

The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature. A physico-theological treatise / Written by Walter Charleton.

Contributors

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CHARLETON'S
DARKNESS
OF ATHEISM



1652







162

S.R. Spec. Coll.

myo

portrait by
Lombard

17410/B

with autograph letter
from Charlton to C. Bookesdale.
The book is bound in
Latin + English - in praise of
Charlton's book.


The handwriting agrees with that of
Marquis of Charlton


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
CHARLTON, W.


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
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To my worthily respected & honoured Brother,
Mr. Clement Barkedale, Theologist.


Dearest Sr.

I here present you the genuine solution of my last years Riddle,
my Book; w^{ch} cannot but be acceptable to you, since it deriv'd
the greatest & most solid part of its Estimation, from those
excellently both ingenious & learned Elogies, you were
pleas'd to affix unto it. And, though I understand the vital
& essential part of my Gratitude to consist only in this; that
I constantly & indelibly endeavour, by a progression in Studies,
so approach, at some nearer distance, the merit of some of
thes^e Attributes, w^{ch} your exceeding Charity, at that instant
prevailing, upon your Judgment, hath vouchsafed me; that
so, in the future I may become competent to make good to the
World, that your Poetry was Prophecy, & your praises hyperbo-
licall only in Anticipation: yet may I not be so injurious
to myself, as not in the present to protest to you, that I have
a Heart as full of Thanks & Devotion to you, as yours hath
appear'd of Kindness & Affection to me; & firmly resolv'd
to waite no opportunity of confessing it in vital Services.

I affect not that sinister way to the reputation of either Wit,
or Erudition, by saying that I could have thought more
profoundly & written more smoothly & properly, had I not wanted
those grand requisites, Leisure & Solitude; but am ready to
acknowledge, that I despair of out-doing myself in some part
culars of this Discourse, should I be furnished with all these
many advantages Poets have wished for, in order to the
Serenity of mind, & Exaltation or Dunning of Phancy: yet
notwithstanding shall I not dissemble, if I profess, that had
I expected these handsome Characters, wherein your elegant Pen
hath transmitted & commended my name to Scholars, I wou
at least have kept it by me, untill it had acquired a stronger
smell of the Lamp, perhaps untill my frequent Revisions
had smoothed many of those Knotts & Inequalities, w^{ch} the
roughness of my Melancholy, & the distractions of my Pro-
fession have unfortunately made me pass over, & leave to
be in the tender hands of Critics. you will know this
piece to be but the First Part of my Philosophical Meddell,
& therefore very imperfect in many considerable Notions, untill
the remainder be superadded. Which that God would be
pleas'd to assist me with the illumination of my Intellect &
life to effect, to his glory & the instruction of those who
cannot study for themselves: be so pious, as in your Devotion
to insert one short petition on the behalf of your

infinitely oblig'd Brother
W. Charlton.

march 20.
1657.





In Effigiem & Librum Dⁿⁱ Charlton

Imago pulchra Est. picta sculpsoris manu.
At pulchriorem dat libris Autor suis.
Hic Corpus. Illis ipsa Mens. depingitur
Imo Vniuersi Mens & Ipsius simul
C. B.

Hombart. Sculpsit A. Londre

THE
DARKNES of ATHEISM

Dispelled by the
LIGHT of NATURE.

A
PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL
TREATISE,

Written by
WALTER CHARLETON
D^r. in Physic, and Physician to the late KING.

*Heu prima Scelerum causa Mortalibus agris,
Naturam nescire DEUM.*——Sil. Italic 4. p. 56.

*DEUS aliquis jussit & primum scribere, & declarationem
ejus, ille ipse novit, me scire.* Galen. 10. de usu part.

LONDON,

Printed by J. F. for William Lee, and are to be sold at the signe
of the Great Turky Head over against Fetter-Lane
in Fleetstreet. 1652. X 17

THE DARKNESS OF ATHEISM

PHYSIOLOGICAL LIGHT OF NATURE

28846



WALTER REEVE

D. in Medicine and Physician to the King

His price 2s. 6d. per copy. Sold by the Author, and by all Booksellers in Great Britain. Printed by W. B. Whittaker, 21, Pall Mall, London.

LONDON

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Epistola Dedicatoria.

CLARISSIMO,

QUIA

ORNATISSIMO VIRO,

Inclutissimi Medicorum Londinensium

Collegii Præsidi longè dignissimo,

FAUTORI SUO,

Omni officiorum genere æternùm

Colendissimo, D. D.

FRANC. PRUJEAN,

GUALT. CHARLETON S.P.D.



*Decretum fuisse olim, accepi,
à Consultissimis æquè ac Am-
plissimis celeberrimi nostri
Collegii (quod omnes, qui-
bus cum Literis ac Humani-
tate aliquod commercium, summa, uti
debet,*

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

debet, veneratione colunt) Fundatoribus; quòd nullus, tantæ familiæ adscitus, Librum quemlibet in dias luminis oras effundere audeat, quem Præses, adplaudentibus simul Censoribus, indignum prius non iudicaverit, qui diutiùs in Vestæ penetralibus abditus late et. Et gravissimo sanè consilio; tametsi enim paucorum admodum, nullorum rectiùs dixerim, nomina vestris adscribi Tabulis solent, qui solennia & Eruditionis & ingenii sui specimina, vel scriptis, vel consiliis medicis, vel disputationibus, abstrusiora circa Physices Theoremata, in Comitibus publicè habitis, prius non exhibuerint; ideoque sit sperandum, neminem ex iis aut meditaturum, aut in publicum daturum aliquid, quod aut Philosophum recta ratione utentem, aut pium atque Christianismo imbutum non deceat: veruntamen, cum quisque fermè infatuantibus pessimæ istius Sirenum, φιλαυτίας, blanditiis sit nimium obnoxius, Scriptorumq; plurimis innatum sit istiusmodi vitium, quòd sui cerebri Minervas

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

*nervas flagrantius, quàm modestia ferat,
ament; quid magis videatur consultum,
quàm ut uniuscujusque Collegarum scripta,
quàm prælo Typographico, prius subjician-
tur examini eorum, quibus id muneris soci-
orum suffragiis demandatum; quo sit perspe-
ctum magis, an ex iis utilitatis aliquid Artium
scientiarumque latifundiis succrescat, & genti
Hippocraticæ honoris? Huic proinde majorum
Senatus-consulto, nedum Philosophiæ, ejusve
sobolis Medicinæ, ast etiam sacris Religionis
Principiis quadantenus sartis tectisque conser-
vandis (saltem quoad vestræ Ditionis exten-
sionem) utilissimo, liberrima voluntatis meæ
ΣΥΝΕΤΑΦΟΣ ipsemet obtemperans; En, in manus
tuas, Apollinæ Artis insigne Deus ac Co-
lumen, hasce meas Philosophiæ Primitias
trado: eo duntaxat nomine, quòd si oculatiori
tuo, quod mihi sit instar omnium, judicio lucis
hujus usura videantur dignæ; & majori, adver-
sus virulenta Semicriticorum Zoilorumque
ΣΥΕΙ*

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

Συειγμετα, Auctoritate foras prodeant præmu-
nita, & Bonorum favori, pleniori cum gratia,
commendentur. Cæteroqui, si vel verbum in
eis aut saniori Physiologiæ, aut Fidei Christia-
næ, aut bonis denique moribus dissonum & in-
congruum reperiatur: vel Tineis Blattisque
perrodendæ mox exponantur; vel fato illi subja-
ceant acerbissimo, quod exuscitatum impiis
Artibus ab Erichthone cadaver olim, ad ro-
gum quàm citissimè reduxit, de quo εὐγλωττος ille
Poeta Lucanus,

Vadit defunctus ad ignes.

Non est verò, quamobrem tam infastè omi-
ner. Omnes etenim, dum huncce Atheismi Tu-
mulum essem meditatus, ingenioli mei nervos,
mediusfidius, eò semper intendebam; ut recto,
& suis genuinis filiis ab Matre Sancta Eccle-
sia in Canonicis præscripto, Veritatis tramiti
insisterem: ne ab opinione quavis insana, splen-
didissima tametsi verisimilitudinis specie lar-
vata, aut Mens, aut Calamus unquam ullibi
deflecte-

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

deflecteretur, salebrofa versùs Hæreseôs, Errorisve diverticula; quæ omnia (Cardiognosten humillimè contestor) ab incunabulis usque ex animo fastidivi.

Nec meo, ad lapsus nimis prono, unicè super hac re, confisus sum arbitrio: sed & labili minùs quorundam etiam Theologorum, ingenio supra vulgus literatorum multùm perspicaci, & queis nihil sit magis cordi quàm ipsamet veritas; quibus singulas hujusce Tractatus Physico-theologici schedulas, dum atramento scriptorio adhuc diffluerent, tradidi, seriò & severè examinandas, imò ubicunq; iis opus visum fuerit castigandas.

Horum itaq; æquabili judicio si tuum etiam, Eruditorum Dictator, omni ex parte consenserit; Librum huncce, ter sacrosanctissimæ Divini Numinis, ab execranda Atheorum impietate (tremendum cogitatu) palàm impetitæ, Majestatis vindicem, magno tuo Nomini à me inscribi consecrarique patiatur, Candorem tuum, cæteras tuas virtutes undiquaque illustrantem,

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

strantem, obnixè ac cum debita Dignitati tuæ observantia rogo. Fabrica est, cujus Fundamenta præclarum istud *Matheseôs* lumen, *CARTESIUM* dico (cui si *Fata* diuturniorem in terris indulisissent incolatum; dubio procul, tam diu anxieque ab omnibus *Sophiæ* cultoribus exoptatum, *Physiologiæ* sanioris compendium *Resp. Literaria* ab illo solo expectasset, imò forsan excepisset) non ita pridem in *Metaphysicis* suis *Meditationibus* posuisse; certè vix me deceret pluribus tibi insinuare: qui omnia ejus & perlustrasti volumina, & quod solertissimi pathognomonicon est ingenii, perlucidè jamdudum intellexisti *Ænigmata*. Fabrica est, cujus stamina *LUDOVICUS VIVES*, *PHILIPPUS MORNÆUS*, *MARINUS MERSENNUS*, & *PETRUS GASSENDUS* (*Heroës* publico *Humanæ* gentis commodo, & nobiliorum *Disciplinarum* incremento nati) ex densissimis confertissimisque suis *sapientiæ* *sylvis* profluentè nobis contulere. Fabrica, ut uno omnia absolvam, cujus constructionem epide-
micus

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

micus fermè sceleratissimi hujus seculi Atheismus ab omni Erudito efflagitasse videatur, omnes apud rectos rerum aestimatores : & quam nulli, nisi sacrilegi Libertini nostri, quos apud Dei, & Religionis causa Assertore prorsus indigna habetur, inutilem censebunt vel supervacaneam.

Memini, Vir Excellentissime, te esse illum, qui me, post præmaturam serenissimi mei quondam Domini, CAROLI, feræ hujus Britannia nostræ Monarchæ, Apotheosin, non limis & invidia vipereo veneno turgentibus, ast ipsiusmet instar Charitatis benignè ridentibus oculis aspexisti; in illustrem Collegii vestri societatem invitasti sæpius; tandemque, quum inaugurali meo munere defunctus essem, candidè exporrectaque (quod aiunt) fronte excepisti. Deinceps verò, toties quoties Te, tanquam Æsculapium redivivum, ægrorum levandorum ergò, adivi; me, circa stochasium, prognôsin, medendi methodum, præsidiorumq; materiam, sat prolixè, de more meo, differen-

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

tem patienter & sine maligno isto medicâstris
innato Contradicendi cacoëthe audivisti ; &
aut meam, ubi rationi assentiret , comprobasti
sententiam, aut rectiorem commonstrasti. Me-
mini etiam (& magnum Hippocratis nostri
Genium semper habeam mihi iratum , si tanti
beneficii fuero unquam oblitus) quàm paterno
amore me, epidemica superioris anni Dysenteria
gravissimè & tantùm non lethaliter infectum,
visitasti ; quanta industria saluti meæ invigila-
sti ; quàm admiranda tandem Arte (favente Ar-
chiatro Cœlesti) animam meam abusque Cha-
rontis cymbula reduxisti : ita ut dignè canam,

Auxiliis PRUIAN, anima hæc mori-
bunda revixit ;

Ut vigil, infusâ Pallade, flamma solet.

Hæc omnia manent alta mente reposita, nec
in Mortis etiam erit tyrannide , viva insignis
tuæ me erga Humanitatis Charagmata, cordis
mei meditullio profundissimè insculpta , peni-
tus deradere. Quid verò retribuam tibi Fau-

tor

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

tor Amplissime , pro tot tantisque favoribus,
 præter Animum Gratitude & Amoris ple-
 nissimum , ignoro prorsus : quem tibi *πρότῳ καὶ*
ἔλωσ addictum , pro consueta tua Benignitate
 agnoscere digneris, etiam atq; etiam te obtestor.
 Cæterum ut mundo etiam universo clariùs inno-
 tescat hæc mea *ὑπερβασίς*; En, in ipsius testimonium
 levidense hoc *τεκμήριον* tibi offero: tot inter volu-
 mina, quibus instructissimos habes Bibliothecæ
 tuæ forulos , infima verò classe reponendum.
 Restant adhuc mihi complurima, in gratæ
 mentis *μνημόσυνον*, insuper dicenda : sed Am-
 phora jam exiit, currente rota. DEUM OPT.
 MAX. tibi longos, & benefico syderum aspectu
 prosperos indulgeat annos , in Morborum fœ-
 cunda nimis sobole, in Humani generis excidi-
 um , quotidie nascentium exantlationem fœli-
 cem , simul ac Artis nostræ compendium ; ex
 animo precor. .

Ἐρρῶσθε θεοεβέστες τε, καὶ ἐμοὶ πολὺ φίλτατε *Præses*.


Ex museo meo Londini, Kal. August. anno

ἀπὸ τῆς τῆς λόγῳ ἐνσαρκώσεως, 1651. ϥ.

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA

... pro rebus publicis...
... praeter haec...
... nihil...
... addidimus...
... dignum...
... in multis...
... sed haec...
... non solum...
... sed etiam...
... in gratiam...
... etiam...
... Max. tibi...
... prosperos...
... cuncta...
... non...
... cum...
... Ex mun...
...
...

An Advertisement



A PREPARATORY
Advertisement
TO THE
READER.

BEfore you set foot within the door of this our *Physico-theologicall Labyrinth* (so the seemingly intricate and obscure method, wherein the *Rowes* of our own and others *Cogitations* are here set, may warrant you to call it) providence enjoyns, that we tender you a *Preparatory Advertisement* of some things, whose *præcognition* is requisite, as well to your calm, unpræjudiciall and satisfactory *Lecture*, as to the *Promotion* of this well-intended *Enterprise* of our Pen, against both those implacable, though

An Advertisement

though always foyled Enemies to learned *Industry*, impertinent and parcel *Contradiction*, and malevolent *Censure*.

The Cardinall points, or *Heads*, under whose comprehension, *All*, whereof we hope a prævious consideration, as your homely, but wholesom Entertainment, during your short Detention in this *Portall*, doth genuinely and regularly fall; are onely these *Four*: viz. (1.) The *Occasion* and *Incitements* to this *Exercise*, (2.) The *Necessity* and *Justification* of *Naturall Theology*, in generall; and of this in particular, and therein principally of the *Demonstration* of the *Existence* of *God*, by beams uniuersally deradiated from that *Catholick Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*: (3.) The gratefull commemoration of those venerable *Authors*, from whose replenish't *Treasures*, the richest *Contributions* toward this *Hospitall* for the cure of miserable *Infidels*, were derived: (4.) Our due *Confession* of those *Defects* and *Impediments*, which rendered us insufficient to the worthy *Administration* of a *Province* so difficult, so sublime, so sacred, so diffusive.

As

To the Reader.

As for the *First* Praconsiderable, viz. the *Occasion*; it is a *Truth*, not more deplorable, then manifest, that this our *Island*, which may justly contend with most parts of the Earth, for the Priority of Conversion to *Christianisme*, and might (Ah! that the righteous Anger of *Divinity* hath left us no other Tense to speak in!) not many yeares since, have challenged the Garland from the whole, for the orthodox, zealous, and sincere *Profession* thereof: hath of late produced, and doth at this unhappy day foster more swarms of *Atheisticall monsters* (such at least, whose licentious Practises, and insolent Discourses in Publick, do equally declare their wild Ambition to be so accounted; as if the only way to acquire the reputation of being *Transcendent Wits*, were to seem able, with bold and specious Arguments, to impugne the greatest and most sacred *Verities*; nay such, upon whose Admission, the Certitude of all other Notions doth individually depend) then any *Age*, then any *Nation* hath been infected withall. Nor, indeed, can this *Assertion* sound harsh in the ears of any æquitable person, who

a

shall

An Advertisement

shall but have observed, that *Religion* (the vitall spirits of all Commonweals, and the Sanction of all Human Laws) and the sacred *Authority of the Church* (the onely *Brasen Wall* of defence against those *Legions of Errors*, and *Illusions*, which the common *Adversary* of mankind, by his subtle workings upon the *Deceptibility* of our frail Nature, hath advanced) are both so shatter'd and undermined by our *Fatall Civill Warre*; that there yet remain many and wide *Breaches*, at which whole *Hosts* of the most execrable *Heresies*, blasphemous *Enthusiasms*, nay even profes't *Atheism* have enter'd upon us, without any considerable *Opposition* from those, who are, by the duty of their *Place* and *Function*, obliged to bee the publick *Champions* of all sacred *Truths*. This when wee had frequently, and not without due sorrow considered, and upon a profound and reiterated *Examen* of all those bloody *Sophisms*, which are usually urged by *Atheists*, to indubitate either the *Existence* of God, or those his *Two Cardinal Attributes*, the *Creation* of the Universe, and the constant *Conservation* and *Moderation* of the same, by his
Providence,

To the Reader.

Providence; found them to be derived from one of those two poysonous *Fountains*; either that *Human Affections* are imagined to be in God, or that man doth vainly arrogate so great *Sagacity* and perfection of *Prudence* to his owne *Minde*, as he thereupon *presumes* to be able to comprehend what God can, and determine what he ought to do: we immediately discovered, that the direct way to a full and durable *Solution* of them all, was onely to advertise men in the generall, that they ought to speculate their own *Mindes*, as *Finite substances*, and the *Supreme Essence*, as an *Infinite*, and therefore *Incomprehensible* one. For, this immense *Disproportion* being once abstractedly cogitated, and in the closest pressures of *Infidelity* always reflected upon: all those *Mountainous Difficulties*, which seem to eclipse the *Light of Nature*, when converted toward *Divinity*, will soon lessen, and vanish, like rorid *Clouds* before the *Orient Sun*.

The way toward the facile *Redargution* of all, either downright, or oblique and inferrible *Atheisticall Misapprehensions*, appearing thus plain; the resentment of our *Duty*, both

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to God, and our *Fellowes* in Humanity; to God in the *vindication* of his injured *Majesty*; to Man, in the *Rectification* of perverted *Judgments*, according to the capacity of our *Talent*; engaged us to attempt a short *progresse* therein. And to the incitement of this forcible *Motive* we the more readily conformed our *Assent*, because, having not long before proposed to our selves to erect an intire *Fa-
brick* of *Physicall Science* upon *Principles* which seem to our judgement to be the most solid and permanent, because most *Demonstrable*, at least, most *Verisimilous*, as to the *Solution* of all *Natures Phenomena*; and firmly embraced that *Axiom* of the Schoolmen, *Nul-
la res, qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus prius intelligatur*, that no one thing in *Nature* can be known, unlesse the *Authour* of *Nature* be first knowne: we conceived it not on-ly no *Apostasie* from our *First Resolutions*, but a more opportune and advantageous *profe-
cution* of them, to beginne at the *Demon-
stration* of the *Existence* of the onely *Per-
fect Ens*, and so many of his *Proprieties*, or *Attributes*, as relate to the *Universe* in
generall,

To the Reader.

generall, and *Humane nature* in speciall; and this, as a *Foundation*, that must not only support, but ennoble and facilitate our future *superstructions*.

Nor could our often and pensive reflexions upon the vast *Distance* betwixt the utmost *Extensibility* of our *Understanding*, and the lowest part of this the most sublime and excellent *Subject*, alter or refract this our *Determination*: for, to counterpoise that *Discouragement*, we remembered, that to offend of *Zeal*, is more venial then to offend of *Neglect*.

Now, albeit this was the *Series*, or subalternate syntax of our *Thoughts*, to which our *Designation* of this *Work*, as the lowest link, was connected; yet dare we not say, that this *Argument* was wholly of our own *Election*: for we have long inclined to that opinion of *Socrates* *, *Eam mentem Dii singulis dant, ut communes utilitates in medium afferant*; That every man's *Province* is imposed upon him by the tacite consignation of *Providence Divine*, and that it is the soft and secret *Touch* of that *Universall Spirit*, which maintains the common *Harmony* of the *World*, that *Tunes* the
2 3 thoughts

* In Oration.
ad Philip.

An Advertisement

thoughts of every *Individuall* to this or that particular key: and therefore apprehended it as criminall, to stifle or extinguish those *sparks*, which we could not but perceive to be kindled, and glow within our breast.

Concerning the *Second*, viz. the *Necessity of Naturall Theology*, we are not singular in our persuasion, that these two Positions, *That there is a God*, and that *the Soul of man is a substance perfectly distinct from his body, and endowed with Immortality, by the Charter of its Essence*; are the Principall among those *Verities*, which are to be demonstrated by *Philosophers*, rather than *Divines*. For, though to us whose *Mindes* are deeply imbued with the sacred tincture of *Christianisme*, it sufficeth to assume upon the evidence of meer *Faith*, that God is, and that the Human Soule, being constituted superior to *Corruptibility*, doth eternally survive the Funerall of the Body: yet, assuredly can the meer *Naturall* man, persisting in the state of *Infidelity*, never be adduced to embrace either any *Religion*, or any *Morall Virtue*, unlesse both those *Propositions* fundamentall be first evicted to him, by *Reasons*
Apodi-

To the Reader.

Apodictical, deduced from that infallible *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*; from whose *Judicature* there can be no appeal.

And, since in this life of *Sensuality*, the *Encouragements* and *Invitations* to *vice*, are both more and stronger, than those to *virtue*: most certain it is, that very few men would prefer the harsh dictates of *Honesty* and *Right*, to those more complacent ones of *Pleasure* and *Profit*; if they neither feared the just vindiction of an *All-observant Deity*, nor expected a future *Subsistence* after *Death*. Now, however it be indubitable, that the *Existence of God* ought firmly to be believed, because it is commonstrated in *Sacred Writ*; And, by conversion, that *Sacred Writ* ought to be believed, because it is deduced from *God*: for, since *Faith* is the *Gift of God*, he that gives *Grace* sufficient for the stable *Apprehension* of other things contained therein, can also give *Grace* sufficient to the admission of his *Existence*: yet cannot this kind of *Argumentation*, with probable hopes of his *Conviction*, be proposed to an *Infidell*; who looks upon *Reason* onely,
as

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as the chief inducement of *Beleef*: because it is a manifest *Circle*, whose parts reciprocally depend upon each other for probation, and therefore he may lawfully except against it.

Again, as it is indispensably *Necessary*, in respect of *Infidels*; so is it not *Unnecessary*, in respect to *Beleivers*, to prove the *Certitude* of these two main Pillars of all Religion, and Morality: since the Evidence of *Reason*, superannexed to that of *Faith*, must of necessity if not augment, yet *Corroborate* it: and that happy soul must, doubtlesse, have much a clearer perception of the *verity* of *supernaturall Objects*, who speculates them both by the *Light* of *Nature*, and of *Grace*.

And therefore, though we should be so largely Charitable, as to grant, that there are no Atheists to be found among Christians: which is more then the observation of the good *Justin Martyr* would give him leave to allow, when he said, *dici quidem nonnullos Christianos, esse verò nullius Numinis cultores**: and that the Principles of Religion are steadily beleaved by All, who make an externall Profession of them: yet notwithstanding would

* In Dialog.
cum Tryphon.

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it not genuinely follow, that therefore it is a *Pleonasm*, or *Parergy* to ratify those Principles to Beleevers, by the concurrent Testimony of that Oracle, *Reason*, to whose *Dictates* all Nations, all Ages, all Interests have unanimously submitted their Assent. For, as it must conduce to the *Information of Unbeleevers*: So also, proportionately, to the *Confirmation of Beleevers*.

Thirdly, as it hath been the positive and settled judgement of most *Divines*, both Ancient and Recent, not onely that the *Existence* of God may be demonstrated, or irresistibly enforced upon the most prævaricate understanding, by the pressure of *Reasons purely Naturall*; but also, that the *Cognition of the Non-principiate and Self-dependent Being*, is farre more easily acquired, then the *Cognition of any Created Nature* whatsoever: insomuch as every man brings into the world with him a certain *Proleptical*, or anticipated *Notion* of the *Deity*, indeleibly impressed upon the very substance of his minde; but the *Science* of all other *Entities* doth emerge from the *Ideas* of their natures, *Extradvenient* or *Adventitious* to the *Cognoscent Faculty*

b

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culty, by the mediation of the Senses: So also was it the expresse Assertion of the wisest of men (*Wisdom* 13. v.8, 9.) and of the greatest of Apostles (*Rom* 1. v.20.) that the Creator was so visibly represented in the mirrour of the Creature, as no excuse could remain to those unhappy *Ethnicks*, who making more then superficial inspection into the one, did yet prætend an Indiscovery of the other. *Quid enim aliud conspicuum hujus mundi theatrum, quam παιδευτικόν τῆς θεογνωσίας, καὶ ψυχῶν λογικῶν διδασκαλεῖον?* As that not long since *Vitall Library*, *Bishop Prideaux* (whose memory, next that of our *Royall Master*, is and shall ever be the most precious of all others, in our esteem: not onely in respect of his insatiable native Capacity, stupendious Acquisitions, and inestimable Benefits to the Republick of Learning; but also of his singular Favours to us in particular) hath in a magnificent elegance expressed, *in concione ad Artium Baccalaureos, in die Cinerum, de scala visibilium ad invisibilia*. To which accomplish't Paraphrase upon that freshly quoted Text of *S^c. Paul*, we refer our Reader; in order to his own more ample satisfaction, and our Justification, concerning

* idem dixit de Longino
Eunapius, erat
Bibliothecarius τῆς ἐπι-
σκοπίας, καὶ περιηγητὴς
μνηστικόν.

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cerning the possibility, nay facility of the mindes mounting up to a graduable Intellection of the *Supreme Ens*, by the roundles, or steps in the *Scale* of subordinate and *Created Natures*.

And *Fourthly*, lest this our charitable Design, to subvert the chief Citadel of *Atheisme*, by a Countermine of Arguments purely *Physicall* (entrusting the managery of that sacred Engine, the Testimony of *Canonick Scripture*, to the more expert hands of those, whose *Function* entitleth them to the proper use thereof) should want any one of the inducements of persuasion, requisite to the accomplishment of its *Defence*; to the Reasons, and *Præcedents* now introduced, we may superadd also the *Authority* of no lesse then the *Lateran Council*, held under Pope *Leo* the tenth. Which, having with exceeding prudence decreed the *Anathematization* of all such *Atheists*, who dare question either the *Being* of God, or any of his *Attributes* (whether *Absolute* and *Incommunicable*; such as his *Eternity*, *Immensity*, *Simplicity*, *Immutability*, *Independence*, &c. *perfections* concentred in his most glorious *Essence*:

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sence: or Respective, such as his *Omnipresence*, *Omnipotence*, *Omniscience*, *Justice*, *Mercy*, *Goodnesse*, *Verity*, *Liberality*, &c. which by effusion relate to the Creature) or the other Basis of Religion, the *Immortality* of the *Humane soul*: doth, in the close of the *Canou*, not only adhort, but expressly command all *Christian Philosophers*, that they sharpen their *Style s* for the totall Erasion of their circumventing *Sophismes*, and the deep Engravement of those *Magisteriall Truths*.

To conclude therefore, infomuch as not onely multiplied *Reasons*, but also *Authority* both *Divine* and *Human* conjunctively, both warrant and enjoyne this kinde of *Naturall proces*s for the conviction of *Atheisme*: as wee can perceive no weight in their opinion, who think any *Principle* of *Religion* either prophanely disparaged and debased, or implicately convelled and staggered, when brought to the *Test* of *Naturall Reason*, though only for *Confirmation*; so neither have we any cause to fear, that the upper Form of *Theologists* will contract their browes, and frown upon this our Benevolent

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lent and opportune, though imperfect *Treatise*. ¶

Concerning our *Third Postulate*, viz. the *Nomination* of those venerable *Writers*, from whose large magazines of Knowledge, no small part of our Ammunition for the Battery of the strongest hold of the Common Adversary to Humanity, hath been furnished; to this your self will acknowledge us oblig'd as well by the bond of *Gratitude*, as *Honour*: the first advising us to return them the due tribute of *Commemoration*, and an open profession of our beholdingness to them; the other impelling us thereupon, in order to the prævention of being reputed *Plagiarist*. Bee pleas'd, then, Candid Reader, to know from us, first that the Demonstration of the Existence of God (being the argument of the second Section in the 1. chap.) together with the ensuing Explanation of the sundry *Scholastick Terms*, therein unavoidably used, and the *Responses* to the severall *Objections* (whereof some were made by the glorious *Marinus Mersennus*, and others by our eminent, M^r. *Hobbs*) was wholly collected out of the incomparable *Metaphysicks* of that heroicall

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roicall Wit, *Renatus De's Chartes*. Whose *Meditations* on that as necessary as excellent subject, having both frequently and with the most abstracted attention of our mind, read over; and with all possible equity of judgement put them into the scales against the *Cogitations* of *Cornelius ab Hogelande*, the Arguments of *Philippus Mornæus du Plessis*, *Hugo Grotius*, and *Petrus Gassendus*, concerning the same *Theorem*: we found them, by vast excesses, to overbalance all the others, in the points of comprehension, perspicuity, profundity, conviction. (1.) *Comprehension*; because their importance is of so great extent, as to take in the substance of whatever hath, or can be said by the whole world, on that particular. (*Consule ipsum Cartesium, in Epist. dedicat. ad Doct. Sorbon.*) (2.) *Perspicuity*; because, though they are not accommodated to junior or illiterate Capacities; as himself prudently intimateth (*in prefat. ad medit. de prima philosoph.*) yet to those Heads, which study and contemplation have prepared for the entertainment of Notions supernatural, must they appear as distinct, clear, and bright, as all the *Light of Nature* could make them; nor can he, who doth not,
after

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after serious lecture, apprehend their *Extracti-*
on, mutual *Connexion*, and genuine, nay indecli-
nable *Illation*, justly pretend to any considerable
reflexions upon his own Nature. (3.) *Pro-*
fundity; because they are their own *Criterion*, being
desumed from the very *Essence* of the mind, and
proleptical *Impresses*, which are the radix, or Foot
of all *Cognition*. (4.) *Conviction*; because they
are of the number, and perhaps the principall
of those *Verities*, which, like *Geometricall Demon-*
strations, storn the most obstinate judgements,
enforce them to a plenary assent, and having
once gained possession of the mind, for ever
after exclude all *Dubitation*, and *Apostasie*. So that
what *Cicero* (5. *de Finibus*.) said of the Stoicks Phi-
losophy; *mirabilis est apud Stoicos rerum contextus,*
respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia
omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident,
& ut in Geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt
omnia: we may worthily transfer upon the *Me-*
taphysicall meditations of *Cartesius*; nay more wor-
thily, for no one *Principle* of his, there propo-
sed, is precarious, but *Necessary*. This perpen-
ded, we perceived our selves not onely en-
couraged, bu straightly concerned, to tran-
scribe,

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scribe and accommodate to our present scope, the summary of his 3^d. *Meditation*. And, Secondly, that many of our Apodictical Reasons, alleaged for the comprobatation of *Providence Divine*, both General and Special, were gleaned from those more fertile Fields of *Lactantius* (de opific. Dei) *Raymundus de Sabunde* (Theologia Natural.) *Aquinas* (contra Gentes) *Ludovicus Vives* (de verit. fidei Christianæ) *Bradwardinus* (de causa Dei) *Valesius* (de sacra Philosophia) and chiefly of *Gassendus* (in Animadvers. in phys. Epicuri:) the leaves of whose most learned Works, we blush not to confesse our selves to have been so conversant in, that we have sullied them by often revolution.

Nor can we expect the Perversion of this our ingenuous Acknowledgement, by any, but the *Malevolent*, or *Illiterate*, to a *Diminution* of the credit due to this our industrious *Spicilegium*; while those *Bookmen*, whose vigilant nostrills are acquainted with the odour of the *Lamp*, need not be informed, how many anxious hours have been spent on the sedulous *Extraction* of this *Vial* of precious Truths, from the choicest *Flowers* of so many excellent *Gardens*

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Gardens (wherein onely to have had some recreative and private *Walks*, to many hath been justly accounted no obscure Specimen of both *Literature*, and *Ingenuity*.) especially when we are not destitute of grounds for our hopes, that they will soon find those Flowers, not to have lost much of their native *Frangency* and *Virtue*, by passing the *Alembic* of our Pen; as also, that it hath been no small part of our care, to *Refuse*, as well as *Elect*.

Besides, there are many *Stars*, and those of the greatest magnitude, now shining with full splendor, in the sphere of *Learned Authors*, whose beams were in great part derived from others, whom the revolution of Time had made lesse vertical, and declined toward the West of Oblivion. Who can blast the verdant Laurel on *Virgils* front, by saying, though truly, that He converted more then 1000. of *Homers* verses to his own use? Who lessen the sound of *Homers* Fame, by exclaiming, that his Muse was a Drone, and lived upon the Honey she so largely suck't from the elder Hives of *Theocritus*, *Apollonius*, and *Hesiod*? Who detract from the full glory of *Cicero*?

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Cicero, by objecting that most of his strong and limpid streams of Eloquence flowed from those two noblest Springs of Greece, *Plato* and *Demosthenes*? Or, who will diminish one Grain of incense, in his sacrifice to the memory of that *Alcides* (for the conquest of monstrous Difficulties) the mighty *Stagirite*; because *Clearchus* hath a tradition, that he saw and discoursed with that knowing *Jew*, from whose oraculous mouth all his Philosophical Maxims were delivered to him? To come neerer home; who hath thought the lesse of *Grotius* his Tract of the verity of Christian Religion; because it seems a Compendium of *Morneus*, of the same Subject and Inscription? Or, who undervalued *Morneus*, in regard of the abundant Contributions he received from *Lactantius*, *Raymundus de Sabunde*, *Aquinas*, & *Ludovicus Vives*? And therefore, though we are sufficiently conscious of the great disparity betwixt those Giant Wits, and our Pygmie Acquisitions; and therefore gladly place our selves more then one sphere below them: yet shall wee conceive our selves not a little injured, if any shall deny our
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Book a room in their Libraries, only because it præsents, in Epitome, and entire, what many moneths reading of the *Schoolmen* would have exhibited at large, and in fractures. *Aphranus*, an eminent *Poet*, for answer to those *Semi-Criticks*, who accused him of stealing many remarkable passages from *Menander*, returns thus; *Fateor, accepi non modò ab illo, sed ut quisque habuit quod conveniret mihi, & à Latino quoque quodcumque me non posse facere melius credidi.*

Moreover, every Brain is not constellated for new *Discoveries*; nor can every Age boast the production of a *Copernicus*, *Gilbert*, *Galileo*, *Mersennus*, *Cartesius*, or a *Harvy*: Providence introducing such, as Time doth *New Stars*, single and seldom. ¶

And as concerning our last *Requisite*, viz. an æquitable consideration of our *Defects* and *Impediments*; to this also are we constrained to court our Reader, in order to our refraction of the *Rigor* of Censure. For though we need not advertise, that the Nerves of our *Intellect* are too slender and feeble to sustain so great a weight; and our *Pencil* too rude and grosse, to expresse such fine *Metaphysical* and *Theoso-*

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phical Notions, in draughts respondent to the life of their Importance; in regard the frequent *stooping* of our *Cogitations* below the dignity and due height of the subject, must soon discover the one, and the *Roughness* of our *Style* through the whole Piece, as soon confesse the other: yet can it not be supervacaneous for us here to intimate, that we had more then one *Disadvantage* to encounter.

First, the often Fermentations and Ebulitions of our *Melancholy*; to the tyranny of which fæculent and Saturnine humor both our native Temperament, and sedentary contemplative condition of life have æqually subjected us; could not but as often obnubilate the region of our Mind, and darken the prospect of our soul, by infecting the requisite purity and lucidity of our spirits, with thick clouds of opac and fuliginous Exhalations.

Secondly, the course of our *Profession*, rendring us obnoxious to many more *Distractions*, *Interturbations*, and *Avocations*, by the intrusion and importunity of the Sick, then

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then we could obtain minutes of retirement for *Lecture* and *Meditation*; will, wee hope, be confest to have had more then a finger in the causation of those *Chasms, Inequalities, Omissions, &c.* Lapses, which occurre to the observation of the *Austere* and *Curious*.

And, Thirdly, it cannot but deserve some favour, to give notice; that the Clue of our studies was broken off in the midst, by the rough hand of the late *Epidemick Dysentery*, which arresting us even then, when the contexture of this Web required the most confirmed vigour of body, and serenity of minde; confined us to the dungeon of a sick bed so long and closely, that it hath left sensible impressions of its Malignity, not only upon our Constitution, but also upon more then halfe of these our *Lucubrations*.

To these Mitigatory Arguments, may rightly be added, the *Narrowness* of our present *Fortunes*, the *Thinness* of our *Library*, our tedious attendance on *Committees* (all the sad effects of our late *Intestine Warres*) together with some other private *Remora's*, the

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least whereof may serve to the *Judicious* and *Benigne*, as a sufficient incitement to look upon our *Imperfections*, through the diminishing Telescope of *Charity*.

Now, this humble *Apology* we address only to the *Erudite* and *Candid*, experience having confirmed, that none the strongest *Charme* of *Reason*, can binde the virulent tongue of that livid *Viper*, *Envy*, the spirit of whose venom doth wholly consist in *Detraction*.

UPON

UPON
DOCTOR CHARLTON'S
NATURAL THEOLOGY.

SO, our poor Cotswold Springs, that have no names,
Render their Tribute to your mighty Thames.

But your Book's perfect in it self. We do
Only acknowledge, not encrease, what You
Have sent forth, streaming through the Land agen,
Out of your Generous, purely-flowing Pen.

To give more Elogy, with my soft Quil,
To Yours from Eagle's wing, were even as ill,
As threaden lace on cloth of Gold to pin,
Or o'rlay Gold it self with baser Tin.

Yet may I venture thus: though not to praise:
To answer OB's, Envy perhaps will raise.
Tis fit that Censure wait on All that's done;
"Wits are made great by Emulation.

Some places are obscure. The Book's not Good,
By every vulgar Head is understood.

What you don't understand, read o'r again;
Compare, Conferr, and Meditate: 'Tis plain.

Th' English is Latin. Know, that th' English Tongue
Hath from each Language Consummation:

And He, that will our Learnedst Writers scan,
Must be both Latinist and Grecian.

The Stile's too High. Fear not the Critick's Rod:

"High Phrase is born of your High Thoughts of GOD.

Forward, Dear Brother: "GIFTS for use are lent:

"To do most good, brings in the most * Content.

Your Physick has done Miracles: But sure,

TH' ATHEIST CONVERTED's, your Divinest Cure.

* Falsi, si scis Artem,
tibi divi aliquid: sin
vero nescis, nihil.

p. 120.

C. B.

ALIUD.
IN EJUSDEM OPERA.

C*harltonus* is, qui Helmontium pridem dedit,
Nuperque nobis reddidit Helmontium ;
Hunc pulveris miranda sympathetici,
Hunc eruditis experimentem paginis
Medentium, De Fluxibus, Lapsus graves ;
Nuperriméque Calculum, fortum Suum,
(O abditâ præclarior Gemmâ Liber !)
Donasse luce publicum gaudet bonum ;
Jam nunc ad altiora surgit. Numinis
Assertor est, Vindexque providentiæ.
Fortuna, Fati vis, Voluntas Libera,
Summi docentur obsequi Dictis Dei.
Deo favente, Cuncta. Vocum Copiam
Lectissimarum mirer, an Rerum magis ?
Utramque miror, pariter atque exosculor :
Utramque pronus veneror, & longè sequor.
O Autor annumerande *Charltonis* Tuis !
Gassende, Chârtes, Magne Sennerte Angliæ !
Et ipse vivas, & Libri vivant diu !
Et Artium, de Te, optimæ certent diu !
Homines priori Opere devinctos habes ;
Nunc Maximum Tibi obligavisti DEUM.

Clemens Barksdallus.

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CHAP. I.

SECT. I.



Aristotle, though an *Ethnick*, poisoned with the *Macedonian* and *Grecian* Idolatry, nay so given over to that sottish impiety, *Polytheisme*, that he could be content to make a *Goddesse* of his *Wench*, and offer solemn sacrifices to her as a *Deity*, whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of *Humanity*, to devote his orisons to her for *good*, whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to *evil*, as *Gassendus* (*Exercitat. 3.*) out of *Diogenes Laert.* hath accused him; had yet a strong and noble sense of the *supreme Being*, as may, even by his adversaries, be collected from hence, that he never durst adventure on a *Definition*, nay not so much as a *Description* of its *Nature*. For

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Section I.
Article I.

Aristotle, the most knowing and curious *Ethnick*, did yet by his silence in the cardinal point of *Theology*, proclaim the impossibility of mans full understanding the simple and perfect *Essence* of *God*.

though he spun out his speculations of *Immateriall Substances*, (the onely and proper theme of a *Metaphysician*) into a long (but knotty and unequal) thread of 14 Books: yet in the 13 first of all those, he seems little better then wholly silent in all things that immediately concern *Theology*; and in some few Chapters onely of the last affords us a sparing and timorous discourse of the *Proprieties*, or *Attributes* of the *First Mover*. Now the pride and ambition of his wit would never have suffered his pen to have skip't over that subject, which being the most abstruse, sublime, and excellent, must by consequence, have adferred the most of glory and renown unto his memory: had he not been fully convicted, from within, of the immense chasme or gulph, that lay between the utmost extent of his own *finite reason*, and the incomprehensibility of the *Essence of God*. This his evasion, or rather supercession, some have been pleased to urge against his honour, as an argument of his *Ignorance* in notions *supernaturall*: but, in my construction, tis the clearest demonstration of the *Modesty* and *Strength* of his *Judgment*. For whoever shall duely consider, how impossible it must be for *humanity*, dull, grosse, and narrow humanity, to behold *Invisibility*, derive *Independency*, calculate *Eternity*, circumscribe *In-circumscription*, limit *Omnipotence*, understand *Omniscience*, &c. and how dangerous a phrensie that brain must be disordered withall, that attempts to describe what he doth not, cannot know: will soon be satisfied, that *Amazement*, and pious silence is the best Lecture man can read on that immense subject, of which when we have said all we can, we have said nothing, if we look forward upon that inexhaustible abyss of excellencies, which must remain unspoken of, and indeed uncomprehended; that a professed *Nescience* in this particular, is the complement, or zenith of all other *Science*, which the miſde of man is capable of in this life; and that *Aristotle* may better pretend to the title of the *divine Philosopher*, for writing so little of the *Deity*, then *Plato* for writing so much to no purpose, the latter speaking little in much, the former all that can be thought in saying nothing.

* Tegygeit. vcl potius
Divin^o is, qui non
multa de Divinis,
Aristoteles:

Lipsius in de Constantioray. 19.

And.

And how far the ancient *Hebrews* (whose frequent *visions* of *Gods* reflexive glories, transmitted to them in the necessary allay of *sensible* natures; as of the pillar of a *Cloud* by day, the pillar of *Fire*, by night, of *Smoak*, *Thunder* and *Lightning* on mount *Sinai*, at the promulgation of the decalogue, &c. might have encouraged them to pretend a nearer acquaintance with *Divinity*, then any other nation of the World) were from daring to conceive any positive *Adumbration* of his *Essence*: sufficiently appears from that high veneration their law enjoined towards his very *Name*, *Jehovah*. Which was never to be pronounced by any, but the *High Priest*; in any place, but the *Sanctum Sanctorum*; at any time, but on the *Festival of annual expiation*; and in any case, but that of generall *benediction*, when the *Mercy* and goodness of God were to be derived down upon the people by the holy mediation of the anointed successors of *Aaron*; under penalty of no lesse then *death*, and particularly that cruel kinde of death appointed for the punishment of *Blasphemy*: as stands recorded in their *Talmud*, in the sad case of *Teradions* son.

Article 3.
The *Hebrews* intimated so much, in the immoderate veneration enjoined toward his Name, *Jehovah*.

Nor can the more illuminated *Christian*, though the super-excellence of his faith justly entitle him to this dignity, above all other darker Religions; that he hath the *true knowledge of God*, (*i. e.*) that he apprehends him under that *Idea*, which he hath been pleased to afford of himself, in the sacred mysteries of the *Gospel*, as of a *Trinity of Persons in an Unity of Substance*, &c. most judiciously and piously collected and knit together in that admirable Anacephalæosis or summary of the *Christian doctrine*, called the *Creed of Athanasius*; raise the eye of his understanding so high, as to look directly upon the *Quiddity*, or pure *Essence* of him whose dwelling is in light inaccessible, and invisible: but must think it happiness great enough for the entrancement of his soul, humbly and awefully to speculate him in the shadow of his *Attributes*, and those onely which mortality is qualified to understand.

Article 3.
The clearer sighted *Christian* also can perceive no more of the *Divine nature* then what is shadowed in its *Attributes*.

Article 4.
And therefore
the Author re-
strains the rea-
ders expectati-
on onely to a
demonstration
of the Existence
of God, in this
Chapter sub-
necting a short
scheme of his
present *designe*
and *Method*.

This being duly perpended, our Reader needs no other advertisement, that in this *Demonstration of the existence of God, from the Idea of him engraven by his own hand on the minde of man,* he is not to expect any bold and vain attempt of the *description of the Formality or simple Quiddity of that supreme Being,* (which is the *Fountain of all other Essences, and Soul of all other Causes*;) and it remains onely on our part, that we tender him an account both of our *designe*, or scope, and of the *method* our pen observes in the periuance thereof.

Though we are fully perswaded, with *Plato* (*Lib. 10. de legib. p. 871.*) upon the conviction of those innate *dictates*, which the reason of every man whispers in the eates of his conscience (which proved the louder thunder of the two, and spoke more terror to the miscreant Emperor) that time never produced such a prodigy, as an *Absolute Atheist, i. e.* such a fool, as durst indubitate the existence of a *Grand-father Principle, or first Intelligence*, from whom, as from the main spring in a Watch, or other Automatus Engine, all motion is derived, and which constantly animates the great machine of the World: yet have we too much ground to suspect, that the accursed sperme of the *Giants* is not yet extinct, that every age can furnish us with a precedent of *Theomachy*, nor need we look beyond our own *Annals* for a second to *Caligula*, or want a parallel for *Epicurus*. Who, though they profest the necessity of a *Deity*, yet sottishly ran into delusions equivalent to the downright denyall thereof, and sinned as high as blasphemy, in their endeavours to cut off those two cardinall and inseparable *Attributes* of the *supreme Essence, viz. Omnipotence, and Omniscient-omnipresence, or Active-ubiquity*; not allowing the *Creation of the World*, out of nothing, to the one, nor the *conservation, or Government* of the same to the other. And having made reflexions upon the unsuccessfull progress many have made, in their enterprises of confuting this sort of implicate *Atheisme*, by the perswasion of *Scripture* only; we became of opinion that to enter the lists with a *Lucian, or Lucretius*, and there contend with him concerning the extent of *Gods Providence* even to every single and individuall nature, urging no other proof of the *Affirmative*

but

but the bare *authority of Canonick Writ* (though to us *Christians* of undoubted truth and more fiduciary then demonstration) is the ready way to confirm him in his impiety, and stiffen his infidelity, in regard a plain and just exception lies against the *Circle*. Nor have we any probable way left to break his objections, but a sober reception of them in the shield of reason, and a smart retort of arguments defum'd from the proper magazine of all temporall knowledge, the *Light of Nature*. Hereupon, when we had determin'd with our selves to erect a building of *Physicall science*, upon those pillars, or principles, which to our judgment appear most solid, firm and permanent, because most sensible in all the operations or effects of *Nature*, that can any way occur to the disquisition of *Philosophy*; as shall be amply commonstrated in the future application of them to particulars: and submitted our assent to that excellent *Rule of the School-men*, *Nulla res qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius*, revived into an *Axiome* by the incomparable *Des Cartes*, in these words; *Omnem omnis scientia certitudinem & veritatem, ab una veri Dei cognitione pendere; adeo ut dum ignoramus Deum esse, & verum esse, nihil omnino de ulla alia re perfecte scire possimus*: we conceived it necessary to begin as high as the *First Cause, God*; and endeavour the demonstration first of his *Existence*, and consequently (for strict reason will never endure their separation) of those two generall operations of his *Wisdom, Power, and Goodness*, viz. (1.) the *Creation* of the world *ex nihilo*, and and (2.) the continuall *Conservation* of the same, in its primitive harmony, by his *Providence*; and this by *Arguments* so purely extracted from the chief inducements of beleeif, that no *Atheist*, how acute, or refractory soever, can justly except against them.

S E C T. II.

TIs an Assertion, which bids defiance to a whole host of *Scepticks*; that the *Soul* of man, while she animates this admirable engine, the *Body*, can apprehend no more of the *Formes of Entities*, then what she reads in those reflex *Characters, Images* or *Ideas*, which she findes represented to her in the mirrour, of *Cogitation*.

B 3

Now

Article 1.

The mind of man can have no cognition of the nature of its objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas.

Article 2. Now of those *Ideas*, or *Representations* exhibited to the understanding, there are three distinct orders 1. Some are *Innate*, or *Congenial*; for that I may understand, what a *Thing* is, what *Truth* is, what the act of *Cogitation* is: I need the assistance, or information of no other nature, but my own. 2. Others are *Adventitious*, or emergent from external objects; for that I actually hear sounds, see the light of the Sun, feel the heat of fire and become sensible of all other qualities of bodies: I have ever hitherto adjudged these acts of sensation to belong to my essence only at second hand, as being derivative from other causes, foreign and alien to my nature. 3. And finally others are *Created*, modelled, or coined in the mint of the *Imagination*; for the *Phantasie* of the most stupid Ideot is naturally empowered to forge, or paint to it self, and represent to the mind what images it please; as *Chimaras*, *Sirens*, *Harpies*, *Goblins*, &c.

Article 3. As for those *Ideas*, on which I look as proceeding from things existent without the circle of my self; I make this enquiry: whether there be any reason sufficient to persuade me to conceive, that such *Ideas* are exactly like to those *things*; whether these *Copies* or transcripts are drawn to the life, so as in all particulars to resemble their *originals*? And the determination, wherewithall I satisfy my self, is this; that the *Affirmative* is taught me by nature, as being hitherto instructed, that those *Ideas* have no dependence at all on my *Will*: and so, by consequence, proceed not from my self, but are obtruded upon my cognition even against my *Will*. For instance, whether I will, or nill, I am sensible of the heat of *Fire*: and therefore think this perception, or *Idea* of heat, to proceed from something distinct from my self, *viz.* from the heat of that fire, by which I stand, and obvious it is, beyond all hesitancy, that I may judge that this fire doth immit into me rather the *similitude* of it self, than any thing else. The stability of which reasons, I shall now strictly examine. When I here say, *I am thus instructed by Nature*; I intend only that I am rapt on, by a certain spontaneous violence, or native propensity, to submit my assent thereunto: not that tis declared

unto me to be a firm and uncontrollable truth, by the *light of Nature*. For I discover a vast and irreconcilable disparity between the *Dictates* of these two *Informers*: and the *Difference* may be stated thus. Whatever things are declared unto me, by the *light of Nature*; as this, that *I am, because I doubt, that 2 and 3 make 5, &c.* can never, on any pretence, be doubted of, in regard there can be no other *faculty*, or *Criterion*, to whose judgement or decision, I can afford so ample and firme credit, as to that of the *light of Nature*, which onely can teach me, whether those things are true or false. But as for those *Inclinations*, or *Propensions naturall*; I have long since found, by deplorable experience, that by them I have been frequently hurried unto, and in a sort impelled upon this *evil*, in my solitary disputes with my self concerning my judicature and election of the *Good*: and therefore am not in any measure convinced, why I should depend upon their information, pursue their conduct, or resigne my assent to their testimony, in other cases. Again, though these *Extradvenient Ideas* depend not on my *Will*; yet is that no valid Argument, that therefore of necessity they must proceed from things without my self: for as those strong *Propensities*, though seated in me, and as it were annexed to my very being, doe yet seem clearly distinct from my *Will*; so also perchance there may be another third *Faculty* within me, which I doe not yet sufficiently understand, that coyns those Ideas, as hitherto my conceptions have ever been, that in my *dreams* such *Ideas* are created in my brain, without the assistance of any forreign *Objects* invading my *senses*. And, lastly, should I grant those *Counterfeits*, or *Ideas*, to be desum'd from things distinct from my selfe; yet could it be no justifiable inference, that therefore they must in all points resemble those things, or *prototypes*, from which they were transmitted: yea, in many particulars, I apprehend them to be disproportionate and dissimilar, *totocælo*, by inequalities never to be parallels. To instance; I finde within my self two divers *Ideas* of the *Sun*, the one taken from my *sense*, (which I therefore think fit to refer to that classis of Ideas, called *Adventitious*) representing the *Sun* in a very small round, of less diameter then a Coach wheel: the other

from:

from the reasons or *maximes* of *Astronomy*, i. e. extracted by way of induction, from certain *Notions* implantate in me, or by any other way whatever composed or modelled; which represents the Sun in a vast circumference, much larger then the Terraqueous Globe. Now both these cannot exactly respond in magnitude to their *Originall*, the *Sun*, existent without me: and reason offers me invincible evidence to assure that image to be the most unlike, which seems to have most neerly streamed from the Sun it self. All which considerations to ample satisfaction evince; that hitherto I have, not upon any *scientificall* and *authentick judgement*, but onely upon a certain *obscure and blinde impulse* from within, beleived, that there are a sort of *Entities* existent without the sphere of my nature, which, by subtle transfusion through the organs of my senses, convey the *Ideas*, or *Idols* of themselves into my mind.

Article 4.
A second disquisition, whether any of those things whose Ideas are found in the mind of man, have any reall existence without it?

But I have found out another certain way, for the more happy progress of my enquiry, *Whether any of those entities whose Ideas sojourn within me, have any reall existence without me; and this is it.* These *Ideas*, considered in this relation, that they are certain *modi cogitandi*, or means which the soul makes use of, in order to her act of *Cogitation*; have indeed no *dissimilitude*, *Alogy*, or inequality amongst themselves, and all seem to flow from me, in one and the same chanel, after one and the same manner: but considered in this interest, that one represents one thing, a second another, a third another quite different from both; manifest it is, that they hugely differ each from other, as to the degrees of more or lesse *objective reality*. For doubtlesse, those *Ideas*, which represent *substances*, are more something, or (to speak more intelligibly, though more scholastically) contain in them more of *objective reality*; then those which represent only certain *modifications* of *substances*, or meer *Accidents*: and again, that *Idea*, by which I speculate some *supreme Essence*, or *Deity eternall, omniscient, omnipotent, creator and conservator* of this great All, &c. seems in severe truth, to comprehend more of *objective Reality*, or *Formall Verity*, then such poor Ideas that carry onely the shadowes of some subordinate, dependent and

and finite substances. Now evident it is, by the *light of Nature*, that there must be so much at least, (if not more) in the *Cause efficient* and *Total*, as is in the *effect* of the same *Cause*. For, I demand, from what can the *effect* derive its reality, but from the *Cause*? and how can the *Cause* bequeath that to the *effect*, which it self is destitute of? Out of which root spring two branches of ever flourishing truth. (1.) *Nihil à nihilo fieri*, nothing can be made by nothing. (2.) *Id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est, quod plus realitatis in se continet, fieri non posse ab eo, quod minus perfectum est*, A more perfect something, *i.e.* which imports more of objective reality, cannot be produced by a lesse perfect something. So that I may safely infer, that this position hath not its verity restrained to those effects onely, whose *Reality* is *Actual*, or *Formal*; but extended also to those *Ideas*, in which is considered only their *Reality objective*. For example; a stone, that never was before, cannot only not now begin to be, unless it be produced by some other thing, which in it self hath formally and eminently what ever is included in the perfect or full nature of the stone; nor can heat be introduced into any subject, that was not formerly hot, unless by something of equal perfection, or at least equivalent to heat: but, besides all this, there cannot be in me the *Idea* of a stone, unless that *Idea* be first inserted into me by some cause, wherein there is so much, at least, of reality, as I conceive to be in the stone, or in the heat. For though that *Cause* transfuse nothing of its *Actual*, or *Formal* reality into my *Idea*; yet am not I therefore to apprehend my *Idea* to be the lesse real, but that the nature of it is such, that it can require no more reality formal *ex se*, then what it borrowes from my *cogitation*, whole manner of apprehension it is. But that this my *Idea*, comprehends this or that objective reality, rather then another: this must of necessity inevitable arise unto it from some other *Cause*, wherein is so much at least of reality *Formal*, as the *Idea* contains of *objective*. For if I grant any thing to be found in the *Idea*, which was not in the *Cause* thereof; that something it must derive from nothing: but how imperfect soever that *Modus essendi*, or manner of being, whereby a thing is *objectively* in the *Intellect*, by an *Idea*, or representative, be; yet is it not

C

wholy

wholy nothing, and cannot therefore proceed from nothing. Nor have I any cause to suspect, that since the reality, which I consider in my Ideas, is onely objective; that therefore the same reality cannot be formally inherent in the causes of them: but that it is sufficient to their nature, that it be in them only objectively. For as that *Modus essendi objectivus* belongs to those Ideas, by the charter of their own peculiar nature; so doth that *Modus essendi formalis* properly belong to their causes, (at least to the principal and grand cause) by the law of their essence.

Article 5.

A firme induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of perfection, then its prototype, or cause.

Further though I allow it possible for one Idea to produce another; yet I can never heer admit a possibility of a progress *in infinitum*, of unravelling the pedigree to a length so immense, as never to goe so high as the *Adam*, or Grandfather Idea, but must at length arrive at the *Ne ultra*, or first Idea, whose cause is the *Archetype* or *Protoplast*, wherein all that reality is inherent *Formally*, which is in the Idea only *objectively*. So that by the light of Nature, I read this unalterable Axiome; *that those Ideas or Images of other natures, or entities, which are in my understanding, are certain Counter-parts, or resemblances, which, in truth, come short of the perfection of those objects, from which they were desumed, and cannot be conceived to contain any thing greater, or of more perfection then their Causes.*

Article 6.

And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection then can be found in our minds: certainly our minds cannot be the efficient of that transcendent Idea.

From hence my thoughts advance to this conclusion. If the reality *objective* of any Idea be so great and excellent, that I may be assured the same cannot be in me, either *Formaliter*, or *Eminenter*; and therefore I cannot be the Cause of that Idea: by direct and genuine inference I determine, that *I am not alone in the World, but that there is existent in the universe some other Being, which is the father of this Idea.* For if I finde no such Idea occur to my minde, in earnest I know no argument, that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from my self.

Article 7.

The diversity of Ideas, respective to the diversity of Entities.

Now among these Ideas (that I may range them into distinct orders respective to the severall Degrees of Entities from which they result, or are derived) there is one which holds forth me to my self (concerning which no difficulty can be started, as

to the concernment of the present *Demonstration*) another which represents *God*; others which pourtray things meerly *Corporeal* and *Inanimate*; others which describe *Angels*; others resemble *Animals*; and finally others that shew me other *men* like my selfe.

As for those *Ideas*, which represent *Men, Animals, or Angels*; I easily understand, that such may be composed and made up of other *Ideas*, which I usually conceive of my self, and other corporeall *Entities*, and of *God*: though there were neither *Men*, nor *Animals*, nor *Angels*, in the whole *World* beside my self. And as for those of *Corporeal Entities*; in them I meet with nothing so great, noble, or excellent, which seems not to have its fountain or origin in my self. For when I make a deep and strict inquisition into them, I discover, that of those things, which they comprehend, there are only very few, which I clearly and distinctly understand; such are *Magnitude*, or *Quantity* extended into its three dimensions of *Longitude, Latitude, Profundity*; *Figure* arising from the termination of that extension; *Situation* of parts, or that position, which parts variously figured obtain and hold among themselves; and *Motion*, or the change of situation in the whole, or parts composing the whole: to which may be superadded *Substance, Duration, and Number*. But as for other things, as *Light, Sounds, Odors, Savors, Heat, Cold*, and other *tactile qualities*; these fall not under the comprehension of my thoughts, but darkly and with as much obscurity as confusion: insomuch that when I have summ'd up all I know of them, it amounts to no more then this; that I am even ignorant whether they be true or false, (*i. e.*) whether such *Ideas*, as I conceive of them, be the *Ideas* of things really existent, or of *Non-entities*. For though I have faithfully observed, that *Falsity*, properly and most emphatically so called, or *Formal falsity*, can be no where found in the world, but in our *judgments, or determinations*: yet is there another *Material falsity* in our *Ideas*, when they represent a *Non-entity* for a real *Entity*, a nothing in stead of a something. Thus, to exemplifie, the representations which I have of *Heat* and *Cold* appear so narrow, dim, and confused; that my most intense and acute speculations cannot acquire from them

Article 8.
The possible originals of each sort severely examined, and all found to be deducible from our selves; the Idea of God only excepted.

any plenary and stable satisfaction, Whether *cold* be only a privation of Heat, or Heat no more but the privation of Cold; Whether both be *real* and *positive qualities*, or neither? and since there can be no *Ideas*, but as of *real* entities; in regard it is a truth apparent, that cold is nothing else, but a privation of heat, that same Idea, which exhibits cold as something real and positive, may justly be reputed false: and so likewise may others of the same series. To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary, that I assigne any other original besides my self; for since they may be *materially false*, (*i. e.*) represent nothing under the disguise of something: it is declared unto me by the *Light of Nature*, that they proceed from nothing, (*i. e.*) that no other reason can be given, why they are in me, but only this; *that something is wanting to my nature, which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and compleat*: and if they were true, yet in respect they exhibit so little of reality, that I cannot, in the most abstracted contemplation, clearly distinguish that little from *nothing*; I see no reason, why they may not worthily be counted the *Minervas* of my own brain, or the productions of my own thoughts. Now as concerning those things, which are clear and distinct in the *Ideas* of *Corporeal Natures*; I have discovered, that some of them also be derived from the Idea of my self: such are *Substance*, *Duration*, *Number*, &c. of the same classis. For when I consider a stone to be a substance, or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting *per se*; and at the same time consider my self also to be a substance (although I conceive my self to be *Res cogitans*, a thinking ens, and look not upon my self as *Res extensa*, a quantitative or extensive; but upon a stone, as *Res extensa*, and not *cogitans*, and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions: yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands. *in termino substantialitatis*) and also when I consider, that I now am, and formerly have been; and when I have various cogitations, whose number I comprehend: I then acquire the *Ideas* of *Duration* and *Number*; which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please. But for the residue of particular things, whereof the *Ideas* of *Corporeal Natures* are composed: as *Extension*, *Figure*, *Situation*, and *Motion*.

tion: these have not their residence in me (since I am nothing else, in propriety of essence, but *Res cogitans*) *formaliter*: and yet, in relation that they are only certain *Modi substantie*, modified substance, and I also am a *substantia*; they seem to be comprehended in me *eminenter*, by way of *transcendency*. And so there remains unexamined only the *Idea of God*; in which I am to consider, whether it include any thing, which cannot be derivative from my self.

By the name *God*, I understand a *certain substance, infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incomprehensible Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intellect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute.*

Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these *Attributes*, that when with deep, yet humble and reverential thoughts I contemplate them, either conjunctively, or distinctively, I become fully informed, that they are too great and noble, to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as my self: and upon this firm foundation I erect to my self this verity; *That God doth exist.* For though the *Idea* of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance: yet it doth not necessarily follow, that therefore I can have the *Idea* of an *infinite* substance, since I am my self but *finite*, unless that *Idea* first proceed from some *substance really infinite*. Nor am I obliged to think, that I do not conceive an *infinite*, by a *true Idea*, but, as most schoolmen will have it, by the *Negation of a finite*, as I understand *Rest* and *Darkness* by the *negation of Motion* and *Light*: for, on the contrarie, I perspicuously understand, that there is more of *Reality* in an *infinite* substance, then in a *finite*; and by consequence that the perception of an *infinite* essence, the *Deity*, is elder then, and so precedent unto the perception of a *finite* essence, *my self*. For I demand of the whole world, by what means possible I should come to understand, that I doubt, desire, &c. (*i.e.*) that

Article 9.

The *Idea* of *God*, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others.

thing is wanting to my nature, which I finde requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no Idea of a more perfect being, by comparing whose perfections to my own deficiencies, I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being.

Nor can it be objected that the *Idea* which I conceive of *God* is *materially false*, and therefore possible to be desumed from nothing, as those Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold* formerly examined: for on the contrary, in this interest, that tis transcendently *clear* and *distinct*, and comprehends more of *objective reality*, then any other Idea, which the minde of man can either conceive, or create; no one is more *true per se*, nor in which less suspicion of falshood can be detected. This Idea, I say, of the supreme Being, perfect and infinite, is most true; for though it might be imagined possible, that there is no such entity existent, as my Idea represents: yet cannot it be imagined, that the Idea of this *Ens summum* can exhibit unto me nothing real, as may the Ideas of *Heat*, *Cold*, &c. Moreover, I am confirmed, that this Idea of *God*, is of all others the most *clear* and *distinct*; for whatever of reality, verity and perfection, I clearly and distinctly perceive in all other Ideas, is radically concentred in this one, as in the Archtype, or universal fountain. Nor can this my beleif be staggered by this weak objection, that I cannot comprehend an infinite, or that, besides these Attributes mentioned in the description of this super-excellent Idea, there are myriads of other *Excellencies* in *God*, which are too resplendent and remote to be gazed upon by the weak and purblind eye of mans understanding, and too numerous to fall under the short Arithmetick of reason, much less to be epitomized or decyphered in the unequall landskip of my cogitations: for I know full well, that it is of the nature of an Infinite, not to be comprehended by me, that am finite; that it is sufficient for me to understand only so much, and to judge all those things, which I perceive to contain, or import any perfection, and perchance innumerable other dignities, of which I am yet ignorant, to be in *God* either formally, or eminently. So the Idea, which I conceive of him, is of all others, to which my intellect can extend its power of apprehension, the most *perspicuous* and *distinct*.
Not-

Notwithstanding, that I may leave no doubt to eclipse the splendor of this assertion, I permit my thoughts to run into this expostulation. Perhaps I have not the just dimensions of my own essence; that I am a far greater and more perfect something, than hitherto I have perceived my self to be; and that all those excellencies, which I speculate in the *Idea of God*, are in some measure *potentially* in my nature, though hitherto they have lain dormant, in *Capacity* only, and have not been deduced into *act*: for I already find my *Cognition* much increased, nor can I discover any impediment, wherefore it may not be every day more and more enlarged even to infinity; nor also, my cognition being so advanced, why I may not at length, by the benefit and advantage thereof, aspire and arise to all those perfections of God; nor, finally, why this capacity of arriving at all those perfections, may not suffice, upon the stock of its own single power, to the production of their true and adequate *Idea*. And I am answered from my domestick oracle, the *Light of Nature*; that not one of those illations can stand. For, first, though it be true, that my knowledge may by degrees be very much multiplied; and that many things are in *potentia* in me, which are not yet awaked into their proper operations: yet not one of all those properly belong to the *Idea of God*, in which there is nothing at all *Potential*; for this very condition, to be capable of augmentation by degrees, is an undeniable argument of imperfection. Secondly, though my cognition should be more and more augmented; nevertheless I understand, that it could never be actually infinite, because it could never be raised to such an *ἄκμην*, or zenith, as to be above all possibility of farther access: but my *Idea* of the divine nature represents him actually infinite, so that nothing is wanting, nothing can be added to the perfection of his nature. And lastly, I perceive that the *objective esse* of an *Idea* cannot be produced by a bare *potential esse*, which (to speak like a metaphysician, and properly) is a meer nothing: but only by an *Actual*, or *Formal*.

Now albeit there is not one among all these notions, which to my retired and circumspect consideration, doth not appear a most serene:

Article 10.

A declaration of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from our selves:

serene, noble, and illustrious truth, demonstrable by the *light of Nature*: yet since, when with more loose and unattentive thoughts I examine them, and when the grosser images of corporeal and sensible natures benight the opticks of my reason; I cannot so easily make it out, why the Idea of a being more noble and perfect than my own, must of necessity proceed from some such other being, which is really more perfect; for this respect, I say, I lead on my mind to a further enquiry, *viz. Whether or no I, who have this Idea, could have an existence, if there were no such Ens as my Idea adumbrates, really existent?* To particular; from what original should my being descend? either from *my selfe*, or my *Parents*, or some other essences of perfection infinitely inferior to that of God; for no phansie can be so wild, as to feigne any thing more perfect than, nay not equally perfect with him. Now had I received my being from my selfe, undoubtedly I should not then have been subject to those frailties of *Dubitation* and *Desideration*, nor would any thing have been wanting to my nature: for at the same instant, when I gave to my selfe a being, assuredly I should have given unto my selfe also all those perfections, whereof I have the Idea in my mind, and so I my selfe should have been God. Nor am I bound to conceive, that those *excellencies*, wanting to the accomplishment of my nature, can be more difficult to acquire, than those graduall abilities, of which I am already master: for on the contrary, tis manifest, that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being, (*i. e.*) for a *Cogitant something* to be deduced from *nothing*, then for me being once constituted in a *Capacity*, to attain to the cognition of many things, whereof I am now actually ignorant, which can be esteemed no more but the *Accidents* of that *substance*. And assuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my *substantiality*, from my own stock of power; I should not have denied unto my selfe the lesse, those *Accumulations*, or accidentall additions, nor any other of those divine accomplishments, which I understand to be included in the Idea of God: why? because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired; and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto, tis more then probable I should understand that difficulty, if

if I had those *Faculties*, of which my nature stands possessed, from my own donation, in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them. Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of these reasons, if I adventure on this supposition; that I have been ever heretofore, as I now am: as if the induction of this hypothesis would be, that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher than my self, or seek out no other cause of my Existence; for in respect that all *time* may be divided into innumerable parts, each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest, either precedent, or subsequent; from hence, that I have formerly been, is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be, unless some other cause be admitted, which doth freshly create me in each of those particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this instant moment, (*i. e.*) doth constantly conserve me in being. For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of *Duration*; that to the *Conservation* of any thing through all those several minutes, in which its existence endureth, is required no less then the same power and act, which is necessary to the *Creation* of the same thing anew, if it were not already existent: and consequently, that the act of *Conservation* doth not at all, but in the cloudy reason of man, differ from the act of *Creation*. These things thus stated, I am concerned to propose to my self this interrogation; Whether there be any power inherent in my nature, whereby I may be enabled to conserve my self the same in the future that I am now in the present? for since I am nothing but a meer *res cogitans* (for here I precisely regard only that part of my self, which is properly and distinctly a *Cogitant substance*) if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence, doubtless I should be conscious of it; but I am convicted, there is none such, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being, for the shortest moment imaginable: I judge, that I am subordinate unto, and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from my self. But (to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation, in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusion) put the case, that this Entity, to whose sufficiency I owe my Conservation (pardon ô! thou incomprehensible *Essence*, thou

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great

great and sole *Preserver of men*, pardon this supposition, that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy *Supremacy*) is not God; and that I deduce my production from my *Parents*, or some other cause less perfect than God. For determination; tis an *Axiome*, to which every Sceptick will readily condescend, *Tantum ad minimum esse debere in causa, quantum est in effectu*, there must be so much at least in the cause, as is found in the effect: and therefore since I am *res cogitans*, a substance thinking, and having a certain Idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being, that cause also must be *Ens cogitans*, and must possess the Idea of all those perfections, which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were derived from it self, or from some other Cause; for if from it selfe, then may it be naturally collected, from what hath preceded in this disquisition, that such a Cause is God. For as it hath the power (or act) of *self-existence*, or *self-conservation*: so also, undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections, the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self, (*i. e.*) all such accomplishments, as I conceive to be concentrated in God.

Article II.
 Of from some
 other cause less
 perfect than
 God.

But if from some other cause; then I repeat my question again concerning this other cause, whether that had its being from it self, or from another, untill I arrive successively at the *first Cause*, or highest linke in the chain: which also will be God. For no melancholy can be so absurd, as to dream of a progress in *infinitum* in the series of Causes; especially, since I doe not here intend that Cause only, which did in *time past* produce me, but principally that, which doth *conserve* me in the *present*. Nor can it be imagined, that a *plurality of Causes* met, concurred, and conspired to the making up of my nature, and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God; from a second the Idea of another; from a third, the Idea of another, &c. so that all those perfections may, indeed, be found *severally* in the distinct and scattered peices of the *Universe*, but no where *conjoynd* and amassed together in one single

single Essence, which might be God. For on the contrary, the *Unity, Simplicity, Inseparability, or Identity* of all those excellencies in God, is one of the chiefest of those perfections, which I understand to be in him: nor, assuredly, could the Idea of the *Unity* of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause, from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also; nor could he have effected, that I should understand them *conjoynd* and married together by an indissoluble union: unless he had also effected, that I should know what they are, in their *distinction*.

To expunge the last scruple, and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God, fair and immaculate; have not my *Progenitors* devolved a being to my *Parents*, and they devolved the like to me? and may not this Idea of those perfections, which I attribute to God, be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation, without the necessary insertion of it, by the immediate hand of any such *Supreme nature* really existent, in which all those *Attributes* are *Formally* inherent, and coessential? By no means. For though I may, in some latitude, allow my *Parents* to be the causes of my generation; yet cannot I think them to be the cause of my Conservation, since they cannot conserve themselves: nor have they made me what I am, (*i. e.*) constituted me to be *Res cogitans*, an Entitie whose nature is to think; but onely as subordinate and instrumental causes, have contributed certain requisite dispositions, or qualifications to that matter, in which I understand my self, (*i. e.*) my mind or rational soul (which in this discourse, I constantly take for the whole of my self) to be enshrined. And upon the credit of this consideration, there can be no difficulty taken up to countermand the certitude of my assertion; but I may safely conclude: that from this position, *I am existent, and my minde contains a certain Idea of a most perfect being, (i. e.) of God; it is most genuinely and most evidently demonstrated, that God is also Existent.*

Article 12.
Or from our
Parents.

Article 13.
The concernment of all; or a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man.

Having sufficiently assured my self, that this Idea, which I have of the *Supreme Being*, or most and only perfect *Ens*, is too excellent to be desumed from *my self*, from my *Parents*, or from *other Causes*, which import not so much of *Reality Formal* and *Eminent*, as the Idea imports of *objective*: it remains only, that I explore *how and when I received this Idea from God*. For I never drew it in through the windowes of my *senses*; nor was it ever obtruded upon me without either my expectation, or notice, as frequently the Ideas of sensible objects are, when those objects offer themselves to the external organs of the senses; nor was it ever *modelled*, or coyned by me, in the laboratory of my *Imagination*, since it is not in my power either to detract any thing from, or superadd any thing unto it: Wherefore it must be primitively *implanted* in, and *congenial* to my very *Essence*, no otherwise then as the Idea of my self is implanted, or essentially impressed upon my self. And surely, to a sober and well ordered consideration, it can seem no wonder, that God, when he was pleased to create me, hath imprinted this Idea of himself upon my *Soul*, that it might remain as an indelible *Mark* or *Signature*; whereupon when I reflect my cogitations, I should instantly know and acknowledge my self to be the work of his almighty hand. Nor is it necessary, that this *Mark* or *Impress* should be a thing plainly distinct from the *work* it self, from my *Essence*; but upon this one ground, that God hath created me; tis very credible; that he created me, in some degree, or respect, after the *Similitude* and image of himself, and that this *Similitude*, wherein the Idea of God is included, may be understood by me, by the operation or information of the same *Faculty*, by which I am empower'd to understand my self: (*i. e.*) that when I convert the eye of my *Soul*, my reason, inwards upon my self; I doe not only clearly perceive my self to be an *Entity incompleat*, *dependent* on some *Superior principle*, and *indefinitely aspiring* to *greater and better things*: but at the same instant, I understand also that *Superior Principle*, upon which I depend, to possess all those greater accomplishments, not *indefinitely* and *in potentia* only, but even *infinitely* and *actually*, and so to be God.

And

And so all the nerves of the Argument may be twisted together into this short (though never-to-be-broken) Cord ; that I cannot but acknowledge it an absolute impossibility that I should exist, being of such a nature as I am, (*i. e.*) having the Idea of God imprinted upon my mind, unless God also did really exist : that very God, I mean, whose Idea is in me, (*i. e.*) an *infinite essence actually possessing all perfections*, which though I cannot comprehend, yet in some degree I can, with humility and veneration, speculate, through the perspective of profound and abstracted Cogitation.

Article 14.
An abstract, or Anacephalaxis of the whole demonstration.

S E C T. III.

NOW in consideration that many of those *Metaphysical Terms*, and *singular expressions*, which I have been forced to make use of in the precedent demonstration of the *Existence of God*, may be conceived either too *difficult* for the unriper sort of heads, or at least *ambiguous*, and therefore subject to perversion, as not being sufficiently adequate and restrained to those notions, to which I have applied them ; I have thought it requisite to subjoyn the particular *Explanation*, or proper *definition* of each, that I could believe subject to obscurity, or exception.

In the word *Cogitation*, I comprehend whatsoever is so contained in us, that we are immediately conscious thereof. Thus all the operations of the Will, Intellect, Imagination, and Senses fall under this one notion of Cogitations: and the particle *immediately*, I have annexed to exclude all those things, that are consequent to these operations, as motion voluntary hath Cogitation for its original, but is it self plainly distinct from cogitation.

Article 1.
The importance of the term, Cogitation.

By an *Idea*, I understand that forme of any Cogitation, by the immediate perception whereof I come to be fully conscious of that particular cogitation ; so that I can express no one thing in words, when I understand what I speak, but from thence it is made evident unto me, that I have in me the particular Idea of

Article 2.
Of an Idea.

that thing, which I signifie by those words. And so I doe not call only those *Images* depicted or engraven on my *Phansie*, Ideas: yea, in this discourse, I doe not allow them to be Ideas as they are depicted in my *Phansy corporeal*, i. e. in any parcel of my brain; but only as they serve, as certain characters, to informe my *minde*, when converted upon that part of my brain, where my phansie is seated.

Article 3.
Of the objective reality of an Idea.

By the *objective reality* of an Idea, I intend the *Entity* of that thing represented by that Idea. And according to the same intention, we may say, the *Perfection objective*, or *Artifice objective*, &c. For whatever things we perceive as in the objects of Ideas, the same things in every particular are objectively included in the Ideas of those objects.

Article 4.
Of the Formal, and eminent being of Attributes in the objects of Ideas.

The same things are said to be *Formally* in the objects of Ideas, when they are truly such in them, as we perceive them to be, or when our Ideas expressly respond to their nature: and *Eminently*, when they are not indeed *Talia*, but *Tanta*, equivalent, inso-much that they may be their convenient substitutes, or serve in their rooms.

Article 5.
Of a Substance.

A *Substance* signifies any thing wherein, as in *subjecto*, is immediately inherent any *Quality*, or *Attribute*, whose Idea is in us; or upon which any thing, that we perceive, immediately depends for its existence. For we can have no other Idea of a substance, precisely so taken, more than this; that it is a thing, wherein either *Formally*, or *Eminently* that something which we perceive, or which is objectively in any of our Ideas, hath its necessary existence: why? because the light of Nature makes authentick that *Axiome*, *Nullum esse nihili reale attributum*; or, as *Aristotle*, *Non-entis non sunt Accidentia*.

Article 6.
Of the word, Mind.

By the terme *Mens*, the *Mind*, I import a substance, whose prime Attribute is Cogitation; for in this place I speak rather of the *Mind*, than of the *Soul*, in regard the word *Soul* is equivocal, and frequently used to express something corporeal.

By

By a *Body* is implied that *Substance* which is the immediate subject of *extension local*, and other accidents, which presuppose extension, as *Figure*, *Situation*, *local Motion*, &c.

Article 7.
Of a *Body*.

Two substances are said to be really distinguish'd, when each of them can really subsist without the assistance of the other.

Article 8.
Of the real distinction of two substances.

That *substance*, which we understand to be *supremely perfect*, and wherein we perceive no defect, or limitation of perfection to be involved, is that we call *God*.

Article 9.
Of the substance supremely perfect.

S E C T. IV.

THE Achilles, or most potent objection, which not only the fierce Militia of the Pulpit; but even such more temperate heads, as have not been refined to a height sufficient to admit the tincture of abstracted and immaterial notions, may send to encounter my Assertion, *That I have a clear, distinct, and true Idea of God in my mind*, is this: *Infinitem, quâ infinitum, est ignotum*, that God being infinite, and therefore incomprehensible, tis impossible for man, while his intellect is muffled up in flesh, to have a clear and distinct Idea of his Being. To instance in a thing, betwixt which and the infinity of God is a vast disparity; let the most Geometrical wit in the World think with the most serious, midnight and fixt attention, upon a *Chiliagon*, or figure with a 1000 Angles: yet shall he acquire in his mind, but a dark and confus'd representation or modell thereof, and cannot distinctly either adumbrate or conceive that chiliagonicall figure; because he doth not particularly and totally speculate each one of the 1000 sides, or *lateral lines*, of which it doth consist. And if so, well may it be doubted, how I can conceive the Idea of an *Infinite*, distinctly and without confusion; when I cannot exalt my thoughts to survey all those innumerable perfections, which meet together to the constitution of its infinity.

Article 1.
Object. 1.
That the mind of man, being finite, cannot extend to the clear and distinct intellection of an Infinite, quatenus an Infinite: and the

This doubt I must welcome, and honour, as the laudable effect of that due veneration, or noble zeal, which ought to be kindled

Solution thereof by three distinctions.

kindled in every brest, upon the sense of that immense disproportion betwixt the invisibility, infinity, and incomprehensibility of the Creator; and the narrow extent, or, indeed, the comparative nothing of the Creature; nor can I think the debasement of our own limited nature, other then a pious and worthy cognizance of the majesty and incircumscription of his: yet to satisfy, that none can have a more lively apprehension of his own frailties, infirmities and defects, nor a greater esteem of the excellencies and accomplishments of God, then my self; and that I more then once look't upon, and throughly examined the weight of this scruple, long before I thought it safe to acquiesce in the Affirmative, I thus answer.

1. An *Infinite*, *quatenus an infinite*, can, in troth, by no means be *comprehended*; and yet nevertheless it may be *understood*: in-
somuch as clearly and distinctly to understand the nature of any thing to be such, as that no limits, terminations, or circumscriptions can be found therein; is clearly and distinctly to understand the same to be infinite. And heer I distinguish betwixt *Indefinitum* and *Infinitum*; calling, properly and precisely, that an *infinite*, in which no limits, terms, or ends can be, on any part, discovered; in which acceptation, God is only infinite: but such things, wherein, under some latitude of reason only, I acknowledge no end or termination; such are the extensions of the imaginary space without *Trismegistus* his circle, or on the outside of the world; the multitude of Numbers; the divisibility of the parts of quantity, &c. such I call *Indefinite*, and not infinite, because on some part they must confels a finality, or termination.
2. Again, I put a difference between the *Formal Reason*, or *Infinity* of an infinite; and the *subject* of that infinity, or *thing* which is infinite. Now, as for the *Infinity*; though we understand that to be most *Positive*; yet we cannot understand it but only by a kind of *Negation*, *viz.* from hence, that we can discover no limitation in the thing: but as for the *subject* of this infinity, or *infinite thing*, we understand it *Positively*, but not *adequately* (*i. e.*) we doe not comprehend all that is intelligible in that thing. Thus when we cast our eyes upon the Sea, though
our

fight cannot extend to all and every part thereof, nor measure every inch of its immense vastity; yet may we be properly said to behold the sea. And if we look upon it at a great distance, so that our eyes seem to take it in all at once, we do not see it but dimly and confusedly, as it were in a thin, blew landskip; as also we do not imagine a Chiliagon but obscurely and in fractures, when we comprehend all the lateral lines thereof at once: yet if we approach the sea at a very vicine distance, and earnestly fixe our eyes upon any one part thereof, such a vision may be clear and distinct, as also may the imagination of a Chiliagon, if our Phansie extend to no more, then one or two of the sides thereof at once. By the same reason, that God cannot be comprehended by the narrow mind of man, I willingly grant, with all the schoolmen; nor can he be distinctly understood by those, who unadvisedly endeavour to comprehend him all at once, and as it were to gaze upon him a far off; in which laudable sense, the most subtile D^r Thom. Aquin. affirmed, *Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, in quantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, id naturaliter nobis insertum est*, that the cognition of the Being of God, is implanted in our minds, under a certain confusion, or cloudy representation: but whoever, with a previous awe, and becoming reverence, shall endeavour to single out his perfections, contemplate each successively, not so much to comprehend them, as to be comprehended by them, and employ all the nerves of their intellect (sequestred from the contagion of *sensibility* and *Corporeity*) in the long and wary speculation of them: such happy persons shall assuredly find in him more satisfactory, ample, and easie matter of clear and distinct cognition, then in all the world beside.

Thirdly, I discriminate an Intellection *Adequate*, from an Intellection *Gradual*, or conforme to the slender capacity of man. For the *First*, twere madness beyond the power of *Hellebor* for any man to dream, that he could understand an Infinite, *Conceptu adequato*, by a comprehension fully as large, and exactly proportionate unto that Infinite; nay it may be a very hard question, whether the armes of our understanding be long enough to commensurate the full nature of any Finite object, though nere so

E small,

small, by an Idea exactly respondent, and equal in all points: for the other, every sober man is able to find within himself, that the wings of his mind are not so clipt, as that it cannot aspire to the *Gradual* cognition of an Infinite, *finita & ad modulum humani ingenii accommodata cognitione*. If any shall pervert this *Distinction* to so sinister a latitude, as to retort; that when I confess my understanding too shallow and dark to comprehend an infinite, *Conceptu adaequato*, I doe at the same time implicitly concede, that I can know no more then a *part* of an infinite, and indeed the least part which can be said to carry the representation of an infinite no more then the effigies of one single hair to represent the whole body of a man: I shall smoothly rejoyne, that to affirm, that if we fully comprehend any thing, that thing must be infinite, is a plain and obvious contradiction *in terminis*; since the Idea of an infinite, if true, cannot be comprehended, *Incomprehensibility* being the formal attribute of an infinite; and yet nevertheless it is evident, that the Idea, which we have of an infinite, doth resemble not only some one particular part, but even really and truly the whole thereof, *co modo, quo representari debet per humanam ideam*, though doubtless a far more accurate and distinct, (*i. e.*) perfect Idea may be allowed to be in the more luminous and clear intellect of *God*, of *Angels*, or other *natures* more intelligent then man. Thus we doubt not, but a *Clown*, who never heard of *Euclid*, or learned one *Axiome* in *Geometry*, may notwithstanding have in his mind the Idea of a whole *Triangle*, when he is once instructed, that a *Triangle* is a *Figure* comprehended in three lines, though he remain ignorant of many other things, which a learned *Geometrician* knowes intelligible in that *Figure*, and insatiably speculates in the Idea thereof: for, as to understand a figure included in three lines, is sufficient to acquire the Idea of a whole *Triangle*; so also to understand a thing not to be comprehended or terminated by any limits or ends, is sufficient to the acquisition of a true and entire Idea of the whole infinite.

This

This Idea you have of God, is no more then *Ens rationis*, a meer figment, or Chimæra, that hath no existence at all but in your intellect; and therefore hath no more of perfection, or reality objective then your own mind that framed it.

Ens rationis hath a double signification; (1.) it imports a meer abstracted *Notion*, devoid of all reality, or a pure *Non-entia*; (2.) it signifies every operation of the intellect, or, more plainly, *Ens a ratione profectum*: in which acceptation, the whole World may be properly stiled *Ens rationis divina*, or an entity created by a simple and pure act of the divine intellect. Now in this last sense only can I allow that transcendent Idea of God to be *Ens rationis*, a clear and distinct representation of the most perfect Being, engraven by his own finger upon my understanding: and to that unprevaricate judgment, that shall maturely perpend the contents, and logical connexion of our precedent meditation, it will plainly appear, that we intend such a *Perfection*, or *reality objective* in this Idea, which (no less then that *Artifice objective*, which is in the Idea of any engine most ingeniously fabricated) requires a *Cause*, wherein all that is *really* and *formally* contained, which is included in the Idea only *objectively*, and at second hand, or by reflexion.

Though we grant your *Thesis*, that this Idea hath more of *Perfection*, or *objective reality*, then your *Mind*: yet cannot your *Assumption* stand, that therefore your *Mind* cannot be the *Author* of this Idea; since an *Effect* may have a degree of *Perfection*, or *reality*, which neither is, nor ever was in the *Cause* thereof. To instance, common observation teacheth, that Flies, Frogs, &c. insects, as also some Plants are generated by the Sun, rain, and earth mutually cooperating by a kind of seminal con-fermentation, or fertile putrefaction; and yet in neither of those causes will any man allow so high a *Perfection*, as that of *Vitality*: *Ergo, &c.*

My *Inference* is founded on the rock of reason, and therefore too impregnable to be demolished by so feeble a battery. For *first*, it is indubitate, that there can be no *Perfection* in *Animals* de-

Article 2.

Object. 2.

That the Idea of the divine nature, resident in the mind of man, is a meer *Ens rationis*: and the

Solut.

Article 3.

Object. 3.

That an *effect* may have more of reality, or perfection then its *Cause*: and the

Solut.

voyd of reason, which is not also in bodies devoyd of Animation; or if there were, that Perfection must be extradvenient, or derived unto them from some forreign principle: nor are the Sun, rain, and earth the Adequate Causes of Insects, or Animals whose production is spontaneous and without other seminalitie, then that analogous sperme of corruption; and it sounds discordant in the harmonious ears of logick for any man, only because he is ignorant of any other Cause that may conduce to the generation of an insect. (*i. e.*) hath so many degrees of perfection, as an Insect hath, therefore to stagger the truth of an Axiome ratified by the Light of Nature. For, *Quod nihil sit in effectū, quod non vel simili, vel eminentiori aliquo modo praexistit in causa*, is a First notion, at which no man can quarell, but he must implicitly abjure his own reason: nor doth the ancient and vulgar maxime, *à nihilo nihil fieri*, differ from it, but only in terminis; because if it be conceded, that any thing is found in the effect, which cannot be found in its cause, it must also be conceded, that this something was made by nothing; nor am I convinced why nothing may not be the cause of something, but only from this evidence to the contrary, that in such a cause there would not be the same, nor any thing equivalent unto that, which is in the effect. Secondly, that my Mind cannot be the Efficient cause of this transcendent Idea, needs neither declaement, nor support, other then this canonical position; that whatsoever reality or perfection is only objectively in our Ideas, must be either formally, or at least eminently in their prototypes, or originals: and upon this one pin hangs all the certification, or assurance, that any man can have of the real existence of any other thing in the world (the Supreme Being only excepted) besides himself; for from what hint could we have suspected, that such or such things are existent, without the orb of our own nature, but only from this: that their idea, or representations have been conveyed into our minds, by the organs of our senses? And that we have a certain Idea, or umbrage of the most potent and most perfect Being; as also, that the Reality objective of this Idea is so excellent, as that it cannot be discovered to be in us either Formally, or Eminently: will be so clear, serene, and orthodox a truth, as to be sworne to
by

by any, who with thoughts sufficiently constant and attentive (for it is a chief *Postulate*, or requisite condition on the behalfe of any man, that intends his own satisfaction in this abstruse particular, *ut diu multumque in natura Entis summe perfecti contemplanda immoretur*) shall be pleased to consort their meditations with mine upon this excellent and most necessary subject. For tis not in the power of my pen to obtrude that notion upon any man, the admission and retention whereof immediately depend upon his own cogitation; I mean an assurance of the certitude of this demonstration, when he is resolved not to be divorced from that uncomely grandmother of Error, *Prejudice*; nor to open the ears of his beileif to the most prevalent charms of argument, or taste those limpid streams, which flow from the fount of all our knowledge, the *Light of Nature*.

Whereas, upon a profound and calme consideration of all, and each of those Attributes enumerated in your description of that excellent Idea, which you pretend to have of God; as that he is a substance, infinite, independent, superlatively both intelligent and potent, by which your self and all the world was created, &c. we find it not demonstratively necessary, that the Idea of such an *Ens*, wherein all those perfections are concentrated and united, should be implanted in your mind immediately by that *Ens*: we conclude that it may be framed and composed of your several *Collections* from other *external* objects. To descend to particulars. (1.) When by the word, *God*, you understand a *Substance*; *Reason* not any Idea, assures you, that *God* doth *exist*: *Substance* and *Existence* being twins, that cannot live but conjoynd hand in hand. (2.) From the notion *Infinite*, (*i. e.*) something that you cannot comprehend, nor imagine any limits, or extremes therein, so as that your thoughts can ever arrive at a *Ne ultra*: there ariseth unto your mind an Idea not of an *Infinity divine*; but of the termination or circumscription of your finite nature. (3.) *Independent* sounds no more then this, that you cannot conceive, or imagine any cause or original of *God*: from whence tis manifest, that from the terme *Independent*, you can collect no other Idea, but the memory of your own Ideas, which had their several

Article 4.

Object. 4.

That the existence of such an excellent Idea, as hath been described of the *Divine Nature*, doth not necessitate the existence of an *Entity*, in all points respondent, or superior thereto: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our collections from *sensible objects*; and the ample

originations at such and such times, and therefore are dependent. Wherefore, to say that God is independent, is nothing more than that God is in the number of those things, of which you can imagine no original, or Cause: as also, to say that God is infinite, is all one, in the import, with this, that God is in the catalogue of those things, wherein your thoughts can discover no end, limitation, or circumscription. And thus every Idea of God is excluded; for what Idea can there be, without either original, or termination? (4.) *Superlatively Intelligent*; here we desire to be informed, by what kind of Idea you understand the Intellection of God? (5.) *Most potent*; here also we require by what Idea you can understand potency, which imports things in *futuro* only, and therefore not existent? undoubtedly we ascend to the cognition of power, by the steps of Memory, and reflexion upon former actions, progressing by the conduct of Ratiocination, thus; thus he hath done, ergo he had power thus to doe, ergo being still the same, he hath power to doe the like again in the future. Now all these are Ideas, which may be extracted from external objects, (6.) *Creator* of all things; we can pourtray to our selves a certain resemblance of a *Creation*, by drawing the reflexions of those things we have seen with our eyes; as when we imagine a man beginning and growing as it were from a point to that figure and magnitude, which he hath in his full stature or virility: nor are we perswaded that any man can have other Idea than this, at the word *Creator*; but yet that we can imagine the world to be created, is no obliging argument to prove the creation. And therefore, though it had been demonstrated by you, that something *Infinite, Independent, &c.* doth exist; yet could it be no genuine inference, that therefore a *Creator* doth exist; unless you shall adventure to undertake the justification of this argument; something is existent, which we beleive to have created all things beside it self; ergo the world was once created by that something. In fine, when you affirme that the Idea of God, as also of your own Soul, is *implantate* in and *congenial* to your *Essence*, we desire to be instructed, whether the souls of men, when they sleep most profoundly and without dreams, exercise their faculty of *Cogitation*; or more plainly, whether they think?

if no, then at such times they have no Ideas: and therefore no Idea can be innate, or congenial, for what ever is *innate*, is always *present*.

To the *first part* of this *objection* I answer in general; that no one of those Attributes, which belong to my Idea of the *supreme Being*, can possibly be deduced from *External objects*, as from an original, or primitive exemplar: because in God we can find nothing which holds any analogy, or similitude to those things that are in *Corporeal Entities*; but whatsoever we contemplate in our Ideas that is dissimilar or disproportionate to corporeal natures, that must proceed not from them but from the cause of that diversity in our cogitation. And here I demand, how any man can deduce the Idea of the *Intellection* of God from corporeal objects? but what kind of Idea I have thereof, I fully explain, when I say, that by an Idea I intimate *all that, which is the forme of any perception*: and who is there, that doth not perceive (the *Philosopher* calls it a *reflex act of the intellect*) that he doth understand the nature of this or that object, upon which his cogitations is acting; and by consequence, who hath not an Idea of his own *Intellection*, which by indefinite extending of it, he forms to an Idea of the divine *Intellection*, and so of all other of his Attributes?

To the *other part* I return, in brief; that whereas I have made use of the Idea of God, which is impressed upon the mind of man, as an invincible argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and that in this Idea so immense a *Powerty* is included, that we may understand it to be repugnant to reason, if God doth exist, that any thing besides him in the world can exist unless it be created by him, and dependent upon him: it cannot but appear a direct and just induction, that the whole world, or all things else which are in being besides God, were *created* by him. To untie the last knot concerning the *eclipse* of this Idea of God, in our midnight sleeps, when all our *Faculties* disappear; it is required only that I advertise the Reader, that when I affirm that there is a certain Idea of God *innate* and *congenial* to us, I doe not mean that this Idea is *always obversant*, or constantly held forth to the eyes of our mind; for in that sense no Idea can be innate: but only that we have within us a certain *Faculty* or *Power* *istam ideam*.

Solut.

ideam eliciendi, of extracting it; or that by the dignity of our Essence, we are empower'd to speculate that *Impress* or *Signature* of the *Deity*, when we convert our cogitations attentively upon it.

Article 5.
Object. 5.
That the Idea
conceived
of God, is
capable of Aug-
mentation and
diminution:
and the clear

Though we should applaud your *superstructure*, that the Idea of God is not to be delum'd from any other cause but himself; yet can we not but suspect the stability of your *Corner-stone*, or capital reason thereof, *viz. that nothing can be superadded unto, nothing detracted from that Idea*. And toward the subversion of it, we need adterre no greater an engine, then our friendly advice, that you would consider how smal a garden-plot of science, well manured, may in process of time be enlarged into a spacious *campania*; that tis not impossible for you to be informed, either by men more learned then your self, or by the extraordinary revelation of Angels, or some other communication from other natures more intelligent then man, of many more perfections or Attributes in God, then you have hitherto discovered: that God himself may be pleased, by the irradiations of his sacred Spirit, so to illuminate your intellect even in this life of ignorance, as to afford you a brightet reflex of his glories, and so augment your knowledge of his excellencies: that your Soul, when she shall have the dark curtain of flesh withdrawn by the rough hand of death, and be advanced to the *Beatifical vision*; shall know so much more of *Divinity*, then what you can apprehend now, that in comparison thereof your present Idea of it, may well be accompted imperfect, and therefore capable of addition: that in your infancy you perceived no such Idea at all; at least it was not so accurate and perfect as at this day, when it hath received the accessses of your more learned speculations: in short, that as you have not attained a full cognition of the perfections of *inferior essences*, nor can ever hope for it, at once, but must ascend by the successive gradations of new discoveries; so can you not acquire a full cognition of the *Perfections* of the *supreme Ens*, at once, but may have your Idea of him made more and more perfect every day, by new additions.

Solut.

When you reprehend this tenent of mine, that the Idea of God engraven on the mind of man, is incapable either of *Addition*, or

or *Subtraction*, you seem to have no regard to that Rule amongst Philosophers, *Essentias rerum esse indivisibiles*. For an Idea represents the *Essence* of a thing; to which, if ought be added, or from which, if ought be subtracted, instantly it becomes the Idea of another thing. And by reason of their ignorance of this truth, the Heathen, not conceiving aright of the *true God*, fell into the wofull delusion of framing to themselves the Ideas of *false ones*, and chiefly that of *Pandora*, ὅτι πάντες ἀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσι δ᾿ ἄρον ἐδώρησαν, in whom all the endowments, or excellencies of all other gods were concentrated. But when once we have conceived the Idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in him, yet neverthelesse is not the Idea of him therefore *Augmented*, but onely made more *distinct* and *express*: in regard all those Accomplishments ought to be comprised in the same Idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been *true* from the very first conception. Thus the Idea of a *Triangle* receives no enlargement, when severall proprieties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is our Idea of the Divine Nature formed by us in parcels, or by sensible additions, out of the various perfections or endowments of the Creatures, amassed together, and multiplyed up to the rate of supernaturall: but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand him to be *an infinite Ens*, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or accessse of more perfection.

Hitherto you have well calmed all those tumults of *Doubts*, which arose within us upon the Lecture of your Demonstration of the Existence of God: but yet there remain some few, though considerable scruples, the full and clear solution whereof is required from you, before you can with reason expect to bring us over to your side.

If the Idea of God be imprest upon you, as a *mark* or *signature* set by an *Artificer* upon the *work* of his hands; what is the *Modus* of that impression? What the *Form* of that mark? by what means can you discern it? if it be not a thing distinct from

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Article 6.
Many scruples, concerning the finality, manner, and form of the Idea imprest; as also concerning the seeming Heterogeneity, or Alterity between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied.

the work it self, from your rational *Soul*, or *Mind*; is your *Soul* then the *Idea*? is your *Mind* nought else, but *Modus cogitandi*, a certain manner of thinking? can your mind be both the *signature impressed*, and the *subjectum impressionis*, or matter upon which it is imprest? Credible it is say you, that you are made after the *similitude* of *God*: True, by a *religious Faith* elemented in us by the doctrine of *Holy Writ*; but how can you make it out from *Natural Reason*, unless you adventure to make *God Homini forme*, like to man? And wherein can that *similitude*, or *typicall analogie* consist? Dare you, being a grosse *Corporeal Ens*, poor despicable *Dust* and *Ashes*, presume to resemble your self to that *Eternal, Incorporeal, Immense*, most *Perfect*, most *Glorious*, and (what is of most weight in this particular) *Invisible* and *Incomprehensible Essence*? Have you beheld him face to face? Nay, with *Moses* in the cleft of the rock, have you seen so much as his back parts; so that you are able to describe his aspect, and make good the Comparison? But you averre, that tis credible for this reason, *Quia creavit*; now we retort upon you, that tis therefore incredible: since there is no necessity that the *Work* should be like its *Maker*, unless in the point of *Generation*, where the *Production* receives a communication of the same nature, that is in the *Productor*: but you were not *Generated* by *God*, nor because he was your *Efficient*, can you safely inferre, that therefore you are participant of his *Nature*; but you were onely created, fashioned by him, according to the exemplar or *Idea*, which was in the *Divine Intellect* from all eternity. So it remains, that you have no more justifiable pretence, to affirm that you are like him; then an *Engine* hath to be thought to bear the image of the *Enginier*, then a *house* hath to be conceived like to the *Mason*, or *Carpenter* that built it.

Further, (not to supersede a jot of your own sense, which may conduce to the illustration of your Position) you subjoyn, that you plainly perceive the *similitude* twixt *God* and *Man*, when you understand your self to be an *Ens incompleat*, dependent upon some superiour Principle, and indefinitely aspiring to *greater* and *better* things: now in our judgement, this is an undeniable argument of a vast disparity and *Dissimilitude*, since *God*, on the

contrary is most *complete*, most *independent*, most *self-sufficient*, as being *Maximus & Optimus*. In very sooth, a *Comparison* 'twixt *Light* and *Darkness*, 'twixt *Heaven* and *Hell*, 'twixt *Good* and *Evil*, 'twixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, 'twixt *Something* and *Nothing*, may be better endured; as importing infinitely less of *Absurdity*, infinitely less of *Impossibility*. In fine, it cannot sound lesse then a *Miracle*, that other men should not understand the same that you doe; and chiefly when there is no reason alleadged, why we may not beleive, that God hath impressed the *Effigies* of his *Essence* upon others, as well as upon you. We profess, this one argument convinceth us, that the *Idea* of God is not impress'd upon the mind of man, immediately by himself, as a *signature*, or *Characterism* to confesse our *Creation*; viz. that if it were, the *Impress* would be one and the same in all men; that all men would then conceive God under the same *Form* and *Idea*; would allow him the same *Attributes*; would have the same thoughts of him in all points. But that all *Nations*, *Ages*, *Religions*, nay and *Persons* have had various and distinct *Ideas* of the *Divine Nature*: is so manifest upon the oath of *Experience*, that we may well here be silent, as to any other attestation.

When you require me to prove, that the *Idea* of God is impress'd upon the mind of man, as a *Mark* or *Signature* set by the *Maker* upon the *Work* of his hands; and what is the *Manner* of that *Impression*; or what the *Form* of that *Mark*: I appeal to the decision of any sober *Arbiter*, whether it be not the same thing, as if, when I had survey'd an excellent *Picture*, and apprehended so much rare art and exquisite skill therein, that I could not judge it to be drawn by any hand but that incomparable one of *Apelles*; I should affirm that this *inimitable Artifice*, or *perfection* never to be paralleled, was a certain *Mark*, or note of *Distinction*, set by *Apelles* to all his pieces, whereby they may be discerned from the ruder draughts of other pencils: and you should notwithstanding press me to tell you, what's the *Form* of that *Mark*, or *Manner* of that *Signal*? Doubtless, such a *Question* deserves no other answer but a smile.

Solut.

Again, to pursue the same adequate *Simile*, put the case, that

I should averre, that the singular *Art*, and unrivald skill, whereby as an infallible sign, the *Pictures* of *Apelles* are distinct from the courser paintings of all others in the World; is nothing really distinct from the *Pictures* themselves; and that you should cavill at my assertion, and by irregular *Logick* inferre, that therefore those *Pictures* are nought else but the *Artifice* or *Skill*, in an abstracted acception, and so are composed of no matter: *Ergo* they are onely *Modi pingendi*, certain manners of painting, &c. Would not your argument be equally both as just and acute, as when you shall thus reason; If there be no distinction between the *Idea* of *God* engraven on your *Mind*, and your mind the *Subject*, or *recipient* of this engravement; then is your *Mind* the *Idea*, and your self nothing but *Modus cogitandi*, then are you both the *Mark* imprest, and the *Subject* of the *Impression*? I profess sincerely, after a due perpenfion, I cannot determine, which of the two *Inductions* carries the greater weight in the impartial balance of right reason: sure I am, that the *Analogie* stands fair and even in all points.

Nor can your Contradiction of that vetust and almost-Catholick Article, *Hominem esse Dei Charagma*, that man is made after the Image of *God*, founded upon a collection of those various particulars, whereby the *Humane Nature* is discrepant from the *Divine*, be found more *Dialecticall*, or perswasory, then this feeble, because preposterous *Enunciation*. If any *Picture* drawn by *Apelles* did ever exactly resemble *Alexander*, then was *Alexander* in all parts exactly like that *Picture*: but the *Picture* was made up of severall different ingredients or materials, as divers *Colours*, oyle, wood, vernish, &c. and *Alexander* composed of skin, flesh, bones, hair, &c. *Ergo*, no picture was ever like *Alexander*, the Disparity between his nature, and the nature of a *Picture*, being so great, as never to be reconciled in a full analogie. For every temperate brain knows full well, that it is not required to the *Formality* of an *Image*, or *Portraiture*, to be the same in all points with the *Antitype*, or *Original*; but onely that it resemble in some: and we all submit to this Manifest, that that most perfect *Faculty* (so I speak as not being ignorant, that all the *Attributes* of *God* are in him *Actually*; but wanting a word more

significant and convenient to this notion) of *cogitation*, which we understand to be in *God*, is in some sort fitly represented by that *imperfect one*, which is in *Man*. Further, I cannot but point obliquely at your imprudence, in choosing rather to compare the Creation of *Man* by *God*, with the Mechanick operation of a *Mason*, or *Carpenter*, then with the Generation of a *Parent*; since no pretext of reason can justify that unmannerly Conference. For though those three manners of acting, *Creation*, *Generation*, *Fabrefaction*, stand a whole *Genus* wide of each from other, and can never be brought neerer then the sword's point: yet to argue from a Production *Natural* to a *Divine*, is, by a whole climate, a neerer way, then from an *Artificial*. Again, (to leave no point of a scruple unresolved) though I have long since assented, that the resemblance betwixt *God* and *Man*, is not so great as that betwixt a *Parent* and his *issue*; yet cannot I be brought to hold it impossible, that an *operation* should ever be enriched with the *Effigies* of the operator; since Experience whispers me, that I have seen a *statuary* carve his own statue, out of white Marble, aswell in the proportion and symmetry, as lineaments of each part, so exquisitely resembling, that every common-eye knew him aswell by his Statue, as his statue by him. Nor is your *Memory* more faithfull, then your *Judgement* profound; for when you accuse me to have said, that I evidently perceive the similitude betwixt *God* and *Man*, from hence, that I understand my self to be an *Ens incomplete, dependent, &c.* You make but a confused and perverse rehearsal of my words, which placed in their proper order express the *Antitheton*, or quite contrary, viz. that from the *Imperfection, Subordination, and depending of my own nature, I deduced the highest Perfection, Supremacy, and Independency of Gods*; that whereas it was essential to me uncessantly to aspire to greater and better things, and that those greater and better things are actually inherent in *God*: therefore had I in me something of *Affinity* to those greater and better things, by the incitement whereof I become ambitious and aspiring to them. And truly, this I inserted as an unquestionable remonstrance of the infinite *Dissimilitude*, which I understood to be betwixt *Divinity* and *Humanity*; with design to prevent both misapprehension and scan-

dal, to both which, otherwise I had some reason to conceive my self obnoxious. Finally, whereas you make it no less then a wonder, why all men in general should not understand the same Attributes in God, that I doe; since if the Idea of his Divinity be imprest univversally and equally, upon the Minds of men, every one hath as great a privilege, by the Charter of his Essence, to speculate the same, as my self: in sober truth you may with equal reason wonder, that since all men know the Idea of a *Triangle*, why all men doe not yet perceive as many *Proprieties* and *Perfections* in that figure, as learned *Geometricians* doe; and why some reason *truly*, others *falsly* upon that Idea.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

*That God created the world ex nihilo,
proved by Arguments Apodictical.*

SECT. I.

He Existence of God being amply Demonstrated, 'tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, and all things existent therein besides himself, were Created by him. For those Attributes, *Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Independence*, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of *Creation*, are all (together with all other *Perfections*, that lie in the ken of mans Cogitation) comprised under the *Idea*, which we hold of his *Essence*. Nor can any man deny, that every single Entity in the vast ark of the Universe, was created by, and holds its existence by dependence upon God; unless he shall have first denied, that God doth exist: which our precedent Demonstration hath made appear to be impossible. For at the same time he denies, that God doth exist, he unavoidably precipitates him self into an Absurdity, implicately denying that himself doth exist: which his very act of denial contradicts; since, had he no existence, he could not deny; all men embracing that *Axiome, Non-entis non sunt Actus.*

Upon a serious peruspension of the irresistible pressure or weight of this plain and genuine *Inference*, I once resolved to supersede all other Arguments of the *Creation of the World out of nothing*, by the sole and immediate Goodness, Wisdom, and

Article 1.
The inseparability, or (rather) identity of God, and Creator.

Article 2.
The two respects, which inclined the Author to a more ample comprehension of the first Article of our Christian

stian breed; together with a dielenchical explosion of that antiquated delusion, that the Universe was *autotthonous* in its original, or constructed merely by *Chance*.

Power of the Supreme, because most perfect Being; especially when I converted my thoughts upon the almost Catholick belief of this truth, every man, at least, every Christian, receiving and retaining it as an Article of Faith: but when my second and more advised meditations had whispered me, that most heads are so indurate by the frost of ignorance, as not to feel the soft touches of a *Collateral* and *enthymematicall Demonstration*; as also, that my proper business was to evince by the testimony of meer Reason, what is commonly embraced upon the single authority of *Moses* pen: I could not but conceive it necessary, in order to the plenary confutation of that as impious, as ridiculous Error of some antient *Naturalists*, that the World was made by *Chance*, or *Fortune*; to endeavour the probation of the same, by other more direct and express means of persuasion, deduced from the *Magna Charta* of all temporal knowledge, the *Light of Nature*. Now that I may perform this, with that exactness, and satisfaction, which is due to so excellent a subject; I am necessitated to bespeak my Readers Patience to endure the recital, explanation, and examen of those specious reasons, which deluded the uncircumspect and easie judgements of those unhappy *Pagans*, who sitting in the Philosophers chair, either founded, or supported, or repaired that detestable opinion, that *Fortune* was the Author and Architect of this admirable fabrick the Universe.

Article 3.
The summary of *Empedocles*, *Leucippus*, *Epicurus*, *Democritus*, &c. doctrine of the worlds spontaneous result from a *Chaos* of *Atoms*.

Epicurus (for him have I singled out, as the most notorious Patron, though not the Father of this execrable delusion; since the monuments of time assure the invention hereof upon his great Master, *Leucippus*) being great with a monstrous design to expunge those Characters of Piety and reverence towards the Deity, which the observation of prodigious Meteors, of frequent Eclipses of the two great Lamps of heaven, of Thunder, and Coruscations, of Earthquakes, of the regular and constant motions of the Spheres, &c. had impressed upon the minds of men; as also to eradicate all conceit of the so-much talkt of Compensation of good and evil actions after death openly breaks forth into the insolent assertion of these three horrid positions; (1) *Quod mundus non sit à Deo constitutus*, that the World was not constituted

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by God; (2.) *Quod mundus à Deo non gubernetur*, that the World was not governed by God; (3.) *Quod animus noster non supersit à funere*, that the soul of man doth not survive the funeral of his body. The First he essayes to declare thus; *Exi-*
stimare oportet mundos, uti & finitam omnem concretionem in
immenso inani factam, quidpiam simile cum iis, quas passim
observamus, habentem, ortum ex infinita rerum universitate
habuisse; & alios quidem majores, alios minores, per proprios
quosdam Atomorum quasi Vortices (Συεεζους) seu convolutio-
nes, seorsim procreatos, &c. (in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Di-
ogen. Laert. lib. 10.) The substance of all which, and much more to the same intent, may be rendred more plainly thus. That the Celestiall orbs, and all their radiant Furniture the stars, are wheeld about, by a constant and even circumgyration; that they veer perpetually towards that point of the World, unto which they first inclin'd, and never change either the way, or tenor of their Circumvolutions; that they observe the same distance each from other, which they obtained at the instant of their Formation, nor sink down upon, and so crowd or enterfeire each the other; that the Eclipses of the two great Luminaries necessarily succeed upon the conjunction of the same Causes, in our days, as in the infancy of Nature, and may therefore with so much facility, as certainty, be prognosticated and predicted by the rules of *Astronomy*; in brief, that such and such determinate effects arise from the Concurrence and coefficients of such and such particular Causes, &c. all these we are not to referre to any other *Principle*, or *Efficient*, but that *Fortune*, whereby they were so and so disposed in the first *Casual Emergency* of the World; nor are those constant and settled operations produced by any other *necessity*, then what fell to their *Efficients*, at the primitive segregation, concourse, disposition, coadunation of those *Atoms*, whereof their bodies are compacted. That before the constitution of the Universe, there was an infinite Chaos of Atoms, of various figures and magnitudes, in an infinite space, floating hither and thither, hurried up and down, on all sides crowding, impelling, and justling each other, by reason of the Tendency resulting from their own innate Gravity. That after a long, long afflux, reflux, con-

flux, elevation, depression, coagmentation and other various and successive agitations and molitions of these Atoms, when each order had chanced to confront and meet with others most consimilar and convenient; then at last they all conspired, acquiesced, and fixed in this regular position and situation, which constitutes the Forme of the Universe; as *Lucretius* (who was deplorably infected with this accurst contagion of *Epicurus*) hath briefly expressed it;

*Que quia multa modis multis vexata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus, & cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata, &c.*

The Worlds *Materials* having first been tost,
An infinite *Time*, within an infinite *Roome*,
From this to that uncircumscribed coast,
And made by their own *Tendency* to roame
In various *Motions*; did at last quiesce
In these *Positions*, which they now possess.

That upon the *Diacrisis*, or segregation of heterogeneal Atoms, succeeding upon a circumvolution, gyration, or vertiginous eddy of them, in the confusion of their eternal Chaos; the more gross and ponderous tended towards the *Center*, or downwards, and in their descent expressed the more gracile and lighter, and impelled them upwards, which convening all together in the *circumference* of the immense vortex, wedged in each other into the form of an integument or cortex, called *Cœlum* or *heaven*; but the more gross and weighty; crowding to the centrals, were there compacted and coagmentated into a solid mass the *Earth*: and the remaining matter of a middle nature, upon the concurrence of its insensible particles assumed to it self the form of a Humid substance, and part thereof being afterward circumagitated incessantly, and so both tornated and calcified, was graduated into many orbs of *Light*, the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*: the residue being re-

ſerved for the compaction of other bodies; &c. And this, if my memory hath proved a faithfull Steward of my readings, is the marrow of *Leucippus*, *Empedocles*, *Epicurus*, and *Democritus* their doctrine concerning the ſpontaneous configuration of the Univerſe.

Tis proverbial amongſt Scholars, and long ſince applyed by an Author of good repute (*Aneponymus*, in *lib. de ſubſtant. phyſic.*) to this particular Caſe; *Nullam eſſe tam falſam opinionem, quæ non habeat aliquid veri admixtum; ſed tamen illud admixtione cujuſdam falſi obſcurari*: that no opinion hath ſo much of falſhood, as not to contain ſome ſprinkling of truth; though that ſpark of truth be ſo obſcured by the cloud of prejudice ariſing from the diſcovery of the falſity admixt, that it may require the ſubtile and deciſive judgement of an *Oedipus* for its diſcernment and ſequeſtration. And in this heap of *droſs* lies raked up ſo much pure and rich *metall*, as, if by the chymiſtry of an induſtrious hand extracted, may more then fully compensate the patient Lecture of a ſhort *Digreſſion*.

In this old Romance of the ſpontaneous reſult of the World from a Caſual ſegregation and diſpoſition of that Abyſſe of Atoms, which rowled up and down, to and fro, by an impetuous and continual inquietude, eſtuation, or civil war, cauſed by their ingenite propenſity to motion, in the range of the infinite ſpace; ſome things ſound ſo harſh and diſcordant to meer Reaſon, as they are juſtly to be abominated; others carry the ſmooth face of ſo much Veriſimilitude, as they deſerve to be admitted, at leaſt diligently and impartially examined. The Poſitions we are to reject, are theſe; (1.) that the *Chaos* of Atoms was non-principiate, or as ancient as Eternity: (2.) that they were not created *ex nihilo, ab aliqua beata ſimul ac immortalis Cauſa*, by God: (3.) that they were not becalmd, ſeparated, ranged, and diſpoſed into their proper ſtations, in that ſerene order and figure, which they are now of inevitable neceſſity bound to obſerve, in every ſingle concretion, or individual Entity, by the artifice of any other *Cauſe*, but the blind Ordination, or improvident diſpoſure of *Fortune*. All which ſmells ſo ſtrong of the Fable, and ſtrikes the noſethrills as wel

Article 4.

A *Digreſſion*, winnowing the Chaffe from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of *Epicurus*, & by the corollary of ſome caſtigations, reſtrictions and additions, declaring the great advantages, that this *Hypotheſis* of Atoms hath beyond any other concerning the *Material Principle* of all Bodies, as yet excogitated.

of the meer Natural man, as the Pious, with such infectious stench, that nothing but the opportunity of confutation can excuse my coming so near it. And yet notwithstanding, I have never yet found out any justifiable ground, why *Atoms* may not be reputed *Mundi materies*, the Material Principle of the Universe, provided that we allow, that God created that first *Matter* out of *Nothing*; that his Wisdom modelled and cast them into that excellent compofure or figure, which the visible World now holds; and that ever since, by reason of the impulsion of their native *Tendency*, or primitive *impreffion*, they strictly conform to the laws of his *beneplacitis*, and punctually execute those several functions, which his almighty *Will* then charged upon their determinate and specifical *Concretions*. For, with the advantage of these restrictions, the *Atoms* of *Epicurus* have more of probability, and hold rational through most of those operations, which occur to the curiosity of the Philosopher, with more familiarity to our conceptions, and less variation or apostasie from the first Hypothesis, then the impossible *Materia Prima* of *Aristotle*, then the *Substantial Principle* of *Plato*, the *Hyle* of the *Stoicks*, or, indeed, then any other imaginable *Præexistent* in the immense space. And after a mature confronting, collation, and comparative perpenfion, of the most general *conveniencies* and *congruities* of all; we have found that, from the ground-work of *Atoms*, we are able to make out what is *Material*, what *Corporeal*, what *Great*, what *Little*, what *Rare*, *Dense*, &c. but from the others we could never deduce the formal attributes of a *body*, or *Substance*, while the original of all things is determined absolutely devoyd both of *Quantity* and *Quality Aétual*, and amounts to no higher a degree of reality, then a meer *Privation*; which a righteous enquiry will soon reduce to *nothing*.

Nor is that affrighting *Difficulty* in the *Theory of Atoms*, which the eye of every *Pedantick Sophister* first glances upon, at the very mention thereof, more then this shadow of a scruple; *viz.* how so vast a mass, as this Giant the Universe, could be made up of such minute particles, as *Atoms*, which every man understands to be much below the perception of sense, and never to be fathomed but by the subtle arms of the Intellect? For I dare entrust the

solution of it to any moderate judgement, that shall take the pleasure to conceive this *Analytick Scale*, or degradation of *Magnitude*. Let us grant the *globe of Earth*, which seems to contain most of *corporeity*, to be but one part of the Universe composed of many such masses congested, and the law of consequence will compell us to concede, that the globe of the earth may be coagumentated of many smaller masses piled one upon another, or of mountains, as *Atlas*, *Caucasus* &c. cemented together; that those *Mountains* may result from an aggregation of rocks, those *rocks* from an accumulation of *stones*, those *stones* from a conflux, and ferrumination of grains of *sand*, that *sand* from a lesser assembly of *dust*, that *dust* from a minor collection of *Atoms*. This granted, let us have recourse to that famous Demonstration of the glorious *Archimed* (*in Aren.*) whereby it is evicted, that twenty five *Cyphers*, or Arithmetical notes set in successive order, 100000 &c. do exhibite the full number of those Granules of sand, which suffice to make up the vast bulk of the World, according to the vulgarly received magnitude thereof, though each of those granules be determined so exiguous, that one grain of Popie seed may contain ten thousand of them. I say, according to the Magnitude vulgarly received; for if, with *Aristarchus* (whose opinion *Copernicus*, in the last age, revived) you shall goe higher, and enlarge the extension of the world: yet according to the *Algebra* of *Archimed*, will no more then sixty four *Cyphers* be required to calculate the number of grains of sand, of the same dimensions with the former, which equal the almost incredible vastity of the Universe. Now, if you please to goe lower in the quantity of those minute grains, and sink them down even to the tenuity of an *Atom*; imagine that each of those small particles is composed of ten hundred thousand *Atoms*, and advance this number by multiplying it into 64, and even then will the number of those particles be exprest by no more then 70. Lower yet, if you think your last division went not so far as *infinitility*, dichotomize those minute particles each into ten hundred millions; and then, upon a just Multiplication made, the number provenient shall not exceed the reach of 76 *Cyphers*. Nay drive the matter so far, that your thoughts may even lose themselves in the pursuit; and you shall

shall still deprehend how easily you may be supplied with Cyphers enough to fulfill the number of all those Atoms, which are necessary to the amassment of a bulk, equal to this of the World.

There is yet a fourth incongruity in this doctrine of Epicurus, worthy our explosion; viz. That Atoms had, from all eternity, a faculty of Motion, or impetuous tendency, inherent in them, and received not the same from any forreign principle, or impression extradvenient. But yet can I meet with no impediment, that may hinder me from conceiving, that Atoms are perpetually active and moveable, by the agitation of that internal tendency, or virtual impression, which the Father of Nature conferred upon them, in the first moment of their miraculous production *ex nihilo*. And truly, thus refined, the Hypothesis of Atoms is less guilty of either inconvenience or incertitude, than any other concerning the first material principle; nay, it hath thus much more of congruity and satisfaction than all the rest, that it fitly declares the radical Cause of all Motion, activity or energie in second Causes, or natures once removed from the *Primus Motor*, God: which can by no means be commonstrated from any other supposition, with the like constancy, correspondence, and perspicuity; especially if we look upon that *Form*, which the Schools commonly conclude on, as the main spring in all motion, or efficient of all activity. For whatever of real Entity they allow to be therein, they desume from no other origine, but the simple and naked Matter: and yet, by unpardonable incircumspection, or forgetfulness, they make that Matter absolutely idle, and devoid of all Motive or active virtue.

Nor did Plato himself miss this consideration, but seems to have held the lamp to posterity, in this particular; for though he restrains not his notion to the word, *Atoms*, yet from his description of an *Exiguity*, *Quam intellectus, non sensus capiat*, and from the immediate subjunction of *De multitudine illarum, deq; motionibus, aliisque facultatibus, congruum prorsus erat Deum providere, quatenus natura necessitati obediens ultrò obsecundaret, &c.* (in *Timæo*) tis a lawful conjecture, that he pointed directly upon the sense. These short Animadversions premised, that we may as well supply the Defects, as correct the depravities
of

of this opinion of *Epicurus*; suppose we, in short, that God in the first act of his Wisdome and Power, out of the *Tohu*, or nothing, created such a proportionate congeries, or just mass of Atoms, as was necessary to the constitution of the Universe: suppose we also, that all those Atoms, in the instant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of *self-motion*, and consequently of concurring, crowding, jostling, repelling, resiliion, ex-filiation, and reciprocal complectence, concatenation, reinviction, &c. according to the respective preordination in the *Divine Intellect*: and then will all the subsequent operations of nature remain so clear and easie, that a meer *Ethnick* by the guidance of those two lamps, *Sense* and *Ratiocination*, may progress to a physical theory of them, and thereby salve all the *Phanomena's* with less apostasie from first Principles proposed, then by any other hypothesis yet excogitated. A meer *Ethnick*, I say; for we, who have devolved unto us the inestimable blessing of *Moses* history of the Creation, have far other thoughts of that method or order, wherein the World was founded, and finished by God: but the pure Natural man, who wants the illumination of sacred Writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by the light of nature, appears most consonant to truth. My *Digression* is now ended, and I returne to the discharge of my Assumption, the redargution of that blasphemous opinion, which ascribes the honour of the Worlds composition to *Fortune*.

S B C T. II.

AND first I oppose to the Patron of this error, the more noble *Auclority* of many antient and eminent *Philosophers*; who, though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paganism, had yet their intellectuals, so irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature, which their Vigilancy and assiduous Contemplation always kept, like the Vestal vapours, shining and uneclipsed by the Cimmerian foggs of *Tradition* and *Prejudice*, that they discovered more then a glimpse of *Divinity* in the original of the World. For

Article I.

The conceit of the Worlds fortuitous production, disparaged by a pre-pollency even of Pagan *Auclority*, that profoundly asserted the contrary, viz. of

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Article 2. *Thales Milesius*, being introduced by *Diogenes Laertius* (in *vita ejusdem*) as rendering a reason, *Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus*, of the extreme glory, comeliness, and decency of the World, and exact symmetry observed in all and every part thereof; most wisely sets up his rest, and silences all further dispute, in this full solution, *ποίνμα γὰρ τῷ Θεῷ*, *tis the Artifice of God.*

Article 3. *Anaxagoras*. That *Anaxagoras* had found out the same truth, by his retrograde tracing of nature up to her first head, or fountain; can be obscure to none, that shall doe his meditations so much right, as to interpret his *νῦς*, *Mens*, or *supreme Intelligence*, to be the same with that, which we call *God*: for even our *School-men* doe as much, frequently using those appellatives, *Summa Intelligentia*, and *Deus*, indifferently and as *Synonomas*,

Article 4. *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* we need no other record, then the single testimony of *Timaeus Locrus*, who, being a famous *Pythagorean*, and therefore prudently deputed by *Plato* to deliver his own sense, in that golden Dialogue concerning *Nature*, (which in the Commentary of *Marsilius Ficinus*, signifies no more then *Divinitatis instrumentum*) in many passages of the debate, or investigation, takes occasion to declare, *Deum esse Parentem ac opificem mundi*. Nor can it cost the study of many houres to collect from *Plato's* other inquest into Divinity called *Parmenides* (who also was a disciple of *Pythagoras*) or *De uno omnium principio*, and the now mentioned description of Nature, *Timaeus*, conferred together; that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* shook hands in that opinion, that the world had its beginning, *ἢ κατὰ χρόνον*, not in *Time*, in regard, as they conceived, it never had beginning, *ἄλλὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*, but in *Cogitation*, *i. e.* though it be *Non-principiate*, yet may our thoughts have the licence to assume that there was some *præexistent* matter, out of which it was formed. For they both apprehended so absolute a dependence of the world upon *God*; that *God* being existent in the World, must of necessity be reputed the *Efficient* thereof, inso much as the World could have no other Cause of its Matter, *Distinction*, *Disposition*, *Beauty*,

Beauty and ornament. And is not this the same, that our Doctōrs now admit, while they defend, that the World might have been created by God, had his Wisdome thought fit, from all Eternity; and if so, yet notwithstanding he must still have been the Cause of it, in regard of that necessary dependence of the World upon him, for if there were no God, there could be no World: καὶ ἰσονομίαν, by the same reason, as though we grant the Sun together with its light, or a Seal together with its signature, to have been from all Eternity; yet must we grant the Sun to be the Cause of his light, and the Seal to be the Cause of its impressiōn. For they condescend to this, that an Effect may be coævous to its Cause; and that, though the Cause be not prior Tempore, it sufficeth that it be onely prior Natura, or τῆ φύσει, which is the very expressiōn of *Timæus Locrus*. However this may be disputed, yet sure I am, that as well these two Patriarchs of Learning, as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point, That God was Author of the Universe.

What the *Stoicks* thoughts were, concerning this grand particular; is publick, and cannot escape the cognizance of any, who have look't into the lives of the Scholiarchs, or Heads of that numerous Sect, amply registred by the even pen of *Diogen. Laert.* or read *Cicero's* second Book, *De natura Deorum*, where he elegantly personates *Balbus* smartly and profoundly disputing against *Velleius* and *Epicurus*; whither I remit the unsatisfied Reader, in avoidance of Prolixity.

Article 5.
The *Stoicks*.

For the grand signieur of the Schools, *Aristotle*; truth is, I cannot conceal, that when he maintains (in 8. *Physic. & prioribus de Cælo*) the Universe to be *ingenitum*, without origination, and contemns that forementioned distinction of Priority, τῆ φύσει, & κατὰ χρόνον, as excogitated by *Pythagoras*, and continued by *Plato*, rather διδασκαλίας χάριν, for the convenience of *Doctōrine*, then the interest of Truth: he is positive, that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all; and therefore *Simplicius* (in 8. *Physic. digress. 3.*) chiding *Philoponus* for daring to assert, that the World had its origin and production from

Article 6.
Aristotle.

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God,

God, according to the testimony of *Moses Chronicle*, cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his oracle, *Arist.* and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned *Productor*; since it tacitly rendered him subject to that imperfection, *Mutability*, which is incompatible with the constant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplisht for so mighty an action, and implies that he was not the same from all Eternity, and but lately became *Parens, Conditorque mundi*. But yet have I ground enough to stand upon, that *Arist.* grew wiser, as he grew elder, and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim; for in the last exercise of his pen, his book *De mundo*, which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies, (cap. 5. & 6.) he sings a palinodia, and makes open profession, that the universal harmony, consonance, and pulchritude of this great machine were ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντων γενεῖσθαι, *ab universorum Conditoris*: Confirming the verity of that pious Adage confessd and pronounced by all men, ἐκ Θεοῦ τὸ πάντα, *All from God*. That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto, fathered upon *Zoroaster*, that King and Magus of the antient *Babarians*, and contemporary to *Ninns* and *Semiramis*, as *Eusebius* (*lib. 10. de prep. Evangel. cap. 3.*) accounts; *Factor, qui per se operans, fabri fecit mundum* doth not want its share of probability, insomuch as the monuments of the *Chaldean Learning* were ransackt by the *Platonicks*, and so came to the view of *Aristotle*, is manifest as well from the circumstance of *Time*, his life falling not much below the plunder of the Oriental Libraries, as from the *Rhapsodies* or Excerptions, which the *Pythagoreans* had made out of the reliëts of *Zoroaster* and *Trismegistus*, and transmitted down to the hands of *Plato* and his Scholars, who frequently insperfed them upon their own writings, a copious series of which sentential transcriptions hath been not long since bequeathed to posterity by the bounty of *Casir Longinus*. But however, I am inclined to beleive rather, that his second thoughts, and more advanced Contemplations on the excellency and glory of the structure, lighted him to this recantation, and enforced him so confess, that the fabrick of the world was too full of Wisdome and Providence, to have been performed by any thing below the
Highest:

Highest: for tis warrantable for me to conjecture, that since he had his erudition, at least his education, at the feet of *Plato*, and so could not be ignorant of any Tradition of moment, which his Master knew; had his judgement been imbued with that lesson in his greener yeers, he could not well have stifled it till immediately before his death, especially when the knowledge of this great truth might have preserved him from that swarm of Difficulties, which he endured in maintaining his Thesis of the *Non-production*, or *Eternity* of the World. There are, I confess, who stiffly question the propriety of legitimation of this book, *De Mundo*, owning it upon some younger Composer; who ambitious to have the *Minerva* of his own colder brain, long lived in estimation, gave it the glorious name of *Aristotle*, and under the defence of that prosperous title, committed it to the encounter of *Censure*. To the satisfaction of these, I shall alledge a place or two out of those pieces, which have ever escaped the imputation of spurious; whereby the former sentence is so ratified, that *Aristotle* may appear to have had great indignation against their incogitancy and stupidity, who could beleive the world to be once produced, and yet ascribe the production thereof to Fortune. *Dignum est*, saith he, (in 2. *Physic. cap. 4.*) *admiratione asserere istos, Animalia quidem & Plantas à Fortuna neque esse, neque fieri, sed aut naturam aut quandam mentem, aut quampiam aliam Causam habere (viz. non ex cujusvis semine quidvis nascitur, sed ex hoc quidem olea, ex illo vero homo) cælum autem, & que sunt sensibilibus divinissima, sponte nata fuisse, nec causam ullam, qualem animalia plantaque sortiuntur, habuisse.*

“ Tis well worthy our admiration, how these men can affirm,
 “ that Animals and Plants neither proceed from, nor can be made
 “ by Fortune; but must have either Nature, or some Intelligence
 “ or other efficient (for the seminalities of things do not fly out in-
 “ to promiscuous and indifferent Generations, but every distinct
 “ species hath its seed restrained and determined to the procreati-
 “ on of its like: nor can the fructifying principle of an Olive de-
 “ viate into the production of a Vine; or the sperm of man pro-
 “ duce any thing but man) but as for the Heavens, and other
 “ peices of the world, which seem of farre greater alliance to Di-

“vinity : that these are spontaneous and casual in their originals, and have not obtained any Efficient to their Formations, equal to that of Animals or Plants. And (in 1. de Anim. Part. c. 1.) he speaks expressly to the same purpose, though in other words ; which, to prevent the further trouble of the Reader, I shall faithfully transcribe. *Quamobrem verisimilius dixerim cælum & factum esse ab ejusmodi causa, si factum est ; & magis esse ob eam causam, quam Animalia caduca atque mortalia : ordo enim, certusque status longe magis in ipsis rebus cælestibus, quam in nobis patet ; incerta enim, et inconstans, fortuitaque conditio in genere mortali est potius. At illi genus Animalium quoddamque natura constare, extitisseque censent ; cælum autem ipsum Fortuna, sponteque ejusmodi constituisse volunt ; in quo tamen nihil Fortuna ac temeritatis deprehendi potest.* Again, *Calius Rhodiginus* (lib. 17. cap. 34. pag. 814) reports of him that, though during the greatest part of his life he had ascribed all effects solely to secondary and inferior Causes, yet immediately before his death, when his soul began to be weaned from sensibility, and feel her wings, he most earnestly implored the compassion and forgiveness of the First and Supreme Cause, *Primæ causæ misericordiam intentius implorabat, &c.* To these I might have annexed a third text of *Aristotle*, selected by the Master of Roman Eloquence, and adæquately engrafted into his second discourse *De Natura Deorum* : but I conceived the two former to be testimony sufficient to the stability of my assertion, that he abhorred the absurd usurpation of *Fortune*.

Now if the meer *Natwral Explorator* shall but perpend both the *Number* and *Dignity* of these more venerable Professors of Science, wholly abating the weight of their Reasons ; I cannot doubt, but he will finde them infinitely to overbalance the single School of *Epicurus*, and of reputation great enough to excuse the conformity of his judgement to theirs : if he look no higher than the point of *Auctority*.

SECT. III.

Is no easie wonder, how any man, whose Faculties are not in disorder, nor the Oeconomie of his head subverted into a Wildness beyond the absurdities of Melancholy adust, can be infatuated into a conceit, that so great, so uniform, so durable, so magnificent, and therefore so glorious a work, as this of the World, could be performed by the lesse then feeble, and ignorant hands of *Nothing*, of *Fortune*. For however it may be allowed, that this imaginary Deity, may produce some effects extraordinary or miraculous: yet how petite and inconsiderable are those achievements of *Chance*, if put in the scale against those more admirable performances of *Reason* and *Wisdom*? Suppose we, that *Prodigies* may arise from the unequal concurrence of dissimilar and disproportionate *Actives* and *Passives*; and Monsters be generated by the casual confusion of distinct seminalities, as well amongst Animals, as Plants: yet how incomparably more prodigious are those ordinary propagations in each *Classis*; which by the certain and invariable law of their peculiar species, are restrained to their determinate Forms, and whose Constancy excludes all pretence of Fortune, or the accidental Efficiency of *Chance*? I leave to the decision of every sober man, which hath most of the Miracle; that the seed of every Animal should be confined to the procreation of its like *in specie*, for the most part; and that the *Plastick Spirit* thereof punctually observe the modell, or pattern of that Fabrick of the body, from whence it came: or that, upon a preposterous commixture of various and unequal seeds, once in an age, there should succeed the production of some new *Heteroclite*, or unpatterned Monster, whose Composition is onely *contingent*, and difform to the Idea, of either its *Active*, or *Passive* Principle, in the simplicity of their divided *Figures*. And are not the exquisite Delineations of every *Embryon*, woven out by the subtile fingers of *Archeus*, or the *Formative spirit*; the multiplicity, distinction, elaboration of *organs* both external,

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and

Article 1.

The pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specification, (i. e.) the restraint and determination of the seminalities of Animals to the procreation of their like in *specie*: and the Atheists objection, of frequent Anomalous and Heteroplasmic, or monstrous Productions, dissolved.

and internal; the severall *Functions*, and *Offices* assigned to those organs, and so artificially contrived, that every one is *distinct*, yet none *independent*; every one *single*, yet all *conspiring* to the same end, all *operative*, yet none (*per se*) *locomotive*: are not these certain and præordinate effects, with innumerable others, the meanest whereof we cannot seriously think upon, without a rapture of amazement, more worthy our admiration, than a single *irregularity*, a spontaneous *Monster* of Nilus, a bipartite *Centaure*, a prodigious *Insect*, &c. whose generations are accounted *accidental*, and their configurations not preordained, but the inconsiderate and extemporary results of *Fortune*? Perhaps these stupid Idolaters of Chance will referre these constant and seded operations to *Nature*; but whatever they mean by *Nature*, how immense a stock of *Wisdom* must it necessarily be endowed withall, which in all its works so cunningly contrives so great variety of organs, observes such exact *Symmetry* in all parts, so providently disposeth every member, and fits them to the easie execution of their predestinate functions? If they goe farther, and affirm, that *Nature is nothing but the primitive Constitution of the World, which resulted from the casual separation, conflux, and disposition of its material principle, Atoms; and that it doth constantly persist in the same Method, which it first obtained from Fortune:* the answer is easie, that though *Nature* be constant to that order, in all her productions, which the World obtained in its first composition; yet how ridiculouly stupid must he be, who can admit a serious perswasion, that the bodies of *Animals*, in the beginning could be so exquisitely configured by meer *Chance*, and without the direction and indeed the designement of an infinite *Wisdom*; in whose eternal intellect the *prototypes* of each *species* were first adumbrated? Let them object again, that every day affords examples of the skill of *Fortune*, in the production of *Froggs*, *Toads*, *Flies*, and other spontaneous *Insects*: and I shall soon return, that those *Insects* or spontaneous *Animals* have their *Causes certain*, and by reason of that energie once conferred upon their *Efficients*, must arise to animation in such or such a *Figure*, according to the magnitude, number, situation, complexion, quiet, motion, or, in a word, the *Temperament* of those parti

particles, out of which their bodies are amassed; and according to the activity of that domestick *Heat*, which ferments and actuates the matter: Secondly, that our debate is about the *original of Nature it self*, and of that precise *Virtue* radically implanted in the *seeds* of things; or more emphatically, what hand inoculated that *procreative power* in each feminality, and endowed it with a capacity requisite to the conformation of bodies so admirable in their structure: if there were not some principle in the nonage of the Universe, who infused that *Prolifical* or fertile *Tincture*, ordained that scheme of members, and gave it rules to act by; from which it never swerves, but upon a disobedience and non-conformity of matter. If we lookt no farther then the *Cortex* or *Exteriors* of *Animals*; and there speculated as well the amiable comeliness of their *Figures* in the whole (for there is no real Deformity in Nature) as the *geometrical Analogie*, or convenience betwixt the *Members* and their *Actions*, each being respectively configurated to the performance of its peculiar office: 'twere more then sufficient to discover to us the impossibility of their primitive institution by Fortune. But when we *disselt* them, prie into their *Entrals*, and there survey the almost infinite multitude of organs, principal and subordinate; the variety of their uses, some being officiall to *Nutrition*, some to *Vitality*, some to *Generati-on*, others to *Sense*, others to *Locomotion*, none impeding the activity of another, but all unanimously conspiring to conserve the œconomy of that *Form*, which, like the main *spring* in an Automaton, invigorates, and actuates the whole fabrick: either we must bid denance to the chief inducement of beleaf, and drown the loud clamors of our Conscience, or else fall down, transported with an ecstasie of pious Wonder, and humbly confess, that these are the *Impresses* of the infinite power and wisdom of an omniscient, and omnipotent Creator; but not the *Contingencies*, or temerarious effects of *Chance*. Thoughts like these had the prudent *Gassendus*, when, in his detestation of the interest of that Pretenders, Fortune (*cap. de exortu mundi.*) his golden pen dropt this rhetorical logick; *Id quod stuporem generat, dispositio interna est in corporibus Animalium. Nam si foret quidem duntaxat multitudo aliqua partium, forte fortuna commissarum, tum ea*
posses

posset Fortuna tribui : at in multitudine illa pene innumerabili nullam esse partem, non tantam, non talem, non ubi, non quomodo, non cum ea functione, qua congruum est, ut neque inutilis sit, neque esse commodior valeat : rationem prorsus omnem fugit, ut ita fieri non sapientia, sed Fortuna sit constitutum.

Article 2.
The necessity
of the Worlds
Creation by an
Agent infinit:
in Science and
Power, proclaimed
by the constant Uni-
formity of Na-
ture, in her per-
petuation of
Vegetables.

Nor doe *Animals* alone, but *Vegetables* also, though of an inferior Classis, amply and sensibly testify the *Divinity* of their *Founder*, and confute the *Apotheosis* of *Fortune*. Thus, when the *Aliment* of a *Plant*, being the aqueous irrigation of the earth insensibly prolected, ascends from the lowest filament of the shaggy root up to the *Trunck*, and thence works up to the extremities of every branch and twigge; can we imagine, that this thin, insipid juice can be so inspissated, and so ingeniously moulded into a *Bud*; that bud discriminated and variegated into a larger particoloured *Blossom*; that Blossom gradually expanded into a determinate *flower*, which gratifies our eyes with the beauty of its embroidery, and our nostrils with the fragraney of its odour; that *Flower* lost in the richer emergencie of a *Fruit*, which hath its figure, colour, magnitude, odour, sapour, maturity, duration, all certain and constant; and the abridgement, or *Epitome* of this included in the *seed* of that fruit, which being insperst upon the earth, is impregnate with a Faculty to expand it self into a second *Plant*, in all things rivall to the former, and empowered to act all those severall *Metamorphoses* over again, to a perpetuall rejuvenescence of that peculiar species: can we, I say, imagine, that all this could arise from a *spontaneous range of Atoms*, or that *Necessity* which ensued upon the casual disposition of the *First matter*; and not rather with devout hymns proclaim the *Efficiency* of a *Glorious and Eternall Cause*, whose *Essence* being incomprehensible, and *Attributes* infinite Intelligence, Goodnesse, Power, Beatitude, Glory, &c. must therefore be the *Ordainer*, *Creator*, and *Consecrator* of all things?

Construator.

Let

Let us sink our meditations yet one degree lower on the scale of Creatures, and consider how convincingly even *Inanimates* argue for the wisdom of their *Maker*. Doth not the *Sun* (to omit the speculation of its glorious *Light*, and comfortable *Influence*; the former whereof is so excellent, the other so necessary, that they challenge as due the *Admiration* of all, and have drawn the *Adoration* of many ingenious nations) by three prevalent arguments. *viz.* the *Commodiousness* of its situation, the *Designment* of its motion, and the *Line or tract* of its revolution, sufficiently illustrate the forecast and artifice of its *Creator*?

First by the universal Convenience of its situation. For had it been placed in any other orb, either inferior, or superior to its own; such horrid incommodities, as are inconsistent with its use and intention, and destructive to the two principal designs of Nature, Conservation and Generation, must unavoidably have followed; nor had the whole fabrick of the Universe been more then one degree removed from the confusion of its originary Chaos. To particular; had the Sun been settled in the lowest sphere, and obtained that place, which the Moon now possesseth: the year had been no longer then a moneth; for in that account of time, it must have fulfilled its course through every part of the Ecliptick, and so the intervalls of seasons had suffered such a contraction, that must have been repugnant to their institution, *i. e.* must have prevented the production of all things; For the *Antipraxis*, or Counter-activity of contrary seasons, immaturely succeeding one upon the neck of another, destroys the principles of Vegetation, and checks the promotion of seminalities. Again, by this unsafe vicinity, or too near approach to the globe of the earth, its intenser beams had verified the Conflagration of Phaeton; at least proved so intolerable, as that all things must have had the ycie and glutinous temper of the Salamander, or else been torrifed into cynders; and to have had no Sun at all, had been the easier misery. For if there be (and some are positive there must be) an intention and remission of heat, respective to the different points, or access and recess of the Sun, in its proper orb;

I

and

Article 3.

The Sun convincingly demonstrates the infinite wisdom of its Creator, by 3 Arguments: *viz.*

I.

The universal convenience of its situation in its proper orb.

and that in its *Apogæum*, or mountee to the highest point in Cancer, the heat is not so scorching under that Tropick on this side the *Æquator*, as on the other side, in its *Perigæum* or stoop to the lowest point of its excentricity in Capricorne: we cannot with any pretext of reason doubt, that, had the Sun been lodged in the bed of the Moon, it had long since anticipated the general combustion of the last day, and calcined all things to the exiguity of their primitive Atoms. And on the other extreme, had the Sun been appointed to the eight or highest sphear; then must it have been, by reason of the exceeding slow motion assigned to that sphear, so many thousand years in the absolotion of its course, as that it must have extended one year to the compute of *Platos* Jubile; nor could the world (if learned men guess aright concerning its duration) have attained to the period of one revolution. Besides that Hemisphear, which first faced the Sun in the beginning of its tedious gyre, must have enjoyd the curse of a long long day, and consequently have mist the fertile blessing of a vicissitude, or reciprocal succession of distinct seasons; but the opposite Hemisphear must have, for many myriads of ages, continued as cold, dark and barren as the grave, and so half of the earth had been made to no purpose. And the like discommodities, though more moderate, would have succeeded to the earth, had the Sun obtained a situation in any one of the other six orbs, between the two former extremes.

2.
The appointment of its continual Circumgyration.

Secondly, *by the appointment of its Circumrotation*. For had it remained fixt and not moved at all; then must the world have wanted that necessary division of times and seasons, of Spring and Autumn, Summer and Winter, day and night: and by consequence, the generation and conservation of things dependent on those vicissitudes of Heat and Cold; it being necessary, that the fixation of this Luminary must have caused a perpetual summer in one hemisphear, and as lasting and disconsolate a Winter in the other; or driven nature upon the exigent of making another Sun to irradiate and cherish the opposite half of the earth, it being experimentally true (and therefore advanced to the dignity of an Axiome by *Galilæo*, *Philolans*, *Niceron*, *Kircherus*, and other junior

junior Masters in the *Opticks*) that no spherical luminous body, of what diameter soever, can project its light upon the whole sphere of another at once, or in a fixt position; though it illuminate more then the half of a lesser placed at convenient distance.

Lastly, by the contrivement of its oblique motion along the line *Ecliptick*. For had its revolution been assigned to any other circle; discommodities no less fatal then the former had unavoidably ensued. First, had it sayled along on either side the *Æquator*, some parts of the earth could have known no Sun at all, but should have groand under the oppression of perpetual frigidty and opacity; while others had suffered the contrary extrem of an everlasting noon, and been parched by the violence of its too constant and perpendicular beams: and so the whole had been inhabitable; an *Alternation of Heat and Cold* being indispensably requisite aswell to the *Conservation* and growth of all things in their *Individuals*, as to their *Propagation* in *Specie*. Secondly, had it been confined to the conduct of the *Æquator*; first unto a parallel sphere, or such who have the Pole for their Zenith, its revolution could have made neither perfect day, nor perfect night; for being in the *Æquator*, it would intersect their horizon, and be half above, and half below it: and to those, who inhabite under the *Æquator*, though it made a distinction of day and night, yet would it not make any considerable distinction of seasons; for the Sun being always vertical to them, in that situation, would have introduced a constant Summer, and the perpendicularity of its unremitted heat have exhausted the fructifying humidity of the earth, and so left the womb of our common mother, squalid and barren as the desert *Sarra* in *Africa*. Lastly, had it moved directly upon the *Æquator*, unto what position soever; well might it have described a day, but never measured out a year: for the progression of it from West to East (by the compass of which motion the circle of the year is constituted) had been wanting; in regard that tis impossible that on one and the same circle, observing the same Poles, the Sun should have performed its two contrary motions, one from East to West, which defines the day, the other from West to East, which measures out the year, both at once. Now all these palpable inconveniences (with many

3.

The contrivement of its oblique motion along the line *Ecliptick*.

other first observed and enumerated to us by a *Spanish*, and lately most elegantly explained by an *English Physician*; both which selected this choice subject, as an impregnable argument of the *Wisdom of the Creator*) were artificially prevented by the device of the Sun's motion along the Ecliptick, and the obliquity of its annual progress upon the Poles of the *Zodiack*, full 23 degrees, and an half from the Poles of the World.

Now this meditation naturally applies it self, and so clearly demonstrates the forecast and artifice of an infinite Intelligence; that I have nothing left to say, but this; that tis a wonder, which nothing but the delusion of the Father of lies can make out to belief, how *Epicurus*, being a Philosopher, in many abstrusities of nature acute enough, nay beyond most of his Tutors, as *Diogenes Laertius* testifies of him; and one that pretended to so much insight in the problems of Astronomy, as to be able to solve all the *Phænomena*, or Apparitions above the Terraqueous orb, (*in Epist. ad Pythoëlem*) could yet be so infatuated, as to ascribe the composition, and location of the Sun, and the invention of its regular, and to all parts convenient motion, to the *Temerity* and *In-cogitancy* of *Fortune*. Nor could I have conceived it possible that so much of the *Scholar*, and so much of the *Fool* could have at once met in one and the same brain; had not I been perswaded thereto, by the agreeing testimonies of many credible Authors, high both in Antiquity and Fame.

Article 4.
The impresses
of an infinite
Intelligence,
plainly legible
in the fronts
even of Sub-
terraneous In-
animates.

If these Arguments reach not, we may descend yet lower (if there be any thing low in Nature) and from the entrails of our Grandmother fetch *Stones* and *Mineral Concretions*, to give in evidence against the insolent arrogance of *Fortune*. For who dares contract the suspicion of madness so meritoriously, as once to dream that the *Magnet* obtained its rich endowments of *Verticity* and *Attraction*; the *Adamant* its radiant translucency and conical angularity; *Alum* its octohedral or eight-faced Figure; *Salt* its Sexangular; *Nitre* its striate or ycycle-resembling; *Vitriol* its multangular, &c. from a meer accidental and undetermined conflux and coalition of their minute and insensible particles: and not from the provident and artificial disposition of them into such

and

and such situations, as are requisite to the causation of those particular qualities and Figures, by the discreet and methodicall influence of an infinite wisdom? If any such there be (and I have reason for more then my fears, that such there are, in these accursed days, when all the *Errors* of the elder world are revived, desperate *Heresies* belched out even by those, who profess to be the Patriots of truth, and horrid *Blasphemies* applauded as commendable strains of high devotion) who tremble not to deny the Creation of all things by God : these I shall pity, and leave to ponder that exclamation of *Gassendus*, (*de exortu mundi*) *O quam hebetem esse oportet, aut quam reclamantem habere conscientiam, si dum ad ista attenditur, sola interim Fortuna laudatur!*
 « O how insensible must that man be either of the advisees of
 « reason, or the convulsions of Conscience; who can consider
 « these things, and yet ascribe the honour of their Creation to
 « Fortune!

And if the Characters of an *Infinite Wisdom* be so plainly visible in the *single and divided peices of the Universe*; how incomparably more legible must they be in the *Whole*, wherein *Amplitude* holds an æmulous contention with *Pulchritude*? True it is, the *Epicureans* were not staggered at the consideration of so vast a mass, instantly addressing themselves for refuge, to an *infinite stock of Atoms congested in an infinite space*. But this Sanctuary is rotten, and cannot protect the credulity of any, unless it be supported by this additional base; that there was some first *Active principle*, which by its infinite power first *created* out of nothing, and then *congested* this mass of Atoms into a Chaos, and after by its infinite wisdom *digested* the same into that exquisite order which doth now constitute the form of the world. Is it possible for any thing that dares pretend to *Humanity*, to imagine, or by any specious argument to hope to persuade, that so many minute bodies, or Atoms, by the rash and undeterminate conduct of their own innate propensity to motion, indifferently hurried up and down, hither and thither, and by reason of the discord arising from their different quantities, and Figures, apt to maintain an everlasting civil war and confusion;

Article 5.
 The impossibility of the worlds Creation by any Agent but God, illustrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchritude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inherent in Atoms, derided.

could notwithstanding by a spontaneous direction meet and unite in that just number, which was sufficient to make up the Globe of the *Earth*, requisite to compose the body of the *Sun*, proportioned to the dimensions of the *Moon*, equal to the several orbs of those radiant Centinels of night, the *Stars*, whose multitude exceeds the figures of Arithmetick, and their magnitude never yet rightly explored; in fine, exactly accommodate to the great body of the *World*, whose bounds we know not, and whose dimensions are immense? The conviction of this impossibility they have endeavoured (though by running into as great a one) thus to evade, As he (say they) must have been deceived, who having observed the generation of nothing greater then a *Flea*, could not therefore beleive the generation of an *Elephant*, as if there could not be found matter enough to arise to so gigantick a body: so are we deceived, while regarding the generation of onely smal things we beleive that the great body of the universe could not be made up by the same means, and after the same manner; as if so vast a proportion of matter could not concur and unite into one Form; nay by so much the more are we deceived, by how much the more proportion the matter of a *Flea* holds to that of an *Elephant*, and the matter of an *Elephant* holds to that of the *World*; then the matter of the *World* holds to that mass of Atoms, which is infinite in the infinite space. But I may with good reason demand, how they can be assured, that in the imaginary space, without the circumference of the world, there is such an inexhaustible abyss of matter, as sufficeth to the generation not onely of this world, but of an infinite multitude of others, fully as large as this: so, well as we are assured, that in this world is contained matter sufficient to the composition of an *Elephant*, as well as of a *Flea*? Sure I am, no man ever saw the outside of the world; and if so, is it not a meer Rhodomontado of phansie, or (as *Pliny* calls it) a high madness, to imagine such an infinite abyss of matter? Let us, however, deal with these, as wise Physicians with Hypochondriacks, that they may the more easily cure them, allow them their absurdities; and grant that from eternity there was such an infinity of Atoms, confusedly hurried to and fro, in an infinite space: yet the difficulty will always remain, how in so great a laxity and infinite

infinite liberty of range, so many Atoms could so convene and combine together, as to terminate and settle each other, by reciprocal coherence and mutual concatenation; how so orderly marshal and dispose their several divisions into such elegant Figures: how adapt those figures to such genuine and constant operations; and all this without the countell, disposition, and revinctiō of any other cause, but their own rude and giddy propensity to motion, and the casual result of their cessation from discord? That *Animals* have obtained such exquisite forms, respective to their several destinations; this we can refer to the artifice of their peculiar *Seminalities*, or the cunning of that *Formative virtue*, which lying ambuscadoed in the spumous consistence of their genital emissions, and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient *Matrix*, or *Receptarie*, immediately designs this or that parcel of matter for such or such a part, another for another, and so spins it out into an uniform labyrinth of members, at last weaving all those into an ingenious *Figure*, in all points resembling the Protoplast or first genitor of that species; who received this *Seminal Tincture*, or faculty prolific from the immediate bounty of its *Creator*. But that *Atoms*, as they are in their naked and incomplex nature, should be allowed to have a *Plastick* or *fabrefactive virtue* equal to that conferred upon the seeds of *Animals*; is a figment as worthy our spleen, as that ridiculous branch of the same root the *Autothous*, or spontaneous eruption of our first Parents from the consermentation of *Water and Earth*, and the production of mankinde like that of *Mushrooms*: which whimsy is also entituled to *Epicurus*, by no meaner a tradition then that of *Censorinus* (*de Di. Nat. cap. 2.*) whose words, for the more clear and credible transmission of the Fable, I thought it not altogether impertinent here to insert. *Nec longe secus Epicurus credidit, limo calefactos uteros nescio quos, radicibus terra coherentes primum increvissse, & infantibus ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante prabuissse; quos ita educatos, & adultos genus hominum propagasse.* To this we may adde (for a single testimony is not strong enough to oblige any man to beleive so unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philosopher) the

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concurrent Auctorities of *Lactantius* (*lib. 2. cap. 7.*) *Plutarch* (*5. Placit. 19.*) *Diogenes Laertius* (*lib. 2. in vita Archelai Atheniens.*) *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib. 1.*) and *Macrobius* (*3. Saturn. 6.*) Though, for my part, I conceive this phrensie to have possessed many heads, upon whose skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Mofs, many hundreds of years before *Epicurus* his was warm; in regard many ancient Nations, in particular the *Egyptians* and *Phœnicians*, contending for the honor of seniority, have gloried in the title of *Autothone*, and thought their Eschutcheons sufficiently noble, if charged onely with this impress, *Terra filii*. But I return from this my Excursion.

If the World, indeed, were as *Ovids* Chaos, *rudis indigestaque moles*, a deformed and promiscuous miscellanie, or masse of Heterogeneities, and the severall parts of it variously blended together without either discrimination or order: then might the pretence of *Fortune* be more plausible. For should we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in some obscure cavern of the earth, and never lookt abroad upon the World, nor heard of more then what immediately concerned his aliment and other natural necessities; on a suddain educe him from his dungeon, and shew him an Animal cut in peices, and all its dissimilar parts, as skin, muscles, fat, veins, arteries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bones, marrow, &c. laied together in a promiscuous heap: doubtless we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be perswaded, that any thing but *Chance* had a hand in that confusion. But should we instantly present him another Animal, feeding, walking, and performing all the comely functions of vitality; instruct him in the severall uses and actions of all those parts, which he had formerly surveyed in the disorder of an heap; then kill that Animal also, and for his farther information, anatomize its carcase; and exhibite to him the severall parts, in all things respondent to the former: tis conjectural that we should finde, that the rudeness of his education would not so totally have extinguished the *Light of Nature* in him, as not to have left some spark, by the glimmering whereof he might discover some more noble *Principle* then *Fortune*, to have been the *Efficient* of that more then ingenious machine.

Now

Now we cannot but observe, that in the great engine of the universe, nothing is with less order, decency, beauty, uniformity, symmetry, constancy, in a word, with less wisdom, either designed, or finished; then in the smaller organ of an Animal, in the perfection of its integrality. And if so, how neer comes it to an absolute contradiction, that we should acknowledge some *noble and prudent Cause*, that moulded and compacted all those different parts into one most elegant and accomplish'd body, and exactly accommodated that body to the easie execution of its predestinate operations: and yet not acknowledg the same, in the ordination and construction of the more admirable, because more difficult fabrick of the Universe? I say, a *Contradiction*; for if the easier Artifice of an *Animal* be conceded too *hard*; assuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organ'd *World* must needs be granted *impossible*, to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of *Fortune*. *Quanto enim major operis moles, tanto erit ut sapientia, ita & potentia majus argumentum; non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpusculorum non commendat artificem: sed quod in opere ingenti & symmetriam servare industrium, & materiam regere operosum esse videatur.*

Lastly, as the Votaries of Fortune have argued *à minori ad majus*, thus; if the smaller machine of a *Hand-worm*, wherein the almost invisible (without an engyscope, or magnifying glass) exiguity of the whole frame, the multiplicity of organs, and the variety of respective functions assigned thereunto, may worthily contend, concerning elegance of composure, with the large captain of the watry regiments, the *Whale*, may be configured by *Chance*, or the casual concurrence of convenient particles of the *First matter*: why may not the grosser movement of the *Universe* be also wrought by the like contingent segregation of disagreeing, and convention of consimilar Atoms; whose tumultuation and conflict growing from the antipathy of different *magnitude* and *Figure*, made the *Chaos*; and their working themselves into peculiar orders, by the accidental conflux and mutual coherence of *Homogenities*, made the *forme* of the *World*. So we, by

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counter-
majori ad minus.

Article 6.

The Epicureans
grand Argument, of the
possibility of
the configura-
tion of the Uni-
verse by a casu-
al and sponta-
neous disposi-
tion of Atoms,
from the fre-
quent & actual
production of
an Insect by
the same means
or principles
countermined
by an Inversion
or Argument *à*
majori ad minus.

counter-demonstration, may argue *à majori ad minus*, thus; if Fortune had the power and skill to make the *World*, why can she not make the more rude and facile movement of a *Watch*? If Atoms could spontaneously range and combine themselves into the immense badlements of the *World*: why not also into the narrower structure of a *Castle*? If they met into the mighty bulwarks of an *Island*: why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a *Fort*? If they could dispose themselves into wide campania's of *Herbs* and variegated *Flowers*: why not into a peice of *Landskip Tapestry*? All which require, as infinitely less of *Power*, so also of *Science*.

Should they endeavour a subterfuge, by replying; that these are the *Effects* of *Art*, and not of *Nature*: we may prevent their evasion by rejoyning, that since they allow *Chance* to have an interest even in the operations of *Art*; why doe they not aswell make her the *Founderess* of a *City*, as of the ædifice of a spontaneous *Animal*, whose structure is more difficult? We are not backward to confess, what we lately supposed concerning the dissected and disordered parts of an *Animal*, that if the *World* were but a promiscuous heap of different materials, such as stones, Timber, Sand, Lime, Clay, Nailes, Tyles, &c. confusedly congested: then could not our choler swell to so high a tide of indignation against the arrogance of Fortune; nor should we be so well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrivement. But since the building of the same is, by infinite transcendency, more durable, more distinct, more symmetrical, and more gorgeous in all its parts, then the most elaborate and magnificent *Palace*: since the *Heart* of a *Pismire* hath more of magisterial artifice, then the *Escherial*; the *proboscis* or trunk of a *Flea* more industry in its delicate and sinuous perforation, then all the costly *Aqueducts* of *Nero's Rome*, the *Arsenal* at *Venice*, or the two Spanish *Engines*, one for the traduction and elevation of *Water*, at *Toledo*, the other for the automatus coynning of money, at *Segovia*, both admired by a *Person* for the most part above admiration, *St. Kenelm Digby*; since the *breast* or laboratory of a *Bee* contains more anfractuons convolutions then the *Labyrinth* of *Dadalus*, and more *Cellules* then the famous monastery
of

of St. Lawrence, in Spain, for bravery and amplitude of architecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World: and since the skull of a Louse hath more ventricles or receptaries for the numerous swarms of Animal spirits, then the spacious Amphitheatre of Rome had seats for the spectators: in fine, since the meanest peice of Nature throwes disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art; how can it be, that man, noble and ingenious man, should fall so much lower then his incircumspect Father Adam, as to confels the visibile influence of Prudence in the easier, and yet, at the same time, deny any cause, but Ignorance to have been exercised in the harder; to admit the managery of an Architect, or knowing principle, in the structure of a house, and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the Universe upon the blind disposal of Fortune?

To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom of our Maker, by leaving no possible objection unanswered, let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole, or salley port, the *Spontaneous motion of Atoms*, and urge, that if the materials of a house, or other artificial structure, were endowed with an innate propensity to motion, as the materials of the World were; then might they also, without the direction of any external Agent, onely by reciprocal convention, complication and revinction, acquire settled and orderly situations, and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabrick: but since they are devoid of all domestick Activity, the disparity betwixt the operations of chance, and those of Art, is so great, that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one, is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other. And when we have supposed this retort, let us also suppose what they would have, *viz.* that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion; and that, by the drift of this internal activity, they should from different quarters meet together in one heap, there croud, compress, express, impell, repell, detruide, elevate, circumgyrate, fix each other, and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce: yet can it never be supposed, by a sober imagination, that the result of all this hurly

Article 7.
An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inference and ours, prevented: and the invalidity of theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded *in terminis*, declared, by an adequate similitude.

burly betwixt those unequal parts, and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each, would be a well ordered ædifice; nay any thing half so neer allied to architecture as a ruine.

I conceive the wit of *Balbus* wound up to a very happy strain, when disputing against *Velleius* (one that blush't not to wear the infamous badge of *Epicurus*) concerning this monstrous figment of the worlds Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos, and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter; he invented this apposite *similitude*: *Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur idem non putet, si innumerabiles, unius & viginti forme literarum vel aureæ, vel qualeslibet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio an in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere Fortuna.* Upon which we may briefly thus descant; if that congruous series of letters, which is necessary to the lecture of one page, line, or word, can never result from a careless congestion of prints; but must be the settled effect of great industry and diligence in the *Compositor*: undoubtedly, with no less violence to reason, can any man opinion, that the innumerable parts of the World, that observe a far more distinct and elegant order than the characters of any *Typographer* disposed into words, lines, pages, sheets, should attain to that admirable Form, which they now hold; by a meer fortuitous assembly; and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some *supremely-intelligent Cause*.

Article 8.

The conclusion of this section; or, the æquipondium of the preceding reasons, if perpended in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration.

These reasons, though not woven into that strict method, which is required to fulfill the web of perfect demonstrations; doe yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to conclude the *Creation of the Universe out of no præexistence, by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence*, and if judiciously twisted together into one *Syndrome*, or complex Argument, must oblige as firmly; since they clearly evince the first *Article* of the *Christians Creed*, as an uncontrollable verity, which none, but such degenerate miscreants, in whom the *Light of Nature* is wholly extinct, or such as are desperately resolved to shut the eye
of

of their minde against the splendor of that infallible *Criterion*, can longer doubt of. And therefore, having determined neither to scandal the intellectuals of my Reader, either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of those proofs already urged, or multiplying others in order to the illustration of that truth, to which he hath formerly submitted his plenary assent; nor unfruitfully to spend that time and paper, which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other necessary points, on a work of supererogation: I shall onely fringe this exercise with that pertinent and emphatical passage of *Lactantius* (*De Opif. Dei cap. 6.*) *Tanta ergo qui videat & talia, potest existimare nulla effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina; sed ex Atomis subtilibus, exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula? nonne prodigio simile est, aut natum esse hominem qui hac diceret, ut Leucippum; aut extitisse qui crederet, ut Democritum. qui auditor ejus fuit; vel Epicurum, in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi fonte profluxit?* and so proceed to the satisfaction of two collateral *Scruples*.

SECT. IV.

Scruple 1.

THE Curiosity of some, (whether more *insolent* or *vain*, is hard to determine,) hath been so audacious, as to adventure upon this *Quere*; *If God made the world, pray what instruments, tools, mechanick engines, what assistants did he make use of in the work?*

disposed, God made use of, in his act of Fabrication of the Universe, copiously satisfied: and the *energie* of the divine *Will* commonstrated superior to the indigence of either.

Article 1.
That Antique
aburd expostu-
lation, what
Instruments
Auxiliants,
materials pre-

The Satisfaction.

This is no green impiety (unless it hath lately budded forth again amongst those Human-devils, the *Ranters*; the report of whose prodigious blasphemies hath sometimes transported me to a hatred, at least a contempt of my self, for being in the same rank of Creatures; and made me wish for a second deluge) but almost half as old as Time, and may be traced as high as the Epoche of the Grecian learning; witness those many secret convulsions of it by *Plato* (both in his *Parmenides* and *Timæus*) while he frequently affirms the *divine Nature* to be *Inorganical*, and the immediate operations of the *universal cause* to be above the necessity of *Corporeal means*: witness also *Cicero* (most of whose streams came out of the Grecian fountain) who (in 1. *De Nat. Deor.*) introducing the Atheist, *Vellejus* disputing against *Plato* and the *Stoicks*, who held the divine essence to be the Author of the Universe; proposeth the scruple at large, in these Words: *Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi à Deo atque edificari mundum facit? qua molitio? qua ferramenta? qui vestes? que machina? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? &c.* That boldness is the daughter of ignorance, is herein plainly verified; for had these unhappy Pagans understood any thing of the majestick essence of divinity, or but apprehended the vast disparity between the efficiency of the *Highest*, and that of all other *Subordinate causes*; tis more then probable, they had not been so sawey with his imperial Attribute, *Omnipotence*, nor run into that common mistake of flesh and blood, of *measuring the ways of God by the ways of man*. True tis, that man hath need of instruments to the performance of any peice of Art, nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule, or describe a circle without the help of his compass; the Carpenter work without his Axe, Saw, and other tools; the Smith without his fire, hammer, anvill, &c. all which the wit of man, sharpened by necessity, hath invented to compensate the insufficiency of his naked hands, made by nature either too soft, too weak, or too obtuse for those difficult uses:

uses: But yet what can impede our assurance of the eternal existence of a more *Noble Efficient*; whose *Will* is infinite *Power*, and that *Power* infinite *Activity*; whose single *Let it be done*, is both *Cause* and *Means*; and whose simple act of *Volition* not only the *Efficient*, but also the *Instrument*? Do not we observe (that I may extract an *Argument* from the evidence of *sense*) how, in the twinkling of a lovers eye, that comely *Arch* of colours, the *Rain-bow*, is painted on the clouds; and yet without either hand, compass, or pencil? doe we not behold whole mountains of ponderous *Clouds* piled one upon another; and yet neither vessels to lave up, nor engines to sustain that sea of water? And cannot these familiar observations instruct us with more knowledge, then to doubt the fabrication of the world without *corporeal organs*? Why is our reason so immodest, as to inquire into the ability of the *First cause*; when alas! it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakest *Secondary*? if the meanest and most ordinary effect of Nature imports so much stupendious industry, as transcends the narrow capacity of man; what audacious ignorance is it in him, to question the *energie* of that *Principle*, that made Nature her self, and prescribed her rules to act by: from which she cannot vary, without a miraculous dispensation? We are willing forsooth, to profess, that we cannot understand by what artifice the delicate body of a *Pismire* is configurated, animated, and impowered for the noble actions of *sense* and *voluntary motion*, nay (for ought we know to the contrary) for that more noble and elaborate office of *discourse* also: and yet, when we come to contemplate the more magnificent form of the *Universe*, shall we degenerate into such impertinent Ideots, as to debate the *Mathematick energie* of its *Creator*, and demand how he could operate without *Engines* to transport, adser, and wind up the materials, with sea-folds to advance the roof, or servants to assist in several offices requisite? Assuredly, as the frame of that slender Animal doth confess a certain *Faculty*, by which it was modelled, delineated, and compacted; though the reason and manner of its contexture remain in the dark to us: so also doth the huge machine of this visible World proclaim a certain *Energeticall principle*, of infinitely

finitely more potency and perfection, by which it was compos'd; though the manner and way of its composition be too abstruse and sublime for the discernment of our weak-sighted intellectuals. Now, whether you shall denominate that *Energy*, a *Power divine*, or *God*; it is indifferent: but indispensably necessary, that you acknowledge it to be so great, as by incomputable intervals to exceed the comprehension of the mind of man; nor is it safe for us to attempt the commensuration of it by the unequal module, or scale of *particular finite Causes*, since even from these our reason stands so remote, as to be able at most onely to conjecture their dimensions. Upon this consideration, if a *Pilot*, while he onely sits in the steerage and hands the helme, doth direct the ship in its course, by a far more excellent industry, then all the rude officers interviene thereunto, that stretch their tougher sinewes to hoise and tack about her sayls, and toyle their tawny bodies in other inferior labours: if a *Prince*, who sits calmly in his throne, doth by a single nod of his sceptre awe millions of his subjects to obedience, and by the magick of a smile or frown conjure whole nations into joy or terror; if he, I say, doth govern his people, by a more mysterious and noble influence, then all his subordinate ministers of state, with all their tumultuous pains and travell, either in the transmission, or execution of his mandates: if an *Architect*, or master-builder, who in his closet onely draws the plat-form, and designes the figure of the structure; doth by his meer designation, operate more exquisitely, and by a more excellent artifice contribute to the perfection of the work, then all the swarm of bustling mechanicks employ'd in squaring, or placing the materials: why should we not allow that mighty *Pilot*, *Prince*, and *Architect of the World* to be empower'd with a certain kind of *Efficacy* so eminent, that whatever can be thought most absolute and puissant in all other natures, must be infinitely inferior to it? And therefore when we, who have learned our lesson out of the sacred leaves of *Moses*, say that he made the universe *solo nutu, atque simplici volitione*, by one simple and entire act of his *Will*, express'd in that word, *Fiat*; we speak all that can be understood by us of that miracle.

As for the last part of the Atheists indecent expostulation; viz. what

What coadjutors or ministers had God to attend him, and what materials præexistent and prepared to conform to his disposal? that may be soon resolved, by offering that *supereminence*, whereby he is, by infinite excesses, above all other *Efficients*. For what were the *Prerogative* of *Divinity*, if it were subject to the want of the same *means*, or cooperating *Causes*, with us despicable and impotent men? To conclude, it will not onely suppress all dangerous *Curiosities* of this kind, but also highly commend our *judgments*; that we draw a large line of distinction betwixt the *Almightiness* of the *Creator*, and the *restrained activity*, or rather pure *imbecillity* of the *Creature*; ascribe to him a *superlative and pancratical energie*, or *virtue paramount*; and on our devout knees proclaim him more able to *create*, than want either *ministers*, or *matter*, whereby, whereon to accomplish his *Will*.

Scruple 2.

The other profane *Scruple* objected by the Atheist, is this; *Cur Deus tamdiu à fabricatione mundi abstinuerit?* If God were elder then Time, and the world made in the beginning of time; why did he so long suspend the Fabrication of it?

The Response.

This is also a poyson spit from the accursed jaws of that black Viper, *Velleius*, against the *Stoicks* (*apud Ciceron. 1. de nat. Deor.*) in this squallid stream; *isto igitur tam immenso spatio, quæro, cur Pronœa vestra* (so according to their own phrase he calls that *Minde*, or *supreme Intelligence*, to whom that sober sect of Philosophers justly ascribed the origination of all things except the *material Principle*, which they erroneously affirmed to have been the *Asbes*, or cynders of a former World, whose production also they conceived to have been, like that fabulous one of the *Phoenix*, out of the urne of its predecessor) *cessaverit? laborémne fugiebat?* and not lately wiped clean off, and its contagious venome cured by the generous antidote of *Eusebius*, who

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Article 2:

A second immodest interrogation, wherefore God so long deferred the creation, resolved: with a detection of the unreasonableness of undecent curiosity.

(in *I. de prep. Evang. I.*) most expressly, amply, and judiciously opposed it. However, lest this poyson ferment afresh, and again exulcerate the impure *Libertines* of this Age (not more for its extraordinary *Calamities*, then unpattern'd *Impieties*, as well the wonder, as grief of our posterity) and since it cannot but be thought most pertinent to my present scope: I shall endeavour the total extinction of it, by applying a smart *Alexiterion* of reason.

From an *Agent infinite in Wisdome, Power, and Liberty*, such as we must allow *God* to be, no account either of *Motives, Means, or Time*, ought to be required. It was, according to their measure of time, about six thousand years from the nativity of the Universe, when the unhappy disciples of *Epicurus* disseminated this uncivil interrogation: but had it been created many myriads of myriads of thousands sooner then it was, tis open to conjecture, that they would have insisted on the same sawcy demand; since eternity compared to more myriads of years, then all the figures of *Arithmetick* can amount to the computation of, must yet import a vast tract or flux of *Time* (for other idiom to express this notion, I could not either recognize, or excogitate) below the foot of that accompt; and that precedent space might have afforded room enough for the intrusion of the same frivolous quære. And therefore it becomes us, either not to enquire, why the world was produced, rather then not produced; or allowing its production, to esteem it all one, whether it were produced then, before, or after, in this so great a latitude of *Eternity*. For the same question now proposed, why *God* did not determine in himself to create the World, ten millions of years sooner then he did; may also be revived hereafter, concerning these times of ours, if another rand of ten millions more should be unravelled. From whence this modest and truly humane lesson fairly infers it self; that it is oraculous in the greatest wisdome to say, *God Created the World in that article of eternity* (we may now call it *Time*) which seemed most opportune to his *Wisdom*. For, that he had some important reasons so long to deferr the creation, and then onely to contrive and finish it, when he did; though those reasons be cryptick and ignote to us: we may more then

conjecture, from the consideration of his inexhaustible and ever moving abyss of his *Prudence*, which is the rule to all other his actions. And truly, if *Princes* ground many of their designs upon profound reasons of State, the knowledge whereof is never diffused among their subjects, but lockt up in the cabinet of their own heart: why may not *God*, who is all *Counsel* and *Prudence*, be afforded the prerogative of having some weighty respects, that moved him to create the World, then when he did, rather then either sooner or later? Which respects, for ought we can explore, is *Mercy* in him to conceal from us: sure I am, tis a pride not much beneath, if not equal to that of *Lucifer*, in us to dare to enquire. Tis a confest truth, that no man can know the thoughts of another, who is constant to his resolve to reserve them sealed up within his own breast; and can any man be so incurably overrun with the itch of vanity, when he despaires of pretending certainly to divine the cogitations of his familiar friend, whose inclinations he hath so frequently read in the book of his conversation: yet to arrogate to himself an ability of searching into the abscondite counsels of him, whom neither *Minde* nor *Sense* can touch? Wherefore tis our duty to reclaim our wild curiosities, to set bounds to our inquisitions, and gratefully fate our boulimic of science with this wholesome morsel; that from hence, that the World was once created, we may safely inferre, that the *Creator* was pleased to declare himself so *Potent*, that no impediment could intervene betwixt his eternal decree, and the opportune execution thereof: so *Free*, as to be above the impulsion or constraint of any necessity: so *Wise*, as to prevent all temerity and collusion of Fortune: so *Good*, that the prescience of mans future ingratitude, and so the infertility of his matterpeice, could not dehort him from fulfilling his purpose of conferring that inestimable blessing of *Existence* both upon him, and all things else for his sake.

As for the last clause of this foolish demand, *An vigilans tanto aternitatis spatio, an verò dormierit mundi opifex?* Whether *God* continued *vigilant*, or *dormant* from eternity, untill he set about the fabrick of this vast All? This includes a manifest *incongruity*, and speaks a *contradiction* loud enough to answer

and refute it self. For those two terms, *Sleep* and *Divinity*, stand at open defiance, and placed in one notion reciprocally deny each other; the one importing an *Affection* of a *Body*, or the effect of the Concidence, or Angustation of the ventricles of the brain, and slender conduits of the nerves in an Animal, caused either by a deficiency, or quiet of the spirits inservient to the Animal Faculties, and causing a temporary and periodical cessation from the offices of sense and Arbitrary motion: the other expressing an *Eternal simple Essence*, neither oppressed with corporeity, nor (therefore) subject to defatigation upon any exolution or wast of spirits; and consequently not capable of sleep. However, to manifest the extreme stupidity of their reply; *viz. that if he were perpetually awake, yet we must grant him to have been constantly idle*, before he began his work of Creation: I shall vouchsafe them that judicious rejoinder of many *Fathers* (whose studies were also not rarely infested with these vermine) that in all that precedent tract of eternity (mortality will excuse the necessary solecisme) he was fully imployed *in the most blisfull contemplation of himself*. Which is an operation most easie, most quiet, most pleasant; as all Philosophers, who ever have, by the steps of abstracted meditation, advanced their minds so high as to ken that perfection of beatitude, have observed.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Why God Created the World.

SECT. I.

THat every Action presupposeth an end, or scope; is Canonical: and hence is it customary amongst men, by so much the more hardly to beleive that such or such a considerable Action was done by such or such a Person; by how much the less either of probable *Pleasure*, or *Emolument* may appear to have invited him to that enterprize. Nor was *Velleius* a stranger to this rule; for fighting the unjust quarrel of that usurper, Fortune, and having at first invaded *Providence Divine* with direct and down-right blowes, unsuccessfully: he at last contrives to wound it with oblique thrusts, and attempts to stab the opinion of the Worlds Creation by God, by striking at the End, or more plainly by cutting off all possibility of either *Pleasure* or *Profit* to accrew to him thereby. And in pursuance of this stratagem, he endeavours to prove (1.) *Conditum non fuisse mundum Dei causa*; that the World was not created for Gods sake, (*i. e.*) that he is no more concerned in the construction of it, then if it had never been altered from its Chaos: (2) *neque hominum gratia*, nor for the behoof of man, (*i. e.*) that man hath no juster plea to the Royalty of the World, then the meanest Animal; nor did Nature look with a more amorous and indulgent aspect upon him, then upon any other of her productions.

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Article 1.
The improbability of the worlds creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible Motive, scope or final cause.

Article 2.
Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either emolument, or delectation, from the Universe.

The *First* position he essays to illustrate and inferre by a *Socratical* way of argumentation, or by circumventing our judgements with a chain of *Interrogatories*, all whose links are dependent each upon other, though by a connexion so subtle, as to be imperceptible to the incircumspect; the *Abstract* whereof, as taken by Cicero (1. De Natur. Deorum) lies in these words. *Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis & luminibus, tanquam Ædilis, ornare? Si ut Deus melius habitaret; antea, videlicet tempore infinito, in tenebris, tanquam in gurgustio habitaverat? post autem; varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua Cælum & Terras exornatas videmus? qua ista potest esse oblectatio Deo, qua si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potuisset?* « What politique respect put God upon the servile office « of an Ædile? What motive prevailed with him to trim the « Universe with gawdy Asterisms, and imbellish the azure roof « thereof with variety of refulgent studs? if to better his habitati- « on; tis a signe that forever before he was but ill accommodated « with a dark and narrow mansion: But afterwards, can we « conceive that he entertained and solaced himself with that va- « riety of beauteous forms, wherewith we observe both stories « of this great Palace to be adorned? What delight is that, « wherewith divinity can be affected? if any such there be, why « would he so long deny himself the fruition of it?

Nor did *Velleius* want a second to joyne with him in this bloody design for the assassination of that sacred Truth, *That God made the World chiefly for his own Glory*; for that witty villain *Lucretius* (and the finest wits, if not maturely pruned and kept under by the severe hand of Prudence, are the rankest Plants and most apt to run up to the highest impiecies) hath digested the challenge into verse, thus:

*Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur,
Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit agri,
Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret ævum,
Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?*

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*An, credo, in tenebris vita, ac mœrore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?* &c. in lib. 5.

After so long Content, what new delight
Could th' happy Gods to this great change invite?
To affect Innovation, doth confess
The present state obnoxious to distress.
He only can t' enjoy new things desire,
Whom the deficiency of the old doth tire.
What therefore could Divinity persuade,
To leave his antient quiet, for a trade
Of Architecture? Can I think, till then
Him cloysterd in a dark and narrow Den? &c.

The Refutation.

'Tis an Apophthegme fathered (and that not unjustly) upon *Epicurus*; *Facere sapientem omnia sui causa*, that a wiseman in all his actions doth principally regard himself. And could not this learn his Scholars more discretion, then to doubt, whether or no *God* the *Elixir of wisdom*, in this weighty operation had an eye upon himself, or reflected upon his own concernment? The Word, *God*, to a metaphysical consideration, contains reasons more then enough to decide this idle controversie, excited only by a predominion of *sensuality*. For when there was nothing existent besides himself; tis plain, that he could gratifie nothing besides himself: and as he not only derived the power of operating from himself alone, but also was the *exemplar* to himself; so also must he be the principal *End* of his operation. The *End* I say, *non utilitatis*; as if his *Essence* were capable of *melioration*, his *Beatitude* so remiss, as to admit of *Augmentation*, his *Condition* so imperfect, as to be improved by *Alteration: sed glorie*, which as he could not want, so was there no reason why he should want. Such was the Freedom of his Will, that no necessity could constrain him to the production of any thing; such the Bounty, that none could restrain him from the voluntary profusion of his goodness. When twas indifferent to him, or to constitute a World, or to continue alone; he yet was pleased to follow the propensity of his own infinity,

Article 3.
The satisfactory refutation thereof; and *Gods glory* manifested to have been his prime and principal end.

infinity Benignity, and to create : infomuch as he judged it better that there should be other natures beside his own, to which he might impart the overflowings of his goodness; then not. *Better*, I say, not for *himself*; for as the perpetual *Emanation* or *diffusion* of his *Goodness* upon the creature, since time (the *Image of eternity*, as *Plato* (in *Timao*) describes it) began, hath not diminished : so could not the *Concentration*, or *Confinement* of it to the orb of his own essence, have lessened his *Felicity*; which hath *Plenitude* and *Constancy* for its supporters, and is therefore raised above the imperfections of *Access* or *Change*. And upon this persuasion (I cannot forget to speak after the manner of men) he vouchsafed to constitute all other natures that are besides his own; and more especially *Man* : not that he might receive any emolument from them, since himself is all goodness, and by consequence all glory; but that, conferring respective endowments upon them, he might have convenient subjects, whereon to exercise his immense liberality and make known his magnificence. That since the creation he expects from man the retribution of *Reverence*, *Adoration*, and *Obedience*; ariseth not *ex indigentia*, from any need he stands in of, or benefit that redounds to him by the unfruitfull homage of man : but, *ne homines sint erga ipsum ingrati*, from his own free *Love* to prevent mans being hurried into that misery of *Ingratitude*. I say, *Misery of Ingratitude*; for that forlorn hope of hell having once taken possession of the minde of man, instantly brings in a whole host of perturbations, subverts its government, destroys its tranquillity, and so layes it open to the devastation of *Infelicity*.

And whereas they demand, *Why God, if he take any delight in these experiments of his wisdom, Power, and munificence, would so long endure the privation, or rather defect of that delight?* The solution is obvious, that this kinde of *delectation* is no more then *Accidentary* to him, and can adfer infinitely less of addition to that fulness of *Beatitude*, formally radicated in his *Essence*; then one smal drop of water superaffused to the immensity of a million of *Oceans*. For *sibi sufficientissimus*, All to himself, is his peculiar *Motto*; since he hath the source of all that's *Amiable* and *Delectable*, arising from, and perpetually
flowing

flowing round his own most perfect nature, nor can he be affected with the unequal oblation of humane *Doxologie*, otherwise then by reflecting upon his own *Goodness*, which freely ordained, formed, and disposed man to that honourable and beatifical duty: and therefore that sentence of the School Divine, *Quicquid agit præter seipsum, ad alterius commodum spectat*, deserves our gratefull assent; for all his *Extrinsicall* or *Emanative* operations look *directly* upon the benefit of that Creature, whom he hath adopted to be the object of his Love, which is Man; *obliquely* upon the convenience or accommodation of all other Creatures, necessary or adjuvant to the well being of that Favorite; and by *reflexion*, upon his own munificence. And hence is it manifest, that he adorned the Universe with asterisms, and beautified the heavens with radiant lamps; not that he might better his own habitation, which is impossible, he being a mansion to himself, and his eternal condition being extreme felicity: but provide a more commodious place of residence for men, for whose sake principally (after that of his own Glory) he intended the Creation. He, doubtless, could want the illumination of neither Sun, nor Moon, whose dwelling is in light inaccessible; nor be enriched by the faint splendor of the Stars, whose glory is so refulgent, that we hyperbolize the lustre of the Meridian Sun, when we define it to be the shadow of its Creator; and since those shining orbs are but pale vapours kindled at his more splendid abyss of light, how infinitely more lucent must his essence be, who is described by some to be *Supersubstantialis Lux*? (*Athanas Kircher in metaphysic. Lucis & umbra, Epichiremate 5.*) Nor can we say lets of that admirable *variety of forms*, wherewith we observe both stories of the World to be adorned; for if they appear so full of *Elegance* and *beauty*; how incomparably more fair and amiable must their *Maker* be, who is the *Soul of Pulchritude*, and by the Analogy which they hold to the comely ideas in his intellect, all things are determined to perfection? For that mighty *Cause*, which can give being to so many various perfections, must of necessity possess all those perfections, *modo eminentiori*, in a transcendent manner. Wherefore the excellencies of his own nature did, before he was pleased to create others, so amply suffice to the

Accomplishment of his beatitude ; that they now at this day wholly suffice to the same ; nor is he capable of having his Felicity encreased by the contributions of any thing without himself. And since all things created, are nought but certain *Emissions*, or as it were *deradiations*, which he pleased to diffuse from himself ; tis perspicuous, that before that *Diffusion* he comprehended all natures in his own, as in their *Fountain*, and therefore could not have his being meliorated by their production ; as also, that he may at pleasure, adnihilate all again, with no more detriment to his glory, then the Sun can want those beams, which yesterday it emitted upon my hand.

S E C T. II.

Neque Hominum gratiâ.

Article 1.
Their second
Argument ;
that God had
no especial re-
gard to the be-
nefit of *Man* :
and the

THis *second Position* he likewise insinuates, by the same imposture of ensnaring the minde in a complex series of *Questions*, after this manner ; “ If all things were constituted by God
“ for the sake of *Man* onely, as you affirme, then either for the
“ peculiar interest of *Wise men* or *Fools* ? if for the sole behoof
“ of *Wise men* ; then a far less provision might have served
“ the turn : for no age could ever glory in the production of ma-
“ ny such at once ; and if all that ever were, or shall be, met toge-
“ ther into one colonie, a very smal Island might be both large and
“ rich enough to accommodate them with necessaries: and so the
“ greatest part of the creation must be confest superfluous, as to
“ the principal destination thereof ? But if for *Fools* only ; then
“ you entangle your selves in a two fold *Incongruity*. *First*, you
“ entrench upon the *Justice* of the Creator, since thereby you im-
“ plicitely confest, that he was partial in conferring so great a be-
“ nefit upon those, who must so ill deserve, as not to know right-
“ ly how to use it : *Secondly*, you infringe his *Providence*, by
“ making him not to have had a foresight of the unfruitfulness of
“ his chief design, which must miscarry and be quite lost in a con-
“ trary

« trary event: Fools being without any dispute, most miserable
 « in that they are Fools; for what can be reputed a more abso-
 « lute misery, then Fatuity? And if for the conjunctive interest;
 « or promiscuous concernment of both; then do you offer vio-
 « lence to the goodness of the Architect; in regard, that during
 « life there unavoidably occur so many bitter discommodities,
 « that wise men cannot sweeten them with the compensation of
 « Commodities: and Fools neither avoid them as they approach,
 « nor endure them when they come, &c.

Nor was *Velleius* singular in this error; for *Lactantius* (*Lib. 7. cap. 5.*) hath accused *Epicurus* also of words to the same effect; which according to the record of his indictment run thus: *Quid enim Deo cultus hominis confert beato, & nulla re indigenti? vel si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causâ mundum fabricaret, ut instrueret eum sapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eumque diligeret tanquam filium; cur mortalem fragilemque constituit? cur omnibus malis, quem diligebat, objecit? Cum oporteret & beatum esse hominem, tanquam conjunctum & proximum Deo; & perpetuum, sicut est ipse, ad quem colendum & contemplandum figuratus est.* What advantage can the barren veneration of man yeeld to God, who is perfectly happy, and knows no indigency? or, if he deigned to bestow so high honour upon man, as to create the whole world for his use, to endue him with wisdom, to inaugurate him Lord royall of all living creatures, and love him with as much affection and indulgence as a Son; why did he yet make him mortal, and so fatally subject to fragility? why expose him whom he adopted to a filial love, to the invasion of all kinds of evil? when on the contrary, in all reason, man also ought to have been both compleatly happy, as being allied to God, by a very neer affinity; and immortal as God himself, to the worship and contemplation of whom he was configurated.

Lucretius also would not be exempted from acting a part in this tragical scene; but scorning to come behind the most adventurous Bravo, that had bid defiance to Divinity, or be outdone by any in the feats of Atheisme: he not only sucks all the venome in the former Arguments, but adds much of his own also,

Fortification
 thereof by 3
 reasons.

and distills it together through his quill into 8 reasons.

1. That God reaps no benefit by the fealty and doxologies of man: *Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum, ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggredierentur?*

2. That in case man had never had existence, it could not have been unpleasant not to have been at all. *Qui nunquam blandum vita gustavit amorem, nec fuit in numero; quid obest non esse beatum?* What never knew existence, can nere know the want of blifs: Nothing can feel no woe.

3. That the greatest moiety of the Earth is wholly barren and unprofitable to man.

*Principio, quantum Cæli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, sylvaque ferarum
Possedere: tenent rupes, vastaque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras;
Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduisque geli casus mortalibus aufert, &c.*

4. That even from those narrow cantons of the earth, which are inhabited, men reap no other harvest, but what themselves have sown, with uncessant toyle; nor doe they find any ground fruitfull, but what they have manured with their own industry, and enriched with the salt dew of their own laborious brows:

*Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
Sensibus obâncat, ni vis humana resistat, &c.*

5. That even those fruits of the earth, which they have so dearly earned, with the profusion of so many showers of sweat, frequently miscarry, and become abortive; the hopes of the husband-man being often frustrated by the unexpected intervention of cross seasons, Ustilagos or Blites, Mildewes, Sulphureous Meteors, late Frosts, high Winds, &c.

6. That if neither the world, nor men, had ever been existent; their Ideas had never falne under the conception of the divine intellect.

7. That

7 That poor, weak, and fragil man is obnoxious to destruction by a thousand divers contingencies ; the ravenous appetite of wild Beasts, the deleterious punctures of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contusion of Thunderbolts, the eruption of Earth-quakes, the arsenical eruptions of Minerals, the epidemick contagion of Pestilential Diseases, kindled either by Anomalous seasons, Tempests, or malignant impressions in the aer ; the invasion of intestine infirmities, upon the civil war often breaking out between the Heterogeneities of his blood, or a mutiny of his Elements ; and though he escape all these, yet doth the Pallie hand of Time soon shake down his ounce of sand, and then turn him over to be devoured by oblivion.

8. *Tum porro puer, ut saevus projectus ab undis
Nasita, nudus humi jacet infans, indigus omni
Vitae auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit,
Vagiturque locum lugubri complet, ut aequum 'st,
Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum. &c.*

That Nature seems more a step-mother to man, then any other Animal ; having cast him into the world naked, feeble, unarmed, unprovided for in all but want, and by his early tears portending that deluge of calamities, which in case he be so miserable to survive his birth, must drown all the comforts of his life, and wash him into earth again after a short flight of time ; in brief, she exposeth him as a bastard, to be taken up and nursed by the charity of that giddy headed gossip, Fortune : who hath no sooner smiled him into strength enough to suffer, but she contracts her browes, disinherits and abandons the desolate wretch to all the hardship and afflictions, that the witty malice of Fate (to whom our tortures are pleasures, and the hoarse groans of the rack sound perfect melody) can either invent or inflict.

And thus have we heard, in Summary, the plea of those three eminent Levellers, who endeavoured to supplant man of his birth-right, to take away the prerogative of his nature, and reduce him to no greater a share in the favour of his Maker, then the meanest

of his fellow Animals. It comes now to our turn to examine, whether their Arguments are strong enough to carry the Cause.

The Refutation.

Article 2.
The total re-
dignation
thereof by a
commonplace
that the benefit
and felicity of
man, was Gods
secondary
end: and the
impossibility of
satisfaction to
the first end, by
any creature
but man, con-
cluded, from
his

I.
Rationality.

That God, in his atcheivem of the Universe, had a priincipal regard to *Man*, above all other the works of his hands; and considered him, *tanquam finem interjectum*, as the *Mediate* or *Secondary End*, his own *Glory* being the *Immediate* or *Primary*, or, more plainly, the end of that end: is clearly deduceable even from this; *that man only among that infinite variety of natures listed in the inventory of the Creation, is constituted in a capacity to satisfie that first end; his intellectualls, or cogitative essence being, by a genial verticity, or spontaneous propension, qualified to admire, in admiration to speculate, in speculation to acknowledge, in acknowledgement to laud the Goodness, Wisdome, and Power of the Worlds Creator; while the ignoble Faculties of all other Animals are terminated in the inferior offices of sense, nor ever attain above the inconsiderate operations of their brutal appetites. And this one reason, if duely perpended, will be found of weight enough to counterpoize all those empty frothy sophisms alleaged to the contrary: nor can any æquitable consideration (if I rightly understand its value) allow it to be much less then Apodictical. I say if duely perpended: for we are not rashly to understand this peculiar Adequation or Præeminence of man to consist in the bare Uprightness of his Figure, which accommodates him *Calum intueri, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus*. For, according to the vulgar acceptation of *Erectness*, and as it is considered to be a position opposite to *Proneness*, or the horizontal situation of the *Spina dorsi*, or rack bones in Animals progredient with their bellies toward the earth: man hath no reason to boast a singularity therein. Since many other Animals, as the *Penguin*, a kind of water fowle frequent upon the straights of Magellan; the devout insect of Province, or *Prega Dio*, the praying Grasshopper, so called because for the most part found in an upright posture answerable to that of man, when his hands*

are elevated at his devotions; the *Bitour*, which my self hath sometimes observed standing upright as an arrow false perpendicular, and his eyes so advanced, as to shoot their visual beams point blank at the zenith, or vertical point of heaven; all *Plane Fishes*, that have the apophyses or processes of their spine carried laterally, or made like the teeth of a Comb, as the *Thornback*, *Plaice*, *Flounder*, *Soles*, &c. and their eyes placed in the upper side of their head, and so pointing directly upward; and diverse others attaining an erectness beyond his, and by reason of the sublimity of their faces taking a far larger prospect of the firmament. For man cannot look so high as the *Æquinoctial* circle, unless he either recline the spondils of his neck and loyns, or place himself in a supine position. And therefore *Lactantius*, though he conceived his argument impregnable, when he said (*Lib. 7. cap. 5.*) *Quod planius argumentum proferrè potest, & mundum hominis, & hominem suâ causa Deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus Animalibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad cœlum directi, facies ad Deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit?* to him that shall literally interpret the same, cannot appear to have stopt the mouth of contradiction: unless perhaps we shall afford him so much favour, as to restrain the erectness of man to that precise definition of our Master *Galen* (*De usu part. lib. 1.*) which allows those Animals only to have an erect figure whose spines and thigh bones are situate in right lines. For in this strict signification, no Animal (for ought Zoographers, or those that write the Natural Histories of living Creatures have discovered, or our selves observed) can exactly fulfill that figure, but man; all others having their thighs pitched at angles, either right, or obtuse, or acute, to their spines. And for this respect was it, that having premised, that *Man only was constituted in a capacity to satisfie that prime end of the Creation, the glory of God*; I thought necessary to subjoyn, his intellectual or Cogitative soul being naturally disposed to admire, &c. thereby importing, that the basis of my Argument was fixt upon the very root of his *Essence*, or better *Nature*, as *Plato* calls it, whose propriety is *sursum aspicere*, to look up to his original, and speculate the excellencies of his Maker. And thus understood, I prefer *Plato's* etymologic
of

of ἀνθρώπος, and am perswaded that the primitive Grecian so denominated man, *quasi ἀναβρῦντα ἀ' ὄρωπε*, *Contemplantem que videt*: nor can I conceive that *Anaxagoras* spake other then tropologically, when being askt, *cur natus esset*, he smartly and pathetically returned, *ut videret cælum & terras*; by that figurative expression intending, that man was made not to gape about or gaze upon the external beauties of heaven and earth, with the dull eye of his body: but to have his thoughts sublime, and with the acies of his mind to speculate the Wisdom, &c. of him that made them. Now by virtue of this divine Prerogative is it, that man is of undoubted right entituled to the especial care, and declared to be the *Secondary end*, or scope of the *Creator*. But farther to expatiate upon this manifest truth; were to light a candle to shew the Sun in the Meridian.

2.
Sermocination.

Nor by the title of Cogitation only, doth man lay claim to this dignity; but he inherits a second endowment also more noble then any other Animal, whereby he is empowerd to fulfill the principal destination of the World, the glory of God: and that is *Sermocination* or *Locution*. For the tongue of man only can own that character, ὄργανον διαλεκτικόν, *inserviens sermocinationi instrumentum*, and can modulate the inspired aër into articulate sounds, and so intelligibly proclaim the majesty of his *Efficient*. This *Lactantius* wisely urged against *Epicurus* his objective expostulation, *Qua utilitas Deo in Homine, ut eum propter se faceret?* appositely opposing, *scilicet ut esset, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem consummandi & sensu admirari, & voce proloqui posset, &c.* and (in *lib. de Ira Dei cap. 13.*) more plainly he says, *Num & mutorum causâ Deus laboravit? minime, quia sunt & rationis & loquela expertia: sed intelligimus & ipsa eodem modo ad usum hominis à Deo facta, &c.*

As for that couchant *Dilemma* of *Velleius*, whether the World was intended for the use of wise men, or Fools: tis soon extricated, by distinguishing the purpose of the Creator into *General* and *Particular*: and so returning, that the Goodness of God had a respect to the benefit of all, *in general*; but of wise men in *especial*.

Now

Now, if by *Wise men*, he mean such, whose minds are imbued with the maxims of Virtue, and their lives conform to the upright rules of morality (who only, in the judgment of Philosophy, can challenge that Attribute) then is it not easie to doubt, that the beneficence of God was lost to them, or unadvisedly placed upon them: since their opportune, moderate, and grateful husbandry of these blessings, though it cannot be extended so high as absolute merit; may yet reach so far as to justify the prudence of their donation, and manifest the provident collocation of them upon convenient subjects, *i. e.* upon such as make it the constant business of their lives to learn how rightly to use them, and practise that excellent lesson, of imploying all things to the temporal supportation, comfort, and improvement of themselves, and themselves to magnifie the bounty of that hand, that so freely bestowed them.

And on the other side, if by *Fools* he intend such as are degenerated from the nobility of their nature, degraded below meer Humanity, that know no good beyond the present blandishments of sensuality, and have sworn themselves voluntary captives to their own luxurious Appetites, (and such was the wise mans fool) then can neither the Justice of God be taxed for conferring such rich favours upon those, that know only how to abuse them; nor his Prævision disparaged, as not foreseeing the miscarriage or unfruitfulness of his charity: since he left it in the arbitrary power of their Wills to make an election of Good or Evil, to turn to the right hand, and pursue the real and true delights of virtue, or deflect on the left, and be lost in the deviations of the only apparent and false pleasures of vice: having set before them the means both of Sapience and Resipiscence, and furnished them with advantages and opportunities either to acquire more knowledge, or at least recant and disclaim their ignorance. Or, if by Fools, he designe such as our common Ideots, in whom the light of Nature is totally eclipsed, by some native distemper, or non-symmetrical configuration, or contingent concussion of the brain, or Presence-Chamber of the Intellect: then all is the case the same with divine Prudence, *siquidem ex ipsorum desipientia, caterorum sapientia efflorescit & collucet magis*, since the

N stolidity

Stolidity of an ignorant hath this use, that it serves as a foil to set off the ingenuity of the knowing, and by the incompatible disparity which appears at the conference of those two contraries, infinitely enhanceth the value of wisdom. The satisfactory force of this solution maturely perpended, it can be reputed neither incogitancy nor precipitation in me to omit the prolix appropriation of those pertinent *similitudes*; that the wary husbandman doth cultivate and prepare his field, as well for the fertility of Pulse, as Wheat; that the most skilfull Gardiner provides room in his nursery for the sprouting of wild, degenerate, and barren plants, as well as for the geniculation of wholesome, generous and fruitful; that Princes account Plebeians, as well as Nobles, members of their Common-wealth; and that *Apelles* prepared his Tables as well to receive the black of shadowing, as the finer touches of his Pencil, and the brighter gradualities of Colours, in emulation of the life. And this, not only because I conceive the objection already more then refuted, and therefore all that can be superadded may sound as nothing to the purpose: but chiefly because I understand, that the Logick of *similes*, or the way of probation by *Comparatives*, is at best but *Analogisme*; and therefore inconsistent with my assumption of declining all but *Demonstrations*, or *Reasons* equally convictive.

As for that demand, *Why God did not endow his favorite with immortality, but exposed him to the stroke of death*; it is manifest that the soul of man is constituted immortal, and shall enjoy a being to all eternity, by the Charter of its *Essence*, and not *ex gratia* only, as *Mt. Hobbs* endeavours to assert (*in Leviathan*) But the demonstration of this grand truth, being too large to be circumscribed by a Parenthesis, or foisted in by way of digression; I have reserved for a singular Chapter in the future.

Article 3.
Lucretius his 8
 reasons subver-
 ted, particu-
 larly.

I.

For those remaining difficulties contained in the Arguments of *Lucretius*; they are easily salved, by answering succinctly to the

First, that the motive which inclined the divine Will to create the World, was not any possibility of emolument accruable to God from the veneration and gratitude of man: but the voluntary

tary diffusion of his own communicative goodnets, in chief; and the benefit of man, as subservient thereto.

2. *Second*, that though that Axiome be undeniable, *Non entis non sunt accidentia*, and therefore it could have been no trouble to us, not to have been at all; yet that invincible reluctancy against *Adnihilation*, radicated in every vital entity, is demonstration enough, that to be, is far better then not to be, and we our selves experimentally find, *that tis one degree of happiness to have obtained existence*; because to be nothing, is a meet *Privation*; to be something, attains to the perfection of *Reality*. Upon which ground many have erected a conjecture, the the devill himself would not consent to his own Adnihilation, though he might evade his torments by the bargain: with advantage preferring the miserable condition of something, to the horrid opacity of nothing.

3. *Third*, that God made such abundant provision conductive to the utility of men, that both from the *Amplitude* and *Variety* of his work, they might collect matter sufficient to incite them to the constant contemplation of his *Wisdome*, and gratefull acknowledgement of his *Munificence*: as also, that having observed what of the Creatures were les commodious, they might be directed in their election of the more commodious and beneficial, as well for their Conservation as Delight.

4. *Fourth*, that the labours of *Agriculture* are superfluous, and voluntarily undergon by man, more for the maintainance of his *delicacy* and inordinate *luxury*, then the provision of *Necessaries* to his livelyhood. Since the same liberal earth, which is Mother, Nurse, and Purveyer to all other *Animals*, cannot be thought inhospitable to man only, nor so cruelly penurious as to exclude her best guest from participating the inexhaustible bouity of her table. And though we grant some moderate labour necessary in order to the comfortable sustentation of our prodigal bodies, always upon the expence; yet have we good cause to esteem that more a blessing then a curse, since the sweat of industry is sweet. Not only be-

cause the active genius of man is consellated for business, and therefore never more oppress'd then with the burthen of idleness; but also because the sprightly hopes of a wealthy harvest sweeten and compensate the labour of semination. Nor is the contentment which growes from ingenious Husbandry much below any other solace of the mind, in this life; if we may credit the experience of many Princes, who having surrerted on the distractions of royalty, have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleasures of the Court (magnified only by such ambitious Novices, who never discovered the gall that lyes at the bottom of those guilded sweets) and with inestimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges; have found it a greater delight to cultivate the obedient and gratefull earth, then rule that giddy beast, the multitude; a happier entertainment of the mind, and more wholsome exercise of the body, to hold the easie plough, then sway an unweildy Scepter, and revell in the infatuating pomp of greatness.

5. *Fifth*, that those preposterous seasons, Blights, Mildews, Combuitions, &c. putrefactive accidents, that make the pregnant earth suffer abortion, and so nip the forward hopes of the laborious swain; doe neither intervene so frequently, nor invade so generally, as to introduce an universal famine, or so cut off all provision, as not to leave a sufficient stock of Aliment for the sustentation of mankind.
6. *Sixth*, that the divine Intellect was the universal exemplar to it self, framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man, within it self, and accordingly configurating them. This may be evinced by an argument *à minori*; since even our selves have a power to design and modell some artificial engine, whose pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing existent without the circle of our selves, but coyned in the solitary recesses of our mind.
7. *Seventh*, concerning mans being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies, as the voracity of wild beasts, the venome of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contagion of the Pestilence

Pestilence, the corruption of swarms of other diseases both epidemick and sporadick, &c. that all these are the regular effects of Gods *Generall Providence*, and have their causes, times, and finalities preordained, and inscribed in the diary of Fate, to whose prescience nothing is contingent. But of this more satisfactorily in our subsequent consideration of universal Providence; whither in strictness of method, it refers it self.

Eight, that this complaint against the unkindness of Nature, for producing man, tender, naked, unarmed, &c. is grossly unjust. For the imbecillity of our Infancy is necessary to the perfection and maturity of those noble organs, contrived for the administration of the mandates of that Empress, the *Cogitant Soul*; and is amply compensated either by the vigor and acuteness of the senses, or by diuturnity of life. It being observed by Naturalists, that those Animals which live long, have a long gestation in the womb, a long infancy, and attain but slowly to their maturity and standard of growth; the four general motions of life, *Inception, Augmentation, State, and Declination*, carrying set and proportional intervals each to other, as that truly noble Philosopher, *Scaliger* hath hinted, in his correction of that fabulous tradition of the extreme longævity of Deer in these words: *De ejus vite longitudine fabulantur, neque enim aut gestatio aut incrementum hinnulorum ejusmodi sunt, ut præsent argumentum longævi Animalis.* As for his being born naked; tis no disfavours, nor neglect in her, for that cumbersome wardrobe of raggs, which man hath gotten upon his back, is become necessary only by the delicacy of his education and custome, not so intended by nature in the primitive simplicity and eucrasie of his constitution; when there needed nothing but the skin either to warme, or adorn the body. Lastly, those *Armes*, which Nature hath denied him; either he wants not at all, or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleasure.

8.



CHAP. IV.

The General Providence of God,
DEMONSTRATED.

SECT. I.

Article I.
The Authors
reasons for his
present adhe-
rence to the
common dis-
crimination of
Providence
from *Creation*.



The Synopsis of my method, exhibited in the hem
of the first Section of the first Chapter, was de-
signed as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my
Reader along the series of those *Attributes* of
the *supreme Ens*, which (as being of most gene-
ral concernment, and such as may be clearly de-
monstrated by the *Light of Nature*, even to those, who either
never heard of, or except against the testimony of *Holy Writ*)
I have promised to illustrate, by the conviction of Arguments de-
duced from that catholique Criterion, *Reason*; to whose Judi-
cature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent:
and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther ex-
planation of the connexion and dependence of this *Theme* upon
the precedent; but only, in avoydance of misconception, to ad-
vertise, that when I say, the *Creation* of the World *ex nihilo*, and
the constant *Conservation* of the same in its primitive order and
harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate, are the general
operations of the *Wisdom* and *Power* of the *First cause*; I doe
not intend, that those are *Acts* really distinct each from other (for
in the demonstration of the Existence of God tis plainly, though
succinctly evinced, that the *Conservation* of the *Universe* is no-
thing

thing but the *Act of Creation prolonged or continued*) but only conform my theory to the customary notions and terms of the Schools, and yeeld to the necessity of a division in the gross capacity of mans understanding, in order to the more gentle enforcement of a stable belieif.

The *Act of Conservation* of all things in their originary stations, and the perpetual obedience of all second Causes, in their several motions, to the laws of his will, that elemented them; hath ever been called *Providence divine*: which derived high enough, seems to import, *the constant operation of an infinite Wisdom, and infinite Power, combined in the effusion of an infinite Goodness.* This *Providence* (for to that Appellation, as most antient, most common, and therefore most familiar, I shall adhere) most Clerks have branched into *General*, whereby the government of the whole Universe is administered: and *Particular, or special*, whereby God doth take special care of mankind, and regulate the affairs of his master-peice. Now according to this necessary *Division*, must I range my forces into two Files, and draw up one to defeat those Atheists, who have proclaimed open hostility against the *First*; and the other to subdue those, that have declared against the *Second*.

The Colonell to that black regiment, that fought against the opinion of the government of the World by the Sceptre of Divine Monarchy, is generally accounted *Epicurus*; but in the authentique records of *Stobaeus* (*Ecl. Phys. 25.*) we may finde him to have been no more then Captain-lieutenant to *Leucippus*, who of all the Graecian Philosophers, whose doctrines have escaped the sponge of oblivion, was the first that appeared in the field against universal Providence, and not long after surrendered the staffe to *Democritus* the elder, whose immediate successor was *Heraclitus*, as we are told by *Nemesius* (*De nat. Homin. 13.*) But whoever led up the van, was closely followed by many both of the same and succeeding ages; the most eminent whereof were *Dicaearchus* (*Cicero 4. Academ.*) *Strato* (*Idem de Divinat. 2.*) *Ennius* (*Idem de Nat. Deor. 3.*) *Lucretius* (*Libro ejus 2.*) *Velleius* (*Cicero*

Article 2.
The Definition and received Division of divine Providence.

Article 3.
A short list of the principal ethnick *Physiologists*, who, in order to their propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: & a gentle cure of *S. Hieroms* wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same.

(*Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1.*) *Lucian* (*in his Accus.*) who like a facetious villain, personates *Jupiter* complaining of the oppression of overmuch business; nay the devout Father *S. Hieron.* (*in Comment. in Abac.*) seems to have espoused the quarrel, though doubtless upon another interest. His words I shall faithfully transcribe for two important reasons. First because I would not appear to have fixt a scandal upon so venerable a Pillar of our Church, who otherwise hath deserved so amply of the Christian faith; that the consideration of the transcendent merits of his pious labours had once almost perswaded me to beleive the possibility of *justification by works*. Secondly, to deliver his memory from the imputation of impiety; for it may be naturally collected from the syntax and scope of his discourse, that it was a noble esteem which he had of the majesty of the Divine Nature, whom he thought too fully taken up with the blisfull contemplation of his own perfections (in truth, the only Felicity God can be capable of) to be concerned in ordering the trifling occurrences of the world; and not any conceit of the insufficiency of omnipotence, that cast him upon this rock. *Ceterum absurdum est* (says he) *ad hoc Dei deducere majestatem ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices, quotve moriantur: quot cimicum & pulicum & muscarum sit in terra multitudo: quanti pisces in aqua natent, & qui de minoribus majorum preda cedere debeant. Non simus tam fatui Adulatores Dei, ut dum potentiam ejus ad ima detrahimus, in nosipos injuriosi simus, eandem rationabilium, quam irationabilium Providentiam esse dicentes.*

So that his diminution of the universality of Providence, may seem the pardonable effect of immoderate devotion, and but a high strained description of the glory of that essence, which in strict truth, can be concerned in nothing but it self; and must then appear to be undervalued, when most magnified by the extension of its influence to petty and trivial mutations, and conceived to act a part in the interludes of Flies, order the militia of Pismires, and decree what, and how many Gnats shall be devoured by swallowes in a summers day. But as for *Epicurus*, and the rest of that miscreant crew; tis more then probable, that a quite
different

different interest inveigled them into this dangerous error. For, *first*, their own writings bare record, that they made it the grand scope of their studies to promote Atheisme, by plotting how to undermine the received beleif of an omnipotent *eternal Being*, to murder the *immortality of the Soul* (the basis of all religion) and deride the *Compensation of good and evil actions after death*. In particular, *Epicurus* did not blush to profess that the chief end at which his *Physiology* was collineated, was this; *ut mens ex perspectis causis conquiescat, neque aliam eamque divinam subesse causam suspicando, felicitatem interturbet*. And *Secondly*, the grounds upon which they erected this detestable negation of universal Providence, may sufficiently satisfy a heedfull enquirer; that not any intense honour or veneration of the most perfect and happy nature, transported their minds to this height of delusion: but rather a confirmed *infidelity of the infinity of his Wisdome and Power*, which is affirmed by us, that maintain the diffusion of Providence over all, and descry the finger of Divinity in the smallest actions of inferior causes, though ne're so contemptible in the eyes of Humane reason. But a more ample knowledge of this doth offer it self to our thoughts, in the particular examination of their Arguments: to which we therefore immediately address.

The *First Argument* they drew from the apparent *incompatibility of busyness and happiness*; or more plainly, from the vast disparity between the blisfull condition or contemplative quiet of the supreme Nature, and the trouble, or disturbance (for so their ignorance unfitly apprehended it) that must arise from the oversight and managery of such infinite variety of Actions, as are every minute performed within the immense Amphitheatre of the World. For *Epicurus*, indiscreetly attempting to take the altitude of the *Divine Intellect*, by the unequal *Jacobs-staffe* of the *Humane*; rashly inferred, that it could not be extended below the sphere of its own mansion, and that no *Intelligence* could be so large, as not to be overwhelmed by that Ocean of Cares, that must flow from the multitude and diversity of continual emergencies here below. This he contracted into that sentence; *Quod est beatum & immortale, neque sibi habet, neque*
 O alteri

Article 4.
 The Atheists
 first Argument
 against univer-
 sal Providence,
 with the absurd
 and malicious
 comment of
Lucretius there-
 upon.

alteri exhibet negotium : which so pleased him, that he reputed it a Cornerstone in the fabrick of science, and enacted it to stand in the front of those *Sententia rata*, which he dared Scepticity withall.

Nor did his sedulous Commentator *Lucretius*, recede an inch from the same text ; but fondly commensurating the power of an *Infinite wisdom*, by the narrow capacity of his own *finite reason*, preached to the world ; that to ascribe the government of sublunary affairs to the Gods, was impiety in the inference, and must implicitly destroy the fundamentals of their *Divinity*, which is made up of *Beatitude* and *Immortality*, neither of which can consist with the perpetual disquiet, and impetuous anxiety of mind, which the Administration of so vast and tumultuous a Commonwealth, as this of the World, must introduce. For when he would impose, that the shoulders of Divinity, though a real *Atlas*, are too weak to sustain so great a weight, as that of *Rektor General* ; under a pretext of tender zeal (forsooth) he insinuates those of prophanation, *Qui summum illud, quicquid est, tam tristi, atque multiplici ministerio polluunt*, as *Pliny* expresses it : and therefore exclaims.

*Nam (proh ! Sancta Deum tranquilla pectora pace,
 Quae placidum degunt avum, vitamque serenam)
 Quis regere immensi summam ? Quis habere profundis
 Indu-manu validas potis est moderanter habenas ?
 Quis pariter Caelos omnes convertere ? & omnes
 Ignibus aethereis terras suffire feracis ?
 Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto,
 Nubibus ut faciat tenebras, caelique serena
 Concutiat sonitu ? tum fulmina mittat, & adeis
 Sape suas disturbet ? & in diversa recedens
 Saviat, exercens telum ; quod saepe nocentis
 Praeterit, et animatque indignos, inque merentis ? &c. lib. 2.*

Ah ! since the happy and immortal Powers
 In calme content melt their eternal houres,
 Feasting on self-enjoyment ; who can keep
 The rains of Nature ? Who command the Deep ?

To wind about the ponderous *Sphears*, what arme
 Hath strength enough? what *Influence* can warme
 The fruitfull earth with *Fires etherial*? who
 Can fill all places, and all actions doe?
 To veil the face of *Light* with sable clouds,
 And wrap the lucid *sky* in sulph'ry shrouds:
 Whose *Cornuscations* iplit the fluid aer,
 Convell the feet of *Rocks*, and with despair
 Affect poor *Mortals* into *Quick silver*: then turn,
 And with *Granadoes* his own *Temples* burn:
 Then dart his flames at *Innocence*, and wound
Virtue, while guilty *Vice* continues sound?

Their other *Argument* is extracted from the conceived *Uncertainty* and *irregularity* of *Contingencies*, and the *unequal dispensation* of good and evil; all things seeming to fall out according to the giddy lottery of Chance, and as confusedly as if there were no Providence at all. This may be collected as well from that speech of *Epicurus*, charged upon him by that heroick Champion of Divine Monarchy, *Lactantius*; *Nulla dispositio est, multa enim facta sunt aliter, quam fieri debuerunt*: as from the context of his *Physiology*, wherein having made it his *Hypothesis*, that all bodies both cœlestial and sublunary were at first configurated by Fortune, *i. e.* arose to such and such particular figures, by the casual segregation, convention and complexion of the General matter, divided into several masses; and that, by the inclination of their convenient *Figures*, they were adliged to such and such peculiar *Motions*, and accommodated to the necessary causation of determinate vicissitudes: he proceeds to reduce all succeeding events in the World to that primitive series of Causes, which made their own spontaneous eruption out of the Chaos, and attained to the certain rules of their future activity, at the same time they attained to their distinctions and single essences; denominating that chain of causalities, *Nature*, and holding her to be her own *Directress*, and by the law of innate tendency obliged to a perpetual continuation of the same motions begun in

Article 5.
 Their second
Argument: and
 its convenient
 dissection into
 two parts, viz.

I.

The irregularity
 of contingencies: and

the first minute of the worlds compofure; according to that exclamation of *Pontanus* (*Lib. 1. de Stellis.*)

*Quid vexare Deos frustra juvat? ordine certo
Fert Natura vices; labuntur & ordine certo
Sydera; tam varios rerum patientia casus.
Illa suos peragunt motus, servantque tenorem
Sorte datum, &c.*

What boot's it man with fruitless praers to fret
The Ears o'th Gods; when *Natures Laws* are set,
Beyond *Repeal* or *Alteration*?
The radiant *Lamps* of heaven still move on
In their old tracks: nor can the *Planets* stray,
In all their wandrings, from their native way;
Or change that *Tenor*, which at first they got
Consign'd unto them, by their proper *Lot*.

The result of all which is, that *Epicurus* would perswade, that the Universe is a Commonwealth, wherein every single member is, by the signature and necessity of its particular constitution, instructed in, and impelled upon the præcise performance of its peculiar office; so as not to want the direction of any *Superintendent*, or to conform to the directions of a *General Council*: and seems to allow this only difference between the universal *Politie* of the *World*, and the particular *Republique* of *mankind*; that in *this*, men frequently make deflexions from the general scope, by reason of the seductions of their unstable and irregular judgments; but in *that*, all individuals punctually keep to their primitive assignations, and so conspire to the satisfaction of the common interest, by reason of the constancy of their natures, and unalterable necessity of their forms. And this Abridgement of his doctrine, *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath prepared to our hands, when personating *Epicurus*, he thus argues; *Nulla est opus sapientia ordinis instruendi in exercitu, si militum quivis sua sponte noverit locum, ordinem, stationem, quam accipere debet & tueri: neque etiam opus olitoribus, Fabrisve murariis, si aqua illeic ultrò affluat indigentibus irratione plantis; heic lateres, ligna, lapidesque eas, natura dante, motiones atque inclinationes subeant, quibus in sua loca, inque expectitam concinnitatem coeant, &c.*

Now

Now for the other part of the Argument, viz. *the unequal distribution of Good and Evil, and the ordinary intervention of many effects inconsistent with the justice and righteous administration of Divinity*: this is clearly hinted by *Lucretius*, who makes it the main scope of his sixth *Canto*, to alienate mens minds from the beleif of an *Universal moderator*, by several instances of events, that seem to hold too visible an affinity to *Temerity* and *Inconsideration*, to have any relation at all to the judicious method requisite to *Providence*; and particularly towers himself over that one example of the *Thunder-bolt*, as if his reason had flown to a pitch above all possibility of contradiction, when yet the summary of all that bold discourse, abstracted by an impartial hand, amounts to no more then this.

Since we observe the *Thunder-bolt* (1.) To be, for the most part, discharged on the heads of the *Innocent*, and not the *Guilty*: (2.) To batter *Sancta Deum delubra*, the Temples of the Gods themselves, more frequently then common buildings: (3.) To be idly spent at random, upon the sea and void *Campanias*; and so seems not to have been the *Artillery of Divine Vengeance*, prepared for the punishment of impious mortals: (4.) To be generated, like other meteors, by natural Causes, being a sulphureous exhalation compacted in the clouds, and thence darted *ala volée*, or at a venture, on whatever is situate in the level of its projection: it appears an absurdity of timorous superstition to beleive, that every single occurrence is præordained by *Wisdom*, or that all temporary *Accidents* have their præscripts in the book of *Fate*.

And these are the *Goliath* objections, or nerves of the *Atheists* Remonstrance against *Universal Providence*; which though many of the *Fathers*, and particularly *S. Clement* (in 5. *Strom.*) have decreed to be filed amongst those impious questions, that deserve no answer but a whip, like the doubts of a *Mahometan* in point of faith: yet since promise hath made it my duty, to endeavour the demonstration of the Attributes of the divine nature (such at least as occurre to the contemplation of a meer *Philosopher*, who hath wholly referred himself to the Testimonies of the *Light of Nature*) by the conviction of *Reason* alone; I am confident so clearly and fully to confute, that no man, who

2.

The unequal or unjust distribution of good and evil.

hath not stubbornly put out the eye of his soul, shall in the future remain a Sceptick, as to this particular.

S E C T. II.

The Vindication.

Article 1.
That the No-
tion of general
Providence is
Proleptical; in-
ferred from the
universality of
its reception.

First I plead the general consent of all Nations and Ages in the acknowledgement of Providence; for, according to the Logical Canons even of Epicurus (*apud Gassend. in Animadvers. in Canonic. Epicuri*) any Notion, that is held in common, and by long prescription grown into *κοινήν ἀνθρώπων πρόληψιν*, *Anticipation*, ought not to be doubted of; as being its own Criterion, and from which there lies no farther Appeal.

Article 2.
From the mis-
placed devoti-
on of Idolaters.

Now that all Nations have met in one Chorus to proclaim the universal and absolute sovereignty of Providence, cannot be obscure to any, that have, but with half an eye, glanced on the Records of Antient and Customes of Present; or but considered, that even the Idolatry of the most stupid and barbarous people that ever lived, doth plainly commonstrate, that they paid both their sacrifices and orizons, as homage to some Power, which held the reins of second Causes, and could dispose them to the production of good or evil events, according to his own beneplacets; and therefore not only in publique Calamities, as War, Pestilence, Famine, &c. but also in the private distresses of each Family and Person, they immediately addressed themselves to the Sanctuary of their devotions, hoping by that means to appease the anger of that flexible hand, that had the arbitrary donation of happiness and misery.

Article 3.
From the con-
fession of most
Philosophers
of the highest
form; as of

That all Philosophers also (who being generally reputed wise men, and all their very Tenets exemplary; could not but draw whole shoals of under-heads into the stream of their opinions) gave

gave in their votes on the side of Providence; cannot cost much
 oyle to illustrate: it being obvious, first, that

Ecphantus, with most of that elder sect, who gave in their names
 to the doctrine of Atoms, did yet establish the necessary concessi-
 on of some universal Moderator, and unanimously referred the or-
 dination of all contingents, as well frequent as rare, auspicious
 and inauspicious, popular and domestique, to the arbitrary dis-
 posal of one common Pilot, who sat at the helme of this great
 vessel, the Universe. (*Leg. Stobaeum in Ecl. Phys.*)

Secondly, that those also, who held the World to be *Non-*
principiate, or to have been so old, as never to have been young,
 did yet notwithstanding condemn the delirium of *Fortune*, and
 concluded the gubernation of all upon the *supreme Intelligence*.
 For *Plato* seems so strongly convicted, and his reason so violently
 ravished into the armes of Divine Providence; that, though he
 inclined to the eternity of the World, he yet conceded the pro-
 duction thereof in time, as a necessary Hypothesis, or foundati-
 on, whereon he might the more firmly erect his superstructure of
 that magisterial Truth, which otherwise would have been impossi-
 ble to be made out, *viz. The universal Administration of Pro-*
vidence. And thus much he frequently declared, in *Lib. de Legi-*
bus: in Epinomide, & in Timaeo more expressly; out of which
 meditation *Plutarch* (*De procreat. Anim. ex Timaeo, & de Fato*)
 collected his tripartite distinction of Providence. *Prima enim*
(says he) & suprema, est Primi Dei intelligentia, sive mavis,
voluntas benefica erga res omnes; qua primum singula divina
res omninò optimè ac pulcherrimè ordinata sunt: secunda secun-
dorum deorum per caelum incedentium qua res mortales ordinatè
fiunt, & singulorum generum constantia atque salus procuratur:
Tertia non ineptè dicitur Providentia, & Procuratio Geniorum,
qui circa terram collocati, humanarum actionum custodes atque
inspectores sunt.

And *Aristotle*, who was much more bold and plain in his
 assertion of the Worlds eternity, though (*in Metaphys. 12.*
cap. 9.) he pretends an unwillingness to have the majestick sancti-
 ty of the *supreme Nature* disparaged, by being debased to the
 oversight of petit and inconsiderable affairs transacted heer below;

and

1.

Ecphantus.

2.

Plato.

3.

Aristotle.

and therefore limited his jurisdiction to the celestial orbs: yet was he forced to confess the impossibility of the worlds subsistence in the due harmony and requisite order of all its motions, without the constant regulation thereof by Providence, as *Laerius*, *Theodoretus*, *Stobaeus*, and other of his most judicious *Expositors* have assured us. And upon this consideration was it, that the good Father, *Origen* allowed him to have been one degree less impious than *Epicurus*. Nay *Cicero* (2. de *Natur. deorum*) makes him upon second thoughts, to have professed a recantation, by allowing the ubiquity of the divine Wisdom, and extending the arms of Providence, which he had formerly shortened and terminated in the lowest sphere, even to the meanest of sublunary passages, introducing him disguised (doubtless to prevent the dishonour of unconstancy to his own principles) under a third person telling a story of some, *Qui post ævum transactum in locis subterraneis, & repente emergi, intuitique hunc ordinem rerum, ipsum sine numine esse non posse arbitrarentur.*

4.
The Stoicks.

Thirdly, that the *Stoicks*, albeit upon that vulgar presumption that to assign the procuration of all minute and trivial occurrences, to that *Nature*, which is all *Felicity* and *Quiet*, was implicitly to infringe the right hand of its divinity, they abridged its empire, and limited its influence to the more weighty and popular actions of mankind only; were howsoever zealous assertors of Providence; is manifest from that saying of *Cotta* reproving *Balbus*, an eminent Stoick (apud *Cicer. de natur. Deor. 3.*) *At enim minora dii neque agellos singulorum, nec viticulas prosequuntur; nec si uredo, aut grandio quidpiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: sic enim dicitis, &c.*

5.
The Academicks and Scepticks.

And lastly, that the *Academicks* and *Scepticks* were of the same persuasion; however being carried against the stream of all *Affirmative* learning, by the contrary tide of their own *Negative* humor, and obliged to fall foul upon all truths, in defence of their own affected *Nescience*; they have been observed to have had some light skirmishes with the Champions of *Providence*. Nor need we acquiesce in the bare affirmation hereof, while to any man, that shall with equanimity and attention compare their

their tender arguments against the opinion of general Providence, with those more sinewy and vehement reasons of their profest neutrality in many other notions; there will offer it self a fair ground for more then conjecture, that they purposely contrived them soft, gentle, and dissoluble, that so they might seem neither to quit their habit of contradiction, nor yet to dare the subversion of that catholick position, to which all men (those few of the black guard of Hell, whom we lately nominated, excepted) had subscribed, and which the dictates of their own domestick oracle, Reason, had confirmed as sacred and uncontrollable. To which we may annex the testimony of *Gassendus*, who (*in Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert. de Physiologia Epicuri pag. 731.*) speaking conjunctively of both those sects, saies thus: *ut argumentati sunt adversus Providentiam, sic opinioni de providentia suam probabilitatem fecerunt, neque saltem ea fronte fuerunt, ut esse providentiam absolute inficiarentur.*

Now to take the just dimensions of this Argument, let us allow it, like *Janus*, to have two faces; and then survey the aspect of each a part. On one hand it looks *Absolute and Apodictical*: on the other only *Perswasive*.

Apodictical; since the universality of any beleaf (such especially, as hath ever been attested even by those, who have made the profoundest search into its fundamentals, and streyned every nerve in the whole body of reason to demolish it,) is no obscure proof, that it must be one of those *λήμματα, έννοιαι*, or *Implantate Notions*, which the same hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the table of our minds, and left it not in the power of our depraved Wills totally to obliterate.

That there are some *Implantate Notions*, no man, who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature, will dispute. Nor is it less certain, that all Philosophers have decreed *Anticipation* (which *Aristotle* (*in 1. Poster. 1.*) calls *προπαρχουσαν γνώσιν*, *præexistentem cognitionem*; and *Cicero* hath interpreted (*1 de Nat. Deor.*) *notionem menti insitam, & anteceptam quandam in animo informationem*) to be the Touch-stone of verity: nay *Empiricus* himself forgot his custome of Scepticisme, when he came

Article 4.
A review of the induction: and the Argument found to be *Apodictical* on one side; and on the other only *perswasive*.

to this point, and grew positive (*advers. Gramm. & advers. Ethic.*) ἔτι ζήλειον, ἔτι ἀπερίειν ἐστὶ ἀνευ προλήψεως, that no man could so much as enquire, or doubt of any thing without *Preconition*.

And that the Notion of the worlds regiment by universal Providence, is one of those propositious, *Qua sunt in nobis adeo antiqua, ut iis, ex quo esse & sentire cœpimus, evaserimus informati*: which, like letters carved on the bark of a young plant, are impressed upon our very Intellect, and grow up together with us; is already proved collaterally and upon induction, in our *Demonstration of the Existence of God*: for therein it is cleared, that the excellent *Idea*, which we have of the *Supreme Being*, contains all *Perfections* whatever, and among the rest, that noble *Attribute, Creator*; which to him that shall attentively consider the nature of *Duration*, must found one and the same thing, with *Conservator, or Governour*.

Only persuasive; since humane Auctority, considered *per se*, is but an inartificial Argument, and binds not, but when conformed with others more rational, into one syndrome or multiplex demonstration: nor is the concentration of all mens minds in one and the same assertion, an infallible Criterion of its verity. For the judgement of man in generall lyes open to the encroachments of Error, and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only discoverable in the gross and visible delusions of vulgar heads (whose business is to beleive, not examine) but hath frequently broken out upon the soundest brains, and confest it self Epidemical in the absurd mistakes of the greatest Criticks of Truth, especially in the promotion and transmission of opinions hereditary and traditional.

S E C T.

SECT. III.

LET us not, therefore, entrust the supportation of so weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of *Auſtority*; but give our ſelves liberty to imagine, that no man ever believed or aſſerted an univerſal Providence: and having thus deſteſted our minds of all *Preſumption*, or *Anticipation*, expoſe them as tables newly deſcated to receive the pure impreſſions or ſincere documents of the *Light of Nature*; converting our contemplations, Firſt upon the *Nature of God*, and thence upon the *moſt exact order and conſederacy of all ſecondary cauſes in the world*.

Firſt, I ſay, let us ſet our reaſon a work upon the *nature of the Firſt Cauſe*, or *Eternal Being*; and order our cogitations thus. The ſame demonſtration, whereby the mind of man is convicted of the *Exiſtence of God*, doth alſo at the ſame time violently, but naturally, conclude his nature to be ſo *accompliſht in all Perfection*s, as to be above all *Acces*s or *Addition*. For manifeſt it is, that by the terme, *God*, every man doth underſtand *ſomething to which no perfection is wanting*: and ſhould it be granted poſſible, that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more then what is comprehended in the idea, which it holds of the nature of God; yet ſtill would that thing, to which it could aſcribe that perfection, be God. Since tis impoſſible to cogitate any perfection, which is not the eſſential propriety of ſome Nature: and to think any Nature more perfect then the *Divine*, plainly abſurd; becauſe we conceive that to be moſt perfect, or elſe we do not conceive it to be *God*; *God*, and *Absolute Perfection* being *one and the ſame thing*, and ordinarily conceived as one notion. Now, to be ſo infinitely *Wiſe*, *Potent*, and *Good*, as to order all things in the world to the beſt, to regulate and predetermine the operations of all ſecond Cauſes, to keep Nature her ſelf ſober and in tune, and ſo prevent thoſe diſcords, which otherwiſe would in a moment ſucceed to the reduction of all to a greater confuſion then that of the Chaos; in a word, to conſerve all things in exiſtence: this no man will deny to be a *Perfection*, ſince we define the per-

Article 1.
Gods General Providence demonſtrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts.

fection of man, by his *abilities for dominion* (i. e.) in the judgement of our reason, every man is esteemed by so much the more perfect, by how much the more generous, august, liberal, prudent and benigne mind he is endued withall, and by inference, by how much the more digne he is to bear rule over others. Therefore is this *Perfection*, *Mundo providere, seu singulis rebus consulere*, to take care of the world, and provide for the subsistence of every single entity; of necessity to be ascribed to *God*.

For though that obsolete fallacy, that *business* imports *disquiet*, and *disquiet* contradicts *felicity*, be retriev'd upon us; and our reason seem captiv'd in the snare of this conclusion; That this *Perfection*, as it stands in relation to *Divinity*, must be an *imperfection*, as being point blank repugnant to its nature, which cannot at once be superlatively happy, and yet subject to multiplicity of business: yet we may soon redeem it to the liberty of truth, by conceiving some nature, wherein these two seeming contraries may be reconcil'd, (i. e.) the *Procuracion of affaires* may shake hands with *extreme beatitude*. Nor do we conceive an impossibility herein; because even among men we daily find, that those Negotiations, which are an oppression to a low, narrow and unpractis'd Wit, are but the pleasant diversions and familiar recreations of a sublime, capacious, and polypragmatical: and by consequence that Nature which is able to sustain the administration of affairs infinite in number and variety, without detriment to its complet happiness; must be conceded, by incomputable degrees of transcendency more perfect, then that whose quiet must suffer diminution by the distraction of cares. Wherefore let us not suffer our cogitations to acquiesce in this imperfect, but vigorously advance to that *most perfect Nature*, whose propriety it is to be at once both *supremely Provident*, and *supremely Beate*. And since we conceive *God* to be such, it is of necessity inevitable, that we grant *Universal Providence* to be *his proper Attribute*.

For Confirmation, or (more properly) requisite Explanation (for sure no man, whose intellectuals are not suppressed by that intolerable tyrant, profess *Incredulity*, can longer doubt) of this; let us reflect upon our *Idea* of the *Deity*, and therein we shall discover, that tis impossible for the minde of man to conceive

the import of this word, *God*; and not in the same numerical notion to understand him to be most *Wise*, most *Potent*, most *Good*, or in abstracto, *infinite Wisdom*, *infinite Power*, *infinite Goodness*, assimilated, or rather identified into one simple eternal essence. For undoubtedly our minds would speculate the Idea of a poor inconsiderable and imperfect *Divinity*; if they conceived it subject to circumscription, and apprehended his *Intellection* so narrow as not actually to comprehend all things; his *Power* so restrained, as to know *Impossibility*; his *Goodness* so scant and shallow, as to be exhausted in a partial diffusion, or limited by the admixture of *Envy*, (i. e.) withdrawn from, or denied unto any of the works of his hand, out of a designe to delight, or glory in their infelicity.

Now if God be *infinitely wise*, he must be *Omniscient*; and consequently, must understand not only the simple and naked *Forms* of all natures in the Universe, but hold also a full and clear theory of their *Essential proprieties*, how and by what kind of activities they operate toward the satisfaction of their predestinate ends, and in what method they may be most conveniently disposed to maintain the order and harmony of the whole; and so must know and exercise the due administration of all things in this vast Common-wealth. I say, must *know* and *exercise*; for if he understood the politic or method of the worlds Gubernation, only *Contemplatively*: then would not his *Intellection* be complet and absolute in all points, and we should have been compelled to recurre to our former device of cogitating some other nature more perfect, which might be actually possessed of both the *Theoretical* and *Practical Intelligence*. Again, since *Sapience* doth consist in, and manifest it self chiefly by *Action*, and the real administration of difficult and important affairs; with what shadow of reason can we argue God to be most *Sapient*, if we conceive him to be *Idle*, devoyd of all action, and taking care of nothing?

Secondly, if God be *infinitely Potent*, then must he be *Omnipotent*: and so to his power there is no ἀδύνατον, or *impossibility*.

P 3

But

Article 2.
The same particularly supported by that trinity of Attributes, viz. his

I.
Infinite
Wisdom.

2.
Infinite Power.

But how can we apprehend this aright, unless we first grant, that having produced all things, and endowed them with faculties respectively inservient to their conducement to the satisfaction of the general end; he doth, through all the independent subdivisions of time, (*i. e.*) constantly, moderate their activities, in full conformity to the prudent rules of his own *Will*: and how can this be done, unless we allow him to have a hand in all operations, and that both Causes and effects doe so fully and wholly depend upon him, that they can have neither *Existence*, nor *Motion*, without the assent and coefferency of his *Beneplacet*. Again, *Action* is the Pathognomonick, or proper manifest of *Power*; nay, in precise and orthodox logick, they are *Correlatives*, or twins that are born, live and dye together; and we are not now to learn, that Gods prime scope in the Creation, was to have an opportunity for the manifestation of his excellencies: if so, can *Inactivity* declare *Supreme Power*, or a cessation from acting not induce a suspicion of *Lassitude* and imbecillity?

3.
Infinite
Goodness.

Lastly, if God be *infinitely good*; it necessarily followes, *Goodness* being *Communicative*, that all natures must be sensible of, by participating that his inexhaustible goodness. And with what unpardonable incogitancy can that be asserted, while we opinion that he doth *concenter* his goodness, and when he hath created so many excellent natures, take no care or make no provision for their welbeing, but abandon them to the impendent misery of confusion? Might we not justly censure him of *Malevolence* or *Envy*, if he should withhold the communication of his perpetual Providence from the works of his own hands; which must unavoidably perish by the Antipathies of their Constitutions, and relaps into their primitive nothing in that moment, when he should intermit his act of *Conservation*? Nay, so essential is the constant oversight and tuition of the Creator to the subsistence of the Creature; that some contemplative heads have hereupon hinted a conjecture, that nothing shall go to the dissolution of all, at the period of time, but the meer *Cessation of Providence*, or the dereliction of Nature to the necessary discord of her several peices.

And

And thus hath the clue of Gods chief *Attributes* (chief in his relation to the World) in a direct line conducted our single reason to the demonstration of his *General Providence*; which indeed, is the clearest mirror of his superexcellent Nature, and to the opticks of mortality doth afford a lively reflexion of his *infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness*. It succeeds, that we endeavour to look at Providence through the *Telescope* or *Perspective* of the *World*.

Since God made the World, as hath been already proved; it cannot but be absurd to imagine, that he instantly deserted it, or having once impressed a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vast machin, immediately withdrew his hand from action, leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or swinge; and all the lesser and subordinate wheels of particular natures to conform to the impulsion of those greater. For though he made all things *Perfect*, (*i. e.*) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accomplishment of each Creature, *in suo genere*: yet since himself is the *Universal Soul*, that both *Material* and *Informed* each particle of this great body; in strictness of consequence, nothing can have existence longer then he shall please, in every minute of its duration, freshly to create it, or (to speak the interest of Providence) to conserve it in being, by a continual communication of it self; all the *Actions* of Divinity, being *real Divinity at second hand*, or nothing but *Diffusions*, or *Emanations* of its own essence.

Again, who ever reared a magnificent structure a purpose to ruine it? and since there is no *Artificer* so unnatural or stupid, as not to desire rather that his *Artifice* should prosper and continue long by carefull looking to, then be exposed to ruine by neglect or violence: tis infinitely more improbable, that the great *Exemplar* of all *Mechanicks* (for no age ever produced a peice of *Art*, whose pattern was not first in Nature) should so far grow out of love with his own operation, and despise those perfections, which were but the *extracts* of himself; as to disclaim it, commit it to the imminent disorder and demolition of *Fortune*, and not make provision of all things conducible to its preservation: especially,

when:

Article 3.

The necessity of the worlds gubernation, by the indefinient influence of Gods general Providence, demonstrated from the consideration of the absolute and total dependence of all *Second Causes* upon the *First*.

when no *Intellect* but his own could be large enough to comprehend the Idea of the work, no *Prudence* but his own absolute enough to project the convenient modell of its due gubernation, no *Power* but his own almighty enough to furnish him with requisites thereto.

Nor can it, with safety, or honour to our judgements, be imagined, that God might, had he so pleased, have constituted the World in such absolute perfection, as that from the minute of its complete existence it might have continued *independent*, and to all eternity have subsisted *by it self*, and all its appointed motions have constantly, without intermission, or variation, succeeded by the direction of their bequeathed impressions, without the assiduous moderation of his care, or the minutely supply of his providence, since the Universe, according to the Grammar of sound Philosophy, is no *Noune Substantive*, and enjoys *reality* only by a *distinction*: *i. e.* is *something by dependence upon him, who was eternally contrary to nothing*; and being, at that instant, when *Omnity* informed *Nullity* into *existence*, educed out of nothing, by the single *Fiat* of God, and thence forward continued to be something by the continued Power of the Creator: must unavoidably revert to nothing again, if the perseverance of that identical power be subtracted, from which it once obtained to be something. And as *Light* cannot subsist, if separated from a *Lucidbody*; but instantly vanishes into opacity: so cannot the World (which is but a reflexive deradiation from that *Light*, which is invisible) continue, if the perpetual source of that miraculous *Virtue*, which upholds its existence, be withdrawn, but must immediately vanish into nothing. For the *Analogy* holds in all points, and the dependence of the *Creature* upon the *Creator*, is as highly absolute, as that of *Light* upon the *Sun*, or other *Lucidbody*. And though there are some things, which being once assisted into determinate essences by their causes, doe afterwards subsist without them, and keep possession of those Forms by their own native force: yet are they such as were still *something* before their specification to this or that nature by their causes; since all that natural Causes can doe, is to mould an old matter into a new figure, and so dispose the faculties existent therein, that a

new something may start out of the ruines of an old something. But the World which was nothing before the fruitfull voyce of *Elohim* called it into something, hath nothing from it self to subsist upon ; but must therefore, in the twinckling of an eye , become nothing again, unless its existence be supported and maintained by the constant recruit of the same *miraculous Power*, which first created it. I say, the same *miraculous Power* ; for the *Creation* doubtless was the greatest *miracle*, that ever was wrought : it being more difficult to turn *Nothing* into *all things*, by the bare *natus* or *vote* of the *First Cause*, then to produce an extraordinary effect by inverting the usual method of *Secondary Causes* ; a harder wonder to make *Nature* herself, then to præposter, or transcend her customary rules of acting, to the causation of an effect either against, or above her self. Though to speak rationally, and as men that understand something of *Theosophy* ; nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal *possibility*, but of equal *facility* also. When therefore we say, that *God is the Cause of the world* ; we are to understand him to be so in the same relation, that the *Sun* is the *Cause of Light* : and by consequence, as the *Light* disappears in the *Aer*, when the *Sun* discontinues its *Actinobolisme* or deradiation in our hemispher, by visiting the lower ; so also must the *World* disappear and be lost in adnihilation, when *God* shall please to discontinue his influx of minutely *Creation*, or (to speak more conform to our præsent scope, though it signifie the same thing in height of truth) to intermit his *Providence*.

Moreover, so immense are the bounds of this vast Empire, the World, so numerous and various its subdivisions, and those again dichotomized into so many myriads of Cantons, or Provinces, and each of those peopled with so many millions of different and discordant natures ; that no reason can admit it so much as probable, that a constant correspondence could be maintained, and a general amity observed though all, without the conserving influence of a *Rector General*, or *Supervisor*, whose *Will* receives laws from his *Wisdom*, and gives them to all besides himself. And therefore their thoughts missed not much of the white of

Q

truth

Article 4.

The vastity of the world : the infinite variety of its parts : and the irreconcilable discord of many natures : demonstrate as much.

truth, who conceived *God* to hold the same place in the world, as a *Pilot* in a ship, a *Charioter* in his Chariot, a *Chantor* in a Chorus, a *Father* in a family, a *Monarch* in a Kingdome, or a *General* in an Army. For, as the first preserves from shipwrack, the second from deviation and subversion, the third from discord, the fourth from poverty and desolation, the fifth from divisions, and the last from confusion: so doth the wise oversight of *God* regulate the efficiencies of all *Natural Agents*, with such admirable policie, that the whole is preserved in safety, in the direct road that lea- deth to the general end, in harmony, in prosperity, in union, in perfect order.

To draw a line yet more parallel; we every day observe in the sad experiments of death, what a leaden and unweildly mass of clay the *body* becomes, so soon as its sprightly Tenant, the *Soul*, hath surrendred to corruption; and it needs not much proof, that the *Soul* of this gigantik *body*, the Universe, is *God*: therefore when this soul shall withdraw and cease its Animation, must that *body* fall by its own weight, and suffer dissolution.

Not that therefore, in strictness of sense, or without the latitude of a metaphor, *God* is a *Soul*, and the *World* his *Body*; but because the informing and actuating Presence of *God* is as absolutely necessary to the vitality of the *World*, and the moderation of all its parts in the due execution of their distinct offices, as the Presence of a soul to the animation of a *body*, and the regulation of all its members in the requisite administrations of their several functions.

Article 5.
Under what re-
striction we are
to understand
that tropology
of some Her-
metical Philo-
sophers, *Deum*
esse Animum
Mundi.

And upon this ground, our zeal ought not to distast that *Figurative expression* of those *mystical and symbolical Philosophers*, who call *God*, the *Soul of the World*; nor be captious at that rhetorique, which hath comparatively styled him, the *Pilot*, *Emperour*, and *General of Nature*: since tis the most mannerly language mortality can invent, for the explanation of his *Government*; nor is it probable, that those profound speculators, who first adopted those modest metaphors, to shadow the unutterable infinity of his *Wisdome* and *Power*, were ignorant that there ought still this *difference* to be allowed, that though a *Pilot* is not *ubiquitary* in all

*
Non quod Deus ipse sit Anima
mundi (ut quidam leviter
inceptant) sed quod Dei di-
vinitas sit mundum quasi
Animans: ut qualibet in eo
Creatura, suis viribus, suas
virtus & virtutes, ad gloriam
disponentis, teneat. De
quodammodo, in concione de
scala visibilium ad asparum

all parts of his ship, nor an *Emperour* actually *omnipresent* in all places of his dominions, nor a *General* locally present in all quarters and stations of his Army; yet God is *intimately omnipresent* in every particle of the world. So that what is uncertainly said of the *Soul*, *Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*: may be most certainly said of God, *Totus in toto, and totus in qualibet parte*.

In fine, as the inspection and consideration of the World, hath formerly replenished us with irrefutable Arguments of its *Creation* by God: so also may it evince the constant *Conservation* of it, by the influence of his *Providence*.

For whoever (though a meer *Pagan*, whose brain never received the impression of either of those two notions, *Creator* and *Providence*) shall speculate the world in an Engyscope or magnifying Glafs, *i.e.* shall look upon it in the distinction of its several orders of natures, observe the commodious disposition of parts so vast in quantity, so infinite in diversity, so symmetrical in proportions, so exquisite in pulchritude: shall contemplate the comeliness, splendor, constancy, conversions, revolutions, vicissitudes, and harmony of celestial bodies: shall thence descend to sublunary, and with sober admiration consider the necessary difference of seasons, the certain-uncertain succession of contrary tempests, the inexhaustible treasury of Jewels, Metals, and other wealthy Minerals concentered in the fertile womb of the earth; the numerous, usefull and elegant stock of vegetables; the swarms of various Animals, and in each of these, the multitude, symmetry, connexion, and destination of organs: I say, whoever shall with attentive thoughts perpend the excellencies of these unimitable *Artifices* (for all things are *Artificiall*, *Nature being the Art of God*) cannot, unless he contradict the testimony of his own *Conscience*, and invalidate the evidence of that authentique *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*, but be satisfied; that as nothing less than an infinite *Power and Wisdome* could contrive and finish, so nothing less than the uncessant vigilancy and moderation of an infinite *Providence* can conserve and regulate them, in order to the mutual benefit each of other, and all conspiring, though in their contentions, to the promotion of the common interest.

Article 6.
The Atheists
subterfuges of
Nature and
Fortune, prax-
cluded.

If any shall yet stand out and object, that what I call *Providence*, is no other but *Nature* nicknamed, all those settled motions and regular effects in the world being but the necessary products of its established laws, and unalterable method: yet since they all declare an *Infinite intelligence* in that *Nature*, which could decree those perfect constitutions, and so strictly oblige all things to observe them in order to a general and particular good; he must at last by compulsion discover *Divinity* disguised under the vizard of *Nature*, by whose counsel and directions all things operate.

Nor can any man with more hopes of safety recurre to *Fortune*; or affirm, that there is no *Praordination* of contingencies, but that all events are the inconsiderate and extemporary results of *Chance*: since we have lately beheld the ruines of that Sanctuary, nor dare I be so uncharitable, as to presume that the reason of any thing pretending to humanity, can be so infatuated with the stupid idolatry of that Fairy Queen, as to expect a farther reformation of that delirium.

S E C T. IV.

HAVING, with perspicuity equal to the highest expectation, demonstrated the necessity of *Universal Providence*, from the nature both of the *Agent* and *Patient*; *God* and the *World*; it remains only that we withdraw that curtain of *objections*, wherewith the Impiety of its adversaries hath darkned the prospect of less ocular discerners, and terminated the vision of those whose opticks have not been strong enough to transfix it.

The first, we may remember, was that vanity of *Epicurus*, that the condition of a blissful and immortal *Nature* (such was his character of *Divinity*) is inconsistent with the necessary perturbations and perplexities of business.

Article 1.
The Atheists
first Antiprovi-
dential Argu-
ment refuted,
by the Perfection of the Divine Nature: and their absurdity, in commensurating the excellencies of God, by the infinitely inferior Faculties of man, detected.

But

But alas ! how grossly must he delude himself, who fathoms the extent of an *Infinite*, by the unequal geometry of a *Finite*, and limits incomprehensible *Omniety* to the narrow circumscriptions of *Humanity* ; which in comparison is but one remove from *Nullity* ? Had *God*, indeed, been, as he conceived him, of *Humane figure* ; it had been no error in the Court of Reason to have concluded him not much superior in the capacity of his *Intellect* : but when the *Divine Nature*, as himself acknowledged, must transcend all other in perfection and excellencies ; how palpable a contradiction did he fall upon, in commensurating the latitude of its *Power* and *Wisdom*, by the span of an imperfect and caduce nature, betwixt which and *Omnipotent-omniscience* are so many degrees of difference, as all the figures and cyphers of Arithmetick cannot amount to their compute, nor is mortality qualified to conceive. To paint a *Sound*, is a far easier task, then to describe the impervestigable manner of *Gods operations* : and to deny the possibility of that, whose reason we cannot explore, is to proclaim our ignorance of any nature more perfect then our own ; and that upon consequence, is to make our nature more imperfect then really it is, by rendring it incapable of the greatest *Truth* ; nay, of that truth, upon whose certitude, the assurance of all possible cognition doth necessarily depend. This had the rash *Epicurus* considered, doubtless he never had disparaged the nature of man, by equalizing it to Gods. I say, *disparaged* ; because to conceive a *Finite essence*, as perfect as an *Infinite*, is openly to confess that nature, which can conceive so horrid and sensible an *Absurdity*, to be far more frail and contemptible, then all other of its actions declare it to be : not but, in direct verity, tis the greatest disparagement, and no less then blasphemy to the infinitely sacred majesty of *God*, to be put in the scales against vile, ignorant, and impotent *Man*.

And while his thoughts flagged so many sphears below the *Empyreum* of all perfection, twas no wonder that he was staggered at *Universal Providence* ; that being a notion impossible to be instilled into any mind, that is not first prepared with the belief of an *Universal Intelligence*.

Again, to draw into a sharper angle, and render the absurdity

of this Comparison more ridiculous; the Reasons why a man, though of the strongest brain, and greatest abilities for business, must of necessity suffer disquiet, distractions and wearisome sollicitude from the multiplicity of cares, are (1.) the narrowness of his Understanding, which cannot be expanded to take in all the remote, proxime, and confederate Causes, events, dependencies, connexions, circumstances, &c. of occurrences: (2.) the shortness of his Power, which cannot stretch to furnish him with all things necessary as well to the prevention and remove of all incident impediments, as to the molition, promotion, and accomplishment of his designs: and (3.) the restraint of his Person to Time, Place and distance. But, on the other side, God is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipræsent; and therefore in the præordination, direction and compulsion of all things to the causation of those effects, which his Will hath decreed, he knows infinitely less of labour or disquiet, than the healthiest man doth in the motions of respiration, in his soundest sleep.

Article 2.
Divinity demonstrated superior to the circumscription both of Time and Place.

That God is not subject to the restraint of *Time*, is manifest from his *Eternity*; for that is *indivisible*, and knows no distinction of tenses: and therefore what we (whose imperfect reason cannot compute the duration of things, but by the successive instances, or concatenated moments of time) call *Prædestination*, is really no prædetermination of what's to come, in respect to God, but an act of his will already accomplisht, and as soon fulfilled as decreed; and so we may truly say, that in relation to himself, there is no *Foreknowledge* in God, all things which to our inferior Capacities seem either past, or to come, being actually præsent to him, whose whole duration is altogether, or but one constant and permanent point, one *Tò vñv*, entire in unity, and incapable of division into successive minutes, or articles.

That he is not subject to the restraint of *Place*, is evident from his *Omnity*, his being all in all; *Ubiquity* being the proper and inseparable *Attribute* of his nature. His being *All in All*, not only *ratione Præsentia*, but *ratione Essentie* also; he being the chief *Soul* not only of all *Bodies*, but of all *Spirits* also. And for this reason we cannot offend *Theology*, if we affirme, that God

is as *fully Present* in Hell among the accursed, as in Heaven among the blessed natures, though not so *comfortably*; and that the Devils would rejoyce if they could conceive it possible for him to be absent thence: since their existence, and so their Torments would then cease, his presence being the original and support of all existence.

Now if all this be amassed into one demonstration, and that duly perpended; I demand as well of the most contumacious infidelity, as the rankest ignorance, what can remain desirable, in order to the full information of our reason; that if there were a million of Worlds, nay as many as there are individuals in this, and in each a 1000000 times more business then in this: yet could the oversight and gubernation of them all, and the regular managery of every the smallest occurrence in them, put *Divinity* to no more trouble, disquiet, or interruption of felicity, then the simple *Act of Volition* doth induce upon the soul of man.

However, for further illustration, I cannot think it unnecessary to superadd this; that since *Man* himself doth ordinarily perform some actions, particularly those, which he is not only qualified and impowered, but also inclined to doe, by the native virtue, or congenial propensity of his Essence, as to *Cogitate, Desire, Love, Rejoyce* in the manifestation of his good parts or endowments, &c. not only without labour and inquietude, but even with superlative delight and content: it cannot but be concordant to reason to assert, that *God* is so far from sustaining any difficulty, molestation, or diminution of felicity, in the constant act of *Universal Providence*; which is the natural effect of his *Infinite Intelligence* and *Indefatigable Activity*, that tis rather a part of his *Beatitude* so to exercise and manifest his *Divinity*. Not that the abyss of his *Happiness* was not full before the World was; but because, being moved by his own immense *Goodness* to create a convenient subject, whereon to actuate his *Munificence*, he is pleased still to delight himself in the continued diffusion and communication of his excellencies, by the conservation and regulation of the same, according to the most prudent laws of his Will.

I have often consulted the most knowing and best ordered
minds,

Article 3.

That the procuration of all the infinitely various actions of second causes, in the World, cannot be any interturbation of Gods serene felicity, proved by an Argument *à minori.*

minds, with whom I could attain the blessing of a free conversation (and such, doubtless, are the only competent judges of delight) wherein lay the Philosophers stone of *Content* in this life, and in what actions of their lives they discovered the highest and most permanent pleasure: and they all concurred in this determination, *Aliis prodesse, & quam licet plurimis bene facere*. And this upon no slender ground, since the *Beatitude* of *Man* doth radically and totally consist in his *appropinquation* to *God*, and we never come so near him, in this remote vale of tears, as when we go out of our selves to relieve the necessities, lighten the oppressions, and prevent or repair the ruines of others. For *Charity* is the only excellence, wherein we may, in some sort, rival our maker: and were but our *Wills* constantly fixt upon the practise of this virtue, and our *Abilities* of doing good but half so infinite as our *Wills* (for the wings of our *Understanding* are, indeed, but *short*; but those of our *Will* are *long*, and have a liberty to fly at all, as shall be singularly proved in convenient place) we might anticipate no small part of the joys of heaven, while we sojourn upon earth, and should need no other *Heraldry* to testify our selves the off-spring of *Divinity*. Now if it be so intense a *delight* to the mind of *man*, which is but a beam deradiated from that immense *Sun of Charity*, to do good: ought we to think it a *trouble* to *God*, who is *most intelligent*, and so best knows the necessities of all things; *most beneficent*, and so most ready to relieve them; *most rich*, and so not obnoxious to impoverishment by the continual profusion of his favours; to be a *general benefactor* by his Providence?

Article 4.
The same illustrated by a second comparison.

To conclude; if the *visible* and *perishable Sun* can with incessant liberality, diffuse his consolatory and all-impregnating streams of light, heat, and influence on all parts of the sensible or adspicable World; and so concur to the generation, vitality, growth, perfection and conservation of all sublunary Natures; and this without labour, lassation, or exhaustion: Why should not the *Invisible, Unperishable, and Infinite Sun* (of which the other is but a dark and contracted shadow) be allowed to have his *Wisdom, Power, and Goodness* (which *Trinity* of *Attributes* make

make the unity of Providence, as I have formerly hinted) in all places, and at all times diffused, in their operations, over all his Works, with the same facility.

And as it can be no *Interturbation* to the serene *Felicity*, so neither can it be a *Disbonour* or disparagement to the superexcellent *Majesty* of God, to transmit the rayes of his *Providence* to the most minute, and seemingly most trivial and contemptible transactions on this great exchange of the world. And therefore *Pliny*, who said, *neesse est ut Deus tam tristi, tamque multiplici ministerio polluat*; might with less absurdity have affirmed, that the Sun doth an action much below the dignity of so glorious a creature, and must have the purity of his light suffer diminution and contamination, when it projects its radiant beams upon fordid and putrid bodies; when it cooperates to the production of Toads, Serpents, worms and other the like base vermin; and when it promotes the fertility of noxious and deleterious weeds, as well as wholesome and medical plants. For those things which appear vile, despicable and ugly to the queazy judgment of man; are not so really to *Nature*: since she knowes no *deformity*, and therefore all her pieces must be amiable: not really so to the eyes of the *Author of Nature*, since he hath thought good to configure them according to the most exact ideas in his own wise intellect; and therefore *Beauty* is best defined by the conformity every thing holds to its primitive exemplar in the Intellect of its Creator: not so to *themselves*, since they have obtained a perfection congruous to their *species*, and enjoy an absolute pulchritude respective to their distinct kinde; and therefore no Animal is so insensible of the perfection of its *Forme*, as to desire either to lose, or exchange it.

Again, those *Actions*, which seem various, cary the face of multiplicity, and fill up whole sheets, in the diary of man; stand but for an unit in the Arithmetick of Nature, and make but a monosyllable in the book of Fate: it being the natural prerogative of Ubiquitary Omnipotence, to doe all things at once.

Consider we, with what ease and quiet the pale and feeble *Soul* of a *Tree* can at once provide for the *Vegetation* as well of each

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Article 5.
That the admittance of petty occurrences can be no indignity or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the contrary absolutely essentiall to him, firmly evicted, from the universality of his *Cognition* and *Presence*.

leafe and blossome, as of the trunk and root, and cook the insipid juice of the earth into an Aliment conveniēt to the conservacion and growth of each single fiber and filament both of the cortex or bark, and of the interior and medullary substance: in a word, transfuse a vital influence through each indivisible particle of that great mass, of which it is composed.

Consider we, how easily the more luminous and energetical *Soul* of an *Elephant*, can at one and the same time, in one and the same blast, or deradiation of virtue, administer its nourishing influx to each particle of that vast body; and omitts not to take care of every single haire among so many myriads as cloth the skin, in its common doale or distribution of Vitality.

And when we have thus gently informed our selves, that tis as easie to the weak and eyand soul of a *Plant* (which the best *Physiology* defines to be nothing, but a certain modification of matter volatilized, or a contexture of smooth, globular equal and so of calefactive *Atoms*, woven by the seminal virtue or plastick Faculty of that particular species, and soon dissolved again, upon a variation of figure and situation of those insensible particles, of which it is composed) to make provision for the livelyhood & sustentation of all parts in that mass, as for any one of them: that tis as genuine and familiar to the *Soul* of an *Animal* (which is also a *Corporeal substance*, or the more spiritual part of the blood subtiliated by vital heat, traduced from its genitor) to animate and govern all parts of its body, as any one: we cannot but acknowledge, that the *Procruration* and *Administration* of all the affairs of the world, is as facil and natural to the *Providence* of *God* (who is the *Soul* of all *Souls*, and the *life* of *Spirits*) as to take the care of any one individual Nature.

If the oversight and regency of but half so many different operations, as that immaterial *Empress*, which keeps her invisible Court somewhere within us, doth every minute, even when we are fast lockt in the narcotick armes of *Morpheus*, and all our thoughts keep holy day, order and effect, while she maintains the oeconomy of the body; were charged upon the hands of our understanding, but for one houre: without question, the burden would prove insupportable, nor could either the skill or strength
of

of our limited reason, in any measure responsible, suffice to the due administration of so large a Province. When, therefore, to fathom the depth of that immense natural prudence, and sovereign virtue, wherewith the soul of man is richly endowed, and which she constantly declares in the prosperous exercise of her Monarchy, with the short line of our intelligence; or to estimate her Providence according to the rate of our cheaper faculties; is both ignorance and injustice: how infinitely more stupid and unwarrantable a course doth that wretch take, who adventures to commensurate the superexcellent *knowledge* and almighty *virtue* of *God*, whereby he procures and moderates the affairs of the World?

That man is, for the most, incurious of final and trivial occurrences; is so far from being a wonder, that contrariwise those, who could tripartite their thoughts to the contrivement of but three different businesses, at once, as *Cæsar*, have been lookt upon as *Prodigies*: and he that can lay the grounds of but one popular designe, so as to have it succeed without impediment, or the intervention of cross accidents; is reputed a profound *Politician*, and his head a whole spear above the vulgar. This, I am not ignorant, the haughtiness of his spirit hath referred to the *fixation* of his thoughts upon objects either of his pleasure or ambition; when in modest truth, this pretension of *sublimity* is but a gloss, or specious vernish to conceal the *imbecillity* and *limitation* of his *intelligence*. For that being too narrow, to be extended to the forecast and regulation of many things at once; and his stomach too high to descend to a due acknowledgment of the imperfection of his nature: he guilds over the poverty with the pride of his minde, and endeavours to excuse his frailty, by insinuating, that to attend the study of trifles, and in the interim supersede the projection of matters of importance, is a disparagement to the nobility of his Intellectuals. When if his reason were so capacious, as to admit the care of petty affairs, without the confusion, or neglect of others of more concernment; nothing, though nere so mean and ordinary, could seem below the dignity of his Providence. But that *God* should be incurious of any action in the world, is absolutely impossible; since contrapugnant to the *Uni-*

versality of his *Cognition* and *Præsence*: for what is *Omniscient* and *Ubiquitary*, can be ignorant of nothing; and consequently it can be no more either of *Profanation* to the *Sanctity*, or *dishonour* to the glorious *Majesty* of the *Deity*, to extend his Providence to the meanest contingents in nature, then it can be to the *Soul*, to vegetate and inspire each single *hair* of that body she informs.

S E C T. V.

Article 1.
The first division of the Atheists second objection; viz. that the apparent irregularity of events doth justify their non-prædestination or meer Contingency; strongly controverted; and that to the præordination of divinity nothing can be casual; clearly demonstrated.

TO their Second objection, that all events in the World are either the non-prædestinate and extemporary results of Chance; or the necessary and settled effects of Nature, all Actives and Passives being, by the unalterable laws of their primitive constitutions, firmly adliged unto, and irresistibly impelled upon the causation of determinate effects respective to the energy of their particular configurations: we as easily as uprightly answer,

First, that to the prædestination of that *Almighty Cause*, which can and doth dispose the motions of all things according to the præscripts of his own *Will*, no event can be casual or unexpected; though indeed, if we have regard to the præscience and forecast of man, to whose dim opticks all things are invisible, that stand in the dark of futurity, many events seem meer *Accidents*, and the most mature *determinations* of *Fate* may pass for the rash and inconsiderate *hiss* of *Fortune*.

And if so, how audacious a temerity is it in us, so to magnifie our own slender perspicacity, as when we cannot discern why this or that particular concurse and encounter of natural causes should occur, rather than another, and such or such an issue of their confederate activities succeed, rather than another; instantly to conclude, that there can be no *Superior Cause*, or *superintendent power*, which hath thus or thus ordained and disposed those certain means to those certain ends, and whose counsels we are not privy

privy unto? Look we no farther then the ordinary Providence of *Princes*, and in every *Republick* our observation shall meet with a thousand events, which in the judgements of their vulgar subjects, and such as stand aloof from the Council table, are deemed meer *Contingents*, as never at all designed upon any secret reasons of State; when yet to the Prince himself, and those to whom he hath communicated the mystery of his designations, they really are the *intended effects of his Prudence*, which had so politickly ordered his affairs, and so wisely prepared all Agents requisite to the bringing about of his purposes, that they could not but hit and be accomplish'd accordingly. And is there then, why we should not be confirmed, that in this *immense Commonwealth*, in whose government the most inobservant cannot but take notice of innumerable passages so admirable, both in respect of the weak *Instruments* that served to bring them to pass, and of the obscurity or impervestigability of the *Ends*, at which they were levelled; that nothing less then an *infinite Wisdome* could contrive, nothing less then an *infinite Power* effect them: there must of necessity be a *Rector General* or *President Paramount*, by whose sovereign dictates all subordinate ministers are set on work, in order to the execution of his pleasure, and in their operations vary not a hairsbreadth from the rules prescribed by his Will; though neither the *manner* of their *activities*, nor the *Ends* to which they are destined fall under the discovery of our purblind reason? For the *Polity of God* is inscrutable, and may well delight our *Piety* with wonder, but must empuzzle our insolent *Curiosity*: and the eye of our souls, being in this life far dimmer then that of *Moses* body, cannot survey so much as the back parts, or *dark side* of *Divinity*; much less pry into the maze of his *Counsels*, and read the invisible decrees of that mystical *Senate*, wherein though there be a consult of *three Persons*, there is yet but *one minde*, which votes without contradiction, and his *Volition, deliberation* and *Election*, make but one simple act. For my part, that the wayes of God in the World are past finding out; that there is a *Sanctum Sanctorum* in the Ark of Providence, into which blind mortality cannot look; and that the cryptick turnings, doublings, and redoublings of that hand, which works all its rarities in the

dark, and sometimes inverts, now and then transcends, and anon infringes the *Axioms* of *Nature* (to shew, that as he made, so he can alter her, and tune all her strings to a concord with his will) make a labyrinth to intricate and lose the presumptuous reason of man, that dares hope to explore and trace it: this, I say, is demonstration enough to me, that there is one *Universal Intelligence*, which both moves and directs all individual *Agents* to act, in order to the accomplishment of some positive end, for the most part best, and many times only known to himself.

Nor is it an illegal process of our reason, but the best logick, as to *supernaturals*; to conclude not only the excellencies, but even the necessary being of some things, merely from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them: since their very being above our capacity, is argument both clear and strong enough, that they are not only so as, but more perfect and far greater than we understand them to be; as he that sees but a small part of the sea with a Telescope at distance, may safely conclude that 'tis exceeding large; because the circumference thereof is, by infinite degrees of magnitude, wider than to be drawn into the aperture of his slender tube. Sure I am, at least, that the *Antisyllogisme*, or *Counter-argument*; the understanding of man cannot discover its abstruse and mysterious plots, resolve its multiplex ænigma's, nor analyze its method, or series of Causes subordinate, and so by a retrograde chase hunt out its first and chief intention: *Ergo*, there can be no Providence: is intolerable, and deserves a greater dose of Ellebor, than that absurdity of the blinde man, who concluded there was not, nor could be any such thing as light, or Colours, only because he could not see them. When therefore we shall have run our eager contemplations to a stand, in the wilderness of Providence, and lost our busie thoughts in the maze of Gods secret decrees; all the satisfaction our bold curiosity can return home with, will be only this: that all occurrences in the World are predetermined, have their *Causes*, *Times*, and *Ends* punctually set down in the *Ephemerides* of *Fate*; and though in the incompetent judgment of man, some of them may seem the *Peradventures*, or temerarious *Hits* of *Chance*: yet are they the mature *Designations* of the *supreme Wisdom*: though in the

ears of man, they may sound *discords* to the musick of *particular Natures*, yet will they at last be found *well composed Aers* necessary both to sweeten, and fill up the common *Harmony* of the Universe. To instance; are there not many *Monsters, Heteroclitics, Equivocal* and irregular births, on the earth: many prodigious and new-faced *Meteors* in the upper, and uncertain *Anomalies* or unseasonable *Tempests* in the lower division of the *Aer*: many new *Phænomena* among the fixed; various encounters, divisions, and conspiracies among the erratick stars &c. and yet doe not all these, as *Chrotchets* and *Quavers* in a grave and solemn lesson on a *Lute*, conduce to the advancement of the *General Melody*? Doth not *irregularity* render *order* the more conspicuous and amiable? and *Deformity*, like the *Negro* drawn at *Cleopatra's* elbow, serve as a foile to set off *Beauty*? Are not the *Moles* on the cheeks of *Nature*, as those on *Venus* skin, placed there to illustrate or whiten the snow, and sweeten the feature of her face? Is it not exceeding gracefull in a *Comedian*, to temper and endear the sage and weighty scenes of *Princes*, and *Melancholy States-men*, with the light interludes of *Pantalons, Clowns,* and *Anticks*? Doth not the *Painter* then shew the most of skill, when he refracts the glaring luster of his *lighter Colours*, with a veil of *Sables*; and makes the *beauty* of his piece more visible by clouding it with a becoming *shadow*? And without doubt, every man will readily conjoyne his vote to ours, that he is best able to *adorn* and imbellish a piece of *Art*, who first *contrived* and wrought it: and therefore the *Perfection* and *Condecoration* of a work doth properly and solely belong to his hand, that brought it to that height, as to want only ornament; nor is it his part to prescribe what's necessary to the conciliation of gracefulness and decorament to an engine, who is ignorant of the modell, and holds not a perfect Idea of the *Artifice* thereof. Now the importance of all these *smiles* being put together, who can be so ignorant in the *Alphabet*, or rudiments of *ratiocination*, as not, at first sight, to spell them into this short lesson, consisting only of two orthodox Positions.

First, that those subitaneous *Accidents*, which the ignorance or carelessness of the vulgar doth usually refer to the blind fortilegies

legies of Chance; are truly the meet hand of God, and the prudent designs of that Catholick Providence, which hath numbred the sands on the Sea shoar, and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance: which feeds the young Ravens, when they cry, and while the old ones wander for meat: which thundereth marvelously with his voyce; and doth great things, that we cannot comprehend: for he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the smal rain, and to the great rain of his strength: by whose breath frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straightned: which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels, that they may doe what ever he commandeth them upon the earth: who made the ordinances of heaven, and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth: who can binde the sweet influences of the Pleiades, and lose the bands of Orion: can bring forth Mazaroth in his season, and guide Arcturus with his sons, &c.

Secondly, that those *Monstrosities*, or extraordinary and prodigious effects, which the nescience of the multitude calls *Irregularities*, *Perversions*, and *Deformities* of Nature; to wiser considerations, prove themselves to be no wanton excursions, or randome shots of her hand, made without aim at any final cause; but *preordained*, and *collineated* by that sure one of *Divine Providence*, point blanck at some certain end, *private* or *publick*. The former being known only to himself, *a priori*; and frequently mistaken by man, *a posteriori*: the later, indeed, we have a liberty to conjecture, to be either that he leaves the straight, and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line, to satisfie the World of his *Prerogative*, that himself is the *Agent*, and *Nature* but his *Instrument*, and therefore to be turned, wrenched, altered, and perverted at his pleasure; or else, that his wisdom thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole, those private fewds and petty discords betwixt Individuals, necessary not only to endear, but conserve the peace of the whole.

Both which durable Truths are, with so much piety, as judgement, contracted by that *Emperor* of the *Stoicks* as well as of the *Romans*, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (of whom the smooth *Herodian* (*initio historia*) gives this glorious Character, μόνον τὴ βασιλείαν φιλοσοφίαν, ἢ λόγοις, ἢ δὲ δογμάτων γνώσεις,

σμιγῶ δ' ἦθει κ' βίῳ σώφρονι ὀπισώσατο: *Solus imperatorum sapientie studium non verbis aut decretorum scientia, sed gravitate morum, vitæque continentia usurpavit*) into one short meditation, in these words; Τὰ τῶν θεῶν, προνοίας μετὰ τὴν τύχης ἢ ἀνευ φύσεως ἢ συγκλάσεως, κ' ὀπιπλοκῆς ἢ προνοίας διοικουμένων. πάντα ἐκείθεν βεῖ, πρόσσει δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, κ' τὸ τῶ ὅλων κόσμῳ συμφέρον, ἢ μέρος εἶ. παντὶ δὲ φύσεως μέρος ἀγαθόν, ὃ φέρει ἢ τῷ ὅλῳ φύσει, κ' ὃ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν. Σώζουσι δὲ νόσμον ὡσπερ αἱ τῶν σοφῶν, ἔπος κ' αἱ τῶν συγκριμάτων μεταβολαί: *Quæ ad Deos ut auctores referuntur, ea Providentiæ plena esse nemo dubitat. Quæ Fortuna vulgò adscribuntur, ne illa quidem extra Naturæ leges, fatalemque illum contextum, complexumque rerum, quæ à providentiæ administrantur. Inde omnia fluunt: adde quod necessarium est, quicquid est, & toti universo (cujus tu pars es) conducibile. Porro autem quod natura Universi fert, quòdque ad eam facit conservandam, id bonum est unicuique Universi particula. Conservant autem mundum, quemadmodum elementorum, ita & ex iis concretarum rerum mutationes. Libri iis ἐαυτῶν primi sect. ultima.*

Secondly, that no *Natural Agent* hath the rains in its own hands, or the liberty to act in a *loose and arbitrary way*; but all things observe that immutable *Tenor*, or settled course, which they began to operate in at their first inauguration to essence: provided that we understand this assertion under a twofold restriction.

First, that this *Tenor* or established method, was not instituted by the improvidence of Fortune, as our *Atheists* would have it; but ordained, enrolled and enacted by the counsel of an infinite Wisdom.

Secondly, that this *supernatural Nature*, which excogitated and decreed this convenient law, and endowed each single entity

hath reserved to himself a prerogative power to alter, transcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature.

Article 2.

The Authors *Antithesis*, that all *Natural Agents* are under the strict laws of their distinct species.

Article 3.

A second *Counterposition*, that those laws were instituted and fancied by an infinite wisdom.

Article 4.

A third, that the legislator

with a Power or Faculty respective to its duty thereto, and observance or execution thereof; hath not thereby so tied up his own hands, or limited his Prerogative, as not to have reserved to himself an absolute superiority, or capacity, at pleasure to infringe, transcend, or pervert it, by giving special dispensation to any of his Creatures, to vary the manner of their Activities, in order to the Causation of any effect, which his own prudence shall think expedient.

Article 5.
The verity of
the first and
second Posi-
tions, amply de-
monstrated.

For the *First* and *Second* of these Positions; viz. that as well the general Law of Nature, as those particular and æconomical rules, which being engraven not only upon every distinct species, but also upon every single or individual entity, stand both for warrant and directions to them in their several operations; were made and established by the counsel of an infinite Wisdom: may (if we may assume the liberty to aggravate what we have formerly asserd toward the attestation of the same subject) be thus demonstrated.

In the whole *Scale of Creatures*, we finde but five *Gradations* or roundles, by which our contemplations may orderly ascend to the highest pinnacle, or summit of Nature, and thence take a full survey of all her Provinces at large: and those are *Existence*, *Life*, *Sense*, *Locomotion voluntary*, and *Reason*. To speak yet more peripicuously.

First, there are some things, which have obtained a bare *Existence*, or meer *Being* only, and remain devoid of all the other four: such are all *simple bodies*, as the *Heavens*, and those four which common *Physiology* calls *στοιχεῖα Elements*; and all *συνελευρα inanimate Concretions*, or *Compositions*, as *Stones*, *Metals*, *Minerals*, &c.

Secondly, some have not only *Existence*, but also *Vitality* or *Vegetability* allotted unto them, and yet want sense, and motion arbitrary, as all *Vegetables*.

A Third Class is endowed with *Being*, *Life*, and *Sense*; and yet hath not attained so high as *Animal* or *voluntary motion*: to which belong all *Conchylia*, as *Oysters*, *Muscles*, *Cockles*, &c. which *Aristotle* (3. *De Gener. Animal. cap. 2.*) for the same
reason.

reason, facetiously calls *Aquatiles Plantas*, a kind of *Water Plants*; as by an inversion, he calls earthly Plants, *Ostrea Terrena*, a kind of *Land Oysters*: because they have not, as he opinioned, the power of translating themselves *de loco in locum* (though our *Democritus Londinensis*, that incomparable indagator of Natures Arcana, Dr. *Harvey*, hath observed that Oysters protrude, or belch out on the conical extreme of their shells, a certain Filme or natural saile, by the help whereof they remove, veer, tack about, and so, observing the Tides, conduct themselves to shoats, rocks, and other places of advantage both for their feeding, and quiet) but are tumbled up and down by the impulse of the Current.

Others of a *fourth order* are admitted to goe higher, and to their *Existence, Vitality, and Sensibility*, is also superadded *Locomotion arbitrary*, or the Faculty of removing their stations at pleasure; but yet they are excluded from the perfection of *Rationality*, and know nothing good or evil, but by the discernment or discrimination of *Sense*: as all brute Animals, Quadrupeds, Birds, Fishes, Amphibions, and Insects.

And *Lastly*, others there are, which being highest in the favour of their maker, possess all these accumulated endowments together, and have *Existence, Life, Sense, Voluntary motion*, and *Ratiocination* contorted together into one excellent Nature, which seems in an epitomy or contraction to comprehend all the others: and these are *our selves*. Some over pregnant Wits there have been, I well remember, who have added one round more to this Ladder of *Corporeal Natures*, making the *Zoophytes* or *Plant-Animals* an half-pace, or middle step betwixt the 2 and 3 degrees: but untill either an autoptical experiment, or the observation of some, who are more curious of Truth, then exotique Rarities, shall remove those scruples which I have in me, concerning the fidelity of those large stories obruded upon us by Travellers, of the *Herba mimosa*, or mimick Plant, described by *Christopher Acofta*, first, afterwards by *Clusius*, and since grown traditional amongst all *Botanicks*; of the *Boramez*, or *Vegetable Lambe of Tartary* (no sparing relation whereof was first communicated to the world in the common language of Europe, by *Sigismund*

Baron of Verbestein (*in rerum Moscoviarum Commentariis*) then countenanced by the glorious Pen of *Jul. Caesar Scaliger* (*Exercit. 181. Sect. 29.*) since made more passant by *Fortunius Licetus* (*Lib. 3. de spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 4.*) and *Libavius* (*part 2. singul. exercitat. de Agno vegetabili Scythia*) and now taken for granted by all or most Herbarists of our age; of the *Sponge*, &c. I shall beg leave to suspend my belief, that there are any such Heteroclitcs, or middle Natures, *half Vegetable, half sensible*; or, at least, that both Faculties are so conspicuous and eminent in them, as that thence they should deserve really to be accounted a distinct order of Creatures.

Now the *Faculties*, or *essential proprieties* of all things being thus incommunicable downward, and each distinct classis so confined to its proper orb of endowments, that it can never advance upward, and usurpe more perfection then what it already stands possessed of by the Charter of its particular Specification; it follows, that we explore the *reason* or *original* of this *Limitation*, and why those Natures of the first degree, are limited to meer Existence, and cannot aspire to Vegetation: why those of the second are chained down to Existence and Vegetation, without possibility of being ever promoted to Sense; those of the third preferd to Sense, but denied the additional favour of Locomotion voluntary; those of the fourth admitted to Arbitrary motion, but excluded Reason; and those of the highest enriched with all. Either this *Necessity* must be imposed upon them by *Fortune*; or by *themselves*; or by some *other principle*, which hath the free donation, and so the limitation of all those priviledges or Faculties.

First, not by *Fortune*; for that she could not institute these assignations, draw this Helix, that still enlargeth into a wider capacity, nor make this law of Propriety inviolable: is amply manifest from the *Perpetuity*, or constant observation of the same by all corporeal entities, every one having their peculiar capacities so defined, circumscribed, and immured; that no one did ever, since the first hour of Time, exceed the bounds of its own species, nor climb up to the state of its superior; for *Constancy* and *Fortune* are Antagonists never to be reconciled, but, like *Castor* and

Pollux,

Pollux, when one peeps above, the other sculks below the horizon.

Secondly, not by *Themselves*; for there is in every thing a Kind of native Ambition to ennoble its nature, enlarge its power, nay (so much as in it lies) to mount even to infinity, according to that Axiom of *Scaliger* (*Exercit. 9. pag. 52.*) *Unicuique enti inest appetitio infinitatis*. Thus simple Natures covet to become compounds; Compounds spurre on to arrive at Vegetables; those affect the dignity of Sense; sensibles grow desirous of muscular Motion, &c. Can we conceive, that a *Plant* would continue fixed and nayled down by its own roots to the earth, and there live a cold, dull, unactive life; if it could give to its self motion and abilities for nobler actions? That a *Beast* would be constant to the gross and heavy operations of meer sense, submit to the burdens, and endure the tyrannous oppressions of man; if it could endow it self with the prerogative of Reason, and so become equal to his imperious Lord? Or that man would sit down quiet, and remain subject to the infirmities, calamities, and mortality of his nature; if he had any hopes to better it, to wind up himself to heaven, and there take the wall of Cherubins, nay rival the calme felicity and immortality of God? For so invincible a reluctancy have we against the necessity of our frailties, and so uncessant horretick a desire to be above them, by the melioration of our state; that we may truly accommodate to our pride, what the eloquent *Tertullian* spake to express that of some of the Roman Emperours; *si ipse Deos facere potuissent, certe quidem homines nunquam fuissent*, could they have made themselves Gods, doubtless they never would have been men. Seeing therefore, that tis repugnant to that insatiable Appetite of *Melioration*, even to infinity, radically inherent in every entity create, though (I confess) scarce perceptible in bodies devoid of Animation; to deny to it self any perfection, which is in its own power to give, or acquire: what clearer evidence can be expected, to ensure our reason, that the *Ampliation*, and *Limitation* of all *Natural Faculties*, or endowments, is not in the arbitrary disposition, or elective power of *Finite essences*; and, by consequence, that the *Law of Propriety*, or the restriction of every

species to its own orb of activity, was not made by compact among themselves, but imposed upon them by an *Infinite*.

This considered, it remains indisputable, that the *Distribution* and *Assignment* of those different *Qualifications*, being neither in the power of *Fortune*, nor of the *Things* that enjoy them: it must properly and solely belong to that *supernatural Infinite*, which is the fountain of *Being, Life, Sense, Locomotion* and *Reason*, and therefore had the power freely to give them; being induced to the *Collocation* of them by the meer invitation of his own *Goodness*, and directed in the convenient *Distribution* of them by the Counsel of his own *Wisdom*.

This Truth, all Ages have held sacred, and the wiser Ethnicks both of *Greece* and *Rome* ever engrafted it into their Creed, preaching it to the world, though blended under the Chaos of their symbolical or Hieroglyphical Idolatry. For *Homer*, courting the propitious aspect of his best Deity, *Jupiter*, in a panegyricall Hymn; ascribes to him, as a chief and peculiar Attribute, the power of *Circumscribing and Bounding* of all things, thus bespeaking him.

Ζῆνα θεῶν ἢ ἀείρον ἀόσμου, ἰδὲ μέγιστον,
Εὐρύοπον, κρείοντα, τελευτῶρον, &c.

*Jovem Deorum optimum canam, & maximum,
Latisonantem, validissimum, Terminos asserentem, &c.*

And *Aristotle* likewise (*de Mundo* Tom. 2. pag. 1592.) calls his *Infinitem divinum*, or God, πεπερωμένον, διὰ τὸ πεπερωμέναι πάντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς ἴσιν ἀπείρον εἶναι, *Quod ab eo omnia terminata sunt, ac nihil in rerum natura sit infinitum*, from his setting bounds to all things, and leaving nothing undefined. Nor was this unacknowledged by the elder Romans; for they had a set form of devotion, and a solemn sacrifice appointed particularly *ad Jovem terminalem*, as *Dionysius Halicarnass.* (*Antiquit. Roman. Lib. 2. p. 133.*) hath transmitted to posterity. To this also seems the sweet tongued *Ovid* to allude, when in his description of the Creation, he saith, *Limisibus discrete omnia certis.*

Now

Now the *Faculties* of all *Natural Agents* being immediately derived from, and strictly limited by *God*, so that no one can ever transcend its own, nor usurpe upon anothers confines: the *Light of Nature* will infer, that all their operations also are prescribed, and both the *manner*, and *end* of all their activities precisely predetermined, nay the very time and place with all other adjuncts and circumstances of their effects appointed by the *Providence* of his *Infinite Wisdom*.

Hitherto have we confronted only *Nature* to *Fortune*; let us therefore now give her one charge more with an *Argument* deduced à *minori*, from *Art*.

Did ever any man, that beheld the curious Mathematicks of *Archimedes* his Sphear; the automatus flight of *Regiomontanus* his Eagle; the artificial wings of *Architas* Dove; or those inanimate Birds that the ingenious Mathematician, whom the glorious *Charles* the fifth selected for his companion in his retirement from Empire sent flying in at his window; or but observe the regular motions in a *trochiliack Horodix*, or Watch: conceive that the motions of those engines were originally spontaneous, instituted by meer chance; or that each wheel assumed to it self, by Lot, its particular figure, situation, axis, number of teeth, and precise measure of circumrotation? Undoubtedly no; but on the contrary, instantly concluded, that they were the appointed effects of provident industry, and had their models grounded upon maxims of the highest and most learned reason. And yet is our Atheist so affronted with impudence, as to give check to his own Conscience, by daring to affirme; that the system of the Celestial orbs, the Laws of natural motions, and the Architecture of those admirable organs in the body of an Animal (which are engines, whose Artifice doth, by incomprehensible excesses, transcend our theory in the mathematicks; insomuch that some of the strongest skulls of our age have ventured crazing to finde out the *Geometry of the Muscles*, or the *Mechanicks of Voluntary motion*: and yet are forced, by an host of difficulties, to retire and suspend their hopes of perfecting their designe) were contrived by *Fortune*, and not by the skill of an *Artist infinite in Science and Power*. How familiar is this Logick to every mans understanding;

ding; the Figures of all things in the adspectable World, are exactly Geometrical, their actions and uses respectively accommodate, their motions constant and regular at all times, their effects certain, and the laws of every distinct species immutable (as to themselves) *ergo* those *Figures, Actions, Uses, Motions,* and *Laws* were delineated, appointed, assigned, begun, and enacted, by an *Omniscient and omnipotent Providence*? And this I conceive sufficient to demonstrate the truth of our *First assertion*; *viz. that that constant Tenor, or established method, according to which all Natural causes operate, was instituted and is perpetuated by an Infinite Wisdom.*

Article 6.
The verity of
the third Pos-
tion demon-
strated.

For the support of our *Third Thesis*; that though the actions of all *Second causes* are *impulsive* and *necessary*, yet those of the *First Cause* are *Elective* and *Arbitrary*; though God hath by the severe laws of Nature, bound up the hands of his Creatures, limited their activities, and punctually consigned them their several provinces: yet he hath reserved his own free, and as an absolute Monarch, can at pleasure alter, transcend, or pervert those Statutes, and give a new Commission to his Ministers to work by a new way, in order to the causation of any extraordinary effect, which his providence hath decreed, of universal, or particular benefit: we need erect no other pillar of argument, but that one firme and immoveable basis, the importance of the word, *Creator*.

For since to be able to *produce all things out of nothing*, by the single efficacy of his word, or the energetical blast of his will, to endow each distinct species with faculties exactly proportionate and meridional to their distinct destinations, and to entail upon them, to the expiration of Times own lease, that estate, in which he enfeoffed them at their creation: doth necessarily imply a greater perfection of power, then meerly to *vary* or *innovate* their efficiencies, according to the expedients, emergencies, or occasional designs of his *Providence*: it remains indisputable upon consequence, that to allow him the *Greater*, and yet deny him the *less*: to beleive him to be the *Author* of that *mighty and difficult miracle*, the Creation, and yet doubt the supremacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn *Natural Agents* out of their
common

common road, and order their digressions to the effecting of *smaller and easier Rarities*; must be a manifest *Contradiction*, and an *Absurdity* that stabs it self.

However, that we may not seem to entrust so noble and sacred a Truth, to the protection of one single Reason; it becomes our care to superadd, for the more security, this defence also. *If God hath frequently manifested his Supremacy, by working effects as well above, as against the establishd and customary power of natural Agents, in times past; then, doubtless, is not his arme shortned, nor the fountain of his energy dryed up, and he can do the like, in the future: but he frequently hath; ergo, &c.*

The *Major*, I am sure, no man will boggle at, who shall consider, that tis the proper *privilege of Divinity*, to be *still the same*, that that *virtue*, which is extreme, and so above all *addition*, must necessarily also be above all decay or *diminution*: and therefore he that conceives God subject to *Mutability, Alterity, or Deflux*, blasphemes the *Simplicity, Purity and Eternity* of his *Essence*, and holds but a false *Idea* of his *Nature*.

Nor can the *Minor* require more proof then its bare *Prolation*; unless the unbelief of any man shall be so inflexible, as not to bowe at the *Convulsion* of a truth, which the *Records* of all *Nations, Times, and Religions*, lye open to attest; For that there have been observed *Prodigious and miraculous accidents*, (such as the most obstinate *Idolaters of Nature*, and those who grew gray in the study of her laws, customes, and secret magnalias, and kept a list of her forces; were surprized with astonishment at the consideration of: and after a vain and tedious scrutiny into their abstruse *Causalities*, were forced to refer to the immediate arme of a *Supernatural efficient*) the indisputable monuments of faithfull *Antiquity* bear witness. And he, who hath not heard of those *Three grand Examples* (to omit the enumeration of any other, that are not universally beleived by men of all interests and persuasions) of the superiority of Gods power to that of his servant, *Nature; viz. The Universal deluge, the Cessation of Oracles, and the total Eclipse of the Sun at the passion of our Redeemer*: can give but weak testimony, that he is either *Jew, Mahometan, or Christian*.

Article 7.

A farther confirmation of the same by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God in *præterito*.

Article 8.
That there was
an universal
Deluge.

The *First* being reputed not onely true, but sacred, and therefore held as point of faith in common by all three Religions; nay countenanced even by Pagan stories, and more, their setled account of time; they computing the second space or intervall of Time (the *First* being little better to them then *Prolepticall*, or as the Heathen called it, *Adelon*, immanifest and obscure, was dated from the beginning of the World to *Ogyges Floud*, which was about 530 yeers after *Noahs*) from the Floud to the first *Olympiad*. which answers to the year of the World 3174. and comes within about 20 yeers before the foundation of Rome.

Article 9.
The Cessation
of Satans Ora-
cles, after the
advent of the
Word of
Truth, proved
authentiquely.

The *Second* being imbraced, and made authentical by the general consent of Christians, upon the forced acknowledgment of those, whose interest obliged them to invalidate it; and those not only *Pagans* surrounded with the horrid darknesse of idolatry, and expecting no day-break from the glorious Sun of Righteousness; but even of the *Devil* himself: who though the Father of lies, and his honour so highly concerned in the intercision of his impostures and delusions, could not yet dissemble this verity; but at four severall times, and in as many severall places publickly proclaimed it. First, when from his famous Oracle at *Delphos* he confest himself to be tongue-tied, his fallacious predictions countermanded, and his so solemnly pretended Divinity expired; being able to return no other answer to the great *Augustus* (whose errand was to have his fortune told him) but this:

*Me Puer Hebraus, Divos Deus ipse gubernans,
Cedere sede jubet, tristemque redire sub Orcum;
Aris ergo dehinc tacitus discedito nostris.*

An *Hebrew Child*, that *God*, whose power's above
All other Gods, commands me to remove
Hence to the *Court of sorrow*; wherefore, goe,
My Altars quit in silence, and nere mee
Of *Future things* from me expect to know.

A second time, when Legion howled out the hideous dirge of their black Prince, and the shoars were heard by Mariners far off at sea to echo their groans into this dismal note; *Great Pan is dead*: as *Plutarch* hath reported in his *defect of Oracles*. A third, about the time of *Constantine*, so affectionately magnified by *Eusebius*, in his sad complaint, that his lips were sealed up, his Prognosticks suppressed, and his sophistry fooled, by the *Righteous upon earth*: as the same *Eusebius* hath related in *Vita Constantini*. And again, in his excuse to the Emperour *Iulian*; who being superstitiously curious to foreknow the success of his great expedition into Persia, and therefore addressing himself with exceeding solemnity to the temple of *Apollo Daphnes*, to anticipate the knowledge of his fortune, could notwithstanding worm out of him no other satisfaction but this; *that he should first remove the bodies about him, before he could have the liberty to return him an answer*: as *Theodoret* hath registred, who also tells us, that not long after that Temple was consumed by lightning.

But I must heer arrest my Reader with a civil and short Advertisement, that by the *Cessation of Oracles*, I may not intend a total and absolute expulsion of that grand Impostor from all his Fanes, Tripods, and other shops wherein he professed his delusions, at once; as if the *Incarnation of Truth* had strook him dumb at one blow: but an extermination of him from his metropolitan Temple at Delphos, and an *Intercision, Diminution, or sensible Decay* of his Amphibologies, Predictions and other Collusions in all other places. For, otherwise, I should not only steal a contradiction upon my self, that unsatisfactory response, which he stammered out to *Iulian*, being full 363 years after the nativity of him, that crush't the Serpents head; but also incur the just censure either of being ignorant of, or undecently neglecting those solid reasons, which *Plutarch, Suetonius*, and our modern learned Wits, *Montacutius*, and *Dr. Browne* have adduced to attest the continuation of his ceremonious Legerdemain and solemn cheats practised upon gross and credulous Pagans, in the point of *Vaticination*, much beyond the rising, setting, and resurrection of the *Sun of righteousness*, who came down to dispell

those fogs of Hell, and irradiate the poor benighted world with
Light supernatural.

Article 10.

That there was
a prodigious
Eclipse of the
Sun, at the pas-
sion of our Sa-
viour.

And the *Last* is sworn to by all. For (1) the *Christian* hath it ratified to him both by sacred and profane Auctory: (2) the *Jews*, that deny Christ to have bin the true Messias, do yet acknowledg the prodigious Eclipse of the Sun, that renowned his passion: and (3) the *Turks*, who allow him to have bin no more then a great and holy Prophet, as their Alcoran frequently intimateth; are yet so zealous of the honour of their antient records, that they would confute him with a scimiter, who should dare to indubitate the preterition of so remarkable a wonder, which certified the half of the earth of its verity, by the sensible perswasion of a panick terror; insomuch that many of the Jews who beheld it; were so shattered with fear, that their hearts were rent as well as the vail of the Temple, and themselves ready to sneak into the graves of those Saints, that were newly risen, to evidence his conquest over death, and give humanity a prelibation or tast of the benefit of his sufferings. Nor was this, as other Eclipses, only *Partial* and *Vertical* to Hierusalem; but the darkness was visible to the whole *Hemispher*: els, how could the *Egyptian Astronomer* take notice of it, and being amazed at the unnatural Apparition, cry out, *Aut Deus Nature patitur, aut machina mundi dissolvitur*; as the reverend Father, his namesake, *Dionysius* hath remembered in his Epistle to *Polycarpus*, and *Apollophanes*? els, how could the antient *Greeks*, in their *Annals*, have filed up a monstrous Defection of the great Luminary, in the 4th. year of 202. *Olympiad*; as *Phlegon Trallianus* noteth? Now the 4th. year of the 202. *Olympiad* jumps even with the 19th. of *Tiberius*, and the 33. of the *Nativity*, which was the 4745. of the *Julian period*; and therefore that exact *synchronisme* makes that monstrous Eclipse observed by the more mathematical eyes of the *Greeks*, to be the same which happened at the death of the *Lord of life*.

That

That the *Catholique Deluge* was purely *Supernatural*, and the destruction of all Living Creatures upon the sublunary Globe (those few that were shifted aboard the Ark, only preserved) by an *Abyss of Waters*, immediately caused by the revenging *Will* of that same Fruitfull *Spirit*, that formerly *brooding* upon the same abyss of waters, had hatcht them into being; though of some difficulty to him, that shall wave all testimonies deduceable from the sacred relation adcribed to *Moses*: can yet be no impossibility to prove, from Considerations meerly *Physical*. For

First, the vast *Quantity* of Waters requisite to overflow the whole earth, and prevail upon the high hills, nay exceed the heads of the most lofty mountains by 15 cubits (for mountains there were before the flood; els how could the waters by degrees encreasing, ascend and cover them: and therefore those wanton Wits, which affirm the Antediluvian earth to have had her face a meer *Plane* or level, without those protuberancies and rugosities, undertake not only a *Paradox*, but a manifest *Absurdity*, point blanck repugnant aswell to the *Text*, as to the natural *Necessity* of those *Inequalities*) could not be powred out from the *Receptaries* or storehouses of the *Ocean*; the Earth having as great (if not a greater) share in the Terraqueous Globe, as the Waters, and the perpendicular *Altitude* of the mountains, by more then two parts of three, at least, transcending the profundity of the deepest Channel of the Sea, that ever the sounding line of any Mariner did profound, except of that *Barathrum* or *Vorago Aquarum, in mari dulci*, between *Roesl* and *Leoffelt*, described by *Olaus-Magnus*; which yet is but a kind of *Sluice* or sink, and therefore of no considerable latitude. For that the *Eminency* of the highest Hills hath scarcely the same proportion to the *Semidiameter* of the Earth, that there is betwixt 1. & 1000; hath bin frequently demonstrated by many of our best *Geographers*: and though we descend to *Eratosthenes* his commensuration, who hath affirmed, that by instruments *Dioptrick*, and an exact measure of the distances of Places, he hath certainly found the *Altitude* of the highest mountains not to exceed *ten stadia*; we shall not however be provided of water enough in the bowells of the Sea to advance

Article II.
A Demonstration of the impossibility of the *Catholique Deluges* proceeding from *Causes Natural*.

our inundation, the depth of the profoundest ocean seldom amounting to a 100 Fathom, as *Scaliger* (38 *Exercit. contra Cardanum*) hath upon justifiable grounds declared.

Nor can this immane Collection of Waters be derived, as some have inconsiderately opinioned, from the *Whole lower Region of the Aer condensed into clouds, and those compressed into waters.* For (to take no strict notice of that large *Tobu, Vacuum Coacervatum*, or *Nothing*, which must then have bin introduced, from the surface of the Waters up to the middle region; which *Nature* could never endure, nor had *God* any necessity to enforce,) if Aer condensed into Water shrinks into a space or Continent, 400. times less then what it posselt before condensation (for since Water weighs 400. times heavier then Aer, as the subtile *Galileo* (*Dialog. I. del moviment. pag. 81.*) examining the proportions of Gravity betwixt those two bodies, demonstratively discovered; it must necessarily carry the same proportion also to *Space, or Locality*,) then assuredly, when we shall have calculated the perpendicular height of the Atmospher, or lower region of the Aer, and reduced it to the 400th. part: we shall soon be satisfied, that the Addition which the Aer Aquafied could bring to the waters of the Sea effused upon the bosome of the earth, cannot suffice to swell the Deluge so high as the semialtitude of many lofty mountains, such as *Stonus* in Norway (which *Franc. Patricius*, out of *Fr. Bacon* and *Scaliger*, hath accounted the highest on the earth,) *Athos* in Macedonia, *Tenariff*, *Caucasus*, *Atlas*, &c. whose tops make large encroachments on the middle region, and seem to invade the Firmament.

Again, to charge this immense Accumulation of Waters upon 40. days rain, though we should conced that rain to be neither Sea evaporated, nor Aer condensed; is not to undo, but entangle the miracle. For taking the Altitude of the mountains according to the calculation of the most moderate Geometry; and then soberly perpending what aggravation to the Waters of the Sea now converted upon the earth, the most violent natural rain of 40. days and nights could probably make, which the most hyperbolical conceit cannot advance higher then 40. fathom: we shall easily detect the difficulty.

And

And *secondly*, as *Nature* could not afford the *Material Cause* of this general Inundation, the *Waters*; so neither the *Mighty Efficient*, or *Impulsive*, that should with such prodigious impetuosity hoise up so huge a mass of Sea, contrary to the strong renitency, or depressoire of its Gravity, drive it from its native easy Currents in the declining veins and cavities of the earth, upon an absolute ἀνω ὀρεσιαν or Acclivity on the elevated surface thereof, and make it fall in Cataracts up-hill. For (1) though the *Waters* desire to stand above the mountains, as the Divine Hebrew Poet hath pleased to phrase it (*Psalms* 104. *vers.* 9.) yet they but desire it, and by their own inherent and essential Tendency are rendered incapable to satisfy that elemental ambition; for water permitted to its own propensity or inclination, immediately tendeth downward: and therefore he that can conceive a river to desert its declivity chanel, and climb a precipice, without the violence of a Miracle; hath a strong Phanasy, but a weak judgement: nor need any man despair to persuade his credulity, that *Helmonts* ridiculous Romance of the *Cause of Earthquakes* (*viz.* that an *Angel*, or minister of Divine revenge, descends into the Centres of the Earth, and there with a great *Clapper* or *Sledge* giving a mighty *Thump* against the feet of Rocks, makes a hoarse or grave kind of *Bom*, which enlarging its sound, rends the foundations thereof, and puts the percussed mass into a *rigor*, or shaking fit of an *Ague*.) is a solid and philosophical Verity.

And *thirdly*, as the *Waters* could not elevate themselves, so neither could the *Attractive Virtue* of those *Celestial Magnets*, the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*, work them out of their depths, by rarefying them into vapours, which mounted up to the middle region of the *Aer*, and there encountered by intense Cold, should be reduced to clouds, and those again dissolved in Cataracts. For should we grant, what the *Arabian Astrologers* returned in answer to the *Egyptian Caliph*, who had set them to untie this knot; *viz.* that there was a great *Conjunction* of ♃ and ♀ not long before the flood, and the malignant influence of that confederacy much aggravated by another fatal *Convention* of all the *Planets*, in the watery sign of *Pisces*, immediately preceding it, as *Sepher Fuchasin* (*fol.* 148.) hath delivered; which the
learned

learned *Mirandula* hath sufficiently disproved, and smiled at yet must the greatness of the *Effect* manifestly confute the possibility of that for a *Cause*. First, because Nature hath frequently shewed to the world the like Conjunctions, but never the like event: and again, because those *Luminaries* are not commissioned with so unlimited a power, and in their strongest conspiracies of influence can at most but weakly *incline* or *dispose*, not at all *compell* or *necessitate*; nor are their destinations to *ruine*, but *conserve* the world.

If therefore *Nature*, uniting all her divisions of Waters below the Moon, into one great heap, or *Abyss*, must yet fall very much short of that immane proportion requisite to furnish out the *Deluge*; and though her stock had bin large enough, yet could she not, without apparent destruction of her self, *i. e.* intruding those fundamental Constitutions, or *Elementary Laws*, whose constant *Tenor* only defines her to be Nature, assist to their eruption out of their proper Receptaries, and their preposterous Ascension up hill: truly; I am yet to learn, what can be conceived to remain, but this, that those *Decumani Fluctus*, those immens Cataracts had both their *supply* and *motion* immediatly from that high hand, to which nothing that he *wills* can be difficult.

With this *Problem*, I confess, I have more then once impuzled my reason; yet doth the difficulty sometimes enflame my Curiosity to enquire out the pervestigable part of the miracle: viz. *Whence Omnipotence summoned this mighty Syndrome, or Conflux of Waters to appear, at so short a warning, upon the face of the Earth, or in what part of the Universe they were quartered before, and by what wayes and means they were drawn off again and voyded after the Flood?* That eminent Master of the Opticks, and excellent Mathematician, *Christoph. Scheinerus* (in *Rosa Vrsina*, pag. 693.) discoursing against those who have asserted the *Incorruptibility of the Heavens*, & *quoad partes, & totum*, introduceth *Ferdinand. Quirinus de Salazar*. a Jesuit, in his *Comment* upon 27. *vers.* of the 8. *chap.* of the *Proverbs of Solomon*, delivering his opinion derived from others, together with reasons to support it; that there must be a *Tehom Rabba*, or *Abyss of Waters* above the *Firmament*, or betwixt the 8th. sphere and the

the *Shecinah*, or dwelling place of God. The Texts of Scripture, upon which this opinion is supported, are (1) the 7. *vers.* of the 1. *Chap.* of *Genes.* where the Author of that book describing the several piles or stories of this great building, saith thus; and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the waters which were above the firmament, &c. (2) that of David (*Psalms* 33. *vers.* 7.) he layd up the depth in storehouses. (3) that of the Angel to *Esdras* (2. *ch.* 4. *vers.* 7.) proposing questions to puzzle weak but proud mortality; How many Springs are above the Firmament, or which are the outgoings of Paradise? (4) that expression of the greatest Naturalist, *Salomon*; and *Wisdom* saw him set his compass upon the face of the depth (which the *Septuagint*, plus de sententia, quam de singulis vocibus solliciti, have rendred, *aderam cum sererneret sedem super ventos.*) (5) that also of the Psalmist (*Psal.* 104. *vers.* 3.) who hath layd the beams of his chambers in the Waters.

Upon these and the like periwasions many of the most learned *Rabbines*, and after them not a few of our modern *Divines*, have concluded; that at the Deluge the Floudgates of this *Tehom Rabba*, were unlockt, and the waters being showred down in Cataracts upon the earth, swell'd the deluge above the mountains. This, indeed, seem'd smooth and plausible to my first apprehensions, and promised not only to satisfy, but compensate my former anxious disquisition: but when I had a little recovered my thoughts out of the pleasant surpris of the novelty, and cast about, by what conveyances or *Aqueducts* the tides of this *Supercelestiall Ocean* might be transmitted through so many *Orbs* (which not a few great *Clerks* have affirmed to be *Solid*) without dislocation of any one, at least without interrupting or confounding their regular Circumvolutions; which happend not, for the stars kept on their Courses, as the retrograde Calculations of their severall Periods will soon evince: as also, if they were transfused, what became of them afterward, when the fourty days were over? For either they must be returned from whence they came, to replenish that monstrous *Vacuity*, their absence had made betwixt the 8th. orb, and the *Empyreum*; or else continue

heer below, and so perpetuate the Inundation, and so put God to the exigent of making a new supply of Waters above the firmament. When, I say, I had abated the edge of my Credulity with these occurring difficulties, I sadly relapsed into my former incertitude. Not but that I am almost perswaded, from the literal sense of those Texts, that betwixt the *Shecinah* or paradise of God and his blessed retinue, and the 8th. orb, there is a *Tehom Rabba*; for I do not see how those places can be otherwise, if rightly interpreted: but that I cannot yet drive my beleif beyond those two objections, and find it more ready to incline to this Conjecture (for tis yet gone no farther) of my own; *That God miraculously created a sufficient supply of Waters purposely for the Deluge, and afterwards adnihilated them again.* This, I am sure, was as easy to him, as any other Course imaginable; less injurious to and inconsistent with the works of the former Creation; and renders the wonder most familiar to our Comprehension. If it be objected upon me, that God put a period to all *Creations* after the first Hexameron or six days; I shall defend my self, with the barrel of Meal, and cruise of Oyle, that sustaind the Widow and her son in the famin of Zarephath; wherein there was a fresh Creation of two severall *substances*, with all their specificall *Accidents* about them every day; or a transmutation of Aet into Meal and Oyle, which was equivalent. And as for the other harsh term of Adnihilation, I say tis equally facil to him to reduce any thing to, as to educe it from Nothing. But this might well have bin spared, it being my proper business to prove that the Deluge was *not Natural*; not to digress into a disquisition how or by what cryptick means twas *supernatural*.

Article 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect meerly supernatural; comprobated uncontrovertably.

That the Cessation, or (rather) *Intercision of Oracles*, was an Atcheivem too difficult for the single arm of Nature; I conceive few will dispute, but such ridiculous Ignorants in the *Metaphysicks of Spirits*, or *Seale of Creatures*, as endeavour to indubitate the very *Existence of Evil Angels*, and refuse to be perswaded, that there is any such real *Entity* as a *Devil*, without a *Demonstration* from Sense, and the conviction of an *Apparition*. But if any shall, the best advice my last can at this time afford them,

them, is this; that they would weave their long clue of thoughts into this short and plain *Dilemma*.

We must grant, either that that black Prophet, *Satan*, made a *voluntary* or spontaneous resignation of his usurped Divinity, at the nativity of the *Prince of Peace*; and of his own accord grew silent, upon the Advent of the *Word of Life*: or els, that by a Power infinitely more absolute and soveraign then his own, he was *compelled* to confess the decay of his tyranny by an Exile from his Altars, and himself stricken with an *Aphonia*, or Palsy in his double tongue, so that all he could utter, was, that he could no longer speak; for one of these two Propositions must be true.

The *First* cannot; since to make a *Voluntary* Confession of his *Ignorance*, *Impotency*, and *subjection*, in the face of the World, and especially in those places, where for so many Ages together he had solemnly pretended to *Omniscience*, *Omnipotence*, and *Supremacy*; is wholly repugnant to Satans *Pride*: nor would that strong *Ambition*, which even in the purity of his nature spurred him beyond the ken of his Angelical wisdom, up to an Attempt of the highest impossibility, (*viz.* to make himself equal to that *Essence*, which made him what he was) suffer him to proclaim himself to be less, then what he had made himself appear to be in the esteem of his infatuated Votaries. For notwithstanding the hand of *Divine Vengeance* had hurled him, (like a prodigious *Meteor* that durst outface the brighter *Sun*, from which its splendor was desumed) from the highest heaven into the lowest hell; and degraded him from the most glorious order of Creatures to the most vile, accursed and despicable: yet is his stomach as great, as when he aspired to the throne of *Unity*; nor hath the *ignis rotæ*, or reverberated flames of hell ever since, bin able to consume that humor of *Competition* in him. Witness his several impudent invasions of the prerogative of God, by arrogating to himself the tribute of *Divine Adoration* from his superior, man; nay even from the Sonne of God, when yet he more then suspected his Divinity. Besides, as it seems a manifest *Contradiction*, that the *Author of Pride* should freely detect his own *shame*: so also, that the *Father of lies* should voluntarily broach a *Truth*, and such a one as once received must openly impeach him of *Delusion*,

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and discover his Indivinity; cannot but find a very great improbability at least. For how unlikely is it, that that sophistical *Spirit*, whose Tyranny was founded, supported, and continued solely by his cunning promotion of *Error*, and his subtil workings upon the deceptible Condition of man; should willingly depose himself, dismantle his strongest holds, proclaim the impostures of his Amphibologies, and divulge his ruine, by rectifying the seduced judgements of his greatest Favourites, and declaring a *Verity* that must disprove all that ever he sayd before? How dissimilar to Reason, that he who durst adventure upon the highest fallshood in the world, to make himself *God*: should so far forget the maximes of his black Art, as of his own accord to confess himself to be the basest of *Entities*, a *Devil*? How remote from all the ways of persuasion, that he who had boasted himself *Ubiquitary*, usurped by a counterfeit title the *Monarchy* of the World, and given out, that the *Prescience* of Future Events was not only the natural annex of his *Omniscience*, but the *Preordination* and disposal of them the adjunct of his *Providence*: should, without the impulsion of a superior, betray himself *chained to utter darknesse*, to be but a *Slave*, that there was a settled law of *Fate* above his comptroll; as in his excuse to *Craesus* ruined by his Amphibologie, and that his *Providence* was at best but *Presagition* from the concurrent inclinations of second Causes, nor his *Predictions* of things to come, other then artificial *Conjectures*? To conclude, no man, I suppose, will be able to remember any other Instance of the Devils *Fidelity* and *Veracity* (those Confessions of *Christs Divinity*, and that in the presence of *Truth* it self, that he came from compassing the earth in quest of whom he might devour, mentioned in holy Writ, excepted;) or produce one sentence of truth ever spoken by him to his own disadvantage, besides this one; *that he was commanded to shut up his Oracles, by a Power, which he could never contradict*: And therefore the *Second Proposition* must be true and evident: viz. that his Oracles were silenced by the immediate hand of that *Cause*, whose *Activity* is so far above the *Power* of either *Satan* or *Nature*, taken either singly, or combined together, (for the Former is but a languid Agent, if you deny him the auxiliatory concurrence of the

the Latter) as *Infinite* is above *Limitation*, *Almightiness* above *Impotency*, or *Omniscience* above *Ignorance*.

Now to me, this process of Argumentation seems so smooth, familiar and customary, and the whole series of Inductions so obvious to a dialectical consideration; that, when I reflect upon the facility of their occurrence to our thoughts, I cannot but extremely wonder, how so many profound and circumspect Philosophers, and those whose threads of life were unraveld in the eager pursuit of knowledge, could referre the cessation of Oracles to *Natural necessities*, and acquiesce in a confidence of those weak, remote, inconsistent, impertinent and so contemptible *reasons*, urged by *Plutarch*, &c. to salve the difficulty of this accident, and serve as a specious *Asylum* for their puzzled curiosities to retreat to.

Lastly, that that generally confess *Eclipse of the Sun*, (and, indeed, the only one this great Luminary did ever suffer; since we may with more propriety call all others but *Partial Interceptions* of his light, by the lesser body of the Moon interposed in a straight line to some part of the Terrestrial Globe) which happened at the *Death of Christ*, was above, nay against the fundamental constitutions of Nature; is manifest from hence, that on the third of *April*, or *Feria sexta*, being the *Passion day*, in the year *Æra Christiani nati 33*. (which is synchronical to the 78. of the *Julian* account) the Sun and Moon were then in *opposition diametrical*, and the *Moon* her self totally eclipsed in *Libra* to the *Antipodes* of *Jerusalem*: as may be certified to any man that can read the *Celestial Ephemerides* backward, *i. e.* recalculate the periodical *Conjunctions* and *Oppositions* of those two great *Lights* of heaven, by the *Tables of Astronomy*. For those *Characters of time* being punctually restrained to set & certain periods, the *Astronomer* may as easily attain to the minute of any eclipse *in præterito*, as to the prescience of any *in futuro*; provided that his *Hypothesis* be sound, and his *Schemes* erected with exactness correspondent: nay such is the certitude of this rule, as to the strict decision of time, that though the *Astronomer* may chance to learn of the *Historian*, that there hath bin an eclipse; yet for the determination of its precise *time & place*, *history* must go to school to *Astronomy*, as *Scaliger* (*de*

Article 13.

That the Eclipse of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely *Metaphysical*, irrefutably demonstrated.

Emendat. tempor.) hath observed to our hands. Thus when *Eusebius* and *Dio* had recorded an Eclipse of the Sun to have falne out a little before the death of *Augustus*, and so to have been a kind of prodigy portending the fall of so bright a Star; the Astronomers coming after to examine the synchronisme, by their retrograde calculations, found the Historians in a double error: that Eclipse being not of the *Sun*, but the *Moon*; and not *preceding*, but *succeeding* his funerals.

To assure the miracle yet nearer, let us look back to the *Elements of Astronomy*. The Eclipse of the Moon is caused by the *Intervention* (for so tis according to the most probable *Hypothesis of Copernicus*) of the opac body of the earth, between her and the original of her light, the Sun; and the Eclipse of the Sun, by the interposition of the Moon betwixt him and the earth: and therefore the Sun cannot be eclipsed, but when he is in *Conjunction* with the Moon; nor the Moon, but when she is in *opposition* to the Sun. Yet notwithstanding doth not every monthly conjunction and opposition of these two lights produce an eclipse to one of the two; but only that *Conjunction* and *Opposition* which is *Diametrical: i. e.* when the Central point of the Sun faceth the Central point of the Moon, and that again confronteth the centre of the earth, so directly, that an arrow shot in a streight line from the circumference of the Sun through its Centre, would also perpendicularly transfix the Centers of the other two orbs. And this falls out only when the Moons *Eccentric* transecteth the Suns, in that line, which is for that reason called the *Ecliptick*; nor this in more then two points, called by *Ptolemy*, the *Nodi*, or knots, and by the *Arabians*, the *Head and Taile of the Dragon*.

Again, these *Intersections* are not constant to one certain point, or place, but circumgyrated by a slow motion, make a circle of 18 years complete; and therefore every 18th year the Moon must be eclipsed in the same degree of the same signe in the Zodiack, infallibly to the end of the world: which is the rule by which every common Almanack maker doth calculate his predictions of Lunar Eclipses.

Now this being excogitated, and the eclipses retrived back as high as the *Mæs*, or foot of the Julian compute, by revolving the
leaves

leaves of the Celestial Volume; we discover that the Moon indeed, was naturally eclipsed on the self same day, whereon the Sun prodigiously suffered together with its Author, in the 2 deg. of *Libra*, the opacity beginning to the horizon of *Jerusalem* some few minutes before six in the evening: so that the Sun was no sooner set in the West, but the Moon appeared in the East deprived of more then half her light; the *Calculation* and figure of which *Lunar eclipse*, are largely set down by *Sethus Calvinus*, to the 3 of *April*, in the 33 year of the *Nativity*, under *Tiberius Caesar*, and by *Henricus Buntingius*, in *Chronologia Catholic.* fol. 337. And thereupon we may safely conclude, that the *Defection of the Moon*, on the *Passion day*, being meetly *Natural*; that of the Sun on the same day must be *Supernatural*; it being impossible for the Moon to keep two different stations, or to possess those two opposite points of heaven, which define the *Conjunction* and *Opposition*, at one and the same time. This *S. Aug.* (3. *de Civit. Dei* cap. 15.) had respect unto, when he said; *Quam solis obscuracionem, non ex canonico syderum cursu accidisse ostenditur, quod tunc erat Pascha Indæorum.*

Twas a *Dismal* day that same, though the *King of Terrors* was then vanquish'd; for *Darkness* was not only upon, but under the earth, the miraculous obscuration of the Sun in our Hemisphere, of necessity causing a defection of the Moon in the subterraneous one, and so making it more then midnight to the *Antipodes*: and a second *natural eclipse* of the Moon succeeding within six hours after; nay, more then all this, *Saturn* (the signifier of *blackness*) aggravated this horrid opacity, for at the same time rising from the *Horoscope*, he beheld both eclipses in a square malignant aspect.

But though this eclipse was *Unnatural* to the Sun, per *πεωλομθεαυ*: yet twas purely *Natural* per *συμπαδειαυ*, it being requisite, nay necessary for a *stream* or reflex of *Light* to suffer a *defection*, when the *Fountain of Light* was under a cloud; proper for the *Creature* to sympathize with the *Creator*. And therefore, though twas a *miracle*, yet twas no *wonder*. The wonder was in the reverse part of the accident; that the most glorious *Son of Righteousness* should suffer a dark and unnatural eclipse, to expiate:

piate our deeds of darknes. Nor was that a wonder neither, now I think ont; for twas the *natural effect* of his infinite love to mankind.

Article 14.
The Adequa-
tion of all to
the verification
of the Authors
third Position.

And this, I presume, the most stubborn and prejudicate Atheist will admit, as evidence both strong and clear enough, to evince the verity of our *Minor Proposition*; viz. that God hath, in times prelaps'd, frequently manifested his prerogative of causing effects not only superior, but also contradictory to the ordinary and establish'd Laws of Nature, his ordinary instrument, when such effects seem'd either necessary, or expedient to his Providence: and therefore our *Conclusion*, viz. that his arme is not shortned, and he can doe the like in the future, upon any occasional emergency design'd by his secret counsel; comes not much short of perfectly *Apodictical*.

S E C T. VI.

Article 1.
Lucretius his
blasphemy, that
mans igno-
rance of the
energy of Na-
tural Causes, is
the sole basis of
the opinion of
an Universal
Providence.

WE have now brought our selves to the last *Objection* urged against Universal Providence; namely, the unequal distribution of good and evil, or the frequent occurrence of events which carry too much appearance of *Temerity*, to be interpreted the mature *designes* of an infinite *Wisdom*; and seem too oblique and deflecting towards *Partiality*, to stand in a right line with the hand of *divine Justice*, which must be conceived to discriminate betwixt the *Pious* and *Impious* in the Consignation of *Happiness* and *Misery*, and accordingly to distribute its benefits in some proportion to the merits, at least the worthy susceptibility of the receivers: this is a member belonging to another head, and falls more properly under the contents of our next Chapter, of the *Special or Particular Providence of God*; and therefore we shall thither transfer the plenary refutation thereof, making it the subject of this last section, to blow off those light and cobweb *scruples*, that were spun by that Spider, *Lucretius*, when he composed

composed these verses to alienate mens minds from the fear of an *Universal Moderator*.

*Cætera, qua fieri in terris, cœloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibûsape,
Efficiunt animos humileis formidine divûm,
Depressosque premunt ad terram; propterea quod
Ignorantia causarum conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res, & concedere regnum, &
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt; hac fieri divino Numine rentur, &c. lib. 6^o.*

Those bug-bear *Meteors*, which the tim'rous eyes
Of pavid *Mortals* wonder at i'th skies;
And those unfrequent *Prodigies*, that appear,
On earth (while their weak souls are fool'd by *Fear*)
Are the sole charms, that emasculate,
And cheat mens minds to a belcif of *Fate*,
And some *vindictive Numen*. For, because
Men understand not *Natures* cryptick *Laws*,
Nor her occult *Efficiency*; they fly,
(To salve their *Ign'rance*) to *Divinity* :
And idly rest in this; what ere befall,
Twas caus'd by *Providence*, that disposeth all.

The Redargution.

True it is, indeed, nor will any thing but ignorance deny that *Physiology*, or the speculation of *Natural Causes* hath a power to raise the mind of man to a generous height, from whence it may securely, and without that vertigo or giddiness, which usually turns the brains of the multitude, behold the most prodigious meteors; and look in the threatening face of *Lightning* without growing pale, while those that stand below become convulst with needle's horror, and are ready to be shook to dust with superstitious fear.

True it is also, as *Lucretius* would have it, that tis unworthy

Article 2.
The redargution
on thereof.

the constancy and settled courage of a *Philosopher*, when he sees a bearded comet, hears a loud crack of Thunder, or feels the earth unhinged (all which Natural events common eyes gaze upon as horrid Portents, and dangerous agonies of Nature) instantly to forget his Principles, and run to consult with the superstitious books of the *Heururians*, and other pusillanimous Comments on those pageants, or necessary Phænomenas, whose Causalities are established, and their precise contingencies prefaceable by the easie prognosticks of meteorology.

But however, though this ought to prevent our fears: yet it cannot be extended to the extinction of our devotion. Though it may commend our knowledge, to smile when the heavens frown: yet it more commends it, if we look above them, and through those visible operations of Nature discover that invisible cause, that made, conserves, and regulates her. Though it demonstrate our skill in *Physicks*, to stand unmoved, when the ground trembles: yet will it detect our ignorance in the *Metaphysicks*, not to fall prostrate in an humble reverence to that awfull majesty, that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing. And though it be an honour to our Reason, to explore the Abstrusities of Nature, and readily refer her most admirable effects to their proper efficient: yet, at the same time, not to confess that omnipotent Agent, which is the soul of all energy, and the highest link in the Chain of Causes; dishonours it even to the most odious shame of Atheisme, which is the greatest ignorance.

Article 3.
Magnanimity
the proper ef-
fect of Reli-
gion.

Nor is it *Religion* that makes men *Comards*; for the best way to harden the *Spirit* of man, is first to soften it with the *Fear of God*: and the noblest Tincture of magnanimity is extracted out of an humble apprehension, and fiduciary acknowledgement of an *all observant Deity*. This the wise *Father* well understood, when refuting that impious error of the Poet, *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor*, he writ this golden Aphorisme; *Qui Deum non agnoscit, is non Dominum excutit superbum, sed averfatur optimum Parentem; cujus respectu Animus fit non formidine humilis, sed reverentia fiducia plenus.*

Again,

Again, when we ascribe the Monarchy of the World to one supreme Cause, we do not derogate a jot from the Power of second Causes; but rather confirm and subscribe the Charter of their deputations: since we thereby inferre an assurance, that those Causes are really such as he was pleased to constitute them, that their activities are but emanations of his omnipotence; and their effects the appointments of his Wisdom. And upon this meditation is it, that when we observe unfrequent wildfires in the Clouds, shaggy Meteors in the aer, Trepidations in the earth, and other the like admirable effects resulting from the concurrence and conspiracy of potent Natural agents; we do not instantly quench our wonder and check our curiosity, by ascribing the production of them to God, so as if he were the sole and immediate *Author* of them, and that no other *Natural Cause* intervened betwixt his *Volition* and their *Contingency*: but by supposing him to be the *First* and *General Cause* aswell of that particular one, as of all others in the World; and that besides the *First* there is required a *Second Particular* one, whose indagation will fully compensate the sweat and oyle of our study, and which we must not deny, though we cannot discover, but acknowledge it to be a Natural one, however to obscure for the invention of our perspicacity.

Article 4.
The opinion
of a *General
Providence*,
consistent with
Physiology.

To conclude, out of this one Fountain may be derived streams enough to rince away all those feculent *Scruples*, which the polluted wit of *Lucretius* hath scraped off the *Thunderbolt*, to obstruct the current of *Providence*. For the *Principles* of that affrighting Meteor are comprehended under that series of *Natural Causes* which *God* permits to act their appointed parts, on the theatre of this sublunary Globe; nor doth he force them from the ordinary road of their essential and proper Activities, upon any extraordinary or new way of violence: and therefore tis as natural an event if this Granado of the clouds fall on the head of an *Innocent*, as if it fell on the head of the most *guilty* person; as regular for it to strike the sacred batlements of a *Temple*, as to light upon an unhallowed roof; and as consonant to the rules of its projection or

Article 5.
Lucretius his
scruples concern-
ing the
seemingly tem-
erarious ef-
fects of the
Thunderbolt;
singularly re-
solved.

explosion, to be shot point blanck at any mark on *land*, as to be discharged at randome on the *Sea*.

But here some have, by way of objection, enquired; *Why did not God, that he might leave nothing to Chance, at his first institution of the Laws of Nature, ordain such a series of Causes, both for the Generation and Explosion of the Thunderbolt, and limit their operations to such a certainty of events, as that it should never come to pass, that this Fireball should destroy the Good, and miss the Impious?*

This itch of ignorant, and therefore bold, curiosity may easily be mortified by applying this euporiston or obvious *solution*; that the *ends* or *designes* of *Particular Providence*, in these or the like occurrences, are full of *Prudence*, as to the intention of *God*; though full of obscurity, as to the investigation of our unequal *Understandings*: and therefore for us, when we cannot find out these imperceptible ends, therefore to conclude that those *Accidents*, are *meer accidents*, and have no ends at all; is not to palliate, but aggravate our ignorance, since tis a rash and open delusion of the judgment of man, to presume that he is acquainted with the secret Counsels of *God*; a madnes beyond the severity of *Bethlem*, for mortality to pretend ability to read those *Arcana Imperii*, or mystical decrees of Fate, written in invisible Hieroglyphicks, which are too hard for the intuition of *Angels*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

*The especial Providence of God
Demonstrated.*

SECT. I.

HAVING sayled over the immens Ocean of *Gods General Providence*, by the direction of our own congenial Cynosure, the *Light of Nature*; our next voyage ought to be up the channel of his *Particular or Special*: which being the golden River, that constantly invirons the Microcosme, or *Iste of Man*, and imports all the advantages and mutations of *Happines* and *Misery*, that occurre to humanity during the trade of life; is that point we have thus long coasted about to discover. But before we put into the mouth of this *Euphrates* *, we conceive it necessary first to sound, and send out our Pilot Reason, to detect those *Shelves* and *Rocks* cast up by the common Adversary of mankind; upon which many weak vessels have founderd, sprung dangerous leaks of *Atheisme*, and so sunk down right into that *Barathrum* of *sorrow*, which knowes no exhaustion, and admits of no regression.

Article 1.
The introduction, intimating the necer cognation betwixt this *present*, and the *precedent* Theme: and the necessity of the *Authors* beginning at the *Atheists* *Objections*.

* *Ab ἐπιπαλ-
veis, quod a-
grum latum se-
cundumque
reddat.*

Article 2.
The first objection, defummed from the Apathie of the Divine Nature.

The *First* of those, we finde to be that contraprovidential Argument of that Secretary of Hell, *Epicurus*; *Quod beatum est, ac immortale, id neque ira, neque gratia tangi*: that those *Passions* of *Anger* and *Love* are inconsistent with the constant and immutable condition of that *Nature*, whose simple essence is compounded of *Immortality* and *Beatitude*; and therefore, as *Business* and *Cares* must destroy the *Tranquillity*, so the affections of *Indignation* and *Placability* must subvert the *Constancy*, or eternal *Sameness* of divinity; and upon inference, that neither our most fervent *Impieties* can accend, nor our penitential *Tears* extinguish the *Wrath* of God.

Article 3.
The same excogitated by *Epicurus*: and promoted by *Lucretius*.

That this poysonous Grape grew upon that wild Vine, *Epicurus* (that we may not seem to belie the Devill) is not only colligible from its stinking odour, and affinity of taste, that it bears to that detestable design of his (in *Epist. ad Herodotum*) to erase out of the mind of man all the impressions of Religion, by the induction of a beleif, that God doth not observe the good and evil actions of men, in this life, and by consequence shall not compensate them with Felicity, or misery, after death: but manifest upon the asseveration of three judicious and conscientious witnesses, *Seneca*, *Cicero*, and *Lactantius*. For the *First* chargeth it upon him in these words; (4. de *Benefic.* 4.) *Deus, inquit Epicurus, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia, quam injuria tangunt*: The *Second* in these; *Dii, inquit Epicurus, neque propitii cuiquam esse solent, neque irati*, (3. de *Nat. Deor.*) the *Third*, in these; *De schola Epicuri est, sicut iram in Deo non esse, ita nec gratiam quidem; nam cum putat Epicurus, alienum esse à Deo malam facere, atque nocere, quod ex affectu iracundie plerumq; nascitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat consequens esse, ut si iram habeat Deus, habeat & gratiam. Itaque ne vitium concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expertem*. Which argument his disciple *Lucretius* (who, as *Thesens*, scorned to forsake his Master, though he led him into hell) hath contracted into this Tristich:

Nam

*Nam privata dolore omni, privata periculis,
Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tangitur ira.*

Th' Immortal Nature, placed above the sense
Of sorrow, danger, and all indigence,
Rich in its own *Perfections*; neither can
Smile at the *Good*, nor frown at 'h *Ill of Man*.

The import of all which amounts to no higher a sum of reason, then only this; that the *Supreme Nature*, being wholly employed in a blisfull vacancy, and entirely taken up with the superlatively-pleasant contemplation of its own excellencies, hath cast the reins upon our own necks, committed the managery of all our affairs to our own providence, and bears neither the clamours of our profane impieties, nor the sighes of our supplications, but stands as unconcerned in, so unregardant of all our actions. *Sic enim sese res habet, ut ad prosperam, adversamve fortunam qualis sis, aut quemadmodum vixeris, nihil intersit*; as *Cotta*, personated by *Cicero* (3. *de Nat. Deor.*) or as *Cesar* in *Lucan*,

— — *Nunquam se cura Deorum
Sic premit, ut vestra vite, vestraque saluti
Fata vacent* —

The *Gods* are never subject to a *Care*;
Nor doe the *Fates* look how you *Mortals* fare.

The *Second*, objected frequently against the *Stoicks*, by the *Academicks*, as that incomparable *Atheomastix*, *Lactantius*, hath observed (*de ira Dei, cap. 13.*) is this; *Cur, si Deus omnia hominum caussa fecerit, etiam multa contraria, & inimica, & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari, quam in terra?* If man be the chief object of *Gods* love, and his welfare the grand intention of his Providence; why then did he create so many powerfull and malicious enemies against him, in all elements, and still expose him to encounter more dangers then his dayes, nay then

Article 4.
The second objection, extorted from mans being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Nature.

then his haire can number? If God be an indulgent *Father*, how dares *Nature* prove her self so cruel a *Stepmother* to man? If his *Creator* intended him for a *Favorite*, and made him the centre in which all the lines of his blessings should convene to make up a full and constant felicity; how comes it to pass, that the vilest of *Creatures* insult over him, and make him the point at which all their darts of hostility are levelled, so that his life is made a full and constant infelicity?

Article 5.
The last objection, of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Impious, in this life.

The *Last*, and indeed the most dangerous rock, against which innumerable numbers not only of unhappy *Ethnicks*, that wanted the *Compass* of true *Religion*, and so were forced to steer by the imperfect *Chart* of their own *natural judgment*; but also of *Christians*, who had the inestimable advantage of the *Scriptures* (the only *Loadstone* that never deflects from the point or unity of truth) have suffered shipwreck; is this: *The calamitous condition of the Virtuous, and the prosperous estate of the Vicious, in this life.*

The most full and accurate description of this *Scylla* we can meet with amongst many of those venerable *Fathers*, who with as much profound learning, as strenuous industry, have attempted the remove of it; is given us by *Lactantius* (*lib. 3. cap. 17.*) in these words: *Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, carorum amisiones: malos contra beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus affici. Videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi. Videbat sine delectu morum, sine ordine, ac discrimine annorum, se vivere mortem: sed alios ad senectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam robustos interire, alios in primo adolescentia flore immaturis funeribus extinguere. In bellis potius meliores & vinci, & perire, maxime autem commovebat, homines imprimis religiosos malis affici; iis autem, qui aut Deos omnino negligenter, aut minus pie colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire, vel nulla.* To the observation of *Epicurus* it appeared, that unjust *Fortune*, not the discriminating hand of *Divine Providence*, had the dispensation of *Happiness* and *Misery*: for *Adversity* is the common cognizance of *Honesty*, and poverty, uncessant and unsuccessfull

cesfull labours, banishment, los of friends, and the like dolefull accidents are alwaies in the lots of *Good men*: but on the contrary, *Prosperity* is frequently the pathognomonick of *Villainy*, and increase of power, accumulation of honours, and other blandishments of fortune are the portion of *Wicked men*. That the ready way to *danger*, was to be *innocent*; and to be extremely *nefarious* the only hopefull means to attain *impunity*. That death, like an inconsiderate Tyrant, spares none upon the exceptions of age, sex, dignities, or merits; but, raging in an arbitrary way of cruelty, suffers some to unravell their clue of life to the last minute of old age, while he cuts off the threads of others more hopefull in the first rundle of infancy. That he extinguisheth the vital lamp of some, in their brightest and strongest lustre; of others before they are well and thoroughly kindled; and permits others to shine till they have consumed their last drop of oyle. That the sword of war both conquers and cuts off the most noble and valiant heads: while the degenerate and cowardly escape unwounded. And, what with the greatest violence swayed him from the beleif of Particular Providence, that the most *religious* had, for the most part, the most *afflictions*; but those, who either contemned, or neglected, or but coldly affected the worship of the Gods, had either les & lighter misfortunes, or none at all.

Nor did the impiety of *Epicurus* rest here, but, as if this objection, though fine enough to entangle the phantasies of vulgar flies, were yet too loosely woven to ensnare the judgments of more decisive and penetrating heads; proceeds to reduce it to more closeness and strength, by superadding these sophistical knots. *Aut Deus vult tollere mala, & non potest; aut potest, & non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut & vult, & potest. Si vult, & non potest, imbecillis est, ideoque non Deus; si potest, & non vult, invidus est, quod aequè alienum à Deo; si neque vult, neque potest, & invidus & imbecillis est, ideoque neque Deus; si vult & potest, quod solum Deo convenit, unde ergo mala? aut cur illa non tollit?*

Either *God* is willing to amove those evils from good men, but cannot; or can, and will not; or neither can, nor will; or both will and can. If he hath a will, but not a power, then is

he impotent, and so no God. If he hath a power, but not a will, then is he malevolent and envious, and so no God: for malice and weakness are equally incompetent to the divine Nature. If he want both will and Power, then is he both malevolent and impotent; and by consequence no God. If he want neither, as he must not if he be God: whence come those evils? or why doth he not amove them?

Article 6.

The sporadical diffusion thereof upon *Ethnick*, *Hebrews* and *Christians*: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of *Job*, to be a Treatise concerning the same subject, insinuated.

And too far did this designe of his succeed; for the contagion of this pestiferous error became so Epidemical, as that it diffused it self not only upon his school, and there corrupted the brains of *Philosophers*; but dilated even to the infection of the more remote and grosser mindes of *Women* and *Poets* (both which *Imitation* makes easily subject to any impression of *falsehood*) that lived many ages after him. For *Women*, witness that relation, assured by the records of *Athenens* (lib. 13.) of one *Danae*, daughter to *Leontius* of the Epicurean sect; who being on her way towards the place appointed for her execution, in the bitterness of her spirit, ejaculated this desperate blasphemy: *Non injuriâ Deos à multis contemni; nam quod meum maritum servavi, hanc mihi gratiam rependunt Dii; Laodice autem, quod maritum suum interfecerit, maximo in honore est.* With very good reason are the Gods contemned by many; for that I have faithfully preserved my husband from an immature death, do the Gods thus ungratefully gratifie me with this my own unjust and violent one: but *Laodice*, because she hath perfidiously destroyed hers, doth now live, flourish, and hath her guilty head incircled with a wreath of the most refulgent honours. Whether the crime, for which she was sentenced, might deserve so severe a doom, as death; I dare not determine, our Author being not positive, nor open in that particular: but this I am sure of, that she suffered justly; and therefore though I cannot acquit her *Judges*, I may her *Executioners*. For *Poets*, witness that confession of *Ovid*.

*Cum rapiant mala Fata bonos, ignoscite fasso,
Sollicito nullos esse putare Deos.*

When

When I see *Good men* by *ill Fates* to fall,
(*Forgive't*) I think there are no *Gods* at all.

Nay the sober *Claudian* professeth, that the *Felicity* of the most *impious* and unjust, and the smart *Afflictions* of the *Pious* and just persons, here on earth, had often staggered his confidence of *Divine Providence*, and more then inclined him to become an *Apostate* from all Religion, and declare himself on the side of *Epicurus*.

*Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem,
Curarent superi terras; an nullus inesset
Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia casu?
Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Adspicerem, letosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios: rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio, causeque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius vacuo que currere semina motu
Adfirmat, magnumque novas per Inane figuras
Fortuna, non arte regi, que Numina sensu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.*

*Lib. 1. in
Rufinum,
sub init.*

Of't hath my dubious mind seem'd well assur'd,
That *Gods* above th' affairs on earth procur'd;
That one wise *Rector* all events did guide;
Nor *Good*, nor *Ill* from *Fortunes* wheel could slide.
But when I saw the *Chaos* of mens *Fates*,
The *Guilty* flourish long in smooth estates,
And *Innocence* afflicted; was the heart
Of my *Religion* stab'd, forc'd to take part
With the adverse opinion: which concludes
That an immense *Vacuity* includes
The *Principles* of all; in that vast range
Fortune, not *Art*, doth their old *Figures* change;
Gods there are none, or such as doe not know
What parts self-ruling *Mortals* act below.

Concerning this eminent Poet, *Claudian*, there hath been old

hacking and slashing among Antiquaries, whether he lived in the owle light of *Paganisme*, or the illuminating day of *Christianisme*; *S. Augustine*, *P. Orosius*, and *Paul the Diacon* (the two former whereof flourished not long after he was withered) describing him to be *à Christi nomine alienus*, and *paganus pervicacissimus*; and *Franc. Petrarcha* and *Landinus* having adopted him for a Profelyte, and affirming himself to be not only *Christiana pietati addictus*, but alio to have bin the composer of this devout Epigram:

*Christe potens rerum, redeuntis conditor avi,
Vox summi, sensusque Dei: quem fundit ab alta
Mente Pater, &c.*

But if he were a *Christian*, yet could he not want the excuse of very holy Precedents even of that profession, who had frequently stumbled at the same stone. For the *Royall Hebrew*, whose *Muse* was the *Holy Ghost*, though a man after Gods own heart, a *Christian* by the baptisme of his propheticque faith, and one who had frequently instructed his harp to echo forth Panegyricks of the speciall Providence of the great preserver of men; had yet his confidence sometimes damp't, and judgement eclipsed by the same fogg of error, exhaled from his experience of the prosperity of Libertines. Nor was the shock of this temptation easily withstood by so strong a Champion; for it made him reel again, as he thus confesseth: *My feet were almost gone, my steps had welnigh slipt. For I was envious at the prosperity of the wicked. They are not in trouble, neither are they plagued like other men. Their eyes stand out with fatnesse: they have more then their heart could wish. They are corrupt, and speak wickedly concerning oppression: they speak loftily. They set their mouth against the heavens: and their tongue walketh through the earth. Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world: they increase in riches. Verily, I have cleansed my heart in vain: and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I bin plagued, and chastened every morning, &c. (Psalm. 73.)* To which we may annex that blunt and emphatical lesson of *Iesus ben Syrach* (*Ecclesiastic. 2.*) *My son, if thou come to serve*

serve the Lord, prepare thy soul for temptation: the concernment of which every man understands to be this: *The more righteous, the more afflicted.* Here also is a convenient place for their opinion, who affirm the *Book of Job* to have bin intended as no history (though they conced him to have bin no faigned person, from *Ezek. 14. 14.* and *James 5. 2.* but a real example of both Fortunes, in an exceeding measure) but a grave Treatise concerning this subject, viz. *the prosperity of the impious, and constant adversity of the pious,* comprehending the arguments of both the *Opponent* and *Defendant* of *Divine Providence.* Which is ground- ed upon strong probability, since, as *St. Jerom* hath observed and attested, in the original Hebrew, from the beginning of the book to the 3 verse of the 3 chapter, where the complaint of *Iob* begins, all is written in *Prose*, and thenceforward, during the whole dispute, to the 6th. verse of the last chapter all in *Hexameter verse*, where the composer again let loose his pen into *prose*, whereby it is manifest that the *Prose* was destined for a *Prologue* and an *Epilogue* to the contest in *verse*. Now every man knows the sor- rows and sickness of *Iob* to have bin too intense and urgent, to endure the calme and leasure requiring humor of *Poetry* either in himself or his friends: and therefore must the book be compos- ed by some Person not molested with either of those two im- pediments, but of serene thoughts, and acquainted with the an- cient custome of disposing their Moral Philosophy into *verse*.

And there are *instances* enough to illustrate both the contumacy and large diffusion of this *objection.* I might have sayd *more then enough*; the strongest and most military *Faith* among us, though assisted by the most evident and firm *reason*, being hardly able justly to boast an absolute conquest of, and constant immunity from the sharpe clandestine assaults of the same *scruple*: and so no man needing other example to evince the frequent prevalency of it, but what his retired meditations may find alleaged in the inventory of his own frailties, lapses, and temptations; (all which are punctually and orderly registred by that recorder of his soul, which the Divine call's *Συμβουλιος*, or *Conscience*) especially in these evil times, wherein *Piety, Wisdom, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Innocence,* and all other *Graces* and *Virtues* are

deposed, and onely their *Contraries* advanced; in a word, *wherein nothing can make a man temporally miserable, but the severe profession of Goodness.*

S E C T. II.

Article I.

That man is the sole object of Gods special Providence, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (extrinsecal) love: and that inferred from hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledge of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualified to speculate, admire, and laud the *pulchritude* of Nature.

THAT God extends the right hand of his Providence upon the head of man (the *Heir* of all his *blessings*, though the *youngest* of his *Creatures*) ordering the occurrences of his life, nay the manner and moment of his death, by a paternal and special care, more excellent then that whereby he is pleased to regulate and dispose the operations of all other Entities in the Republicque of the World; is amply manifest from hence, *Quod majorem sui hominibus, quam ceteris rebus notitiam impressit*, that he hath impressed upon the mind of man a knowledg of his Divinity more cleare and distinct, then upon any created natures beside, *Angelical* and *intuitively intellectual spirits* only excepted.

For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their distinct Forms, some certain Signatures or Characters, that undeniably attest their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wisdom; and in that respect may be properly enough said, to shew forth the glory of their Maker: and though all *Animals* do, by a kind of tacit homage, confess their origination from, and constant dependence on one *Eternal* and *Omnipotent Cause*; yet are they induced, excited, or rather impelled thereunto, *instinctu solum quodam ceco*, only by a blind and confused instinct, of which themselves have no possible notion. But as for the *Favorite, man*, he holds a clear and distinct *idea* of the Nature of God, as hath formerly bin demonstrated; and hath therefore a Logical, assured, and expresse cognition of his *Creator* and *Conservator*, and that so *radically* united, or identified to his essence, that it can be no Paradox to averr, that this science is part of his soul, though that be a simple, pure, homogeneous, and so

so indivisible substance: nay some modern Enquirers into the nature of the soul, have described it to be, *Actus simplex Cognitionis omnium, quæ cognosci possint*, a simple Act, or present Cognition of all things intelligible, *i. e.* of *God*, and consequently, tis not in the power of the most desperate and obdurate Atheist, to erase this idea out of his mind, no more then to change, meliorate, or adnihilate his essence, or prevent the stroke of Death. Now, what could be the *Motive*, that induced *God* to ennoble man by the prerogative of this excellent Idea, or representation of himself, other then the reflex act of his own infinite Goodness; which in the language of mortality, is *Free Love*, that flowed in a fuller and richer stream upon man, then upon all the World beside? And what can be the *End* of this implantate and coessential Knowledge in man, other then this; that he should constantly contemplate, admire, and laud the Perfections of the *Donor* thereof, and more particularly that concerned *Attribute*, which moved him to the free *Donation*, namely his immense *Beneficence*? This being conceded, it remains a plain and perpendicular *Inference*; that since between *God* and man there is a greater relation, or *Communion* (so the learned *Gassendus* calls it, in *Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert: de physiolog. Epicuri. pag. 744.*) then betwixt *God* and any other of his Creatures: therefore also must there be a greater measure of *Providence* in *God* for man, then for any other; it being necessary that the *Providence* of *God* should hold exact proportion, and be æquilibrated to his *Love*. This necessity of a parity or *æquilibrium* betwixt *Love* and *Providence Divine*, may be conveniently exemplified in our selves; for by how much the more we love our Friends, Wives or Children, by so much the more carefull and provident are we for their conservation and welfare.

Again, our own Experience is both argument and testimony sufficient, that the perscrutation of the mysteries of Nature, and the contemplation of sublime and celestial objects, is proper only to man; no other Animal being constituted in a capacity to rival him in those noble operations. And if so, undoubtedly he must violently stifle the conviction of his experience in this particular,
who

who dares deny, that those heavenly beauties, and all the peices of Nature beside were created principally for the use of man, inso-much as man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator. *Ad quidem tantus decor universi, nisi esset homo, qui consideraret, ipseque perspecto hymnum Authori caneret?* Tis an Axiome of constant Verity, that Nature makes nothing in vain; and this rule, doubtless, she learned from that *Wisdom*, which determineth all its actions to certain, adequate, and proper Ends: now we must grant, either that God adorned the Universe with such exquisite pulchritude, and admirable embellishment of Art, to no purpose at all; and so was more vain and improvident than his instrument, Nature: or else, that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it, to this end, that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained, exercised, and delighted in the speculation and admiration thereof, and through that maze of pleasant wonder be conducted to the true Elyzium, the contemplation of the *Fountain of Pulchritude*, and *entelechia* of Excellencies, *God*. For there is no *medium* between these two Contraries, nor any hope of evading the rigour of this *Dilemma*, upon pretence of neutrality: since God had no other end, wherefore he beautified the World, but his own Glory in chief, and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man, as subservient thereunto; nor doth the World contain any other Nature, but Man, that is qualified with Faculties requisite to the satisfaction of that end. *Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam, qua adificium hoc tantum conspicens, in Architecti sapientissimi admirationem perinde rapiatur?* We well know, that *Relatives* (*secundum esse*) positively necessitate the existence each of other; and therefore to allow (what cannot be disallowed, but by incurring a more dangerous absurdity) that God made, and exhibited the *Beauty* of the World, *tanquam admirandum spectaculum*, as a spectacle that cannot but excite *Admiration* in the *speculator*; and yet to deny that he provided a fit and respective *spectator*, such whose *Sense* should transmit the *idea* of that *Pulchritude* to the judicature of a higher *Faculty*, and that again be thereby impregnated with *Admiration* (which is nothing but our *Reasons* being at a stand at the *novelty*

or excellence of an object occurring to our sense ; for what is either frequent, or manifest to our cognition, we never admire : and that's the cause, why this *Affection* of the mind as it is the first of *Passions*, so it is the only one that wants a *Contrary*, as the unimitable *Des Cartes* hath discovered to us, in *lib. de passion. part. 1. articl. 54.*) is not only an impious derogation to the wisdom of God, but also a manifest Contradiction to our own reason, which from the existence of the *Relatum*, a *spectacle*, immediately concludes the necessary existence of the *Correlatum*, a *spectator*. And that this Spectator can be no other Animal, but man ; is too bright a truth to need any other illustration, but what is reflected from it self.

To which Argument, of the Creators adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favorite, the Logick of every man may superadd many others of equivalent importance, drawn from the consideration of those *Praeminences and Prerogatives*, wherewith his Munificence hath bin pleased to ennoble his nature, and exalt him to a neerer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Essence, then any other Creature in the Universe ; as the excellent contexture and majestic *Figure* of his *Body* ; the semi-divine *Faculties* of his *Soul* ; his *Monarchy*, domination, or royalty over all other sublunary natures, *Omnia enim sibi submittit, dum omnia quae in mundo sunt, vel ad usus vitae necessarios refert, vel ad varia genera voluptatum* ; and lastly that inestimable propriety, the *Immortality* of his *Soul*.

Now to direct all this to the mark ; since God hath thus proclaimed Man to be, next to his own *Glory* (which is the *last* of *Ends*, as his *Will* is the *first* of *Causes*) the grand and principal scope of his mighty work of Creation ; and that he made all things, in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life, and allurement, nay manuduction or conduct to immarcescible beatitude after Death : and since his Act of Providence, or the constant Conservation of all things, in the primitive perfection, distinction and order of their Natures, is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged, or spun out through all the independent Atoms, or successive particles of time, as hath bin more then once intimated ; beyond all dispute, the *Product* must be the same

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with our *Thesis*, viz. *That Man is the object of Gods special Providence*, and by consequence, *that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined, ordered, and brought to pass by the same.*

Article 2.
That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods special Providence.

As every man brings into the World with him a certain *Prolepticall*, or *Anticipated Cognition* of a *Deity*, or *First Cause* of all things, deeply and indeleibly stamp'd upon his *mind*; as hath bin formerly demonstrated: so also holds he, as an *Adjunct*, or rather a *part* thereof, a coessential *Prenotion*, that this *First Cause*, or *Supreme Nature*, is the *Fountain* from whence those two different streams of *Happiness* and *Misery*, or *Good* and *Evil*, the former by *Condonation*, the other by *Permission*, are constantly derived: and upon consequence, that all *Occurrences* of his life, are the just and prudent *Designations* of its *special Providence*.

That every man, in whom the *Light of Nature* is not damp't by *Fatuity*, either native and temperamental, or casually supervenient, hath this *Evrosia*, or *imprefs* of an *especial Providence*, decreeing and disposing all events, that have, do, or shall befall him; is manifest from hence, that no man, though educated in the wildest ignorance, or highest barbarisme imaginable, but was naturally, and by the advisees of his intestine *Dictator*, inclined either to conceive, or imbrace some kind of *Religion*, as an homage or fealty due from him to that *Supreme Power*, in whose hands he apprehended the rains of *Good* and *Evil* to be held, and whose favour and benigne aspect he thought procurable, and anger atoneable by the reasonable addresses of *Invocation* and *Sacrifice*.

Article 3.
That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion.

And in truth, to him, whose meditations shall sink deep enough, it will soon appear, that this *Anticipation is the very root of Religion*; for though man stood fully perswaded of the *Existence of God*, yet would not that alone be argument sufficient to convince him into the necessity of a devout *Adoration* of him, unless his mind were also possessed with a firme beleaf of this proper *Attribute* of his Nature, which so neerly concerns his felicity or infelicity, viz. his *special Providence*, which regulates all the affaires, and appoints all the *Contingencies* of every individual mans

mans life. For tis the sense of our own *Defects, Imperfections,* and *Dependency*, that first leads us to the knowledge of his *Allsufficiency, Perfections,* and *Self-subsistence*; the apprehension of our *Necessities*, is the school wherein we first learned our *Orizons*, and the hope of obtaining *Blessings* from his immense Bounty, is both the excitement and encouragement of our *Devotion*: and therefore the *Devil* spake profoundly and to the purpose, in his expostulation with God concerning the cause of *Jobs* integrity, *Doth Job serve God for nought?* This being duely perpended, I hope I shall not offend Theology, if I affirme, that since to love God aright, is to love him purely and solely because he is God, *i. e.* all that's truly Good and Amiable; *tis impossible for the soul of man, in this life, to love God as she ought to doe*: because impossible for her, before her refinement by *Glorification*, to cast off all *self-interest*, as to love him without reflexions upon her self, *i. e.* without the hopes of being made eternally happy by that love. If this reason bear not out my paradox, I dare any man to the bar of Experience, and boldly appeal to the *Conscience* of any the most mortified Christian, whether in his most pure, abstracted, and holy raptures of *Divine love*, he did not always perceive a considerable mixture, and weighty alloy of *Ipsity* or *Selfness*.

That the Concession of an *Especial Providence* in the *Supreme Being*, whereby he constantly moderateth and disposeth the operations and products of *Second Causes* for the induction of *Good* on the heads of those, whose *Virtuous inclinations* may, in some latitude of *Worthyness*, seem to prepare and qualify them for the gratefull *Acceptance*, and genuine *use* thereof; and of *Evil* on those whose *Vitiosties* and habitual *Depravities* seem, by the importunity or violence of demerit, to extort it from the *Justice* of his *Indignation*: that this inbred *perswasion*, I say, is the spark, at which all the *Tapers of Religion* were first kindled, the very *Ethnicks* themselves, while groping in the *Chaos* of *Idolatry*, have long since discovered. Witness their *Magnificent Temples*, costly *Hecatombs*, human *Holocausts*, and frequent solemn *Invocations*; all which kinds of addresses they generally made use of, and obliged themselves unto, as the only hopefull means as well to atone the displeasure, as conciliate the favour of that *Power*,

in whose hands they conceived the book of Fate to be kept, and who had the *Gardianship* or *Administration* of the *Fortunes* not only of *Cities*, nations, and families, but even of every individual Person. Witness also, that Glorious Pagan, *Cicero*, who deriving the pedigree of *Religion*, fathers it immediately upon the persuasion of an *Especial Providence*, (*1. de nat. Deor.*) in these words; *Sunt Philosophi, & fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procuracionem Deos. Quorum si vera est sententia, que potest esse Pietas? que Religio? Hac enim omnia pure ac caste tribuenda Deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertantur ab his, & si est aliquid à Diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem Diu neque possunt, nec volunt nos iuvare, nec curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertant, nec est quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanere possit: quid est, quod ullos Diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliqua virtutes, ita pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul & sanctitatem, & religionem tolli necesse est. Quibus sublatis, perturbatio vite sequitur, & magna confusio.*

Article 4.
That Man
brings into the
world with
him, an irre-
sistible propen-
sion to Reli-
gion.

That no man ever entred upon the theatre of the World, but he acted some one *Religious* part, bringing along with him an irresistible propension to revere and adore that *Nature*, which he conceived superior to his own, and all others; cannot be obscure to any, whom either *Peregrinations*, or *Books* have acquainted with the religious *Customes* and *practises* of forreign *Nations*, either *Ancient* or *Modern*. For read we the voluminous monuments of Antiquity, erected by the noble industry of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Ptolome*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, *Solinus*, *Iustine*, and other *senior Historiographers*; read we *Munster's Cosmography*, *Ortelius* his *Theatrum Orbis*, the *Histories* of *Brasile*, written by the judicious pens of *Guilelm. Piso*, the *Hollander* and *Physician* to the *States Fleet*, of *Georg. Marcgravius* the *German*, and *Iohan. de Laet* of *Antwerp*; and in our *Mother tongue*, *Grimstones Estates and Empires*, *Purchas* his *Pilgrimage* (a work that speaks its venerable Compiler, to have bin a man of many Languages, indefatigable study, vast readings, large

large rhapsodies, and strong judgement,) *Hackluit's Collection of English Voyages*, the several Descriptions of *America*, together with the manners of its various Inhabitants; and other Works of the *Neotericks* (in all which we find not only the *Chorography* and *Topography*, but also the faithfull *Morography* of all the known parts of the World) I say, read we all these, and we shall find them unanimously positive in this point, *That there is no Nation but hath its Religion.* And therefore, with *Arnobius* (*lib. 1. contr. Gent. pag. 476.*) I am bold to demand of the whole world; *Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius Principis notione, diem primæ nativitatis intraverit? Cui non sit ingenitum, imo affixum, & pene in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum; esse Regem ac Dominum cunctorum, quacunque sunt, Moderatorem?*

If any shall pull me by the eare, and here object out of *Strabo* (*lib. 13. pag. 382.*) that the *Calaici*, a rude and savage people of old *Spain*, were absolute *Atheists*, and worshiped no Gods at all; I answer, that *Strabo* wrote this particular with no more authentick a quill, but what he found drop't from the wings of *Fame*, himself insinuating as much: for his words are, *Calaicis Deum nullum esse, quidam ajunt*; there is a certain rumor, or traditional report, raised, dispersed and authorized, where, when, upon what grounds, or by whom, I know not, that the *Calaici* had no religion among them. And if a *quidam sic ajunt*, be proof enough to ratifie any historicall position, or assertion; then may *Fame* aspire to the throne of *Truth*, *Fables* become *Histories*, and strangers may beleive that we *Christians* are the most absolute *Atheists*. For *Cæcilius* hath reported of us, that we doe *& templa despiceret, & Deos despuere*: both despise the temples, and despise the Gods; as *Arnobius* (*lib. 8. cont. Gent. pag. 748.*) hath informed us.

Nor have I forgotten, that the two fierce Nations, the *Massagetae* and *Scythians*, (whose rudeness and want of Civility, the indiscretion or severity of some hath aggravated into an *Atheistical Barbarisme*, and want of all *Religion*) have bin stigmatiz'd

Z. 3.

Article 5.
An objection, that the *Calaici* were absolute *Atheists*, refuted.

Article 6.
A second objection, that the *Massagetae* and *Scythians* were devoyd of all *Religion*, with prevented.

with the same infamous brand; and therefore to anticipate this exception, I refer the doubting Reader to the testimonies of *Herodotus* and *Lucian*: the former (*lib. 4. pag. 278. & 279.*) at large expunging that fabulous asperſion, and proving them ſtrict, ſolemn, and ceremonious Votaries to all the Gods of Greece: the latter (*lib. de ſacrificiis. p. 57.*) deriding them for their ſuperſtition, nay ſuch immoderate and frantique zeal, towards the honour of their principal Deity, *Diana*, as made them embrace the flames, and offer themſelves as holocausts unto her.

Article 7.
That it is not
in the power
of man, totally
to eradicate
this plant of
Religion, or
notion of ſpe-
cial Provi-
dence Divine,
out of his
mind; ſe-
vinced
from hence,
that the moſt
contumacious
Atheiſts have,
at ſome time or
other, acknow-
ledged it: as

Moreover, as this inoppugnable propenſity to *Religion* is a *Cyence* of *Gods* own ingraſſing on the mind of man; ſo alſo is it not in the power of any man, though aſſiſted by all the ſtratagems and legions of Hell, totally to eradicate it thence.

This is a truth confirmed by the *Experience* of all Ages. For, notwithstanding the insolent pretences, and blaſphemous Rhodomontadoes of many miſcreants, who have gloried in the moſt execrable cognomen of *Atheoi*, and ſtudied to advance their names to the higheſt pinnacle of Fame, by being accounted men of ſuch abſolute and fearleſs Spirits, as that they ſcorned to own any *Being ſuperior* to their own, to which they ſhould be accountable for their actions: yet have they bin compelled (ſo violent are the ſecret touches of that hand, which converts all things into demonstrations of his own Glory) either by the ſcourge of ſome ſharp calamity, or the rack of ſome excruciating diſeaſe, in their lives, to recant; or at the neer approach of that King of terrors, Death, to confeſs this their horrid impiety.

Article 8.
Pharaoh.

Thus the proud and Adamant-hearted *Pharaoh*, who deriding the Divine Embaſſy of *Moses*, in an imperious ſtrain of Scern, and expoſtulatory bravado, demanded of him; *Quis eſt Jehovah, cujus voci auſcultem, dimittendo Iſraelem? non novi Jehovam, &c.* did yet, when the *Violentum* of Divine Vengeance by heavy judgements had convinced him; when the true and real Miracles of *Moses* had won the garland from thoſe weak Deluſions and preſtigious impoſtures of his *Magicians*, and he beheld their black Art fooled in their vain attempts to imitate

imitate *Moses* in the visible transformation of Dust into Lice; when the tangible darkness that benegroed the horizon of *Egypt*, and so made it more than midnight to the eye of his body, had illuminated that of his Soul; and when the frozen *Granadoes* of the clouds had broke open the iron door of his Conscience; then sends he post for thole, whom he had barbarously exiled from his presence, humbles himself before them, and howles out this *Palinodia*; *Peccavi hac vice: Jehovah justissimus, ego vero & populus meus sumus improbissimi.*

Thus *Herod Agrippa*, who, in the morne, to enhance the estimate of majesty, and stroke that vertiginous and admiring beast, the multitude, had arrayed him in his brightest ornaments of State, thickly imbrodered with plates of Oriental Gold, and studded with Diamonds and all other resplendent Gemms, so that the incident Sun beams seemed to have acquired a greater lustre by reflexion from him, and who by the blast of popular Euges had the wings of his Pride fanned up to so sublime a pitch, that he lost sight of his own Humanity, and vainly conceived the adulatory Hyperbole of his Auditors to be but their just acknowledgement of his Divinity: being wounded by the invisible sword of a revenging Angel, before Sun set, by a fatal experiment confuted both his own and his flatterers blasphemy, and with the hoarse groans of a tortured wretch, cryed out; *En ille Ego, vestra appellatione Deus, vitam relinquere jubeor; fatali necessitate mendacium vestrum coarguente: & quem immortalem salutastis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda est voluntas celestis Numinis.* (*Joseph. 19. Antiquit. p. 565.*)

Article 9.
Herod Agrippa.

Thus that real *Lycaon*, *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who had not only denied, but being enraged by a malicious Phrensy beyond that of *Lucifer* newly degraded, publicly despited and reviled the Almighty Patron of the Jews, blasphemed his most sacred name, demolished his temples, profaned his consecrated Utensils, violated his religious institutions, and persecuted his worshipers with all the most bloody cruelties, that the wit of an exalted malice could invent, or inflict: being put upon the rack of a

Article 10.
Antiochus Epiphanes.

fore:

fore and mortal disease (which some have conjectured, and not without good warrant from probability, to have bin a *Cancer* in his bowells, introduced *mediately* by *Divine Justice*, *immediately* by a fix't *melancholy* generated by the uncessant stings and convulsions of his guilty Conscience, as by its *procatartick Cause*.) and despairing of any ease or cure but from his injured enemy, God; he sighes out his Confession. *The sleep is gon from my eyes, and my heart faileth for very Care. And I thought with myself, into what tribulation am I come, and how great a flood of misery is it, wherein I now am? But now I remember the evils that I did at Jerusalem, and that I took all the vessels of Gold and Silver that were therein, and sent to destroy the inhabitants without a Cause. I perceive therefore, that for this cause, these troubles are come upon me &c. It is meet to be subject unto God, and that a man who is mortal, should not think himself equal unto God through pride. (Maccab. 1. chap. 6. vers. 9, 10, 11.)*

Article 11.
Maximinus.

Thus the Giant Emperour, *Maximinus*, as insatiate a Blood-hound to the *Christians*, as *Antiochus* had bin to the *Jews*, *novorum suppliciorum inventione sese insolenter efferens*, boasting the acuteness of his wit by the invention of new ways of tortures for those patient martyrs, as *Eusebius* (*lib. 1. de vita Constant. cap. 51.*) hath described him; and advancing the Roman *Eagle* in defiance of those who fought under the sanguine standard of the *Cross*; nay so infatuated with the confidence of his own Greatness and personal strength, that he entertained a conceit, that *Death* durst not adventure to encounter him, for feare of having his javelin broke about his own crazy skull, and all his skeleton of bones rattled to dust, as *Capitolinus* tells us: notwithstanding when he felt himself invaded with a *Verminous Ulcer*, or *Fistula*, *in mediis corporis arcanis*, which did *letificum foetorem exhalare, ut medicorum aliqui incredibilem foetorem ferre non valentes, occiderentur*, evaporate so contagious and pestilential a stench, that some of his Physicians, not able to endure that mephitic or steam of intense corruption, fell down dead; and understood the same to be *supplicium Divinus illatum*, a judgement

ment sent from God to retaliate upon him those tortures, which he had caused in the bowells and secret parts of many innocents; then did his flinty heart melt within him, and *tandem sentire coepit, quae contra pios Dei cultores impiè gesserat, & hac se propter insaniam contra Christum praesumptam, merito & ultionis vice, perpeti confessus est*, and in the midst of these confessions of his own *Guilt*, and *Gods justice*, breathed out his execrable soul from a gangrenous and loathsome body. (*Eusebius, lib. 8. Histor. Eccles. cap. 17.*)

Thus also that notorious *Apostate, Julian*, who had not only renounced the faith of *Christ*, but proclaimed open and implacable hostility against him, and to quench the thirst of his diabolical malice, drank whole Tuns of the pretious blood of his *Members*; being defeated and mortally wounded in a battaile fought against the *Persians*: he instantly learned of his awaked Conscience, that the Cause of his present overthrow was his former impiety, and rightly ascribing the Victory to the revenging finger of that God, whose Divinity he had abjured, rather than to the arme of flesh, he threw up his blood into the aer, and together with his black Soul, gasped out this desperate ejaculation; *Vicisti Galilae, vicisti!* Thou hast overcome me, oh! thou *Jesus of Galile*, thou hast overcome me: *simul confessus & victoriam, & blasphemiam*, at once confessing both Christs conquest and his own detestable blasphemy; as *Theodoret (lib. 3. Histor. Eccles. cap. 20.)* hath descanted upon those his last (but truest) words.

Article 12.
Julian Apostata.

And thus also *Tullus Hostilius* (a *Cognomen* exactly accommodated to his fierce nature,) immediate successor to *Numa Pompilius* in his throne, though not in his mansuete and pious Inclinations; being a man of so rough and martial a temper, that he held *Religion* to be but a kind of *Emollient Cataplasme*, prescribed by *State Policy* to soften and emasculate the minds of men, as *Plutarch (in vita Numa pag. 158.)* hath noted of him; and thereupon in his prosperity neither acknowledging, nor sacrificing unto any *Deity*, but his *Ferreus Acinaces*, or old sword: when cast upon the thorny bed of sickness, he soon

Article 13.
Tullus Hostilius.

A a

discovered,

discovered, retracted, and renounced his *Atheisme*. (which remarkable mutation of his judgement, *Livie* (*lib. 1. pag. 12.*) hath both amply and elegantly described thus, *Adeo fracti simul cum corpore sunt spiritus illi feroces, ut qui nihil antea ratus esset minus regium, quam sacris dedere animum; repente omnibus magnis parvisque superstitionibus obnoxius degeret, religionibusque populum impleret.* I sayd *Mutation* of his judgement, not *Rectification*; nor can I properly allow him so much: since he that runs from one extreme of *Atheisme* to the other of *Polytheisme*, shall find himself in the same point of *Error*, from whence he set forth. For to beleive, that there are more Gods then one, in strictness of truth is to beleive there is none at all; *Unity* being the essential and inseparable Attribute of the *Deity*. And therefore we may allow him to have bin *superstitious*, but never truly *religious*. Nor did the *Judge of all hearts* accept of this *Change* for a *Conversion*; for the records both of *Livy* and *Entropius* concur in this; *Fulmine ictus, cum tota domo sua, conflagravit*: he, his house, and family were consumed by *Lightning*. A punishment so proportionate to the rules of *Divine Justice*, that we may therein give a faire conjecture of his guilt: and that which all *Atheists* have stood convulst at.

Juvenal.
Satyr. 13.

*Hi sunt, qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent,
Cum tonat, exanimés, primo quoque murmure cœli.*

Such *Villains* quake at *Thunder*, and each flash
Of *Lightning* doth their *Souls* with *Terror* quash.

Article 14.
Bion Borysthenites.

A like example of the impossibility of extinguishing this spark of Religion, which the Creator hath kindled in the breast of every man, doth *Diogenes Laertius* afford us (*in vit. Bionis*) in the recantation of *Bion of Borysthenes*. Who continuing (or rather only pretending to continue) in profest *Atheisme*, till he was arrested by sickness, that rough Serjeant of Death, and then affrighted into an acknowledgement of that truth, he had so long stifled: *inductus est pœnitentiam agere super iis, qua peccarat in Deum*, was induced to become a penitentiary for those offences he had perpetrated against the sacred majesty of God.

To

To conclude therefore; as *Lucilius* sayd of *Homer*, *Nemo qui culpatur Homerum, perpetuo culpatur*; so may we more truly say of *God*, *Nemo qui Deum negat, perpetuo negat*, no man who deny's *God*, doth constantly deny him. For all men have confuted, disfavow'd, or repented that impiety at or before their death, which they seem'd with so much impudence and pride, to cherish in their lives. This the sweet-tongued *Tertullian* (*Apolog. cap. 17.*) profoundly observed, when he distilled the quintessence or spirit of all we have sayd, concerning this assertion, into this short sentence: *Anima, licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus & concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, & sanitatem suam patitur, Deum nominat.*

I shall not gainsay, but that tis possible (I am sorry, I might have sayd, too frequent) to have this ingravement of Divinity on the mind of man, obscured, and buried under the dust raised in the summer of Prosperity; for as *Lactantius* (*lib. 2. cap. 1.*) most solidly, *tum maxime Deus ex hominum memoria elabitur, cum beneficiis ejus fruente honorem dare Divinae indulgentiae deberent*, men are then most prone to forget *God*, when being sated with the accumulations of his immense bounty, they have the greatest reason to remember him: yet I shall confidently affirme, that the least gust of Affliction, in the winter of Adversity, soon blows that dust off again, and renders the Characters faire and legible to the first reflexive or inward glance of the soul. *Si qua enim necessitas gravis presserit, tum demum recordantur; si belli terror infremuerit, si alimenta frugibus longa siccitas denegaverit, si seva tempestas, si grando ingruerit: ad Deum protinus confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus, ut subveniat, oratur; si quis in mari vento saeviente jactatur, hunc invocat; si quis aliqua vi afflictor, hunc protinus implorat, &c.* as the same *Lactantius*.

Article 15.

The possibility of the obscuration of the impress of special Providence Divine, pro tempore, conceded: and the impossibility of the total Deletion thereof, briefly proved.

Article 16.
The reduction
of all, to a con-
cise and me-
morable de-
monstration;
that the occur-
rences of every
mans life are
the configura-
tions of Special
Providence

Now to abstract all this to a smaller bulk, such as may be no burthen to the weakest memory, and reduce our Argument into a sharper point, so that it may, with the greater facility, sink into the thickest skull; If *Religion* be a *Plant* radicated in the soul of man, so deeply and firmly, that though the damp of a *barbarous education* may for a while *retard*, or the ranknets of those *Weeds of Sensuality*, the *Honours* and *Delights* of this *World*, conceal the *germination* of it: yet will it, at some time or other, early or late, and always in the *Winter of Calamity*, shoot up and bud forth into an absolute *Demonstration* of the dependence of our *Happiness* and *Misery* on the *Will* of the *Supreme Being*: and if the *πληροφορία*, or full *Perswasion* of an *Especial Providence*, as a relative *Attribute* of the *Supreme Being*, whereby all the various Occurrences of every individual mans life are predetermined and disposed, bee the *Seed* from whence this *Plant of Religion* hath its root; both which *Propositions* we conceive sufficiently proved: then doe not I see, how the subtilest Wit can evade the rigour of the *Inference*, or *Conclusion*, viz. *That all the affaires of man are regulated by the Special Providence of God.*

S E C T. III.

Article 1.
The Atheists
first objection,
confuted; and
the Divine
Nature de-
monstrated
both *invisibile*
and *placable*,
(anthropopa-
thically.)

Thus far have we Demonstrated the *Necessity of Gods Specie-
al Providence*; and our next business is to remove those *Rocks* cast up by the Pioners of Satan, to obstruct the Current of mans cleare and full beleif thereof.

As for the *First*, *Deum neque ira, neque gratia tangi*; this may without much difficulty be dejected, by answering, that it can no way infringe the *Immutability* or constant *Sameness* of the *Divine Nature*, to affirme it to be capable of *Anger* and *Placability*: provided that we understand neither of these as a *Passion*,

Passion, but (as the *Schoolemen* precisely speak) *in effectu executionem, potius quam in Affectu perturbationem*, rather an execution in *Effect*, then a Perturbation in *Affect*. As for *Anger*; if a *Wise-man* can so conserve the serenity and tranquillity of his mind, as to chastise or severely punish his disobedient servant, without any passion or internal commotion at all: 'tis very hard, if *God*, the *Fountain of Wisdom*, cannot be admitted to conserve the constant and immutable peace or calme of his *Beatitude*, when he punisheth the improbous actions of men. For *Justice* is a *virtue*, which to speak strictly, cannot frown, which abhor's the society of a *Passion*, and only actuates the mind into a noble and commendable *Zeal*, not an illiberall or rough *Perturbation*. And upon the consideration of this was it, that the first *Preservers of Equity*, knowing it not to be impossible for the breast of a *Magistrate* to be inflamed, beyond this moderate heat, into an excess of Indignation against a *Malefactor*; therefore wisely provided, that the *Judge* should square his *Sentence* by the direct and impartial rule of the *Law*; which some *Civilians* have therefore wittily defined to be *Ira sedata*, Anger without *Choler*, Indignation refracted, or the sword of Vengeance put in the hand of *Mercy*. As for the Contrary to *Anger*, viz. *Grace*, or *Placability*; why this also may not be adscribed to *God*, as fully consistent to the *Eternal plenitude* and immutability of the *Divine Beatitude*, I cannot understand: provided that we accept it *absque gestiente letitia*, and as an effect infinitely remote from that kind of *Passionate Joy*, which tickles the heart of man into a suddain paroxysme of delight, upon the apprehension of a gratefull and pleasing Object, either in the anticipation of *Hope*, or actual fruition. The *Reason* is the immense *Goodness* of his *Nature*, which being in perpetual *Effusion*, without possibility of exhaustion, or an Ocean that replenisheth all things with *Amability*, yet suffers no diminution of its own fulness; doth more then incline him to be pleased with, or accept of as gratefull, that in man, which is originally but an *Extract* of his own *Delightfulness*, or himself gratefully returned to himself by reflexion from us. This the *Schoolemen* most judiciously pondered, when they establish, as Canonical, *Deum*

exercere gratiam, ea natura sinceritate, qua Bonus est. Nor are we to deny this *Placency* or *Delight* to God, since it is so far from *infringing* this constant and equall tenor of his essential *Felicity*, that in some sort it mainly conduceth to the *Conservation* thereof; insomuch as to be uncessantly exercised in a liberal *Benefaction* to other Natures, is to doe what is most consentaneous and genuine to the swindge or *Verticity* of his own: and so to do, all men, doubtless, will allow to be the highest and most permanent *Delight* in the World.

Nor is it a legal proceis in the common Pleas of *Reason*, to argue thus; God hath left us to act our own parts, in the world, therefore he takes no farther care of us, and therefore all the *Occurrences* of our lives are either the necessary *subsequents*, or collaterall *Adjuncts* of our own either *natural*, or *moral Actions*: for though it be most true, that he hath endowed us with an absolute *Freedom* of our *Wills* (an evidence of his exceeding *Grace* and *Benignity*,) and that, indeed, which supports the necessity of our *Rationality*; for if our *Wills* were subject to compulsion, undoubtedly we should have little or no use at all of our *Reason*, since then our *Objects* would be both *judged* of and *electèd* to our hands) and so permitted us the enjoyment of our own intire liberty: yet hath he, out of a compassionate preno- tion of the *Deceptibility* of our *judgement*, prescribed us rules, whereby our *Understanding* may be directed in the *selection* of *Good*, and *devitation* of *evill*.

To speak more expressly; he hath set on our right hand *real* and *true Good*, on our left only *specious* and *apparent*: the *Electi- on* of either is dependent on our *Will*, our *Will* is guided by our *Judgement*, and our *Judgement* is the *Determination* or resolve of our *Intellect* (for, without dispute, though common *Physi- ology* hath founded this *Liberty* on the indifferency of the *Will*; yet is it radicated in the indifferency of the *Intellect*, or *Cogno- scent Faculty*, primarily, and in the *Will* only secondarily, inso- much as that ever follows the manuduction of the *Intellect*,) but yet that he might in a manner direct us in our choyce, he hath annexed *Happiness* as a *reward* to invite us to the one, and *Misery* as a *punishment* to deter us from the other: and therefore

tis manifest, that God wills the felicity of all men, more then themselves can desire it.

And hence comes it to be a truth, that on one side *Fortune* (*respectu nostri*) frequently puts in for a share in the playing of our Cards; but yet still the *Special Providence* of God supervises her hand, and manageth the whole game: and on the other, that our own *Prudence* doth many times conduce to our winning of the stake; but yet still 'twas the *Goodness* of God that gave us that *Prudence*, and takes great delight to see us use it, as we ought to do, to our own advantage.

Doth he so, sayth the *Atheist*, how comes it about then, that he frequently turnes a deaf care to our most earnest *Prayers*, and but rarely grants our *Petitions*? For how few barren wombs have bin cured of their sterility, by the fumes of sacrifices? and how few Mariners preserved from naufrage, by the appension of their *Votivables*? or who hath observed such holy magick in the perishing Seamans pious sighes, as to have hush't the dreadful scolding of the waves and winds? For answer let us return,

That the most indulgent *Father* doth not always condescend to the importunate desires of his child: that as well *Pious*, as *Impious* men may be included in the same ship, that's banded up and down by the wanton Billows of the Sea; that the Good may be lost, and the Bad escape the fury of the tempest: and all this consist both with the *Goodness* and righteous *Providence* of God. The *Reason* in brief (for the full solution of this *Parallaxis* of *Justice* doth more properly belong to our refutation of the last *Objection*, concerning the apparent Prosperity of the Vitious, and the calamitous condition of the Virtuous, in this life) is this; *God in his Wisdom knows our real necessities, and understands what's most convenient for us.* This the acute *Satyr*ist handsomly expresth thus;

— *Si Consilium vis,
Permittes ipsis expendere Numinibus, quid
Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris:
Nam pro jucundis aptissima queque dabunt Dii.*

Carior

Article 2.
The Atheists
scruple, of
Gods inauditi-
on of the pray-
ers of good
men, or not
concession of
their petitions;
satisfied.

*Inven.
Sat. 10.*

*Carior est illis Homo, quàm sibi. Nos animorum
Impulsu, & magna, cæcæque cupidine ducti
Conjugium petimus, partumque Uxoris, at illi
Norunt qui Pueri, qualisque futura sit Uxor. &c.*

Would't be advis'd to choose the best? refer
That choyce unto the Gods, who cannot err.
For better then our selves our wants they know:
And will true joys, for false delights, bestow.
Their love to us transcends our own By blind
Affections spur'd, and fury of the mind,
We Wife and Sons desire; the Gods above
Know what that Wife, and how those Sons will prove.

Article 3.
The Atheists
second Argu-
ment against
Special Provi-
dence divine,
dissolved: and
the necessitie of
Objects ho-
stile, and dele-
terious to the
life of man, de-
monstrated.

As for the second Rock, *Cur si Deus omnia hominum causa fecerit, etiam multa contraria, imò & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari quàm in terra?* this also may easily be removed, by digesting our meditations into this short reply.

The Creator, having formed the machine of mans body into a Figure fit to receive the majestick charagme of Divinity, as the last act of his hand, and the accomplishment of his most exquisite Artifice, breathed into him a *Wife, intelligent, or cognoscent Soul*; that by the transcendent operations thereof, man might justly intitle himself to the Empire of the Creatures, subjugate them to the dominion of his unconfined Will, and accommodate all things either to the relieve of his *Necessities*, or the promotion of his *Delights*. This done, he set before him *Good* and *Evill*; and this upon the highest reason: because he had endowed him with *Sapience*, whose basis is founded in the actual discernement of those two Contraries For no man can make an election of the *Better*, and know what's really *Good*, unless at the same time he know also what's really *Evill*, and how to reject and avoyd the *Worse*. Those two objects, though absolute *Contraries*, are yet perfect *Relatives*; though irreconcilable *Enemies*, are yet coexistent *Twins*, and live so connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one necessitates the ablation of the other. *Good* and *Evill* therefore being thus blended together,
and

and in this miscellany proposed to man; then begins that *Criterion*, *Wisdom* to exercise its Faculties, display its discretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, *affects* the *Good* for *Utility*, but *rejects* the *Evill* for *Safety*. As therefore there are innumerable *Goods* offered to the judgement of man, which he may with happiness enjoy; so also are there as many *Evills*, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing evill, nothing dangerous, in short, nothing hurtfull to man; pray, what stead could his *Reason* stand him in? And hence is it manifest, that whoever strikes at the necessity of *Evill*, at the same time cuts off the necessity of *Wisdom*, and downright adnulls the use of the *Intellect*: since if *God* had created nothing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpose would his *Cogitation*, *Intellect*, *Science* and *Reason* have served? For then to what object soever he had extended his hand, though at adventure; yet would that have bin by nature fit and commodious for him.

To illustrate this by a familiar, yet in all points respondent *Example*; if any man make a feast for a company of *Infants*, and prepare a liberal table of many both pleasant and wholsom meats for them; though they are not wise enough to make their own choyce, by *rational judgement*, but pursue the inclination of their *Sensual Appetite*: yet can they not choose amiss, all things good and gratefull being praelected to their hands. And if so, of what disadvantage is their *Ignorance*, or of what advantage could their *Intelligence*, were they arrived at so much maturity, be unto them? Truly, none at all; for as they could know no want of the one, so could they receive no damage by the continuation of the other. But if among those many pleasant and nutritive dishes the master should mingle as many either *bitter* and distastfull, or *poysonous*; then doubtless must the greedy Wretches be deceived through their ignorance of *Good* and *Evill*, unless *Wisdom* step in to their protection, and informe them what is safe, and what destructive, and so direct them in the *Delection* of the one and *Refusal* of the other. Now clearly the Case is the same, in all particulars, twixt *God* and *Man*, as to

Article 4.
The same illustrated, by a correspondent *Simile*.

the point of Good and Evil: and therefore we may conclude, with *Lactantius*; *Propter mala opus nobis esse sapientia, qua nisi fuissent proposita, rationale Animal non essemus*: had there bin no evill for man to avoyd, he never had bin endowed with a rational Soul.

Article 5.
The Atheists
last and grand
objection, of
the prosperity
of the Vicious,
and adversity
of the Virtu-
ous, redargued:
and the nature
of the Goods of
Fortune pro-
founded.

The last, and greatest *Rock*, upon whose shelves Myriads have bin split and shipwrackt in their judgements, our memory tells us is this; *πῶς δὲ ἕπεται τῆ τῷ θεῷ προσέτι τὰ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων οἰκονομίαι, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον ἐπιτυχίῃ, τὸ δὲ ἀστέρον τ' ἀνάπηρα πάχαι;*
Qua ratione, si cura Deo res humane sunt, malis est bene, & bonis male?

This, I confess, to the first and superficial survey of my meditations, appeared mountainous and stinty, and such as might require both a larger Current of acuteness to dissolve it, then what runs in the shallow chanel of my braines; and a greater strength of Argument to dislodge and crane it up piece after piece, then the lax and feeble nerves of my Reason could afford: but to my second and penetrating thoughts, it discovered it self to be, like those objects we look upon through the magnifying glass of Fear, great only at a distance, and devoyd of all Solidity, nay in reality no more then a heap of mud heaved up by the back of that subterraneous Mole, the *Devil*. For though Experience assures us, that this field of the World hath a strange and preposterous soyle, wherein *Weeds* most commonly prosper, and usefull *Plants* wither: yet a profound scrutiny into the business, shall soon detect, that there is an *admirable Providence* in the distribution of *Good* and *Evill*, or *Prosperity* and *Adversity*.

First therefore, let us seriously examine the inside of those *Good* things, that are showred down on the laps of *Evill* men, and make their tides of Fortune high and smooth; while the streams of *Good* mens lives seem to run low, sink down to the lowest ebbs, and are constantly ruffled by the contrary gusts of Afflictions. Certain it is, that nothing can be affirmed to be *really Good*, but only *Virtue*, or at least that, which being tempered, impregnated and qualified by *Virtue*, doth positively conduce to our *well-being*: and as certain it is, that *Evill* men want this

this *Universal Ferment, or Elixir, Virtue*, which only hath a power to convert all things into Good; and therefore cannot they either receive, or use those things called the *Goods of Fortune*, with that temper and moderation of mind, which is requisite to the perfect assimilation of them into their well-being; and upon consequence, those abused Goods instantly alter their Property, and degenerate into *Evils, Vice*, like a depraved stomach, having a power to corrupt the best things into the worst. And this the reason is, why those *Blessings*, which the bounty of *Providence* hath ordained for our refreshment and consolation in this tedious pilgrimage on earth, and furtherances or contributions towards our easier purchase of immaculable Felicity in heaven, when Death shall have evacuated our Faith; such as *Vigor, health, and beauty of Body, ingenuity of disposition, longevity, multitude of Friends, equality in marriage, fertility of issue, education in civility and learning, science, wealth, nobility of blood, absoluteness in power and government, &c.* when they come into the polluting hands of *Vicious* men, they instantly suffer a total castration of their *Goodness*, a depravation of their *benignity*, and putrify into perfect *Curses*: the possession of them raising uncessant tempests and distracting storms of *Passions* in the obnubilated region of their minds; nor permitting that comfortable sun of true *Content* to shine clearly forth, and make one faire day, during their whole lives.

For though the Mole-eyed multitude, whose sight is always terminated in the gawdy outfight, admire even to envy the lustre of splendid *Vice*, cry up the happiness of wealth, and beleive that the Rich man, though nere so unjust and sinfull, doth every moment surfeit with variety of Delights: yet if his *Conscience* were strictly examined, twould soon confesse, that all his luxurious *Viands* are but *Pils of Colocynthis* neatly gilded, or *Apples of Sodom*, whose Vermilian rind doth emulate the blushes of Aurora, but are within nothing but sulphureous dust; that his magnificent *Buildings* are but a more strong and spacious *Prison*; his numerous *Attendants*, but so many *plummers* superadded to that oppressing weight of cares, which keeps his mind in the perpetual motion of inquietude; his troop of *Adulators*, but a swarme of

hungry *Fleas* that molest him by sucking, or a nest of *Tarantulas*, whose titillations prove venenate and poyson his sobriety into a phrensy of deadly jollity; that his *bed of down* growes every night more full of *thorns*; that his *baggs* of treasure, like the massy statue of *Jupiter* on the *Asses* back, *oppress* and gall him; in short, that he never tasted any one sincere and limpid drop of pleasure in his life.

And this one truth brancheth it self into the manifestation of *two* others;

First, that those golden showers which *Providence* raineth into the bosomes of Vitious men, are no more then *Bona fucata*, real Evils couched under the specious hatchment of apparent Goods; fruit whose *Cortex* is sweet and beautifull, but *Kernels* full of amaritude and loathsome venom; and all the magnified presents of Fortune, like *Pandora's Box*, have glorious outsides, but contain millions of infections and pestilential Evils.

Secondly, that the *Possessors* of them, by reason of the exorbitances, and habitual depravities of their minds, seem incapable and therefore, in the judgement of the Supreme Wifdome, absolutely unworthy of more solid and substantial Goods; *Providence* dealing with these, as a Wise *General* with *Cowards*, who are assigned to the sordid offices of common *Sutlers*, and *Baggage-Carriers*, while the generous and heroical are appointed to *Arms*, *difficulties*, and *encounters*. *Cum videris bonos acceptosque Diis viros, laborare, sudare, per arduum ascendere; malos autem lascivientes & voluptatibus fluere: Cogita, filiorum nos modestia delectari, Vernularum licentia; illos disciplina tristiori contineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat, bonum virum in deliciis non habet; experitur, indurat, sibi illum praparat. Seneca (de Providentia.)*

Nay, more then all this, should we grant that the *Cornu Copia*, or affluence of the Goods of Fortune makes one step, or gradation in the ascent to the Palace of *Temporal Happiness*: yet can we not infer, that Vitious men are therefore neerer to the top, then those indigent and tattered *Lazarusse's*, that ly groveling below, because they are mounted thereon; since, as *Iamblicus* (*in Protrept.*) hath most prudently observed, Malice ever drinks the

the greatest part of her own poyson; since the continually excruciating torture, resulting from the sense of their own impiety, ten times more dejects them, towards the abyss of misery, then the fruition of those goods can advance them; since that sharp-beaked Vultur, an Evil Conscience, never ceaseth day nor night to dilacerate their hearts, but racks them into a most severe condemnation of themselves, which doubtless is the keenest arrow in the quiver of Divine Revenge, and that affliction which best defines the terrible essence of Hell.

To all which we may justly superadd this, that the brightest and longest days of *Fortune* have ever closed in the blackest and most tragical nights of *Sorrow*; that the *Plays of Libertines* have always proved *Come-tragedies*, and their pompous Masks finished in dismal Catastrophes; nor can the records of the whole world produce one Example of *Sinfull Greatness*, that hath not, either before, or at his eternal Adieu, by woefull experiment manifested the truth of this maxime; *That none can ever arrive at the Elizium of true Felicity, who constantly pursue it through the gardens of Sensuality: that the Rose of happiness grows on the prickly stem of Virtue: and that the just discharge of our duties to God and Man, in all things, to the utmost of our abilities, is the only means of acquiring that Philosophers stone, Content, the only Summum Bonum in nature.*

Lastly, as to that seeming *Appov'noia* that the hand of Gods *Bounty* is observed to be extended early and long on the heads of Impious men; but, on the contrary, that of *Justice* either late, or not at all, in this life: though we grant the *Question*, yet shall we soon salve the *scruple*, by considering, that his *Providence* observes this method, for two important Reasons: *First* in respect of themselves, and *Secondly* in respect of the Virtuous. (1.) *Of themselves*; God, in order to the manifestation of his infinite *Goodness*, therefore conferr's a plentiful portion of his benefits upon them, that by the blandishments of their sense he might allure them to a desire of those delights, whose pleasantness consists in this, that they infinitely transcend the apprehension of Sense; and that the fragrant odor of his temporal Mercies

Article 6.
The Reason,
wherefore Di-
vine Provi-
dence confers
Good things
on Evil men.

might attract their minds to the affectation of Virtue, and thence lead their thoughts on to a gratefull and reverential Contemplation of him, that both made them out of nothing, and bestowed them freely, upon no motive of worthiness in the receivers: and in order to the manifestation of his *Longanimity*, and *Clemency*, he therefore suspends their punishment, *ut tempus habeant, quo in se descendant, atque resipiscant*, as the holy Father expresseth it, that they may have both time enough to discover, and opportunities to repent and reforme their heynous enormities. (2.) *Of the Virtuous*, in a threefold respect; *first*, that he might become an Exemplar of mansuetude, patience, and long suffering to them; *secondly*, that the tyranny and oppression of Ungodly men might serve to actuate and exercise those Virtues in them, which otherwise had wanted an opportunity to display their Sovereign and all-conquering efficacy: and *thirdly*, that they might extract to themselves a Cordial out of the poysonous Fate of others: *i. e.* when they shall observe those, who dayly bathed themselves in rivers of Voluptuousness, to be by Divine revenge on a suddain precipitated into the black Sea of misery, they may recruite their Confidence, that the same Justice will, in his own appointed time, more then compensate their momentary objections, and convert their night of obscurity and trouble into a glorious day of interminable Delectation.

Article 7.
Those apparent
Evils, which
Providence Di-
vine consignes
to Virtuous
men, anatomi-
zed; and found
to be real Goods
intrinsically.

Having thus precisely dissected the *Apparent Good*, which Divine Providence allots to *Evil men*, as their portion to this life; and found it to be, as painted fire, bright but comfortless, or such at best, whose Abuse aggravates the Guilt, and upon consequence, the misery of the receivers: it will no less conduce to the rectification of our distorted judgements, and so to the cure of our depraved Affections, to anatomize also the other Ventricle in the heart of the objection, viz. the *Apparent Evil* frequently assigned to *Good men*.

If *Felicity* be the Daughter of *Virtue*, as the Philosopher most judiciously, τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια, εὐδαιμονία, *perfecta virtutis actio est beatitudo* (*magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 4.*) and *Virtue* the daughter of *Wisdom*, as the same, ζῶντας αἰ ἀρεταὶ

'αρεταὶ καὶ δούλων ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορίω, *Virtutes omnes, in Anima parte rationali sint, necesse est, (lib. ejusd. cap. 1.)* and if the *Wisdom* of God be infinitely more perfect than the *Wisdom* of man, as all justly confess; then assuredly can they only be *happy*, who conform their *Wills* to the *Will* of the *Highest Wisdom*: now *Good men*, in all conditions of their lives, and all the changes of *Fortune*, still submit their desires and affections to the *Will* of *Divine Providence*; therefore are they constantly *happy*, and consequently those *seeming Evils*, which befall them, prove real *Goods*, that implicate resignation of themselves, and that equanimity wherewith they entertain those *External Evils*, instantly altering their malignity, dulcifying their amaritude, and converting them unto *Intrinsic Blessings*.

This Argument (without ostentation, I profess it) was the ground upon which I erected me a Sanctuary to secure my judgement in, when the multiplied stormes of Adversity, raised by the impetuous winds of our Civil Wars, had beaten me from all other probability of shelter. For taking this for my *Hypothesis*, that man, in this life, wants only so much of *Happiness*, as he doth of *Obedience*, so much of *Content*, as he doth of *absolute Conformity* to the good will of *Providence*; I inferred, that no man can be truly miserable, but he that makes himself so, nor any man really happy, but he that hath pared off the bias of *Affection* from his mind, and fitted it to run smooth and even in the level of *Indifferency*, as to the *Goods* of *Fortune*, having no other mark, but *Fiat Voluntas Dei*. And, having first humbly implored the assistance of *Divine Grace* to enable me to reduce this excellent lesson into practice, I wore it as a sacred charme or *Pentacle* on my breast, and thereby become Shot-free from all the bullets of an angry *Fortune*: nor did I feel that to be a considerable *loss*, which the conquest and rapine of an insulting *Enemy* called my totall *ruine*; but could with more constant and internal alacrity sing *Pæans* to Heaven, for this victory over my *Pusillanimity*, then did the triumphant *Foe*, for his, over my *Royal Master* and his loyal *Armies*.

Article 8.
The Authors
Sanctuary
wherein he secured his mind from discontent, in all those stormes of Calamities, which our late Civil war showed upon him.

Lect.

Article 9.
Virtue, a meer
Chimera, with-
out the occur-
sion of those
things, which
Sensuality calls
Evil.

Let us take away those things, which the delusion of Sensuality call's *Evils*, and *Virtue* must then be, what the mistaken Libertine will have it, a bare *Notion*, or empty *Terme*, as neer of kin to a Chimera, as one of *Plato's Ideas*: For what would become of *Magnanimity*, if there were no *danger*? what of *Patience*, if there were no *sufferings*, &c. *Marcell sine adversario virtus*, and every man knows that the *Insignia*, or Coat-arms of a gallant mind, is a *Palme tree*, that thrives by oppression, with an orient *Pyropus*, or *Carbuncle* suspended on its trunk, which deradiates the most refulgent splendor in the darkeft night, as *St Austin* (*lib. 2. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 16.*) out of ancient *Lapidaries* hath affirmed, and *Bernhard. Casius* (*de mineral. p. 556.*) on the testimonic of many modern *Mineralogists*, asserted. This the *Orator* glanced at, when in derision of their ignorant *Malice*, who had attempted to blast the *Laurel* on *Cato's front*; he smiles out this character of a well-ordered Mind: *At etiam eo negotio M. Catonis splendorem maculare voluerunt, ignari quid gravitas, quid integritas, quid magnitudo animi, quid denique Virtus valeret; quæ in tempestate sæva quæta est, & lucet in tenebris, & pulsa loco manet tamen, atque hæret in patria, splendetque per se semper, neque alienis unquam sordibus obsolescit.* (*orat. pro P. Sextio.*)

Article 10.
The Sense, no
competent Cri-
terion of the
Good or Evil
of the mind.

I sayd, those things which the delusion of Sensuality call's *Evils*; for tis no *Kenodox* or novelty of my own, that the *palate* of the *body* is no competent judge of the *sweets* of the *Soul*; that the bitterest *Potions*, are the most magisterial *Julebs* to extinguish the fevers of *Lust*; and the abstinence of *Poverty*, the surest prophylactick to prevent the *Tumors* and *Inflammations* of the mind; that a wise man is sensible of more true delight, in one *Affliction*, then *Nero* or *Lucullus* ever felt in all the pompous and studied *luxury* of their lives; and that the tears of *sorrow* are not half so Salt, nor corroding, as those expressed by immoderate *Laughter*. This those *Heroes* well experimented, who even in the *Calmes* of their state, have voluntarily cast all the *Goods of Fortune* over board; as unnecessary luggage, that might hazard

hazard sinking of their vessels, in a storme, but could never pass for current merchandise on the exchange of Happiness. What a voluminous *Legend* could a good *Collector* make of those *Princes*, who have gladly resigned their imperial *Scepters*, for a more portable and smooth *Shepherds staff*? of those *Potentates*, who have with smiles quitted the noise and tumult of their magnificent *Palaces*, for the soft murmurs of a *Wilderness*? of those *Cræsus*, who have cut off the ponderous bunches of Wealth from their own wearied backs, and reduced their spacious *Treasuries* to a *scrip* and *bottle*? of those holy *Prelates*, who have relinquished their *Episcopia*, or ample *Sees*, and retired themselves to some coole and silent *Hermitage*? How many victorious *Generals* have thrown down their leading staves, in the heads of their mighty and obedient *Armies*, and withdrawn into obscure *Cottages*, there to learn a nobler militia of conquering their rebellious *Passions*? How many *Noble Persons*, as high in Honour and Power, as Ambition it self could wish, have chearfully torn off their venerable *Purple*, and disguised themselves in contemptible *rags*; changed their august and Dithyrambick *Titles* into a vulgar and easy *Monosyllable*; and left their *native soyle* for a contemplative recess in some empty *Island*? in fine, of those *Worthies*, who in their spring of life, their canicular days of pleasure, the Jubile of unphysick't *Health*, the Zenith of *Riches* and *Honour*; have contentedly shook hands with all this *vexatious Vanity*, and fervently courted not only the loathsome solitude of *Prison*, but even that affrighting *Skeleton*, *Death*: as those things which promised more real content, then all their former enjoyments? And since they did all this upon no necessity, but that compulsion of their own rectified *Wills*: what reason have we to account *Poverty*, *Exile*, *Sorrow*, *obscurity*, *sickness*, *Imprisonment*, nay *Death* it self, such absolute *Evils* of themselves, as never to be alienated from their malignity, and converted into *Goods*, by the Chymistry of a *Virtuous mind*? What reason have we to conceive, that those *Generous Spirits* would have complained of the injustice of Gods Providence; if he had bin pleased to have allotted them the same apparent *Evils*, and consigned them to the same sufferings?

The *Wiseman* considers, that if the rapine of his Enemies, the oppression of Tyranny, the devouring jaws of Fire, or other sinister Accident deprive him of his *estate*; yet notwithstanding he loseth nothing, that was *properly his own*: if he be tormented in his *body*; that his raggs of *Flesh* are torn off, his mud-walled Cottage shattered, but that impatient Tenant, his *Soul*, remains whole and invulnerable. In a word, as the tall *Olympus* advanceth his intempered head above the clouds, and with a smooth front looks down upon the pageantry of Thunder, and other vaporeing Meteors of the *Aer*: so doth the head of a *Virtuous Person* stand above the Clouds of Misfortunes, and with a magnanimous bravery bid defiance to Adversity, in all the Foggs of trouble still conserving the serenity of his mind imperturbed. *Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest. Non miscentur Contraria. Quemadmodum tot amnes tantum supernè dejectorum imbrium, tanta medicamentorum vis fontium, non mutant saporem maris, nec remittunt quidem: ita adversarum rerum impetus viri fortis non vertit animum, manet in statu, & quicquid evenit, in suam colorem trahit. Est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit, & alioquin quietus placidusque contra incurrentia attollitur: Omnia adversa, exercitationes putat. &c.* sayth the grave *Seneca* (*lib. de Providentia*.) Who having tuned his meditations to this heigh Key, falls not only into a profuse Encomium of that saying of his admired Cynick, *Demetrius*; *Nihil mihi videtur infelicius eo, cui nil unquam evenit adversi*, nothing in my judgement can be more unhappy, then he who never tasted of Adversity: but into this *Paradox* also, that the condition of *Regulus*, in his nayled barrel, was as far from real *Infelicity*, as that of the great *Mecenas* solacing his pamperd limbs on a couch of down. For weighing the constant and invincible *Patience* of the one, against the perpetual *Anxiety* or civil war in the breast of the other, he concludes, *quod dubium sit, an electione Fati data, plures Reguli nasci, quam Mecanates velint*; that it may be disputed whether or no, if men might elect their own Fates, the greater number would not rather choose to be born under the angry stars of the *former*, then the flattering constellation of the *latter*:

ἔλεγε αἰσχρῶς,
τὸν αἰσχρῶς
μὴ φέρουσα.
Bias.

so indifferent are those things to a Wise man, which the judgement of the *Sense* hath denominated *Good* and *Evil*.

This magnanimous temper of a Virtuous Mind, those Ideots never so much as heard of, who have objected; *that it would have bin more consistent with the justice of Divine Providence, rather constantly to have preserved Good men from affliction, then to subject them to the malice and oppression of Evil men, and afterward seem to vindicate their integrity, and compensate their sufferings, by a late remuneration of happiness, and the punishment of their Oppressors.*

For even Good men themselves esteem those acute *Afflictions*, as a *Diploma* or Testimonial of their genuine Education in the Academy of *Virtue*, and, like Veteran Souldiers, produce the scars of their wounds, as so many indeleble characters of *Valour*, and consequently of *Honour*. They look upon their smartest stripes, as the faire impresses of Gods *paternal Affection*; and return him a patient submission to his frequent chastisements, as the most gratefull sacrifice of *Gratitude*, their frail and indigent condition can afford. They account their temporal *Dejections*, not only an undeniable *symbol* of his *Special Favour*, in this military state; since they manifest them to be elected by him, *non ad molliem, sed ad tolerantiam*, not to dull and inglorious effeminacy, but honourable hardship, and masculine achievements: but also as an *Ἀππαλλών*, or *Earnest* of their eternal advancement, in the Jubile, when he shall distribute his triumphant wreaths of Laurel, such whose Verdure shall know no decay, till the impossible period of *Eternity*. Thus the *Valiant*, with noble emulation, contend for priority in enterprises of the highest difficulty and most eminent danger; and then think themselves in most grace and reputation with their General, when he vouchsafes them the honour of the *Forlorn Hope*, and consignes them to encounter a whole Host of Deaths. Thus the *Lacedemonian* youngsters measured the affection of their *Parents*, and *Tutors*, not by their *indulgence*; but the severity of their *chastisements*: and embraced their smartest flagellations as welcome opportunities to experiment their *Constancy*. And thus the *Wives of Ruscia*

Article II.

The Atheists objection, that God ought, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil; expunged.

estimate their Husbands love, not by the frequency of their *Conjugal Embraces*, but of their *Castigations*: and then bewaile themselves as more then halfe repudiated, when their matrimonial Lords neglect to afford them the benevolence of the *Lash*. And yet for all this shall man, noble man, who is the *Souldier*, *Sonne*, and *spouse* of *Providence*, so far forget his *courage*, *constancy*, and *duety*, as to repine against those things as *Evil*; which are, by the *Supreme Wisdome*, intended for his *Good*, nay which a mind, imbued with the soveraigne *Tincture of Virtue*, hath a power, were they real *Evils*, to convert into inestimable *Benefits*?

Article 12.
The *Summum bonum* of this life, consistent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will.

I do not only assent unto, but gratefully applaud their judgements, who have defined the essence of *Good* and *Evil*, in this life, by the *Truth* or *Falshood* of *Opinion*; experience informing me, that the *Sensual Appetite* of some apprehendeth many things under the title of absolute and transcendent *Goods*, which the *Rational Appetites* of others abhor, as positive and detestable *Evils*.

And therefore, when the soul sits in consult upon the Election of *Good*, she ought first to wipe her eyes from all the dust of *Sensual Prejudice*, and resolve that the *Vote of Temporal interest* shall goe for nothing, but disturbance and seduction; fixing her Cogitations only upon that pathognomonick, or proper and inseparable, and therefore infallible signe, by which the *Wisdom* of *God* hath described what's really *Good*; and that is, an *indifferency to all objects but himself*, or a *free and totall resignation of our Wills to his*, or more precisely, *if he hath appointed it*.

Article 13.
An excellent meditation of *Marcus Antoninus*, concerning the *Good* and *Evil* occurrent to man in this life.

This most excellent lesson, that Stoical Emperor, *Marcus Antoninus* had often read by the meer *light of Nature*, and endeavouring to reduce it into practice, whispers this maxime to himself: *Τὸ ὃ ἐπιθυμῶ, ἢ ὡς εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, μὴ προσεδέτω τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἕξ αὐτοῦ; opinionum autem mali aut boni adsentire mens*

non debet (lib. de seipso 5. numer. 18.) and in one short meditation staves the whole Controversie concerning the good and evill occurrences to man ; which for that reason , I heer present to the Reader. Dicit aliquis: infelicem me, cui hoc acciderit ! quinimo, felicem me, qui hunc casum sine dolore perferam, & nec presentibus frangar, nec futura extimescam ! Nam unicuique tale quid potuit accidere : at non cuiusvis erat, sine dolore eum casum excipere. Cur igitur illud potius infortunio, quam hoc felicitati adscribis ? Aut cur id infelicitatem hominis appellas, in quo nihil mali passa est hominis natura ? An verò tibi humana natura damnum videri potest id, quod non est contra propositum natura ejus ? Quod ergo natura propositum esse didicisti ? Num casus iste efficere poterit, quominus sis justus, magnanimus, temperans, prudens, circumspèctus, tutus ab errore, verecundus, liber ? aut adimere omnino quicquam eorum, que hominis nature sunt propria ? Proinde quoties inciderit quicquam quod ad dolorem te provocet ; recordare hujus præcepti : non illud quod accidit infortunium verè esse, sed quòd fortiter illud feras, id felicitati tribuendum esse. (lib. 4. numero 31.)

“ Some man [perchance] says, that I am unhappy, to
 “ whom this infortune hath hapned ! Nay, rather may he say,
 “ that I am happy, who can endure this misfortune without grief;
 “ and am neither dejected with the present, nor afraid of future
 “ Accidents. For the like might have befallne any other man :
 “ but ’twas not in the power of every one to sustain that mis-
 “ fortune without grief. Why, therefore, doe you ascribe that
 “ rather to misfortune, then this to Felicity ? or why account
 “ that to be an infelicity of man, wherein the Nature of man
 “ hath suffered nothing of Evil ? Can that seem to you to be an
 “ Injury to Humane Nature, which is not contrary to the in-
 “ tention thereof ? What, therefore, hast thou learned the
 “ Intention of Nature to be ? Can this misfortune effect, that
 “ thou mayest be les just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent,
 “ circumspèct, superior to error, modest, free ? Or can it take
 “ from thee any of those things, which are proper to the Nature
 “ of man ? So often, therefore, as any Accident shall occur,

“ which may provoke thee to grief ; remember this Precept :
 “ that what happens , is not truly Misfortune ; but that thou
 “ canst bear it nobly, is a Happiness.

More then this, I can not, need not say, in order to the refutation of this Objection : and therefore I remit the *unsatisfied* to the more profound, elegant, and ample discourse of the learned *Mornaus Du Plessis* (*lib. de veritate Christiana Religionis, cap. 12.*) on the same subject ; and leave the *satisfied* to the calme enjoyment of their persuasion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

*The Mobility of the Terme of Mans
Life, asserted.*

S E C T. I.

HAVING thus by Apodictical and uncontrollable Reasons made it manifest, that all things in the Universe, as well Generals, as Particulars, Contingents as Necessaries, are in the means, manner, opportunity and finality of their Operations, precisely predetermined, disposed, and procured by the General Providence of God; that all Occurrences of every individual mans life, are the prescripts and consignations or allotments of his Special and Paternal Providence; and by the meer Light of Nature dispelled all those clouds, which either ancient Ethnicisme, or modern Atheisme hath exhaled from the abyss of Hell, to obscure the splendor of both those excellent truths: it remains only, that we deduce the influence of Divine Providence down to the *Catastrophe*, or *Exit* of life, or prove the extension of it to the point of *Death*; and endeavour a compendious and plain decision of that tedious and enigmatical Controverſie, *An terminus Vitæ humane sit immobilis? Whether the period of every individual mans life be so immoveably fixt by the Special Providence of God, that it can be neither by any negligence, immoderate and inordinate*

Article 1.
The Affinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a *specific* and *individual* consideration.

inordinate use of those things Physicians call the Six Nonnaturals, or suddain Casualties, anticipated or abbreviated; nor by prudence, temperance, convenient Medicaments, or caution, prolated or prolonged?

For the first; viz.

Article 2.
The reasons of
the Authors
concise tracta-
tion of the first
part.

That God is the sole *Moderator*. though not the *Author* of *Death* (for reason will not endure that we conceive him to have created a *Privation*;) or, more plainly, that the hand of his Providence guides the dart of that inevitable and victorious Enemy to life; this is a position so frequently and amply illustrated by the pens of many the most learned and judicious men of all ages, religions, and professions; and so genuinely and directly inferrible from the Context and importance of those Arguments formerly introduced, in order to the Demonstration of the interest of Providence, even in the smallest interludes of Nature, and most apparently fortuitous effects of all subordinate Causes: that, should we run out into any profuse probation thereof, in this place, the most patient and candid Reader could not but frown at the attempt, and justly censure it, non only as unnecessary and supererogatory, but also as scandalous and derogatory to his own Dialectical and Collective abilities. And therefore humbly referring him as well to his own easy recognition of notions formerly collected from the lecture of other more mature and nervous Discourses on the same Theorem; as his familiar Inductions upon many propositions insperfed upon the leaves of this our cold and dull Decembers Exercise: I shall, in avoydance of an undecent Chasme, or Vacuity, insert only two concise and obvious Arguments, as *Corollaries*, or annexes inservient to the same perswasion.

Article 3.
The moderatio
of Death by
Special Providence
Divine,
argued from
the impossibili-
ty of the mo-
deration there-
of by any other
power.

Argument 1.

The life, and consequently the Death of every man necessarily depends upon the absolute *Will* of the *Creator*, and so upon the *Decrees* or resolves of his *Providence*; or upon some other *Principle* extraneous, alien, and superior to the nature of man;

or

or upon *man himself*. Not upon any *Third* or *Neutral Principle*; for that must be either the Epicureans *Fortune*; or the Stoicks *Anus Fatidica* or *Fate*; or *Homers Lottery*; or *Pythagoras* his *Συστοιχίασις*, mentioned by *Plutarch* (*de placit. 1.*) or the Jews *Angelus mortis*, or their terrible she Devil *Zilith* described by our many-tongued *Gregory* (*in tract. de Episcopo puerorum*, out of the *Glossa Talmud. in Nidda, fol. 24.*) and erroneously conceived, by *Gaffarel* (*Unheard of Curiosities, pag. 317.*) to be the same with *Lucina* of the Romans, for the one was thought propitious to parturient women, the other so hostile and malignant, that the Hebrew Wives, so soon as they fell in travel, caused this proscription to be written on the doore of their bed-chamber, *Adim, Chavah, ehouts Lilith; Adam, Eve, keep out Lilith*; or the Astrologers *Helec* and *Alcocoeden*, and the like *χέρους & διαθίσις* of the Planets called *χρωναπαλογία* or *Fridaria*, derided by *Archangelus a Burgo novo* (*in Comment. in dogmat. Cabalist.*) and *Scaliger* (*in Comment. in Manilium*) or the *Numbers, Ideas, or grand Revolution of Plato*; or the *Malus Deus* of the Manachees; or *Helena*, aliàs *Selene*, of *Simon Magus*; or *Hefiods Pandora*; or the great Beldam *Mylitta*, aliàs *Alytta*, of the Echnicks; or the Turks *Nassub*, aliàs *Ctusura*, which signifies the Goddess *Fortune*; or *Paracelsus* his *Anima mundi Platonica*, or rather the Macrocosmical Harmony of the Universe, and the Microcosmical Concordance with the invisible signatures of the Ascendent; or that *Hermetico-magical Lamp of life and death*, lately invented and cryed up by *Ernestus Burchgravius*, but most judiciously extinguisht by *Sennertus* (*de Consensu Chymicorum cum Galen. cap. 18.*) or that *Internal man of Paracelsus*, named *Ens syderium, Olympicum, Gabalim, &c.* by that vaine admirer and promoter of Hermetical Follies, *Oswaldus Crollius* (*in Basil. Chym. pifat. admonit. p. 6.4. & 65.*) or the implacable *Strix*, or *Erinnys* of the Gentiles; or, finally, some such fantastique Hobgoblin, that hath no more of reality, then what it borrows from the confused and obscure idea of it self, conceived in the luxuriant womb of a perturbed or deluded Imagination: but every sober man already knows, that all these are absolute Chi-

mera's, hatched in the adled brains of mad men, Poets, and idolatrous Pagans; and so below our laughter, much more our serious Confutation. Not upon *Man himself*, or any domestick Conservatory essentially inherent to his Nature. For that absurdity once conceded, entangles our reason in two the highest Impossibilities imaginable; (1) it confounds the Relative Maximes of Nature, breaks her chain of Dependence, and infers a second *Self-existence* beside Divinity; for, dreaming that a Principiate Entity actually existent, gave to it self existence; that a Future something derives its *υπιδουσία*, or *Futurition* immediately and solely from it self; and that nothing can, by its own power, attain to be something, *i. e.* that which is neither *Potentia*, nor *Actus*, can endow it self with the perfection of both *Power* and *Act*; we must be carried upon this rock, that there is in the World a second something *ἀναρχον, ἀναίτιον & ἀύλαστον*, *Non principiate, Causeless, and Self-sufficient*, besides *God*; which is a falshood far beyond the *two Principles of all things* imagined by the *Manichees*, and more ridiculous then the Devils promise to make our *Saviour* Monarch of the World. (2) It imports an absolute power in man to make himself *immortal*; a Delusion that never found entertainment in the brain of the most desperate Hypochondriack, nor durst the Father of lies ever suggest it to his most credulous vassals. It follows therefore of pure necessity, that as *God* is the *Author of life*; so alio can he alone *dispose of the issues of Death*, and that the *end*, as well as the *beginning and mutations* of all things are subject to the moderation of his *Providence*.

Article 4.
The same demonstrated, from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the First Mover.

Argument 2.

A confessed Verity it is, that all *Natural Motion* must proceed from one *First Motor*, which can be no other but *God*, untill we can find out something coequal to him in *Eternity*; and a position never yet disputed, that the *life of man* is a *Natural Motion*, to which the *Apostle* seemes to allude in his sacred axiome, *εἰς θεὸν ζῶμεν, & κινούμεθα, & ἔσμεν*, *in God we live, move and have our being* (*Act. 17. ver. 28.*) and of parallel certaintie

it

it is, that every motion hath its determinate *beginning, duration, and period*, dependent on the *Will* of the *First Mover*: therefore must the end as necessarily as the beginning and continuation of mans *life*, his *Death* as well as his conception, nativity, and maturity be certainly commensurated, defined, and limited by the *Special Providence of God*. Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the monuments of the most *Ethnical Philosophers*; nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability, if we conjecture, that our Patriarch, *Galen* (in most other things, but weakly armed against their censure, who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithite, *'Αθεολογίατος*, an Atheist of the highest Classis) had his mind touched with the same Magnet, at that time, when he wheeled about from his old position of a meer *Naturalist*, and pointed directly at the pole of *Divine Providence*, in these words, *δραῶσαι πάντα ὅσα προέβλεπον* (2. de usu part.) *God hath done all things, that he had formerly decreed to do.*

D d 2

SECT:

S E C T. II.

For the second;

Article I.
A transient discovery of the almost insuperable Difficulties to be encountered in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, whether the Term of mans life be Moveable, or Fatal; premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a middle way between the absolute Fatality of the Stoick, and the meer Fortune of the Epicurean.

MORE than sufficient reason had I, to call it a *Tedious* and *Enigmatical* Controversie. For, first, the obscurity of the Subject (being such whose clear imperceptibility hath worthily listed it among the *θρυμασά*, or secrets of Gods Council, proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential *Wonder*, then exercise our sawcy *Curiosity*) hath unhinged the brains of most, who have essayd to explain it, and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions, discrepant *ἄσπον ἑπάρδς ἐς* *ἀπὸ γαίης*, as far as heaven and earth each from other, and left future enquiry instructed rather what to *avoid*, then what to *follow*: infomuch that the learned and profound *Job. Beverovicus*, whose flame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits, on this side the line, into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular; when he had received, perused and indifferently perpended their severall *Epistological responses*, found himself still perplex't with his former tremor of Scepticisme, and therefore confessed; *super hac re nuper plures consului, qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio, mihi certe penitus satisfacere non poterunt; in tanta itaque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixerim cum Xenophonte apud Varronem, Hominis est hac opinari, Dei scire.* And again, whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympick exercise, by deciding the quæstion on the side of Truth; must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between *absolute Fate* and mans *Freewill*: must clearly distinguish between the certain *Prescience*, and immutable *Predestination*, or *Predetermination*, of the *Divine Intellect* and *Will*, (a task not to be undertaken after dinner, nor performed upon one leg; as must soon

soon appear to him, who sufficiently excogitates, how hardly the blunt edge of mans understanding can divide betwixt the *Providence* of God, and his positive *Decrees* settled from all eternity: since *Cognition, Election, Volition, and Decretion* make but one simple and entire act in his *Intellect*; nor can reason make out, how God can *Foresee* meer *Contingents*, while they are yet in the nothing of *Futurity*, unless because he hath preordained the means, place, time, and other circumstantial requisites to their respective *Contingencies*) must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolemen, whether any of Gods *Decrees* are *Hypothetical* or *Conditionate*, and so subject to mutation upon mans observation, or non-observation of the *Condition*, or proviso on his part to be performed? and, lastly, must solve that Scruple, *An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam, or, An conditionata Dei voluntas ullum faciat decretum de futurorum eventu?* Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God (if any such there be) doth import an absolute and immutable Decree, concerning the event of things to come? *Problems*, about which not only the gravest *Philosophers* have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hack't and slash't for many ages together; but even the *Church* her self hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rent her seamless coate of *Faith* into such numerous and wide *Schismes*, that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the *Jews*, then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her *Sects*. Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Phrensy of *Vanity*, as not to know how immense a disproportion lyeth between the utmost extent of my short judgement, and the center of the nearest of these *Abstrusities*; but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my *Presumption*, as *Capacity*, I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me, to have collected so much light from the beams of *Mersennus, Episcopius* and others, as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a middle way betwixt the *Absolute Fatality* of the *Stoicks*, on one extreme; and the absolute *Fortune* of the *Epicureans*, on the other. The *First* whereof strains the cord of *Predestination* up to the height of *inevitable Necessity*; and so

leaves nothing in the power either of Mans *Free-will*, or the conspiracies of *Second Causes*; nay chain's up the hands of the *First Cause* in fetters of *Adamant*, according to that of the *Poet*.

*Fatis agimur, cedite fatis.
Non sollicita possunt cura
Mutare rati stamina fusi.
Quicquid patimur mortale genus,
Quicquid agimus, venit ex alto.
Non illa Deo vertisse liceo
Quae nexa suis currunt Causis.*

By *Fate* we are impell'd; submit
To what the *Destinies* think fit.
That thread, by 'th *Fatal Damsels* spun,
By our *Cares* can nere b' undone.
What we *act*, what *undergoe*,
From their fixt *Decrees* doth flow.
Jove himself cannot controll
What doe's from linked *Causes* rowl.

As also that of *Seneca* (*de providentia*, where he had the reason to speak it:) *Quicquid est, quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori: eadem necessitate & Deos alligat. irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus. vehit, ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. semper paret: semel jussit.* The *Others* cut it quite afunder, and so relaxing the ligaments of *Providence Divine*, leave all Events to the loose and undetermined results or hits of meer *Chance*: but both concurring in the most bloody Error of *Irreligion*. But the concernment of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular, exprest, and ample enquiry, how that long Civil war betwixt these three different *Notions* of *Fate*, *Fortune*, and *Free-will*, may be conciliated and brought to a full Combination and Consistence with *Divine Providence*.

In the meane time, that we may, both with more decent Method, and perspicuity, attain to some verisimilous (at least) solution of our present Problem, viz. *Whether the Term of mans life (in individuo) be so immoveably prefixt by the Decrees of Divine Providence, as that neither temperance or care on mans part can extend, nor the violence of second Causes, situate without the orb of his moderation, accelerate it?* Necessary it is, that we seriously examine and search into the marrow of two things conductive to the right stating, and consequently the right understanding of the Question: (1) *What we are to understand by the Term of Life:* (2) *In what sense we are to understand this Term to be fixt, or moveable.*

What we are to understand by the Term of Life.

Concerning the *First*; obvious it is, that all things, or causes inservient both to the Conservation of life and the adduction of its period, Death, fall under the contents of *three General heads*; for either they must refer to those that are *Necessary*, or such as, by the ordinary course of Nature, no man can subsist without, to which classis belong our Aliment, Aer, sleep, &c. or (2) *Non necessary* or *Fortuitous*, which no way conduce to the Fomentation or fuel of our Vital Flame, but point blank to the Extinction of it; and therefore the instinct of nature perswades every man to avoyd them; such are Shipwracks, stabbs, shots, precipices, halts, &c. causes of immature, suddain and violent deaths: or (3) *Meerely Supernatural*, or the Will of God, which as it is impossible (without Special Divine Revelation) for us to foreknow, so also to alter, or prevent. Upon these three pillars was it, that *Laurentius Joubertus* erected his *triple Difference* of the *Term of mans life*; making one *Supernatural*, such as the Breath of our nostrils was pleased to assign to most of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, or Seminares of Humanity, either in order to the more expedite multiplication of mankind, to the more advantageous invention and propagation of Arts and Sciences, or for some other considerable respect, at which our ignorance

Article 2.

Two previous considerable, necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question.

Article 3.

The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three General heads, viz. *Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural*; supports the discrimination of the *Term of life* into *Supernatural, Natural, & Accidentary*; & the impertinency of the consideration of the *Supernatural Term*, to the present scope.

ignorance can only squint by conjecture: which being long since cancelled, Art fits down in a contented despaire to renovate, nor can the records of the world afford us the story of any impudence, that durst rant so high, as to promise it, except that of a certain Mountebanck *Greek*, derided by *Galen*, and our late Nugipolyloquides, *Paracelsus*; both which experimentally confuted their own unpardonable Arrogance, before their sands had run out 50 years. Another *Natural*, which Physiologie defines by that space of time, during which our radical Balsam, or the oleaginous Fewel of our vital Lamp, maintains the innate Heate, or Flame of life, untill the total exhaustion of the one, causeth a total privation of the other; or, more plainly, that circle of time, which comprehends the *seven Segments* or *Ages* of man; which, though prestitute and limited, by the Governour of Nature, according to the compute of the *Psalmist*, to 80. years, of *Plato* to 81. of the *Egyptians* to 100. (*Calius Rodiginus*, 19. *antiq. Lect. cap. 21.* & *Ioh. Langius*, lib. 1. *Epist. Medicinal.* 79.) of the best of the *Sibylys* to a 100. as is exprest in those 2. verses corrected by the incomparable *Salmasius* (*Pliniarum observat. pag. 77.*)

Ἄλλ' ὅποσον μάλιστα ἴν χρόνος ἀνθρώποισι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑπτῶν ἑξαλοῦσάδα κύκλον ὀδεύσας;

And of the ancient *Jews*, to 120. (*Ioseph. Antiq. Judaic. lib. 1.*) is yet left to some considerable latitude, and hath more or less of Duration, respective to the more or less durability of the Principles of life, *i. e.* the *Eucrasy*, or *Dyscrasy* of the body, in every individual; provided that neither the oyle be inquinated by crude, or putrid Supplies, nor prodigally depredated by immoderate intension of its consumer, the Flame, nor that immaturely either suffocated, or wasted by Diseases, or suddainly extinguished by violent *Accidents*; which make the third *Difference*, or *Accidental Term of life*.

But as for the first branch of this Ternary, the *Metaphysical*, or *Supernatural Term of mans life*, dependent on the *Divine Will* immediately; since according to the doctrine of *Nicholaus Florentinus* (*in Serm.*) the *Conciliator* (*in different. Medicis*) and

and *Joubertus* (*in Errorib. popular.*) it concerns only the *first Age* of the World: this place may very conveniently want any farther consideration thereof; nor can it much avail to the achievement of our design, to insist upon more then the *two last*.

By the *Term of life*, therefore, we ought to understand either (1) that period of every individual mans days, which is caused by a sensible decay, and total dissolution of the ligaments, which chain the Soul to the Body; or, more expressly, by an extinction of his *Vital Flame*, naturally succeeding upon a consumption of its *Pabulum*, or fuel, the *Radical Moisture*, when both those Principles of life are permitted to their natural and proper tenor, *i. e.* when no *Preternatural Cause* intervenes, and by Corruption anticipates the dissolution of that Disposition or Temperament of the Elements of the body, upon which the subsistence of life doth necessarily depend: or (2) the end of every mans life, in general, whensoever, and by what means soever, either Diseases, or violent and unexpected Accidents, introduced; without any respect to the gradual and successive declination, and consequent cessation of the Natural Temperament, in the *marasmus* of old age.

Now from the acceptation of the Term of Life, in the *First* signification, there genuinely emerge *Two Questions*:

First, Whether this Term of life, which is circumscribed, *per ipsius temperamenti defluxum & decursum*, by the natural *Deflux*, or wearing out of the requisite Temperament of the body, and which we may, without impropriety, call a kind of *mature*, easy and spontaneous falling asunder of the Ligaments of life; be absolutely and definitely fixt, so that *God* hath constituted to leave the nature of every Individual to its own moderation, nor by any means to interrupt or alter its course prescribed: *i. e.* not by any means to procure, that this *Deflux* of the Temperament should have more or less duration, then what may naturally be expected from the more or less durability thereof, dependent on the more or less perfect proportion, that the *Passive*

E c and

Article 4.
The proper import of the *Natural Term* of mans life: and also of the *Accidental*.

Article 5.
The result of our acceptation of the *Term* of life, in the *first* signification.

and *Active Principles* hold each to other; or, more plainly, that the *Renitency* or *Resistance* of the *Oyle* holds to the depre-datory and consumptive *Activity* of the *Flame*.

Secondly, if this Term of life be thus *Fixt*, and that God indeed hath decreed not to intend or prolong that *Deflux* of the *Temperament*, beyond the point of its natural *Durability*; whether yet notwithstanding, without alteration of his Decree of committing *Nature* to its own establish'd course, he may not, being thereunto moved by our repentance, prayers, and piety, correct those depravities, and repaire those violent decays of that our temperamental *Constitution*, occasioned by intemperance, diseases, extraneous *Accidents*, or other means whatever; and so hinder the otherwise impendent immature *Collabescence*, and precipitous *Dissolution* thereof? In a word; Whether, though God hath predetermined, that no man shall exceed that Term of life, to which the *Durability* of his individual *Temperament*, or the strength of his particular *Constitution* may, in probability, be extended; his *Special Providence* doth not yet suffer, that, by reason of putrefactive and destructive *Preter-natural Causes* occurrent, the temperament may be vitiated, impaired, and ruined: and so not hold out to that point of time, to which otherwise, in respect of its primigenious and native condition, it might have lasted?

Article 6.
The consequence of our understanding the Term of life, in the second signification.

But if we understand the Term of life in the *second signification*; then the *Question* must be: Whether the immature or *preternatural Period* of every individual mans life, by what means soever, either disease, famine, war, wounds, naufrage, decollation, suspension, suffocation, luxury, drunkenness, sollicitude, grief, &c. occasioned, be so precisely fixt by *Destiny*; that no prudence or caution on his part can transpoſe, nor danger of fortuitous *Accidents* invading, accelerate or prevent it? In short; Whether the *Catastrophe* of every mans life be prescribed in the book of *Fate*.

In what sense we are to understand the Term of Mans Life to be Fixt or Moveable.

As for the Second *Preconsiderable*; the Term of life may be sayd to be *Fixt* in a *twofold sense*: (1) in respect to some *positive Divine Decree*, antegredient or precedent not only to all conspiracies, but also the *Prescience* of all *Secondary or Instrumental Causes*; whereby God hath so precisely fixt and limited a certain space, or time of life to every single man, together with all relative *Circumstances*, as place, manner, or kind, and cause of Death: that it is absolutely impossible to man, what means soever he shall use to the contrary, in order to his preservation, or what dangers soever he shall have formerly exposed himself unto, notwithstanding, either to prolong his life beyond, or to fall before that *Fatal Term*. (2) In respect not to some *Absolute*, but *Hypothetical*, or *Conditionate Decree* of God: *i. e.* such whose mutation or accomplishment is suspended on the liberty, or *Free Election* of mans Will, according as that, either being conducted by the manuduction of *Light Supernatural*, or *Divine Grace*, shall pursue the real and true Good; or being seduced by the delusion of its own sensual judgements, shall wander in the devious tracts of Error, and so hunt after only apparent and false Good. Now whether we understand this *Conditionate Decree* to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible *prenotion* of all concomitant things, circumstances, manners, causes, and finally of mans election of and adherence unto *Good*, or *Evil* objects, and his consequent *Virtuous* or *vicious* course of life: or whether we understand it to be made without any such certain *prenotion*, or *Volition* of *prenotion* at all; but yet with a deliberate and positive *Sentence* certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fulness of time, or opportunity, when the right use, or abuse of this *Prerogative* or *Freedome* of the *Will*, shall be in actual determination, *i. e.* shall ripen the *Suppositionality* of the decree into *Absoluteness*, and reduce the *Possibility* thereof into actual *Necessity*: the distinction is not *Material*. For it can be of no considerable advantage to our

Article 7.
The Fixation of the Term of life, acceptable in a double interest; *viz.* (1) in respect to some *Absolute Divine Decree*, precedent even to Gods *Prescience* of all *Secondary or Instrumental Causes*; (2) to some *Hypothetical Divine Decree*, whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of mans Will. And the *indifference* of either branch of the distinction to our instant designe.

present attempt, whether of these two *Notions* we prefer; and that the reason is, why we here omit to enquire, whether holds the neereſt Cognation to truth.

Article 8.
Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Division.

From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three different opinions.

The *First*, of those, who hold it as point of faith, that the Term of every mans life, together with all means or Causes, immediate, mediate, remote, circumstantial and corollary, or in any relation whatever pertinent thereto, is absolutely immoveable and Fatal; being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistibile law of the Divine Will

The *Second*, of those, who averre the absolute *Fatality*, or *Fixation* of every individual mans Term of life, *à Posteriori*: but decline it *à Priori*, i. e. they concede, that in truth the term of every mans life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate. in this respect, that it can never be *extended* or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that, to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain: but not in this respect, that it admits no possibility of *Contraction* or *Abbreviation*.

The *Third*, of those, who allow the Term of life to be *Fatal* indeed; yet upon no higher a *Necessity*, then that of Gods meer *Prenotion*, or *hypothetical determination*, respective to mans right use, or abuse of the Liberty of his Will: and therefore not so fixt, but that it may be not only *abbreviated* but also *prolonged*; *non præsupposita ista aut prænotione, aut hypothesi citra prænotionem.*

Article 9.
The convenient reduction of them to *Two* only.

And this is the most passant Division of mens dissenting opinions concerning this intricate Subject; but if we come with naked minds to examine the state of the difference between the *last* and the *second*, we shall find them concentral in the point of *Mutability* or *Mobility*: and therefore both perspicuity and brevity perswade, that we gratefully adhere to that more convenient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem, to *two* only, offered by *Joh. Beverovicus* (*Epist. ad Simon. Episcopium*)

scopium) in words of this importance : Some maintain the Term of mans life to be fixt by the eternal and immutable law of Destiny ; and on the contrary, others contend that it is not so fixt, but that it remains moveable as well forwards as backwards, not only obnoxious to *Decurtation* or *Anticipation*, by depravities and exorbitances of the *Six Non-naturals*, by Epidemical Distempers, or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant Fortune ; but also capable of *Production* or *Postposition* by a temperate, anticachectical and cautious course of life.

Now as for the *First* of these Opinions ; 'tis generally known to have bin Canonical among the *Stoicks*, who bound up the efficiency of all things in the Universe, in the iron chaines of Fate; beleiving all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity, that their prevention, suspension, or alteration is not only above the hopes of man (whose virtuous endeavours, piety, and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion ; as vitiösities, impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecree'd) but even of God himself : whom though they allow to have bin the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny, yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof. This was the Creed of *Philetas*, when he sayd

Ἴχθυα γὰρ ἐπικρατῆ ἀνδρὸς ἀνάγκη,
 ἢρ' ἔσθ' ἀθανάτος ὑποδείδειν, διτ' ἐν ἐλύμπῳ
 Ἐκποθεν χαλεπῶν ἀχέων οἶκος ἐκάμειο.

— *Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est,
 Vi solida ; quia nec superos reveretur, in almis
 Qui Cæli spatius degunt sine luctibus ævum.*

Of that old *Poet*, quoted by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) who sayd, *quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem* : and of that renowned Captain, *Hæctor*, when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a salley upon the Græcian trenches, he

Article 10.
 The *First* opinion declared ; and the principal *Abettors* thereof mentioned.

conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidence, that no sword could reach his heart, but that of Fate, by this spell ;

*Parce, precor, nimio misera indulgere dolori ;
Nam quis me, Fatis invitis, mittet ad Orcum ?
Nullum equidem vitasse hominum dico ultima Fata.*

Prithee, forbear thy needless grief ; and know,
No hand can send me to the shades below,
Without the *Fates* assent. I hold it true,
What Fate hath destin'd, no man can eschew.

As also of those *Military* men, mentioned by *P. Gregorius Tholosanus* (*lib. 21. de republ. cap. 8.*) whose minds being seasoned with the same persuasion, that the manner and moment of every mans Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate, and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead; became of so hard a temper, as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant, Danger : nor did they account it other then a vanity, resulting from the cowardize of Ignorance, to provide against the blows of War either by caution, or defensive armes ; urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers, who have bin observed to have confronted whole showers of levelled bullets, shot from the neer engines of the advancing Foe, without a wound ; and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected pebble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny, even then, when they seemed immured in the secure Cittadel of Peace, and thought their triumphant Lawrels armour of proof even against thunder.

*Occidis, Argiva quem non potuere phalanges
Sternere, nec Priami regnorum everfor Achilles.
Hic tibi mortis erant meta, &c. Virg. 12. Aeneid.*

But, alas ! 'tis not the Academy of the *Stoicks* alone, that affords patronage to this Error of *Absolute Fatality* ; nor the *Camp* that only contends for the propagation thereof ; nor the politick

politick institutions of that Secretary of Hell, *Mahomet*, in his absurd *Alcoran* (cap. 6.) that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days: for even the *Schools of Christianity*, in some parts, have advanced the reputation thereof to so unreasonable and dangerous a height, as to make it an Article of Faith, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least collaterally conducive to Salvation; and this by Authority of the *Council of Dort*, which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle, *Calvin*, concerning *Absolute Predestination*, and enjoined the publick Assertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation.

I sayd, the *Doctrin* of *Calvin* concerning *Absolute Predestination*; thereby, though tacitly, intimating my knowledge of the no small *Disparity* between the *Fate* of the *Stoicks*, and that propugned by many *Christian Divines*. The one being, as *Chrysippus* hath defined it, *Sempiterna & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena, quæ seipsam volvit, & perpetuò implicat, per æternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus connexa est*; A sempiternal and indeclinable series, syntax, or chaine of Causes, whose turnings, convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on it self, by those eternal orders of consequence, of which it is made up and connected: the other, as the best of School men hath defined it, *Pendens à Divino Consilio series, ordoque causarum*; a series, or successive complexion and order of Causes, dependent on the Will of God. From the just Collation of which two Definitions, our first thoughts may collect, that the *Difference* between the *Stoical* and *Theological Fate*, may be thus stated.

Article 11.
The *Stoical Fate*; and the *Calvinists Predestination*, fully defined.

The *Former*, in some things, excludes *Divinity* from that round or Circle of Causes, referring all events, as well general, as particular, to the meer subsequence of *Naturall Actives* operating upon capable *Passives*, subordinately connected unto, and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular *Effects*, to the *Causation* whereof their *Natural Faculties* were at first determinately accommodated: and, in others, includes *Divinity* within it, *i. e.* confines his

Article 12.
A full and clear discrimination of the *Stoical*, from the *Theological Fate*.

Power

Power and Will to that rigid and infrangible Law of Necessity, excogitated by his Witdom from all eternity, and established by his Decree, at the inauguration of Nature to Existence. The *Later* makes the Will of God to be the first link in the chain of Causes, and so superior to the restriction of natural necessity dependent thereon. The *Stoick*, being a declared Enemy to the *Arbitrary Prerogative* of God, adligeth the Energie of the *First and Infinite Cause* to the capacity of *Secondary and Finite*; and, upon consequence, doth acknowledge neither the *Liberty* of his *Will*, nor the *Absoluteness* of his *Power*, or *Omnipotency*. But, on the Contrary, the *Christian* look's up to heaven, as the Council-house, where the Instruments, opportunity, place and success of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpose; to the *Arbitrary Resolve* of God, as the *Definite Sentence* or *Injunction*; and on all *Second Causes*, but as subordinate, and subalternally instrumental to the punctual execution and accomplishment of the same: and, upon legal consequence, concludes, that the *Divine Will* is absolutely *Free*, knowing no circumscription, but that of the *Divine Wisdome*; that the meet *Fiat* of that Council, is the *Director*, and *Spring* in the Engine of the World; and that the *Author of Nature* hath reserved to himself the *Privilege* of adding unto, detracting from, intending, remitting, inverting, transcending, or annulling the fundamental Constitutions of Nature, and so breaking that Concatenation of Causalities, or the *Chain of Fate*, at pleasure. The *Heathen* absurdly dream't that all effects are inevitably produced by the conspiracy and coefficienty of natural Causes, respectively qualified; or that all Accidents spring up from the proper tendency of their particular Efficient, without the influence, direction, or moderation of any other Virtue, besides their own native and Congenial Faculties. The more intelligent *Christian* proves, that all natural Causes doe not produce their respective Effects $\chi\tau\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\sigma$, *ex inevitabili necessitate*, by the absolute and never-failing power of their Essential Qualities, or inherent endowments; but $\chi\tau\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\chi\theta\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$, *quatenus fieri licuit*, or according to the possibility of their Contingency: and therefore, though he confesseth

fesseth that all Events are foreknown and preordained in the eternal Council of God; yet he stands assured, as well upon the ground of Reason, as Faith, that the precise and opportune contingency of every individual Event proceeds from the influence of this *Providence*, which disposeth and conjoyneth some certain convenient Causes to the production of this or that determinate Effect, in some sort respecting the last of Ends, his own *Glory*. To conclude, the *Stoick* hath clip't the immense and towering wings of *mans Will*, and allows it no wider range, then what the line of *Fate* affords: while the sublimer *Christian* scornes to stoop to the Lure of any *Necessity*, besides the special *Decrees* of the Divine Council; not conceiving his will subject to the *inclination*, much less the *compulsion*, of any force below that of him, who conferred that infinite liberty upon it. For *he*, indeed, holds the reins of our *Wills*, and can bend them: yet *non coactione violenta, sed leni suavique influxu*, not by violent *Coaction*, but gentle and sweet *Invitation*, as the *Schoolmen* distinguish.

Now if we consider *Fate* in the notion of the *Stoicks*; 'twill be no easy wonder, if any man, though his reason be never so much hoodwinckt with the veil of Prejudice, shall not at first glance discover it to be an opinion *Blasphemous in respect to God*; insomuch as it strikes at no less then the cardinal and inseparable Attribute of his Nature, *Omnipotence*, by coercing his infinite and arbitrary Activity with the definite laws of second Causes, and denying him the prerogative of absolute superiority to his mechanic Vicegerent, or (rather) Instrument, Nature: and, *in respect of man, intolerably Absurd*; since it subverts the Liberty of all humane actions, and leaves nothing in the power of mans Will either to elect, or avoide. For whoever conced's that the mind of man is subject to the compulsive regiment of Fatal Necessity, and so that all the actions of our lives are but the accomplishments of so many ineluctable, immoveable, and inevitable Decrees, from the birth of time enrolled in the Ephimerides of Destiny; must also concede, upon clear inference, that our Creator endowed us with the Semi-divine

F f

Faculty

Article 13.

A list of the execrable *Absurdities* independent on the opinion of *Absolute Fatality*; so accepted, as the *Stoick* proposeth it.

Faculty of Rationality, either to no purpose at all, or at best to facilitate our betraying our selves into the snares of ruine and misery beyond possibility of reparation or redemption; Must induce, that the Will being deposed from her arbitrary throne, the judgement seate of Reason must fall to the ground; nor can there be any room left for *Consultation* to sit and determine the debates of the Soul concerning the good or Evil of her objects: since notwithstanding all our most profound, serious, and prudent *Deliberation*, the success of our actions, as well as the results of our counsels, would then be no other, but what hath bin resolved on and predecreeed by Fate; and then, to conceive our selves obnoxious to punishment, for incurring those sins, which are imposed upon our wills by a necessity beyond our controll, is an open derogation to the equity and *Justice* of the Divine Nature, and to ascribe our *Evil* to that, which is by essence *superlatively Good*. That *Prudence*, is miserable *Folly*; the study of *Wisdom*, laborious *Vanity*; and all our ancient *Lawmakers*, either ridiculous *Fools*, or detestable *Tyrants*: since they prescribe and enjoine those things, which either we must have done, had not they injoyed them, or are restrained from doing, in spite of our own conformable inclinations, by the contrary impulsion or seduction of *Destiny*. And, finally, that all Divine and Human *Exhortation* to Good, and *Dehortation* from evil, are unnecessary and superfluous. Thus shall *Virtue* and *Vice* vanish into meet and empty notions; and *Religion* become, what Libertines would have it, a mysterious and well contrived invention to support temporall Greatness, and fright vulgar minds into a tame submission to the arbitrary dictates of their imperious Lords: nor shall there be a *Heaven* to compensate suffering *Piety*, or a *Hell* for the punition of *Villainy*; because as the Good man could not but live honestly and religiously, whether he would or no; so must it not be in the power of the Wicked man, to abstain from doing Evil. Thus shall *Love* and *Hatred*, the two most usefull Affections of our Souls, be robbed of their proper Objects, *Amiable* and *Detestable*: nor shall *Justice* find convenient subjects, whereon to place *Laudation* and *Reproberation*; since Praise only belongs to those, who have chosen

sen to do Good, when 'twas in their power to have done Evil and Dispraise is the due guerdon of those, who choose to do Evil, when twas in their power to have done Good. And thus shall all our *Prayers* be fruitless, our *vowes* hopeless, our *Sacrifices* unprofitable, and all other acts of *Devotion* desperate Vanity. The least of which and of a myriade of other equivalent Absurdities, Incongruities, and oblique, or appendent and inferrible Blasphemies, shooting up from this one poysonous root of Absolute Fatality; is more then enough inconsistent to the fundamentals both of Reason and Religion, to deterr even Heathens from approaching, much more embracing and defending it.

But as for *Theological Fate*, or *Predestination*; if accepted in the legitimate sense of the *Primitive Church*, and not in that rigorous and inflexible notion of the *German Calvinist*: I conceive it fully concordant not only to many *Texts* of Sacred writ, but even conciliable to mans *Free will*, notwithstanding the apparent repugnancy betwixt them; as I shall endeavour to prove singularly in an ensuing chapter.

S E C T. III.

AS for the *Second Opinion*, viz. that the Term of mans Life is not fixt beyond possibility of either *Anticipation*, or *Postposition*; this, I profess, my judgement inclines me to prefer, as that which seem's to be drawn in the directest line from the point of Truth; and that for two mighty Reasons.

First, because there are very few places, or testimonies of Scripture, which may be thought to advantage the doctrine of *Absolute Fatality*; but, on the contrary, very many alle-
gable in defence of this.

Secondly, because those *Texts*, which make for this, have their importance so perpendicular, that nothing but a violent
perverfion

Article I.
The Authors
adhesion to the
Second opinion,
justified by two
important rea-
sons.

1.

2.

perversion can wrest, so perspicuous, that nothing but obscure interpretations can darken, so soft and easy, that nothing but over nice and unnatural Exceptions can harden it. And Justice will frown on that stupid partiality, that shall prefer paucity to multitude, obscurity to clarity, and difficult to genuine and familiar solutions.

Article 2.
The great obscurity, & small validity of some Texts of holy writ, alleged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected.

To explain and justify this by *Instance*; the *Hercules*, or most champion Text usually brought into the field to assert the opinion of *Absolute Fatality*, in the precise manner and time of every mans *Dissolution* into his first matter, is that of *Job*; *Definiti sunt dies ejus, & numerus mensium ejus tecum est; statuta ejus fecisti, & non prateribit*: His days are determined, "the number of his moneths are with thee; thou hast appointed his bounds, that he cannot pass. (*chap. 14. vers. 5.*)

Now this place hath much of *obscurity*, and little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, more then ours. (1) *Much of obscurity*; since, though racked to the highest extension of its importance, no *Logique* can extort any other Conclusion from it, but this, that the Term of mans Life is fixt by God, so that impossible it is for man to remove it forwards to a greater *longitude*; the concession whereof no way infringeth our assertion. For hence it follows not, that tis impossible for man, by intemperance, by the temerarious obtrusion of himself upon the jaws of danger, or other means whatever, to *Anticipate* that Term, or remove it backwards to a greater *Brevity*. Again, I have yet met with no substantial reason, that may countermand our construction of these words, *εν πλατει*, or in the latitude of *Generality*; and therefore may safely understand them, as an expression of the brevity of mans life, *in specie*, not *in individuo*; their whole Mass weighing no more then this: that the life of man, being included within a certain Circle, or round of days and moneths, and circumscribed by a short succession of minutes flowing into a stream of Time, cannot possibly be extended to a longer duration then what our Creator hath prefixt to all mankind: *i. e.* then that moment to which he hath determined and adapted the durability of mans specifical Temperament, or Principles.

Principles of Vitality. And thus interpreted, this place runs parallel to that of *Moses* (*Psalm. 90. vers. 10.*) *Dies nostra vite septuaginta anni, & si in fortudinibus sit, octoginta anni, & fortitudo eorum molestia ac labor, quoniam recedit citò & avolumus*: as also that of *David* (*Psalm. 39. vers. 5.*) *Ecce, ut palmas posuisti dies meos, & avum meum tanquam nihil coram te; profectò universa Vanitas est omnis homo stans*; Behold, thou hast made my days as a hands breadth, and mine age is nothing before thee: every man, verily, at his best state is altogether Vanity.

True it is (nor have I heard many, besides *Helmont*, and a Fanatique Brother or two of the mystical Order of the *Rosy Cross*, impugne it) that the *Life* of Man doth consist in a *Peacefull Discord* maintained between the 4 *First Qualities* (I understand them, according to the *Physiology* of *Epicurus*, and *Cartesius*, as certain *Modifications of Matter, or Quantity*) arising from the commixture of them in a proportionate *Dose*, or commensurate symmetry, respective to the *Activity* of some and *Patability* of others; and proximly, in a requisite harmony, of the *Primigenious Heat* and *Radical Moisture*: which harmony being more or less durable according to the more or less exquisite temperament of body assigned to each single person, by the free dispensation of the *Divine Will*; it follows, unavoidably, that the *Longitude* or *Brevity* of every mans life must naturally depend upon the *perfection*, or *imperfection* of his *Idiosyncrasy*, or individual Constitution.

Nor doth it carry less semblance of truth, that by the decrees of that Council, which is all *Wisdom*, and can therefore *will* nothing but what is superlatively *Good*, it was enacted, that the ordinary *Duration* of this *Humane Temperament* should be circumscribed and limited to some certain general, though not precisely adstrict, term or space of years, conceive of 70. 80. 90. or 100. over or under: and that our *ingenerated Protogenitors*, even before the depravation of their *Vital Principles* by their *παράπτωμα* or precipitous Fall, held their lives by the same common lease; for manifest it is, that the *Tree of Life* was

Article 3.
The *Natural Causes* (proxime) of the *Longitude* and *Brevity* of mans life: and the Authors private conjecture of the cause of *Longevity* in the first age of the world.

planted in Paradise to this purpose, that the fruit thereof being frequently eaten might *instaurate* the *vital Balsam* of man as salt as it suffered *exhaustion* from the depredatory operation of his *Implantate Spirit*, and by a continual refocillation of impaired nature keep her up fresh and vigorous to longevity. To which I ask leave, with due submission to the correction of maturer judgements, to tender my private conception; that the like *extraordinary* means of making the sands of life run slowly and long in the glass of Time, was by the special indulgence of the great *Preserver* of men, permitted to *Methusalem* and other *μικροβίοις* of the worlds youth; whose registers amounted to more *Centuries* of years, then ours usually to *Decads*, and who outlived all the titles of *Consanguinity*.

Article 4.
The injustice
of our Adver-
sary, title of pa-
tronage from
the foremen-
tioned text of
Job; further
manifested.

(2) *Little of strength* for the supportation of their opinion, more then of ours; for though we should concede, what these eager Patrons of Fatality principally insist upon, viz. that the sense of these words of *Job* is restrained only to that precise Term, or prestitute Date appointed by God to the life of every *individual* man: yet notwithstanding can they not from this concession extort more advantage to their plea, then what doth naturally result from thence towards the justification of ours. For *Job* doth not so much as tacitly insinuate, by what kind of *Decree*, manner of institution, or computation that Definition or Circumscription of daies and moneths was made by God: nor is there ought to hinder us from affirming, that the tenor of his words remains sincere and inviolate, when we understand that kind of statute, concerning the circumscription of mans life to belong to that Classis of Decrees, which God, either upon his own infallible *Providence* of the future demeanour of every man, or upon the *Hypothesis* of mans good or evil use of the liberty of his will, hath made, or may occasionally make. Besides all this our equitable conference of many other *Texts* of Scripture, which we shall have occasion, in the remaining dilucidation of this Theorem, to alleadge, with this of *Job*; will plainly, and almost unavoydably ascertain us, that his words are to be interpreted in our sense, *de specie*, and not *de individuo*.

But,

But, in the present, it is sufficient for us to have declared, that from that place of such reputed validity amongst the Defendants of Destiny, no firme Argument can be extracted to protect them, or impugne us.

And therefore I find my self at liberty to discharge my proper duty, viz. the Confession of those *Reasons*, which charmed my judgement to an adherence to their persuasion, who contend for the *Mobility* of the Term of mans Life.

The *First* of those is defumed from the *Testimonies* of the Oracle of Truth, the *Book of God*; and in our list of those Testimonies, those deserve to stand in the front, which in ample, elegant, and exprefs terms warrant our Assertion, *that the life of man hath bin, and may be, both Abbreviated and Prolonged.*

The Coryphaeus, or leading Text is that of the Wise King (*Proverb. 10. vers. 27.*) *Timor Domini apponit (aut prolongat) dies; anni vero impiorum abbreviantur: the Fear of the Lord prolongeth daies; but the years of the wicked shall be shortned.* Then which nothing can be more exprefs, perspicuous, and positive; and so nothing less subject to detorsion or altercation.

The Lievtenant, or second to that, is the gracious encouragement to filial reverence and obedience annexed to the 5th. Precept in the Decalogue; *Honora Patrem tuum, & matrem tuam, ut prolongentur dies tui super terram quam Jehovah Deus tuus dat tibi:* which the Apostle of the Gentiles (*in Epist. ad Ephes. 6. ver. 2.*) call's the first (understand it of the second table) Commandement with promise, viz. of a singular reward; or the first with a peculiar promise, and such as hath ever bin held distinct from the promise made in the second Precept of the Decalogue, inso much as that is common and universal, comprehending all kinds of Blessings, but this only peculiar and determined to that of diuturnous subsistence, or Longevity. In *Exhod. 24. ver. 25.* and many other places, the Pen-man of God earnestly inculcates the benefit of the Fear of God, by this forcible impulsive; that he would crown them with length, health, and serenity of days, who should revere his most sacred name and conscientiously observe.

Article 5.
Seven testimonies, out of holy writ, supporting the mobility of the Term of mans life, in individuo.

observe his laws. *Si colatis Deum vestrum, benedicet pani vestro, & aquis vestris, auferetque infirmitatem e medio vestri, non erit abortiens aut sterilis in terra vestra: numerum dierum in terra vestra complebo.* Which importune incitement to piety, those Commentators have no way enlarged, who have extended it to this just height of intention; that to those happy Sonnes of Israel, who subjugated their Wills to the written Will of God, and cherished no desires so much, as those of cordial obedience to the rules of his Law, demeaning themselves reverently towards their Maker, and righteously toward their Neighbour; to these God would vouchsafe, not only that they should accomplish that lease of life, which they held by the grant of Nature, or the condition of each mans *Idiosyncrasy*; but even that their Temperament should be meliorated, made more symmetrical, compact, tenacious and consequently more durable, as well by the sovereign, balsamical, and restorative Faculties of their Aliment, impregnated or enriched by the tincture of his continual Benediction, as by the benigne and salutiferous disposition of the Aer, and propitious influences of the Host of Heaven, which otherwise are wont to induce sensible Exorbitances and Anomalies upon the blood, spirits, and solid parts of mans body, and from those seeds of morbosities produce various both Acute and Chronique Diseases, which either consume, or corrupt the Vital Nectar, and accelerate the execution of that Sentence, *Pulvis es, & Pulvis eris.* So that of infirme, languid, and valetudinarian persons, they should be made robust, athletical, and longevous; no less then the *Barren* should be made *Fertil*: the one by the *Conservatory*, the other by the *Prolifical* virtue of Gods *special Grace.* The same promise we read frequently repeated by God, in most of his Embassies delivered by his Secretary, *Moses*, to his People; and more particularly in *Deuteron. 4. vers. 40. and chap. 30. vers. 20.* And as he proposeth *length of days* for the desirable reward of obedience: so, on the contrary, he makes *Immaturity of Death*, the affrighting penalty of Disobedience. For (*Deuteron. 30. vers. 19. and 28. vers. 20.*) contain a large Catalogue of infirmities, diseases, and corporal calamities feircely comminated

to the immorigerous and disobedient: and in *vers. 62.* tis emphatically sayd of *Transgressors, ye shall be left few in number, whereas you were as the starrs of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldst not obey the voyce of the Lord, thy God.*

A Third egregious text, is that where God, gratefully resenting *Salomons* Election of *Wisdom* before all other Accomplishments temporal set before him, supererogates to his vote, by the additional concession of long life (*2 Kings 3. 14.*) *And if thou wilt walk in my wayes, to keep my Statutes and commandments, as thy Father David did; then will I lengthen thy days.*

A fourth, is that definitive sentence of *David* (*Psalm. 55. vers. ult.*) *Bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days.*

A Fifth, that of the same *Aythor* (*Psalm. 102. vers. 25.*) *O my God take me not away in the midst of my days:* and in like manner, (*Psalm. 6. and 30. and 88. and 111.*) he with fervent importunity supplicates, that God would be pleased not to cut off the thread of his life, while he was then in the spring and vigour of his age, but restore him from that languor and marcid Consumption, introduced by his grievous disease, to his pristine sanity, that he might thereby be enabled to chant his praises in the Sanctuary, and do good to the children of *Sion.*

A Sixth, that remarkable Precedent of the prolongation of life beyond the term prefixt, *King Ezechias* (*Esai. 38. vers. 10.*) who being infested with the most mortiferous of diseases, the Plague, and convulst with the horror of death, denounced by the thundering Prophet; in the intervalls betwixt the showers of heavy tears, he sighes out this lamentation: *in the cutting off my days I shall go to the gates of death; I am deprived of the residue of my years. Mine age is departed, and is removed from me as a shepherds tent: I have cut off like a weaver my life* (*vitam meam veluti textoris telam praeceidi*, as some read it) *he will cut me off with pining sickness.* Which signifies as much as this, that he was adjudged to dye before his time. But this night of sorrow was dispelled by a comfortable morn, caused by the light of that Sun, which riseth with healing in his wings;

for immediately after, his contrition, sincere repitance, and earnest supplications obtaining a reprieve from the mercifull hands of him, who desireth not the death of a sinner, the execution of that fatal sentence was suspended, and a paroll lease of 15. years supernumerary annexed to that old one of his life, fully, to some few anxious minutes, expired. And can any Prejudice be so inflexible, as not to stoop to the conversion of this pregnant Example, which on one side, testifies the possibility of the *Decurtation* of the Term of mans Life, by any mortal disease; and, on the other, manifesteth the possibility of the *Prolongation* of the same, by the seasonable and right use of the means conductive thereunto, viz. remorse of Conscience, repentance, supplication, and medical remedies. For, prescribed it was by *Isaiah*, thus: *Let them take a Bunch of Figgs, and lay it for a plaister upon the boyle (or Carbuncle) and he shall recover.*

And, to bring up the reare of these Sacred Arguments, militant on our side, let us instance in the semblably pertinent story of the *Ninivites*; who, by the counter-violence of those holy spells, *Penitence*, severe *Humiliation* as well of the outward, as of the inward man, and *Prayer* distracted with nought but tears and groans, seem to have abrogated the Decree of Destiny. For the Bowels of *Divinity* yearning with paternal compassion towards so populous a City; wherein though all were guilty, yet many millions must have bin blended in the chaos of common ruine, who were yet too young to share in the actual Depravities; smoothed the brow of his *Justice*, and prevailed with him to interpret their univetsal mortification of *Impiety*, as an Allegorical accomplishment of his resolve concerning the general devastation and mortality denounced against their *Persons* and *Habitations*; to accept the flames of their thick *sacrifices* as Expiatory and preventive to the impendent Combustion of their City; and heighten the wholesome virtue of their *Abstinence*, observed in the strict Fast, to a generous *Prophylactique* or Preservative against the *Pestilence* now ready to be kindled by the breath of his Indignation.

Not are we destitute of *Instances*, in holy *Chronicles*, to testify

testify the *Reverse* part of our assertion, viz. That the Term of mans life hath bin *Abbreviated*. For who can read the story of the *General Deluge*, and not observe, that the whole stock of Humanity (except 8. beleivers, who committed themselves prisoners to the Ark of Preservation) was immaturely extinguished, and by the most proper and expedite way of corruption, resolved into its *Hyle*, or Watery Principle? Who can rehearse *Moses* his relation of those many thousands of incredulous and murmuring *Israelites*, buried in the wilderness, to whom God had promised, nay sworn to give them possession of the land of Canaan; and not be satisfied, that their Rebellion and Infidelity anticipated their funerals? and who examine the fate of those *Cowards*, who being sent to explore the fertility of the promised Land, and the forces of the *Amalekites*, returned a discouraging answer to their brethren, and were therefore cut down by the revenging sword of the Lord of Hosts, in the noon of their lives; and not be convicted, that the *wages of Sin is Death*, and may be paid as justly, though not so naturally, in the morn, or noon, as evening of life?

Now so fiduciary are these *Testimonies*, that whoever shall justly compute their *Number*, perpend their *Gravity*, and clearly discern their *Perspicuity*; must confess it no less than open injustice to all the Inducements of beleife, to debase them so much as to a Competition for the priority of perswasion, with those *Few, Light, and Obscure Allegations*, upon whose Credit the Factors of *Immoveable Destiny* have adventured to take up their opinion. However, that we may add a brighter polish to this our Gold, by scouring off the rust of all *Exceptions* made against it: it deserves our time, and sweat to dispossess our Adversaries of all their pretended interest in the importance of *Three* the chiefest of our *Testimonies*.

First they attempt to infirme our title to that definitive and emphatical sentence of the *Psalmist*, *The bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days*; and this under the pretext of several perverse *Interpretations*: as (1) by understanding the place thus; *Impii & sanguinarij non dimidiabunt*

Article 6.

A full vindication of the *Fourth Testimony*, from the several *Exceptions* made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of *Fatality*.

negotia sua, they shall not accomplish half their *Designes*, or, contrary to their expectation they shall fall before they have brought their evil Purposes to pass.

To this unlawfull Construction we reply, that this subterfuge was contrived by that profest Libertine of Christianity, *Luther*, to the end he might support his doctrine of *Absolute Fate*, which with so much Ardor and Pertinacy he had once maintained against that ornament not only of *Germany*, but of *Europe* also, *Erasmus*. But the Connexion of these with the former words, manifestly prohibite any such Comment. *Thou, O God* (sayth *David*) *shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction*, i. e. thou shalt irretiate or insnare them, and suddainly precipitate them into the same pit, which they have digged for me, thy servant; or thou shalt, according to the concernment of the *Hebrew* phrase, destroy them *subita pramatura morte*, by a suddain premature death; that from the experiment of their unexpected ruine, the world may learn thy justice, and be satisfied of thy favour and indulgence to the pious, and thy hatred and indignation to the impious. For if we accommodate this text meerly to the Natural expiration of the term of life, which is appointed as well to the Righteous as to the Reprobate, and generally to all men: pray, what *Energy* or *Emphasis* can remain to that saying of *David*, *Tu facies eos descendere in puteum fovea*; for then we shall reduce all the meaning only to this, *illi morientur statuto suo tempore, sicut mortales alii omnes*, they shall dye in their appointed time, as all other mortal men: and if so, who might not have justly made this retort upon *David*; *& te etiam tuo tempore, sive cum finis vite tue prastitutus aderit, Deus faciet descendere in puteum fovea*, and thee also, when thy appointed time shall come, or when the temperamental lease of thy life shall be worn out, shall God bring into the pit of destruction.

Again, if we exchange *Negotia* for *Dies*; then must we renounce the appropriation of the sense to the Wicked, and make it common also to the Godly. For, who ever lived to accomplish all his purposes? But the expression sufficiently illustrates the intention; for it exactly responds to many other phrases used by

by the Holy Spirit to the same scope, as, *They shall not fulfill the number of their days, their days shall be abbreviated &c.*

(2) By Translating the Text thus; *Non dimidiabunt dies suos, (i. e.) peribunt antequam sperent*: they shall perish in the immaturity of their *Hopes*, not of their *Lives*. For the sensuall *Affections* of their earthly minds having determined their judgements only to the expectation of enjoying blessings inservient to the satisfaction of their domineering Concupiscence, make them promise to themselves long subsistence in this their paradise; nay extend their vain projects as far as the impossible period of Eternity: so though they survive even life it self, by dwindling out their bedrid days, till the *marasmus* of extreme old age hath embalmed them before-hand, pined them into perfect Skeletons, and so defrauded their hungry Creditors, the Wormes; yet since they drop away full of youthfull and green hopes, their departure is premature and inopine; and so they may be sayd, not to dimidiate their days.

We return that this illegitimate *Descant* ought to be rejected for 4. considerable *Causes*. (1) Because it cannot be justly charged upon the words, no not in the greatest latitude of Construction. For tis not there sayd, the Wicked shall dye sooner then they expect; but positively and expressly, they shall not dimidiate their days: now every Ideot can tell, that it is one thing, not to live out half their days, and another, not to beleive they shall live out half their days. (2) because it argues the facted *Psalmist* of a manifest *Falsity*. For when the ungodly expire, they do not only *Dimidiate* their days, but *Accomplish* them, *Death* being at any time the *December* of life. (3) Because it imports a double repugnancy to Truth. For first, now there are, and in all ages, since the first experiment of death, have bin millions of *Vicious* men, who even in the wildest paroxysme of their Vanity, and highest orgasme of their Pride and Ambition, have still cooled themselves with *Εἰς μῶρος, εἰς θάνατος πάντων ἐπιρχόμενος*, and felt a dejecting horror from within, at the remembrance of that Motto, *Statutum est omnibus semel mori*; so far is our Nature from entertaining any hopes of Immortality, though but in a dreame, or melancholy deprivation of Phanly.

And, again, no Chronicle is barren in the stories of prosperous Libertines, who have wanted nothing but some *Cross* to in-deare the Felicity of their lives, have unravelled their vital web in the highest blandishments of Sense, attained to miraculous Longevity, and being sated with the profuse treatments of Fortune, have outlived their own large stock of Hopes; so that a Poet might take the Liberty to say of them, they dyed for grief, that they had nothing left to wish for, which they had not already surrerted in the fruition of. (4) Because the admission thereof loseth the *Singularity* or *Determination* of *Dauids* speech to *Sanguinary* and *Nefarious* Persons. For, if to *Dimidiate* their days, import no more then to dye by the same common kind of Death, and at the same period of their Temperamental Lease, when, by the ineluctable laws of Destiny, it is enacted that all men shall revert to Dust: certainly, there can remain no reason why Impious men, so dying, should be thought more unhappy, because they were Cruent and Unjust, then others. To conclude; of all those just Persons mentioned in the old Testament, who were translated from this Vale of tears to the Celestial Hills of permanent delight, by early and premature deaths (amongst whom the *Apostle* (*Heb. II. vers. 38.*) hath accounted some so excellent above the common rate of humanity, that *the world was not worthy of them*) of such, I say, 'twas true, according to this ertoneous paraphrase, that they did not *Dimidiate* their days, because they dyed sooner then they expected. For they did not only hope, but upon the faithfull promise of God even assure themselves of a longer continuation heer below to do him further service. And confidently to expect, nay by a lively hope to anticipate the fruition of a promised blessing; is a privilege peculiar only to those, to whom the promise doth properly and solely belong: but the blessing of Longevity was only then promised to the pious observers of the Divine laws; as is manifest from the places formerly cited.

(3) By fixing the scope of the Text only upon that *mature Term* of life, to which many ordinarily attain, viz. to 60. 70. 80. 90. years, more or less, according to the respective Duration of every individual Constitution; and so concluding the verity

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of *Dauids* speech only in this respect. For (say they) the *Annales* of *Impious* men seldome arise to so large an account; because either the sword of war, or justice, or some Accident occasioned by their Villanies takes them off, before the completion of their natural Term of years.

But this sinister *Detorsion* of the Text ought also to be repudiated for *two Reasons*.

(1) In regard tis manifestly *heterodox*, and *dissimilar* to the *express sense* of the words; since they say not, Wicked men shall not live out half the days of *Others*, but their *own*. Now the days of their lives amount not to so many years, as are required to the commensuration of the natural space betwixt the Animation and Disanimation of the posterity of *Adam*, prefix by the decree of him, who is the *Breath of our nostrils*: and therefore, when they fully and wholly accomplish that common compute, with what semblance of truth can they be sayd to *Dimidiate* their days? Moreover, if those *Sanguinary Miscreants*, against whom *David* directly denounceth this judgement of *Premature Mortality*, be sayd not to dimidiate their days, only in this respect, that they seldome arrive at that protract and silver-headed Age, wherein the Tapor of life, by the ordinary deflux of Nature, burns dim and languid, and at last, for want of oyle, winks out into perpetual night: then with equal right may it be affirmed also of many *Holy and Just* persons, that they do not dimidiate theirs; nay tis a question not easily answered, whether the same may not be asserted of *these*, with more justice then of *those*. For, how rarely doe we observe the pulse of *Pious* men to beate, till their Arteries grow hard from the *Hectick* distemper of old age? How small a manual would the *Legends* of all those *Saints*, whose names and stories yet survive, make, who have lived till the *Almond tree* hath budded and flourished: and how vast a volume would theirs make, who have bin gathered green into the *Granary* of God, and never lived to see one revolution of *Saturn* about the *solary Orbe*? and how frequently have we occasion to comfort our selves, after the transplantation of *Junior Virtue*, with that adage, *ὅτι φιλία θεός ἀποθνήσκει νέος*? Nor hath *Piety* always proved a Coat of maile against

against the danger of *Malice*; or the *Panoplie* of a Christian, defence against the sword of war; or perfect *Charity*, an Antidote to *Poyson*; or *Temperance*, an Alexipharmakon against the *Pestilence*; or religious *Abstinence*, a Preservative against *Famine*; or *Innocence* awarded the stroke of the *Executioner*: in short, as to the time of Death, in this concernment, *there is one event to the Righteous, and to the Wicked, to the clean, and to the unclean, to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not; as dies the Good; so dies the Sinner, and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.*

(2) In respect it *disarmes the Text of all its Force and Purpose.* For to what end could *David* say, they should not dimidiate their days, if thereby he intended no more then this, that they should not run over half their stage of life, or subsist untill grey haire; unless the *ground* or *reason* thereof be also subjoyned, viz. because of their *impious and bloody Inclinations and Practises*: and so consequently our present opinion be admitted? For if he beleived it constituted by the immutable law of *Fate*, that such should then, and at no other time be taken off; without any relation at all to the contracting and anticipating merit of their *Impiety*: what makes it to the principal scope, that he sayd, they shall not dimidiate their days? since, according to this inconvenient interpretation, they do not only not Dimidiate their days, but fully Accomplish them, as any the most mortified and conscientious observers of Gods sacred laws: and so neither *Piety* shall retain its attribute of having the power to *prolong*, nor its *Contrary* longer wear the just imputation of having the power to *abbreviate* the Term of Life. To which we may add, that *David* could not, without *special Revelation* from that *omniscient Light*, that penetrates the darkness of *Futurity*, deliver this certain Prognostick concerning the non-dimidiation of their days. For since he could not but have observed that many the most accursed Vassals of Satan, (the *Providence* of God so permitting, for considerations privy onely to his Wisdome) attained to extreme old age: whence could he acquire that prophetique knowledge, that those particular Villaines, whom he levelled at, should be taken in their own snares,

and perish immaturely in the nonage of their lives? Undoubtedly, he could desume that prediction from no oracle less precient, then that *Spirit*, whose Essence is Truth, and to whose cognition all things are actually present: but who can, though but with a specious or verisimilous argument, prove that *David* received any such special Revelation? Wherefore Reason adviseth that we acquiesce, in the judgement of most of the *Fathers*, who unanimously resolve, that *David* reflected his thoughts upon that positive sentence in the *Levitical Law*, which (*ἐπι τὸ πλεῖστον*) for the major part, comminates a short and calamitous life, and a repentine and miserable death to the Ungodly; but, on the contrary, promiseth longevous and peaceable days, to those, who should revere the sacred Majesty, and observe the wholesome ordinances of *Jehovah*: and upon the general infallibility of that Sentence, erected his particular prediction; that those *Sanguinary* traytors who had with so much detestable policy prepared stratagems to ensnare his feet walking in the ways of innocence and charity, should be entangled in their own mischievous wiles, and stumble into their graves in the middle of their race: To which we may accommodate that of *Juvenal*,

*Ad Generum Cereris, sine cade ac sanguine pauci
Descendant Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.*

Few *Tyrants* goe late to th' infernal flood;
But sink betimes in Cataracts of blood.

The second place they endeavour to betray out of our possession, is that promise of *Longevity*, whereby the *Father of all things* was pleased to invite *Children* to a due *Veneration* of their *Parents*: which they corrupt with this dangerous gloss. This (say they) was spoken *Anthropopathically*, or *ad captum hominis*, by the *Holy Spirit*, who frequently hath descended to discourse in the stammering and imperfect dialect of mortality; so that the days of obsequious children are said to be prolonged, then when they are blessed with diuturnity, tranquillity and sanity of life, which as it immediately depends on the immutable decree

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Article 7.
The second
Testimony vindicated from
several Exceptions.

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of God, so cannot one moment be superadded thereunto beyond the term prefixt, unless we infer a manifest *Inconstancy* upon that immutable *Essence*, *πᾶρ ᾧ ἔστι παραδραγὴ, ἢ τροπῆς ἀποκλίσιμα,* with whom is no *variableness* nor *shadow of turning*. But that the *Ancient of days* had determined, that such should live to wear the honourable badge of *Antiquity*, who should constantly beare a venerable regard toward those, from whom, under God, they had derived their being; yet so, that if any obedient Child should chance to be snatched away by the talons of that sarcophagous Vultur, *Death*, before time had reduced his haire to the same colour with his skull; which is no rarity; yet notwithstanding doth God in no respect deflect from the point of his general determination, but persevere in the accomplishment of his promise, no less then a Prince, who bestows a million of crowns upon that servant, to whom he had promised only a hundred. For this life is no *Mansion*, but a narrow and incommodious *Inne*, standing in the way to a better, whose *Term* is *Eternity*; and therefore, *ter felix ille, cui ante lassitudinem peractum est iter*, thrice happy he, who arrives at his journies end, before he is weary of travell. And our Grandfathers tell us, that old Age is but the magazine of sorrows, the sowre Dreggs of life, the Portal to the Nosocomie or Hospital of Diseases, and indeed a kind of living-Death, wherein men only *Breathe* and *Doate*; which though all men wish for, yet no man delights in when it comes: *optima cum expectatur, cum advenit, onerosa sibi, aliis molesta*; good only when expected, evil when enjoyed, because burdnesome to it self, and troublesome to others. So that those Saturnine minds, which were most ambitious to wear the silver Crown of old Age; when they had obtained it, found it to gall their feeble temples, and enervate all their limbs: nor did they appear other then weatherbeaten and mouldring statues of their former selves, *Human-Grashoppers*, or *Ghosts* walking in *Skeletons*. In fine, that the whole concernment of this encouragement to *Filial Duty*, doth consist only in this; that *Vivacity* in this transitory World is promised unto morigerous Children, only in this capacity, that it is a *Benediction* of God: and a *Benediction* only in this respect

spect, that it is a *Document of Divine Grace*, or an Evidence of Gods singular love toward them; which he doth infinitely more testify unto them by a timely and early delivery of them from this calamitous prison of Mortality into the glorious Liberty of the Sonnes of God.

We reply, that this plea of Exception against our lawfull right to the place, is not only frivolous and dilute; but even derogatory as well to the Sanction, as *Excellence* of the *Promise*. For, to transmute the *serious and faithfull promise* of him, whose words are *yea and amen*, into an *Anthropopathical Sophisme*, or affected expression in the stammering Dialect of Humanity; is frivolous, and not only to stagger, but subvert the *Fidelity* thereof, and so demolish the comfortable hopes of *Filial Piety*, nay, what's a degree of *Blasphemy*, to insinuate *Truth* it self of *Imposture*. For, to promise *Longevity* to morigerous Children, when formerly and without any respect to their prevised obedience, God hath prefixt unto them an *Intransible Term* of life: what els can it be, but to make him promise that, which cannot be promised *Hypothetically*, or upon condition; unless that which was *Absolutely* decreed long before the promise was made, be violently cancelled and altered. And so much the more intolerable indignity to the sacred majesty of God, doth this absurd Exception infer; by how much the more both of *Impudence* and *Inconstancy* it must import, to play the uncircumspect Sophister with thole, who (as our Adverfaries themselves affirme) stood possessed with a full perswasion, that the Term of every mans life was absolutely, and without any respect to his future piety, or Impiety, predetermined. I profess sincerely, I am yet to be perswaded, that any Credulity can be so pedantique and slavish, as to entertain a beleif; that even *Man* (I forbear to say, *God*) can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive; unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men, and by this loose and childish juggling forfeit that reputation, which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties, and the just performance of all Articles, to which he had subscribed. 'Tis *one thing* to admit, that the *Holy Ghost*

Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man, when he is pleased to hint unto us those *ἄρρητα*, or *ineffable Mysteries*, which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh, and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul, when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity; such are those glances, whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the *New Jerusalem*, and allegorical description of the joyes and glories of the *Eternal Life*, an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible *Essence*, and three distinct *Subsistences* in one indivisible *Existence*, &c. and a *far different*, nay contrary, to say, that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities, when he promiseth those things, which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension; but are familiar to our knowledg, nay such as the nearest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know. And such is the quality of those *Blessings*, which the Bounty of *Providence* hath by promise assured unto the *Virtuous*, in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life; and particularly that of *longevous subsistence* upon earth. To conclude; the *Spirit* or *Form* of a *Promise* doth consist in this, that they, to whom the promise is made, do understand the good therein specified, to be *really*, *bona fide*, & *in specie*, intended to be performed by him, who made the promise. Now, if there arise any doubt, whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared; then doth the force and sanction, together with the Dignity thereof, totally vanish and become voyd.

Our *Adversaries* have rejoyned, that God doth therefore promise *Longevity* to obsequious Children, because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective *Durability*.

But, alas! this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty, nor prevents the Doubt. For if his Decree, concerning their Longevity, be *Absolute*, devoyd of all Suppositiounality, and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience: no reason can discover what *Force* or *Energy* the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the *Condition* required. Again, how can that

that Promise, by way of *invitation* or allurement, affect those, who are already confirmed, that what the promise imports, is formerly, by the *positive* and non-conditional *Will* of God, made *inevitable*, and hath the *Possibility* of its *Futurition* determined to precise *Necessity*? In fine, the *Postulation* of that Condition can neither consist with the *Eternal Identity* of God that promises; nor effectually move those, to whom he makes the promise, to endeavour the *Consequention* of that ample reward of filial obedience: for his *Decree*, concerning the Term of their life, doth and shall forever stand firm and immote, whether the Condition be performed, or not.

The last *Testimony* they have essayed to extort from us, is the *Instance of Ezechiah*; and this by a *Fourfold Cavillation*.

(1) By this Excuse, *Singulare aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam*, that one single denormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law; or one swallow makes no summer.

This Exception, I confess, might have had some colour, or slender pretext of Validity; had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it, by asserting that the immutable law of *Destiny* was *equally extended to all* and every individual person from *Adam* down to us. For most certain it is, that *God* never limited his free *Omnipotence*, by any fixt law, or bound up his own hands with the same settled *Constitutions*, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his *Creatures*: it being the *Prerogative* of his Nature, to *know no Impossibility*, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his *Deputy*, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases. But I have no warrant to believe, that among the *Propugnators* of *Fate*, any one hath deviated into so remote an *Alogie*, as to opinion, that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne; but that the *Decrees* concerning the *Destinies* of some particular persons, are not so definitive, precise, and immoveable; as those of all others in generall.

Article 8.
The sixth Testimony cleared from 4. Exceptions.

(2) By this Response, that under the seeming *Absoluteness* of the Prophets Sentence, *Morieris, Thou shalt dye*; there lay concealed a tacite *Hypothesis*, which was this: *Nisi seria pœnititudine te ad Deum convertas*, unless by serious and profound repentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin, and apply thy self wholly to the Mercies of God.

Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be, that it wants the principal inducement to beleif, and so can afford no satisfaction at all. For, (besides this, that it quadrates neither to their *First Exception*, nor their *Thesis* concerning the *Immobility of Destiny*) what Logick can tolerate the induction of an *Hypothetical* upon a *Categorical* Proposition? or, more expressly, how can any *Condition* be comprehended under that message, which by a *definitive and peremptory decree*, and such as carried no respect to the performance, or non-performance of any condition whatever, tels the K. in down right terms, that the date of his life was now expired, and that the severe Publican, Death, stood ready at the door of his chamber, within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature? *Subordinata non pugnans*, is an Axiome I well know, and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity, that dares question the universality of its truth; but, *that a conditional Decree can be subordinate to an Absolute*, I am bold to deny, nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof; the very *Antithesis* of those notions, *Absolute* and *Conditional* sufficiently declaring as much. To take the just dimensions of this Cloud; every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty, as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause, viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will: insomuch, that the Event thereof cannot be known, nay not unto the Omniscience of God, who is the only *Cardiognostes*, and sees beyond our very Essences, so long as it hangs in suspence or indecision, by reason of the Indifferency, or non-determination of its Cause, *i. e.* while it is not determined to either part by the Actual Volition of mans will. But as for an *Absolute decree*; that cannot but be *Certain* and *Immutable*; as being constitute without, and antecedent to any *Prevision* of a *Condition*, that is to be,

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or hath bin performed, or is not to be, or hath not bin performed.

(3) By insinuating, that God made use of this sharp *Commination*, in order to the more Expedite and effectual reduction of the K. to *Penitence*.

But, alas! this also is a broken reed, and he shall fall into the ditch of Error, who relies thereon. For who can be perswaded, that this *Commination* could be *serious* and in earnest, that must not at the same time dissolve the rigour and *immutability* of Gods decree concerning the fatal Term of the K. life? or how could it be serious, if it were fully constituted from all Eternity that the K. should not die, till full 15. years after the Sentence? This is a pure *ἀγαπάλησιον*, and something that no man can comprehend. For, to comminate suddain death to him, whom our Adversaries acknowledge reserved by the law of Destiny till the complete expiration of his prefixt Term of life: is not to comminate in *earnest*, but in *jest*, and argue the *God of Truth*, of *Dissimulation*. Again, what *Efficacy* or inforcing Virtue could that *Commination* have over the *Affections* of *Ezekiah*, if he firmly beleived, that he should not, could not dye before the precise term of his life constituted and made intransible from Eternity? Assuredly, if so; he had no just cause either to *complain* of, or *fear* the abscission of his days.

(4) By recurring to this their last refuge, *Deum hac ratione palam facere voluisse, quam Regi ab aeterno designarat μακροβιότητι*, that God was pleased to take this course for the promulgation of that *Longevity*, which he had from eternity designed to *Ezekiah*.

This is more impertinent, and less satisfactory then any of the precedent Exceptions. For extremely ridiculous it is, to opinion, that God would by a *Commination* suspended on a condition, or by a hypothetical decree, make that known; which long before he had, by an Absolute Decree, without any condition, or prevision of any condition, constituted firme and immoveable. Unworthy and disparaging thoughts both of the *Wisdom* and *Justice* of the *Supreme Being* doth that unhappy man entertain, who ascribes unto it the making of *Decrees subordi-*

subordinate, disparate, and irreconcilable. That Sacred, omniscient, omnipotent Agent, as himself makes nothing in vaine; so would he have us make him our Exemplar, and doe no action, but what points at some certain end, and conduces both to our benefit, and the last of ends, his Glory. But *in vain* had he promised, in vain threatned, had he either promised or threatned those things, which his own irrevocable Decree had formerly made immutable, which must of necessity, had they never bin promised or threatned, have come to pass in their predetermined opportunity: or such, to whose Existence it was wholly and absolutely necessary, that that very thing, under which the promise or commination was made, should be effected by such a power, to which no other power can resist.

And this (we hope at least) is sufficient to the ample justification of our opinions right to those *Three appropriate and Convincing Testimonies*, of the Mobility of the Term of mans life, desumed from *holy Writ.* ¶

S E C T. IV.

Article 1.
The necessity
of our enquiry
into the myste-
ry of *Predesti-
nation*, in or-
der to the solu-
tion of the pre-
sent difficulty:
and the Facills
grand Argu-
ment.

IT remains only that we endeavour to wind our reason out of that profound abyſs of *Predestination* (of which the *Apostle*, though he had the advantage of all other men in this; that he had the eye of his Soul illuminated by beams deradiated immediately from the Soul of Light: did yet excuse himself for his non-comprehension, with ὁ βλαβος πλετο κη σοφιας κη γνωστος θεῶ, ὡς ανεξιχγιατοι αι ὁδοι αυτη.) into which the solution of this grand difficulty hath unavoidably precipitated it: for the strongest hold, which the Defendants of *Absolute Fatality* have left them to retreat unto, is erected upon this Foundation.

It makes no materiall difference (say they) *whether the Pre-
science of God be conceived precedent to his Preordination of any
future Event, and so Predestination be founded upon Prevision; or,*

on the contrary, this *Praordination* precedent to his *Præscience*, and so *Prædestination* be the basis of *Prævision*: for, from the concession of either, it follows of absolute necessity that the *Term of mans life (in individuo)* must be fixt and intransible.

We answer,

That the *Consequence*, indeed, ought to be admitted as firme and impregnable. For this *Præscience*, whether it præced, or succed *Divine Prædestination*, is and must be ever certain, præcise, and infallible; or so supposed to be, at least: and therefore must the *Term of mans life* be constituted certain, præcise, and immutable, *ex necessitate si non consequentis, saltem consequentia*, by necessity if not of the *Consequent*, yet of the *consequence*; i. e. if not from the *Virtue or Efficiency*, yet from the *Hypothesis*, or *Conditionality* of that *Præscience*. For no Sceptick can disallow of this *Consequence*; if God doth infallibly foreknow, that this and no other shall be the *Term of my life*: ergo this and no other shall be the *Term of my life*.

But this is not the point, at which our inquiry is levelled. Manifest it is, aswell from our precedent discourse, as from the Condition of the subject, that these two Propositions are not repugnant each to other; viz. The *Term of mans life* is fixt and immutable in respect to the infallibility of Gods *Præscience*: and the *Term of mans life* is moveable in respect to our right use, or abuse of the *Liberty of our Will*. Though, I confels, with the great *Mersennius*; that the apparent discord betwixt the infallibility of Gods *Prævision*, and the indetermination of mans *Free Will* to the actual election of good or evil; hath bin the rock, against which many the greatest wits of all Ages and Religions have bin shipwrackt, in their perswasions of the irresistible enforcement of *Destiny*.

To extricate our judgements out of this maze, let us remember and adhere unto that excellent Axiome of the most and most learned of the School-men; *Prævisionem Dei nihil influere in nostras actiones*, that the *Prævision* of God hath no influence upon the actions of man, not upon the operation of the remedies applied by the Physician to the cure of diseases: but presuposeth

Article 2.

The retention thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of Gods *Prævision*, to the indetermination of mans *free will* to the actual election of Good or Evil.

poseth both the one and the other. For, in truth, God cannot foreknow the future actions of man, or the effects of remedies administr'd, otherwise then because of their necessary Futurity. Since, if we take away the *Futurition* of events, we necessarily destroy the *Prevision* of God.

Which *Abstrusity* that we may the better comprehend, let us begg the liberty, to suppose some *Momenta rationis*, or *successive minutes in Eternity* (which, though in reality impossible, *Eternity* being one permanent *no vñ*, or *instance*, as incapable of *division*, as *cessation*; may yet serve, as an excellent *Perspective*, to our weak-sighted reason in its inspection of many sublime *Phanomena* in *Theology*;) and humbly conceive; that in the *First Moment* of *Eternity*, God saw, and only saw, without any relation at all to his future decrees, all things to come, as well *Εσόμενα*, or such whose futurity is necessary from the condition of their Nature, or impuls of their proper Causes; as *Μέλλοντα*, or *Futura Contingentia*, which hang suspended in *equilibrio* upon the Free Will of their *Efficients*, so that they may, or may not succeed, whether they be *Absolute*, or *Conditionate*: in which *First moment* had God acquiesced, and proceeded no farther, then only to foresee the *Necessity* and *Possibility* of their *Futurition*; then nothing should have bin to come. That in the *Second Moment*, God saw, and only saw, that this or that event was in *Possibility* of *Futurition*, in the life of this or that particular man, if such or such things were done, in this or that time, with this or that *Temperament* of body, and other respective *Circumstances*: but yet did neither determine any thing to *absolute Necessity* of *Futurition*, and therefore nothing could be said to depend upon the *Præordination* of God, though all things should come to pass in the same manner, as he foresaw them, whensoever the *Fiat* of his *Will* should bring them into *actual existence*, or educe them *extra suas causas*; nor did he see, that they would so and no otherwise come to pass; from hence that he would they should so and no otherwise come to pass; since this *Prævision* anteceds all *Volition*. That, therefore, in the *Third Moment* of *Eternity*, God decreed, that he would make *Future* not all those *Possible* Effects, whether

whether Absolute or Conditionate, but only some particulars, as, for example, that he would make *Alexander*, or *Plato*, of this or that individual temperament of body, in this or that climate and country, of this or that particular course of life, with all conspicing Circumstances; to whom all things should happen according to the possibility of their Futurition, wherein God beheld them before the conception or pronounciation of his Decree; so that by this influence of God's definitive Will, those Events are no more then deduced into actual existence, which formerly were only in *Subiectis*, or in the womb of their Causes.

Now, upon this Hypothesis our understanding is advanced to this manifest Conclusion, That the Prescience of God doth nothing conduce ad rem existentem, nor to the Actions or Passions thereof; since it is not the cause of their Inference: nor doe his Decrees, that are subsequent unto, and in a manner grounded upon his Prevision, work any the least mutation at all in the natures of his Creatures, or by violence pervert their Virtues to the production of any Effects, to which, by their primitive Constitution and individuation, they were not precisely adapted and accommodated. Since, in so doing, he must take away from his Creatures those peculiar Faculties, which he at their creation freely conferred upon their severall natures; and innovate the fundamental laws of Nature.

Now this dark shadow of that darker mystery of Predestination, how obscurely soever presented, doth yet sufficiently demonstrate how vast and diametral a disparity is between that Divine Prevision, which is Antecedent; and that which is subsequent to Divine Praordination. For that Prescience, which hath for its object a thing to come, without any previous and prædeterminant Decree; supposeth that particular thing to come, together with the whole series or concatenation of its proper Causes, and method or manner of its Futurition: the Modus Futuritionis being, as the Schoolemen well define, *Id quod futurum est, sive quod ad rei, quæ futura præscitur, futuritionem quolibet modo pertinet.* This that Rabbin *Isac bar Sefat*, quoted by *Menasseth Ben Israel* (*de termino vite. pag. 236.*) seems

Article 3.
The diametral Disparity between that Divine Prevision which is antecedent to Divine Praordination; and that which is subsequent; amply declared.

well to have understood, when he said; *Deus ab aeterno disposuit totius mundi negotia, & divina sua sapientia, ac perspicacia, vidit omnes effectus, qui in tempore futuri essent: qui licet pendeat (loquor enim de actionibus humanis) a libero hominis arbitrio, ut fiant aut non fiant; nihilominus tamen Deus certo & infallibiliter eos praevidit, ac praescivit. Neque tamen ideo quicquam in tempore facit homo, quia Deus ea facturum praescivit: sed è contrà, quia homo in tempore hoc vel illud facit, aut operatur, ideo Deus ab aeterno illud scivit.*

But on the Contrary, that *Præscience*, which follows upon the *Prædetermination* of the *Divine Will*, hath, indeed, for its object a thing to come, and also presupposeth it as fully as the former; but so that it comprehends the order and manner of its futurition as fixt and *immutable*, being so constituted by virtue of the antecedent *Prædestination*.

For the further inculcation of this *Distinction*, let us make use of an *Example* most familiar, and pertinent to the difficulty in hand.

Article 4.

A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification.

That *Divine Præscience*, which hath no dependence on a prædeterminant decree, let us suppose it to be a *Præscience* of the *life* and *death*, of the health and sickness, of the good or evil use of the *Free will*, of *Peter*, *John*, and every individual man in the world: and is twofold.

First Conditionate; if *Peter*, or *John*, being born of a sound and durable constitution, shall choose such a course of life, as that he shall observe the wholesome *Aphorismes* of *Temperance* in his use of the *Six nonnaturals*, shall opportunely, in all distempers introduced by the inclemency of the aer, the malignant impressions of the *Stars*, epidemick contagions, or other undelinable *Accidents*, recur to the use of such convenient remedies, as both reason and experience prescribe for the preservation or restauration of health; then I foreknow that he shall live healthy and long: but if, on the contrary; then I foreknow, that he shall be infested with frequent diseases, and die immatirely.

Second Absolute; I foreknow that *Peter* or *John* shall choose a prudent course of life, convenient both to his *Genius*, and tempera-

temperament ; shall sedulously endeavour the preservation of his health, by moderation in diet and other nonnaturals, and the restoration of the same, when impaired by any distemper, by rational and approved medicaments ; and shall therefore enjoy health, and attain to longævity. On the *Contrary*, I foreknow, that he shall lead a disorderly and luxurious course of life, accelerate the dissolution of his temperament, by the immoderate, præmature, or unseasonable use of Wine, Woemen, Passions &c. and when assaulted by any disease, chronique or acute, shall either omit to consult learned, judicious and experienced Physitians, or disobey their pharmaceutical or dietetical præscripts, drinke wine in a Fever, cold water in a Critical sweat, salt, sharp, acid or corroding liquors in a Dysentery, eat Astringents in obstructions, frigid, crude and dyspeptical fruits in an imbecillity of the stomach, &c. and shall therefore ruine his health and drop into the grave before hee's ripe.

Now take which *Præscience* you please, and either hath for its object, the præcise Term of *Peter* or *Johns* life, as a thing to come ; and fully and punctually presupposeth the same : but so, that together with that fixt Term it comprehends also all the *order* and *manner* of its *Futurition*, or all the antecedent and conspiring causes ; amongst which the principal and most energetical is the right *use* or *abuse* of his own *Free will*, in whose power it was to move that Term either forwards or backwards, (*i. e.*) either to *adduce*, or *produce* it.

Sofar, therefore, is this *Prævision* of God from *excluding* the necessity of *Medical Remedies*, as the Defendants of Fate would impose, according to that of *Solon* in *Stobæus*.

————— *Fato quacunque manet fors ;*

Non hanc avertet victima, sed nec aves,

Nec qui Pæonias ægris mortalibus herbas

Sæpe erraturam ferre laborat opem.

That it totally *includes*, nay presupposeth it so necessarily, that if we take away from man the *Liberty* of his *Will*, and the opportunity of using either prophylactical, or therapeutical means, in order to the prolongation of his life ; we must also submove

the *Certainty of Gods Præscience*: since that determineth nothing, but only præsupposeth all things; nor doth God, by a decree subsequent to that Præscience, præordain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease, unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies, which the Physician shall in the opportunity præscribe.

Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason, to argue thus; if the Term of mans life be certainly and precisely fore-known to God, then must it, together with the order and manner of its Futurition, be fixt and immutable: then to argue thus; if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing *already past*, as of the Creation of the world; therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise, nor at any other time, then it did; therefore was the world created by God, *non libere sed necessario*, not by an *Arbitrary*, but *Necessary* and restrained activity. For, as *Science*, having for its object a thing *Præterite*, doth infer no necessity upon that thing præterite, that it should have bin so and no otherwise effected: so doth *Præscience*, having for its object a thing *Future*, infer no necessity upon its futurition; each being an *Immanent Action* in God, & *extra rem*, or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing, or its Causes: and *Futurum esse* imports no other thing, but an object of *Præscience*; nor *Præteritum esse*, any thing but an object of *Science*, or *Memorie*. *Science* is the perfection of the Subject, or thing knowing; not of the object, or thing known: much less the destruction of the thing known. For necessary it is to perfect *Science*, that it agree in all points with the nature of its object.

But wholly Antartical to this, is that *Præscience* which is grounded upon *Divine Prædestination*, whereby not only the Term of every individuals life, together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition, is præfixt; but also all those Causes, whose *refractory* or *counter-activity* might in any respect hinder the precise accomplishment of that præfixt Term, are prævented or prædetermined to invalidity, lest the Præscience become uncertain or dubious: whether that *Prædetermination* dispose *per modum Cause Efficientis*, by a certain *Physical* and really effective

effective action, or impression upon the will of man, enforcing it to the election of such a course of life, as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that præstituted Term; or *per modum Cause Deficientis* by nonconcurrent, but only *permissive* influence (by some called *Permissio simplex*, Simple Permission: by others, *Permissio efficax*, efficacious permission,) since that rule amongst Philosophers *Causa Deficiens in necessariis reducitur ad Efficientem*, doth warrant the *Indifferency*. For this *Decretory Præscience*, though it agree with the precedent *simple Præscience* in this, that it hath for its object *rem futuram*, includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futurition, and presupposeth both the end, and respective means fully and absolutely; yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this, that the precedent *Præscience* presupposeth the *liberty* of mans *Will*, and the use thereof not only incoacted, and without irrefragable impuls, but absolutely free and arbitrary: but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will, by importing that the influence of the *Decree* not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or persuasion, but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means, which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof; and this lest the *Certitude* or *Infallibility* of the *Divine Præscience* be infirmed and staggered.

To discriminate this *Later* from that *Former Præscience* yet more fully; and so insinuate the result of the *Distinction*, by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation: it will be necessary for us to conceive the *Decrees* of God in the same method of *subordination*, wherein they, who found the infallibility of his *Prævision* upon the necessity of his *Prædestination* and *Prædetermination*, have bin, by the obscurity of the Subject, compelled to range their thoughts, in the declatement of their opinion.

The *first Decree* of God runs thus; I will, that *Peter* live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life; conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year: but that *John* wither before hee's ripe, and fall in the
June

Article 5.

A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the *Divine Decrees*, in the same *subordinate series*, which the *Faustists* have imagined.

June of his age ; conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth.

The *Second* thus ; I will preserve *Peter* from this or that sickness, defend him from this or that knock of misfortune, conserve him in, or restore him from this or that dangerous disease ; lest he expire before the præstite Term of his life : but for *John*, he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease, receive such or such a wound incurable, or perish by this or that fatal Accident ; so that he may verify my prognostick in dying at the hour appointed.

The *Third* thus ; lest *Peter* laps into such or such a mortal disease, I will that he be provided of an industrious and prudent Physician to prescribe unto him rational ; generous, and effectual prophylactical means ; or, if surpris'd therewith, that he use convenient and victorious therapeutical medicaments. in order to the expulsion of the same ; that so the number of his days be not shortned : but, on the contrary, that *John* shall fall into such or such a dangerous sickness, and want Physicians, medicaments, and all other Conservatives whatever ; lest he survive beyond the moment præfixt.

The *Fourth* thus ; that *Peter* may not, by the abuse of his Arbitrary prerogative, become insensible, incurious, or negligent of the means ordained to conserve health, and run into the perpetration of such sins, as may be injurious to the temperament of his body, as well as the peace of his mind ; I will, by the powerfull influence of my Special Grace, so prepare and dispose his Will, that he shall lead a temperate, circumspect and virtuous life, and so subsist till the period of his days præfixt. On the contrary, that *John* may not, by the right use of that Elective Liberty conferred upon his Will, and by a desire of attaining to longævity, endeavour the conservation of his health, by diætetical or pharmaceutical observations ; I will, that he want that ingenuity, that prudence, that advice, and those precripts, conducible to the prolongation of his life, and finally that assistance of *Divine Grace*, without which it is not only probable, but necessary, that he should resign up the reins of his Will to Sensuality, and so either by the prodigal effusion of his

Vital

Vital oyle in the immodest and destructive rites of Venus, or the extinction of his implantate heat by the frantique sacrifices of Bacchus, or other exorbitances, decurtate the temperamental lease of his life; and so confess Corruption in the moment prefixt.

Or, in a higher key of Fatality, thus; though *Peter*, by the abuse of his Will, rashly expose himself to the fury of the most dangerous Enemies to life, and by gluttony, ebriosity, vindictive anger, falacity, &c. render himself both unfit, and unworthy longer to inspire the common aer; I will notwithstanding all this again repaire the breaches of his constitution, protect him from the malice of danger, and conserve him till the moment predestined, nor shall he be taken off by any other means, but what my Will hath predetermined. Contrary; though *John*, by the right use of the liberty of his will, shall constantly and severely practise all the hard lessons of Virtue, subdue the impetuous and forcible Temptations of Sensuality, lead a life more impassionate then the most rigid of the Stoicks ever professed, more chaste then aged Hermits, more abstinent then *Lessius*, more peaceable then Charity her self, and so deserve to become the greatest Example of Longevity: I will notwithstanding, that the appointed Term of his life remain fixt and intransible beyond that point, which my will hath from all Eternity decreed to be the *Ne Ultra* of his subsistence.

On these, or the like Decrees, must the *Certitude* and infallibility of the *Divine Prescience* be erected by any; who subordinate Gods *Prescience* to his *Predestination* of the end, and *predetermination* of the means.

Now, to use all this; so many, so great, and so intolerable are the *Incongruities*, and *Inconveniencies*, which necessarily depend on this *Decretory Prescience*; that we need no other argument to evince the weakness of their judgements, who have laboured in its defence, but only to select and consider the *chiefeft* and most *obvious* of them.

First, this opinion, that, all the actions of man, and their Events, are *Fatally predetermined* by the *Decretory Prescience* of God; doth not only enervate and scandal, nay destroy the *sincerity*

Article 6.
The first *Ab-*
surdity impen-
dent on the o-
pinion of a *De-*
cretory Presci-
ence of God, as
to the *Actions*
of man,

of those many *Divine Precepts*, enjoying man to endeavour, to the utmost of his knowledg and power, the conservation of his health, and the prolongation of his life, by temperance and all other lawfull means; of those many *Promises* made to encourage him to a strict observance; of those many *Comminations* annexed, to deter him from the neglect of those Precepts; but also, upon inference, dissolves the *obligation* to all serious study and sollicitude to explore, procure, prepare, and use all convenient remedies, in order to the expulsion of diseases, and the revocation of health, on the part of the *Sick man*; and on the part of the *Physician*, to be industrious, carefull, vigilant, and conscientious, in the exercise of his Profession.

That the *Patient* is hereby disobliged from the duty of Self-conservation, may be thus manifested. If it be, *ex Decreto Divino*, fixt and immutable, that such a man shall lead a peaceable, healthfull, and blisfull life, and do all things that are either necessary or conductive to the procurement and continuation of that happy estate; or on the *Contrary*, that such a man shall eate the bread of sorrow, drink the bitter waters of Affliction, and unravell his tedious days in poverty, contention, valetude, or craziness of body, anxiety of mind, &c. and therefore take no care at all to do those actions, which might be necessary or conductive to the amendment of his miserable condition; by reason he wants the assistance, counsel, and manuduction of *Divine Grace*: then doth it unavoidably follow, that the *labour* and *sollicitude* of the one is *superfluous*, and of the other *unsuccessful*, nay *impossible*. For whatever the one, or the other shall do, and however live; yet still the success shall be no other, but what God hath predestined, and though the intention of either be levelled at an end quite contrary to what is designed by the Volition of the *Predestinant*; yet shall the *Force* of the *Decree* either pervert, or render it ineffectual: and if we grant, that the *Happy* man did take care to conserve his health and life; we must also grant, that he could not but take that care; and that the *Miserable* man did take none to preserve either, because it was not in the power of his *Wil* to determine on that care. And thus, what either shall do, can be neither *Care*, nor *Negligence*,
strictly

strictly and properly so called : but a meer *Necessity* of Caring, or not Caring.

On the part of the *Physician*, the Reason is the same ; for, if this doctrine of Fatality be true, well may he be excused, nay thought the wiser man, if he shut up his books, forget his Aphorismes, deliver out his Prescripts *per Sortilegium* (a course, as I have bin ascertained by the testimony of a judicious and faithfull observer thereof, not long since taken up and constantly practised by a Devout Impostor, whose counterfeit zeal to the Cause had advanced him to the trust of a Physician in that Army, which gathered the first flowers of its triumphant wreath in Naseby Feild) and supinely give Coloquyntida, or Scammony in a Dysentery, Antimony in the Iliaca Passio, Opium in a Crisis, Aqua Fortis for a Julep &c. since no Art can supersede, nor Poyson accelerate his departure, whose time of transition to the invisible world Destiny hath limited to a moment ; *Et cum Fata volunt, bina Venena juvant*. Nor can it be rightly esteemed a *Virtue* in the Physician, to be studious and solicitous ; or a *Vice* to be debauched, ignorant, and negligent of the safety of his Client : if it be only the irresistible *Impulse* of Fate, which forceth his *Will* to the election of either, in order to the precise accomplishment of its Decree : or, more plainly, if the Care or Negligence of the Physician be but the *Medium*, whereby Fate brings about its end concerning the dissolution of the Patient. And if so, what *Moral* obligation remains upon the conscience of the Physician ? Assuredly none at all. Which every moderate judgement will soon detect to import so manifest, dangerous, and detestable an *Absurdity* ; that of it self tis able not only to discredit the opinion of Fatality, but also to accuse and convict the Abettors thereof of unpardonable Inconsideration, Stupidity, and Irreligion.

The *Second Inconvenience*, or rather *Absurdity*, inseparably conjoynd to this opinion of a *Decretory Prescience* in God ; is this : Whoever shall grant, that all the means or remedies, and so the sedulity or negligence as well of the Sick, as the Physician, are subordinately predetermined by the Decree of

Article 7.
A Second *Absurdity* connected to the same.

Fate; must also, by the necessity of natural consequence, be compelled to grant, that to allow the merit of *Praise* or *Dispraise*, *Commendation* or *Reprebension* unto either, is open *Injustice*. For by what pretext of Equity can a Sick man challenge to himself the honor of having done a praise-worthy action, in endeavouring to preserve himself both by observing a course of Diet contrary to his disease, and seasonable consulting with and strictly conforming unto the advice of a learned and judicious Physician; or the Physician for the full discharge of his duty in regulating the sick according to the most profound and salutiferous maximes of his Art: if the obedience of the one, and the care of the other be not Arbitrary, but coerced or necessitated by the Force of the complex Decree of Fate, as instrumental to the subsistence of the sick man till the predestined term of his life? *Ubi mera necessitas locum habet, ibi laudem exulare necesse est*: where meer *Necessity* is admitted, thence all *Laudation* is excluded. And with what justice can we reprehend the sick man, for being incurious in the disquisition, or irregular in, and averse from the use of the means prescribed for his restauration: if that his supinity, irregularity, and aversion be imposed upon his Will by the impuls of Destiny, and predetermined as a necessary Medium to accomplish the Decree of his immature death? or the Physician either for his neglect, or ignorant and inartificial tractation of his Client; if twere decreed he should be so, to the end the client might expire according to the decree? *Persuasum est omnibus* (saith *Menasseh Ben Israel, de Termino Vita. pag. 205.*) *nec laudandum, nec arguendum quemquam, nisi qui libero arbitrio & consulto benè agit, aut delinquit; adeo ut nullus suasioni, consiliis, redargutioni, premio aut pœna locus sit, si homo non est liber in actionibus suis.*

Article 8.
Two Subterfuges of the Fatalist, precluded.

From this distress our Opponents have promised themselves an easy evasion, by replying; that both *Patient* and *Physician* are wholly ignorant of the Decree, the Opticks of Mortality being too weak and remote to read the lines in the Book of Fate, without the perspicill of *Divine Revelation*.

But

But this way of *Subterfuge* may be blockt up, by rejoyning; that though the *Decree* be known to neither, yet tis sufficiently manifest to both, from the Hypothesis of this opinion, that not only their *Actions*, but also the *Successes* thereof are the pre-*scripts* and consignations of Fate; and so can be no other then what is included in, and necessitated by the *Decree*: and consequently that there can remain no just Cause of *reprehension* on either side.

Should they insist yet further upon the same plea, and urge; that tis part of the *Decree*, that either the *Physician*, or *Patient*, or both should be negligent, and so become *Culpable*: we may soon expel this obstruction only by demanding, what *reason* or *equity* can be found to justify such an accusation and respective punishment, where the *Will* of the delinquent is controlled, inflected, nay impelled upon the commission of a crime, or omission of a duty, by a power infinitely superior to his reluctancy; and not only the act, but time, place, instruments, means, &c. conspiring circumstances, precisely preordained by a decree of that *Will*, which is *Omnipotence*? *Reprehension* imports not only an *Act* of the *Reprehendent*, but also the *Guilt* or *Culpability* of the *Reprehended*: otherwise it cannot be just. To the legality, therefore, of a reprehension it is undeniably necessary, that the ground or cause thereof be a *real* and *proper Guilt* in the person reprehended. Now *Guilt* can have no place, where that which is impeached cannot be a *Voluntary Agent*, but a *Medium*, or *Instrument* ordained, and actuated by an irresistible Power to the execution of an infallible *Decree*.

The *Third* and last *Absurdity* imports no less then the sub-*version* of the very fundamental *Principle*, or basis of all *Moral Virtues*, and *Christian Graces*; by inferring a deni-*all* of *Justice* in the reward of *Good*, and punishment of *Evil*, either before, or after death. For, tis the *Liberty of the Will* only that supports the *Equity* of *Compensation*: and therefore he, who doth a good action, when twas not in the election of his *Will* to have omitted that good action, or to have done it otherwise then he did; hath but a weak claim to a *reward*; nor hath he, who

Article 9.

A third *Absurdity* inseparable from the hypothesis of a *Decretory Pre-
science Divine*.

commits a sin, which is not in his power to leave uncommitted, more reason to feare a *punishment* from the even hand of *Divine Justice*.

To conclude, therefore; since these are the *Absurdities*, which every mans Logick may perceive necessarily and immediately to flow from the doctrine of *Decretory Prescience*, or such as is subsequnt to *Divine Predetermination*; and since the same, nor any others of equal danger to the Principles of our Knowledge, and Articles of the Christian Faith, can ever be deduced from the hypothesis of that *Simple Prevision* or *unactive Prescience*, which we have allowed of as consistent to the *justice* of God, because consistent to the *Arbitrary freedom* of mans *Will*: tis no hard task to determine, in which opinion our judgements may with more safety and permanent satisfaction aquiesce.

Article 10.
The reduction
of the whole
dissertation to
4 *Conclusions*,
genuinely ex-
tracted from
the Premises.

Now, that we may relieve the Memory of our patient Reader, from the oppression of our (not well to be avoyded) precedent prolixity; we conceive our selves in gratitude obliged, to tender him a Recapitulation, or reducement of all this tedious discourse, concerning the *Mobility* of mans term of life, in *Four Conclusions*, naturally resulting from the Premises.

The First Conclusion.

That God hath circumscribed the duration of mans life, with a certain Circle or round of time, conceive it to be of 70. 80. 90. or 100. years, more or less: but yet hath reserved to himself, as *jus suprema Majestatis*, the prerogative power of extending the term of any individual mans life beyond the limits of that sphear, so far as it shall seem convenient to the *Wisdom* of his Will. ¶

The Second Conclusion.

That God, who loves justice more then man, and man only for Justice sake; and hates Injustice more then man, and man only
only

only for Injustice sake (for *Sin*, unravelled to the botome, will be found to be nothing but *Injustice*) is willing, in respect of the object of his Love, or in consideration of mans justice, to prolong; or, on the contrary, in respect of the object of his Hate, or in consideration of mans Injustice, to abbreviate the term of mans life, included within that determinate Circle of time: reserving still to himself an arbitrary power of acting the quite contrary; (*i. e.*) of abbreviating the life of the just, and prolonging the life of the unjust, upon the persuasion of reasons either manifest to us, or private to himself. ¶

The Third Conclusion.

That God, when he is pleased to condescend to the prolongation of the life of a Just person, doth procure the same, either by means conforme to the ordinary and seded Constitutions, or by means Supernatural. The *Former*, when bearing a respect to the native Durability of his individual Temperament, he assists to the duration thereof untill the natural Period, or last moment of this sphear of time; wherewith the life of man (*in specie*) is circumscribed: and this either by conserving his Temperament in its decent tenor, and requisite Vigor; or by prohibiting and preventing the invasion of those known Enemies to longevity, which might any way conduce to the denormation, and consequently the premature dissolution of its harmony. The *Later*, when bearing no respect to the native durability of his individual Temperament, he meliorateth, exalteth, and by the secret immission of some special *Athanasia*, or Antidote against early death, corroborateth the same, so that it doth last longer, then otherwise, *pro vi sua nativa*, it could possibly have lasted, had it never bin impaired by any distemper. And this when God doth, then is he properly sayd, *to prolong the life, or fulfill the number of the years of the Just*. But the Contrary effect he procures by contrary Causes; (*i. e.*) he abbreviates the life of an unjust Person, either by an immature turbation and dissolution of his temperament, by its native disposition sufficiently tenacious and durable to extreme old age: or by not prohibiting, (*i. e.*) permitting and so procuring the violent

lent and preternatural dissolution thereof by the destructive surprisall of any Accident whatever. And in this case, properly are the Unjust sayd, *not to Dimidiate their days.* ¶

The Fourth Conclusion.

That a just Person, who, so much as in him lies, fixeth all the Affections of his Soul upon the Fear of God, and the avoydance of Evil; if he chance, through the frailty of his nature, or the force of temptation, to fall into some Capital Sin, which according to the penalty annexed to its prohibition, deserves to be punished by the *Abbreviation* of his life: may notwithstanding *sometimes*, his remorse of Conscience, profound sorrow, fervent prayer, religious fasting, and other duties requisite to true and perfect repentance, effectually exciting the Mercies of God, obtain from him a full and absolute remission not only of the sin, but also of the temporal punishment due thereunto; and moreover a restauration of his Temperament to its native vigor, from which it was alienated by former infirmities, or corrupted by the dyscratical or distemperring contagion of sin. And *sometimes not*; and this chiefly, when it hath seemed convenient to the most wise and just God to pronounce the fatal and irrepealable sentence of Death upon him: for in such a case, I beleave the sin committed, to belong to that black order of *Sins unto Death*; by contradistinction thereof from that Sin, which is *not* unto Death, or upon which the irrevocable Sentence of Death is not yet pronounced; which no man can certainly know without special revelation. ¶

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Liberty Elective of
Mans Will.

SECT. I.



our enumeration of the Venenate *Absurdities*, which naturally grow upon that inflexible stock of *Absolute Fatality*, or, more expressly, upon that execrable *Hypothesis* of the *Stoicks* (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any *Christians* of that irreligious persuasion) that all the Actions of every individual man are prædestined, and the whole order and manner of their Futurition præcisely præordained by the invariable decrees of that *Supreme Power*, against which the coacted and limited *Will* of man can make no effectual resistance; we well remember, we specified the total sublation of all *Virtue* and *Vice*; the abnegation of *Justice* either *Divine* or *Human*, in the compensation of *Piety* and *Impiety*; the adnihilation of the use and efficacy of *Laws* to coerce from Evil, of *Præcepts* and *Adhortations* to elect and prosecute good; in a word, the subversion of all *Religion* and *Morality*, and consequently the necessary resignation and rendition of the minde of man to receive all the destructive *Impressions* of *Hell*. And no less, nor fewer *Absurdities* may the reason of every man discover emergent from the *Antithesis* or contrary Assertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Successes, are

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neither

Article I.
The Parity of
Absurdities re-
sulting from
those two An-
tagonistical
Hypotheses,
of *Absolute Fa-
tality*, and meer
Contingency; as
to the Actions
of man.

neither the prædeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional designations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of mans will, but the meer unpræmeditate, and temerarious *Hits of Chance*: since, in pure Justice, those actions onely are *Laudable*, or *Vituperable*, which are done *Deliberatò & liberè ratiòne Agentis*, upon a deliberation of the *Intellect*, and an arbitrary election of the *Will* subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are meerly *Fortuitous*, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of *Fortune*.

Article 2.
Those 2 contrarie streams found to have bin derived from one and the same poysonous Fountain; viz. a subterfuge of man to evade Culpability.

When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient *Greeks*, many of the noblest *Romans*, and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of *Christianity* have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their *reason*; I must confess, I conceived them to have bin derived from two different fountains, or *interests* as irreconcilable as *Light* to *Darkness*: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from one and the same vein; viz. the propensity of *Human nature depraved*, to attempt by all means imaginable the *Excusation* or *Extenuation* of the *Guilt* of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, upon some external influence prevalent over mans *Will*. For man, having from the *Light of Nature* learned this as an *Axiome*; that the *Justice* of *Reprehension* and *Punition* is radically consistent in the intire *Freedom* of the *Delinquents Will*; or, more plainly, in this, that the *Delinquent* chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his *Will* was enforced by a *Necessity* that admits of no repugnancy, first to the *Volition* and after to the actual *prosecution* of that ill; or that he was onely a meer *illiberal*, *incogitant*, & *fortuitous Agent*: 'twas obvious for him to conclude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable *Necessity*, or simple and meer *Chance*, then he might with equal facility, discharge himself of the *Culpability*, or *Guilt*, and consequently of the *punishment* due thereunto.

Now,

Now, though our pen hath drop't, on the præcedent leaves, frequent and cursary Detections of the gross and ruinous Absurdities of both these *subterfuges*, so that a rational consideration may, from those transient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total *Demolition* of them: yet, since those notions of *Fate*, *Fortune* and *Free-will* are subject to *Equivocation*, some men understanding them as *positive Causes*, others as *Modi agendi Causarum*, certain manners of Causes operating, and others as *Vana Nomina*, meer *Terms*, which in Logical verity respond by way of adæquation to no real Entities; and since the difficulty of the subject encouraged us to promise a full *Reconciliation* of all their apparent *Antipathies*, or *Inconsistencies*, and also a perfect *Accommodation* of them all to the *Special Providence* of God (the onely cause of their continuity and connexion to the present clue of our thoughts) we esteemed it not onely a pardonable, but a laudable design to attempt by a singular discourse the manifestation of their *particular Natures*, or, more plainly, what we are to understand by *Fate*, what by *Fortune*, and what by *Free Will*. Which that we may atchieve with the more familiarity to common Apprehension, both method and perspicuity command us to consider the *last* in the first place.

Article 3.
The Authors Incitements, here to enquire profoundly into the Nature of *Free-will*, *Fortune*, and *Fate*

By the *Liberty* or *Freedome* of mans Will (that we may maturely prævent all Logomachy or Sophistical contention impendent from the ambiguous sense of that term) we intend not that *Freedome*, which being called by the Græcian *Ἐλευθερία*, defined by *Cicero*, *Potestas vivendi ut velit quilibet*, and by the Civil Law *Ἐξουσία αυτοκρατορίας*, the Power of leading the life of a *Freeman*, is the contrary to *Servitude*; since that concerns onely the *Civil* or *Political* state of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Græcian defines *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμᾶν*, or *τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς*, the Latines *Id quod in nobis seu penes nos, nostròve in arbitrio, potestatéque situm est*, and the Divines commonly name *Liberum Arbitrium* an Absolute power of electing what objects we please, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections;

Article 4.
What is intended properly by the *Liberty* of mans Will.

since that concernes only the *natural* state of man, and is that alone which can justify the *Equity* of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the punishment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man.

Article 5.
The several
subordinate
Actions of the
Mind, exercised
about its ob-
jects: and the
respective
scholastick
Terms, by
which Philoso-
phers have ad-
equately ex-
pressed them.

For more then one respect did the Ancients select and fix on this word *Arbitrium*; For, whether we would intimate that *Action* of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that seemed dubious; as we use to say, that for the Decision of any case, whose obscure æquity either our own imprudence, or interest makes us unfit to determine, we ought to referre our selves to the *Arbitration* of some judicious and impartial person, who is thence most accommodately called an *Arbiter*: or the *Rational Faculty* it self existent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration it self doth proceed, the word signifying the *Action* being transfered upon the *Agent*; we can hardly be furnished with a more adequate and significant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the first Imponents up to the original, in respect the *rational faculty*, being the same with the *Mind* or *Intellect*, is conversant and exercised about not onely things that belong meely to *speculation*, but also such as are reducible into *Action* or *Practise*; therefore doth the term *Arbitrium* seem to be appropriated to the *Faculty*, chiefly in respect of things to be *done*, inasmuch as it is occupied in the expension or dijudication of the consequent good of those actions, and fits as it were an absolute Arbiter to determine, whether they shall be done, or no.

And hence is it that when the rational faculty having perpended the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of *Deliberation*, adheres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient then the others; this second act or *Adhesion* may be in the general (*i. e.* in respect of things both speculable and practical) called *συγκατάθεσις*, an *Assent* or *Approbation*; but in particular (*i. e.* in respect only to those things that fall under action) *επιλογισις*, an *Election* or *Choice*: since it supposeth the prælation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this distinct

distinct relation was it that *Aristotle* (*Ethicor. 3. cap. 3. in fine*) styles the object elected, τὸ ἀρξίζητον, *id quod ceteris propositis, & postpositis, amplectendum nobis proponimus, or, id quod sub delectum cadit.* This the *Latines* most frequently render *Consilium*, as in those phrases, *capere consilium, sequi rationis consilium, nescire quid sit alicujus consilium, &c.* and *Propositum*, as in those, *adharere, stare, manere in proposito, à proposito revocare, propositi esse tenacem, &c.* and we translate into *Resolution, or Determination.*

Again, so soon as the *Mind*, its act of *Consultation* or *Deliberation* being finished, hath preferred one thing to all others, in the present, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately superveneth the function of the *Appetite*, whereby the mind is carried on towards the *Amplectence*, or *fruition* of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the *Greeks* call βέλους, the *Latines* *Voluntas* and *Volitio* indifferently, and the *English* the *Will* or Act of *Volition*. Which we glance at *per transfennam*, because vulgarly, by the word *Voluntas*, men understand rather the *Appetite* (rational and proper only to Man) it self, then the *Function* or operation thereof: for which consideration, we shall in all our subsequent discourse conforme to custome, in using the terms *Will* and *Appetite indiscriminatim*, as Synonymas implying one and the same thing.

Moreover, in regard, that upon the *Appetition* of the *Will*, which is properly the actual prosecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately succeeds the action of the *Motive Faculty*, therefore is the action consequent to that appetite justly called *Voluntary*, as having bin deliberated and undertaken *ex consilio*, upon consultation and election, and respondent to that which the *Græcian* calls ἀρξίς. For that is it, whose beginning *Aristotle* hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphorisme, ἀρξίς μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρξίσεως, which was the ground of *Ciceros* Paradox, *non esse actionem in rebus inanimis*, that there could be no action in *Inanimate* things, since they are devoid of the power of *Election, Assent, or Approbation*: and of *Aristotles* also, when he contended that this kind of ἀρξίς

or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to *Brute Animals*, nay higher yet, not to *children*, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both τὸ ἐκείστων, *spontaneous motion*. Not but that by τὸ ἐκείστων, he sometimes signifies *motionem appetitus spontaneam*, the spontaneous motion of the *Appetite Rational*, or the *Will* it self, as (in 3. *Ethic. cap. 4.*) where he constitutes this difference betwixt *Volition* and *Election*; that βέλους, or *Voluntas*, is chiefly the *end*, and ἐπιχειρεσις the *Election* of the *means* conducing to that end, as in this instance, We *will* health, and then *elect* the means which in probability may officiate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more precisely, he allows not every *appetition*, to be the *Will*, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθῆ, *boni cum ratione appetitio*, an *Appetition of Good with Reason*.

Nor doth he always restrain the word ἐπιχειρεσις to that Action which proceeds from the *Will*, or election of the *Rational Appetite*: but many times lets it loose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the *Sensual*; as in these words (1. *Rhetor. cap. 10.*) *Omnia que homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se: ac per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, que sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, que sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt.* And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several *Terms*, by which both ancient and modern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several successive or subordinate actions of the *Mind* exercised about its objects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the *Quiddity* or *Essence* of that we call *Liberum Arbitrium*, and wherein it doth radically and principally consist.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Familiar it is to the Apprehension of every one, that Man is affirmed to possess a *Free-Will*, for this reason; that amongst many divers objects occurring to, and falling under the deliberation of the *Cognoscent Faculty*, or *Intellect*, he is not obliged to make his election of any one more then the others, nor doth he so elect any one, as that it doth not still remain in his power to refuse that again and elect the contrary. *This Liberty* of election some men have founded only in the *Will*, and others in the *Rational Faculty*; to whose opinion reason adviseth us to adhere. For doubtless the *Will*, considered *per se* is a blind and undiscerning *Faculty*, or *Power*, which can make no progress, nor find the way towards convenient objects without the manuduction of the *Intellect*, which as it were lights the torch unto, and as a knowing guide conducts the *Will*: so that since it is the proper office of the *Intellect* to inform and conduct the *Will*, and the proper office of the *Will* to follow the direction and guidance of the *Intellect*; it is not only manifest, that the *Will* cannot deslect from the right way, towards the amplement and fruition of Good, unless by the mistaking *Intellect* it be seduced into the devious paths of Evil; but also, that the *Liberty* of election is consistent in the *Intellect primarily*, and in the *Will* only at the *second hand*, or by way of *dependence*. To speak yet more expressly, the nature of this *Liberty Elective* seems radically to consist in that *Indifferency*, in respect whereof the *Faculty* called free, may or may not be carried on towards any particular object, which the Schoolmen call the *Liberty of Contradiction*; or be so carried on towards one object, as that it may at pleasure renege that Election, and make a new one of the quite contrary, which they call the *Liberty of Contrariety*. Assuredly, since no man can

understand

Article 1.

The Essence of mans Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the Indifferency of the Intellect; and in the Will only dependently.

understand how there can be a Liberty, without a Faculty of Election; it is evident that the Election can be only there, where is the *Indifferency*: in regard that either where one single object is proposed, or the faculty restrained and determined to the election and prosecution of any one single object; there can be no free election, since election presupposeth a variety of objects, and is nothing but the preferring one to all the rest, or, if there be but two, the choyce of one and the refusal of the other.

Article 2.

An egregious Error of some Divines, that the Liberty of the Will doth consummate ly consist in its immoveable Fixation on real Good.

Some there have bin, and those no mean Clerks, who have affirmed the Will to be then most free, when it is so determined to, and fixt upon one object, grant it to be the *Summum bonum* or chiefest Good, that it cannot be deflected to its contrary Evil; and the reason they give is this; that since the Dilection, prosecution and fruition of that Good is highly *Voluntary*, it ought therefore to be accounted highly free.

Article 3.
Their inadvertency of the real Difference between a Spontaneous, & Arbitrary action; the occasion of that Error.

But we have just ground to doubt, that the Authors of this Paradox did not either clearly understand, or at least sufficiently consider the real difference betwixt a *Spontaneous* and an *Arbitrary* action; while they contended that because either may be said to be *Voluntary*, therefore they are one and the same originally. For indeed a *Spontaneous* action, though when men discourse at randome and in the general, it may seem to comprehend an *Arbitrary* one, yet in præcise and distinct reasoning, it sounds no more then a certain blind impulse of nature grounded upon no præcedent ratiocination; when an *Arbitrary* action properly so called, depends upon a prævious ratiocination, examination, dijudication, and election.

Article 4.
That a Spontaneous action, and an indeliberate Impulse of Nature, are homologous or identical.

That a *Spontaneous* action is no more then an indiscreet impulse of nature, devoid of all deliberation, is manifest from hence; that not onely Infants and Brutes (to neither of which a Philosopher will allow either use of Reason, or Liberty of Will) may do many things spontaneously, but even Inanimates have their *Spontaneous* motions, as Fire ascends spontaneously, and all

all bodies endowed with gravity descend spontaneously : so that in truth, to act by the impulse of nature, and to act spontaneously appear to be one and the same thing diversly phrased. And this makes it the less wonder, if since every appetite be *ex sua natura* by the tendency of its own nature, carried on towards Good, it may be said to be carried on towards Good of its own accord or spontaneously ; and so indeed that as a stone because by naturall tendency it falls downward, cannot again change that tendency and ascend upward, so likewise the Appetite because it is determined only to Good, wants an Indifferency of tending towards Evil : and as a stone by reason of its want of Indifferency to upward and downward, is said to be moved downward Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily, so the Appetite by reason of its defect of Indifferency to Good and Evil may be said to tend towards Good in general Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily. And hence comes it, that if you please to suppose the Will to be determined to any one particular Good, grant it to be the *Summum Bonum*, so that it cannot relinquish that, and with equal appetite prosecute any other Good, real, or only apparent, then indeed you may justly enough affirm the Will to tend towards that *Summum Bonum spontaneously*, since 'tis most natural to the Will to prosecute that which is the chiefest of Goods (for it would not prosecute the same above all others, if it were dimoved to the prosecution of less Good) but not *Arbitrarily*, since it wants an Indifferency of tending to another Good as well as that, or to speak more plainly, since it is not in its power at pleasure to desert that chiefest Good, and address it self to the pursuit of a less Good.

Nor can this truth be staggered by that objection, that this tendency of the Will is *Volent*, since that *Volency* (I ask leave to use that word untill I can find another more adequate to my notion) imports not a Liberty but a meer *Libency*, that is a Complacency, or Collubescence, and so an exclusion of all co-action, violence, renitence, or imposition : and from hence that the Dilection, Prosecution, and Fruition of such a Good may be properly enough accounted Voluntary ; no man can

M m

rightly

Article 5.

The Divines objection, that the Tendency of the Will is *Volent*, and therefore *Free*; prevented, by a distinction of *Libency* and *Liberty*.

rightly inferre that tis therefore highly *Arbitrary*, but only that tis highly *Libert* or *Complacent*; for there may be a *Libency* we confels, and yet no *Liberty*, becaufe no *Indifferency*.

Article 6.
Their Super-
structure, that
the *Perfection*
of the Wills
Liberty, is its
constant Ad-
hesion to, and
inseparability
from real Good
demolished by
two reasons:
(1) that this
Perfection
imagined is
not of the Li-
berty, but the
Will it self;
(2) that it be-
longs only to
separated Souls,
in the state of
Glorification.

Again, whereas they have added, that the *Perfection* of the Liberty of the Will doth consist in this, *so to adhere to Good as not to be capable of dimotion or diversion from it*; we may not unjustly suspect them of inadvertency, in that they did not discover this *Perfection* which they so much magnify to be not of the Liberty it selfe, but of the *Will* or *Appetite*, which being *Imperfect* only in this respect, that at pleasure it may desert and abandon real and true Good, and convert to the Affectation and prosecution of specious and counterfeit; must acquire its *perfection* from hence, that quitting that native *Indifferency* or *Liberty*, it so firmly and inseparably adhere to real and true Good, that nothing can divorce it from thence and alienate it to the prosecution of counterfeit. Besides, we conceive such a perfection of the Will to be above the sober hopes of mortality, as being reserved to make no small part of the Souls *Beatitude* in her state of *Glorification*, when she shall have no other object but the real *Summum Bonum*, and no other Appetite but a fixt dilection thereof. For, had flesh and blood bin capable of so great and divine an Excellency, as the devesting the Will of that *Indifferency* to Good and Evil, and the constant determination of it only to real Good; doubtless *S. Paul*, a man of the most mortified affections to the specious Goods of this life, and of the most fervent desires towards the substantial and eternal of the next, had never with so many tears lamented his being subject to that inevitable and implacable *Psychomachy* and civil war betwixt his Rational and Sensual Appetites, nor in the height of despaire to conquer those rebellious inclinations to evil, cried out, *Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἀνθρώπος, τίς με ρύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου;* *Miserable man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?*

But

But this mistake hath proved of no small advantage to the investigation of the truth, for from this which they concede, *viz.* it is impossible for the Will, which is once fixt upon the dilection and fruition of the *Chiefeft Good*, really and clearly ſounderſtood (which is the prerogative only of thoſe *Sainted Minds*, which the kindneſs of Death hath made ſuperior to the ſeducements of Senſe) ever to revolt from it, and deſlect to the queſt of a leſs Good: we may receive ſome aſſiſtance to our meditations, and the more eaſily underſtand what kind of *Indifferency* that is, wherein the nature of this *Liberty Elective* doth conſiſt, during our ſouls obligations to corporeity. In our præcedent lines we affirmed, that the *Intellect* is guide, and doth hold the torch, or give light to the Will; and manifeſt it is that this *Light* which the Intellect holds forth to the Will, is no other but that *Judgement*, which the Intellect delivers concerning the Good and evil of objects, *i. e.* that this object is good, and that evil; or among ſeveral different goods, that this is more, and that leſs good: ſo that when the Will is ſaid to be averted from one object and converted to another, that mutation proceeds from hence, that the Judgement of the Intellect is now for one thing and anon for another, and the inflexion of the Will is dependent on the inflexion of the Intellect. Since, therefore, the *Flexibility* of the Will is ſubſequent and conform to the *Flexibility* of the Intellect, which conſiſts in the mutability of its Judgements: we are upon that conſideration to obſerve, that the Intellect makes uſe of certain *Notions*, or as common Phyſiology calls them, *Simple Apprehenſions* of things, in order to its own information, and ſucceeding pronounciation of Judgement concerning their natures. For neceſſary it is, that the Mind have a *Prænotion* what the Sun is and what *Light* is, that ſo it may judge afterwards that *Light* is in the Sun, or that the Sun is a *Lucid Body*; as alſo what *Hony* and what *Sweetneſs* is, that it may afterwards pronounce *Hony* to be *Sweet*. But in reſpect that in objects which fall under *Speculation*, the Intellect doth acquieſce in ſuch a ſimple Judgement, nor can inferre anything further by neceſſity of conſequence: therefore in objects reducible to *action*, it hath a certain compound *Notion*

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called

Article 7.
What kind of
Indifferency that
is, wherein the
Liberty Ele-
ctive is eſſen-
ced.

called a *Proposition* or *Enunciation*, which by reason of another common Notion congenial and implantate in the mind of every Man from its first existence, is immediately annexed to the former simple notion, and superadded thereunto as a Conclusion, which is really that which we call *Judicium Practicum*, Practical Judgement. For instance, the Intellect having judged that the Sun is a Lucid Body, may therein acquiesce and proceed to no further inference; but so soon as it judgeth hony to be sweet, because it holds as implantate a second complex notion, that what is sweet is to be tasted, therefore it instantly pronounceth this conclusion, that Hony is to be tasted. And because practicable objects are not *Vniversals*, but *Singulars*; and for instance, the Intellect doth not give judgement concerning Hony in general, but of this objected Hony that it is sweet; therefore to this judgement, this Hony is sweet, instantly coheres and is superadded that second judgement, this Hony is to be tasted. Nor that only, but such is the nature of this judgement, that without any delay, if nothing countermand, succeeds the *Execution* thereof, as in this case the actual Degustation of Hony. And upon the consideration of the immediate supervision of the Execution upon a practical judgement, was it that *Aristotle* (*de Animalium motu cap. 7.*) would allow no distinction between an *Action* and a *Conclusion*, for saith he, ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται πράξις, that Conclusion which follows upon two propositions, is the very action itself: which he most conveniently illustrateth by several Examples, the present omission whereof we hope either the memory or lecture of our competent Reader will supply. And this justifies their knowledge, who first denominated such a conclusion which is the Action it self (or to which at least the Execution doth individually cohere) a *Practical Judgement*.

Article 8.
That to every
Judgement of
the Intellect,
is immediately
and necessarily
conjoynd an
Appetition or
Aversion of
the Will; re-
spective to the
Good, or Evil
nunciated.

We are moreover to observe, that since the action or Execution of a Judgement cannot succeed, unless the function of the Appetite or Will intervene between the Judgement and Execution; therefore must every Judgement or Notion of Good have adjoynd unto it an *Appetition* of that Good, as every Judgement

ment of Evil hath adjoyned unto it an *Aversion* from that Evil : so that the Intellect cannot pronounce this judgement, that what is sweet is to be tasted, but instantly riseth up the *Appetite* and wills the tasting of the Sweet ; nor (to descend to singulars) enunciate this sweet is to be tasted, but immediately the Will is on edge to tast this Sweet. And hence it comes, that no conclusion can be extracted, nor Execution thereof succeed ; but onely because together with the Judgement the function of the Appetite hath præceded. For the reason why the Conclusion of a *Practical* Syllogisme hath always the Execution or action coherent to it, but the Conclusion of a *Speculative* hath not ; is no other then this, that the function of the Will or Appetite is always associated to the præmisses or judgements of the Intellect in one, and not in the other. And therefore so often as the Intellect gives Judgement of Good ; which is the proper object of the Will ; as often is the Will excited so necessarily, that its function or desire of fruition follows upon the heeles of the Judgement. as closely as a shadow attends a body in Sunshine ; so that if the Intellect judge any thing to be good, the Will immediately desires that good ; as on the contrary, if the Intellect judge any thing to be evil, the Will immediately abhors that evil.

This is an excellent Axiome, *that one truth can never be clearely understood, but it leads on to the discovery of another* ; and here we have experience of it : for from the præmisses it results a perspicuous verity, that because the Intellect is for the most part fickle and inconstant in its judgements ; therefore must the Will be as wavering and unstable in its *Appetitions* : and when the Intellect to day judges any object to be good, but to morrow judges it to be evil ; then doth this Pædantique faculty the Will affect that object to day, and hate it again to morrow : and when the Intellect to day declares that such an object is to be affected and prosecuted because 'tis good, but to morrow faceth about to a second object, and apprehending it to be better then the first, judges that to be prosecuted rather of the two ; then is the Will to day carried on to the first object, and to morrow

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averted.

Article 9.

The Instability of the Will, in its *Appetitions* ; necessarily caused by the Instability of the Intellect, in its *Judgements*.

averted from it to the Second. In a word, the *Prosecution* and *Aversion* of the Will is dependent on, and conforme to those *Notions* and *Judgements* which the *Intellect* delivers concerning the more or less good, or good and evil of objects.

Article 10. Further, in respect that amongst good objects, one is *really and truly good*, another only *apparent and counterfeit*; and likewise among evil objects (for too frequently good is disguised under the uncomely vizard of evil, and evil again gilded over with the specious and alluring hatchment of Good, and then what is really good seems either to be absolute evil, or a less good comparatively, and what is really evil seems either to be absolute good, or a less evil comparatively) hence comes it we say, that as the *Intellect* is frequently *deluded* in its *judgements*, as being invited by the *Apparence* of Good, it judgeth a gilded evil to be a real good, or offended at the *Apparence* of evil, judgeth that disguised good to be a real evil; so must the *Will* of necessity be *deluded* in its dependent *Appetitions*, and prosecuting an apparent good, obtain a real evil, and avoyding a seeming evil, be frustrated of a real good; or certainly as the *Intellect* enunciates a less good to be a greater, or a less evil to be a greater; so must the *Will*, prosecuting a greater good, obtain a less, and avoyding a less evil, fall upon a greater.

Article 11. On the demonstration of this grand-father Truth, *viz.* that the *Will* is but the *Needle*, and the *Intellect* the *Magnet*, by whose verticity it is impregnated with an affectation of lying parallel to the point of good, real or apparent, (for evil as evil, *i. e.* presented naked and without disguise, is not the proper object of either) or, more consimilar, that the *Will* is the *Mariner*, and the *Intellect* the *Compass* by which he steeres; depends also the discovery of another Abstrusity, *viz.* that the *Indifferency* found in the *Will* is but the *Counterfeit* or *Representative* of that *Indifferency* which is congenial to the *Intellect*, and consequently, that the *determination* of that *Indifferency* in the *Mistress* causeth the determination of the like *Indifferency* in the *Handmayd*, to this or that particular object. Now the
Indifferency

Indifferency of the Intellect seems essentially to consist in this, that it is not so adliged to adhærence, to its own judgement concerning the good of any thing objected, as that it may not alter its judgement, and if the apparence of good seems greater in another object, apostate from the first, and as vigorously, and confidently convert to the second. For the Intellect is not of the Number of those faculties, which by these fundamental constitutions of their Essence are determined only to *one* certain motion, as Gravity in bodies devoid of animation, the Generative virtue in Animals, &c. but is by nature so *Flexile*, that having truth or good for its object. it may one while judge this and another while that, and perhaps the quite contrary of one and the same, and now affect an object under the notion of true and good, and within an hour, nay possibly in a moment, revoke that judgement, and again dislike it under the notion of false or evil, or at least, of less true, or less good.

This constant Inconstancy of the Intellect, the most happy Wit of *Cicero* descanting upon, most conveniently compares it to a *Balance* (*4 Academic:*) for, in troth, no *simile* in the world, at least, that ever passed our observation, can be more quadrant, or hold a neerer resemblance, in all points: since, as a Balance, if geometrically adjusted by dimidiation, is of it self indifferent to be depressed at either extreme, and is so forced from its æquipondium, or depressed at that end, on which the greater weight is suspended; as that the contrary end may be immediately depressed, if a greater weight then the former be suspended thereon: exactly so is the Intellect of its self indifferent, as to inclinations, and is so inflected to that object, whereto the greater apparence of truth or good (which is the weight that sways it down to determination from Indifferency) is adhærent, that it can upon the appension of a greater apparence of good be reflected to: a second object.

Article 12:
The Analogie
betwixt the
Intellect, and
a Balance.

For

Article 13.
That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater Verisimilitude, and the reason of its Fluctuation.

For it is not much below Uncontrollable Necessity, that the Intellect should thither convert, and there fix, where is the greatest *semblance* of good: and therefore its native *Indifferency* is not such, as that abandoning an object, whose good is more perspicuous, it can affect another, whose good is less perspicuous; or, rejecting a judgement which appears more true, court and embrace another which appears less true: because, as the beam of a balance, being depressed on one extreme by a greater weight imposed, is never elevated by the imposition of a less weight on the contrary extreme, but of a greater; so likewise can it not be, that that assent of the Intellect, which is caused by the perspicuity of Experience, or some prevalent reason, should be removed to another object, unless by the attraction of an Experience of greater moment, or a reason whose validity and importance is more perspicuous. And, for the eviction of this natural conformity of the Intellect to the attraction of the more ponderous Verisimilitude of its objects, we need no other argument but this; that many times we find our minds æquibrated betwixt two judgements, or wavering in suspence between two objects equally attractive; which *Fluctuation* or *Doubling* ariseth of necessity from hence, that the moments of verity, or weights of reason are equal on either side, and so exactly counterpoise each other, that the mind can acquiesce in the election of neither; as a paire of scales charged with two equal weights cannot be swayd from an æquilibrium.

Article 14.
That the Determination of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Appearance of Verity therein, or the minds greater Attention to the moments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other.

Again, that it seems during this Fluctuation, one while to incline to the one part, and instantly to be counter-inclined to the other, and then again to revert to the former, and so to be agitated by the inquietude of suspence; hath no other reason but this, that one while it is more *attentive* to the perpenfion of reason in the first object, and anon more Attentive to that in the second; and so long doth it remain inclined to the invitation of the one, as it apprehends the good thereof more apparent than of the other, and no longer; after the same manner as if when a paire of scales are æquibrated by two equal weights,

you

you shall superadd to either end of the balance but a few grains more, that end must be depressed, and upon the shifting of those grains to the other end the former again elevated. So that when the Intellect doth at last deflect to one part, this *Determination* must proceed from hence; that either the Appearance of verity is somewhat more ponderous on that part, or at least that the more constant *Attention* to the Verisimilitude of that part, conjoynd to the minds *impatience*, (which too frequently helps to turn the Scales, and therefore ought to be allowed for) supplying the defect of weight, makes it seem so.

Most certain it is, we confess, that the Intellect frequently doth, retracting that judgement which of its self, *i. e.* in the simplicity of its nature, is either more good, or absolutely good, adhere to a second judgement, which of its self is either less good, or absolutely evil: but yet notwithstanding that in the object, which affects and inclines the Intellect, is always *ipsa veri species*, the Appearance of Truth, which it observes and is attentive to. And because that species of Truth may be either real or counterfeit; therefore may that which is in its own nature really true, be presented under the disguise of an absolute falsehood or less Truth, and that which is in its own nature really false, be presented likewise under the disguise of an absolute truth, or less falsehood: and so the Intellect becoming subject to deception in the point of judicature, may be affected to the prosecution of an absolute falsehood, or less truth, while the object remains obvelated under the delusive vizard of an absolute truth or a less falsehood, & *è contra*.

This seriously considered supports three excellent *Consequences*; (1) that as often as the Intellect, having adhered to a true judgement, quits and pursues a false one, so often of necessity doth something intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Appearance from the good object, and imposes a counterfeit Appearance upon the evil one, and by that means causes a mutation of the Intellects assent, or judgement: and therefore (2) that the commutation of the species or Appearance of the object is the sole

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immediate

Article 15.
That the *Appearance of Truth* is always the cause of the Intellects inclination.

Article 16.
Three considerable *Inferences* from the premises.

immediate cause of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and assent: and therefore (3) that since the Will is obliged, by that necessity formerly declared, to conforme to the conduct and directions of its Guide, the Intellect; it is in vain therefore to hope or attempt that the Will should change its Appetition, unless care be first taken, that the Intellect change its judgement, or, that the Will should be constant to its Appetition, unless we provide that the Intellect be constant to its judgement. And, therefore, that Mind, which having discovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her, and stands resolved to court no other Mistress but her, ought to be exceeding circumspect and cautious in this particular, that it submit to the allurements of no object, untill it hath profoundly examined whether that species of Good therein presented, be really true, or only superficial and counterfeit, that so it may render its self superiour to the delusion of painted Vice.

Article 17.
Cartesius his
 general Præ-
 servative a-
 gainst the ex-
 cesses of Pas-
 sions.

The admirable *Des Cartes* (in 3. part. passion. artic. 22.) presenting a general præservative against all the excesses and exorbitancies of our passions, gives us this excellent advice, that having learned first to distinguish betwixt those motions or Affections which are terminated in the *Soul*, and those which are terminated only in the *Body*, we should, when we feel our blood and spirits agitated by any affection which concernes only the body, reflect upon this as a general Maxime; that all things which offer themselves to the imagination, do tend to no other purpose but to the deception of the *Soul*, and to perswade the rational and judicative Faculty, that those reasons inservient to the *Commendation* of the object of that passion, are far more solid, firme and worthy our assent then really they are, and, on the contrary, that those reasons inservient to the *Improbation* or disallowance of the object, are far more trivial, infirme and less worthy our assent, then really they are. That when the passion perswades to those things, whose execution may admit suspension or delay; we abstain from passing our verdict too hastily upon them, and divert our cogitations to the serious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their pursuit and execution: or, at least,

least, to some other object, till time and sleep shall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and spirits, which the seeming good of the object hath excited. And that when the Passion incites to those actions, whose fleet occasion gives the soul little or no time to consult and deliberate; we always endeavour to convert our Understanding to the peruspension, and our Will to the prosecution of those reasons, which are contrary to those inferred and urged by that passion; notwithstanding they shall, at the first view, appear less valid and ponderous: for thereby we shall mainly refract and abate the violence of the passion.

Now, this may be our *Exemplar* in ordering our advice, how to prevent the Delusion of our Understanding, and the seduction of our Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. First, we ought to learn the discrimination of the goods of the *Mind*, from those pertinent only to the *Body*: and then, when we meet with any object apparently good, abstractly to examine, whether that good concerns either the body alone, or the mind alone, or both body and mind equally, or more the body than the mind, or more the mind than the body. *If only the body*, we are to convert our cogitations upon the reasons which dissuade, more intently than upon the reasons which persuade the election of and adherence to it, that so we may, if there be any, detect the Evil couched under that vernish of good, and also conquer the Minds *impatience*, which too often beares a large share in our deceptions. *If only the Mind*, in that case we are to bring it to the touchstone of the *Divine Will*: *i. e.* examine whether those reasons whereby it persuades our Intellect to an Approbation, and consequently our Will to an affectation and prosecution of it, are correspondent to that inseparable or proper sign, or mark of true Good, *Conformity to the Will of God*, or not; for the very Soul, or quintessence of virtue doth radically consist in this; that man without all hesitancy, murmur, diffidence, and reluctancy, conforme his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will, as being ascertained, that he can will nothing more excellent in its self, nor convenient to him, than what God hath willed before.

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If

Article 18.
General Rules
prescribed by
the Author,
how to prevent
the Delusion of
the Understanding,
and dependent
seduction of the will
by Evil disguised
under the
similitude of
Good.

If both body, and mind equally, then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense, and insist only upon those which prefer it to the mind: for, if they shall be found worthy of assent, we need the Authority of no other to justify our election of that object. If more the body than the mind, then we ought to estimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind, and not by that greater it holds to the body. And finally, if more the mind than the body, since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be preferred to that of the body, where the reasons are equal on each part: tis manifest, we may safely acquiesce in that judgement, and embrace the object. But, in case the object seem *dubious*, and such whose Verity or Falsity is not easily discoverable, then the only way of avoyding Error in our judgements, is *cohibere assensum*, to suspend our approbation of, and assent to the Apparences, or species on each part offered. And by this power of withholding our assent does *Des Cartes* endeavour to establish the Liberty of the Will. (*Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. Sect. 6.*) This in generall, we conceive to be the Art of rectifying the Will by the previous information of the Intellect; and that thrice happy Soul that hath learned it, hath anticipated one degree of that Perfection, which is one moiety of that State of immortal Beatitude, which we are confident that knowing Soul of *Des Cartes* once aimed at, and now enjoys, without that nothing of measure.

But alas! while we dwell in the Courts of Vanity, walk amongst the snares of Satan, and carry in our very nature whole legions of frailties, the least of which too strongly inclines us to the delusions of Vice, if presented in the colours of Virtue; tis a Province above the power of meer Humanity to acquire such an habitual *Constancy* of our Intellect to its judgement, and of our Will to its Appetition of real Good, as that neither can be divorced from it, and alienated to the embracements of specious or splendid Evils, and therefore we must indefatigably endeavour to conquer part of this inherent Indifferency, upon our knees, humbly and fervently imploring the assistance and continual manuduction of *divine Grace*, that supernatural Light; whereby

w hereby the Intellect may be illuminated to a clarity, that shall transfix and dispel all the thickest clouds of Error and falsehood, wherein the opticks of Sense are usually terminated; and modestly suspend our hopes of a totall and indissoluble union with Verity, untill our Souls shall have abandoned this body of sin to corruption, and entered the new Hierusalem, where there is no Indifferency, but an eternal determination of the Mind and all its Faculties to the Supreme Good, where nothing shall occur to either Intellect, or Will, but that Supreme Good, and (in a word) where that *Libency* of the Will, which some Divines calls the *Perfection* of its Liberty, shall become a pure and ineluctable *Necessity*.

S E C T. III.

HAVING made it sufficiently manifest, that the *Liberty* of Mans *Will* doth radically consist in the *Indifferency* of the *Intellect* to its judicature; and amply explained the nature of that *Indifferency*: it remains only that we expedate that proverbial *objection*, whereby the best of us are too prone to palliate our delinquency and excuse our offences; viz. *Omnis peccans est ignorans*, Ignorance is the mother of all Sin. This *Aristotle* doubtless alluded to when he sayd, *Quis fieri possit, ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, incontinens sit?* and *Socrates* also when he said, *Fieri non posse, ut in quo sit Scientia, in eo aliud quid dominetur, atque adeo ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, non id quod est optimum agat; cum si id agat, necesse sit (δι' ἀγνοίας) ob ignorantiam id fieri.*

Out of this Labyrinth we may soon extricate our thoughts by making use of that Clue of a *Distinction* between *Science* in *Habit*, and *Science* in *Act*; For, a man may have a knowledge, and yet neglect to make use of it, as when he diverts his mind

N 3.

Article 1.
An objection,
that Ignorance
is the mother
of sin.

Article 2.
The same ex-
peded, by a
Distinction of
Science into
Habitual, and
more Actual.

more intently to some thing, then to that which he doth know; or hath the clarity of his Understanding benighted with sleep, madness, wine, &c. and a man may have a knowledge and reduce it to practise, as when he converts his mind unto, and fixes it upon that only which he doth know. Now if a man *Actually* know, or hath not the acies of his mind levelled at any other thing but what he doth know; in this case, we confess it impossible, that he should do an action contrary to his knowledge: and consequently, that holding a clear and perfect knowledge of the decorum or pulchritude of Virtue, and contrariwise of the turpitude or deformity of Vice, he should forsake the former to court the later. But if he know only *Habitually*, or hath his cogitations more attent to another thing, then that of which he hath a clear and indubitate knowledge; since his *neglect* to use it is æquivalent to the total *want* of that knowledge; we have no reason to deny, that he may do what is point-blank repugnant to his knowledge; and consequently, though he possess a clear theory of the loveliness of Virtue, and contrariwise of the ugliness of Vice, that he may notwithstanding abandon the former and embrace the later.

Article 3.

A reply, that the reluctancy of every Delinquents Conscience, doth evidence the possibility of mans doing an Act repugnant to his *Actual* Science.

To this some have inconsiderately replied; that a man may do a thing repugnant to his *Actual* knowledge; why? because for the most part every Delinquent so soon as he hath acted amiss, and most commonly at the same instant, feels himself surpris'd with a certain horror, secret regret, reluctancy and conturbation of mind, called by Divines *remorse of Conscience*: which must of necessity proceed from his cognition of the amiableness of Virtue which he hath repudiated, and of the odiousness of Vice which he hath embraced; since if he wanted this, he must also have wanted that.

Here

Here *Aristotle* hath prevented our *Rejoynder* by retorting; that every such *Delinquent* acts the same part with vinolent *Rhapsodists*, who, by the habitual exercise of their memory, use ex tempore to rehearse a whole sheet of *Empedocles* moral verses, of which they understand little, and practise less; or *School-boys*, who distinctly read what their understanding doth not comprehend; or *Stage-players*, who can gracefully personate the most magnanimous *Heroes*; but themselves still continue most abject and superlative *Cowards*. For in him who commits a vicious Act, there always is excited some *Passion*, either of *Pleasure*, or *Anger*, or *Ambition*, or *Avarice*, which raiseth a tempest in his mind, and so perturbeth, perverteth, and drowneth that habitual *Science*; infomuch, that what ever of good is in virtue, and what ever of evil is in vice, becomes thereby obnubilated, and darkened; and on the contrary, whatever of difficulty seems to be in virtue, and what ever of pleasantness in vice, becomes thereby more conspicuous and illustrated: *i. e.* *Passion* is a *Perspective*, which representeth as well the difficulty of virtue, as the complacence of vice, in magnified dimensions; and on the contrary diminisheth the good of the one, and the evil of the other. And hence comes it, that the real good of virtue attracteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming Good of vice more strongly; and on the contrary, the real evil of vice averteth or disgusteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming evil of good more strongly. So he that offends, may, we confess, with *Ovid*, say, *Video meliora, probóque, deteriora sequor*, that he knows those things which he rejecteth to be the better, and those things which he electeth to be the worse; but yet, this must be referred unto some other time, when he recognizes his habitual *Science*, and calls to mind, that once he had other judgements of those things: for he cannot justly say so of that time wherein he offended, since then he judged those things he pursued to be the better, and those he deserted to be the worse.

Now as for that internal *regret*, *contristation*, and penitence, which invades the mind of every *Delinquent* immediately after,
and

Article 4.
The *Rejoynder*, that the Habitual *Science* of every *Delinquent*, is perturbed and obnubilated by some *Passion*, excited in him: and that the Remors of *Conscience* proceeds from the sense of the *Loss of Good*.

and most frequently in the same moment of the perpetration of his offence; this proceeds from his animadversion that he suffers some *loss of good*. But since this his apprehension of the loss of good, and that reluctancy of mind attendant thereupon is but dull and weak, in comparison of that complacency he is affected withall by the seeming good or pleasure of evil, which subdues his judgement to an approbation of it: hence it is manifest, that he considers and perpendes the impending omission of Good, and the incursion of evil, not *seriously* and *profoundly* as he ought, but only *perfunctorily* and *slightly*. For, were the punishment, sorrow, ignominy, and other evils, which he only lightly and confusedly apprehends, and fears, profoundly examined and lookt into by him, not as absent, not as future, not as uncertain, and avoidable, but as impending, present, certain, and inevitable; without all doubt the smallest glimpse of reason would be sufficient to let him see those forcible determents, nor could he be so mad as from the rock of knowledge to precipitate himself into the most horrid gulph of vice. And therefore albeit an offender may say that he saw and approved the Good, but embraced the Evil, yet is that *Inconsideration* or *Non-advertency*, by reason whereof he doth not sufficiently discover all the qualities and circumstances of the evil object, and what and how great mischiefs must necessarily ensue upon his actual prosecution thereof, a kind of Ignorance. And in this sense only can we allow *Ignorance to be the mother of Sin*; for had man sufficiently understood the evil thereof, he had never bin vicious.

¶ Article 5.
What kind of
Ignorance that
is, which may,
in some degree
excuse a Delin-
quent.

To conclude therefore, this Ignorance must prove but an invalid and ridiculous plea at the judicious Tribunal of Justice, nor ought a Delinquent to flatter himself with the vain hopes of impunity by such an excuse; that he sinned for want of knowledge, that he prosecuted the apparent Good he saw in the object, that it was above his power to prevent the delusion of his understanding by Evil presented under the species of Good (*τῆς γὰρ φαύλας ἰδέσθαι*, we cannot countermand *Apparences*) that no man is vicious with his own consent, nor happy against his will, according to that Proverb, *Nemo malus ultro est, neque beatus non volens*,

volens, and that he wanted an ability of Judgement to do otherwise : this we say cannot extenuate his guilt, and consequently not avert the punishment due thereunto. For, that Ignorance which excuseth, is of another nature ; such as we may more properly call *Inscientia mera*, meer *Nescience*, *Ignorantia pura ac invincibilis*, pure and invincible Ignorance ; such as that of *Cephalus*, when mistaking her to have bin a wild beast couchant in a brake he discharged his dart at his beloved wife *Procris*, and unfortunately slew her ; and that of the constant *Deianira* when she poysoned *Hercules* with a shirt dipt in *Nessus* the Centaures gore, which she intended for a Philtre to revoke his affections from *Iole* ; and that also of the fatal handed Gentleman, who shooting at a Deer in New-Forest, killed *William Rufus* : but that Ignorance, of which we here discourse, is in proper truth *Ἀμύλεια*, *Incuria*, *vel Negligentia mera*, meer *Negligence*, *Inadvertency*, or *Heedlesness*, and is therefore for distinctions sake denominated *Ignorantia crassa, affectata, supina*, gross, affected, supine ignorance.

To understand the nature of this *Non-excusing Ignorance* the more distinctly, let us observe, that every Delinquent must in justice charge the Ignorance he prætends, upon one of these two Causes ; either *that himself was to himself the cause of his ignorance* : or *that he neglected the means and advantages of acquiring knowledge*, i. e. that he did not imploy his *Cognoscent Faculty* on the examination and consideration of the real good or evil of his action, with that care, seriousness, and sedulity, which was requisite.

To the *First* of these Causes belongs the ignorance of a *Drun-kard* ; for in being the Cause of his *Ebriety*, he is also the Cause of his *Ignorance* ; and 'twas in his power to have prævented *this*, by the præcaution of *that* : and therefore his Ignorance is so far short of extenuating, that it naturally aggravates his culpability ; and he, if *Aristotle* may be judge, deserves a double punishment, one for making himself drunk, another for the crime committed in his Drunkenness. Hither also we are to refer his Ignorance, who resisteth not the force of a *Passion* or perturbation of his mind in the first motion or beginning thereof,

while 'tis yet but weak, and to be suppress'd by a small opposition of reason; but permits it to acquire more violence, and gain upon him by degrees, till its impulse grow imperious, and more inoppugnable: as also his, who suffers a vicious *Inclination*, which he might without any considerable difficulty have at first refracted and totally extinguished, to grow into a settled *Habit*, which pleading prescription and possession, is hardly ejected, but plays the absolute Tyrant o're the mind, and holds the Scepter of both Understanding and Will by the ineluctable title of Conquest. Thus if a man, who having a rare Bird in his hand, willingly lets it fly, should complain that he cannot recover it again; 'tis not to be expected that any rational person should pity him for his loss, but rather deride his folly, in that he manumitted it when 'twas in his power to have kept it; and if a man contract some dangerous disease by intemperance, who can afford him half so much compassion, since 'twas in his power not to have bin intemperate, as if he had bin invaded by some impartial Epidemick Contagion, against which none the greatest temperance is an infallible preservative? To this purpose were these words of *Aristotle* intended; *Nemo enim cecitatem, quam natura, morbus, ictus fecerit, exprobrat, sed cecipotius misereatur; at si illam aut ebriositas, aut intemperantia alia fecerit, non id opprobrio ducat?* (in 3. *Ethic.* cap. 7.)

Article 6.
Four weighty
Reasons, con-
vincing, that
man hath an
Absolute Power
in himself to
controll the
temptations of
Evil.

To the other belongs his ignorance, who being hurried on to the prosecution of Evil, by the impetuous rapt or swindge of *Passion*, can yet say *Video meliora proboque*: for in this case also was it in his power to have more seriously and sedulously examined, sifted, and preconsidered the evils impendent on that action, and so to have avoided it; We say, *absolutely in his power*, for four weighty respects. (1) Because we frequently observe, that if in the same moment, when we are prepared to commit a sin, and already entered upon the execution, there chance to come in some grave and virtuous Person, whom we revere, or some Magistrate, whose revenging sword we fear, intervene: we instantly become conscious of our wicked intentions, and desist from the perpetration of it. (2) Because there

there are many Virtuous Persons, who having learned and practised that noblest militia of conquering themselves, can command themselves even in the highest orgasmus and fervour of their passions; holding it most base and unworthy the dignity of a generous mind, to be surprized with the subtlest Ambushes of Vice, and led captive by the Pygmie armies of sensual Temptations. (3) Because tis not in vain that God, compassionating the frailties and deceptibility of humane nature, hath vouchsafed to accommodate our understanding with those faithful and powerful auxiliaries, *Laws, Precepts, Exhortations* and pious *Precedents*, to which we may, in the hottest charges of vicious temptations, with safety and assured Conquest recur; and upon which if with sufficient attention we reflect the eye of our mind, we shall become *τῶν πῦλαιος κῦβητοί, ejus domini, quod res esse apparet*, Lords Comptrollers of *Appearances*, i. e. detect the frauds and impostures of Evil, though drest in all the glorious ornaments of Good. (4) Because no man endeavoring to excuse his offence, can truly say *Video meliora probóque*; but he doth manifestly grant the action he doth to be *Deliberate*, and *Præcogitate*; which is as much as this, twas absolutely in my power to have omitted the doing of it, and to have done the contrary good. For none can say so of an indeliberate action, as when he feels a commotion of his blood and spirits at the first touch of Anger; which is the reason of *Seneca* his affirmation (2 *de Ira* 3) *quod primus motus non sit voluntarius*, that the first motion which an object excites in the mind is involuntary, and the ground of that *Maxime Primi motus non sunt in nostra potestate*.

What these *First Motions*, which objects, their species being by the mediation of the nerves and spirits transmitted to the mind, excite therein, are in the general; though *Epicæterus* hath furnished us with a convenient brief description of them, in these words, *Primus motus est quem creant visa animi (παρρησίας appellant Philosophi) quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei, pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua sese inferunt*

O o 2

hominibus

Article 7.
What those
First Motions
are, which ob-
jects inevitably
excite in the
Mind: and that
the *Consequences*
of those moti-
ons are præ-
ventible.

hominibus noscenda: yet the most apposite and most familiar way of explaining their nature and extent, which our meditations could find out, is to *exemplify* them in some one particular beginning *Passion*, and chiefly in that of *Anger*, where these Impulses or motions are most sensible, because most forcible. Which that we may the more worthily performe, let us, with *Des Cartes*, concede two distinct species of Anger, (1) one caused in a moment, which invading with some violence, cannot be concealed; but discovers it self for the most part by colouring the face with a Vermilion, or Aurora tincture on a suddain; but performs little, and is easily and soon calmed. (2) Another, which invading with less violence, is not to be discovered, unless rarely by inducing paleness upon the Countenance, by any signes in the beginning; but being of a less diffusive condition, doth more corrode and gall the heart, and consequently produce more dangerous effects. To the first of these, they are most obnoxious, who have the most of Love, Nobleness or sweetness of disposition habited in them. For it ariseth not from any profound *hatred*, but from a suddain *Aversion*, repentinely surprisng the Mind: and because loving, good, and Heroick minds are always propense to imagine, that all things ought to proceed in that manner or course which they judge to be the best, therefore so soon as they discover any thing to be carried on in a contrary course to Good, they instantly make a stand in their thoughts, become offended at it, and grow angry; yea many times when the matter concerns not them in special; for since they love much, they take to heart, (as the vulgar phrase it) resent, and appropriate the Cause of them they love, as neerly as if it were their own, insomuch as what would have bin no more then matter of *Indignation* to others, proves matter of *Anger* to them. And because that Inclination, whereby they become possesd with a constant propensity to love, doth effect, that they have always much of heat, because much of blood in and about their Heart; therefore that repentine *Aversion*, which suddainly surpriseth them, cannot but propell some small quantity of Cholera (the Tinder whereon the sparks of this Passion fix and foment) to the Heart; nor that little of Cholera

Choler but be accended, and excite, in an instant, a great commotion, and effervescence of the blood thither propelled. But this Commotion lasteth but a small space of time, because the impulse or force of the unexpected Aversion is of no continuance; and so soon as they deprehend the matter for which they were angry, to be of no moment, and such as ought not to have commoved them to that height; they becalme themselves, conjure down their spirits, and become affected with a reluctancy against and a penitence for that Passion, and so destroy it in the Embryo or shell. With the *other*, weak, abject, and ingenuous minds are most transported. For though it seldome discover it self in the beginning, unless by some paleness in the face; yet is its force by degrees increased by reason of that agitation which the fervent desire of Revenge exciteth in the blood, which being permixed with that Choler propelled to the heart from the inferior part of the Liver and Spleen, kindles therein a sharp, pungent, and corroding Heat. And as those minds are most generous, and noble, which are most inclined to *Gratitude*; so are those the most proud, abject and base, which suffer themselves the most to be transported with this kind of ignoble *Anger*. For by so much the greater do Injuries appear to be, by how much the greater value Pride makes a man put upon himself, and by how much the greater estimation is set upon those Goods which are taken away by that Injury: and by so much a higher rate are those goods prized at, by how much the more weak, abject, and ignoble the mind of him is that estimates them, because in truth they are dependent upon others pleasure; nor doth a well ordered mind lose any part of its happiness by being deprived of them. Now, having duly præconsidered all things occurrent in this pregnant example, we may not only without difficulty understand what those *first motions* or *incitements* are, which objects exciting in the mind thereby obtrude themselves upon the Intellect, or rather compell the Intellect to apprehend them under that species in which they præsent themselves; but also that, though those motions are not in our power, yet the *Consequents* or *Actions* to which they provoke us, are subject to our *Deliberation*, Examination, and Arbitrary *Election*, or
O o 3 *Rejection*;

Rejection; since every Action, is the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogisme, and every Conclusion præsupposeth two præcedent Propositions, and these again præsuppose Deliberation, and consequently that who ever committing an Evil Action, doth yet say *Videóque meliora probóque*, doth in that confess his Action to be *Deliberate* and *Arbitrary*, which is as much as to confess that twas absolutely in his own power not to have done it.

And as for that proverbiall subterfuge *ὁυδέ τις ἐκὼν πονηρός, ἢ δ' ἄκων μακάριος*, *Nemo malus ultro est, neque beatus non volens*; Aristotle hath long since subverted it by answering, That though it be true in the later part, insomuch as *no man can be happy, because not virtuous, against his will*, yet tis false in the former, insomuch as *vice, whereby man becometh Evil, is voluntary* (ὡς δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκὼν) whereupon *M. Anton.* said *τὸς δὲ τοῖς τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς κινήσει μὴ παροξυσθεύσας, ἀνάγκη κακοδαμοῦσιν: qui verò sui ipsius animi motus certa ratione consilioque non gubernat, necessario miser est.* (lib. 2. num. 5.) And therefore though many have thought to palliate their vitiolities, by affirming that no man doth commit a sin *voluntarily*, but being compelled thereunto by the impulse of some *perturbation*: yet tis manifest, since every *Delinquent* gives either occasion or way to that *perturbation*, and suffers himself to be transported by the impulse thereof, beyond the sphere of reason, that no *co-action* can intevenc.

Article 8.
Necessity, and
Fear conceded
to be, in some
measure, Excuses;
and what
are the objects
of Excusing
Fear.

To conclude, we are ready to confess, that among those many excuses, which the Sophistry of the Advocates of vice hath alledged for the extenuation of its Culpability, the most weighty and considerable is the violence of *Necessity* and *Fear*. But, all violence must proceed from an *external* Principle, and is not admitted without some *Renitency* in the thing that suffers it; and that *Necessity*, whereby any man is coacted, must proceed from an *external* and *present* Cause; and *fear* is an *internal* Passion, though excited by an *external* Cause, viz. a future Evill; and differeth from *Cupidity* in this, that this, though it be excited by an *external* cause also, viz. a future Good, yet
it

it is joyned always with a *Libency* or *Willingness*, but Fear with a *Renitency* or *Unwillingness*. Upon which consideration was it, that *Aristotle* concluded him exceeding stupid and ridiculous, who, having vitiated his friends wife, should for excuse pretend, that he was constrained to that perfidious and immodest action by the violent temptation of *pleasure*; but holds him excusable who is compelled to omit an office of friendship by the prevention of some more considerable incommodity impendent upon himself, since the Necessity of the one is more violent and urgent, then the obligation of the other. For the more easy decision of all disputes concerning the more or less pressure of these kinds of Necessity, *Cicero* puts this Case. *Si constitueris te cupiam advocatum in rem presentem esse venturum; atque interim graviter agrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris; magisque ille cui promissum sit, ab officio discedat, si se destitutum queratur.*

This premised, we may safely conclude, that a *small* and *light* fear is not to be accounted sufficient to excuse a malefaction; because it cannot usurp upon and countermand the Liberty of the Mind; nay nor a *great and strong* fear (which is therefore allowed by some great Clerks for an excuse, because it may sometimes invade and stagger a mind in other things constant and generous) since it cannot so oppose the Liberty Elective, as not to leave the mind possess'd with some *Libency*. And this is to be understood, not in respect to that Evil, which is sustained or undergone in the present, but to that far greater one, which is avoided, and in comparison of which the less Evil hath indeed the reason of Good; because it is as it were the *means* whereby the greater Evil is averted or prevented, as when Merchants throw their treasure overboard, for fear of drowning, and a Traveller delivers his purse to Robbers for fear of having his throate cut. Now, how far this kind of fear, which seems to necessitate the commission of a small Evil for the probable prevention of a greater, may be extended by way of Excusation; as also of what sorts those evils must be which justify this fear; the exactest and profoundest of *Moralists* have found it no easy matter precisely to determine; chiefly because according to the
variety

variety of mens Temperaments, ages, sexes, Educations, Habits &c. what is but a weak and light fear to one, may be great and potent to another; but all consent that we are to understand it to be a fear of no less then Death, Mutilation, torment, servitude, long exile, tedious imprisonment, æternal dishonour or ignominy, privation of all, or the greatest part of ones estate, or livelyhood (and in this particular, not in respect of a mans self only, but also for those who depend upon him for temporal subsistence, as wife, children, parents &c.) as also that kind of fear which is a species of *Reverence*, and such as may be in a subject, in respect of his Prince, in a child in respect of his Father, in a wife in respect of her husband &c. We said that fear which *seems* to necessitate the commission of a small evil &c. thereby insinuating, that it only *seems* so to do. For, *Truth* its self hath taught us, that we ought not to do evil, though never so small, for prevention of another evil, though ne'r so great; and every man knows that *Fear* (unless of doing Evil) is wholly excluded the society of *virtue*. Which our late *Salomon* (whom we can hardly think upon, without a devout *Adoration* of his *deified* part) reflected upon, when he affirmed for a Maxime of general truth, *That a Coward can hardly be an honest man.* And this we desire our Reader candidly to accept, as a sufficient enquiry into the nature of mans *Free-Will*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fortune.

THat this *Phant⁴smie*, though of no great antiquity (comparatively) hath under the disguise of a *Reality*, so long and so universally possessed the heads not only of the *Vulgar* (whose rank and muddy brains are ever more fertile in the production, and more favourable to the conservation of *Monsters*, then *Nilus* and all *Affrica*) but even of some of those more cultivated *Explorators* of truth, who well knew the absurdity of *Multiplying Entities*, and pretended to examine every *Idea* occurring to the mind, whether it had an exemplar, or prototype in real Existence; that so, though they could not attain to a full cognition of the distinct *Essences*, or simple *Forms* of Objects, they might at last acquire an assurance of their *Reality*, or *Being in rerum natura*: this, we say, seems to us no contemptible Argument, that the Venome of the Forbidden Fruit hath a stronger and more infatuating operation upon the posterity of *Adam*, in the old age of the world, then it had in its youth and middle age; and that the *sun* in the *Microcosme* hath suffered a greater and more demonstrable decay of Splendor, Clarity, and Influence, then *Bodin* (*method. Histor. cap. 8.*) out of *Copernicus*, *Reinaldus*, and *Stadius*, hath affirmed that in the *Macrocosme* to have sustained, and confessed by its neerer approach to the Earth, and more Southerly inclination, since the daies of *Ptolomie*. For (first) though *Simplicius* (*2. physic. comment. 39.*) hath a certain obscure tradition, that *Orpheus* ingaged in the expedition of the Argonauts, composed a votive Hymne to this Fairy Queen, which was afterward inserted into the idolatrous Liturgie of the

P p

Delphian

Article 1.
The Antiquity
and Genealogy
of Fortune.

Delphian *Apollo*, together with whom she was solemnly invocated: yet hath, *Macrobius*, much the better Antiquary of the two, faithfully observed (5. *Saturn. ib.*) that she was, if not unborn, yet unnamed in *Homers* time; subjoyning as a reason thereof, *quod priscis illis temporibus omnia, quæ fierent, referri ad Deos Authores solerent*; that more simple and intelligent Antiquity used to referre all events to the wise procuration of the Gods. Which is evidence sufficient, that *Fortune* could not mount up to an *Apotheosis*, till the world grew into its *Dotage*, and man sunk a whole spear below that of his Ancestors simplicity and knowledge. And (2) that, whenever she was borne, and whoever was her Father, yet *Ignorance was her Mother*; besides the convincing Authority of our own *Reason*, we have that of the impartial *Cicero*, in these words: *Stultitia, Error, Cacitas & Ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Fortuna nomen primò induxisse, certum est*. And so much the more of weight may this Argument bear, by how much the more manifest a Contradiction they incur, who have either defended, or advanced her reputation; for though no one among those many Writers, who have professedly treated of her Nature and Power, hath denied her extraction from, and necessary dependence upon that accursed Beldam, *Ignorance*: yet have most agreed, that she is something more then *Nomen inane*, a meer and empty Name, or *Chimera*; and some allowed her the dignity of a considerable *Influence* upon the actions of Man; nay, others have gon so farr as to exalt her virtue to a competition with *Providence Divine*, and consigned her a throne among the *Cælestial Deities*, as is intimated in that verse of *Juvenal* (*Satyr. 14.*)

— sed te

Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cæloque locamus. And this briefly concerning the *Antiquity* and *Genealogie* of this *Nothing*.

As

As for the full description of her *Nature*, or more properly, what Kind of *Activity* the chiefest *Philosophers* have allowed her, and to what order of *Causes* referred her; this we cannot so satisfactorily present by any other way, as by a short *Commemoration*, and æquitable *Collation* of their several *Definitions* of her.

Plutarch (1. *placit.* 29.) makes *Plato* to have defined her thus; *Fortuna est causa ex accidenti, & consequens inopinatio in iis, quæ consilio fiunt*, Fortune is a Cause by Accident, and unexpectedly supervenient in those actions, which are deliberately and upon consultation performed: and *Aristotle* thus; *Fortuna est causa per accidens in iis, quæ rei alicujus gratiâ, appetitu movente, fiunt, eaque incerta & instabilis*; Fortune is an Accidental (yea and an uncertain and instable) cause, interesting it self in those actions, which are done by an Agent, upon the incitement of its Appetite, in order to its consequence of an object. Which words, indeed, seem to comprehend, in Epitomy, all that the *Philosopher* (in 2. *physic. cap.* 5.) intended in his more prolix description of Fortune; abating only this, that he there confines her concernment only τῶν ἐπιδηχόμενων, *rebus Contingentibus*, to Effects purely *Contingent*, i.e. such as may, or may not come to pass, and are therefore of dubious or uncertain event. To explain this, they exemplify in him, who digging in the earth, with no other designe, but to plant a tree, found a great Treasure, of which he never thought: for (say they) the Invention of the Treasure is an effect by Accident, i.e. evenient above the hopes and besides the intention of him that digged; and so the Digger in so much as he is *Causa per se* of the digging, is also *Causa per accidens* of the invention of the Treasure. Such an *Accidental Cause*, therefore, doe our *Philosophers* call *Fortune*: and the Event it self, viz. the invention of the treasure, they call *Rem fortuitam*, a *Fortuitous Effect*. But whereas *Arist.* hath frequently advertised, that *Fortune* (τὸ τύχην) and *Chance* (τὸ αὐτόματον) are different each from other in this, that *Fortune* is proper only to things done by Causes, whose activity is *Arbitrary*; and *Chance* common both to such, and also *Inanimate* or meer

Article 2.
Plato and Arist.
their Descriptions
of Fortune,
examined, and
illustrated: and
3 Conclusions
inferred there-
upon.

Spontaneous Causes (as when a stool falls, and breaks a Glafs.) & consequently that all Fortune is Chance, but not every Chance Fortune: hence may we observe, that he would have aswell Fortune, as Chance to belong to the classis of *Contingents*, and that all *Contingents* belong to the classis of *Possibles*. More expressly, that since among *Possibles* some are such, as that their Event cannot be interdicted, impeded, or countermanded, as this, *the sun cannot be hindred from rising again to morrow morn*; and others such, whose event is not necessary, as this, *'tis not necessary, though possible, that it should raine to morrow at sun rising*; therefore is it manifest, that a *Possible* of the first sort, is the same with that which is called *Necessarium*, absolutely Necessary, or such whose Contrary is purely Impossible; and of the second sort, the same with that which is called *Contingens*, meerly Contingent, or of an uncertain event, such whose Contrary is æqually possible. Further, in respect that the meer *Contingency*, or *Ambiguity* of any Event must be founded on this, that either some *Liberty* interveneth, by reason whereof that which otherwise would come to pass, doth not; or that which otherwise would not have come to pass, doth; or some *other Cause* interposeth, which, besides its proper destination and the unpræmeditated concurrence of certain other things, effecteth that some event, which otherwise would, doth not come to pass, or that some event, which otherwise would not, doth come to pass: hence is it manifest, that this *Posterior* kind of Contingency, is in the general that, w^{ch} men call *Chance*; and if it be especially in *Man*, besides or beyond whose intention any Effect eveneth, then is it what they call *Fortune*: unless that sometimes they confound both these, and then 'tis indifferent whether the event be referred either to Fortune, or Chance.

However, we perceive (reflecting upon the former Example) since the Double Effect, viz. the digging of the earth, and the invention of the treasure, had but one single Cause, viz. the man that digged: that, for this reason, the Digger may justly enough be sayd to be *Causa per se*, in respect of the one, and *per accidens* in respect of the other. To which we may add this, that since in Effects meerly Natural, one and the same thing may be both

Fortune.

Fortune and *Nature*, or a Natural Cause : therefore *Gassendus* had very good reason to justify *Epicurus* in this particular, that he made *Fortune* and *Nature* no more then *synonoma's*, signifying one and the same thing in Reality.

Now though common Enquirie may goe away satisfied with this pausible *Adumbration* of *Fortune* ; yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein : for the *Example* introduced to explain it, comes largely short of a requisite *Adequation* ; insomuch as no rational man can appositely enough accept either *him* that digged, or his *Action* of digging, for all that's comprehended under that obscure notion of *Fortune*. Wherefore, omitting the consideration of *Res Fortuita*, or the Event, which is most frequently apprehended for *Fortune* it self, or the cause of that insperate event ; let us understand *Fortune* to be, *such a concurse of various Causes, made without all mutual consultation, or præcogitate conspiracy betwixt them, as that from thence doth follow an Event, or fortuitous Effect, which neither all the Causes concurrent, nor some of them, nor especialy he to whom the Event happens, ever in the least measure intended, or could expect.* Now, according to the tenor of this Definition, in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treasure, is required not only the Person, who digg's and finds it ; but also he, who first digg'd and hid it : it is no obscure nor controvertible truth, that *Fortune*, or the Cause by Accident of the invention of the treasure, is the Concurse both of the Occultation and Effusion thereof, in that particular place. We sayd, *without mutual Consultation, and besides the intention of any or all the Causes concurrent* ; thereby intimating, that though one or more of the Causes may have haply intended that event : yet nevertheless tis properly and absolutely *Fortune*, in relation to that Cause, which intended it not. Thus if any man, who foreknowes, or at least conjectures, that such a Person will come and digg in such a place, doth there hide treasure, to the end that the other may find it : in this case, in respect to him that hid it, the Invention of the treasure is not a Fortuitous Effect ; but in respect to him, who unexpectedly finds it, it is. Thus was it not altogether *For-*

Article 3.
Their Anatomy of her *Nature*, deficient : & a more perfect one presented.

tuitions in respect of *Nitocris*, what hapned at the Violation of his Tomb; in regard he præsumed that, in process of time, there would be some King or other, who invited by this promising Inscription [*If any of my Successors, the Kings of Babylon, shall want mony, let him break open this Sepulchre, and thence take what may supply his wants; but on no condition, unless his wants be real, let him attempt it: for it shall redound to his no small detrimēt.*] would open it: but yet, in respect to *Darius*, that in stead of mony he therein found this deriding Engravement [*Had'st not thou bin insatiable with riches, and covetous of sordid lucre; thou wouldst not have thus prophaned the Ashes of thy Prædecessors, and ransack't the sacred Dormitory of the Dead,*] this was meerly *Fortuitous*. And thus also, though *Democritus* hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old *Æschylus*; why because his bald pate, being mistaken by a volant Eagle for a white stone in the field, was the cause why the Eagle drop't a Tortois perpendicular thereupon: yet, had we bin of the Jury, we should have found her guilty of the Murder; (1) in respect of the *Poet*, since that sad event was besides his intention, he at the same time having withdrawn himself from the Town, for fear of being destroyed (according to the tenor of the Astrologers prædiction) by the fall of an house, nor could he possibly foresee that prodigious mischance impendent: (2) in respect of the Eagle, who drop't not the Tortois with purpose to brain the *Poet*, but to break its shell, that so he might come at his prey, the flesh thereof. However, we are willing, because, in truth, we ought to acknowledge, that if we regard the height or punctilio of her *Propriety*, *Fortune* is chiefly, when among all those several *Causes*, which concurr, no one either principally, or collaterally intends or aimes at that *Event*, which unexpectedly succeeds upon that their concurse: of which we have a most illustrious and competent *Example* in the Dilatation of the death of *Socrates*, a day beyond the time præfixt by his Judges, for the Execution of their Sentence upon him; as *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath præcisely observed.

We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature, Dr. Harvey, that he never dissected any Animal, but he always discoverd something or other more then he expected, nay then ever he thought on before; so useful & infinite in variety is the *Magna Charta of Nature*: and perhaps some of our Readers may here have occasion to say as much of this our Dissection of *Fortune*; for while we have exercised our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature, we have unexpectedly found that, if considered *per se & reverá*, she hath no nature at all, i. e. that *in Reality she is nothing*. For, when we have abstracted all those Causes in the Concourse, which act *per se*, or by natural virtue; there remains no more but a meer *Privation* or *Negation* of all Prænotion in the concurrent Causes of that particular Concourse, and also of the intention and expectation of the subsequent Event: nor can that unpræmeditate Concourse of Causes be rightly accounted the Cause of the Fortuitous Event, by any neerer relation then that which Philosophers have termed *Conditio sine qua non*. Since, as the *Admotion* of any combustible body to Fire, may be sayd to be the Cause of its combustion, in this respect only, that it was *Conditio sine qua non*, or, if that Admotion had not præceded, the combustion had not succeeded: so also cannot that Concourse of Causes, from which any Fortuitous Event doth result unexpectedly, be sayd to be the Cause thereof, in any other respect but this, that it was *Conditio sine qua non*, i. e. if that Concourse of Causes had not præceded, that Event had not succeeded, though not one of those Cause s in the single energy of its nature, nor all in confederacy ever any way intended it; the Analogy betwixt these two cases standing faire and full in all points.

Article 4.

Fortune, nothing but a meer *Negation* of all Prænotion in a Concourse of natural Causes, respective to a fortuitous Event.

Again, forasmuch as this indeliberate Syndrome or Combination of Causes, is always *uncertain* and various, the Causes being neither elected, nor connected, nor managed by any Providence of their own: we cannot in justice but applaud the wary judgment of *Epicurus* in this, that he called Fortune, ἀσάτων αἰτίαν ἀποσάτων, χρόνους, τόποις* a Cause instable in Persons, Times, and Manners; which is æquivalent to this, that since she

Article 5:

Epicurus commended, for illustrating the instability and uncertainty of Fortune.

is.

is a Cause of uncertain and indeterminate influence, none but Fools can hope that this Chamæleon should constantly appear in the same colours, or wear the same Countenance.

Article 6. Nor is he less to be commended for his, $\tau\ \delta\ \pi\ \chi\ \omega\ \epsilon\ \pi\ \theta\ \epsilon\ \delta\ \nu$,
 Her Indivinity manifested: & how she came by her Deification.
Cave ne habeas Fortunam Deam (apud Diogen. Laert. Epist. 3. Epicuro conscripta.) endeavours to degrade Fortune from her imaginary Divinity, and deride the egregious folly of her solemn Worship; for so great is the imbecillity of vulgar minds, that what they do not well comprehend, they not only immoderately admire, but superstitiously revere, as something wholly Divine, and as far above Nature, as it seems above their Capacity: and undoubtedly mans Ignorance of the prævious Conspiracy of Accidental concurrent Causes, from which any Event extraordinary and superintentional doth emerge; first prevailed upon him to invest Fortune in such a specious disguise, under which he might, with less dishonour to his own Intellectuals, advance her to the reputation of a Deity, and adore her. 'Tis more then probable, that men did not, at her first Canonization, either much care for, or enquire into the condition and extent of her Power; and evident, that when she began to be cryed up for producing strange Effects in the transactions of the world, and by a kind of impervestigable superintendency to dispose the activity of Natural Causes to the induction of Events above or beside their proper and Customary Destinations: then began the Vulgar to think themselves concerned in the conciliation of her favour, and early atonement of her displeasure; and so by those, to whom she seemed friendly and prosperous, was she accounted a Good and Propitious Numen, and by those, to whom she appeared Inclement and Adverse, an Evil and Malevolent one. And hence (the Error, like Rivers, still enlarging) were stately and magnificent Temples erected for her popular and solemn Adoration, and several Inscriptions respective to that particular Attribute, which her fond Votaries conceived most eminent in her, or most advantageous to themselves, ingraven in capital letters on their Porches; such as Αγαθὴ πύχην (one of which I have seen at the house of that ingenious Benefactor to Antiquaries, Mr Vernon, in Essex

in *Essex*, with no small cost and difficulty digged up in a field near *Smyrna*, and together with many other very antique Monuments brought by him into England) *Male Fortuna*, *Averrunca*, *Blanda*, *Calva*, *Vitrea*, *Equestri*, *Fallaci*, *Aurea*, &c. a large catalogue of which Appellations we may read in *Pliny* (*lib. 2 cap. 7.*) *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fortuna Romanorum.*) and *Natalis Comes* (*lib. 4. Mytholog. cap. 9.*) This *Pliny*, with some indignation at the ridiculous delirium of the world in the Deification of this *Non-entity*, takes ample notice of in these words: *Toto mundo, & locis omnibus, omnibusque horis, omnium vocibus Fortuna sola invocatur, una nominatur, una accusatur, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arguitur, & cum convitiis colitur; volubilis, à plerisque verò & caca etiam existimata; vaga, inconstans, incerta, varia, indignorum faulrix: huic omnia expensa, huic omnia feruntur accepta; & in tota ratione mortalium sola utramque paginam facit; adeoque obnoxia sumus sortis, ut Sors ipsa pro Deo sit, qua Deus probatur incertus.*

We are not ignorant (nor, in duety to the præservation of their memories from ingratefull Detraction, ought we to conceal) how difficult it is for any man to impeach any one *Philosopher*, among those many, whose Names or Writings have hitherto escaped the jaws of Oblivion, of this absurd Delusion of ascribing *Divinity* to Fortune. For though *Plato* (*de legibus. lib. 4.*) hath this saying; *Deum omnia, ac secundum Deum Fortunam & Tempus omnia gubernare; & Aristotle* (*2 Phys. 4.*) affirms that some there were, who held, *Fortunam esse causam quidem, sed humane menti obscuram; & Stobæus* (*Ecles. Physic.*) tells us of others, *Qui partem aliquam Fortune, ex eo esse Divinam censerent, quo quidam temere agentes optatum finem consequerentur, ceteros verò prudentia ntes optata destituerent; who* opinioned, that Fortune was in some part *Divine*, for this reason, that some men, who enterprized their designs rashly and inconsiderately, did notwithstanding accomplish them successfully, and happily attain their ends, while others who grounded theirs upon the most apparent probability, and managed the means conducing to their procuration, with

Q 9

great

Article 7.
All sober Philosophers vindicated from the guilt of ascribing *Divinity* to Fortune.

great prudence and circumspection, were however fooled in their attempts, crost in their hopes, and frustrated of their purposes, by the suddain intervention of some occult impediment, which as no Forecast could discover, so no Caution prævent: yet cannot all this be justly interpreted any other then their wary and tacite Confession of their Ignorance of the cryptick ways, and imperceptible Ends of *Providence Divine*; nor did these great Book-men speak other then the Dialect of the Illiterate, and conforme their Expressions to the customary notion of the Multitude, when they referred to Fortune those *Contingents*, which to the judgement of Reason seemed to want a Natural Series of Causes proper for their induction, being as it were obtruded upon man by a power *Supernatural, i. e.* so far above the præcaution of his *Prudence*, as the investigation of his *Sapience*. And though some few perhaps, whose Curiosity was weak, but Superstition strong, may be found to have contributed toward the propagation of this Error; yet cannot that in reason be extended to the attainder of the major and more judicious number of Philosphers: who upon the strictest examination of their Reliques must be found guilty of no more then the continuation of that laudable custome of their Prædecessors, in transmitting the most abstruse and difficult mysteries of Science, in the more comprehensible Allay of *Symbolical* and *Emblematical* traditions; and in this particular, what the Multitude could not well understand under the Metaphysical notion of *Providence Divine*, disposing the confederations of Natural Causes to the production of Events either above or besides their native and proper virtues, or, at least, above the investigation of Reason; this they accommodated to weaker Capacities, in the casie *Representation* of *Fortune*.

Article 8.
The Necessity
and use of *Al-
legorical, Sym-
bolical, and
Emblematical
Traditions*, in-
vented by the
Ancients.

We sayd, *the more comprehensible disguise of Symbolical & Emblematical Traditions*; because, though it be commonly conceived, that primævous Antiquity used to invent Parables and Emblems rather to invellope the *Arcana* of Philosophy and so conceal them from the prophaning eyes of Ignorance, then to render them more intelligible; yet Parabolical and Poetical Fictions conduce

duce tam ad lumen & illustrationem, quam ad involucrium & velum, as well to the illustration of darker, as the involution of more evident peices of Truth; as the Oedipus of this last Century, the *Lo. S. Alban* (in *prefat. ad lib. de Sapient. Veterum*) hath acutely observed.

Nor ought we to be so vainly credulous as to admit, that the Ancients, being better acquainted with Simplicity and Benevolence, then Fraud and Envy, would expose their names to infamy, and the just execration of succeeding Ages, by drawing a curtain of *Allegories, Symbolisms, and Similitudes*, betwixt the eyes of Posterity, and the naked glories of Verity; thereby to detain them in the most horrid darkness of Ignorance: especially while tis manifest, that such was the rudeness of the Illiterate in those blinder times, when *Contemplation* was accounted inglorious Idleness, and *Action* the only end of life, that most were either incapable of, or impatient of the study requisite to learn any thing, which was not reduced down to a familiarity with *Sense*; and consequently, that the professors of Science had no other way left to insinuate the Maximes, and secret Conclusions in physiology, into the narrow minds of their Scholars, but by the mediation of their Senses affected with *Corporeal Representations*. Which is also the reason, why *Hieroglyphicks* were much more ancient then *Letters*; and *Parables* then *Arguments*.

Now, that the Philosophers Description of Fortune was only Emblematical; needs no other remonstrance, but this of *Pacuvius* (apud *Anth. lib. 2. ad Herennium*)

*Fortunam insanam esse, & cecam, & brutam perhibent Philosophi;
Saxoque illam instare globoso predicant volubilem;
Ideo, quò saxum impulerit Fors, cadere eò Fortunam autumant.
Cecam, ob eam rem esse iterant, quò nihil cernat, quò sese applicet:
Insanam autem aiunt, quia atrox; incerta, instabilisq; fit:
Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum negat internoscere.*

Philosophers paint Fortune, mad and blind,
Fix't on a Globe revolv'd by every wind

Q q 2

Of

Article 9.
Their Descriptions of Fortune, only Emblematical.

Of *Casualty*: importing her to fall,
 Where *Chance* converts her whirling pedestal.
 Her eyes vaild over with the skarf of Night;
 'Cause she doth ne're distinguish *wrong* from *right*.
Frantique, because Unconstant, Giddy, Cruel
 To him, at night, who was, at morn, her Jewel.
Irrational, 'cause she doth ne're elect,
 By *merit*, whom to grace, whom disrespect.

Article 10.
 As also the
 Images of
 Fortune fra-
 med by Pain-
 ters, and Sta-
 tuaries.

Not had those ingenious *Painters* and *Statuaries*, whose happy Fancies invented an Alphabet of *Things*, and composed a silent language of *Figures*, intelligible by the eye, to express the several attributes of *Fortune*; any other design, then by a pleasant affectation of the *Sense* (the only *Criterion* of illiterate Heads) to offer a gentle violence to the mind, and by a most familiar way of information, conduct the captived thoughts through the labyrinth of the mystery, to an easy and durable perception of the *Deuteroscope*, or *Mythological* intention. Thus the *Scythians*, as *Piccolominius* (in 8. gradu *Philosoph. Moral.*) relateth, had an Image of Fortune without feet; sensibly intimating, that the Goods of Fortune must be beholding to the leggs of *Virtue*, to support them in the constant benignity of their nature; *i. e.* they fall to the ground, and perish in a depraved use, unless they be managed by *Prudence*. Thus the *Smyrnaans*, as *Pausanias* (lib. 4. *Messenicorum*, pag. 178.) hath recorded, had a statue of Fortune, like *Atlas*, supporting the Pole with one hand, and holding in the other the *Amalthæan Horn*, or *Copia Cornu*: intuitively importing the Universality of her Empire, and that Riches are rather showred down on the heads of Mortals, by the free bounty of *Providence Divine*, then collected by the hands of *Human Industry*; which had I beheld, I should instantly have reflected upon that observation of *Salomon* (*Eccles. 9. vers. 11.*) *That the race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of Understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time, and Chance happeneth alike to all.* Thus others, pourtraying her

her bestriding a *Serpent*; would have the Spectator intuitively understand from the theory of that Express; that Fortune holds the bridle to Human *Prudence*, and can at pleasure countermand the profoundest Policy. And others, by representing her riding on a running Horse, lash'd on by Fate, which treads upon his heels; tacitely instruct the beholder, that Fortune must at last be overtaken, and vanquish'd by *Destiny*. To conclude, a copious list of many the like Emblematical and Symbolical Idols of Fortune, together with their several Significations and Mythologies; the ranging pen of *Bernhardus Casus (de Mineral. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 12.)* hath collected, and exhibited together in one sheet: and therefore we should defraud the Curiosity of our Reader, not to remit him thither for more ample Satisfaction.

Now, from a review of this disquisition into the nature of Fortune, tis obvious to the meanest capacity that if we respect only the *Pranotion* and *Expectation* of *human Reason*; then none the most præcise in Christianity can justly quarrel at the customary use of the Notion: but if we respect the influence and disposition of *Providence Divine* extended to all occurrences in the world; then none but the most barbarous, or Atheistical Ignorance dare defend it. Which distinction the learned *Spondanus (in Comment. in Homeri Iliados libr. 7. pag. 123.)* hath more fully and elegantly delivered thus; *Minime audiendi sunt, qui sortium dispensationem fortuitam esse dicunt. Quod Ego tamen admitto, si Homines tantum spectaveris: sed ille etiam ex Providentia Dei omnino pendent. Eo sensu etiam accipiendum est nomen Fortune; quæ enim consilio humano non fiunt, causam quoad nos non habent: sed illa omnino Deus regit & moderatur.*

Article II:
The review, tolerating the name of Fortune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God.

CHAP. IX.

Of Fate.

S E C T. I.

Article 1.
The convenient
reduction
of all opinions,
concerning the
essence of Fate,
to 2. General
Heads.



IS not unknown to the meanest in the Commonwealth of Learning, that no less than an Age can suffice to the observant lecture of that Vatican of Books composed by Philosophers of all times, concerning this perplexing *Theorem*; there being more Discourses (abating those, which the kindness of Time hath substracted) now extant thereupon, than any other subject, that ever exercised the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as must be acknowledged by any, who hath surveyd the singular Iatrophilological Treatise of that judicious Parisian, *Gabriel Naudæus*, *de Fato & Vise Terminis*. But yet, such hath bin the singular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, *Tot sententia, quot Authores*: there being found, upon a just audit of them all, fewer Opinions than Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent scrutiny may soon explore, that they all fall under the comprehension of only Two Catholique Heads; some understanding Fate to be *Aliquid Divinum*; a certain power *Divine*, and the rest, *Aliquid merè Naturale*, a certain Constitution merely *Natural*.

In the Classis of those, who have conceived Fate to be a *Divine Power*, the highest seat belongs to the *Platonist* and *Stoick*; according to whose doctrine, methodized and summarized

maried by *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fato*) we may consider it in a twofold Notion.

First, *ὡς ὄντα, ut Substantia*, as a *Substance*. In which sense it is accepted for *God Himself*, or that sempiternal Reason, or establish't method, according to whose tenor He hath præordained and disposed All things in the World, and so connected Causes to Causes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably result from that subalternate Series, or Complication of Efficients. For thus *Plato* (*in Timæo*) one while affirms that Fate is *ipsa Anima Mundi*, the very Soul of the Universe; and another while, *Natura Universi æterna ratio ac lex*, the eternal reason and law of Nature: and thus also both *Zeno* and *Chrysippus* are cited by *Plutarch* (*in 1. placit. 28.*) as defining Fate to be, *Vis spiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis universa gubernans*, a Spiritual Power, and constitution governing All things according to an order eternally præcogitate and prædecreed. And all the rest of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by *Diogenes Laertius*, as *Panætius* and *Possidonius* (at least, if He be the true Father of that Book, *de Mundo*, vulgarly conscribed to *Aristotle*, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by *Stobæus* (*Ecl. Physic.*) have unanimously held, that Fate was the same with *God*, *Jupiter*, and the *Universal Mens*. To whom we may justly associate *Seneca* also, who, (*in 4. de Benefic. & 2. Natural. Quæst. 45.*) sayth, in downright terms; *si Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris*: if you please to assert that *Jupiter* and Fate are one and the same thing, you shall speak the truth. Hence comes it, that though *Poets* sometimes refer all events to the procuration of *Jupiter*; and sometimes again to Fate: yet may not the nicest Critick impeach them of Inconstancy or Contradiction; since those Terms differ only in the sound, not in the notion; as signifying one and the same *Eternal Principle*, disposing the virtues and conspirations of all second Causes to the opportune effecting of Events, designed by it self, and so made indeclinable. Thus *Homer*, introducing *Agamemnon* as pleading his excuse for being instrumental.

Article 2.
What the *Platonist* and *Stoic* meant by Fate, considered (*ὡς ὄντα*) as a *substance*.

instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon Fate and Jupiter at once, in these words :

Ἐγὼ δ' ἐκ αἰτίας εἰμι,

Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ Μοῖρα,

Non Ego Causa,

Verum Jupiter & Fatum.

Article 3.

And, what (ὡς Ἐνέργεια) as an Energy or Act: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry Appellations, the Stoicks have imposed upon it.

Secondly, ὡς Ἐνέργεια, ut Actus, as an Act; according to which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be *ipsum Dei decretum*, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futurition; from whence the Latin word, *Fatum*, importing a Decree pronounced, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, *ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natura statutam*; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose præscript tenor all Events prædestined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (*de Fato*) viz. *est lex Adrastaæ, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can elude, or infringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of Chrysippus, Fatum est sempiterna quedam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per aternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est*; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the *Mobility of the term of mans life*. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signification and importance of each of those various Appellatives, which the Stoicks have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) *Εἰμασμένον*, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) *Πεπραμένον*, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) *Ἀνάγκη*, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because it self is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition:

(4)

(4) Ἀδράστεια, because no attempt can prevail to an alteration infringing of its tenor: (5) Αἴσα, because it is a Constitution Eternal: (6) Νέμεσις, because it is a distribution made to every Individual: (7) Χρεῶν, because it comprehends whatever is, by Consignation, due to every man: (8) Κῆρ, because as the original, so also the Dissolution of all things is subject to its appointment: Μοῖρα, *Parca*, because it is the peculiar Lot or Portion destined to every man. But as for this æquivocal Denominative, *Parca*; insomuch as it not onely determineth the state of all other things in general, but also the Life of man in special, *quasi Nendo*, as it were by spinning out a thread of commensurate longitude: thereupon did *Hesiod* (in *Theogn.*) dichotomize it into three distinct species; viz. (1) Ἀτρέσπες, in respect to the Irrevocability of time *past*; which exactly resembleth a thread already spun, and wound upon the reel or fuze; (2) Κλωθῶ, in respect to the Decurrent, or *Present* time, which responds to a thread now in twisting, in the hand of the Spinster; (3) Ἀράχνη, in respect to the *Future*, or Lot yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogie to Flax not yet spun off the distaff. Which is the Summarie of *Possidonius* (*de mundo*) and *Apuleius* (10. *de repub.*) their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the *Three Fatal Sisters*.

Article 1.

The second
Classis of Phi-
losophers, who
understood

Fate to be a
Constitution
meerly *Natural*
subdivided into
2 distinct Sects;

viz. (1) those
who assert the
Immutability

& *Inevitability*

of Fate; (2)
those who de-
fend the possi-
bility of its Al-
teration & *Evaz-*
sion.

S E C T. II.

IN the other *Classis* of Philosophers, who have apprehended *Fate* to be *Res purè Naturalis*, a Constitution meerly *Natural*, devoyd of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eternal Decree; we find a subdivision of two different Sects. For,

(1) *Some* have proposed to themselves a Series of Natural Causes, so harmoniously adapted and linked together by mutual revinctiō, that the posterior being continually suspended on and moved by the precedent, performe their operations *compulsively*, i. e. they cannot but do, what they do: so that thereby is inferred a *Necessity* so absolute, that it admits of nei-

the Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks *Lex Adamantina*, or *Adrastæa*, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that according to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by God; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal duration are made by, and dependent upon *it self*, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable than the other. And

(2) *Others* have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natural Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be *impeded* from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inhaerent Efficiency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. *Impeded*, we say, by things purely *Contingent*, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the *Arbitrary Liberty* of their Will.

Article 2.
The Leaders
of the First
Sect, *Heraclitus*,
Empedocles,
Leucippus, *Par-*
menides, and
chiefly *Demo-*
critus.

The *Coryphæi*, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, *Leucippus*, *Parmenides*, and (who took the right hand of all the others) *Democritus*; as we have found upon the list of *Cicero* (*de Fato*). For, albeit the Foundation of his Physiologie was the same with that of *Epicurus*, *Fortuito factum esse mundum*, that the Universe was made by *Chance*; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, examined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endeavour to impose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, *Fato omnia fieri*, that all things are effected by *Fate*; confounding two most contrary Notions, meer *Contingency*, and ineluctable *Necessity*.

Article 3.
Democritus just-
ly charged with
the patronage
of *Inevitable*
Fate: and his
doctrine con-
cerning it, con-
cisely rehearsed.

If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of *Democritus*; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected from hence: that it was his opinion, that *Fortune* is nothing else in reality but *Nature*, and that *Nature* is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the *First* of these positions, that *Nature and Fortune are Identical*; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of *Fortune*

tunc

tune are but surreptitious and usurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a meer philosophical Sense, import more then Mans Ignorance in the *Di boti* of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at least produced by natural means. For the *Second*, that *Nature is its own Fate*, or, more expressly, that Nature being only a constitution of Causalities resulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous disposition and settlement of the Universal Matter, in that Figure the adspicable World now beareth; doth necessitate her self to the causation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this process of reason. Atoms (saith He, *apud Magnenum*) being the Catholique Principle, of which all things consist, have an ingenite or con-natural Motive Faculty essentially inhaerent; by the uncessant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coalescence composed of Atoms, cannot but conforme to the same motions; by which their principles are commoved. And sithence some Atoms tending one way, are by the occurse and jussling of others diverted to another course; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but observe, continue and pursue those necessary motions. By the same reason, some bodies, composed of concreted Atoms, as they are præcipitated one way, by the impulse of their own eoessential Faculty, may, by the occurrence and arietation of others steering a different course, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to some other transverse, oblique, rectilinear, &c. so that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but observe, continue, and pursue those compulsive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or *Necessity*, whereby *Democritus* would have all things effected, and by which the World was at first composed, in the same Figure, we speculate at this day; for, as the Universal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite space, by the agitation of their own inexistent Faculty, could not but convene; coalesce, and cohere into any other Forme, but what they did: so now having acquired that forme by Chance, can they not either change it, or not observe and execute those motions begun, and by the mediation or intercession

whereof all Events are brought to pass. For, in *Plutarch*, (1. *placit.* 26.) He sayth plainly, *Necessitatem nihil esse aliud, ἢ τὴν φορὰν, καὶ τὴν πλῆξιν, καὶ τὴν ἀρπυξίαν τῆς ὕλης, quam lationem, percussionem, repercussionem Materiae*; that Necessity is nothing else but the Lation, Percussion, Repercussion of the material Principle of all things, *i. e.* of *Atoms*. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that passage in *Simplicius* (2. *physic. comment.* 59.) that some of the Ancients held an opinion, that Ἀνάγκη ὕλική, *Material Necessity* was the sole *Causatrix* of all Effects; in respect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as most have dreamt, but uncessantly operative; and that, not by impression, but *Inherency*, as being to it self the *Principium à quo* of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to discriminate this *Doctrin* from that of others, who constituted a meer *Formal*, or *Agent Necessity*, distinct from the material principle of the world; whether that *Agent* be simply *Natural*, according to the *Physiology* of *Aristotle*; or *Primus Opifex*, the First Operator, according to the hypothesis of *Plato*, and the *Stoicks*, who also sometimes radicated that Necessity, whereby Evils are continually existent in the world, in the *Matter* thereof, as *Seneca* (*de Provid.* 5.) excusing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, sayth positively, *Non potest Artifex mutare materiam*, it was not in his power to Abstract it, because not to alter the *Matter*. But, not to leave our Explanation of *Democritus Fatum Materiale* imperfect; we may, from what hath preceded, perceive at what mark these words of his were directed; *Necessitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, esse & Fatum, & Iustitiam, & Providentiam, & opificem mundi* (*apud Plutarch.* 1. *placit.* 45.) that the *Necessity*, whereby all things are effected, is both *Fate*, *Justice*, *Providence*, and *Maker* of the World: *viz.* this, that the Series of things, in which the reason or essence of Fate doth consist, could not have bin otherwise constituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Just, and another Unjust; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the present method, and no other; and why the adspectable form of the Univerſe was made in all points responsible

responsible to what it now holds, &c. For, He referred the Causation of all things to those newly explicated congenial motions of Atoms; and so conceived that even the *Soul*, or Mind of man (which He also fancied to be a certain *Conixture of spherical or orbicular Atoms*) is variously agitated, not only by those *internal* motions of its own insensible particles, which vary according to its individual Complexion (*i. e.* the Atoms composing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one sort, at least of one conixture; those of a Cholerick, of another; those of a Phlegmatick, of a third, &c.) but also by those *Extradvenient* motions caused by Objects; by whose *Species*, or Images incurrent (which Atoms also constitute) the Mind cannot but be *Attracted*, if they be consentaneous and allecive, or gratefull; nor not be *Averted*, if they be dissentaneous and repulsive, or ingratefull. That, if the Mind be not alwaies allecited by *Attractive Species*; the reason is, because at the same instant there occur unto it the more potent sollicitations of their *Contrary, Averting Species*: and if it be not alwaies *Averted* by *Repellent*; the reason is equal, *viz.* because at the same instant it is more strongly sollicitated by their *Contrary, Attractive Species*. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is gratefull and allecive, so long as it discovers no Evil admixt thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingratefull and averfant, so long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but pursue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoyd the greater; as that whereby it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the same time present their *Species*; it cannot but neglect the Good, so long as the Evil averts more potently than the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more strongly. Finally, that since, by reason of the Ignorance, or Dimness of the Mind, it doth frequently not perceive the Evil consequent upon its prosecution of some Good; therefore is it subject to *Deception* in some cases, and is often carried

carried on to that, from which it ought to have bin averted: nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecution of some Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have bin converted. But notwithstanding, insomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; still it cannot but *Necessarily* be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and consequently, that there remains to it only a *Desire of Truth*, i. e. that no *Counterfeit Species* may occur, but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o're with the splendid semblance of Good. For this is the summe of what *Empiricus* (2. *advers. Physic.*) makes *Democritus* to have desiderated, when He sayd; Εὐχῆ) εὐλόγων εἰδῶν πυχάνειν. *Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci.* Now, by this complex Argumentation, *Democritus* may be understood to have inferred; that though some Actions seem situate within the præcinets of our own jurisdiction, or that it is absolutely in our power to *Elect*, or *Reject* this or that object; insomuch as every mans experience doth demonstrate to him, that he doth and can consult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuseth the other; and that, not by Compulsion, but *Freely*: yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power, because not only the *occasion* of our Consultation, but also the *Consultation* it self is imposed upon us by inevitable *Necessity*. *First*, that the *Occasion* of Consultation (or the *Exhibition* of many objects, which almost equally affecting the Mind, and by reason of the æquipondium of their Verisimilitude, or moments of Good, holding it suspended in æquilibrio, of necessity ingage it to a *Deliberation*) cannot but be imposed upon us; we conceive it not obscure to him, who shall deduce the conducting Series of things from a due Epochè, or height, and analytically undoe the chain of Causes: and *Secondly*, that also the act of *Consultation* is a *Necessary Effect*, is manifest from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, so equally Attractive; that their Apparencies of Utility, or Presentations

Præsentations of Good, are æquilibrated, and reciprocally counterpoise each other; the mind must of necessity be agitated by a kind of *Fluctuation*, and detained in the suspence of *Indifference*, or *Indetermination*, or *Consultation*, untill it acquiesce in its *Election* of that Object, whose præsentation of Utility seems to præponderate the others. Which, æquitably audited, amounts to no more then this; that *Election* is nothing but the prosecution of an Object which either really is, or at least seems more Good; and that a spontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in respect that man doth both spontaneously affect, and willingly prosecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold assertion, *viz.* that both the Occasion and Consultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and so comprehended under this Natural Necessity, propugned by *Democritus*: the *Stoicks* intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as strange, *viz.* that it depends on the same Concatenation of things, *that you now read this our discourse of Fate*; as *Manilius* (*lib. 2.*) *Hoc quoque fatale est, sic ipsum expendere Fatum.* And this, because whatever Action of any man you shall suppose; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypothesis, to find out the proxime Cause exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cause to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, &c. unravelling the series of Causes, so that it must at length be inferred, that that supposed action could not but follow upon those other actions subalternately præcedent, and consequently, that it must be, as *Democritus* would have it, *Fatal*, or *Necessary*. Which opinion *Aristotle* ardently impugneeth (*in lib. de Interpre. cap. 8.*) when discussing the verity and necessity of Propositions, He contends to evince; that though of two opposite singular propositions, which concern a thing either *Præterite*, or *Præsent*, one must be true, the other false: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary singular propositions, which concern a thing *Future*; the Verity of the one not necessitating the Falsity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every *Affirmation*, or *Negation* concerning a thing to come, were true or false, *ex Necessitate*: then would
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the Futurity of any thing include a Necessity of its Futurition, i. e. whatever is *Future* would be *Necessary*, and on the contrary, whatever is not *Future*, would be *Not-necessary*: and upon just inference, nothing could remain either *Fortuitous*, or *Arbitrary*; which to admit, is an *Incongruity* so manifest, that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it; an *Incommodity* so intolerable, that it not only disparageth, but confuteth it self. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the *Summary* of their Theory, who have apprehended and asserted *Fate* to be a *meer Natural Constitution of Causes, subalternately connected*; as not dependent on any thing *Divine*, nor any *Eternal Decree*; so not capable of any *mutation or interruption*, by the intervention of any *Impediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbitrary Agent.*

S E C T. III.

Article 1.
The Principal
of the *Second*
Sect, *Aristotle*
and *Epicurus*.

Article 2.
The Grounds
of the *Authors*
imputing the
opinion both
of *Fates Identity*
with *Nature*, and the
possibility of
its *Mutation &*
Declination, by
either *Fortuitous*
or *Arbitrary*
Antagonists,
to *Aristotle*.

IN the other *Division* of *Philosophers*, who also conceded *Fate* to be a *meer Natural Constitution of Causes subalternately dependent, &c.* but yet denied the inevitable or necessary insequition of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the possibility of its mutation, or interruption by either *Chance*, or mans *Free will*: the Principal are *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*.

First, as for *Aristotle*; that He held *Fate*, or fatal *Necessity* to be nothing but very *Nature*, or (if you like it better) every particular *Cause* acting *secundum suam naturam, naturalémve ductum*, according to its proper or natural *Virtue*; is manifest from his own words, in sundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He sayth (in 2. *phys. cap. 6.*) *Eas generationes, accretiones, & alterationes, qua violenta sunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas prematurè pubescere,*

pubescere, adolesceréque) esse in *ἐναρμύνας*, non *Fatales*, hoc est non *Naturales*; making *Fatal* Effects to be meerly *Natural*. And (2) He sayth (1 *Meteorol. cap. ultim.*) *χρόνον ἐναρμύρων*, *Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes, imbriumque excessus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eomodo, quo & contingit hyems statis anni temporibus*: which rightly paraphrased, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at some certain period of the yeer, according to the Ecliptick progress consigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance; even so are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of some periodical Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the settled Constitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to observe, that though *Stobæus* (*Ecl. Phys.*) tells us; *Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam, quàm modum Cause advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis*; that *Arist.* conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause, as the manner of a Cause, advenient to things determined by Necessity: yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant, as that we understand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cause, but Nature her self, which, in respect to her *Agency*, is called a *Cause*, and in respect to the certain, proper, and necessary manner or way of her acting, is called *Fate*. And, that He impugned the former Error, *viz.* that all Agents, included in this Universal Subalternation, act *ex inevitabili necessitate*, or cannot but doe, what they doe; is not obscurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure *Nature*. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inopugnabile *necessity*; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter, and other resisting Accidents; but also in Generous and virtuous Minds, which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations, or propensities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency &c. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles, and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reason,

we may conjecture, that *Arist.* reflected, when He sayd of *Socrates*, *prater naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit*: He acquired an Habit of *Continency*, even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual *Nature*, and particular *Fate*.

Article 3.
Epicurus un-
animous to *Arist.*
in the point of
Physical and
Elnctable Ne-
cessity.

Secondly, as for *Epicurus*; that his thoughts made an Unison with those of *Aristotle*, in the key of a *Non-ineluctable Fate*, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain *Necessity Natural* in this sentence, *Naturam à rebus, ipsarumve serie*, (*διδασχθῆναι τὴν ἀναγκαστικὴν*) *doceri, cogique, sive necessitate agi* (in *Epist. ad Herodotum*:) He yet denied the *Inevitability*, or *Absoluteness* thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by *Stobæus* (in *Ecl. Phys.*) where He delivers as a general Canon, *Omnia fieri trium modorum aliquo, (κατ' ἀνάγκην, κατ' ἀερισπασσιν, κατ' ἰσχυρὰν) Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna.* For, in that he makes *Fortune*, and *Consultation*, or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with *Necessity Natural*, He manifestly excludes it from being *πρωτῶν διαπονήων*, sole *Despot* or *Monarch*, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that *Cicero* (*de Fato*) introducing *Epicurus* disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with *Aristotle*, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; *Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas.*

Article 4.
The scope of
Epicurus his
Fagment of the
Declination of
Atoms in the
human Soal:
and his Accom-
modation
thereof to the
mition of mans
Liberty, epitomized.

And, certainly, as He stood equal with *Aristotle*, in the denial; so hath He outdoe him, by many degrees, in his endeavours for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute *Necessity*: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the *Declination* of *Atoms* (illustrated in the incomparable Commentary of *Gassendus*) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispenfable rigor of *Fate*, and conserve an *Evasory* or *Declining Liberty* for the Mind of man. This *Plutarch* taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He sayth (*de Anim. Solert.*) that the motion of the *Declination* of

of Atoms in the Human Soul, was subtilly invented by *Epicurus*, ἔπος εἰς τὴν ζῶν ἢ τύχῃ παρεστῆθη, καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπλήθει, that *Fortune* might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the *Arbitrary* power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (*de Stoic. repub.*) that the same *Epicurus* (*sefe in omnem partem versare, ingeniumque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac pravitatem esse inculpabilem non patiatur;*) rack't all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of mans *Free will*, and so that evil might not prætend to *inculpability*.

Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our præsent Theme, into a wide Digression concerning *Epicurus* his whole Romance of the *Declination of Atoms* in the Soul; especially having lately remitted him to *Gassendus* his accomplisht Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method, here to arrest him, while we informe him briefly, How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of mans *Liberty* from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that *Epicurus*, having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but principally in Man, *viz. Natural, Violent, and Voluntary*; took it for granted, that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from *Atoms*, the *Principium à quo* of all motion: and hereupon concluded, that the spring of all *Natural* motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhærent to *Atoms*, *viz.* that which physiology calls the motion of *Gravity*, whereby an Atom is præcipitated *ad lineam rectam*, to a perpendicular; that the spring of all *Violent* motion, was the motion of *Reflexion*, or that which ariseth from occurrantion, arietation, or repercussion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried *ad lineam obliquam*; and lastly, that the spring of all *Voluntary* motion was the motion of *Declination*, to which no region is determined, nor time præfixt.

Article 5.
An Exception,
in the name of
Democritus, a-
gainst Epicurus
Inference.

But might not *Democritus*, and other *Defendants* of *Absolute Necessity natural*, have excepted against this, as insufficient to the protection of mans *Evasory Freedome*, by returning; that because this motion of *Declination* is no less *Natural* (for it is derived from no other principle, but *Atoms* themselves) then that of *Gravity*; therefore doth it still remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when *Epicurus* his Hypothesis is conceded, as before. Infomuch as all things, which were to come to pass, by reason of those various motions of *Arietation*, *Repuls*, *Declination* &c. by an eternal series, and kind of subalternate *Concatenation*, are consequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of *Cognition* and *Appetition*, to which mans *Liberty* appertains; and so are brought to pass by an equal *Necessity*. For, that the Mind of man may display, or execute that *Liberty Elective*, whereby it affects and prosecutes any object, conceive it to be an *Apple*; necessary it is, that the *Image* or *Species* of that *Apple* be first emitted from it, and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight, invade, percell, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Necessary to the *Apple*, before it can transfuse its visible *Species* to the eye, that it be put in some place convenient for adspect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere. Necessary, that the *Tree*, which bore that apple, be first generated by a seed, and nourished by the moisture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Necessary, that that *Seed* be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its *Vegetable* seeds had their origination from the *Concussions* and *Complexions* of *Atoms*; which could not (being agitated by the impulse of their own inherent *Faculty Motive*) but convene and coalesce, and acquiesce in those *Figures*, those situations, at that time. Again, if the *Soul*, or *Mind* be also a *Contexture* of orbicular *Atoms*; those *Atoms* must have bin contained in the *Sperm* of the *Parents*; must have confluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as also from the *Aer* and beams.

beams of the Sun; those metals must have bin such and no other: and so subalternately successive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity, whatever of the Causes, lateral or concurrent (which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you shall please to begin at. Because from Eternity Causes have so cohered to Causes, that the last causes could not but concurr; which being deduced into act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or desire that particular object, viz. the Apple. And what is here said of *Causes*, the same in all points is to be understood also of *Atoms*, which constitute those causes, and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their *Motions*, by which they attain to be Causes.

To this *Exception*, that we may compose some *Response*, such as may seem Consistent to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, and to contain somewhat of Probability, at least; we must usurp the liberty to assume: that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its *Declinant Atoms* can break that *Rigidity* arising from other Atoms, and so make its nature *Flexile* to any part; in which *Flexibility*, the root of *Liberty* doth consist. And therefore, the mind, being affected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but so, that if another object shall instantly occur, whose Attraction is æquivalent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that object also: so that, deflected from the first, it may become æquibrated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtless, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus constituted *Flexile* and Indifferent, doth at length determine it self rather to one than the other part; this ariseth from hence: that the *impression* of one *Species* is more violent than of the other; and consequently that the *Election* succeeds, upon the *Apprehension* of that object, whose species appears either positively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it electeth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring; by whose motions all the Faculties, and the members destinate to execution are excited, and carried thither,

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whither.

Article 6.
The justification thereof, by a *Response* conforme to the Physiology of *Epicurus*.

whither the Mind tendeth : and this by mediation of the *Spirits* discurrent, or rather transmitted through all parts of the body. All which *Lucretius* fully expresseth in these Verses :

*Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo,
Nec regione loci certa; sed ubi ipsa tulit Mens:
Nam dubio-procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas
Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur.* lib. 2.

Again, perhaps *Epicurus* will not gainsay, but that the motion of *Declination* is as much *Natural* as the motion of *Gravity*; But yet will He by no persuasions yeeld, that the Mind, being temperate of *Declinatory Atoms*, is so affected and attracted by *Necessity* toward one object, that it cannot instantly be deflected to another. For, as a mixt Nature is made, so is the *Mobility* of its insensible parts varied : and from various *Natural* motions refused or refracted, ariseth a *Third Nature*, according to which its motions may be sayd to be *Voluntary* and *Natural* both ; inso much as they proceed à *Natura libera*, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, supposing the *Occursation* and *Arietation* of *Atoms*, that it is pure *Necessity*, that *Percussions*, *Repulses*, and either *Reflexions* or *Cohasions* should succeed among them : but yet may He refuse to allow a *Necessity* of such *Occursations*, as if they could not be impeded, nor their *Consequents* be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal series of the *Causes* of the *Apple*, and the *Mind*; *Epicurus* will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of *Necessity* may be attributed thereunto, such in respect whereof those things cannot be uneffected; since, *non datur jus in præterita*, there is no countermanding things *Præterite*: but before those things were peracted, there was no such *Necessity*; since both *Fortune*, or *Contingency*, and the opposing *Liberty* of mans *Will* might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide disparity between these two *Affirmations*, *viz.* What is once done, cannot be not done : and what is done, might not have bin done. Since, in the *Former*, a thing is considered as already *past*; and in the *Later*, as yet to come:

come : and as according to the *Former* it is *Necessary* ; so according to the *Later*, it may be or *Contingent*, or *Voluntary*. By which reason, was it possible, that the *Apple* might not have bin presented to the eye ; possible, that the *Tree* which bare it might first have withered ; that the *Seed*, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and sterile, or else have bin sowed in some other place ; that other of its *Causes* might have bin divers ways prapeded : which also may be affirmed of the *Mind*, and its *Causes* ; and consequently none of the many *Causes*, which did antecede the *Appetition* of the *Apple*, can be conceived to have bin *Necessary*, as they might if the *Causes* were of themselves incapable of *Impediment*, or if there were one *Cause* *Paramont* to all others in the *Concatenation*, which by an absolute sovereignty, or despotique power, had directed and coacted them. Allbeit we concede, that the *Appetition* of the *Apple* by the *mind*, is the *Consequent* of the *Minds Cognition* thereof, and that *Cognition* the consequent of its *Occursation* to the eye, and that the *Consequent* of its *Position* in a place convenient for sight, and that the consequent of its *Existence*, and so from link to link retrograde up to eternity : yet notwithstanding can no man justify this *Inference*, that therefore the *Mind* is *Necessitated* to that *Appetition* ; because still there remains a *Posse* to the *Mind* of being *Averted* from the *Affectation* and *Prosecution* thereof, in case either the *Species* of a better object, or a suspicion of poyson therein concealed, shall intervene, or a refrigeration of the *Stomach* by the *dyspeptical* and *flatulent* juice thereof be feared, or any other *Cause* of moment sufficient to perswade the *mind* to abstain from the use thereof, shall be interposed,

Nor is this *Rejoinder* dissuasive ; that, when the *Mind* is averted from the *Appetition* of the *Apple*, the *Causes Antecedent* were not such as might induce the *mind* to an *Appetition*, but such as induced it to an *Aversion* ; and that these *Averting*, not those *Attracting* *Causes* were so connected to the series of *Fate*, that the *mind* could not but be averted from it.

well as of those, which *Attract* it to an object ; to the eternal *Series* of *Fate*)
to overbalance *Epicurus* his defence of mans *Liberty* .

Article 7.

The most weighty *Rejoinder*, (of the connexion of those *Causes*, which *Avert* the *Mind* from, so found too light.

For,

For, though the Mind be contemperate of such a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be *Commoed* by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture such also, as that it can derive from it self some motions distinct from, nay contrary to those motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being instituted by no other Principle but it self, are manifestly *Spontaneous* and *Voluntary*, and by which it is empower'd to resist *External* motions, and therefore may not so be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another: And hence we may *Conclude*, that the Mind is not obliged to a necessity of any one Object; but stands *Free* to refuse that, and elect another: and that the Reason of a thing to *come*, is not a little different from that of a thing already *past*; since, in respect to a thing *Future*, there remains an *Indifferency* to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in respect to a thing *Præterite*, there is a *Necessity* of its election of one. If this *Solution* be thought too light, we can superadd another of weight sufficient to counterpoise the Doubt; *viz.* that which *Carneades* in *Cicero* insinuated, when he taught, that the *Epicureans* might have defended the Liberty of mans Mind, without their commentitious *Declination* of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath *Voluntary* motions of its own institution, they needed no other Argument to confute *Chrysippus*: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a *Cause Movent*; there remained no reason why they should have granted, that all Effects have their *Antecedent* Causes; since to the will of man no Causes are Antecedent, it being to it self the *Principium à quo* of all its motions *Voluntary*.

And this is the faithfull Abridgement of *Epicurus* his Doctrin concerning Fate, as a Constitution meerly Natural, and capable of interruption; alteration, opposition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, *viz.* *Fortune* or pure Contingency, and the *Liberty* of mans mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶

SECT.

S E C T. I V.

There is yet another *Species* of Fate, retaining to our Second *Genus* (as *Ἐπίγνῳστα*) whose exceeding vanity and inconsiderableness had well-nigh occasioned our total Inconsideration thereof, in this place; and that is *Fatum Mathematicum sive Astrologicum*, the *Mathematicians* and *Astrologers Fate*; being a certain imaginary Necessity Natural, imposed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more especially upon Man, as the most analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Celestial Bodies, respective to their Motions, Positions, Connexions, Aspects.

Article 1.
Mathematical
Fate briefly
described.

Tis no wonder, we confess, that the *Chaldeans*, a Mercurial and volatile Nation generally infatuated with *Astral Idolatry*, were the *Inventors* of this *Planetary Destiny*; since they Deified all they understood not, and advanced their observations of the circumvolutions of the Spheres, together with their Orbs of light, to such a height of insolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet represented in the Figures of the Asterisms, and ~~pretending~~ to the skill of reading the Celestial Ephemerides, by spelling those Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Apparitions seemed to make, into words and sentences perfectly signifying, to the exact and intelligent observer, the intent of God concerning not only the subversion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religions, &c. general Events, but also the prosperity or adversity, the health or sickness, life or death of particular persons: as *Rabbi ben Ezra*, and out of him *Gaffarel* (without the concealment of his strong inclination to the same superstitious Arrogance) hath observed; and, by several experiments alleaged, endeavour'd to patronize, in the 13. Chap. of his *Unheard of*

Article 2.
The gross Van-
ity thereof
concealed from
many Philoso-
phers, only by
the cloud of
Transcriptive
Adhesion to
Antique Tra-
ditions.

pretend: d

T t

Curiosities.

* Rabbi ben
Ezra, in ductore
dabiorum.

Curiosities. Nor is it a wonder, that the *Hebrew*, and after them the *Græcian Astrologers*, with great ostentation of transcendent knowledge, and no less than privacy with the three Fatal Sisters, sedulously promoted the same splendid Error, of ascribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratique Starrs: since, upon the testimony of the greatest *Antiquaries*, * we may justly affirm, that the Hebrews added to the vanities and absurdities of the Chaldaean, and the Græcians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Astrology; the stream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reason, why we inherit to dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great *Astronomical Sagacity* of the more simple and upright times of *Abraham* and *Moses*. Though this be no wonder, we say, yet tis a considerable one, that even many *Physiologists*, who pretended the indagation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of verisimilitude at least, have liberally contributed towards the diffusion and propagation of the same Delusion. Witness that peremptory speech of *Pliny* (*1 nat. Histor.*) *singulis sydera tributa sunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obscura defunctis, & pro cuiusque sorte lucientia ad munera mortalibus.* Nor can we conjecture, what should occasion the Deception of so many and so great judgments, in this easy particular; unless that grand Cause of Popular mistakes, viz. *Transcriptive Adherence* to all, that seems presented in the reverend habit of *Antiquity*, especially if guilded over with the Estimation of *Rare* and *Sublime*: the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather than Indubitate and Examine those Transmissions, which concern the remotest Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Energy and Configurations of Celestial Bodies. *Prodigia cum narantur, excipi solent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti sint, postquam semel Scriptorem invenerunt, pluribus placent, veneratione crescunt, vetustate commendantur;* was *Nicompompus* his saying, in *Joh. Barolaii Argenis, lib. 2.* For, had they devoted their minds of all traditional Præjudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the *Hypothetical Necessity* of the Matter, or Subject, whereon the Starrs are supposed

supposed to discharge and fix their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely *different Fortunes of Twins*, conceived and borne under the same Constellation; or upon the *double Impiety* of ascribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Causes, those Effects, which proclaim their designation by an *Infinite Wisdom*, and their Præordination to Ends above the sagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the most nefarious Villanies of sinfull man upon the innocuous and exceeding both usefull and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we say, but pondered any one of these Reasons, that sufficiently demonstrate the Absurdity of Planetary Necessity; doubtless, they had soon reclaimed their belief from this dishonorable seduction, and would no longer have abused themselves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individuall mans life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of those Starrs, which were Lords of the Horoscope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both.

The *First* Reason, whereby this *Chaldean Fate* may be demonstratively redargued of extreme *vanity*, we deduce from the *Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter*, whereon the Planets exercise their power. For, according to their own Concession, *Omnis receptio est ad modum recipientis*, All bodies ought to be *Analogous*, i. e. prædisposed to admit either the benigne, or maligne influences of the Heavens; for *Alteration* is of necessity prævious to *Production*, and before a body be configurate, necessary it is that the Matter, whereof it is composed, be altered and variously præpared; and præpared it is by *Second Causes*, but perfected by *First*. Thus the Geniture of the *Male*, though perfect and prolificall in its self, must yet be frustrated of its end, unless it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plastick virtue, *viz.* the Blood and seminal infusion of the *Femal*, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of *Ægypt*, because *Nilus* (being *Δυναρος*) doth yeeld no Evaporations sufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues still serene and unobnubilated; notwithstanding the potent Attraction of the Sun,

T 1 2

Moon,

Article 3.
The Absurdity
of Sydereal Ne-
cessity evicted
(1) by an Ar-
gument dedu-
ced from the
Hypothetical
Necessity of the
Matter on
which Celestial
Impressions are
to operate.

* *Respice pag.*
143.

Moon, and other Sydereal Magnets: and though all the Planets should convene in the watery signe of Pisces, as before the catholique Deluge *, and threaten an *Apertio portarum* to that Climate; yet, because the material Cause of rain, *Evaporations*, is there wanting, must their conspiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And therefore, by equal reason, unless the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, shall find a Subject qualified in all points for the admission and promotion of this Celestial Fate, which our effronted *Genethliacks* have conceived it to immit into Embryons and Births, all its magnified Influx must miscarry, and be lost in an invalidity as absolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who should attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould sand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it must be true; that the *Preparation* of the Matter, on which the Impressions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon *Sublunary* and *determinate Causes*: then may we, with more honour, recurr to that excellent sentence of the *Poet*;
Libera stat nobis mens, nulli subdita caelo.

Article 4.
(2) By the
common Ex-
periment of the
unæqual For-
tunes of
Twins.

The *Second* prægnant Argument, wherewith the more sober sort of Book-men usually deride the Arrogance of our *Genethliacks* (who blush not to promise to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Destiny, and divine as confidently as if they had bin of the Cabal with all the Asterisms) we derived from the common *Experiment of Twins*: who, though procreated of the same Seminalities, fæcundate in the same Ovarie or bed of nature, and (for ought even our most perspicacious *Harvey* knows to the contrary) conceived in the same moment, and so under the same *Ascendent*; are notwithstanding many times observed to differ in Sex, physiognomy, genius, condition of life, and most-ly in the manner and time of their death. Thus *Esau* and *Jacob*, who may, without the dispensation of a Figure, be sayd to have bin but one and the same Birth, the younger Midwifing himself into the world by holding fast his brothers heel, and so if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at least portending his future purchase and usurpation thereof: were yet so disparate
in

n their Complexions, Dispositions, Fortunes, course of life, Age, and dissolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven must either demonstrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that short moment that intervned betwixt their neer Nativities; or confess it to be the hand of *Providence Divine*, which distributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Starrs that caused that vast disproportion. And thus *Proclus* and *Euristhenes*, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of *Lacedemonia*, and so æqually disposed by their Fortunes also to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramount Conjunction of the Planets had impressed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor perish by equal and synchronical Fates. On the *Reverse*; how many Myriads have proved Twins, in their Decease, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, constitutions, professions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Astrologers affirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the same sydereal Fate, which necessitated that their Copartnership in the grave? unfainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be so contradictorily impudent. What excuse have they then left them, for stopping their ears against that grave Admonition of the oraculous *Zoroaster*; μή σὺ γ' ἀυξάνῃς τὴν ἐμαρτύρησιν, *Ne tu augeas fatum*, Beware thou dost not aggravate thy Fate. which signifies no less then this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or frustrate the virtues of Celestial Influxes: to promote them by Cooperation, to infirme and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate also that memorable Aphorisme of the Prince of Astrologers, *Ptolemy*; *Potest is, qui sciens est, multos stellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac seipsum ante illorum eventum preparaverit.*

Our last Argument to confound Chaldæan Fate, is the *Double Impiety* inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativity infused into his nature; as our *athereal Mercuries* affirme:

T c 3

Article 3.
(3) By the *double Impiety*, inseparable from the belief thereof.

then must it follow, that those glorious orbs were created by God more for the *harms* and *ruine*, then benefit and comfort of mankind; for whose sake only, subordinate to his own Glory, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the regicides, parricides, homicides, incests, rapes, rapines, blasphemies, sacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, &c. nefarious acts of Miscreants (the very naming whereof will blister the most innocent lips) be the executions of those designs, which the malevolent stars in their Confoederations have determined to accomplish by such and such unhappy Instruments: then must it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to justice, because he can plead, *Non equidem vellem, sed me mea Fata traherant*; as also, that *God is the Author of Evil*, by giving to the stars such noxious power, and such unlimited Commissions, as doe authorize them to operate to the Destruction of his *Masterpiece*.

To these 3 Redargutions of *Astrological Necessity*, we might have annexed as many score, borrowed from *Picus Mirandulanus*, *Bradwardine B.* of Canterbury, *Sixtus Senensis*, *Mersennus*, *Gassendus*, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious swords, in this quarrel, against the Host of Heaven: but, remembering that proverbial axiome, *Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri possit per pauciora*, we found our selves obliged to decline supererogation, and refer the unsatisfied to these incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to insert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confession of *Hillarius Altobellus Senior* (in *prafatione ad Tabulas Regias Divisionum 12. partium Cœli*) in these words. *Cum igitur per tot secula fluctuarit Astronomia & mendax tanto tempore peragravit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis auctoribus, inverecunda, fronte perfrecta, fornicata est? nunquam, nullibi, nullis (ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemeo post aliqua secula) annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus consignavit, non ipsa, non dilectissima filia Astrologia. Utraque enim pavit curiosos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdum mendaces non fuere, sors favit, vel casus, vel per*

per accidens congruentia syderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenious Confession of a Person, whose assiduous inquest into the most recondite mysteries of Astronomy, non only by indefatigable lecture of the choicest of Urania's Secretaries, but also by the most exact use of Instruments and Tables, and frequent tempestive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all those pernicious Frauds, which either the *Ignorance*, or *ostentation* of succeeding Ages had foisted in upon the simple and demonstrable *Uranometrical observations and Axioms* of Antiquity; not only to the *Corruption*, but eternal *Defamation* and contempt of that noble *Science*: how much of just *Disparagement* is inferred upon *Judicial Astrology*, which the *Avarice* of Divining Impostors, on one hand, and the superstitious *Curiosity* of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of *Destiny*; we should rudely derogate from our *Readers* Capacity, not wholly to entrust to his own immediate judgement. To ratifie and terminate this our reprobation of our *Genehliacal Schematists*, we have the like censure of them from *S. Ambrose* (in *Hexaemero*) *Nonnulli tentaverunt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus unusquisque, qui natus sit, esset; cum hoc non solum vanum sit: & inutile quarentibus, sed impossibile pollicentibus.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

*The Liberty of Mans Will, Fortune,
and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine.*

SECT. I.

Article 1.
The intent of
the chapter.



Hus long have we exercised the Candor and Patience of our Reader, with the prolix *Recitation*, and necessary *Explanation* of the Ancients opinions concerning *Fate*: and the residue of our province is to gratify him with the concise *Declaration* of our own, both concerning the legitimate Admission of this notion of *Fate*, and the *Conciliation* thereof to mans *Free-will, Fortune, and Providence Divine*; which we have formerly invited him to expect, as the grand scope at which all our previous *Meditations* were directed, and the point in which all these lines of this small matter of *Book* are concentred.

Article 2.
Democritus
Fate, inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of *Religion*, and the *Liberty* of mans *Will*: and therefore detested.

First, we are to abominate the execrable Opinion of *Democritus*; not only because it is incapable of due Consistence with the sacred and indubitable Principles of Religious *Faith*, which ascertain that the Creation, Molition, Conservation, and constant Administration of all things, are impossible rightly to be ascribed to any Cause but the *Supreme Being* alone: but also because it is *à diametro* repugnant to the evidence of that infallible Criterion, the *Light of Nature*; which demonstrateth the Soul of man to be an *Arbitrary* and uncoacted Agent. For, that man hath in himself a power of inhibiting, or suspending his *Assent* unto, and *Approbation* of any object, the
Verity

Verity of whose Species is not sufficiently clear and distinct, but *Dubious*; is a perfect Demonstration of the Indifferency, or *Liberty* of his Intellect, and so also of its charge, the *Will*, or *Faculty Elective*: as *Cartesius* excellently observes, in *Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. sect. 6.*

Secondly, that opinion of *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, may, indeed, be defended so far forth as it makes *Fate* and *Nature*, or the Concatenation of natural Causes, to be one and the same thing in reality, though expressed by different Terms: but ought to be exploded, inasmuch as it not only denies the *Verity* of Future Events, and so subtracts from God the proper Attribute of his most perfect Essence, *Omniscience*, by not conceding to him an infallible Science of all things to come; but also supposeth no Creation of natural Causes, no disposition, no moderation of their Efficiencies by *Providence Divine*.

Article 3.
Aristotle and *Epicurus* their *Fate* admitted, in that it is Identical to *Nature*: but abominated, in that it clasheth with the *Certainty* of *Divine Præscience*.

And thirdly, as for that more specious opinion of the *Platonist* and *Stoick*; we can discover no danger in our adhesion to it, so far as it affirms the primitive *Constitution*, and continual *Gubernation* of all things in the Universe by God; by defining *Fate* to be that Method, series, or systeme of Causes, which the *Divine Nature* at first constituted, and established, in order to the præcise, and opportune effecting all things prædetermined by his infinite *Wisdom*: But yet we must cautiously abandon it in this, that it not only blasphemously invades the cardinal Prærogative of Divinity, *Omnipotence*, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those *Laws*, which Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his armes in the adamantine fetters of *Destiny*; but also, in great part, excludes the mind of man from acting any voluntary part on the theatre of the world, and leaves no room for the intervention of *Contingents*.

Article 4.
The *Platonick* and *Stoick Fate* embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a *Constitution* of the *Divine Wisdom*: but abandoned, in that it detracts from *Divine Omnipotence*.

Nor is there any substantial reason to deter the most scrupulous *Christian* from admitting the use of this term, *Fate*, in a rectified sense; *i. e.* provided that He thereby understand, not

Article 5.
In what qualified sense *Christianisme* may tolerate the use of the term, any *Fate*.

any blind and unpræmeditate *Necessity*; but a provident and well ordered Concatenation of Causes, which (like the *Magnetick Chain*, where all the inferior links are dependent on the imprægnating or invigorating Emanations of the First,) was constituted by the *Fiat* of the *Eternal Wisdom*, and may be varied, or inverted by the occasional Determinations of the same; and this without incurring the Imperfection either of *Inconstancy* or *Improvision*. For our warrant in this we have no less a Præcedent, then *S. Austin*; whose words are these: *Qui omnium connexionem seriemque Causarum, quæ fit omne, quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum iis de verbi controversia certandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem summi Dei tribuunt Voluntati; ac proinde Fati voce qui voluerit uti, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat.* (in 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 8.) ¶

S E C T. II.

Article 1.
Fate and Fortune conciliated, in the point of Providence Divine.

NOW, as for the Abolition of the seeming *Enmitie* between *Fate* and *Fortune*; tis not obscure, that the Concession of the one is very far from adnihilating the other. For, if we admit *Fate* to be a Law, by the Divine Will imposed upon Natural Causes, according to the tenor whereof all things are done, that are done; and *Fortune* to be an Event resulting from a concurrence of Natural Causes, besides, above, or contrary to the expectation, conjecture, and forecast of man, though præordained by the Providence of God, and connexed to the series of Causes, or Chain of Fate: we cannot but soon perceive their Convention, Concentration, and Identity in the point of *Providence Divine*; nor is there any veil of *Discrepancy* betwixt them, in their naked and simple Realities, but that light and thin one, which either the *Ignorance* or *Sophistry* of man hath rudely, and perhaps profanely drawn. When a *Prince* dispatcheth two Posts to the same place, by several waies, neither knowing of the others mission; and they meet each other in

one

one moment at their journeys end: though we may rightly call it Fortune, in respect to them, who never thought of that Convention; yet still is it providence, in respect to the Prince, who sent them; and limited their time of travel to such an hour. And undoubtedly, by the authority of no less reason are we bound to acknowledge, that though many Events hourly occurring to us, which the highest Human Prudence could never so much as suspect, may without derogation to the sacred Monarchy of God, be styled meerly Fortuitous, in relation to our Improvition: yet still are they the wise and convenient Prædeterminations of his Special Providence. Our Memory may rehearse, that the Terme, Fortune, hath a double importance; (1) a Concourse of Causes; (2) mans prævious Ignorance of the Event resulting from that Concourse: and our Reason cannot but hence infer, that according to the First, Fortune may be admitted in respect to man, though not of God; and according to the Last, nothing can interdict our assertion, that *Fortune* is a part, not only of *Fate*, but also of *Providence Divine*, which, as hath bin profusely demonstrated, comprehends all occurrences, as well those which are, as those which are not prævised by Man. And in this sense only are we to interpret that sentence of *Plato* (*Epist. 6.*) *Deum apparare Fortunam*; as also that other, (*in 4. de Legibus*) *Deum, & cum Deo Fortunam humana omnia gubernare*. This duely considered, we cannot but conclude; that Fortune is consistent with Fate, by the same interest, that a Species doth consist with its Genus: for that the Analogie is consimilar, is manifest from what immediately præcedes.

Plutarch, when descanting upon *Plato* his Distinction of Article 2. Providence into *Supreme, Planetary, and Sublunary*; judiciously interpreteth the supreme, to be *Intelligentia & benefica Dei voluntas*, the Intelligence and benefical Will of God: and this for two respects; (1) that He might with greater reason enunciate, that Fate is to be reputed subordinate to the *Divine Will*; (2) that He might with greater auctority contradict that proverbial error, *Omnia Fato fieri*; though he conceded,

Plutarch's ingenious Assimilation of Fate to the Civil Law: and his design therein.

ceded, *Omnia Fato complecti*, that all things are comprehended in Fate. We say *All* things, not only meerly *Fortuitous*, and more *General Contingents*; but also τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, such whose Event is ambiguous, and suspended on the Election or Aver- sation of Mans Free-will. And the scope at which He aimed this Distinction; was to insinuate and commend the *Analogie betwixt Fate and the Civil Law*. For (sayth He) as all actions are not *Legitimate, i. e.* are not done according to the rule of the Law, which are under the comprehension of the Law (for the Law comprehends Prodition, Desertion, and many offences of the same kind, which yet no man can justify to be Legitimate: since that only is Legitimate, which is prescribed by the Law; and therefore He, who kills a Tyrant, doth not a Lawfull, (though a Commendable, at least not a punishable Act) but only those, which are enjoyned and expressly prescribed by the Law: even so, though Fate doth comprehend all Events, yet are not all Events therein comprehended, *Fatal*, or the *Designations and Effects* of Fate; but only those, which follow upon *Causes* (ἐν τῇ θεῖα διατάξει) in the *Divine Disposition Antecedent*, or *Necessary*; such as are the motions of the Planets, upon which their Rising and Setting follow of Necessity.

S E C T. III.

Article I.
Fate concentric
to mans
Elevive Lib-
erty, in the point
of Prædestina-
tion.

AND finally, concerning the Enodation of that more then Gordian Knot, (about which many Ancient *Philosophers* have broken the teeth of their *Reason*, and as many *Christian Theologists* bin driven to make use of the sword of *Faith*, to cut it asunder) viz. the *Conciliation of Fate to its apparent Contrary, Mans Free-will*; we conceive the most hopefull way of dissolving the mighty Difficulty to be, with the most penetrating *Thom. Aquinas*, to understand *Fate*, in respect to man, to be

no more but that part of Providence Divine, which Theologifts intend by the Term, *Predestination*. For the vulgarly conceived Antipraxis between Providence Divine and Liberty Human, being once removed: the Repugnancy between Fate and Liberty will also vanish of consequence. This that we have, in the 4. *Sett*, of our *Chapter concerning the Mobility of the Term of mans life*, to more then a small part performed; the Memory of our Reader is a sufficient record. However, that we may leave no stone unturned, under which any the most minute particle of Truth, to whose Explanation the concernment of our present Theme doth adlige us, may be thought to lye neglected: we shall, with permission from, and due submission unto the Censure of the *Church* (from whose Fundamentals we humbly beseech the *God of Truth* we may never recede in the least) make a second attempt to expound the mysterious Riddle of *Predestination*; that so we may with more perspicuity evidence the Conciliability thereof to mans *Arbitrary Agency*.

In order hereunto, we are to observe, that as *Theology* holds it for a maxime, that God created two distinct orders of Causes, in the General, *viz.* *Necessary*, and *Free*; and that both of these constantly and faithfully execute the commission of their Natures, respectively, *i.e.* the *Necessary* operate by *Necessity*, and the *Free* by *Liberty*: so also doth *Philosophy* admit it for Canonical, that both the *Necessary* and *Free* equally acknowledge God for their Author, and are so comprehended in the episcopacy of Fate; that the *Necessary* operate *Necessarily*, or *Fatally*, and the *Free* not *Fatally*, but *Freely*. And from this *Consent* comes it to pass, that as the *Difficulties*, which perplex both Divines and Philosophers, are of great *Affinity*, if not *Identical*, in the main: so also are the *Responses* thereto of equal moment: Wherefore it must commend our studies, to select only those *Two Cardinal Doubts*, to which all others may, in some relation, either direct, or collateral, be referred: and, to the perspicuous *Solution* of each, accommodate such pregnant Reasons, as may be of correspondent extent in their importance.

U u 3.

The

Article 2.
The Concord betwixt *Theology* and *Philosophy*, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, *viz.* *Necessary*, and *Free*; the ground of the *Affinity* both betwixt the *Difficulties*, and *Solutions*, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming *Repugnancy* between *Fate* and mans *Free-will*.

Article 3.
The First capital Difficulty, desumed from Divine Præscience; as stated by Divines.

The Former, being desumed from Divine Prænotion, is by the Theologist propoied thus. Either God knew definitely and certainly, that Peter would deny Christ: or He did not know it. That he did not know it, cannot be affirmed; first, because He præcisely prædicted his Abnegation; secondly, because Truth it self cannot lye: and if He had not known it, He not bin Omniscient, and consequently not God. Therefore He knew it definitely and certainly: and upon inference; it was impossible to Peter, not to deny. For had it bin left to his Election, and he using that Liberty had not denyed: then might the Prænotion of God have bin argued of Fallacity, and his Prædiction of Falsity. But if it was not in Peters power, not to have denyed; 'tis manifest, that he wanted the Liberty of Election.

Article 4.
The same, as stated by Philosophers.

And by the Philosophers thus. Either the Gods have a definite and infallible præscience of the future events of Contingents (i. e. whether of 2. contrary Events, in possibility, shall be deduced extra Causas, or actually succeed) or they have no knowledge at all of future things; or they have an indefinite, and only conjectural cognition, such as even Man may justly pretend to: but neither the 2. nor 3. proposition can be endured, without the joynt toleration of most horrid Absurdities, and inevitable præcipitation upon that dangerous rock, the Commensuration of the Infinite Science of the Gods, by the Finite extent of mans capacity; and therefore the First remains only to be asserted. If therefore the Gods have a certain Prænotion, which of 2. Contraries, whose Event is equally possible, as to the virtues of their Causes, shall come to be effected: manifest it is, that that particular Event, whose Ambiguity is determined to Certainty of Futurition, and is actually brought to pass, is Fatal or Necessary, i. e. could not but come to pass. For, otherwise, the Gods must be confest subject to Mendacity. One of the two therefore, must be granted, viz. that all things come to pass, Necessarily. as they are foreknown and Prædicted by the Gods; and so that the word, Contingens, is excluded, as importing no Reality, but a meer Chimæra; or, that the Affairs or Occurrences

Occurrences of man, are neither præcognite, nor procured by the Gods; the Impossibility of which assertion, doth also fully exclude all Contingency.

To the Solution of this Difficulty, tis well known, the Divines have most judiciously accommodated their Distinction of *Necessity* into *Absolute* and *Suppositional*. For instance; that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yesterday is præterlapsed, is Absolutely Necessary: but, that I should to morrow take a journey into the Country, or write a Consult for such or such a Patient, is not absolutely Necessary; yet if I suppose, that I shall travel; or write; then there ariseth a Necessity of my travelling, or writing, *ex Suppositione*, from that my Supposition. Now, in respect tis manifest from this Distinction, that the Necessity *Absolute* of any Action doth destroy the *Liberty* of the Agent; but the *Suppositional* doth not (for though I journey, or write, according to my Supposition, yet was it possible to me to have done neither) thereupon doe they most excellently reason thus: that *Peters* Abnegation was foreseen and prædicted by God, as an Event to come of *Necessity*, not *Absolute*, but *Suppositional*, by which nothing was detracted from *Peters* Liberty of not denying. For, as now in the *present*, if He be interrogated concerning his Master, he is intirely *Free* or to avouch, or disavow his knowledge of him; so also will He be in the *Future*, when He shall be interrogated. Wherefore, as, if He now determine himself rather to deny, then affirm, and according to that determination actually deny; He doth that *Freely*, notwithstanding from the moment he denied, his denial is *Necessary*, insomuch as it is supposed that he hath actually denied: so also in the *Future*, when He shall determine himself rather to deny, then affirm, and according to that determination shall actually deny, shall his denial be *Free*, or *Arbitrary*; however it cannot but be granted *Necessary* that He hath denied; because he hath already actually denied. Nor is it paradoxical, or difficult to affirm, that this *Suppositional Necessity*, and *Peters Liberty* are not *ἄσυστα*, *Discordant*, or *Inconsistent*, in any respect; because the Necessity is subsequent,

Article 5.

The full solution of the same, by virtue of the Divines Discrimination of *Necessity* into *Absolute* and *Hypothetical*.

subsequent, not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty; and because it doth not consist so much in *Re, vel Actione*, in the Thing or Action it self, as in *Temporis Circumstantia*, the Circumstance of Time when 'tis done. Since, when we say, tis Necessary that *Peter* hath denyed; that Necessity is not understood to have bin any thing Antecedently in him, which compelled him to deny: but that it is radicated now in *Time* it self, which as it is really past, and cannot be not past; so the Action done in that past time, however it was done, cannot be not done. And hence it is evident, though no man can justly assert, that 'twas Necessary to *Peter* to deny, because according to that assertion, there must be understood some Antecedent Cause, by which he was coacted to deny: yet justified it may be that Now tis Necessary that he hath denyed; because the Action being once done, and so impossible to be not done, all the Necessity falls upon the *Præterition* of the Time. Now, in respect that God is *Omniscient*, He cannot but *Foresee* that *Peter* will deny; yet that *Divine Prænotion* of *Peters* Abnegation, is subsequent to the *Divine Prævision* of *Peters* Free Determination: and therefore God *Foresees* that *Peter* will deny, only because He *Foresees*, that *Peter*, abusing his Liberty, will freely determine himself to a denial. And hence comes it to be embraced amongst the most judicious School-men, as a truth indisputable; That *Peter* will deny, not because God hath *prævised* and *prædicted* that he will deny: but that, because *Peter* will deny, when he shall be examined, therefore and for no other reason doth God *Foresee* and *Foretell* that he will deny. For, *uti Scientia, præteritam rem pro objecto habens, nullam rei præteritam, ut ita & non aliter fieret, necessitatem infert: ita Præscientia, rem futuram pro suo objecto habens, rei futura, sive Futuritioni nullam potest inferre necessitatem: utraque enim est extra rem, & in Deo actio Immanens; that as Science having for its object a thing Præterite, doth induce no necessity thereupon; that it should have bin so, and no otherwise, so also doth Præscience, having for its object a thing Future, inferr no necessity upon its Futurition, that it shall so and no otherwise come to pass; for both Science and Præscience are distinct from,*

and

and alien to their Objects, and Actions *Immanent* in God, *i. e.* not at all effluxed to the object, to the destruction, or alteration of its Nature: this, we say, is a Verity which demonstrateth it self, and which we have more precisely insisted upon, in the 4. *Artic. 4. Sect. of our discourse of the Mobility of the term of mans life.* And that all *Cognition* is a thing really distinct from, and extraneous to its Object; and that a thing comes to be actually, what it is, not from the *Cognition* thereof by an *Idea* in all points conformable, but from it self, or its *Efficient Cause*: needs no other probation, but the conviction of this instance; that *Snow* is white, not because tis known to be white, but contrary, that it is known to be white, because really it is so. To speak a profound truth plainly, in few words; herein consists the *Disparity* between *Divine* and *Human Cognition*, *viz.* that *Human* can be extended only to *Present* and *Præterite*: but *Divine* doth extend it self, with equal Certitude, to *Future* Contingents also. Now, inasmuch as *Præterite* Contingents were sometimes *Future*, and in the same condition with those, which are yet *Future*; and again, those which are yet *Future* may be understood to be *præterite* in time to come, and in the same condition with those, which are already *Præterite*: manifest it is, that as neither *Divine*, nor *Human Cognition* is the Cause, why Contingents already *Præterite*, are *præterite*; but, *è contrà*, they are known as *Præterite*, because really they are so: in like manner, that those which are *Future*, are not therefore *Future*, because God holds an exact prænotion of them, as *Future*; but, *è contrà*, because they really are *Future*, therefore doth God hold an exact prænotion of their *Futurition*. And upon this Basis was it, that many Schooollmen erected that *Axiom, Prævisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones*; that the *Prævision* of God hath no influence (*coactive*) upon the actions of man. Now, what hath bin argued for the *Prævision* and *Prænotion* of God, is also to be extended to his *Prædiction*; especially because tis uncontrovertible, that *Prædiction* is posterior or subsequent to the *Prænotion* of any Contingent, yet in the womb of *Futurity*: since what is not exactly *foreknown*, can never be certainly

foretold. For which respect, shall any urge upon us, that the Divine Prænotion and Prædiction cannot be *Fallacious*; we shall most willingly concede their position, as most indubitate, because nothing can be prognosticate by God, as Future, which is not really Future: but, when it shall be thence inferred, that if *Peter* had once the absolute power in his own hands to have not denyed, and rightly using that arbitrary power, had actually not denyed; in that case, the prænotion and prædiction of his denyal by God had proved *Fallacious*; we must reject the *Illation*, as illegal and absurd, because had not *Peters* denyall bin really Future, God had neither prævised, nor prædicted the same. For, it is the *Reality* of its *Futurition*, that supports the *Certitude* of the *Prædiction* of any future Contingent. And therefore, in case *Peter* had bin not to deny; God had as certainly prædicted, that He would not deny: since so the *Supposition* had bin quite *contrary*, viz. that *Peter*, rightly using his Liberty of Election, would determine it, not to a Negation, but *Affirmation*. Whereupon we may safely conclude (1) that *Peters* Abnegation was Future, and (2) that God both prævised and prædicted the same, upon no other Necessity but only this: that *Peter*, when it should be in his own power to determine himself to either part, would then actually determine himself rather to *Disclaim* and *Abjure*, then own and avow, his Master. Thus the *Divines*.

Article 6.

The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the definite Prænotion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their definite Contingency: but, è contrà, the definity of their *Futurition*, the cause of their definite Prænotion.

And thus the *Philosophers*. *Non quia Dii definitò norunt Contingentia, ideo illa eventura sunt. Neque enim, quia Dii norunt, ideo necessariò eveniunt; sed quia, cum natura sint ancipitis, aut talem, aut talem exhibebunt exitum; norunt Dii necessariò qualem, seu utrum obtinebunt: adeo ut Contingens, ex sua quidem natura indefinitum sit, sed respectu tamen notitia Deorum definitum. Quinetiam constat, nostra quoque notitia Contingens definitò cognosci; cum, viz. propriè Contingens deinceps non sit: sed necessariò consequitur antegressas, cur fiat, Causas: Saith Ammonius (in lib. de interpret.) The whole importance whereof is this. That the definite prænotion of Contingents by God, is in no relation the cause of their definite Contingency;*

Contingency; but, their being of themselves definitely Future, or their *Ambiguity* being to be determined to *Definity* of Futurition, is the Cause of their prænotion by God. For, though a Contingent be *Indefinite*, in respect to its own nature, *i. e.* it is equally determinable, by the Liberty of its Causes, to either of two contrary Events: yet, in respect to the *Prænotion* of God, it is *Definite*; because God hath an infallible prænotion, to which of two contrary Events its Causes will determine it. All which may be confirmed *à Minori*, from the Prænotion of Man; experience assuring, that Physicians frequently prognosticate and prædict the death of their deplored Patients, even to an hour. Not that their Prognosticks have any influence upon the Disease, to determine it to Mortal, when yet tis Dubious: but that the determination of the disease from Dubious to definitely Mortal, by its causes, is the ground of their Prognostick.

Here, lest we be misconceived to confound *Divine* and *Human* Præcognition, we advertise; that the Prænotion of God is *Infallible*, because *à Priori*, *i. e.* He foreknows Contingents, while they are yet only in Possibility, and in the womb of their Causes; nor to him, who demands, Why, or How God foreknows Events, while they are yet in the Dark, or Nothing of Futurity? can any other response be given, but this, that He is *Omniscient*, *i. e.* God: but the Prænotion, or (rather) *Præsağition* of man, is *Fallacious*, because desumed *à Posteriori*, from Effects educed *extra Causas*, into actual Existence.

Article 7:
The Disparity
betwixt Divine
and Human
Prænotion.

Which vast Disparity may be most adæquately *Exemplified* thus. God certainly Foreknows that *Peter* shall fall sick, and die of such or such a disease, *viz.* a Pestilent Fever. How? because He foreknows, that those Causes, which in respect to the *Ambiguity* or *Indifferency* of their event may, or may not generate an intense putrefaction and malignity in the humors of *Peters* body, shall lose that their Possibility, and determine themselves to the actual production of that particular malignant or pestilential inquinament in his blood, which constituteth the

Article 8.
The same
exemplified.

essence of that disease: and that the disease so generated will be so violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature, that the Temperament of *Peters* body, being too weak to sustain such a disproportionate Encounter, will thereby be dissolved, and so Death shall inevitably succeed.

But the *Physician* can only conjecture, that *Peter* may fall sick of such a malignant Fever; why, because He discovers that *Peters* previous Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cause, or Fewell for a putrid Fever; and that the access of Malignity, either by Contagion communicated, or from an intense Corruption of humors internally kindled, may, according to the Aptitude of its nature, seise upon that prepared fewell, and Ferment it into a pestilential Fever: but *Definitely* He doth not know, that *Peter* shall fall sick of such a pestilential disease; in regard, it transcends the maximes of his Art, and the Capacity of his limited Reason, to foreknow, whether the Possibility of such an Effect from such Causes, shall be determined to Necessity. Nor can He predict, that *Peter* being invaded with that disease, shall certainly perish thereby; untill the Dubiosity of the Fever be actually determined to *Lethality*: for then, from Symptoms, that signify the total Succumbency or yeelding of Nature to the victorious fury of the disease, he may, with good warrant and honour, praesage the imminent death of *Peter*. ¶

SECT. IV.

Article 1.
The Second
Capital Diffi-
culty, erected
upon a sophism
called *Ignava*
Ratio; as it re-
specteth both
Theology, and
Philosophy.

THE other Capital Difficulty, being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticisme, or Interrogatory Sophisme (most adæquately denominated by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) ἀργὸς λόγος, *Ignava Ratio*, an *unactive Argumentation*; because, prevailing upon the mind, it stupefies the same to a perpetual *Restiveness*, or *Supinity*, by charging even the *Thoughts* of every man upon the absolute and inoppugnable præordination of *Destiny*; and consequently adnihilating the use of *Piety*, *Prudence*, and

Circum-

Circumspection in all the actions of our lives) on that side which respecteth *Theology*, beareth this forme.

Either I am, from Eternity, *prædestined* and *Elected* to *immortal* *Glory*; or *Reprobated* to *interminable* *misery*. If the *Former*; then notwithstanding all my *Impieties*, I cannot be *Damned*: if the *Later*; then notwithstanding all my *pious* *endeavours*, I cannot be *saved*. But one of the two must be true: and therefore, since all my *Good* or *Evil* actions are of no avail, so what end shall I afflict my self with unnecessary, because fruitless care in any action of my life? Better is it for me, to grant a *general* *Indulgence* to my *Genius*, and provide for nought, but the *satisfaction* of all my *Sensual* *desires*; since that, nor ought else, can neither countermand my *Election*, nor promote or confirm my *Reprobation*.

And on the other side, which respecteth *Philosophy*, it is presented thus. If the *Decree* of *Fate* be, that I shall recover of such a *sickness*; then, whether I consult the *Physician*, or not, I shall however recover: but if the *decree* of *Fate* be, that I shall not recover; notwithstanding my use, or neglect of the *Physician*, I shall not recover. And one of the two is necessarily *Future*: therefore is it vain and needless for me to use the *Physician*.

In order to our hoped *Solution* of this prodigious *Problem*, we begg leave to be our Readers Remembrancer, that among *Divines* there are two eminent *Opinions*, concerning this *Δυσκόνη*, or almost incomprehensible *mysterie*; in both which they have expressed so opportune and becoming a *Modesty*, as must extort from every ingenuous person not only a worthy *Acknowledgement*, but superlative *Commendation*. For, being reduced to an admission of some kind of *Necessity*, and considering how inconsistent any the weakest *Necessity* is with *Liberty*, wherein the *Good* and *Evil*, and so the *Laudability* and *Culpability* of all the *Actions* of man, must be confessed to be essentially *radicated*: they thought it the highest point of *Wisdom*e to secure their routed judgements by a mature retreat to the *Sanctuary* of *Ignorance*; conceiving it a pitch sublime enough for the most aspiring thoughts of man to mount up to the

Article 2.
Two eminent
Opinions of
Divines touch-
ant the Soluti-
on of this Dif-
ficult y, recog-
nized: and their
judicious Mo-
desty, in duely
acknowledging
the mysterie of
Prædestination,
to be *Arcanum*
Divini imperii,
commend. d.

Apostles *ô Altitudo!* and soberly becalming the distractions of their Reason, by the Laudanum of Faith. If so, tis no shame for us to confess this Wonder of Prædestination to be *Arcanum Divini Imperii*, not only impervestigable by the acutest and profoundest Speculation of Man, but also too abstruse for the clearer intelligence of *Angels*.

The *Former* opinion states the Abstrusity thus. That God, from all eternity, did Prædestinate, or *Elect*, out of the whole stock, or mass of mankind, a definite number of persons, to whom, *sine ullis eorum meritis, operibusve bonis prævisis, & ex pura sui Bonitate*, without any respect at all to his Prævision of their Good works, but merely of his own Favour and Benignity, He had decreed eternal Felicity; and the rest He decreed to *Reprobate*, or Damn to eternal Infelicity; yet, *ex prævisis eorum malis operibus*, in respect to his prævision of their Future Evil works.

The *other* thus. That God did as well prædestinate some men to Glory, from his prævision of their Good; as others to misery, from his prævision of their Evil actions. Or thus. God, from Eternity, decreed to create the World, and therein a certain number of men, who should be capable of deserving well, or ill at the hands of his Mercy, or Justice, according to the right use, or abuse of that Liberty of their Understanding and Will, which He was pleased to endow them withall. And, compassionating the Deceptibility of their Nature, He also decreed to diffuse upon the souls of all men, that Supernatural Assistance, which Divines call *Sufficient Grace*; that so they, who should, by the right use of their Elective Liberty, husband their stock or portion of sufficient Grace, to empower them to the performance of Good Actions, should be Elected to Glory: but they, who should abuse both their Liberty, and his Auxiliant Grace, to the doing of Evil Actions, should be Reprobated to misery. And *finally*, because He foresaw, that some would rightly use his Auxiliatory Grace, and constantly persevere in that state of Piety untill death; and that others would neglect, condemn, and abuse it, and never repent perfectly, but die in that horrid state of Impiety: therefore did He decree everlasting Glory to *those*, and as lasting misery to *these*. And this we conceive

ceive to be the most intelligible Adumbration of this more than Ænigmatical Subject.

Now, of these two Opinions, the *First* seems as wholly incapable of Expedition from the intricate Entanglings of the præcedent *Interrogatory Sophisme*; as the Absolute Decree of Reprobation is of a full Conciliation to the Liberty of mans Will. For what Liberty can remain to those men, who are, by a decree Antecedent to all prævision of their future Good actions, prædestinate to Glory? And were there any Contrapractical Liberty remaining to them, and should their Will, according to that liberty, elect evil, and they do such actions, whose guilt might deserve Damnation Eternal, at the tribunal of Justice Divine: in that case, would the Decree of their Election be eluded and countermanded. Nor is it less Contradictory, to reserve a Liberty to those, who are *Reprobate*; since, for this reason alone, that they are not Elected, it is impossible to them, notwithstanding all their Good inclinations, endeavours, and performances, to bring themselves into the number of the *Elect*. And yet damned they shall be, and justly too, for their Evil works: but how is it possible for them to doe Good, and not Evil of Necessity, when the decree of their *Reprobation* is supposed Antecedent to Gods Prævision of the future concurse, or conspiracy of their Will to the tenor of that Decree; and when they are left such deplorable wretches, to whom Damnation, and so the Patration of evil Actions only remain *possible*? To evade this Difficulty of Difficulties, many eminent Doctors of the Chaire as well in Universities, as Synods, have fabricated for themselves as many Sanctuaries of Distinctions. Some adscribing to God a certain Science *Conditionate*, or *Hypothetical* (they unanimously phrase it, *Scientia Media*, and are so immoderately delighted with the Acuteness thereof, that, as the more then generally learned, *D^r. Prideaux* hath satyrically observed (*in prælect. de Scient. Media.*) *de genuino ejus parente, haud segnus ac de Puero vivo inter meretrices, 1 Reg. 3. est decertatum*, there hath bin as passionate and sharp a conflict between *Fonseca, Molina, Leonhardus Lessius Lovaniensis*, &c. Jesuits, for the

Article 3.

The *First* opinion found totally incapable of Expedition from the *Sophisme, Ignava Ratio.*

the honor of its Invention, as was betwixt the two Harlots about the right to the Living Child) others requiring, if not to the justification of the Decree it self, yet at least to justify the Execution thereof, the concurrence of *Good Works*, so necessarily, that no man can ever attain to Glory, but by the scale of *Merits*, at least those of our *Saviour*: and others mincing, or extenuating the Elective Liberty of man into a meer and simple *Libency* (which we have more then once specified, and as often described) and accordingly attempting to salve the *Repugnancy* thus; that the Elect are therefore Free, because they do their Good works *Libently*, or *Willingly*; and likewise, that the Reprobate are also Free, because they doe their Evil works *Libently*. Hereupon, to him, who shall charge upon them with this *Unallive Argumentation*, they instantly oppose; that there is very great reason, why every man, endowed with this *Libency*, should most strenuously endeavour the constant practise of Good, rather then Evil: because, though He be uncertain of the Decree concerning his Election or Reprobation; yet is He certain of this, that no man shall ever be assumed into Glory, unless he shall have done Good, nor any be excluded the Celestial Eden, unless He shall have done Evil. To which they add, that it is the main Duty of every man, to the utmost of his power, to ascertain himself rather of *Election*, by his perseverance in good; then of *Reprobation*, by a debauched and desperate resignation of the sceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil: that so he may prevent, or mitigate that *Fear* and *Anxiety*, which must otherwise uncessantly excruciate his mind, during his whole life, by acquiring a settled confidence, that from God, who is infinitely Good and Just, he hath no cause to expect evil, while the scope of all his endeavours is, to deserve well, at least to obtain Mercy at his hand. To conclude, lest man should in the interim either *Glory* in himself, as if He ought, according to justice, to be *Elected*, for his good works sake; or *Complain* of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation, murmuring that it was not his fault, why his name was not inscribed in the Book of life: they check his Glorifying with this cooling card of the Apostle, *O Homo! quis te discernit?* and hush his Complaint with, *Tu qui es, qui*

Qui respondeas Deo? Nunquid dicet vas Figulo, quare me fecisti sic? Nunquid facere illi licet aliud vas in honorem, aliud verò in contumeliam? (Roman. chap. 9. ver. 21.) And if this satisfy not; they here set bounds to Curiosity, and lime the wings of those Eagle Wits, who would soare higher then the lower region of the mysterie, with that grave advice of the Canonized Doctor: *Quare hunc trahat Deus, illum verò non trahat, noli judicare, si non vis errare;* or that modest rule of *Cornelius Tacitus, Sanctius & reverentius visum, de actis Deorum credere, quàm scire.*

But as for the *Second Opinion*; to our first inquisition, that seemes capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth, without much difficulty thus. *I am* (says *Adrastus*, or the *Fatist*) *either Elect to glory, or Reprobate to misery, by an eternal Decree of God.* This we grant to be most true; but with this additional qualification: *that Himself is Now the Cause, why He was from eternity Elect, or Reprobate.* For, He is now in that very state, in which God foresaw that he would be, when educed into existence, endowed with reason, and assisted with sufficient Grace, for the clear discernment of Good from Evil; and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will, that God hath prövised him operating good or evil: so that the Decree of his Election, or Reprobation, is subsequent or posterior to the Divine Prövision of his future good, or evil Demerits. To speak yet louder; God therefore *Elect*ed him to Glory, because He Forelaw that he would use both the Liberty of his Understanding and Will, and that Supernaturall Light, or Divine Grace, which the Compassion of God vouchsafed for his Assistance, as he ought, to enable him to lead an honest and pious life: and therefore *Reprobated* him to misery, because He Forelaw that he would Abuse the Lights of Nature and Grace, in constantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Advisees. This being inferred, the *Fatist* cannot but perceive, that it lyes on his part, now to doe well, and with all the nerves of his Mind to *Cooperate* to Divine Grace: that so God, from eternity foreseeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace, may have *Elect*ed him.

Y y

For

Article 4.
The *Second*
Opinion, to a
great part, ex-
tricated from
the same La-
byrinth.

For if he shall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Divine Grace, and pursue Evil: those Evil works shall be very they, which God from eternity having respect unto, hath Damned him for the Guilt of them, and impænitence for them.

Article 5.
The Fatists
Subterfuge, of
the Infallibility
of Divine
Prævision,
præcluded.

Nor can He elude this truth, by pleading; that God doth from eternity *Foreknow*, whether He shall be Elect, or Reprobate: and that therefore of Necessity he *shall* be, what he *Will* be; since the Divine *Science* is incapable of *Elusion*, or *Mutability*. Because, though God, indeed, had an infallible Præcognition, from Eternity, whether he would be Prædestinate, or Reprobate; yet is that Præcognition grounded upon his own eternal Decree, and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Prævision of the Fatists Good or Evil life. So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the constant prosecution of Good; is the *Basis*, or first Degree in this mysterious *Climax* of *Prædestination*; the *Prævision* thereof by God, the *second*; the respective *Decree* of God, the *third*; and his indeceptible *Præscience* the *fourth* and last. Not that these *Antecessions* and *Consecutions* are *Temporary*; i. e. not that the Præscience of God is posterior to his Decree; and his Decree posterior to his Prævision (for those 3. make but one simple and intire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will: and Eternity is but one permanent *Now*, incapable of Division, because of Cessation) really, but *Anthropopathically*: i. e. that narrow and remote Man, when he speculates the nature of his own *Free-Will*, and that of *Divine Justice*, as integrally *Consistent*; is necessitated, for comprehension sake, to suppose some *Momenta Rationis*, or Priority and Posteriority in *Eternity*, as we have singularly enunciated in the 2. *Articl.* 4. *Seët.* 6. *chap.* præcedent.

Article 6.
A second sub-
terfuge of the
Fatist, viz. that
the Subsequence
of the Decree
to Prævision,
doth implicate
the possibility of
its *Elusion* and
Mutability;
prævented.

Again, the Fatist can justly promise to himself no greater protection by this farther objection; that, if the Divine Decree be subsequent to Divine Prævision; therefore is it in his power to stagger the Certitude of the Decree, and dissolve its rigour into an arbitrary *Mutability*. Why? because the Decree is not made, *nisi supponendo, quid esset facturus*, but upon a Supposition what the

the future Actions of his life would be: and the *Immutability* thereof is established upon the *Necessity Suppositional*, which can diminish nothing of the Liberty of man, as we have more then once professedly evinced.

And as little solid reason hath He to argue thus. If God did therefore Elect me, only because He eternally praxised those Good works, which I now do: then (*ipse ero, qui me discernam*) shall I my self be to my self the Author of my Discretion. For, tis not man, who by his own single power can make this Discretion, but the very Grace of God alone; without which no man can ever attain so high as the foot of Goodness.

Conclude we, therefore; though it be not difficult to mans Reason, to investigate the Cause, Why God was pleased to ordain this vessel for Honour, and that for Dishonour; why He, by the vigorous Magnet of his special Indulgence, doth Attract this, and not that man; still dispensing a sufficient portion of his illuminating Grace to all men: since it is not obscure, that the *Concourse, Conspiracy, and Cooperation* of this mans Will to that *sufficient Grace*, may inoffensively be conceived to be the Cause, at least a Cause, and so *è contra*. Yet is it (and the Acutest Wits have, from the Flaws made in them by the more then Adamantine Hardness of this Rock, had great reason to conjecture it will always continue) the most Desperate Difficulty, that ere perplexed the Cogitations of inquisitive Mortality, to explore the reason, why God made men of such a condition, as that some would be destinate to Honour, and others to Dishonour; and not All men such, as that they should willingly suffer themselves to be Allected by the Loadstone of his Love, or be willing to cooperate to his Grace diffused upon them: when, had it seemed convenient to his Wildome, He might have made All men such, as that they would, with all ardeny of Affection, and force of their Wills, have Cooperated to his Grace, and so have bin Elected to Honor. And certainly, from hence alone, that our *Delection of Virtue, or Vice* (conforme to which our Minds are carried on with a kind of infranable Tendency; and

Article 7.

A third Conclusion, viz that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods praxision of mans future Good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Discretion; detected and redargued.

Article 8.

Two Extralls from the praxises; (1) that the Cooperation of mans Will to sufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cause of his Election: (2) that to render a reason, why God did not constitute All men such, as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace and so be Elect; is an impossibility to mans understanding; other then this, that such was his eternal will.

to which the Prævision of God being extended, He hath either Elected, or Reprobated) is necessarily dependent upon the *Notions*, or *Species* of things objected to our Senses, and traductively to our Cognoscent Faculty: there remains to us more then a great occasion of applauding and admiring the Modesty and judgement of the *Apostles* Exclamation, *ô Altitudo!* especially when the *Exhibition*, or Præsentation of those *Notions*, and *Species* doth depend upon that *Concatenate Series*, or sub-alternate syntax and Disposition of Causes, and Effects, which God, when He Created the World, according to the Model of his own imperferutable Wisdome, thought good to institute. And this we have judged to be a faithfull Summarie of what the *Divines* Respons to this *Circæan Charm*, or *Sophisme* of *Adrastus* containeth.

The Remnant of our Assumption, is only to contract those voluminous Discourses of *Philosophers*, which perpendicularly point at the Solution of the same most bloody and impious *Sophisme*, into a few medullary or essential. lines.

Article 9.
The former
Sophisme, (ig-
nava Ratio) in
part dissolved,
by *Plutarchs*
Distinction;
that though All
effects are com-
prehended in,
yet all are not
caused by Fate.

Plutarch (*de Fato*) as *Platos* Interpreter, insisting upon the præcited Adequation of Fate to the *Civil Law*; hopes to decide the mighty Controversy by distinguishing thus: *Tamet si omnia, qua sunt, Fato contineantur; non tamen Fato omnia fieri: ac ejusmodi esse ea, qua Contingenter, sive Liberè, ac Fortuito sunt.* That though all things, which come to pass, are contained in Fate; yet are not all things effected By Fate: and particularly those Events, which are meerly Fortuitous, and those which are effected by Arbitrary Agents. Now, according to this eminent Distinction, we may concede; that it is, indeed, comprehended in Fate, not only that Thou, being cast upon the thorny bed of Sicknaess, shalt or recover, or perish. but also that thou shalt or Consult, or Neglect the Physician: But positively deny, that therefore either thy Convalescence, or Death is Fatal, since tis *Contingent*; as also, that thy use, or neglect of the Physician, is Fatal, since tis *Arbitrary*.

Notwith-

Notwithstanding this nice and specious Distinction, we confess, there remains a *Difficulty*, and such a one as the greatest *Oedipuses* of the World may, without dishonour to their Perspicacity, despair of its satisfactory Dissolution; *viz.* How it can be, since there is some Cause, which conduceth rather to thy Convalescence, then Destruction; or, *è contrà*, rather to thy Destruction, then Convalescence; and some Cause, which induceth, or inclineth thee rather to Consult, then Neglect the Physician, or, *è contrà*, rather to Neglect, then Consult him: and since those Causes had others Antecedent to them, and those were connected to others, and those to others, &c. retrograde along the chain of Fate: How it can be, we say, that these Effects, being admitted to be Contained in Fate, may not be also admitted to be Caused by Fate. Especially, when we cannot, without passion, quarrel at his Construction, who shall tell us; that to be Contained in Fate, is as much as to be connected to the Series of Causes, and that little less, then to be Effected by Fate. To palliate, not cure the Itch of Curiosity in this particular; we ask leave, with the sublimest and most daring Contemplators of the World, to recur to that General Asylum; *Non debet Humana Sapientia supra Divinam illam gloriari, juxta quam vetamur scrupulosius inquirere, quamobrem Deus sic ordinavit.* And this the reason was of our saying, that the second opinion of Divines, to our first inspection, seemed capable of Extrication from the Labyrinth of the Fatists *Unactive Argumentation*: for our second and more profounding meditations have found it far otherwise. However, we judge it worthy our Readers Patience, here to acquaint himself with the subtle *Evasions* of some *Philosophers*; especially when He shall survey them in epitome.

Plato (in 10. *de Repub.*) sagely discoursing about the future *Infusion* of Souls into Bodies, imagineth some certain *Sortes*, or *Lots*; which *Lachesis* distributing to souls, as she pleases, thus inaugurates them: *Non vos Dæmon excipiet, sed vos Dæmonem eligetis*; your Genius shall not obtrude it self upon you,

Y. y 3

Article 10.
The insufficiency of that Distinction, to the total solution of the *Difficulty*, duely acknowledged.

Article 11.
The most promising Responses of some Philosophers, concisely presented: *viz.* of

I.

but *Plato*,

but every one shall elect his own particular Genius. And soon after, as a Comment upon his former Parable, He superaddeth thus much; *Virtus sola extra omnem servitutis noxam est; libera planè & servire nescia: quam prout quis vel honorabit, vel negliget; ita plus vel minus ex ea possidebit. Culpa omnis est penes eligentem; Deus est extra omnem culpam.* Virtue is alone superior to all servitude and compulsion, being absolutely Free, and nescious of subjection: of which every man shall possess more or less, according to his estimation, or neglect thereof. All blame is lodged on the *Electors* side: and none can be on *Gods*. In both which parabolical presentations collated, we need not the opticks of *Sphinx* to discover a lively adumbration of the Later opinion of Divines, which is yet warme in our memory; for therein appears a shadow or pale description of *Divine Prædestination*, joynd hand in hand with the future use of mans *Liberty*: and this becomes the more visible by *Virtue*, which is but the representative, or succedaneum of *Divine Grace*.

And as for the mythology of his imaginary *Sortes*, or *Lots*; *Plotinus* (*Enn. 2. lib. 3. cap. 15.*) unriddleth them to be, not only the Disposition of the Univers, at what time the Soul is immersed into the body; nor only the individual Temperament of the Body, derived by traduction from the Parents; nor only the condition of the Climate, region and place; but also All other Extraneous Influences, by which the Mind may be either Adjuvated, or Impeded, in its right Ratiocination, Judicature, Election, and Prosecution of Good, or Evil.

2.
Seneca.

Seneca (*in 2. Nat. Quest. 35.*) vindicating their Devotion, who fled to the Sanctuary of Prayers, Vowes, and Expiations, as a more certain Præservative from the Combustion of Lightning, then a Chaplet of Laurel (whose case holds no remote Analogy to theirs, who in sickness address to the Physician) hath this observable and pertinent passage. *Hoc habent commune nobiscum, quòd nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi, ac potestate Fatorum. Quedam enim à Diis immortalibus ita suspensa relicta sunt, ut in bonum vertant, si admota Diis preces fuerint, si vota suscepta. Ita non est hoc contra Fatum, sed ipsum*

ipsum quoque in Fato est. Aut futurum, inquit, est, aut non. Si futurum; etiam si non susceperis vota, fiet. Falsa est interrogatio; quia illam mediam inter ista exceptionem prateris. Futurum, inquam, hoc est, si vota suscepta fuerint. Hoc quoque necesse est, inquit, Fato comprehensum sit; aut suscipiat vota, aut non. Puta me tibi manus dare, & fateri hoc quoque Fato esse comprehensum, ut utique fiant vota; ideo fient. Fatum est, ut Hic disertus sit; sed si literas didicerit. Ab eodem fato continetur, ut literas discat; ideo discet. Hic Dives erit; sed si navigaverit. An in illo fati ordine, quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur; hoc quoque protinus fatum est, ut naviget, ideo navigabit. Idem dico tibi de Expiationibus; effugiet pericula, si expiaverit prae dictas Divinitus minas; at hoc quoque fato est, ut expiet; ideo expiabit, &c.

And Chrysippus (apud Agellium, lib. 6. cap. 2.) being pressed hard by the same ponderous Argument of the necessary Exhibition of the Species of objects of the Mind; is driven to assimilate the Mobility of the Mind to that of a *Cylindre*, or *Bowle*, which in respect to both its Gravity and Figure, is naturally indifferent either to acquiesce, or be agitated, according as it is either permitted to its own quiet, *in plano*, or deturbed from it, by an external impuls. And this upon Design, by that familiar Comparison to illustrate the Liberty of the Mind to be of such a constitution; that though it cannot but be commoved by the Species of Objects irruent through the gates of the Senses: yet nevertheless is it still in its own power to afford, or deny its assent unto them, *i. e.* or to *Elect*, or *Reject* them. Which was our only scope; in our praecedent Discourse concerning the *First Motions* of the Mind, and their *Consequences*. The words of Chrysippus are these. *Sicut (inquit) lapidem Cylindrum, si per spatia terra prona atque deruta jacias; causam quidem ei, & initium praecipitantis facis; mox tamen ille praecipit volvitur; non quia tu id jam facis; sed quoniam ita se modus ejus & forma volubilitas habet: sic ordo, & ratio Necessitatis Fati genera ipsa, & principia causarum movet; impetus vero consiliorum, mentiumque nostrarum, actionesque ipsas voluntas cujusque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur.*

4. *Aquinas.* To which we may consarciate the most plausible and promising Respons of a School-man. *Voluit Deus homines deliberare, eligere? Deliberant sine ulla vi, & eligunt per voluntatem. Et tamen hoc ipsum, quod electuri fuerunt, vidit ipse ab eterno: sed vidit, non coegit; scivit, non sanxit; prädixit, non prescripsit. Quid titubant hęc nostri Curiones? Miselli! non alius mihi locus videtur in clariori luce, nisi quod petulca mens ista identidem se scalpit, & exasperat, mala quidem scabie infecta litigandi, & differendi. Quomodo enim (inquiunt) si Deus prævividit me peccaturum, & non potest falli ista prævizio; non peccem necessariò? Certè non necessariò, pro tua mente & liberà voluntate hęc interveniente. Nempe hoc prævividit Deus, ut eo modo pecces, quo prævividit: prövividit autem ut liberè; igitur necessariò liberè peccas. Satin' hoc clarum? sed enim Deus ipse in nobis omnis motus Auctor. Communiter Auctor, fateor: sed non nisi boni Fauctor. Ad virtutem accingeris? illo sciente & excitante fit. Ad vitium? sciente, sinente, & sapienter moderante in bonum finem.*

Article 12.
These acute Responses equitably audited, & their import found to be no more then this; that man hath a Freedom of Assent, but not of Dissent to the will of God.

But alas! All this is Aer: and Curiosity is no Chamæleon. For though we extend these ductile *Distinctions* to the extreme of their capacity, and rack their importance with all the nerves of the strongest reason: yet will they at length be found so far short of attaining so much as to the outside of the remote Myserie, as Impossibility is beyond Difficulty, Infinite beyond Finite, Omniscience beyond Nescience; in a word, as the inscrutable Counsels of Divinity are above the comprehension of narrow, crass, and frail Humanity. Had they sayd no more then He, who being assaulted with the same consternating Scruple, returned in short; *Fata volentem ducunt, Nolentem trahunt*: they had contracted (but increased the weight of) their Speculations. For that rich and emphatick Sentence comprehends the substance of all their larger Evasions; and yet for all that the summe thereof ariseth to no more then this: Though man hath a power of *Non-resistance*, yet he hath no power of *Resistance*; i. e. though man hath such a Liberty, that he may be drawn *Not-unwillingly*, yet not such as that he may not be drawn

drawn *Unwillingly*; or, more plainly, that man hath a *Freedom of Assent*, but not of *Dissent*; for who hath resisted the *Will of God*?

Nor could it have proved any *Disparagement*, but contrary-wise, the highest *Honour*, to which the circumscribed Intellectuals of dark Mortality have any reason to aspire, here to have confessed a *Ne ultra*, and humbly acquiesced in a becoming despair of other satisfaction then this: *Deus, ab aeterno, Fati syntaxin, causarumve naturalium seriem subalternatim sic ordinavit, & sanxit; quia sic ordinavit & sanxit, i. e. quia imperscrutabili ejus sapientie sic visum est.* When the Wit of man, wanting the Ballast of Piety, bears too much sail, it cannot escape overfetting: especially when it adventures upon the immens, vertiginous, and bottomless ocean of Providence Divine; where All that is discoverable, is darkness and horror. What greater Prudence did the great *Plato* ever shew, which might consecrate his Memory to the venerable esteem of inferior Ages, then that in his introduction of *Socrates*, preparing his Auditors, when He was to dispute about some things which concerned the Attributes of the Divine Nature, with this excellent Allay, or suppressive of immoderate scrutiny in such reserved mysteries: *Aequum est, nos meminisse, & me qui disseram, & vos qui judicabitis, Homines esse*; meet it is for us to remember, that both I who am to discourse, and you who are to judge, are but *Men*. The *Arcana* of Gods Decrees are like the meridian Sun; on which the more we gaze, the less we perceive: and all we can gain by our audacious inspection, will be only *Blindness* and too late *Repentance*. When the most Learned and Acute, whose monuments of Perspicacity are the most refulgent Gemms in the embroidered coate of Fame, have found their Disquisitions terminated in the sensible Mellifce of Bees, the contexture of Spiders, the spinstry of Silkworms (not to advance to those Giant Problems of the reciprocal Afflux and Reflux of the Sea; the sensible torrent of the Aer from West to East under the Tropicks; the Cause of Earthquaks; the motions and distances of Celestial or Quintessential bodies; the Circumference and

Z z

Diametre

Article 13.
A *Dehortation* from immoderate Curiosity, in Divine Mysteries: and concise *Adhortation* to conform unto, and calmly acquiesce in the *Revealed will* of God.

Diametre of the Globe Terraqueous, and its Libration or suspension upon Nothing; the verticity and Alliciency of the Loadstone; the nature of the Soul, &c.) we say, when the most Eagle-eyed Indagators have found themselves discouraged, and at a loss in these minute Mechanicks of *Nature*: what a distracted Insolency is it for us to Attach those infinitely more inexorable Abstrusities of the Divine Præordination, which are too intense for the stronger Opticks of Cherubins? What did grave and modest Antiquity design, by their erecting of the statue of that Monster, *Sphinx*, over the doores of their Temples? only this; by the commination of imminent Destruction, to deter the Curious from prying into the reclusè and abscondite *Sanctum Sanctorum* of the *Deity*. This the profound *Euclid* more then glanced at, when, being interrogated by some Philopragmonist (who hoped to confound the Mathematicks with the Metaphysicks) concerning the Nature and Politie of the Gods, He made this incomparable answer: *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ ἔσδα, τὰς μὲν φιλοπράγμονας ὅτι μυσῶσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἔσδα*; as for other things concerning the Gods, I know nought, but this I know full well, that they detest and abominate the profanely Curious. And this that reverend *Father* also reflected on, when He sayd; *Ut multò faciliùs invenit syderum Conditorum humilis Pietas, quàm syderum ordinem superba Curiositas; ita firma stabilique fide sciamus omne Dei judicium justum esse, & ubi investigare non poteris quare ita judicaret, sufficet scire quis judicaret.* Since therefore it is impossible for us to make our selves privy to the *Concealed Will* of our Creator; all that remains on our part, is to endeavour, with all humility and serenity, to conforme and cooperate to his *Revealed*: assuring our selves, that He, who is *All Wisdome* and *Goodness*, can will nothing but what is Good; nay infinitely better for us, then what our imperfect and deceptible understanding can instruct our Will to desire for our selves. This was the noblest resolve of the noble *Epictetus*. *Semper magis volo, quod Deus vult, quàm quod Ego: adjungar illi, velut minister & assecla; cum illo appeto, cum illo desidero, & quod Deus vult, volo.* And in truch, this is the

the only true Halcyon, that can calme all the distracting tempests of our Cares; the imperturbed Haven, wherein the Weather-beaten vessels of our Minds may safely Anchor, and bid defiance to all the impetuous Gusts of Adversity, and Temptations; the Magisterial Elixir of all *virtue*, and so of all real *Delight*; nay, Heaven anticipated; and the Term wherein both my *Cogitations* and *Pen* shall acquiesce.


*All Glory be to God on high, on earth Peace, and
Good Will towards men.*


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
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
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