

Wisdom and Reason : or, Human understanding consider'd, with the organization: or, with the form and nature of the solids and fluids of the body. How much their wrong or different formation may effect our wisdom, judgement, or reason. Some examinations about wisdom; as also of our common conduct and learning, and the most material affairs of human life: with reflections upon a single and married state; and of the education of youth in general.

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Consider'd, with the

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Some EXAMINATIONS about WISDOM; as also of our Common Conduct and Learning, and the most material Affairs of Human Life:

W I T H

REFLECTIONS

Upon a SINGLE and MARRIED STATE;
and of the EDUCATION of YOUTH in
General.

L O N D O N:

Printed for JOHN HOOKE, at the *Flower de-Luce* over against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet. M.DCC.XIV.

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T H E

INTRODUCTORY PREFACE.

THE Subject of Wisdom, or Human Understanding, is no doubt, justly to be esteem'd and regarded, as the most weighty, most considerable, most valuable and necessary Consideration we can treat of, or imploy ourselves in, since the most material Affairs of human Life depend upon it, as well as in a great Measure (and in all probability) our eternal Blessings, or future Comforts of Joy and Felicity.

This Subject has been writ upon by very great Men, both in *France* and *England*; yet have all treated it after a quite different Manner to this (and have perhaps) every one of them been so very obscure and Metaphysical, as might have puzzled, even the Authors themselves, a little after their having writ. I have rather endeavour'd here, an easy Way of Thought and Style; so as to adapt or fit it for the meanest Capacity.

I have in some Places quoted Mr. *Locke*, where his Thoughts seem'd reasonable; nevertheless, I do not for that pretend to vindicate his Principles, or any way to enter into the Dispute betwixt him and Mr. *Lee*, the Method here (I think) being entirely foreign

to that : However, wish to do all Mankind Justice; and, although his Antagonist alledges strongly, and accuses him with the worst of Principles, (as is but too common among all Disputants;) yet since he does not own it, but rather writes the plain contrary, I think good Men (as well as in the Law) are obliged in Justice and Conscience, to put the best Constructions upon Mens Words and Writings; for without that, there is no living: Do we not daily see the best Intentions Misconstructed, and the most serious Subjects turned to ridicule.

Yet I cannot, but on the other Hand own, that Mr. *Locke* has writ in a very Mystical Way or Manner, and as Mr. *Lee* says, has brought us a new spawn of Words; it may probably be own'd too, that the latter has follow'd him far enough; but may, perhaps be in this, as in Fighting, when once heated, are loath to part.

Mr. *Lee* also finds fault with Mr. *Locke's* Sense of the Word *Idea*, which is not, he says, to be understood or allowed of, in such general Terms, but distinguishes betwixt Ideas and Modes, Powers, abstract Notions, &c.

But if this shall be found fault with, as too general a Term in mine likewise, let them consider, that it is but a Word; and that any of the others will serve my turn as well, since it is plain, that any manner of Ideas, whether simple, complex or compound, or any manner or sort of mixed or unmixed Modes, or Powers, or any general or particular abstract Notions, or what Notions they will, either considered distinct from Ideas,
or

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or how acquired, or in what Sense they please, or whatsoever Way they will, or understand innate Ideas, &c. any of all which can be of no Use or Force, if the Organization be wrong; so that in this Case, all can only amount to a dispute about Words.

For no Notions whatever will make a Changling or foolish Man to reason Right; neither, I think, can any one dispute his being a Man, any more than a wise Man's being so; who by some Accident is become changling, foolish or mad; the first only being before the Birth, or in the Womb, the other thereafter. Neither are we any way to doubt of his being a Man, let him be in what Shape or Form soever, or although with e'er so little Sense, if we can but suppose him to be of the *Animalcula in semine Masculino*; since they are no more doubted to be the Animal or humane Creature already form'd, and whose very tender, soft, and flexible Parts, we know ever has, and will be capable of many various, monstrous, and uncommon, or different Shapes, Modellations or Formations, more particularly in the Womb, while the Parts are so very apt to yield, or so tender, soft and delicate, than afterwards.

The whole Design of this Treatise, is to shew the vast Variety and Difference in the Organization, or the various Forms of human Creatures, as well as in all other Things of the Creation; and as there are so many Degrees or different Formations among Men, so their Inclinations, Tempers, Passions, and Opinions, will be as various; nor ought this any way to make Truth or Agreement to be

doubted or put in Question; since I understand, that either to be immediately from God, or from the common Condescension, or Nearness of Agreement (of any Thing or Proposition) among wise Men, not having any material or expressible Difference in their Thoughts, but observing the great Rules of the Almighty, or of moral and natural Religion, tending all to the Benefit of human Society: For we can in no way be serviceable to him; so that all he commands us must be for our own proper Benefits, either present or future.

I have given a full Definition of Wisdom, which in few Words, I understand to be the Souls acting in a well organized Body, with just Instruments, Ideas, or Notions; which will undoubtedly tend to the Benefit of Society. As to Faith, or revealed Religion, that, I think, must be allowed to be the particular Gift of God. But if it be alledged, that I take the Word Wisdom in too large or general a Sense; I answer, that all its Properties or Faculties, as Prudence, Understanding, Reasoning, Judgment, &c. are only its Branches, or have such a Connection, that the first comprehends all; and therefore I think not necessary to multiply Words, which for not making Confusion, I have altogether endeavour'd to avoid; for if the Organization be wrong, we shall find them all wanting.

The Intention of this whole Treatise being entirely from a Desire to serve Mankind, if possible for me so to do, this being my whole Design; and thus I hope it will be received with
a good

a good Meaning, which is to give great Allowances; for the necessary Variations of Temperaments, and the differences of Opinions, not to dispute Trifles; but to be very careful of being too hot or warm in those Things especially, which cannot be agreed on by all wise and virtuous Men: Yet no doubt, as Mr. *Lee* observes, there is a great deal of deference due to Government, to determine Matters of Discipline, for Peace, Unity and Concord.

As to the Nature of the Soul, that being out of my Sphere, or beyond my Reach, is what I have not enter'd into, but leave the Definition to those who know more about it. I only consider the Body and it together, while in a compound Being; and have endeavour'd to show, that the just Operations of the latter upon the former, are altogether owing to the Perfection or Exactness, of the Organization, although I am sensible there may be bad Effects, from wrong Representations or Ideas, without any defect in the Body.

I know that treating on such Subjects, oftentimes lay Men open to be villainously branded or stigmatized, with some base Name, as Atheist, Deist, Sceptick, &c. without taking the Trouble, or endeavouring to reconcile things to Reason or Scripture; so he who first mention'd the *Antipodes*, was put in the Inquisition. But, alas! for Religion these noisy hypocritical Zealots, think they have enough, if they go but frequently to Church; yet I wish they may not reasonably be found to be the greatest Atheists, since often de-

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monstrated

monstrated by their Actions; they neither believe God or Devil, but make large Pretensions, as a Cloak to their farther Knavery. I wish that the Actions of Mens Lives were regarded, rather than Words, since from that, I think, we can best judge of a Man's Thoughts; for the greatest Charlatans and Pretenders have the finest Words or Speeches.

My endeavours in these few Sheets is to shew in what Wisdom truly consists, to expose Vanity and useles Learning, to unite us with our different Opinions, Sects or Parties, into strict Friendship, or into one common Society of good Men. And far from any Thought of adding to the many lamentable Distractions, Divisions, and Disorders, now so common among Christians. I should be very sorry if it did in the least scandalize, or disoblige any Ecclesiastick, (but rather thought to have dedicated it to one) but hope it will be well receiv'd among wise and good Men.

The whole is altogether aim'd at the foolish, mad, or vicious, the proud, vain, or ambitious, the too much interested and avaritious, the quarrelsome Disputants, Wranglers, or envidious, the knavish, selfish, evil natured, and foolish Zealots, Biggots, Hypocrites, or the cunning and great Pretenders to the Purity of Religion, and strict Devotion, often serving them, only as a Cloak to cozen with. I have exposed our common Follies and Vanities, proceeding from vicious and foolish Men, who have brought us into extravagant Modes, silly Customs and Manners; as also, that wrong
way

way of thinking, since Wisdom and Virtue is what is most valuable in this World.

In Order to that, the Manner and Way I have taken, is entirely different from any upon that Subject; and therefore, if not altogether so regular in the Method, I hope will be more easily excused, having no Path to tread in.

The first Thing then I have considered, is, the different Formations of Men, as the great cause of their different Capacities, Passions, and Inclinations; what is truly to be called Wisdom, or that Clearness of Judgment in one Man above another; as also what is properly to be call'd Madness.

I consider the great causes of our many foolish Disputes and Quarrellings, whether from a Vitiating of the Organs, or the wrong Representation of Ideas, Impressions of Objects, or Things, or from the Strength or Power of Habit, Custom, or Interest, either of our selves, or from Friends. I have attempted to expose our wrong Ways of Thinking, with our wrong Valuation of Men and Things. The Usefulness and Value of that which is allow'd by all good and wise Men, to be truly valuable; the Unusefulness of other Things not valuable; but only as said before, proceeding from ambitious, vicious, and foolish Men, who brought Fools in, to dance after their extravagant Customs and Follies.

The Organization considered, with some Reflections on real Happiness, both in the single Life and married State. The conclusion

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sion of the whole, with some hints upon the Education of Youth in general.

I have made my Citations of Authors, without any respect to Sect, or Party; but have readily taken what I found good in either. I thought it absolutely necessary to make large Quotations of some good Authors, the better to support my own Opinion, which being some what new, might otherwise appear too strange or absurd; nevertheless, I doubt not, that some of these Notions will appear very surprizing; and probably ridiculed, as even the best Thoughts at first broaching commonly are. Yet I beg the Thoughts may not be too rashly judged of, but duly weighed, since, at least, I think will bear a Consideration.

Neither have I levell'd or design'd against any particular Sect or Party, but have omitted any Thing I thought might point that Way, my whole Intention being entirely to apply it to the Wranglers, Biggots, or foolish of any Party whatever, whom I imagine to be all the same; and by ridiculing the Vices and Follies of bad Men and Fools, may make them seek after Wisdom and Virtue; since I believe it may justly be said, that the Biggots, Zealots, Wranglers and Hypocrites of all Religions are the same; and its like may suffer a Quæry, whether the wise Men, and good Men, bad Men, or mad Men; the virtuous, the foolish, and the quarelsome are not so to: For this I think may be consider'd differently from Faith, reveal'd Religion, or Christianity, the particular gift of God.

I have quoted what I thought good, either of Prose or Verse; especially, since there are some Stomachs which cannot digest dull Prose, without the Sauce of a little Poetry; so there are others as splenetick, who cannot digest Verse. I therefore beg, that each Man may only take what he likes, and if he finds any one good Thought, that I think is sufficient Re-compense for any Charge or Trouble of Reading, and enough to atone too, for a thousand trifling Faults. That there are a great many Errors in it, I do not much doubt; yet wise Men, I hope, will have regard to the Intention, and consider the whole, take what is good, and leave the bad, since as Mr. Pope says,

*Whoever thinks, a faultless piece to see,
Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor e'er shall be.*

* Monsieur Pascal's, and the best thoughts are scatter'd, and without Order; so Mr. Locks were Originally, nor can that form and candence be observ'd, wherethe Author's great intent is the justness of Thought

But how much more * amiss may we not reasonably expect that which is out of a common Road, as this is: It is true, that those who keep at their own Trot in a common Path, are more secure, or in no great Danger of going much astray; and as true, that there is but little probability of their making great Discoveries.

Other Men who dare to venture more boldly, although it do not succeed to expectation (that disappointment is enough) ought still to be commended if the Design was good. I think Mr. Dryden has something to this Purpose, that brave Spirits dare to take a flight, or snatch a Thought out of the common Road.

I must

*It is too true, the World loves to be flatter'd.

+ I myself condemn'd a Manuscript over-Night as good for nothing, yet on second viewing it next Morning found many excellent Things in it.

I must own, that I shew'd the Design to two or three different Hands; the one or two very much approv'd, while the other found fault; the one esteem'd Poetry, the other not; the one alledg'd it was a Satyr against all Mankind,* and therefore would never be agreeable to the World; the other differ'd in Opinion, and said, that was the best of it, or as salt for seasoning it, would for that be no less esteem'd by wise and virtuous Men; the first desir'd to take out such Parts, the other bid let all alone, &c. I was now in more doubt what to do then before, but accidentally casting my Eye on Monsieur *Bruiere* upon Eloquence, has something to this Purpose, that Men give very various and different Opinions of a Manuscript, few he says speak frankly or rightly of it; and if the Author were to leave or strike out according to each † Man's Fancy, no Book would ever appear in the World. Why, sure then say I, it's even so, for which all shall stand without any Alteration. I then plainly conclude, so many Men so many Minds, or so many Noses, so many Opinions of different Kinds; is it not plain, if two or three Women go into a Silk Shop or Mercers, the one likes plain Silk, the other flower'd, she likes one Colour, the other some other Colour, &c.

But says my Friend, you must please the generality of the World, or be in danger of being banter'd, laugh'd and hiss'd at; as to that said I, my endeavours are to please the one wise Man in a Thousand, *Solomon* Mentions, if I do that, I gain my End, the 999 may laugh on; if a Man stands in fear of being

being laugh'd at, he must follow or run along with the mobbish croud of Fools, and will dare to do but little good in this World: Do we not see that a Wit, a Harlequin, or Merry-Andrew, will ridicule, out-banter and rally the wisest Men upon Earth, the most sacred Things are so treated, so even the Scriptures likewise, and the greatest and best of Men with their Actions daily ridiculed: Much laughter no doubt is the great sign of a Fool, as in much Wisdom there is much Sorrow, (says Solomon) the Patron of Mankind is said never to have laugh'd, Democritus always weep'd, &c. Pythagoras oblig'd his Scholars the first five Years to silence.

No, no, if the wise and virtuous, or the one Man of a Thousand does approve, I dare, with an undaunted Courage bravely to stand the shock against Crouds of Fools, and Millions of Men full of Distraction, Folly and Madness. How very well does our foresaid Authour say in his *Criticism*.

*Pride, Malice, Folly, against Dryden rose,
In various Shapes of Criticks, Parsons, Beaus;
But Sense surviv'd, when merry Fests were past,
For rising merit, will buoy up at last.
Envy will merit, as its shade pursue,
But as a shadow proves the substance too.*

But before I conclude, I cannot omit to tell my Reader, what is to be observ'd, that it is a folly to answer, where People come with an evil Design or Intention, only for the sake of caveling or disputing; do we not see, that
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* Yet
as far as
my ability
shall
still be
ready to
solve
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difficul-
ties in a
friendly
Manner.

the greatest Truths are disputed, both within and without the Schools; nor did I even know or hear of any that could not have an answer, where People had a mind to cavil, as its said, a W——re is never without an Excuse. Nor is there ever any good done that way, except when in a friendly Conversation, because otherwise they come with a Prejudice and Resolution not to be convinc'd, and am ever resolv'd to baulk all such quarrelsome Gentlemen. Mr. Butler says,

*Its strange how some Mens Tempers suit,
Like Bawd and Brandee with Dispute.
That for their own Opinions stand fast,
Only to have them claw'd and canvas'd.
So the ancient Stoicks in their Porch,
With fierce Dispute, maintain'd their Church.
Beat out their Brains, with fight and study,
To prove that virtue is a Body.*

Neither is there any Thing that may not be misconstrued or wrested to a wrong Sense, where People incline to it, and the misrepresenting of one Word, may give occasion to their writing a Thousand Books of Dispute or Controversy; in fine, there is no end of disputing. But now, lastly, I must take notice of the plainness and simplicity of my Writing or Style, without pompous Words and gawdy Trappings, now much more study'd than good Thought, Sincerity, Virtue, or Truth, which we shall always find to appear cloath'd in the simplest Manner; and yet this Truth shines so bright, that Mortals cannot abide the discovery

covery thereof, he can only behold its Beauty,
who rejects Falshood. Mr. Pope says,

*Others for language, all their care express,
And value Books, as Women Men for dress.
Words are like Leaves, and where they most abound,
Much Fruit of Sense, beneath is rarely found, &c.*

For Men may spend their time only in the
knowledge of Words, so Wit and Punning, or
even thinking and speaking are to be improv'd
or to be learned as Buinesses; and he who is
good at the one, is rarely so at two, for what
we get the one way, we lose the other: It is,
however, most certain, that some Men will
come a greater Length, or are better fitted
for one Study then another.

But to conclude, after all Apologies for
Errors, Irregularities, Simplicity of Words,
Style, &c. What Hazards do they not run
who write, of being envied or despised? And
yet the great Prize, the very best we can
expect is, as Mr. Cowley very well says of his
Muse,

*The reward is but with popular breath,
And that too after Death.*

Definition of the Word *I D E A*.

BY *Idea*, I understand the Stamps, Impressions, Tablets, or Representations of Things, Objects or Words, said to be made, stamp'd, or imprinted, in the Substance of the Brain, whether so from common touching, or by any Means or Modellation of the Rays of Light, from Objects, or the forc'd Air by Sounds, or by Exhalations to the Smelling, or the Aliment in Tasting. Ideas being only the Effects, Remains, or Footsteps of Things, and not any real Thing or Body, as some, although I think very absurdly do suppose. Neither is it strictly to be confin'd to the Greek Word *εἶδω* to see, since Things may have the same Effect upon any of the other Senses, so as to make an Alteration in the Organization, by which the Soul becomes sensible of such a particular Alteration of the Instruments or Organs.

N. B. That this is only a Word or Expression, and that if we consider innate Ideas, in what Sense soever, or make use of the Words Complex, or Compound, Modes, Powers, abstract Notions, or what Notions we please; any of all which can be of no greater Force against what I have advanc'd.

WISDOM *and* REASON,
 O R
Human Understanding
 CONSIDER'D :
 WITH THE
 Organization of the Body.

Rom. ix. 20, 21.

*Nay, but O man, who art thou that reflectest
 against God? Shall the thing form'd say to
 him that form'd it, why hast thou made
 me thus?*

*Hath not the potter power over the clay, of
 the same lump, to make one vessel unto
 honour, and another unto dishonour?*

THE great and wise Creator of
 all Things, seems to have been
 pleas'd to order it so, that not
 any one thing though of the same Spe-
 B cies,

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cies, should every way be form'd or proportion'd exactly like another; or I believe can any Man say he ever could discover among those millions of Shells and Stones, any two that were every way and exactly the same: It's true, we may sometimes believe them to be so by reason of the smallness of Objects, whose Difference we cannot so easily perceive, even with help of the best Microscopes; but we are not so deceiv'd in large Objects, where we much more easily see the different Proportions of the Two when compared together.

I am not ignorant, that two People have been said to be so very like to one another, that Strangers have frequently taken the one for the other; yet I could never see, or do I believe, there ever was any two, as that by the Parents, or a long Acquaintance, and strict comparison in presence one with the other, and at full Growth, but the Difference might plainly be seen by the naked Eye; and by the same Rule, that Difference in the Face or Body, must proceed from the different Proportions of the Bones, Muscles, Vessels or Fibres, which composes the whole.

And Anatomists I think must readily agree, to the many perceptable Differences

rences there are to be found in all Bodies when dissected ; or I question whether any one can say, that he ever did see a Scull or Bone exactly, and every way like another ; and if the Difference be much in large Objects, in all probability there is the same variation in little Ones ; altho' not so easily to be seen : And in this the Almighty Creator of all things, seems to have shewn his most wonderful and miraculous Power, by making every thing even of the same Species, to differ one from another ; and this vast variety must occasion much more Wonder, Pleasure and Admiration, then to have had but one thing ; or even for the same Species of Creatures, to have been exactly the same, would have afforded no great Satisfaction.

Thus the Bodies or Mechanism of all Animals when considered, is surprizingly wonderful ! and that of Man may justly be compar'd to a Machine or Engine, made up of Solids and Fluids. The Solids may be compar'd to Columns or Pillars, Beams, Pullies, Ropes, Sives, Strainers, Channels and Cisterns ; which altogether serve for the carrying on and fecerning, or straining the Liquids, Fluids, or Juices. And again, the said Fluids by Hydrostatic force or power

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give motion to the Solids, by which means some part or the whole Machine acts.

The Bones may be accounted the Pillars, or Basis of this Engine, to which many of the Solids are fasten'd, and are the Origine and Insertion, or beginning and ending of all the Muscles of the Body.

That the Blood or Fluids of Animals, differs as well as the Solids, seems very probable; or the different Proportions of the Grumous and Serous, or more glutinous, salt or thin. Yet whether to Attribute the different Passions and Inclinations of Body and Mind, to these, or to the solid Structure of the Body, or to both, is what I shall not pretend to determine.

Yet it seems much more reasonable to me for its Proceeding from some such Cause, then from the strength of any particular Ideas.

This may in a great measure be observ'd, in the Form or Figure of the crab Faced, where ill Nature may generally be seen in the Face; and if we sometimes err in that Knowledge, I believe it will rather be found to proceed from our want of studying that Art so much, as some of the Ancients were used to do; rather then from the uncertainty of that Rule.

It

It may likewise be observ'd, that the *Indians*, and those of the most remote Climates, of an human Form and Disposition, are much the same in Temper and Inclinations, as those of that human Form are with us; although their common Objects or Ideas may not be exactly the same with ours, yet all agree with us in the same common Principles of Reason, howsoever much we may differ in Religion, or Metaphysical Thoughts, owing to Education, Mysteries, or Matters of Faith.

It is said that the King of *France*, having sent some of his Church Missionaries, with an Ambassy to the King of *Siam*, bid tell him that he wish'd him very well; and as a Demonstration of his good Wishes, told, that he had sent those who would instruct him in his own Religion (the Christian Faith) which was the only way to Salvation or future Happiness, and the greatest Compliment he could make him: His Answer was, That he very heartily thank'd the King of *France* for his good Wishes towards him, yet that he could not believe, but the great and Omnipotent Creator, could have made us all of one Opinion and Religion, had he thought fit; but that it seem'd to be

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his divine Will and Pleasure, he should
be worship'd in different Ways and
Manners. Mr. Cowley from *Manilius*,
compares Man to a Game at Chase;
where Kings, Knights and Pawns play
their different Parts: He says,

*What e'er these seem, what e'er Philosophy, }
And Sense and Reason tell (said I) }
These things have Life, Election, Liberty. }
It's their own Wisdom moulds their State, }
Their Faults and Virtues make their Fate, }
They do, they do, said I: but straight, }
Lo, from my enlightned Eyes the Mists and
(Shadows fell,
That hinder Spirits from being visible;
And lo I saw two Angels play'd the Mate.
With Man alas! no other way it proves,
An unseen hand makes all their moves;
And some are great, and some are small,
Some climb to good, some from good Fortune;
Some wise Men, and some fools we call,
Figures, alas! of Speech, for destiny plays us all.*

But to return from this Digression as
before, to the Structure of the Body;
it seems necessarily to follow, that if it
be possible for two Engines to be ex-
actly the same, they must consequently
do one and the same Offices; or the
nearer they come in likeness to one ano-
ther

ther; the nearer they will perform, and the greater the disproportion, the more must the Difference in the Performance of their Offices be.

The same then may reasonably be said of all Animals, and consequently of human Creatures; so that Men and Women (as well as other Creatures) such as Brothers and Sisters, &c. who come nearest in likeness to one another, are generally near in Temper.

I know it may be objected, that this Rule does not always hold; but it's probable they may Mistake, from not considering it rightly. As for Example, If two who seem to be like to one another, are not however near in Temper, altho' like in Face, may be very different in their Bodies, each part of which differs as much as a Face; but altho' e'en like in Body too, yet the Form of the Head or Brain, which is the principle part to be notic'd, may be very much different. On this occasion the common Saying may well be applyed; *He is a Fool, has got a knock in the Cradle*, that is, by a Stroak or Blow when young, has made a Depression of the Cranium or Scull; so as in some measure to alter the Form and Figure of the Brain, which hath made him a Changling.

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We find this confirm'd likewise in People come to Years, where they have received a great Wound in the Head, or Depression of the Scull; they afterwards inclined to be crazie, especially when the Brain has been any way touch'd or affected.

And this Simplicity or Foolishness is often times very observable in the Face, and from thence we may very often judge of the Passions and Inclinations of the Mind.

There is in the *East-Indies* a Tygerish-faced sort of Elephant, easily known by the *Indians* who catch them; which are never brought to be tame or docil as the other Kind are. It may likewise be observ'd, that our Wisdom or Capacity increases with the Organs, and oftentimes also decreases with them.

Or needs it seem strange, if two of a Temper, as Brothers and Sisters do not agree, since if both Passionate, it is impossible they should.

Mr. Collier in his *Historical Dictionary*, gives an Account of two *French Counts*, who were Brothers; and so very like to one another, that it was scarce possible to tell the one from the other; and were as like in Temper, Nature, and Constitution, so that when the one was sick, the
other

other was so too, and were very much one and the same in their Desires and Inclinations: He also Reports, that the one dying at Home in the South of *France*, when at the same time the other being at *Rome* in *Italy*, was likewise seiz'd with a violent Fever (of which the Brother dyed) but although in the same Distemper, and was at the Point of Death, yet recovered; which might partly be owing (though not very perceptably different) to the Structure of the Solids, and Fluids of his Body, and partly to the Difference of the Air and Aliment, which in time likewise may make an Alteration of the whole.

Several Instances of this Nature might be given, but shall only add one more, to my own Knowledge: Which is of two Brothers (Twins) yet alive, who were so very like to one another, that few could distinguish them, but their Parents. A Gentleman, or Friend of theirs coming to see them, told the Parents over Night, that he would lay a Wager certainly to distinguish the two Brothers next Morning; and the Mark he had to know them by, was that the one had shed a Tooth that Evening, but the Gentleman to his great Surprise, next Morning found that both
the

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the one and the other, wanted a Tooth in the same Place, for the second had cast his also that Night, so that he could not tell which was which. This and many such like Instances, might be brought to prove that the nearer the Machines or Bodies comes in likeness to one another, the nearer will their Operations be, and if exactly and every way alike, they must be one and the same in their Natures; and although the one should judge with byass'd Ideas, by the Prejudice of Education, and the other with right ones, yet the Justness of their Thought and Imagination must be the same.

Nor can it be alledg'd, that one Body differs only from another, in bigness or smallness, but every the most minute Part seems to have something different in its Form; as may be seen by Bones, and comparing the most minute Parts together: For if otherwise we should all be exactly and justly proportion'd one to another, only differing in bigness and smallness.

The Difference of the Inclinations, Passions, Wisdom and Folly, seems to be owing to the different Figures or Form of the human Body or Brain.
And

And although its true, Custom * may * It may have some Effect, yet not to be compared to the other. As likewise that the Difference of our Opinions and Reasonings, may in a great measure be owing to that as well as to our Ideas; for if all or any of our Senses differs in any way from that of our Neighbours, the same Sense will in some Measure convey to us a different Notion, Impression, or Idea, of the external Object.

That this is so, seems not only plain from what I have advanced before of the variety of Form in all things, but likewise that it cannot, I think, but be obvious to every one, that we do after this manner (in some measure) receive different Impressions from all Objects; for who can say that he has the same Taste in eating or drinking that his Neighbour has, for one Man likes one thing, the other another thing, and although both may agree it to be sweet or sower, yet it is probable that the one may taste it more sweet or more sower than the other; and this cannot proceed from the different Figures of external things, but from the different Figuration of the *Organs*, or the *papillæ pyramidales* of the Tongue.

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We see the same Difference seems to be in Sounds, one likes one Tune, another some other Tune, or if both agree in one, the one shall be more affected with it, or like it better than the other.

The same may be said of the Eyes, and other Senses, and may be proved thus according to the first Supposition: If the Convexities or Mediums of the Eye be different, the refraction of Rays of the Object, must be so too, and consequently the Object must make a different Impression.

Or some particular Mediums or Bodies, being only capable of receiving such particular Rays, as red, or blue, must as they more or less differ, admit of more or less of those different Rays, and consequently make various Appearances by means of a Difference in the Mediums or Humours of the Eye.

As this then must necessarily make various Ideas, or Impressions in human Creatures, so the Difference will still be greater as the Creature, or *Organization* differs, that is, by the former Rule, Objects will in some Measure be more differently represented to a Horse, or Fish, from their different Form and Structure of the Eye and Brain, than to human Creatures.

So after the same manner the more human Creatures differ one from another, the more different will their Ideas, or Impressions be.

From hence then it will appear, that all the Ideas we have in some Degree, vary one from another, although, they come so very near to one another, that we are not capable of expressing the Difference by Words.

'Tis true, that this different Figuration of the Eye, will only make the Object to appear bigger or smaller, or of a deeper or lighter Colour.

Yet this with the different Form or Figuration of the Brain, (no doubt) must occasion different Impressions upon the *Organization*; altho' not to make such an expressible Difference, yet it is very probable, that this same Difference of Impressions, upon that different *Organization* of the Brain, may in a great measure, excite the various Passions and Inclinations of the Body or Mind, and may very much contribute to the Difference of Opinion in reasoning. So that this Variation of the solid Structure, or form of the Body, as also of the Blood, or Fluids, may be call'd that Difference of Temper. And this with Interest and Education, may probably

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probably be said to be the great Causes of those many Disagreements, we so commonly find betwixt Man and Man.

Agreement then, or being of the same Opinion, seems to be nothing else but a near Likeness of the Idea, or Representation of the Object, and is so like, that the Difference is not easily to be expressed, unless Interest is engag'd, which immediately makes a vast Disproportion, and may occasion much greater Differences, in their Distinctions, Definitions, or Opinions.

Thus then the generality of the World, or such a Nation, or Community of People, call a thing good or bad, because every one finds it so for himself and Community; and he who is contrary to this common Rule or Axiom, is thrown out as an out-law, and is called a Fool or Knave, being an Enemy to the common Good.

Although all this Agreement does no way argue, but that every one of that Community, have in some Degree, different Notions of good and evil, or sees the Colour of that red or blue, differently, or more red, or more blue, as is said before. Neither ought I think this Opinion to be any way thought contrary to the Christian, or reveal'd Religion,

Religion, which comes by divine Revelation being matters of Faith, which must be allowed to be a Gift from God, of which some have more, some less, according as his divine Will is pleas'd to bestow that Blessing.

It may not be improper to take Notice of the Limner's Observations of the just Proportions of human Creatures, as eight Faces make the Length of a right proportion'd Body, although nine according to the *Grecians* three Noses the length of the Face; the external Angle, or Corner of the Eye opposite to the upper Part of the Ear, the same as the Mouth to the lower Part of it; the Arms extended the length of the Body, &c.

I have often said to a certain Gentleman in copying of a Face, that if he or any other should still copy their last Copy for a hundred or a thousand times together, the last would scarce have any Resemblance at all of the first, altho' they differ'd but very insensibly the one from the other, which insensibly shews the vast Variation of things, and Incapacity of making any two things exactly the same. Copper Plates we see differ after the same manner, for the first cast off will be very different from the thousandth

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standth Copy, by the Copper wearing at every times casting off. I have already said that there are not any two things, or Creatures exactly the same, and that all the Objects we have will in some Measure appear differently to us, according to our *Organization*; from which we may easily perceive, the Difference that must necessarily follow in our Ideas of all things that are communicate by the Senses; so that the Question will be, whether there be any thing (excepting reveal'd Religion) which is not communicate that way.

It seems plain, there are not any but what are communicate by the Senses, and those who doubt of it, I shall recommend them to read Mr. *Locke's* first Book in his *Human Understanding*, altogether of innate Ideas, and proves it better than *Aristotle*, or any of the ancient Philosophers, that all our Ideas or Knowledge must come from Experience, or Observation.

And as I have taken notice that every thing in the Universe (in some measure) differs one from another, so every one of the Senses, and even as much every particular Part of the Body, so by the same Reason the Ideas of every particular Man, differs as much one from another,

another, and that no doubt is the cause of that Clearness of Judgment and Reason, in one Man above another, and here Mr. *Locke* seems to have been very much wanting. Nor can the most just or exact Ideas, ever make a Man judge right, without a right Formation of the *Organs*; the Justness of which, with the right State of the Fluids, is that which capacitates the Soul to act, and nicely to distinguish one thing from another.

Thus as I have said, Mr. *Locke* proves, that we can have no Knowledge further than what we have from Ideas, yet says he, there are some who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads, or weigh Proofs or Testimonies rightly, that there is great Difference in Mens Understandings, and that we may without Injury to Mankind, affirm there is a greater Difference between some Men and others in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts. But says he, how this comes about is a Speculation, altho' of great Consequence, yet not necessary to our present Purpose.

However, I must own that if he did know it, it was (I think) as certain and necessary a thing as any in his Book; but he seems to have been carried in such a

very metaphysical Strain, as to have thought of nothing else; and although he would appear to be very much against that way of Writing, yet is very unluckily fallen into the same Error himself, and probably to the highest Degree.

Nevertheless, as I say, this clearness of Judgment, is in a great measure owing to the Structure or Form of the *Organs*, or Solids and Fluids of the Body, although no doubt sometimes want of Ideas in such a way, or not thinking enough on them, may sometimes hinder us from judging so nicely, or the Effects of our Judgment may not be so good.

Thus that Difference of Opinion in things certain, seems to proceed from nothing else, but either a Defect in the Asserter of an Opinion, in not explaining or defining the thing he asserts rightly, or in clear and plain Terms; otherwise must be a Defect in the *Organization* of one or t'other, or the judging by bad Instruments, or wrong and byass'd Ideas.

A Man
may be
convin-
ced, yet
Pride or
Interest
may not
allow him
to yield.

Words no doubt properly signifie the Ideas in mens Minds, and as Mr. *Lock* very well observes, Men commonly suppose their Words to be marks of Ideas in the Minds of other Men with whom

whom they communicate, and stand not to examine whether their Ideas, and those of others be the same, but think it enough they use the Word in the common Acceptation of that Language, and suppose them to stand for the reality of things. And this Want of examining precisely the Signification of Words, makes us so often, and is the great Occasion of our so many Disputes and Quarrels. As likewise that there are many Faults in the Languages themselves, yet I believe oftner proceeds from our Negligence in the use of Words, or using them without clear and distinct Ideas; or as the aforesaid Author says, using them rather as Signs without any thing signified, as those introduced either by Sects of Philosophy or Religion, out of some Affectation or Singularity, or to support some strange Opinion, or to cover a Weakness of an Hypothesis. And if well examined will be found inconsistent or insignificant Terms, and commonly used by Schoolmen and Metaphysicians, or the using Words without any distinct Meaning, all which can make up nothing but Confusion, Noise, Nonsense and Jargon.

For every thing which is indisputably allow'd by Mankind, may be made

plain to the meanest Capacity; providing there be not a Vitiating of the Solids or Fluids of the Body. For most of the Disputes in Schools, with their Distinctions and Definitions, when they are not allowed of by all the World, or when disputable, seems some way uncertain, and consequently better let alone than troubled with; or need we fatigue our selves about understanding those things which are so disputable, and cannot be brought to a Certainty, and had probably been happy for Christians, had they gone no further, from the Beginning.

Natural and experimental Philosophy the meanest Capacity is capable of, if as I have said, the Body or *Organization* be perfect; all other Philosophy seems uncertain, (and if so) does more harm than good, because oftentimes takes those Uncertainties, for certain. Mr. *Locke* supposes the Mind to be at first as white Paper, void of all Characters, and that all our Materials, Instruments, Ideas, or Stamps, are altogether owing to Experience and Observation; and must, says he, be either from external material Things, as the Objects of Sensation; or from the Operations of our Mind, as the Objects of Reflection;

Reflection ; these, says he, are the Original, or the Beginning of all our Ideas. Nor that the Understanding has the least Glimmering of Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two Sources, and will find these to make up our whole Stock of Ideas, and can have nothing in our Minds which did not come that Way : He likewise adds, that the Powers of Substances, makes up a great Part of our Enquiries, and our Knowledge of them reaches no farther than Experience ; since they consist in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot discover ; and the Faculties we have, will never be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this Part, and Experience is that which (in this Part) we must depend upon, and were to be wish'd, says he, it were more improved : We cannot be sensible how advantageous the generous Pains of some Men has been, and how much their great Industry in this, has added to the Stock of natural Knowledge. But alas ! how little taken Notice of, rewarded, or regarded by the Publick.

However, *Wisdom*, or the *Understanding* it self, is not, I think, even by this means capable of being any Way made

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better or worse, but only by an Alteration of the Solids or Fluids of the Body; for the various Objects and Ideas we receive, only serve as Instruments for the better conveying of our Judgment to others, or to make us more capable of thinking, or judging of a greater Variety of Things, or in such a particular Way, Science, or Trade. Thus then a Man of Learning, and one of no Learning, if equally proportion'd in the Solids and Fluids of the Body, or exactly the same (if that were possible) are equally wise, understanding, or judicious, only that the first has greater Embellishments of Art, or handsomer and more convenient Instruments, by which he more neatly and modishly conveys, or gives his Judgment to another; or has a greater Number of Ideas the better to fit him for such, or such a Way, Science, or Trade; and this is esteem'd according to the Times, Fashion, Place, or Country.

Nor can it be said that a Man is less wise, or reasonable by his judging with wrong or byass'd Ideas, which he has received by the Prejudice of Education, from Parent, or Master, since if these things by them, are laid down for Certainties, he judges accordingly, and yet

Wisdom,

Wisdom, or the *Understanding* in it self, or in him, will still be found to be the same, even as much as if he judged with right Ideas, although the Effects of the first Judgment cannot be said to be so good. Nor are Languages any way more capable of bettering the Judgment, *Wisdom*, or *Understanding*, since at best, can make nothing but Instruments, and perhaps very frequently does more Prejudice than Good; for it often diverts Men, in only thinking, or cavelling about Words, whereas that *Wisdom*, or *Reason* might be employ'd to better Purpose.

This we plainly see, for Pedants and Schoolmasters, are not Men of the greatest Sense, nor can we say, that the most profoundly learned Man, is any way more wise than he who has none, or can be said to be nothing but as a Science, Art, or Trade he has serv'd his Time to, by which according to Mode of the Place (where he has learn'd) he may be said to convey his Thoughts more handsomly, and would have been just as wise, had he been put to making of Shoes, only that he could not have expressed himself so modishly, or would not have had so many Ideas of different Sciences, Subjects, or Trades, to

C 4

have

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have talk'd upon ; of which more here-
after.

And this *Wisdom* I think may very much be seen, in the prudent Conduct and Management of Life, and human Affairs ; which is not however to get rich, since there is often as much Fortune, and evil Management in that as any thing. Or should one or the other learn *Turkish, Indian, or Hottontot Language* ; their *Sense, Wisdom, or Understanding* would there appear to be equally the same.

Nor can we deny the *Turks* and *Jews* to be as wise, reasonable, or judicious as our selves (although without Faith, which is a Gift from God) since our Arts and Sciences are nothing but as Trades to be learned, which cannot add one Grain, or any way better *Wisdom, or the Understanding*.

Yet it's certain, that what is commonly taught at the University, such as Logick, the common Philosophy, Metaphysics, with great parts of other Sciences, may with their bombast Words and Terms, be said to have made up a particular sort of Dialect, or gibbrish Language, in which these Students speak, and doubt of all Mens Understanding who do not talk in that Way.

Nor

Nor can Language, History, or Experience be said any way to better, or add to *Wisdom*, or the *Understanding*; these serving only as a greater Number of Ideas, or Instruments; by which we may more capably, quickly, or handsomely receive, or understand the Meaning and Thoughts of another Person; or the Circumstances of an Affair (or insinuate the like to another) in such a Way, or in such a particular Science, Trade, Art, or Business.

For his *Understanding* or *Wisdom*, will still be the same, if he has none of these; and if there can but Instruments or Ideas be found, rightly and justly to convey the Thought to him, will make it to appear by his Determination. But if the *Organization* be wrong, that is a Changeling, or any way foolish from that Cause, all the Ideas in the World will never make him wise.

Mr. *Locke* very well observes, That most of the Wranglings and Disputes, we have with one another, are from the not rightly conveying of our Thoughts; or justly understanding one anothers Meaning. Nor says he, can the affected, ambiguous, or obscure Terms, be of any greater Use; such as the Peripatic and other Philosophers made use of, so

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as to confound their ordinary Meaning ; and this admir'd Art of disputing says our Author, hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages ; whilst it has been made use of, and fitted rather to perplex the real Signification of Words, than to discover the Knowledge and Truth of things : Or he who examines those learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermin'd in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Conversation. Besides says he, we often take Words for real Things ; as abhorrence of *vacuum*, &c. Those especially who confine their Thoughts to Systems and Hypothesis : By which they persuade themselves, that the Terms of that Sect are so well suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence. Nor can any of these in the least signify to the Improvement, or perfectionating of supernatural Thoughts, which is a Gift from God to the meanest Capacities. And may be a question, whether it were not better, the Definitions and Distinctions of supernatural Beings. &c. Or those things which Mankind do not agree in, were let alone, since incomprehensible ; nor can there be any
comparison

comparison betwixt Time and Eternity,
or material and immaterial Beings.

One might as well compare, or endeavour to give a Notion of nothing, by the smallest Object; in saying nothing is yet a great deal smaller, than that by which we must still retain the Notion of an Object, or something; although to what smallness soever we can conceive it. It had probably been happy for Mankind, especially * Christians; that * Or, they had not enter'd into those Definitions which has made so many Divisions; nor perhaps need we go farther than the meanest Capacity is capable of judging. Since all other Definitions and Disputes, mostly proceeds from the Ambition or Interest of the Imposer or Party.

I have already shewn the use of Language, History and Philosophy, which serve only I say, to make a greater variety of Ideas, or Instruments, by which we are more capable of receiving the Thoughts of others; as also the making others receive ours so much the better, on such particular Subjects, Sciences or Trades.

The next thing I shall put in Question is, whether the dead Languages, and Hypothetical Philosophy are such just Ideas,

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Ideas, or so useful to our Reason and Judgment, as the living Languages, and various Customs of Place and Country, with experimental Philosophy. I think none can deny but that the latter seems to make the truest and most useful Ideas, or Instruments, being the most certain; so that although *Wisdom* or the *Understanding* is still the same, yet by the first Education may be byass'd in his judging, or give Judgment, according to those wrong Ideas; whereas the latter being right, judges rightly.

This I think may be confirm'd by many instances, both modern and ancient; as for Example, some of the wisest, most ingenious, and most politick Men, we have not found to be the most profoundly learn'd, or Masters of that universal Learning so much esteem'd amongst us; not to name the more ancient, or those of the more remote Climates; let us but consider this present King of France, *Mazerine Colbert, Oliver Cromwell, Duke of Rothes, Shakespear, Johnson, Butler, D'Avenant*; and and may be a very great Question, whether the former might have appear'd so great in Politicks or Knowledge of Men, or the World, had their Education been more bookish; since I think no
Man

Man can say, he ever see a very studious, or very learned Man scarce to know, or fit to live in the World, unless he come to throw it (in a great measure) aside; or is it possible it can be otherwise, since the Bent of a Man's Thoughts cannot run to any Perfection but one way; for if his Applications be divided, what he gets one way, he loses the other; excepting in those studies which have an Affinity or help one another, of which more hereafter.

Many have been pleas'd to say, that King *James* 6th, or 1st of *England*, was fitter to have wore the Gown, then the Royal Robes, or would have made a better School-Master then a King, probably very much owing to his Governor *Buchanan*. It is reported of *Henry* the 4th of *France*, a Prince of a great deal of Life and Spirit; when he first heard of King *James*'s being made King of *England*, *Masoy* (*dit ill*) *c'est un trop bon Meaureau pour un Pedant*; faith says he, it is too good a Bit for a *Pedant*.

Nor can we pretend that any of the most learn'd in Languages, have gone beyond the Primitive Fathers in their original Tongues; or indeed, who has writ better then *David*, or *Solomon*, as also many others, who cannot be
said

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said to have been Inspir'd, or ever re-
ceiv'd the Christian Faith.

The *Grecians* and *Romans* always writ
in their original Tongues, the latter of
which went to *Egypt* and *Greece*, to learn
the Language, or Customs of the Place
(without studying the dead Tongues)
as we may go to *France*, *Holland*, or
Italy.

Nevertheless, the *Greek* and *Latin*, is
more necessary to us, whose Laws,
Physick and Divinity, so much depends
upon those Authors.

Yet I think it cannot be said, or al-
ledg'd, that these adds one Grain to
Wisdom, Reason, or Human Understan-
ding; and were it possible to make a just,
full, and exact Translation, his Judgment
of it must be the same; whether with,
or without the Language. From these
then, and such like Considerations, I
conceive, that the greatest Perfection of
Wisdom, or the *Understanding*, is abso-
lutely depending upon the Perfection of
the *Organization*, or exactness of the Hu-
man Proportion (especially the Brain)
or the good Form of the Solids and
Fluids of the Body.

For it is evident, that no part of the
Body, seems so much to affect our Rea-
son, or Wisdom, as the Head and Brain;
being

being well or ill form'd, which is the Principle ; together with the Fluids being in a proper State.

For this seems to be the more noble part of the Body, the Seat of all the Senses ; the *Sensorium commune*, and chief Seat of Wisdom and Reason, or the Understanding.

It may not be improper, I here endeavour to give my Opinion, of what we commonly call Simplicity, Folly, or Madness, from a Vitiating of the Solids or Fluids. I understand it to be either natural or accidental ; the first is no doubt a Fault in the *Organization* from the Birth, or before. For it may no doubt suffer a wrong Modelling, Pressure, or Vitiating, as well before Born (and probable easier then) as after. And we may very well observe, I say, how much great Wounds of the Head, affecting the Brains, Depressions of the Scull, or Knocks in the Cradle ; affect our Reason, Wisdom or Judgment.

As to the accidental Madness, it seems to be a Vitiating and irregular Motion of the Fluids, which probably proceeds from an Obstruction, or want of a due Secretion of some particular Glands, which will necessarily occasion the too much in others ; and that no doubt will
alter

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alter the Nature, and regular Course of the Fluids; and consequently occasion Distortion or Disorder, in the solid Structure or Form of the Brain. &c. The Cure of this then must be Evacuations, and such Medicines as either affects all the Glands of the Body; or in particular those obstructed Glands which may either occasion an universal, or that particular Secretion; so as again to bring the Fluids to the proper State, or as at first. By which the more Solid Parts, or distorted and dilated, or widen'd Canals, Channels or Ducts, will contract as before; unless of a very old and long standing; where the obstructed Glands will not yield to the Power of Medicines, nor the so much widen'd Canals, again, to contract themselves, which makes Madness of so long a standing incurable.

And those who become delirious by Depression or Fracture of the Scull, or by extravasated Blood lying upon the Meninges or Brain, are cured by the Trepan; by which means the Obstruction, Load, or Pressure is taken away.

Having thus then consider'd the Nature and Cause of what we call Madness, and that there are not any two things in the Universe, equally and exactly the same;

same; and consequently the parts of the Body or Brain, of every one differs as much from another, as the Head or Face; which difference of Parts will be more perceptible, to the more nice and observing Anatomist than to others.

According then to this principle part of the Bodies, being better or worse form'd; together with the right state of the Fluids, (which proceeds much from the good Formation of the Solid Parts) the great cause of our different Inclinations and Passions, so likewise † Wisdom, Reason, or the Understanding, will be found by this to be better or worse, more or less perfect; for how can a Machine act, but according to its Form or Instruments, any more than the different Pipes of an Organ, can play all the same Notes. Or probably the Soul may be compar'd to the Organist, who plays better or worse, according to the Goodness of his Instrument or Organ.

† Or shall the thing form'd, say to him that form'd it, why hast thou made me thus?

And thus if the Mediums or Humours of the Eye, be more or less convex, or spherical, the Objects must necessarily appear to be greater or smaller, according to that Convexity; would it not be then very ridiculous, for any one to be angry, that the one Man cannot see the Object so big as his Neighbour;

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hour, or that the other sees it bigger or plainer.

Or should we chide a Man, because he cannot see Objects with the same Colour as we do.

For I doubt not but that the Water and Humours of all Eyes, are in some Degree differing one from another; which will make every one to see Colours deeper or less deep than his Neighbour; that is, to see it more red, or more blue, although probably not to any material Difference.

But if it be said, that this is only in the Eye or other Senses, the same Difference in all Probability is in the Brain; for if that in some Degree be different (as every thing else) the Impressions or Ideas of Objects, must in some measure vary upon that different *Organization*; and this will hold even in the most certain things we agree in, or mathematical Figures; such as a Circle or Square, &c. and (I say) our Impressions, Ideas, or Imaginations of these things will reasonably vary in Degrees, as well as that of Colours; for if we would but suppose Millions of Degrees of Colour, as of red (or the same of any other Idea) it were endless, and next to impossible to find Words to express so many different

ferent Degrees ; for which Reason we can only give distinguishing Names, where there are very material Differences ; since none can say, but that there are Millions of Degrees betwixt two scarlets or blacks, &c. and as many different Representations to our various Organs, and yet we all agree it black or scarlet, without Distinction ; and altho' this Difference in it self is so very minute, yet all our Ideas or Impressions thus differing in some Degree, though each so very little, yet in the whole may incline us to draw different Consequences ; or in some measure, make us to reason differently, or excite our various Passions ; and as I have said, although the Eye or other Senses, make no material Difference as to the Representation of Objects ; yet this different Figuration of the Brain (with that variety of Impressions) is no doubt sufficient to cause that Difference in the Imaginations, and both together, yet so much more. Or what can cause that of liking or disliking, but this different Form or Figuration.

Thus then after the same manner will the different Proportions, Obstructions, Ruptions, or Distortions of the Body or Brain, with the Vitiations of the Fluids,

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make Creatures to judge or reason in that irregular Manner. None then but those who are as mad, or more then they, can be angry if they do not reason justly; and it must surely be a great deal of Vanity and Pride in any Man to suppose his own Judgment to be the Standard for all other Men, or these will be often found to be the greatest Fools, of which we have but too many.

But let us here consider the true Effects of Wisdom, and just Reasoning? It seems to be that which tends to the universal benefit of the Creation, and human Society, of which our selves are a part; and all the Commandments or Institutions of the *Almighty seem to be to that End: and what is opposite to this, whether by the more unnatural Formation in the Womb, or some accidental Cause thereafter, may justly I think be call'd Distraction, Folly or Madness; yet if proceeding from bad Instruments, or wrong and byass'd Ideas, by Mistake or Prejudice of Education is not to be call'd so.

* Since we can in no way be serviceable to him, so that all his Rules and Ordinations are for our Benefit.

It may not be amiss likewise, to take notice, that this wrong Formation or Distortion of the Brain, in some measure is communicate to the Face, which seems to be the Index, or by which we may partly

partly know something of the Wisdom, or Folly of the Person, especially when very notably different, either one way, or the other; as the Face of a Changling is easie to be distinguish'd from that of a Man of good Sense or Reason, and that Simplicity, or Foolishness is plainly to be seen; so likewise the Eyes and Face of one in a *Mannia*, or the Madman, are easily to be distinguish'd.

To this I shall add, that as the Brains of all Creatures, differ one from another, as much as every other part of the Body, or every other similar thing in the Creation; must necessarily occasion as much Difference in their Natures, Wisdom, or Judgment, as the Difference of these parts are, so that it will necessarily follow, that from the *Organization* or *Formation* of Parts, or Difference in the Solids and Fluids of the Body, The Temper, Natures, Passions, Wisdom, Reasoning, and Judgment will be as various, which with good or bad Ideas will accordingly appear to be more or less. Nor from hence is it to be argued, but that all wise Men do agree in the great and fundamental Rules of Reason and Morality, which all must visibly see tends to the universal Benefit of the

D 3 Creation,

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Creation, or human Society, of which every one is a Member.

And yet altho' they all agree in that, there must no doubt be some Differences, though inexpressable in their Thoughts, or Conception of Things; for as the first and second Prints of a Figure, that are cast off, may be said to be the same, yet no doubt differs; which we will perceive when the thousandth is cast off.

And thus I say, although the generality or the Wise, equally or well form'd, do agree in that general Rule; yet there will still be some whose wrong Formation will never allow them to agree, or are Exceptions from that Rule. Mr. Pope very well says,

*Its with our Judgments, as our watches
(none,
Goes just alike, yet each Man believes his
(own.*

Here might likewise be added, the Knowledge of the different Temperaments or Natures of more inferior Animals from their Form; such as the innocence and mildness of the Dove and Lamb, the friendly and sagacious Temper of the Dog and Horse, the cunning of the Ape, the fierceness of the Lion, the

the Cruelty of the Crocodile, Tyger and Leopard, &c.

And no doubt, were we to study *Physiognomy* more, as the *Arabians* and *Antients* used to do, it might be a very great help to us, in the better Knowledge of Men, so very necessary for every one in this World.

Its true, that this Rule of observing by the Face, is said to be falacious, and does not always hold good; yet I am apt to think, it may rather be our Defect in not understanding it rightly; for although a Man may have a rough or ugly like Face at first View, and yet of a sweet Temper; it is probable that when we come to examine it more narrowly, we may find something of an Agreeableness in it. The same may be said of some beautiful Faces, who are nevertheless very peevish, or evil temper'd; but if we come to examine those Features more strictly (if not passionately in Love) we may probably find something Tygrish or Viperish, in the Looks or Tracts. Mr. Cowley, in his Description of *Saul's* two Daughters, after having admirably describ'd their Beauty, Colour and Features, he says,

And Mr. Cowley says, in *Michal's Love to David*.

*Soon she perceived, scarce can Love hidden
(lye,
From any Sight, much less the loving Eye.*

We find that dumb People, come to a much greater Knowledge in that way than we do, which readily proceeds from their stricter Observation and Thoughtfulness, for not being able to spend time in talking or hearing, are forc'd to observe our Faces more narrowly ; and receive all their Knowledge of us by their Eyes, and by that means come to a great Knowledge of our Passions and Inclinations.

But let us here a little consider, those who truly are, and may justly be call'd Wise men, Wisdom, or just Reasoning, as I have signify'd is the not doing that which may any way prejudice human Society, of which we are a part ; but on the contrary to make all our Actions tend to the Benefit of it. And these no doubt, who do this, are the Wise men, the generous, the good Men, and Men of Spirit : Although but too commonly look'd upon to be greater Fools than any, since they are the Men who study,
and

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and act most for the universal Benefit of Mankind, by which means neglecting their own more private and particular Part, often become needy, poor, and in Want; nor is the Publick but rarely so generous, as to take notice of them; but on the contrary laugh at them for Philosophers or Fools.

Or how have we sometimes found, the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous Men of our Nation taken care of, who have liv'd and often dy'd in very ordinary Circumstances; or can we say that Sir W——lter R——leigh, Sir W——m T——ple, Sir M. or Judge H——les, were rewarded as they deserv'd? The L——d B——on, its said, his Friend or Relation, Sir J——l——y C——f——s, became weary of him before he dyed, and that the Lord C——refus'd him Small-Beer. How was Mr. Boyle rewarded? Or how Mr. J. Ray, so neglected? Yet that they spent most of their Time and Estates, for the sake of their Country is very well known, and how useful they were to their Nation, none can be ignorant of. Or how few are there in E——l——d, who have had tolerable Gratifications; Sir J. N——ton, as it is said was first taken notice of abroad, and received thanks
from

from thence, before he receiv'd it at Home.

And yet these Men no doubt must be allow'd (by all Mankind) to have been the most useful, the most generous, the most wise, virtuous, and most knowing Men of our Nation. And besides this natural Negligence and Ingratitude, they are rather commonly persecuted with Malice and Envy.

To this might be added Mr. Cowley, Mr. Butler, Sir Roger L'Estrange, Collier, Dryden, &c. Who have all done Service in their particular Ways.

Or is it possible such Men should make Estates, or grow rich, if it be not by the publick Care; since he who does for, or is intent upon the good of every one, takes, or has but little time to mind himself.

Yet I know there are some, who applaud and praise them for good Men, but at the same time laugh in their Sleeves at them for Fools.

Although, if they would but a little consider, they might soon find, that it is much more easie for a Fool, or mean spirited, knavish, selfish, and interested Man, to heap Riches, then for a wise Man so to do; since the former is altogether devoted, and minds only his own Interest;

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Interest; and never did, or any way minds the Benefit of his Society, or any but self. So that he may rather be esteem'd among them, as a Pirate, a Thief, a common Robber, or one who is altogether bent upon cheating, filching, pilfring, coufening, or sneaking all he can from the rest of his Brethren, or otherwise ravaging, destroying and sacrificing, all the quiet or universal Good, to his Lust, Pride or Avarice.

But if there be yet another more Harmless sort, who may be worthy of that Name of the Drones of human Society, who have never done, or aim'd at any thing for the common Good; why ought not both the one and the other of all these, like lazy idle Drone Bees (for living upon the Industry of others) be drove out of the Republique of brave and worthy Men, as common Enemies, or at best but useless in human Society.

† Crates being laugh'd at for a Philosopher, became Merchant, to shew he could get Riches, after which he again left it.

Or let us consider, what an easie thing † it is, for a Man that has the least Grain of Sense; or is not a Changeling, Debauchee or Madman, to get Money or Riches, in the World, if he thinks of no ones Benefit but his own; especially if he be once put in the Road, or applies himself to what may be Beneficial;

cial: but as Men have in all Ages prefer'd their private Interests to the publick Good, will ever be found so, until the Publick becomes more grateful to private Men.

For who can doubt, that any of the formerly mention'd great Men, could have made very considerable Fortunes, (with their paternal Heritage, and publick Posts) by living penuriously, accepting of Bribes, cheating the Publick, or Country, taking great Premiums for their Money, or by lending it at Usury? Or can any one believe, that those great Men, have not the Sense to know, that such are the Ways of making Money? Or in bargaining, out-witting as they call it, or rather downright cheating, and filching their Neighbours.

But as wise and virtuous Men, bind themselves up from such bad Practices, which with their publick Spirits for the common Good, find it a much harder matter to heap, or a-mass Riches.

Its said of Judge *Hales*, that when a Gentleman came in suit of his Daughter, and asking him what Fortune he could afford to give her; the Judge told him, he could give her Five hundred Pounds; at which the young Gentleman staring or surpriz'd, told him that was not a Fortune

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Fortune for the Lord Chief-Justice of *England's* Daughter; it is very true Answer'd the old Gentleman, I am Lord Chief-Justice of *England*; but let me tell you said he, that this was Money left her by her Grandfather, Money that was hard and well got, will wear well like Steel to the Back.

† For if we suppose two Men of an equal Organization or Understanding, the one to apply to Musick, or being a School-Master, &c. the other to Merchandize, a Trade, or Shop-keeping, the latter will propably grow most rich, although still equally wise.

But if we should yet consider those of a more inferior Rank, where we shall find some Men of the best Sense, almost ready to Starve, and the greatest Loggerheads in the way of getting Money plentifully; this in a great measure proceeds from the Parents, or themselves; having made choice of some Science, Knowledge or Trade; by which it is not possible much Money can be made. As being a Mathematician, Musician, Schoolmaster, &c. Or who on the other Hand can suppose, but that any Man of the least common Sense; and † not vicious, (or given to debauching, whoring and drinking, but frugal) is capable of standing in a Shop to sell a piece of Cloth, Silk, or any other Merchandize or Trinket; and standing there for Years untill he dies, and minding nothing but his own private Interest, must he not get Money.

There

There are no doubt among the Shop-Keepers, as well as other Men; brave Spirits capable of greater things, or in their Temper, or Way, may be serviceable to the common Good. Although others little better than Sign-Posts. And this may in a great Measure be owing to the fault of Parents, who have not studied or understood rightly their Nature and Genius's.

We find that among the *Turks*, even the best of them learn some Trade; and the great Genius's are regarded and sought for among the meanest of the People; as we have known Shoemakers rais'd to the Dignity of *Prime Vizier*, and who we find to have govern'd with as much Judgment and Policy, as any of our *European* Ministers; the greatest of which, as I said before, have not been Men of that great Learning, so much esteem'd among us. For as the ingenious *Mr. Pope*, very well says in his Poem of *Criticism*,

Yet if we look more closely, we shall find,
Most have the Seeds of Judgment in their
(Mind;
Nature affords at least a glimmering Light,
The Lines though touch'd, but faintly are
(drawn right;
But

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*But as the slightest sketch if justly trac'd?
Is by ill colouring but the more disgrac'd,
So by false Learning is good Sense defac'd.*

And as these Men of a sound Judgment, have not learn'd to judge by those often byas'd Ideas, or suppos'd hypothetical, or notional Philosophy; but judge by the more certain and common Ideas, such as their own true Observations, natural History, or experimental Philosophy; which are allow'd to be the best, or no doubt the most certain. And perhaps had been better we had never known the other.

*Some are bewilder'd in the Maze of Schools,
And some made Coxcomb's, Nature meant but
(Fools.*

It may be a Question, whether the notional Philosophy, and the many fine Systems have been built upon it, has been of any greater use in Physick; since we visibly see, that *Hypocrates's* Practice was mostly built upon Observation: * Nor did he know any thing of the Thoracic Duct, the Circulation of the Blood, the *foramen Ovale* in the Heart, *ductus Arteriosus* or communicating Canal, or of the *Animalcula*, and yet I believe

* But on the contrary suppos'd the Brainto be the Origine of the Blood Vessels.

none

none can say, that any since his Time, have had more, or so much true Knowledge, and good Success in the Practice of Physick as he had.

How falacious and unhappy in their Practice, have we found the greatest of these Systematic Gentlemen? Such as the famous *Bellini*, *Willis*, and *Van-Helmont*; it's true, that the first of these seems to have been the most reasonable; his *Theory* being built upon mathematical Demonstration, although it seems probable, that the Suppositions he takes for granted, must be false or uncertain; otherwise we must believe he should rarely have err'd, or at least have been more successful in his Practice.

Nor do we find, that the second was any better in his Success; although he has writ us wonderful Stories of the Brain, and Animal Spirits: Or what more can we say of the third? who fancy'd as *Decartes*, he had found out the very Seat of the Soul.

Only that as *Decartes* suppos'd it to be in the *Glandula Pinealis* of the Brain, so he suppos'd it to be got into the upper Orifice of the Stomach. What strange Notions then and Errors, has this Hypothetical Philosophy, or wild Systems led those great Men into; who seems to

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have been in nothing more certain, then
in that which was most uncertain.

The famous *Sydenham* was of this same
Opinion, that most of those Systems of
Physick had led Men into great Errors.

Or indeed, where have we found a
Writer but has given us a different ac-
count of a *Fever*. And no doubt we
shall find it a very hard matter, if we
consider the Bodies, or Solids and Fluids
of all Animals, in some measure to be
different; together with the Nourish-
ment and Accidents, must necessarily
occasion the Diseases and Distempers to
vary, and to differ one from another.
More might be said on this Subject,
but respect to the Body of Physick bids
me forbear.

Neither would I have any one to believe,
but that I think a regular Education, is
absolutely necessary; such as the Ana-
tomical Structure, or Knowledge of the
Solids and Fluids of the Body; which
however may be of greater Use for the
better judging of the Symptoms of Di-
stempers, for our better Knowledge of
them; as likewise in the Practice of
Chirurgery, then that we know from
thence the certain Causes of Distempers;
or certainly to account for the manner
of Medicines operating.

As

As also the *Materia Medica*, is very useful, or the Knowledge and Use of Medicines, *Simple, Galenicall, and Chymical*; together with Observation and experimental Philosophy; which will teach us to reason more justly, and not to impose Notions on the World for certain, but where every one allows them to be so. To this may be added Observation, with the Signs, and *Diagnosticks* of Distempers: Or who can pretend to tell the Way, how specifick Remedies operate. In a word, all I do urge from these Arguments, is to shew the Vanity, Fallacy, and Uncertainty of our so much valued and common Education: Which for the most part, gives us but wrong and byass'd Ideas, as Instruments by which our Judgment operates in such a manner.

It's true however, that the University Learning, may be said to be a Language, or those Mysteries taught there, are more easily defin'd, and talk'd of in their proper Terms (because still obscure) for when they come to be put in plain words, look too much like Nonsense.

Let us now examine then what is properly to be call'd Wisdom, Reason, or a right Understanding? I take it to be an effect of the Soul, upon an exact

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Organization, or the perfect Form and Proportion, of the Solids and Fluids of the Body : Which with just Ideas, or Instruments, that form or make right Impressions, upon those well proportion'd Parts ; the necessary Consequence (I think) must be, the Souls acting there in greatest Perfection ; and may properly be call'd Wisdom, true Judgment, or just Reasoning. Nor can I allow, if the *Organs* are right form'd, that even wrong or byass'd Ideas makes him less wise ; for although the Effects of his Judgment is bad, yet his Wisdom or Understanding is still the same ; for his Sentiments or Judgment is right, according to those wrong Ideas.

The next thing then we have to enquire, will be whether the common and more familiar Ideas, such as in great Observation, of the common Accidents of Life ; a good and certain Experience in the various Mutations, and different Turns or Changes of Nature and Times ; or even in particular Applications, in their Business, Trade, or own Way. Whether I say, these may not as much tend to true Knowledge, shall be the Question ?

I have already taken Notice, that this natural Knowledge, this experimental

mental Philosophy, this true Observation, in the common Affairs of human Life, are the more certain and less fallacious.

The Knowledge we have of the World, by a studious Application, or that hypothetical Philosophy, or common Learning being oftentimes chimerical, false, (or at least) more uncertain; and must necessarily led us into greater Errors, by giving us those crooked Instruments, or wrong Ideas; by which we come to form wrong Judgments of things.

Mr. *Locke* very well observes, That our want of precise and distinct Ideas, of the insensible *Corpuscles*, or most minute active parts of Matter; and their primary Qualities, keep us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. And says, however far experimental Philosophy, may advance the Knowledge of Physick; yet still sciential, will be out of our Reach, because we want perfect and adequate Ideas, of those very Bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our Command. And this says he, shews us, that if the material things, or Beings of this World, be so hid from us; in how much more Ignorance and Obscurity

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must we be of Spirits, and the whole intellectual World. For says he, bating the few Ideas we have of Spirits, we get from our Minds by Reflection, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits, and Author of all Things. We have says he, no certain Information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits, but by Revelation: Much less distinct Ideas of their different Natures, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, how or wherein they differ or agree, either from one another, or from us; and consequently absolutely ignorant of their Species and Properties. As those then, and such like Reasonings are very uncertain; so after the same manner we find, that the wisest Men, when they come to act in the World, throw aside the *Theory* of Philosophy and Physick; and come to Experience or Observation and Practice; the first being more falacious, the second more certain.

But now let us a little consider, what great store of Wealth or Knowledge, one Man may receive beyond another; by means of this Education or Learning; supposing their Bodies or Organs, to be equally the same, and well form'd, if that be possible.

Let

Let us then draw a Parallel, or suppose these two Men, to be a Philosopher, and a Ploughman; the first in describing the different sorts or parts, and nature of Earth; he will tell you, that its made up of a greater or lesser Number of *Corpuscles* or *Atomes*, of various Forms or Figures, *Spherical* or *Angular*; and that a greater or lesser Number of these, being combin'd, or gather'd together by some occult Quality, makes those terrestrial Differences.

The other supposes the parts of Earth to differ, by being more dry, or more moist, or more marshy, or more fat, barren or sandy, heathy, clayie, or chalky or stony, or more fertile or fruitful, and is made so by a supernatural Cause, or as God pleases. Or yet, if the first should insist upon a greater Certainty, or a more mathematical Point; such as that the terrestrial Globe is in a continual Rotation, or circular Motion, upon its own *Axis*, and is *Mid-day*, when the Sun is in our Meridian.

The other says he knows nothing about that, but can tell you how well the Wheel of his Cart runs round, or to and again upon its own Axle-tree, and knows its Noon-day when the Sun is at his greatest Height.

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The Question now may be, which of these two will be found to know most? it must be allow'd, that the first goes on in a bombast pedantic Strain, upon a great many Uncertainties; whereas the other goes on in a simple easie Way, and tells only of what is certain; nor can we say, that the Judgment of the one, or his Knowledge, Wisdom or Reason, is more than that of the other.

Since as I have supposed, they are equally form'd in their Organs or Bodies, and had either of them been educated the contrary way, their Notions must have been one and the same. The next thing then we have to examine, will be, which is the most useful Knowledge as to living in the World, and the benefit of human Society; we find that they are both as Trades, or may equally be learn'd by the one or the other: The Ploughman knows the Differences or Nature of the Earth, and what is good and proper for such or such Uses, or fit for the planting, or sowing, of such particular things, useful for his Society; and has this certain Philosophy by repeated Experience and Observation; and although his Conversation is in a simple *Dialect*, yet will be found to be good Reason, just, true and certain.

The

The Philosopher seems wrapp'd up, or transported with chymical Notions, full of Uncertainties, and consequently of little Use, unless for the amusing of some in Conversation ; as *Romances* and *Novels* may do Ladies; nor can their Reasonings with such wrested or crook'd Ideas or Impressions, have that just or true Effect as the other, which is grounded upon certain Experience and Observation ; so that in short, the first very often tells you, with a great deal of Gravity, a very fine florid Lie, or romantic Whim, which being wrapp'd up in obscure Terms, is by this means believ'd to be a most knowing Man ; while he at the same time, is buoy'd up with that vain Praise, and believes so too. Although most of all the Men of good natural Parts, and even those bred at the Universities, agree in the Folly and Fallacy of this mistaken sort of Learning.

It is certain however, that if a Man be very busily imploy'd in working with his Hands or Body, he can have no Time or Opportunity, either of receiving new Ideas, or making of many compound or complex ones, from the few simple he already has.

But

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But if it should be alledg'd, that the custom of receiving many new Ideas, much more exercises the *Organization* of the Brain; and consequently keeps those parts more penetrable, free or open, which otherwise might grow up, or become more indocile, hard, or callous. This in the first place, would prove the Power or Difference of the *Organization*, for that then the Organs or Man is alter'd; and secondly, it may be a very great Question, whether the continual looking upon two or three Objects, does not keep those Passages as open, free or penetrable, as the looking upon two or three Thousand; since probably we can look but very directly at one at a time. Nevertheless, what is meant here in the Comparifon of these two, is, that they be both idle Men, and as I suppose them equally *Organized*; so I suppose them to have an equal Liberty of thinking, for whether he thinks right or wrong, the Parts will be equally exercised, whatever the Consequences of it may be.

It is very probable however, that from this great Idleness, or so much thinking and ruminating we have had, or has been the cause of so many spurious Notions, or vain chymical and hetrodox Principles.

Yet

Yet if it be still urg'd, that Ideas of the Experiences of other Men may bring one to a greater Knowledge in Arts or Sciences: I answer, that if they do, they only fit him with the Instruments or Ideas, most proper to work with in such a Business, Trade, Art or Science, yet in no way betters *Wisdom* or the *Understanding*. Since before, or without these, he could distinguish as well betwixt Good and Evil, or in any thing that could be brought to his Comprehension, or to be apply'd to the few Ideas he had formerly; so that his Wisdom or just Reasoning is still the same. The other, he can only be said to be better fitted, with Instruments or Ideas, for different Businesses, Trades, Arts, or Sciences.

But if any one should still be taken, or much pleased with the delicacy of Stile, or a chosen Language of soft Vowels, which some may much more admire, then that rustick and harsh Language although true; let them first consider, that it adds nothing to Truth or Wisdom: And secondly, that it is as a Trade, Art or Business, and may be learn'd more easily than Musick, with which I would sooner advise them to divert themselves, or serenade their Ears with Singing, *Violins*, &c. For

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For Languages or Words, may be understood only as a nicer, smother, or harsher Articulation of Notes, which is much more easie to be taught or learn'd, than Whistling or Singing, which some can never attain to: As the aforesaid Author says,

*They haunt Parnassus, but to please their
Ear,
Not mend their Minds, as some to Church
repair,
Not for the Doctrine, but the Musick there.*

From all these Considerations I infer, that as the Souls and Organs of this Philosopher, and Ploughman are equally the same; as supposed at first, their Judgment and Reasonings would be one, had they both received by Art or Nature, the same Ideas; but as the one works with wrong Impressions, the other with right, their Sentiments must necessarily be different.

From what I have said then, it may I think plainly be seen, that the one seems more necessary and useful in the World, or among his Society than the other.

But if it should yet be urg'd, that none can deny the Mathematicks to be

be very useful to Mankind; I shall only say, that how useful the speculative part may be, is a Question? As for *Algebra*, and the practical Parts (no doubt) they are of great Use, yet those are to be learn'd as Arts or Trades; such as Navigation, Gauging, Measuring, Fortification, &c. Thus then it will appear, that the Ploughman is more useful both to himself and fellow Creatures, than the hypothetical and speculative Philosopher: Nay, from what we have said before of his just though simple Ideas, his Judgment and Reasoning is more to be depended upon, and his Advice is sooner to be taken, and consequently more useful in the World. For a simple and familiar Idea, or Comparison has (at least) as great a Force (if not greater) than the more foreign and obscure ones.

For his Judgment and Reason will be full as just, by reasoning with those simple Ideas, as with the more hidden ones, which oftentimes we do not so rightly comprehend; and by that means more fallacious.

Or why may we not suppose (for example) the Axis of the World, the Idea of it originally to be, or may have been taken from the Idea of the Axel-tree of a Coach

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a Coach or Cart-Wheel; and from some spherical or round Body. But what may justly be said is, that when Men talk by more simple Comparisons, the World judges (although very much in the wrong) that there is not the same strength of Reason, as when in more obscure Terms, or a bombast and lofty Stile. I am likewise perswaded, that there is not any thing that comes under the comprehension of Judgment or Reason, but what may be laid down in the most plain and easie Terms.

As for Metaphysicks, which requires so many Abstract and obscure Ideas, it may be a very great Question how necessary they are? And whether all those Distinctions and Definitions, have not been the great Cause, for the many Differences, and unhappy Divisions in the Church? And as our Primitive Fathers had no such Learning among them, whether it were not better for us we wanted it likewise? and more adviseable for us to think only of those things we can know.

But what may be judged of this, as well as of the hypothetic Philosophy, is, that when those *Heathens*, or *Grecians* and *Christians*, came to flourish or to be in Quiet, Luxury and Ease; it was
then

then they with aspiring Imaginations, thought to have found out, the out-most Bounds and Limits of Nature, or the most hidden Secrets of the Almighty Creator. But well might the * Wise-^{*It seems probable that Divisions and Philosophick Whims grow as Weeds by Idleness.} man say, *O vanity of vanities, and all is vanity and vexation of Spirit:* And how well did Solon say, when answer was made by the Oracle, that he was the wisest Man in the World: *I know not said he that I am so, unless it be in knowing, that I know nothing.*

Let us rather as Mr. Cowley very well advifes, and who has given us a Specimen of the manner of Schools for natural and experimental Philosophy, or follow the Examples of Bacon and Boyle, who so greatly improv'd that Knowledge, which may be useful and necessary for human Life; a Knowledge to be arrived at, and a noble Exercise (to those especially who have no Trade or Business) and will divert them from entering into those bottomless, hidden and obscure Notions, never to be found out; many of which only serve for the Division of good Men, invented by those great Enemies to Happiness, Idleness, Avarice and Ambition. For it may be observ'd, that as the Riches of the Church

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Church increas'd, so their Divisions did also.

* *Mr. Lee* against *Mr. Locke* p. 35. says, the Vulgar understand that part of natural Philosophy, as well as the most refin'd Argument Maker, &c. owing to the Author of their Natures, although they may express their Worship by Words or Signs, of Custom or Country.

* From all those Reasonings, then I conclude, that the Ploughman is much the wiser Man, who thinks not on those mysterious Disputes; nor can any Man deny him to be less (but may be more) in the way to Salvation, then the most learn'd Divine, or Metaphysical Doctor; who in place of endeavouring to heal the Breaches of the Church, still make them wider, by their confused or interested Distinctions, Divisions, or Definitions. If we look into most of the Books of Controversy, we shall find them full of obscure, unsteady, and equivocal Terms, which is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. And if the Ideas be not agreed on, betwixt Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words stand, the Argument or Dispute is not about things, but Names.

Mr. Lock says, it deserves to be well consider'd and examin'd, whether most of the Disputes we have in the World, are not meerly verbal, and about the Signification of Words; and that if the terms they are made in, were defin'd and reduced in their Significations, with clear

clear and steady Meanings to the single Ideas they stand for, whether those Disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. But alas! how easily are all those Matters reconcil'd, where there is neither Interest, or any other private Design in it.

This Author likewise adds, that our predominant Passions and Inclinations, are of great force ; for says he, let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous Man's Reasoning, and Money on the other, it is easie to foresee which will prevail. As also the Authority of common receiv'd Opinions of our Friends, or party Neighbourhood, or Country, Passions or Interest: But notwithstanding says he, the great noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I must do Mankind that right, as to say, there are not so many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions, as is commonly suppos'd ; not says he, that I think they embrace the Truth, but because concerning those Doctrines they keep such a stir and pother about ; they have no thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one should a little Catechize the greatest part of the Partizans of most Sects in the World, he would not find, that concerning those matters

F

they

they are so zealous for, they have any Opinion of their own. And yet less, that they take them on Examination of Argument, but are resolv'd to stick to a Party, that Education or Interest has engaged them in; and there like the common Soldiers of an Army, shew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direct; without ever examining the Cause they contend for. Wise-men of all Parties no doubt are sensible enough of this, but these are so very few, that they are forced to submit to the ignorant Multitudes of hypochondriac Women, or hypocritic or crazie Enthusiastic, and hair-brain'd Fools; zealously led on by Passion, Folly or Interest, to execute whatever the ambitious and unlimited desires of their Leader does command.

What is farther to be observ'd, that the Leaders of those Parties, never endeavour to make up those Differences; (that probably might not suit with their Interests.) It's true however, they sometimes take the trouble of privately persuading an ignorant Fellow, to that he knows little or nothing about: Yet I know not whether we can call this any better than stealing of a Sheep; since not so ready for entering into Argument
with

with those who are Leaders or Professors
 * in the opposite Party, or those who * How
 may understand as much as themselves; can there
 or if they do, it is more to wrangle or be a Re-
 show their Parts, then with a design concilia-
 of Reconciliation; so most of the Books where
 of Controversy which are writ, seem they only
 much to the same purpose, and without come
 any real design to heal those Divisions: with a
 A sign, that the Prince of Pride and design
 worldly Interest is too much concern'd. to Dis-
 pute?

It seems very strange, and I wish that
 the Directors of those different Parties;
 may not have Interest too much at bot-
 tom: Is it not enough that all those
 Christians agree in the materials or
 fundamental parts of the Christian
 Faith, and all agree in receiving the
 Sacraments, as Testimonies of their
 being such; and all say they take or
 understand it no other way then as our
 Saviour design'd it: To what end then
 those Definitions, Divisions, or Di-
 stinctions, but to confound, divide and
 perplex us. For even among the Apo-
 stles or Disciples, and Primitive Chri-
 stians, we find there were such hot Dis-
 putes, as like to have made Seperation
 or Breach, and yet all were in the true
 Church; but now alas! we want *Paul*,
 or such as he to heal and unite us, or

68 *Human Understanding consider'd,*

† But as
Mankind
differs in
their Or-
ganizati-
on, so
they will
ever be
in Tem-
pers and
Opini-
ons or
so many
Com-
menta-
tors, so
many
different
Kinds.

keep us together. † The plain and easie way seems to be the best and surest; do we not find, that the Doctors of the same Church cannot agree in their private Definitions, and Sentiments in many things: But finding themselves pen'd down to such a Doctrine approv'd on by that Sect, or such particular Tenets, dare go no farther; since many Inconveniencies might arise from thence, such as the loss of Benefices, &c.

It may likewise be a very great Question, whether in changing from one Sect to another among Christians, there might not generally be some view or hope of temporal Interest in it, either present or future? As likewise whether if it could be made plainly to appear, that any of the different Opinions of the Christian Religion, were more to the temporal Interest of the opposing Man, his Friends and Country, (which any good moral or politic Man will mind, not only for gratitudes sake, but likewise for his own better Security) and whether if that (I say) could plainly be made to appear, his great Difficulties about Religious Matters would not easily be resolv'd or vanish. So that in this Case we shall find Interest our Religion

ligion and Dispute; the one only serving as a Cloak for the other, or as a Hoodwink to Fools, made use on by politic, hypocritical, or ambitious, and avaricious Men. Thus where there is great Wrangling and Dispute, we shall rarely find the one without the other, for true and only pure Religion makes little noise. But how much more powerful then these interested Religious Disputes, will be among evil and more avaricious Men, one may easily judge. Or how often have I observ'd and never known it to fail; that where two Men of good Sense and Temper, of different Parties, had neither of them the least regard or view to their own temporal Interest, their Friends or their Countries; that all the Differences of Opinions betwixt their Sects, were easily reconciled between them two.

* Now what material or temporal Matters, have to do with spiritual and eternal, every one may easily judge; for one might as well endeavour to make up a hodge-poge, or mixture of material and immaterial things together. Where it is so, he seems much the honestest Man who does frankly own that his Interest is his Religion; then let us conclude with the wise *Hudibras*,

* N. B.
Not to be compared to Soul and Body, for when most suppress'd and distracted in state, the Church ever was then in its greatest Purity.

70 *Human Understanding consider'd,*

*When all Disputes are weary'd out,
It's Interest still resolves the Doubt;
For Money being the common Scale,
Of things by Measure, Weight and Tale;
In all the Affair's of Church and State,
It's both the Ballance and the Weight.*

* But the Man is surely Mad, and might as well pretend to stop the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, with his Thumb, as to agree Man-kind, or to bring them to a Reconciliation, since so many Men, so many Minds.

* From hence then we may plainly see, the Vanity, Folly and Madness of these Philosophical, Metaphysical and Religious Disputants; then let us return again to judge of the Wisdom of our Philosopher and Ploughman, the last of which may I think reasonably be judg'd to be the wiser Man. And we find that the *Romans* who were a wise People, went and chose many of their great Men from the Plough, to make them Senators and Consuls. It's certain however, that there are such, or such Ideas, which are more proper for the bringing a Man sooner to understand a particular Science, Trade or Business; yet if his former Ideas be true, though e'er so simple, his Wisdom or Understanding must still be the same, whether with those Ideas or the other; all the Difference will be, that the one will judge by the Ideas, Materials or parts of his Trade; whereas the other will do it by his. Nor is this Ploughman, if of good Sense,

Sense, less capable of understanding when he applies himself to War, Politics, or any other Science, Knowledge or Trade,

Thus Sailors talk and make Comparisons in their own Dialect, of Ships and Sea Affairs; Landmen in their's of things on Shoar, Town's-men of the Town, and Country-men have their rustick or rural Comparisons, yet still their Wisdom or Sense will be the same; only that we understand and esteem that most which is most in our own Way, or love that which is like to our selves; so like draws to like, *simile simile gaudit*. † And although a Logician by his Custom and Practice of disputing, (which is

† Nor have we any occasion to learn or form Syllogisms (as Mr. Locke very well observes) since we see the truth or fallacy of it before we can form any such Syllogism in our Minds; the reason of this clearness of Distinction in one Man above another, he seems to beat some loss about; although I think it is very plain, that this justness or clearness of Reason or Judgement, is more particularly owing to the exactness of the Form or Organization, then to the strength of any particular Ideas, learn'd as a Business) may sooner find out the fallacy of a Sophism. Yet the wife Country man will find it out at his own time, if the

And it is very probable, that this logical way of Reasoning, rather does harm than good; besides, that those Repeti-

72 *Human Understanding consider'd,*

ons are very troublesome to the Mind ; so that if good for any thing, may more easily discover the fallacy of a Sophism, or a little Wit cover'd with good Language, or with a rhetorical Flourish.

I have often laugh'd to see an old Woman puzzling a Philosopher, by asking him a great many odd Questions ; or a Country Fellow putting a Logician to his Logicks. I remember a Lady of Quality of very good Sense, who I had the honour to know, used to puzzle all the Philosophers and Metaphycians that came to her House ; by asking them what a Spirit was, and bid them define it to her ? She used to say, that she could never tell what they would be at, while they at the same time alledged in their own Defence, that her Ladyship could not understand these things, unless she had learn'd her Latin, Philosophy and Metaphysicks : O reply'd the Lady, *if it be so profoundly obscure and subtile, as not to be brought to good Reason and plain English, I shall never break my Brains about such fine Matters, as surpass these ; but continued she, I wish you may not fancy you know a great deal of that you know little or nothing about more then my self.* All she said she could learn about their incorporeal Beings (as they call'd them)

or Spirits, was, that a thousand of them could dance upon the point of a Pin. And I fear we do but too often bring our selves into wild Labyrinths, so as either to talk Nonsense or Blasphemy, when at the same time we imagine our selves to be a talking most profoundly in these Matters.

Mr. *Locke* observes, That according to the method of the Schools, we have often very clear and coherent Discourses, of substantial Beings; which nevertheless amount to nothing. Thus says he, one who has learn'd the following Words, with their ordinary Acceptations annex'd to them, *viz.* Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational, may make several and undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this sort there may be found a great many such Propositions, Reasonings and Conclusions in the Books of Metaphysics, School, Divinity, and natural Philosophy; and after all know as little of God, Spirits or Bodies, as he did before he read them. And these sorts of Reasonings are generally stuff'd full of obscure and perplex'd Terms, which certainly can be of no real Use, unless it be to those who make use of it to shelter their Ignorance. This

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This same Author says, that our having Ideas of the existence of Spirits, proves not that any such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite Spirits, or spiritual Beings, but the eternal God. We have ground to believe (says he) from Revelation, and other Reasons, that there are such; but our Senses are not able to discover their particular Existence, nor can we any more know that there are finite Spirits really existing, by the Ideas we have of such Beings, then the Ideas any one may have of *Fairies* or *Centaures*; he can come to know, that there are such things really existing, which answer to those Ideas: I shall now only add a little Story as to Logicks of a Country-man or Farmer, who having put his Son to the University for his Education; was again return'd home to his Father very full of his Logicks, and a couple of Eggs being laid before him to Eat (was very willing to shew his Wit and Learning) Sir said he to his Father, what would you think to prove that there are three Eggs here? Why truly reply'd the honest Farmer, I should think it very strange; well said the Son, pointing at one of the Eggs, is not that one? Yes said the Father; then pointing at the second, and is not that

that two said he? yes reply'd the old Gentleman; well says the Son, and does not one and two make three? very right says the Father; but at the same time snatching up the two Eggs, now eat you the third said he.

And thus we often fancy to our selves, that we have learn'd or know something more then our Neighbours, when in effect it is often no more but a little Quibbling; or as to the true forming of Syllogisms, I have already said enough, Mr. Butler says,

*He was in Logick a great Critick,
Profoundly skill'd in Analytick;
He could distinguish and divide,
A Hair 'twixt South, and South-West side:
On either which he would Dispute,
Confute, change Hands, and still Confute;
He'd undertake to prove by force,
Of Argument a Man's no Horse;
He'd prove a Buzzard is no Fowl,
And that a Lord may be an Owl;
A Calf an Alderman, a Goose a Justice,
And Rooks committee Men, and Trustees,
He'd run in Debt by Disputation,
And pay with Raticionation.
All this by Syllogism true,
In Mode and Figure he would do.*

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The ingenious Mr. *Lee*, against Mr. *Locke* on Reason says, that a Syllogism is only a Form of Words, and whether it be not better to express our selves by Syllogism, or form then otherwise? First if we were bred up, and accustom'd to this formal Way from our Infancies, in all our common Conversations, Discourses or Reasonings, something more might be said for it; but surely there is no Logician or Schoolman, but must allow that it is some trouble, or takes a little time to range or put those Words in that Form or Order, and consequently a Hindrance to the more nice Perception of Truth; since we cannot be very intent upon two different things at once; or the Soul to be very directly imploy'd two Ways at the same time. But in short, Mr. *Lee*, himself does not deny this distinguishing Capacity or Perception, without knowing any thing about Syllogisms; so that we see the Truth, or right and wrong, before we can Form or know any thing of them: Nor at best can they be said to be of any other Use, but to persuade another; which if he is not without them, never was, nor will be with them: So that they may serve for Dispute and Wrangle, but not to convince.

Or

Or ever to better the Understanding, Wisdom, Judgment, Reason, Perception or Capacity.

And thus much more I dare to add in behalf of those Men and Women, who have not had that sort of Education, are probably better without it; and may reason more justly than the others, who amuse themselves with great things; since oftentimes have their Head only stuff'd full of quibbling Notions.

Thus then a *Ploughman*, a *Sailor*, a *Taylor*, a *Cobler*, or a *Tinker*, if perfectly form'd, or well Organiz'd, will with their true, although common Ideas, all reason exactly and justly, only in talking of a Court, or any thing else; the first will do it by Country Ideas, and makes his Comparisons by these; † so the *Sailor* † By this I infer, that Wisdom is in the Perfection of the Organs. in his Way, the *Taylor*, *Cobler* and *Tinker*, in their's. Yet any one of them being bred or accustomed to Court or Politicks, military or merchantile Affairs, which are as Arts or Trades to be learn'd, would make (no doubt) great Proficients, as we see of the great *Mazarine*, who originally was a Footman, and of little or no other Education then Languages; so likewise *Colbert*, as also *Oliver Cromwell*, who as it is said, was originally bred a *Bremer*, or of no University Learning, &c.

And

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And for what I have observed in the World, the greatest Politicians and Generals, have had but very little, or at least not much esteem'd for their Knowledge in common School Learning; the same might be said of our great Merchants; neither have the famous Physicians in this sort of reputed Learning (as already hinted) been the most successfull.

And it is most certain, that as the genius of a Man of Sense is bent, so he will improve in his Ideas and Knowledge, and arrive at the Perfection of any thing he entirely designs or applies himself too; throwing all other Thoughts aside, to arrive at the height of what he aims at; and probably not having so many Notions in his Head (to lead him out of the way) keeps directly to that, and by this means comes to the greatest Perfection in any one thing, of which more hereafter: And thus we see Men of good Sense can learn or know more in a Years time, in any thing they study or apply too, than others in their whole Life-times. How necessary then are Men of those natural Parts, either in publick or private Business, * although commonly take pleasure in living most obscurely; yet how necessary are they when

* From this Perfection of the Organization, we see the natural Effects.

when found out, in all the Affairs of human Life; serving as a common directory upon all occasions.

But wise-men being sensible of the Follies and Madness of publick Greatness, or Pomp and Splendor, are careless of it, or less forward; for Wisdom and Modesty, as Companions, love a retired and quiet Life; while Impudence and Forwardness carry the Bell in Publick: For such are the Follies of human Nature, that I never knew a huge big carriage of a Man, if forward enough, and although but with a little of that call'd a genteel Air; though e'er so empty or void of Sense, but still got something, where he applied himself either among Courtiers or Women; while the little Modest Man, though e'er so Wise, is rarely much noticed: But these Men it is true, are not so anxious in seeking after Riches; nor can they take those Methods, or think it worth the trouble: Nay, often refuse Greatness, when in their offer as vain, troublesome and foolish.

But to return from this Digression, to the Men of Genius, or natural Wisdom and Reason, without the common Education; it is true, that a *Tinker*, or a *Cobbler*, who has never had or got any other

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other Impressions or Learning, then the continual poreing upon the bottom of a Kettle, or old Shoe, cannot have so many general Ideas, or universal Notions of the World, as one who has read, seen or convers'd more in it; and consequently cannot talk so well, upon many, or the generality of Subjects; yet the more he knows in one way, the less he knows the other way; and probably he who knows every thing, knows nothing.

Nevertheless, I say let us consider, that the few Notions or Ideas which this Man has, are mostly certain, just and true, (which perhaps may be better then where there are many more, and many of which are false or uncertain) what he understands if well Organiz'd, he reasons justly in, and as well as the most universally learn'd; or if he applies himself to Politicks, or the knowledge of Men, War, Merchandize, or any other thing (all which I look upon to be learn'd as Arts or Trades,) he readily arrives to be great, or to a Perfection in them; and probably may be accounted for thus, that he takes most of what he learns, without that regular Education; all by his own certain Observation, Practice or Experience; so that he seems to walk upon very sure footing, in all he does;

does ; and readily adventures no farther then what he very well knows, by true Observation, and certain Experience ; whereas the other imagining himself to know a great deal more then what he truly does, and often building Schemes and Projects upon a traditional Knowledge, or some learn'd Conjecture from some speculative Philosopher, as *Aristotle* or *Descartes*, makes him very often fall into great Blunders or Errors, which often proves his intire Ruine ; of this we see but too many Instances daily, besides a Vanity and Pride it often gives them ; which very frequently likewise proves to their Prejudice, serving to them much in the same manner as Romances and Novels do to some Ladies ; who by reading them, fancy to themselves, that they are no more to be look'd upon as poor Mortals, but as Angels and Goddeses. But what can be said of these things, more then of the common Vanities of the World, and the unreasonable Fancies, Follies and Madnes of Mankind ; may it not justly be compar'd to some Farce or Puppet-show, or to the common Stage with its Actors, or to Children acting a Play : Says the one, I will be a King, and the other, I will be a Queen, and I the Cook, says

G

a third,

a third, and me the Butler, says a fourth, no but says a fifth, you shan't be a King, for I will, and says t'other you shan't be Butler, for I will; at which they readily fall a scuffling, or go together by the Ears, while the strongest Hand carries it. But what Folly? What Madness? From the want of Wisdom, which can only shew us real Happiness; Does not the Butler, the Cook, or the Scullion, live more happy than the King? Or can any troublesome Labour of the Body, equal the Distractions of the Brain? For Pomp, Glory and Splendor, is a meer imaginary thing, or little or nothing real in it. Besides, that when this Play is ended, or Curtain drawn, they are all one and the same, or all *Jack* Fellow well met, *Tom* is as good as the King; and *Joan* as good as my Lady. It is said of *Augustus*, that he ask'd with his last Breath, whether he had not play'd his Farce very well: Or if we would but a little consider, the wonderful Parity or Equality, that the Almighty has put all the Affairs and Circumstances of human Life in, we should not be so very anxious about Greatness, since there is not such a vast deal of Difference as People commonly imagine: For Example, Let us suppose a *Shoemaker* to get a hundred

dred and fifty Pounds a Year, and a Secretary of State, or some publick or great Man to have three thousand a Year, if the latter by his great Post is oblig'd to spend all, and the Tradesman saves any thing, then he is the richer Man; or if we should suppose the one to save a thousand, the other but fifty Pounds a Year, they may be reckon'd equally Rich, since fifty to the one is as much as a thousand to the other.

Neither do his fine Cloaths keep him any warmer then that of the other, or if he has more Delicacies to eat, or Superfluities, is troubled with Stomach-ach, or other Distempers for it; if more Conveniency and Ease as a Ballance for it, is plagu'd with Gout and Gravel, &c. if more Pomp and Grandeur, has more Distraction and Trouble. Or can I see he has any thing more which is truly valuable for his own private Person, and can look upon him as little better then a Factor for others, or a Steward to Tradesmen and Servants. The rest being mostly imaginary, and for that has his own Fears and Mortifications.

Thus the Almighty has thought fit to annex Trouble and Pain to the Joys and Pleasures of this World; that we readily and only seek full Happiness in the

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Enjoyment of him with whom is fulnels of Joy, and at whose Right-hand are Pleasures for evermore.

Monsieur Pascall, admirably well says, speaking of the Vanities of Mankind, that we will not be satisfy'd to live only in such a Way, as might content our own Inclinations, or in the way which is in our Powers; but we will needs live an imaginary Life, or according to the Ideas and Opinions of others, and neglect the true way of living. For says he, if we have Happiness, Generosity or Faithfulness, we immediately must let it be known to others, that it may be added to that imaginary Life; and are guilty of our so many Follies, only for to please the Fancies of other Men, which is never to be done. *Mr. Cowley* from *Martial* says,

Would you be free? it's your chief Wish you
(say,
Come on, I'll shew the Friend the certain
(Way :
If to no Feasts abroad thou lov'st to go,
Whilst bounteous God does Bread at home
(bestow ;
If thou the Goodness of thy Cloaths dost
(prize,
By thine own use, and not by others Eyes ;
If

*If (only safe from Weathers) thou can'st
(dwell,
In a small House, but a convenient Shell ;
If thou without a Sigh or golden Wish,
Can look upon thy beechen Bowl and Dish :
If in thy mind such Power and Greatness be,
The Persian Kings a slave, compar'd with thee.*

If we reason thus then with our selves, our Desires and Inclinations will be much more bounded ; for although it may be very commendable to provide against Sicknes, or the Inconveniencies of old Age ; yet as to the heaping up of vast Sums of Money, is I think what we need not be so very anxious about, since if frugal, a small matter will serve our turns here, and if extravagant, the World cannot satisfy us : Besides, that the getting of great Wealth with a good Conscience is very rare, but if a Man inclines much to be rich, with an intention of doing publick or good Offices with it, is very commendable ; yet we find but few such Instances, or what e'er they intend that way, they but very rarely perform.

And it may be observ'd, that the Men who incline most that way, are least anxious about getting rich. Or as to Children, although a Man is reasonably

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oblig'd to put them in an honest way in the World ; yet I cannot see that he is at all obliged either to damn himself, or to live in Misery, in order to make them rich ; for if good for any thing, a small matter will put them in an honest way in the World, and if extravagant or good for nothing, even that is too much.

If this should seem to be a Digression, yet the whole of my Intention is to keep upon the Subject of Reason, and to shew the Fallacies of our common Customs and Reasonings, as well as its perfection in the *Organization* : Thus then when we seriously come to consider, all the Affairs of human Life, there seems almost in every thing to appear Distraction, Folly and Madness : It is true, there are some who are less than other some, and that as I have said before, very much depends upon the Exactness of the *Organization*, and a good and plain Education.

I have already hinted, that a Man who minds nothing but his own private Interest, and has no thought of the common good of his Society ; nor has ever done or endeavour'd any thing for their benefit as well as his own, ought to be esteem'd and treated as a *Wasp*, a *Thief*, or a common *Robber* ; nor can this Man
miss

mish to get rich, while the other who endeavours for the publick good must grow poor. Where there is an incapacity of Brains, the Purse should supply according to Ability. Nor as Mr. *Locke* says, can the Country Esquire who has never done, or made the least Attempt for the good of Mankind, be look'd upon any better, than as one of his own Cattle.

Mr. *Cowley* speaking of a Man of Sense, and Virtues being in the World; what can an honest Man do says he, in the middle of twenty thousand Knaves, who are all armed cap-a-pee with the defensive Arms of worldly Prudence, and the offensive too of Craft and Malice. Or says he, it must be more easy and happy for this Man to be alone, than in the middle of so many wild Beasts; for Man is to Man all kind of Beasts, a fawning Dog, a roaring Lion, a thieving Fox, a robbing Wolf, a dissembling Crocodile, a treacherous Decoy, and a rapacious Vulture: And those says he, we call the most barbarous People, are probably the most civiliz'd: And adds, that the greatest boast of Eloquence and Philosophy is, that they first congregated Men dispersed, united them into Societies, and build up the Houses and Walls of Cities.

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I wish says he, they could unravel all they have Woven, and gives us our Woods, and Innocence again, instead of our Castles, and our Policies; and no doubt, the first Builders of Towns, and Founders of Empires, were Avarice and Ambition; and the gathering those Multitudes together, has made them rather to Couzen, Murther, and live upon one another, then any great Benefits receiv'd by their wholesome Laws. Or if they were not (before) so well defended against Vice, there were no such Rewards for it. We find that one infects another, and that *Evil Communication corrupt good Manners*: How wise and friendly was that Advice of *Martial's* to *Fabian*, meeting him newly arriv'd at Rome,

*Honest and poor, faithful in Word and
Thought,
What hast thee Fabian to the City brought?
Thou neither the Buffoon, nor Bawd canst
play,
Nor with false Whispers the Innocent betray.
Nor corrupt Wives, nor from rich Beldams
get,
A living by thy Industry and Sweat;
Nor with vain Promises and Projects Cheat
Nor bribe or flatter any of the great.*

But

But you're a Man of Learning, prudent, just,
A Man of Courage, firm, and fit for Trust,
Why you may stay, and live unenvied here,
But faith go back, and you keep where you
were.

And thus we see that the wisest men are for retiring themselves, for it must be very shocking and uneasy for a Man of Sense, to keep Company with Fools and Madmen, or Virtue with Vice and Knavery; or can we say, whether *Democritus* or *Heracitus*, had most Reason in retiring; the one Weeping, the other Laughing at all the World, as so many Madmen. And I think the World may truly be consider'd, as nothing else but one *Bedlam*: Or who indeed is not mad in some Respect or other? Or whether those who would pass for the most Wise, are not often the greatest Fools? † Who would pretend to give Rules to Bedlamites or Madmen. Mr. *Dryden* I think says something to this purpose, that great Poets surely are next a kin to Madmen. And I have oftentimes known the wisest of Men to be call'd Fools, because they did not agree in the common Notions of the World,

† And *Horace* in his third *Satyr* says, that *Chrysippus* and his Followers, call'd all those Mad who were led by their vicious Passions or Inclinations.

Were

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* Para-
phrase on
Boileau.

* *Were I to chuse, who to my cost already am,
One of those monstrous Creatures call'd a Man;
I'd be a Dog, a Monkey, or a Bear,
Or any other Shape I'd wear :
But that of this vain Animal,
So fond of being thought Rational.*

So the wisest Men, who find their Rules or Precepts but of little use; are generally, or for the most part for retiring themselves from the World, or living quietly and privately. Nevertheless, I cannot believe, but that a Man of a sound Judgment, and solid Reason, is capable of coming to as great Perfection (if not greater) were he to apply himself that way; in trepanning, couzening, or cheating, for this is a Trade to be learn'd and improv'd both by Practice and Observation. And that wise-men are most capable of improving, is not I think to be doubted; but as they have no other Ideas or Practices, but what are honourable and virtuous; so they direct their Thoughts, and improve that way, as the Fool or Knave does the other way.

We plainly see, that a Man understands things according to the way he directs his Thoughts; for I look upon the Knowledge, in respect to the Affairs of this World, as so many Trades or Bu-
sinesses

finesses to be learn'd or acquir'd, and only by accustoming our selves to the different things or Ideas, proper to such an Art or Way, is that which must make us come to a Perfection in it.

And some young Men of good Sense, shall learn more in any Business, or the Knowledge of Mankind in a twelve Months time, or such a short but true Observation and Experience, then others in their whole Life-times; so that although often, yet it is not always; we find the vinegar Face, and grizly Beards, the most knowing. It is certain, that a Man may trifle or spend his time away any how; yet if a wise man is condemned to the heel-piecing of Shoes, or Cobling, or Fishing; how can any such Man make an Appearance in the World (according to Mode and Fashion now a Days) and yet we see, that the wisest Men were such in the primitive Times. In a Word, all the Sciences and Improvements in temporal Affairs, cannot I think reasonably be reckon'd but as so many Arts or Trades, and improve or come a greater length, as we imploy our selves more or less in such or such a way; as in *Law, Physick, Mathematicks, the Belles lettre, Politicks, Merchandize, Cosmography*: Nay, even
Language

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Language or Speaking, goes much by Practice and Custom too; so likewise a Proficiency in making Amours. And he who is a great Master at any one, can scarcely be so at all: For what a Man gets the one way, he readily loses the other, unless it be in those things, which have a dependency upon, or are a help to one another. Mr. Pope very well says in his *Essay on Criticism*,

*Nature to all things fix'd the Limits fit,
And wisely curb'd proud Man's pretending
Wit,
As on the Land, while here the Ocean gains,
In other parts it leaves wide sandy Plains:
Thus in the Soul, while Memory prevails,
The solid Power of Understanding fails;
Where Beams of warm Imagination play,
The Memories soft Figures melt away:
One Science only will one Genius fit,
So vast is Art, so narrow human Wit;
Not only bounded to peculiar Arts,
But oft in those, confin'd to single Parts:
Like Kings we lose the Conquests gain'd
before,
By vain Ambition still t'extend them more.
Each might his several Province well com-
mand,
Would all but stoop to what they understand.*

And

And thus if we consider a great many very ingenious Men, such as *Mr. Cowley*, who was no doubt a Man of excellent Sense, although he amused and imploy'd himself in Poetry; as also *Mr. Dryden* and *Shakespear*, &c. Yet I think none needs to doubt, but that if they had intirely employ'd themselves to Politicks, or any Application or Business, that depended upon good Sense, they would have made as great a Figure that way; but had receiv'd such a Habit, as to have made so strong and deep Impressions or Ideas in their way of Poetry; by which Application, although no Man ever got great Riches any more than they, yet took such a particular Pleasure in it, as not to think of leaving it off.

That it is so I think cannot be deny'd, and a great many Instances might be given to this Purpose; of which we have a very lively Instance of late, the ingenious *Mr. Prior*. And thus Wisdom or Sense, will always be good Sense; which e'er way it is directed whether in that we call but Trifles, or that we call Matters of greater Consequence, which perhaps, are all but Trifles in the main.

Nevertheless it is most certain, that some Men are better fitted or more proper for some Ways or Businesses, than other
some,

94 *Human Understanding consider'd,*

some, which may not only proceed from the Difference of Ideas ; but likewise from the Structure of the Organs, or Form of Parts and Nature of the Fluids, the great Causes of our different Passions and Inclinations: Therefore our last Author very well says,

(frame,

*First follow Nature, and your Judgment
By her just Standard, which is still the same:
Unerring Nature, still divinely Bright,
On clear, unchang'd, and universal Light ;
Life, Force and Beauty, must to all impart,
At once the Source and End, and taste of
Art.*

And no doubt that old saying is very true, *Poeta Nascitur, non fit* ; which I understand thus, that although a great many both learn'd and wise-men, could not however make good Poets ; yet I judge that readily proceeded, either from the want of Application, or from the *Organization*, or Form of the parts of the Brain, or of Hearing ; although I never knew a Man of Sense, and who lov'd or understood Musick, that could not have made a good Poet if he read much Poetry, and apply'd himself that way. For it is only (as I imagine) good Sense or Wit, put in Harmony, or musically set.

Yet

Yet some will always be more fit for one fort of Poetry, others for other forts.

Thus Men have different Talents, and each values himself according to the way he follows or applies himself too; Poets laugh at Merchants, and Merchants at Poets, Physicians at both, and Lawyers at all; while every one is for discoursing and making Comparisons in his Way: He of the *Belles lettres*, thinks you talk Nonsense, if you speak not in his Way; the Souldier for martial Terms, the *Sailor* for a marine Dialect, and the Merchant a merchantile, while the Politician fools them all. Whereas there is not in reality any other Difference among Men, then those who are most beneficial to the common Good: And even in that there are Considerations to be made too; as in some who have the opportunities and helps of shewing themselves much more than other some. Neither can I be of Opinion, that Wisdom or Reason, is one bit to be help'd, or any way to be improv'd, as is commonly suppos'd, for although it is true, that a greater variety of Impressions or Ideas, will make us capable of judging of a greater number of things, yet Wisdom or Reason must still be the same. For if two who have all right
Ideas

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Ideas, the one a great many, the other but a few; if he who has the many comes to Reason upon them few which the other has, their Judgments or Wisdom, will be found equally the same. Since that Wisdom or Reason as we have said, is altogether owing to a Perfection of the Organs, and proper state of the Solids and Fluids of the Body; or the Soul's acting in that well form'd Machine, upon true, perfect and just Ideas or Impressions, receiv'd from external Things, Actions or Objects.

But if any one shall grumble at the Word Idea, as too general a term, we shall find it the same thing, if we make use of the Words, Modes, Powers, abstract Notions, or what Notions they please; neither of all which will be of use or force if the *Organization* be wrong: For no Notions will make a Changeling reason right; and he who denies him to be a Man, may deny a Man of Sense to be so likewise, when he becomes foolish, mad, or changling, which often happens; the one being an Accident before the Birth, and the other afterward.

And we plainly see, that if a Man is not rightly organiz'd or well form'd, all the Logick, or Learning in the World will

will never make him reason right. It is true, that it may give him a Confusion of Ideas or Notions, and make him talk very learned Nonsense, as we often find; yet never to speak better Sense, but rather worse than before, because he fancies to himself to know something, and is in effect nothing; having his Mind only burden'd or carry'd with things he knows not the use of, (if they have any) or how to reason rightly about them. So that I believe it may often make Fools to appear worse than what they otherwise would do: And although certain Experience or Observation are the best Instruments by which we can shew the good Effects of our Wisdom and Judgment, yet it cannot be said, that Reason or Wisdom, in it self, is any better than before.

For Example, if a *Centaur*, (which among the Ancients, is supposed to have been a Man on Horse-back) is told me by some one to have been half *Satyr*, half *Dragon*: I shall consequently say, that a *Centaur* is a very fierce and ugly Creature: No says another, who has seen the *Centaur*, or Man on Horse-back, it is a Mistake; he is neither fierce nor ugly. Nevertheless I say, the one reasons as justly as the other, for each of

H

them

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them reason right according to the Representations given. It is said, that a Boy passing by a *Butcher's-Stall*, see a couple of Sheep lying there, ready to be kill'd; the Boy ask'd what they were; *Lions*, said the *Butcher*; after which going to School, he told the Master he look'd very like a *Lion*; a *Lion* said the Master: where did you see one? In the *Butcher's Stall* said the Boy; upon which the Master very severely whipp'd him. Now none can say, but that the Boy reason'd as right, or his Judgment was as good, if the Master did look sheepish, as if he had known to have given it the proper Name of a Sheep.

And the same is to be said of all other false Ideas, Wisdom or Reason is still the same, although the Consequences may prove different, occasion'd by wrong or false Representations of things: So as *Mr. Locke* says, a Man ignorant of the *English Tongue* may call Purple Scarlet yet makes no Falshood in the Ideas.

Thus then if the Solids and Fluids be right and equally well form'd, Wisdom or Reason will still be the same; neither can any number of Ideas or Notions make us Wise, and if a wrong Formation all manner of Ideas will be of little Effect. *Solomon* says, *Bray a Fool in a Mortar*

and

and he shall not become Wise : Or according to the old Proverb, Send a Fool abroad, and he will come home a greater Fool than he went. One of the Professors of Philosophy at *Paris*, used to alledge, that the Children were very much beholding to the Midwives, in taking care to put or form their Heads right, when newly born ; but whether so or not, we are certain that they can be wounded, depress'd, or put wrong, both then and afterwards.

A great deal more might be said, and a thousand other Instances could be given, that our Wisdom and Reason is altogether owing to the Perfection of our Organs, (and particularly to the Brain) or to the Solids and Fluids of the Body.

Nor can any thing help or amend it, but the Alteration of the *Organization* or Fluids : And which I believe is not always impossible, of which we have several Instances, as by drinking much, or the great Passions of Grief or Joy, Alteration of Diet or Climate.

After the same manner we may consider, that Wisdom or Reason seems to grow as the Body, and comes not to its Perfection, until the Organs are perfectly form'd, or the Body is at its full

Growth; so we generally find the reasoning Faculties most clear, when a Man is at his full Strength; as likewise that we often find them to decay as the Body does, and frequently also to grow better and worse with it.

So commonly when a Man becomes crazy in all the parts of the Body, his reasoning Faculties for the most part become so too (and where there is an Exception, I am apt to think, that the Brain and Fluids may be in a good State.) Nor can it be otherwise, if we consider all Souls to be the same; and that it is the Soul's acting with fit Instruments, or a well organiz'd Body, whose Solids and Fluids are in Perfection; which with Ideas performs the Operations call'd Judgment and Reasoning.

For, as before, whether the Ideas or Impressions are just or not, Wisdom or Reason will still be the same; for things are either wrongly represented to us, by our Education, or the Senses mistaken by a *Deceptio Visus*, or such like; the Defect being a wrong Representation of the Object or Idea to the Senses, or to be what it is not, and according to which the Soul makes a Judgment. Or can the Knowledge of *Dio p tricks*, or different Representations,

sentations, be call'd any thing else but an Art or Experience in such a Way.

Nor can it be said, that Wisdom or Reason any way improves by thinking, as is commonly suppos'd; for even that no doubt may be learn'd or made a Business; as it is said of *Pythagoras*, who oblig'd his Scholars to be silent the first five Years. It is true, that a Man by thinking may draw more variety, or a much greater number of Consequences, from such particular Ideas; yet Wisdom or Reason will still be the same, can neither be said to be better or worse; for the more he thinks one Way, the less he'll do the other: Or at best, is only better fitted with Instruments for such a Way.

What I shall farther add is, that it seems very probable, Writers who have pass'd their full Vigour and Strength, are not so strong, bright or clear, in their reasoning Faculties (for thinking and reasoning much, is hard Work.) For which I think they ought not to trouble themselves so much with intricate Dissertations, or very hidden and obscure Disputes; but rather to oblige the World with certain and undoubted Quotations, Observations or Experiences.

* N. B. We do not soon or rashly judge of the Wise-
man's Judg-
ment to fail, until it is be-
come very ap-
parent. Or he may have great Experi-
ences, and yet the rea-
soning Faculty not so strong.

For we have but too often seen many famous Authors, who have wrote in Vigour and Strength, have again lost their Reputation, by writing in their old Age.

But if it be alledg'd, that some Men have kept their Judgment and good Reasoning, when their Bodies have been crazy and fail'd; it must still be allow'd, that their Senses remian'd good, and consequently the Brain. For if these are crazy too, or fail'd, we shall find a Decay of Wisdom; for the vital Fire then extinguishes, and the Soul soon leaves the frail Machine, that tottering Habitation, or ruinous Frame, to make its final Exit, where Time shall be no more.

THE

REFLECTIONS

UPON A

Single and Married State.

AFTER what I have said of the *Organization and Understanding*, I shall now more particularly consider Wisdom, and in what Happiness consists, both in the single and married State. Wisdom or Reason, if not the same, I think (at least) may very well be said to be inseparable; and no doubt contributes more to our real Happiness both here and hereafter, than any thing else in this World.

But let us reflect a little on this Felicity, Happiness, Satisfaction, Enjoyment or Pleasure: For to the Wiseman, no doubt that will appear to be Happiness and Pleasure, which to the Fool seems Misery and Trouble; so the foolish Man's Happiness is Misery and Trouble to the Wiseman. And although Custom may habituate or make us to

follow, or run more in such a way, yet doubtless our Inclinations are much owing to our Passions, natural Disposition or Constitution ; which is much according to the Make, Form or Structure, and nature of the Solids and Fluids of the Body. And after the same manner our Appetites and Senses are delighted with different things, which Difference or Delight (as already prov'd) proceeds from the different Structure, or the Form and Figure of the Organs or Senses. How ridiculous then is it for me to endeavour to persuade a Man to like that which the Form and Structure of my Organs allow to be good, while his deny it: For the Diversities of Pleasure and Dislike, (in the same thing) must be, from the different Figuration or Texture and Make of the Senses, or Organs. As Hearing, Seeing, Tasting, Feeling and Smelling, the Nerves being all the same, and is that which makes one Man like one thing, another to dislike it ; so one Man can eat *Cheese*, and another cannot suffer the Sight or Smell of it ; the same may likewise be said as to Seeing and Hearing : And as there are not any two in the Universe (or their Senses) which are exactly alike ; so it is not possible for any two to agree exactly

+ Thus
one Man
likes one
Woman,
another
likes the
other
Woman,
&c.

ly in their Sentiments, or in every thing alike : And much to be doubted whether ever there were any such two in the World. This however may sound harsh in the Ears of Lovers, although certainly so ; for which Happiness seems to be yet more certain in a single Life, then in the married State : and probably for this *St. Paul* wisely prefers *Celibacy*, or the single Life to Matrimony ; knowing how difficult or hard it is to make a Choice, or to find two who are very near in Temper, or very agreeable to one another, and that for their whole Life-times. Thus it is probable that Fools of a Temper, if coupled with Fools of the same Temper, may (for ought I know) be the most happy Choice ; and by the same Reason the Wise with the Wise ; for one Wise, and the other Fool, can never be both happy : The Wise one may make the Fool so, but the Fool can never make the Wise one so. How careful ought we to be then in our Choice, since this is the greatest and most material Turn or Change in human Life, and on which in a great Measure, both our present and future Happiness depends.

Thus *Solomon* sought Wisdom, and not Riches, and doubtless it is that only
which

which can make us happy, and nothing else ; for all the Gold in the World cannot : Nor is there any Comparison to be made betwixt Wisdom and all the Treasure of the Universe ; for a Beggar, if a Wise-man, will make himself more happy than an Emperor, if a Fool. Nor is it possible for any Couple if both are Wise and Prudent, (*viz.* Wisdom, not Wit) ever to be unhappy, although reduced to the greatest Poverty and Want. So it is as impossible for two Fools, although e'er so rich to be truly happy. Thus Wisemen will value Wisdom, and Fools Riches : And although all must allow that Riches has its own Value, yet there is no more Comparison betwixt Wisdom and Riches, as to the making us happy both here and hereafter, than betwixt the Choice of the Devil and an Angel : Nor is the greatest or richest Man in the World, if a Fool, to be compared to a Beggar, if Wise.

How much more happy was *Diogenes*, and how did he despise *Alexander the Great*, when he came to see him in all his Glory, and bid him ask what he would have from him ? Stand out of my Sun-shine (said *Diogenes*) thou takest from me what thou canst not give me.

In a Word, Wisemen know the Value of Wisdom, and Fools will never know it. Thus either for a Wiseman or Woman, although reduced to the greatest Necessities, and from thence chose to be Partner to the greatest Prince or Princess of the Universe; if foolish, the Wife one must surely make the poorest and a very miserable Bargain; for what can be greater Pain, Trouble or Torture, then to be ty'd to Nonsense, Folly and Madness, during the whole Life.

To the Wise (who are Modest and Sober) a very small matter suffices, and for a Fool, the Riches of the Universe will not satisfy.

* Nor can I ever be persuaded, but that a Wise-man, although e'er so poor, is more preferable, or farther above a Fool, tho' e'er so rich, than an Angel is above a Man; Wisdom being the Gift of God, and not to be purchas'd. Wisemen are so sensible of the Value of it, with the Happiness and true Pleasure it carries along with it, that if they alter their Condition (if single) to the married State, their cheif Aim is (or ought to be) a Wise-woman, which is the true and great Barter, all other worldly Trifles being only as common Accidents, and altogether

* Or
ought a
Man
ever to
be e-
steem'd
because
Rich; for
if so, we
are to
esteem
the De-
vil or
Prince of
Riches;
and thus
Vice will
ever in-
crease:
therefore
we are
only to
respect
and va-
lue Wis-
dom and
Virtue.

† The
chief end
of Mar-
riage,
ought to
be for a
sincere
Friend
so rare to
be had,
and for
which
the wise
and vir-
tuous are
only to
be de-
pendent
on.

altogether foreign to the true Design,
or real Joy and Felicity: † Nor can
Riches any more be compar'd to Wis-
dom, then a Grain of Sand is to real
Happiness. It is certain however, that
if a Man and Woman are both e'er so
Wise, and both Poor, yet common
Prudence ought not to allow them to
go together only to make Beggars in the
World; thus such People commonly
live single. Nor is it to be doubted, that
if both Wise, and both Rich, they will
find greater Conveniencies for Marriage;
although I can never be persuaded, that
all the Money in the Universe, or even
Birth or Beauty, or any thing else in this
World, is any way comparable, or can
make any manner of amends for the least
Degree or Deficiency of Wisdom. All
Creatures have a regard to their Choice
and Posterity; or will the best Animals
degenerate into a base Race: How
much more then ought Man to regard
his Choice.

However, we do but very rarely
find, that the wise and virtuous Men
make great Fortunes in the World, es-
pecially by Marriages (or yet Preferment
at Court,) since it may be a very great
Question, whether a Woman ever fell in
Love with Wisdom? that they do with
Nonsense

Nonfense and Folly, we see daily Instances of it ; or as Children, with a Fool and a Feather in his Cap, the Bigness of his Carcase, his * Laced-Coat, * As Children value or chuse, their Ginger-Bread Men by their guilding. Sir Walter Raleigh says, fine
 or Handsomness of his Wig ; whereas Wise-men make the least Figure or Appearance that Way. As a Gentleman, who Courting of a young Lady, was rejected ; and being ask'd her Objections to him, found fault with his Dress and Wig : Nay then, reply'd the Gentleman, my best Advice is for her to marry a *Valet de Chambre* or Perriwig-Maker.

Or indeed how much better is it at Court, where a fine Suit of Cloaths is but too often preferr'd to a fine Intellect ; for Wise-men are not fond of Show, but as Mr. Cowley says, they led a Life just as it were by Stealth ; for Wisdom is rather known to be Melancholy, Modest, and Pensive ; as Solomon says, *in much Knowledge, there is much Sorrow* ; which I understand thus, that it must needs be Sorrow and Trouble for a Wise-man to see the common Madness, Follies and Distractions of Mankind, as it may make one melancholy to go into *Bedlam*. For otherwise Wisdom, no doubt, in it self, is altogether comfortable. Or what a poor Figure do we commonly find the wisest Men make in the World.

110 *Reflections upon a Single*

World. Mr. Cowley says, of Merab, Saul's Daughter, upon his promising of her to David,

*But haughty she, did this just Match
despise,
Her Pride debauch'd her Judgment and her
Eyes :
An unknown Youth, ne'er seen at Court
before,
Who Shepherd's Staff, and Shepherd's Habit
bore :
The seven born Son of no rich House were
still
Th'unpleasant Forms which her high Thoughts
did fill.*

It's true he again says,

*But Michal, in whose Breast all Virtues
move,
That hatch the pregnant Seeds of sacred Love;
With juster Eyes the noble Object meets,
And turns all Merab's Poyson into Sweets.
She saw and wonder'd, how a Youth unknown,
Should make all Fame so soon to come his
own.*

But such a Choice is very rare; besides, that our Author intimates in some Lines hereafter, that she knew he
was

*This weight all Mercenary Projects tries,
And knows that to be rich, is to be Wise:
By usual Observations he can tell,
The sacred Charms that in true Sterling
dwell.*

Grace : * No so-
Mind; ber Man
kind : can get
supplies, by the
ies. Riches of
a Wife,
since on-
ly as a

* No sober Man can get by the Riches of a Wife, since only as a good Steward for her and her Children. The extravagant Man gets because he wants much Money to spend.

If

If ever I more Riches did desire,
Then Cleanliness and Quiet do require:
If e'er Ambition did my Fancy cheat,
With any Wish so mean as to be great;
Continue Heaven, still from me to remove,
The humble Blessings of that Life I love.

And then he says,

*This only grant me, that my Means may lye,
Too low for Envy, for Contempt too high.*

But then he says, speaking of Liberty,
*Who governs his own Course with steady hand:
 Who does himself with sov'reign Power
 command:
 Whom neither Death, nor Poverty does fright,
 Who stands not awkwardly in his own Light
 Against the Truth: Who can when Pleasures
 knock
 Loud at his Door, keep from the Bolt and Lock.
 Who can, though Honour at his Gate should
 stay,
 In all her masking Cloaths, send her away,
 And cry be gone, I have no Mind to play.*

In a Word, I have endeavour'd to shew in what Happiness consists; altho' it is probable, that every Man will have his own particular Thoughts of Happiness. And no doubt most of the World

World are against a single Life : The *Roman Emperors* and *Consuls* were against it, and look'd upon the *Roman* Batchelors as Enemies to the common Good ; although it's probable that proceeded from a politick Design, by being numerous, the better to maintain their Strength, Power and Grandeur : Yet it is very probable, that where there is a right and prudent Choice of a wise Woman, it is the most happy Life ; but she is not every where to be found : *Solomon*, I think, says a Man wise have I found in a Thousand, but a wise Woman have I not found among all these. However, I must own, that I think there are as many Wise among them, as among Men, (if not more) since rarely that they have such a great Opinion of their learned profound Chymical Knowledge, as the vain Man too commonly has ; and probably proves them to be so much the wiser. Besides, that if Men deny them other Notions and Ideas, or any Play to Act, but that of Pots and Petticoats, their whole Knowledge, Discourse, and Fancies must run that Way ; whereas I have said before, such particular Impressions by Custom, make us capable of such a particular Trade, Knowledge or Science. And it is according to the Part we have to

act in the Play, we are esteem'd, or make a Figure in the World. However, it is most certain, that the wise Ones either of Men or Women, are but too, too rare in the World.

Thus then we shall find a great many Difficulties, as to a Marriage Choice : Besides that, if we consider to chuse right, we ought to prefer that one before all other Creatures in the Universe, in order to be truly happy.

He then who is resolv'd to live comfortably in that State, let him guard against Beauty, or be careful how he too precipitately falls in Love; for in that Case, his Eyes, Ears and Senses, are become viciate, and no more to be trusted too : For as a Man in the *Jaundice*, who sees every thing yellow, so the other sees all right that the belov'd does, though e'er so wrong : But Sir *Walter Rawleigh* very well says, it is a Folly to advise against the Witchcraft of Beauty ; but believe it, says he, that if you can resist it for a while, you shall see another yet much more pleasing than the first, second, or third Love ; and remember, says he, he who marries for Beauty, binds himself to that for Life, which may neither last or please him for a Year, for the Degree dieth when it is obtain'd, and the Affection

Affection perisheth when it is satisfy'd. Solomon says, *Who can find a virtuous Woman, for her Price is far above Rubies: The Heart of her Husband doth safely trust in her, so that he shall have no need of Spoil. She will do him good, and no evil, all the Days of her Life. Strength and Honour are her cloathing, and she shall rejoice in time to come: She openeth her Mouth with Wisdom, and in her Tongue is the Law of Kindness. She looketh well to the ways of her Household, and eateth not the Bread of Idleness: Her Children arise up and call her blessed, her Husband also, and he praiseth her. Many Daughters have done virtuously, but thou excellest them all: Favour is deceitful, and Beauty is Vanity, but a Woman that feareth the Lord, she shall be praised.*

Sir Thomas Moor advises his Friend to have no regard to either Wealth or Beauty in the Choice of a Wife; and if he desires Happiness, bids be sure to chuse a virtuous One, which will be Joy, Felicity and Comfort to him during his whole Life, whether in Adversity or otherwise: And the same no doubt may be said of Men. Sir Walter R. as yet speaking of Beauty, says, it is true, a Man generally prefers his Fancy in that Appetite or Passion, before all other

worldly Desires, sacrificing his Honour, Credit and Safety to it. Yet remember, says he, although these Affections do not last, Marriage endureth to the end of thy Life. But alas! we are but rarely so wise as to take those wholesome Precepts until it be too late.

To what Purpose then is it to advise in this, any more than in Controversy: It is a Passion but rarely to be govern'd by Reason; or where have we seen one fall in Love with Wisdom or Virtue. Then let us cease with this musty Philosophy, or to advise that which will not be advised, and conclude with the great Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia*, where in his Dialect betwixt Reason and Passion,

Reason says,

But Reason will, that Reason govern most,

Passion Answers,

But Passion will, that Passion rule the Roast.

T H E

THE
CONCLUSION;
AND OF
EDUCATION.

FROM all what is said before, then I conclude, that Wisdom or Reason is not any real thing, but a Capacity, or the Soul's acting in the greatest Perfection; which must altogether be owing to the Exactness, and Justness of the Instruments, or Solids and Fluids of the Body: Since, if those be wrong, all the Ideas or Impressions in the World, will never give him a Capacity, or make him Wise. These only serving, as I said, to fit or make him better to understand such a particular Trade, Science or Business; since all the Knowledge or Learning we have, for our temporal and human Affairs, are to be acquir'd or learn'd as so many Businesses or Trades: For the Souls of all Men are probably

the same, or equally Wise; and if so, there cannot be any other way rightly to account for the Differences of their Operations. For if we were to suppose the Soul of one Man to be better than another; it were reasonable to believe, that it should still appear to be so, what e'er may happen to the *Organization*: But on the contrary, we see, that the wisest become equally mad or foolish by Accidents, or from the Vitiation of the Solids and Fluids of the Body. Nor I believe, will any be so gross as to say, that God has given a foolish Soul to a Changeling: For the Soul is the same, although it acts in that different Manner, upon that different Fabrick or Machine.

Hath not the Potter power over the Clay of the same lump, to make one Vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

Nay, but O Man, who art thou, that reflectest against God? shall the thing form'd, say to him that form'd it, why hast thou made me thus?

A good *Organization* then, or Form, and particularly that of the Head or Brain, (the Seat of all the Senses) with the proper State or Nature of the Fluids, is the principle thing to be wish'd for; and not to be acquir'd, but probably preferable to any thing else in this World.

Not

Not but that it is absolutely necessary, for the judging right, or rather the shewing of our Wisdom and Reason, by the good Effects, which can only be done by the receiving of just and true Notions, or right Ideas, Impressions, or Representations of things; whether it be by those we call more simple, (probably the most certain) or those we call more learn'd.

For we shall find, that according to the old Proverb, *An Ounce of Mother's Wit, is worth a Pound of Logicks.*

And thus according to the Structure or Form, and the Nature of the Fluids, we shall have our Passions or Inclinations to differ; and by the wrong Representation of things, will occasion different Effects; that is, a different Sentence or Judgment to arise from our Reason. If thus we join then the strength of our different Temperaments or Inclinations, the wrong or various Representation of things, (by prejudice of Education) together with our private or publick temporal Interests; we shall find these the great and original Causes of all our Quarrellings, Divisions and Disputes.

And if we did but take the time seriously to reflect, and think a little

† Altho' every one, in some Degree differs; yet still there is Truth or Agreement, which is observing the Will or Institutions of the Almighty, being all for the Benefit of human Society, since we can in no way be serviceable to him.

on this, it would make us more cautious, and consequently much more wise, in not too rashly judging of any other Man's Judgment, Wisdom, Reason, or Opinion; excepting in those things which are contrary to the Dictates, and great Rules of Morality, and deny'd by all good Men, and civil Societies. I can never enough wonder at the Impudence and Vanity of some Men, (which however seems to be the greatest Sign of Ignorance) who would have all the World to believe, that their Reason is preferable to all Mankind's: But may not one as easily, and with as much Reason, endeavour to persuade the World, † that he has the most beautiful and handsomest, or best Form of Body and Face in it: Since it is not to be doubted, that our Reason and Judgment is as much different one from another, as we are in Forms or Faces; and may probably be as easie for him to prove the one as the other; since so many Men, so many Minds. For my own Part, I could never have the Vanity to believe or think my Face or Body comparable to Millions of others; and far less could I ever believe, my Reason, Opinion or Judgment, preferable to any Man's, where the thing could suffer the least Dis-

Dispute, and was not condemn'd by all good Men, or human and regular Societies : And this in some Measure is to do justice to all Mankind.

Not but that we may in a friendly manner, endeavour to represent things rightly (or according to our Notions or Conceptions of them) to one another : But if that will not do, it is probably the best way to decline it ; since it is to be fear'd, that they have contracted too strong a Prejudice, Habit, Custom or Interest, if not likewise vitiate in the *Organization*, or Form and Nature of the Solids and Fluids of the Body : For it seems but too apparent, that there are a vast many who are loath to change their Religion, or Church, only from the being used and habituate to that Place, and from an Unwillingness to leave their old Acquaintance there, and its Customs. For if we find a Man unwilling to leave an old accustom'd Place or Tavern, Friends, Company, or Coffee-house he has been used to all his Life ; and from whose People or Companies, he receives Friendships, Civilities and Favours : How much more must this make him adhere to the former. And these I say, with the strength of Interest, we shall

† Thus we ought probably to give some allowance for insignificant Differences, of Tempers and Opinions ; as also to Times, Places or Countries.

find

find to go a great Length in the hindring Multitudes to change from one Sect to another. In fine, I shall refer my Reader to the foregoing Parts, being almost a weary of Treating any longer upon this Subject, although inexhaustible in it self: Yet if what I have said already, be not of some Use, to say more may be of as little; for which I shall conclude this to say something of *Education*.

If there be so much owing from what is said, to the Perfection of the Organs; especially the principal Part, or *Sensorium Commune*, the Seat of all the Senses, viz. the Head and Brain: How much ought we to take care of our Choices, in order to have our Posterity the more perfect that way: We find, that this has ever been regarded among all Sorts and Kinds of Creatures, as well as Vegetables; such as grafting upon a good Stock, or a Chip of the same Block, a Bird of a good Nest, a Dog or Horse of a good Kind. Yet Man, who ought above all Creatures to be the most careful that way, has been the most careless, especially of late, that they have so run into all manner of Vice, so as to be tempted to sell, pawn or mortgage their Body and Souls to the Devil, (for Money) in order

order to support their most insatiable Avarice, and unparallel'd Pride and Luxury: which nevertheless, can only tend to their temporal miserable Infirmities, accompany'd with Confusion, Distraction, Folly and Madness, while here; and to their eternal Damnation and Slavery hereafter. But if such Care is taken for the good Kinds of all Creatures and Things, how much ought we to take care in the coupling and chusing of the good Kinds, among human Creatures; since that is a natural Gift not to be purchas'd by all the Riches in the Universe. For how much do we find Dogs and Horses to be valued according to their different Kinds and Natures; so we may observe, that Children generally take very much after their Parents (*N. B.* All Children may not be of the suppos'd Father).

And although the Stateliness of the kind is something to be valued, for pleasing of the Eye, or to look at; yet above all, the Stateliness of the Mind, that is its Humility, Virtue, Prudence and Wisdom, (which latter probably includes all the other good Properties) is far preferable to any Form of Body.

Nor shall we but very rarely find, that the Children of a very wise and
virtuous

virtuous Father and Mother, prove nevertheless, very great Fools, and very vicious (N. B. that a great many very good and virtuous People, are not always endow'd with great Prudence and Wisdom) : Thus we shall find something of the old Proverb true, Cat after Kind ; and the same may be observ'd in all other Creatures.

So that the Wise, Prudent and Virtuous, will always make Choice of those of their own Kind, as preferable to any thing else in this World ; not only for the sake of Posterity, with their own temporal or present Satisfaction, in true and real Happiness ; but also as being the most probable way of bringing both them and theirs, to the eternal Blessings of all Joy and Felicity.

But now having been all along upon Wisdom or Reason, I need not give any farther Marks of it, being so evident to every one ; nor will I pretend to determine, whether a long Head is more wise or preferable to a Bullet, round or Turnip fashion'd Head ? Or whether the Male, who furnishes the perfect *Animacula*, be more to be regarded than the Female, who only gives Nourishment ? Or how differently the *Animacula*, *Embryo*, or Infant, may be modell'd

or

or moulded in the Mother's Belly, or the usefulness of the Midwife's right setting of their Heads, at the time of Delivery of the Child; nor of the good or evil Effects of Nourishment, or even that of Nurseries: How much Children take after them, of their Nature and Temperament, so as oftentimes more than from their Mothers.

But let it satisfy us at present, that the Child is come into the World as it can, and well or evil form'd as it is: I shall in the first Place, give this as a general Rule, from the Birth to the Grave, to make Choice only of the most Wise, and most Virtuous People about us; especially in all those things which can any way be suppos'd to affect our Virtue, Knowledge, Wisdom or Reason: And which is yet more particularly to be fear'd in Infants and Children, either from the Mismanagement or Viciation of the Organs, or spoiling of the Form or Nature of the Solids and Fluids of the Body; or by teaching or communicating to them wrong Notions, Impressions or Ideas.

I should even advise too, a Wife, Midwife, because reasonably to be believed, she understands her Business best: And if the Mother is not very healthy,
and

and able to suckle, let the Parents take care and spare no Cost to have a wife, virtuous, and good temper'd Nurse, (especially the two latter Properties) and to have her healthy, and one of good Milk; since they often, or for the most part, take very much from them of their Nature, Temperament, Habit and Constitution.

The dry Nurses, or People about them, during their Infancy (as well as afterwards) ought no doubt to be the same, that they may imprint, or insinuate to them no other, but good, just and true Impressions or Ideas, (by this I do not mean whining Zealots or Biggots, since they, too commonly Hypocrites, are by all means to be avoided) but rather those of a large Capacity, good temper'd, virtuous, prudent and wise; these being the great Pillars and Supports of true Religion and human Society.

And although all manner of care is to be taken in chusing them good and wise Managers, or Company, to dictate, teach, explain, and give them right Notions of things: Yet by no means to be mop'd up, or kept from their innocent childish Diversions and Company, which may probably be as necessary then, as
grayer

graver Matters are at Man's Estate ;
 since probably they give as right Ideas.
 Let their childish Company too, be of
 the best temper'd and wise to their Age ;
 as also fuitable in Tempers, unless the
 one be inclin'd to be vicious : But above
 all, let them not be in the House or
 Company of old or young, who are in-
 clin'd to be passionate ; since they take
 much from such Example, Custom or
 Habit. *

As to Schooling, it were to be
 wish'd, as Mr. *Locke* says, That there
 were little *Hieroglyphick* Marks or Stamps
 to the most significant Words, as of the
 Names of Things : for by having the Re-
 presentations with the Words, might give
 us more just, equal, or exact Notions
 of them. As also great Care to be had
 in giving the right Meanings of Words ;
 and to be wish'd, that each Word had
 only one Meaning. As to Languages,
 it is above all to be endeavour'd, to un-
 derstand their own Paternal one rightly,
 and next the foreign Languages ; that
 is, those which may be the most useful
 to them ; for one Language can give us
 no more Knowledge than another : But
 so far as it is more useful in such a Trade,
 Science, Way or Business ; so that Pa-
 rents ought as soon as possible, to study
 the

* And Custom may perhaps in some measure alter the very Organization.

the Inclinations and Capacities of their Children ; and according to what they intend them, or the part they are to act in the World, they ought to give them all their Notions and Education, as near as is possible, and not to give them a smattering of every thing, in order to make them good for nothing ; or if design'd for a Trade, let them begin to use their Fingers or Body soon, for the sooner they begin, the more agile and handy they will become.

As to the *Latin* Tongue by Custom and Manner of our Country and Education, *Divines, Lawyers* or *Physicians*, can do nothing without it ; as likewise the *Greek* : Not but that Sets of Men, appropriate for such a Language by Translations, might communicate all that's necessary, and effectually enough in the common Language ; but that say they, would make our mysterious Businesses too common, or too plain ; yet if it were not for such like Reasons, all the World must allow, that those, or the *Dead Languages*, cannot otherwise be so useful as the *Living*. *Fabius, Quintilianus, Tacitus* and *Demosthenes*, seem to be of the same Opinion, since in speaking of Rhetorick, they all advise it from the Orators own Mouth ; and signify at the
same

same time, that there is more Nourishment in the Words of the Living, than of the Dead. And no doubt is so, since more inliven'd with the true Sense and Meaning of Words; together with Gesticulation or Gesture, and Customs of the People. But since necessary according to the Customs and Education of *Europe*, to learn the *Latin* or *Greek*; it seems very probable however, that there might be found much more easy Ways for the teaching of it, then we commonly have in Schools; which should rather be after having learn'd the *Nouns* and *Verbs*, by the expounding of good diverting Authors, than by Themes and Rules; and rather by making Schools the places of Diversion, than of Terror; by having daily Plays for them both to act and speak in the best *Latin*, each according to his Capacity; their Punishments should be by advice of the Master, but so as rather to come from the Derision or Castigation of their Fellow Companions than otherwise. The Master's Business being as a Judge, to sentence or determine Justice upon their Complaints, and to contrive for them Plays and Speeches, that may be diverting. From hence it will follow, that the Master should be a wise, prudent,

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virtuous

virtuous and facetious Man, who should frequently converse with them, even in the Schools upon different Subjects, letting them converse or tell any little innocent Tales or Stories, among themselves; he assisting them when they spoke wrong *Latin*; or even sometimes for them to play at Children's Plays, as Questions and Commands, &c. by this means the Language would easily be learn'd, and become familiar to them as any other, after which if they think fit might study its Rules, and Criticisms more strictly.

As to the University Learning, I have already hinted something of the Usefulness of it, in the foregoing Sheets: I shall only add here, that it were probably much more to our Advantage, we had the experimental Philosophy, more taught and improv'd there, then to trouble our selves with the *Aristotelian*, or *Cartesian* Notions; and in place of our Logicks and Metaphysics, to apply our selves more to the Mathematicks, since *Algebra*, the Doctrine of true and equal Proportions, might be of more use in Reasoning, as also Mechanicks; I doubt not, but that it would be of great use, if some of the best Artists or Trades, were planted or had a publick Place in the Seminary

Seminary or University, for Students to see the Practice, as well as know the Theory of Mechanicks. And although *Physiognomy* is but little regarded, and out of Use; yet I doubt not, but there may be more in it, than what we commonly imagine; was much studied by the Ancients, who were no Fools: And I doubt not, but that it might be a great Introduction to the Knowledge of Mankind in general; this with the Knowledge of our selves, being the most necessary study of any in this World. And if so, why ought we not to have Schools, teaching us the Knowledge of Men, and of the World, as well as of our selves; by shewing us the different Natures, Kinds and Degrees (by lively Examples) of Hypocrisy, Virtue and Vice: This being a Study the most necessary in human Life, and yet the most neglected especially with us. And although the *Italians* have no Schools erected to that Purpose, yet naturally study this, more than we do.

Nevertheless, it being by Custom found necessary to go through the common University Learning; I should rather advise but a superficial Knowledge, by that means rather to see the folly of it, then to amuse themselves much

with it, since Thinking in any way goes much by Custom: That is, our Thoughts run much according to the way we have imploy'd them; for which we are to take a great deal of care, of the ways we do imploy them in.

Asto Travelling, if a Man has a great stock of Wisdom, Virtue, or good Sense; I esteem the travelling without a Governour, to be his best way, and never to have any other Servants but of each Country he goes too, which should be well taken care of, by Letters before Hand, and well recommended for their good Sense, Sobriety, Fidelity and Virtue, (cost what they would) and by this Means, and the keeping Company only (as also in travelling) with none but People of the Country he is in, and not at all with those of his own Nation, will make him much more civilized; and by this means much better to know the Customs, Manners and Language of the Country and People.

But if it be found more proper he should have a Governour, let him above all, be a Man of Wisdom, Sobriety, Gravity, good Temper, virtuous, of a good Conduct, Life and Conversation; nei-
ther

ther extravagant, or too narrow, a Man of a good Behaviour, and if possible, one who has travell'd and knows the Countries and Languages. As to the Parts to travel in, let the Youths Temper be well consulted: For Example, one who is naturally very sprightly, gay and airy, should stay but a short while in *France*; and rather to go first, and spend most of his time in *Holland*, *Italy*, or *Spain*, there to keep grave, virtuous and sober Company, which with Air and Diet, may very much influence him; as also the Chase board at sometimes, may be a very proper Amusement for such a Youth; whereas one who is naturally inclin'd to be grave, pensive, melancholy or phlegmatick, should rather go first to *France*, to stay there, and keep Company with the innocently merry and facetious, to make but short stay in those other Countries mention'd before; and for a Diversion, the *Tennis* may sometimes be very proper for him. As to his Religion, it cannot be expected I should advise him to be any other, than what his Parents have brought him up, and incline too; especially among Christians: And if he happens to be of the establish'd Religion of his Country, it will be so much

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much the more for his Quiet, Ease and Interest.

As to the other particulars, I shall leave them to the good and prudent Management of himself and Governour; who ought no doubt to be as I have said, a Man of Humility, easy Conversation; not stubborn in Temper, or rigidly strict, but rather a Man affable, kind, free, complaisant, generous and indulgent in any thing that is not vitious, or very extravagant; endeavouring rather to persuade him by the strength of Reason, good Manners, Love and Friendship, then by hectoring or bouncing, which rarely does any good, and should rather endeavour to make himself to be esteem'd by his Pupil as a Companion, than as a Guard or Spy upon his Actions. To this I shall add, the best Receipt against Love, which is Exercise both of Body and Mind, especially the latter; with absence of the Object: Idleness being the Oyl or Feuel for that Fire, and was that which degenerate the greatest Heroes, as *Alexander, Hannibal, &c.*

As to the coming to true Knowledge, or to the getting of right Impressions, or true Notions of things; of all temporal or worldly Affairs, thorough the whole
Series

Series of our Lives) is by chusing, and keeping Company with the truly wise, prudent, virtuous, sober and good temper'd of what e'er Degree or Rank forever.

Wisdom and good Temper, are the great Signs of that natural Perfection of the *Organization*; or of the good State and Form of the Solids and Fluids of the Body.

Wisdom and Virture are the true Hinges, on which all the great and good Affairs, or the material Praise worthy, and noble Actions of human Life do turn; although too true, that our common Affairs now adays, rather turn upon the Hinges of Ambition, Pride, Avarice, Folly and Vice. As to our Managements, Circumstances, and Application to Business in the World: I have already hinted something to that Purpose, in the foregoing Sheets, I shall only add here, that Parents are to study the Genious's Capacities and Inclinations of their Children, and to breed and give them Ideas accordingly, with respect to the study they are proper, and intended for, which should always be to something, since Idleness is the Mother of Drunkenness, Debauchery, or all manner of Vice; and

probably may be a great Cause of some Mens being such miserable, avaritious Wretches, when nothing else to do, but upon the continual thinking of their Money, and the Sums they are to heap up. The *Turks*, whom we look upon to be such a very ignorant People, are surely much more wise than our selves in that, since even the greatest of them divert and amuse themselves, by learning of some Trade or Business; and probably travelling through *Turky*, and to *Persia*, may be of greater use than our travelling in *Europe*, where we still seem to be at Home, both as to Customs and Manners; whereas, there we come as into another World, the People, their Manners, Customs, and Livings, being entirely different.

Youth are to consider their own Temperaments, Capacities, and Inclinations, as soon as possible, to insinuate the same to their Parents, who are probably (if wise, and not byass'd by a foolish Fondness) the best Judges of their Capacities and Inclinations. For it is better, and a Man may make a good enough Bookseller, Shopkeeper, Attorney, or Apothecary; whereas he may make but an indifferent Divine, Coun-
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fel, or Physician; and on the other hand, may make but an indifferent Shopkeeper, Attorney, or Apothecary; and yet might have made a good Divine, Counsel, or Physician. Thus the Oracle of *Delphos*, when *Cicero* ask'd what Business he should take himself too; made answer, and bid him follow Nature.

But what is mostly taken notice of in this World, are the common Characters Men take upon themselves, and are esteem'd accordingly; for every Man is imploy'd according to the Name and Rank he puts himself in, and rarely otherwise; for if an Apothecary should understand Physick better than many Physicians, yet he will never be imploy'd and pay'd as such, or an Attorney as a Counsel, although he should know much more; and the Reason is, he not having rank'd himself in that Class. So a Coffee-man, or Vintner, will never be regarded or esteem'd as a Politician, although he should understand it e'er so well. And for this Cause if a Man thinks he cannot be so well in a private Condition, as in the more publick, splendid, or popular Way, let him vest himself with the most reputed Name, Title, or Character that his Capacity

capacity and Circumstances, (especially the latter) will allow of, being accordingly admitted, valued, and esteem'd by Courtiers and Women: For one who takes the Title of a Gentleman, although e'er so good for nothing, shall be preferable to an honest Shoe-maker, or Tradesman; or a good for nothing Physician, to any, although much more knowing Apothecary, &c.

As for Money, it is rather to be got by the Methods of Buying and Selling, or Merchandize and Usury, than by the more studious Applications; for if a Man applies himself to any of those Ways, wherein there are great Probabilities or Possibility of making a Fortune, a Man of Sense will have a good Chance for it, (especially if he can away with the common little Tricks and Knaveries of the World, call'd Sharpness) but if on the contrary, he applies himself altogether to the Mathematicks, Musick, Poetry, Languages, or as a School-Master; there is scarce a possibility of making an Estate out of any of these, or not easily out of the more inferior Trades, although better than out of the former; in a Word, in all those Businesses, where there is neither

ther much Money given, nor the handling of much Money, (as in that Case, some still sticks) there is not otherwise a possibility of making any great Estate.

But let me stop here, least I have said too much; and that either by the more knowing, or more foolish, or the more invidious, or evil natur'd Criticks; I should be look'd upon, as one full of Ostentation, Folly and Vanity, to pretend to give my private Opinion to the World, of the most weighty Affairs of human Life; and may probably get the parting Blow from one or both of the Disputants and Fighters, or Thanks from neither, as those who go to separate Quarrels. But as to this Part, I must run the Risque; and to the first I shall conclude, with the most ingenious *Monsieur Pascal*, that all Mankind have their particular Vanities, and is so fix'd into the Heart of every Man, that a Chymny-Sweeper, a Kennel-Raker, or cleaner of Shoes, brag, and will have their Admirers; and so will the Philosophers themselves, or even those who write against it, have the Vanity to wish, that the World may think they have writ well upon it; and as he says, so even I
may

may have that Vanity; so likewise those who read it, then as before, let us conclude with the wise Man; *Vanity of Vanities, and all is Vanity and Vexation of Spirit.*

But let me stop here, lest I have said too much; and that either by the more knowing, or more foolish, or the more invidious, or evil natured Criticks; I should be look'd upon, as one full of Offentation, Folly and Vanity, to pretend to give my private Opinion to the World, of the most weighty Affairs of human Life: and may probably get the party Blow from one or both of the Disputants and Fightings or Thunders from neither, as those who go to separate Quarrels. But as to this Part, I must turn the Helms; and to the last I shall **some** use, with the most ingenious downyest Pencil, that all Mankind have their particular Vanities, and is to fix'd in to the Heart of every Man, that a Chymist, my Sweeper, a Kitchin-Baker, or cleaner of shoes, drag, and will have their Admirers; and so will the Philosophers themselves, or even those who write against it, have the Vanity to wish, that the World may think they have writ well upon it; and as he says, so even I may

Some few

THOUGHTS

By way of

QUÆRY.

Quæry I. **W**Hether we can be any way serviceable to the Almighty? if not, whether all his Commandments were not given for the proper Benefit of Mankind, or the common Good of human Society?

Quæry II. Whether all things do not become agreeable, or satisfactory to us, disagreeable or dissatisfactory, either by our right or byass'd Impressions, Ideas or Notions, from good or bad Education, by reading or conversing; or from that which we imagine and find to be our Interest or Satisfaction? Otherwise from the different Structure and Form of the Organs or Solids; or of the Mediums, Fluids or Liquids, of the Body, (causing the different Passions of all Creatures) and whether these together, or some one or other of them, be not the occasion of all Disputes?

Quæry III. Or whether the difference of Opinions proceed not from the difference of the Passions,

Passions, or Structure and Form of the Solids, and nature of the Fluids; excepting when from different Veims given by Ideas or Impressions; or a particular Gift from God.

Quæry IV. *Whether we ought ever to dispute about those things, which can never be determin'd; or whether all these Cavils of things, not agreed upon by all good, virtuous and wise Men (especially of Christians) it were not better they were let alone, than troubled with?*

Quæry V. *Whether in place of our common Wrangling and Controversy, we ought not rather to lessen the Faults of our Neighbours or Brethren, of different Opinions; and wholly to endeavour Reconciliation and Concord, which is heavenly, as preaching of Division is diabolical?*

Quæry VI. *Whether if we know a Man's Interest (now a-days) we may not for the most part from thence, easily guess his Religion?*

Quæry VII. *Whether if a Man believes himself to be in the right, and that he really thinks he acts and performs the Will of God, as he truly design'd, that be not sufficient?*

Quæry VIII. *Whether we ought not rather to judge of Mens Religion, by their Lives and Actions, than from their Words?*

Quæry IX. *Whether the generality of Mankind, are not more busie about other Peoples Religion than their own?*

Quæry X. *Whether all wise and reasonable Men, ought not to allow, that their Neighbour:*

Neighbours have as good Reason to condemn their private Sentiments, as they have to condemn their Neighbours, excepting those things which all of them agree to be wrong?

Quæry IX. Who is to be judge of Wisdom, betwixt the hottontot and another, or which is the wiser Man?

Quæry XII. Whether a Man ought ever to dispute, or reason closely with any but good Men, friendly Men, disinterested Men, of good Sense, good Manners, good Morals, without Vanity, Pride or Ambition, and always in private, and never in publick?

Quæry XIII. Whether we do not rather judge of Men and Things, Opinions or Writings, as we love or hate, rather than as they really and truly are?

Quæry XIV. To what extravagant Degrees do we not defend the Faults of those we wish well, and as much condemn the good things and Properties of our Enemies, or those we have no Affection to?

Quæry XV. Whether it be not a very hard Matter, to judge right, and without a Byass either of Men, or of things, unless a Man be very wise, generous and disinterested; have received also right or just Impressions or Ideas of Things?

Quæry XVI. Whether Faith can be acquired, or whether it be possible for one Man to believe more than another; but by the particular Gift of God? and whether that Ble-
sing

ing may not be an Alteration or difference of the Structure and Temperament, or the very change of the Solids and Fluids of the Body?

Quæry XVII. *Whether it be in the Nature of some to be violent, or in others to be moderate? as it is impossible a Viper should become as a Dove, or a Crocodile, as a Lamb.*

Quæry XVIII. *Whether it be not sufficient for us to know, that our Neighbour is a Christian, a Man of Virtue and good Morals, without examining any farther into more private or particular Notions?*

Quæry XIX. *Whether the Viziers and Cadees, among the Turks, are not as good Judges of moral Justice betwixt Man and Man, as our best Lawyers with their Education?*

Quæry XX. *Whether Education, Law, Physick, and some parts of Divinity, or Religious Worship, are not subject in some measure to Changes, as all other things in this World.*

N. B. We may often be in hot Disputes, and yet both right.

F I N I S.

The Authors Absence from the Press, has occasion'd the following E R R A T A.

PAGE the 6. L. 19. after *Fortune* r. *Fall*. p. 18. l. 16. for *that* r. *then*. p. 25. l. 30. r. *Peripatetick*. p. 43. l. 11. for *this* r. *these*. p. 46. l. 19. *Mathematician*. p. 55. l. 7. for *corpuses*, r. *corpuscles*. p. 62. l. 15. r. *Abstract*. p. 68. l. 7. for *pen'd*, r. *pin'd*. l. 14. for *might*, r. *may*. p. 72. l. 13. r. *Metaphysicians*. p. 79. l. 13. for *Carriage*, r. *Carcass*. p. 101. l. 8. for *obliged*, r. *oblidge*. p. 111. l. 3. for *weight*, r. *wight*. l. 7. for *usual*, r. *usefull*.







