

Thoughts on dreaming. Wherein the notion of the sensory, and the opinion that it is shut up from the inspection of the soul in sleep, and that spirits supply us with all our dreams are examined by Revelation and reason. Occasioned by an essay on the phoenomenon of dreaming, in a book, entitled An enquiry into the nature of the human soul [by Andrew Baxter]. Wherein the immateriality of the soul is evinced from the principles of reason and philosophy / By Tho. Branch.

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
THOUGHTS
ON DREAMING


BRANCH

1738

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






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THOUGHTS
ON
DREAMING.



[Price One Shilling and Six Pence.]

Supposed to be by
Andrew Baxter, the
Antislavery Missionary.

THOUGHTS

ON

DREAMING

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THOUGHTS
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WHEREIN

The Notion of the SENSORY,
and the Opinion that it is shut
up from the Inspection of the
Soul in Sleep, and that Spirits
supply us with all our Dreams,
are examined by REVELATION
and REASON.

OCCASIONED BY

An ESSAY on the PHOENOMENON
OF DREAMING, in a Book, Entitled,
*An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human
Soul; wherein the Immateriality of the
Soul is evinced from the Principles of
Reason and Philosophy.*

By THO. BRANCH.

L O N D O N:

Printed for R. DODSLEY, at Tully's Head in
Pall-Mall; and J. JOLLIFFE, at the Bible in
St. James's-Street. M.DCC.XXXVIII.

ERRATA.

PAge 3. Line 12. for *Meterialists*, read *Materialists*; p. 13. l. 26. for *have*, r. *bath*; p. 15. l. 10. for *effect*, r. *affect*; p. 16, l. 7. for *Declinations*, r. *Declination*; p. 16. l. 23. for *visiated and destroyed*, r. *vitiating and destroyed*.





THOUGHTS O N DREAMING.



O intelligent Persons who have reflected on the *Phænomenon* of Dreaming, will regard an Enquiry about it, as useless or trifling; since it is, perhaps, from hence that we are furnished with one of the most obvious and satisfactory Proofs Reason affords of the Soul's Existence in a separate State. To such who have never attended to the working of the Mind during Sleep, I wish the same Pleasure this Search has given me, and they will then readily grant, that their

B waking

waking Thoughts are not unworthily employ'd in examining their sleeping ones.

The *State of Sleep* has been considered in very different, nay, opposite Lights.

Some have thence argued the *Materiality of the Soul*; attributing the Inconsistency, and seeming Irrationality, of Dreams, to the Body's Sleep; and from the want of constantly remembering them, have inclined to suppose Sleep an Affection of the whole Man, Soul and Body.

Others contend, that the Senses being then laid aside, the Soul is to be regarded as in a kind of separate State; and from its Operations in Sleep, they infer its *Immateriality*, and the Likelyhood of exercising its Faculties when entirely divested of the Body.

As to the *efficient Cause of Dreaming*.

Many believe Dreams nothing more than *Thoughts during Sleep*.

Holy

Holy Writ assures us, that *Dreams* or *Visions of the Night*, have been sometimes caused by *supernatural Agents*. This has been the Opinion too of many wise *Heathen*, as well *Philosophers*, as *Poets*.

The Author under Consideration, supposes *all Dreams*, whether common or extraordinary, to be represented to the Soul by *Spirits*; and that they must necessarily be so, because the Sensory is shut up during Sleep, from the View of the Soul.

The *Materialists* have a quite different Way of accounting for Dreams, viz. from *Matter and Mechanism*; but if they are pleased to consider this *Phænomenon* half so accurately as it requires, they will find abundant Reason to distrust their Philosophy.

This *new Hypothesis*, which the learned and ingenious Author has admirably managed, carries something very curious and pleasing in it, as it leads us toward a belief, that when this World's busy and fatiguing Scenes are closed with the Day,

Sleep nightly ushers us into a Theatre, where the Soul is entertained, and its Faculties are employed by Beings of an higher Rank. But tho' so many Charms attend this Conjecture, that one is strongly inclined to wish it true, and finds a Reluctance in opposing it ; I am so unhappy as not to meet with compleat Satisfaction in it. I fear no Man ever invented an *Hypothesis* (so partial, or rather imperfect, are we all) but he became enamoured of it ; and as the supporting this Favourite is a Point we much interest ourselves in, 'tis not strange that the Mind, so full of, and intent on one Object, should not take in many Things which would present themselves in a more extended and impartial View. On this Account it is, that we find it abundantly easier to overturn, or unsettle old Notions, than establish new. I make this Observation, rather to excuse myself, than blame any one else ; for, 'tis certain, the Mind may have Truth in its View, and yet be much misled by singling out and pursuing some Particular which strikes it powerfully. If any of my Objections shall occasion this excellent Author's explaining himself, I know many
of

of his Readers will thank him, and me as the mean Instrument of it.

I shall not confine myself precisely to observe on this Gentleman's Scheme ; but endeavour to shew, not only that our *ordinary Dreams are not effected by Spirits* ; but that the *Sensory is not immediately necessary to the Soul for producing the common Appearances of Dreaming*. And as I wish to make these Sheets of some use to Readers, who have not been conversant in Matters of this Nature, I desire it may be forgiven me, that I touch a little on the *Powers or Operations of the Soul* ; and proceed in a more minute and diffused Way, than speculative Persons require.

To form reasonable Conjectures of Dreaming, it seems necessary to consider,

I. The Manner of the Soul's receiving the Materials of its Knowledge, about which it is exercised when we are awake :
And,

II. The Power it has over them when received.

From

From hence we shall be tollerably well enabled to judge of *natural* and *supernatural Effects*. If it appears that the Soul has no Preceptions during Sleep, but what might have resulted from some of its waking Thoughts, and the Employment of its Faculties about them ; and there be but a Possibility that our Dreams may be our own, methinks, 'tis unwarrantable, as well as unphilosophical, to call in the Assistance of Spirits ; because it has a manifest Tendency toward divesting the Soul of its active Power ; and incapacitates it for the Exercise of its proper Functions without immediate Aid from the Body, or foreign Agents ; which Supposition would greatly affect our best founded Notions in relation to its seperate Existence. But more of this hereafter.

I. Then. *As to the Manner of the Soul's receiving the Materials of our Knowledge.*

I think we may very safely believe, that all the Particulars about which the Soul is employed when we are awake (except what arises from the Contemplation
of

of its own Powers) had their Conveyance thro' the *Senses*. We may, at least, subscribe to this Opinion, as far as the present Enquiry is concerned; for as to *Instinct*, and some other disputable Points, they will not interfere with it. Let it, by no means, be infer'd, that I controvert the Possibility of communicating Knowledge, or Objects, to the Soul, without using the Body as a Medium. I am abundantly satisfied that God, who made the Soul, can, during its Union, apply to it in what Manner he pleases; but where, in any Instance, the ordinary and stated Method is not apparently discontinued, I see no Reason for substituting an extraordinary one.

II. *Touching the Power the Soul has over the Materials of its Knowledge, received by the Senses.*

1st. The Soul can *add* and *multiply*, and *magnify*. As, when from its Idea of an *House*, it forms that of a *Row of Houses*. Or from a *Model*, a *large Palace*. And from a *Unit*, a *Million*.

2dly.

2dly. It can *diminish*, or *contract* an Idea, as it was originally received. Thus an *Army* is reduced to *fewer Forces*; and the *World* shrinks into a *portable Globe*. Indeed, *abstracted Ideas* will not, properly, admit of this, or the foregoing Operations, as being Creatures of the Mind which have a fixed Standard: But all which have *Number* or *Quantity*, if a determined Portion thereof is not necessary to make up the Idea, may be conceived of by the Mind as augmented and diminished.

3dly. It can *abstract*. As when from the Ideas of particular *white* and *round* Bodies, it attains the general Ideas of *Whiteness* and *Roundness*. And from the Actions of Men, as they respect God, and each other, it frames the abstracted Notions of *Piety*, *Justice*, &c.

4thly. It can *compound* its Ideas, and thence obtain, as it were, a new one. Thus, of *Justice*, *Benevolence*, *Temperance*, &c. it makes the complex Idea of *Virtue*.

5thly

5thly. It can, contrarywise, *divide* or *reduce* its complex Ideas into their constituent simple ones. So *Virtue* is brought back into *Justice, Benevolence, Temperance, &c.*

6thly. It can *compare* and *judge* of the Similitude and Disagreement of its Ideas. As when the Difference is considered between *this* and *that*; or the Propriety of one, or the other, for a particular Purpose.

7thly. By its Faculty of *Memory*, the Soul reviews, and recognizes Ideas formerly received.

8thly. The Soul, by its *imaginative Power*, forms Multitudes of Appearances and Scenes, which never existed together in the Mind before; tho' the several Ideas that make up the Whole, must have been there. This is done by *compounding, dividing, transposing, &c.* what it finds in the *Memory*. The Objects produced by this Faculty, appear to the Soul, when it reflects not on their Manner of Production, as real as those brought in by the Senses.

These Functions (which are all that are necessary to be considered with Regard to this *Phænomenon*, and, perhaps, more than enough) together with the *Contemplation of its own Powers and Acts*, the Soul performs when we are awake, without the least Assistance from the Senses. If it can do thus much during Sleep, what a vast Fund may hence arise for the Employment of its Faculties! And how few Dreams are there which will not be accounted for from this Stock! That the Soul does exert these Powers in Sleep, one would think no Person, who believed it immaterial, could seriously doubt.

After the most strict Enquiry I have been able to make, nothing appears which may occasion any Hesitation in this Particular, except we can suppose, that when the Body sleeps, the Soul is stript of its *Memory*. Indeed, if this be gone, and the Soul has no Means of reviewing any thing it was ever possessed of, the Faculty of *Imagination* must cease, as having no Materials to work on; and the Objects of our
 Dreams

Dreams will then be incontestably of foreign Communication.

Of Memory and the Sensory.

The *Memory* is usually considered, both by *Materialists* and *Immaterialists*, under the Notion of a *material Organ*, which serves for a Repository, or Store-house, of Images, as they were conveyed to the Soul's View by the Senses; this is supposed to be seated in the Brain, or Breast, according to the Place assigned for the Soul's Residence, and is called the *Sensory*; and, to the several Paintings, or Traces thereon, it is that the Soul has Recourse, when it exercises the Act of *remembering*; as from thence it received its first *Perception* of material Objects.

This Supposition has the Sanction of Antiquity, and is honoured with the greatest Names of old and modern Philosophers; it is, therefore, with the utmost Deference, that I take the Liberty of saying any thing in Opposition to it; but, I hope, a Desire of coming at Truth, will not be miscon-

strued into an Affectation of Novelty, or a Fondness for Scepticism.

That some internal Organ is necessary for the Soul's first Perception of outward Objects, during its Confinement in the Body, where it is denied immediate Intuition, is certain. That a vast Variety, and large Scenes of Objects, are, at once, contracted and painted on a small Part of the Eye, and thence conveyed, thro' intermediate Passages, to the Soul's Inspection, Experience forbids our questioning; but what becomes of these Objects afterwards, or how the Ideas, excited thereby, are preserved by the Soul, is far less explicable. There is a wide Difference between painting to the Soul from external Objects, and fixing, and making permanent those Representations in the Brain; as also between the Necessity there is for the former and latter. Perhaps we don't err much in likening the *Sensory* to a *Mirror*, or *darken'd Room*, whereon many Objects may be at once viewed; but no one will go about to prove, that all the Representations made thereon at any one Time, remain there, when the Aspect or
Situ-

Situation is changed, or when new Objects cover the whole, or part, of their Superficies ; one, or both, of which, must, I think, inevitably be the Case of the Sensory. According to my best Understanding of the Matter, the Sensory is to be considered only as a Superficies ; and, if so, let it be hard or soft ; let it receive Impressions, or reflect Objects ; I am utterly at a Loss, in conceiving that a very small Superficies, and such it must be, can contain at once, that almost Infinity of Images our Memory will afford. Is it not reasonable to think, that the Eye, supposing it filled, must discharge its Objects constantly on the same Part of the Sensory ? Or if, by contracting itself, it receives only a single Object, in any particular Point of View ; must not that, and every other Object seen in the same Point of View, and Degree of Contraction, fall exactly on the same Part of the Sensory ? We must otherwise, surely, assign an *Intelligence* to the *Objects*, or the *Sensory*. If it be said, it is not pretended that all is retained in the Sensory, which have been received ; for many Images, in time, leave no Trace of their having been there, and hence proceeds

Want

Want of Memory; and thus Room is made for new Objects. Were this admitted, we shall still find the Sensory of far too little Extent. We are told, that all Objects which come to the View of the Soul, thro' the Senses, are *remembered* to have been seen by it before, only from their *Patterns* already in the *Sensory*; but every time a known Object occurs to the Sense, there must be a new Image on the Sensory; so that there may be Ten Thousand Images of the same Object, at once on the Sensory; and, therefore, contract the Objects, and enlarge the Sensory, as much as Imagination will permit, it seems an insuperable Difficulty that they should, without utter Confusion, find Place there. It cannot, very consistently, be supposed, that the Soul rejects the superfluous 9999; in regard they must be, agreeably to the Notion of a Sensory, imprinted on it previously to the Soul's taking Cognizance of them. How happens it that some Persons, Things, and Places, with which the Soul has been formerly much conversant, or greatly affected, but the Images of them have not been renewed in the Sensory, by the Sense of seeing, should remain, after
many

many Years, so perfect and vivid. It will not, surely, be said, that the frequent reviewing them in the Sensory, has preserved them; (perhaps this has been done but seldom) that were strangely to confound *Cause* and *Effect*, by making the *Image* an *efficient Cause* of the Soul's having its *Idea*; and then making that *Idea* an *efficient Cause* to the *Image*. The Image might, every time it was beheld, effect the Passions; but that they, or the Animal Spirits excited thereby, should retouch the Paintings, or Traces, in the Sensory, much surmounts my Conception. If the Sensory be a *material* Part, and a most soft and yielding one, as is supposed, it is more than wonderful, that any Traces made thereon, should be permanent for any considerable Length of Time, notwithstanding the Change the whole Body is perpetually undergoing; this will be poorly solved by saying that the same Organization of the Body is preserved, tho' there be a Change in the Matter whereof its Parts are constituted. I don't know whether I may not venture to call these Images, or Traces, a *foreign Force* on the Organ; and such a one as Nature is constantly

stantly endeavouring to remove. Nor is it less strange, that Objects should take their Places so aptly, as not to fall on, and so obliterate, or deface the Images already in the Sensory. This is equally unintelligible to me, with *Lucretius's Declinations of Atoms*, for which he could give no Reason.

I can't convince myself, that Objects conveyed thro' the Eye, impress Traces in the Sensory ; but suppose it more probable that they are superficially *painted thereon, by means of the Light* which carried them thither : For, methinks, 'tis not very reasonably believed, that the Effect of Light on the Objects represented should be stronger in the Sensory, after its passing thro' the Eye, and other intermediate Parts, than before ; and that it should then operate in a quite different Manner. ▸ The Objects certainly leave no Traces in the Eye ; if they did, that Organ must soon be visiated and destroyed : And so I apprehend, the Sensory would be, or at least rendered in a very unfit Condition to represent Objects truly, were Impressions made in it. Whereas, if we suppose that
visible

visible Objects remain no longer on the Sensory, than the Rays of Light which conducted them continue there, and are unoccupied by any other Object, we shall account for the Soul's Preception of them, and leave the Sensory unhurt.

It seems the proper Office of the Sensory to receive Representations, but not to retain them : For tho' never so many Objects pass thro' the Eye into the Sensory, if the Soul be, at that Time, otherwise attentively engaged, they are unobserved, and cannot be recovered by searching in the Sensory for them ; which they might certainly be, if they had left Traces there. I think, we are to consider visible Objects in the Sensory, as the Effect of Light and Shade in Painting ; but by no means as Pieces of Sculpture. If *Memory* depends on the *Sensory*, is it likely that the Soul would be so much at a Loss as frequently 'tis, since so very useful an Organ may reasonably be supposed most commodiously placed for its Inspection ; and, at least, as much at Command as the far less necessary Parts of the Body ? One would think that the Mind, which travels with incom-

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parably

parably swifter Expedition than the Eye, might very soon glance over every Image the Sensory contained. It hath been supposed, that were the whole Treasure of the Sensory laid open to the Soul at one View, it must create Confusion; but that seems improbable, since the Soul might regard, and pass by, what served, and what was impertinent to its purpose, as it does when it uses the Eye about external Objects. The Soul, for want of such a displaying the Contents of the Sensory, (admitting it thus stored) is often much confused and distressed about what it looks for.

As the Notion of a *Sensory* seems to receive its firmest Establishment from the Consideration of *visible Objects*, it will not be amiss to examine that of a *Person blind* from his Birth: For some blind Men have very copious Memories; and agreeably to the Supposition of a Sensory, theirs must be well stored. 'Tis certain, such a Person can form no Conception of Images, as they would appear thro' the Eye; but his other Senses, in all Probability, make their Report to the Soul in a similar Manner with theirs

theirs who see. Sounds, Smells, Tastes, and Touching, affect him as they do me, when considered meerly by themselves unaccompanied with the Objects occasioning them, which are displayed to Sight. Can it be said, that his four Senses convey Images or Representations of the several Sensations they produce, and leave them on the Sensory? The *Picture* of a *Sound*, *Smell*, &c. seperate from the visible Objects occasioning them, seems very chimerical in a seeing Person's Sensory; but I'm afraid 'twere worse to assert it in one's born blind. If it be deemed necessary that the Soul, in order to its remembering a visible Object, should actually behold it represented in the Sensory, it must, for the same Reason, be supposed really to hear, taste, smell, and touch, in the Sensory, the Objects of those respective Sensations, every time it remembers them. When we remember, the Soul seems to exercise the particular Sense which conveyed the Object remembered, but that it actually does so, is certainly false. Our Ideas necessarily conform themselves to the Appearances the Objects made to the Soul; but this, by no means, proves that those ori-

ginal Appearances remain with us, tho' the Ideas copied thence do. I cannot admit that Appearances, and our Ideas, are so much the same Thing, that without retaining the former, we lose the latter; but rather look on Ideas as Inhabitants of the Mind, whom it can retain, tho' the Appearances which gave Birth to them are annihilated.

It is not improbable that the supposed Necessity of a Sensory for Memory, maintains its Footing from this Consideration, that when seeing Persons *think*, it is always in *Figures* or *Images*: Even the most abstract Ideas of those who can read, are painted to the Mind under the Form of *Words*. This being the Case, what seems more plausible than to conclude, that when the Eyes are closed, or the Mind turned inward on itself, it really sees the Images it contemplates: Whereas this is wholly owing to the Sense of seeing, and the Skill in reading; both which away, the material Sensory stands on too weak a Foundation.

The Sensory hath a farther and more pernicious Latitude ascribed to it, than I have yet considered it in, *viz.* 'Tis made a Repository of what passes in the Soul, and its Acts; and thus becomes, if I may so title it, *The Registry of Conscience*: But 'tis on many Accounts too ill qualified for this Purpose. When we reflect on past *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and call to mind how Objects, or our Actions, formerly affected us therewith; the bare Representation of those Objects or Actions, admitting them to remain on the Sensory, could not shew the Soul how it was affected with them; for it may be very differently, nay, contrarily, affected upon a Review of them; those Objects may now give Grief, which, in Time past, inspired Joy. If then the Objects, as they came into the Sensory, and were there delineated, will not shew us this, we must either suppose the Soul to have traced its Affection on the Sensory, so as to recognize it, which is vastly improbable, not only because it is the Office of the Sensory to receive external Objects; but also for that in reflecting on Pleasure and Pain, we do not observe them

to

to appear under any Representation ; they are conceived of as felt, not as described : Or, which is more rational, we must look elsewhere for *Memory* than in the *Sensory*. Beside, How is it conceivable that the Soul's own Acts, wherein it solely respects itself, and which it can for a long Time remember, should be described on the *Sensory*, v. g. the Act of *reflecting on its Powers* ? But could we imperfectly Paint out this Action for ourselves, who can see ; tho', I confess, my Fancy comes vastly short of it ; if we suppose ourselves in the blind Man's Case, who remembers such an Act of his Soul, and conceives as clearly about it as we do, all Possibility of portraying it on the *Sensory* is gone.

I think we owe this Notion of the Necessity of a *Sensory* for Memory, to Philosophers, who believed the *Soul material* ; and endeavoured to account mechanically for the Exercise of its Faculties. They had no other imaginable Way of explaining Memory, than by assigning a *Sensory* to retain *Simulacra* or Images, which might again act on the Mind, when the Objects they represented did not. But
those

those who hold the Soul a distinct, immaterial Being, will find that making a Sensory immediately necessary for the Act of remembering, clashes very much with the Doctrine of its Immortality. We reasonably suppose, that were the Soul disembodied, its Discernment, which is now restrained and limited by the Organs it is forced to use, would be prodigiously extended. I would therefore gladly be informed, whether in such a State where it had *immediate Intuition* of the Objects it now sees mediately by the Eye, it can be deemed unlikely that it should *retain its Knowledge*, at least in some Degree, of those Objects, tho' they might be removed from its actual Inspection. [For surely the Soul cannot be omnipresent.] If it be thought that the Soul would not be deprived of its Knowledge then, by the Removal of, or from the Objects, I apprehend that the same Reason which induces that Supposition, will have equal Force with regard to Memory independent of a Sensory, in our present State: For tho' now, the Soul sees not outward Objects themselves immediately, but their Representations in the Sensory; its *View of those Representations* is as *immediate* to the Soul, as we can conceive

ceive its *View of the Objects themselves to be in a State of separate Existence.*

The Office of a material Sensory, as far as relates to Memory, will, I think, be much better supplied, by supposing that the Soul has a Power of retaining its Ideas, or that Portion of them which we find it in Possession of. It must be acknowledged a very wonderful Thing, that a small Hint, or single Idea, should, as it does, almost instantaneously restore a large Combination of Ideas to the Soul: But this will not, very intelligibly, be explained, by supposing the Renovation of almost defaced Traces in the Sensory; since one Object can with no Probability be thought to act on more than its own Trace; and how it should even do that, is to me inconceivable. I apprehend that the attributing Memory solely to the Soul, will be clog'd with much fewer Difficulties than the contrary *Hypothesis*: For tho' during the Residence of the Soul in the Body, the Senses are the Canals thro' which Knowledge flows to it; the making a Sensory necessary, by way of Reservoir, to contain it, seems not warranted by Philosophy; as we shall find it impossible thus
to

to account for Memory, either from the Action of *Matter on Matter*, or an *immaterial Substance on a material one*, or *e contra*: And, if we cannot do this, it is a right Conclusion, that it must have its *Seat in the Soul*. The other Supposition will moreover draw after it such Consequences as seem incompatible with a right Belief of the Soul's Immateriality, and separate Existence, some of which will anon be remarked.

I am prolix, and I fear tedious, in treating of the Sensory; but it is a Point of some Consequence, and this ingenious *Author's* Scheme principally turns on the Supposition of its being shut up during Sleep, from the Soul's Inspection; whereby he divests it of Memory, and thence infers the Necessity of receiving all the Materials of our Dreams from foreign Agents. I am induced to conjecture, that he found himself a little pressed by Mr. *Locke's* Arguments against the Soul's perpetual Thinking, but that it sometimes nods with the Body, which has an Aspect of making them too nearly related, and perfectly to get over this Difficulty (which he has

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otherwise, with much Success, attempted) he deemed it proper to detach the Soul from having the least Dependance on the Body as to Dreams, by drawing a Veil over the Sensory in Sleep ; whereby too, the Irrationality charged on our sleeping Thoughts cannot be attributed to our wanting the Assistance of the Body, as tho' we owed the Perfection of Thinking thereto ; but must be occasioned by Spirits, who obtrude on us what we then think about : But I cannot help apprehending, that tho' this *Hypothesis* makes the Soul sometimes active, whilst the Body sleeps, and its Thoughts at that Time independent on the Body ; yet it renders the View of the Sensory so necessary to Thinking, that, should the Soul, deprived of its Aid, be at the same Time unoccupied by Spirits, it might, nay must, as soundly nod, as by the other Supposition.

Having thus touched on the *Powers of the Soul*, and considered the *Sensory* ; I shall now point out some of the Consequences resulting from the Opinion that the Sensory is shut during Sleep.

distrest an *Immaterialist*, who had made him this Concession, that the Body, in its natural State, had nightly deprived the Soul of its Knowledge. If it be said, that the Supposition of shutting the Sensory is so far from making the Soul and Body one, that it evidently discriminates them, as it asserts the former to be active in the Contemplation of Phantasms exhibited by Spirits, whilst the latter sleeps; and this affords Scope for the Exercise of all its Faculties: It is answered, That if it does distinguish them, it is not done sufficiently and rightly; it takes a very noble and useful Faculty from the Soul, *v. g. Memory*, and converts it into a *bodily Sensory*, which, in the State of Sleep, can do neither Soul or Body any Service. Beside, it doth not leave the Soul in Possession of all its other Faculties; for the *Imagination*, which strongly argues the Soul immaterial, cannot, by this Supposition, be exercised during Sleep. This Author, who has excellently endeavoured to demonstrate from the Nature of the Soul, that it must perpetually think, had as little Occasion as can be conceived, to make the Inspection of the Sensory needful in that Behalf. *A Being,*
which,

which, in its Nature, must think, seems to require, for that Act, no foreign Aid, either of Sensory or Spirits; as it could never want Employment from the Contemplation of its own Nature, abstracted from all material Objects, and its Powers with regard to them.

2dly. We are, sometimes, *conscious in Dreams, that we have, formerly, dreamt the present Thing.* If every one's Experience will not tell him this, it will, at least, assure him, that he frequently dreams of well-known Objects. How is this to be accounted for, since, for want of Recourse to the Sensory, we can't see their Patterns there traced; which, on the Supposition that a Sensory is necessary for Memory, we should do? We remember many Dreams. Have we two Sensories, one for sleeping, the other for waking Use; If so, how is it conceivable that we should be restrained from beholding our waking one, when asleep, as freely as we do the sleeping one whilst awake? This Gentleman, indeed, allows but one Sensory for both these Occasions, tho' that seems to add to the Wonder; for, to admit that Spirits
make

make their Representations on the same Organ where the Soul's Representations (if I may thus call them) are traced, and yet, that, during Sleep, we can perceive theirs, but none of our own, tho' we retain their's when awake, is hardly explicable; nor does this, at all, solve the Difficulty how we should, in Sleep, remember Objects we knew waking; for their being barely represented by Spirits cannot be supposed to give us Memory; as hath been before mentioned, and will, by and by, be farther considered. This mediate Application to the Soul, by Spirits, acting on a bodily Organ, favours too much of Matter and Mechanism. As the supposed Communication of Objects is internal, I see no more Occasion for an Organ to give the Soul Perception, than in a separate State; for if the Soul would be impercipient of Objects, held out to it in one Case, I think it might be so in the other too.

3dly. As *Consciousness identifies*, or makes us be *ourselves*; and that it does so, is on all Hands agreed; the want of it would certainly divest us of that Identity. When
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the Soul is disembodied, how can Consciousness of its past Actions attend it, since all the Records are deposited in the Sensory, from which there is a Separation till the Resurrection of the Body? If it be said, that God may, if he so pleases, till then, appoint a Spirit to employ the Soul, and give it Consciousness by some immediate Application, and so there will be no want of the mediate Use of the Sensory; I answer, Consciousness of the *Deeds done in the Body*, may, with much Reason, be supposed to constitute a very considerable Part of our future Happiness and Misery; and to imagine a Ministration of Spirits, to represent to the Soul what may be effected by its Faculty of Memory, seems very unphilosophical, and raises a great Difficulty to solve a small one. Seeing and remembering, are very different Things; the Soul's intuitive Knowledge in a separate State, is no more likely to give it Reminiscence, than its present beholding a Representation in the Sensory, for the first Time, can make it remember to have seen it before.

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We have our most perfect Knowledge, touching *Souls in a separate State*, from Revelation; which is so far from affording any thing which tends toward destroying the Memory of departed Spirits, that it appears, in many Places, in direct Opposition to it. In the Parable of the *rich Glutton* and *Lazarus*, *Luke xvi. 25.* *Abraham* is made to bid the former, Remember *that in his Life time he received his good Things, and Lazarus his evil Things.* And the *rich Glutton* intreats most affectionately for his *living Brethren.* This, indeed, was not related by our Saviour as a Fact, but spoke for Instruction only; yet it looks like a Proof that our *future Memory* will be our own. Again, *Rev. vi. 10.* The Souls of those who had been slain for their Testimony to the Word of God, are represented as crying, *How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and revenge our Blood on them that dwell upon the Earth?* There are many other Parts of Scripture, where this Point of the Soul's retaining its Memory, seems established; but I don't perceive any, the most distant, hint of the Absence of the Sensory being supplied by Spirits;

Spirits ; nor that past Thoughts, or Actions, may be remembered by an immediate Intuition of their Objects.

Let us now take a View of what Scripture will furnish us with in regard to *Dreams*. Many are there recorded ; and in every one of them, *the supernatural Cause is expressly mentioned, or very discernable* ; which affords no weak Ground for concluding against the Agency of Spirits in ordinary ones. Should it be objected, that in Scripture Language many natural Effects are ascribed to God as their next and immediate Cause. The Event of these Dreams argues them supernatural : But I am not to expect this can be controverted by those who make all Dreams such ; and therefore I proceed.

Scripture Account of Dreams.

Gen. xv. 12. *And when the Sun was going down, a deep Sleep fell upon Abraham. God is said to have spoke to him herein.*

xx. 3. *God came to Abimelech in a Dream.*

xxvi. 24. *And the Lord appeared to him (Isaac) the same Night.*

Chap. xxviii. Jacob's *Vision of the Ladder*, has all possible Marks of a supernatural Agency.

xxxi. 11. *The Angel of God spake unto me (Jacob) in a Dream.*

xxxi. 24. *God came to Laban, the Syrian, in a Dream.*

Chap. xxxvii. *Joseph's Dreams.* It is not said that God, or an Angel, appeared to him; for which Reason, perhaps, his Brethren stigmatized him with the Title of *Dreamer*. But the wonderful Event forbids doubting of their Origin.

Chap. xl. Pharaoh's *chief Butler and Baker.* Their Dreams are not said to have been supernatural; but the fulfilling *Joseph's* Interpretation of them, and the Consequences resulting therefrom, on him, seem to declare them such.

Chap. xli. *Pharaoh's Dreams*, are, by *Joseph*, declared to be from God; and
their

their exact Completion is a sufficient Attestation that he spoke Truth.

xlvi. 2. *God spake unto Israel in the Visions of the Night.*

Numb. xxii. 20. *God came unto Balaam at Night.*

Judges vii. 13. *The Dream of the Midianite, has Marks of a supernatural One.*

2 Sam. vii. 4. *The Word of the Lord came to Nathan at Night.* This, in Verse 17. is called a *Vision*.

1 Kings iii. 5. *In Gibeon, the Lord appeared to Solomon in a Dream.*

1 Kings ix. 2. *The Lord appeared to Solomon the second Time, as he had appeared unto him at Gibeon.* [Which was in a Dream.]

Job. iv. 13, 14, 15. *In Thoughts from the Visions of the Night, when deep Sleep falleth upon Men, Fear came upon me, and Trembling, which made all my Bones to shake. Then a Spirit passed before my Face; the Hair of my Flesh stood up.*

Dan.

Dan. ii. 28. Nebuchad nezzar's *Dream*, is said, by *Daniel*, to be a Revelation from God. But it may not be amiss to observe, that, in *Verse* 29. *Daniel* says thus; *As for thee, o king, thy Thoughts came into thy Mind upon thy Bed, what should come to pass hereafter; and he that revealeth Secrets, hath made known to thee what shall come to pass.* I don't perceive but that the *Thoughts*, here said to be the King's, may be understood *sleeping ones*; if so, he had certainly his Memory without supernatural Aid.

Chap. iv. *This Dream of Nebuchad-nezzar was apparently supernatural.*

As to Daniel's own Dreams or Visions, these were doubtless Revelations from God.

Zac. i. 8. The Visions which the Prophet saw, in this, and the five following Chapters, were by Night, and are said to be *the Word of the Lord.*

Joel. ii. 28. *I will pour out my Spirit upon all Flesh; and your Sons and your Daughters shall*

shall prophesy, your old Men shall dream Dreams, and your young Men shall see Visions.

These are all to be supposed supernatural Effects. It was no strange Thing that both Old and Young should Dream; but uncommon for either to do so supernaturally. *St. Peter*, in the 2d. Chapter of *Acts*, explains this Prophecy, by the Effusion of the Holy Ghost on the Day of *Pentecost*.

Job xxiii. 14 to 18. God speaketh once, yea twice, yet Man perceiveth it not: in a Dream, in a Vision of the Night, when deep Sleep falleth upon Men, in Slumberings upon the Bed; then he openeth the Ears of Men, and sealeth their Instruction, that he may withdraw Man from his purpose, and hide Pride from Man.

This seems to point at some extraordinary Revelations made to Persons, during Sleep, for their Conduct. The *Translators*, in the Contents of this Chapter, understand it thus. They say, *God calleth Man to Repentance by Visions.* I presume it cannot be extended to ordinary Dreams.

Numb.

Numb. xii. 6. *If there be a Prophet among you, I, the Lord, will make myself known unto him in a Vision, and will speak to him in a Dream.*

Jer. xxiii. 28, 29. *The Prophet that hath a Dream, let him tell a Dream, and he that hath my Word, let him speak my Word faithfully; what is the Chaff to the Wheat, saith the Lord? Is not my Word like Fire, saith the Lord? And like a Hammer that breaketh the Rock in Pieces?*

The two last Quotations seem to declare, in the most forcible Terms, that there is some obvious Criterion whereby to distinguish supernatural from common Dreams.

Job. vii. 13, 14. *When I say my Bed shall comfort me, my Couch shall ease my Complaints; then thou (the Lord) scarest me with Dreams, and terrifiest me thro' Visions.*

It is not improbable that Job thought his disturbed Sleep might arise from Natural

tural Causes, tho' he ascribes it immediately to God; as he does every one of his numerous Afflictions. Or, perhaps, he considered the Permission of God as equivalent to his Order. But whatever his Opinion was, it will not warrant our supposing all Dreams supernatural Effects; nor can we reason from his Case to our own; because we are told, that he was given into the Hand of *Satan*, who may very consonantly be thought to have distressed him Sleeping and Waking, to the utmost Extent of his limited Power.

Ecclef. v. 3. *Solomon*, tho' he had two supernatural Dreams, which have been above taken Notice of, says here, *A Dream cometh thro' Multitude of Business*. And in the 7th verse, *In the Multitude of Dreams, and many Words, there are also divers Vanities; but fear thou God*.

From the Consideration of all which Places of *Scripture*, I think the following Inferences are fairly deducible, *viz.*

1st. That there are Dreams in which Spirits have no Concern.

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2dly. That such Dreams only, which by some very extraordinary and distinguishable Impulse on the Mind, or by their Subject, or their Accomplishment, evidently shew their supernatural Origin, can on any warrantable Foundation be attributed to Spirits.

3dly. That Dreams sent from God are for Purposes of Moment.

If then *Revelation* makes so little for the Supposition that all Dreams are Supernatural; it is proper to examine what Difficulties there are in the *Phænomenon* of Dreaming, which may support it.

Difficulties in accounting for Dreams from NATURAL CAUSES, attempted to be solved.

D I F F I C U L T Y I.

The Soul in Dreams is often entertained with Representations of Persons and Things, which never occurred to it waking.

SOLUTION.

SOLUTION.

Let the Powers of the Soul, which are before mentioned, be considered, and it will appear, that there are none of its sleeping Thoughts (except such as I shall not scruple to admit Supernatural) but what may be thence well accounted for. The Imagination frequently exhibits as mysterious Compositions when awake, as during Sleep, and such as never existed together in Nature, nor received their Being before from Fancy.

D I F F I C U L T Y II.

The Soul soon detects the Fallacy of the Chimeras its Imagination raises, whilst we are awake; but in dreaming, it is quite the reverse: We Joy, Grieve, Fear, Hope, Act, and Suffer, and still acquiesce in the Reality of the Objects affecting us: And therefore we are not to believe the Soul constantly imposes thus on itself; but rather that it is under the Influence of a supernatural Agent.

SOLUTION.

When awake, we have the *Senses* to consult about the Truth or Fallacy of such Objects as the Soul creates to its own Disturbance. Should we conceit, with our Eyes shut, that any terrifying Object approaches us, it is but opening them, and we are undeceived. Where this kind of Evidence is wanting, those Minds which we call weak, are oftentimes as much affrighted waking as dreaming. To this Cause it is to be attributed that Spectres are most usually seen in the Dark, when Persons have only the Mind's Eye to appeal to. If the Imagination is too strong for the waking Senses, as sometimes it is, are we to wonder, that the Soul does not detect in Sleep, the fantastick Scenes of its own raising? I do not see a Possibility that the Soul can determine against the Reality of its own Perception of Objects, where the Senses do not contradict it. If it be said, that by a Train of sound Reasoning the Soul can, and does, when we are awake, prevent the Imposition of the Imagination, without Recourse to the Senses. I would have

have it considered, whether in any supposed Instance of its so doing, one of the Senses is not a Monitor, who makes us distrust the Reality of the Object under the Soul's View. When a Man sets his Imagination to work in collecting horrible Ideas, he is assured that the Forms which will arise before his Mind, have their Existence only there; because he receives the Conviction of his Senses, that they do not convey them. He who reads such Collection, knows that his Eyes behold only a Description, but not the Thing described; and yet how powerfully is the Soul sometimes affected by it! In Sleep, the Faculty of Imagination is exercised by the Soul, without the least Apprehension that the Senses do not bring in the Objects.

O B J E C T I O N.

We experience as manifest a Difference in Dreaming that we Read, or Hear, Descriptions of Persons, or Things, and that we see them, as we do between those Acts when awake: But if the Senses, as I would suppose, are necessary to make this Distinction

stinction, whence can it arise, that these being laid aside in Sleep, we should be so much more affected in one Case, than the other.

A N S W E R.

Tho' the Senses are actually useless to the Soul during Sleep, they are imaginarily exercised. But as when the Soul is conscious of seeing Words, or hearing Sounds in a Dream, it were absurd to conceit, that it could, at the same Time, be conscious they were Things or Persons: So when it is conscious of perceiving Persons or Things, it has no means of disproving the present Perception. It does in both Cases, and alike mistakenly, take it for granted that it Sees and Hears corporeally: And we are in either Case affected, as we should be, had we the real Use of the Senses, and the same Objects were brought in by them.

D I F F I C U L T Y III.

Our Dreams are sometimes for the whole Night, of very different Subjects from the
Business

Business and Thoughts of the Day ; but were they only Cogitations of the Mind, and not exhibited by foreign Agents, they would in all probability participate greatly of our waking Thoughts, especially when the Mind has been intensely engaged upon some particular Affair.

SOLUTION.

Dreams many times so apparently result from the Business, Study, Pleasures, and Uneasiness of the Day, that they forbid our calling in foreign Aid. It is true, that they sometimes, tho' rarely, consist of quite opposite Subjects ; as where a troublesome Day is succeeded by a delightful Night, or the contrary. But even in this Case we shall not be much at a loss to find a possible Way for the Mind's effecting this, if we consider, with what great Difficulty it is that we fix it long, whilst awake, on one Subject ; and that in Opposition to our best Endeavours, and notwithstanding its Attention is helped by sensible Objects relating to what we would confine it to, such as Books, Conversation, Writing our Thoughts, &c. It is ever and
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anon flying off, and will hardly be held in: And these away, it is far from being strange that the Mind, naturally a Wanderer, should rove at large. It may be remarked too, that till the Attention of the Soul to its waking Thoughts is abated, it is impossible to sleep. When we address ourselves to Rest, we designedly take off the Mind from particular Objects which engrossed it; and avoid, as much as may be, regarding or reflecting on what passes in it. I think we are not to be much surprised at our having no more of the Days Thoughts in Dreams, which we thus take care to lay aside for others, before we can Dream.

O B J E C T I O N.

May it not very reasonably be supposed, that the Soul, during Sleep, would, if it had the Use of the Sensory, and were not prevented by Objects supernaturally communicated to it, take again into its Consideration, Matters that we had been just before conversant about, and much interested in, tho' they were postponed for the purpose of going to sleep; as we
drop

drop and resume Affairs, for particular Ends, whilst awake? But the Impracticableness of doing this in Sleep, proves, either that our Thoughts are obtruded on us by Spirits; or that we have not the Use of Memory to remind us of the Business of the Day.

A N S W E R.

— We must Sleep on such Terms as God has been pleased to grant us. We are not conscious during Sleep, that we are asleep; had we any way of making this Discovery, we should, perhaps, then employ our Time otherwise than we do. This Knowledge is, doubtless, concealed from us for very wise Ends; tho' I cannot presume to assign them. It would, methinks, be a very astonishing Consideration to the Soul, were it conscious in Sleep that it had not Power over any part of the Body, but must attend its Leisure before it would be employed: I do not apprehend it could then be satisfied it was not in a State of Separation. And had the Soul a Consciousness of Sleeping, and, at the same time, a Power of Commanding the Senses,

Senses, it would hardly be possible to refrain from exercising it; and I doubt not but we should, to our much greater Prejudice, deny the Body its needful Rest. As to *Memory*, the Exercise of that Faculty in Sleep, will be proved in the *Solution* of the 6th *Difficulty*, and elsewhere, sufficiently to shew the Materials of our Dreams our own. It cannot be denied, that the Business of the Day is frequently Part of our Nightly concern.

D I F F I C U L T Y I V.

We are sometimes conscious in Dreams, that we are Dreaming; which we could not possibly be, unless Dreams were the Effect of a foreign Agent: The Soul would otherwise be only Conscious that it *Thought*; whereas here it strives by awaking the Body, to extricate itself from some Uneasiness oppressing it, which seems plainly forced on it.

S O L U T I O N.

The Soul, as far as comes within my Observation, has never this Consciousness
of

Dreaming, but in Cases where its Perturbation is very great; and there it is highly probable, that, previous to the Consciousness, the Soul's violent Emotions may have so far roused one of the Senses, as to receive sufficient Testimony from it, of having Dreamt. If this be the Case, the Consciousness is not to be attributed to the sleeping, but the waking Man. Had we Consciousness at any time in Sleep, that we then Dreamt, I see nothing which hinders our perpetually having it. But this no one will assert.

D I F F I C U L T Y V.

The Soul being undisturbed in Sleep, by the Avocations of the Senses, if its Dreams were its own Thoughts, it is reasonable to suppose, that they would be more Conversant about Matters of Importance, and be consistent among themselves; and that we should Reason better, at least as well, when its Faculties are disengaged from material Objects, as we do awake: Whereas our Dreams are, for the most part, trifling, vague, ridiculous, absurd, &c. And if this be attributed, as I would

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have it, to the Soul's wanting the Senses, we shall make its most rational Thinking owing to the Body.

SOLUTION.

Dreams are sometimes on Subjects not unworthy our best waking Thoughts ; and we Reason on them to a considerable length. I think we always Reason as rightly, and design acting as properly, from what occurs to the Soul in Sleep, as when awake ; and our Passions are affected in much the same Degree : And I am apprehensive, that most of the Folly charged on Dreams, would, on a strict Examination, find its Parallel in the waking Man. Methinks the Dreams here objected to, are but with an ill Grace charged on Spirits. It seems, very likely, that the Body, by its various Uneasiness and Disorders during Sleep, tho' they are not sufficient to awake us, does very much contribute to the Confusion of our Dreams, and the shifting a train of Thoughts. It may, without Impeachment of the Soul's Immateriality, be admitted to affect it in this State, as it does in a waking one. The Senses are commonly

commonly supposed great Impediments to intense Thinking ; and so they truly are when they affect us in such a manner as to call us off from the Objects then under the Soul's Inspection ; but, on the contrary, they are sometimes Auxiliaries to the Soul, without whose Aid we should ramble waking, as we do in Dreams. But this having been already touched on, I wave a further pursuit of it. It may not be improper to observe, that the Supposition of a shut or disordered Sensory, makes the Body no less an impediment to the Soul's rational Thinking, as it is here understood, than the Absence of the Senses, which I assign as the obstacle : Tho' it is certainly true, in both Cases, that a Thing may hinder Perfection, which cannot alone cause it.

D I F F I C U L T Y VI.

We often Dream of dead Persons, whom we suppose living, nor remember that we ever knew they were dead ; and of long past Actions and Circumstances of our Life, and believe them present : But had we a sight of the Sensory, or the Use of Memory, the Soul could not make this

great Mistake : Therefore both these are wanting, and the Delusion is occasioned by such Appearances as are presented to the Soul by Spirits.

SOLUTION.

The Soul in many Cases exercises the Memory during Sleep ; it does it, in some Degree, in those this *Difficulty* supposes ; where it Recognizes our dead Acquaintance, past Actions and Circumstances. This alone is sufficient to destroy the Supposition of a shut Sensory ; or, establishes a Memory independent of its Aid. As to the particular Circumstances which the Soul does not remember ; may we not reasonably conjecture its Attention too much engaged by the Objects of its present Thought, to have recourse to the Memory, and draw Inferences from it ? When we are awake, and think on Persons dead, and past Actions ; it is usual, at first, to consider them as dead and past : Where it is otherwise, and they start up suddenly in the Mind, they sometimes occasion a long Series of Thought before we reflect on them as not living and present : Indeed
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it is from the Memory that we procure this testimonial on Reflection; but here the Memory is exercised with another View; in the former Case, it shewed us the Objects in one part of Time, and in the latter at another. Besides, I would have it remembered, that when we are awake we have the Senses to give us Assurance that we are only Thinking; but in Sleep they are, by mistake, supposed to concur in every Representation the Memory and Imagination suggest: this may, perhaps, retard the Soul's farther Enquiry about them. I believe I may appeal to the Reader for Instances of Dreaming, where the Dead are thought of as Dead; and former Circumstances of Life and Actions, as past: If these at any time, during Sleep, appear in a true Light, it assures us of Memory; and how at other Times they come only to be regarded as living and present, has, I apprehend, been sufficiently accounted for.

D I F F I C U L T Y VII.

We sometimes in Dreams conceit ourselves in Places, Circumstances, and amongst
Persons

Persons, all which we seem very well acquainted with ; nor are at all surprized at our Situation or Condition : but when we awake, we are conscious that we never saw or thought of them before ; and wonder at this our late Familiarity. 'Tis hence infer'd, that the Memory must be suspended during Sleep, otherwise it would have convinced us of our Error ; for the Patterns of those Objects not being in the Sensory, we should have known them to be New. Here this ingenious Author supposes, that the Spirits who entertain us, give us, together with the Objects, a kind of supernatural Memory, which makes us thus intimately acquainted with them, as soon as they are exhibited.

SOLUTION.

This is to be accounted for in much the same Way with the *last Difficulty*, viz. That the Soul being busily engaged about its Objects, and much engrossed by them, and not distrusting the concurrence of the Senses, does not stay to ask the Question how it became thus intimate with its new Acquaintance ; nor considers at all whether it does, or does not, remember them ;

it takes Things as it finds them. For I think this Case never happens but in such Scenes where we have a considerable Part to act ourselves. When the Mind rambles awake, and gets into new Scenes; their being new is not discovered to it by the Imagination which raised them, nor by the Contemplation of them, when considered in and by themselves; but it arises from a quite different Act of the Soul. 'Tis one Thing to *think*, in this Sense, and another to *remember*; the former Act has merely the Objects or Ideas in View as they then affect us; the latter proceeds from a Reflection on the Objects, and our Relation to them, and an Examination of the Memory, whether they ever made their Appearance before. There is a great Difference between actually beholding new Scenes when awake, and Imagining them; but there is a much wider between Waking and Dreaming. We cannot certify ourselves in Sleep, that we are only thinking; we don't regard our Dreams as Thoughts; but we can, when awake, convince ourselves, by help of the Senses, that Thinking is not Seeing, Hearing, &c. Therefore, whatever Station or Company the
Imagi-

Imagination puts us in during Sleep, the same must be taken by the Soul as real; if it be represented as new, or as old, so it must pass, unless, by another Act of the Soul, we reflect thereon. The Soul does frequently thus reflect in Sleep, and looks on the Objects of its Dreams and its Situation, with respect to them, as new or old. If this be not perpetually the Case, 'tis enough to shew clearly, that the Soul can exercise its Memory at such Time when 'tis asserted to receive no Aid from the closed Sensory. As to the Memory, or Knowledge, supposed to be communicated together with the new Objects, by Spirits; I have no conception of its possibility, in the present Case: Seeing, and Remembering to have seen, differ, at least, as widely as past and present Time. If this Doctrine, that Spirits can make us believe that we have seen what we never saw, obtains, I don't know how we can be sure that any thing will appear new to us in a future State; which is but an uncomfortable Conjecture, and vastly improbable; to say no more of it. The most perfect and adequate Knowledge of Objects, by immediate Intuition, cannot be said to
make

make us remember them ; nor would they be the less New, but rather the more so. If Spirits, when they exhibit new Objects in Sleep, prevent our supposing them new, they can, as far as I understand what is meant by this supernatural Memory, or Knowledge, only confine us from reflecting on their Newness ; and this I have endeavoured to shew how the Soul itself, may, very reasonably, pass over unremark'd.

D I F F I C U L T Y VIII.

There are not wanting Instances of Dreaming that we are exposed to imminent Danger, on Account of Crimes formerly committed by us ; and that we receive Praise and Rewards, for past Services, and other-like Matters, wherein Respect is had to past Time ; in all which Cases we are accompanied with a Consciousness of the reality of the imagined past Actions, which we never performed. From hence an Inference is drawn, that as this Consciousness can have no Foundation in our own Memory, it must necessarily be of foreign Communication. And, 'tis said, that tho' the last *Difficulty* may be ac-
I counted

counted for in the Manner I would have it, this cannot; in regard here is, indisputably, a Concession made by the Soul, which Memory, whether seated in the Soul, or Sensory, could not warrant its making. I cannot state this Difficulty, so as not to exceed Probability, in a more pressing Manner, than by giving two Instances of Dreaming, produced by this Author; the Exactness in the Relation of which, he says, and, I doubt not, may be depended upon; *viz.* “ A Person dreams that he hath
 “ lived for a considerable Time in a State of
 “ Marriage, with a certain Woman, who
 “ had been dead many Years before; and
 “ tho’ he knows not the Beginning of
 “ this Affair, or how it came about, yet
 “ he allows it to be so, and remembers
 “ *some Circumstances* of their past Life together, and seems to know the Situation of their Circumstances at present,
 “ as if he had been led into it *from the Experience of some Years.* Again, another
 “ hath this Scene presented to him in his
 “ Sleep. He fancies a *Person* reads to him
 “ certain Sentences out of a Book, and
 “ that neither the *Person* reading, nor the
 “ *Subject* read, are unknown to him, but
 “ that

“ that he is familiarly acquainted with
 “ both ; infomuch, that he knows before-
 “ hand what the other is to read to him,
 “ and the Design of the Writer ; and has
 “ his Remarks ready to offer upon it, as
 “ if he had perused this *visionary Author*
 “ long since.”

SOLUTION.

There are, certainly, no Appearances
 in Dreaming more surprizing than our
 ready familiarity with new Objects ; and
 this seeming Reminiscence of past Things,
 which, when awake, we are conscious we
 never knew. The former of these I have
 attempted to explain and account for in
 the Solution of the last *Difficulty*. In the
 Consideration of these, and all other In-
 stances of Dreaming, we should first ob-
 serve, how the like Thoughts are produced
 by the Soul, and effect us waking ; and
 then, the Difference between a waking,
 and a sleeping State : This will abate
 much of our Astonishment. It hath been
 shewn, that the Soul cannot avoid be-
 lieving that every Object its Imagination
 exhibits in Sleep, is really brought in by
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the Senses : This, together with what was said to the last *Difficulty*, will explain those Things, in the Dreams here instanced, which relate to present Time ; v. g. *The dead Woman living, and in a State of Marriage, and the Situation of present Circumstances* ; as also, *the Reader*, tho' not the Sentences read. [How the Soul should want a Consciousness of raising these imaginary Scenes, and that it should be conscious of performing its own Parts in them, and conscious that other Actors perform theirs, will be, anon, spoke to.] These Particulars, then, being laid aside, let us proceed to consider the other Parts of these Dreams, *viz. The Circumstances of the past Life of the married Couple ; and the previous Acquaintance with the visionary Author's Subject, and the Remarks ready to be offered thereon.* I may venture to suppose, that these, *some Circumstances* remembered, were not many, tho' this Gentleman concludes the Sentence thus, “ as if “ he had been led into it *from the Experience of some Years ;*” for I understand him to intend no more, than that the Soul acquiesces in the Certainty of the past and present Circumstances, as it would do if the

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the Dream had been a Reality. I conceive too, that the *certain Sentences* read were few. Nor can I doubt, but that both *Circumstances* and *Sentences*, will be admitted within the Power of the Dreamer's Imagination to form, when waking. But the yet remaining Mystery is, how those Things should seem to the Soul as Remembered, which it never knew before; or, in other words, how it can regard its present, as past Knowledge. Let us examine this Matter by our waking Thoughts: He who imagines, when awake, that he sees an unknown Person reading, can, by the same Faculty, add to that Image, a Subject which he may conceit him reading, and a manner of treating that Subject, and then form Objections to the Arguments of his own framing. Tho' all the Parts of this Scene are new, yet, as to the Order of their Creation by the Fancy, they must precede one another in point of Time. The Objections raised against the Arguments, presuppose an intimate Acquaintance with them, which we may call an old one if we please. If we turn this Scene into a Dream, wherein 'tis impossible, as hath been observed, to distinguish such Imaginations from

from Realities, it shews, if I mistake not greatly, the manner in which the present Acquaintance with the *visionary Author* is mistaken for a past Acquaintance: For I do not know from Experience, that in a Dream of this sort, we ever seem to remember as at any certain past Period of Time, *v. g.* a Month, a Year, or seven Years ago. We come next to the *past Circumstances* remembered in the Dream of Wedlock. These, if thought on when awake, would seem as formerly passed through, tho' they had never been thought on before the Marriage had its rise in the Imagination. How then can this be properly called a restoring of past Knowledge? The Soul, with regard to these *Circumstances*, has a retrospect to past Time, and transfers the *Thought* thither, tho' it never existed till the present Instant, and its *Subject* never had a Being. This is all that is done in Sleep, only with this Difference, that the Idea is then regarded as a Reality. The other Cases stated in this *Difficulty*, may, from what hath been here said, receive their Solution, without our being reduced to the Necessity of supposing the Soul prompted by Spirits
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with *instantaneous Knowledge of what never had been.*

D I F F I C U L T Y IX.

We sometimes Dream of Courts, Senates, Battles, publick Diversions; think we make and hear Harangues; and transact Matters with various Persons; and all this seems represented to the Soul without its contributing in the least thereto, by setting the Imagination at Work: Whereas it would be a very laborious Task to us, awake, to form such extensive and crouded Scenes; *Invention* being a Work of great Difficulty.

S O L U T I O N.

The imaginative Faculty is vastly different in Men; in some, it is almost instantaneous and boundless in its Productions; it is *fiery* and *forgetive*, as *Shakespeare*, well expresses, and happily experienced it. In others, it creates slowly, and its Prospects are but narrow. I believe it will appear, upon Examination, that the Dreams of both sorts of Men are proportionate

tionate to this Faculty, and the extent of their Knowledge when awake. Perhaps the Fancy takes larger flights in Sleep, as not being then check'd by other Business, nor by the Senses. However, when any Dream shall be produced, which shall be apparently beyond the stretch of the Imagination and Knowledge of the Man when awake, I shall not quarrel at its being ascribed to a supernatural Cause. But this is very remote from the Case of ordinary Dreams, whose Scenes are chiefly laid in well-known Places, and the Actors and Subjects such as we are acquainted with waking, by Converse, History, or otherwise; or at most, but a Composition of these modelled by Fancy, the particulars whereof can be traced out, and the whole reduced to its first Principles. Let it be remarked too, that Dreams of this complicated Nature, which have a Connection and Continuance of any length, are very rare, unless where they take rise apparently from the Employment of the Day.

That the Soul is not conscious of setting the Imagination to work, during Sleep, is very true; and this I take to be a principal Reason

reason why its Acts are performed without any trouble to the Soul; and this too contributes greatly toward preventing the Soul from detecting the Impositions (if we must call them so) of the Fancy. I may appeal to every ones Experience, if he will observe it, whether frequently in each Day he has not Imaginary Forms brought before him, which he knows not of going in search after, and even wonders how they were introduced; tho', upon an accurate Examination, he may sometimes trace out what gave rise to them. We very often find ourselves, whilst Awake, and in an indolent and musing condition, in new and very busy Scenes; and are no more conscious of the Design of the Soul to form them, either by an instantaneous Act, or a continued Series of Production, than we are during Sleep. This is a very different affair from that of INVENTION, properly so called; tho' the Imagination performs both. When the Imagination is exercised for any particular purpose, the Soul confines it, and rectifies, or selects the Forms it brings before it, by the *Judgment*; those which are approved, are laid by to be preserved in the *Memory*, or else

are committed to writing; the others are rejected and discarded as much as may be; and then the Imagination is sent in search of more; and so on. This is certainly a work of Fatigue; perhaps Materials come in slowly, and the Judgment deliberates long about their Propriety. But, on the contrary, when we controul not the Imagination, but let it fly at all, and pursue its own Game, this costs us no Pains; many Persons find much more in pinnioning it. We do not allow ourselves time to attend its idle Flights when awake; (I should rather say Reflect on, for Attention in a proper Sense, would prevent them) but in Sleep, we can do nothing else in the mean time. I look on Sleep as the Province of Imagination; here it reigns. Corporeal Objects are shut out and cannot approach the Soul in this State, but myriads of incorporeal Ideas, presented by the Memory and Imagination, and principally the latter, afford it Exercise and Entertainment. It has a World of its own Creation and peopling to range in, and converse with, tho' then imprisoned in a sleeping Body. I do not apprehend it possible to demonstrate so satisfactorily to
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all Understandings, from the Nature of the Soul, that it may seperately Exist and Think, as we may from this miraculous Faculty of Imagination, which accompanies us in Sleep : And I shall be sorry that so clear and convincing a Proof, which is in every one's Power who Dreams, should be argued away, unless a better can be substituted in its room.

D I F F I C U L T Y X.

We are conscious that we perform our own Parts in Dreams, but have not the least perception that we act the others ; nay, we are conscious that they are performed by other Actors : And to suppose that we should make Speeches or Answers for other imaginary Persons, and put Doubts in their mouths which we find ourselves unable to solve, and are ashamed of our Ignorance ; or receive Information from others when we hesitate ourselves ; and still want Consciousness that this is all our own doing ; is to admit that we may Think, and at the same time have no Consciousness of it, but even believe our own Thoughts, to be those of another

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Person ;

Person ; which is a manifest absurdity, and impossible ; and would, in its Consequences, carry us into universal Scepticism : For if we cannot be sure of our own Thoughts, we shall easily be inclined to distrust the certainty of every thing else. There is a vast difference between Thinking of such Circumstances as these waking, and Dreaming them ; in the one case we are satisfied it is all the Work of our own Minds, but in the other, part of it plainly appears foreign to us, as much as any thing in nature can do so ; and it is therefore highly reasonable to suppose it the Work of Spirits.

SOLUTION.

This seems the greatest Mystery in Dreaming ; but a Reflection on what hath been said, will go far towards bringing it within our Comprehension ; and perhaps anon we shall be able to think of it without surprize. We have no possible way, or at least no known one, whereby to distinguish between what we imagine to See, Hear, &c. and a real Appearance. The Soul cannot contradict the Perceptions it is conscious

conscious of. I do not find any much greater Cause of wonder at the Imagination's putting a Fallacy on us with regard to the Actions of other Persons, than that it should make us believe so very erroneously concerning ourselves. We are persuaded by it, that we Speak, Read, Write, Sail, nay Fly; and all the while, we are Asleep. We are not conscious that we Think of these Actions, but that we really perform them. This mistake is occasioned by the supposed Use of the Senses in Sleep. Indeed the Identity remains with us in these Cases; we are conscious of being the Performers. Let us then see how far our waking Thoughts can transfer (if I may so express it) this Identity, to imaginary Persons. Suppose then, that a *Conference* be imagined, Waking; whenever any discovery is made by the Soul in these mental and silent Arguings, if it seems to come from one of the Imaginary Persons, as very frequently it does, the Soul, in the Act of Imagining, does not detect that this Discovery was made by itself; it is true, when the Conference ceases, or whilst it is carrying on, the Soul can, by another and very different Act, reflect thereon, and obtain
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a Consciousness that it owed this Discovery to no foreign Assistance; but this must be ascertained by consulting the Senses, and a want of Consciousness that it was communicated by them. I did not Hear any Person tell me this, I neither Saw or Read it; therefore it was my own Suggestion; my Imagination has been at Work. But the State of Sleep forbids this kind of Reasoning: Nor can we, whilst awake, Imagine and Reflect at the same Instant. When we retain a Consciousness of what we ourselves did or said in Sleep, and have likewise a Consciousness that the rest was performed by others; what is this more than we do with regard to the above supposed Conference when Awake, upon Reflection? We have every jot as distinct a Consciousness of our own Parts, and those of others, as a Dream can afford us. Here we say, without the least Hesitation, it was all the Work of our Imagination. If a Person is asked, how he knows that? the Answer is very ready and very true, "I was awake, and had my Senses about me." And really no stronger Proof can be given, or required. May not a Man then as reasonably say, "I dreamt that I did," and

“ and said, such a Thing, and another
 “ Person a different Thing; and tho’ I
 “ can clearly distinguish him, and what
 “ relates to him, from myself, and my
 “ own Words and Actions; I am certain,
 “ that I Thought the whole, tho’ I was not
 “ conscious thereof during Sleep, because
 “ I had not then my Senses to discover to
 “ me that I only Thought.” I hope there
 is no Danger of being led to any pernicious
 Scepticism, by not knowing at a
 particular Time, that we then only Think
 when we seem to Act; or at another
 Time, that we ourselves Think, what we
 suppose others to Say or Do: Since both
 these harmless Mistakes, which make no
 inconsiderable part of our Happiness in
 this Life, are soon rectified when we are
 Awake and in our right Mind. The Facts
 seem to be thus, and we need not fear to
 follow where-ever Truth conducts us. The
 Confusion supposed in this *Difficulty*, is a
 necessary Consequence of our Pride, or
 Modesty, and the imagined reality of the
 Persons we dispute with. The Soul, during
 Sleep, when it wants the Senses, but takes
 it for granted that it has them, is much
 alike in its working with that of a Person
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whose Imagination is too powerful to be interrupted by his Senses; such a one Talks to himself, Contradicts himself, and Quarrels with himself under the Appearance of a Fancy-created Opponent : Had this Man ability to consult his Senses, the Cheat were over ; but in both Cases the Soul is too busily engaged about its Objects, and too well satisfied of their Reality to distrust them.

O B J E C T I O N.

Here it will be said, that what I ascribe to the Power and Prevalency of the Imagination, is better accounted for by supposing, either that the Sensory is disordered, as in the Cases of Frenzy, Drunkenness, a Wound in the Brain, &c. so that the Traces in it are thereby obscured, defaced, or misrepresented to the Soul ; or else that Spirits, during the Disorder of that Organ, take their opportunity of intruding Illusions ; and that in Sleep, when this Organ cannot be used by the Soul, they employ it for their purposes. That to attribute the Disorders affecting the Soul by means of the Sensory, to a defect in some
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of the Soul's Faculties, or an undue Superiority of its Imagination over the rest, will be to make the Soul disordered in itself, which its simple Nature will not permit us to suppose. When Men are Mad, Drunk, and Sleeping, the Soul continues to exercise its Faculties as rationally from what the Sensory affords it, and it is percipient of, as when they are Awake, Sober, and in their Senses.

A N S W E R.

My Subject does not call upon me to account for the Manner how the Soul is affected by such violent Bodily Disorders, as I may be allowed to call unnatural ones; and such whereby the Sensory and the whole Brain undoubtedly suffer much. Sleep, *Nature's soft Nurse*, gently lays the Senses to rest, without varying our Organization. I cannot regard Sleep as a Disorder. Whatever odd and fallacious Forms, a Sensory discomposed or flattered by Intemperance, or otherwise, may put together to misguide the Judgment when we are Awake, they cannot either by this Author's Hypothesis, or mine,

take place during Sleep ; he denying that the Soul can then view them in the Sensory ; and I conjecturing that it has no Occasion for a sight of them. But thus much I must observe, that it is utterly inconceivable by me, that a Mad-Man, who takes himself for what he is not, suppose, a King (and some have much odder Thoughts of themselves) should see himself so pourtrayed in his Sensory ; and that a casual jumbling together of other Traces should produce this. Matter and Motion may effect Wonders at this rate ! But admitting that he there saw the Representation of a Monarch, with all the Pageantry necessary to accompany such a State ; and that this were delineated by natural Causes, or by Spirits ; this Picture might be look'd at by the Mind's Eye, but its being regarded as the Man's own Case, and that he should *mistake it, for himself*, must certainly have another Cause, which I shall not here examine into. I shall only add, that the reinstating the lost and dispersed Traces in the Sensory seems a Work almost as curious and wonderful as the Resurrection of the Body, and demands Omnipotence to perform it ;
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and yet we see Sleep and Medicine restore the Mad and Drunk to their Memory: I am therefore, as well as for other Reasons, inclined to suppose that it cannot depend on Traces in the Sensory. Methinks, if we may, to help out our defective Philosophy, assign an Agency of Spirits to occasion an Imposition on the Judgment, the Seasons of Madness and Drunkenness are abundantly properer than this of Sleep. The Faculty of Imagination will certainly afford what we find produced in ordinary Dreams; and why we are to suppose the Soul deprived of this Power at a Time when it seems principally to exert it, I do not yet see. We are not to transfer what may be effected in a natural Way to a supernatural Cause, by making foreign Agents necessary to assist the Soul in producing a Phænomenon its own Faculties can bring about. Let it be first demonstrated that the Sensory is necessary for Memory; and then, that the Soul cannot view it during Sleep. I have several Times observed, that we have Memory in Sleep: and endeavoured to shew, that tho' Spirits should present Objects to us, it is improbable that they could make

us Remember to have seen them before ; but that the Power of Recognition must be in the Soul, as retaining its former Idea, with which it compares the present Object.

This Author would have the *letting loose the Imagination upon us*, to be consider'd as the same Thing with *letting in the Agency of Spirits*: But I must take the liberty of dissenting from him. To suppose that a Faculty of the Soul may, without the Interposition of a supernatural Cause, be restrain'd, and enlarg'd, at different Times, with regard to its Power over the Materials of our Knowledge, seems not to carry the least Absurdity in it. We experience the Soul to exert its Faculties in a very different Degree, at different Times ; and sometimes one Faculty in preference to another, when the Body affords no discernable Help or Impediment. The *Passions* are sometimes *let loose* upon Men, in the same Sense the Imagination is, even when they have an incorporeal Object to work on, v. g. *Fame*. Here the Judgment is restrain'd ; it cannot determine against the Evidence given at its Tribunal, tho' Soul and Body often suffer greatly for want of
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a right Discernment of real from imaginary Good. He who believes all Dreams supernatural, might, methinks, as easily suppose it practicable for Spirits to apply a Faculty of the Soul, *v. g.* Imagination, to a particular Purpose, and for that Time hold back the rest from obstructing the Work; as give them, or, which is worse, the Body, Power to extinguish that Faculty; which is certainly done by the Supposition that Dreams are not the Work of our own Minds.

I apprehend that we don't sufficiently distinguish the Faculty of *Imagination*, from that of *Memory*, unless we admit that the Soul can thereby compose, and represent to itself, Objects as received by the Senses, which were never conveyed to it by them, under that particular Form; and also can realize, and make its past Ideas appear as present: Whereas the Memory always considers what is past, as past. Ideas Remember'd, appear to the Soul under the same Form with their Objects brought in by the Sense; and whenever we review them, we should, if the Senses forbid it not, regard them as corporeally beheld
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at a past Time: Here, therefore, the Imagination has nothing to do. This Faculty is then truly exercis'd, when its own Forms, compounded and made up in such Manner as the Senses never presented them, are regarded as brought in by the Senses: and when past Ideas are consider'd as if they then made their first Entrance into the Mind. The Soul, in the Act of Imagining, cannot suppose the contrary; that must be discover'd by another Act, *viz.* Reflection on the having used, or not used, the Senses, or the Imaginative Power: and this cannot be a doubt during Sleep; wherein the Soul ever supposes it actually uses the Senses, nor knows that it then uses the Imagination. How very dreadfully is the Imagination of timorous Persons Waking, let loose upon them in Church-yards, haunted Apartments, and other Places of which they have form'd frightful Ideas; only because they want the bodily Use of one Sense! These unhappy Persons have no more Power to restrain the Imagination, and turn it to other Objects, than a Sleeping Person has: and some of them can hardly, perhaps not at all, be brought to distrust the Imagination upon
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the credit of the Senses, in conjunction with Reason itself. Must we call this *Possession*, and the Work of *Supernatural Agents*? Memory alone could not produce the horrid apprehensions Men are oppress'd with in such cases; the Ideas presented by that faculty, would be regarded as former perceptions of the Soul; but 'tis the Imagination which realizes, and makes them appear as present. I think we may almost as well roundly deny such a Faculty to the Soul, as admit it to perform nothing; or so much less than it does.

D I F F I C U L T Y X I .

Were Dreams no more than Thoughts during Sleep, it is not likely that the Soul would so terrify itself as frequently it does; some persons seldom pass a night without very troublesome Dreams. It is absurd to suppose the Soul should lay a Plot to frighten itself, without knowing that it did so; and were it conscious of such contrivance, it could not be affrighted at what appears to it. This therefore must be the work of Spirits.

SOLUTION.

There are many ways to account for frightful Dreams; as from Bodily Disorders, Grief, Apprehension of approaching Danger, and indeed every other internal cause of the Soul's perturbation when Awake. As to the manner how Dreams of a particular complexion result from particular Sensations, we must remain a little in the dark: but in regard these appearances are, I think, pretty uniform; as, he who sleeps with his Head in a sliding position, commonly dreams of falling down; he who lies cold, seldom has very sanguine dreams, and the like; we have little occasion for ascribing them to Spirits. How much soever we are terrified in Dreams, there is certainly no Plot in the case; and that is the very reason we are so terrified. Who will say that he hath not frequently in every day, or it may be hour, whilst awake, many Thoughts which he is not conscious of bringing before his Mind; but they seem to have presented themselves spontaneously? Nothing which the Soul Imagines in Sleep, arises from premeditation;

tion ; and every thing must appear Real ; for the Reasons before given : Were this the Case Waking (as it is sometimes) and sensible Objects did not assist in calling us off from one Train of Ideas to another ; the Soul would suffer as much Pain from oppressing Thoughts, which it did not hunt after, and yet were brought before it in a Way not Supernatural, as it does in Dreams. Let it be observed too, that our Dispositions accompany us very closely in Dreams ; and, in all probability, influence the Imagination in its Productions. The *Hero*, *Philosopher*, *Lover*, and *Debauchee*, have, as it were, their proper Dreams : And I doubt not that *Don Quixote* was Victorious, and *Sancho* drub'd, in most encounters they respectively dreamt of.

D I F F I C U L T Y XII.

We sometimes Dream most inconsistent Things, and look on them as Real, which would appear contradictory to Nature and Reason, were we awake. Beasts speak ; one Appearance is converted into another, we Fly, &c. The Soul could not impose any thing as real on itself in

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Sleep, which it must believe an impossibility, waking; or at least not possible to any thing but supernatural Power.

SOLUTION.

It is certain the Imagination performs Wonders in Sleep; tho' those of this kind are not very frequent. But till we rival *Ovid* and *Æsop*, it must be admitted within the Power of the Imagination to produce such Ideas. As to their supposed Reality; and our want of Consciousness of producing them, by any designed *Invention*, I presume enough has been said; I will only add, that he whose Imagination exhibits such absurd Appearances in Sleep, has (tho' it seems a Paradox) more inducement, I had almost said Reason, to rely on them as Realities, than a waking Person. Whoever Sees or Imagines such Things, whilst awake, has his Reason to correct his Senses, and his Senses as a Check on his Imagination; whereas a sleeping Person can have no Objection made by his Senses to any thing he Imagines.

D I F F I C U L T Y XIII.

If Dreams are only Thoughts during Sleep ; and the Soul then believes that it uses the Senses ; and this mistake, and not the real View of Objects presented by Spirits, is the Reason of our not knowing that we are then only Thinking, when we suppose ourselves to See, Hear, &c. It will be scarce possible to prove that we are at any time Awake ; since, according to this Supposition, we are as well satisfied of our having the Use of the Senses in one State, as the other.

S O L U T I O N.

On having recourse to the Senses, we can, whilst awake, assure ourselves by Experiment, of the difference between Thinking or Imagining, and Seeing, Hearing, &c. I do not know a better Way of proving myself Awake, than by making a Question of it. This doubt does not occur in Sleep, because the imaginary Use of the Senses prevents it. I have before taken Notice, that sometimes we think we

are Dreaming ; but this I conjectured must be in an Interval of Dreaming. It is very possible for a Person to Dream of *going to bed* ; but I believe few Dream of their *Dreaming whilst there*. If we admit that Phantasms are presented to the Soul in Sleep, it is not less wonderful that we should apprehend them to have been brought in by the Senses, which we certainly do in ordinary Dreams ; than that our Thoughts during Sleep should pass for real Appearances : And we should on that Supposition be as much at a loss in proving ourselves Awake.

D I F F I C U L T Y XIV.

If ordinary Dreams are to be attributed to natural Causes ; and we are to suppose, that because the Soul constantly looks on the Objects as presented by the Senses, therefore it is not conscious that it barely Thinks ; what Distinction can it possibly make between such Dreams as owe their Origin to natural and to supernatural Causes ? If supernatural Dreams are admitted, it is highly reasonable to expect a certainty in this behalf.

S O L U -

SOLUTION.

This Criterion would be much better given by one who has been honoured with supernatural Dreams. That such are very distinguishable from common ones I make no doubt : And tho' it should be impracticable for the Soul during Sleep to observe any difference in the manner of their Communication ; this would not disprove the possibility of its Conviction, when we are Awake, that they were supernatural ; as from the uncommon force with which they affected the Soul ; their foretelling future Events ; discovery of past Actions, &c. Some of the Dreams mentioned in *Scripture* as supernatural, seem principally denoted such by their Accomplishment, and, perhaps, were not before regarded by the Dreamers themselves in that Light ; as being very much within the Limits of their imaginative Power. But tho' I conjecture the Soul constantly to apprehend its using the Senses in Sleep, and that therefore its Thoughts appear as real as a Phantasm would ; I desire to be understood with this Restriction, that God undoubtedly can suspend

suspend this Apprehension, and by shewing us that we are Sleeping, imprint such legible Marks on his Orders given, and Promises and Revelations made during Sleep, that the Soul cannot mistake them for its own Thoughts. The supposition that all Dreams are supernatural, leaves us much more in the dark as to the Credit we ought to give the Spirits who entertain us ; than the Opinion that their Representations when we are favoured with them, are manifestly discernable, either during Sleep, or at least when we wake, from our sleeping Thoughts.

D I F F I C U L T Y XV.

It is thought that Dreams must proceed from Spirits, in regard, that if the Sensory were not shut during Sleep, but the Soul, by means of the Animal Spirits, or otherwise, could perpetually use it, the Body could not Sleep ; because the Soul from its active Nature would be incessantly working on this Organ, wherein the Materials of its Knowledge are contained ; and, undoubtedly, this Part of the Body requires Rest.

S O L U.

SOLUTION.

If the Sensory be not necessary for Memory, which I have endeavoured to shew, this *Difficulty* is of easy Dispatch: For we might as reasonably Object the closing of the Eye in Sleep; and thence infer that as the Soul is precipent of Objects in that State, the Sense of Seeing must have been communicated to it by Spirits; because, if the Soul perpetually used the Eye for Seeing, that Organ would want its necessary Rest. If the Sensory be necessary for Memory, how do we Remember in Sleep, when it is closed from the View of the Soul? If we can Remember in one Instance, without its Aid, I think we may in all. I have made it appear very improbable, that Spirits by any Representation of Objects for the first Time, should give us Memory. It seems exceedingly strange, that were the Sensory so necessary a part to the Soul as it is supposed, it should continue out of its power in Sleep, since we experience it sometimes to use other Parts of the Body which can do it no Service; we speak, rise, walk, &c.

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in Sleep ; and this without waking ourselves. With regard to the Necessity of Rest for the Sensory, and the Supposition that the Soul's using it must keep the Body waking. I do not apprehend that the Soul's using it could more, nor indeed so much, affect it as Spirits : For these are supposed to make new Traces in it, whereas the Soul would only review those already there. The Opinion that Dreams are the Work of the Soul, independent of the Sensory, leaves that Organ quite at Rest, together with the Senses.

D I F F I C U L T Y XVI.

If Dreams proceed from natural Causes, and we can Imagine in Sleep, unassisted by the Sensory ; it may be reasonably supposed that we always Dream ; and if so, it is much to be wondered at, that some Persons, who have otherwise very strong and retentive Memories, Remember so few of their Dreams. But if Dreams are Representations made by Spirits, this Wonder ceases ; because we may probably Conjecture that in those Intervals, wherein Memory will not assure us that
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we dreamt, the Spirits did not practice on us. *N. B.* This *Difficulty* comes not from the learned Author; (who supposes that the Soul is in its Nature a Substance from which Thinking is inseparable; and that Spirits, during Sleep, supply it with Materials; and hath very ingeniously observed, that tho' we may sometimes not be *conscious of having Thought* at a past Time, we cannot be *conscious that we did not then Think*) but it is raised by such as are at a loss to satisfy themselves, from the Operations of the Soul, that it always Thinks in Sleep.

SOLUTION.

It must be acknowledged, that if we perpetually Dream, we forget many of our Dreams; and that some Persons pass whole Nights, without being conscious, when they awake, that they have dreamt. Mr. *Locke* and others tell us of those who professed themselves to have passed whole Years of Nights thus: The Truth of which it is hard to disprove; but more difficult to believe. That a waking Person should Think, and not know at the Time

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that he does so, is certainly impossible ; but that he may very shortly after not be conscious of the particular Subject which employ'd his Thoughts at a past Time, is every Hour's Experience. This will not satisfy : If you cannot recount every particular Thought a Day yields, you can distinctly remember many. Mr. *Locke* supposes the Case of one, who, when you awake him, cannot tell you what he thought on the preceding Minute, nor knows that he was then Thinking. To this it might be answered ; that the sudden Transition from Sleeping to Waking, may be supposed to affect us at least as powerfully as a surprize does when awake, which frequently leaves us quite at a loss for what we thought about immediately before it. This will, perhaps, be admitted ; but it will be said, that we are sure we then Thought, tho' the Subject has escaped us ; whereas in the other Case we are not certain, nor have the least Remembrance, even of that. I Answer. When any waking Thoughts are forgot, by surprize, or otherwise, I do not apprehend that the Soul can assure itself of having Thought at the Time which the lost Thoughts took up,

up, but from the Report of the Senses, that we were then awake ; from whence the Soul draws this Conclusion, *I Thought*. This Proof the State of Sleep cannot afford ; and, therefore, if the Objects of our Dreams are lost, it is not to be expected that the Soul should retain Consciousness of having Thought at all. But it is urged, that even when we awake of ourselves, and at the usual Time, not a single Thought, but a whole Night's Business is forgot ; which so exceedingly differs from our Case waking, that we must go still farther to make it appear probable that we have Thought. Let us then consider, how our Thoughts affect us, when awake, with regard to Time. When there is a quick Succession of various Thoughts, we suppose ourselves to have past thro' a considerable Portion of Time : As on the contrary, where few differing Thoughts have occupied the Mind, or one alone hath maintained its Station there, we do not perceive how Time runs. Had we no other Measure of Time, than the Train of our Ideas, the Accounts kept by one of a lively, and another of a slow Imagination, would very widely vary. Suppose

pose then, that the Mind of him who Remembers little of his Dreams, has been taken up by only a few Thoughts during the whole Night; when he wakes, he will be apt to conclude, that in regard he finds himself to have slept many Hours, he cannot have dreamt the whole Time: Tho' according to the Computation by Thinking, the same quantity of Time must have flipt by him unobserved, had he been awake. If it be objected, that should the Mind dwell so long as I am willing to suppose it, on a few Thoughts, it is likely their Impressions would be too strong and lasting, to be obliterated and lost on waking. Let it be considered, that a single Thought or Image (I do not mean a train of Thoughts or Reasoning on one Subject) or several different Images, may remain a considerable Time in the Mind, when in an indolent and inattentive State, without affecting it so forcibly, as to be recovered after a Surprize. When we awake, one or more of the Senses constantly sollicit the regard of the Mind, in a manner which may be deemed Equivalent to a sudden Avocation from Thinking on a particular Subject when awake; and

and instantaneously the Business of the Day rushes in, and engrosses us : Why then should it seem strange that many sleeping Thoughts escape the research of the Mind when it would call back its fleeting Dreams ? Tho' I am persuaded that were Persons to make it their first Business in the Morning, to survey that of the Night, they would seldom miss of enough to satisfy them, that they had not been very idle. Those Dreams which we most frequently Remember, are on such Subjects as would have commanded much of our Attention, had we been waking : May it not then be rationally conjectured, that those we forget, just appeared, and gave place to their Successors, so that none of them kept their Station long enough, or affected the Mind sufficiently to claim a particular regard ; and that the Confusion arising from the whole, has (in Conjunction with the other Causes abovementioned) left the Mind without Consciousness of any individual : And if no particular Thought be remembered, it is impossible the Soul should be conscious that it Thought in Sleep. We must Reason with some uncertainty from the *Nature* of
of

of a Being so inscrutable by us as the Soul is ; I think our *Experience of its Effects*, except in Cases where *Revelation* affords its Light, is the best source of our Knowledge. That one great End of Sleep, is the Ease and Refreshment of the Body, and Renovation of its Powers, is certain : And whether the Soul, during its Union with so unequal a Partner, which but too often we find very troublesome to it, may not have been so constituted as to require a Relaxation (I do not say Cessation) from its Labour, must remain a little doubtful, till we are better acquainted with *Immaterial Substance*, and the difference between its Powers, whilst in the Body, and when in a State of separate Existence. That in our present State, some nightly Remission of the Intensity of Thinking is necessary to refit (if I may so call it) the Soul for the Business and Cares of the Day, is rendered not improbable, if we consider, that the Minds of those who remember great part of their Dreams, seem, when they awake, to be apparently fatigued ; whereas those who retain few of their Dreams, find the Soul's Faculties in a much apter Condition for fresh Employment. If it be objected, that this supposed weariness of the Mind is only a bodily Disorder. I Answer; admitting

mitting it to be so, it is such a one as must be acknowledged owing to the Disturbance or Interruption of the Body's necessary Rest by the Soul's intense Thinking; and this, in its Effects, is reverberated on the Soul in such a manner as to impede the Exercise of its Powers. So that whether this Fatigue be attributed to the Soul or Body, it is an Argument for the needfulness of a Relaxation of the Soul's Labour whilst in the Body. For my own Part, I find no such Chasms in Dreaming as induce me to suspect that the Soul does not perpetually Think; but it is too great a Task for me to convince another that he dreamt a whole Night, if he wants Consciousness of having dreamt in any part of it.

The foregoing are the most considerable Appearances in ordinary Dreams, which I at present recollect; and, methinks, they may be well accounted for, from the Exercise of the Soul's Power over its past Ideas, without any new, or foreign supply. If Persons could be brought to believe that Spirits have this nightly concern with them, it might go far toward reforming their daily Practices; but I am apprehensive that this Way of explaining the Phenomenon of Dreaming, by shutting up the Sensory, makes that Organ so necessary to Memory,

Memory, that the Soul, on parting from it, must lose all its past Knowledge and Consciouſness, for that must, methinks, stay or go with the Memory: And unless it can be demonstrated from *Revelation*, or *Reason*, that Spirits supply the Soul with Materials for Thinking, and give it moreover a supernatural Memory; and that they will continue to do so hereafter, without the Help of a corporeal Sensory, which, according to this learned Author's Hypothesis, they now use for their Representations; I fear this may lead some to conceit, that as two very great Powers of the Soul, v. g. *Memory* and *Imagination*, are supposed to *cease in Sleep*, in regard they depend on a Bodily Organ; *others may stand still on Death*. Whereas, if we can shew, which I have attempted in a far too weak and injudicious Manner, that *Sleep wherein the Body gives not the least assistance to the Soul, by the Senses, Sensory, or otherwise, leaves it in Possession of every intellectual Faculty; and that the Soul has, besides, the imaginary Use of the Body*; it is highly probable that a total Separation from the Body will do the same; and, if so, it is absolutely certain, that we cannot want full Employment, even from ourselves, to all Eternity.



