A sentimental view of vivisection / by Mona Caird.

BIJOU LIBRARY, No. 3.

A SENTIMENTAL VIEW OF VIVISECTION

"The agonies of animals may leave us smiling and placid; but the menace to ourselves might surely rouse the most callous to resistance."

BY

MONA CAIRD.

Price SIXPENCE.

THE BELLAMY LIBRARY

OF FACT AND FICTION

(ONE SHILLING Each.)

23-24.—WHAT IS PROPERTY? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government, by P. J. Proudhon, cr. 8vo.

22.—CRUELTIES OF CIVILIZATION: A Program of Humane Reform. By H. S. Salt, R. Johnson, C. H. Hopwood, Q.C., M.P., Miss I. O. Ford, Mrs. C. Mallet, and J. F. Oakeshott. Humanitarian League's Publications—First Series. Edited by H. S. Salt, cr. 8vo., 1s. (cloth 2s.)

21.—VISIT TO FREELAND, by Dr. Hertzka. Paper, 1s. (cloth, 1/6). 70,000 Sold in Germany.

20.—LAWS OF ETERNAL LIFE: Being Studies in the Church Catechism, by Rev. Stewart D. Headlam. Paper, 1s. (cloth, 2s.)
"Mr. Headlam starts with the assertion that the Church Catechism is the best Manual of Socialism."

19.—SONGS OF THE ARMY OF THE NIGHT, by Francis Adams, New Edition, Revised and Enlarged with Biography by H. S. Salt, with Portrait, 1s. (Cloth, superior paper, 3s. 6d.)

18.—THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIANITY, and other Essays, by Richard T. Ely, Ph. D. Price 1s., (Cloth, 1s. 6d.)

17.—THE ANATOMY OF MISERY: Plain Lectures on Economics, by J. C. Kenworthy. Price 1s. (Cloth, 1s. 6d.)

16.—THE GOSPEL OF THE POOR, by J. M. Davidson. Third Edition. Price 1s. (Cloth 2s.)

15.—WOMAN, Her Position in the Past, Present, and Future, by August Bebel, Second Edition, Price 1s. (Cloth 2s.)

14.—RENT, INTEREST, AND WAGES, or the Real Bearings of the Land Question. By M. Flurscheim Second Edition. Price 1s., (cloth 4s. 6d.)

13.—KARL MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE. (Complete) Forming the First 9 Chapters of "Capital." Price 1s. (Cloth 2s.)
"The gist of the Theory of Marx is found in the first 8 chapters of his work given here in full.

12.—THE STRIKE OF A SEX. A Novel, by George N. Miller, 32nd thousand Price 1s. (Cloth 1s. 6d.)

11.—POLITICS FOR THE PEOPLE, by J. M. Davidson. Price 1s. (cloth 2s.)

10.—A SEQUEL TO LOOKING BACKWARD, or Looking Further Forward, by Richard Michaelis. Paper Cover, 1s.

9.—AN EXPERIMENT IN MARRIAGE. By Chas. J. Bellamy Price 1s.

8.—IN DARKEST LONDON, A Story of the Salvation Army By John Law with Introduction by GENERAL BOOTH 281 pages, 1s.

7.—THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: Exposition of Modern Socialism. By Laurence Gronlund. English Edition. Edited by George Bernard Shaw, cr. 8vo., paper cover, 1s. (cloth 2s.)

6.—*Scotia Rediviva.* HOME RULE FOR SCOTLAND. With Lives of Sir William Wallace, George Buchanan, Fletcher of Saltoun and Thomas Spence. By J. Morrison Davidson. Paper boards, 1s.

5.—PROGRESS AND POVERTY. By Henry George, Paper 1s., Limp Cloth, 1s. 6d Cabinet Edition, 2s. 6d.

4.—MISS LUDINGTON'S SISTER. By Edward Bellamy, with Portrait Limp Cloth 1s., or Bevelled Cloth, with Steel Portrait, 2s.; (Also Cheap Edition at Sixpence.)

3.—THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW Savagedom Slavedom, Serfdom, Wagedom, Freedom. By J. Morrison Davidson. Fourth Edition, Paper 1s. (Cloth 2s.)

2.—DR. HEIDENHOFF'S PROCESS. By Edward Bellamy, with portrait, Limp Cloth, 1s., or, Bevelled Cloth, with Engraved Portrait, 2s. (Also an Edition at Sixpence.)

1.—LOOKING BACKWARD; Or, Life in the Year 2000 A.D. By Edward Bellamy. With new copious Index and portrait, Paper, 1s., Limp Cloth, 1s. 6d., Cabinet Edition, with Steel Portrait, 2s. 6d. (Also

ES, 185, Fleet Street London, E.C.

BIJOU LIBRARY—No. 3.

A

SENTIMENTAL VIEW

OF VIVISECTION

BY

MONA CAIRD.

LONDON:
WILLIAM REEVES, 185, FLEET STREET, E.C.

[1894?]

PRINTED BY
WILLIAM REEVES, 185, FLEET STREET,
E.C.

A SENTIMENTAL VIEW OF VIVISECTION

Notes corresponding with the italic letters will be found at the end.

IN order to measure the distance that we have travelled since the time of the early Christians, in regard to certain principles of conduct and morality, let us imagine a tragic incident of ancient Rome, say in the days of the Antonines, when the Empire had at its head, rulers of high character, and among them, one of the noblest and wisest men who ever lived. Let us try to imagine some untimely conscience, born through one of Nature's occasional freaks, amidst the splendour and the tumult of the Imperial city: an unhappy prophetic soul, tormented with appeals and perceptions, belonging not to its own time, but to ours. Suppose him to have summoned courage to announce to his astounded father that he took no interest in seeing the lions fed on Christians, and that he objected, on moral grounds, to the carnage of the arena. "What! take no interest in seeing the lions fed on Christians? Object to our manly national sports! Great Jupiter! is this sentimental milk-sop, my son?" Such

would, assuredly, have been the feeling of the mortified parent, whose very daughters witnessed, with delight, the combats of the amphitheatre, and turned down their thumbs, when the wounded gladiators looked up to them, in a last hope of mercy, in a manner worthy of their iron-hearted race. "Everybody" went to the amphitheatre, and, obviously, "everybody" could not be barbarous and inhuman. The Christians never were more useful in their lives than when providing amusement to the assembled city. Unjustifiable to use them as fodder for lions? Stuff and nonsense; the Gods had provided them for the purpose; besides they were a tiresome, agitating people, and most irreligious; so unorthodox! Their attitude towards the Gods was simply shocking. And they disturbed the peace of the Empire. One really had no patience with this young upstart who presumed to set himself up as a judge of the conduct of all Rome. Who was *he* forsooth, that he should object to institutions which the wisest men approved and supported? Besides it was such "bad form." And well-bred Rome arranged its toga with an approved gesture, and ordered its chariot for the next performance at the amphitheatre.

Since this ill-starred youth was sufficiently sensitive to feel disgusted at sights that all his world approved, he must have suffered keenly from the lack of sympathy and the scorn that he would meet on every hand; and when he saw the generous and humane Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, among the supporters of the fashionable barbarities, one may suppose that he felt solitary indeed in his conviction, and ready, at times, to doubt his own sanity, or at any rate, to fear that he must be lacking in manly qualities, since everyone whom he most respected, sneered at his scruples and tried to shake him out of his hyper-sensitiveness. And probably his mentors succeeded. If our hypothetical youth ever existed, (as in all likelihood, he *did* exist and suffer, in obscurity and solitude), he was probably convinced, as he grew older and more accustomed to the standards and sentiments of his time, that

all the world was right and he was wrong. In the same way, many a young man of the present day is shaken out of feelings that are finer and nobler than those of his contemporaries.

Let us now reverse this imaginary picture, taking London of to-day for the scene, and for hero, a stern soul yearning for the customs of the ancients, as less effeminate and sentimental than our own. Let us suppose him to devote his life, in all good faith and rectitude, to a determined effort to persuade the reluctant British public to cast heathens to be devoured by wild beasts, in the Albert Hall, and to establish a body of gladiators for the general amusement ; also on the same, ever serviceable plea, to vivisect men and women (as was done frequently in the middle ages), for the advancement of science and the good of humanity. "Shocking ! disgraceful ! impossible, inconceivable !" The British public would doubtless treat such a preposition as that of a dangerous lunatic. Yet our Roman youth underwent a sort of martyrdom for daring to object to the very practice now regarded as so utterly preposterous. Such are the changes of human thought and sentiment. But our reactionary philosopher might commend his case to modern enlightenment by arguing that the doctrine of the survival of the fittest demanded the sacrifice of the unfit, whose artificial preservation was harmful to the race. The sentiment of the day—he would point out—was too humanitarian ; it interfered with the beneficent action of nature, by its ill-timed pity and protection. Nature had no mercy for individuals ; why should man pity them ? Let us add the ruthlessness of man to the ruthlessness of Nature and see what sort of a regenerated world we should then have for a happy hunting-ground. True, its harshness and cruelty might tempt many to suicide, for there would be neither hope nor comfort anywhere on earth ; but this would only be a cause for congratulation, since the unfortunate were proved to be "unfit" and the sooner they were hounded out of the society that they enfeebled, the better for those that

remained. The whole law of nature, (so the argument would logically run) is founded on sacrifice; it is through the sacrifice of the weak to the strong that nature works her evolutionary will, and therefore our best policy is to imitate Nature in her methods, which are so much wiser than ours, and to frankly fall upon our unfit brothers and force them, through torture, if it seem advisable, to the service of humanity.

Any one who objected to this stern but salutary doctrine, must be regarded as a sentimentalist. It is useless (so its expounder would point out) to urge that life—already so full of tragedy,—would become an absolute wilderness, hideous and unbearable, if weakness and misfortune, or a lack of the cruder kind of force and bluster were to be punished more severely than the worst of crimes: misfortune would be the only crime in a society organized on modern scientific principles of this sort; and crime (in the old sense of the word) would be sanctified by the superior force that had made it possible.

Now, although this is precisely the reasoning that certain modern thinkers are constantly using, the proposition, in the crude and startling form given above, would certainly be regarded as preposterous; whence we may infer the vast difference between the ancient and the modern standards of morality: the difference lying in the modern view of personal rights and in the sentiment of mercy. We may be the inferiors of the ancient Romans in many respects, but we have grasped a principle that they had scarcely conceived; one that places us on a new social plane, and offers a starting-point for developments beyond anything possible to the ancient civilizations, however high of their kind. These rested on no permanent principle except that of patriotism, which itself was without the nourishment that can only be afforded it, in the long run, by security of personal rights. There was an idea of duty to the state, but little or no sense of fealty towards one's fellow man, as

an individual. No binding force was at work, producing a spirit of mutual defence among the people, except as against a foreign foe. Ancient civilisation appeared to be a brilliant inflorescence of human power, doomed to certain extinction as soon as the impetus died away. We moderns feel that we have something to preserve in our state, something that belongs to *each* of us, as well as to *all* of us, as a birthright; a right fought for by our ancestors, and needing jealous care, even now that it may not be taken from us, in the name of humanity and the common good. This tendency to encroach upon individual liberty on the plea of the general good, is a great and increasing danger of our times, and corresponds to the apparently entirely different danger that springs out of the tyranny of despotic governments.

The sense of the sacredness of personal rights, happily strong so far, forms an element of stability in the modern commonwealth that enables it to tide over many perils, in spite of a thousand otherwise fatal forces of disruption. It will be an evil moment for us when that belief in individual claims and liberties grows dim.

The utter lack of this idea among the Romans in Imperial times is obvious, from their treatment of their fellow men and women in their public games,—to seek no further proof of the significant fact. The right to immunity from legalised torture, was not granted by the Romans to every human being, *as such:* this immunity rested on some entirely different and arbitrary ground. What ghastly possibilities this involves, can only be fully grasped when one considers, in detail, the awful scenes in the amphitheatre; the increasing ingenuity of the torments, in order to gratify the jaded appetite of the people for excitement and cruelty; the pleasure taken in such festivals of crime by respectable citizens and their wives and daughters.

Perhaps the most startling proof of our change of stardand is the presence among the spectators of one of the world's greatest men; one whose tolerance, humanity, justice and

nobility are to this day, a source of inspiration to his successors: the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.*

It had not apparently occurred, even to him, that it was an act of atrocious tyranny for one human being to force another to be tortured for his amusement or benefit. Not only the mercy and justice of the philosophic Emperor stopped abruptly at this point, in obedience to the habits of his time and country, but his judgment seemed to slumber; for he saw not that such legal onslaught upon human rights, as such, was a menace to humanity, as such, and an element of insecurity to every man and woman alive.

The Emperor seems to have tacitly assented to the theory which placed slaves and Christians and prisoners of war on a lower plane of being than the Roman citizen, and doomed them, *on that plea*, to hideous ill-usuage. Nor did he see, that the fact (if granted) of their being on a lower plane, was entirely beside the point, since it is obviously capacity for suffering and not accident of birth, or any other accident, that gives a rational claim to exemption from torture.

Why should the fact of being born on the shores of the Danube, or of holding the doctrines of Christianity make it rational—let alone just—to abandon to wild beasts, one who was thus born or thus convinced, while the creditable accident of having first seen the light by the waters of the

* "As for the brute animals . . . use them generously and nobly, as beings that have reason should treat those that have none. But treat men, since they have reason, as members of the same society."

"The best way of revenge is not to imitate the injury."

"Be always doing something serviceable to mankind, and let this constant generosity be your only pleasure . . . ."

"Recollect . . . whether men can say of you: He never wronged a man in word or deed."

"Your manners will depend very much upon the quality of what you frequently think on; for the soul is as it were, tinged with the colour and complexion of thought."

"'Worship the Gods and protect mankind.' This life is short, and all the advantage that you can get by it is a pious disposition and unselfish acts."—MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS.

Tiber afforded protection from such a fate? Putting aside all question of mercy, is such a position even intelligible?

There are some rights that can be claimed only in virtue of intellectual or moral faculties, but the right to immunity from torture, if it can be claimed at all, is surely established by the mere fact of possessing a sentient nervous system. Apart, once more, from all humane considerations, is there any other form of claim that is even comprehensible?

A claim ought obviously to hold some relation to the thing claimed; and what relation has one's birth-place, or creed, or usefulness, or moral status to the torments from which one pleads to be saved, simply because one can feel them? If sensibility be not sufficient ground, in itself, for exemption from torture, then the Romans were *not* morally mistaken when they fed their lions on Christians; they were only misguided in their ideas as to the inferiority of Christians, a mere question of fact, not of morals. And who could severely blame them for that little error of judgment—if so it really was? Possibly they were not so far wrong after all, even as to the Christians, and almost certainly the gladiators and prisoners of war, *were* inferior to the average Roman citizen, and if this were the case, be it observed, the citizen was perfectly justified in treating them as he did, provided the theory be accepted, in its simple incoherence, that rank in the scale of being is the real test in the matter.

Unfortunately that preposterous test is still in vogue among people calling themselves civilised.

Let anybody question his average acquaintances as to their opinion of vivisection, and he will find that ninety-nine out of a hundred vaguely approve of it, and if pressed for their reason, they will reply that an animal *is lower in the scale of being* than man; thus choosing exactly the same plea as that of the ancient Roman when he justified his treatment of his slaves and prisoners.

Why then, does the modern Englishman blame the ancient Roman, whose reasoning he repeats? He may consistently

condemn his judgment as to the importance and worth of his victims, but how can the modern condemn the ancient, on moral grounds, without at the same time condemning himself?

In what manner does the modern defend the right of the human being, at all costs, to immunity from torture? He supports the doctrine very strongly, but on what principle does he found it? Even when the worst of criminals are in question, he still decides that society has only the right to protect itself against the offender, not to benefit (if that were possible) from the torments of even its determined enemies. No matter how much a man has made society suffer, society will not resort to the ferocious forms of revenge only practised among savages. What is the ground for this firmly rooted and just feeling? The criminal has absolutely nothing (and less than nothing) to recommend him to the mercy of his fellows, except his capacity to suffer, yet, in his case, that is held sufficient; and justly so held: to torture on any plea whatever being, in fact, the work of devils, not of men.

Society seems, even in this extreme case, to recognise that a man's character, or nationality, or spiritual rank has nothing whatever to do with the question of his moral right to exemption from torture. Pain is always pain, as heat is always heat, and cold, cold, and nothing else holds relation to the matter at issue. *Obviously, however, this principle cannot be the real ground of our protection to every member of the human family, because the animal creation, which is also endowed with a capacity to suffer, is excluded by us, from this decree of justice.* What then *is* the ground of our conviction, and what is the modern qualification for immunity?

We are forced to conclude that it is founded on something arbitrary and unrelated to the question, and that we have no more reason or consistency in our action than the Romans had, when they made opinions, or birthplace, or accidental misfortune (such as having been taken prisoner when fighting for one's country), the test qualification.

To indicate, by means of exaggeration, the nature of the inconsequence, it is as if one granted immunity to a man, because he was (say) over six feet, or because his name was Brown.

Tremendous has been our stride, since the times of the Antonines, seeing that we now include, without exception, the whole human race (even its enemies) in our circle of protection, but we seem to have progressed rather by good luck than good guidance. If the importance of the end to be gained affects the matter (as we loudly insist that it does, when there is a question of animal torture) why do we object to the immolation of human beings? Let us grant that the end is so important as to justify means *otherwise unjustifiable:* then there is no disputing that *human* vivisection is more easily proved righteous than that of animals, for obviously there is far more probability of obtaining useful knowledge for humanity from human subjects than from the brute creation. Utility being the test, *Man* is the victim marked out as the bearer of Man's sins and his deliverer from their natural penalties.

The important end of advancing science and of benefiting humanity would—(on this line of reasoning)—permit us to take our brother and our sister, whose lives we thought worthless (or even without that pretext), tying them down to the operating board, and seeking, from their anguish, to learn something that might perhaps (so we try to believe in the very teeth of common sense) save us from the results of having consistently over-eaten ourselves, or drunk ourselves stupid, or having neglected the simplest laws of health, or remained in willing ignorance of them; or if not suffering through some transgression of our own, then through some sin or stupidity of our ancestors.

Now it is obvious (as has been pointed out above) that if *any* knowledge of importance can be obtained from animal vivisection, enormous benefits might be expected from human vivisection. Yet we shrink from the idea with horror; not

so much, it would appear, because of the awfulness of the pain involved (since animals also suffer awful pain), but because of the *kind* of victims used. We feel that it is so "very much to his credit" that a man should be a man and not an animal, that we behave as the Romans behaved when they exempted their own worthy citizen from the slaughter of the arena, because they were so pleased with him for abstaining from being a prisoner or an alien or a "pestilent" Christian.

This may have indicated wisdom and merit in the ancient Roman, but it scarcely seemed sufficient of itself, to have won for him a position of such enormous advantage over his mistaken fellow, who also had nerves to be racked and a body to be torn. Without wishing to make light of the merit of being human and not animal, one might perhaps suggest that we show an almost too grateful recognition of the credit due to the achievement, when we decree, on the one hand, that no member of the human family shall be legally tortured (no matter how great an enemy of his kind, nor how great a benefit might be hoped from such action), while, on the other hand, we decide that any animal may, under certain conditions, be handed over to indescribable agony no matter how innocent, or how faithful a friend to man (*a*).

Such, however, is the decision of the civilized world of the Nineteenth Century. Yet we feel ourselves in a position to be extremely shocked at our Roman predecessors. It does not even strike us as necessary to explain why we condemn the Romans for their conduct. That conduct seems to us, obviously and unspeakably barbarous. We know that they considered their victims as inferior beings whose suffering was therefore of no importance, but we never dream of admitting *that* as a justification, in their case. Yet we naïvely set forth the very same plea as a justification for our own acts of aggression.

Astonishing indeed will such pleas sound in the ears of our successors, when vivisection will appear as preposterous

and unthinkable among reasonable and civilized beings as the games of the Roman amphitheatre seem to us now.

It is, indeed, almost impossible to realize that such crude and callous barbarism is possible among people highly organized, and in some respects, highly sensitive. The very persons who would go out of their way to help an animal in distress, who would be tender and careful in their treatment of a dog or a cat belonging to themselves or their friends, are willing to support, by their influence, or by their silent acquiesence, the almost inconceivable cruelties that are going on every day in the name of Science and humanity (*b*). Men and women who are, in other respects, neither lacking in feeling nor guilty of meanness, are ready to encourage these sins of strength against weakness, which are dastardly in their very essence.* What is the reason of this strange inconsistency?

If we visit some wild island in the Pacific, we are not surprised, though we may regret to find the inhabitants gratifying their appetites on roast relative or boiled stranger. We sadden at the evidence of the inborn savagery of our species, but we have, at least, the consolation of remembering that these untutored brothers *are* savages, by common consent, and that no one with any pretentions to civilization, justifies their cruelties, or calls them by euphonious epithets.

But, when, instead of our island in the Pacific, we visit some great centre of civilisation, where the religion of mercy is professed, where all the intellectual and moral culture of the day finds its home, then we are left with colder comfort when we find that in spite of all this supposed enlighten-

* It is not denied that experimental physiologists *may*, in spite of their hideous calling, be humane and kind-hearted towards their fellow-men and women, but this does not prevent the infliction of torture on the defenceless from being, in itself, a dastardly and an evil action, nor does it alter the fact that such action must, by the very law of our being, tend to blunt the sympathies and debase the nature. There is nothing on earth so debasing as cruelty.

ment, men are still guilty of cruelties as terrible (to put the case mildly) as the worst that ever entered into the heart of the most ferocious savages to conceive (*c*). Then we are driven to ask ourselves, with horrible doubt of the eventual redemption of our race, whether the civilized state is anything more than an elaboration of barbarism, a new and wider field for the selfishness and brutality of the human animal (*d*). Of what avail are our religions and philosophies, if they cannot so much as teach us to exempt from atrocious torture, the race of animals who appeal by their very helplessness to our mercy ?

Have all our sufferings, all our efforts and aspirations left us blind, and stupid, and brutal to this extent ? (*e*)

If anything, after this, could add to the sense of hopelessness and unbelief in man's goodness, it is his attempt at justification. To sin, terribly and shockingly is not always to be past redemption ; but to sin in that way, with words of piety on the lips, with bland smiles and elevated sentiments—setting forth one's devilries in the light of self-denying virtues—this seems to indicate absolute deadness of the moral nature—on one side, at any rate—and to make belief in human goodness seem almost insane. For what is the defence for taking creatures, capable of affection, of fear, of gratitude, of devotion, in short of suffering— ; what is the defence for taking these creatures and mangling them—brain, spine, liver, heart, blood-vessels, bones ; for poisoning them, innoculating them with disease, suffocating them, paralysing them with a drug that renders them motionless, while leaving the sensibilities as keen as ever ; for freezing them, skinning them alive, baking, boiling and burning them—— ? (See Notes *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, etc.)

The defence for creating this hell on earth, more awful than the imagination can conceive, for these creatures that lie at our mercy is : that perchance, if we probe among their agonized nerves with sufficient patience and perseverance ; if we sufficiently maim, and mangle and paralize and tear them,

in a sufficient number of laboratories throughout the Christian and civilized world; if we approach the operating tables—where our subjects are strapped down, awaiting their agony—"in a truly reverent spirit" * (this last astounding sentiment for the special delectation of the troublesome British public) then we may, in course of time, arrive at some discovery that might conceivably be of service to that valuable abstraction that we call Humanity, in whose name we are privileged to practise whatsoever devilries may seem good to us.

Such is our defence—our Sunday-best-go-to-meeting defence, to be paraphrased in various fashions to suit each particular audience, or to be dropped altogether, with a sigh of relief, when one has the good fortune to deal with a pleasant public like the French or the Italians, who never bother one to apologise, in any way, for making scientific research among living nerves and tissues. They understand the joy of these experiments and the natural desire of a man to advance in his profession and to make his name famous (*f*).

Such then is the justification which the Christianity, the enlightenment, the moral sense of the most highly civilized nations of our century plead for inflicting anguish more terrible than anything we can imagine (luckily for our sanity). Such is the defence accepted by these nations, for not one of them has arisen yet, in wrath, to declare that it will not be saved (if such things could save it) at that damning price.

Happily, the more the evidence is examined, the less and less likely does it appear that valuable knowledge is derived from the practice, and the more illusory are proved to be the pretentions that have been founded on it (*g*).

It has been said that there is no animal so cruel as man; and one is obliged, with shame, to confess the justice of the accusation, for there is no other animal whose intellect and imagination tell him more surely and accurately what cruelty

* From a speech by Sir Andrew Clarke.

is, no other animal that knows so precisely what he is doing, or whose obligation to a generous use of his power is so overwhelming. Man's cruelty is open-eyed, cold-blooded and often sanctimonious into the bargain. He professes to be a moral being; to respect a moral law; and at no time, perhaps, more than the present, has he preached altruism, and sought to arouse the altruistic sentiments. Might is not admitted as right, and the claim of the weak to equal legal and social rights with the strong, has become a mere commonplace of our ethical philosophies.

But if all this be not empty profession (which it is not) what is the reason that the public placidly permits these practices which involve the most flagrant contradiction of all that is fine, or just, or generous in human nature? If they really desire that helpless creatures should be tortured for their (supposed) physical benefit, why do they not frankly declare their belief that might is right, and that mercy and kindness and generosity are empty names, suitable only in the mouth of the sentimentalist? Why not profess as well as practice, a worship of the Devil and all his works? In short why proclaim belief in a moral law, while we justify the oppression of the very weakest by the very strongest of sentient beings, and applaud the extreme form of the exercise of might as opposed to right?

This is a wrong that involves in its guilt every human being, without exception; for it is perpetrated by the human species upon the animal species, it is a crime of race against race, and therefore its abolition cannot rationally be asked to wait till all the crimes of man against man are put an end to, even were that within measurable distance. The weight of this crime holds us down, one and all. It is sheer mockery to talk of raising the human race morally, while it remains quiescent and complaisant under this terrible incubus of guilt; while we rest our state on the cowardly abuse of a power of which we prove ourselves utterly unworthy. There are many who honestly believe

that God gave us the animals for our use, and conclude, therefrom, that we are justified in using them in any way that may benefit us. If they believe in a God capable of creating beings possessing affections, and the ability to suffer, and then of deliberately handing them over to be mangled and agonised in every conceivable fashion, they may well tremble for their own fate at His hands. For what sort of treatment is to be reasonably expected of a Diety capable of such conduct? Unutterably savage cruelty and injustice towards one race of his dependants does not seem to hold out a cheerful prospect to the other!

The practice of vivisection, be it observed, differs from every other evil in society, in being entirely within the responsibility and the jurisdiction of the public will; an abuse that (so far at least) is not ingrained into the very nature of man, in such a fashion that stupendous changes of habit and a great effort of self-control would be needed to check it; this being the case with almost every other great social wrong. Its issues are simple; no one practises it involuntarily, or encourages it involuntarily. It is not woven into the very fabric of our life, so that we can scarcely breathe without being involved in the system that supports and necessitates it. The crime is practised by a class with the permission of the community (who do not in the least realise what it is they have sanctiond), and since its abolition would involve no tremendous wrench and no wide-reaching disorganisation, it needs but the decided expression of the public sentiment, through the machinery of representative Government, to destroy, at a stroke, the protection which the law of the land affords to this "our meanest crime," as Dr. John H. Clarke well calls it, in giving a title to his paper.

It is not therefore, the extreme complications and dangers that attend almost every other sorely needed reform, which are holding back this one. No suffering or disturbance (except to the feelings of the vivisectors), no vast difficulties and perils would ensue if the practice were prohibited to-morrow.

The guilt then must surely rest on the shoulders of each one of us, in whose name the crime is committed.

It has often been urged that if we may kill animals for food, there can be no good reason why we should not mutilate them alive for science; but it is scarcely conceivable that those who bring forward this argument, really believe that swiftly inflicted death and slow dissection during life, stand under the same category.* Whatever judgment one may hold as to the right to *cut short* existence, anticipating the inevitable end by the swiftest and most merciful means at our command, the question obviously stands apart, absolutely from the question of the right to torture. It is a further subject to be considered, but not to be confused with this entirely different one of vivisection. There is every reason to believe that science might render death instantaneous and absolutely painless for animals,† certainly less painful than natural death from disease or starvation, if it would condescend to consider their welfare: so that (the element of pain being eliminated) the right and wrong of the question rests on this point: Are we justified in shortening animal life for our own needs or supposed needs? In this enquiry—unlike that of vivisection—the intellectual and spiritual rank of the being in question *has* some relation to the matter.‡

* It is only those who desire to find an excuse for one atrocity by pointing to another, who will seek to remove the onus of guilt from the vivisector's practice, by citing, in its defence, the horrible abuses of the slaughter-houses. These abuses are of the most shocking kind and every one ought to oppose them to the utmost; they are already offences against the Law: the State and the people being the proclaimed enemies of these cruelties; they are not legalised and justified, as are the horrors of vivisection.

† M. Carnot, the late President of the French Republic, presented a fine Sèvres Vase to a butcher named Burneau, who invented a method by which oxen can be slaughtered painlessly. Why could not this method be enquired into and adopted in this country? The Paris Society for Anti-vivisection, 22, Rue Matignon, would doubtless be able to give information on the subject.

‡ See Sir Benjamine Ward Richardson's recent address as President of the London Model Abbatoir Society.

Unquestionably the slaughter of animals is a relic of barbarism, and our flesh-eating habits are the cause of many evils, physical and moral (though this point, of course, would be hotly contested); unquestionably also, the finest ideal is that which holds it unlawful to kill, except in self-defence; but it is childish to pretend that killing and torturing are on the same plane, and that they stand and fall together. The evident object of such a contention is to protect vivisection through the ingrained flesh-eating propensities of the population.

We see the difference between killing and torturing clearly enough when it suits us; for we administer to our own kind death as a punishment, in extreme cases, but public opinion does not justify torture, even then.

Another favourite device, in support of their interests, that vivisectionists do not disdain, is to accuse their opponents of being sentimental, nay even of being well-meaning! There is no simpler method of fighting one's adversaries than this, and none is more effective, in proportion to the expenditure of brain-tissue involved. It is not to be denied that the opponents of vivisection are actuated by sentiment. But the weakness is not peculiar to the anti-vivisectionist. That man is actuated by sentiment, who being sufficiently strong to punch another man's head refrains from doing so; it is sentiment that restrains the average citizen from dancing a Highland fling in his parish church, or from smoking a cigar, in his pew, during the sermon. Sentiment is at the bottom of most things that we do, and that we refrain from doing. In its absence, we should most of us fare rather badly. To hurl the accusation of sentimentalism at an opponent, therefore, simply amounts to saying: "I object to the nature of your sentiment, and having the majority behind me, I state that objection with the addition of a sneer; not being, at the moment, provided with an argument."

To be sentimental, in popular estimation, is to widen the

boundaries of human sympathy and mercy. It is not indeed permitted to swerve from the accepted line in either direction; for if some bold person attempts to trample upon the feelings of his great aunt, or to wound the susceptibilities ot his somewhat interfering second-cousin, then loud and long is the outcry, and great is the dismay among the faithful; yet if, on the other hand, the deliquent ventures to feel pity, or to plead for a mangled dog, or a cat baked alive, then he is a mere sentimentalist, to be smiled or sneered or bullied into silence.

To hurl opprobrious epithets is not to provide arguments; but it seems to answer the same purpose—for a time. If we were to question the parent of our unfortunate Roman youth, he would certainly give, as a glaring example of sentimentalism, his son's objection to the slaughter of the amphitheatre; if we were to enquire of the average Spaniard, he would apply the same epithet to any opposition that might be made to bull-fights, and so forth, in accurate accordance with the forms of brutality sanctioned, at the moment, by the national feeling. *Our* particular form of brutality is vivisection; thence the popular definition of sentimentality. It might be useful to remember, when this reproach is cast at the cause of mercy, that the sentimentalism of one age, is only the common decency of the next.

It may also be salutary to remember that had it not been for the "sentimentalism" of the past, we might any of us be the interesting subjects of the vivisectionist's investigations, at this moment (*h*). It is sentiment and nothing else that has preserved us from that liability, and it is sentiment and nothing else that must protect us, and save our more helpless fellow beings, in the future. Sentiment, in short, is the sole safeguard that the individual possesses against the crude and ferocious instincts of the human animal, and reason tells us that it is to our interest (if we care for nothing else) to respect and preserve it. Sentiment, at present, be it observed, is taking a drift most perilous to our valuable selves.

The practice of animal vivisection, accustoming the mind to the idea of vicarious sacrifice (we remember devoutly that Nature effects her evolutionary processes through sacrifice), leads us, by gentle graduations, to look tolerantly on the notion of obtaining knowledge by means of painful experiments on human subjects; hospital patients for instance (*i*). "Pain the most atrocious that the mind of man can conceive" has been inflicted on animals, by the confession of the operator,* and all over England, France, Germany, Austria, Italy—indeed, in all countries calling themselves civilised, these cruelties are being perpetrated, with or without apology or attempt at justification, according to the state of public feeling in the matter. No one can study the question, without seeing that the "good of humanity" is a mere pretext, held forth to lull the opposition of those who are not yet sufficiently, "scientific," to have lost all sense of pity towards the defenceless subjects of physiological research.

Claude Bernard, and indeed all the continental experimenters make no pretence whatever that they have any object other than the joy of research and the hope of fame and advancement. "Artists in Vivisection," they call themselves. They laugh at any scruples on behalf of the victims. They record their own experiments, of the most awful character, in a light-hearted spirit, evidently without the faintest sense that there is anything therein to be ashamed of, or anything that any reasonable person could take exception to. If men of this type are being educated, and a public is learning to listen to them apathetically (even admiringly), is it not pretty certain that the safeguards of our own precious liberties and rights are attacked at their very foundation? For the security for each man's rights obviously lies in the general sentiment of his fellows.

The agonies of animals may leave us smiling and placid;

* Claude Bernard. Article already quoted in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," September, 1864.

but the menace to ourselves might surely rouse the most callous to resistance.

There is unquestionably growing up a singular spirit of toleration for the practice of painful experiments on hospital patients.*

It is by no means uncommon to hear the system defended, and even applauded, by perfectly conscientious persons who really seem not "more than usual" fools. They appear to imagine that this view is "advanced" and broad-minded, and will gravely urge, with an enlightened air, that the poor know perfectly well what they may expect when they go to a hospital, that nobody compels them to go there, and they must take it as part of the bargain, if they do elect to claim its privileges. Why should not a useless life be made of service to humanity and to science? (*i*). This idea is spreading, public opinion is losing in sensitiveness, and is forming in harmony with that kind of science which demands victims more greedily and ruthlessly than ever they were demanded by the worst forms of superstition, against which science has waged such superior war.

Science herself has warned us of the dangers of a priesthood, with its eternal menace to human liberty, and now she is justifying her warning by the gradually extending claims of her own priesthood to arbitrary power; by undermining our precious birthright of individual freedom. Can a man call himself free, if he is liable to the possibility of being experimented upon, as soon as illness and poverty force him to venture within the doors of a hospital? On the plea of the good of humanity, we are lured from the defence of our rights and our liberties; thus being led to surrender the rights and liberties of our fellows at the same

* The recent scandalous disclosures of such experiments on a grand scale, at the Chelsea Hospital for women, have been made since the above sentence was written.

time; not realizing, unhappily, that *once the principle of compulsory vicarious sacrifice be admitted, there is no conceivable cruelty that might not be justly inflicted on the one, for the good, or the supposed good of the many.*

The poor man is the first to fall a victim to this perilous doctrine, but if the tendency increases (as it *must* increase, unless it is vigorously opposed) it is scarcely to be imagined, that were a rich man to be attacked by a rare and interesting disease, or to offer opportunity for valuable research, he would be able to bribe Humanity and its Priesthood to leave him in peace. Illness is a tragic enough incident in human life, as it stands, but in the enlightened future, its terrors promise to be ghastly.

If the old Oriental doctrines are, in any sense, true (and their affinity is remarkable with the modern scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy, the non-destructibility of force in the universe) then there must be gathering an unspeakably awful inheritance of suffering for the race that is guilty of these deeds of selfishness and violence; and indeed it is not difficult to see how the curse will descend and *has* descended; for the conscience must of necessity be blunted and hardened by our participation in these practices, either in body or in spirit—either with the instruments of torture in one's hands, or the decree of torture on one's lips,—even in the case when one has consented to remain ignorant of the evil, in order to avoid the pain of knowing it, and for the sake of escaping the discomfort of possessing a conscience that urges us to action which we have no intention whatever of taking.

That searing of the conscience is not a matter of indifference, even to the most completely selfish of human beings, for are not our laws, our customs, our whole conditions of existence dependent on the decision and state of that public conscience? Is not every man and woman alive subject to the opinion of the majority, as to what may be permissible with regard to each of us?—just as, for instance, the

criminal of the middle ages had to thank the sentiment or indifference of his contemporaries, for his liability to be strapped down and submitted to the outrage of vivisection.

We may rest assured that a practise which asserts so frankly and ferociously the right of the strong to abuse the weak, cannot go on amongst us, without bearing its fruit of evil for ourselves. If we regard it as lawful to torture at all, on any conceivable plea, we shall find the principle will sooner or later have to be applied to our own persons, and it is hard to to see on what reasonable grounds we can object. There are obviously thousands of men and women who are positively harmful to their fellows, and unless we assert some principal of personal right, irrespective of merit, there is nothing that can logically protect such enemies of society from the cruelest forms of sacrifice. Indeed there can be but few persons whose lives are, in themselves, more valuable to humanity than would be some great and beneficent discovery for saving life and curing disease, which might (let us assume) be obtained through their torture. How many then could, on this principle, claim immunity? Can a doctrine be rational, let alone just, which logically drives one to such a conclusion?

Yet the practise of vivisection obviously must tend in that direction, and it has tended in that direction, as any one who will read the evidence on the question, is forced to see. If a body of peculiarly influential men are familiarised, at an impressionable age, with the scenes that vivisection involves, even in its least horrible forms, is it conceivable that they avoid being more or less hardened thereby? If a man can witness tortures (which he knows are not for the eventual relief of the sufferer) without discomfort—let alone anguish—it seems an insult to common sense, to assert that he can be as alive to pain in human beings, and as sensitive as he would have been, had all his work been directed to the alleviation of suffering in the creature under his hands. The beneficent motive (supposing it to exist), is at best, so abstract

and far off, that its effect on the character, in the presence of such direct and terrible mal-treatment, can hardly be very powerful. And rare indeed is that beneficent motive! The vivisector has had a long and efficient education to eradicate the sense of pity and the instinct that is present in any civilized man worthy of the name, to protect the weak. In the absence of this sense, there is no atrocity that the human race has not shown itself capable of committing against itself, as well as against its more friendless fellow-creatures. Cruelty begets cruelty, and it is certain that men cannot go on dissecting, and boiling, and baking, and freezing animals alive, without causing humanity to reap, sooner or later, in some form or other, the harvest of misery that they have sown. Every pang and every moment of anguish that these creatures have suffered *must* work itself out somewhere, and by some means, upon human nerves, and human hearts. No one who has been forced to realize, to any extent, the unutterable sufferings of the victims of this practice, has escaped some share of the penalty of anguish. The nation expiates its guilt in a thousand unforseen ways, first through moral injury, and thence, eventually, through physical degeneration, *for the physical and moral, in the long run are never separated.* Let those who uphold vivisection remember that inexorable law.

In so far as the vivisector induces men and women to accept the gains of cruelty with complaisance, he has lessened the chance of human progress, for he has stimulated the savage and primeval instincts of rapine and selfishness that lie at the root of all the misery and distraction of the world. Every influence that teaches man to clutch at good for himself, at the expense of evil to others—especially of the defenceless—is an influence that degrades and therefore checks the progress of the race.

The more direct forms of evil that follow the practice of vivisection are more difficult to trace, but they are not wanting.

The misleading results of this cruelty, in certain cases, have

kept back medical science for years and years,* and it seems to be impossible to find one really trustworthy case of a great and beneficent discovery made by this means (*g*), but even if the practice *had* brought stupendous physical benefits, even if we should foresee that through the inflow of health, consequent (be it assumed) upon this method of research, we could enter upon a terrestrial Paradise to-morrow; yet we may rest assured that our Paradise would crumble beneath our feet, for we should still suffer from a loathsome moral disease (leading back to physical unhealth); we should have founded our kingdom on selfishness, the most awful and callous that can be conceived, going about our little affairs in complete indifference to unspeakable agonies, suffered on our behalf and by our command. For this, assuredly, payment would have to be made, and made down to the uttermost farthing. The first indication of the dire penalty exacted of us, comes in the form of an insidious lowering of moral standards as between man and man; the check to spiritual development, the coarsening of fibre, which all go to make life for each of us more painful, more full of disillusion, more forlorn and despoiled of beauty and graciousness. This process helps to make way for the more terrifying calamities that follow in due course—the weak and the destitute being the first victims.

To select one's position in this question by the impression that we obtain from the statements of physiologists, as to the benefits to be derived from their profession, is simply to shirk the moral question altogether. To take a balanced and "moderate" tone, and propose "a little vivisection" but not too much—say the right side of the animal, but not the left—(in order to avoid doctrinaire extremes), is to accept the principle that torture is justifiable; and once that principle is accepted, the rest is a mere matter of practical detail; a little more or less anguish being allotted according

* See Professor Lawson Tait, etc.

to the degree of sensibility in the person who sits in judgment. To plead for a "little vivisection" under proper supervision, is about parallel to pleading for a little murder, carefully conducted in a reverent spirit.

In taking up such a position, are we not doubly, nay, trebly guilty: first and foremost, towards the animals, secondly, towards the operators, and thirdly, towards ourselves and the human race, which assuredly has to expiate, in tears and misery the wrong that it has wrought?

Nature is often ruthless and demands innocent blood. Man, who has shewn signs of taking another view of his opportunities, who has evolved the conception that we name justice, and that we call mercy; who has even been known to hold that the possession of power brings with it responsibility, and not an invitation to use it against the weak,—man nevertheless, decides to turn a deaf ear to these suggestions of his better self, and to imitate Nature at her worst, ignoring the more generous counsels which that very Nature, in her higher developments in his own soul, has been whispering to him for so long. He too will be ruthless and demand innocent blood—not merely blood indeed, but long slow agony, so terrible that many of the accounts of vivisectional experiments given by the operators themselves, with engaging frankness, are almost unreadable.

We are accustomed to regard this question as of minor importance among the problems of society; to believe that it stands low in the order of precedence. Yet it involves the most fundamental of moral questions; it involves our whole attitude towards life and conduct, our whole philosophy and our whole religion. Using the word religion in the sense that is now often attached to it: of an actuating motive and faith, it is obvious that our view of the question of vivisection is a profoundly religious question, whatever be our creed, and that it decides our view of the universe, as a whole, and our view of ethics as a whole.

If the universe were governed by a race of Gods, stronger and more intellectually developed than ourselves, should we think them justified in vivisecting us for their own benefit? Should we treat the subject "moderately" and be disposed to approve of the practice under "proper supervision," if we were ourselves the victims of superior force, instead of the possessors of opportunity to abuse it?

Is it rational to suppose that a race of beings can ever rise, even physically, to its highest, or progress in any permanent fashion, in defiance of the moral sense, which in the long run, carries with it the intellectual and the physical nature? It is indeed possible for an individual to be extremely intellectual and extremely bad (though he will assuredly be deadly stupid in certain important directions) but it is not possible for a whole people to be really enlightened and prosperous, in the genuine sense, while it is profoundly cruel and selfish and callous, indifferent to the rights and claims of others, and therefore lacking in respect for itself. It is devotion to abstract ideas of right and justice that keeps a race permanently sane and prosperous.*

Now if there be such a thing as a moral law in the universe at all—which the possibility of suffering, so awful for innocent creatures, almost tempts one to doubt—then it is surely obvious that there can be no offence more skocking and no act more dastardly than this of trying to shift the natural punishment of our own sins and vices and stupidities, on to

---

* Since writing the above, I came across the following quotation from Rabelais in J. A. Brierley's Volume of "Essays from Philistia."—"But since," as Solomon says, "wisdom enters not into an evil mind, and knowledge without conscience is only the ruin of the soul; therefore serve love and fear God, and in Him place all thy thoughts and all thy hope; and be joined to Him by faith which works by love."

This particular mode of expression may not suit modern forms of thought, but the idea, apart from all dogmatism, is translatable into the language of any faith or creed, and holds equally with all who admit the reality of the moral law.

the shoulders of those who are powerless to resist us. Indeed, in any case, the act is unspeakably contemptible.

If there *is* no moral law in the universe; if justice and charity and sympathy and mercy are empty names and utterly powerless to prevail over their enemies, in the long run; then life indeed is a sad and terrible gift, and the universe must seem to us, who struggle and suffer, like the plaything of a maniac, and we ourselves like his own vivisectional subjects; yet even in that case, would it not be well to range ourselves on the losing side, and to see to it that, at least, our sins shall not be of the cowardly kind ?

There might be some sad satisfaction in standing by the helpless, and saving some small amount of undeserved misery; even in the face of the most despairing conviction of the inherent evil of the universe, and of the eventual triumph of cruelty and of all the unlovely forces that now fill the world with sorrow.

This doubt of the eventual progress of the race might occur even to the most determined of optimists when he sees that science herself, for so long the true friend and saviour of man, now seems to be turning against him, while professing an extreme devotion to his interests. Ignorance and superstition have done their worst, and science, risen to power, is proving herself a bitter and an insidious enemy: tempting us to be false to our responsibilities and to grasp at any chance of benefitting ourselves, no matter by what infernal means. She offers us a scape-goat, and urges us to thrust upon it all our woes and all the penalties of our sins, if we can, and never mind how terrible it may be for the unoffending scape-goat.

The instinct of tyranny is inborn, and when the chance comes, it springs forth in priest and King, in demagogue and sage. Science is losing her old benign quality, and is growing like some fierce fetish of a despised superstition; thirsting for propitiatory sacrifices, and teaching her too docile pupils to offer, on her altar, some trembling creature

that cannot retaliate, some unfriended brother; with the promise that in acknowledgment of the pious offering, the new God will prepare for the faithful, a great reward—if mangling and murder can avail anything.

Thus our unfortunate race sees itself betrayed by the two great forces that professed most for its salvation: Religion and Science. They have both encouraged us in this cowardly abuse of our power; they have both helped to hold us under the yoke of our meanest and most selfish instincts. They have both urged us, or allowed us, unrebuked, to oppress the weakest and most unprotected creatures alive.

The Churches of the civilized world have scarcely lifted a finger against this abuse; * they have, by their silence (and sometimes by their speech) aided and abetted their hated enemy Science, now, for the first time in history, when she has made her successful appeal to the selfishness of man, and is, in this respect, doing her best to undermine his moral sense. And thus, these professed guardians of our welfare have been instrumental in producing among us a sort of moral insanity, a disease, which is now rapidly spreading far and wide, maiming and blinding and stupifying the conscience.

It is a perilous and critical moment, that we, as a race, are approaching, apparently with closed eyes. Science seems to have understood only the superficial facts of existence and of man's nature, after all. She has advanced as a conqueror, and has placed vast powers, won by her, at man's command. How will he use them? How will he face and resolve the problems of his complex existence? What will he decide to make lawful and what unlawful, in the struggle of life, and the aspiration after knowledge? Are all things to be accounted lawful, in this pursuit? Are all considerations of mercy to be thrown over, so soon as the object is tempting enough to our

* Among the clergy, those who have generously thrown their influence on the side of mercy, are still exceptions.

selfishness? Is nothing to be safe and nothing to be sacred? Upon the solution to these problems rests the moral rank of the race, for the future, and the security of all life and liberty. In solving them, man proclaims, consciously or unconciously, the nature of his faith in the universal government, and try as he may, he cannot set this question apart from the fundamental conceptions whereon his religion or his philosophy are resting. How are hideous cruelties to helpless beings to be reconciled to the principles of justice and of mercy, and what moral law is that, which has not a place of honour for these?

Surely the whole question of a moral law in the universe, whether from the theistic or from the agnostic point of view, stands or falls with the answer to this question: May men torture animals to benefit themselves? If the answer be Yes, then the world may be governed by a powerful and a coldly intellectual being, but assuredly it cannot be governed by a a wise, or a loving, or a just, or a merciful one, nor can the nature of things, in any way, be dominated by those principles. Pessimism and cynicism—if that view be adopted —become the only rational creeds.

Let any really clear-headed person, honestly try to build up a system of morals which would leave the practise of vivisection as a foundation for the code, and see how he succeeds. He would be forced to give charity and sympathy and unselfishness and pity a place therein, to avoid a contradiction in terms. Kindness would have to be added, and forbearance, even under provocation; and man would be exhorted to be not only just but generous, to render more than the mere letter of the law demanded of him. Even the milder forms of selfishness must be discouraged, and sins of omission as well as of commission condemned; while the higher kinds of imaginative sympathy would take rank as ideals. The responsibilities of power would be insisted upon, and also the claims of the weak (at lowest) to remain unmolested, and (at highest) to be defended and cared for. Chivalry, courage in

defence of the helpless, justice, mercy—these are the qualities that would be indisputably essential to any civilized standard of ethics. Now imagine such a system with the following propositions added:—N.B. As regards the virtues inculcated above, it must be understood that they are not intended to be put in practice towards animals, for these have no means of claiming protection from our code, whose principles are to be considered as applicable only to our fellow men, because they only can hit back if we injure them, whereas animals are unable, in that emphatic manner, to remind us of our moral sentiments, and of our lofty ethical standards. Let us therefore read our code as follows:

Be merciful. Be just. Be chivalrous. Be generous. Be sympathetic.	(Except to animals.)
Do not abuse your power. Regard your responsibility as co-extensive with your power.	(Except in the case of Animals).
Bear your own sufferings courageously, both those that you bring on yourself and those that come to you through heredity and the faults of your fellows.	(Unless you can lay hold of some defenceless creature and force it to suffer for you; if so, do not let any sentimental consideration deter you from enlightened research. You may derive benefit from it, who knows? May the blessing of God and Humanity rest upon you and your labours. Amen).

Is this the sort of code that we intend to adopt, as guide and compass for our future? If so, may heaven help us and our victims!

MONA CAIRD.

16 *August*, 1893.

NOTES

To a Sentimental View of Vivisection

(*a*) In "The Nine Circles," compiled from the reports of the operators, the various methods of experiment are given under different headings, of which a few may be quoted. Those who dispute the existence of extremely painful experiments upon animals, ought to take the trouble to examine for themselves the accounts of these researches, given, in their own words, and in their own journals, by the physiologists themselves. It is not easy to obtain some of these works, as they are intended only for those initiated in the mysteries, and it would not be prudent to allow the public to become familiar with the real nature of these experiments: still the British Musmum can supply many volumes which shew, in only too terrible a manner, the utter absurdity (to use no stronger terms) of denying that torture is inflicted by vivisectional experiment.

The following are some of the headings under which the experiments are divided:—

MANGLING.—Of the brain, spine, stomach, liver, kidney and spleen, heart and blood-vessels, bones, by larding feet and wings with nails, by dissecting out nerves and irritating with electricity &c., &c.

CREATION OF DISEASE.—By trepanning and squirting virus into the brain. By ordinary inoculation of cancer, leprosy, &c., by inoculation in the eyes, by injections in the ears, by placing glass tubes in the stomach, by injecting foreign matters into the blood, such as arrowroot, particles of potato, putrid water, &c.; artificial inflammation to enhance pain. (Page 69.)

POISONING.—With drugs, by curare, &c., &c.

SUFFOCATION.—By slow drowning, by plastering mouths of dogs with gypsum, &c.

BURNING AND FREEZING.—Baking, boiling, stewing, pouring boiling water in stomach, pouring boiling water over animals, pouring boiling oil over dogs and setting them on fire, freezing.

STARVATION.—By depriving of food, of drink, by feeding with unnatural substances.

FLAYING ALIVE AND VARNISHING.—(Various methods given.)

SPORT.—Fastening animals till they grow together, tying limbs over the back, scooping out brains, stiffening a dog like a piece of wood, making brains of cats to run like cream, exchanging brains, exploding dogs, &c.

MORAL EXPERIMENTS.—Testing a dog's feelings, &c.

In each case, the name of the operator or of the work or journal containing the account of the experiment, is given, and reference to the original sources is made easy.

It will be observed by the reader of this heart-rending compilation, that the foreign experiments recorded are generally more cold-blooded and awful in their savagery than the English experiments. Abroad, there is no public opinion against such practices, and therefore physiologists have no motive for concealment, and so we find a cynical frankness in describing even the most objectless and hideous of their investigations. This shows with appalling clearness how utterly the practice has deprived the operators of all vestige of pity, or sense of responsibility towards the creatures in their hands.

We see how far human nature is to be trusted in the exercise of arbitrary power.

(*b*) "I venture to record," says Dr. Hoggan, "a little of my own experience in this matter, part of which was gained as an assistant in the laboratory of one of the greatest living experimental physiologists. . . . In that laboratory we sacrificed daily, from one to three dogs, besides rabbits and other animals; and, I am of opinion, that not one of those experiments on animals was justified or necessary. . . . During three campaigns, I have witnessed many harsh sights, but I think the saddest sight I ever witnessed was when the dogs were brought up from the cellar to the laboratory for sacrifice. Instead of appearing pleased with the change from darkness to light, they seemed seized with horror as soon as they smelt the air of the place, divining apparently their approaching fate. They would make friendly advances to each of the three or four persons present, and as far as ears, eyes, and tail could make a mute appeal for mercy eloquent, they tried it in vain. . . . Were the feelings of experimental physiologists not blunted they could not long continue the practice of vivisection. They are always ready to repudiate any implied want of tender feeling, but I must say they seldom show much pity; on the contrary, in practice, they frequently show the reverse. Hundreds of times, I have seen, when an animal writhed in pain, and thereby deranged the tissues during a delicate dissection, instead of being soothed, it would receive a slap, and an angry order to be quiet and behave itself. . . . One of the most revolting features of the laboratory was the custom of giving an animal on which the professor had completed his experiment,

and which had still some life left, to the assistants to practise the finding of arteries, nerves, &c., in the living animal, or for performing what are called fundamental experiments upon it."—(Letter of Dr. Hoggan, in the *Morning Post*, February 1st, 1875.)

"I am inclined to look upon anæsthetics as the greatest curse to vivisectable animals. They alter too much the normal conditions of life to give accurate results, and they are therefore little depended upon. They indeed prove far more efficacious in lulling public feelings towards the vivesectors than pain in the vivisected."—DR. GEORGE HOGGAN.

The following is taken from an article in the *New Review*, January 1893, entitled, "WOMEN, CLERGYMEN, AND DOCTORS."—A reply by the Rev. Canon Basil Wilberforce:—

(Canon Wilberforce, who has been attacked by Mr. Ernest Hart, for using certain strong expressions, quotes the passage in which they occur.) "The words I used," he says, "were these:—

"An immense amount of dust is thrown in the eyes of the public with regard to that anæsthesia. In the first place, if you thoroughly chloroform a dog, the chances are that the dog dies on the spot, the action of chloroform on a dog is very different from the action of chloroform on a human being. . . . In the second place, the anæsthetic may possibly be administered during the first part of the operation; but when the animals are kept for many hours in prolonged torture, the effect of the anæsthesia passes away, and it would require the imagination of a Dante to call up before you the awful horrors of those silent hours of the vivisector's laboratory, when that poor dog is lying crucified to the torture-trough, while the operator has gone home to the comforts of his own house, forgetful of that poor creature that he has left in suffering. In speaking during this summer in another place, I ventured to say that there were certain people who could so harden their hearts by the performance of these operations, that they deserved no other name than the name of inhuman devils, if they could do certain things. Well I have been told that I made that statement in haste, and therefore I take this opportunity of repeating it, in composure and in leisure. And my definition of an inhuman devil would be just that. I should require no other than an able, clever man, with abundance of authority, with plenty of opportunity, with nothing to check his way, and with the sentiment of love, pity, and all idea of the great solidarity of the great throbbing multitudes of beings here on earth, stamped out of him, to come under the definition of an inhuman devil. And I say God help any animal, that comes under the hand of a man like that."

The Canon then proceeds as follows:—"I have nothing to withdraw, nothing to extenuate. In the endeavour to awaken the public conscience to a great evil, sheltered by sophisms innumerable and hypocrisy unbounded, it is a positive duty to denounce it in the strongest language,

even should such terms be used as 'generation of vipers,' or, 'ye are of your father, the devil.'"

Mr. Hart having asserted that Professor Goltz's experiments quoted in the "Nine Circles," were conducted under an anæsthetic, Canon Wilberforce remarks that he cannot see how that statement is reconcilable with sueh experiments as the following which he quotes as examples:—

"Fifty-one dogs had portions of the brain hemispheres washed out of the head, which had been pierced in several places. This was repeated four times, the mutilated creatures and their behaviour being studied *for months*. Most of the creatures died from inflammation of the brain." (Page 415.)

"Interesting experiment on a delicately formed little bitch: left side of brain extracted, wire pincers on the hind feet. *Doleful whining*. The little animal *began to howl piteously*, soon afterwards foamed at the mouth. The same dog was operated upon on October 15th, since then blind; died on November 10th. The dissected brain resembles a lately-hoed potato field." (Page 424.)

"These mutilated animals, no longer able to scratch themselves, twist about in 'the most ludicrous attitudes,' without gaining their object. (41286.) A few of the dogs had attacks of madness after the operations, and these died in a few days. (Page 433.) Pincers put on toes and other parts of blind mutilated dogs." (Pages 439, 440.)

"I undertook these studies of the mutilation of the brain in order to refute the false theories of the celebrated physiologist Fleurens, and I have attained that end:"—PFLUGER'S ARCHIVES, Vol. XIV., 1877, pp. 412-431. On the Destruction of the Cerebrum, by Professor Goltz, of the Physiological Laboratory of Strasburg.

(*c*) Among other almost inconceivable cruelties is the use of curare, "the hellish drug," as Tennyson calls it, which has actually been employed instead of an anæsthetic, its effect being to paralyse all motion while leaving sensation unimpaired, and indeed rather heightened in acuteness.

The celebrated vivisector, Claude Bernard, thus describes the effect of curare:—"We shall see that this death which seems to us to arrive so calmly and so free from pain, is on the contrary accompanied by the most atrocious sufferings that the imagination of man can conceive."—"REVUE DES DEUX MONDES," Chap. II., p. 173, of bound Numbers of the Periodical.

In Chap. IV., p. 182, he says, "In this motionless body, behind that glazing eye, and with all the appearances of death, sensibility and intelligence persist in their entirety. The corpse before one's eyes hears and distinguishes all that is done around it; it suffers when it is pinched or when irritated. In a word, it has still feeling (le sentiment) and will, but it has lost the instruments which serve to manifest them."

"The experience of men who have taken curare is given. They describe

their sensations as very dreadful. They are perfectly conscious, but unable to move, to speak, or in any way manifest their consciousness or express their feelings."

As, I think, Miss Cobbe has said, the horror of this torment surpasses all that Dante has imagined.

"Professor Mantegazza caused a machine to be constructed, a drawing of which is inserted in his book. In the centre is a large cylindrical glass box or bottle, in which lies a rabbit. Through the cover, descends and moves freely, a handle, terminating in iron pincers and claws, so arranged that the presiding physiologist may grip at pleasure any part of the animal's body, and lacerate or crush it at his discretion, "Thus," he says, "I can take an ear, a paw, or a piece of skin of the animal, and by turning the handle, squeeze it beneath the teeth of the pincers, I can lift the animal by the suffering part; I can tear it or crush it in all sorts of ways."—"THE NINE CIRCLES," compiled by G. M. Rhodes.

CARPENTER'S PHYSIOLOGY. 5th Edition. Page 85.—"The introduction of a little boiling water into the dog's stomach threw the animal at once into a kind of adynamic state, which was followed by death in three or four hours."

STARVATION. Page 55.—"The Phenomena of Inanition or starvation have been experimentally studied by M. Cossat, on Birds and Mammals." . . . (Symptoms given).

(Page 283).—"Dr. Snow found that birds and mammalia introduced into an atmosphere containing only from 10½ to 16 per cent. of oxygen, soon died although means were taken to remove the carbonic acid, set free by their respiration as fast as it was formed."

(Page 404).—"From the experiments of Dr. Fourcault, it appears that complete suppression of the perspiration in animals by means of a varnish applied over the skin gives rise to a state termed by him 'cutaneous asphyxia,' which is marked by imperfect arterialization of the blood, and considerable fall of temperature, and which, as it produces death in the lower animals, would probably do the same in man."

(Page 412).—"M. M. Delaroche and Berger tried several experiments on different species of animals, in order to ascertain the highest temperature to which the body could be raised without the destruction of life, by enclosing them in an air heated from 120 degrees to 201 degrees until they died."

(Pages 415 and 416).—"It was found by M. M. Becquerel and Berschet, that when the hair of rabbits was shaved off, and a composition of glue, suet, and resin (forming a coating impermeable to the air) was applied to the whole surface, the temperature rapidly fell notwithstanding the obstacle thus afforded to the evaporation of the sweat, whereby it might be supposed the temperature of the body would be considerably elevated. In the first rabbit which had a temperature of 100 degrees before being

shaved and plastered, it had fallen to 89½, by the time the material spread over him was dry. An hour afterwards the thermometer placed in the same parts (the muscles of the thigh and chest) had descended to 76 degrees. In another rabbit prepared with more care, by the time the plaster was dry, the temperature of the body was not more than 5½ above that of the surrounding medium, which was at that time 62½, and in an hour after this the animal died."

(Page 522).—"Fleurens found that when the cerebellum was mechanically injured, the animals gave no sign of sensibility, nor were they affected with convulsions. When the cerebullum was being removed by successive slices, the animals became restless and their movements were irregular; and by the time that the last portion of the organ was cut away, the animals had entirely lost the power of springing, flying, walking, standing, and preserving their equilebrium, in short, of performing any combined muscular movements, which are not of a simply reflex character."

Baron von Weber. "TORTURE CHAMBER OF SCIENCE." Page 2.

(Page 9.)—"Dogs covered with turpentine and then set fire to."

(Page 9).—"Boiling water was poured nine times over five dogs, and some of them remained alive for 5 days after."

(Page 7).—"Kidneys cut out."

(Page 6).—"Baked alive."

(Page 19).—"Suffocation."

(Page 20).—"Experiments on the brain."

(*d*) Kirk. "PHYSIOLOGY." Page, 273).—"From experiments by Walther, it appears that rabbits can be cooled down to 64 degrees F., they cannot recover unless external warmth be applied together with the employment of artificial respiration. Rabbits not cooled below 77 degrees, F., recover by external warmth alone."

"Walther found that rabbits and dogs when tied to a board, and exposed to a hot sun, reached a temperature of 114 degrees, 8 F., and then died."—*Ibid.*

(*e*) "A very clever, lively young female dog, which had learned to shake hands with both fore paws, had the left side of the brain washed out through two holes on the 1st December 1875. This caused lameness in the right paw. On being asked for the left, the dog immediately laid it in my hand. I now demanded the right, but the creature only looked at me sorrowfully, for it cannot move it. On my continuing to press for it, the dog crosses the left paw over, and offers it to me on the right side, as if to make amends for not being able to give the right paw."—Baron von Weber, "TORTURE CHAMBER OF SCIENCE." Page 20.

(*f*) Dr. Gharles Bell Taylor in a pamphlet entitled, "Vivisection, is it justifiable ?" quotes the following from Dr. Hoggan ;—

"The idea of the good of humanity was simply out of the question, and

would have been laughed at,—the great aim being to keep up with, or get ahead of one's contemporaries in sicence, even at the price of an incalculable amount of torture, needlessly and iniquitously inflicted on the poor animals."

The following is taken from the reports of the evidence given before the ROYAL COMMISSION in 1875.

Q. 35,296.—"When you say that you only use anæsthetics for convenience, do you mean that you have no regard at all for the sufferings of the animals ?"

DR. KLEIN.—"No regard at all."

Q. 3,541.—"Then for your own purposes you disregard entirely the question of the suffering of the animal, in performing a painful experiment."

DR. KLEIN.—"I do."

(The following replies are given in condensed form, as space does not allow of insertion in full. The number of the Question is given in each case, and the report of the commission can be seen at any time at the Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, 20, Victoria Street, S.W., or elsewhere.)

Q. 357, 359.—SIR JAMES PAGET thinks that frogs have little sensibility to pain. Does not think that experiments on them lasting for two hours inflicted any suffering to speak of.

(I have in many cases quoted the condensed answers given by MARK THORNHILL, ESQ., late Judge of Sakarunpore, in his work "The case against Vivisection," having in each case had the digest verified by reference to the report itself.)

Q. 4,888.—DR. NOE WALKER. A frog was cut open and pinned on a board till it died, merely to show the combined effects of pain and exhaustion.

Dr. Walker states that these and similar experiments are performed by the thousand, and are repeated over and over again, merely as demonstrations to students.

Q. 846.—DR. PRITCHARD "considers from his great experience of operations on animals, that they are as sensitive to pain as human beings."

Q. 3,553, Q. 3,552.—DR. EMMANUEL KLEIN does not consider English physiologists to be more humane than foreign physiologists, nor the English students more humane. Very rarely knew them to object to any experiment, though performed without anæsthetics.

Q. 3,454.—DR. HOGGAN states that it is a common practice for painful experiments to be repeated as proofs of skill by the experimenter, or as an interesting exhibition to visitors in the laboratory.

Q. 4,571.—DR. MC DONNELL. Asked about the experiment of puncturing an animal in a particular point which had the effect of making

it spin round and round for a long period, considers that the animal suffered no pain ; gives as a reason for this opinion that he frequently performed the experiment himself" (not *on* himself).

Q. 5,193*b*.—DR. SCOTT gives testimony to the cruelties practised in Edinburgh in the vivisectional experiments. No regard shown to the animals or endeavours to diminish their sufferings.

Q. 5,201*b*.—Not the slightest abhorrence was manifested by the students.

Q. 5,228*b*.—The students used to make private vivisections in their own rooms.

Q. 4,928*b*. Q. 4,932—Mr. MILLS speaks to the same effect. . . .— They would hunt down dogs and cats in the streets at night, carry them home to their rooms, and vivisect them, merely to gratify idle curiosity. (Having learnt the practice from those chosen for their guidance and instruction.)

B. PAGE, 343.—The PROFESSOR AT EXETER COLLEGE speaks of the bad effects on students of seeing the struggles of animals operated on.

Q. 4,785*b*, Q. 4,787.—DR. SIBSON does not consider that starving to death is painful in the later stages, "no pain whatever" in the earlier stages—perhaps a little,—"a very slight discomfort."

Is asked if human beings when starved to death "do not feel something more than discomfort?" Replies—"I am not aware that they do."

Q. 4,444.—DR. CRICHTON BROWNE. A cat under experiment screamed, turned its head round, bit and gnawed its own legs, lashed its tail, panted, uttered long-continued cries as of rage and pain. In regard to these indications of pain, Dr. Browne maintains that they were simply the effect of the stimulation of a motor centre, and that the animal felt no more real pain than a piano does when its keys are struck.

(Have we then scientific authority for believing that cries and screams etc., are no sign of pain? When a human being so comports himself, are we to regard it as a mere case of a stimulated motor centre, and turn aside smiling?)

Q. 4,111.—DR. HOGGAN quotes an account of an experiment of the most awful character on a dog in which no anæsthetic was given. The object of the experiment was to note the effect of pain on certain nerves. (These last-mentioned experimenters, unlike Dr. Crichton Browne, seem to have believed in the existence of pain in animals). The animal was subjected to ten hours of the extremest agony. It had been rendered motionless by curare (see Note, page 19) and artificial respiration was kept up by the tube of a bellows inserted in the windpipe, the bellows was worked by an engine. After the ten hours expired, the experimenters left for their homes; they did not however put the dog out of its misery, nor did they release it, but they allowed it to remain as it was, on the

chance of its living through the night, and of being capable of further experiment the next day.

Q. 4,888.—NOE WALKER. "Finally in order to prove that a frog with the medula oblongata divided, does not always respond to stimuli, he places it in a basin or trough of water, gradually raises the temperature, until the water boils and the animal of course gradually stiffens and dies without having made an effort to escape. Now to any one who has not allowed his heart and intellect to get gradually enslaved and carried away by his inordinate zeal and culpable indifference to pain, this experiment would be sufficiently conclusive. I do not think it was necessary to institute a comparative one because the action of boiling water and of heat generally is practically known to all the world, and boiling water has always but one effect on animals, whether dead or alive. The experimenter however thinks all this must be ignored. He therefore takes a sound frog and places it in the basin with just enough water to cover all but its head. The temperature is then gradually raised up to 20 or 30 centigrade, and of course the animal soon makes desperate efforts to escape from the painful effects of the hot water."

There are a number of experiments that are said to be made under anæsthetics and to have been humanely conducted. A full account of these are also to be found in the report of the Royal Commission. Among these are Dr. Brown's and Dr. Ferrier's experiments, which are thus described;—

Q. 4,444*b*.—"The animals were tied down on boards, the cords being afterwards relaxed, portions of the skulls being sawn off, leaving the brains exposed. The exposed brains were then stimulated by electric shocks, by acids squirted into them; parts of the brain were cut out and other parts broken up. The experiment on each animal continued for several hours." (How was it possible to keep up the effect of the anæsthetic, which we are assured was administered, for several hours?) "Three of the animals were suffered to live for three days after the conclusion of the experiments in order to note the results." "During the performance of the experiments" (Mr. Mark Thornhill continues in his Appendix to his work already mentioned), "the animals, notwithstanding that they were said to be unconscious, exhibited every sign of extreme suffering, as is evident from Dr. Ferrier's published account, which is quoted at p. 220 and from which I give the following extracts:"—

Q. 4444, ROYAL COMMISSION.—"The animal (a cat) exhibited signs of pain, screamed, and kicked out with its left leg, etc. The animal bit angrily and gnawed its own legs. Restlessness and long-continued cries as of rage or pain. The animal starts up, throws back its head, opens its eyes widely, lashes its tail, pants, screams and spits as if in furious rage." Nevertheless both he (Dr. Ferrier) and Dr. Brown in their examination before the Royal Commission and in their published defence of the experiments

(quoted pp. 221 and 222, ROYAL COM.) maintain that the animals did not really suffer. The experiments are also stated to have been *humanely performed.*

(It would be well for the public to take note of what vivisectors understand by the word *humanely*.)

In a pamphlet entitled "The Annual Report and Return, under the Act regulating Vivisection," by Benjamin Bryan, occurs this passage;—

"Thus it follows that year after year, when this annual return comes out, we see the numbers of experimenters and of experiments grow larger. . . . We find . . . an increase of 1,292 in a single year." (1893 as compared with 1891); Statistics on this subject leave us in no doubt as to the increase, and the rapid increase of the practice. As may be imagined, familiarity with the sights of the laboratory has not made the operators more humane. Peculiarly painful experiments are also on the increase. The acknowledged number of experiments in the last annual Report, without anæsthetics is about twice as great as those in which an anæsthetic was said to be used.

(*g*). This point is, of course, fiercely contested. Evidence on the matter is so voluminous that it is impossible to attempt quotation. Suffice it to say that the vivisectionists have never been able to adduce one absolutely, proved instance of a great advance made by means of their operations, while their opponents have shewn that knowledge has, in many instances been retarded by the experiments, which have turned out, as one might expect—misleading. (*See* "Professor Lawson Tait etc.")

Vivisectionists have claimed vaccination, anæsthetics, the circulation of the blood, as discoveries for which we must thank experiments on living animals. But investigation seems to disprove this assertion. (*See* "Vivisection Scientifically and Ethically Considered" by Abiather Wall, Rev. Brewin Grant, and James Macaulay. This Vol. gives much information and many authorities.) These authors, as well as many others, adduce the words of the discoverers themselves to show that the idea that has made them famous, by no means owes its birth to vivisection.

See also "Vivisection, Is it Justifiable?" by Charles Bell Taylor, F.R.C.S., and M.D., Edin. *The Times* Article on the Results of Experiments on Living Animals, answered by Professor Lawson Tait. Also "Brain Surgery to Date," reprinted from the *Zoohpilist.*

"Government Vivisection," by J. H. Clarke, M.D.

"The Discussion of Vivisection at the Church Congress," "The Fruits of Vivisection," and "A Wrong Method, being two Letters on Experimentation on Living Animals," by Professor Lawson Tait. "The Uselessness of Vivisection as a method of Scientific Research," by the same author.

"Do the Interests of Humanity require Experiments on Living Animals? And if so, up to what Point are they Justifiable?" by F. S. Arnold, M.B., B. Ch. (Oxon) M.R.C.S.

"The Futility of Experiments with Drugs on Animals," by Edward Berdoe. Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians (Edin.), Member of the Royal College of Surgeons.

"Hydrophobia and Vivisection," by Benjamin Bryan.

"Pasteur and Rabies" by Dr. Dolan.

"Extracts referring to Dr. Buisson's Method both of Prevention and Cure of Hydrophobia."

"A few Words on M. Pasteur and His Institute."

"A Birds-Eye View of a Great Question," written and compiled by Sydney G. Trist.

Literature on the subject can be obtained through the Victoria Street Society for the protection of animals from Vivisection.—20, Victoria-St., London, and from the London Antivivisection Society, 32, Sackville St., Piccadilly.

"Almost all our knowledge of the laws of life must be derived from observation only. Experimentation can conduct us very little farther in this enquiry."—Dr. Carpenter. PHYSIOLOGY. Quoted by Dr. James Macaulay.

"On such subjects as the functions of the different parts of the encephalon I do not believe that experiment can give trustworthy results, since violence to one part cannot be put in practice without functional disturbance of the rest. Here I consider that a careful anatomical examination of the progressively complicated forms, from fishes up to man (the experiments already prepared by nature), is far more likely than any number of experiments to elucidate the problem." Dr. Carpenter. PHYSIOLOGY. As quoted by Dr. James Macaulay.

(*h*) "It has been recently discovered that during the middle ages, indeed so late as the sixteenth century, criminals condemned to death were vivisected at Florence."—MARK THORNHILL.

(This practice has undoubtedly been known throughout the world's history, wherever human beings have possessed sufficient power over their fellows to be above the reach of punishment or the check of an influential public opinion. Humanity has certainly not shown itself too generous or too merciful for such deeds, and it is absolutely certain that the custom might be revived at any moment, were the opinion and feeling of the public to grow sufficiently familiar with the idea. The recent proposal to bring in a Bill in America for the vivisection of criminals, shows that the idea *is* becoming alarmingly familiar, as might have been expected, seeing the rapid increase of the practice of animal vivisection.)

"THE TORTURE CHAMBER OF SCIENCE." Page 12. Baron Ernst von Weber.—"French physicians in Montpellier have in former times vivisected criminals sentenced to death, on the ground of furthering Science."

In replying to a request sent by the Scottish Society, for the Total Suppression of Vivisection to the Editor of the *Personal Rights Review*, the latter replies:—

"The Anti-Vivisection movement, as such, is beyond the limits of our Association, but we have strenuously resisted the State patronage of vivisection, and the use of hospital patients as *corpora vilia*."

This is quoted in the Sixteenth Annual Report of the Society, 1893.

The manner in which the practice is here spoken of openly, as a well-known fact is somewhat significant.

In a pamphlet by Stanford Harris, M.R.C.S., are given numerous instances of experiments on patients, the accounts being by the operators themselves.

"In conjunction with Dr. Bury, I have some investigations concerning the action of saliciæ on the human body, using healthy children for our experiments, to whom we gave sufficient doses to produce toxic symptoms." (*i.e., symptoms of poisoning.*)

"Our first set of experiments was made on a lad aged ten. He was admitted with belladonna poisoning, but our observations were not commenced till some days after his complete recovery."—(Dr. Ringer's HANDBOOK OF THERAPEUTICS. 8th Edition, pp. 340, 341).

The same writer says that Dr. T. Gilber Smith is reported to have said in his address at Nottingham in 1882, that the wards of Hospitals are too often filled with cases useless for the instruction of students of medicine, and that if such cases were refused admission, "the existing number of beds would be found to provide a far richer material for the purposes of clinical instruction." . . . . "Ward work would possess an attraction hitherto unknown."

The whole pamphlet is full of detailed accounts of innumerable experiments on patients, including inoculations with skin diseases, consumption, &c., &c.

"Dying Scientifically," is the title of a volume by the author of "St. Bernards," a romance written by a medical man, revealing the shady side of hospital practice. The book created a stir at the time of publication, and the author was attacked by the press and the profession. In "Dying Scientifically" he quotes chapter and verse from the accounts of the operators themselves, proving that his representations were founded on undeniable fact.

EXAMINATION BEFORE ROYAL COMMISSION. Q. 3390.—"I believe such an experiment was performed in the case of an Irish servant, who from ulceration had a large part of the brain exposed, and the American physician, thinking that irritation might be applied to the human brain, with the same degree of safety as to the brains of the lower animals, applied electricity to ascertain whether similar movements would be induced in her as in a monkey, and he found that that was the case. The woman afterwards died, some said from the results of these experiments. I believe, however, that the woman was in a very perilous condition at the

time, the post mortem examination shewed that she had died from results of the disease."

The experiments are said to have been undertaken as supplemental to those performed in England by Dr. Ferrier, on cats and monkeys.

A similar experiment (on the same plea of the case being hopeless) was performed on the Italian Rinalducci, at Turin, 1882.

In the *Daily News* for August 18th, 1893, an interesting article on the late Dr. Charcot contains these significant words. "Burg's discovery of the effect of metals on the nervous system was scoffed at by most Paris doctors, but Dr. Charcot asked the discoverer to make experiments in the Saltpetrière," (that is on human subjects). . . . "Dr. Charcot was as prudent in testing a theory by experiments as he was bold in striking out new paths," (a happy combination for his patients!) "He was reckless of the effects of his experiments on individuals, though affectionate in his home relations . . . *Patients to him were generally interesting cases which he treated in the spirit of the vivisectionist.*"

Those who enquire into the evidence on these questions will, from all sides, discover startling proofs of the effects of vivisection upon the minds of those who practice it. Their home relations may remain affectionate, but on the side of their profession they seem to become morally insane; just as a man may be intellectually sane on all points but one, and on that one, be completely mad.

"In this country," says Mark Thornhill, "where the practice of human experiment is new, it is confined to the performance of such experiment, as is presumed will occasion only discomfort or temporary suffering. Abroad, where the practice has longer prevailed, we find experiments had recourse to, causing actual torment, life-long injury, even the probability of death itself. . . . The history of vivisection shows that the practice of experimenting on living beings, when once adopted, tends to develop, to increase. The experiments become more frequent, more cruel. . . . The experience of the Continent, and of America, shows that what in this respect is true of animals, is true also of experiments on men."—"EXPERIMENTS ON HOSPITAL PATIENTS," Mark Thornhill.

(*i*) This point of view which begins to gain ground even, among laymen is of course still more tempting to the profession, who are daily possessed of opportunity for putting it into practice.

The following is a letter to the *Standard* of Nov. 24th, 1883, from Armand de Watteville M.D. (There had been some controversy on the subject of using hospital patients.)

"SIR,—A few days ago an anonymous letter appeared in your columns. . . . which . . . . ought not to be allowed to pass without an energetic protest.

"As far as I can see, the writer intends to bring a charge against a distinguished member of his own profession, ... viz., that of having used

patients in a hospital for other purposes than those tending to their own direct benefit. Now I should like to ask 'M.D.', whether his whole career as a medical student, from the day he handled his first bone to that on which he passed his last clinical examination, did not involve abuses very similar to those for which he now joins the unfortunately ever-growing pseudo-humanitarian out-cry against the methods of rational medicine? What right had he to trample upon the feelings of others in dissecting the bodies of people whose sole crime was to have been poor, and still more to acquire his clinical experience at the expense of, perhaps, much human shame and suffering? I think we, as medical men should not attempt to conceal from the public the debt of gratitude they owe to the *corpora vilia*,—for such there are, and will be, as long as the healing art exists and progresses. So far from there being a reason why moral and pecuniary support should be refused to hospitals on the ground that their inmates are made use of otherwise than for treatment, there is even ground why more and more should be given to them, in order to compensate by every possible comfort for the discomforts necessarily entailed by the education of succeeding generations of medical men, and the improvements in our methods of coping with disease."

(This at all events is pretty plain speaking!)

The volume from which I quote, viz., "Anti-Vivisection Evidences," by Benjamin Bryan, contains a collection of evidence from various medical journals and from papers read before medical Societies, shewing, from the accounts of the operators themselves, the numerous experiments that have been made on patients with drugs and otherwise, inducing painful and often dangerous symptoms.

The *Zoophilist for* 1884, contains accounts of experiments by Bargigli on two children. He inoculated them, according to this journal, with matter from a leprous tumour.

RINGER'S HANDBOOK OF THERAPEUTICS, p. 352,—contains account of experiments with alcohol "administered in poisonous doses." Among the subjects of the experiments was a boy of ten.

(EXAMINATION BEFORE THE ROYAL COMMISSION. Q. 558-569.) PROFESSOR SHARPEY IS THUS QUESTIONED:—"You were speaking of the Scientific end being the true end; surely if the scientific end is the great end, those experiments would be justifiable on human beings."

The examination is too long to quote in full. Eventually Professor Sharpey says that the question is a speculative one, which he, "is not prepared to discuss."

DR PAVEY. Q. 2,132-2,139,—is pressed in a similar way; he similarly avoids a direct answer to the logical difficulty.

W. SHARPEY. 563.—"Might you not submit those who had incurred minor penalties to experiments not endangering life, and those who had incurred the greater penalty to the more dangerous experiments?"

"I never thought of that; If I mistake not, the first experiments of inoculation of the small-pox were made on criminals."

564.—"Is not that a precedent that might be repeated with great advantage to Science?"

"I have not thought out that question."

565.—"You are not prepared to recommend it to the "Crown and Parliament?"

"Certainly not."

566.—"But you would admit that the way in which you put it, that the scientific object is the great object, would lead to that logically?"

"I do not think it is very likely to lead to it actually."

567.—"I do not mean practically, but that it would suggest that?"

"It is alleged that in antiquity, they did perform dissections upon living men. It is said that Herophilus of Alexandria did, and he was denounced by Tertullian, one of the Fathers of the Church, as having made vivisections on human beings. But I do not know how far that is true, but yours is a speculative question, which I really am not prepared to discuss, and I think it never will come up practically at all."

Zoophilist, June 1892.)—In the Greek and Alexandrian schools human vivisections were practised. Tertullian writes of this.

Erasistratus, Diocles and Herophilus were in the 2nd Century, all known to have practised human vivisection on an enormous scale. Statements, not only from Christian Fathers, but verified by Aurelius Celsus, celebrated physician of the Augustan age.

Fifteen centuries after the age of Celsus, with the revival of learning and Science came revival of Human Vivisection. Cosmo de Medici seems to have taken anatomists of Pisa under his special favour, and to have made them presents of the miserable convicts from the prisons at his option.

Accounts of several cases are to be found in Criminal Archives of Florence.

After the date 1570, no more cases occur in the Archives.

NOTE.—All quotations given above, have been verified either by myself, or on my behalf, by reference to the original sources of information. I have, by no means, picked out the worst cases; there are many that are too awful to quote in a pamphlet of this nature.

THE BIJOU LIBRARY.

No. 1. **Price Fourpence.**

IBSEN'S WOMEN.

A LECTURE given before the LONDON ETHICAL SOCIETY by

MARY S. GILLILAND.

"Ibsen seems to say 'Trust humanity, dare to give women freedom and responsibility—they will be worthy of your trust.'"

No. 2. **Price Sixpence.**

CO-OPERATION:

Its Laws and Principles.

By C. T. FOWLER.

"The Social Problem is here dealt with from the point of view of VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION, OR ADMINISTRATIVE ANARCHY Monopoly is here shewn to result simply from law-created inequalities. The impositions of Rent, Interest, Profit and Taxes are first exposed."

No. 3. **Price Sixpence.**

A SENTIMENTAL VIEW OF VIVISECTION

By MONA CAIRD.

No. 4 **Price Sixpence.** (Cloth, 1/-)

THE VILLAGERS' MAGNA CHARTA.

"THE VILLAGE FOR THE VILLAGERS."

The Parish Council Act, 1894,

WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT MAY BE MADE.

By J. MORRISON DAVIDSON.

LONDON: WILLIAM REEVES, 185, FLEET ST., E.C.

New Volumes in the Bellamy Library

(*See Full List on page 2 of Cover.*)

By GEORGE N. MILLER (Of the ONEIDA Community).

STRIKE OF A SEX

Paper, 1s.
(Cloth, 1/6)

A NOVEL.

32,000 *Sold.*

By DR. HERTZKA.

VISIT TO FREELAND

Paper, 1s.
(Cloth, 1/6)

70,000 *Sold in Germany.*

By Rev. STEWART D. HEADLAM.

Paper, 1s.
(Cloth, 2/-)

The LAWS OF ETERNAL LIFE:

BEING STUDIES IN THE CHURCH CATECHISM.

"MR. HEADLAM starts with the assertion that the Church Catechism is the best Manual of Socialism."

By P. J. PROUDHON.

WHAT IS PROPERTY?

Edited by H. S. SALT.

CRUELTIES of CIVILIZATION

Paper, 1s. (Cloth 2/-)

☞ The Oldest, Largest, and Best Circulated Musical Weekly in England.

The MUSICAL STANDARD.

Price 1d. Weekly.

LONDON: WILLIAM REEVES, 185, FLEET ST., E.C.