and of the poet, than upon the bare facts themselves.

The preference which Mr. Burke says would be given to a real execution over a represented tragedy, it is not clear to me would be the case, if *Sympathy* were the only attraction. Much must be allowed to the *rank of the criminal*, to the *rarity* of the spectacle, and to the *curiosity* of the spectator. Let the sufferer be a common malefactor, and let executions be so frequent that curiosity shall have little allurements, would the theatre lose a single spectator? Inform a mob, gathered on an execution-day round the scaffold at Newgate, that George Barnwell was going to be played at Drury-lane or Covent-Garden, gratis; and that the first at the doors would get seats: I rather think that Newgate would be forsaken till the playhouse was filled.

As to the pleasure we take in viewing *Ruins*;—it arises from two causes: in the first place, they are picturesque to the eye; and, in the next, they suggest sublime reflections. It is to be observed, that the object must be of magnitude; and then to whatever power its destruction be owing, whether to time, or to conflagration, the ideas excited are sublime, and Sympathy for the unseen sufferers is lost in the admiration of power. Not so where the object is not grand. I once passed through the ruins of a miserable village in France, that had been reduced by fire: pity and pecu-

niary contributions were raised on travellers, but the remains of the clay cottages had never been the object of a visit.

Upon the whole, I cannot think that it is natural to have any pleasure in the misfortunes and pains of others; and I confess I am glad that I have found no arguments sufficiently conclusive to make me think so: for while I allow that a very great part of our species is degraded and corrupt, and that much malignity prevails among us, I am anxious to maintain man in that exalted state where I believe he was originally placed. To feel delight in the pain of others disgraces him; and still more is he disgraced by Rochefoucault's selfish sentiments, that he comforts others solely with the view of being comforted himself on like occasions. I believe no such proposition. I believe Sympathy to be a genuine disposition of the mind, independent of selfishness, by which the Almighty has strengthened the bonds of social affection. I believe it too to be attended in sorrowful cases with pleasure, when accompanied with the power, or even the hope, of alleviation. I believe that we generally pity, and fear for others, instinctively; and that when we take time to reason ourselves into compassion, our emotions are lost in the cooler wisdom of our duties.

SECT. III.

·SYMPATHETIC FEAR, or TERROR, is a violent emotion on perceiving the danger of another, and is felt in degrees, according to the sensibility of the heart. He must be of a flinty nature indeed, who can with coolness see another seized by a devouring monster, or suddenly buried under the ruins of a falling edifice, or stabbed by an assassin. Sympathy of this kind felt on real occurrences cannot surely be attended with pleasure. If I were permitted to speak for a moment from my own feelings, I would say that I once, through a transparent sea, saw a man seized, and carried off by a monstrous shark—my whole frame suffered great commotion; but certainly I was sensible only of a most painful agitation.

Why is it then, that in dramatic poetry we are pleased with the representations of mournful and terrible occurrences? The fact is, that whether in real or imaginary scenes, it is the province of Sympathy to interest our feelings: but to interest them, it is not necessary that the result should be pleasurable. The pain suffered by another, interests us as well as the pleasure he enjoys and perhaps more. Were the brightest genius on earth to compose a large folio on the subject,

I do not think he could discover a better reason than Terence has given in eight words, "Homo sum, humani nihil alienum a me puto." I am a man, and therefore must be interested in whatever concerns a man: I must, if I am not unnatural, delight in his pleasures, and ache at his pains.

But, as I have already said, Sympathy will not send us in quest of the latter, nor probably of the former, unless other causes concur. A good heart will seek opportunities to participate happiness, by being the means of conferring it; but I do not know that the purest heart would be allured by any uncommon instance of individual happiness to become the spectator of immoderate joy; unless it were the reward of virtue, talent, or for some ulterior reason beyond the actual joy. Common society, or what is called company, is supported with a view to reciprocal pleasures; its enjoyments are founded on an interchange of ideas, or of politeness; but with sympathy it is little concerned. Sympathy is, indeed, a main support of that uncommon society, which is built on friendship, virtue, and talents, whence arise the highest social enjoyments. Yet even by such society those only can be allured, who are in a great degree deserving of it. To dramatic scenes however, we are all strongly impelled; and strongly affected by them: we are always made to love, and to admire the character for whom we
are

are to be led into grief: we have pleasure in loving and admiring, but the pleasure yields, and is absorbed in our sufferings at the misery that ensues.

It appears to me, that by compounding Mr. Burke's objection with Dr. Johnson's opinion, we may probably arrive at the real causes, as well of our *seeking*, as of our being gratified with, the scenes of tragedy. Dr. Johnson says, "it is because they are fictitious that they please." Mr. Burke imagines "we should be much mistaken, if we attributed any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy, to the consideration of its being a deceit: that the nearer it approaches the reality, and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power." To move the passions is the grand magic of poetry. It is a sublime gift of God to man; and we naturally take great delight in offering ourselves to the proof of its operations.

E un dolce incanto,
 Che d'improvviso
 Vi muove al pianto,
 Vi sforza al riso,
 D'ardir v' accende
 Tremar vi fa.
 Ah se alle Muse
 Tanto è permesso,
 A Giove istesso
 Che restera?

MET.

I conceive that we go to a tragedy, perfectly prepared to be delighted with the effect of fiction; but that when the powers of the poet contrive to veil that fiction, to realize his scenes, and to wring our hearts, the sympathy upon which he works is not a pleasure, but the sorrowful interest we are bound by nature to take in the pain of others; of which we are most susceptible in the reality, and which we bring upon ourselves in a theatre, from going in quest of the delight we take in the powers of poetry. Let the audience be informed, that the actor, who was performing Macbeth, had in a fit of fury or revenge absolutely fought the man who was personating Duncan, and had savagely cut his throat, but that the play should go on with substituted characters; I think the house would be thinned.

The French Revolution produced in London a remarkable instance of painful, but noble feelings, impressing a large body of men, which does honour to the British character. In the year 1793, when the company of Drury-lane Theatre were performing at the Opera House, the news of the death of the late King of France arrived in an evening, just as the curtain was going to be drawn up. It was immediately announced from the stage, and the whole audience, feeling the shock at once, rose and left the theatre.—Here, I think, we have an example, in which delight could not be mingled. Those noble hearts withdrew, not to
behold

behold a fight in the adjoining square, but because pleasure was incompatible with the reality of horror.

—So true is it that men generally avoid real tragic scenes, when they are convinced that they can be of no service by the exercise of their virtues, and are not led by curiosity, that we find, as the poetic art loses its dominion over the soul, even the best scenes of fictitious terror and pity are represented at the theatres to thin houses. The present cultivated apathy of many, and the blow that has been given to the expression of sentiment, are causes from which the Tragic Muse languishes. They, to whom the pain of sympathy is more intolerable, than the taste of genius is delightful, improve a happy indifference, and shun all violent emotions:—but we may rest assured, that when the pomp of decorations, the horse-laugh of ridicule, and the graces of gesture supplant the powers of poetry, Nature deviates, and taste declines.

I must add, that however difficult it be to conceive sensations of pleasure and of pain co-existing, yet as it is the end of poetry to delight by moving, the delight flows considerably from the preparatory disposition in our natures to be moved by the imitative arts; as we are pleased with a picture, of which perhaps the real object would be disgusting,

SECT. IV.

This grand current of the social affections, *Sympathy*, depends, in course, for its purity upon the other streams that mingle with it. He who sympathises with the envious, the covetous, the revengeful, the malevolent, the coward, the cruel, and the proud, may reckon among his own passions, envy, avarice, revenge, malevolence, cowardice, cruelty, and pride.

CHAPTER XII.

WONDER, *and its Varieties.*

WONDER or Astonishment is the emotion produced by things uncommonly strange. All novelty excites this passion, in a greater or less degree: and the commencement of life is the period of its fullest influence. Then every thing is strange; and, for a considerable time, one wonder only yields to another. Experience abates the
the

the emotion, but it is never wholly stifled: youth and age, folly and philosophy, rustic ignorance and polished taste, every stage of life, and every gradation of intellect, are all supplied with objects to gratify Wonder. But while some men continue so puerile as to seek gratification, if not from ordinary, yet from trivial occasions, there are some who have almost ceased to wonder, even in the fullness of *Admiration*: whose minds have been able to take so comprehensive a view of the works the Deity has placed before them, as to wonder at no effects while they admire and adore the great First Cause of all. This kind of *admiration* is an emotion, we may justly conjecture to be attendant upon immortality; and in this view we cannot but esteem it a passion of the highest character.

All wonder is natural; there is no deviation of this passion; yet misplaced, it becomes ridiculous or disgraceful. The clown, who wonders at the movements of a watch, and the mathematician, who is surpris'd at the nicety of his own calculations on the return of a comet, are equally natural; but if the mathematician were to be surpris'd at the watch it would be a disgrace to him; and if the clown were surpris'd that the tail of the comet did not scorch the earth it would be ridiculous.

It is, in general, advisible to curb *Astonishment*, or at least the appearance of it; as, perhaps, what creates it in us, is only an ignorance, that
would

would reflect no credit upon our education. But this is a delicate theory; for it might lead to indifference and insensibility; and not to admire, where admiration is a proof of taste, is as degrading as to be in ecstasies at trifles. Wonder, however, is, in every view, an innocent emotion, and naturally its own corrector, where it tends to be ridiculous.

CHAPTER XIII.

PROPRIETY OF THE PASSIONS.

Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety.

LET us now enquire into the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety, and into the necessity of Self-command. The propriety of every passion excited by objects peculiarly related to ourselves, the pitch which the spectator can go along with, must lie, it is evident,

evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the passion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it. Grief and resentment for private misfortunes and injuries may easily, for example, be too high, and in the greater part of mankind, they are so. They may likewise, though this more rarely happens, be too low. We denominate the excess, weakness and fury: and we call the defect, stupidity, insensibility, and want of spirit. We can enter into neither of them, but are astonished and confounded to see them.

This mediocrity, however, in which the point of Propriety consists, is different in different passions. It is high in some, and low in others. There are some passions which it is indecent to express very strongly, even upon those occasions in which it is acknowledged that we cannot avoid feeling them in the highest degree. And there are others of which the strongest expressions are, upon many occasions, extremely graceful, even though the passions themselves do not, perhaps, arise so necessarily. The first are those passions with which, for certain reasons, there is little or no sympathy: the second are those with which, for other reasons, there is the greatest. And if we consider all the different passions of human nature, we shall find that they are regarded as decent or indecent, just in proportion as mankind are more or less disposed to sympathize with them.

SECT. I. *Of the Passions which take their Origin from the Body.*

IT is indecent to express any strong degree of those passions which arise from a certain situation or disposition of the body; because the company, not being in the same disposition, cannot be expected to sympathize with them. Violent hunger, for example, though upon many occasions not only natural, but unavoidable, is always indecent, and to eat voraciously is universally regarded as a piece of ill-manners. There is, however, some degree of sympathy, even with hunger. It is agreeable to see our companions eat with a good appetite, and all expressions of loathing are offensive. The disposition of body which is habitual to a man in health, makes his stomach easily keep time, if I may be allowed so coarse an expression, with the one, and not with the other. We can sympathize with the distress which excessive hunger occasions when we read the description of it in the journal of a siege, or of a sea voyage. We imagine ourselves in the situation of the sufferers, and thence readily conceive the grief, the fear, and consternation which must necessarily distract them. We feel, ourselves, some degree of those passions, and therefore sympathize with them: but as we do not grow hungry by reading the description,

scription, we cannot properly, even in this case, be said to sympathize with their hunger.

Such is our aversion for all the appetites which take their origin from the body that all strong expressions of them are loathsome and disagreeable. According to some ancient philosophers, these are the passions which we share in common with the brutes, and which having no connexion with the characteristical qualities of human nature, are upon that account beneath its dignity. But there are many other passions which we share in common with the brutes, such as resentment, natural affection, and even gratitude, which do not, upon that account, appear to be so brutal. The true cause of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men, is that we cannot enter into them. To the person himself who feels them, as soon as they are gratified, the object that excited them ceases to be agreeable: even its presence often becomes offensive to him; he looks round to no purpose for the charm which transported him the moment before, and now he can as little enter into his own passion as another person. When we have dined, we order the covers to be removed; and we should treat in the same manner the objects of the most ardent and passionate desires, if they were the objects of no other passions but those which take their origin from the body.

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In the command of those appetites of the body consists that virtue which is properly called temperance. To restrain them within those bounds, which regard to health and fortune prescribes, is the part of prudence. But to confine them within those limits, which grace, which propriety, which delicacy, and modesty require, is the office of temperance.

It is for the same reason that to cry out with bodily pain, how intolerable soever, appears always unmanly and unbecoming. There is, however, a good deal of sympathy with bodily pain. If I see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, I naturally shrink and draw back my own leg, or my own arm: and when it does fall, I feel it in some measure, and am hurt by it as well as the sufferer. My hurt, however, is, no doubt, excessively slight, and, upon that account, if he makes any violent outcry, as I cannot go along with him, I never fail to despise him. And this is the case of all the passions which take their origin from the body: they excite either no sympathy at all, or such a degree of it, as is altogether disproportioned to the violence of what is felt by the sufferer.

It is quite otherwise with those passions which take their origin from the imagination. The frame of my body can be but little affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that of my companion: but my imagination is
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more ductile, and more readily assumes, if I may say so, the shape and configuration of the imaginations of those with whom I am familiar. A disappointment in love, or ambition, will, upon this account, call forth more sympathy than the greatest bodily evil. Those passions arise altogether from the imagination. The person who has lost his whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body. What he suffers is from the imagination only, which represents to him the loss of his dignity, neglect from his friends, contempt from his enemies, dependence, want, and misery, coming fast upon him; and we sympathize with him, more strongly upon this account, because our imaginations can more readily mould themselves upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body.

The loss of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the loss of a mistress. It would be a ridiculous tragedy, however, of which the catastrophe was to turn upon a loss of that kind. A misfortune of the other kind, how frivolous soever it may appear to be, has given occasion to many a fine one.

Nothing is so soon forgotten as pain. The moment it is gone, the whole agony of it is over, and the thought of it can no longer give us any sort of disturbance. We ourselves cannot then enter into the anxiety and anguish which we had before conceived.

ceived. An unguarded word from a friend will occasion a more durable uneasiness. The agony which this creates is by no means over with the word. What at first disturbs us is not the object of the senses, but the idea of the imagination. As it is an idea, therefore, which occasions our uneasiness, till time and other accidents have in some measure effaced it from our memory, the imagination continues to fret and rankle within, from the thought of it.

Pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied with danger. We sympathize with the fear, though not with the agony of the sufferer. Fear, however, is a passion derived altogether from the imagination, which represents, with an uncertainty and fluctuation that increases our anxiety, not what we really feel, but what we may hereafter possibly suffer. The gout or the tooth-ach, though exquisitely painful, excite very little sympathy; more dangerous diseases, though accompanied with very little pain, excite the highest.

Some people faint and grow sick at the sight of a surgical operation, and that bodily pain which is occasioned by tearing the flesh, seems, in them, to excite the most excessive sympathy. We conceive in a much more lively and distinct manner the pain which proceeds from an external cause, than we do that which arises from an internal

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nal disorder. I can scarcely form an idea of the agonies of my neighbour when he is tortured with the gout or the stone ; but I have the clearest conception of what he must suffer from an incision, a wound, or a fracture. The chief cause, however, why such objects produce such violent effects upon us, is their novelty. One who has been witness to a dozen dissections, and as many amputations, sees, ever after, all operations of this kind with great indifference, and often with perfect insensibility. Though we have read or seen represented more than five hundred tragedies, we shall seldom feel so entire an abatement of our sensibility to the objects which they represent to us.

In some of the Greek tragedies there is an attempt to excite compassion, by the representation of the agonies of bodily pain. Philoctetes cries out and faints from the extremity of his sufferings. Hippolytus and Hercules are both introduced as expiring under the severest tortures, which, it seems, even the fortitude of Hercules was incapable of supporting. In all these cases, however, it is not the pain which interests us, but some other circumstance. It is not the sore foot, but the solitude, of Philoctetes which affects us, and diffuses over that charming tragedy, that romantic wildness, which is so agreeable to the imagination. The agonies of Hercules and Hippolytus are in-

interesting only because we foresee that death is to be the consequence. If those heroes were to recover, we should think the representation of their sufferings perfectly ridiculous. What a tragedy would that be, of which the distress consisted in a cholic! Yet no pain is more exquisite. These attempts to excite compassion by the representation of bodily pain, may be regarded as among the greatest breaches of decorum of which the Greek theatre has set the example.

The little sympathy which we feel with bodily pain is the foundation of the propriety of constancy and patience in enduring it. The man, who under the severest tortures allows no weakness to escape him, vents no groan, gives way to no passion which we do not entirely enter into, commands our highest admiration. His firmness enables him to keep time with our indifference and insensibility. We admire and entirely go along with the magnanimous effort which he makes for this purpose. We approve of his behaviour, and from our experience of the common weakness of human nature, we are surpris'd, and wonder how he should be able to act so as to deserve approbation. Approbation, mixed and animated by wonder and surprize, constitutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, of which, applause is the natural expression, as has already been observed.

SECT. II. *Of those Passions which take their Origin from a particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination.*

EVEN of the passions derived from the imagination, those which take their origin from a peculiar turn or habit it has acquired, though they may be acknowledged to be perfectly natural, are, however, but little sympathized with. The imaginations of mankind, not having acquired that particular turn, cannot enter into them; and such passions, though they may be allowed to be almost unavoidable in some part of life, are always, in some measure, ridiculous. This is the case with that strong attachment which naturally grows up between two persons of different sexes, who have long fixed their thoughts upon one another. Our imagination not having run in the same channel with that of the lover, we cannot enter into the eagerness of his emotions. If our friend has been injured, we readily sympathize with his resentment, and grow angry with the very person with whom he is angry. If he has received a benefit, we readily enter into his gratitude, and have a very high sense of the merit of his benefactor. But if he is in love, though we may think his passion just as reasonable as any of the kind, yet we never think ourselves bound to conceive a passion of the same kind, and for

the same person for whom he has conceived it. The passion appears to every body, but the man who feels it, entirely disproportioned to the value of the object; and love, though it is pardoned in a certain age because we know it is natural, is always laughed at, because we cannot enter into it. All serious and strong expressions of it appear ridiculous to a third person; and though a lover may be good company to his mistress, he is so to nobody else. He himself is sensible of this; and as long as he continues in his sober senses, endeavours to treat his own passion with raillery and ridicule. It is the only style in which we care to hear of it; because it is the only style in which we ourselves are disposed to talk of it. We grow weary of the grave, pedantic, and long-sentenced love of Cowley and Petrarch, who never have done with exaggerating the violence of their attachments; but the gaiety of Ovid, and the gallantry of Horace, are always agreeable.

But though we feel no proper sympathy with an attachment of this kind, though we never approach even in imagination towards conceiving a passion for that particular person, yet as we either have conceived, or may be disposed to conceive, passions of the same kind, we readily enter into those high hopes of happiness which are proposed from its gratification, as well as into that exquisite distress which is feared from its disappointment.

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It interests us not as a passion, but as a situation that gives occasion to other passions which interest us; to hope, to fear, and to distress of every kind: in the same manner as in a description of a sea voyage, it is not the hunger which interests us, but the distress which that hunger occasions. Though we do not properly enter into the attachment of the lover, we readily go along with those expectations of romantic happiness which he derives from it. We feel how natural it is for the mind, in a certain situation, relaxed with indolence, and fatigued with the violence of desire, to long for serenity and quiet, to hope to find them in the gratification of that passion which distracts it, and to frame to itself the idea of that life of pastoral tranquillity and retirement which the elegant, the tender, and passionate Tibullus takes so much pleasure in describing; a life like what the poets describe in the Fortunate Islands, a life of friendship, liberty, and repose; free from labour, and from care, and from all the turbulent passions which attend them. Even scenes of this kind interest us most, when they are painted rather as what is hoped, than as what is enjoyed. The happy passion interests us much less than the fearful and the melancholy. We tremble for whatever can disappoint such natural and agreeable hopes: and thus enter into all the anxiety, and concern, and distress of the lover.

Of all the passions, however, which are so extravagantly disproportioned to the value of their objects, love is the only one that appears, even to the weakest minds, to have any thing in it that is either graceful or agreeable. In itself, first of all, though it may be ridiculous, it is not naturally odious; and though its consequences are often fatal and dreadful, its intentions are seldom mischievous. And then, though there is little propriety in the passion itself, there is a good deal in some of those which always accompany it. There is in love a strong mixture of humanity, generosity, kindness, friendship, esteem; passions with which, of all others, for reasons which shall be explained immediately, we have the greatest propensity to sympathize, even notwithstanding we are sensible that they are, in some measure, excessive. Notwithstanding all this, the degree of sensibility and generosity with which it is supposed to be accompanied, renders it to many the object of vanity; and they are fond of appearing capable of feeling what would do them no honour if they had really felt it.

It is for a reason of the same kind, that a certain reserve is necessary when we talk of our own friends, our own studies, our own professions. All these are objects which we cannot expect should interest our companions in the same degree in which they interest us. And it is for want of this reserve, that the one half of mankind
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make bad company to the other. A philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of a club to his own little knot of companions,

SECT. III. *Of the unsocial Passions.*

THERE is another set of passions, which, though derived from the imagination, yet before we can enter into them, or regard them as graceful or becoming, must always be brought down to a pitch much lower than that to which undisciplined nature would raise them. These are, hatred and resentment, with all their different modifications. With regard to all such passions, our sympathy is divided between the person who feels them, and the person who is the object of them. The interests of these two are directly opposite. What our sympathy with the person who feels them would prompt us to wish for, our fellow-feeling with the other would lead us to fear. As they are both men, we are concerned for both, and our fear for what the one may suffer, damps our resentment for what the other has suffered. Our sympathy, therefore, with the man who has received the provocation, necessarily falls short of the passion which naturally animates him, not only upon account of those general causes which render all sympathetic passions inferior

inferior to the original ones, but upon account of that particular cause which is peculiar to itself, our opposite sympathy with another person. Before resentment, therefore, can become graceful and agreeable, it must be more humbled, and brought down below that pitch to which it would naturally rise, than almost any other passion.

Mankind, at the same time, have a very strong sense of the injuries that are done to another. The villain, in a tragedy or romance, is as much the object of our indignation, as the hero is that of our sympathy and affection. We detest Iago as much as we esteem Othello; and delight as much in the punishment of the one, as we are grieved at the distress of the other. But though mankind have so strong a fellow-feeling with the injuries that are done to their brethren, they do not always resent them the more that the sufferer appears to resent them. Upon most occasions, the greater his patience, his mildness, his humanity, provided it does not appear that he wants spirit, or that fear was the motive of his forbearance, the higher the resentment against the person who injured him. The amiableness of the character exasperates their sense of the atrocity of the injury.

These passions, however, are regarded as necessary parts of the character of human nature. A person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them. We cannot enter into his indifference and insensibility;

insensibility : we call his behaviour mean-spiritedness, and are as really provoked by it as by the insolence of his adversary. Even the mob are enraged to see any man submit patiently to affronts and ill-usage. They desire to see this insolence resented, and resented by the person who suffers from it. They cry to him with fury, to defend, or to revenge himself. If his indignation rouses at last, they heartily applaud and sympathize with it. It enlivens their own indignation against his enemy, whom they rejoice to see him attack in turn, and are as really gratified by his revenge, provided it is not immoderate, as if the injury had been done to themselves.

But though the utility of those passions to the individual, by rendering it dangerous to insult or injure him, be acknowledged ; and though their utility to the public, as the guardian of justice, and of the equality of its administration, be not less considerable, yet there is still something disagreeable in the passions themselves, which makes the appearance of them in other men the natural object of our aversion. The expression of anger towards any body present, if it exceeds a bare intimation that we are sensible of his ill usage, is regarded not only as an insult to that particular person, but as a rudeness to the whole company. Respect for them ought to have restrained us from giving way to so boisterous and offensive an emotion. It is the remote effects of these passions
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which are agreeable; the immediate effects are mischief to the person against whom they are directed. But it is the immediate, and not the remote effects of objects which render them agreeable or disagreeable to the imagination. A prison is certainly more useful to the public than a palace; and the person who founds the one is generally directed by a much juster spirit of patriotism, than he who builds the other. But the immediate effects of a prison, the confinement of the wretches shut up in it, are disagreeable, and the imagination either does not take time to trace out the remote ones, or sees them at too great a distance to be much affected by them. A prison, therefore, will always be a disagreeable object; and the fitter it is for the purpose for which it was intended, it will be the more so. A palace, on the contrary, will always be agreeable; yet its remote effects may often be inconvenient to the public. It may serve to promote luxury, and set the example of the dissolution of manners. Its immediate effects, however, the conveniency, the pleasure, and the gaiety of the people who live in it, being all agreeable, and suggesting to the imagination a thousand agreeable ideas, that faculty generally rests upon them, and seldom goes farther in tracing its more distant consequences. Trophies of the instruments of music or of agriculture, imitated in painting or in stucco, make a common and an agreeable ornament of our halls
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and dining rooms. A trophy of the same kind, composed of the instruments of surgery, of dissecting and amputation knives, of saws for cutting the bones, of trepanning instruments, &c. would be absurd and shocking. Instruments of surgery, however, are always more finely polished, and generally more nicely adapted to the purposes for which they are intended, than instruments of agriculture. The remote effects of them too, the health of the patient, is agreeable; yet as the immediate effect of them is pain and suffering, the sight of them always displeases us. Instruments of war are agreeable, though their immediate effect may seem to be in the same manner pain and suffering. But then it is the pain and suffering of our enemies, with whom we have no sympathy. With regard to us, they are immediately connected with the agreeable ideas of courage, victory, and honour. They are themselves, therefore, supposed to make one of the noblest parts of dress, and the imitation of them one of the finest ornaments of architecture. It is the same case with the qualities of the mind. The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as
necessary

necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature. No speculation of this kind, however, how deeply soever it might be rooted in the mind, could diminish our natural abhorrence of vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose remote ones are too distant to be traced by the imagination.

It is the same case with those passions we have been just now considering. Their immediate effects are so disagreeable, that even when they are most justly provoked, there is still something about them which disgusts us. These, therefore, are the only passions of which the expressions, as I formerly observed, do not dispose and prepare us to sympathize with them, before we are informed of the cause which excites them. The plaintive voice of misery, when heard at a distance, will not allow us to be indifferent about the person from whom it comes. As soon as it strikes our ear, it interests us in his fortune, and, if continued, forces us almost involuntarily to fly to his assistance. The sight of a smiling countenance, in the same manner, elevates even the pensive into that gay and airy mood, which disposes him to sympathize with, and share the joy which it expresses; and he feels his heart, which with thought and care was before that shrunk and depressed,

depressed, instantly expanded and elated. But it is quite otherwise with the expressions of hatred and resentment. The hoarse, boisterous, and discordant voice of anger, when heard at a distance, inspires us either with fear or aversion. We do not fly towards it, as to one who cries out with pain and agony. Women, and men of weak nerves, tremble and are overcome with fear, though sensible that themselves are not the objects of the anger. They conceive fear, however, by putting themselves in the situation of the person who is so. Even those of stouter hearts are disturbed; not indeed enough to make them afraid, but enough to make them angry; for anger is the passion which they would feel in the situation of the other person. It is the same case with hatred. Mere expressions of spite inspire it against nobody, but the man who uses them. Both these passions are by nature the objects of our aversion. Their disagreeable and boisterous appearance never excites, never prepares, and often disturbs our sympathy. Grief does not more powerfully engage and attract us to the person in whom we observe it, than these, while we are ignorant of the cause, disgust and detach us from him. It was, it seems, the intention of Nature, that those rougher and more unamiable emotions, which drive men from one another, should be less easily and more rarely communicated.

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When music imitates the modulations of grief or joy, it either actually inspires with those passions, or at least puts us in the mood which disposes us to conceive them. But when it imitates the notes of anger, it inspires us with fear. Joy, grief, love, admiration, devotion, are all of them passions which are naturally musical. Their natural tones are all soft, clear, and melodious; and they naturally express themselves in periods which are distinguished by regular pauses, and which upon that account are easily adapted to the regular returns of the correspondent airs of a tune. The voice of anger, on the contrary, and of all the passions which are akin to it, is harsh and discordant. Its periods too are all irregular, sometimes very long, and sometimes very short, and distinguished by no regular pauses. It is with difficulty, therefore, that music can imitate any of those passions; and the music which does imitate them is not the most agreeable. A whole entertainment may consist, without any impropriety, of the imitation of the social and agreeable passions. It would be a strange entertainment which consisted altogether of the imitations of hatred and resentment.

If those passions are disagreeable to the spectator they are not less so to the person who feels them. Hatred and anger are the greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind. There is, in
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the very feeling of those passions, something harsh, jarring, and convulsive, something that tears and distracts the breast, and is altogether destructive of that composure and tranquillity of mind, which is so necessary to happiness, and which is best promoted by the contrary passions of gratitude and love. It is not the value of what they lose by the perfidy and ingratitude of those they live with, which the generous and humane are most apt to regret. Whatever they may have lost, they can generally be very happy without it. What most disturbs them is the idea of perfidy and ingratitude exercised towards themselves; and the discordant and disagreeable passions which this excites, constitute, in their own opinion, the chief part of the injury which they suffer.

How many things are requisite to render the gratification of resentment completely agreeable, and to make the spectator thoroughly sympathize with our revenge? The provocation must first of all be such that we should become contemptible, and be exposed to perpetual insults, if we did not, in some measure, resent it. Smaller offences are always better neglected: nor is there any thing more despicable than that forward and captious humour which takes fire upon every slight occasion of quarrel. We should resent more from a sense of the propriety of resentment, from a sense that mankind expect and require it

of us, than because we feel in ourselves the furies of that disagreeable passion. There is no passion, of which the human mind is capable, concerning whose justness we ought to be so doubtful, concerning whose indulgence we ought so carefully to consult our natural sense of Propriety, or so diligently to consider what will be the sentiments of the cool and impartial spectator. Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our own rank and dignity in society, is the only motive which can ennoble the expressions of this disagreeable passion. This motive must characterize our whole style and deportment. These must be plain, open, and direct; determined without positiveness, and elevated without insolence; not only free from petulance and low scurrility, but generous, candid, and full of all proper regards, even for the person who has offended us. It must appear, in short, from our whole manner, without our labouring affectedly to express it, that passion has not extinguished our humanity; and that if we yield to the dictates of revenge, it is with reluctance, from necessity, and in consequence of great and repeated provocations. When resentment is guarded and qualified in this manner, it may be admitted to be even generous and noble.

SECT. IV. *Of the social Passions.*

AS it is a divided sympathy which renders the whole set of passions just now mentioned, upon most occasions, so ungraceful and disagreeable; so there is another set opposite to these, which a redoubled sympathy renders almost always peculiarly agreeable and becoming. Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship, and esteem, all the social and benevolent affections, when expressed in the countenance or behaviour, even towards those who are not peculiarly connected with ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occasion. His sympathy with the person who feels those passions exactly coincides with his concern for the person who is the object of them. The interest, which, as a man, he is obliged to take in the happiness of this last, enlivens his fellow-feeling with the sentiments of the other, whose emotions are employed about the same object. We have always, therefore, the strongest disposition to sympathize with the benevolent affections. They appear in every respect agreeable to us. We enter into the satisfaction both of the person who feels them, and of the person who is the object of them. For as to be the object of hatred and indignation gives more pain than all the evil which a brave man can fear from his enemies; so there is a

satisfaction in the consciousness of being beloved, which, to a person of delicacy and sensibility, is of more importance to happiness than all the advantage which he can expect to derive from it. What character is so detestable as that of one who takes pleasure to sow dissension among friends, and to turn their most tender love into mortal hatred? Yet wherein does the atrocity of this so much abhorred injury consist? Is it in depriving them of the frivolous good offices, which, had their friendship continued, they might have expected from one another? It is in depriving them of that friendship itself, in robbing them of each other's affections, from which both derived so much satisfaction; it is in disturbing the harmony of their hearts, and putting an end to that happy commerce which had before subsisted between them. These affections, that harmony, this commerce, are felt, not only by the tender and the delicate, but by the rudest vulgar of mankind, to be of more importance to happiness than all the little services which could be expected to flow from them.

The sentiment of love is, in itself, agreeable to the person who feels it. It soothes and composes the breast, seems to favour the vital motions, and to promote the healthful state of the human constitution; and it is rendered still more delightful by the consciousness of the gratitude and satisfaction which it must excite in him who is the
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object of it. Their mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other person. With what pleasure do we look upon a family through the whole of which reign mutual love and esteem, where the parents and children are companions for one another, without any other difference than what is made by respectful affection on the one side, and kind indulgence on the other; where freedom and fondness, mutual raillery and mutual kindness, show that no opposition of interest divides the brothers, nor any rivalry of favour sets the sisters at variance, and where every thing presents us with the idea of peace, cheerfulness, harmony, and contentment? On the contrary, how uneasy are we made when we go into a house in which jarring contention sets one half of those who dwell in it against the other; where, amidst affected smoothness and complaisance, suspicious looks and sudden starts of passion betray the mutual jealousies which burn within them, and which are every moment ready to burst out through all the restraints which the presence of the company imposes?

Those amiable passions, even when they are acknowledged to be excessive, are never regarded with aversion. There is something agreeable even in the weakness of friendship and humanity. The too tender mother, and the too indulgent

father, the too generous and affectionate friend, may sometimes, perhaps, on account of the softness of their natures, be looked upon with a species of pity, in which, however, there is a mixture of love; but can never be regarded with hatred and aversion, nor even with contempt, unless by the most brutal and worthless of mankind. It is always with concern, with sympathy and kindness, that we blame them for the extravagance of their attachment. There is a helplessness in the character of extreme humanity which more than anything interests our pity. There is nothing in itself which renders it either ungraceful or disagreeable. We only regret that it is unfit for the world, because the world is unworthy of it, and because it must expose the person who is endued with it as a prey to the perfidy and ingratitude of insinuating falsehood, and to a thousand pains and uneasinesses, which, of all men, he the least deserves to feel, and which generally too he is, of all men, the least capable of supporting. It is quite otherwise with hatred and resentment. Too violent a propensity to those detestable passions, renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil society.

SECT. V. *Of the selfish Passions.*

BESIDES those two opposite sets of passions, the social and unsocial, there is another which holds a sort of middle place between them; is never either so graceful as is sometimes the one set, nor is ever so odious as is sometimes the other. Grief and joy, when conceived upon account of our own private good or bad fortune, constitute this third set of passions. Even when excessive, they are never so disagreeable as excessive resentment, because no opposite sympathy can ever interest us against them: and when most suitable to their objects, they are never so agreeable as impartial humanity and just benevolence; because no double sympathy can ever interest us for them. There is, however, this difference between grief and joy, that we are generally most disposed to sympathize with small joys and great sorrows. The man who, by some sudden revolution of fortune, is lifted up all at once into a condition of life, greatly above what he had formerly lived in, may be assured that the congratulations of his best friends are not all of them perfectly sincere. An upstart, though of the greatest merit, is generally disagreeable, and a sentiment of envy commonly prevents us from heartily sympathizing with his joy. If he has any judgment, he is sensible of this, and, instead of appearing to be elated with

his good fortune, he endeavours, as much as he can, to smother his joy, and keep down that elevation of mind with which his new circumstances naturally inspire him. He affects the same plainness of dress, and the same modesty of behaviour, which became him in his former station. He redoubles his attention to his old friends, and endeavours more than ever to be humble, assiduous, and complaisant. And this is the behaviour which in his situation we most approve of; because we expect, it seems, that he should have more sympathy with our envy and aversion to his happiness, than we have to his happiness. It is seldom that with all this he succeeds. We suspect the sincerity of his humility, and he grows weary of this constraint. In a little time, therefore, he generally leaves all his old friends behind him, some of the meanest of them excepted, who may, perhaps, condescend to become his dependants: nor does he always acquire any new ones; the pride of his new connections is as much affronted at finding him their equal, as that of his old ones had been by his becoming their superior: and it requires the most obstinate and persevering modesty to atone for this mortification to either. He generally grows weary too soon, and is provoked, by the swollen and suspicious pride of the one, and by the saucy contempt of the other, to treat the first with neglect, and the second with petulance, till at last he grows habitually insolent, and forfeits
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the esteem of all. If the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved, as I believe it does, those sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute much to happiness. He is happiest who advances more gradually to greatness, whom the public destines to every step of his preferment long before he arrives at it, in whom, upon that account, when it comes, it can excite no extravagant joy, and with regard to whom it cannot reasonably create either any jealousy in those he overtakes, or any envy in those he leaves behind.

Mankind, however, more readily sympathize with those smaller joys which flow from less important causes. It is decent to be humble amidst great prosperity; but we can scarce express too much satisfaction in all the little occurrences of common life, in the company with which we spent the evening last night, in the entertainment that was set before us, in what was said and what was done, in all the little incidents of the present conversation, and in all those frivolous nothings which fill up the void of human life. Nothing is more graceful than habitual cheerfulness, which is always founded upon a peculiar relish for all the little pleasures which common occurrences afford. We readily sympathize with it: it inspires us with the same joy, and makes every trifle turn up to us in the same agreeable aspect in which it presents itself to the person endowed with this happy disposition.

position: Hence it is that youth, the season of gaiety, so easily engages our affections. That propensity to joy which seems even to animate the bloom, and to sparkle from the eyes of youth and beauty, though in a person of the same sex, exalts, even the aged, to a more joyous mood than ordinary. They forget, for a time, their infirmities, and abandon themselves to those agreeable ideas and emotions to which they have long been strangers, but which, when the presence of so much happiness recalls them to their breast, take their place there, like old acquaintance, from whom they are sorry to have ever been parted, and whom they embrace more heartily upon account of this long separation.

It is quite otherwise with grief. Small vexations excite no sympathy, but deep affliction calls forth the greatest. The man who is made uneasy by every little disagreeable incident, who is hurt if either the cook or the butler have failed in the least article of their duty, who feels every defect in the highest ceremonial of politeness, whether it be shewn to himself or to any other person, who takes it amiss that his intimate friend did not bid him good-morrow when they met in the forenoon, and that his brother hummed a tune all the time he himself was telling a story; who is put out of humour by the badness of the weather when in the country, by the badness of the roads when upon a journey, and by the want of company, and dull-
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ness of all public diversions when in town: such a person, I say, though he should have some reason, will seldom meet with much sympathy. Joy is a pleasant emotion, and we gladly abandon ourselves to it upon the slightest occasion. We readily, therefore, sympathize with it in others, whenever we are not prejudiced by envy. But grief is painful, and the mind, even when it is our own misfortune, naturally resists and recoils from it. We would endeavour either not to conceive it at all, or to shake it off as soon as we have conceived it. Our aversion to grief will not, indeed, always hinder us from conceiving it our own case upon very trifling occasions, but it constantly prevents us from sympathizing with it in others when excited by the like frivolous causes: for our sympathetic passions are always less irresistible than our original ones. There is, besides, a malice in mankind, which not only prevents all sympathy with little uneasinesses, but renders them in some measure diverting. Hence the delight which we all take in raillery, and in the small vexation which we observe in our companion when he is pushed, and urged, and teased upon all sides. Men of the most ordinary good-breeding dissemble the pain which any little incident may give them, and those who are more thoroughly formed to society, turn of their own accord, all such incidents into raillery, as they know their companions will do for them. The habit which a man, who lives in the
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world, has acquired of considering how every thing that concerns himself will appear to others, makes those frivolous calamities turn up in the same ridiculous light to him, in which he knows they will certainly be considered by them.

Our sympathy, on the contrary, with deep distress, is very strong and very sincere. It is unnecessary to give an instance. We weep even at the feigned representation of a tragedy. If one labour, therefore, under any signal calamity, if by some extraordinary misfortune he is fallen into poverty, into disgrace and disappointment; even though his own fault may have been, in part, the occasion, yet he may generally depend upon the sincerest sympathy of all his friends, and, as far as interest and honour will permit, upon their kindest assistance too. But if his misfortune is not of this dreadful kind, if he has only been a little baulked in his ambition, if he has been only jilted by his mistress, or is only hen-pecked by his wife, he may lay his account with the railery of his acquaintance.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of Self-command.

THE man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect knowledge of those rules will not alone enable him to act in this manner: his own passions are very apt to mislead him; sometimes to drive him and sometimes to seduce him to violate all the rules which he himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves of. The most perfect knowledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect Self-command, will not always enable him to do his duty.

Some of the best of the ancient moralists seem to have considered the passions as divided into two different classes: first, into those which it requires a considerable exertion of Self-command to restrain even for a single moment; and, secondly, into those which it is easy to restrain for a single moment, or even for a short period of time; but which, by their continual and almost incessant solicitations, are, in the course of a life, very apt to mislead into great deviations.

FEAR

FEAR and ANGER, together with some other passions which are mixed or connected with them, constitute the first class. The love of ease, of pleasure, of applause, and of many other selfish gratifications, constitute the second. Extravagant fear and furious anger, it is often difficult to restrain even for a single moment. The love of ease, of pleasure, of applause, and other selfish gratifications, it is always easy to restrain for a single moment, or even for a short period of time; but, by their continual sollicitations, they often mislead us into many weaknesses which we have afterwards much reason to be ashamed of. The former set of passions may often be said to drive, the latter, to seduce us from our duty. The command of the former was, by the ancient moralists above alluded to, denominated fortitude, manhood, and strength of mind; that of the latter, temperance, decency, modesty, and moderation.

The command of each of those two sets of passions, independent of the beauty which it derives from its utility, from its enabling us upon all occasions to act according to the dictates of prudence, of justice, and of proper benevolence, has a beauty of its own, and seems to deserve for its own sake a certain degree of that esteem and admiration. In the one case, the strength and greatness of the exertion excite some degree of that esteem and admiration. In the other, the
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uniformity, the equality and unremitting steadiness of that exertion.

The man who, in danger, in torture, upon the approach of death, preserves his tranquillity unaltered, and suffers no word, no gesture to escape him which does not perfectly accord with the feelings of the most indifferent spectator, necessarily commands a very high degree of admiration. If he suffers in the cause of liberty and justice, for the sake of humanity and the love of his country, the most tender compassion for his sufferings, the strongest indignation against the injustice of his persecutors, the warmest sympathetic gratitude for his beneficent intentions, the highest sense of his merit, all join and mix themselves with the admiration of his magnanimity, and often inflame that sentiment into the most enthusiastic and rapturous veneration. The heroes of ancient and modern history, who are remembered with the most peculiar favour and affection, are, many of them, those who, in the cause of truth, liberty, and justice, have perished upon the scaffold, and who behaved there with that ease and dignity which became them. Had the enemies of Socrates suffered him to have died quietly in his bed, the glory even of that great philosopher might possibly never have acquired that dazzling splendour in which it has been beheld in all succeeding ages. In the English history, when we look over the illustrious heads which have been
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engraven by Vertue and Howbraken, there is scarcely any body, I imagine, who does not feel that the axe, the emblem of having been beheaded, which is engraved under some of the most illustrious of them; under those of the Sir Thomas Mores, of the Raleighs, the Ruffels, the Sydneys, &c. sheds a real dignity and interest over the characters to which it is affixed, much superior to what they can derive from all the futile ornaments of heraldry, with which they are sometimes accompanied.

Nor does this magnanimity give lustre only to the characters of innocent and virtuous men. It draws some degree of favourable regard even upon those of the greatest criminals; and when a robber or highwayman is brought to the scaffold, and behaves there with decency and firmness, though we perfectly approve of his punishment, we often cannot help regretting that a man who possessed such great and noble powers should have been capable of such mean enormities.

War is a great school both for acquiring and exercising this species of magnanimity. Death, as we say, is the king of terrors; and the man who has conquered the fear of death, is not likely to lose his presence of mind at the approach of any other natural evil. In war, men become familiar with death, and are thereby necessarily cured of that superstitious horror with which it is viewed by the weak and unexperienced. They consider

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it merely as the loss of life, and as no further the object of aversion than as life may happen to be that of desire. They learn from experience, too, that many seemingly great dangers are not so great as they appear; and that, with courage, activity, and presence of mind, there is often a good probability of extricating themselves with honour from situations where at first they could see no hope. The dread of death is thus greatly diminished; and the confidence or hope of escaping it, augmented. They learn to expose themselves to danger with less reluctance. They are less anxious to get out of it, and less apt to lose their presence of mind while they are in it. It is this habitual contempt of danger and death which ennobles the profession of a soldier, and bestows upon it, in the natural apprehensions of mankind, a rank and dignity superior to that of any other profession. The skilful and successful exercise of this profession, in the service of their country, seems to have constituted the most distinguishing feature in the character of the favourite heroes of all ages.

Great warlike exploits, though undertaken contrary to every principle of justice, and carried on without any regard to humanity, sometimes interest us, and command even some degree of a certain sort of esteem for the very worthless characters which conduct it. We are interested even in the exploits of the Buccaneers; and read with

some sort of esteem and admiration, the history of the most worthless men, who, in pursuit of the most criminal purposes, endured greater hardships, surmounted greater difficulties, and encountered greater dangers, than, perhaps, any which the ordinary course of history gives an account of.

The command of ANGER appears upon many occasions not less generous and noble than that of FEAR. The proper expression of just indignation composes many of the most splendid and admired passages both of ancient and modern eloquence. The Philippics of Demosthenes, the Catalinarians of Cicero, derive their whole beauty from the noble propriety with which this passion is expressed. But this just indignation is nothing but anger restrained and properly attuned to what the impartial spectator can enter into. The blustering and noisy passion which goes beyond this, is always odious and offensive, and interests us, not for the angry man, but for the man with whom he is angry. The nobleness of pardoning appears, upon many occasions, superior even to the most perfect propriety of resenting. When either proper acknowledgements have been made by the offending party; or, even without any such acknowledgments, when the public interest requires that the most mortal enemies should unite for the discharge of some important duty, the man who can cast away all animosity, and act with confidence and cordiality towards

towards the person who had most grievously offended him, seems justly to merit our highest admiration.

The command of ANGER, however, does not always appear in such splendid colours. FEAR is contrary to ANGER, and is often the motive which restrains it; and in such cases the meanness of the motive takes away all the nobleness of the restraint. Anger prompts to attack, and the indulgence of it seems sometimes to shew a sort of courage and superiority to fear. The indulgence of anger is sometimes an object of vanity. That of fear never is. Vain and weak men, among their inferiors, or those who dare not resist them, often affect to be ostentatiously passionate, and fancy that they show, what is called, spirit in being so. A bully tells many stories of his own insolence, which are not true, and imagines that he thereby renders himself, if not more amiable and respectable, at least more formidable to his audience. Modern manners, which, by favouring the practice of duelling, may be said, in some cases, to encourage private revenge, contribute, perhaps, a good deal to render, in modern times, the restraint of anger by fear still more contemptible than it might otherwise appear to be. There is always something dignified in the command of fear, whatever may be the motive upon which it is founded. It is not so with the command of anger. Unless it is founded, altogether

ther in the sense of decency, of dignity, and propriety, it never is perfectly agreeable.

To act according to the dictates of prudence, of justice, and proper beneficence, seems to have no great merit where there is no temptation to do otherwise. But to act with cool deliberation in the midst of the greatest dangers and difficulties; to observe religiously the sacred rules of justice, in spite both of the greatest interests which might tempt, and the greatest injuries which might provoke us to violate them; never to suffer the benevolence of our temper to be damped or discouraged by the malignity and ingratitude of the individuals towards whom it may have been exercised; is the character of the most exalted wisdom and virtue. Self-command is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre.

The command of FEAR, the command of ANGER, are always great and noble powers. When they are directed by justice and benevolence, they are not only great virtues, but increase the splendour of those other virtues. They may, however, sometimes be directed by very different motives; and in this case, though still great and respectable, they may be excessively dangerous. The most intrepid valour may be employed in the cause of the greatest injustice. Amidst great provocations, apparent tranquillity and good humour may sometimes conceal the most determined
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and cruel resolution to revenge. The strength of mind requisite for such dissimulation, though always and necessarily contaminated by the baseness of falsehood, has, however, been often much admired by many people of no contemptible judgment. The dissimulation of Catharine of Medicis is often celebrated by the profound historian Davila; that of Lord Digby, afterwards Earl of Bristol, by the grave and conscientious Lord Clarendon; that of the first Ashley Earl of Shaftesbury, by the judicious Mr. Locke. Even Cicero seems to consider this deceitful character, not indeed as of the highest dignity, but as not unfavourable to a certain flexibility of manners, which, he thinks, may, notwithstanding, be, upon the whole, both agreeable and respectable. He exemplifies it by the characters of Homer's Ulysses, of the Athenian Themistocles, of the Spartan Lyfander, and of the Roman Marcus Crassus. This character of dark and deep dissimulation occurs most commonly in times of great public disorder; amidst the violence of faction and civil war. When law has become in a great measure impotent, when the most perfect innocence cannot alone insure safety, regard to self-defence obliges the greater part of men to have recourse to dexterity, to address, and to apparent accommodation to whatever happens to be, at the moment, the prevailing party. This false character, too, is frequently accompanied with the

coolest and most determined courage. The proper exercise of it imposes that courage, as death is commonly the certain consequence of detection. It may be employed indifferently, either to exasperate or to allay those furious animosities of adverse factions which impose the necessity of assuming it; and though it may sometimes be useful, it is at least equally liable to be excessively pernicious.

The command of the less violent and turbulent passions seems much less liable to be abused to any pernicious purpose. Temperance, decency, modesty, and moderation, are always amiable, and can seldom be directed to any bad end. It is from the unremitting steadiness of those gentler exertions of self-command, that the amiable virtue of chastity, that the respectable virtues of industry and frugality, derive all that sober lustre which attends them. The conduct of all those who are contented to walk in the humble paths of private and peaceable life, derives from the same principle the greater part of the beauty and grace which belong to it, a beauty and grace which, though much less dazzling, is not always less pleasing than those which accompany the more splendid actions of the hero, the statesman, or the legislator.

The degree of any passion which the impartial spectator approves of, is differently situated in different passions. In some passions the excess is less disagreeable than the defect; and in such
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passions the point of propriety seems to stand high, or nearer to the excess than to the defect. In other passions, the defect is less disagreeable than the excess; and in such passions the point of propriety seems to stand low, or nearer to the defect than to the excess. The former are the passions which the spectator is most, the latter, those which he is least disposed to sympathize with. The former, too, are the passions of which the immediate feeling or sensation is agreeable to the person principally concerned; the latter, those of which it is disagreeable. It may be laid down as a general rule, that the passions which the spectator is most disposed to sympathize with, and in which, upon that account, the point of propriety may be said to stand high, are those of which the immediate feeling or sensation is more or less agreeable to the person principally concerned: and that, on the contrary, the passions which the spectator is least disposed to sympathize with, and in which, upon that account, the point of propriety may be said to stand low, are those of which the immediate feeling or sensation is more or less disagreeable, or even painful, to the person principally concerned. This general rule, so far as I have been able to observe, admits not of a single exception. A few examples will at once, both sufficiently explain it, and demonstrate the truth of it.

The disposition to the affections which tend to unite men in society, to humanity, kindness, natural affection, friendship, esteem, may sometimes be excessive. Even the excess of this disposition, however, renders a man interesting to every body. Though we blame it, we still regard it with compassion, and even with kindness, and never with dislike. We are more sorry for it than angry at it. To the person himself, the indulgence even of such excessive affections is, upon many occasions, not only agreeable, but delicious. Upon some occasions, indeed, especially when directed, as is too often the case, towards unworthy objects, it exposes him to much real and heartfelt distress. Even upon such occasions, however, a well-disposed mind regards him with the most exquisite pity, and feels the highest indignation against those who affect to despise him for his weakness and imprudence. The defect of this disposition, on the contrary, which is called hardness of heart, while it renders a man insensible to the feelings and distresses of other people, renders other people equally insensible to his; and, by excluding him from the friendship of all the world, excludes him from the best and most comfortable of all social enjoyments.

The disposition to the affections which drive men from one another, and which tend, as it were, to break the bands of human society; the disposition to anger, hatred, envy, malice, revenge; is, on the contrary, much more apt to offend

offend by its excess than by its defect. The excess renders a man wretched and miserable in his own mind, and the object of hatred, and sometimes even of horror, to other people. The defect is very seldom complained of. It may, however, be defective. The want of proper indignation is a most essential defect in the manly character, and, upon many occasions, renders a man incapable of protecting himself or his friends from insult and injustice. Even that principle, in the excess and improper direction of which consists the odious and detestable passion of envy, may be defective. Envy, as we have seen, is that passion which views with malignant dislike the superiority of those who are really entitled to all the superiority they possess. The man, however, who, in matters of consequence, tamely suffers other people, who are entitled to no such superiority, to rise above him or get before him, is justly condemned as mean-spirited. This weakness is commonly founded in indolence, sometimes in good nature, in an aversion to opposition, to bustle and solicitation, and sometimes, too, in a sort of ill-judged magnanimity, which fancies that it can always continue to despise the advantage which it then despises, and, therefore, so easily gives up. Such weakness, however, is commonly followed by much regret and repentance; and what had some appearance of magnanimity in the beginning frequently gives place to a most malignant envy in
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the end, and to a hatred of that superiority, which those who have once attained it, may often become really entitled to, by the very circumstance of having attained it. In order to live comfortably in the world, it is, upon all occasions, as necessary to defend our dignity and rank, as it is to defend our life or our fortune.

Our sensibility to personal danger and distress, like that to personal provocation, is much more apt to offend by its excess than by its defect. No character is more contemptible than that of a coward; no character is more admired than that of the man who faces death with intrepidity, and maintains his tranquillity and presence of mind amidst the most dreadful dangers. We esteem the man who supports pain and even torture with manhood and firmness; and we can have little regard for him who sinks under them, and abandons himself to useless outcries and womanish lamentations. A fretful temper, which feels, with too much sensibility, every little cross accident, renders a man miserable in himself and offensive to other people. A calm one, which does not allow its tranquillity to be disturbed, either by the small injuries, or by the little disasters incident to the usual course of human affairs; but which, amidst the natural and moral evils infesting the world, lays its account and is contented to suffer a little from both, is a blessing to the man himself, and gives ease and security to all his companions.

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Our sensibility, however, both to our own injuries and to our own misfortunes, though generally too strong, may likewise be too weak. The man who feels little for his own misfortunes must always feel less for those of other people, and be less disposed to relieve them. The man who has little resentment for the injuries which are done to himself, must always have less for those which are done to other people, and be less disposed either to protect or to avenge them. A stupid insensibility to the events of human life necessarily extinguishes all that keen and earnest attention to the propriety of our own conduct, which constitutes the real essence of virtue. We can feel little anxiety about the propriety of our own actions, when we are indifferent about the events which may result from them. The man who feels the full distress of the calamity which has befallen him, who feels the whole baseness of the injustice which has been done to him, but who feels still more strongly what the dignity of his own character requires; who does not abandon himself to the guidance of the undisciplined passions which his situation might naturally inspire; but who governs his whole behaviour and conduct according to those restrained and corrected emotions which the great inmate, the great demi-god within the breast prescribes and approves of; is alone the real man of virtue, the only real and proper object of love, respect, and admiration. Insensibility
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and that noble firmness, that exalted self-command, which is founded in the sense of dignity and propriety, are so far from being altogether the same, that in proportion as the former takes place the merit of the latter is, in many cases, entirely taken away.

But though the total want of sensibility to personal injury, to personal danger and distress, would, in such situations, take away the whole merit of self-command, that sensibility, however, may very easily be too exquisite, and it frequently is so. When the sense of propriety, when the authority of the judge within the breast, can control this extreme sensibility, that authority must no doubt appear very noble and very great. But the exertion of it may be too fatiguing; it may have too much to do. The individual, by a great effort, may behave perfectly well. But the contest between the two principles, the warfare within the breast, may be too violent to be at all consistent with internal tranquillity and happiness. The wise man whom Nature has endowed with this too exquisite sensibility, and whose too lively feelings have not been sufficiently blunted and hardened by early education and proper exercise, will avoid, as much as duty and propriety will permit, the situations for which he is not perfectly fitted. The man whose feeble and delicate constitution renders him too sensible to pain, to hardship, and to every sort of bodily distress, should not wantonly embrace

brace the profession of a foldier. The man of too much fenfibility to injury, fhould not rashly engage in the contefts of faction. Though the fenfe of propriety fhould be ftrong enough to command all thofe fenfibilities, the compofure of the mind muft always be difturbed in the ftruggle. In this diforder the judgment cannot always maintain its ordinary acutenefs and precision; and though he may always mean to act properly, he may often act rashly and imprudently, and in a manner which he himfelf will, in the fucceeding part of his life, be for ever afhamed of. A certain intrepidity, a certain firmnefs of nerves and hardinefs of conftitution, whether natural or acquired, are undoubtedly the beft preparatives for all the great exertions of felf-command.

Though war and faction are certainly the beft fchools for forming every man to this hardinefs and firmnefs of temper, though they are the beft remedies for curing him of the oppofite weaknefses, yet, if the day of trial fhould happen to come before he has completely learned his leffon, before the remedy has had time to produce its proper effect, the confequences might not be agreeable.

Our fenfibility to the pleasures, to the amusements and enjoyments of human life, may offend, in the fame manner, either by its excefs or by its defect. Of the two, however, the excefs feems lefs difagreeable than the defect. Both to the fpectator and to the perfon principally concerned,
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a strong propensity to joy is certainly more pleasing than a dull insensibility to the objects of amusement and diversion. We are charmed with the gaiety of youth, and even with the playfulness of childhood : but we soon grow weary of the flat and tasteless gravity which too frequently accompanies old age. When this propensity, indeed, is not restrained by the sense of propriety, when it is unsuitable to the time or to the place, to the age or to the situation of the person, when to indulge it, he neglects either his interest or his duty ; it is justly blamed as excessive, and as hurtful both to the individual and to society. In the greater part of such cases, however, what is chiefly to be found fault with is, not so much the strength of the propensity to joy, as the weakness of the sense of propriety and duty. A young man who has no relish for the diversions and amusements that are natural and suitable to his age, who talks of nothing but his book or his business, is disliked as formal and pedantic ; and we give him no credit for his abstinence even from improper indulgences, to which he seems to have so little inclination.

The principle of self-estimation may be too high, and it may likewise be too low. It is so very agreeable to think highly, and so very disagreeable to think meanly of ourselves, that, to the person himself, it cannot well be doubted, but that some degree of excess must be much less disagreeable

disagreeable than any degree of defect. But to the impartial spectator, it may perhaps be thought, things must appear quite differently, and that to him the defect must always be less disagreeable than the excess. And in our companions, no doubt, we much more frequently complain of the latter than of the former. When they assume upon us, or set themselves before us, their self-estimation mortifies our own. Our own pride and vanity prompt us to accuse them of pride and vanity, and we cease to be the impartial spectators of their conduct. When the same companions, however, suffer any other man to assume over them a superiority which does not belong to him, we not only blame them, but often despise them as mean-spirited. When, on the contrary, among other people, they push themselves a little more forward, and scramble to an elevation disproportioned, as we think, to their merit, though we may not perfectly approve of their conduct, we are often, upon the whole, diverted with it; and, where there is no envy in the case, we are almost always much less displeas'd with them, than we should have been, had they suffered themselves to sink below their proper station.

In estimating our own merit, in judging of our own character and conduct, there are two different standards to which we naturally compare them. The one is the idea of exact propriety and perfection, so far as we are each of us capable of
comprehending

comprehending that idea. The other is that degree of approximation to this idea which is commonly attained in the world, and which the greater part of our friends and companions, of our rivals and competitors, may have actually arrived at. We very seldom (I am disposed to think, we never) attempt to judge of ourselves without giving more or less attention to both these different standards. But the attention of different men, and even of the same man at different times, is often very unequally divided between them; and is sometimes principally directed towards the one, and sometimes towards the other.

So far as our attention is directed towards the first standard, the wisest and best of us all, can, in his own character and conduct, see nothing but weakness and imperfection; can discover no ground for arrogance and presumption, but a great deal for humility, regret, and repentance. So far as our attention is directed towards the second, we may be affected either in the one way or in the other, and feel ourselves, either really above, or really below, the standard to which we compare ourselves.

The wise and virtuous man directs his principal attention to the first standard; the idea of exact propriety and perfection. There exists in the mind of every man an idea of this kind gradually formed from his observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people.

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It is the slow, gradual, and progressive work of the great demi-god within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. This idea is in every man more or less accurately drawn, its colouring is more or less just, its outlines are more or less exactly designed, according to the delicacy and acuteness of that sensibility, with which those observations were made, and according to the care and attention employed in making them. In the wise and virtuous man they have been made with the most acute and delicate sensibility, and the utmost care and attention have been employed in making them. Every day some feature is improved; every day some blemish is corrected. He has studied this idea more than other people, he comprehends it more distinctly, he has formed a much more correct image of it, and is much more deeply enamoured of its exquisite and divine beauty. He endeavours, as well as he can, to assimilate his own character to this archetype of perfection. But he imitates the work of a divine artist, which can never be equalled. He feels the imperfect success of all his best endeavours, and sees, with grief and affliction, in how many different features the mortal copy falls short of the immortal original. He remembers, with concern and humiliation, how often, from want of attention, from want of judgment, from want of temper, he has, both in words and actions, both in conduct and conversation, violated the exact rules of

perfect propriety; and has so far departed from that model, according to which he wished to fashion his own character and conduct. When he directs his attention towards the second standard, indeed, that degree of excellence which his friends and acquaintances have commonly arrived at, he may be sensible of his own superiority. But, as his principal attention is always directed towards the first standard, he is necessarily much more humbled by the one comparison than he ever can be elevated by the other. He is never so elated as to look down with insolence even upon those who are really below him. He feels so well his own imperfection, he knows so well the difficulty with which he attained his own distant approximation to rectitude, that he cannot regard with contempt the still greater imperfection of other people. Far from insulting over their inferiority, he views it with the most indulgent commiseration, and, by his advice, as well as example, is at all times willing to promote their further advancement. If, in any particular qualification, they happen to be superior to him, (for who is so perfect as not to have many superiors in many different qualifications?) far from envying their superiority, he, who knows how difficult it is to excel, esteems and honours their excellence, and never fails to bestow upon it the full measure of applause which it deserves. His whole mind, in short, is deeply impressed, his whole behaviour and deportment
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are distinctly stamped with the character of real modesty; with that of a very moderate estimation of his own merit, and, at the same time, of a full sense of the merit of other people.

In all the liberal and ingenious arts, in painting, in poetry, in music, in eloquence, in philosophy, the great artist feels always the real imperfection of his own best works, and is more sensible than any man how much they fall short of that ideal perfection of which he has formed some conception, which he imitates as well as he can, but which he despairs of ever equalling. It is the inferior artist only, who is ever perfectly satisfied with his own performances. He has little conception of this ideal perfection, about which he has little employed his thoughts; and it is chiefly to the works of other artists, of, perhaps, a still lower order, that he deigns to compare his own works. Boileau, the great French poet, (in some of his works perhaps not inferior to the greatest poet of the same kind, either ancient or modern,) used to say, that no great man was ever completely satisfied with his own works. His acquaintance Santeuil (a writer of Latin verses, and who, on account of that school-boy accomplishment, had the weakness to fancy himself a poet) assured him that he himself was always completely satisfied with *his* own. Boileau replied, with, perhaps, an arch ambiguity, *That he certainly was the only great man that ever was so.* Boileau, in judging of his own

works, compared them with the standard of ideal perfection, which, in his own particular branch of the poetic art, he had, I presume, meditated as deeply, and conceived as distinctly, as it is possible for man to conceive it. Santeuil, in judging of *his* own works, compared them, I suppose, chiefly to those of the other Latin poets of his own time, to the greater part of whom he was certainly very far from being inferior. But to support and finish off, if I may say so, the conduct and conversation of a whole life to some resemblance of this ideal perfection, is surely much more difficult than to work up to an equal resemblance any of the productions of any of the ingenious arts. The artist sits down to his work undisturbed, at leisure, in the full possession and recollection of all his skill, experience, and knowledge. The wise man must support the propriety of his own conduct in health and in sickness, in success and in disappointment, in the hour of fatigue and drowsy indolence, as well as in that of the most awakened attention. The most sudden and unexpected assaults of difficulty and distress must never surprise him. The injustice of other people must never provoke him to injustice. The violence of faction must never confound him. All the hardships and hazards of war must never either dishearten or appal him.

Of the persons who, in estimating their own merit, in judging of their own character and conduct,

duct, direct by far the greater part of their attention to the second standard, to that ordinary degree of excellence which is commonly attained by other people, there are some who really and justly feel themselves very much above it, and who, by every intelligent and impartial spectator, are acknowledged to be so. The attention of such persons, however, being always principally directed, not to the standard of ideal, but to that of ordinary perfection, they have little sense of their own weaknesses and imperfections; they have little modesty; are often assuming, arrogant, and presumptuous; great admirers of themselves, and great contemners of other people. Though their characters are in general much less correct, and their merit much inferior to that of the man of real and modest virtue; yet their excessive presumption, founded upon their own excessive self-admiration, dazzles the multitude, and often imposes even upon those who are much superior to the multitude. The frequent, and often wonderful, success of the most ignorant quacks and impostors, both civil and religious, sufficiently demonstrate how easily the multitude are imposed upon by the most extravagant and groundless pretensions. But when those pretensions are supported by a very high degree of real and solid merit, when they are displayed with all the splendour which ostentation can bestow upon them, when they are supported by high rank and great power,

when they have often been successfully exerted, and are, upon that account, attended by the loud acclamations of the multitude; even the man of sober judgment often abandons himself to the general admiration. The very noise of those foolish acclamations often contributes to confound his understanding, and while he sees those great men only at a certain distance, he is often disposed to worship them with a sincere admiration, superior even to that with which they appear to worship themselves. When there is no envy in the case, we all take pleasure in admiring, and are, upon that account, naturally disposed, in our fancies, to render complete and perfect in every respect the characters which, in many respects, are so very worthy of admiration. The excessive self-admiration of those great men is well understood, perhaps, and even seen through, with some degree of derision, by those wise men who are much in their familiarity, and who secretly smile at those lofty pretensions, which, by people at a distance, are often regarded with reverence, and almost with adoration. Such, however, have been, in all ages, the greater part of those men who have procured to themselves the most noisy fame, the most extensive reputation; a fame and reputation, too, which have often descended to the remotest posterity.

Great success in the world, great authority over the sentiments and opinions of mankind, have
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very seldom been acquired without some degree of this excessive self-admiration. The most splendid characters, the men who have performed the most illustrious actions, who have brought about the greatest revolutions, both in the situations and opinions of mankind; the most successful warriors, the greatest statesmen and legislators, the elegant founders and leaders of the most numerous and most successful sects and parties; have many of them been, not more distinguished for their very great merit, than for a degree of presumption and self-admiration altogether disproportioned even to that very great merit. This presumption was, perhaps, necessary, not only to prompt them to undertakings which a more sober mind would never have thought of, but to command the submission and obedience of their followers to support them in such undertakings. When crowned with success, accordingly, this presumption has often betrayed them into a vanity that approached almost to insanity and folly. Alexander the Great appears, not only to have wished that other people should think him a god, but to have been at least very well disposed to fancy himself such. Upon his death-bed, the most ungodlike of all situations, he requested of his friends that, to the respectable list of deities, into which himself had long before been inserted, his old mother Olympia

might likewise have the honour of being added. Amidst the respectful admiration of his followers and disciples, amidst the universal applause of the public, after the oracle, which probably had followed the voice of that applause, had pronounced him the wisest of men, the great wisdom of Socrates, though it did not suffer him to fancy himself a god, yet was not great enough to hinder him from fancying that he had secret and frequent intimations from some invisible and divine Being. The sound head of Cæsar was not so perfectly sound as to hinder him from being much pleased with his divine genealogy from the goddess Venus; and, before the temple of this pretended great-grandmother, to receive, without rising from his seat, the Roman Senate, when that illustrious body came to present him with some decrees conferring upon him the most extravagant honours. This insolence, joined to some other acts of an almost childish vanity, little to be expected from an understanding at once so very acute and comprehensive, seems, by exasperating the public jealousy, to have emboldened his assassins, and to have hastened the execution of their conspiracy. The religion and manners of modern times give our great men little encouragement to fancy themselves either gods or even prophets. Success, however, joined to great popular favour, has often so far turned the heads of
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the greatest of them, as to make them ascribe to themselves both an importance and an ability much beyond what they really possessed; and, by this presumption, to precipitate themselves into many rash and sometimes ruinous adventures. It is a characteristic almost peculiar to the great Duke of Marlborough, that ten years of such uninterrupted and such splendid success as scarcely any other general could boast of, never betrayed him into a single rash action, scarcely into a single rash word or expression. The same temperate coolness and self-command cannot, I think be ascribed to any other great warrior of later times; not to Prince Eugene, not to the late King of Prussia, not to the great Prince of Condé, not even to Gustavus Adolphus. Turenne seems to have approached the nearest to it; but several different transactions of his life sufficiently demonstrate that it was in him by no means so perfect as in the great Duke of Marlborough.

In the humble projects of private life, as well as in the ambitious and proud pursuits of high stations, great abilities and successful enterprize, in the beginning, have frequently encouraged to undertakings which necessarily led to bankruptcy and ruin in the end.

The esteem and admiration which every impartial spectator conceives for the real merit of those spirited, magnanimous, and high-minded persons, as it is a just and well founded sentiment, so it is
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a steady and permanent one, and altogether independent of their good or bad fortune. It is otherwise with that admiration which he is apt to conceive for their excessive self-estimation and presumption. While they are successful, indeed, he is often perfectly conquered and overborne by them. Success covers from his eyes, not only the great imprudence, but frequently the great injustice of their enterprises; and, far from blaming this defective part of their character, he often views it with the most enthusiastic admiration. When they are unfortunate, however, things change their colours and their names. What was before heroic magnanimity, resumes its proper appellation of extravagant rashness and folly; and the blackness of that avidity and injustice, which was before hid under the splendour of prosperity, comes full into view, and blots the whole lustre of their enterprise. Had Cæsar, instead of gaining, lost the battle of Pharsalia, his character would, at this hour, have ranked a little above that of Catiline, and the weakest man would have viewed his enterprise against the laws of his country in blacker colours, than, perhaps, even Cato, with all the animosity of a party-man, ever viewed it at the time. His real merit, the justness of his taste, the simplicity and elegance of his writings, the propriety of his eloquence, his skill in war, his resources in distress, his cool and sedate judgment in danger, his faithful attachment

tachment to his friends, his unexampled generosity to his enemies, would all have been acknowledged; as the real merit of Catiline, who had many great qualities is acknowledged at this day. But the insolence and injustice of his all-grasping ambition would have darkened and extinguished the glory of all that real merit. Fortune has in this, as well as in some other respects already mentioned, great influence over the moral sentiments of mankind, and, according as she is either favourable or adverse, can render the same character the object, either of general love and admiration, or of universal hatred and contempt. This great disorder in our moral sentiments is by no means, however, without its utility; and we may on this, as well as on many other occasions, admire the wisdom of God even in the weakness and folly of man. Our admiration of success is founded upon the same principle with our respect for wealth and greatness, and is equally necessary for establishing the distinction of ranks and the order of society. By this admiration of success we are taught to submit more easily to those superiors, whom the course of human affairs may assign to us; to regard with reverence, and sometimes even with a sort of respectful affection, that fortunate violence which we are no longer capable of resisting; not only the violence of such splendid characters as those of a Cæsar or an Alexander, but often that of
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the most brutal and savage barbarians, of an Attila, a Gengis, or a Tamerlane. To all such mighty conquerors the great mob of mankind are naturally disposed to look up with a wondering, though, no doubt, with a very weak and foolish admiration. By this admiration, however, they are taught to acquiesce with less reluctance under that government which an irresistible force imposes upon them, and from which no reluctance could deliver them.

Though in prosperity, however, the man of excessive self-estimation may sometimes appear to have some advantage over the man of correct and modest virtue; though the applause of the multitude, and of those who see them both only at a distance, is often much louder in favour of the one than it ever is in favour of the other; yet, all things fairly computed, the real balance of advantage is, perhaps in all cases, greatly in favour of the latter, and against the former. The man who neither ascribes to himself, nor wishes that other people should ascribe to him, any other merit besides that which really belongs to him, fears no humiliation, dreads no detection; but rests contented and secure upon the genuine truth and solidity of his own character. His admirers may neither be very numerous nor very loud in their applauses; but the wisest man who sees him the nearest and who knows him the best, admires him the most. To a real wise man the judicious and well-

well-weighed approbation of a single wise man, gives more heartfelt satisfaction than all the noisy applauses of ten thousand ignorant though enthusiastic admirers. He may say with Parmenides, who, upon reading a philosophical discourse before a public assembly at Athens, and observing, that, except Plato, the whole company had left him, continued, notwithstanding, to read on, and said that Plato alone was audience sufficient for him.

It is otherwise with the man of excessive self-estimation. The wise men who see him the nearest, admire him the least. Amidst the intoxication of prosperity, their sober and just esteem falls so far short of the extravagance of his own self-admiration, that he regards it as mere malignity and envy. He suspects his best friends. Their company becomes offensive to him. He drives them from his presence, and often rewards their services not only with ingratitude, but with cruelty and injustice. He abandons his confidence to flatterers and traitors, who pretend to idolize his vanity and presumption; and that character which in the beginning, though in some respects defective, was, upon the whole, both amiable and respectable, becomes contemptible and odious in the end. Amidst the intoxication of prosperity, Alexander killed Clytus, for having preferred the exploits of his father Philip to his own; put Calisthenes to death in torture,
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for having refused to adore him in the Persian manner; and murdered the great friend of his father, the venerable Parmenio, after having, upon the most groundless suspicions, sent first to the torture and afterwards to the scaffold the only remaining son of that old man, the rest having all before died in his own service. This was that Parmenio of whom Philip used to say, that the Athenians were very fortunate who could find ten generals every year, while he himself, in the whole course of his life, could never find one but Parmenio. It was upon the vigilance and attention of this Parmenio that he reposed at all times with confidence and security, and, in his hours of mirth and jollity, used to say, Let us drink, my friends, we may do it with safety, for Parmenio never drinks. It was this same Parmenio, with whose presence and counsel, it had been said, Alexander had gained all his victories; and without whose presence and counsel he had never gained a single victory. The humble, admiring, and flattering friends, whom Alexander left in power and authority behind him, divided his empire among themselves, and after having thus robbed his family and kindred of their inheritance, put, one after another, every single surviving individual of them, whether male or female, to death.

We frequently not only pardon, but thoroughly enter into and sympathize with the excessive self-estimation

estimation of those splendid characters in which we observe a great and distinguished superiority above the common level of mankind. We call them spirited, magnanimous and high-minded; which all involve in their meaning a considerable degree of praise and admiration. But we cannot enter into and sympathize with the excessive self-estimation of those characters in which we can discern no such distinguished superiority. We are disgusted and revolted by it; and it is with some difficulty that we can either pardon or suffer it. We call it pride or vanity; two words, of which the latter always, and the former for the most part, involve in their meaning a considerable degree of blame.

Those two vices, however, though resembling, in some respects, as being both modifications of excessive self-estimation, are yet, in many respects, very different from one another.

The proud man is sincere, and in the bottom of his heart, is convinced of his own superiority; though it may sometimes be difficult to guess upon what that conviction is founded. He wishes you to view him in no other light than that in which, when he places himself in your situation, he really views himself. He demands no more of you than what he thinks justice. If you appear not to respect him as he respects himself, he is more offended than mortified, and feels the same indignant resentment as if he had suffered

ferred a real injury. He does not even then, however, deign to explain the grounds of his own pretensions. He disdains to court your esteem. He affects even to despise it, and endeavours to maintain his assumed station, not so much by making you sensible of his superiority, as of your own meanness. He seems to wish, not so much to excite your esteem for *himself*, as to mortify *that* for *yourself*.

The vain man is not sincere, and in the bottom of his heart, is very seldom convinced of that superiority which he wishes you to ascribe to him. He wishes you to view him in much more splendid colours than those in which, when he places himself in your situation, and supposes you to know all that he knows, he can really view himself. When you appear to view him, therefore, in different colours, perhaps in his proper colours, he is much more mortified than offended. The grounds of his claim to that character which he wishes you to ascribe to him, he takes every opportunity of displaying, both by the most ostentatious and unnecessary exhibition of the good qualities and accomplishments which he possesses in some degree, and sometimes even by false pretensions to those which he either possesses in no degree, or in so very slender a degree that he may well enough be said to possess them in no degree. Far from despising your esteem, he courts it with the most anxious assiduity. Far from wishing to mortify
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self-estimation, he is happy to cherish it, in hopes that in return you will cherish his own. He flatters in order to be flattered. He studies to please, and endeavours to bribe you into a good opinion of him by politeness and complaisance, and sometimes even by real and essential good offices though often displayed, perhaps, with unnecessary ostentation.

The vain man sees the respect which is paid to rank and fortune, and wishes to usurp this respect, as well as that for talents and virtues. His dress, his equipage, his way of living, accordingly, all announce both a higher rank and a greater fortune than really belong to him; and in order to support this foolish imposition for a few years in the beginning of his life, he often reduces himself to poverty and distress long before the end of it. As long as he can continue his expence, however, his vanity is delighted with viewing himself, not in the light in which you would view him if you knew all that he knows; but in that in which, he imagines, he has, by his own address, induced you actually to view him. Of the illusions of vanity this is, perhaps the most common. Obscure strangers who visit foreign countries, or who, from a remote province, come to visit, for a short time, the capital of their own country, most frequently attempt to practise it. The folly of the attempt,

though always very great and most unworthy a of man of sense, may not be altogether so great upon such as upon most other occasions. If their stay is short, they may escape any disgraceful detection; and, after indulging their vanity for a few months, or a few years, they may return to their own homes, and repair, by future parsimony, the waste of their profusion.

The proud man can very seldom be accused of this folly. His sense of his own dignity renders him careful to preserve his independence, and, when his fortune happens not be large, though he wishes to be decent, he studies to be frugal and attentive in all expences. The ostentatious expence of the vain man is highly offensive to him. It outshines, perhaps, his own. It provokes his indignation as an insolent assumption of a rank which is by no means due; and he never talks of it without loading it with the harshest and severest reproaches.

The proud man does not always feel himself at his ease in the company of his equals, and still less in that of his superiors. He cannot lay down his lofty pretensions, and the countenance and conversation of such company overawe him so much that he dares not display them. He has recourse to humbler company, for which he has little respect, which he would not willingly chuse, and which is by no
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means agreeable to him; that of his inferiors, his flatterers, and dependants. He seldom visits his superiors, or, if he does, it is rather to show that he is entitled to live in such company, than for any real satisfaction that he enjoys in it. It is, as Lord Clarendon says of the Earl of Arundel, that he sometimes went to court, because he could there only find a greater man than himself; but that he went very seldom, because he found there a greater man than himself.

It is quite otherwise with the vain man. He courts the company of his superiors as much as the proud man shuns it. Their splendour, he seems to think, reflects a splendour upon those who are much about them. He haunts the courts of kings and the levees of ministers, and gives himself the air of being a candidate for fortune and preferment, when in reality he possesses the much more precious happiness, if he knew how to enjoy it, of not being one. He is fond of being admitted to the tables of the great, and still more fond of magnifying to other people the familiarity with which he is honoured there. He associates himself, as much as he can, with fashionable people, with those who are supposed to direct the public opinion, with the witty, with the learned, with the popular; he shuns the company of his best friends whenever the very uncertain current of public favour happens to run in any respect against them. With the people to whom he wishes to recom-

mend himself, he is not always very delicate about the means which he employs for that purpose; unnecessary ostentation, groundless pretensions, constant assentation, frequent flattery, for the most part a pleasant and a sprightly flattery, and very seldom the gross and fulsome flattery of a parasite. The proud man, on the contrary, never flatters, and is frequently scarcely civil to any body.

Notwithstanding all its groundless pretensions, however, vanity is almost always a sprightly and a gay, and very often a good natured passion. Pride is always a grave, a fullen, and a severe one. Even the falsehoods of the vain man are all innocent falsehoods, meant to raise himself, not to lower other people. To do the proud man justice, he very seldom stoops to the baseness of falsehood. When he does, however, his falsehoods are by no means so innocent. They are all mischievous, and meant to lower other people. He is full of indignation at the unjust superiority, as he thinks it, which is given to them. He views them with malignity and envy, and, in talking of them, often endeavours, as much as he can, to extenuate and lessen whatever are the grounds upon which their superiority is supposed to be founded. Whatever tales are circulated to their disadvantage, though he seldom forges them himself, yet he often takes pleasure in believing them, is by no means unwilling to repeat them, and even sometimes with some degree of exaggeration. The worst falsehoods of
vanity

vanity are all what we call white lies: those of pride, whenever it condescends to falsehood, are all of the opposite complexion.

Our dislike to pride and vanity generally disposes us to rank the persons whom we accuse of those vices rather below than above the common level. In this judgment, however, I think, we are most frequently in the wrong, and that both the proud and the vain man are often (perhaps for the most part) a good deal above it; though not near so much as either the one really thinks himself, or as the other wishes you to think him. If we compare them with their own pretensions, they may appear the just objects of contempt. But when we compare them with what the greater part of their rivals and competitors really are, they may appear quite otherwise, and very much above the common level. Where there is this real superiority, pride is frequently attended with many respectable virtues; with truth, with integrity with a high sense of honour, with cordial and steady friendship, with the most inflexible firmness and resolution. Vanity, with many amiable ones; with humanity, with politeness, with a desire to oblige in all little matters, and sometimes with a real generosity in great ones; a generosity, however, which it often wishes to display in the most splendid colours that it can. By their rivals and enemies, the French, in the last cen-

tury, were accused of vanity; the Spaniards of pride; and foreign nations were disposed to consider the one as the more amiable; the other, as the more respectable people.

The words *vain* and *vanity* are never taken in a good sense. We sometimes say of a man, when we are talking of him in good-humour, that he is the better for his vanity, or that his vanity is more diverting than offensive; but we still consider it as a foible and a ridicule in his character.

The words *proud* and *pride*, on the contrary, are sometimes taken in a good sense. We frequently say of a man, that he is too proud, or that he has too much noble pride, ever to suffer himself to do a mean thing. Pride is, in this case, confounded with magnanimity. Aristotle, a philosopher who certainly knew the world, in drawing the character of the magnanimous man, paints him with many features which, in the two last centuries, were commonly ascribed to the Spanish character: that he was deliberate in all his resolutions, was slow, even tardy, in all his actions; that his voice was grave, his speech deliberate, his step and motion slow, and that he appeared indolent and even slothful, not at all disposed to bustle about little matters, but to act with the most determined and vigorous resolution upon all great and illustrious occasions; that he was not a lover of danger, or forward to expose himself to little dangers, but to great dangers;
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and that when he exposed himself to danger, he was altogether regardless of his life.

The proud man is commonly too well contented with himself to think that his character requires any amendment. The man who feels himself all-perfect, naturally enough despises all further improvement. His self-sufficiency and absurd conceit of his own superiority, commonly attend him from his youth to his most advanced age; and he dies, as Hamlet says, with all his sins upon his head, unanointed, unanealed.

It is frequently quite otherwise with the vain man. The desire of the esteem and admiration of other people, when for qualities and talents which are the natural and proper objects of esteem and admiration, is the real love of true glory; a passion which, if not the very best passion of human nature, is certainly one of the best. Vanity is very frequently no more than an attempt prematurely to usurp that glory before it is due. Though your son, under five and twenty years of age, should be but a coxcomb; do not, upon that account, despair of his becoming, before he is forty, a very wise and worthy man, and a real proficient in all those talents and virtues to which, at present, he may only be an ostentatious and empty pretender. The great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects. Never suffer him to value himself upon trivial accomplishments. But do not always discourage his pretensions to those

that are of real importance. He would not pretend to them if he did not earnestly desire to possess them. Encourage this desire; afford him every means to facilitate the acquisition; and do not take too much offence, although he should sometimes assume the air of having attained it a little before the time.

Such, I say, are the distinguishing characteristics of pride and vanity, when each of them acts according to its proper character. But the proud man is often vain; and the vain man is often proud. Nothing can be more natural than that the man, who thinks much more highly of himself than he deserves, should wish that other people should think still more highly of him: or that the man who wishes that other people should think more highly of him than he thinks of himself, should, at the same time, think much more highly of himself than he deserves. Those two vices being frequently blended in the same character, the characteristics of both are necessarily confounded; and we sometimes find the superficial and impertinent ostentation of vanity joined to the most malignant and derisive insolence of pride. We are sometimes, upon that account, at a loss how to rank a particular character, or whether to place it among the proud or among the vain.

Men of merit considerably above the common level, sometimes under-rate as well as over-rate themselves. Such characters, though not very dig-

dignified, are often, in private society, far from being disagreeable. His companions all feel themselves much at their ease in the society of a man so perfectly modest and unassuming. If those companions, however, have not both more discernment and more generosity than ordinary, though they may have some kindness for him, they have seldom much respect; and the warmth of their kindness is very seldom sufficient to compensate the coldness of their respect. Men of no more than ordinary discernment never rate any person higher than he appears to rate himself. He seems doubtful himself, they say, whether he is perfectly fit for such a situation or such an office; and immediately give the preference to some impudent blockhead who entertains no doubt about his own qualifications. Though they should have discernment, yet, if they want generosity, they never fail to take advantage of his simplicity, and to assume over him an impertinent superiority which they are by no means entitled to. His good-nature may enable him to bear this for some time; but he grows weary at last, and frequently when it is too late, and when that rank, which he ought to have assumed, is lost irrecoverably, and usurped, in consequence of his own backwardness, by some of his more forward, though much less meritorious companions. A man of this character must have been very fortunate in the early choice of his companions, if, in going through
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the world, he meets always with fair justice, even from those whom, from his own past kindness, he might have some reason to consider as his best friends; and a youth, too unassuming and too unambitious, is frequently followed by an insignificant, complaining, and discontented old age.

Those unfortunate persons whom nature has formed a good deal below the common level, seem sometimes to rate themselves still more below it than they really are. This humility appears sometimes to sink them into idiotism. Whoever has taken the trouble to examine idiots with attention, will find that, in many of them, the faculties of the understanding are by no means weaker than in several other people, who, though acknowledged to be dull and stupid, are not, by any body, accounted idiots. Many idiots, with no more than ordinary education, have been taught to read, write, and account tolerably well. Many persons, never accounted idiots, notwithstanding the most careful education, and notwithstanding that, in their advanced age, they have had spirit enough to attempt to learn what their early education had not taught them, have never been able to acquire in any tolerable degree, any one of those three accomplishments. By an instinct of pride, however, they set themselves upon a level with their equals in age and situation; and, with courage and firmness, maintain their proper station among their companions. By an opposite instinct, the
idiot

idiot feels himself below every company into which you can introduce him. Ill-usage, to which he is extremely liable, is capable of throwing him into the most violent fits of rage and fury. But no good usage, no kindness or indulgence, can ever raise him to converse with you as your equal. If you can bring him to converse with you at all, however, you will frequently find his answers sufficiently pertinent, and even sensible. But they are always stamped with a distinct consciousness of his own great inferiority. He seems to shrink, and, as it were, to retire from your look and conversation; and to feel, when he places himself in your situation, that, notwithstanding your apparent condescension, you cannot help considering him as immensely below you. Some idiots, perhaps the greater part, seem to be so, chiefly or altogether, from a certain numbness or torpidity in the faculties of the understanding. But there are others, in whom those faculties do not appear more torpid or benumbed than in many other people who are not accounted idiots. But that instinct of pride, necessary to support them upon an equality with their brethren, seems totally wanting in the former and not in the latter.

That degree of self-estimation, therefore, which contributes most to the happiness and contentment of the person himself, seems likewise most agreeable to the impartial spectator. The man who esteems himself as he ought, and

no more than he ought, seldom fails to obtain from other people all the esteem that he himself thinks due. He desires no more than is due to him, and he rests upon it with complete satisfaction.

The proud and the vain man, on the contrary, are constantly dissatisfied. The one is tormented with indignation at the unjust superiority, as he thinks it, of other people. The other is in continual dread of the shame which, he foresees, would attend upon the detection of his groundless pretensions. Even the extravagant pretensions of the man of real magnanimity, though, when supported by splendid abilities and virtues, and, above all, by good fortune, they impose upon the multitude, whose applauses he little regards, do not impose upon those wise men whose approbation he can only value, and whose esteem he is most anxious to acquire. He feels that they see through, and suspects that they despise his excessive presumption; and he often suffers the cruel misfortune of becoming, first the jealous and secret, and at last the open, furious, and vindictive enemy of those very persons, whose friendship it would have given him the greatest happiness to enjoy with unsuspecting security.

Though our dislike to the proud and the vain often disposes us to rank them rather below than above their proper station, yet, unless we are provoked

voked by some particular and personal impertinence, we very seldom venture to use them ill. In common cases, we endeavour for our ease, rather to acquiesce, and, as well as we can, to accommodate ourselves to their folly. But, to the man who under-rates himself, unless we have both more discernment and more generosity than belong to the greater part of men, we seldom fail to do, at least, all the injustice which he does to himself, and frequently a great deal more. He is not only more unhappy in his own feelings, than either the proud or the vain, but he is much more liable to every sort of ill-usage from other people. In almost all cases, it is better to be a little too proud, than, in any respect, too humble; and, in the sentiment of self-estimation, some degree of excess seems, both to the person himself and to the impartial spectator, to be less disagreeable than any degree of defect.

In this, therefore, as well as in every other emotion, passion, and habit, the degree that is most agreeable to the impartial spectator is likewise most agreeable to the person himself; and according as either the excess or the defect is least offensive to the former, so, either the one or the other is in proportion least disagreeable to the latter.

CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION.

IT has been my aim, in the foregoing system of the passions, to justify the nature of man, and to bring into view, as well as I could, that sublime picture of it, which, the more I contemplate its origin, appears to me to have been the work of a Being, in whom my mind adores the attributes of a God.

I see a creature formed with a superior personal beauty ; endowed with the desire of excellence ; with an eagerness for knowledge ; and gifted with the delights of wonder, love, and joy : a pure, a happy creature, worthy the *fiat* from which he sprung.

I see this creature misconceiving excellence ; content with ignorance, or pursuing folly ; his wonder sunk into stupid astonishment ; his love lost in selfishness : and his joys bounded by his senses : a corrupt, a miserable being, that never could have originally so fallen from his Creator.

Which is the nature of this creature ?

It came not within the scope of my plan to investigate the reason, why corruption has been permitted : but I have endeavoured to shew the origin of our nature to be good ; and to point

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out where commence the deviations that diverge to that corruption. I have traced our passions to sources, pure and worthy of our Creator; I have marked their just and regular channels, even in our present subjection to evil; and have brought directly into view, the unnatural and deplorable courses into which they have burst.

The name of Nature has been exceedingly abused, and we have been accustomed to impute to her much that belongs to vice. In this elemental enquiry she has been restored to her purity; and it has appeared that the perfection of every thing is its nature.

But where is this perfect man? Does he exist? Did he ever exist?—There are not wanting both in sacred and profane history, instances of those who have exalted themselves to the perfection of their nature; and many excellent men do honour to the world even at this day. Yet in justifying the dignity of our race, I pretend not to say that its radiance is not deeply obscured by surrounding clouds; or that we can catch daily glimpses of that eminence from which it has too surely fallen.

Selfishness and malevolence prey upon the degraded heart of man; and the emotions of his mind have been influenced into a combination with the animal appetites, to sweep him from his station. In the very blood of his parents lurk the seeds of his maladies and of his vices; and from
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the ignorance and folly of his first attendants are caught his prejudices and his habits. To attain, or to recover his perfection; to be the creature God created him; and to possess that genuine happiness which is the result of Self-knowledge and of Self-command, is worthy of a struggle; and he is most likely to be successful, who meditates upon his nature, investigates his passions, and becomes thoroughly acquainted with himself.

THE END.

