

The philosophical touch-stone : or observations upon Sir Kenelm Digbie's Discourses of the nature of bodies, and of the reasonable soule. In which his erroneous paradoxes are refuted, the truth, and Aristotelian philosophy vindicated, the immortality of mans soule briefly, but sufficiently proved. And the weak fortifications of a late Amsterdam ingeneer, patronizing the soules mortality, briefly slighted. / By Alexander Ross.

Contributors

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
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











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Having with much delight
His Majesty, and content perused this
 Treatise, entitled, The Philosophical
 Touch-stone, I allow it to be printed
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
John Dornanic.

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John Downame.



THE
PHILOSOPHICALL
TOUCHSTONE:
Paras OR *Academe*
OBSERVATIONS
UPON

Sir *Kenelm Digbie's* Discourses of the
nature of BODIES, and of the rea-
sonable SOULE.

In which his erroneous Paradoxes are
refuted, the Truth, and *Aristotelian Philosophy*
vindicated, the *immortality* of mans Soule
briefly, but sufficiently proved.

And the weak Fortifications of a late Amsterdam
Ingeneer, patronizing *The Soules mortality*,
briefly slighted.

By ALEXANDER ROSS.

Perf. Sat. 5.

*Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis
Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo.*


LONDON,

Printed for *James Young*, and are to be sold by *Charles
Green*, at the signe of the Gun in Ivie-lane. 1645. *v. f.*

J. Moore

mercy full

7.3.




And the west Fortifications of a late Antient
Laguer, & building the same walls
briefly signed.

By Alexander Ross.

Non equidem hoc libro dubitavi in scribere
Parsis scriptis, sed quia idem fuit.

LONDON.

Printed for James Kearsy, and are to be sold by
Gives, at the sign of the Gun in the street.



TO THE
Right honourable, *JOHN*, Earle
of RUTLAND, Lord ROSS, &c.

My Lord,



With the same boldnesse that I
have adventured to lap up in the
folds of a few paper sheets the
rich Jewells of *Philosophicall*
truths, with the same have I
presumed to present them to your *Lordships*
view; not that you can receive from them any
addition of *honour*, but that they, from your Name
and Protection, may partake a farther degree of
irradiation and *lustre*. Here you may see what odds
there are between *naturall gems*, and counterfeit
stones; between solid wholesome meats, and a dish
of *Frogs* or *Mushroms*, though made savoury with
French sauce, to which that ingenious rather
then (in this Discourse) judicious Knight doth
invite us: who, breathing now in a hotter cli-
mate, cannot digest the solid meats of *Peripatetick*
verities, which hitherto have been the proper and
wholsome food of our *Universities*; and therefore

with a plate with which

The Epistle Dedicatory.

entertaines us with a *French dinner* of his owne dressing, or with an airie feast of *Philosophicall quelque choses*: a banquet fitter for Grasshoppers and Camelions, who feed on dew and aire, then for men, who rise from his Table as little satisfied, as when they sate downe. We that have eat plentifully of the sound and wholesome viands which are dressed in *Aristotle's kitchen*, are loth now to be fed, as the *Indian gods* are, with the steem or smoak of meats; or, as those

—*Umbræ tenues, simulacra, luce carentum,*
those pale ghosts in *Proserpine's Court*, to champ Leeks and Mallowes.

My Lord, in this Dedication, I onely aime at an expression of my gratefulness and observance, which I owe to your goodnesse; and of those reall sentiments I have of your favours and opinion, which your self, and your truly noble and religious Countesse have been pleased to conceive of mee. I heartily pray for an accumulation of all happinesse on you both, as likewise on the fruit of your bodies, especially the tender plant, and hopefull pledge of your mutuall loves, my *Lord Ross*; which is the wish of

Your Honours humble servant,

ALEXANDER ROSS.



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in primative leaf The

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*The neerer the Intelligences are to God, the more they know. The superiour have a greater similitude with God then
the*

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THE



THE
PHILOSOPHICALL
TOUCHSTONE.



Oble Sir KENELME, as I reverence your worth, so I admire your paines, who, being a Gentleman of such eminencie, thinks it no disparagement, but an honour, to spend your time in good literature, which giveth true Nobilitie: your practice herein is exemplary, which I wish the Gentry of our Nation would imitate, who think they are born meerly for themselves and their pleasures; whose time is spent either *idlely, wickedly, or impertinently*, as *Seneca* complaines, *Eorum vitam mortemque juxta existimo*: but your mind, being of a more noble extraction, *semine ab aethereo*, you know that you are not borne for your selfe; and therefore, by your indefatigable paines, doe both eternize your fame, and enoble your Countrie: but because this life of ours cannot challenge the priviledge of perfection, and truth

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here

here is accompanied with error, as the light with shades; therefore I find that this your Work, of the nature of Bodies, and of the Soules immortality, hath some passages in it *Heterodoxall*, and not consonant to the principles of Divinity and Philosophy, which have drawne from mee these sudden Observations (for I have here neither time, books, nor opportunitie to enlarge my selfe) in which I promise both brevity and modesty, suffering no other language to passe from mee, but such as may beseem both your worth, and my ingenuitie; for my end is not to wound your reputation, but to vindicate the truth.

Sect. 1.
Pag. 2. cap. 1.

The first mistake I meet with is [*That words expresse things only according to the pictures we make of them in our thoughts, and not as the things are in their proper natures.*] But if our words expresse not the things which we conceive in our minds, as they are in their owne natures, then our conceptions are erroneous, and our words improper or false: and if there be not an *adequation* of our conceptions with the things we conceive, there can be no *metaphysicall* truth in us; which consisteth in the agreement of our thoughts with the things, as *ethicall* truth doth in the consent of our words to our thoughts. Our conceptions are our internall words which represent reall things, and our externall words represent these conceptions, and, by consequence, they expresse things as they are in their natures: So *Adam* in *Paradise* gave names to the creatures according to their natures, and so have wise men ever since. The *Latines* call the sea *mare, quasi amarum*, from its saltnesse or bitternesse, for it is so in its owne nature.

Sect. 2.
Pag. 9. cap. 2.

Secondly, [*You define quantity to be nothing else but the extension of a thing*] and shortly after [*that quantity is nothing*

thing else but divisibility.] Thus you confound *extension* and *divisibility*, which differ as much, as in man *rationality* differs from *risibility*, the one being the effect of the other; for therefore things are *divisible*, because they are *extensive*: take away *extension*, *divisibility* faileth; and therefore numbers are not properly *divisible*, because they have no *extension*, but onely in resemblance. Secondly, *extension* is not the essence of *quantity*; for if it were, all that have quantitie must have also extension: but Angels have discrete quantitie, which wee call number, and yet have no extension. Thirdly, there is a *quidditative* or *entitive* extension, by which one part is not another in bodies, though there were no *quantitative* extension at all: therefore not every *extension* is the essence of quantitie. There is also the *extension* of *site*, which is no quantitie.

Whereas [you make heat a property of rare bodies, and that out of rarity ariseth heat, and that a body is made and constituted a body by quantity] you speak paradoxically; for the rarest bodie is not still the hottest: A burning coale is hotter then the flame, and scalding lead is hotter then scalding water. Secondly, *rarity* is not the cause of *heat*, but *heat* the cause of *rarity*; that which begets heat, is motion, and the influence and light of the Stars: *motion* then begets *heat*, *heat* begets *rarity*. 'Tis true, that rarefaction prepares the matter to receive heat, as heat prepares the matter to receive the forme of the hot element; but what prepares, is not the cause. Thirdly, a bodie is not made and constituted by quantitie, for this is posteriour to a bodie, being a substance, and followes the bodie as its accident; and therefore more ignoble. Every accident hath a *subjective dependence* from the substance; a bodie hath or may have entitie without

Seēt 3.
Pag. 28. cap. 4.
Pag. 30.

quantitie, so cannot quantitie without the bodie.

Sect. 4.
Pag. 34. cap. 5.

The essence, or, as you call it [*the substance of locall motion, doth not consist in division;*] because whatsoever *division* there is in this motion, it is either in respect of the thing *moved*, or in respect of the *space* in which it is moved: but both these are externall to motion, and not belonging any waies to its essence; therefore in that *divisibility* which is in them, cannot consist the essence of *locall motion*. Besides, *divisibility* is a propertie of quantitie flowing from its essence, whereas locall motion is *quantitative* but by accident; and not, but by way of reduction, in the predicament of quantitie: therefore, except you be of *Scotus* his opinion, who will have *mobile* and *motus* all one, *division* cannot be the essence of *locall motion*: And if you were a *Scotist* in this, yet you cannot prevaile; for division, being the accident of the thing moved, it cannot be of its essence; for no accident can constitute the *essence* of a substance.

Sect. 5.
Pag. 34. cap. 5.

You speak not like a Philosopher, when you speak [*of uniting a body moved to that other body, which is called its place:*] For place is defined to be the *superficies* of the ambient bodie, but the bodie *quantitative* is a different *species* from the superficies: the *substantiall* bodie is in another *predicament*; therefore *place* cannot be a *body*: for if it were, it could not be equall to the thing contained; for every bodie that containes, is bigger then the bodie contained: as the *dish* is bigger then the *water*. The aire then is not the place of our bodies, but the *superficies* or *terminus* of the aire, which is the accident of that subject.

Sect. 6.
Pag. 36. cap. 5.

[*In regard dense bodies (you say) are dividers, the earth in that respect must be the most active element, since it is the most dense.*] The earth is active in dividing, not because

it

it is most *dense*, but because most *heavy*; and, indeed, the cause both of *density* and *gravity* is *frigidity*; and therefore this is the active quality, not *density*. Again, elements are called active, in respect of the two active qualities, heat and cold; and, of these two, heat is the more active; and consequently, the element of fire is simply and absolutely most active.

[The action of cold is composed of two parts, to wit, *pressing*, and *penetration*.] Pressure and penetration are not the parts, but the effects of *frigesaction*. Pressure but a remote effect, for it is immediately caused by *gravity*, and this by *cold*: And for *penetration*, it is rather the effect of heat than of cold; for *hot* liquors pierce sooner than *cold*: and it is rather by reason of the rarity of its substance, than of the coldness thereof, that it pierceth; for this cause *aire* is more penetrating than *water*, and *fire* than *aire*. Sect. 7.
Pag. 36. c. 5.

[A reall entity necessarily hath an existence of its owne, and so becomes a substance.] By this you inferre, that qualities must needs be substances, seeing they are reall entities distinct from the bodies they accompany. But this consequence is irrationall; for *accidents* are reall entities, because they are not bare notions and conceptions of the mind, but things existent, and distinct from their bodies; yet their entity is weake compared with that of substances, so that sometimes they are called *non-entities* by *Philosophers*: but if all reall entities must needs be substances, then in vaine is it to make above one predicament, or to divide *entity* into *substance* and *accidents*. Then qualities cannot be contrary one to another, as heat to cold, nor can they admit of *magis* and *minus*, but are subjects susceptible of *contrariety* without alteration of themselves, which are the properties of substance: but although accidents be reall entities, yet they have no Sect. 8.
Pag. 39. c. 6.

existence in or by themselves, but in or by their substances; for *Accidentis esse est inesse*; and therefore *ens* is called [*ἄνδρως ὡς μίαν οὐσίαν*] as respecting principally substance; but accidents *secundario*, as they inhere in their substance: which as they cannot *subsist*, so they cannot be *defined* without their substance. The Papists themselves will not yeeld, that accidents in the *Eucharist* can subsist without their proper subject, except by *miracle*, or *Divine* power: and *Scotus* is so far from yeelding any *subsistence* to accidents without their substance, that he will rather beleeve, that the accidents in the *bread*, are turned by *miracle* into a substance: to which opinion it seems you encline. *Thomas* tels us, that whitenesse and other accidents have no *entity*, but as they are in their subjects: And *Aristotle*, that accidents are *entis*, rather then *entia*. You must first prove that accidents have any *entity* without their subjects, and then, that to have *reall* *entity*, and to subsist by it selfe; or, that *essence* and *self-existence* is all one: when this is proved, we will be of your opinion.

In 1. Phys.
quest. 7.

1. 1. q. 90.
Art. 2.

7. Metaphys.

sect. 9.
Pag. 41. c. 6.

[Heat is nothing else in the fire, but the very substance of it.] If heat be the substance of the fire, then it is either the *matter*, or the *forme* of it; not the *matter*, for heat is *active*, the *matter* *passive*; not the *forme*, for the *forme* is the *essence*, and therefore incommunicable; but heat is communicated by the fire to the water: Heat is not in the *element* the principle of motion, but the *forme* thereof is. One *forme* is not contrary to another: but *heat* is contrary to *cold*. Heat admits degrees, so doth not the *substantiall* *forme*. Heat and cold cannot be contraries, seeing heat is a substance, say you, and cold a quality.

Contraria sunt
sub eodem ge-
nere.

sect. 10.
Pag. 43. c. 6.

[It cannot be imagined that light is any thing else but fire.] If it be so, then where-ever fire is, there is light: but we

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reade of a fire without light. 2. Then where-ever light is, there is fire: but there is light in the *Stars*, in *Cats eyes*, in *Glow-wormes*, in *Fish scales*, yet no fire. 3. The nature of fire is to *ascend* onely, the nature of the light is to *descend* also. 4. *Water* is opposite to *fire*; but to *light*, *darknesse*. 5. *Fire* heats by degrees, and *successively*, *light* illuminates *suddenly*, and in an instant. 6. *Fire* contains it selfe in a narrow place, as the chimney, *light* dilates it selfe over all the roome. 7. If *light* be *fire*, then it must be *heat*, for *heat* you say is *fire*; but if *light* be *heat*, then it will follow that *light* is *tangible*, and *heat* *visible*: but ask a blind man, if he can discern *light* by *touching*, and ask him that hath eyes, if by them he can *see* *heat*, which he must needs do, if *heat* and *light* be the same thing. 8. There is *heat* in a *dark Oven* that bakes your bread, when there is no *light* at all; and there is *light* in *Saturne*, but no *heat* at all. 9. When the *fire* warms the *water*, it makes a change in the *water*, by expelling a positive quality, but when the *Sun* illuminates the *aire*, there is no change made in the *aire*, because no positive quality is expelled; *darknesse* being a meere privation. 10. The *light* of the *Sun* in the *aire* and in the *Sun*, is the same *light*; but if it be *fire* in the *aire*, much more must it be *fire* in the *Sun*: No wonder then if *Icarus* his waxen wings melted, flying so neere the *Sun*. But the *snowie mountaines* have the *Suns* *light* more then the *valleys*, yet have they not thereby the more *heat*. *Snow* enlightneth the *aire* in the night, but warms it not. The *aire* is not *warmer* at the full *Moone*, then at the change. 11. If *light* be *fire*, then it must be a *body*, but a *body* it cannot be; for then when *light* is in the *aire*, two *bodies* must be at once in one place. 2. It must be the *subject* of motion. 3. It must be *compounded* of *matter* and *forme*,

forme. 4 It can never be *annihilated*, for the matter remains still; but what becomes of the *candle-light* in your chamber, when the candle is put out? doth the matter of it assume some new forme? and is the *corruption* of light the *generation* of darknesse? 5 If it were a body, it must enter into the composition of things, and so make up a part of the mixed body; but how absurd is the conceit of these things? 12. If light be fire, then it must be a substance; and so it can *subsist* by it selfe, and is *incapable* of degrees; not to speake of the *instantaneall* motion of light, of which corporeall substances are not capable, nor of the *immobility* of it in the aire, when the aire is moved with winds.

SECT. II.
Pag 43.

[You see upon the paper which you held neere the flame of a candle, being a little removed, some part of that which you saw in the candle.] The parts of the candle are, the *wieke*, the *tallow*, and the *flame*; Doe you see any of these on the paper? Indeed, you see no part of the candle on the paper; but only by the light of the candle you see the paper; which will not prove light to be a body, no more then [the dilating of gold:] for though gold dilated, and fire dilated, are gold, and fire, yet this will not prove that light is fire dilated. As for your [blind School-master] you speak of, he might feele the heat of the fire in his *brains*, but not the light; for light is not the object of touching. [As for the breaking or reflecting of light] these wil prove it no more to be a body, then the *breaking* or *motion* of a shadow, can prove a shadow to be a body: *Nullum simile est idem*. The motions of light and shadowes, are but like the motions of bodies. [The uniting of light in a burning-glasse] proves it no more to be a body, then the uniting or *re-inforcing* of cold by *antiperistasis*, proves cold to be a body: And if you'l say that light is fire, because

cause it begets heat in a *burning-glasse*; you may as well say, that motion is fire, because that begets heat in two hard bodies rubbed together.

[*There is no doubt but light heats as well as enlightneth.*] Sect. 12.
Pag. 46. c. 7.
All *light*, as is said, *heats* not, nor hath all *heat light* annexed with it. But if all light did heat, yet will it not from thence follow that light is fire; for motion heats as well as light, and the Sun warms us as well by the one, as by the other; and both are but meanes, and the Suns instruments to procreate heat by in this inferiour world. [*As for the flame of the spirit of Wine, which you say will not burne,*] I grant it; but yet it will warme, which the light doth not: Nay, I am assured, that no light at all warms, except the celestiall, which it doth (as they speake) *effektivè*, not *formaliter*: But the fire heats by its *forme*, not by its *light*: Therefore you are mistaken in all your discourse, confounding the celestiall light, with that of the fire or candle; and attributing heat to the light of the fire, which heat proceeds immediatly from its *forme*, not from its *light*. And though the Suns light in a burning-glasse may inflame, yet no other light can do so; and so by calling light fire, you confound the accident with the substance, as when you call [*The sent of odoriferous water, the water it selfe.*]

When we ask you, What becomes of the light when the Sun is gone, or is intercepted by a cloud, or the Moons body? You ask again, [*What becomes of the flame when it is extinguished?*] I answer, the *flame*, being a substance begot of *smoake*, returns again unto *smoak*, for the *smoak* being elevated to that height of heat and drynesse, presently becomes flame, which when its *nutriment* failes, or violently by the wind is separated from its grosser substance, encountring with the cold aire, returns

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unto smoak again: But for the light in the roome, there is no such generation and corruption, for when the flame is extinguished, and resolved into smoak, the light quite perisheth and vanisheth into nothing, as being a bare accident, and somewhat like to nothing. If it be a substance, and resolved into some other matter, tell us into what.

Sect. 14.
Pag. 7. c. 8.

[You prove the light to be nothing else but the flame dilated, by bringing similes of a basin of water dilated unto vapours by heat, and of perfumes dilated unto odoriferous smoak.] But these are no proofes at all: Wee sensibly perceive the vapors generated of the water, and the smoak of the perfume, and the diminution or totall resolution of these named grosser bodies, into thinner aereall; But wee see no such thing in the light, for there is no resolution at all of the flame into that diffused light, nor any diminution of the flame, by the encrease of the light; or any totall abolishing of the flame unto that imaginary substance of the light. When the water and perfume is quite consumed, the steame and smoake remaine a great while after; but doth there remaine any light of the flame in the roome after the flame is wasted and gone? which must needs be, if the light be the flame dilated or resolved. It were strange Philosophy to say, that the light of the Sun is nothing else but the body of the Sun dilated: To how many inconveniences should that celestiall body be subject? To how many generations and corruptions?

Sect. 15.
Pag. 53. c. 8.

[Light is not in every place of the roome really, which is illightned.] This is a pure contradiction, for, what is illightned hath light in it. If there be not light in any part of the roome which is illightned, then some illightned parts are dark: such mysterious Philosophy I understand not. As

for these *Atomes* in the Sun, [*Which you say hinder not our sight;*] if they be but few, 'tis true: but I have seen often times so many of them, and so thick together neere the ground, that they sensibly hinder the sight. And though there be many *Atomes* in the aire, yet there is no *penetration* of dimensions, as there must needs be, if the light be a body. If there be a thousand lights in a Church, so many bodies there must be, besides that of the aire, *penetrating* one another. What a strange body is the light, that can passe through the solid and dense substance of a glasse, and not breake it?

[*As for the circumaetion of a lighted torch in the dark, and the swift motion of the Sun,*] though these may deceive our sight: this, by reason of its vast distance; that, because the fiery end of it, being the onely object of the eye in the dark, sends the *species* of it unto the eye, and in the forme of a fiery wheele; because the beames of our eye are dissipated and broken, by the swift motion of the *lucid object*: Yet these will not prove, that wee are deceived in the instantaneall motion of the light from East to West, or of a candle in the roome where we are; for if the eye be continually deceived in the motion of its proper object, being within a convenient distance, then is the eye given to us in vaine, and so God is made imperfect in his worke: And therefore our argument is good, when we say, that the light can be *no naturall body*, seeing it illuminates the whole *Hemisphere* in an instant.

You give a reason why the light by its motion doth not shatter the aire, or other bodies in pieces: [*Because in light there is only celerity, but no bignesse or density:*] This is a strange body, that hath no *dimensions*; you were better call it a spirit, then a body; for if it be a body, it must have matter and forme: by the matter, it hath quantity,

Sect. 16.
Pag. 56. c. 8.

Sect. 17.
Pag. 59. c. 8.
Pag. 60.

which is inseparable from it; by the forme, that quantitie hath its détermination and limits: therefore if there be in the light *celerity*, there is motion; if motion, then the principles of motion, which are two, to wit, the active *forme*, and the passive *matter*: and these cannot be without quantitie, nor this without *dimensions*; and what dimensions can be wanting in so vaste a body as the *light* is, reaching from heaven to earth? You cannot allow lesse then the three dimensions of *longitude*, *latitude* and *profundity*, and that (I think) is bignesse: and if it incorporate it selfe with the aire, there must needs be a condensation; two bodies, nay perhaps a thousand, in one Church (if there be so many candles) being united in one.

Sett. 18.
Pag. 61. cap. 8.

[No light is seen by us, but what is reflected from an opacous body to our eye.] I pray, from what opacous bodie is the light of the Sun, Moon and Stars reflected, when we look upon these *luminaries*? Doe they not immediately, without any such help, strike our eyes when we look on them? And wherefore [hath the wind no power to shake the light, which strikes our eye in a straight line?] Is the wind more restrained by a straight then a crooked line? The wind shakes the aire, and yet shakes not the light which is in it. Sure, it is not the straight line that keeps the light from shaking, but because it is an accident, and not a bodie, as the aire is, and bodies only are the objects and subjects of motion.

Sett. 19.
Pag. 62. cap. 8.

[Our arguments (you say) against light being a body, are only negative.] All negative arguments are not to be rejected; there be negative *demonstrations* as well as affirmative: and you which hold light to be a body, how will you prove it to be no accident, but by negatives? and yet I have urged already divers *affirmative* arguments

ments to prove that light is a qualitie, as well as *negative*, to prove it is no bodie. And whereas you conclude [*that if fire be light, then light must needs be fire,*] Pag. 63. it will not follow; for fire may be light or lucid in the *concrete*, and yet not so in the *abstract*: and if it were so, yet light is not therefore fire; for sure, the light of snow, or fish, or glow-wormes is not fire, nor indeed any light, as I have proved.

[*By how much the quicker the motion is, by so much the agent is the perfecter.*] Sett. 20. Pag. 65. cap. 9. The quicknesse of the *motion* argues not the perfection of the *agent*, except you will have the *Moon*, which moves swifter, a perfecter agent then the *Sun*, whose motion is much slower. Is *Mercurie* a more perfect agent then his father *Jupiter*? or is *Tobias* lesse perfect then his *dogge*, because he is not so nimble footed?

[*The nature of a body is, that greater quantity of the same thing hath greater vertue then a lesse quantity hath.*] Sett. 21. Pag. 65. cap. 9. You confound the two sorts of quantities, to wit, *virtutis* and *molis*; the greatest *vertue* is not alwaies in the greatest *bulk*: there was more spirit and courage in little *David*, then in great *Goliath*. A little horse hath oftentimes more metall then a bigger; and a few drops of chymicall spirit have more vertue then an handfull of herbs: little women, for the most part, are fruitfuller then the tallest. And there is more force in a little gunpowder within a musket, then in twenty times so much in an open place.

[*You can see no principle to perswade you, that any body can move it selfe towards any place.*] Sett. 22. Pag. 70. cap. 9. If your meaning be, that no body can move it selfe *totally*, that is, that the whole, and every part in the whole be both movers and moved, I assent to you; for one and the same thing cannot
be

be in the same respect *actually* and *potentially* in being, but the mover is still *in actu*, the thing moved *in potentia*: nor can the same thing be more *noble* then it selfe, which it must be, if the bodie thus move it selfe, seeing the mover is more noble then the thing moved; but if your meaning be, that no bodie moves it selfe, that is, that in the same bodie one part doth not move the other, you are mistaken: for every bodie is compounded of *forme* and *matter*; the forme is the mover, the matter is moved: and so every bodie moves it selfe, as having within it selfe the principle of its motion, which is the forme. So heavie bodies move themselves downward, light bodies upward; the one by *gravitie*, or the forme of *gravitie*, the other by the forme of *levitie*: *gravitie* and *levitie* being qualities proceeding from the forme of these inanimate bodies; and this power of moving themselves, these bodies had in their generation from their *generator*, who gave them being and forme, and the consequences of forme; *dans formam, dat consequentia ad formam*: therefore when a stone falls downward, that motion is not from an *externall* mover; for then the motion should not be naturall, but violent: now the motion is naturall; for *nature* is the principle and cause of it, and *nature* is intrinsecall, and the forme is the chiefe nature, which causeth this motion; therefore the *generator* cannot be the cause of this motion, as being gone and separated from it: nor is the removing of the impediment or the *impeller* the cause of this motion, for these are causes only by accident, which must be reduced to the selfe cause: Doubtlesse then all bodies move themselves. Now [if the quality be nothing else, (as you urge out of *Thomas*) but the modification of the thing whose quality it is,] then you must exclude all habits, naturall faculties

culties and passions, all colours, sounds, fents, and many other qualities, from being reall entities; which is absurd.

[The Sun is a perpetuall and constant cause, working upon
inferiour bodies, by his being sometime present, sometime ab-

Sect. 23.

Pag 76. cap. 10.

sent.] You spend much paper in shewing that the Sun is the cause of the motion of inferiour bodies, which wee deny not; but wee are not satisfied with this cause: for the Sun, as all other celestially bodies, is but an universall and remote cause of inferiour bodies and their motions; but such a cause begets no scientificall knowledge: the cause, by which we must know scientifically, is particular and immediate, to wit, the formes of bodies by their properties, gravity and levity; these are the causes of motion, by which we know. The Sun is too remote a cause, and I doubt whether hee be a cause at all why the fire burnes, and of other such like effects. And though the Sun, being present, is the cause of sublunary effects, yet, being absent, he cannot be a cause properly, but accidentally, or *causa deficiens*, not *efficiens*.

[The light carrieth up an atome with it,] and shortly after you tell us [that light is a part of the atome.] Is not the aire strong enough to beare atomes, except you adde this new carrier or porter, light? What becomes of these atomes when the light is gone? Are they not too heavie a burthen for the aire to support, without its fellow-helper?

Sect. 24.

Pag 80. cap. 10.

Hercule supposito sidera fulcit Atlas.

This is much like their conceipt, who feared that *Atlas* was not strong enough to beare up the heavens, if *Hercules* shoulder had not helped him; but how comes the light to be a part of its owne burthen? an atome then, I see, is no atome, but may be cut in parts and anatomized,
and

and these parts are light: But is light an *integrall*, or an *essentiall* part? Are there any atomes in candle-light? if there be, how shall we know? if there be not, then is the light no part of atomes: And if *atomes* be opake bodies, how can light be a part of such? is one opposite a part of another? I think, your *atomes* sustained by the light, are like the dreames in *Virgil*, supported by an *elme*; or like the shadowes in the *Elysian* fields, flying about the green medowes:

— *tenues sine corpore vitæ*

Cernuntur volitare cava sub imagine formæ.

You have been too much conversant in the schoole of *Democritus*, who held the world to be made of atomes.

Pag. 76.

[And to say, that the first and most generall operation of the Sun, is to raise and make atomes,] is to give the Sun a very poore, unworthy, and fruitlesse imployment. *Caligula* and his souldiers were better imployed, when they gathered shells and pebble-stones; and so was *Dioclesian* in catching of flies.

Seff. 25.
Pag. 81. cap. 10.

[There is no such thing among bodies, as positive gravity and levity, but that their course upwards or downwards happen to them by the order of nature.] It seems you understand here by nature, the *universall* nature, which is nothing else, but the *dependencie* of all inferiour causes orderly from the supreme cause. If this be your meaning, as it must needs be, you commit a contradiction; for you deny the *secondary* causes, which you suppose to depend from the *supreme*. If then I should aske you, why a stone descends, you will answer, Not because of any *positive gravity* in it, but because it so happens by the order of nature. But why hath nature ordered a stone to fall downward, & not to move upward, seeing there is no positive gravitie in it? You answer me, [Because it meets
with

with the aire or water, bodies lighter & thinner then the stone.]

Then you here acknowledge a *comparative* gravitie in the stone; for, if the aire be lighter then the stone, the stone must be heavier then the aire, and so *comparatively* it is heavie: but every *comparative* includes a *positive*; for, if you be wiser then another, then you are wise: but indeed, *universall* nature works not without the *particular*, neither doth *God* or the *heaven* move the stone downward, but by the stones *gravity*; therefore gravitie is the immediate cause of its motion, which if you deny, you may as well deny the fire to be hot; and if you say the fire burnes only, because it happeneth so by the order of nature, you were as good say nothing.

[*Any body will descend, if it light among others more rare then it selfe; and will ascend, if it light among bodies more dense then it.*] Sect. 26.
Pag 81. c. 10. What say you then to your light bodie of *light*, which you say is nothing else but fire dilated? surely, meeting with aire, a bodie heavier and denser, it should never descend to us, who live here on the earth, but ascend rather; how comes it that so light a bodie should descend so many miles from its fountaine, the *Sun*, to us, seeing the aire is much more dense then it? Nay, it descends thorow a denser bodie, the *water*; for, divers find light in the bottome of the *sea*. Againe, what say you to a thick plank of timber, which meeting with the water, a rarer bodie, notwithstanding descends not to the bottome, but swims above? This is contrary to your doctrine.

You told us afore, that light hath no bignesse or densitie, that the more dense the bodie is, the more active it is, that the light carries up atomes; [*and (now you say) that these atomes, the subtilest divisions of light, doe presse* Sect. 27.
Pag. 86. c. 11. *downe a leaden bullet, and penetrates or runs thorow it, as light*

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thorow

thorow a glasse, water thorow a sponge, and sand thorow a sieve.] The light then carries up these atomes, which presse downe a leaden bullet, and yet the light hath not densitie. These are riddles which *Oedipus* cannot unfold: for, how a qualitie should be a *body*, how that bodie should want *dimensions*, how it should want *density*, and yet beare up that which presseth downe with its weight a leaden bullet, how there should be so much weight in *atomes*, as to presse down such a bullet, how these *atomes* should pierce so dense a bodie as *lead*, whereas light cannot doe it; yea, run thorow *lead*, as water thorow a sponge, or sand thorow a sieve, are (I thinke) some of these second notions which *Chimera* did eat. But how doe the *atomes* presse downe the lead? doe they remain in their expansion dispersed? then they cannot more presse the lead, then the sea-water presseth him downe that dives in it; *elementum in suo loco non gravitat*. Or doe the *atomes* meet together in a bodie to help the lead downwards? if all the *atomes* in the light were in one bodie, how big would that bodie be?

Sett. 28.
Pag. 87. c. 11.

[The clod of earth, which in Egypt is shut up in a close roome, and doth shew the change of weather by the increase of its weight,] receiveth not this weight [from the atomes of salt-peter, piercing the walls, as you say;] but from the aire it selfe, of which it is made up, as other mixed bodies are, which therefore *sympathise* with the aire, and its changings, as our owne bodies doe, though wee were never so close shut up in a roome. When the aire is inclined to raine, bodies grow heavie, and in a close room we see the water in weather-glasses ascend and descend, as the aire changeth abroad, although the water in the glasse hath no commerce with the aire abroad: and so wee feele *aches* upon change of weather in our bodies, and

and heaviness of our heads after sun-set, by reason of the heaviness or gloomy heat of the aire, caused not by your *atomes*, but by *vapors, mists, or fumes* in the aire, which we are continually sucking in by the lungs, by which the two principall parts of our bodies are affected, to wit, the *head* and the *heart*, and by them the rest of the bodie. And as for [*spirits or atomes of snow and salt-peter, which (you say) passe thorow a glasse-vessell,*] I know no such thing. 'Tis true, that the outside of a glasse or pot, being made wet, will freeze to the board, though neere the fire, if you put snow and salt-peter in the pot, because the cold snow, by *antiperistasis*, becometh much colder, in having the hot salt joyned with it, and so shunning its enemy, the salt, fortifies it selfe, which causeth the wet bottome to freeze. So in great frosts the fire is most hot and scalding; wells and deep cellars in summer are most cold, without any penetration of *atomes* at all, which were heretofore *bodies*, and parts of light, now by you are called *spirits*. And as there is no concurrence of *atomes* to presse downe the falling bullet in the aire [*neither is there of water, to presse down the stone falling in it, as you say*] because both the aire and the water meet onely to fill up the place which the bullet and stone had, that there may be no *vacuity*; for lighter bodies presse not downward the heavier, but support the lighter. But it troubles mee to waste so much time and paper in refelling your *Paradoxes* of *atomes*, which are as void of soliditie, as the *atomes* themselves. Hence wee see how easie it is to deviate from the truth, and to lose our selves in the winding *labyrinths* and intricate *Meanders* of error, when we fall off from these knowne and generally received principles, which have had the approbation of wise men for so many generations. Is it

not a shorter way, and more consonant to reason, to say, that cork sinks not, and iron doth, because the one is porous and full of aire, the other dense, and more earthy; because the one and the other are moved diversly, according to their divers *formes*, and the properties from them, to wit, *gravity* and *levity*; then to devise *phantomes* of *atomes*, which involve within them so many absurdities?

Sect. 29.
Pag. 95 c. 11.

[*The elements doe weigh in their owne spheres; for, a ballone stuffed hard with aire, is heavier then an empty one. Secondly, more water would not be heavier then lesse. Thirdly, if a hole were digged in the bottome of the sea, the water would not run into it.*] I answer, a stuffed ballone is heavier, because the aire, which is in it, is separated from its own *sphere*, in which it doth not weigh, according to our principles. Secondly, more water is not in its owne *sphere* *actually* heavier then lesse; for a man in the bottome of the sea feels no more weight, then if hee were but halfe a yard from the superficies: but *potentially* it is, *gravidata est, sed non gravitat.* Thirdly, the sea would run downe, and fill up the hole, because it moves naturally, as it is heavie, towards the centre; which weight appears not *actually* in its *sphere*, till it remove towards the *centre*. Nature in her actions is not to be seen in all places, and at all times. There is life in seeds, and fruit in trees, though not alwaies *actually* seen: So there is gravitie in water, though not alwaies felt; as you seeme afterward to confesse, when you say [*that water in a pale, because it is thereby hindred from spreading abroad, hath the effect of gravity predominating in it:*] So one part of water in its own *sphere* doth not divide the other; Shall we then say, there is no power in water to divide water? Yes, there is; for water powred out of an ewre in-

Pag. 97. cap. 11.

to a bason, wherein is water, will divide the water in the bason.

Your reason, to prove that there is no inclination in heavie bodies to tend to the centre [*because the centre is as often changed, as any dust lighteth unequally upon any one side of it,*] is a weak one; for let the centre change never so often, every houre if you will, yet a centre there must be still; and to that *centre*, in what place of the earth soever it be, the heavie bodie hath its inclination. And no lesse weaknesse is it, to confound *vis impressa*, or a violent motion, with the naturall motion of gravitie, as you do; for gravitie is neither the mediate nor immediate cause of a violent, but of a naturall motion. [*Neither is it impossible for any cause (as you say) to produce an effect greater then it selfe;*] for the flame may produce a greater heat in iron, then is in it selfe: May not a little man beget a tall man? Oftentimes the effect exceedeth the cause both in *quantity* and *vertue*: A blind man begets a son with eyes; the heat of an *Egyptian* oven hatcheth chickens; and the *Suns* heat begets many sensitive creatures of putrefied matter. Neither must you inferre [*That gravity is no naturall quality of earthy bodies, because a bullet can ascend out of the bottome of the barrell of a gun, being suck't up by ones breath:*] for this infers the bullet to be naturally heavie, in that it doth not naturally ascend, but is forced by the violent motion of *traction*; which traction were needlesse, if the bullet were not naturally heavie. Neither doth this motion shew [*That gravity is an intellectuall entity, as you say;*] for though the naturall properties of things have not understanding, yet they have that appetite given to them by the God of nature, to preserve their owne unitie, and the unitie of the universe, and to shun their owne destruction: and this is no determining

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determining of the qualitie by it selfe, which is the act of an intelligent creature, to wit, to determine it selfe; but it is a power given by the God of nature to every thing, to preserve it selfe, and to shun its owne hurt. So the stomach, which hath no understanding, receives and concocts wholsome food: the meseraick veines suck the purest part thereof, prepare and fit it for the second concoction, and send away the excrementitious and superfluous parts to the guts; and the same stomach vomits out that which is hurtfull to it; and all this is *nature*, not *understanding*. What understanding will you give to a load-stone, when it drawes iron? or to those senselesse creatures, which by their *sympathies* and *antipathies* affect or hate each other?

Sect. 31.

Pag. 181. c. 12.

Though your atomes be but little bodies, yet they are your great servants; for they help you still at a dead lift, and doe you much service in all your actions: they are your *light-bearers*, they make all things move in their naturall courses, upward and downward; they are also the causes of violent motions: as of projection; for [by their help the arrow flieth out of the bow (as you say) and the ball from the racket:] So these atomes are your *archers*, *slingers*, *gunners*, or *canoneers*, and they help you at your sports in the Tennis-courts. *Multitudo populorum sepidum*, as *Apuleius* calls them, the *Ants*, did not so much good service to *Psyche*, in that intricate labour of dividing all sorts of graines, enjoyned her by *Venus*, as these *atomes* doe you: By them the arrow flies out of the bow, the stone out of the sling, the bullet out of the gun or canon; and if it were not for them, we could not kill our enemies in the wars: for, the gun-powder could have no force to carry the heavie iron bullet so farre in the aire, and to beat downe stone walls of townes and castles,

castles, if these *atomes* did not put to their shoulders. What *Hercules* is able to resist such *Pigmies*? but wee, who have been bred in the *peripatetick* schooles, at the feet of *Aristotle*, find the maine cause of projection to be the qualitie or force of the *projicient* impressed upon the bodie projected; as, the force of the gun-powder-fire impressed in the bullet, carries it thorow the aire: Neither is it more impossible for this impressed force and adventitious qualitie, to carry a bullet *violently*, then for the intrinsecall qualities of gravitie and levitie, to carry bodies to their owne places *naturally*. The *generator* impresseth a qualitie of gravitie in the stone, to move naturally to its owne place: the *projicient* impresseth the qualitie of projection in the same stone, to move violently from its place. If you aske why the stone returnes at last to its owne motion downward, and continues not flying in the aire; the reason is, because the aire makes resistance, which at length weakens the impressed force, so that this, growing weaker then the resistance, yeelds, and the stone falls downe. Neither is it reasonable, that an *extrinsecall* qualitie should have that continuance, as a qualitie that is *naturall*, which cannot receive any mutation, except there be a change in the first qualities, whose commixtion, gravitie and levitie naturally follows; but the force of the *projicient* makes no such change in the first qualities of the bodie projected. Neither doth the stone lose its gravitie whilst it flies upward, but hath it only suspended, while the *projicients* impression lasts: when this is spent, downe falls the stone againe, shewing the same gravitie it had before. If any say, that this *impulse* is contrary to the inclination of the bodie impelled, I answer, 'Tis contrary to its inclination to locall motion, but not to any inclination

the stone might have to the active quality of levity, which is not in the stone; levity then expells gravity, but projection doth not. This impulse then is an accidentall forme, and, in respect of the *impression*, it is in the third species of Quality; but as this impression inclineth the stone to motion, it is a naturall faculty in the second species of Quality; I say naturall; not as being the naturall forme, or the property flowing from thence; but because it moves like the naturall forme, though not to the same place; and because the stone in which the impression is made, is a naturall *subject*, and the projicient is a naturall *agent*. You see then that this doctrine of impression is no shift, as you call it; but it is a shift to make *Atomes* carry a Canon bullet so farre in the aire; for as the aire it selfe is passive, having no other motion in projection, but what it receives from the projicient, even so be your *Atomes* (if any such were) which are dispersed by the wind and force of the bullet.

Sett. 32.
Pag. 27. c. 14.

[*Wheresoever there is variety of bodies, there must be the foure elements:*] then belike in the Heavens there must be the foure elements, for there are variety of bodies, one starre differing from another in glory: But indeed, there be no elements, nor generation, nor corruption, nor alteration, but such as belong to light, and locall motion; and therefore the heaven is but a naturall body *analogically*, which proportion consisteth in this, that as sublunary bodies have a nature, which is the inward principle of motion, so hath the heaven, though in a far different way; and for this cause, we deny that the matter of the celestially bodies is *univocall* to that of elementary, for then there should be mutuall action and passion betweene them. ² Then the celestially matter should have an *appetite* to being or not being. ³ It should

should have an *appetite* to divers formes. † It should be the subject of corruption, and of transmutation into sublunary bodies; all which are absurd, as I have shewed elsewhere.

*In comment.
de terye mo:ta
circulari.*

Why may we not as well say, that fire warmes the water, or burnes the board, by its quality of heat, as to multiply entities to no purpose, as you do, in your innumerable *Atomes*, which is your salve for all diseases? for, as if these had not done you service enough already, you must make them your *Cooks* to boile and rost your meat: You will have them to come out of the fire, and pierce the bottome of the kettle, and so up unto the water, and being quickly weary there, ascend in smoake, and then descend in drops. But, if these *Atomes* be the smallest parts of the substance of the fire, I wonder how they scape drowning, when they are in the water, and that they are not served, as the *Persian* god was by the *Egyptian* Priest, and so *Canopus* prove to be the better god: Nay, you will not have any occult quality in the *Load-stone* to draw the iron, but these *Atomes* must doe it; and your reason is, [*because otherwise the whole body of the agent must worke, which it cannot do but by locall motion.*]

Seff. 33.

Cap. 15. 6. 16.

Pag. 139.

But what need is there to say, that the whole body must worke, if the *Atomes* do not? It is not the whole body that works, or at least not totally; for the fire heats by its forme, not by its matter; and so the *Load-stone* draws: but if we did yeeld that the whole body did work, must it therefore worke by locall motion? Cannot the fire warme you, being within a fit distance, except the fire come to you? The *Load-stone* shall keep its distance from the *iron*, and yet shall draw it without *Atomes*; but they are little beholding to you, in that after all their good service they have done you, you set them together by

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the cares, and makes all *re-actiōns* to be performed by them; you make an irreconcilable warre betweene the *firy* and *watry* Atomes; like *Homers Batrochomyamachia*; or like that battell in *Ovids Chaos*; where

*Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.*

When you hold *ice* in your hand, you will not have the *ice* by its coldnesse to worke on your hand, nor your hand by its heat to re-worke on the *ice*, but *Atomes* to work one against another. When you saw wood, be there any *Atomes* that come out of the teeth of the saw, which divide the wood? or *Atomes* out of the wood, which blunt the saw? But, seeing you will not have *re-actiōn* to consist in qualities, I desire to know, whether in every *re-actiōn* there is not an alteration: this you cannot deny, for when you put hot iron in cold water, you make an alteration from heat to cold, and from cold to heat; but alterations consist in qualities, as augmentation doth in quantity, and generation in substances; therefore *re-actiōn* must consist in quality, not in your *Atomes* which are substances. Besides, substances are not contrary to each other, but in *re-actiōns* there be contrarieties, which argues qualitie, in which properly consists contrariety.

Sect. 34.

Pag. 142. c. 16.

Pag. 143.

Ibid.

I know not what to make of your *Atomes*, for sometime you call them substances, and [*here you will have them to be qualities:*] Again, you say [*these Atomes are the pure parts of the elements;*] and by and by, that [*they are accidentall qualities:*] It seems then, that accidents are parts of substances, by your *Logick*. Besides, you say [*the elements remaine pure in every compound,*] and yet you will not have [*their substantiall formes to remaine actual-ly:*] sure the elements remaine not if their formes are gone;

gone; for it is by their formes that they are *elements*: and if they remaine pure in the compound, then the compound is not a *physicall* mixed body. And if your *Atomes* be qualities, then there is no mixture at all, for mixture is of substances, not of qualities; and the body mixed differs *specifically* from the elements of which it is mixed. We hold then, that the elementary formes remaine in mixture, but *refractè, remisè, castigatè*, as they speake, and in some degree onely, which degrees the substantiall formes admit, but not as the qualities doe; for these admit degrees, remaining the same they were before; so do not the formes, for as soone as there is any remission of degree in them, the *species* is changed, and so that which was the forme of the element, becomes now the forme of a mixed body, being of another *species* then the element. Take any degree of the *substantiall* forme from fire, and its no more fire.

[It doth not appeare to what purpose nature should place store-houses of simples, seeing mixed bodies can be dissolved into other mixed bodies.] Into what then shall these mixed bodies be dissolved? Into mixed stil? Must there not be a dissolution into simple bodies at last, as well as there was a composition of them? Sure if there were not store-houses of these *simples*, the world could not be perfect; for in this is its perfection, that it consists of all sorts of bodies, to wit, as well *simple*, as *mixed*: and if there be foure prime qualities, where shall they have their residence, but in the foure prime simple bodies, which we call elements? hence the elements are eternall in the whole, though they be perishing in their parts, when they enter into composition.

[The motion of *Atomes* we call a winde:] A winde is a substance, as afterward you confesse, when you say,

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[winds

Sect. 35.
Pag. 143. c. 16.Sect. 36.
Pag. 152. c. 17.

[winds are made up of bodies:] but motion is an *accident*, therefore wind cannot be a motion; I think your meaning is, that winds are *Atomes* moved, or moving; but then you should have told us whether these *Atomes* move themselves, or are they moved by some other: these *Atomes* are unruly bodies, which if they were not curbed by *Aeolus*,

— *Maria ac terras, cælumque profundum,*

Quippe ferent rapidi secum, verrantque per auras;

Who would think there should be such strength in *Atomes*, to over-terne trees and strong houses, to move the Seas from the bottome, to sink ships, and to move the earth it selfe? Was that a motion of *Atomes* which drove the Sea againe into its own place, and dried the earth from *Noahs* Flood? Are those *Atesii*, which blow continually under the *Line*, motions of *Atomes*? or those which blow constantly in *Egypt* forty daies together, in the summer solstice? 'Tis strange there should be such strength in these bodies, which are so weake, that the light, as you said before, can support them; and that there should be such spite and courage in them, as to encounter in duels, and trouble the world with their quarrels,

Sæpe & ventorum concurrere praelia vidi.

Were these *Satans* souldiers, when he by the winds overthrew the house where *Fobs* children were? Your best way will be to leave your *Atomes*, and to acquiesce in the received opinion, that the winde is an exhalation raised by the Sun out of moisture; which exhalation, by reason of its lightnesse mounting upward, is repelled by the cold middle region of the aire, and so moveth not directly downward, because 'tis light, but athwart and sidlings. As for your *Atomes*, leave them for *Aeolus*

lus to bind up in a bagge, who were so unruly before he took them to taske, that they turned the sea upon the land, and the land into the sea, dividing *Italy* from *Sicily*, and *Spaine* from *Africa*.

[Is it not a wrong to God and his instruments, to impute to the Divell the aides, which to some may seem supernaturall?] Sect. 37.
Pag. 164. ca. 18.

True, for there is a *naturall magick*, by which you may doe strange things, and anticipate the time prefixed by nature, in producing of divers effects, by applying *activa passivis*: So you may produce a Rose in Winter, and raise Parsly out of the ground within a few houres after the seed is sowne. There is also a *Mathematicall magick*, by which strange things are done; as was that wooden Pigeon, which *Architas* caused to flie; and that brasen head, which *Albertus Magnus* made to speak. That worthy man *Boëtius* was very skilfull in this way. Such things, and many more, may be done without witchcraft: but withall, there is a *Diabollieall magick* in working strange things by the power of *Sathan*, by a contract which *Witches* make with them, God permitting, in his secret judgement, the affectors of such evill things to be deluded and abused by the evill *Angels*. Saith *S. Austin*, De doct. Christ.
l. 2. cap. 22, 23.

'Tis fit that he, who forsakes the fountaine of living waters, digge to himselfe fountaines that will hold no water: Therefore in all our actions wee ought to aime at Gods glory, at the salvation of our owne and others soules, at the honour of the Church and State, in which we live, and to avoid scandall, to submit our thoughts and actions to Gods Word, and not to practise such things as have no cause or reason in nature: as, to cure diseases by *spells* or *words*, *characters* and *knots*, which, being artificiall, and quantities, cannot naturally operate.

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Seff. 38.
Pag. 164 c. 18.

[The weapon-salve must be conserved in an equall temper, and the weapon, which made the wound, must be orderly dressed.] Paracelsus, the inventor of this salve, is ill reported of, to wit, to be a *Magician*: *Baptista Porta*, *Goclenius*, *Dr. Floid*, & some others have bin too credulous to beleieve him; for, if it be not *magicall*, it is suspicious, considering the author, the superstitious ceremonies in gathering of the mosse from the dead skull, with the other simples used in it, besides the unreasonableness of their opinions, who think that a wound can be cured by such a way; whereas *nihil agit in distans*, naturall agents work not but within a proportionable distance: as the fire will not heat, if the object be not within its reach: neither will the *load-stone* draw, except the *iron* be neer: But the patrons of this *salve* will have it cure the *wound*, though many miles distant, and though there be an interposition of many dense bodies; as of houses and hills. What *medium* can carry this vertue so far, & thorow so many impediments, whereas the *Sun* cannot conveigh his beames to us, if the *Moon*, or a thick cloud be interposed? And what *sympathy* can wee conceive to be between a sword, or a clout, and a wound? except you'll say, It is because the blood touched it; or, as you say, [Because the steem or spirits entered into the pores of the weapon.] These are piercing spirits indeed, that can passe thorow *steele*, and stay there so long after the blood is cold, whereas the blood, which in *phlebotomy* is received into a dish, loseth the spirits as soon as the blood is cold; though many ounces of blood be there, yet never a *spirit* left, nor any *sympathy* at all between the dish and the wound. Sure, by this reason, when the sword that wounds is kept in the same roome with the wounded man, it must cure, whereas it cures so farre off. But no such

such cure is to be found; for I was yet never cured by the knife that cut my finger, though never so often dressed. If any reply, that some cures have been done by this salve; I answer, that I have heard so, and they that write of it, most of them write but upon report: and suppose some cures had been done, yet I will not impute them to the salve, but to the washing and keeping of the wound cleane, in which case nature will help it selfe. The *imagination* also is sometimes a help to cure; and sometime *Sathan* may concurre, for his owne ends, *videlicet*, to confirme superstition and errour. If any say, that there is a *sympathy* between the *pole* and the *needle* touched with the *load-stone*, which are farther distant then the *sword* and the *wound*; I grant it, because the influence of celestiall bodies upon earthy, is not hindred by distance; but we cannot say so of the actions of sublunary bodies, whose matter is farre different from that of the heavens. In a word, the effects of this salve which you speak of, are much like the effects that are said to be caused by images of wax made by *Witches*. The like credit is to be given to those other reports you speake of, to wit, the curing of the kins swelled soles by a turffe cut from under their fore feet, and hung upon an hedge; the drying of which is the mending of the fore feet: And the running over of the Cowes milk in boiling into the fire, wil cause an inflammation in the Cowes udder; and that this is cured by casting salt into the fire upon the milk. I could tell you many such tales as those, which I have partly read, and partly heard; but

— *credat Judeus Apella.*

I will stick to that Philosophicall principle, *Ominis actio fit per contactum*: but here is no contact; and I will as
soon

soon credit *Apuleius* his *Metamorphosis* into an *Asse*, by the anointing of his body, as the curing of a wound by an ointment, which is not at all applyed to the bodie. If any will say, that such cures are done by the influence of the *Stars*, let him prove it; wee may so salve all questions, and not trouble our selves to search any further into the hidden causes of things: These *influences* are the sanctuary of ignorance, but *Stars* are universall agents, whose operations are fruitlesse, if they be not determined by the particular agents. Lastly, I like your supposition wel: [*If the steem of bloud and spirits carry with it the balsamick qualities of the powder into the wound, it will better it.*] In this I am of your opinion; for if *Dædalus* did flie in the aire, wings doubtlesse would help him: but there is great odds between the fents which the *Deere*, or *Hare*, or *Fox* leave behind them, and this imaginary vertue of the *weapon-salve*; this being altogether hid, these other being manifest qualities, quickly apprehended by the *sagacious hounds*.

Señ. 39.
Pag. 176. c. 20. [You say, that the heat of the torrid Zone drawes aire to it from the Poles, and rest of the world, otherwise, all would be turned into fire.] The aire about the Poles, you confesse, is very cold, and the aire under the Line very hot. Now, that heat should draw cold to it, is to contradict a sensible maxime; for, what is more plaine and sensible, then that one contrary drives out another, and like drawes its like? The heat of the fire drawes out the heat of a burned finger, or the heat of the stomach, whereas the cold aire repells it. Hence it is, that we concoct better in Winter then in Summer. The heat of the upper and lower region of the aire doth not draw to it the cold of the middle region; but the cold fortifies, and unite its selfe against its enemy. Secondly, the aire under

der the *Line*, is carried about so fast by the motion of the *primum mobile* from East to West, that there is a continuall trade-wind, and a strong tide to the West: So that the aire there will not give leave, by reason of its swift motion, for any other aire to come thither. Thirdly, the *torrid Zone* needs no refrigeration from the *Poles*; for there are great lakes, rivers and seas, besides constant gales of wind, which refresh the aire, and make it no lesse temperate then *Spain*, if you will believe *Acosta*. Not to speak of the equalitie of the night there with the day, so that the Sun is not so long above their *Horison*, as hee is above ours in Summer. And if there were such extreme heat there, as is supposed, there would not be such multitudes of all sorts of herbs, fruits, and trees green all the yeare, as *Lerius* witnesseth in his navigation. Hist. Americ.

You have found out a pretty way for generation of the load-stone, [*which* (you say) *is begot of atomes, drawne from the North Pole, by the heat of the torrid Zone, and so sent downe into the bowels of the earth, where meeting with some condensate stufte, becomes this stone.*] This is the summe of your large discourse: But first, wee would know what these *atomes* are, whether parts of that cold aire, or of the light. Secondly, how the heat of the *torrid Zone* can draw cold *atomes* such a great way, ninety degrees at least, whereas wee have shewed, that hot aire expelleth the cold, but draweth it not. Thirdly, how it comes that load-stones are found in *Macedonia, Spaine, Bohemia, Germany*, and other Northern places. Did the *atomes* in their Southern progresse stay there, being weary of so long a journie, and plant *colonies* neer home? Or were they sent back by the heat which brought them thence? Fourthly, how can such weak bodies

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pierce so deep into the earth? Fifthly, when these *atomes* cast their spawne into the *matrix* of our great Mother, whether she doth feed upon iron when shee's breeding, seeing the stone, when it's come to maturitie, loveth *iron* so well? Or did shee not surfeit upon *garlick*, which is such an enemy to the load-stone? Sixthly, of what *atomes* is the stone *Theamedes* made, that so much hates the iron, which the load-stone loves; and the *Adamant*, that hinders its operation? Though I honour your worth and ingenuitie, in aiming at such abstruse causes, yet both you and I, and all men must confesse, that our science here is but ignorance: and wee see the natures of things, as that blind man, who saw men walk like trees. Who can tell why *Rhubarb* purgeth choler; *Agarick* phlegme? How the *Torpedo* stupefieth the hand thorow the cane, and the *Remora* stayes the ship?

Virgil.

*Has nē possumus natura accedere partes,
Frigidus en obstat circum præcordia sanguis.*

Sect. 41.
Pag. 185. c. 21.

[The load-stone (you say) workes by bodies: Ergo, not by qualities.] I deny the consequence; for, bodies doe not work upon bodies, but by their qualities: take these away, and there will be no action in nature; for *actions* have their originall from *qualities*, and their properties too: therefore actions are susceptible of contrarieties, of intensiō and remission, because the qualities, from which they have their being, are capable of these: And, as among *substances*, only the forme; so among *accidents*, only the qualitie is operative, because it is the accidentall forme of the subject in which it is. 'Tis true, accidents work not by their owne power, but in and by the power of their substances: The *hen* by her heat, which is a qualitie, prepares the matter of the *egge* for introduction of the forme of a *chick*; for the same agent that disposeth

disposeth the matter, introduceth the forme: The fire warmes by its heat. What's the reason that you can cut downe a tree with an axe, which a childe cannot doe with a wooden dagger? 'tis because you have the qualities of strength and skill, which the childe wants; and the axe hath the qualities of strength and sharpnesse, which are wanting in the wooden dagger. Your reasons, by which you prove your assertion, are weak, viz. [*Because a greater load-stone hath more effect then a lesser.*] A greater fire heats more then a lesser; is therefore heat no qualitie? Or must the same degree of heat be in a little fire that is in a greater? The qualitie encreaseth and decreaseth, according to the quantitie of the subject. Secondly, [*A load-stone giveth lesse force to a long iron then to a short one.*] So the fire warmeth more at a neer, then at a remoter distance: Naturall agents work not *in distans*. Will you deny your facultie of seeing to be a qualitie, because you can see better neer at hand, then at too remote a distance? Thirdly, [*The longer an iron is in touching, the greater vertue it getteth.*] Fourthly, [*An iron or load-stone may lose their vertue, either by long lying, or by fire.*] Will these reasons prove the vertue of the *load-stone* to be a bodie? then vertue, I see, is a body with you, and in the *predicament* of Substance. These your reasons prove the *load-stone* to work by a qualitie, because it hath degrees of more and lesse vertue, and because it may be lost. Is cold no qualitie, because it may be lost in the water? Or is the blacknesse of a mans haire no qualitie, because it may be lost? Or doth the fire consume nothing but bodies? Is whitnesse an accident, or a bodie? a qualitie it is, doubtlesse: Cast your paper in the fire, and what becomes of its whitnesse?

Qui color albus erat, nunc est contrarius albo.

Your arguments are so weak, that they refute themselves, and so they will save me a labour.

Sect. 42.
Pag. 186.

Pag. 186.

[*Atomes, which pierce iron, may penetrate any other body.*] I know the fire can pierce iron, and yet not pierce the dense bodie of the earth, which your *atomes* must doe, if they will beget a load-stone. And if the fire could pierce the earth, yet this will not prove, that your *magneticall atomes* can doe the like, except you give them the same vertue. And [*though light passe thorow thick glasses,*] as you say, yet there is some hinderance; for the thicker the glasse is, the lesse light you shall have: Trie if light can passe thorow a thick unpolished horne, as it doth thorow the thin horn of a lantern. If the thicknesse of a bodie makes no opposition to the light, then you may see the *Sun* as well thorow a thick cloud, or thorow the bodie of the *Moon*, as thorow the thin aire. If then there be opposition, though never so little, of the glasse to the light, there must needs be some *tardity*. As for odoriferous bodies, which, you say, [*continue many yeares spending of themselves, and yet keep their odour in vigour,*] is a miracle; for, how can the odour be kept in vigour in those bodies that still spend themselves? If odour be a qualitie, it must decay, as the bodie spends in which it is: If odour be a bodie, it cannot continue in its vigour, and be still spending of it selfe; this is a contradiction: Besides, its repugnant to sense; for, as the flower decays, so doth the smell: And though there be a power in roots of *vegetables*, to change the advenient juice into their nature, yet there is not the like power in *load-stones*, or *salt*, as you will have it, except you will make these also *vegetables*, and so they must not be called stones and mineralls, but plants rather. Salt doth not change the aire into its substance, by lying in it, as you say.

say, and would prove by the weight of it increased; for, if it change the aire into its substance, it feeds on it, and so some parts of its matter must be still wasting, and there must be still a repairing of the decayed matter by *nutrition*, and this must be done by natural heat, and a *vegetative* soule; and what is this but to make salt a plant? As for the weight of it, which you say encreaseth, I doubt of it: but if it were so as you say, yet that weight is not encreased, by turning the aire into its substance, but rather by the losse and evaporation of the aire, by its long lying: So paper-books grow much heavier, by beating the aire out of the paper. But whereas you say, [That the nature of the Load-stone proceeds from the Suns operation on the torrid Zone, which operation is contrary to the Load-stone, as being of a fiery nature, and therefore the torrid lands are not so magneticall as the polar,] is a riddle; for how can the nature of the Load-stone be contrary to that which begets it? and how can the Sun beget magnetick vertue by that heat, which by reason of its fiery nature hinders or destroyes it?

Pag. 200. c. 22.

You say, [Tis as impossible for diversity of worke in the seed to proceed at one time, and in the same occasions, from one agent, as it is for multiplicity to proceed immediatly from unity.] I will not now tell with what arguments *Physicians* prove, that the seed is the epitome of the whole body, and extracted from every part thereof, and containeth potentially all the parts of the body, which the *plastick* or formative power of the seed educeth unto act, by degrees: but this I must tell you, that naturall agents can, at the same time, produce diversity of works; for, doth not the Sun, at the same time, produce multitudes of divers effects, according to the multitudes of bodies it works upon? doth not the fire, at the same time, rarifie,

Sect. 43.
Pag. 215. c. 23.

condense, soften, harden? doth not the same *liver* at the same time by its heat, produce blood, choler, melancholy, and phlegme? even so may the same formative power of the seed, at the same time, fabricate and distinguish all the parts of the body.

Sect. 44.
Pag. 226. c. 24.

[*The marrow being very hot drieth the bones, and yet with its moisture humecteth.*] How the same naturall agent can, at the same time, on the same object, worke contrary effects, I know not: Can the fire at the same time both harden and soften the wax? 2. The braine comparatively is colder then any other of the soft parts of the body, and consequently the *marrow* which groweth from thence. 3. If heat be the cause of the *bones* drinesse, then the *heart* which is the hottest part of the body, should have the hardest bone about it. 4. What the bones are in sensitive creatures, that the stones are in vegetables: but the hottest fruits have not the hardest stones; for the stone of a cold *Peach* is harder then the kernels or stones of the hot *Grapes*. 5. If marrow were the cause of drinesse, or hardnesse, it would follow, that where there is most marrow, there should be the hardest and driest bones; but Philosophers tell us, that those creatures whose bones are most solid and drie, have least marrow. 6. That drinesse then and hardnesse of the bones proceeds not from the heat of the *marrow*, which is held to be lesse hot then the *braine*, but from the innate heat of the bones themselves, wasting the aeriall and oylie substance thereof, which heat is not *fery*, but temperate, as the naturall heat should be; yet it causeth this hardnesse and drinesse, because the matter on which it works is grosse and terrestriall, and because of the heats continuall working on the bones.

Sect. 45.
Pag. 227. c. 25.

You will not have us [*too irreverently ingage the Almightyes*

mighties immediate handy-worke in every particular effect of nature.] We offer no irreverence to the Almighty, if we call him the Creator even of the meanest creatures, being no lesse admirable in *Creatione vermiculorum, quàm Angelorum*, in the creation of wormes, then of Angels, saies *S. Austine*: and therefore *Basil* thinks it no irreverence to say, That God in the beginning did not onely create *Fishes* in the sea, but *Frogs* also in the pooles, nay *Gnats*, and *vermine*. Whose immediate handy-work were the *Lice* that were procreated of the *Egyptian* dust, at the stretching out of *Aarons* and *Moses* his Rod? Did not the *Sorcerers* acknowledge, that the finger of God was there? If it be no disparagement to the *Almighty*, that the excrementitious haire of our head, are the objects of his providence; neither can it be any dishonour to him, if we say, the meanest creatures are the effects of his omnipotence.

Homil. 7. in
Gen.

[The worke of generation (you say) is not effected by the formative power, except we meane by it, the chaine of all the causes, that concurre to produce this effect.] When wee speak of the proximate or immediate cause of things, we exclude not the remote causes; for, *Causa cause est causa causati*: He that saies that *Isaac* was begot of *Abrahams* seed, denies not that *Abrahams* seed is begot of his blood; and he that saies a man is a reasonable creature, saies also, that he is a sensitive, vegetative, corporeall substance: but what ever the remote causes be, the formative facultie in the spirits of the seed, effects the work of generation; which spirits are derived from all parts of the body, otherwise how could they frame all the distinct parts and members in the seed? but the grosse or materiall part of the seed, is onely from the vessels.

Sect. 46.
Pag. 231. c. 25.

[Ton

Sett. 47.
Pag. 225. c. 24. [You hold the heart to be first generated.] This is probable, but it may be doubted; because whatsoever liveth must be nourished: but nourishment is from the blood, and blood from the liver; therefore Galens opinion was, that the liver is first generated; which he also proveth by the umbelicall veine: But indeed, Hippocrates his opinion is most likely to be true, that all the parts are formed at the same time by the spirits in the seed. However it be, this is certaine, that fearfully and wonderfully are we made.

Sett. 48.
Pag. 244. c. 27. [The touch converseth with none, but with the most materiall and massie bodies.] What think you of the aire, the winde, the flame? are these massie bodies? and yet they are the objects of our touch; the instrument of which is not only in the hands and fingers, but diffused also through all the skin: and if the flame touch your skin, you shall as soone feele it, though it be no massie body, as you shall a stone. But whereas you call [heat and cold, wet and drinesse, affections of quantity,] you confound entities, and the predicaments, as you use to doe. If by affections you meane properties, then heat and cold are not the properties of quantities, but of elementary bodies, which are substances: If by affections you meane effects, much lesse can these be the affections of quantity, for quantity is not operative: Neither are rarity and density (out of the degrees of which you will have cold and heat, &c. to arise) quantities, but qualities; for rarity is nothing else but the tenuity of parts, and that is a quality: but if you take rarity for the distance of parts among themselves, as a sponge is called rare or thin, so it is in the predicament of Site; but quantity you cannot make it by Logick.

Sett. 49.

Your argument by which you prove the object to worke

worke materially upon the sense, is, [*because it works so* Pag. 245. c. 27. upon inanimate things, as the heat or cold works alike upon a stone, and upon a mans body:] but indeed these work not alike; for the fire that heats the stone, heats also my body, and in that respect it works upon both *materially*, that is, it produceth the same form (*specifically*, not *numerically*) of heat in the matter of the stone, and of my body: yet besides this operation, it produceth another, which we call *spirituall* or *intentionall*, upon my sense, which it doth not upon the stone, to wit, the *Image, Idea*, or *representation* of that heat which my sense apprehends, or receives, and, by meanes of the *sensitive* soul in me, judgeth of it; which a stone, being inanimate, cannot do: The heat then worketh on the stone only *materially* by heating, it worketh on my body not only *materially* by heating; but *spiritually* also, by impressing the *species* of the heat in my sense of feeling, by which the *soule* in the sense is stirred up to judge of it, and to make use of it, so far as it may be convenient for the body, otherwise to avoid it; therefore we need not labour much to prove these *intentionall species* to be in nature, which you deny: for, though their entity be weaker then of *materiall* formes, because their being is not in the subject, that is, the *intentionall* heat by which my sense is affected, is in the sense as in a subject; yet in its being and conservation it depends not on the *sense*, but on the *agent*, the fire that produced it; whereas the *materiall* forme of heat is received into the body, and depends onely in *fieri* from the *agent*, but in its *esse* and conservation from the *matter* in which it is received. Neither is it hard for us to prove, that your *materiall* actions are not able to performe these effects, that our *intentionall* can; for if the heat did work *materially* on your body, it must produce another heat,

for a *materiall* accident cannot passe from one subject to another, which it must do, if the same *numericall* heat of the fire did pass out of the fire into your body; & so you having another heat in your body then was in the fire, cannot feel nor judge of that heat which was in the fire. Again, if the hardness of the iron did work *materially* on your hand when you touch it; your hand must be also hard. Besides, when you see a horse, is the same horse in your eye, that is without? Or hath he the same *materiall* being in the eye, that he hath without? This must needs be true, if he worke *materially* on your eye. Moreover, if the object work *materially* on the sense, the neerer it is to the sense, the better it is perceived: but the contrary is true; for, *sensibile positum supra sensorium impedit sensum*. Again, no *materiall* action is in an instant, being it is a motion, and hath resistance from a contrary quality; but the act of sense is in an instant. Lastly, you must attribute action to quantities, if the object worke *materially*; for when you see a triangle, that must produce another triangle in your eye, which is absurd; & may be avoided by saying, the *species* or *image* of the triangle is in the eye.

Sett. 50.
Pag. 249. c. 28.

[*That thing which we call sound, is purely motion.*] If sound be motion, which is the *mobile*? for every motion is in a subject, and no other subject can be given but a body. The aire is the *medium* that conveyeth the sound to us, but the subject thereof it is not; for the aire being a light body, its motion is to ascend, but sounds are carried to us by all sorts of motions imaginable: The sound of the bell at the same instant ascends, descends, spreads it selfe abroad through all the parts of the circumstant aire. Besides, no motion is performed in an *instant*, but the sound in an instant fills thousands of eares, if they be neere. Againe, rest is opposite to motion, but

it is not opposite to sounds: By the motion of the aire sound is carried to us, but sound is not therefore motion; and so you doe often times in this Chapter distinguish sounds from the motion of the aire. And whereas you say, [*Great sounds do shake houses:*] It is not the sound, but the wind of the Ordnance or Gun-powder that moveth the aire violently, by which houses or towers may be shaken; and the same aire which is moved by the winde, and shakes the house, carries the sound to our eare; which sound can no more be perceived by the eye (as you averre in this Chapter, thereby confounding both the actions of the senses, and their objects) then colours can be perceived by the eare. He that sees sounds, let him heare colours too. 'Tis true, a blind man will discern light from darknesse, when a candle or the *Sun* beame is brought and let into a room, not that he perceives the light by his eares, but because, though the *chrystalline* humour of his eyes be out, yet, the *visive* spirits in the *optick* nerves not being lost, can easily discern light their proper object, though they cannot see visible objects by it, the *chrystalline* humor which should receive the visible species being gone. [*As for a* Pag. 257.
deafe mans perceiving of musick by a stick held in his teeth, whose other end lieth on a Violl:] I deny that he heares any sound at all, if he be deafe: he may perceive a motion or trembling of the aire, by meanes of his stick, but a sound he cannot perceive, as wanting the *organ* of perception: And though I should yield that he perceives the sound, yet that will not evince sound to be a motion: for there be many motions without any sound; as the motions of the *heavens*. The shooting of *stars*, and the light, which you will have a body, move through the aire without any sound: So the clouds move; and you may move

your hand, or any part of the bodie, without sound. Besides, there is a *sympatheticall* & an *antipatheticall* power in sounds, to affect or dis-affect the hearer, which is not in motion. Again, after the sound of the Ordnance is past, the motion of the aire continueth a while. Lastly, lay any soft cloth or silk upon a bell whilst it's sounding, the sound will be dulled or stayed, but not the motion: therefore, doubtlesse, *sounds* and *motions* are different *entities*; these being in divers *predicaments*, and sounds only in the *predicament* of *Qualitie*.

Sect. 51.
Pag. 262.

You conclude [*That colour is nothing else but the power which a body hath of reflecting light into the eye.*] Then immediately you say, [*Light is nothing else but the superficies of it,*] and shortly after, [*Colours are not qualities, but tractable bodies.*] With the same breath you contradict your selfe; for you deny *colour* to be a *qualitie*, and yet you will have it a *power* in the bodie, to reflect light. Are not naturall *powers* or *faculties*, *qualities*? Is not the *power* that water hath to coole, a *qualitie*? but in this you are also mistaken; for *colour* is not such a *qualitie* as you make it, to wit, in the second *species*, where only those *powers* are, which can naturally produce their owne *acts*: As, in the eye there is a *power* to see, a *power*, I say, which it can produce into *act*, when occasion serves; for the eye doth not alwaies *actually* see: but *colour* is no such *power*; for it cannot produce its owne *act primarily*, as the former *power* did, but in the second place: For first, it must affect the subject in which the *colour* is, and secondly, work upon the eye; and so *colour* is in the third *species* of *Qualitie*. Now, if *colour* be a *qualitie*, how can it be a *superficies*, which is a *quantitie*? The essence of *colours* is not in *extension*, though they may be extended according to the extension

sion of the subject in which they are. *Extension* is the essence only of quantitie. If colour then be not a quantitie, but qualitie, how can it be a tractable bodie? Colours cannot subsist of themselves: they admit degrees; therefore cannot be substances.

You are angry [*with vulgar Philosophers, who force you to beleeve contradictions, in that they say, life consisteth in this, that the same thing hath power to work upon it selfe.*] Sect. 52.
Pag. 275. c. 22.

Aristotle then and his learned *Peripateticks* are with you but *vulgar Philosophers*, who teach us, that those which move themselves by an internall principle, have life in them; and so, because *quick-silver* seemes to move it selfe, and *fountaines* or springs of water seeme also to move themselves, hence the *Latines* call the one *argentum vivum*, the other, *aquas vivas*. And because these created entities, which wee call *living*, actuate themselves, either by *perfecting* themselves, or by *representing* something within themselves by their knowledge, or by *enclining* themselves to the things which they know by their appetite: hence it is, that we attribute life unto *God*, in that hee actuates himselfe, at least *negatively*, so that hee is not *actuated* by any other; and in that hee *understands* and *wills* himselfe, and all things in himselfe. But here is the difference between the life of the *Creator*, and of the *creature*, that our life is $\eta \mu \acute{o} \nu \eta \tau \eta \varsigma \theta \epsilon \omega \tau \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \iota \omega \iota \varsigma \psi \upsilon \chi \eta \varsigma$, as *Aristotle* sayes, the abode or mansion of the *vegetive* soule in the bodie, or naturall heat: Or, as *Scaliger*, another of these *vulgar Philosophers*, tells us, *unio animæ cum corpore*, the union of the soule with the bodie. And our life hath a dependance from a higher cause, and our vitall actions depend from a *causality*, as *Understanding* and *Will* from the essence of the soule; but the life that is in *God*, and his vitall actions, are the same

same *identically* with his essence, having no *dependance*, or *inhesion*, or *connexion* at all. Tell us then where the contradiction lieth, when wee say, that the living creature can move it selfe? Doth the *Scripture* teach contradictions, when it tells us, that *Saul* killed himselfe, that *Judas* hanged himselfe, that we should *accuse* our selves, *condemne* our selves, *convert* our selves, and many such like? Neither doe we say, that life consists in this, that a thing can work upon it selfe, as you would have it; for wee make not the essence of life to consist in this, wee only make this a propertie of life, for the living creature to move it selfe. Neither doe we say, that life is action, but that life is the principle of action: therefore we act, because we live; *actiones sunt suppositorum*. Though the forme work upon the matter, yet the *suppositum* or compound is the subject of action or motion: The forme worketh originally, or as *principium Quo*; the *suppositum* worketh *subjectively*, *denominatively*, or as *principium Quod*. The forme is *ἐνεργητικόν*, the *suppositum* *ἐνεργόν* and so life is *ἐνεργεια*, not *ἐργον*, the act, not the action; but the efficient cause of five actions; to wit, of *understanding*, *sense*, *motion*, *nutrition*, and *generation*: For, if life were an action, it should be the cause of these actions; but *actionis non datur actio*. Lastly, life is in the soule *originally*, in the bodie by *participation*, and in the compound *subjectively*.

Sect. 53.
Pag. 275 ca. 32.

You challenge also Philosophers [that they hold sensation to be a working of the active part of the same sense upon its passive part, and yet will admit no parts in it, but will have the same indivisible power work upon it selfe.] Philosophers distinguish between the organ, the faculty, and action of the sense. The organ is a substance, the faculty a quality, which is properly called *sense*, of which ariseth the
action,

action, which is properly *sensation*. The forme is the cause of sense, God is the supreme cause of the forme, and consequently of sense too: for, *dans formam, dat consequentia ad formam*; and sense is the cause of sensation. And so they hold, that there is in the sense an *action* and a *passion*, but in a different respect; for the passion is in respect of the object, the *species* of which is received by the sense; but *reception* is *passion*: yet in the sense there is an action too, but that's in respect of the soule, working by the sense, its instrument, which it animates, and by it judgeth of those objects which are convenient or inconvenient, not only for the bodie, but for the soul too: For the two noblest of the senses were made principally for the soule, that by them she might gaine knowledge; and in the second place for the bodie. Now, out of all that's said, tell us where this *indivisible* power workes upon it selfe; or who holds any such thing. The *power* of the soule in *actuating* the sense, the *power* of the sense in *receiving* the *species*, is not the same power, no more then the power of the soule in moving the hand, and the power of the hand in receiving a blow; the one being an *active*, the other a *passive* power; the one being from the *soule*, the other from the disposition of the matter, whose propertie is to *suffer*, as the formes is to *act*: Therefore wee hold not active and passive parts in the sense, but that the whole sense is passive, in respect of the object; & the whole sense is active, in respect of the soul working in it: So the whole water is *passive*, in regard of the fire which heats it; and it's wholly *active*, in respect of the hand which is warmed by it. Lastly, I hope you will not deny, but some indivisible powers there are, which work upon themselves, else, how can *Angels* and *soules* of men love and know themselves?

The

Sect. 54.

Pag. 277. c. 32.

Pag. 278.

The atomes are your *sanctuary*, to which you flie upon all occasions: [For you will now have these materiall parts of bodies work upon the outward organs of the senses, and passing thorow them, mingle themselves with the spirits, and so to the braine. These little parts must needs get in at the doores of our bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits in the nerves, and of necessity must make some motion in the braine.] Doubtlesse, if this be true, there must needs be an incredible motion in the braine; for, if the atomes of two armies fighting should rush into your braine by the eye, they will make a greater motion then *Minerva* did in *Jupiters* braine: you would call for a *Vulcan* to cleave your head, and let out those armed men, who would cause a greater strugling in your head, then the twins did in *Rebecca's* womb: For I doe not think these little *Myrmidons* would lie so quiet in your braine, as the *Grecians* did in the *Trojan* horse. But if the materiall atomes of the object pierce the organ; as for example, of a horse, then tell us how many atomes must meet to make up a little horse: and how can that horse, being bridled and saddled, pierce your eye without hurting of it, especially, if you should see mounted on his back such a gallant as *S. George*, armed with a long sharp lance; or *Bellerophon* upon *Pegasus*? And if a thousand eyes should look at one time upon that object, will it not be much lessened, by losing so many atomes and parts as enter into so many eyes? Or can the object multiply it selfe by diminution, as the *five loaves* did in the *Gospel*? Or suppose, you should see as many horses at a time, as were in *Xerxes* his army, would there be stable-room enough in your braine to containe them all? Or, if you should see a thousand horses one after another, doth the coming in of the *later* drive out the *former*? Which way doe they

they come out ? the same they went in ? or some other way ? or do they *stable* all together there ? or doe they die in the braine ? Will not they perish the braine, and poyson your *optick spirits*, with which, you say, they are mingled ? Or suppose you should see in a looking-glasse a horse, doth the *atomes* of that horse pierce first the glasse to get in, and then break thorow the glasse again, to get into your eye ? Sure, if this be your new *Philosophy*, you are like to have but few *sectaries* of these *de-ambulatory* wise men, whom you call *vulgar Philosophers*. Is it not easier, and more consonant to reason, that the image or representation of the object be received into the sense, which reception we call *sensation*; then to say, that the very materiall parts, which you call *atomes*, should pierce the organ ? for then the same object must be both one, and many; and so, if all the inhabitants of either *hemisphere* should look at once upon the *Moon*, there must be as many *Moons*, as there are beholders. Again, wee distinguish that which you confound, to wit, first, the *organ*, which is called *sensorium*: secondly, the *sensitive* facultie, which resides in the spirits: thirdly, the act of *sensation*, which is caused by the object: fourthly, the *object* it selfe, which causeth sensation, but not the sense or facultie it selfe: fifthly, the *species*, which is the image of the object: sixthly, the *medium*, which is aire, water, &c. seventhly, the *sensitive* soul, actuating the organ, and in it judging and perceiving the object, which diffuses and sends its *species*, or spirituall & intentionall qualities, both into the *medium* & the *sensorium*: & this is no more impossible, then for the wax to receive the impression or figure of the seale, without any of its matter.

[What are words, but motion ? and words are the chiefest object of our remembrance.] Words are not motion, but

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by

Sect. 55.

Pag. 283. c. 32.

by the motion of the tongue words are uttered. I believe you move your tongue many times when you speak not : but if *words* were *motion*, you must still speak when you move your tongue. Words are *articulate* sounds, but wee have already shewed, that sounds are not motions, but caused by motion, or the collision of solid bodies. And if *words* be the chiefe object of our *memory*, we have spent our time ill ; for the end why we learne words and languages, is to come by them to the knowledge of *things* : And if we remember words onely, then our knowledge is verball onely. Doe you remember nothing in *Divinity* but words? or are these the chiefe object of your memorie? If this assertion be true, *Christians* are of all men most miserable, who spend their time, strength, and meanes, to attaine the knowledge of those things, which when they remember, prove but words. I have read of a verball, and of a reall memorie : some are apter to remember words then things ; others remember things better then words.

Sect. 56.
Pag. 286. c. 33.

[The medium which these bodies move in (that is, the memory) is a liquid vaporous substance, in which they swim at liberty.] These atomes in this Chapter you call sometimes *bodies*, and sometimes *similitudes* and *species*, confounding qualities and substances, as you are wont. But if you take memory here for the *organ*, or hinder-part of the brain, that is not the *medium*, but the receptacle of the *species*: the *medium* are the *spirits*, which conveigh the *species* from the *phantasie* to the *memorie*; which two senses are neere neighbours in the braine : much lesse can these bodies (as you call them) in the memorie, be the memorie it selfe, which is a facultie of the *intellective* soule in man, of the *sensitive* in beasts : And indeed, the *intellect* and *intellective* memorie is one and the same power

of

of the soule, onely differing in this, that as it keeps the *species*, it is called *memorie*; as it makes use of them in understanding, it is called *intellect*: And what need wee multiply faculties to no purpose? for, as the same facultie which apprehends, *judgeth* also; so the same facultie which understandeth, *remembers* too. And as these bodies or *medium* cannot be the *memorie*, much lesse can they be *reminiscence* or *recoration*, which is the motion of the impressed *images* in the *memorie*; which *reminiscence* is onely in man, because it requires discourse, of which beasts are not capable.

You tell us of two effects of purging: [*the one, to make the humour more liquid; the other, to make the stomach or belly suck or vent it.*] But indeed, the effect of purging is not the *liquefaction* of the humour, which is liquid enough of it selfe, saving the *melancholy* humour, which is somewhat thicker then the rest, by reason 'tis more earthy; but the *pituita* and *choler* are liquid enough of themselves: therefore 'tis not the work of the purge to liquefie the humour, but, by reason of its innate similitude it hath with the humour, to draw it, as the *load-stone* doth *iron*: which similitude consisteth in their essentiall forms, and in the properties flowing thence. And, as the *load-stone* draweth iron, & is not drawn by it; so doth the *medicament*, being the more active, draw the *humor*, but is not drawne by the humour. Neither doe I think, that the stomach or belly sucks the humor, which is so offensive to it; for, *simile trahit simile*: but the *expulsive* facultie of these parts, wherein the humour lay, being partly oppressed by the humor, & partly irritated by the *medicament*, sends it away to the stomach or belly; & these also, being quickly wearied with such troublesome guests, send away the humour by vomit, or by the stoole.

Sect. 57.

Pag. 292. 6. 34.

Señ. 58.
Pag. 294.

[There riseth a motion of a certaine fume about the heart, which motion is called pleasure.] *Apuleius* makes pleasure to be the childe of *Cupid* and *Psyche*: you say, that it is the motion of a fume about the heart; of which *Psyche* cannot be the mother, nor *Cupid* the father. There are oftentimes fumes about the heart, which beget more pain then pleasure; and there are pleasures, where are no fumes at all. What fumes are there in beautifull objects of the eye, with which it is delighted? *Musick* affords pleasure to the eare, but no fume at all: and so the other senses have their pleasures in their objects without fumes; for pleasure is nothing else, but the apprehension of a convenient object, or its species rather, which object is the efficient cause of pleasure. The forme or essence of pleasure consisteth in the fruition of that convenient object, either by judging of it, if present; or by remembering it, if absent. If from this pleasure there proceed an elation of the mind, by diffusing of the spirits, this wee call joy. Again, if pleasure consist in fruition, it is rather a rest then a motion. Besides, if pleasure be the motion of a fume, what think you of the soule? Sure, there are no fumes, and yet there is pleasure in the soule. And *Angels* have their pleasures too without fumes; for, I beleeve the fumes in *Popish* Churches doe as much please the *Angels*, as they affright *Divels*. Did *Paradise*, the garden of pleasure, called therefore *Eden*, beget many fumes about *Adams* heart? Or, are there greatest pleasures, where there be most of these cordiall fumes? I think, that where is most heat, there are most fumes; but so a *Lion* should have more pleasure then a man: for, the lions heart is hotter; and so our hearts are hotter in burning fevers, then in health. Moreover, when at the first sounding of *musick* we take pleasure, that pleasure quite vanisheth,

vanisheth, if we grow weary of the *musick*; do the *fumes* then vanish also? Lastly, if *beatitude* consists in pleasure, as many think, then it is within our selves, having these fumes; and so we need not goe farre to be blessed. But why should the fumes about the heart be pleasures, rather then the fumes about the braine, seeing in the brain is the *phantasie* and *apprehension*, as also the originall of the senses? Now, pleasure consists in feeling and apprehension, so that pleasure encreaseth as the sense and apprehension doe. I beleeve, *Tobacco-suckers* and *Wine-bibbers* will hardly admit of your *Philosophy*, who define their pleasure by the motion of fumes in the braine, rather then about the heart.

[All that moveth the heart is either paine or pleasure.]
Physicians tell us, that the heart is moved by the vitall spirits; the *Aristotelians* by the heat, which is the soules instrument: the heat moves it upward, the hearts owne weight moves it downward, and this is that they call *systole* and *diastole*; not a compounded motion, but two severall motions, proceeding from divers principles; for, no naturall motion can be compounded, nor can two contrary motions make up one, nor is motion made of motions: and not only are these two motions *opposite* in the heart, but also *different* in respect of time. Secondly, paine and pleasure are *passions* of the appetite; for every motion in the sensitive appetite is *passion*, caused by externall objects, being apprehended as good or evill: but passions are not agents. Thirdly, what paine or pleasure moves the childe's heart in the mothers belly, or our hearts when we sleep, or a heart after it's taken out of the bodie? We see it moves, so long as any heat or spirits remaine in it: but you will hardly beleeve, that paine or pleasure moves it. Fourthly, if pain
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Señ. 59.
 Pag. 298.

and pleasure move not the senses, but the *species* of such objects (which are convenient or inconvenient for us) cause this motion, and of this ariseth paine or pleasure; how can these move the heart, which never moved the sense?

Sec. 60.
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Pag. 301.

[The effect, which we call paine, is nothing else but a compression.] Paine is not a compression, but the effect of compression, and not of this neither; for some pleasing compressions there are, but of compression, as it is offensive or hurtfull to our nature: Neither [are they generally hard things which breed paine in us, and those which breed pleasure oily and soft,] as you say; for there are divers soft and oily things, which, being touched, would not cause any pleasure in us. A Toad is soft, gold is hard; but as the touching of this breeds no paine, so the touch of that begets no pleasure. [Neither is the heart extremely passive, by reason of its tenderesse and heat,] but rather active; for heat is an active qualitie, and where is most heat, there is most activity: therefore is the fire the most active of the elements, and the heart the most active of all our members, because of heat. And how the heart is exceeding tender, I know not; the flesh of it is not so tender as of other parts. [Feare in its height contracteth the spirits, and thence 'tis called Stupor.] Sorrow contracteth also the spirits; what difference then do you put between sorrow and stupiditie? You should have said, a sudden contracting; for *stupor* suddenly contracts those spirits, which sorrow doth leasurely, and by degrees. Secondly, you should have distinguished stupiditie; for there is one that comes of *feare*, another of *admiration*. Thirdly, feare and stupiditie are not the same thing; for in feare there is an *inordinate* motion of the spirits, in stupiditie there is an *immobility* of the same spirits.

spirits. [*Passion is nothing else but a motion of the bloud and spirits about the heart.*] Pag. 306. c. 35. There is a continuall motion of the spirits and bloud about the heart, even when wee sleep; is there then also a continuall *passion*? I think, in sleep men are seldome troubled with passions. Secondly, if *passion* be continually in us, then *passions* and *patible* qualities are ill distinguished by *Logicians*, which make the one *transient*, the other *permanent*. Thirdly, *passion* is the motion of the *sensitive* appetite, which is moved by the object, and from it receives its *specification*, as from its forme; how then can it be solely the motion of the spirits and bloud? I grant, that in every *passion* there is some alteration of the naturall motion of the heart; that is, the *systole* and *diastole* is more or lesse: but this alteration is caused by the *passion*, which is, as I say, the motion of the *sensitive* appetite, not of the bloud and spirits, but *secondarily* and *accidentally*. Fourthly, every *passion* in us is either *morally* good or evill: but the motion of the spirits and bloud about the heart is meerly naturall; and therefore cannot be good or bad *morally*. Fifthly, every *passion* is not a motion; for *joy*, which is one of the six *passions* of the *concupiscible* appetite, is a rest or acquiescence in the *fruition* of that good, which we desired, but now possesse. The other five indeed consist in motion, to wit, *love* and *hatred*, *desire* and *flight*, and *sorrow*; and so doe the other five which are in the *irascible* appetite, to wit, *hope* and *despaire*, *feare* and *audacity*, and *anger*: but these are the motions of the *sensitive* appetite, not of the spirits and bloud, as is said.

[*Birds are more musicall then other creatures, because they are of a hotter complexion.*] Pag. 318. c. 36. If this were true, then *Ostriches*, *Eagles*, and *Hawkes*, should be more musicall then *Larks* and *Nightingales*; for, they are farre hotter: And birds
are

are hotter in the *dog-dayes*, then in the *spring*; and yet in the *dog-dayes* they are mute, and vocall in the *spring*: neither do they sing as you say, [*because they require more aire to coole them,*] for their singing, being a strong motion, (as some birds by too much and too eagerly singing, have killed themselves) should rather heat then coole them: it is not therefore heat, but *emulation* which is stirred up in them by some sharp and *sympathising* sound; or else the delight and pleasure which they take in the weather or aire, in which they are most conversant, and by it the spirits are cheered.

Señ. 61.
Pag. 332 ca. 38.

The agreement and disagreement of the creatures [*you will not have to be caused by instincts, antipathies, and sympathies, but by downe-right materiall qualities.*] This is *petere principium*; for, if I ask you, What it is that makes these materiall qualities affect or disaffect one another, you must be forced to flye to secret instincts, and occult principles. Are they materiall and manifest qualities, that in the *Torpedo* stupefie the fishers hand, and in the *Load-stone* draw the iron, whereas other stones and fishes have the same manifest qualities, that the *Load-stone* and *Torpedo* have? Why do not other stones and fishes produce the same effects? If by these materiall qualities you understand your *Atomes*, you must be forced to flye to *occult* qualities; for what cause can you give of the emanation of these *Atomes* from the *Load-stone* to the iron, more then to any other thing, but the *sympathie* it or they have with the iron? Would you have me tell you the causes of *sympathies* and *antipathies*? I will tell you, when you can tell me the cause of the contrarieties that are betweene manifest qualities. Tell me why heat is contrary to cold. 'Tis modesty and ingenuity to confesse our *ignorance* in those secrets which
God

God hath purposely concealed from us, to teach us *humility*, for the *pride* of our first Parents, in affecting the forbidden fruit of *knowledge*; and that we should account all knowledge here but ignorance, in respect of the excellent knowledge of *Christ*, in whom are hid all the *treasures of wisdom and knowledge*. This we know, there are divers contrary, and also *sympathising* principles in nature, which are the causes not only of occult, but likewise of manifest qualities: but to demand the reason of these, is to search into those secrets of God, the knowledge of which is reserved for us in a happier life, then this we now enjoy. And to flye upon every occasion to *Democritus* his *Atomes*, is a poore *asylum*. Why cannot qualities produce the same effects which your *Atomes* do? Do not you see how the sound of *Musick*, or the words of an eloquent *Orator*, which are but qualities, worke forcibly upon the affections?

You say, [*the impression which the mothers imagination makes upon the child, is by meanes of the spirits conveyed from the head unto the seed.*] If you will assigne us the prime cause, you must ascend higher, to wit, to the *soule* it self, which is both the *mover*, the *forme*, and *fixall* cause of the body: which soule sendeth not only the spirits from the head of the parent, but from all parts of the body, as it doth the seed; for therefore the seed containes *potentially* all the parts of the body that shall be, because it is derived from all parts of the parents body actually in being: and as the soule conveyes the spirits unto the seed, so doth it likewise the *formative* power, by which the impression is made; not in the seed, which is not capable of such impressions, whilst it is *seed*, but afterwards in the *Embrio*; which formative power doth not all its worke at one time, but successively; first, *trans-*
I
forming

See 62.
Pag. 330. c. 38.

forming the seed, then *distinguishing* and *articulating* the parts and members, and then making the *impression* on the childe, being now capable to receive it.

Seff. 63.
Pag 342.
Conclus.

In the conclusion of your first Treatise, [*You call qualities unknowne entities, and you will have us prove, if in nature there be such.*] If qualities be unknowne, then tell me what it is we know; for substances we know not, but as they are cloathed with their accidents or qualities. Take away heat, colour, light, levity, and other qualities from the fire in your kitchen, and how shall you know there is fire there? and what will your Cooke say, if you bid him dresse your supper with fire, wanting these qualities? We have no knowledge but by the senses, to which, neither the *forme*, nor the *matter* of things are obvious, but by their qualities, therefore if substances be known to us by their qualities, much more known must the qualities be; according to the old rule, *Propter quod unumquodque est tale, &c.* 2. To bid us prove qualities, is to bid us prove that fire is hot, and water cold; or to prove that you are a learned Gentleman, a good Philosopher, a wise States-man: and I pray you, are not *learning*, *wisedome*, *goodnesse*, qualities? from whence proceed all alterations in the world? do they not from qualities? the substance is still the same. When water which before was cold, is now hot, hath lost neither its matter, nor forme, it is the same water still, onely altered in its quality. Are not you sometimes *angry*, sometimes *pleased*, sometimes *fearefull*, sometimes *bold*, sometimes *sick*, sometimes *healthie*? you are not still *glad*, but sometimes *sad*; what is it in you that is thus altered? not your body, nor your soule, which are still the same subjects of all these passions: the alterations then are in the passions, or qualities themselves. I beleve these entities
are

are not unknowne to you as you are a man: *Homo es, humani à te nihil alienum puto.* Lastly, if qualities must be proved, then I must prove that there is *motion*, *action*, and *passion* in the world; but you'l say these need no prooffe: so say I, and consequently, neither need we prove, that there are qualities; for if there were not heat in the fire, there could be no calefaction in the water. The perfection of substances consisteth in their *operations*, but take away qualities, you take away all operation, and by consequence, the *perfection* of substance; nay, you must deny all generation and corruption in nature, if you deny qualities, for by their service the matter is prepared to receive the form, or lose it; and they are inseparable *hand-maids*, waiting on the formes as their *mistresses*, and ready to performe their commands.

[*The body is a meere passive thing.*] What think you of the celestially bodies? are they meerly passive? if they be, what is it that works upon this inferiour globe? Are the *Sun* and *Moone* meere passive bodies, by which all things here have *light*, *life*, *motion*, and *vegetation*? But perhaps you meane not celestially bodies: Then come lower; Are not the animall and vitall spirits bodies? and yet they are *active*, not meerly *passive*: and if they were not active, they could not unite the soule with the body, as they do; but, *unire est agere*: nay, what say you to your little Pages, the *Atomes*? they are bodies you confesse, and yet not meerly passive; for in this Treatise of yours, they have done you Knights-service. Neither am I of your opinion when you say, [*that rare and dense is the* Pag. 342. *primary and adequat division of bodies.*] For there is in bodies a division more prime then of dense and rare; to wit, of hot and cold; for rarity is but the effect of heat, and density of cold; now the effect is not the

Sect 64.

Pag 342.

Conclus.

prime but posterior to its cause.

Sett. 65.
Conclus.

Though we have not sworne to defend *Aristotle* in all his Dictats, yet, till we know better, we will adhere to his: If you can informe us of principles more consonant to truth, wee will follow you, and leave him; for neither *Plato*, nor *Aristotle*, but Truth is it we fight for. But indeed, wee doe not find your *Philosophy* answerable to your paines, or our expectations. I will not *dispraise* your endeavours, nor will I promise to *follow* them. I honour your *worth*, I admire your *paines*, but I dislike your *tenets*. Your good parts deserve my *love*, but your principles convince not my judgement: therefore afford me the same libertie in *dissenting* from you, which you assume to your selfe in *deviating* from *Aristotle*, whom notwithstanding you thinke you have exactly followed in your opinion of *Atomes*. But if my judgement faile me not, in this you are mistaken: for, though hee denies not *minima naturalia*, or *atomes* in bodies, which are parts of the whole; yet hee never affirmed, that all *actions*, *passions*, *motions*, *mutations* are performed by them: much lesse was he of your opinion, that light, heat, cold, and other qualities were *atomes* or *corporieties*, but through all his workes, when hee hath occasion to speak of them, he makes them distinct entities, and placeth them in distinct predicaments: Therefore fater not these your *Atomes* upon *Aristotle*, but set the right saddles on the right horse, and let *Democritus* enjoy his owne conceipts, to whom by right these *atomes* belong, and not to *Aristotle*.

Sett. 66.
Pag. 344.
conclus.

Though *Metaphysicall* principles be of a higher straine then *Physicall*, yet we must not [set them apart, and make no use of them in the compositions, resolutions, and motions of things,] as you would have us; for, both the subject of
Physick

Physick is subordinate to *Metaphysick*, and the principles of that demonstrable by the principles of this. How can you know exactly a naturall bodie, and its affections and principles, if you know not what is *entity*, *essence*, *existence*, *act*, *possibility*, &c? The thing *defined*, cannot be knowne but by the *definition*, nor this without the *genus* and *difference*. If you know not what is *animal*, you know not what is *man*. How shall wee know without *Metaphysick* what your active *atomes* are? whether they be bodies or spirits, corruptible or incorruptible, substances or accidents, perfect or imperfect, &c? By the touch-stone of *Metaphysick* we must try the goodnesse of your new coined opinions: but you wrong the learned *Aristotelians*, when you say [that they imagine positive entities to the negatives of things, as to the names of points, lines, instants:] for they never called names and negatives positive entities; nor are the names of points, lines, instants, negatives with them: and though they did imagine such to be positive entities, yet they doe not hold them to be so indeed; for, you may imagine or conceive darknesse or blindnesse under the notion of positive entities, though you know them to be privations. And indeed, wee cannot imagine privations and negations without some reflexion on their habits and affirmations; because entities are only the objects of the *intellect*. You shall do well to name the *Aristotelians*, who are guilty of this your accusation.

You would make *Aristotle* a weak Logician [if hee should meane by qualities nothing else but a disposition of parts,] as you say. But he is of another mind; for qualities are with him in one predicament, the disposition of parts in another, to wit, in the *Category* of *Site*: therefore your definitions are lame, for want of *Logick* and *Metaphysick*;

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Metaphysick; for you define [*beauty, a composition of parts and colours in due proportion,*] whereas *beauty* is a qualitie, *composition* an action, and *proportion* in the predicament of relation. So when you define [*health a due temper of the humours,*] health is not the temper of humours, but is the effect of this temper: For, as sicknesse is an affection hurting and hindering our naturall, vitall, and animall actions; so health is an affection, preserving and maintaining these actions in safetie: but affections are qualities. Neither is [*agility a due proportion of spirits, and strength of sinewes,*] as you define it; for, proportion is a relation, but agilitie a qualitie. Besides, there is in Elephants a due proportion of spirits, and more strength of sinews then in a Mouse or Weasle, and yet no waies that agilitie. And as bad is your definition of Science, which, you say [*is nothing else but ordered phantasmes,*] whereas I have ordered phantasmes of contingencies, corruptible and individuall things, and yet of these there is no science. Though I have ordered *phantasmes* of the effect, yet, for want of the knowledge of the cause, I have not the science of it; for, *scire est per causas cognoscere*. And, if you take phantasmes for the objects of knowledge, as they are in the phantasie, sure science cannot be phantasmes, no more then the eye can be the colour which it sees: Knowledge or Science, and the thing knowne, are relatives; but these are opposites: therefore not the same. Lastly, *science* is a habit, *phantasmes* are patible qualities, if you speak of the objects in the phantasie; but these are different *species* of qualitie.

Señ 68.

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Conclus.

You conclude your first part pleasantly, making your selfe merry in these sad times, but with your owne shadow and conceipts, playing with these, as a Cat doth with her owne taile. You make the *Aristotelians* speak
absurdities

absurdities of your owne invention, and of which they never dreamed, and then you laugh at them, comparing them to a boy, that, by adding *Bus*, turned all English words into *Latine*. Thus, *Turnus*-like in the Poet, you fight not against *Aeneas*, but his Image, or rather your owne imaginations; and you play upon these *Sampsons*, who can easily pull down, with the strength of their arguments, this temple of your large discourse, which you have been so many yeares in building. If you were not a Gentleman, whom, for your good parts, I honour, I could say, that the boy was not so much to blame for *Bus*, as you are for being too *busie* in jeering at such eminent men, and at those Maximes which have been so unanimously received by all Universities, and for so many hundred yeares constantly maintained; but your worth and my modestie enjoyne mee silence, and re-straine my pen from recrimination.

But let us see what it is that you so play upon them for, [*Because when you aske how a wall is white, they answer, There is an entity, whose essence is whitenesse, in the wall: If you aske againe how whitenesse sticks to the wall, they reply, By meanes of the entity called union. If againe you aske, how one white is like another, they answer, 'Tis done by another entity, whose nature is likenesse.*] Thus you make them very simple and ridiculous, and indeed, no wiser then the boy with his *Bus*, or rather *Bussards* then *Philosophers*. These men (whom you mock) say, that [*prædicare sequitur esse,*] the wall is called white, because it is white; and it is white *in concreto*, because the *Painter* would have it so, by introducing whitenesse the abstract into it. But I will tell you, why whitenesse is in the wall, & other accidents in their subjects; because they cannot *subsist* without them; and

Sect. 69.

and they cannot *subsist* without them, because their essence is to *inhere*. If you aske a reason of this their essence, I must leave you, and send you to the Author of nature. If you dislike the terme of entitie to be given to *whitenesse*, and *union*, and *likenesse*; then they must be *non-entities*: for the one or the other they must needs be, seeing there is no *medium* between *entity* and *non-entity*. But Philosophers are not so childish as you make them, when you will have them say, that whitenesse sticks to the wall by meanes of union; this is to *tautologise*, not to satisfie: they say not then, that union unites whitenesse to the wall, but that *accidents* are united to their *subjects*, as heat to the fire, because without them the substance, whose *ultimate perfection* consists in operation, cannot work; nor the accidents, whose *essence* is *inherence*, without their subjects cannot subsist. So wee say, that in mixture the substances are united, not by meanes of union, but of humiditie, which is the *glue* and *cement* in naturall compositions, as drinessse dissolves the union. Againe, one whitenesse is not like another, because of likenesse: that's childish; but because nature aims at unitie, and in similitude there is a kind of unitie. The reason why shee aims at unitie is, because there is most *entity*, where is most *unity*; *multiplicity* enclines to *non-entity*, from which nature flies as farre as shee can: and because she aims at perfection, which consisteth in unitie; therefore she aims at unitie. And because where there is division, there are parts; now parts being of the whole (which is the same either generically or specifically with the parts) they resemble the whole, and each other in some sort: Or, if you aske mee the reason why two eggs are like each other, I answer, Because they have the

the same qualitie. So then the *identity* of the qualitie is the cause or ground of similitude; and so saith *Aristotle*, *ὅμοια ὅν ὡς ὁμοίους μία*, they are like that have the same qualitie; yet not qualities only, but other entities also are the ground of similitude: The thing generated, and the generator have the same similitude, because they have the same *essentiall forme*. All things that are united in a *specificall forme*, have a *specificall similitude*; and they have a *genericall similitude*, that have the same *genus*, and so equivocall effects are like their causes. So there is the similitude of *actions, passions, quantities, relations, site, &c.* And as the forme, whether *essentiall* or *accidental*, is the ground of that similitude, which is called of *participation*; so entitie it selfe is the ground of that which is called the *similitude of proportion*. Thus man is like unto God, because hee is an entitie as God is, but by *participation*; therefore like to him onely by *analogie* and *proportion*. And because the entities of God and of man are not of the same order; therefore God is not like man, no more then you are like your *picture*, though perhaps your *picture* may be like you. Lastly, [you will not admit qualities, except we can shew you out of *Aristotle* a medium between *naturall* and *logicall entities*.] Then belike you suppose, that wee make qualities neither *naturall* nor *logicall* entities, but some middle between both: but if you were versed in *Philosophy*, you will find, that *Aristotelians* make qualities *naturall* or reall entities; and therefore place them directly in the *predicament*, which is the receptacle of reall entities onely. You would take it ill, if any should tell you, that the habits of *wisedome, learning, &c.* the *naturall* faculties of *seeing, hearing, &c.* which are in



ANIMADVERSIONS upon Sir Kenelme
Digbie's Treatise, of the nature
of the SOULE.



IN your Preface you traduce Philosophers [for turning all bodies into spirits, because they make heat and cold to be of it selfe indivisible, a thing by it selfe.] This is a great mistake; for neither do they make heat and cold in themselves *indivisible*, but *divisible* rather, to wit, into degrees: nor do they make them things by themselves, but they say, that they have no being, except in and by their subjects; so neither doe they make them *indivisible*, in respect of parts, but they hold qualities *partible*, according to the parts of the bodie in which they are. And if they did, yet it will not follow, that therefore they turne bodies into spirits; for spirits are not free from *divisions*: nor are qualities bodies, as we have already shewed; nor can bodies be turned into spirits, except you meane such spirits as flie up and downe your *nerves* and *arteries*. And indeed, not *Philosophers*, but the *Masse-Priests* are guilty of your accusation; for they, as it were, by *magicall* words, turne the

Sett. 1.
Pag. 352.

bread into a spirit, and they make the accidents of the bread to have essence and existence by themselves, without their subjects.

Sett. 2.
Pag. 356. c. 7.

[The nature of a thing apprehended, is truly in the man who doth apprehend it, and not the similitude; because where there is a likenesse, there is a disimilitude, which is not in the thing apprehended; and therefore no likenesse, but the very thing it selfe.] Then first, the thing containing and receiving, must be the same with the thing contained and received, which is impossible: Then secondly, there will be no difference between the direct act of the intellect, in apprehending things without it selfe by the species or similitudes of these things; and that act which is called reflex, when the intellect understands it selfe, without any species: though in this the apprehendent, and thing apprehended be the same; yet it cannot be so in the outward objects. Neither indeed is the intellect every way the same as it apprehends, and as it's apprehended: it apprehends as the intellect, it's apprehended as an intelligible object. Then thirdly, one and the same object may be multiplied in an instant to two or three thousand, if there should be so many to look upon an object at the same time. Fourthly, Tell us how an horned beast, passing thorow a mans eie, should not hurt it; or a stone thorow a looking-glasse, and not break it: but there must be a breaking of the one, and a hurting of the other, if the very substance of the thing apprehended is truly and really in the eie or phantasie, or mind of the man apprehending, or in the glasse. Is the very substance of the seale, or onely the impresion and species of it in the wax? Fifthly, The intellect is not the same with the thing apprehended essentially and formally; but onely subjective (as they say;) for the intellect is the subject of
the

the received *species*, which of an *abstract* becomes a *concrete*, and which before the reception of the *species* was *intellectus*, but not *informatus*, till they come. Now, if the thing received by the intellect be a substance, then it cannot be one with the intellect, being they are both actuall entities; *Ex duobus in actu non fit unum per se*. Sixtly, If the intellect be every thing really what it understands, then by understanding or apprehending a horse, it becomes a horse, and so man must needs be a horse, saith *Scaliger*. Seventhly, If the intellect be essentially the same thing which it apprehends, then the thing apprehended cannot be present or absent without the destroying of the intellect; but we say accidents may, and therefore the *species* are but accidents, because by their coming and going the intellect is not destroyed. Eightly, There is nothing in the *intellect* which was not before in the *sense*; but if the substance of the fire be received into the *chrystalline* humor of your eye, before the *visory spirits* can apprehend, or convey that fire to the *phantasie*, & thence to the *intellect*; either the fire wil burn up the *chrystalline* humour, or the moisture of the humor extinguish the fire, and so the intellect be deprived of its object. Ninthly, Give me the reason why a man seeth that which sometimes he perceiveth not: Our *Peripateticks* give the reason thus; because, though the *chrystalline* humour suffers in receiving the *species*, yet the *visory spirits* act not by apprehending them, because the *phantasie* employes them about some other object: but this could not be, if the substance of a man or horse be received into the eye; for it were impossible that such a substance could be received into the eye, and not perceived by the spirits in the eye. Lastly, There is a dissimilitude betweene the thing *apprehended* and the power *apprehending*,

Exerc. 307. 6.

ding, though you deny it: for, if there be no dissimilitude betweene the fire that is in your chimney, and that in your eye, then there must be the same coales, heat, smoak, and quantity, in your eye, that is in the chimney: if it were so, your braines could not avoid conflagration, nor your eyes a totall extinction.

Sett. 3.
Cap. I. p. 359.
& 360.

[A respect is no where to be found in its formall subsistence, but in the apprehension of man: the likenesse that one white hath to another, is onely in man, who, by comparing them, giveth nature and being to respect.] Then it seems there is no true and reall respect or relation betweene a father and his son, a master and his servant, a King and his people, but a meere notion in our apprehension; so that if men did not apprehend such notions, there should be no relation at all betweene these: So you are no longer a father, nor can your son be your son, but whilst you are thinking of it; and if you think not of it, nor dreame of it in your sleep, your son hath lost his *filiation*, and consequently his tie of obedience and respect, which he oweth to you. 2. Our Philosophers were unwise men, to place relations in a *predicament*, which is the *series* of reall entities, if respects be meere notions; and so they ought not to be handled in *Metaphysicks*, if they be not reall entities. 3. What think you of that respect or relation which is betweene the *Creator* and the *creature*? or those relations which are in the persons of the blessed Trinity? are they onely notions, and such as have no subsistence, but in mans apprehension? 4. In relation there is opposition, but opposits differ really. 5. A respect or relation may be really lost from its subject, and therefore 'tis a reall entity; for when you die, the *relation* ceaseth which you now have to your son, or he to you. 6. If all respects be notions, what distinction do you

you make betweene those which are called *relata realia*, and *relata rationis*? 7. Relations are so far from being meere notions, that in them there is a two-fold reality: The one, as they are accidentall formes, inherent in their subjects; the other, as they import a respect to another, which is called its *terminus*. Lastly, they are said to be like, which have the same quality; to wit, of whitenesse, or such like; but if whitenesse be a reall entity, the likenesse, which is the identity of it, cannot be a notion: for *Metaphysick* tells us, that identity is reall: And what will you say of that similitude which *Adam* had with God, or which a regenerated man hath, consisting in righteousnesse and true holinesse? Is this image of God in man, which by us was lost, and now by grace is repaired, a bare notion? then will our happinesse, and joy, and hopes, and religion, consist rather in conceit than in reality:

Dii meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum.

[*BEING* or a thing (the formall notion of both which is meerly being) is the proper affection of man.] This *enigma* would trouble *Oedipus*, or *Sphynx* himselve; for in your margin, by this word *being*, you understand *existence*: But is this the proper affection of man? what becomes of other creatures? have they no *existence*? If they have, then it is not proper to man *quarto modo*. If they have not, then they are but entities in possibility; for *existence* is the actuating and restraining of the *essence* (which in it selfe is indeterminate, and in possibility) to *actuality*, which we call *existence*; therefore existence is not the proper affection of man, but of entity as it is in act, or rather the formality of actuall entity. Besides, if existence be the proper affection of man, what shall we say of *Angels*, and other *spirits*; nay, of *God* himselve?

Sect. 4.
Cap. 1. p. 360.

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Pag. 361.

Pag. 361.

Is there no *existence* in them? Again, *existence* is not an affection or propertie; for it is no accident, but the very *essence* of the thing actuated, which before was in possibility; and therefore by *Philosophers* 'tis called *actus primus*, to distinguish it from properties and operations, which are called *second acts*; for a thing is first actuated by its *existence*, and then by its properties and operations. But what you meane by [*the formall notion of both which, and of their meerly being,*] I know not. *Sibylla's* leaves are not more obscure, to which you may adde, [*your stock of being, and the grafts inoculated into it,*] for with such mists of *metaphors* you involve your *Philosophy*, against the rules and custome of *Philosophers*; and so you leave your Readers, as *Sibylla* left hers, unsatisfied; thus,

Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere Sibyllæ.

I wish Mr. *White* had helped you here, whose aid hath not beene wanting to you at a dead lift hitherto. I should trifle away too much time and paper, if I should insist or name all your fancies, of the *tribes* as you call them of *predicaments*, whose office you will have [*to comprehend all the particular notions that man hath: and how you will have [all entities to be respective] and all notions to be grafted on the stock of being, &c.*] Abundance of such stuffe, with which your booke is fraughted, I passe over, as being not worth the expence of time; and indeed, they refute themselves. As likewise that you make [*essence and existence the same*] whereas they are one and the same in *God* onely, but not in the *creatures*, in whom the *essence* and *existence* differ: for, whilst a thing is in its *causes*, it hath an *essence*, but no *existence*, till it be produced by its *causes*, and as it were quit of them.

Pag 368. c. 2.

[*All the knowledge we have of our soule, is no more but that*

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it is an active force in us.] I hope you know more of the soule then this, to wit, that it is an *immortall, immateriall* substance, infused by God into the body, created of nothing, consisting of the intellect and will, capable of *beatitudo*. You know also, I hope, that the soule had no being till it was infused into the body, and that it is not in a place as bodies are, by way of *circumscription*, and that it is all in all, and all in every part of the body, and that after death it immediatly goeth to hell or heaven, not lingring about the *grave*, or sleeping in the dust till the resurrection. But it seemes you have not very great knowledge of the soule, when you say [*that a thing apprehended by the soule, becomes a part, or affection of the soule;*] for neither hath the soule any parts, nor can that be an affection of the soule which comes from without.

In your 5. Chapter you make [*1. Being to have a very neere affinity with the soule. 2. To be the end of the soule. 3. To be the soules patterne and Idea.*] For the first, there is small affinity betweene the soule which is a substance, and *Being* which is neither substance nor accident, but a *transcendent*. *Being* or existence is the generall affection of entity, so is not the *soule*: the body hath existence before the soule is infused, and when the soule is gone, it hath existence still: the body hath no more existence from the soule, then the soule from the body. 2. If being be the end of the soule, then it moved God to create it, for the end moveth, at least *metaphorically*; but sure nothing moved God, except his owne goodnesse and glory: and how can that existence which God gave to the soule in the creation, be the end of its creation? Is creation the end of creation? and the giving of being the end why being is given? what can be more absurd? And whereas *being* is *internall* and *essentiall* to the soule,

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how can it be the end, which is an externall cause?
 3. *Being* is not the patterne or *Idea* of the soule; for *Being* is intrinsecall to the soule, so is not the patterne or *Idea*, but extrinsecall: As, the *Idea* or patterne of a building is in the mind of the builder, but not in the house which is built: and if *being* is the end of the soule, how can it be the *Idea*? for the end excites the action of the agent, but the *Idea* determinates that action; and these are very different.

Sett. 7.
 Pag. 404. c. 6.

[You will not have the understanding to be the objects it understands by way of similitude, but by way of respects.] Understanding is by way of similitude, not of respect; for your son, who hath a neere respect or relation to you, doth not the more for that understand this your Booke; I beleeve he understands books written by strangers, to whom he hath no respect, better then these your intricate mysteries. There are relations and respects between *inanimate* or senselesse creatures, and yet no understanding: it is not therefore the *respect*, but the reception of the *species* into the intellect, and its *assimilation* or similitude with the intellect, that makes understanding. Besides, there are some *respects* grounded upon similitudes, then I hope there are some things understood by way of *similitudes*: I may truly say, all things, for nothing is understood, but what is in the understanding; and nothing can be there, but by way of *similitude*; every thing is intelligible actually, if its similitude be in the intellect actually.

Sett. 8.
 Pag. 405. c. 6.

[The amplitude of the soule, in respect of knowledge, is absolutely infinite, that is, she is capable of knowing at the same time objects without end or measure.] Where is absolute-nesse, there is no *respect*; how then can the soule be infinite absolutely in respect of knowledge? Is there an absolute

absolute respect, or a respective absolutenesse of infinitie in the soule? I thought God onely had been absolutely infinite; and what odds will you make between Gods knowledge and mans, if the soule at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure? Gods knowledge cannot exceed this; for what can be knowne beyond *infinitenesse* and *immensity*? And if the soule knowes at the same time things infinite and immense, then the soule must be also infinite and immense: For the Understanding, and the thing understood is the same; but infinitenesse and immensitie are Gods proper *attributes*. For my part, I confesse that all I know of infinitenesse is, that I know it not. For this cause *Aristotle* proves, that the principles of naturall bodies cannot be *infinite*, because they are *knowne*; for they could not be *knowne*, if they were *infinite*: And therefore *Philosophers* could not attaine to the knowledge of *God*, because of his *infinitenesse*, but onely by degrees reached to the knowledge of some of his attributes: as first, that he was an *entity*, then a *mover*; then they came to know his *power*, after that his *wisdome*, and then his *goodnesse*. And sure, all the knowledge we have of God in this life, is but the light of the *Owles* eyes to the *Sun*. Our *Peripateticks* are more modest, who say not, that the soule at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure, as you doe; but they say, that the facultie of understanding must be proportionated to the object. Now, the *object* of the *intellect* is finite; for nature acknowledgeth no *infinitum actu*. Infinitenesse by succession there is, and so she may know infinite things, that is, one thing after another *in infinitum*; for she knoweth not so much, but she may know more: yet she knoweth not infinite things *actually* or *habitually*, because actually

Lib. 1. phys.
text. 35.

at the same time she knoweth that only which hath one *species*; but infinitenesse hath not one *species*. Hence it is, that shee knoweth in infinitenesse one part after another; and so, wee know not God in this life, because there is no *proportion* between his actuall infinitenesse, and our finite understandings. Nay, in heaven wee shall not know him by way of *comprehension*, though we shall then know his *essence*. And because wee cannot *actually* at the same time understand many things, therefore the intelligible *species* enter into the understanding *successively*. And if at any time wee understand many things together, it is, not as they are many or divers, but as they are *united* in one common notion or nature. So the *Angels* themselves understand not many things at once, but as they are united in one *species*, whether wee speake of those *species* which are *innate*, or of those which they see in the *glasse* (as they call it) of the *Trinity*. And this truth of the *Peripateticks* you seem afterward to yeeld unto, when you say, that *if knowledge be taken properly, we doe not know eternity, however by supernaturall helps we may come to know it.*

Pag. 410. 67.

Sect. 9.
Ibid.

[All things which within our knowledge lose their being, doe so by reason of their quantities.] Quantities are not *active*; therefore nothing can lose its being, by reason of them. When a man dieth, hee loseth his being, as man; and yet the same quantitie remaines that was before in the bodie. If you speake of the formall being of things, they are lost; not by reason of the *quantitie*, but by reason of the introduction of another *forme*, which expells that forme that was; as, the forme of the chick expells the forme of an egge, and then followeth a change of the quantitie: but if you speake of *materiall* being, that is not lost at all, the matter being *eternall*; and
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so *quantity*, which followeth the matter, remaineth too, but *indeterminate*, till the forme come, which restraines and confines the exorbitancie both of the matter, and of its *quantity*.

You say [*that those Philosophers, who search into nature, are called Mathematicians.*] They are so by you, but by whom else are they so called? They use to be termed *Physici*, naturall *Philosophers*; but for *Mathematicians*, they consider not nature at all, neither the matter, nor the forme of things, but bare accidents; not as the naturall *Philosopher*, (who handles them as *affections* of naturall bodies) but as they are abstracted from all *sensible* matter: So the *Geometrician* considereth continued quantities, the *Arithmetician* discrete quantities or numbers, *Astronomers* motions and measures of celestially bodies, *Opticks* light and shadowes, *Musicians* sounds.

[*All life consisteth in motion, and all motion of bodies cometh from some other thing without them. The soule can move, without receiving her motion from abroad.*] First, all life consisteth not in motion: for, there is life in *spirits*, without motion; so there is in bodies too: In *Dormise* and other sleeping creatures in Winter, in trees at the same season, in women that are troubled with *histerica passio*, they have life, and yet no motion at all. Secondly, *life* consisteth not in *motion*; for it is not the *action*, but the *act* of the soule; not *ἔργον*, but *ἐπιτέλεια*. Life consists in *union*; but this is rather rest then motion. Life is not in the categorie of action. From life proceed divers actions: as *understanding*, *sensation*, *motion*, *nutrition*, *generation*; but *actionis non est actio*. It's true, that life is manifested by motion; but it consisteth not in motion: for the soule, being separated from the bodie, liveth, but moveth not. Thirdly, all motions of bodies come not from

Sect. 10.
Pag. 419. c. 9.

Sect. 11.
Pag. 410. c. 9.

from without; for the forme is the cause of motion, but the forme is not an *externall* cause. Though your hand, in flinging up a stone, be an *externall* mover, yet when the stone falls downward, it is moved *internally*, by its owne forme. What *externall* mover is that which moveth the *heart*, even when it is *separated* from the rest of the bodie? Fourthly, the soule moveth not, but by receiving her motion from abroad: for, as all things have their formes from the first cause; so from the same cause they have their motion, which followes the forme, *dans formam, dat consequentia*: therefore the Apostle tells us, it is in God wee live, and move, and have our being.

Señ. 12.

Pag. 423. c. 10.

You are troubled with phancies, when you tell us [*of a perfect, and imperfect soule; that, you call a knowledge, an art, a rule, &c. and this, you call a participation of an Idea. So in our thoughts, you make some part of them corporeall, and some spirituall. In the soule you will have no accidents, but all to be soule that is in her.*] We say, that every bodie is perfect in its owne kind; so that there is no imperfect bodie in the world: but how one soule is more imperfect then another, you must tell us, if you will have us be your disciples. The essence of every thing is *indivisible*; but the soule is the essence of the living creature, and the essence of the thing is the *perfection* of it. A *negative imperfection* there is in the *creature*, compared to the *Creator*: so in mens *soules*, compared to *Angels*; because they have not these *perfections*: nor are they capable of them in that estate they are now in, except their *species* be altered; and yet the soules are perfect in their owne kind: for, *perfectum est, cui nihil deest*. Thus a *Diamond* is a perfect stone, though it hath not the *perfections* of *man*. But a *privative imperfection* is not in any soule,

soule, because there is nothing wanting that ought to be in the soule (I speak here of naturall faculties, not of supernaturall grace) if there be some failing or defect in the *organs*, by which the soule worketh, that imperfection to no more to be imputed to the soule, then want of skill to an expert *Musician*, because his *Lute* is out of tune. Secondly, when you call [*the soule a knowledge, an art, a rule,*] you make the soule an accident, or a collection of accidents; and so, you are more injurious to the soule then *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, who beleevved it to be nothing else but a *celestiall heat*. Thirdly, what you meane by [*an imperfect soule, which (you say) is the participation of an Idea,*] I know not. Fourthly, neither can I tell [*how some part of our thoughts are corporeall, and some spirituall,*] seeing they are actions, and accidents of the soule. Fifthly, if there be no accidents in the soule, then there be no *habits*, nor *actions*, nor intelligible *species* in her; for these are meere accidents, but such are in every soule, or else you must deny, that there is either knowledge or wisdom, goodnesse or evill in the soule. 'Tis true, there are not *materiall* accidents in her, because she is free from *materiality*; yet, in that she is not a pure *act*, as God is, there is in her a *potentiality*, whence arise these spirituall and immateriall accidents which be in her.

[*To be in a place, is nothing else but to be in a circumstant body. It is absurd to say [it is] therefore [it is somewhere.]* Sect. 13.
Pag. 424. c. 10.

it is an eminent property of a separated soule to be no where, and yet she is every where.] Place is not a bodie; for then two bodies must be in one place, which nature abhors. Neither is place any part of a bodie: not the *matter*, because the matter doth not *containe* as the place doth, but is *contained*; nor is it the *forme*, for the bodie may be separated from the place containing, without any hurt

to the bodie contained: so cannot a bodie be separated from its forme, without its destruction. And if *place* were either matter or forme, there would be no *motion* to a place; for, bodies *move* to their place, because they are not in it; they *move* to enjoy that they want: but bodies having and enjoying already their matter and form, cannot move to *have* or *enjoy* them; therefore place is not a bodie, but the *superficies* of an ambient bodie, or rather the *concavity* of that *superficies*. Secondly, it is no absurditie from the *existence* of a thing, to prove the *ubiety* of it; for whatsoever is, must necessarily be somewhere, except God, whose *centre* is every-where, his *circumference* no-where. And though *spirits* are not in a place, by way of *circumscription*, as bodies are, whose *extremities* fill the *vacuity* of the containing *superficies*; yet they are in their *ubi*, by way of definition or designation; that is, whilst they are here, they are not there: whilst the *Angel Gabriel* is with the *Virgin* in her chamber, hee is not the same time in heaven; and whilst our soules are here present in their bodies, they are absent from the Lord, saith the *Apostle*. And though *Angels* and our soules are in bodies, as in their *ubi*, yet they are not there as in a *place*; for neither is there any *dilatation* nor *condensation* of the bodies upon their entering in, no more then there is of the aire in your chamber upon the shining of the *Sun* beams in it: Or, if they be in a place, they are not there by any *quantitative*, but by a *virtuall* contact. Thirdly, you make it [*the eminent property of a soule to be no-where, and yet every-where.*] But if the soule be no-where, it is *nothing*; and if every-where, it is *God*, whose property it is indeed to be every-where, by his *essence, power, and providence*: but how the soule can be every-where, and yet no-where, is one of your *riddles*. I think

think you have read that passage in *Seneca*, *Nusquam est, qui ubique est*. But, indeed, neither are the soules no-where, nor are they every-where; not *no-where*, for *ubie-tie* is so necessary to created *entities*, that (like *Hippocrates* twins) they live and die together: *Tolle spatia corporibus, & nusquam erunt, & quia nusquam erunt, omnino non erunt*. What *S. Austin* speaks there of bodies, must be also un-^{Epist. 57.}derstood of spirits; for, no reason can be given why spi-rits should have more priviledge to exist without their *Ubi*, then bodies have to exist without their *place*. And how can wee imagine, that a spirit can work or produce any effect, except the *cause* and the *effect*, the *work* and the *worker* have a locall co-existence? Therefore *Plato* ^{In *Timeo* part. 3.} said well, that what is not contained within the com-^{part. 3.}passe of heaven and earth, cannot be at all. And so saith *Aristotle*, that which is no-where, is not. If *Sphinx* be ^{4. *Phys.* t. 1.}no-where, there is no such creature. And to say, that soules are every-where, is to oppose both *Divinity* and *Philosophy*: for the one teacheth us, that *ubiquity* is Gods property; the other, that *Intelligences*, which are of a more eminent essence or nature then our soules, are not in every part of their *orbe*, but in that onely which moveth most *swiftly*. As their *essence* is finite, so is their *existence*, and so is their *Ubi*. As they cannot *work* every-where, so they cannot *be* every-where. The soules departed then are in their *Ubi*, which excludes *ubiquitie*.

You say [you have explicated how time is the motion of the heavens.] You had need explicate this well; for ^{Sett. 14. Pag. 424. c. 10.} how the *measure* can be the same thing with that which it measureth, I know not. Now, time is the *measure* of motion, but not of *celestiall* motion: for time, being the affection of that motion, must needs be after it; but a

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Exerc. 352. 2.

measure is naturally before the thing measured; and the cause is the measure rather of the effect, then the effect can be of the cause, saith *Scaliger*: Therefore, as the first bodie is the *measure* of other bodies, so is the first motion the *measure* of other motions. And nature by *motion* measureth time, because by *motion* shee begets time; but wee make time to measure motion, when wee say, so many degrees of the *equinoctiall* have moved in such a time. Againe, *time* cannot be *motion*, because *time* is the same every-where, but *motion* is not the same: one time is not swifter or slower then another, but one motion is swifter or slower then another motion. Besides, it is a received opinion among *Divines*, that the *motion* of heaven shall cease after the *resurrection*, being the motion of the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars* is a part of that vanitie, to which the creature is subject; and of this motion there shall be then no use, either for *distinction* of times and seasons, or for *generation*, *corruption*, and *alteration* of sublunary bodies: but though this motion shall cease, yet time shall not cease, except it be that which is caused by their *motion*, to wit, *houres*, *dayes*, *yeares*, &c. But that time, which consisteth in the *succession* of duration or motion of any other thing, whether it be of our bodies, or of our thoughts, that *time*, I say, shall not cease. To be briefe, time is not the motion of heaven, because that *motion* is onely in heaven, as in its subject; but time is every-where, and in every thing: neither is that time, which is caused by the motion of the first *movable*, the same that inferiour motions are, because they are *separable*; for the heaven might move and cause time, though there were no inferiour motion below: and there may be motions here below, though the heavens

vens stood still. The *wheele* of a clock would go, though the heavens moved not: And *Josuah* did fight, though the *Sun* stood still.

[Though a separated soule consists with time, yet shee is not in time.] If you understand by *being in time*, to be measured by time, and to be overcome by it, I yeeld; for so, whatsoever hath a perpetuall being, is freed from the *lawes* of time, saith *Aristotle*, Τα ἀεί ὄντα ἐκ ἑστίω ἐν χρόνῳ, ἐδὲ μετρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν πρὸ χρόνου. And so motion onely is in time, to wit, *per se*, & *primò*, because it is motion only that primarily, and by it selfe is measured by time; for time is the *number* and *measure* of motion *per prius* & *posterius*: And therefore motion, having of it selfe and primarily, *prioritie* and *posterioritie*, it is onely *primarily* and of it selfe in time, and other things but in *respect* of motion. As for spirits, because they have no dependence on time, nor on the motion of the first *sphere*, neither in respect of their being, nor of their conservation, they cannot be said to be in time: for, *to be in time*, includes three things: first, to be measured: secondly, to be comprehended: thirdly, to be mastered and consumed by time; and so onely corruptible bodies are *in time*, and yet these are not in time, but in *respect* of their motions and mutations: For the being or essence even of corruptible things consists in *indivisibilitie*, and have not in them *priority* and *posteriority*, nor *succession*, which are necessarily required for time. But though spirits are not in time after the manner of corruptible bodies, yet they are in time, in respect of their *locall motions*, *thoughts*, *volitions* and *operations*, which require a *succession*, *prioritie* and *posterioritie*, and cannot be in an instant: But this the *Schoole-Doctōrs* will not have to be called *physicall* time,

time, which consisteth in a *continued* motion; but *tempus discretum*, being composed of divers *minutes*, or little *staves* or *delays* succeeding one another. And though their operations be *indivisible* in themselves, yet they, by succeeding one another, make up that *discrete time*, which is divisible: So unities and instances *indivisible* in themselves, make up numbers and time which are *divisible*: So then this *duration* of spirits, though it be *indivisible* and permanent, according to their proper being, yet it is variable, according to their operations proceeding from them. And though in respect of *indivisibility* and permanencie, they will have this their *duration* to be called, not *tempus*, but *ævum*; yet they acknowledge them to be in *discrete time*, in regard of their successive operations; and they admit, that their *ævum* is *virtually* divisible, having its *succession*, as it is co-existent with our time: And therefore the duration of Angels and separated soules is greater this yeare, then it was an *hundred*, or a *thousand* yeares ago, because they have been *co-existent* to a longer time. Besides, nothing but God can be said to be exempted from time, because his *essence*, *existence*, and *duration* or permanencie, is all one: but in the creatures these are distinguished; for duration is *extrinsecall*, and accidentall to the essence of the creature, even of *spirits*; and therefore they are not the same with their duration, but something else: they are *in ævo*, as we are *in tempore*, although *ævum* be not a fit terme to expresse the duration of *Angels* and *soules*, being it signifieth the same that *eternity*, onely proper to God; for *αἰών* is from *αἰεὶ ὄν*, and this is *eternity*: and God onely is *eternall*, knowing neither *beginning* nor *ending*, *antiquity* nor *novelty*: for the one supposeth an *end*, the other

ther a beginning, as Tertullian sheweth: *Deus, si vetus est, non erit; si novus, non fuit: novitas initium testatur, vetustas finem comminatur.* In Marcion. 1. cap. 8.

Not long ago you said, [*The soule was nothing else but an active force,*] now you call it [*an indivisible substance, an actuall knowledge of all things, a skill, a rule by what it selfe is, that shee is all that shee knoweth; her nature is order. That there are some imperfect soules, and an interiour soule; that the amplitude of knowledge is common to all humane soules separated; that phantasmes are little bodies, which goe with the body; that life is a generall motion, preceding that moment in which shee becomes an absolute spirit.*] And then you confesse, [*you have engulfed your selfe into a sea of contradiction.*] You have indeed, and I know not how to help you out, but by telling you, that if the soule be a substance, it cannot be a rule, a knowledge, a skill, an order; for these are accidents. Secondly, if the soule be all she knoweth, then shee needs no other knowledge but of her selfe; for in knowing her selfe, she knowes all things. Thirdly, if there be some imperfect soules, then God is not a perfect Creatour; for he immediately creates the soule, and infuseth it. Fourthly, and if there be an interiour soul, tell us which is the exterior, or how many soules a man may have. Fifthly, and if phantasmes be bodies, how can they have their residence in the soule or understanding? Spirits may dwell in bodies, but that bodies should reside in spirits, I have not heard till now. Sixthly, neither doe you tell us a reason why these your little bodies should forsake the soule upon her departure, and goe with the bodie. Is not the understanding of a separated soule, as capable to lodge and entertaine such guests, as before? Or, are these little bodies made of dust, that to dust they must returne? Seventhly,

Self 16.

Pag. 426, 427,
428 cap. 10.

Seventhly, have all separated soules the same amplitude of knowledge? then the soule of *Fudas* in hell hath as much knowledge, as *Abraham's* soule in heaven; but I see no reason for it. Eighthly, if life be a motion, it is an imperfect thing, consisting not in *esse*, but in *fieri*; and so the life of man, both here and hereafter, cannot be perfect, no not in heaven. And in a separated soule, tell mee which is the *mover*, the *motion* and the *mobile*. Ninthly, tell us what this *Shee* is, that becomes an absolute spirit: Is it the *soule*? or is it *life*? If the *soule*, then she was, before she was a *spirit*: If *life*, then *motion* may become a *spirit*. I see, it is not without cause you complaine of engulping your selfe into the sea of contradiction. Help your selfe out againe, if you can.

Sett. 17.
Pag. 430. c. 10. But you plunge your selfe over head and eares, when you tell us, [*That separated soules doe enjoy their knowledge, without the help of externall objects, phantasmes, instruments, or any other helps, having all things requisite in themselves.*] This is to deifie soules, and to elevate them above the pitch of *created entities*. For the *Angels* themselves have not such an eminent knowledge, in that they stand in need of helps; both *externall*, to wit, that *supreme light*, and cleere looking-glasse of the *Trinity*, in which they see all things; as also of the *innate species* or *idea*, both of *universalities* and of *singularities*, without which they can have no knowledge: therefore *à fortiori*, if *Angels* stand in need of such helps, much more must departed soules. Secondly, *memorie* remains in departed soules, but *memory* or recordation is by help of the *species* laid up in the mind, to the understanding of which, when the mind applies it selfe, this is called *recordation*. Thirdly, though the intelligible *species* depend from the senses and phantasie in their *fieri*, or being, yet they have no dependence

dependence from them in their *conservation*. For the sensible *species* in sleepe serve the *phantasie*, though the *common sense*, and all the outward, are bound up, and as it were dead. Fourthly, in *Angels* and departed *soules* there are divers habits both of *love* and *knowledge*, and *vertue*, yea, of *tongues* also in respect of entitie, though there be no use nor exercise (but after a spirituall way) of speaking: now habits are the *causes* of action, and in vaine should they be left in the soule, if she by them did not worke, and actually understand: neither can the effect, to wit, *actuall* understanding, subsist without its cause, which is the *habit*; for this is such an effect as depends in its *conservation* from the cause. Fifthly, understanding, and the manner of understanding accompany the nature of the soule, but the nature of the soule is the same here and hereafter, therefore the manner of understanding must be the same, to wit, by the *species*. Sixtly, Whereas the soules departed do *specifically* differ from the *Angels*, they must have a different manner of understanding, to wit, by *discourse*: but this way needs help, not of the *phantasme* or *senses*, (being all commerce with the body is taken away) but of the *species*. Hence then it is apparent, that departed soules stand in need of *helps*, and of *objects* of their understanding, and that they have not all things requisite in themselves: which objects are *externall* in respect of their essence, though the *species* be inherent or adherent to the soules: much more externall are these objects which they see in God, although God himselfe is not intelligible by any *species*, by reason of his *immensity*; neither doth the soule understand it selfe by any *species*, nor doth she know (except by revelation) what is done or doing here on earth; which she must needs know, if she had all things requisite for know-
ledge

De cura pro
mortuis.

Sect. 18.
Pag. 430. c. 10.

ledge in her selfe; but indeed, *Abraham* is ignorant of us, and *Israel* knows us not. *Nesciunt mortui quid hic agatur, nisi dum hic agitur*, saith *S. Austin*.

[Our looking upon the phantasmes in our braine, is not our soules action upon them, but it is our letting them beat at our common sense, that is, our letting them work upon our soule.] The phantasie being a corporeall sense, cannot work upon the soule which is a spirit: it is not then the phantasie that works upon the soule, but the *agent intellectu* refines, purifies, and makes more spirituall those phantasmes, or species which are represented by the phantasie, and so impresseth them in the *passive intellectu*; and this is called *understanding*. The *agent intellectu* is the force or quality of the soule mediating betweene the phantasie and *passive intellectu*, framing the intelligible species, which the *passive intellectu* receiveth, and so by the one power the soule acteth, and by the other suffereth; but not at all by the phantasie, whose hand cannot reach so high as to knock at the gates of the soule. It must then be a spirituall power that must worke upon a spirit: the passive intellectu is *rasa tabula*, like cleane paper, having no innate species, or images of objects in it selfe, but what it receiveth from the active intellectu; so that the phantasie helps the understanding onely *dispositivè*, not *efficienter*, being rather the *materiall* then *efficient* cause of understanding, furnishing those species which the *active intellectu* refineth, and impresseth in the *passive*. If you should ask, whether our understanding is an *action*, or a *passion*, I answer, that it consists in both, for not only doth it receive the *intelligible species*, but also operats upon them. And this is that action of the soule which you deny: and what do you talke of [letting our phantasmes beat at our common sense?] The phantasmes will beat

beat whether you will or no. If you will not beleve me, beleve your owne *dreames* in sleep: I suppose your *phantasmes* then beat, when you could be content they would spare their labour, and be quieter. But so long as the spirits do make their intercourse betweene the *phantasie* and the *common sense*, there will be an agitation and beating of the *phantasmes*. But it seemes, you take the soule and common sense for the same thing, when you say, [*that to let the phantasmes beat upon the common sense, is to let them work upon the soule.*] They may beat upon the one, and not work upon the other; for the soul suffers not but by it selfe, and her suffering is *perfective*, not *destructive*, as that of the matter is. But she doth not worke upon, or deduce her selfe out of *possibility* into *act*, considered as the same thing, but in respect of her *divers faculties*, whereof the one is the *efficient*, the other the *patient*, and resembles the matter: and if it were not so, we should never actually understand; for what should excite the *passive intellect* to receive the *species* being purified and cleared from *materiality*, and those accidents which neither conduce to the essence, nor to the intellection, if there were not an *active power*, altogether *impatible, immateriall, immortall*, using neither corporeall *organs*, nor being mixed with corporeall *senses*, which we call the *active intellect*, and which irradiats & illuminats *intelligible things*, making them *actually* intelligible, which before were *potentially* only, as the light makes these colours actually *aspectable*, which in the dark were *invisible*?

[*In the state of a soule exempted from the body there is neither action nor passion: which being so, the soule cannot die; for all corruption comes from the action of another thing.*]

This is but a weake argument to prove the soules immortality; for actions and passions do neither hinder

nor further it. In departed soules there remaine *loco-motive* actions, for they move from the body to their *ubi*, where they remaine till the resurrection, and then they shall move again to their bodies; so the actions of understanding and will remaine in them. Shall any then conclude that the soules are mortall, because they are the subjects of action, and of passion? but their passion, as I said is *perfective*. The same actions are in *Angels* both in moving and removing. Were the *Angels* that carried *Lazarus* his soule into *Abrahams* bosome mortall? or that *Angell* that carried *Habakkuk*, because of this action? Are there not also in *Angels* the actions of intellect and will? Nay, action and passion do rather prove immortality, and the *cessation* of these, *corruption*: For, whilst the body is the soules patient, it lives; but when it ceaseth from *suffering*, and the soule from *acting* in it and by it, followes immediatly its *corruption*. What think you of the *first matter* which is the first subject of passion, and yet it is eternall *à parte post*? And if you take away all action and passion from departed soules, you must abridge them of the joyes they have in the *fruition* of Gods presence, and of their duty in *praising* him; so you rob God of his *honour*, and them of their *happinesse*. Again, we have shewed that habits remaine in departed soules, but to what end, if there be no action? for, *Habitus est propter actionem*; and indeed, actions are more excellent then habits. Again, if there be neither action nor passion in the departed soules, they are in the state of *death*, rather then *life*; for life consisteth in *action*, though it selfe be no *action*; and the soule is an act, therefore cannot be without action: but death is a *cessation* and rest from all action. If you had said, that *some* actions cease in the soule after her departure, as *generation*,
nutrition,

nutrition, and such as are the actions of the whole compound, you had said somewhat; but to exempt her from all action, is to make her a *dead body*, not a *living soule*: and though corruption, as you say, [*is the effect of action,*] or indeed, rather of passion, yet it will not follow, that all action is the cause of corruption; for there are actions of creation, generation, conservation, &c. Lastly, you contradict your selfe, for here you deny actions in separated souls, but in the next Chapter, *cap. II. p. 439.* you say, [*that the body hinders the soules operations, and that her actions will be far greater and more efficacious, when she shall be free from the burthen of her body.*]

[*To put forgetfulness in a pure spirit, so palpable an effect of corporiety, and so great a corruption, is an unsufferable error.*] I do not think *oblivion* to be an effect of corporiety; for, as the soul is the subject of *memory*, which is one of her faculties: of *recognition*, which is the work of the intellect, viewing over the *species*: of *reminiscence*, which is a disquisition or unfolding of the same *species*, if they be clouded or confused; so likewise is the same soule the subject of *oblivion*, as the same *eye* is of sight and blindness, the same *aire* of light and darkness, there being the same subject of *habit* and *privation*. Now, there are habits in the soule departed as I have said, some *actually* there, as the habit of knowledge; some *potentially*, as in their roote and originall, such are the *sensitive habits*: where the habit is *actually*, there is the *privation potentially*; but where the habit is *potentially*, there the *privation is actually*, as the habits of seeing, hearing, &c. in the separated soule, make it cleere. And what we have said of the habits, we may say of *memory*, which is a power and faculty in the soule, by which she retains the *species*:

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Pag. 433. C. II.

why then may there not be in her a deletion, losse, or abolition of such *species*, the *memory* whereof will make her rather *miserable* than *happy*? therefore the blessed soules in heaven remember not the *vanities* nor *infirmities* of their former life: if they did, they could not be truly happy and joyfull; and so the *oblivion* of such things, is not in them [*a corruption,*] as you say, but a *perfection* rather. Therefore *Albertus Magnus* before his death prayed, that he might obtaine the oblivion of all former vaine knowledge, which might hinder his happinesse in the knowledge of *Christ*.

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Pag. 439, 440,
441. C. 11.

Your *Rhetoricall* descriptions (which are both uselesse in, and destructive of *Philosophy*) make the soule sometimes equall with God, sometimes no better then a corruptible body; for to a separated soule you give those attributes proper to God, [*as, freedome of essence, and subsisting in it selfe, a comprehension of place and time, that is of all permanent and successive quantity, and the concurrence of infinite knowledge to every action of hers.*] So you give to the soule *independency, ubiquity, infinity*, which three are Gods due. If you lay the fault of this upon your *Rhetoricall* expressions, I must answer you, that *Rhetorick* in such a subject may be well spared: use your *Rhetorick* when you will work upon the *affections*, but not when you will *informe* the *understanding*; for in this regard you do but cloud, not cleere the intellect. *Rhetorick* is like fire and water, a good servant, but a bad master; therefore ought not to be used, but with great discretion, especially in abstruse questions: For this cause, *Logick* was invented, to curb and restraine the exorbitancy of *Rhetorick*. If you will dispute like a *Philosopher*, you must lay aside *Rhetorick*, and use *Philosophicall* termes; otherwise

wife you'l do as the fish *Sepia*, to wit, you'l so thicken the waters of your discourse, with that *liquor* that cometh out of your mouth, that you will make your selfe *invisible*, and delude the Reader, which is the fashion of those, who dare not confide in the strength of their arguments; whereas *naked truth* cares not for such *dressings*, nor seeks she after such *corners*. And indeed, you are too much in extremes; for you do not more extol a *separated*, then you do abase an *incorporated* soule, as you call it, in saying, [that her being in a body, is her being one thing with the body she is said to be in:] for if she be one thing with the body, she hath the same *essence* and *essentiall properties* of a body, which I beleeve you will not subscribe to.

[Should a soule by the course of nature obtaine her first being without a body, and be perfect in knowledge, she must be a complete substance, not a soule, whose nature is to acquire perfection by the service of the senses.] 1. You suppose what is not to be supposed; for no *soul* can obtain her first being by the course of *nature*. 2. If she did, yet it were not repugnant to her nature to be *perfect* in knowledge. 3. Perfection in knowledge will not make her a *complete* substance. 4. Though the soule *naturally* acquires perfection by the service of the *senses*, yet that hinders not her bringing in of knowledge with her. *Adams* soul had *perfect* knowledge, as it was fit, being all the works of God were created in their *perfection*, and *Adam* was to be the *Doctor* and instructor of his posterity, and because he was created both in the state and place of *happinesse*, which could not subsist without knowledge; yet *Adams* soule ceased not therefore to be a soule, or the forme of his *materiall* body, nor did her knowledge make her a complete substance; for in her substance she was no more complete then our soules are in our *nativity*. Neither did that know-

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Pag. 41. c. 11.

knowledge which *Adam* brought with him, hinder his soule from acquiring, by the service of his senses, a fuller measure of understanding; for hee neither had the knowledge of *future contingencies*, nor of the secrets of mens hearts, nor of every particular *individuum* of every *species*, nor of every stone or sand in the world, which belonged nothing to his *perfection* and *happinesse*. If you'l say, that *Adams* soule obtained not her first being by the course of nature, I grant it, nor was it possible she should: but by what course soever you imagine the soule to have her being, shee may bring perfect knowledge with her, and yet not cease to be a soule. But when you say, [*That no false judgements can remaine in a miserable soule after her departure,*] you make the *damm'd soules* in hell in farre better condition then wee are here upon earth, who are subject to *false judgements*, and *erroneous* opinions, even the best of us: but I am not of your mind; for, doubtlesse, false judgements are a part of that punishment which the wicked soules suffer in *hell*. But if there be no falshood or errour of judgement in them, they must be in this point as happy as *Adam* was in *Paradise*.

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[*If nothing be wanting but the effect, and yet the effect doth not immediately follow, it must needs be, that it cannot follow at all.*] This inference will not follow at all; for wee see many *effects* doe not immediately follow upon the working of the *efficient*, and yet follow at last. The *fire* melts not the metall presently, nor the *Carpenter* builds the house, nor the *Sun* produces corne, grasse, and fruits *immediately*, nor doth the *Physician* presently cure diseases; and yet all these are *efficient causes*, and *actually* work: the effects follow at leasure, and at last, though not immediately. You should doe well to distinguish between

between ἐπέργειν and ἐνεργεῖν, the working or operation, and the work it selfe. When the efficient is not only in its act of *entity*, but of *causality* too, there followes immediately *operation*, but not *opus*; the working, not the work; the effect in *fieri*, not in *esse*. Againe, you must discriminate between *voluntary* and *naturall* agents; the one operate *freely*, the other of *necessity*. The soule is doubtlesse a *voluntary*, not a *naturall* agent; so that the effect may follow, though not immediately. And if in *naturall* causes the effect followes still *immediately*, it is where the effect is an *essentiall property* of the subject flowing immediately from the forme: as, heat from the fire, which notwithstanding produceth not heat *immediately* in water, or other subjects. Lastly, if your argument be good, they are not to blame, who held the *eternity* of the world: for, they reasoned as you doe, that the cause being eternall, the effect must *immediately* or *eternally* follow, or else not follow at all: But they should have knowne, that God was no *naturall*, but a *voluntary* agent; and though from eternity hee did actually exist, yet he did not from eternitie actually create: The act of *entity* in him was eternall, but not the act of *causality*.

In the conclusion of your discourse you make nature play the Smith; for you say, [If the dull percussion, which, by natures institution, hammereth out a spirituall soule from grosse flesh and bloud, can atchieve so wondrous an effect by such blunt instruments as are used in the contriving of a man; fifty or an hundred yeares time, must forge out in such a soule an excellency above the forme of an abortive embryon.] You may with your Rhetorick as soon perswade me, that *Minerva* was hammered out of *Jupiters* braine, by the percussion of *Vulcans* hatchet, as that the spirituall soule can by natures institution, or any dull percussion of hers,
be

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be hammered out from grosse flesh and bloud. It is not nature, but the God of nature that is the efficient cause of the soule: It's not *natures* dull percussion, but *Gods* active inspiration that is the instrument: It is not flesh and bloud, out of which it is *educed*, but into which the immateriall soule is *introduced*. The soule is not framed either in, or of the bodie, by the work of nature; but is inspired by the breath of the *Almighty*, who in the beginning breathed into *Adam* the breath of life, and so became a living soule. Nature cannot hammer out such a piece as the soule is, though shee had the help of *Vulcans Cyclopes*,

Brontesque, Steropesque, & nudus membra Pyracmon:

She is of too pure a *quintessence*, and of too *sublimated* an alloy, to be extracted out of such grosse materialls as flesh and bloud are. After the bodie is *articulated*, the new created soule is *infused*, accompanied with her perfecti-
 ons, which she receives not from, but communicates to the bodie; and so that rude masse of flesh in the *matrix* becomes a man: And the same soule which makes him a man, makes him *lord* over all the workes of Gods hands; by this he *subdues* the wilde beasts, *commands* the earth, *masters* the ocean, *measures* the heaven, *searcheth* into the nature of herbs, trees, metall, minerall, stones, &c. *fore-tells* celestiall changes, *inventeth* arts and sciences, and becomes the lively *character* and expresse *image* of the *Almighty*. Can nature then hammer such a divine essence out of grosse flesh and bloud? It is questioned whether God himselfe can doe it, without implying a *contradiction*, which is so repugnant to him. Nature indeed extracts the grosse soules of the beasts out of their grosse bodies, which, as they came of them, so they dye with them; but the reasonable soule, being
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1. the act of the bodie, and principle of all vitall operations: 2. being shee is a spirit, not capable of *physicall* matter and quantitie; for shee is all in all, and all in every part of the bodie: 3. being shee is not onely the first act of the *organicall* bodie, but also the very agent or efficient of the bodies *organisation*; therefore shee cannot be materiall, nor hammered out of the matter. 4. If shee were corporeall, either in her being, or in her extraction, the world could not be perfect or complete: for, as it is made up of creatures, some meerly *spirituall*, some meerly *corporeall*; so, for the complement and perfection of it, there should be some creatures partly *spirituall*, partly *corporeall*; and these are onely men. 5. The effect cannot *exceed* the cause in perfection and eminencie, but the soule farre exceeds the bodie. 6. Man had not been fit to rule over the corporeall creatures, if hee had not a spirituall soule, which onely is capable of reason and dominion; and not the bodily substance. 7. One *species* cannot beget another; but the soule is a *species* of spirits, far different from bodily *species*. 8. There can be no connexion between the superiour and inferiour creatures, but by certaine *media*, by which nature passeth from one extreme to another: therefore it was fit, that the spirituall and corporeall creatures, which are the *extremes*, should be united in that creature which is partly spirituall, partly corporeall; and this is onely man. 9. If the soule be not meerly spirituall, she cannot enjoy the *vision* of, nor *friendship* and *familiarity* with God, who is a spirit; nor can she be capable of any spirituall gifts. The Spirit of God cannot dwell but in a spirit; nor can that which is meerly corporeall be like unto God, or see him as he is. 10. If the soules be materiall, they must be mortal; for we have no other reason to induce us to beleeve

the soules of beasts to be *mortall*, but because they are *materiall*, and educed out of the possibility of the matter.

11. As Christ proved the *truth* of his body, by feeding upon bodily substances, so we prove the *spirituality* of the soule by her food and delights, which are not corporeall, but spirituall things; for *knowledge, wisdom, truth, vertue, honesty*, which are incorporeall things, are the soules chiefe delights, next to God, in whom only she rests, and with whom onely she is satisfied. *Fecisti nos Domine à te, & inquietum est cor nostrum, nisi requiescat in te.*

August.

12. If the soule be of the parents seed, or conveyed with it, the seed must needs be man, and so a reasonable creature, and consequently capable, as being man, of eternall joy or paine. 13. The operations of the soule are spirituall, such as be the actions of *understanding* and *will*. The principle then of these operations, which is the soule, cannot be corporeall; for no operation can in dignity of entity exceed the substance whence it ariseth, or the power and facultie of the soule by which she worketh, and which differs from the soule as the property doth from the subject; for as the *potentia* or facultie receiveth its *specification* from the *act*, so the *act* hath all its dignity from the *faculty*: now, if the faculty be spirituall, the soule which is its subject cannot be corporeall, for no *indivisible* quality can be inherent in a *divisible* subject. And as the faculty receives its *specification* from the *act*, so doth the *act* from the *object*, and therefore the *act* by which we understand spirits, must be spirituall: And though in the *act* of *conception* we may *fancie* spirits to be like bodies, yet in the *act* of *judgement*, we know them to be immateriall substances, and of a far other nature or essence then bodies; and this *act* is elevated above the senses, and *abstracts* the

the spirituall object from all *sensible conditions*. 14. The soule knows all bodies *celestiall, terrestriall, simple, mixed, &c.* which she doth by receiving these *intelligible objects*: but she could not receive them being corporeall, if she were not free from *corporiety* her selfe; for *Intus existens prohibet contrarium*: and she doth not receive them as the senses doe, to wit, *superficially* one by, but she pierceth into their inmost natures, searcheth out their causes, properties, and effects; and yet higher, she riseth above the senses, by *abstracting* bodies from *individuation*, and all sensible accidents, which the senses cannot do; and so she considereth them in their *universalities*, which is a kind of *spirituality*: but this she could not do, if she were not spirituall her selfe. 15. As the *dissolution* or *corruption* of the body dissolveth not the soule, neither doth the *constitution* or *generation* of the body give being to the soul; for if she hath her being from the body, she must decay with the body. 16. *Liberty* of will proves also the *immateriality* of the soule; for all *material* agents worke either by *necessity*, as the *insensitive*; or are led by *instinct*, as the *animat*, except man, who is master of his owne actions, and can *promote* or *stay*, *suspend*, and *incline* them which way he likes best: and in this he comes neere to the *Angelicall* nature, for, onely *Men* and *Angels* have this prerogative of free-will; inferiour creatures want it, because of their *materiality*, which *determinats* them to one kind of *operation*, and so to a necessary working that way; as, for the fire to heat, for a stone to fall downward. But such is the *independency*, and *spirituality* of mans soule, that no creature, neither *Heavens*, *Stars*, nor *Angels*, have any power to command or force mans

will: whereas all materiall entities are subject to *mutation*, by the *influence* and working of the superiour agents, to wit, the *Angels*, and the *Heavens*. 17. If the intellect or the soule were *corporeall*, she should be hurt and weakened by a vehement object, as the senses are; to wit, the eye with too much *light*, the eare with too violent *sounds*: but no *intelligible* object, be it never so strong and powerfull, hurts the *intellect* at all, but perfects it rather. 18. If the soule were *corporeall*, it would grow *weak* and *feeble*, and by degrees *decay*, as the body doth by old age; but we see the contrary, for the soule, even when the body is weakest, is most *active*, and by old age rather *perfected* then *weakened*. 19. If the soule were *corporeall*, *entity* in its latitude could not be the *adequat* object of the *intellect*; for the *materiall* and *organicall* faculties are *determinated* by the matter to some particular objects: onely mans understanding, as likewise that of the *Angels*, have *entity* as *entity* for their object; that is, both *uncreated* and *created*, *spirituall* and *corporeall*, *substantiall* and *accidental* entities: which could not be, if the *intellect* were not *spirituall*. 20. That this hath been the doctrine of the *Church*, of *Fathers*, of *Councils*, of *Philosophers* and *Poets*, is manifest to them, who are conversant in their writings: even *Aristotle* himselfe was of this opinion, though a few passages in him have caused some to doubt. And the Scriptures, lastly, are plaine in this case, which we will not forbear to alledge, though we deale with a *Philosopher*: *Solomon* tels us, that the spirit returnes to God that gave it. *Christ* commends his spirit into the hands of his Father. *S. Paul* sayes, that the *holy Spirit* beares witnessse with our spirits: in which places, the word *spirit* is used, as it is opposite to a *corporeall*

Eccles. 12.

Luke 23.

Rom. 8.

reall substance. *Apollinaris* of Alexandria indeed held the souls to be corporeal, and *Tertullian* too, but in that sense that he held *God* himself to be corporeal, to wit, a true & reall substance, and not *imaginary* or *fictitious*. And when we read in *Athanasius*, *Basil*, *Damascen*, and some others, that the soule is a bodily substance, we must know that they speake of her, not as she is in her selfe, but as she is compared to *God*, to wit, that both *soules* and *Angels* are infinitely distant from that purity and excellency which is in the *Divine Essence*, in comparison of which, they are *corporeall* and grosse substances. And the more willingly they used to call the soule *corporeall*, because they would beat downe their *heresie*, which held the soule to be a part of the *Divine Essence*; such as were *Carpocrates*, *Cerdon*, the *Gnosticks*, *Manichees*, and *Priscillianists*; then which *heresie* none can be more pernicious, for it makes *God* changeable and divisible, and the soule altogether immutable, all-sufficient, eternall, omnipotent: these then are two dangerous rocks wee must avoid, to wit, *deifying* of the soul with the *Gnosticks*, and *incorporating* her with the *Stoicks*. He that holdeth the soule to be *Particula divina aurea*, is a *Manichee*; and he that beleeves the soule to be a *body*, is a *Sadducee*: the one is injurious to *God*, the other to the *soule*; the one is the scholer of *Carpocrates*, the other of *Cleanthes* or *Chrysippus*, but neither of *Christ*.

[You will have a soule of fifty or a hundred yeeres standing, to be more excellent then the soule of an Embryon.] All souls are of equall excellency and perfection, as well the soule of an Embryon, as of *Aristotle*; if you speake of the *essentiall* or *specificall* excellency, which is equally communicated to all the *singulars* or *individua* of the same *species*: for there is but one *specificall* difference by which man,
and

Sect. 25.
Conclus.

and every particular man is distinguished from the beasts, so that one man is not more reasonable then another. It is true, that the *genus* may be more perfect in one *species* then in another, so man is a more excellent creature then a beast, because the difference of *rationality*, which is in man, is more excellent then the *irrationality* of beasts: but *Peter* is not a more excellent man then *Paul*, because the *specificall* difference is not more in *Peter* then in *Paul*; in respect of some *accidental* differences, there may be some *inequality*, but these concerne nothing the nature or essence of man: even so, one soule may have more knowledge, or other *accidental* perfections then another, in respect of fitter organs, and a better disposed *phantasie*; otherwise the same *essentiall* excellencie is equall in all, and the soule of a *foole* is not lesse excellent then that of *Salomon*, nor of an *Embryon*, then of him who hath lived a hundred yeares, except in *accidental* perfections, as I have said: for had the *Embryons* soule the same perfection of *organs*, and *phantasie* that the soul of *Aristotle* had, she would exercise the same *organicall* acts that he did; the same, I say, that *immediatly* flow from, and depend upon the soule.

Sect. 26.
Pag. 453.
Conclus.

[Among the *Intelligences*, the lowest knows as much as the highest, and yet the knowledge of the highest is infinitely more perfect and admirable then the knowledge of his inferiours.] The neerer any *Intelligence* is to God, the more perfectly doth he know his will, and the more acquainted he is with his *counsels*; the neerer he is to that *Divine Light*, the more *illumination* he must needs have: but the superiour *Intelligences* are neerer to God then the inferiour, and therefore better acquainted with his counsels. There is a greater measure of knowledge and other perfections in the *superiour*, then in the *inferiour* *Intelligences*

telligences, seeing the *inferiour* worke by the *power* of the *superiour*; and God, who is the God of *order*, not of *confusion*, will have a dependency of these *inferiour* spirits from their *Superiours*. Secondly, where there is a greater similitude with God, and a more lively *representation* of divine excellencies, there must be the greater knowledge; but this similitude is greatest in the *superiour Intelligences*. Thirdly, where are fewest *intelligible species*, and more *universall*, there is a more excellent way of knowledge; but such are the *species* of the *superiour Intelligences*, whereas the *inferiour* must make use of multitudes of *species*, which is an imperfection in knowledge. Fourthly, the *inferiour Intelligences* do not understand so exactly the nature of the *superiour*, as the *superiour* doe themselves, therefore their knowledge cannot be so great, as that of the *higher Intelligences*. Fifthly, can the lowest *Intelligence* as well understand the nature of that *orbe*, which the *supreme Intelligence* moveth, as he himselfe that by his *understanding* moveth it? I deny not but all the *Intelligences* immediatly behold the Divine Essence, yet not all in the same measure and perfection: we looke upon the same *Sun* that *Eagles* do, but much more weakly then they; therefore doubtlesse the *inferiour Intelligences* must in knowledge yield to the *superiour*, who know things both *sooner*, and more *exactly*: so that what is revealed immediatly by God to the *superiour*, is communicated by them to the *inferiour Intelligences*. But whereas you make [*the knowledge of these spirits equall, and yet the knowledge of the highest infinitely more perfect and admirable,*] is to me an admirable riddle; for, can there be in *equality* an infinite *inequality*? this is one of your contradictions, and none of the least: If their knowledge be equall, it must be infinitely perfect in both, or else

else it is not equall : besides, you must grant, there may be two infinits; which cannot be, because there must be something in the one which is not in the other, or else they cannot be discriminated; but there can be no *infinitude* where there is a *defect*.

Sect. 27.
Pag 453.
Conclus.

I like not your phrase [*of a complete soule, completed in its body;*] for the soule receives no completion or perfection in or from the bodie, but shee *brought* it with her. You should rather say, that shee is *incomplete* in the bodie, because she becomes a part of the *compositum*, and every part is *incomplete*. She was *complete* before she informed the bodie, and she will be *complete* after she hath forsaken the bodie : *Complete*, I say, in her entitie, whether it be of *essence* or *existence*; and complete in her knowledge too : for wee know but in part here, and *in enigmat*. The souls of beasts have their *completion* from those bodies whence they have their *originall*, without which bodies they have no subsistence; but mans soule gives subsistence to the *compositum*, whereof the bodie is a part : so that the soule receives no more completion in or by the bodie, then an exquisite *Musician* hath in or by his Lute. The soule, being separated, ceaseth to *informe* the bodie; but doth not therefore cease to be *complete*, no more then a *Lutenist* ceaseth to be a *Musician*, when he layes aside his Lute.

Sect. 28.
Pag. 456.
Conclaf.

You will have us [*to supply what is wanting, before wee are called to our dreadfull account: which is soon done, if we be what our nature dictateth us to be; if we follow but reason and knowledge, our wants are supplied, our accounts are made up.*] Wee shall make but a *sorry* account, if wee follow such guides as *our owne nature, reason, and knowledge* : These are *blind guides*, which will lead us into the ditch. The *Scripture* tells us, that the *naturall man* comprehendeth
not

not the things of Gods Spirit, neither can he : That our ^{1 Cor. 2. 14.}
naturall wisdom is enmity against God, for it cannot be ^{Rom. 8. 7.}
 subject to the Law of God. Of *our selves* wee cannot ^{2 Cor. 3. 5.}
 thinke a good thought, as of our selves. Our foolish ^{Rom. 1. 21.}
 hearts are *darkned*. Our understanding is *darkned*. Wee ^{Ephes. 4. 18.}
 were sometimes *darknesse*. The light shined in *darknesse*, ^{Ephes. 5. 8.}
 but the *darknesse* comprehended it not. There is none ^{John 1. 5.}
 that *understandeth*, none that *seeketh* after God. Wee are ^{Rom. 3. 11.}
 stiffe-necked and of *uncircumcised* hearts, and have al- ^{Act. 7. 52.}
 waies resisted the holy Ghost. *Evill trees* cannot bring ^{Mat. 7. 15.}
 forth good fruit. Our hearts are *perverse* and *deceitfull* ^{Jer. 17. 9.}
 above all things. The *imaginations* of the thoughts of ^{Gen. 6. 5.}
 mans heart are onely *evill* continually. Wee are by na- ^{Ephes. 2. 1.}
 ture *dead* in our sins and trespasses. What guides were ^{Mat. 23. 37.}
reason, nature and *knowledge* to the *Jewes*, when *Christ*
 would have gathered them, as the *hen* gathers her *chickens* ^{Rom. 11.}
 under her wings, and they would not? What fruit
 can *wilde olives*, or *withered* vine-branches bring out, if ^{John 15.}
 the one be not inserted into the true and naturall *olive*, ^{Mat. 7.}
 the other into the true *Vine*? Doe men gather *grapes* of ^{Act. 16.}
thistles, or *figs* of *thornes*? If God had not opened the
 heart of *Lydia*, her owne *reason* and *nature* had never
 opened it. God must give us a heart to *understand*, and ^{Deut. 29.}
 eyes to *see*, and eares to *heare*. Hee must take away our
stony hearts, and give us *hearts of flesh*, that wee may *walk* ^{Ezek. 11. 19.}
 in his statutes, and *keep* his judgements. He must give us
 his Law, and *write* it in our hearts. And indeed, he must ^{Jer. 30. 33.}
 give us *ipsum velle*, even Will it selfe; for, as by nature
 our understandings are *darkned*, so our wills are *perver-*
ted, our *affections, inclinations, thoughts* and *desires* are all
 depraved. If nature and reason had been good *guides*,
 man, who was made upright, had not found out to him-
 selfe so many *inventions*, as *Solomon* complaines. *Cain's*
 posteritie

posteritie had not fallen from the true Church; nor had the posteritie of *Noah*, by *Cham* and *Japhet*, nay, by *Sem* too, fallen into *idolatry*. Why did God communicate his will by *tradition* before, and by *writ* after the Law; nay, oftentimes by *miraculous* and extraordinary waies, if mans reason and naturall knowledge had been good guides? And how can these be but deceitfull guides in *supernaturall* things, which faile us even in the causes of things meerly *naturall*? Therefore that saying, *Naturam ducem sequi optimum*, is not true in *supernaturall* things, nor altogether sure, as I said, in *naturall*. The ship of mans soule will split against the rocks of errour, if shee have no better *helme* to steere by, then the helme of reason. Reason is not the *Starre* that will bring us to *Bethlehem*, nor the *cloud* and *fire-pillar* that will conduct us to *Canaan*. We must deny our selves, if we follow *Christ*. And what is that, but to abandon *nature*, and naturall reason in the things that concerne *Christ*? *Peter* had reason and *nature*, when he bid *Christ*, speaking of his death, have a care of himselfe; but how *Christ* took him up for it, you know. There was as much *nature*, *reason* and *knowledge* in the great *Rabbies*, as in the poore ignorant *Fisher-men*, yet these followed *Christ*, and forsook all; so did not the others. The young *Lawyer* had too much *nature* and *reason*, which hindered him from, not furthered him to *Christ*. And truly, the *Gentile Philosophers* acknowledged, that reason was oftentimes *clouded* and *enslaved* to *fear*, *anger*, *love*, and other *passions*; even so in us all, what was *straight*, is become *crooked*; and what was *alive*, is *dead*: Wee are *dead*, saith the *Apostle*, in *finne*; what reason can be expected from a *dead man*? I know this is but a similitude, yet it sufficiently proves, that untill *Christ* hath spiritually quickned us, our *reason* and

nature

nature will little availe us. Our hearts are by *nature* barren, as the mountains of *Gilboa*; fruitlesse, as the *fig-tree* in the Gospel; untame, as the *wilde colt*, or the *wilde asse*, that scornes the voice of the *hunter*: and all this is *naturall* to us. If *Lycurgus* his dogge had not had more then *nature*, when he forsook the flesh-pot, to run after the Hare, hee would have staid at home with his fellow, which had nothing but nature. And even the *Schoole-men* acknowledge, that *nature* is wounded in us; to wit, our *understanding* with *ignorance*, our *wills* with *wickednesse*, our *irascible* faculty with *weaknesse*, our *concupiscible* with *lust*. You had done well then not to have named these guides, which, like *ignis fatuus*, will bring us out of the way. You should have named him, who is the onely *way*, the *truth*, and the *life*; without whom wee can doe nothing, as he saith himselfe; and without whom there is no coming to the Father. 'Tis hee who first opened heaven to all *beleevers*; who is the *doore*, by whom wee enter: and the *key of David* too, who openeth, and no man shuts; shutteth, and no man openeth. The bright *morning-starre*, the *Sun of righteousness*, the *ladder of Jacob*, upon the steps or degrees of whose merits and graces, wee may climb up to *heaven*. The true *brassen Serpent*, by looking on whom we are cured of our spirituall wounds. If then by *nature* you had meant *God*, who is *Natura naturans*: If by *reason*, you had meant *Christ*, who is λογος, the reason or word of the Father, whose service is λογικη λατεια, a reasonable service: If by *knowledge* you had meant that which is in *Christ*, by which he justifieth many, & in respect of which he is called the *Wisdom* of the Father; for in him are hid all the *treasures* of wisdom and knowledge: Or, had you meant that which wee have of *Christ* by illumination, and in respect of

John 14.

John 6.

John 1.

Rom. 12.

which, the *Apostle* accounted all things lost, desiring to know nothing but *Christ* crucified: If, I say, you had meant such guides, I had approved of your judgement, and I had been your fellow-traveller; for, indeed, by these onely [*our wants are supplied, and our accounts made up:*] And in this respect *naturam sequi, est Deo obsequi.*

The Conclusion, wherein is asserted the Soules Immortality, and Objections answered.

THus, Sir *Kenelme*, I have briefly run over your *luminous* Discourses of the *nature of Bodies*, and of the *Soules immortality*; in which, though you have shewed much wit and good language, yet your arguments and descriptions of the Soule are not of that evidence and validitie (which I have shewed) as to convince our understanding, and to vindicate our beliefe in assenting to all your *dictats* in this your laborious Work: therefore give mee leave, without *prejudice* to your paines, to point briefly at such reasons and arguments, as I conceive will be more evincing and pressing, and more prevalent, both with *Christians* and *Pagans*, then those which you have imparted to us.

I. We will first then begin with divine Testimony, which is of greater *authority* then all humane *capacity*. God tells *Moses*, *Exod. 3.* that he is the God of *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*; by which words our Saviour proves the soules immortality, in affirming, that God is not the God of the *dead*, but of the *living*, *Matth. 22.* and consequently, that these were not dead, but alive in their soules. *Solomon* tells us, *Eccles. 12.* that the *spirit* returnes

to God that gave it. The *Scripture* tells us, that *Samuel's* soule was alive after her separation, *2 Sam. 28.* which place, though it be controverted, whether it was truly *Samuel's* soule or not; yet that apparition which was believed by the *Jewes*, shewes, that they doubted not of the soules immortallitie. *Christ* tells us of *Lazarus* his soule, that was carried by *Angels* into *Abraham's* bosome, and the *rich Gluttons* into hell, *Luke 16.* Hee tells us also of that *rich mans* soule, which, after his barnes were full, was to be taken from him, *Luke 12.* But if she perished with the bodie, how could she be taken away? Hee assures *the good thiefe*, that his soule should be with him that night in *Paradise*, *Luke 23.* And hee will not have us feare them that can destroy the bodie, but cannot kill the soule, *Matth. 10.* by which he intimates, that the soule is not liable to death, as the bodie is.

2. Wee prove it by *arguments* grounded on the *Scripture*: as first, The soule of *Christ* was immortall, when it was separated: therefore our soules are so. The consequence is evident, because *Christ* was like to us in all things, except sin: The antecedent no *Christian* will deny, except he will deny the *hypostaticall* union of the Divinitie and the Humanitie, which was not, nor could not be dissolved by death: for the Divinitie was not separated from *Christ's* bodie in death, much lesse from his soule, to which it was *immediately* united. 'Tis true, *Christ's* bodie died, because the soule was separated, by which the *Divinity* gave life to the bodie, to wit, *effectively*, not *formally*; but God, being united immediately and principally to the soule, shee could not die. And though God hath not so united our soules to himselfe, as he did *Christ's*, yet hee is so neerly united to our spirituall soules, being a spirit himselfe, that they cannot die,

die, except hee should forsake them, which hee will not doe; for he will not leave our soules, nor forsake them, nor suffer them to see *corruption*. Secondly, man was made to the *image* of God, *Gen. 1.* which image consisteth partly in *hyperphysicall* graces, as righteousness, and true holinesse; and partly in five *physicall* gifts: 1. understanding, 2. will, 3. dominion, 4. liberty, 5. immortality. Thirdly, mans soule was not *educed* out of the earth and water, as the soules of other creatures were, but immediately *inspired* by God, *Genes. 1.* by which it is plaine, that the soule of man is of a farre more excellent condition and nature, then the soules of beasts are; and that shee hath immediate dependence from God, not from the bodie: therefore not *mortall*. Fourthly, if the soule die with the bodie, there can be no *resurrection*; and so our hope and faith are in vaine. Now, there can be no *resurrection* of the bodie, if the soule, its forme, be not pre-existent: For how can the soule be re-united to the bodie, or informe it againe, if it be *extinguished* with the bodie? Fifthly, the Kingdome of *Christ*, the joyes and happinesse of the *Saints*, and the torments of the *wicked* are eternall: therefore the soules of men, which are the subjects of *Christs* Kingdome, and the inheritors of joy or paine, cannot be mortall; for what subjects shall this eternall *King* have, or to what end are the rewards and punishments eternall, if the soules, which are the chiefe subjects, and chiefly interessed in these rewards and paines, perish and die? Sixthly, *Moses* shewes, that the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars* of heaven were made for the service of man, *Deuteron. 4.* which argueth, that man is of a more excellent nature then they. Now, this could not be, if he were not spirituall and immortall in his soule; for in his bodie hee is inferiour to them, in regard they

1 Cor. 15.

Luke 1.
Matth. 25.

they are incorruptible, and unchangeable substances.

3. We prove that the soule is not onely immortall by *Divine* power, but also of her owne *nature*. First, she is made to the *image* of God, but this image, as I have shewed, consisteth not onely in *supernaturall* graces, but also in *naturall* powers and faculties of the soule. Secondly, the soule is a *spirit* of her owne *nature*, therefore of her owne nature immortall; for spirits are free from the *prime qualities*, which are the causes of corruption. Thirdly, the soule is a *simple uncompoundd substance*, therefore cannot be corruptible; for, how can that be dissolved which was never compounded? And though *Tertullian* held the materiality, yet he acknowledgeth the soules immortality to be *naturall* to her, *Salva erit anima natura sua per immortalitatem*. Fourthly, if the soule were not in her selfe immortall, how should the *Heathen Philosophers* who knew not God, nor the Scriptures, dispute so accurately as they do in defence of her *incorruptibility*? But when I say that the soule is immortall by *nature*, my meaning is not that she is the *efficient cause* of her owne immortality, or that she is not mortall and dissoluble by *externall power*, for so God is onely immortall, as the *Apostle* sheweth, and as the *sixt* Tim.6. *Synod* hath defined, and some *Fathers* have proved; so *Seff.* 11. that the *Angels* in this respect are not immortall: but my meaning is, that the soule is not a subject capable as bodies are, neither hath she in her selfe any *passive power* or possibility of dissolution.

4. The soules immortality is proved by naturall and morall reasons, thus: 1. If the soule perish, it must be either by *annihilation*, or *dissolution*: not by the first naturally

naturally, for nothing of its owne *nature* can be annihilated: God indeed by his *omnipotency* may *annihilate* what he made of nothing, but there is no entity of it selfe capable of non-entity, nor any action tending to it naturally: Neither by the second, for nothing is *dissolved* but what had parts, (*dissolution* being nothing else but the *solution* of one part from another) but what is not *compounded* hath no parts, and such is the soule, as I have shewed: For she is *independent*, as she is a substance, from any *subject*: as she is a spirit, from any *created substance*; therefore dieth not when the body dieth: for neither is she compounded of essentiall parts, which we call *matter* and *forme*; nor of *integrall*, which we call *members* or *limbs*: And hence it appeares, that though the foules of beasts may be free from such *compositions*, yet they are not from *dependence* on the body, of which they came, and with which they decay. 2. The soule is a *quintessence*, and of a more excellent nature then the foure *elements* are; and therefore as she is not of their nature and substance, she cannot be capable of their *affections* and *properties*: but the maine quality and property of elements is to be the subjects of generation and corruption. 3. Such as the *operation* of a thing is, such is the *subject* whence the operation proceeds, for *operations* are *emanations* of the substance, and flow from thence: but the chiefe operation of the soule, which is *understanding*, is spirituell; therefore the soule cannot be corporeall: for, if the soul were compounded of the elements, these *operations* of the soule must be in the elements, for whatsoever is in the *compound*, was before in its *principles*, these being their acts, whose principles they are: but *understanding* and *will* were never in the *elements*, nor are they

they capable of such operations: and so the soule is immortal as she is incorporeall. 4. If the soule may be *annihilated* naturally, then naturally she was *produced* of nothing; but such a *production* is repugnant to the *Peripatetick* tenents, and so, by consequence, must such an *annihilation* be. 5. Whatsoever is corruptible, is corrupted or destroyed by a *contrary agent*, for without *contrariety* there can be neither generation nor corruption: But in mans soule there are no *contrarieties*, for she can receive *contrarieties* without *contrariety*, because she receives not contrary formes as they are in their *naturall*, but as they are in their *intentionall* being: Hence it is that the heavens, though they be *compounded*, are not *corruptible*, because they are not subject to *contrarieties*. 6. The *Gentiles*, by the glimmering light of *Nature*, knew there were some supreme *entities*, by which the *world* was guided, the *wicked* punished, and the *innocent* rewarded; which the Poet acknowledgeth:

*Si genus humanum, & mortalia temnitis arma;
At sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi.*

But they saw that, for the most part, *wicked men* enjoyed most outward happinesse here, and *good men* were most wronged and oppressed; therefore they beleevd the *soules immortality*, that wicked men might receive their due *punishment*, and good men their *reward*, or else they must confesse that their gods were *unjust*. And as this reason did strongly move them, so it must us also, to beleve the *soules immortality*: for it is a *righteous* thing with God, to render vengeance to the *wicked*, and to you that are *afflicted* peace with us, saith the *Apostle*. 1 The. 1.
7. It is an undeniable *Maxime*, that God and Nature made *nothing in vaine*, but if there should be in mans soule
Q
such

such a *desire*, and so earnest an *affection* to immortality, and yet not enjoy it, that desire which God hath given to her had been in vaine. 8. From what proceeds the *horror* of *conscience* in wicked men, their *trembling* at the report, and serious thoughts of future judgement? on the other side, the unspeakable *joyes* of good men, their *cheerfulnesse*, *comforts*, and *alacrity*, even in their paines and afflictions, if they did not *beleewe* the soules immortality, and that after this life all *teares* should be wiped from their eyes? 9. God made man for some *end*, and that was to enjoy eternall *beatitude*, which consisteth in the enjoyment of himselfe: but if the soule be mortall, man cannot attaine to his *end*, and so God made him to *no end*. 10. In *extasies* and *raptures*, though the body be without sense and motion, and seemes as it were dead; yet the soule is not, but remains *unperished*, or *unextinguished*: which doth argue her immortality. 11. If the soule were mortall as the body is, she would grow *aged*, *feeble*, and would *decay*, as the body doth; but we see the quite contrary, for then she is most *active* and *vigorous*, when the body is most *weake* and *decrepit*. 12. If the soule be *corruptible*, she may be separated from her *existence* and being: now this cannot be done, but by the worke of an *externall* and *contrary* agent, which is more powerfull then the soule; but no contrary agent *abolisheth* one forme, but by *introducing* another; nor taketh away one existence, but by giving another: for no action tends to a *negative*, but to some thing that is *positive*. 13. The *Gentiles*, by the light of nature, *beleevd* the immortality of the soule; hence sprung the doctrine of *transanimation* among the Pythagoreans, of the *Elysian fields*, and places of torment among the Poets,

*Hac iter Elysiam nobis, at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, & ad impia tartara mittit.* Æneid. 6.

Hence Tully concludes, that the ancient Romans beleev'd the soules immortality, because they were so carefull of their dead bodies, and funerall ceremonies; *Tam religiosa jura majores nostri mortuis non tribuissent, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, &c.* So Homer acknowledgeth the soule of Patroclus to live, appearing after his death to Achilles: The word *εἰδωλον* by him, and *imago* by the Prince of Poets, is much used for separated soules, as — *Inhumati venit imago, — Nota major imago, — Sub terras ibit imago, &c.* The barbarous Indians assent to the soules immortality, as Acoſta, Leriſus, Martyr, and others do witneſſe: and Aristotle, who in some places seemes to doubt, yet in other places plainly asserts this doctrine so universally beleev'd, that the soules can subsist by themselves, because they have distinct affections and operations from the body, and the understanding or intellect enters from without into the body; it is void of passibility, and is some divine thing; and that the actions of the mind are not one with those of the body; and so in the ninth and tenth Chapters of his *Ethicks*, we may see how he affirms the immortality of the soule, by her desire of *beatitude*. And whereas some think that he held the soule mortall, because he saith, she depends on the *phantasie* in her operation; they are mistaken, for he speaks of the soule as she is united to the body, and so she depends on the *Phantasie*; but yet onely *objectively*, *instrumentally*, and *occasionally*, as the *Philosophers* speake, and not *efficiently* or *formally*; for it is true, that the Intellect receives its *species* from the *phantasie*, and therefore in the body depends *antecedently* from the *phantasie*:
De Amicit. Iliad. 23. Æneid. I. 2. 4. De Anima. l. 1. t. 13. l. 3. t. 5. l. 2. de gen. Animal. c. 3.

otherwise the Intellect is meerly *inorganicall*, and no waies depending on the *phantasie*, as a proper mover, and of it self, but onely the *passive* Intellect thus depends on the *active*, and the *act* of understanding is altogether *independent*: And so when he sayes, that the *passive* Intellect is corruptible, he meanes nothing else but the *phantasie* or *cogitative faculty*, which, because it is in some sort capable of reason, he calls the *Intellect*, as he calls the *passive Intellect* sometimes by the name of *phantasie*, because it is moved by the *superiour* Intellect. And so when he sayes, that *remembrance* and *love* perish in the soule, he meanes that their dependance, the one from the *phantasie*, the other from the *appetite*, perisheth, because these are corporeall faculties, and perish with the body; but otherwise *recordation* and *love*, in respect of their *entity*, remaine in the soule as in their subject. So likewise when he saith, that the Intellect is in the *possibility* of the matter, he meanes that it is in the *possibility* of the matter in respect of *introduction*, not of *eduction*; as the matter is capable to receive it, when by a superiour power it is thither *induced*. The soule then is in the *possibility* of the matter by way of *reception*, but not by way of *extraction*. So likewise, when he sayes, that the *dead* are not *happy*, he meanes the *happinesse* of this life, which consisteth in *operations* flowing from the *compositum*, of which the soule is not capable. And lastly, when he sayes, that all have *ending* which had *beginning*, he meanes of those things which had beginning by *generation*; and so it is true: but the soules originall is by *creation*.

Out of all then that wee have said, it is apparent to any man, who is not a wilfull *Saducee* or *Arabian*, that the

the soule is every way *incorruptible*, both in respect of *grace*, and in respect of *nature*; both in respect of *externall* and *internall* agents, both in respect of *annihilation* and *dissolution*. There is onely an *obedientiall* power of dissolution in the soule, as there is in *Angels*, and in the *heavenly bodies*, by the infinite power of the *Almighty*; and that rather by the *negative act* of his influx, then any *positive act* of resolving that into nothing, which he made of nothing: so that the soule hath no *parts*, *principles*, or *causes* in her selfe of *corruption*, nor of *annihilation*. Such reasons and arguments I take to be more evincing, then these far-fetched notions of Sir *Kenelm's*, which he hath clothed with too many words; whereas *Philosophicall* arguments sort not well with *Rhetoricall* flourishes, and *Tullian* pigments.

Now let us see what hath of old been, or can of late be objected against this knowne and generally acknowledged truth, by the impugners thereof.

First they say, that the soule is immortall by *grace*, not by *nature*: To which I answer, that shee is immortall by both; by *grace*, in that the soule hath her *dependence* from God, the first and sole *independent* entitie, of whom, and by whom she is what she is, and so by that entitie, as I said, shee may be deprived of that *being*, which of his *bounty* she obtained: for, though she be free from *subject* and *termination*, yet she is not free from the *causality* of the *first agent*. Shee is also immortall by *nature*, in that there is nothing either in her owne, or in the universall created *nature*, that can destroy or dissolve her. Our bodies are destroyed either by *externall* agents, or by *internall*; the *naturall heat* wasting our *radicall moisture*, as a candle that is either wasted by the wind, or by its
owne

Sett 6.
Object. I.

owne heat: but in the soule, which is a spirit, there is no such thing.

Señ. 7.
Object. 2.

Secondly, they alledge *Solomons* words for them, *Eccles. 3. 19.* where hee saith, There is one end of man and beasts; as man dieth, so doe they. *Answ.* Here is no comparison between mans soule, and that of beasts; but between the *death* of the one, and of the other: so that both are lyable to death and corruption, and to outward *violence*, and inward *distempers*, which procure death in both: and both are so lyable to the law and dominion of death, that from thence there is no redemption or returning by the course of *nature*: So that it's no more possible for man to avoid *death*, or its *dominion*, of himselfe, then it is for a beast. Secondly, *Solomon* speaks not this in his owne person, but in the person of the *Atheist*, who will not forgo his earthly pleasures, because hee beleeves not any heavenly, or any life after this.

Señ. 8.
Object. 3.

Thirdly, they would make *Job* plead for them, when he sayes, there is more hope of a tree cut downe, then there is of man, *Job 14.* *Answ.* *Job* speaks not there in his owne person, but in the person of a wicked man. Secondly, though hee did speak this as from himselfe, yet this will not availe our moderne *Saducees*; for, by the course of *nature*, man cannot revive againe, though the tree may sprout again after it is cut: which the Poet intimates, when he sayes,

Horat. lib. 4.
od. 7.

*Pomifer autumnus fruges effuderit, & mox
Bruma recurret iners:*

*Damma tamen celeres reparant caelestia Luna.
Nos ubi decidimus*

Quò

*Quò pius Aeneas, quò Tullus dives, & Ancus,
Pulvis & umbra sumus.*

Thirdly, man shall not returne againe to *live that life*, or to performe those functions which he did in this world, when he lived here: but hence it will not follow, that man shall not be raised by that *power* which gave him being at the first: or, that he shall enjoy no life, because he shall not enjoy this life.

Fourthly, they would faine draw in *Austin* to their side, because sometimes he doubts of the manner of the soules production, whether it is by *creation* or *traduction*. *Answ.* 'Tis true, that sometimes hee doubted of the *manner* how the soule entered into the bodie, because he doubted of the manner how *originall sin* is propagated: but will this prove, that therefore hee doubted of the soules immortalitie, which hee strongly maintaines throughout all his Workes? And so hee doth also the soules creation and *infusion*, although in a few places he speaks doubtfully of *traduction*, so farre as it hath relation to *originall sin*; which notwithstanding is propagated, though the soule be *pure* which is infused, by reason of the *union* betwixt the soule and the bodie: for *originall sin* is in the parent, as in the *efficient*; in the seed, as in the *instrument*; in the soule, as in the *subject*; but in the flesh by way of *punishment*: or rather indeed the *whole man* is the subject of *originall sin*, which, with the soule, is conveyed from the parent to the childe by, and in the seed; but onely *dispositivè*, not *effectivè*; by disposing and preparing the *embryo* to receive the soule, and not by way of *efficiencie*, producing the soule: and so, upon the infusion of a *pure soule* into the prepared and disposed *embryo*, the whole man is made up, who becomes

Sett. 9.
Object. 4.

comes the subject of *originall* sin, by reason of the *union* of the soule and corrupted flesh; and in that hee is the *issue* of such a parent, the *branch* of such a stocke, which hath derived corruption in and by the seed, and fitted or disposed the bodie to receive a soule, though pure in it selfe, yet upon the *union* impure and corrupted, and even in it selfe *actually* void of originall righteousnesse, and *inclinable* or potentially subject to guilt or sin. As a *leprous* father begets a *leprous* son, which *leprosie* is not in the seed *actually*, but *potentially* and *dispositivè*; so the *privation* of righteousnesse is in the seed *actually*, but *concupiscence*, or inclination to sin, *dispositivè*.

Sect. 10.
Object. 5.

Fifthly, they tell us, that mans soule cannot conceive any thing, yea not a spirit, but under the *notion* of a bodie; therefore shee is corporeall, and consequently *mortall*. *Answ.* Though shee were *corporeall*, yet is shee not therefore mortall; for, the *Sun*, *Moone* and *Stars* are bodies, and yet incorruptible. Secondly, though the soul, being in the bodie, understands by the outward *senses* and *phantasie*, yet the act of understanding is *inorganicall*, and that not onely when she is *separated*, but while shee is in the bodie: though then in the bodie she stands in need of the *phantasie*, without the bodie shee shall not need it. Thirdly, the soule not onely *understands* bodies under *materiall notions*, but searcheth deeper then any corporeall facultie can do, even into the natures, formes, and abstruse principles of bodies; so that here shee understands the *quiddities* and *essences* of things, which a bodily power cannot doe.

Sect. 11.
Object. 6.

Sixthly, they say, that the soule can suffer, to wit, by griefe, paine, &c. therefore shee is corruptible. *Answ.* As the soule is a spirit, so her sufferings are *spirituall*; all
suffering

suffering supposeth not *corruptibilitie*, except it be caused by the prime *elementary qualities*, of which the soule is not capable. Secondly, there are some sufferings so far from being *destructive*, that they are rather *conservative* and *perfective*; such are the motions of the heavens. Thirdly, the soule suffers not, but by her selfe in griefe: for by her owne *agencie* she makes her selfe a *patient*; by her *thoughts* and *knowledge* of griefe and sorrowes she grieves and sorrowes, and so becomes a *sufferer*.

Seventhly, they tell us, that immaterialitie is no argument of the soules immortality; for spirituall graces, which are infused into us, are immateriall, yet corruptible. *Answ.* These graces are *accidents*; we speake of the soule, which is a *substance*. Secondly, these graces are not corrupted by us *physically*, but *metaphorically*, or *morally* onely.

Eighthly, the desire of immortality, say they, is the affection of the whole man, not of the soule alone, and yet man is mortall: therefore they will not have us inferre the soules immortality, from her desire thereof.

Answ. Though this desire be *subjectively* in the whole man, yet it is *originally* in the soule. Secondly, it is a good argument to prove, that something is *immortall* in man, though not all, because he so earnestly desires *immortality*. Thirdly, this desire is in man onely, and not in beasts; which shewes, that he, not they, hath an immortall soule. Fourthly, though the beasts strive to preserve their *naturall being*, yet man onely aimes at a *supernaturall being*, as having a more *divine* knowledge and appetite then other creatures are capable of. Fifthly, how much man desires immortality, is plaine by the many *pyramides*, *obelisks*, *triumphant arches*, *mausolets*,

Sect. 12.

Object. 7.

Sect. 13.

Object. 8.

brasse, and marble statues, prodigious palaces, bookes, and other monuments; for which who would care, if hee thought his soule should perish with the beasts?

Sect. 14.
Object. 9.

Ninthly, mans understanding perisheth after death; therefore the soule cannot be immortall. *Answ.* Though the *act* of understanding did cease, yet the *power* remains, and consequently the soule, the subject of that power: for *actually* wee understand not many things here, by reason of some *defect* in the *organs*; yet the soule ceaseth not therefore to be, nor the *faculty* of understanding to be none. Secondly, the soule doth *actually* understand, and more excellently, being separated, then shee did in the bodie; because not onely doth shee retain the *species* which shee carried out with her, but also shee receiveth an addition of new *species*, by *divine illumination*. Thirdly, though shee understands now by the *phantasie*, yet hereafter, by reason of new illumination, shee shall need neither *phantasie, externall object, nor any corporeall organ*. Fourthly, the knowledge which the soule shall have after death, shall be *naturall* to the soule, though it proceed from God; for he is the author both of naturall and supernaturall light.

Sect. 15.

These are the chiefe weapons, by which the *Soules Antagonists* strive to wound and kill her; which are of no more *validity* to hurt her, then that dart, which old feeble King *Priamus* flung at *Pyrrhus*, was able to hurt him:

—telum imbellè sine ictu

Conjecit, summo quod protinus are pependit.

These arguments make a *sound*, but have no *strength*: These *Arabian Pigmyes* will never be able with such *engines* to overthrow the soules *immortalitie*, which is the
strong

strong Fort and Citadell of every good Christian in his afflictions. Let there be but way given to this doctrine of the *Saducees*, wee must bid farewell to *lawes* and *civility*, nay, to *Religion* and *Christianity*. We must bid adieu to *vertuous actions*, and to all *spirituall comforts*. *Christ* died, the *Apostles* laboured, the *Martyrs* suffered, but all in vaine, if the soule be mortall. Our *faith*, our *hope*, our *preaching* and *reading*, our *restraint* from pleasures, our *sorrowing* for sins, our taking up of our *crosse*, and following of *Christ*, is all in vaine, if the soule be mortall: And, in a word, wee *Christians* are of all men the most miserable, if the soule be mortall. Why did *Abel* offer sacrifice, *Abraham* forsake his countrie, *Joseph* forbear his mistresse, *Moses* refuse the pleasures of *Pharaoh's Court*? And why have so many thousands endured *mockings*, *scourgings*, *bonds*, *prisonment*, *stoning*, *hewing asunder*, *murthering* by the sword? Why would they wander up and downe in *sheeps skins* and in *goats skins*, being *destitute*, *afflicted*, *tormented*, if the soule be mortall? What needs *Cain* feare to kill his brother, *Joseph* to lye with his mistresse, *Saul* to persecute the Church, and *Felix* to tremble at the mention of a future judgement, if the soule be mortall? Admit but such *Lucretian* doctrine, you may shake hands with heaven and hell.

Esse aliquos Maneis, & subterranea regna,
Et contum, & Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,
Atq; unâ transire vadum tot millia cymbâ,
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum ære lavantur.

Juven. Sat. 2.

Here I had ended, but that I have now lighted on a Pamphlet by chance, the Scribler of which was ashamed

Sect. 16.

*Mans mortali-
 lity.*

to put to his name, his cause is so bad. He undertakes to prove the soules mortalitie, but so weakly, that I should lose too much time, and spend too much paper to answer him according to his *folly*: For there is nothing in it but the *froth* of a luxurious wit, wantonly abusing *Scripture*, and obtruding a *cloud* in stead of *Fumo*, *shadowes* of reason in stead of solid arguments: As first, when hee will prove the death of the soule out of *Scripture*, hee brings those places that speake of the *metaphoricall* or *spirituall* death of the soule, which is the defiling of her by sinne, and her separation from God; and so hee confounds the life of *nature*, of *grace*, and of *glory*, as he doth death spirituall and corporall. Secondly, hee abuseth the *Synecdochicall* speeches in *Scripture*, when he will have those phrases which are spoken of *man*, to be understood of the *soule* and *bodie dis-junctively*: And so, when the *Scripture* speakes of mans dissolution and death, hee will have the soule die as well as the bodie; but by this meanes hee must affirme, that the soule *eates*, *drinckes*, *playes*, *sings*, *weeps*, because these things are spoken of men. What? were the soules of the *Egyptians* drowned in the *red sea*, and the soules of the *Chaldeans* burned in the *fiery fornace*, or the soule of the disobedient *Prophet* torne by the *Lion*, because these men died such deaths? Many things are spoken of the *whole man*, but not *wholly*: the totall *compositum* is the subject of such *predications*, but not *totally*. *Christ* died, was buried, was borne, was crucified; and yet his *Divinity* suffered none of these things. Hee is a bad *Divine*, that knowes not, that by the *communication* of *properties*, that is spoken of

of the person of *Christ*, which is proper onely to either of his *natures*; and so that is spoken of man, which is proper onely to either of his *essentiall* parts. Thirdly, he confounds the *act* and the *habit*, concluding that the *habit* is lost, because the *act* ceaseth; as that there is no *habit* or faculty of reason in a *mad man*, because the *act* of reasoning is hindered: As if you should say, that a *Musician* hath lost his skill in Musick, when he ceaseth to play. Fourthly, some old objections hee hath inserted, which wee have already sufficiently answered; and the rest of the passages in his *Pamphlet* are so *frivolous*, that they are not worth the answering, or reading: for, *Magno conatu, magnas rugas dicit*. And so, he that shall diligently read this former Discourse of ours, and shall make use of these foure *Observations* which now I have set downe, will find that this irreligious *Rapsodie* of his, is but *froth*, a *vapour*, or one of his *dreames*,

Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno: Virgil.

and which I thinke will little prevaile with any *rationall* man, much lesse with him who is truly *sanctified* with grace. For he that was led meere by reason, confessed, that the *fatall* *houre* of death was the last *houre* to the *body onely*, not to the soule.

Decretoria illa hora; non est animo suprema sed corpori. Seneca.

For, even *reason* will teach us, that the soule, which in her selfe is *immortall*, (I exclude not here the generall, but the speciall or miraculous concourse

of

of the Almighty,) may *naturally* subsist by her self after separation; for if her *subsistence* from the body were *violent*, then her returne to the body should be *naturall*; as, if the *holding* of a stone in the aire be *violent*, the *falling* downe of that stone, upon the removing of the impediment, must needs be *naturall*: But her returning to the body, is an *act miraculous*, and of *supernaturall* power; for though the soule, as she is the *forme* of the body, hath a *naturall* propensity, or *innate appetite* to a *re-informing* of, or re-union with the body, yet is she not againe conjoyned with the body, but by a *speciall* and *supernaturall* worke of God in the resurrection. Neither againe must we thinke that the soule subsists after separation, by any *speciall* or *supernaturall* power, for then we shall make the soule so subsisting, of no better *metall* then the *iron* so swimming on the water, both being sustained not by their owne, but by a *speciall* and *miraculous* power; and by this meanes the soule of a *dog* may as well subsist after death, as the soule of a *man*: but he that thinks so, that the soule hath no other being after this life, may be in name a *Christian professor*, but is indeed a *Cynick Philosopher*, or *Epicuri de grege porcus*, fitter to dwell in the *Isle of dogs*, then among men. Therefore, as it was *naturall* for the childs soule to subsist in the mothers wombe, and it is as *naturall* for the same soule to subsist without it; so is the *subsistence* of the same soule in and without the body *essentiall* and *naturall* to her, and not *violent* or *supernaturall*.

But

But, to leave these men, whose soules are fitter to dwell with *Nebuchadnezzars* in a beasts body, then in their owne; I will conclude this Discourse with an acknowledgement and confession of that *solace*, and true comfort which I take in these dismall and calamitous times in which we live, from the consideration of my soules immortality; that, however she be now tossed upon the *proud and lofty billowes* of the turbulent *sea of afflictions* in this life, with *Noahs Arke*, yet a higher mountaine then those of *Ararat* is prepared for her to rest upon; and however this weary *Dove* flutter upon these *boysterous waters*, that she can find no rest for the soales of her feet, yet she sees a *window* in that *celestiall Arke* which is above, ready open to receive her. *Christ* hath not in vaine gone to prepare a place for us; he hath prepared it, that we may enjoy it: and to what end should he shed his blood for our soules, and redeeme them at so *deare a rate*, if they be mortall, and can not enjoy that which they long after, as earnestly as the *Hart* brayeth after the rivers of water? Doth *God* mock us, when by his *Prophet* he tels us of *fulnesse of joy in his presence*, and at his right hand pleasures for evermore? Is *God* our *Father*, and *Heaven* our *Inheritance*, and must we be put off from the enjoyment of either? We are here miserable *Pilgrims* and *strangers*, if, after our tedious journey, we have no other home to rest in but a cold and stinking *grave*, and no other companions but *wormes*: better is the condition of *beasts*, then of *Christians*. Surely

ly the place of our future rest should not be called the *Land of the living*, if our soules there must die. And why should the *Angels* be so carefull of us here, if they must be debarred of our company hereafter? In vaine are our soules fed here with the *Bread that came downe from Heaven*, if they must not enjoy that same bread againe in heaven. Our condition will be far worse then that of the *Prodigals*, if we shall be fed with *husks* here, and not have accessse, when we returne by death, to eat bread in our Fathers house, where is such exuberant plenty. Can *Christ*, the *Bridegroom*e of our soules, suffer himselve to be perpetually separated from his *Bride*, whom he hath bought with so high a price as his owne blood? Our *life is a warfare*, what encouragement have we to fight the *good fight*, if we enjoy not the *Crowne of righteousness*? Hath *Christ* no other reward for his souldiers but a *crowne of thornes*? then indeed we fight, as one that *beateth the aire*; and we were better, with *Caligula's* souldiers, spend our time in gathering of *shells* and *pebble-stones*, then fight under the standard of such a *Generall*. But indeed we need not feare, for he that permitted the soule of the *penitent thiefe* into *Paradise*, and by the ministry of his *Angels* conveyed the soule of *Lazarus* into *Abrabams* bosome; and when himselve gave up the *Ghost*, recommended his soule into the hands of his *Father*, will not leave our soules in hell, nor will he suffer his holy ones to see *corruption*. Though the *shell* of our bodies be broken, the precious *kernell* of our soules shall not be lost:

lost: these *earthen pots* may crack, but the *jewels* in them shall be preserved: There lieth a hid *Mannah* within (not our golden, but) our *earthen pots*, which is not capable of *wormes* and *corruption*. Let that proud insulting *Conquerour*, who rides upon the *pale horse*, bruise the *satchels* of our bodies (as the Tyrant did that of *Anacharsis*) unto dust, yet over our soules, which are our selves, he hath no power. Be not dismayed; though our mistresse, *Nature*, strip us of the *garment* of our body, as *Potiphars* wife did *Joseph*, yet of our soules she cannot rob us: she gave us the *garment*, it is her owne, she may challenge it; but the soule was no gift of hers, she hath no title to it, she cannot *claime* it. *Diseases*, *infirmities*, and *injuries*, like so many *Sodomites*, may beset these *houses* of our bodies; but they cannot injure our soules, which are the *Angels* lodged within us. The *celestiall fire* of our soules shall never be extinguished, though the *temples of our bodies* in which they burne shall be destroyed. That fire which consumed the *Temple of Peace* at *Rome*, did no hurt to the *Palladium* that was in it; neither shall the conflagration of our bodies in a *Calenture* or *Burning-feaver*, prejudice or hurt our soules. The *Vestall Virgins* were not more carefull to rescue the *Palladium* from the flame, then the good *Angels*, our ministring spirits, shall be to convey our soules out of these flames, unto a *place of refreshing*. Therefore my soule shall

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not

not be dismayed, though she be carried in this weake and leaking ship of an infirme body, on the waves of the Red sea of persecution; for even from hence she smells by faith the sweet odours of her heavenly Arabia, though as yet with her bodily eyes she cannot see it. The hot fiery furnace of affliction shall no more consume and annoy her, then the flame did consume the drie bush, or the drie furnace of Babylon did the three Children. The Presteres live in the fire, and are not burned; fresh waters spring out of the salt Sea, and yet are not thereby infected; nor are the fishes salt which live in salt water: neither shall our Soule either suffer by sicknesse in the body, or die with the body; but after she hath fought the good fight, like a Conquerour or Emperour, she shall be carried out of this *campus Martius* upon the shoulders, not of Senators, but of Angels. And as an Eagle flew out of the funerall pile when it was set on fire, leaving the body of the Emperour to be consumed; so shall our soules flye up unto their Maker, leaving their bodies to be wasted by time and corruption. For, as it is impossible for the body to die till the soule forsake it, which is the life of it; so much more impossible is it for the soule to die, untill God, who is her life, forsake her: and that will never be, till God himselfe cease to be; for he hath promised never to forsake us, his love like himselfe is unchangeable. A mother may forget the fruit of her wombe, fathers and mothers may, and will forsake us, but the Lord will

- will never forget or forsake us ; but when friends,
and all leave us , he will then receive us : there-
fore let our *soules magnifie* the LORD,
and let our spirits rejoyce in God
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
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