

**The Vedanta Siddhantamuktāvali / with English translation and notes by
Arthur Venis.**

Contributors

Prakāśānanda, active 16th century.
Venis, Arthur.

Publication/Creation

Benares : E.J. Lazarus and co., 1898.

Persistent URL

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REPRINT FROM THE PANDIT.

THE
VEDĀNTA
SIDDHĀNTAMUKTĀVALĪ
OF
PRAKĀŚĀNANDA,

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

ARTHUR VENIS, M. A. BALLIOL COLLEGE,
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AT THE MEDICAL HALL PRESS.

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
[मूल्यम् १॥]

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


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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली

प्रकाशानन्दविरचिता ।

१ अदृष्टद्वयमानन्दमात्मानं ज्योतिरव्ययम् ।

विनिश्चित्य श्रुतेः साक्षाद्युक्तिस्तत्राऽभिधीयते ॥ १ ॥

तत्रादौ मङ्गलं तत्त्वाऽनुस्मरणरूपं सूचयन्नभिधेयप्रयोजने
साक्षात्प्रतिपाद्य कर्तव्यं प्रतिजानीते अदृष्टेत्यादिना । आत्मानमुक्त-
विशेषणचतुष्टयविशिष्टं श्रुतितोऽपरोक्षीकृत्य तत्रोक्तविशेषणचतुष्टयवि-
शिष्ट आत्मनि युक्तिः श्रुत्यनुयाहकस्तर्काऽभिधीयते इत्यन्वयः ।

२ नन्वात्मसाक्षात्कारे श्रुत्यपेक्षैव नास्ति देहादेरेवात्मत्वात्
तस्य च लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वादिति चेत् न ।

1. Having first gained through Veda a true intuition of that Self, which has no second self and which is bliss and light and is imperishable, we next expound the method of reasoning in regard to that Self....I.

In the opening words 'which has no second self, &c.' the author implies a benediction recalling to mind the Reality (Brahman); and having directly shown the subject matter of his work (*i. e.* ratiocination in regard to the Self) and its aim (*i. e.* the attainment of Bliss which is Brahman) he premises his task. The grammatical construction is as follows: Having gained through Veda an intuition of the Self with its four above mentioned characteristics, reasoning, *i. e.* ratiocination which is confirmatory of Veda, is now expounded in regard to it, *tatra*, *i. e.* the Self as characterised in the aforesaid manner.

2. It may be objected that Veda is certainly not necessary
Heretical objection : Veda is super- to bring about an intuition of the
fluous. Self; for the body and the sense-
organs (*ādi*) are the Self, and the existence of this Self is

आत्मा नित्योऽथवाऽनित्यो भेदस्त्वादो स्फुटो मतः ।

अन्त्ये कृतस्य हानिः स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ॥ २ ॥

आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् । जगद्वैचित्र्यस्याऽदृष्टहेतुकत्वात्
अन्यथा वैचित्र्यानुपपत्तेः दृष्टस्य क्षणविनाशित्वात् अदृष्टस्य च पूर्व-
जन्मसम्बन्धित्वेन तदाश्रयस्यात्मनोऽनादित्वादनादिभावस्य च
नित्यत्वनियमात् अन्यथा कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् देहादेश्च
विकारजातस्याऽनित्यत्वकृतकत्वरूपवत्वजडत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वादिभिर-
नात्मत्वनिश्चयात् तस्य च नित्यस्यात्मनोऽविनाशी वा अरेऽयमा-
त्माऽनुच्छित्तिधर्मेत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धस्यापरोक्षीकरणे द्वारान्तराभावाद-

proved by ordinary sense-perception and inference (*ādi*). This objection is rejected :—

The Self is either eternal or non-eternal. If eternal, then

Reply thereto : Self is neither body nor sense-organs, for it is eternal : It is eternal, because the inequalities of the present life demand an eternal Self : Revelation alone can make known the Eternal Self.

the difference (between the Self and the body) is clear (for no one believes the body to be eternal).

If non-eternal, then what the individual had done in a former life would be lost, and further the consequences of actions which he had never performed, would accrue to him (in the present life).

...II.

(It is rejected) because the Self is eternal. For the diversities of the present world must have their source in the *unseen* retributive power of actions (*adṛiṣṭa*),—these diversities being inexplicable on any other assumption, since that which is seen is transitory—and since the *unseen* power links on to prior stages of existence, the Self as the locus of this *unseen* power must be beginning-less and also end-less, in accordance with the established induction that a positively existing thing can have no end, if it had no beginning.

स्त्येव श्रुत्यपेक्षा इत्यभिप्रेत्योक्तमव्ययमिति । न विद्यते व्ययो
 षनाशो धर्मतः स्वरूपतोऽव्ययवतो वा यस्य स तथा । निरव्यय-
 निर्दुर्मकः कूटस्थनित्यः परिपूर्ण इत्यर्थः ।

३ नन्वात्मनि प्रमाणमस्ति न वा । न चेतस्याऽसत्त्वापत्तिः
 न हि प्रमाणविरहिणो नरशृङ्गादेः सत्त्वं पश्यामः । आद्ये तत्किं
 लौकिकं वेदो वा । नाद्यः तस्य निर्दुर्मकत्वात् इन्द्रियाणां च रूपा-
 दिमत्परागवस्तुविषयत्वेन तद्व्याप्राहेतोरनिश्चयेनानुमानाविषयत्वात्

If the Self were not eternal (anyathā) it would follow that the retributive power of actions could not be realised and that the results of certain actions would accrue to an individual who had not done those actions. And it is certain that the body and the sense-organs (ādi), which are an aggregate of products, are not the Self; for they are non-eternal, are products and possessed of form, are non-intelligent and limited, &c. And that Veda is necessary follows from the fact that no other means exists for the intuition of that eternal Self which is established in such passages as 'Verily that Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature.' With this view the word imperishable, avyayam, was used (of the Self in our opening verse)—that is imperishable of which no vyaya, destruction is known as regards either attributes or essential nature or parts, which means that the Self has neither parts nor attributes, being eternally unchanged and infinite.

3. An objection is brought forward in the form of a question :

Objection : No evidence, natural or supernatural, for the Self. Is there any evidence for the Self or not? If not, then it fol-

lows that the Self does not exist, for we are not conscious of the existence of the horns of a man or like imaginary objects, to which no source of evidence is applicable. If any evidence exists, is it sensible or supersensible (sc. Veda)? Not sensible. For the Self (as declared above) is without attributes (and only that which

प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वेन लौकिकवाक्याऽविषयत्वात् तदन्यविषयत्वस्य सम्भावयितुमशक्यत्वात् । द्वितीयेपि वेदजन्यज्ञानभास्यत्वं वा प्रकारान्तरेण भासमानस्य वैदिकज्ञाननिवर्त्याऽज्ञानविषयत्वं वा । आद्ये वेदजन्यज्ञानभास्यत्वेन घटादिवज्जडत्वादनात्मत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये किं तत्प्रकारान्तरं स्वयं मानान्तरं वा । चरमे दोषस्योक्तत्वाद् आद्यः परिशिष्यते तच्च न सम्भवति स्वयंप्रकाशमानस्याज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि स्वयंप्रकाशमानस्वरूपे मध्यन्दिनवर्तितन्यादित्ये तमः सम्भावयितुमपि शक्यम् ।

possesses attributes can be known through the senses). And since the sense-organs can make known only external objects possessing form &c., there is no means of gaining a perceptive knowledge of the logical reason* (middle term) as being invariably attended by the Self (or major term here), and (in the absence of this knowledge, the induction or universal major premise of the syllogism cannot be formed), therefore the Self cannot be proved through a process of inference. Nor can the Self be known through what is technically termed **verbal evidence*, since it is not an object of perception or inference; nor possibly even through the other sources of knowledge (technically termed **presumptive evidence* and evidence from **non-perception of an object*; for both these are, in the first instance, dependent on sense-perception which, as shown above, is inapplicable to the Self).

Secondly, if the evidence is supersensible, it may be asked, Is the Self made known (lit. illumined) by the knowledge gained through Veda; or, while shining forth through some other means, is it made an object of (*i. e.* invested by) Nescience, which is destroyed by knowledge gained through Veda? On the first alternative it follows that the Self loses its self-hood (*sc.* character of Brahman, Intelligence), for it must be unintelligent, like earthen

* cf. Vedāntaparibhāṣā: Pandit Journal. New Series: Vol. v. 620 et seq: vi. 91. vii. 313, 318.

४ अथ केचिद्वन्धमोक्षादिव्यवस्थामाश्रित्य श्रुतिसिद्धमप्यद्वैतं
सङ्कोचयन्त आत्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वमसहमानाः प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते ।

जीवाश्रया ब्रह्मपदा ह्यविद्या तत्त्वविन्मता ।

तद्विरुद्धमिदं वाक्यमात्मा त्वज्ञानगोचरः ॥ ३ ॥

नन्वात्मशब्देन जीवः कथ्यते स चाऽज्ञानस्याश्रयो न तु
विषयः विषयत्वं तु ब्रह्मण एव । स च जीवोऽनेकोऽन्यथा व्यव-
स्थानुपपत्तिः । यस्य तु श्रवणाद्यभ्यासपाटवेन ब्रह्मात्मावबोधस्तस्य

pots &c., (which require illumination by Brahman before they can become objects for our consciousness), in that it has to be illumined by the knowledge gained through Veda. Adopting the other alternative, what are the other means? Does the Self know itself? Or is it known through some other evidence? The faultiness of the latter assumption having been exposed above, the former remains to be dealt with and is inadmissible: for a self-luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescience, no more than it is possible to think of darkness as existing in the self-luminous sun at noon.

4. Against this, some thinkers, keeping in view the demands

Met by a Vedantin of the not thorough type, who replies that the above argument does not apply, because it is Brahman and not the Self or jīva (personal sentiency) that is invested by Nescience. The jīvas are many and distinct from Brahman. Nescience also is a plurality.

of bondage and emancipation, narrow Vedantic monism (by teaching that Brahman and jīva or personal sentiency are distinct, and that there is a plurality of jīvas), and not tolerating the opinion that the Self (or jīva) is an object for i. e. is invested by Nescience, urge the following:—

Knowers of the truth maintain that Nescience has jīva as its locus and Brahman as its object. Opposed to this is the declaration that the Self (jīva) is an object for Nescience...III.

Certainly jīva is intended by the word Self. It is the locus of Nescience. And the jīvas are many, otherwise the transmigratory order of things could not be accounted for. Thus, he who has attained the knowledge that his Self is Brahman, through

मोक्षस्तदितरस्य बन्ध इति । अत एवाज्ञानान्यनेकानि कल्पन्ते । अन्यथाऽज्ञानस्यैकत्वं एकज्ञानेनाऽज्ञानतत्कार्यस्य कृत्स्नस्य निवृत्तौ प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धस्य जगतोऽननुभवप्रसङ्गः । न चेतावता कालेन कस्यापि ज्ञानं न जातमिति साम्प्रतं प्राचीनानां सम्यक् साङ्गोपाङ्गसाधनानुष्ठातृणां व्यासवसिष्ठादीनामपि ज्ञानानुत्पत्ताविदानींतनानां ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः सम्भावयितुमप्यशक्यत्वेन अवगाद्यप्रवृत्तावनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् ।

५ ननु व्यवस्थानुरोधेनाऽज्ञानभेदकल्पनावत् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानुरोधेन सत्यमेव द्वैतं किं न स्यादिति चेत् तत्र वक्तव्यम् ।

proficient practice in the means prescribed in the Veda termed **hearing, pondering and deep meditation*, is emancipated ; and he who is without this knowledge is in the bondage of the transigratory world.

For the same reason Nescience also must be conceived of as a plurality. For if Nescience were a unity, then as soon as one single soul had gained the knowledge (described above) there would be an end to Nescience and all its products, whence it would follow that the world whose existence is given in perception &c. would no longer be an object of consciousness (to other souls). Nor can it be justly argued that up to the present time no one has gained such knowledge. For if such knowledge was not attained by ancient sages like Vyāsa and Vasishṭha, who practised all the means, principal and subordinate, for its attainment, its realisation by men of the present day cannot be imagined even to be possible ; hence the latter would not turn to 'hearing' and the other prescribed means, and it would therefore follow that for them there could be no emancipation.

5. Here a question may be asked :—Why should not the

Why not hold the world to be real as given in experience ? dual order of things be considered real, in accordance with the

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां प्रमात्वं परतो यदि ।

अनवस्था स्फुटा तत्र स्वतस्त्वे दोषसंशयः ॥ ४ ॥

किमिदं प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारसमर्थार्थविषयत्वं वा सर्वथाऽबाधितार्थविषयत्वं वा । आद्ये कल्पितार्थत्वेनाप्यविरोधः । अन्त्ये तत्किं स्वतः परतो वा । नाद्यः प्रत्यक्षादेः सम्भावितदोषत्वेन स्वप्रामाण्यं प्रति दोषाऽभावग्राहकप्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षत्वेन स्वतस्त्वाभावात् । नापरः गृहीतप्रामाण्यस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चायकत्वेऽनवस्थानात् । अगृहीतप्रामाण्यस्य तथात्वे प्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्य वैयर्थ्यात्

data of perception and the other sources of knowledge, just as Nescience was assumed above to be a plurality to accord with the transmigratory order of the world? The reply is as follows:—

If the trustworthiness of perception and the other sources of

Because experience cannot vouch for its own truth : nor is there any voucher for it : Besides Revelation declares the unreality of the world.

knowledge is proved by some further evidence, then clearly a *regressus in infinitum* results. If

the trustworthiness is self-proved, it is vitiated by the doubt that (often) arises with regard to the knowledge supplied by perception &c. — IV.

What is this trustworthiness of perception &c. ? Does it consist in the things known being such as admit of practical treatment in daily life ; or such as can never be proved unreal ? If the former, there is no opposition between your view and our own in that (we hold) then the objects of perception &c. to be falsely surmised (unreal) objects.

If the latter, then it may be asked,—Is this trustworthiness self-proved or proved through some further evidence ? Not self-proved, for perception, inference &c. being liable to error demand in support of their trustworthiness, some further evidence which shall testify to their freedom from defect. Nor does their trustworthiness depend on any further evidence ; for a *regressus in infinitum* results, if the voucher for the trustworthiness of the first cognition is a second whose trustworthiness has been vouched

प्रथमेनैव विषयनिश्चयात् । किंच नेह नानास्ति किंचन मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यादिति च प्रतिपन्नापाद्यै* निषिद्ध्यमानत्वमायाप्रकृतित्वाभ्यां कृत्स्नस्य जगतो मिथ्यात्वप्रदर्शनेन तद्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षादेर-
प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुत्यैव दर्शितत्वात् । तस्माद्भवस्थानुरोधेन इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते इति मायाभिरिति बहुवचनानुरोधेन च जीवाश्रयाणि ब्रह्मविषयाण्यनेकान्यन्नानानीति तत्कथमात्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वं विकल्पितमिति सङ्केपः ।

for (by a third cognition). And if the voucher of the first cognition is one whose trustworthiness is itself unvouched for, then the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of the first cognition is a useless proceeding; for certitude as to the object may as well be gained solely through the first cognition.

Moreover, by the declaration of the unreality of the whole

Bṛihad : Up : IV. 4—19.

world, in such passages as 'There is in it (Brahman) no diversity' and 'know that the material cause of the world is Māyā'—

Śvetāś : Up : IV. 10.

(in the first passage) by means of the negation (of duality) with regard to (Brahman, which is) the substrate of the erroneously surmised (world), and (in the second passage) by means of the qualification that the material cause of the world is Māyā (unreal) —Śruti also declares the untrustworthiness of perception, inference &c. which make known the world.

Hence out of a regard both for the transmigratory order of things and for the plural form of the word Māyā in the text,

Rig Veda, IV. 47, 18.

'Indra of many forms goes along by his magic powers,' it must be

maintained that Nescience is a plurality, residing in the jīvas and investing Brahman. The Self or jīva cannot therefore be supposed to be an object for i. e. invested by Nescience. This is a summary of the views (of § 4).

* A Vedantic technicality, usually explained by प्रतिपन्नस्य आरोपितस्य जगत उपाधिरधिष्ठानं ब्रह्म ।

६ अत्र वदन्ति

जीवब्रह्मप्रयोगाभ्यामेकं वस्त्वथवा द्वयम् ।

आद्ये त्विष्टं ममैव स्यात् द्वितीये त्वन्मतक्षतिः ॥ ५ ॥

जीवब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यामात्मैवोच्यते उत जीवशब्देनात्मा ब्रह्म-
शब्देन तु तदन्यदिति । आद्ये कथमात्मनो नाऽज्ञानविषयत्वं
ब्रह्मशब्देनापि तस्यैवाभिधानात् । ननु आत्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वे कथं
तस्य भानं तमसाऽऽवृतत्वात् न ह्यन्यकारावृत्तो घटो दृश्यते इति
चेत् न अद्वयानन्दरूपेणैव तस्याऽज्ञानविषयत्वात् चैतन्यमात्रस्यैव
भासमानत्वात् तस्य चाऽज्ञानाऽविषयत्वात् अन्यथाऽज्ञानस्याप्यसि-
द्धापत्तेः । अद्वयानन्दस्वरूपं चैतन्यमात्रादभिन्नमेवेति चेत् ।

6. With regard to the above views some may ask.—

Do the words jīva and Brahman denote one substance or two?

The Vedāntin of § 4 is refuted by an opponent who adopts for the time being the rigorous Vedānta of our author, (a) jīva and Brahman are really one and the same though falsely imagined through Nescience to be distinct.

One, you say? To this I agree. Two substances? Then your te-
net (of Monism, sc. Brahman is the sole substance) is invalidat-
ed...V.

Is only the Self denoted by both words jīva and Brahman? Or does the word jīva denote the Self, and the word Brahman denote something else? If both words denote the Self, how can the Self not be an object for Nescience? For by the word Brahman (you say) the Self is intended (and Brahman you hold to be an object for Nescience, cf. v. 3). Against this you may argue that if the Self were an object for Nescience, it could not *shine forth* as being involved in darkness (Nescience), just as an earthen pot, involved in darkness, is not visible. Not so. For only in its character of the sole Reality and supreme Bliss is the Self an object for Nescience, since it is only to the Self as Intelligence that the character of *shining forth* belongs. And the Self as Intelligence cannot be an object for Nescience, for if this were possible, the existence of Nescience could not be proved (for, if Nescience involved the Self, there would be no witness of Nesci-

सत्यम् । वस्तुतस्तथैव । कथं तर्ह्यज्ञानविषयत्वव्यवस्थेति चेत्
अनादिसिद्धाज्ञानसम्बन्धात् । स्वयंप्रकाशपरिपूर्णानन्दस्वरूपेण भास-
मानेप्यात्मनि मिथ्यैव भेदं परिकल्प्याद्वयानन्दस्वरूपस्य विषयत्वा-
भिधानम् चैतन्यमात्रमेव भासते नानन्दस्वरूपमिति भ्रान्तप्रतीत्य-
नुरोधात् । कथमस्याः प्रतीतेर्भ्रान्तत्वमिति चेत् परमप्रेमास्पदस्या-
त्मन आनन्दस्वरूपेणैव भासमानत्वादिति वदामः । तथापि पर-
मार्थतोऽज्ञानस्य विषयाश्रययोर्भेदो न निरूपित इति चेत् । सत्यम् ।

अविद्या स्वाश्रयाभिन्नविषया स्यात्तमो यतः ।

यथा बाह्यं तमो दृष्टं तथा चेयं ततस्तथा ॥ ६ ॥

ence). Again, you may urge that the Self, as the sole Reality and as supreme Bliss, is identical with Intelligence. This is quite true from the standpoint of absolute truth. How then, it may be asked, is the being an object for Nescience fixed on the Self as the one Reality and supreme Bliss? Through an eternally established connexion of Nescience (with the Self). Although, in reality, the Self shines forth as self-luminous, absolute and blissful, a differentiation of it into parts is falsely imagined through Nescience; hence the Self in its character of the one Reality and supreme Bliss is said to be an object for Nescience. It is due to this false knowledge that the Self is said to shine forth in its character of Intelligence only, and not in its character of Bliss. But why, you ask, is this knowledge said to be false? Because the Self, in this very character of Bliss, does shine forth as the object of our highest love.* You urge, however, that the difference between the locus and object of Nescience was not declared by us to be absolutely real (—which we ought to have done, for Nescience being a power, śakti, demands that its locus and object should be absolutely distinct). True, we did not set forth the difference as absolutely real; for

The locus and object of Nescience are identical. For Nescience

As darkness resides within a house and pervades it, so Nescience resides in and pervades Brahman.

is a kind of darkness, and is known as the external darkness is. Hence, as in the case of external darkness, its locus and object are identical...VI.

* As shown in our desire to live, cf. Panchadaśī I, 8.

तस्य तमःशब्दवाच्यस्य तदनपेक्षत्वात् । न हि गृहोदर-
वर्ति तमः स्वाश्रयगृहान्तर्वर्तिदेशं न विषयीकरोति येन तदति-
रिक्तमपेक्षेत । अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि । किञ्च

ब्रह्मात्मनोर्विभिन्नत्वे भेदः स्वाभाविको यदि ।

औपाधिकोऽथवा भेदः सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तिकः ॥ ७ ॥

ब्रह्मात्मनोः स्वाभाविको भेदः औपाधिको वा । आद्ये
आत्मभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणो जडत्वापत्तिः । तथा च विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्र-
ह्मेति श्रुतिव्याकोपः ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तिश्च । आत्मनश्च

For the thing denoted by the word darkness does not require that its locus and object should be different. For darkness within a house makes an object of the space within the house, while this space is itself the locus of the darkness ; so that no space other than that within the house need be sought for as the object of the darkness. Hence too (*i. e.* since locus and object of Nescience are identical) the other alternative, viz., that the words *jīva* and *Brahman* denote two different substances, is inadmissible. Moreover,

If *Brahman* and the Self (*jīva*) are distinct, their differ-

(*b*) The distinction into *jīva* (Self) and *Brahman* wholly unwarranted :
ence must be either natural (*sc.* constituted by the nature of each) or due to external limitations. In either case the difference is altogether incapable of proof...VII.

If the difference is *natural*, it follows that *Brahman* as

The distinction not determined from within, for then *Brahma*-hood and Self-hood would be at an end :
being different from Self is un-
intelligent (for Self is intelligent).
And if this is so, the Śruti passage,

‘*Brahman* is Intelligence, Bliss’ is contradicted. And if un-
intelligent, *Brahman* cannot be the object of Nescience (as held in § 4. ; for whatever is unintelligent is Nescience, and to assume that Nescience invests itself is idle) ; and, further, it would follow that the Self, as being different from *Brahman*, would lose its self-hood (*sc.* its absolute, pervasive self-presentative character) to become like earthen pots &c.

ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वे घटादिवदनात्मत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीयेऽप्युपाधिजन्यत्वं ज्ञेयत्वं तन्त्रत्वं वा औपाधिकत्वम् । जीवब्रह्मभेदस्य उपाधिरप्यज्ञानमेव वक्तव्यम् अज्ञानकार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वेन जीवब्रह्मविभागानुपाधिकत्वात् । तच्च नाद्यः भेदोत्पत्तेः पूर्वमेव केवले आत्मन्यज्ञानसिद्धेर्भेदानपेक्षणात् स्वतन्त्राऽज्ञानानङ्गीकारात् । न द्वितीयः अज्ञानस्य जडत्वेन भासकत्वानुपपत्तेः । नापि तृतीयः । तन्त्रत्वं

On the other alternative that the difference between jīva and Brahman is due to external limitation, it may be asked,

Nor determined from without: for Nescience, the only possible external determinant in this case, can be neither cause, actual or logical, of the distinction, nor subject in which the distinction should inhere as attribute.

Does this limitation consist in the difference being an effect produced by the limiting condition as its cause, or in the difference being made known through the limiting condition, or is it some other kind of dependence on the limiting condition?

It must be premised that Nescience is the only limiting condition possible with regard to the difference between jīva and Brahman: for the products of Nescience (sc. mind, sense-organs &c.), as being temporary, cannot be the conditions determining the difference between jīva and Brahman (—a difference which in the Vedānta is held to be eternal *ab ante*, *anādi*—). To consider these alternatives. The first is inadmissible, viz., Nescience as the limiting condition is the cause of the difference, sc. the effect. For, since Nescience has been proved to have existed in the undifferentiated Self even before the difference between jīva and Brahman was brought about, the differentiation is unnecessary (—the Vedāntin of § 4 distinguished between jīva and Brahman in order to provide Nescience with locus and object; but the identity of the latter is proved in *v. 6 et seq.*—). And Nescience cannot be admitted as an independent entity (sc. it must have a locus somewhere and embrace some object: hence the assumption of a differentiation into jīva and Brahman effected through Nescience is unnecessary). Nor is the second alternative admissible: for Nescience, the limiting condition, being itself unintelligent,

the difference being made known through the limiting condition, or is it some other kind of dependence on the limiting condition? It must be premised that Nescience is the only limiting condition possible with regard to the difference between jīva and Brahman: for the products of Nescience (sc. mind, sense-organs &c.), as being temporary, cannot be the conditions determining the difference between jīva and Brahman (—a difference which in the Vedānta is held to be eternal *ab ante*, *anādi*—). To consider these alternatives. The first is inadmissible, viz., Nescience as the limiting condition is the cause of the difference, sc. the effect. For, since Nescience has been proved to have existed in the undifferentiated Self even before the difference between jīva and Brahman was brought about, the differentiation is unnecessary (—the Vedāntin of § 4 distinguished between jīva and Brahman in order to provide Nescience with locus and object; but the identity of the latter is proved in *v. 6 et seq.*—). And Nescience cannot be admitted as an independent entity (sc. it must have a locus somewhere and embrace some object: hence the assumption of a differentiation into jīva and Brahman effected through Nescience is unnecessary). Nor is the second alternative admissible: for Nescience, the limiting condition, being itself unintelligent,

हि विधा दृष्टं लोके जन्यत्वेन आश्रितत्वेन भास्यत्वेन च ।
तत्र अन्यतमस्यापि प्रकारस्याऽज्ञाननिरूपितस्य प्रकृतेऽसम्भवात्
तन्त्रत्वानुपपत्तिः । न चाऽज्ञानात्मसम्बन्धवत् अज्ञानतन्त्रत्वं
ब्रह्मात्मभेदस्येति वाच्यं सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धितन्त्रत्वनियमात्
भेदस्य च तथात्वाभावात् । तस्माज्जीवब्रह्मविभागशून्यमात्मान-
माश्रित्य तमेव विषयीकरोतीत्यज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः सिद्धम् ।
तदुक्तम् । आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचित्तिरेव केवला ।
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचरः ॥

can make known (lit. *illumine*) nothing. Nor is the third ad-
missible. For the kinds of dependence commonly recognised
are three, viz, the procession of an effect from a cause; the attach-
ment of an attribute to a substrate; the cognitional relation
between something made known and that which makes it known.
And since, in the present case, neither of these kinds of depend-
ence is possible with regard to Nescience, dependence on a limiting
condition cannot constitute the difference between * jīva and
Brahman. Nor can it be urged that the difference between jīva
and Brahman is dependence on Nescience, like the relation which
exists between Nescience and the Self,* jīva, (sc. a relation not

* Both causal and cognitional relation having been shown to be inapplicable to
Nescience, the attributive relation remains to be disposed of. Thus : difference
(bheda) is negation (abhāva) : every negation has as its counter-entity (pratiyogi)
that which is negated, and resides in a locus (anuyogi: अनुयोगि in the sense of
locus used also in such a case as घटवद्भूतलम्, where भूतल is अनुयोगि also used
in sense of विशेष्य) other than the pratiyogi: thus, the judgment, "jīva and Brah-
man are different" may be otherwise expressed by 'the negation of jīva resides in
Brahman and has jīva as its counter-entity'—जीवप्रतियोगिको ब्रह्मनिष्ठो भेदो
ब्रह्मणि वर्तते—and, *vice versa*, by 'the negation of Brahman resides in jīva and
has Brahman as its counter-entity'—ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिको जीवनिष्ठो भेदो जीवे वर्तते—
Thus, the locus (anuyogi) of this difference is either jīva or Brahman, and not
ajñāna. But ajñāna may yet be a locus for this difference between jīva and Brah-
man—an opponent is supposed to argue,—if bheda be regarded as relation (sam-
bandha) in the technical sense of something apart from, and linking on to, the
things related (sambandhi): thus the difference between jīva and Brahman might
be conceived of as a sambandha existing not only between these but also between
these and ajñāna, and thus finding a locus in ajñāna. The text replies, difference
(negation) is not the technical relation—भेदस्य च तथात्वाभावात्—sc. the negation
of jīva does not reside in jīva itself, which ought to be the case if bheda were the
technical sambandha.

० तथापि तदज्ञानमेकमनेकं वेति कथं निर्णय इति चेत् एकमेवेति वदामः । किं तत्र साधकमिति चेत् । उच्यते ।

लौकिकी वैदिकी चापि नाऽज्ञाने दृश्यते प्रमा ।

कार्यदृष्ट्याथ कल्प्यं चेन्नाद्यवादेकमेव तत् ॥ ८ ॥

अज्ञानं किं वेदसिद्धमुत लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धमुत परि-
दृश्यमानकार्यान्वयानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यम् ।

only between Brahman and jīva but also between these and Nescience). For with regard to relation the restrictive rule is that relation is dependence on the things related; and *difference* is not *relation* (in the technical sense of *sambandha* or a link that joins on to two things, while it is itself different from them). Hence Nescience takes as its locus the Self, which is free from differentiation into jīva and Brahman, and makes the Self its object. Thus the Self has been proved to be an object for Nescience. This conclusion has been declared thus:—‘Undifferenced, absolute Intelligence is the locus and object of Nescience. For

Samkshepasāriraka, I, 319. Pandit, that which follows from previously existing Nescience (sc. jīva and

Īśvara) is neither locus nor object of Nescience.’

7. Nevertheless, it may be asked (by the Vedantin of § 4),

(c) Nescience, for whose existence only presumptive evidence is found, must be a unity, in accordance with the law of parsimony.

what proof is there of Nescience being a unity or a plurality? It is a unity, we say. What proof of this, (he asks)? We reply:—

Of the reality of Nescience there is no evidence, revealed or human. If Nescience is to be assumed as the cause of certain visible effects (sc. this world), then, in accordance with the law of parsimony, Nescience must be a unity and not a plurality...VIII.

Is Nescience proved by Veda; or by perception &c., sc. inference and human testimony; or is it assumed to account for the world of experience, which cannot otherwise be accounted for?

तत्र नाद्यः पूर्वकाण्डस्य कर्ममात्रविषयत्वात् वेदान्तानां च परिपूर्णसच्चिदानन्दब्रह्ममात्रविषयत्वात् तत्रैव फलसम्बन्धात् अज्ञानादौ तदभावात्तदप्रतिपादकत्वात् । नापि द्वितीयः स्पष्टप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वे विवादाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्स्वतोऽसङ्गोदासीनस्य सदा स्वानन्दतृप्त्याऽसत्यानेकविधसुखदुःखाद्यात्मकप्रपञ्चरचनानुपपत्त्याऽज्ञानं कल्प्यत इत्येष वाच्यं गत्यन्तराऽभावात् । तथा च कल्प्यमानमज्ञानमेकमनेकं वेति विवादे एकस्यापि निद्रादोषस्यानेकविधकार्यजनकत्वस्य स्वप्ने दृष्टत्वाल्लाघवसहकृतान्यथानुपपत्तिर्विचित्रशक्तिकमेकज्ञानमादाय विश्राम्यतीति युक्तम् ।

Not by Veda. For the earlier portion of the Veda (karma-kāṇḍa) is devoted to ritual, and the later portion (Vedānta proper) expounds only Brahman, the Absolute, Existence, Intelligence, Bliss; since in this declaration of Brahman as the only Real, the intended result of the Veda (sc. cessation of pain and attainment of absolute Bliss) is secured. And since this result would not follow in the case of Nescience and its products being declared real, the Veda does not set these forth.

Nor by perception, inference or human testimony. For if by any of these Nescience were clearly proved, controversy would be at an end. And since there is no evidence for Nescience, it must needs be granted that Nescience is *assumed* to account for the otherwise inexplicable production of an unreal world, a complex of joys and pains, by the unrelated, passive, ever blessed and satisfied Being. For there is no other course apart from this assumption of Nescience. Accordingly, in the debate as to whether this assumed Nescience is a unity or a plurality, the just conclusion is that, as in the case of dreams, the defective nature of sleep, which is a unity, is known to produce, a variety of objects, so in this case presumptive evidence, seconded by the law of parsimony, is satisfied in the acceptance of Nescience as a unity possessing manifold powers. Moreover since Nescience is the limiting condition of jīva and is a unity, the Self conditioned

Jīva also a unity : defined according to this view. by Nescience, i. e. jīva, is a unity : —thus declare those who hold that jīva is a unity.

अत एवाऽज्ञानस्य जीवोपाधित्वात्तस्य चैकत्वात्तदुपाधिक
आत्मा जीवो भवन्नेक एव भवतीत्येकजीववादिनो वदन्ति । यथो-
क्तानुपपत्तिसिद्धान्तानुवादिनो श्रुतिरपि । अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
वह्नीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः । अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः । अस्याऽयमर्थः । असत्यस्य जगतो-
ऽविद्याहेतुकत्वे वक्तव्ये सा किं जन्याऽजन्या वेति संशये न जन्ये-
त्याह अजामिति । न चाऽविद्यावाचकपदाभावः अजामित्यस्यैव
स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्दिष्टस्य तद्वाचकत्वात् । तस्या अनेकत्वं व्यावर्तयति
एकामिति । तस्या विचित्रकार्यजननसामर्थ्यं त्रिगुणात्मकत्वेन सम-
र्थयते लोहितेत्यादिना । तादृशाऽविद्योपहितस्य जीवस्योत्पत्तिं
निरस्यति अज इति । तस्य जीवस्यानेकत्वं निषेधति एक इति ।

Śruti also declares what the above assumption established (sc. Nescience and jīva as unities). 'There is *one* unborn (female), red, white and black, producing uniform, manifold offspring.

Śvetās : Up. IV. 5. supports this view. There is indeed one unborn (male) For var. lec. cf. *Sacred Books*, Vol. XV. who, loving her, lies by her. This other unborn leaves her through whom he has had his fill of enjoyment.' The meaning of this passage is as follows:—Since Nescience is to be declared (in the second quarter of the above verse) as the cause of the unreal world, the doubt arises whether Nescience is a product or not. It is not a product as shown by the word *unborn* of the text. Nor can it be said that there is no word in the text for Nescience, for the adjective *unborn* with a feminine termination denotes Nescience (*avidyā*, fem.). In the word *one* a plurality of Nesciences is denied. In the words *red, white* and *black* the text shows that Nescience as made up of the three *guṇas* is able to produce manifold products. In the word *unborn* (masc.) the text denies that *jīva*, which is conditioned by Nescience, is a product. In the word *one* the plurality of *jīvas* is denied. It might be objected that a plurality of *jīvas* is a matter of common experience, and the unity of *jīva* is, therefore, not possible. To meet this objection the text shows by the word

ननु जीवगतमनेकत्वं लोकेऽनुभूयते तत्कथमेकत्वमित्याशङ्क्याऽभे-
दस्योपनिषत्प्रसिद्धत्वं युक्तिसिद्धत्वं च प्रसिद्धार्थेन हि शब्देनाह हीति ।
ननु स्वयंप्रकाशब्रह्माऽभिन्नात्वाज्जीवस्य कथं तद्विलक्षणावस्थेत्यत
आह अनुशेत इति । तामविद्यामनुसृत्य निद्रित इव शेते अज्ञा-
नेनावृतः सन्मुद्रितज्ञाननेत्रो भवतीत्यर्थः । पश्चात्कार्याकारेण
स्थितां तामेव जुषमाणः सेवमानः संसारी भवति स्वप्नदृगिवेत्याह
जुषमाण इति । नन्वविद्याया अनादित्वेनाऽविनाशित्वादनिरमोक्षप्रसङ्ग
इत्यत आह जहात्येनामिति । वाक्योत्थात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण
निवर्तयतीत्यर्थः । त्याज्या चेदविद्या कथं तर्हि तामाश्रितवाना-
त्मेत्याशङ्क्य भोगार्थं ह्यविद्याऽऽश्रयणं भोगस्य च तया जनितत्वा-
दिदानीं स्वात्मदर्शनेन प्रयोजनशून्यां मन्यमानो जहातीत्याह भुक्त-
भोगामिति । भुक्ता भोगो यया सा तथेति विग्रहः ।

indeed, which expresses something well-known, that the non-
differentiation (sc. unity) of *jīva* is proclaimed in the Upanishads and
is proved by argument. Again, it may be objected that since *jīva*
is identical with the self-luminous Brahman, it cannot have any
other mode of existence. This objection is met by the word
lies by, which means that *jīva* approaches Nescience and lies as if
asleep, i. e. being involved in Nescience, *jīva*'s eye of knowledge
is closed. Afterwards, *jīva*, *loving* i. e. serving Nescience in the
form of objects, is involved in the bonds of the transmigratory
world, just as the dreamer is engaged with the objects of his
dreams. It may be objected that Nescience being eternal *ab ante*
must be indestructible—from which it would follow that final
emancipation is impossible. This objection is met by the words
he leaves her, i. e. he puts an end to Nescience by the intuition
of the real nature of Self attained through Śruti. Again,
it may be asked, why should the Self approach Nescience, if the
latter is to be abandoned? The reply is that recourse to Nes-
cience is indeed for the sake of enjoyment, because enjoyment is
effected through Nescience. The *jīva* abandons it when through
intuition of the Self he deems Nescience worthless. Hence the
compound in text must be resolved thus:—*her through whom*
enjoyment has been enjoyed.

वामदेवादेर्ज्ञानं श्रूयते इति चेत् सत्यम् तस्य जीवभेदाऽप्रतिपाद-
कत्वात् । श्रुतार्थाऽनुपपत्त्या कल्प्यते इति चेत् न निश्चितार्थजी-
वैक्यप्रतिपादकवाक्यान्तरविरोधेन कल्पनानुपपत्तेः । एकजीवपक्षे
एकमुक्त्या सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् न एकत्ववादिनं प्रति सर्वत्वस्य
निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् । तथापि बहवो जीवा अनुभवसिद्धा इति
चेत् भवतु तर्हि स्वप्नवद्भवस्या ।

itself: (this knowledge constitutes emancipation, these Rishis were therefore emancipated, and the Veda therefore teaches a plurality of jīvas, some bound and some emancipated). True, we reply, as regards declaration of a knowledge of Brahman, but the passage does not declare a plurality of jīvas. To the further objection that this plurality must be assumed in order to save the meaning of Śruti from contradiction, we reply that this assumption is inadmissible as contradictory of another Śruti passage declaratory of the unity of jīva, (which unity is) the undoubted meaning of Śruti.

Another objection—it will follow on the single-jīva theory that when one person is emancipated all persons will be emancipated. This objection is to be set aside, for the question of *all* (as implying a plurality of really existing jīvas) cannot be raised against the holder of the single-jīva view (who denies the real existence of such plurality).

Yet the jīvas are many, it is urged, as proved by our consciousness. Well then, we reply, let this order of plurality be admitted on the same footing with that of dreams. Against this it may be argued that as in a dream the only real person is the dreamer and all the other persons in the dream are falsely imagined, so (on the above assumption of the dreaming and waking states being on the same footing) in the waking state there can be only one real person, all the rest being falsely imagined by him—and this being so, there will be uncertainty as to which out of the many persons is the only real person, while owing to this uncertainty no man will apply himself to the prescribed means

ननु यथा स्वप्ने एक एव स्वप्नदृक् परमार्थसत्यः अन्ये तद्भ्रमकल्पिताः सर्वे एवं जागरेपि एक एव परमार्थसत्योऽन्ये सर्वे कल्पिताः तथाच बहूनां मध्ये कोऽसावेक इत्यनिश्चये कः श्रवणादौ प्रवर्ततेति साधनानुष्ठानाभावेऽनिर्माद्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् नूनं देहात्मवादमाश्रित्य भ्रान्तोऽसि । कथमिति चेत् शृणु । स्वप्नेऽन्ये जीवाः कल्पिता इति कोऽर्थः । किं देहा देवगन्धर्वादिसृजकाः कल्पिता उताऽज्ञानोपाधिको यो जीवोऽस्मदभिमतस्तादृशा एव बहवोऽनुभूतास्तेषां मध्ये एकः सत्योऽन्ये कल्पिता इति । नाद्यः देहानां कल्पितत्वेऽप्यविरोधात् । नहि देहं वा देहावच्छिन्नं वा श्रवणाद्यधिकारिणं ब्रूमे येनाऽविनिगमो दोषः स्यात् ।

of emancipation termed 'hearing' &c., and since the prescribed means will not be employed, it will follow that there will be emancipation for none.

In reply to the above we would say to the objector.—You are indeed in error, holding as you do that the body is the Self. How so, he asks. Listen ! what is meant by your statement that in a dream other jīvas are falsely imagined by the dreamer. ? Do you mean that bodies under such names as gods, gandharvas &c. are imagined ? Or that many jīvas are perceived in our sense of the word jīva, sc. that which has Nescience as its limiting adjunct, and that one of these jīvas is real and the rest unreal.

The former interpretation will not avail you against us, for even if the bodies (in the waking state) are unreal, the possibility of emancipation is not overthrown (which was the point you urged against us above). For we do not say that the person qualified to enter on 'hearing' and the other means of emancipation is the body, or Intelligence limited to a body—which statement would have exposed us to the charge of proposing alternatives (sc. as to which of the jīvas thus defined is real) without giving reasons to compel the adoption of one or other of the alternatives. Nor is the latter interpretation applicable, since in dreams a plurality of jīvas is not perceived, using jīva in the sense

न द्वितीयः अज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्य स्वप्ने भेदाऽननुभवात् ।
 न हि पराऽज्ञानावच्छिन्नः परस्य प्रत्यक्षो भवितुमर्हति । तथापि
 तत्तद्वेहचेष्टया अनुमीयत इति चेत् न एकेनाप्यनेकदेहचेष्टोपपत्तेः
 नेयायिकानां कायव्यूहदशायां योगिदेहवत् । तद्वदेवानुसन्धानप्रसङ्ग
 इति चेत् सत्यम् अविद्यावच्छिन्नं प्रतीष्टत्वात् तत्तद्वेहावच्छिन्नं प्रति
 तत्राप्यभावात् आत्ममात्रस्यानुसन्धातृत्वाद् । अत एवैकस्मिन्नपि
 देहे पादावच्छिन्नः शिरोऽवच्छिन्नस्य दुःखं नानुसन्धते पादे मे सुखं
 शिरसि मे वेदनेत्यनुभवात् ।

of 'that which is conditioned by Nescience.' For A, or 'that which is conditioned by the Nescience associated with A' cannot be perceived by B similarly defined (none can be immediately conscious of another's ignorance or knowledge). Still you urge that a plurality of jīvas is inferred from the (visible) actions of the several bodies. We reply that the inference will not hold; for the actions of various bodies may be proved to result from a single jīva, as is the case with the Yogin's body,* which, as the Naiyāyikas teach, assumes a variety of manifestations. You may further urge that as in the case of the Yogin who recognises himself as real and the bodies he has created as false; so in the case of jīva there must be a recognition of itself as real, and of the others as falsely imagined by it. We reply that such recognition is to be admitted in the case of jīva defined as 'that which has Nescience as its limiting adjunct' and not as 'that which is limited to a body', for, in the example also, such recognition does not pertain to the bodies created by the Yogin, since his Self alone is the recogniser.

And since the Self (jīva or Intelligence conditioned by Nescience) is the only knower, the Intelligence confined to the foot, even in one and the same body, is not conscious of a pain felt by the Intelligence which is confined to the head, as the common experience, 'my foot is at ease, my head pains,' shows. Thus we

तथाच देहात्मभ्रममाश्रित्यैव जीवभेदानुभव इति स्थितम् ।
तथापि कथमत्रानुभव इति चेत् । श्रोतव्यं सावधानेन । एक एव नित्य-
दुबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव उपनिषन्मात्रगम्यो वस्तुतोऽस्ति । स एवाज्ञानमा-
श्रित्य जीवभावं लब्ध्वा देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यादिदेहान्परिकल्प्य तदुप-
करणत्वेन ब्रह्माण्डादिचतुर्दशभुवनं सृष्ट्वा तेषु तेषु देहेषु कश्चिदेवः
कश्चिन्मनुष्यः कश्चिद्विरण्यगर्भः सर्वेषां सृष्ट्वा कश्चिद्विष्णुः पालकः
कश्चिदन्यः सर्वसंहारकर्ता रुद्रः प्रलये । तेषामुपाधयः सत्त्वादि-
गुणाः तद्वशात्तेषां सर्वे सामर्थ्यम् अहं पुनः कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकुमारः
तेषां भक्तिं पूजानमस्कारादिनाऽनुष्ठाय श्रवणादिसाधनं सम्पाद्य मोक्षं
साधयिष्यामीतीश्वरोपि सन् भ्रान्तो भवति जागरे ।

have proved that the common view of a plurality of jīvas is due simply to the error of confounding the body with the Self.

Nevertheless it may be asked, how in the waking state is this consciousness of a plurality of jīvas to be explained (if jīva is really a unity ? Listen attentively. There is really but one Self, in its own nature eternal, absolute, intelligent, free, made known in the Upanishads only. This Self, associating itself with Nescience becomes jīva and falsely surmises the bodies of gods, men &c., for whose enjoyment it creates, as means, the 'egg of Brahmā' and the fourteen worlds. Of these bodies one is a god, another is a man. There is Hiraṇyagarbha the creator of all things, Viṣṇu the preserver, and Rudra who destroys the world at a pralaya or final resolution. These three have the rajas, sattva and tamas qualities respectively as their limiting conditions, to which all their powers are due. Then again there is the individual man who thinks within himself 'I am the son of a Brāhman ; having served the Gods in pūjā &c. and acquired 'hearing' and the other prescribed means I shall gain emancipation. In all these forms the Self, though really Īśvara (Brahman) is deceived in the waking state. Again, the Self having put an end to the world of waking consciousness as described above, and aided by the defects of sleep, surmises in dreams a world precisely similar to that of

पुनर्यथोक्तजागरप्रपञ्चमुपसंहृत्य स्वप्ने निद्रादोषसहकृतः ता-
दृशमेव प्रपञ्चं परिकल्प्य तत्तद्वेहेन्द्रियसाध्यभोगं भुक्त्वा वसिष्ठादयो
मुक्ता अन्ये बद्धा अहमपि कश्चिद् बद्धः दुःखी संसारी मुक्तो भवि-
ष्यामीति च कल्पयित्वा पुनस्तामवस्थामुपसंहृत्य जागरं सुषुप्तिं वा
सर्वभ्रमनिवृत्तिरूपं प्राप्नोतीति । एवं सति एक एवात्मा परिपूर्णः
स्वयंप्रकाशनन्दैकस्वभावः स्वाज्ञानवशाज्जीवः संसारीत्यादिशब्दा-
भिधेयो भवति । न तदन्यः कश्चित्संसारी सम्भावयितुमपि शक्य
इति स्थितम् । तस्यैवानादिसंसारसञ्चितपुण्यनिचयक्षपितकल्मषस्य
वैराग्यादिसम्पन्नस्य शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादासादितादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घका-
लादिसेवितश्रवणादिसाधनपाटवस्य यदा तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थात्म-
साक्षात्कार उदयमासादयति तदाऽज्ञानं तत्कार्यं सर्वमुपसंहृत्य

waking, falsely imagining thus :—Vasishtha and other Rishis won emancipation, when through their bodies and sense-organs they had experienced the results of their actions; other men are bound; I too am bound, miserable in the bonds of transmigration, I shall obtain emancipation. Then again the Self puts an end to this dream and enters on the waking state, or that of dreamless sleep in which there is an end to all such false imaginings. Since this is the case, the Self which is one only, absolute, self-luminous and wholly blessed is, through the influence of its associate Nescience, termed jīva, the transmigrating individual. Nor other than this Self can any transmigrating individual be conceived of: thus we have clearly proved.

When through such Śruti passages as 'that thou art' this same Self (termed jīva) has gained intuition of Brahman (sc. recognised its identity with Brahman the absolute)—the Self with its sin destroyed by the store of merit acquired during a beginning-less round of transmigrations, possessed of dispassion &c. and proficient, through the grace of the Śāstras and of a teacher, in 'hearing' &c. which have been practised faithfully and continuously—then the Self becomes what is commonly (regarded as an

स्वानन्दतृप्तः स्वे महिम्नि स्थितो मुक्त इति व्यवहारभागभवति ।
तस्यामवस्थायां न तदन्यः कश्चित्संसारी तेनाऽननुभूयमानं द्वैतं
वा किञ्चिदस्तीति रहस्यम् ।

६ अज्ञातसत्त्वं नेष्टुं चेद् व्यवहारः कथं भवेत् ।

न ह्यदर्शनमात्रेण विषण्णो नाशनिश्चयात् ॥ १० ॥

ननु कथमेवमुच्यते तेनाऽननुभूयमानं द्वैतं नास्तीति याव-
ता अज्ञातस्यापि द्वैतस्य सत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अत एव त्रिविध-
सत्त्वमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति वृद्धाः । न च तदज्ञातसत्त्वानभ्युपगमे उपपद्यते
प्रातीतिकृपारमार्थिकभेदेन द्वैविध्यस्यैव सम्भवात् । अन्यथा गृहा-

emancipated man and is) described thus—‘he has put an end
to Nescience and all its products, he is self-contained in that
Bliss which is his real nature, he is returned to that greatness
which is his real nature, he is emancipated.’

In that state of emancipation, sc. when knowledge of Brah-
man has been gained by one, there is left no jīva other than that
one; nor for this reason does any *unperceived order of duality*
really exist:—here lies the esoteric truth of the matter.

9. If the existence of things when unperceived is an in-

Objection: the view that the esse of
things is percipi (which is a part of the
jīva-unity theory) is opposed at once to
common sense and to the express teach-
ing of the ancients as to three kinds
of existence:—*pāramārthikī sattā*, real
existence, sc. that of Brahman alone;
prātibhāṣikī, the esse of which is percipi,
sc. that of objects of the dream—world
and of those erroneously imagined in
the waking state; *vyāvahārikī*, practi-
cal existence, sc. that of objects of wak-
ing consciousness.

admissible assumption, pray how
is common experience possible?
For no man grieves for an object,
thinking it destroyed merely be-
cause he sees it not...X.

An opponent asks how we concluded above that ‘for this
reason no unperceived order of duality really exists,’ seeing that
some thinkers have maintained a real existence for a dual order
also even when unperceived; and adds that it was just because
duality exists though unperceived that ancient Vedānta teachers
taught three kinds of existence; and that this three-fold division of
existence will not stand, if the existence of an unperceived object

निर्गतस्य पुत्रपश्वादिसकलसाधनजातमपश्यतस्तदभावनिश्चयेन
शोकाग्निना दह्यमानस्य रुदतो मरणप्रसङ्गः ।

ननु स्वप्नवज्जागरेपि प्रातीतिकसत्त्वसंपन्नेनैव द्वैतेन व्यव-
हारः किमिति नोपपद्यत इति चेत् न वैषम्यात् जागरबोधेन तस्य
बाधात् इह तु साक्षात्कारात्पूर्वं तदभावादिति । अत्राहुः

सत्त्वत्रयं वदन्वादी प्रष्टव्योऽत्राधुना मया ।

सत्यं द्वैतमसत्यं वा नाऽसत्ये त्रिविधं कुतः ॥ ११ ॥

किं द्वैतं पारमार्थिकमाश्रित्य अज्ञातसत्त्वं साध्यते उतानिर्व-

is denied; for then there can be only two kinds of existence, viz., the absolutely real (pāramārthikī) and the merely perceptual (prātibhikī). If (he continues) the existence of an unperceived object is denied, it should follow that the man, who leaves son and home and herds and all other sources of joy, should die weeping and consumed by sorrow in the conviction that these loved objects exist not, since he no longer beholds them.

Here the opponent (speaking in v. 10.) might be asked by way of objection, why experience of a dual order of things whose existence is merely perceptual is not possible in the waking state, as it is possible in the dreaming state, (for all schools hold that the esse of the dream-world is percipi). This objection he would put aside, because the waking and dreaming states are dissimilar: for whereas the latter state is put an end to by waking knowledge, there is no sublation of the world in the waking state previous to an intuition of Brahman. To the opponent's view they rejoin:—

The man who maintains three different kinds of existence must

Met: the common sense view that a thing exists even when unperceived is beset with difficulties: Ancient teachers admitted vyāvahārikī sattā only out of a kind regard for the needs of the vulgar mind.

be asked whether he holds duality to be real or unreal. Real it cannot be. If unreal (non-existent, asatya); how can existence (sattva) be three-fold?...XI.

Does the opponent prove that an object exists even when

चनीयम् । नाद्यः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रामाण्यनिरासेन निरस्तत्वात् । अन्त्ये अनिर्वचनीयं प्रथमतः क्वचित्सिद्धं न वा । न चेत् तर्हि दृष्टान्ताभावात् कथमाकाशदेरनिर्वचनीयत्वं साधनीयम् । सिद्धं रज्जुसर्पादिकमिति चेत् तर्हि तच्च यादृशं सत्त्वं तादृशमेवाकाशदेः प्रपञ्चस्येति स्थिते विवेचनीयं किमज्ञातसत्त्वं किं वा प्रातीतिकमेव । यद्यज्ञातमपि सत्त्वमाकाशदेः कल्प्येत तदा कथमयं दृष्टान्तो दार्ष्टान्तिके सामञ्जस्येनोपसंह्रियेत विरोधात् ।

unperceived by maintaining that the dual order is either absolutely real or is what is technically termed *inexplicable** ?

The former alternative will not hold, for an absolutely real duality must be rejected on the (already shown) rejection of the trustworthiness of perception, inference and other sources of evidence, (cf v. 4).

If the latter alternative be adopted, it may be asked whether this merely apparent existence was observed in any instance prior (to the inference which establishes a merely apparent order of duality), or not? If not observed, how, in the absence of an instance confirmatory of the inference, is the merely apparent existence of the world, beginning with the subtile element ether, to be proved. If it be replied that the snake, which erroneously appears in the place of the rope seen at night, is a well-known instance, among others, of a merely apparent object, then, it being premised that the existence of the world beginning with ether is precisely similar to the existence of the snake in the example adduced, the question remains to be discussed whether the object-world exists even when unperceived, or only so long as perceived. If an existence independent of perception be surmised for the world, the example (sc. the existence of the snake) and the case in point (sc. the existence of the world) do not sufficiently correspond, because of the dissimilarity (with regard to the snake whose *esse* is admittedly *percipi*).

* An *inexplicable* object is one that merely appears in consciousness as some thing, i. e., more than nothing (*asat*), and yet is proved by experience to be less than real (*sat*, Brahman). Hence it is *inexplicable*, or a product of *Māyā*.

न च गृहान्निर्गतस्यासत्त्वनिश्चयेन रोदनादिप्रसङ्गे दोषः बाधकप्रमाणस्याप्रवृत्तत्वेन अभावनिश्चयानङ्गीकारात् स्वप्रवत्सर्वव्यवहारस्योपपादितत्वाच्च । न च तत्र बाधोऽस्तीति वैषम्यं भ्रमावस्थायां कुचापि बाधस्यानङ्गीकारात् । प्रमाणप्रवृत्तौ बाधेऽपि न कश्चिद्विषयः तदानीं भ्रमसिद्धेन व्यवहारानभ्युपगमात् । न च विविधसत्त्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः सर्वस्य द्वैतस्य प्रातीतिकसत्त्वमपरित्यज्य तैर्भ्रान्तसन्तोषमात्रस्य कृतत्वात् प्रातीतिकत्वेऽपि प्रपञ्चस्य भ्रान्तबुद्धिसिद्धवान्तरवैषम्यमाश्रित्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाभिधानाविरोधात् ।

Nor against us can be urged the case of the man, who leaving home ought (as a logical consequence of our view, you said) to weep for his dear ones, because certain of their non-existence. For we do not say that he is convinced of their non-existence so long as no evidence subversive of his belief in their existence is forthcoming; and, further, because we have shown that all experience is like that of dreams. [In dreams, the *esse* of all objects is *percipi*, admittedly; and yet the dreamer weeps not for his absent son].

Nor can it be argued that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge; for in neither case, while the error lasts, is any sublation (of either state) admitted. Nor is there any inconsequence in holding that there is a sublation of error on the application of evidence; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object.

Nor is the view of a two-fold existence contradictory of the older view of a three-fold existence; for while ancient teachers (e. g. Sarvajña Muni in the *Samkshepaśārīraka* I, 1, 178) did not abandon the position that the existence of a dual order of things is dependent on the perception of it, they taught a third kind of existence (the so called *practical*) to satisfy the deluded vulgar. For although the *esse* of the world is *percipi*, there is no contradiction in maintaining the *practical* as a third kind of existence, if attention is had to those intermediate differences (sc. between the waking and dreaming states) which the unphilosophic are persuaded of.

१० द्वैतभेदे प्रतिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञा कथं वद ।

दशानां युगपत्सर्पभ्रमे तद्वन्तथैव सा ॥ १२ ॥

तथापि अज्ञातसत्त्वानभ्युपगमे स्वप्नप्रबुद्धस्य स एवायं प्रपञ्च इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाने का गतिरिति चेत् एकस्यामेव रज्ज्वां मन्दान्ध-कारवार्तिन्यां दशानां युगपत्सर्पभ्रमेण पलायमानानां परस्परं संवादेन एक एव सर्पः सर्वैरनुभूत इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां या सैवेति सन्तो-ष्ठव्यम् । तत्र हि स्वस्वभ्रमसिद्धः सर्वैः पृथक् पृथगेवानुभूयते विषयः अन्यभ्रमसिद्धस्यान्येन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् अन्यभ्रमस्याज्ञानात् ।

10. If for each cognition there is a separate object (as must

Objection : If esse is percipi, recognition (which implies continuity of the object) would be impossible. Answer : recognition itself is error.

be the case on the view that the esse of things is percipi), then you must explain how recognition

is possible (sc. how the present object is recognised as the identical one previously known). The reply is that the recognition in this instance is precisely similar to the recognition in the case of the imaginary snake observed simultaneously by ten men (each declaring to the other :—I saw the same snake as you did)...XII.

Still (an opponent may urge as above)—if the view that an object exists though unperceived be not maintained, what explanation is there of the case of the man who waking from dreams recognises the present world as identical with the one he knew before falling asleep? Our opponent, we reply, must content himself here with the explanation he is prepared to offer for the recognition—‘one and the same snake we all saw’—of which the ten men speak when they have fled from an imaginary snake, which was only a piece of rope lying in the dark. For in this example the erroneously perceived object (sc. the snake) is perceived by all and each separately, since the object erroneously perceived by the one man cannot possibly be perceived by another, for one cannot have immediate knowledge of another’s error.

अविवेकादेव तु तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानमेक एव सूर्यः सर्वैरनुभू-
यत इति । एवं जाग्रदवस्थायां प्रपञ्चमनुभूय सुषुप्तिं गत्वा पुनरु-
त्थाय योऽयं प्रपञ्चानुभवः स प्रपञ्चान्तरमेव विषयीकरोति प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानं त्वविवेकादेव । न च सुषुप्तौ प्रपञ्चविलये प्रमाणाभावः न हि
द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात् न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति
ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत् पश्येदिति श्रुत्या सुषुप्तौ द्वितीयाभावं वदन्त्या
तत्र सर्वप्रपञ्चाभावस्य दर्शितत्वात् ।

११ सूर्यभ्रमाद्विशेषोऽस्ति जाग्रद्वोधेऽन्यथा कथम् ।

इन्द्रियादेरुपादानं तदभावे यतो न धीः ॥ १३ ॥

The fact is that the recognition—'one and the same snake we all saw'—is simply due to error. And so when a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which again he awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; but his recognition of the identity of the present and former series is simply due to error.

Nor can it be said that there is no proof that in the state of dreamless sleep there is an end to the world of experience. For the cessation of all experience during dreamless sleep is indicated in the Śruti passage declaratory of the absence of any second thing during that state:—'For there is no loss of sight to the

Bṛihad : Up : IV. 3. 23.

seer, because it cannot perish.

Nor is there then (in dreamless sleep) any second, any thing different from him that he could see.'

11. Waking consciousness is different from the false conscious-

ness of an imaginary snake. If

Common Sense reasserts itself : If ease is merely perceiving, the well ascertained distinctions between true and false knowledge are at an end.

not different, how is it that the organs of sense are accepted as

necessary to bring about waking

consciousness? For when organs of sense are absent, no knowledge results....XIII.

तथापि रज्जुसर्पादिज्ञानादाकाशादिप्रपञ्चज्ञानेऽस्ति कश्चि-
द्विशेषः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविद्याकारणकत्वभावाभावाभ्याम् । न हि
यादृशमर्थमिन्द्रियादिजन्यं ज्ञानं विषयीकरोति तादृशमेवाविद्याज-
न्यभ्रमोऽपीति सम्भवति भ्रमात्पूर्वं विषयस्यासत्त्वात् इन्द्रियादिज-
न्यज्ञानस्य च सन्निकर्षादिजन्यत्वेन ज्ञानात्पूर्वं विषयसत्त्वस्यावश्य-
म्भावात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां चेन्द्रियादेः कारणत्वस्य सिद्धत्वात् ।

In the above an opponent urges that, in spite of what has been said for the view that the esse of a thing is percipi (tathāpi), there is a difference between knowledge of ordinary objects and that of an imaginary object like the snake seen in a rope—the difference being due to the presence and absence respectively of perception and the other sources of evidence, on the one hand, and of Nescience, on the other, as causes (of these two kinds of knowledge, sc. sense-organs, and not Nescience, are the cause of ordinary waking consciousness ; whereas only Nescience is the cause of the false consciousness of an imaginary object). For it is not possible (so runs the objection) that the erroneous cognition effected through Nescience should have as its object one precisely similar to that which the cognition, effected through sense-organs, has as its object, since the imaginary object did not exist previous to the erroneous cognition ; and, because the cognition effected through the sense-organs and other sources of evidence was effected through contact of the object with the sense-organs &c., the existence of the object previous to its being cognised is a necessary postulate ; and because it can be proved, by the inductive method of conjoint presence and absence, that sense-organs &c. are causes of knowledge (sc. when these are present, knowledge results ; when absent, no knowledge.)

तस्मात्प्रपञ्चस्याज्ञातसत्त्वाऽभ्युपगमोऽवश्यम्भावी । अन्यथा
वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः । मैवम्

इन्द्रियाणां कारणत्वे भवेच्चेदं तदा तव ।

स्वप्नभ्रमे यथा तेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकधीः ॥ १४ ॥

इन्द्रियादेर्वस्तुतः प्रपञ्चज्ञानं प्रत्यकारणत्वात् । कुत इति
चेत् तच्च वक्तव्यं किमिन्द्रियादेः प्रमितिमात्रे कारणता किं वा भ्रम-
प्रमासाधारणज्ञानमात्रे भ्रममात्रे वा ।

Hence, concludes our opponent, the view that the world exists though unperceived is a necessity ; for on any other view the difference (between true and false knowledge) is inexplicable.

Not so, we reply :—

Your objection would hold if the sense-organs were causes

of knowledge. Similar to the
But common Sense is delusive : The senses can prove nothing real: The world, or sum of effects, is a pure fiction due to Nescience as its cause. consciousness of the presence and

absence of these in the delusion of sleep (is the consciousness, in the waking state, of the presence and absence of sense-organs, which you urged as a proof of the sense-organs being causes of knowledge, i. e. our consciousness in both cases is false ; for no one maintains that the dreamer sees with his eyes though he may imagine that he does so)...XIV.

For sense-organs &c. are not really instruments of our cognition of the world. Why not, you ask. Declare then, we say, whether the sense-organs, and the rest, are instruments of true knowledge only, or of true and false knowledge, or of false knowledge only ?

नाद्यः इन्द्रियादिजन्यज्ञानप्रामाण्यं भ्रमविषयव्यावृत्तार्थविषयत्वेन साधनीयं भ्रमविषयव्यावृत्तार्थत्वं च प्रमितिविषयत्वेनेत्यन्योन्याश्रयात् । न च प्रमितिविषयत्वमर्थसत्यत्वे हेतुरपि मिथ्येदं रजतमिति प्रमित्याऽसत्यस्यापि विषयीकरणात् अबाधितत्वस्य चाऽसिद्धेः । किञ्च इन्द्रियाणां प्रामाण्यत्वेन अज्ञातार्थविषयत्वे वक्तव्येऽधिष्ठानमात्रविषयत्वं प्राप्तं प्रपञ्चस्य सर्वस्य जडत्वेन अज्ञातत्वाभावात् ।

Not of true knowledge merely; for the truth of the knowledge effected through sense-organs &c. would have to be proved by declaring that the object of (sc. what was made known by) this knowledge was something different from what false knowledge makes known; and again, that its object was something different from the object of false knowledge would be proved by the declaration that its object was the object of true knowledge—which would give rise to a logical see-saw. Nor does the fact that the knowledge is true, prove the real existence of the object made known by that knowledge; for in the case of the true cognition—'this silver is unreal'—(e. g. where mother of pearl is mistaken for silver) a true cognition has as its object an unreal thing (sc. the imagined silver). And (it cannot be urged that the difference between true and false objects consists in objects of the former kind being such as are not subsequently proved false, for) absence of falsification cannot be maintained (in the teeth of Śruti and argument, which prove all save Brahman to be false). Moreover, since it must be held (on your view of things existing independent of cognition) that the sense-organs as sources of knowledge must have for their objects things which exist even when unperceived (for it is the essential character of an organ of knowledge, you say, to make known what existed before unknown), it follows that the sense-organs have as their sole object the substrate of all things (sc. the Self, Brahman). For the whole world of objects being non-intelligent (jāda i. e. Nescience when considered apart from Self, Intelligence the substrate), it cannot be what is termed *unknown* (ajñāta, meaning thereby *invested by Nescience*; for the objects are Nescience itself, and Nescience could only invest or make *unknown* Intelligence and not itself).

तथाचाधिष्ठानत्वस्यात्मन्येव विश्रान्तत्वेन प्रत्यगात्मविष-
याणीन्द्रियाणि प्रमाणानीति वक्तव्यं तच्च नेपपद्यते प्रत्यगात्मन
इन्द्रियाविषयत्वात् तस्य निर्दुर्मकत्वात् । तथाच श्रुतिः न सन्दृशे
तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चिदेनं पराञ्चि खानि
व्यतृणत् स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्निति । नचानयैव
श्रुत्येन्द्रियाणां प्रपञ्चविषयत्वं दर्शितमिति वाच्यं स्वप्नेन्द्रियवदन्वय-
व्यतिरेकभ्रमसिद्धप्रपञ्चज्ञानकारणत्वानुवादेनात्मन इन्द्रियाविषयत्व-
प्रदर्शने तात्पर्यात् । एतेन भ्रमप्रमासाधारणज्ञानकारणत्वमप्यपास्तं
प्रमाकरणत्वस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

Accordingly, since the fact of being the locus of the world can apply satisfactorily to the Self only, you will have to declare that the sense-organs as sources of knowledge have the Self within as their object; and such a declaration is impossible, for the Self cannot be an object for the sense-organs, since it is without attributes. And thus runs the Śruti—

Kātha Up : II. 6. 9:
4. 1.

‘His form is not to be seen, no
one beholds him with the eye.’

‘The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses so that they turn forward (outward): therefore man looks outward not inward into his Self.’ Nor can it be said that this passage declares that the sense-organs have the world of phenomena as their object. For while the passage re-states the instrumentality of the sense-organs in regard to our knowledge of the world—which instrumentality is commonly regarded as proved by a method of conjoint presence and absence which is really false, as (the presence and absence of) sense-organs in dreams (is purely imaginary)—the real meaning of the passage lies in showing that the Self is not an object for the sense-organs.

By thus showing that the sense-organs cannot be instruments of true knowledge, we have refuted the (second) alternative that they are instruments of true and false knowledge together.

अस्तु तर्हि भ्रममात्रे कारणता इन्द्रियाणाम् । न भ्रमज्ञानस्या-
विद्यामात्रयोनित्वस्य त्वयैवोक्तत्वात् ज्ञानं प्रतीन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरे-
कयोश्च स्वप्नेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः । एवं घटादिकार्यमात्रे
कारणाकाङ्क्षायां कारणत्वेनाविद्यैवोपसंहर्तव्या । तत्तदर्थिनां तत्तत्का-
रणविशेषोपादानं तु तथैव स्वप्नवदुपपादनीयम् । ततो ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं
कृत्स्नकार्यजातं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयरूपं तत्सर्वमाविद्यकमेव । इति प्रतीति-
कमेव सत्त्वं सर्वस्येति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं वसिष्ठेन अविद्यायोनयो भावाः
सर्वेऽमी बुद्बुदा इव । क्षणमुद्भूय गच्छन्ति ज्ञानैकजलयो लयम् ॥

Let then the (third) alternative stand, *viz.*, the sense-organs are instruments of false knowledge only. This will not hold, for you yourself declared that Nescience alone is the cause of false knowledge. And because we also have proved that the presence and absence of sense-organs (which you urged as a proof that the latter are instrumental) with regard to (waking) knowledge is on precisely the same footing as the presence and absence of sense-organs which we are conscious of in dreams (*sc.* is a bare imagining).

Thus, to meet our expectation of a cause for all effects, such as earthen pots, cloth &c., Nescience alone is to be accepted as their cause. But the acceptance of special causes for each of these effects (—clay for the pot, threads for the cloth—) by those who desire these effects can be proved to be precisely similar to the acceptance during the dreaming state (of these special causes when, as all admit, the clay, threads &c. are purely fictitious).

Hence, with the sole exception of Brahman, all things, whether cognitions or things cognised are the effects of Nescience; and their *esse* has been proved to be *percipi* only. And thus Vasishtṥa declared :—‘ All things have Nescience as their source :

Yogavāsishṥṥa Nirvāṇaprakaraṇa, śl. 20. bubble-like they spring up for a moment and are refunded into the great ocean of knowledge (*sc.* Brahman) ’

१२ मृदादीनां कारणत्वं न चेदिदं घटं प्रति ।

अविद्यायाः कारणत्वं कथं सिद्धयेत्प्रमां विना ॥ १५ ॥

नन्वाविद्यायोनित्वं भावानां कार्य्यकारणभावमङ्गीकृत्य न
वा । न चेदविद्यायोनित्वमपि कथम् । अस्ति चेत्कार्य्यकारणभा-
वस्तदा यथायथमन्वयव्यतिरेकादिरेव प्रमाणं तत्र प्रकारान्तरासम्भ-
वात् । तथाचान्वयव्यतिरेकादिसिद्धं मृदादिकारणत्वमपहाय अवि-
द्याकारणत्वाभिधानमनुचितमेव । किञ्च अविद्यायोनित्वं भावानां

12. If you do not admit that clay &c. are causes of a pot,

Common Sense again urges that the
sceptic too must start from certain as-
sumptions: thus he must assume that the
causal relation is itself real, in order to prove
that Nescience is the cause of the world.

how, in the absence of a
correct confirmatory instance,
is the causality of Nescience
to be proved?...XV.

It may be asked whether, in maintaining Nescience as the
source of existing things, the causal relation is assumed as real.
If not, then the causality of Nescience also cannot be affirmed.
If the causal relation be admitted as real, then the inductive
methods of argument from conjoint presence and absence &c.,* as
may be demanded in each case, are trustworthy sources of know-
ledge; for no other methods of proof can apply to the causal
relation (tatra). And so it is manifestly improper to maintain
the causality of Nescience, while rejecting the causality of clay,
threads, &c. (in the case of pots and yarn, cf. supra) which has
been proved by inductive methods.

Moreover, he who holds that Nescience is the source of
things should be asked, whether Nescience is the sole cause,

* The etcetera is glossed in Nānādikshita's Siddhāntadīpikā by धर्मिणाहकमान-
परम् ac. all cases in which existence of substrate is inferred from existence of
attributes; as subtile ether (substrate) is inferred from sound (attribute).

वदन् प्रष्टव्यः । किमितरनिरपेक्षा अविद्यैव कारणमुतादृष्टेश्वरादिका-
रणान्तरसापेक्षा । नाद्यः कारणवैचित्र्याभावेन कार्यवैचित्र्यानुपपत्तेः
चेतनाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण लडशक्तेः कार्यकारित्वानुपपत्तेश्च । नापरः
अविद्याकारणवादिनाप्यदृष्टेश्वरादेः कारणत्वस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यत्वा-
ल्लाघवात्तत एव विचित्रकार्योपपत्तौ किमज्ञानेन कारणत्वाभिमतं
कल्पितेन । तथाच प्रत्यक्षादेर्लौकिकस्य प्रमाणस्य पूर्वकाण्डस्य च
पुत्रपशुस्वर्गादिकं प्रति यागादेः साधनताबोधकस्य प्रामाण्यं सम-

independent of any others, or as conjoined with the retributive power of actions, God and the other *general* causes.* Nescience cannot be the sole cause; for variety in the effects is impossible if the cause is a unity (as Nescience is); and because an un-
intelligent force (like Nescience) cannot be a cause without the aid of an intelligent substrate (to will that force). Nor will the other alternative stand, for he who holds to the causality of Nescience is bound also to admit the conjoint causality of the retributive power of actions, God, &c.; and since it is easier to account for the production of a variety of effects from these various causes (*tatah eva*), what necessity is there to assume Nescience as the cause?

And so (continues the objector) there is established the trustworthiness of perception and the other sources of human knowledge, and of the earlier (or ritual portion) of the Veda which declares that sacrifices &c. are the means of obtaining sons, cattle, paradise &c. If the trustworthiness of both human knowledge and Revelation be denied (*anyathā*), pray what view can he adopt who thus places himself in opposition to human experience and to the Veda? Therefore (concludes the objector), that the world has Nescience as its only cause is a downright rash statement.

* To those mentioned in the text are usually added—God's knowledge, desire and volition; time, space, antecedent non-existence (of the effect); and, sometimes, absence of an obstructive, cf. *Nyāyakośa*, ed. Bhīmāchārya, *sādhāraṇakāraṇatva*.

र्थितं भवति । अन्यथा लोकवेदविरुद्धः कं पक्षमवलम्बेत । तस्मा-
दविद्यामात्रकारणकं जगदिति साहसमाचम् । अत्र वदामः

यथा सतो जनिर्नैवमसतोऽपि जनिर्न च ।

जन्यत्वमेव जन्यस्य मायिकत्वसमर्पकम् ॥ १६ ॥

किमिदं कार्यं सत्यमसत्यं वा । नाद्यः एकमेवाद्वितीयमि-
त्यद्वैतमात्रपर्यवसितागमविरोधात् अनुपपत्तेश्च । तथाहि किमु-
त्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यं सदसद्वा । असच्चेत् तर्हि शशविषाणमपि कारण-
व्यापाराज्जायेत असत्त्वाविशेषात् । सच्चेत् किं कारणव्यापारेण पूर्वमपि

To the above we reply :—

Just as production cannot be (explained as proceeding) from

The philosopher replies : So far from the causal relation being *real* the very notion of it is *inexplicable*, and leads us back to Nescience. *Māyā*, or the *Inexplicable*, as the source of this inexplicable world.

something previously existing, so also production from something previously non-existent cannot be explained. The bare fact of pro-

duction proves that the product is the work of *Māyā*...XVI.

Is an effect something real or unreal ? Not something real ; for this is opposed to the purely monistic teaching of Śruti in such passages as 'one only without a second.' Nor can an effect be proved to be something real. To explain :—Previous to its production, is an effect existent or non-existent ? If non-existent, then a nonsensical effect such as the horn of a hare ought to be produced through the agency of the cause, sc. the non-existent in this case ; for the non-existent is a unity without difference (and if the non-existent can be a cause, why should it not endow the hare, as well as the ox, with horn ?) If the effect was something previously existent, then causal agency is unnecessary ; for the effect existed previous to the exercise of this function ; and the nature of the effect (as a *consequent*) is thus overthrown. If you urge that it is merely the manifestation of the thing that is brought about through causal agency, we reply that even on this supposition there is no getting rid of the evil fate which awaits you, which-

तस्य सत्त्वात् कार्यत्वव्याघाताच्च । अभिव्यक्तिमात्रं कारणव्यापारा-
ज्जायत इति चेत् न तत्रापि सत्त्वासत्त्वविकल्पयासत्त्वासानपायात् ।
अस्तु तर्हि सदसद्विलक्षणमनिर्वचनीयमेव कार्यम् । एवं चेत्तर्हि
कार्यानुसूयानाद्यनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानमेव कारणमुचितं सत्यस्यासत्य-
हेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः लोके तथा दर्शनात् । न च कार्यवैचित्र्यानुपपत्तिः
विचित्रशक्तिकस्यैवाज्ञानस्य कल्पनादित्युक्तम् । न च पूर्वकाण्डस्य
प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः तस्यापि साध्यसाधनभावमुखेन सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारेण
प्रवृत्तिद्वारेण वा ब्रह्मण्येव तात्पर्यात् तात्पर्यार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामा-

ever of the alternative you assume, (for you will have to admit that the manifestation, previous to its being brought about, was either existent or non-existent). Grant then (you say) that an effect is something inexplicable either as existent or non-existent. In this case, we reply, it is fitting to maintain, as the only cause, Nescience, inexplicable, eternal *ab ante*, and of the same nature as its effects; for it is impossible that entity should be the cause of non-entity and common experience vouches for this impossibility.

Nor may you urge that a variety of effects is impossible, (if Nescience as a unity be held to be the cause of the world); for, as we have already shown (§ 7) there is presumptive evidence for Nescience as a unity possessing manifold powers, (and the variety of effects would follow, consistently, from the variety of the powers of Nescience).

Nor may you urge that, on our view, the authoritativeness of the earlier or ritual portion of the Veda is impossible; for the real aim of this portion also is to teach Brahman, indirectly, by teaching that certain means, sc. sacrificial rites bring about certain results, through the performance of which the intellect* (of the sacrificer) is purified (and thus prepared for a study of

* For this technical meaning of *sattva* cf. Katha Up. II, 6, 7. Śāṅkarabhāṣya in loco.

य्यात् । तस्मादविद्यायेनित्वं भावानां सुष्ठूक्तम् । अतोऽविद्याक-
ल्पितस्य जगतः प्रतीतिसमकालीनमेव सत्त्वमुचितं रज्जुसर्पशुक्तिर-
जतगन्धर्वनगरस्वप्नप्रपञ्चेषु तथा दर्शनात् ।

१३ अचेदं निरूपणीयम् ।

प्रतीतिमात्रं सत्त्वं चेत्सत्त्वं प्रातीतिकं मतम् ।

अविरोधान्ममापीष्टं तद्भेदे वद का प्रमा ॥ १७ ॥

प्रतीतिसमकालीनं सत्त्वं जगत इति कोऽर्थः किं प्रतीतिरेव
सत्त्वं किं वा प्रतीतिव्यतिरेकेण जगतः पृथक् सत्त्वमस्ति । अन्त्ये

Brahman), or through which he becomes possessed with the desire to practise the means of attaining a knowledge of Brahman (sc. *hearing* &c. cf. note p. 6). And because the authoritativeness of the Veda (Śabda) depends on the *implied* (and not on the *literal*) meaning of the word.

Hence our view of Nescience as the cause of things is consistent; whence it follows that our view that the Nescience-presented world is strictly cotemporaneous with the cognition of the world is also consistent. For such is our experience of the existence of a snake imagined in rope, or of the silver imagined in mother-of-pearl, or of the mirage, or of the dream-world.

13. Here this must be explained :—

None of the commonly accepted 'means of proof,' *pramāṇas*, will prove duality, *bheda*. If by your view that existence is cotemporaneous with percep-

tion (*sattvam prāṭitikam* cf. *supra*) is meant that *esse* is merely *percipi*,* I accept your view as not opposed to mine. If you hold that there is a difference (between the existence of the world and the cognition of it), pray declare the proof thereof...XVII.

What is meant by saying that the existence of the world is cotemporaneous with the cognition of it? Is it meant that the

* प्रातीतिकं सत्त्वमिति यत्तत्प्रतीतिमात्रं प्रतीतिरेव सत्त्वमिति मतं चेद्यदीत्यनुवादः ।
N. D's. gloss.

तत्र प्रमाणमस्ति न वा । अस्ति चेत् किं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमोऽ-
र्थापत्तिर्वा । प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् तत्र घटोऽयमिति यत्प्रत्यक्षमिदमेव
स्वस्माद् घटस्य भेदं विषयीकरोति प्रत्यक्षान्तरं वा । स्वयमेव स्ववि-
षयभेदं गृह्णाति प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् तत्किं स्वप्रकाशं परप्रकाशं वा ।
तत्राद्ये स्वविषयविशेषणत्वेन भेदस्य भानेपि विशिष्टज्ञानस्य विशेषण-

esse of it is percipi and nothing else? Or that the world has an
existence independent of the cognition of it? If the latter mean-
ing be adopted, it may be asked whether there is any proof (for
the existence of an unperceived world) or not?

If proof exists, is it immediate perception, or inference, or
Veda or presumptive evidence? If you say that immediate
perception is the proof, then we ask, does the perception, ex-
pressed in—'This is an earthen pot'—, make known a difference
between itself (sc. the perception of the pot) and the pot? Or
does some other perception make known this difference? [This
other perception taking the form—'this pot is different from the
cognition of pot'—]. If you say that the very perception declares
(lit. grasps) the difference between itself and the perceived object,
then, we ask, is this perception self-known, or known through
some other perception? If self-known, and if the view be adopt-
ed that a *determinate* knowledge* (viśiṣṭajñāna is effected

* Viśiṣṭajñāna is judgment or the knowledge of a subject,
viśeṣhya, as qualified by an attribute, viśeṣhaṇa. In regard to viśiṣṭa-
jñāna two views obtain, as stated in the text:—(a) "विशिष्टज्ञानस्य
विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वपक्षे," (b) "विशेषणविशेष्येन्द्रियसंचिकर्षमात्रं विशिष्टज्ञानकारण-
मिति पक्षे." The former is the Nyāya view (cf. Bhāṣāparichohheda,
Muktāvalī śl. 58). It holds that for the formation of a viśiṣṭajñāna,
e. g. ghaṭo' yaṁ, there is necessary not only intercourse (sannikarṣha)
of sense-organs with the viśeṣhya or ghaṭa, but also a previous know-
ledge of the viśeṣhaṇa or ghaṭatva. Such previous knowledge is
technically termed *indeterminate*, nirvikalpaka, and is not effected

ज्ञानजन्यत्वपक्षे स्वेनैव भेदलक्षणविशेषणविषयेण स्वयं जन्यत इति
प्राप्तं तथाचात्माश्रयः ।

through a knowledge of the *attribute* portion—then, although in the present case the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot) is known as the attribute of the object (sc. earthen pot) made known by the perception itself (*sva*), it follows that the perception is self-originated in that it makes known an attribute, viz., the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot : and, *ex hypothesi*, it is the knowledge of this difference as the attribute portion which brings about the determinate knowledge or judgment that the pot is different from the cognition of the pot) : and this is an instance of the logical vice of self-dependence.*

through sense-organs, *atīndriyaṃ*. The latter view is that of the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. It denies the necessity of a previous knowledge of the *viśeṣhaṇa*: all that is necessary is intercourse of sense-organs with both *viśeṣhaṇa* and *viśeṣhya*.

To follow the argumentation of the text, it should further be remembered that the difference between cognition and the thing cognised (which difference is supposed to be made known by the *viśiṣṭajñāna* in question, sc. *ghaṭo'yaṃ*) may be expressed in two ways:—(i) *मत्तो भिन्नो घटः* Here *mattaḥ = ghaṭo' yaṃ* it *pratyakṣhāt*: *bheda* is the *viśeṣhaṇa* and is *ghaṭanishṭha* (sc. resides in locus *ghaṭa*): *ghaṭa* is *viśeṣhya*; both *pratyakṣha* is *bhedapratiyogi*.—(ii) *मद्वयोर्भेदः* Here *bheda* is *viśeṣhya*; both *pratyakṣha* and *ghaṭa* are *viśeṣhaṇa*'s: *pratyakṣha* is *bhedapratiyogi*; *ghaṭa* is *bhedadharmi*. The method employed in the text is that in vogue with controversial *Vedānta* treatises such as the *Khaṇḍana*, *Chitsukhī* and *Advaitasiddhi*. Briefly stated, it consists in the attempt to show that consciousness of duality, whatever theories may be held as to its genesis and formal expression, is inexplicable (*anirvachaniya*), false (*asat*).

* स्वसिद्धौ श्रव्यवधानेन स्यादेवा आत्माश्रयः ।

विशेष्यत्वेन भेदस्य भाने विशेषणविशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षमात्रं विशिष्टज्ञानकारणमिति पक्षे ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं भेदोऽस्तीति वाच्यं तथा च तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य कथं स भेदो विषयः स्यात् स्वात्पत्तेः पूर्वं स्वस्यैवाभावात् । ज्ञानान्तरस्य च स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानविषयत्वेन तत्प्रतियोगिकभेदोऽविषयत्वात् । अवर्तमानस्य ज्ञानस्य परप्रकाशयत्वे वर्तमानकालोपाधिकं स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति स्यात् । वर्तमानकाले ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव स्वप्रकाशमिति चेत् न अतीतानागतयोरपि तथात्वापत्तेः ।

If (you say that) the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot) is known as the subject portion—and if the view be adopted that the sole cause of a determinate perception is the intercourse of sense-organs with both subject and attribute portions (of such determinate perception)—then you will have to admit that the difference existed previous to the perception of it, (otherwise there could be no contact of sense-organs with it, and, *ex hypothesi*, no determinate perception could follow)—and if the difference existed previously (*tathā cha*), that difference could not possibly be vouched for by the perception (as you first stated); for the perception did not exist before it was produced (through contact of sense-organs with the subject portion (sc. the difference between the pot and the perception of the pot). And since a second perception cannot make known a self-known perception (—and this is what you started with—), it cannot make known a difference which has as its counter-entity a self-known perception (*tat*). If it be urged that a perception in other than present time is made known by a further perception (in present time), then the self-presentative character of cognition is made to depend on present time as its limiting condition (and is, *pro tanto*, destroyed). Again you may urge that the self-presentative character of cognition is by its very nature confined to the time of presentation,—which we deny; for self-presentative character belongs equally to the cognition of an object perceived in the past and to the cognition of an object yet to be perceived in the future (since both are cognitions like cognition

न हि घटः कदाचिदघट इति स्यात् । इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयस्य भेदस्य स्वसत्तामात्रेण स्वविषयकज्ञानजनकत्वमित्यपि प्रक्रियामात्रं प्रमाणाभावेन सत्तामात्रस्याप्यसिद्धेः । अस्तु तर्हि परप्रकाशज्ञानपक्षे प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण ज्ञानाज्ज्ञेयस्य भेदग्रहः । सोऽपि व्यावृत्तप्रतियोग्यादिग्रहपूर्वको न वेति विवेचनीयम् । न चेत्कथं भेदं विषयीकुर्यात् । न हि निर्दुर्मिकं निष्प्रतियोगिकं वा भेदं कश्चित्प्रत्येति अयमस्माद्विन्न इत्यनुभवात् ।

in the present time). (Nor can you argue for a change in the nature of cognition corresponding to a change in time), for the once perceived earthen pot ever remains a pot. Again, you may urge that, merely by the fact of its own existence (i. e. without being perceived), the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot), with which difference the sense-organs were in contact, produced the perception in which that difference was declared. This is nothing but a bare statement on your part; for, in the absence of evidence, the mere fact of existence (of difference, to which you refer,) is unproved.

Well then, let it be granted, on the view of one cognition requiring a second to make it known, that the difference between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing is made known through a second perception. Now it must be decided whether or not the knowledge of the difference was preceded by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counterentity and locus (the counterentity, *pratiyogi*, is the perception of the pot; the locus, *anuyogi* is the pot: cf. p. 13, note). If not thus preceded, how could the second perception, we ask, make known the difference? For no one is conscious of a difference which is destitute of locus or counter-entity, as is proved by the form our consciousness invariably takes (with regard to difference), viz., 'this is different from that.' If, on the other hand, you admit that the knowledge of the difference was preceded by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counter-entity and locus, you commit yourself to a regressus in infinitum in seeking for some

व्यावृत्तप्रतियोग्यादियहपूर्वकत्वे तु व्यावृत्तिग्राहकप्रत्यक्षा-
न्तरान्वेषणेऽनवस्था । तेनैव व्यावृत्तिग्रहे आत्माश्रयः । तस्माद्वस्तु-
मात्रावगाहि प्रत्यक्षं न भेदवार्तां जानातीति सिद्धम् । अस्तु तर्ह्य-
नुमानाज्ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्भेदग्रहः । तथाहि विमतो विषयः स्वविषयज्ञा-
नाद्विद्यते तद्विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वात् यो यद्विरुद्धधर्माश्रयः स ततो

further cognition to make known this difference (—a second cognition will demand a third and so on—). And if you declare that the knowledge of the reciprocal difference (between the perception of the thing and the thing perceived) was brought about by this same (second) cognition, the logical vice of self-dependence results (—the second cognition merely re-states the already perceived difference: to say then that it is the cause of the latter is to say that it is the cause of itself—). Thus we have proved that perception, which testifies merely to something existing, gives not the least evidence for a difference (between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing).

Grant then, you say, that the knowledge of a difference between the thing perceived and the cognition of the thing follows from an inference. Thus:—*

i. The thing under discussion differs from the perception which makes it known.

ii. Because this thing is the substrate of † attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known.

* The five-membered syllogism (nyāya) consisting of i. pratijñā or proposition to be proved; ii. hetu or probans; iii. udāharana or confirmatory instance; iv. upanaya or application; v. nigamana or conclusion. For the reduction of this number to three, cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. V. p. 659.

† so the object is jada, non-intelligent, whereas the perception is chetana, intelligent.

भिद्यते यथा घटात्पटस्तथाचायं तस्मात्तथा । मैवं विरोधस्य भेद-
निहृप्यत्वेन भेदासिद्ध्या विरोधासिद्धौ तद्विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वस्याप्य-
सिद्धेः । साध्याप्रसिद्ध्या व्याप्यसिद्धेश्च । न हि घटपटयोर्भेदः केन
चिन्मानेन सिद्धे । येन साध्यं प्रसिद्धेत् । प्रत्यक्षाभावेऽनुमानान्त-
रानुसरण्येयनवस्थादिदोषस्य तादवस्थ्यात् ।

iii. Whatever is the substrate of attributes which are oppos-
ed to the attributes of some other thing is different from that
other thing ; as for example, a piece of cloth is different from an
earthen pot.

iv. And the thing under discussion, sc. the perceived object,
is similar to the piece of cloth.

v. Therefore the *perceived* object is also different from the
perception of the object.

We reject the above argument. For since the *opposition* (of
the attributes) is to be known through the *difference* (between
the substrates to which the attributes severally belong), it fol-
lows that while the *difference* (between the substrates) is un-
proved, the *opposition* (of the attributes) is also unproved : hence
(the probans, ii.) 'this thing is the substrate of attributes which
are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this
thing known' is invalid. And because as long as the probandum
(*sādhya*, sc. difference between the perception of the object and
the object perceived) is unsupported (by any confirmatory ins-
tance) so long the universal concomitance (of opposition of attri-
butes and difference of substrates expressed in iii, or the universal
major premise) is unproved. Nor can the difference between an
earthen pot and a piece of cloth (which was adduced as a confirm-
atory instance) be proved by any evidence whatever so as to sup-
port the probandum. And if in the absence of perception (to prove
the confirmatory instance), recourse is had to a second inference
to prove it, the logical vices of an infinite regress, a see-saw &c.
will continue to haunt the argument.

आगमस्याभेदमात्रे तात्पर्येण पर्यवसन्नस्य भेदबोधकत्वं शङ्कितुमप्यशक्यम् । ननु ब्रह्मणः सकाशात् सृष्टिं प्रतिपादयन्नागमः कार्यजातस्य ततो भेदमपि प्रतिपादयति । अभेदे ततो जन्मैव न स्यादिति चेत् न सृष्टिवाक्यस्य सर्वस्य प्रधानादिपरपरिकल्पितकारणान्तरनिराकरणपरस्य मृद्घटादौ कारणात् कार्यस्य भेदेनानिरूपणवद् ब्रह्मणः कारणात् कार्यजातस्य सर्वस्य भेदेनानिरूपणेनाद्वितीयब्रह्मसम्भावनामात्रे तात्पर्यात् । अन्यथा भेदपरत्वे तन्निषेधोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । किञ्च

Since the Veda finds its complete meaning in teaching non-difference only (sc. Brahman alone exists), it is perfectly impossible to suppose that it can teach difference (sc. duality or reality of the world). Here it may be objected that, in teaching the emanation of the world from Brahman, the Veda also teaches that all products are different from Brahman : for, if not different, their emanation from Brahman could not be (spoken of). This objection must be set aside. For since every Vedic passage bearing on creation is devoted to the refutation of those other causes (of the world), sc. *matter*, *pradhāna* &c. (of the Sāṅkhyas) assumed by other thinkers (*i. e.* non-Vedāntins), by showing that just as in such cases as that of earth and the earthen pot, it is impossible to explain* what the difference is between earth, the cause, and the pot, the effect, so too it is impossible to explain what the difference is between Brahman, the cause, and the whole world which is an effect from Brahman, it follows that every such passage finds its real meaning only 'in making possible a conception of' Brahman, the one without a second. Otherwise, if the Veda were devoted to teaching *difference* (duality, or a real world), the prohibition with regard to duality (contained in such passages as 'there is no diversity in Brahman') would be purposeless.

* If the difference is inexplicable, *anirvachniya*, it is unreal, *asat* : this is of course the implication of the text.

सृष्टिवाक्यं न तावत्साक्षाद्भेदं प्रतिपादयति भेदवाचकपदाभावेनापदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वाभावात् पदार्थस्यैव संसृष्टत्वेन वा धर्मिमात्रपरत्वेन वा वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् कल्पनायाश्च निषेधवाक्यविरोधेनानुत्थानात् । न च ज्ञानमेव स्वातन्त्र्यचेयव्यतिरेकेणानुपपन्नं स्वभिन्नं चेयं विषयीकरोति न हि निर्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्भवति दृष्टं वा सविषयस्यैव भासमानत्वात् अन्यथा निष्प्रकारकमेव भासेत ज्ञाने विषयातिरिक्तस्य प्रकारस्याभावादिति वाच्यं चेयव्यतिरेकेण ज्ञानस्यानुपपत्त्यभावात् ।

Further, passages dealing with creation do not *directly* teach *difference* (between Brahman, cause, and the world, effect): for since no word bearing the sense of *difference* occurs in such passages, these cannot declare a meaning which the words composing them do not bear; because it is only what is meant by the words that a sentence can directly make known, either by showing syntactical relation between the words, or by conveying the simple notion of identity* (of subject and predicate in the sentence). And an inference (from Vedic passages bearing on creation of the world to the difference between Brahman and the world) is inadmissible as contradictory of (such) prohibitive passages (as 'Brahman is not this, not this'; and human inference must yield to the direct utterances of Revelation). Nor can the following be urged:—Cognition, which would be impossible in the absence of an object (to be cognised) different from the cognition, itself declares that the object cognised is different from the cognition; for object-less

* Nānādikshita glosses thus : अखण्डवाक्यत्वपक्षमाश्रित्य आह धर्मेति । A sentence (vākya) is (a) predicative, i. e. makes known a relation (samsarga) between the objects meant by the words (padārtha) in the sentence—पदार्थसंसर्गावगाहि वाक्यजन्यज्ञानम्—or (b) it expresses the bare identity of the objects meant by the words without predicating and relation between them—वाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थता धर्मिमात्रपरत्वं वा—अखण्डार्थता=अपर्यायानेकशब्दप्रकाशयत्वे सति अविशिष्टत्वम्, or=संजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशून्यत्वम् For the stock illustrations, tat tvamasi and so'yaṁ Devadattah, cf. Ved. paribh. Pan. lit. Vol. VII., p. 463.

तथाहि तत्किं ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयव्यतिरेकेणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिः स्थित्यनुपपत्तिर्ज्ञान्यनुपपत्तिर्वा । नाद्यः ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपत उत्पत्त्यभावात् । भावे वा प्रमाणतदाभासाभ्यामेवतदुत्पादनसम्भवे विषयानपेक्षणात् ज्ञानस्य सर्वत्र विषयजन्यत्वे नियमाभावात् । नापि स्थित्यनुपपत्तिः विषयस्य ज्ञानानाश्रयत्वात् तथात्वे वा विषयत्वव्याघातात् । ज्ञानविषयकज्ञानस्य विषयज्ञानाधीनत्वेन ज्ञेयं बिना ज्ञान्यनुपपत्तिरस्त्विति चेत् न ज्ञानस्य स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वेन स्वव्यवहारार्थं स्वाति-

cognition is neither possible nor a fact of experience, since only cognition accompanied by an object is experienced : otherwise (sc. if object-less cognition were a fact) only indeterminate cognition would be experienced, for apart from an object cognised there is nothing to determine the cognition. (The above is to be rejected) because the impossibility of cognition, in the absence of an object to be cognised, (as held above) does not exist. To explain :—Is it meant that the *production* of cognition is impossible, or that the *persistence* of cognition is impossible or that *secondary cognition* is impossible ? The first view will not hold, for cognition (sc. Brahman) in its essential nature is not a product at all. Or if it be conceded that cognition is a product, an object is not necessary to produce it, since cognition (whether true or false,) can be effected through (trustworthy) organs of knowledge (sc. perception, inference &c.) or through their counterfeits—there being no restrictive rule that cognition is in all cases produced by an object, (thus, in knowledge through inference the inferred object is not perceived.

Nor is it that the *persistence* of cognition is impossible, for the object cognised is not the locus of the cognition. Or if it be held that the cognised object is the locus of cognition* then the object has lost its character as an object (and has become a substrate of cognition, i. e. a cogniser).

* The special point of this argument is against the Naiyāyikas, with whom knowledge is an attribute (dharma) residing in Self (ātman) the substrate (āśraya).

रिक्तानपेक्षणात् । परप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षायां तस्याप्यन्यतस्त-
स्याप्यन्यत इत्यनवस्थित्या ज्ञानासिद्धेः जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात् । अज्ञा-
यमानस्यैव ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयसाधकत्वे प्रमाणाभावेन नरशृङ्गतुल्यस्य
स्वरूपसत्त्वासिद्धेः । अस्तु वा ज्ञानस्य स्वज्ञानार्थं ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षा
तथापि विषयापेक्षणं कुतः विषयज्ञानस्यैवापेक्षणात् । ज्ञानसामान्य-
स्यानपेक्षणे स्वविषयव्यावृत्तज्ञानापेक्षायां विषयापेक्षाप्यवश्यम्भावि-
नीति तत्तुच्छं ज्ञानस्य स्वत एव व्यावृत्तत्वात् परसिद्धजात्यादिवत् ।

Suppose then that it is impossibility of *secondary* cognition, in the absence of an object to be cognised; since secondary cog-
nition is dependent on the cognition of an object. This cannot be; for cognition being self-presentative does not require any-
thing besides itself to make itself known. Adopting the view that cognition is not self-presented, a second cognition will be needed (to make known the first), the second will demand a third cognition and so on ad infinitum; hence, cognition being left baseless, the world becomes blank darkness (sc. nothing could ever be known). On the view that it is an *unknown* cognition that testifies to the object cognised, it follows that the very existence of this cognition is a chimera like the horns of a man, for there is no means of proving its existence, (the cognition being *unknown*, ex hypothesi). Or granting that a cognition needs a second cognition to make it known, yet why, it may be asked, is a cognised object needed? For only cognition of the object is necessary. Against this it may be urged (by the opponent) as follows:—Since the necessity of cognition in general (sc. apart from some object cognised) is not here postulated, it follows that there is a necessity for a cognition as *differenced* (determined) by some cognised object; and hence the demand for an object is inevitable. But the above objection is idle; for cognition is self-differenced, as are the categories of generality (jāti) &c. maintained by the other (schools of philosophy).

The etcetera includes akhandopādhi and viśeṣha. cf. Muktāvali śl. 10 and 58. विशेषस्तु स्वतएव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरपेक्षा नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ and जात्यखण्डोपाध्यतिरिक्तपदार्थस्य किञ्चिद्धर्मप्रकारत्वनियमात् ॥

तथापि ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयव्यापृत्वाज्ज्ञेयं बोधयतीति चेत् न
व्याप्यसिद्धेः ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्विभिन्नदेशत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्याभावात् ।
अतीतानागतार्थज्ञानदर्शनेनैककालत्वस्याप्यसिद्धेः । तस्मात्

प्रत्येतव्यप्रतीत्योश्च भेदः प्रामाणिकः कुतः ।

प्रतीतिमात्रमेवैतद्भाति विश्वं चराचरम् ॥ १८ ॥

ज्ञानज्ञेयप्रभेदेन यथा स्वाप्नं प्रतीयते ।

विज्ञानमात्रमेवैतत् तथा जाग्रच्चराचरम् ॥ १९ ॥

Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the very fact of cognition* leads us to infer the existence of some object, because of the universally established concomitance of cognition and cognised object (sc. wherever there is cognition, there is also cognised object). Not so, is the reply. For this universal concomitance cannot be proved: because cognition and cognised object cannot exist together in the same locus (adhikaraṇa) since their spatial positions are distinct (sc. cognition is in the mind, and the cognised object is external to the mind; whereas smoke and fire are found together in one place): and, further, because the temporal co-existence (of cognition and cognised object) cannot be proved, since cognition of a past or future object is a matter of common experience.

Therefore, to sum up:—

There is no proof that cognition and cognised object are different. This universe, animate and inanimate, which appears in consciousness, is nothing but cognition....XVIII.

As the world of dreams, which is really nothing but cognition (Brahman), appears in consciousness under divers forms of cognitions and cognised objects; so too the world of waking consciousness, of things animate and inanimate (is nothing apart from Brahman)...XIX.

* तथापि इति बोधयति ज्ञानमिति शेषः । N. D's gloss.

तन्तोर्भेदे पटो यद्वच्छून्य एव स्वरूपतः ।

आत्मनोपि तथैवेदं भानमात्रं चराचरम् ॥ २० ॥

रज्जुर्यथा भ्रान्तदृष्ट्या सर्परूपा प्रकाशते ।

आत्मा तथा मूढबुद्ध्या जगद्रूपः प्रकाशते ॥ २१ ॥

आत्मन्येव जगत्सर्वं दृष्टिमात्रं सतत्त्वकम् * ।

उद्वेगस्थितिमास्थाय विनश्यति मुहुर्मुहुः ॥ २२ ॥

पूर्णानन्दाद्वये शुद्धे पाप्मदोषादिर्वर्जिते ।

प्रतिबिम्बमिवाभाति दृष्टिमात्रं जगत्त्रयम् ॥ २३ ॥

तदुक्तं भगवता वसिष्ठेन तस्मिंश्चिद्वर्णने स्फारे समस्ता
वस्तुदृष्टयः । इमास्ताः प्रतिबिम्बन्ति सरसीव तटद्रुमाः ॥ तथा—
यस्य चित्तमयी लीला जगदेतच्चराचरम् । यस्य विश्वात्मकत्वेपि

Just as a piece of cloth really turns out to be mere non-entity, in the absence of its component threads (*i. e.* if we attempt to think of the cloth as existing independently of the threads); so too this world, whose *esse* is *percipi*, (is reduced to non-entity, in the absence of Self (Brahman, Intelligence)...XX.

As rope (in the darkness) when vision is deceived, appears to be a snake; so, when the mind is deluded, the Self appears to be this world...XXI.

In the Self alone (as locus), all this world, whose *esse* is *percipi* takes its rise, and persists, and perishes ever and again...XXII.

In the One without a second, which is absolute Bliss and pure, free from sin and all defects, appear, as if reflected, the three worlds† whose *esse* is *percipi*...XXIII.

His reverence Vasishṭha has declared the same view:—

‘In that pure mirror (Brahman) are reflected all these things

Yogavāsishṭha Upasama prakaraṇa, śl.13.
” Utpatti ” śl.3,4.

whose *esse* is *percipi*, as trees
on its banks are reflected in a
stream. Again ‘All this world

खण्ड्यते नैकपिण्डता । तदेवं दृष्टिमात्रात्मकं जगदात्माश्रयविषये-
णाज्ञानेन कृतमित्यात्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वं साधु विकल्पितम् । तथा-
चात्मनि लौकिकवैदिकप्रमाणासम्भवेन शशविषाणादिवदसत्त्वे प्राप्ते
कुतस्तत्साक्षात्काराय शास्त्राभ्यर्थना कुतस्तरां युक्त्यपेक्षेति सङ्क्षेपः ।

एवं प्राप्ते ऽभिधीयते ।

१४ यत्तत्त्वं वेदगुप्तं परमसुखतमं नित्यमुक्तस्वभावं सत्यं
सूक्ष्मात्सूक्ष्मं महदिदममृतं मुक्तमात्रैकगम्यम् । यस्यांशे लेशमात्रं
जगदिदमखिलं भ्रान्तिमात्रैकदेहं प्रत्यग्ज्योतिःस्वरूपं शिवमिदम-
धुना कथ्यते युक्तितो ऽत्र ॥ २४ ॥

is the mental sport of that one (sc. Brahman as Hiranyagarbha),
and 'That one, although it constitutes the universe, does not lose
its character as a unity.'

Thus, therefore, the world whose esse is percipi is produced
through Nescience, which has the Self both as locus and as object,

The opponent of § 6, acquiescing in
our author's sensationalism, now pushes
it to its farthest limit : reduces the Self
also to non-entity, and dispenses with
both Veda and Vedānta philosophy.

and the assumption, therefore, of
the Self being an object for Nes-
cience (cf. § 6.) was *excellent* ! In
accordance with this assumption

(tathā cha), there can be no evidence, human or divine (sc. Veda),
for the existence of the Self : whence it follows that the Self is
non-entity like the horns of a hare ; further, there can be no desire
to study Veda in order to gain intuition of the Self, much less can
there be any necessity of argument (to support the teaching of
Veda as to the Self).

The above is a summary of the opponent's view.

14. To the view thus laid down it is replied :—

Now, in this place, we declare and support by argument that
Reality which lies hidden in the Veda, absolute Bliss, in its own

Self, the knower, cannot be *proved*,
not because it is non-entity, but because
it is self-proved, i. e. superior to all proof,
as being that by virtue of which proof,
pramāṇa, can be said to exist at all.

nature eternal and unrelated to
anything else, the existent, smaller
than the small and infinite ; this
is emancipation and is to be ap-

prehended only by the emancipated, a small part of a part of it is
all this false world, it is in its essence the light within, it is
blessed...XXIV.

किं तत्र प्रमाणाभावेनात्मनः स्वरूपानुपपत्तिः प्रतीत्यनुप-
पत्तिर्वा । नाद्यः आत्मस्वरूपस्य नित्यतयेतरनिरपेक्षत्वात् प्रमाणस्य
स्वप्रमेयानुत्पादकत्वाच्च । द्वितीये प्रमाणेपि तर्हि प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्यं
तदभावे नरशृङ्गवदसत्त्वेन स्वप्रमेयसाधकत्वासम्भवात् । तथा च
प्रमाणे प्रमाणान्तरानुसरणे ऽनवस्थितेः प्रमाणेनैव वस्तुसिद्धिरित्यभि-
मानमात्रम् । अथ प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षमेव स्वं स्वप्रमेयं च
साधयति स्वप्रकाशस्वभावस्य तस्य स्वपरव्यवहारे प्रकाशान्तरनिर-
पेक्षत्वात् प्रदीपप्रकाशवत् । न हि सर्वस्य साधकं प्रमाणं स्वसिद्धि-
र्थमन्यदपेक्षत इति युक्तिमत् । हन्त तर्हि सर्वस्य प्रमाणप्रमेयभेद-
भिन्नस्य जगतः साधक आत्मा कथं स्वाधीनसिद्धिकेन प्रमाणेन

In the above argument (*tatra*), is it meant that because there is no evidence (for the Self), the very existence of the Self is impossible, or that knowledge of the Self is impossible? Not the first; for the Self being in its essence eternal is independent of aught else (from which it should originate); and because evidence cannot originate that of which it is evidentiary. As regards the second alternative, even if evidence for the Self be granted, a second evidence must be premised to support the first evidence; for, if this second evidence be wanting, the first evidence is non-entity, like the horns of a man, and cannot therefore be evidentiary of its object. And so, in postulating a second evidence to support the first evidence, the logical vice of an *infinite regress* results: hence the view (underlying the second alternative) that the existence of an object can be proved only through one of the (recognised) sources of evidence (*sc.* perception, inference &c.) is merely a bold assumption.

Now (the opponent interposes) an evidence is indeed independent of any second evidence and proves its own existence as well as that of the object (to which it testifies); for being by nature *self-luminous* the evidence requires no further *illumination* to make itself and its object (*para*) known, just as the light of a lamp (needs no other light to illumine it). Nor is it logical to hold (continues the opponent) that what is evidence for all things needs to be proved by something else. Sad conclusion this!—we reply—for how in the face of it can it be held that the Self, which is evidence for the varied universe of things known and instruments of knowledge, can be proved by evidence which, in its turn, has to be vouched for by the Self (*sva*)! For the Self must have

सिद्धः स्यात् प्रमाणात्पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् । अन्यथा ऽसिद्धप्रमातृकं प्रमाणमेवात्मानं न लभेत । कथं वा सर्वस्य प्रमातारमात्मानं विषयीकुर्यात् प्रमाणं कर्मकर्तृविरोधप्रसङ्गात् तदन्यस्य च सर्वस्या-
नात्मत्वेनाप्रमातृत्वात् । तथा च श्रुतिः विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानी-
यादिति । तथा च प्रमातुरात्मनः स्वत एव सिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणाभा-
वान्नासत्त्वप्राप्तिः । किञ्चेदमात्मनो ऽसत्त्वमापाद्यमानं प्रमाणसिद्धम-
सिद्धस्वभावं स्वतो वा सिद्धम् । आद्ये ऽसत्त्वग्राहकप्रमाणस्य प्रति-
योगिविषयत्वनियमेनात्मनोपि प्रमाणसिद्धत्वेनासत्त्वानुपपत्तिः । न
द्वितीयः असिद्धस्यापादनानुपपत्तेः ।

existed prior to any source of evidence. Otherwise a source of evidence could not take on its character* as evidence while no cogniser of it existed. Or how could a source of evidence make known the Self which is the cogniser of all things; for this would be subversive of the distinction between agent, sc. knower, and object, sc. thing known (—the Self, in this case, being both knower and thing known)? Nor can anything other than Self be a cogniser, because it is not Self. And

Bṛihad : Up : IV. 5. 15.

thus Śruti declares:—"By what should one know the knower." And thus, since Self, the knower, is self-proved, its non-existence is not proved by the fact that there is no source of evidence applicable to the Self.

Further, we ask, is this non-existence of Self, as urged above, something proved by one of the recognised sources of evidence, or is it by nature something unknown, or is it self-proved? In regard to the first alternative—since the restrictive rule is that any source of evidence that makes known a non-existence must also make known the counterentity to that non-existence, the Self also must be proved by that source of evidence which declared for the non-existence of the Self, and therefore the non-existence of the Self cannot possibly be proved. Nor will the second alternative hold good, because no affirmation† is possible in regard

* आत्मानं स्वरूपम् N. D's gloss.

† परं प्रति शब्देनानिष्टप्रसङ्गनमापादनमत्रापादनशब्दार्थः N. D's gloss.

न हि बुद्धावनारूढस्वभावमापादयितुं शक्यम् । तृतीये त्वा-
त्मैव स्वतःसिद्धो ऽस्तु असत्त्वस्य च स्वतःसिद्ध्यनुपपत्तेः । अन्यथा
आत्मनो नामान्तरकरणप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्चात्मनो ऽसत्त्वं किमात्मना
ज्ञायते ऽनात्मना वा । नान्त्यः अनात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वाभावात् । नाद्यः
व्याघातात् । तथा हि किमात्मा स्वसत्ताकाले स्वासत्तां जानाति स्वास-
त्ताकाले वा । आद्ये स्वसत्ताकाले स्वासत्ता कुतः । तथा च किं जानीयात्
विषयस्यैवाभावात् । द्वितीये कथं जानीयात् स्वस्यैवाभावात् । स्वस-
त्ताकाले आत्मैव कालान्तरभाविनी स्वासत्तां जानातीति चेत् तर्हि
सन्नेवा ऽऽत्मा ऽनित्यः परं तच्च कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गेन परिहृ-

to anything wholly unknown ; for that which has not entered into the mind cannot be affirmed. But if the third alternative be adopted, then grant that it is the Self alone that is self-proved ; and (grant this) because non-existence (being *jada non-intelligent*, like *material* things) cannot be self-proved. If this be denied (sc. if you regard non-existence as *chetana*, intelligent), it follows that you have given to Self another name (and called it *non-existence*). Moreover is the non-existence of Self cognised by the Self or by not-Self ? Not by the latter, for the not-Self is not a knower. Nor by the former—which is a contradiction in terms. To explain our meaning, we ask, Does the Self cognise its own non-existence while it is itself existent or non-existent ? On the first alternative, the non-existence of the Self is impossible while the Self exists. Further, what should the Self cognise, since the very object to be cognised (sc. non-existence of Self) does not exist at that time ? On the second alternative, the Self could not possibly cognize, because it is itself non-existent at that time. If it be argued that the Self, while existent, cognises its own future non-existence, then we reply that (according to this view) the Self, existent now, perishes later on. And this view of a non-eternal Self (*tachcha*) we have already refuted (cf. § 2), because it logically implies the destroyal of the retributive power of actions, and the fruition of actions never performed by the individual.

तम् । किञ्चात्मनोऽसत्त्ववादी स्वात्मानं निराकरोति परात्मानं वा ।
आद्ये निराकर्तुरसत्त्वान्निराकार्य एवात्मा परमार्थः सन् । द्वितीये
निराकर्ता परमार्थ एव स्थितः कुतस्तेनात्मनोऽसत्त्वम् । तथा च
श्रुतिः असन्नेव स भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् अस्ति ब्रह्मेति
चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति । किञ्च प्रमाणं सति विषये प्रवर्तते
असति वा । असति चेत् तर्हि शशविषाणमपि साधयेत् असत्त्वा-
विशेषादसत्साधनसमर्थत्वाच्च प्रमाणानाम् । सति चेत् न तर्हि
प्रमाणाधीना वस्तुसत्ता प्रमाणप्रवृत्तैः पूर्वमेव प्रमेयसत्ताभ्युपगमात् ।
अन्यथा सति प्रमाणं प्रवर्तत इति स्ववचनव्याक्रोशः । सत एव

Further, does he who maintains the non-existence of Self mean to deny his own Self or the Self of another? In the first case, since the denier is (by supposition) non-existent, that other Self which it was intended to deny remains behind as real. In the second case, the denier is indeed posited as real. How then is it possible to maintain the non-existence of Self? Śruti confirms our view:—‘He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes

Taittir : Up : II. 6. himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing, him, in consequence, the wise know as existing.’

Again, we ask, Does a source of evidence apply to (sc. make known) an existent, or a non-existent object? If it can apply to a non-existent object, then it ought also to prove the existence of a sheer non-entity like the horns of a hare, because non-existence is a unity indivisible (and, therefore, includes pure nonsense like the above); and because (by supposition) sources of evidence are able to prove the existence of the non-existent. If a source of evidence is applicable to an existent object, then (the opponent’s view) that the existence of an object is subordinate to some source of evidence (which testifies to the existence of the object) is no longer tenable, because he must admit that the object existed even before the source of evidence was addressed to it. If he denies the previous existence of the object (anyathā), he contradicts his

वस्तुनो भानं प्रमाणाधीनमिति चेत् भवत्वभानस्वरूपे ऽनात्मन्य-
चेतने तथा । स्वयमेव भानस्वरूपे आत्मनि कथमेवं भविष्यति ।
तथा च श्रुतिः तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं वि-
भातीति । किञ्चात्मनि किं प्रमाणमित्यभिनिविशमानं प्रति सर्वाणि
प्रमाणानीत्येवोत्तरम् अज्ञातस्यैव प्रमाणविषयत्वात् आत्मन एवाज्ञा-
तत्वात् जडस्य च स्वत एवावृत्तस्वभावस्याज्ञानलक्षणावरणान्तर-
कल्पनाप्रयोजनशून्यतया ऽज्ञानाविषयत्वेन प्रमाणाविषयत्वात् प्रमा-
णाधीना ऽविद्यानिवृत्तिविशिष्टात्मस्वरूपचैतन्येनैव जडस्य सर्वस्य
प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः । तथा च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मनः प्रमाणाभावादस-

own statement that 'a source of evidence is applicable to an
existent object.' But (it may be urged) that it is the presentation
in consciousness of an existent object that is subordinate to a
source of evidence. Grant (we reply) that this is so in the case
of not-self which is by nature non-presentative, unintelligent.
But this cannot possibly be the case in regard to Self, which is
itself consciousness. Śruti confirms our view:—'When the Self
shines, everything shines after it:
by its light all this is lighted.'

Kaṭha Up: II. 5. 15.

Moreover to the man who is determined to have an answer to
his question, What evidence is there for the self?—our answer is
just this—All the recognised sources of knowledge (are evidence)
of the Self. For only that which has been concealed by Nescience
(ajñātasya can be made known by an instrument of knowledge,
(and) the Self is the only thing concealed by Nescience. And
since it is unnecessary to assume further concealment, in the form
of Nescience, of an unintelligent (material) thing, which is by
nature self-concealed (sc. which is itself Nescience), an unintelli-
gent thing cannot be (said to be) an object for (sc. concealed
by) Nescience and cannot therefore be an object for (sc. be made
known by) any of the recognised instruments of knowledge. For
knowledge of all unintelligent (material) things is effected only

त्वमिति साहसमाचम् । कथं तद्वैपनिषदत्वमात्मनः सर्वप्रमाण-
विषयस्योपनिषन्मात्रगम्यत्वाभावादिति चेन्न परिपूर्णसच्चिदानन्दप्र-
त्यग्रूपेण मानान्तराविषयत्वादौपनिषदत्वमिति वदामः । ननु स्व-
यम्प्रकाशस्याज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तिरित्युक्तम् । सत्यं वस्तुतस्तथैव ।
तथापि यथा मध्यन्दिनवर्तिन्यपि सवितरि स्वयम्प्रकाशे दिवान्धाः
पेचकादयस्तमसा ऽऽवृता ऽयं सवितेति कल्पयन्ति तथा ऽत्यन्तमूढ-

through Intelligence, which is the Self, when the Self is attended
by cessation of Nescience—this cessation of Nescience being de-
pendent on, as being effected through, an instrument of knowledge.
Hence, it is a downright rash statement to make, that the Self,
which is proved by all the instruments of knowledge, does not
exist because there is no evidence for its existence.

How then, it may be asked by way of objection, is the Self
to be considered as the *peculiar* subject-matter of the Upanishads;
for the Self cannot be said to be made known *only* by the Upani-
shads, if (as just admitted above) it is made known by *all the*
instruments of knowledge? Not so, we reply: for the Self is
the peculiar subject-matter of the Upanishads, in that the Self*
as identical with (Brahman) the absolute Existence, Intelligence,
Bliss, cannot be known through any other source of knowledge.

The opponent urges that he has already shown that 'a self-
luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescience.' (p. 4, l. 6.) True,
we reply; precisely so from the stand-point of absolute truth.
And yet just as blear-eyed owls fancy that the self-luminous sun
at noon is enveloped in darkness, so the grossly ignorant imagine
that the Self is concealed by Nescience. Hence all the Upani-
shads start to destroy the Nescience above described which con-
ceals the Self and is falsely imagined, and which, through the
special virtue of the Self (sc. its self-luminousness), was already
destroyed, *i. e.* was non-entity even previous (to a study of the

* प्रत्यग्रूपेणोपनिषन्मात्रविषय इत्यर्थः । N. D's gloss.

बुद्धयो ऽज्ञानेनावृतोयमात्मेति कल्पयन्ति । अत एवम्भूतस्यात्मा-
ज्ञानस्य कल्पितस्य पूर्वमेवात्ममाहात्म्यादेव वस्तुतो निवृत्तस्यासतो
निवृत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः प्रवृत्ताः स्वयम्प्रकाशस्वरूपे आत्मन्यज्ञान-
निवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण फलान्तराऽनिरूपणात् तदाकारवृत्त्युत्पादनेनैव
वेदान्तानां तद्विषयत्वोपपत्तेः । न चात्मनः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वे विप्रति-
पत्तिः । तथा हि आत्मा इतरानपेक्षप्रकाशः स्वसत्ताया प्रकाशा-
व्यभिचारित्वात् संविद्वदालोकवद्वा । तस्मात्स्वयम्प्रकाश आ-
त्मैत्यभिप्रेत्यैकं ज्योतिरिति । सैन्यवधेनवद्विज्ञानधनैकस्वभावतया

Upanishads). For since no other effect than the destroyal of Nescience can be supposed to be wrought in the self-luminous Self, it follows that the Upanishads have the Self (tat) as their subject-matter just in so far as they produce (in the minds of those who study them) a modification (vṛitti) of the Self (tat), (i. e. effect an intuition, sākshātkāra, of the identity of Brahman and Self).

Nor can there be any controversy as to the self-luminous character of Self. We explain :—the Self is not dependent on another for its light, because the light of Self invariably accom-
panies the existence of Self (sc. where Self is, there light is); as is the case with consciousness (samvit) or the light (of the sun). Hence the word *light* was used (verse 1, p. 1), meaning thereby that the Self is self-luminous: that is to say, the essence of Self is self-illumination because the Self is one mass of Intelligence, as a lump of salt (is self-salted). And thus runs the Śruti

Bṛihad : Up : IV. 4. 9.

passage :—‘In that state the Self is its own light.’

An opponent may argue that at one time our consciousness takes the form ‘I know the Self; at another time, the form ‘I know not the Self: and thus the self-luminousness of Self is contradicted by the fact of *cognisability* and *non-cognisability* (of Self) declared in the above states of consciousness. He proceeds to explain—if, in accordance with the consciousness ‘I know the Self,’ it be ad-

स्वयंज्योतिःस्वरूपमित्यर्थः । तथा च श्रुतिः अचायं पुरुषः स्वयं-
ज्योतिर्भवतीति । ननु कदाचिदात्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभवः कदा
चिदात्मानमहं न जानामीत्यनुभवः तथा चैतदनुभवद्वयोपस्थापि-
तज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वाभ्यां स्वयंज्योतिष्प्रमात्मनो विरुद्धते । तथा हि
यदात्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभावानुरोधेन ज्ञातत्वं ज्ञानकर्मत्वमा-
त्मनः स्वीक्रियते तदा ऽनात्मवत्स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वानुपपत्तिः । तदेव
हि स्वयम्प्रकाशं नाम यत्केनापि रूपेण कस्यापि ज्ञानस्य कदा चि-
दपि कर्मतां न भजते । अन्यथा पारिभाषिकमेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं

mitted that *cognisability* means 'the fact of Self being the object of the cognitive act' (sc. being *illuminated* by the cognition, *jñāna*), then the self-luminous character of Self cannot be maintained, for in this case the Self is like not-Self (which needs to be illuminated by cognition). Hence only that is self-luminous which never, under any form whatever, becomes the *object* of any cognition whatsoever. If any other meaning be attached to the term (*anyathā*), self-luminousness becomes a mere technicality (without logical connotation). Again, if in accordance with the consciousness 'I know not myself' the *non-cognisability* (of the Self) be granted, even then the self-luminous character of the Self is overthrown; because we cannot be conscious of one and the same object as both *present* and *not present* in consciousness simultaneously, for there is a contradiction here. Since our consciousness does not take this form—'when the object is in consciousness, even then it is not in consciousness'—; nor this form—, when it is not in consciousness, then it is in consciousness.' How, therefore. (concludes the opponent) is the self-luminous character of Self proved? We reply; this contradiction) cannot be urged against us as a fault, for in reality the Self is by nature different from both the *cognised* and the *non-cognised*. Śruti confirms our view, thus:—'That (Brahman)

Kena Up : I. 3.
also than the unknown.'

is other than known : it is higher

स्यात् । यदि च मामहं न जानामीत्यनुभवानुरोधेनाज्ञातत्वमेव स्वीक्रियते तथापि स्वयंज्योतिषद्वयः न ह्येकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि युगपद्भाति न भाति चेत्यनुभवितुं शक्यं विरोधात् । न हि यदा भाति तदानीमेव न भातीत्यनुभवः यदा न भाति तदानीं च भातीति । तत्कथं स्वयंज्योतिषद्वयमात्मन उपपद्यत इति नैष दोषः ज्ञाताज्ञातविलक्षणस्यैवात्मत्वात् तथा च श्रुतिः अन्यदेव तद्विदितादयोऽविदितादधीति । आत्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभवस्य का गतिरिति चेत् विशिष्टविषयत्वमेव न ह्येकस्मिन्ननुभवे निर्विकल्पकमज्ञानानानन्दव्यावृत्तं वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रं भातीत्यनुभवः येनात्मनो ज्ञानकर्मत्वं भवेत् अपि तूपाधिविशिष्टमेव तस्य च ज्ञानकर्मत्वेऽप्यविरोधः ।

What then (the opponent asks) is the process of the consciousness 'I know Self.' It consists, we reply, in this consciousness making known the Self as conditioned. For in 'I know Self' we are not conscious of Self, the reality as it is in own nature, unconditioned and free from Nescience and pain (anānanda), in which case (you could urge against us) that the Self might be the *object* of the cognitive act (and, therefore, not self-luminous); but we are conscious of the Self as conditioned by attributes (upādhi), and there is no contradiction in holding that the *conditioned* Self (*tasya*) is the *object* of the cognitive act. For the conditioned Self is not self-luminous, since it is only of the pure unconditioned Self that self-luminousness is maintained. The consciousness 'I know not the Self' is indeed a proof of the self-luminous character of Self. To explain: it is this very consciousness which makes known the Nescience that conceals (lit. has as its object) the Self. Accordingly, it must be held that in this same consciousness the Self, concealed by Nescience, is present. If this were not so, the form of the consciousness (*tat*) would merely be 'I know not.' Hence the consciousness 'I know Self,' having declared the Self which shines forth by reason of its own self-luminous character, the 'not' (in *I know not Self*) declares with regard to

न हि तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमस्ति । शुद्धस्यैवात्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वाङ्गीका-
रात् मामहं न जानामीत्यनुभवः आत्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वसाधक एव
तथा ह्ययं ह्यनुभवः आत्मविषयमज्ञानं विषयीकरोति । तथा चैतस्मि-
न्ननुभवे ऽज्ञानवदात्मापि भातीति वाच्यम् अन्यथा न जानामीत्येव
तदाकारस्यात् अत आत्मानमहं जानामीति स्वयंप्रकाशतया भा-
समानमात्मानमुल्लिख्य नेत्यज्ञानलक्षणमावरणं तत्र विषयीकरोतीति
युगपद्भासमानत्वाभासमानत्वे स्वयंप्रकाशस्याविरुद्धे इति मामहं
न जानामीत्यनुभवबलादेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमात्मनस्सिद्धम् । ननु घटं न
जानामीत्यनात्मन्यपीदृशानुभवास्तीति तस्याऽपि स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्र-
सङ्ग इति चेत् अथ कोयं घटो नाम यस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमापाद्यते

the Self (tatra) the *concealment* which is Nescience: hence the simultaneous *shining forth* and *not shining forth* of the self-luminous are not contradictory: hence on the very strength of the consciousness 'I know not self the self-luminousness of Self is established.

The opponent may here urge that since a similar consciousness holds good in regard to the not-Self, sc. 'I know not the earthen jar,' it should follow that the jar also is self-luminous. Pray declare what you mean by this said jar, whose self-luminous character you urge against us. Do you mean that it is the substrate (yatra) in which are observed certain attributes, e. g. *jar-ness* &c. ? If so, then having carefully pondered what the *own nature* of the jar is, set it forth as discriminated from aught else. You may say that it is a special kind of whole consisting of certain parts, e. g. the two halves of the jar &c. Not so, we reply for the relation of whole and part and other attributes pertaining to the jar are different (from the jar); these are not the *nature* of the jar itself. The *own nature* of the jar you must declare to be something different from these. The opponent may reply:—The *own nature* of the jar as something different from these attributes I am unable to specify. Whence this inability, we ask

घटत्वादयो धर्मा यत्र प्रतीयन्ते ऽयमेवेति चेत् किमस्य स्वरूपं तत्सम्यगनुभूय इतरविविक्ततया प्रदर्श्यतां कपालाद्यारब्धावयवि-
विशेष इति चेत् न अवयवावयवित्वादयो हि घटसंबद्धा अन्ये न
त्वेते एव घटस्वरूपाः । एतदन्यत् स्वरूपं वाच्यम् एतदन्यत्स्वरूपं
विशिष्य वक्तुं न शक्नोमीति चेत् कथमशक्तिः अननुभूयमानत्वात्
वा निर्विशेषत्वाद्वा नाद्यः घटस्वरूपस्य सर्वजनीनानुभवसिद्धत्वात्
द्वितीयेऽपि वक्तव्यं निर्विशेषमनुभूयमानं यत्स्वरूपं तत्किं स्वतो
ऽनुभूयते स्वभिन्नेन मानान्तरेण वा अन्त्येनिर्विशेषत्वव्याघातः न हि
निर्विशेषं वस्तु मानान्तरविषय इति संभवति चक्षुरादेः सार्वलौकि-
कस्य प्रमाणस्य सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वनियमात् । तस्मान्निर्विशेषं सक-

Is it because the nature of the jar is not present to consciousness or because it is a simple (undifferenced) entity ? The first alternative will not hold ; for the nature of the jar is a fact of common experience (sc. all know what is meant by *jar*). On the second alternative too you must declare whether this simple undifferenced nature of jar, present to consciousness, is self-cognised, or cognised through some source of knowledge other than the nature of the jar (*sva*). If you say through some source of knowledge other than the nature of the jar (*antye*), the simple undifferenced character (of jar, *per se*, as maintained above) is overthrown ; for a simple undifferenced entity *cannot* be made known through a source of knowledge different from itself, since all human instruments of knowledge, sc., the eye &c., are of necessity confined to making known a *differenced* entity (*i. e.* one qualified by attributes). Hence (you must admit) the *own nature* of jar remains as a simple, self-presented entity, not made known by any of the instruments of knowledge, sc. speech, mind &c. Now you must consider whether this *own nature* of jar is different from the Self or not ? Different, you say ? Not so, we reply ; for the *nature* of jar being an attributeless something, there is no attribute which might serve to establish a difference (between the jar

लघाङ्गनसाद्यविषयं स्वभासमानं वस्तु घटस्वरूपमित्यवशिष्यते
तत्किमात्मनो भिद्यते न वेति विचारणीयं भिद्यते चेन्न भेदकध-
र्माभावात् निर्विशेषत्वात् धर्मप्रतियोगिनोरुभयोरपि स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन
तद्विशेषितस्य भेदस्य प्रमाणेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वाच्च तस्मात्स्वयंप्रका-
शात्मस्वरूपमेव घट इति स्थितम् । एवं पदार्थान्तरमप्यात्मस्व-
रूपमेवेत्यनात्मा आत्मभिन्ना नास्त्येव । कस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमापा-
द्यते तुल्यन्यायादिति अतः स्वयंज्योतिः स्वभाव आनन्दधनो ऽस-
ङ्गादासीन एव आत्मा अनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाविद्यासंबन्धात् द्वैताकारेण
भाति रज्जुरिव सर्पदण्डाद्यात्मना परमार्थतस्तु न द्वैतं नाद्वैतमा-
त्मैव केवले विज्ञानघन इति सिद्धम् ।

per se and the Self). And further since both the (Self and the jar *per se* which are in this case the) substrate, dharmī and counter-entity pratiyogī (respectively of their mutual difference) are self-luminous, the difference between them cannot be made known (lit. grasped) by any of the recognised sources of know- ledge. Hence we have proved that the jar in its own nature is the self-luminous Self. In the same way it may be proved that other things are in essence the Self: hence the not-Self is in- deed not different from Self. For of which of the two (Self or not-Self) is self-luminousness affirmed (by you), since the argu- ment (for self-luminousness) is equally strong in both cases? Hence we have proved that the Self, which is by nature self- luminous, pure bliss, unrelated and without desire, *appears* in the form of the manifold through its connection with eternal, *inex- plicable* Nescience; just as a piece of rope (seen in the dark) at one time appears to be a snake, at another time, a stick or some- thing else: but in reality neither duality nor non-duality *is*, the Self, pure Intelligence, alone *is*.

१५ आत्माऽयं सर्वसंबद्धो भानुभासक उच्यते ।

नित्यो ऽयमविनाशित्वादुपादेयः कथं भवेत् ॥ २५ ॥

नन्वेहिकामुष्मिकसकलसांसारिकसुखतत्साधनकलापाद्विमुख-
स्यानादिभवसंचितपुण्यनिचयक्षपितकल्मषस्याशेषविषयदोषदर्शना-
सादितोद्वेगस्य परमपुरुषार्थकामिनो मुमुक्षोः कथमयमुपादेयः स्यात् ।
तत्र यद्यप्ययमात्मा नित्यः विनाशसामग्रीरहितत्वात् आत्मविनाश-
स्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वाच्च स्वसत्ताकाले ग्राह्याभावात् ग्राह्यकाले ग्राह-
काभावात् । न च परिच्छिन्नत्वादस्यानित्यत्वमनुमेयम् आत्मत्वादा-

15. This Self is in relation with (as the substrate of) all things. It is said (of it in the Veda) that sun-like* it illumines (all things) It is eternal, for it is imperishable. How then can this Self be *accepted* (as the goal of human endeavour) ?.....XXV.

An opponent argues that the Self as taught in Vedānta cannot be the highest aim of man: pleasure and the absence of pain are the only aims.

An opponent now urges that the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man by one who, when his sin has been destroyed by the store of merit acquired by him during a beginningless round of transmigratory lives, is pained at seeing defects in all earthly objects; and turning his face away from transient pleasure, present and future, together with the means of obtaining such, desires the highest aim of man, sc. emancipation. (This the opponent maintains) although (he admits that) the Self is eternal

* भान्विति भानुवद्भासकः । उच्यते युत्या इति शेषः । N. D's. gloss.

त्मा ह्यपरिच्छिन्नः । यत आहुः । यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चाति विष-
यानिह । यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते ॥ व्यापकस्या-
पि गगनादेरनित्यत्वं दृष्टमिति चेत् न व्यापकत्वापरिज्ञानात् सर्व-

for there is no means* of destroying Self (since Self is not a *product*, *kārya*): nor is the destruction of Self conceivable, for while Self *is*, the thing to be known (*grāhya*, sc. non-existence of Self) *is not*; and while the non-existence of Self *is*, the knower (*grāhaka* sc. Self) *is not*. Nor (continues the opponent) can the non-eternal nature of Self be inferred from its finitude; for to Self belongs self-hood, and Self is infinite. Hence the sages declared:—‘Since in this world it pervades things, grasps and enjoys them, and since of it the presence is unbroken, hence it is termed *ātmā*.’

But as a matter of fact (some one may argue) ether &c. (viz., time and space), which (like Self) are pervasive (infinite), are also non-eternal. Not so: for such an argument implies a misapprehension of the meaning of *pervasion*. Pervasion means relation with all things—*complete*† relation with everything—in short, the

* The gloss expands, technically,—समवायिकारणनाशो वा असमवा-
यिकारणनाशो वा द्रव्यनाशसामग्री परैरिष्यते—so. by the Naiyāyikas—न च
अकार्यस्य आत्मन उभयमस्ति । अकार्यत्वं च अनाद्यदृष्टप्रवाहाधारत्वादिति प्रागेवोक्त-
मिति—cf. pp. 2,3 supra.—To annihilate Self, we must destroy either the
samavāyikāraṇa, i. e. the material of which Self is composed, or the
asamavāyikāraṇa, i. e. the contact of the parts which make up the Self.
And this would be possible only if Self were a product, *kārya*, which
Self is not.

† *सर्वात्मना* is glossed by निःशेषतया ‘without a remainder.’ अधि-
ष्ठानं by सत्ताप्रदं; further on, आत्मनः सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वं नाम अध्यस्तस्य सत्तास्फूर्ति-
प्रदत्वम् ।—the substrate gives existence to that which it pervades,
and makes it appear in consciousness, *sphurti*. अननुगत = व्याप्य; अनुगत =
व्यापकः Pervasion, *vyāpti*, is not to be taken in the Nyāya sense

संबद्धत्वं हि व्यापकत्वं सर्वस्मिन्सर्वात्मना संबद्धत्वमननुगतानामधिष्ठानमिति यावत् न ह्यन्येनान्यत्सर्वात्मना व्याप्यते व्याप्यस्वरूपाऽसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् व्यापकस्वरूपविनिर्मुक्तस्वस्वरूपाभावात् अन्यथा सर्वात्मना व्याप्यऽसंभवात् । न च कालदेशवस्त्वपरिच्छिन्नेष्यात्मनि प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा भानुवत्स्वयंप्रतिभातत्वात् सर्वजगदवभासकत्वेन श्रुतौ प्रसिद्धत्वात् तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वे तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभातीति श्रुतेः । तथापि सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वादनुपादेयत्वमेव ।

being the substrate of finite (non-pervasive) things. Nor can one finite be *completely* pervaded by another finite, for it would follow from this that the pervaded thing was in itself non-entity, since it has no character apart from that of the pervading thing: otherwise (sc. if it had an independent character) *complete* pervasion could not take place. Nor is there need of any other source of knowledge to make known the Self, unlimited though this is as to time, space and substance; for, like the sun, Self is self-illuminated; for Self is declared in Śruti to illumine the whole world, thus—
'When the Self shines, every thing shines after it: by its light all this is lighted.'

Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man, because it is something different from pleasure and the absence of pain (which are the only aims.)

of invariable concomitance of two or more things; but in the further sense of that final and complete pervasion of the manifold by the One Existent or Self (ātman) on which Vedānta texts are for ever insisting. The Self alone is: the manifold *appears*, is *unreal*, mithyā, because *inexplicable* apart from the Self, anirvachaniya.

ननु किमिदमनुपादेयत्वं आदानक्रियाऽविषयत्वं वा इच्छा-
विषयत्वविरहे वा स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविरहे वा एतद्विशेषितसुख-
दुःखाभावेतरत्वं वा विशेषमेव वा अन्यद्वा । नाद्य इष्टापत्तेः सुख-
दुःखाभावयोरनुपादेयत्वापत्तेश्च न हि सुखं वा दुःखाभावो वा
आदानक्रियया विषयीक्रियते । न द्वितीयः इच्छातद्विषयत्वयोरप्यु-
पादेयत्वापत्तेः ।

Now what (we ask) is this unfitness to be accepted as the aim of man ? Does it consist (a) in the not being an object for the act of acceptance (in the literal sense of taking by the hand) ? Or (b) in the not being an object of desire ? Or (c) in the not being something which one can bring about (sādhya) by volition ? Or (d) in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, as qualified above in (e)* ? Or (f) simply in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, without the above qualification† ? Or (g) does this unfitness consist in anything else ?

The first (definition) will not avail the opponent, for from it follows what we are quite prepared to admit (viz., that the Self cannot be handled) : and further will follow (what he is not prepared to admit) that pleasure and the absence of pain are not to be accepted as the aim of man, because neither of these is the object of the act of handling.

Nor will the second definition‡ avail ; for from it will follow that both to *desire* and to *the being the object of desire* belong

* एतदिति एतेन स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविरहेण इति । gloss.

† sc. that Self is not a product (sādhya) to be willed into existence. विशेषमेव इति सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वमात्रमित्यर्थः । gloss.

‡ The obscure argumentation of the text (of which a re-statement largely based on Nānādikshita's gloss is attempted below) is urged against a Naiyāyika, who holds that not the Self but pleasure and the absence of pain constitute the sole end of man. Challenged to give a satisfactory explanation of his statement that the Self is *unfit* to be

fitness to be accepted as the aim of man. Nor can it be argued that what is to be accepted as the aim of man is the desired object itself as characterised by occasional and accidental attributes, sc. desire and the being the object of desire.

accepted as the aim of man, he is supposed to offer a number of definitions of such *unfitness*; but he is met on his own ground, and in each definition thus offered some one flaw or another is exposed. So much by way of apology for the inevitable pedantry of the following.

Now, if unfitness to be a human aim consists in the thing not being an object of desire, then, contrariwise, *fitness* consists in the thing being an object of desire. Next suppose that the emotion of desire has found expression in a proposition, e.g. 'I desire pleasure.' This proposition discovers (at least for the Naiyāyika) three elements, viz., the desired object or vishaya; the desire, ichchhā; and the being an object of desire, ichchhāvishayatā. The two latter are qualifying or adjective elements to the vishaya, which, in the above proposition, stands, not per se, but in relation to desire, sc. sakhe ichchhāvishayatā varttate. But now it is for the Naiyāyika to say whether he regards these adjective elements as viśeṣhaṇa's, i.e. distinguishing attributes 'which must be present with and inhere in (as forming a constituent part of) the object' (for this defn., cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. vii, p. 450). If so, both the ichchhā and the ichchhāvishayatā will have to be accepted as human aims along with the sukha to which they are both present and essential. And this of course he cannot maintain. To escape this difficulty he is supposed to argue that ichchhā and ichchhāvishayatā are upalakṣhaṇa's, i.e. occasional and accidental attributes; as 'the crow perched on Chaitra's house yester lay, though not there now, serves to point out the house, and is therefore only an upalakṣhaṇa,' (cf. Ved. paribh. supra). Now the absence of pain is universally desired, and this is based on the common consciousness that absence of pain is desirable: in the latter, again, pain is a part of what is known; and since only what is known can be desired, pain too must be an object of desire.

ताभ्यामुपलक्षितं विषयस्वरूपमिति चेन्न दुःखस्याप्युपादेयत्वापत्तेः
ज्ञानविषयस्यैवेच्छाविषयत्वादिच्छाजनकस्य च ज्ञानस्य सविकल्प-
कत्वेन दुःखाभावविशेषणदुःखविषयत्वात् । विषयैकदेश इति चेन्न
सुखे तदाभावत् इच्छाविषयविशेष्यस्वरूपमात्रमुपादेयमिति चेन्न अहं
स्वर्गो स्यामित्यत्रात्मनोपि तथात्वापत्तेः । न तृतीयः स्वकृतिसाध्य-
योरपि दुःखतत्साधनयोरनुपादेयत्वात् । न चतुर्थः विशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् ।
न पञ्चमः साध्याऽवैशिष्ट्यात् । अन्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् दुःखत-

For from this would follow that pain also is to be accepted as an aim. For only that which is known can be an object of desire : (and pain is known), because the knowledge which gives rise to desire (for the absence of pain), inasmuch as it implies a knowledge of certain attributes in the thing desired (*savikalpakatvena*), implies a knowledge of pain as the counterpart of the absence of pain. Nor can it be held that only a part of the (desired) object (is the aim of man), for in the case of pleasure this is absent (sc. a *part* of the pleasure is not desired). Nor that the subject portion only of the thing desired is to be accepted as an aim ; for in such a case as 'May I possess heaven' the Self would have to be admitted as an aim (which the opponent will not admit). Nor will the third definition avail ; for pain and the instruments of pain, although these are things which one can bring about by volition, are not accepted as the aim of man. Nor is the fourth definition valid ; because the qualification (inserted therein) is useless (since the highest aim of man is admittedly not the means of obtaining pleasure, but pleasure itself). Nor is the fifth definition valid ; for the probandum (*sādhya*) is here identical (with the probans, *hetu*).

Nor is it possible to unfold any other definition,* because the

* The only view open to the opponent is to declare that Self is not the aim of man, because it is identical with pain.

त्साधनतादात्म्यस्यानभ्युपगमपराहतत्वात् । न च सर्वात्मकत्व-
व्याघातः सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वस्यैव सर्वात्मकत्वस्यार्थत्वात् न हि सत्यस्य
मिथ्यातादात्म्यमस्ति सत्यत्वविरोधात् । तथा चानुपादेयत्व-
स्यैव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् किमिदमनुपादेयत्वमात्मनोऽनिष्टमापाद्यत
इति चेन्न इतरानुपसर्जनत्वस्यैवोपादेयार्थत्वात् तच्च सुखदुः-
खाभावयोरेव अन्येषां तदुपसर्जनत्वात् सुखदुःखाभावेतरश्चात्मा
भावरूपत्वेन दुःखाभावानात्मकत्वात् । सर्वशून्यात्मकत्वे दुःखा-
भावात्मकत्वमप्यस्तीति चेन्न विज्ञातुरात्मत्वात् न च शून्यं
विज्ञातृ न च विज्ञानं शून्याश्रयमभावस्य भावधर्मकत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

view that pain and the instruments of pain are identical with Self is already set aside as being held by nobody.

Nor may the opponent argue that thus (sc. by denying the identity of the Self with pain) the all pervasive character of Self is overthrown; for what we mean by this all pervasive character is that the Self is the substrate of all things (cf. *adhis-
thāna*, p. 67 note). For the identity of the real (*satya*) with the unreal, (*mithyā*) cannot be affirmed as subversive of reality.

And as this very *unfitness* to be accepted as a human aim cannot itself be explained (by the opponent), what, we ask, has he proved against us (*anishṭa*) as regards the unfitness of the Self to be the aim of man? Nor so, (replies the opponent); for that something is fit to be accepted as the highest aim of man implies the independence of that thing as regards other things. And this independence belongs only to pleasure and the absence of pain; for to these all other things are subordinate (as aims). And the Self is something different from pleasure and the absence of pain, for since Self is a *positive* entity (*bhāvarūpatvena*) it cannot be the *negation* of pain. And it cannot be urged that since Self is the void (or blank pervading) all things, it can be the negation of pain; for self-hood belongs to the cogniser. Nor is the void a cogniser; nor does cognition reside in the void; for a mere negation cannot (as substrate) have a positive entity as its attribute.

आरोपितो धर्मधर्मिभाव इति चेत् तर्हि आरोप्यस्याधिष्ठानं वाच्यम्
न हि निरधिष्ठानो भ्रमोऽस्ति । शून्यमेवेति चेत् तर्हि शून्यस्यामि-
श्रमेव सर्वः सर्वं प्रतीयात् न च तथ्यस्ति सत्त्वेनैव सर्वस्य प्रतीतेः ।
किं च सर्वस्यारोपितत्वे आरोपाधिष्ठानस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धिर्वाच्या सा
च स्वत एवेति कथं शून्यं स्यात् न हि शून्यं स्वतः सिद्ध्यति
अन्यथा परिभाषामावत्त्वापत्तेः तस्माद्भावरूपत्वादेव दुःखाभावा-
नात्मकत्वम् । न च सुखात्मकत्वं स्रगादिविषयज्ञानाज्जन्यत्वात्
सुखस्य च तज्जन्यत्वात् अन्यथा तदर्थितया तदुपादानानुपपत्तेः ।
जन्याजन्ययोश्चाभेदानुपपत्तेः ।

If it be argued that this relation of substrate and attribute is falsely imagined, then some substrate for this false surmisal must be affirmed; for there is no error without a substrate (of reality). If it be said that this very void is the substrate, then all men should be conscious of all things as blended with this void (which, as substrate, should appear identical with the things surmised in it): but such is not the case, for all things are known as existent only. Further, on the view of the universe being erroneously surmised, some proof of the existence of the substrate of the surmisal previous (to the surmisal) must be declared. If it be said that this proof proceeds from itself alone, than a void cannot be the substrate; for a void is not self-proved: for to say that it is self-proved (anyathā) would be to convert it into a mere technicality (or synonym of Self). Hence Self as a positive entity cannot be the negation of pain. Nor is the Self pleasure, for it does not follow as an effect from the knowledge of garlands and other pleasurable objects. And pleasure is an effect from such knowledge: if it were not, then the pleasurable objects could not be accepted (desired) through a desire for pleasure. And the Self is not pleasure, because the identity of a product (sc. pleasure) and a non-product (sc. Self) is impossible. Nor is it the relation only between pleasure (and the Self) that is brought about as a product by the acceptance of pleasurable objects (tena); for consciousness takes the form, 'pleasure has been produced for me': and further,

न च सुखसंबन्ध एव तेन जन्यः सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीतेः सुखात्मनोः संबन्धस्य समवायस्याजन्यत्वाच्च । न च स्वात्माऽसंबद्धे स्वतन्त्रे सुखे प्रमाणमस्ति त्वया चाङ्गीक्रियते त्वया-
प्यात्मतादात्म्यापन्नस्य नित्यसुखस्यैव स्वीकारात् । किं च सुखा-
त्मनोऽस्तादात्म्ये ऽहं सुखमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः न च तदस्ति तस्मा-
त्सुखदुःखाभावान्यत्वादनुपादेय एवात्मा । न च ताभ्यामन्यः
पुरुषार्थोऽस्ति येनात्मा मुमुक्षुणामुपादेयः स्यात् । न चात्म-
त्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजकं तथा लोके व्यवहाराभावात् । सुखं
मे स्याद् दुःखं मा भूदिति आत्मसंबन्धिसुखदुःखाभावयोरेव
काम्यमानत्वात् । न चात्मा मम स्यादिति कामनास्ति न चाऽ-
काम्यमानः पुरुषार्थः ।

because the relation between pleasure and Self technically termed *samavāya*, *intimate*, is not a product (it is considered *nitya*, eternal in the Nyāya). Nor is there evidence for pleasure independent of (as) not in relation with the Self, nor do you admit such; for what you admit is eternal pleasure only, identical with Self. Moreover, if Self and pleasure were identical, our consciousness ought to take the form 'I am pleasure'—which is not the case. Hence Self is indeed not to be accepted as an aim; because it is different from pleasure and the absence of pain. Nor apart from these two is there any other human aim, so that Self might be accepted as an aim by those desiring emancipation. Nor can it be held that self-hood constitutes the highest aim of man, since this is not the common experience of the world; for pleasure and the absence of pain, relating to ourselves, are the only desirable things:—thus 'may pleasure be mine; may pain cease for me.' Nor does desire take the form,—'may Self be mine'; and that which is not desired is not a human aim.

न चायमलौकिकः पुरुषार्थः । लोकव्यवहारानुलङ्घनेनैव वेदेन पुरुषार्थप्रतिपादनात् । अन्यथा * ऽलौकिकत्वात्स्वर्गस्यापि सुखरूपता न स्यात् । किं च किमयं लोकोत्तरो येनैहिकं पार-
त्रिकं च ससाधनं सर्वं पुरुषार्थं परित्यज्याऽऽजन्मब्रह्मचर्याद्यऽशेष-
दुःखजातेनात्मानमवसादयन्नलौकिकः पुरुषार्थोऽयमात्मेति वदन्नेव
कृतार्थः स्यात् । तथा च रागिगीतं । वरं वृन्दावने शून्ये शृगालत्वं
य इच्छति । न तु निर्विषयं मोक्षं मन्तुमर्हति गौतम इति ॥

Nor can it be said that this (Self) is a super-sensuous aim ; for the Veda declares the aim of man without running counter to human experience. If this were otherwise, paradise (svarga) also, as being something super-sensuous, could not have (for men) a blissful character. Moreover, how strangely has this (Vedāntin opponent) transcended human experience, that, setting aside all human aims in this and in the next world, together with the means of attaining them, and harassing himself with all that complex of pains from birth onwards through the various stages of studentship &c., to the end of life, he should rest satisfied in the bare statement that the Self is a transcendental aim ! To our view conforms (tathācha) the song of the lover:—' Better he who desires to be a jackal in the lonely Vṛindā forest † : nor can one accept emancipation in which no objects remain to be desired, O Gautama !'

* पुरुषार्थत्वात् var. lect.

† cf. Gadādhara's Mukti-vāda :

वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये शृगालत्वं ब्रजाम्यहम् ।

न च वैशेषिकीं मुक्तिं प्रार्थयामि कदाचन ॥

किं च यद्ययमात्मा पुरुषार्थः स्यात् कथं तर्ह्यप्रयत्नलब्धमात्मानमुपेक्ष्य वैषयिकसुखलोभाततत्काम्यतीर्थादौ म्रियन्ते प्राणिनः न च ते भ्रान्ताः शास्त्रेणापि तदनुमोदनात् । न लोकवचनात्तात न वेदवचनादपि । मतिरुक्रमणीया ते प्रयागमरणं प्रतीति ॥ कुष्ठाद्युपहताश्च दुःखाभावमुद्दिश्य म्रियन्ते इति तु सर्वजनीनम् । तत्किमनात्मैवोपादेयः । कः संशयः । सुखदुःखाभावयोस्तत्साधनानां च पुत्रकलवगृहक्षेत्रगोहिरण्यादीनामुपादेयत्वस्याविगीतत्वात् । नन्वैहिकामुष्मिकसकलसुखतत्साधनजातमुपेक्ष्य केवलमात्मानमेवोद्दिश्य श्रवणादावपि के चन प्रवर्तन्ते एवेति चेते

Moreover, if this Self is the aim of man, how is it that living beings disregard the Self which is to be attained without difficulty, and through a desire for sensuous pleasure go to die at one or other of the favourite tīrthas? Nor can it be said that these men are deluded, for even the Śāstras approve their action: thus,

Matsya Pu. IV. 23.

‘Dear one! thy resolve to die at Prayāga thou shalt not yield through word of man or Veda.’ And it is a common fact that lepers and others, seeking rest from pain, choose to die. What then, (the Vedāntin asks) is something other than Self to be accepted as the aim of man? Assuredly; for the acceptance of pleasure and the absence of pain and the means thereto, viz., sons and home, cattle &c., as aims, is without reproach.

Now it may be urged that some men disregarding all present and future pleasure and the means thereto, and keeping in view the Self alone, enter on *hearing* and the other prescribed means. Well then, according to the maxim that compliance with the opinion of the many is right, let these men be considered the deluded ones; for they are few indeed. It may be urged that the Veda

तर्हि भ्रान्ता भवन्तु बहुनामनुग्रहो न्याय्य इति न्यायात् द्विचा एव हि ते । विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति सुखरूपत्वमप्यात्मनः श्रुतौ श्रूयत इति चेत् श्रूयतां नाम न ह्येतावता ऽऽत्मा पुरुषार्थः न हि सुखमित्येव पुरुषार्थः स्वसंबन्धितयैव तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वात् अन्यथा शत्रुसुखस्यापि पुरुषार्थत्वापत्तेः न हि सुखं सुखस्य पुरुषार्थः । सांसारिकमपि सुखं नानादुःखसंभिन्नमनुपादेयमेवेति चेन्न गत्यन्तराभावात् न हि भिक्षुकमिया स्यान्न्यनधिश्रयणम् । आयाति चेत् दुःखं परिहर्तव्यं । सुखं तूपादेयमेव । कथं तर्ह्यात्मज्ञानार्थं श्रवणादिविधिः दुःखाभावार्थमेव । एवमात्मनोऽपुरुषार्थत्वे प्राप्ते ब्रूमः ॥

declares that the Self is pleasure in the passage 'Brahman is Intelligence Bliss.' This may be granted ; but by this is not meant that Self is the aim of man : for pleasure in itself is not an aim but only as being in relation with one's Self. Otherwise the pleasure of an enemy also would become an aim. Nor is pleasure the aim of pleasure (which the Vedāntin identifies with Self.) It may be urged that wordly pleasure, mingled as it is with all kinds of pain, certainly cannot be accepted as the aim of man. This objection is to be set aside, because no other resource (than this sorrow-mingled pleasure) is open to man : nor does the fear of beggars deter one from putting the cooking pot on the fire. But (you say) pain comes. Away with it then ! But pleasure is indeed the aim of man. Why then for the sake of a knowledge of the Self are injunctions as to *hearing* &c. prescribed in the Veda ? Simply to bring pain to an end.

To the view thus laid down, viz, Self is not the aim of man, we reply :

१६ आत्मा सर्ववस्तूनां यदर्थं सकलं जगत् ।

आनन्दाब्धिः स्वतन्त्रोऽसाधनादेयः कथं वद ॥ २६ ॥

यदन्यद्वस्तु तत्सर्वं यद्वेदे न शृङ्खलत् ।

सता सर्वपदार्थानामनादेयः कथं वद ॥ २७ ॥

यद्वशे प्राणिनः सर्वे ब्रह्माद्याः कृमयस्तथा ।

ईशानः सर्ववस्तूनामनादेयः कथं भवेत् ॥ २८ ॥

यच्चक्षुः सर्वभूतानां मनसो यन्मनो विदुः ।

यज्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिषां देवो नोपादेयः कथं विभुः ॥ २९ ॥

मोदप्रमोदपक्षाभ्यामानन्दात्मा तमो गतः ।

जीवयत्यखिलान् लोकाननादेयः स्वयं कुतः ॥ ३० ॥

16. That which is the Self of all things; for the sake of which the whole world is; that ocean of bliss, independent of aught else;—pray declare how this Self is to be rejected as the aim of man.....XXVI.

How is that to be rejected which is the Existence of all things; that from which all that is regarded as distinct is sheer non-entity like the horns of a man?.....XXVII.

How is that to be rejected under whose control are all living things from Brahmā down to insects; the ruler of all things?.....XXVIII.

How is that to be rejected which the wise know to be the eye of all things; the mind of the mind, the light of lights, the bright, pervading one?.....XXIX.

How is that to be rejected, the Self which is Bliss, which, when it has gone to darkness on its two wings of joy* and great joy, gives life to all the worlds?.....XXX.

* cf. Taitt. Up. II. 5.

यस्यानन्दसमुद्रस्य लेशमात्रं जगद्गतम् ।

प्रसृतं ब्रह्मलोकादौ सुखाश्रितं कः परित्यजेत् ॥ ३१ ॥

हिरण्यगर्भमैश्वर्यं यस्मिन्दृष्टे तृणायते ।

सीमा सर्वपुमर्थानामपुमर्थः कथं भवेत् ॥ ३२ ॥

यत्कामा ब्रह्मचर्यन्त इन्द्राद्याः प्राप्सम्पदः ।

स्वस्वभोगं त्यज्यन्त्येव न पुमर्थः कथं नृणाम् ॥ ३३ ॥

यद्विदुर्नाफलाः सर्वा वैदिक्यो विविधाः क्रियाः ।

यागाद्या विहितास्तस्मिन्नुपेक्षा वद ते कथम् ॥ ३४ ॥

That ocean of Bliss of which only a small portion belongs to this world ; that sea of pleasure which pervades the world of Brahmā and the rest, who would reject ?.....XXXI.

That which being known, the majesty of Hiranyagarbha is estimated as nothing ; * how can that which is the utmost limit of all human aims be not the aim of man ?.....XXXII.

How can that not be the aim of men through desire for which Indra and the others†, happy as they were, entered on pupilage and abandoned each his own sphere of happiness ?.....XXXIII.

All the various actions, sc. sacrifices &c., prescribed in the Veda, have as their result the desire to know that Self (yat)‡ : pray then declare how you can reject that Self.....XXXIV.

* cf. Taitt. Up. II. 8. 4. and Max Müller's note, *in loco*.

† cf. Chānd. Up. VIII. 7 et. seq.

‡ The true aim of Vedic sacrifice is not the securing of a transient paradise (svarga) for the sacrificer, but that purification of his mind whereby he may gain intuition of Self which is Bliss eternal. Paradise is but the half-way house, as it were, to reach which he engages in sacrifice who knows not this highest truth.

यद्दृष्टिमात्रतः सर्वाः कामाद्या दुःखभूमयः ।

विनश्यन्ति क्षणेनासावुपादेयः कथं न ते ॥ ३५ ॥

आह्लादरूपता यस्य सुषुप्ते सर्वसाक्षिकी ।

तत्रोपेक्षा भवेद्यस्य तदन्यः स्यात्पशुः कथम् ॥ ३६ ॥

सत्यमितरानुपसर्जनत्वमुपादेयत्वं तच्चात्मन्येव विश्रान्तं
सुखदुःखाभावयोरपि तदर्थत्वादन्यथा परसुखदुःखाभावयोरप्युपा-
देयता स्यात् तस्मादात्मैव परमपुरुषार्थः सुखदुःखाभावात्मक-
त्वाच्च । न च भावरूपस्यात्मनो दुःखाभावात्मकत्वानुपपत्तिः ।

How can that not be your aim by the mere knowledge of
which all desires &c., the causes of pain, perish instantly?.....
...XXXV.

Is he not a beast who rejects that Self which as Bliss is
vouched for by all living beings in the state of dreamless sleep?...
.....XXXVI.

Grant then (as the opponent holds) that fitness to be

His objections met in detail: Self
which is absolute Bliss, remains as the
highest aim of man.

accepted as the aim of man con-
sists in the thing being indepen-
dent of aught else. But this in-

dependence abides only in the Self; for pleasure and the absence
of pain are for the sake of Self (tat). If this were not so, one
might accept as one's aims the pleasure and absence of pain per-
taining to another. Hence Self is the highest aim of man; and
further, because Self is pleasure and the absence of pain. Nor can
it be urged against our view that Self as a *positive* entity cannot
be the *negation* of pain.

भवेदयं दोषो यद्यात्मनि दुःखं पारमार्थिकं स्यात् न त्वेवमस्ति किं तु अज्ञानफणिफणासमुद्भूतदेहाद्यभिमानविषदंष्ट्रायवर्तिरागादिलक्षणहालाहलविषज्वालाप्रतिबद्धस्वात्मदृष्टिः सवितरि तमोवन्निर्दुःखेपि स्वात्मनि रौरवाद्यनेकभेदभिन्ननरकसमुदायसमुद्भूतदुःखाद्यमारोपयत्येव केवलम् । आरोपितस्य चाभावो नाधिष्ठानादतिरिच्यते अधिष्ठानादभेदेनैवारोपितत्वाद्भेदेन च तस्यासत्त्वात् असन्निषेधस्य च सत्त्वात् । तस्माद् दुःखाभाव एव परमपुरुषार्थ इति यो मन्यते तस्याप्यात्मैव परमपुरुषार्थः तस्याशेषसंसारदुःखनिवृत्तिरू-

This would be a weak point in our position, if to Self pain pertained as something absolutely real: but such is not the case. But the man whose vision of Self has been overcome by the heat of that deadly poison sc. his passions, lurking in that poison-fang, sc. the false consciousness of his body, sense-organs &c. (as identical with Self)—which issues from the hood of that serpent Nescience;—such a man merely surmises in the Self, to which in reality no pain belongs, all those pains which issue from the various hells, raurava and the rest; just as one might surmise darkness in the sun. And the negation of a falsely surmised thing is no other than the substrate itself (in which that thing was falsely surmised, for only as identical with the substrate was it surmised; and because, as distinct from the substrate, it is non-entity; and because the negation of non-entity is entity. Hence even the thinker who holds that the cessation of pain is the only aim of man has the Self indeed as his highest aim; because Self (tasya) is the cessation of all this world of pain.

पत्वात् । असाध्यत्वादात्मनो ऽपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेत् न । साध्य-
त्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात् । स्वतःसिद्धदुःखाभावमुद्दिश्य
मुमुक्षुप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न । ब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारानन्तरं प्रवृ-
त्त्यनुपपत्तेरिष्टत्वात् । तत्फलस्य जातत्वात् । पूर्वं त्वशेषदुःखाभा-
वरूपब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारेणैव सफलत्वात् । ज्ञानमपि न साध्यं
वृत्तेरारोपितत्वात् चैतन्यस्यात्मत्वादिति चेन्न अस्य परामर्शस्य
ज्ञानोत्तरकालीनत्वात् ।

Nor can it be argued that Self, inasmuch as it is not some-
thing that can be brought about as a result, cannot be the aim
of man ; for it has been disproved* that a human aim consists in
something to be brought about as a result. Nor can it be argued
that the aspirant to emancipation would not engage (in *hearing*
and the other prescribed means), if he were to have in view the
absence of pain (sc. the Self) which is self-established (*i.e.* already
exists independent of his efforts). For it accords with our view
that activity (on the part of the aspirant) should be impossible
after he has gained intuition of Self as identical with Brahman :
because the result of his activity (tat) has been brought about ;
whereas, previous to this, his activity is fruitful only through his
intuition of Self as identical with Brahman, which is the cessation
of all pain. Nor is it to be urged that knowledge also is not some-
thing to be brought about as a result, because the mental modifi-
cation (vṛitti, which is supposed to give rise to the intuition) is
something falsely imagined, and because knowledge (chaitanya,
Brahman) is the Self. For this judgment (as to the falsity of
mental activity) is subsequent to the rise of (perfect) knowledge
(sc. the intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self).

* निरस्तत्वाद्भाष्यकारेणेति शेषः । Gloss. cf. Ved. Sū. I. 1. 4. Bhāshya
in loco.

दुःखाभावोऽपि न केवलः पुरुषार्थः दृष्टदुःखेऽपि विषये भोग्य-
सुखलोभेन प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादिति चेन्न आत्मन एव परमानन्दरूपत्वेन
सुखस्यापि सत्वात् । न चात्र विप्रतिपत्तिः परमप्रेमास्यदत्त्वेन सुख-
रूपत्वस्य सिद्धत्वात् असुखात्मनि प्रेमादर्शनात् । न च सुखस्य
जन्यत्वात् जन्याजन्ययोरानुपपत्तिः जन्यत्वासिद्धेः ।
न च सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीत्या तत्सिद्धिः शुभादृष्टवशादात्मस्व-
रूपसुखाभिष्यञ्जनयोग्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्युदयेनान्यथासिद्धेः । न चाऽहं
सुखमिति प्रतीत्यापत्तिः विद्वांसं प्रतीष्टापादनात् । अविदुषस्त्वध्य-
स्ताहङ्कारदेहादावेवात्माभिमानात् तत्र चात्मन उपसर्जनतयैव
स्फुरणात् ।

Nor is it to be argued that the absence of pain is not alone the aim of man, because, as a matter of fact, through the greed for pleasure to be enjoyed, activity follows in regard to an obviously painful object. For the Self in its character of the highest Bliss is pleasure also. Nor is there any contradiction here, for we have proved that Self, as the object of the highest love, is pleasure (cf. p. 10.), since love for a Self which is not pleasure is unknown. And it must not be urged that because pleasure is something produced, the identity of a product (sc. pleasure) and a non-product (sc. Self) is impossible: for it has not been proved that pleasure is a product. And it cannot be urged that the consciousness 'pleasure has been *produced* for me' is a proof of this; for the above consciousness was brought about in another way, sc. through the rise of a mental modification capable of manifesting (*i. e.*, removing the veil of Nescience from) pleasure which is the Self,—(and this was possible) through the merit acquired by the individual in his former lives. Nor is it to be argued that (if Self and pleasure are identical) our consciousness should take the form 'I am pleasure.' For, as against him who knows the truth, this is merely to affirm what he himself maintains; but such consciousness does not accrue to him who knows not the truth, because he falsely identifies the Self with his body and with his consciousness of 'I' (*ahamkāra*), which again have been falsely surmised (in the Self): and because in his case the Self appears in consciousness (sc. I am happy) as subordinate to his body and *ahamkāra* (*tatra*).

अत एव ज्ञानसुखादिगुण आत्मेति तार्किका भ्रान्ताः ।
 न च दुःखेपीयं गतिः समा दुःखस्य सुषुप्त्यादौ व्यभिचारित्वेनात्म-
 स्वरूपत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रमाणाभावाच्च सुखात्मकत्वग्राहकश्रुतिविरो-
 धाच्च । तथा चात्मत्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजकं । न च लोकोत्त-
 रत्वोपालम्भः महानुभावैरेव व्यासवशिष्टादिभिर्महाराजैश्च ऋषभा-
 दिभिरैहिकामुष्मिकसकलसुखतत्साधनस्यात्मलिप्सयैवोपेक्षितत्वात् ।
 न च बह्वनुग्रहो न्यायः देहात्माभिमाने तदभावात् । न च सुख-
 रूपत्वे ऽप्यात्मनः स्वसम्बन्धिसुखाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वं सम्बन्धस्या-
 त्माऽभेदोद्देश्यकत्वात् ।

Hence also the Naiyāyikas are deluded who hold that the Self has knowledge, pleasure &c. as attributes. Nor can it be said that the line of argument (adopted above in regard to pleasure) will hold equally well in regard to pain. For since pain is absent from the states of dreamless sleep &c., it cannot be the Self (which is all pervasive): and because there is no evidence (to support the argument advanced in regard to pain); and because Śruti, declaratory of pleasure as the Self, contradicts this position. Accordingly, our view is that Self-hood alone constitutes the highest aim of man. Nor can the reproach that our position transcends human experience find place; for mighty ṛishis like Vyāsa and Vasishṭha and mahārājas like Ṛishabha, through a desire to obtain Self, put aside all pleasure, here and hereafter, together with the means of obtaining such. Nor can the maxim that compliance with the majority is right apply here (to exclude the few like Vyāsa and the rest); for this maxim does not hold (even the opponent will admit) in regard to the false identification of the Self with the body (by the ignorant majority).

Nor can it be argued that even if the Self is pleasure, it cannot be the aim of man, on the ground that there is no such thing as pleasure in relation with itself (sc. pleasure viewed as Self). For the relation desired (uddeśyakatvāt), is that of identity of Self (with pleasure).

सुखं ह्यत्यन्तमुपादेयं कथं मे प्रियतमे आत्मन्यभेदेन प्रवि-
शेदिति कामयमानो भेदभ्रमस्य प्राबल्यादभेदं कर्तुमशक्नुवानः सम्ब-
न्धमात्रेण संतुष्यति । न च सम्बन्धः स्वतः पुरुषार्थः सुखदुःखाभा-
वेतरत्वात् । यत्तु सुखस्य सुखं न पुरुषार्थ इति तस्य सुखे अना-
त्मत्वारोपनिबन्धनत्वात्* । न च कुशाद्युपहतानां मरणानुपपत्तिः
तत एवात्मनः सुखरूपत्वसिद्धेः । ते हि परमप्रियतमे आत्मनि
दुःखकारणं देह इति तमुपेक्षन्ते न त्वात्मानम् । पारलौकिके सुखे
कामनादर्शनात् । एतेन काम्यतीर्थादौ मरणं व्याख्यातम् । मरण-
स्यापि देहपरित्यागरूपत्वात् ।

For pleasure is accepted as an absolute aim. 'How may pleasure enter into the relation of identity with my beloved Self'—the man, who thus desires and is unable to identify Self with pleasure because his mistaken notion (of Self and pleasure being distinct) prevails, is content to desire merely the relation (between Self and pleasure). Nor can it be said that this relation is in itself the aim of man, for it is something other than pleasure and the absence of pain (which alone the opponent regards as the aims of man). But as regards the opponent's statement that pleasure cannot be the aim of pleasure, that was due to his falsely surmising that pleasure is not Self. Nor can it be urged that (on the view of Self and pleasure being identical) lepers and others would not choose death, since the very fact of this choice proved that Self is pleasure; for, thinking that the body is the cause of pain to the beloved Self these men set at nought the body and not the Self:—(they do not disregard the Self) as is proved by the fact that they do desire pleasure in the world to come. For this reason death at one or other of the favourite tīrthas is praised (in the Śāstras), since death too is an abandonment of the body.

* अज्ञानारोपनिबन्धनत्वात् var. lec.

आत्मन एव पुरुषार्थत्वे मुक्तसंसारिणोरविशेषापत्तिरिति चेत्
न ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां विशेषात् । अज्ञानी हि भ्रान्तः कर्ता भोक्ता
संसारी जरामरणधर्मा इत्येवमात्मानं जानाति विद्वांस्तु तद्विरुद्धा-
कर्त्रभोक्तृसंसारिजरामरणजन्मादिशून्यस्वप्रकाशसच्चिदानन्दपरिपूर्ण-
स्वभावाशनायाद्यतीतास्थूलानुनेतिनेतिसत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणसर्वजग-
दधिष्ठानभूतमात्मानमागमाचार्यस्वानुभवैकवाक्यतया साक्षात्कृत्या-
शेषदुःखनिदानमज्ञानं तत्कार्यं च बाधित्वा देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेद-
शून्यपरिपूर्णानन्दविग्रहः स्वमहिम्ना प्रतिष्ठितः परमपुरुषार्थो भवति ।
न च ततः परं कामयितव्यमस्ति सर्वेषां कामानामात्मप्राप्तिमीमत्वात् ।

Nor can it be urged that if Self is the sole aim of man, it follows that there is no difference between an emancipated soul and one that is still in the bonds of transmigration. For there is a difference between them due to their knowledge and ignorance respectively. For the ignorant one being deceived, regards his Self as agent and enjoyer, as in the bonds of transmigration and subject to decay and death. But he who has knowledge, when he has done away with Nescience as false, the cause of all pain, and its products, on gaining intuition of the Self through the unanimity of the Vedas, of his teacher and his own experience—the Self which is the substrate of the whole world, which, per contra, is neither agent, nor enjoyer, nor bound in transmigratory bonds; nor subject to birth, decay and death; (but which) is self-luminous Existence, Intelligence Bliss, absolute in its own nature, described (in Śruti) as beyond hunger &c; as neither great nor small; as *not this, not this*; as Existence, Intelligence &c.,—then this one who has knowledge becomes the highest aim of man (sc. the Self), established in his greatness, the absolute Bliss, unlimited as to space time and substance.

Nor beyond this is aught to be desired; for all desires find their goal in the attainment of Self.

१७ नन्वात्मसाक्षात्कारः श्रुतिजन्यः कथं स्यात् इन्द्रिय-
जन्यस्यैव ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्कारत्वात् शब्दस्य च परोक्षज्ञानजनक-
त्वस्वाभावात् । न चापरोक्षे आत्मनि शब्दस्याप्यपरोक्षज्ञानजन-
कत्वमेव युक्तमिति साम्प्रतम् । करणस्वभावस्यान्यथाकर्तुमशक्य-
त्वात् अपरोक्षयोग्येऽपि वह्न्यादौ शब्दादिना परोक्षज्ञानस्यैव जन-
नाच्च । न च परोक्षमपि ज्ञानमध्यस्थमानमपरोक्षं भवतीति युक्तम्
अनुमित्यादौ तथा ऽदर्शनात् उत्तरोत्तरज्ञानस्यापि शब्दत्वाविशे-
षात् । न च मास्त्वपरोक्षज्ञानम् अपरोक्षभ्रमस्याज्ञानतत्कार्यस्या-
नुच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नास्त्येवात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानम् ।

17. An objection: How can intuition of Self be effected

Objections:—(a) Veda can effect only through Śruti, for only to know-
mediate knowledge of Self: ledge effected through a sense-
organ does intuitional character belong; and because it is the nature
of verbal communication (śabda) to bring about non-intuitional
(mediate) knowledge. Nor is it correct to say that the power
to bring about intuition of the Self, which is self-presented,
justly belongs to verbal communication also. For the nature of
an instrument of knowledge cannot be changed, and because
through verbal communication (and inference &c.), only a mediate
knowledge of fire and like objects is effected, though these are
fit objects for immediate knowledge. Nor is it right to hold that
mediate knowledge also, when repeated, becomes immediate;
for such is not observed in regard to inferential knowledge, &c.,
since verbal character belongs equally to each succeeding cog-
nition. Nor may an opponent reply,—Well then, away with
intuition of Self! For (if there be no such thing as intuition)
it will follow that there can be no destruction of Nescience and
its products which are forms of *intuitional* error, (since *intui-
tional* error can be removed only by *intuitional* right know-
ledge). Hence (concludes the opponent of p. 66) there is no
intuitional knowledge of the Self.

अथ वदन्ति । श्रवणाद्यभ्यासजनितशब्दज्ञानसमुद्भूतभाव-
नाप्रचयसचिवमन्तःकरणमेवात्मसाक्षात्कारे करणं न च भावनाधी-
नसाक्षात्कारस्य मृतपुत्रसाक्षात्कारवदप्रामाण्यम् । शब्दप्रमाणमूल-
त्वेन विश्वासात् । न च यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सहेति
विरोधः आगमगम्यत्वे ऽपि तुल्यत्वात् तस्य वाक्यस्य लौकिकश-
ब्दवैदिकसंस्कारासंस्कृतमनोग्राह्यत्वनिषेधपरत्वात् ।

With regard to this point some (Vedāntins)* maintain that
(b) Veda *plus* mind necessary for the instrumental cause of intui-
immediate knowledge of Self. tion of the Self is indeed the
internal organ, assisted by the store of mental impressions
springing from *verbal* knowledge (sc. knowledge through Śruti)
which knowledge was effected through constant practice of
hearing and the other prescribed means. Nor is it to be argued
that intuition which is dependent on (a store of) mental
impressions is untrustworthy, as is the intuition of one's dead
son (—such is the force of these mental impressions that the
father *seems* to see his dead son before his eyes—). For trust
is to be placed in this intuition of the Self, since it based on the
Veda as its authority (śabdapramāṇa). Nor can it be urged that
this view is contradicted by the
Taitt. Up. II. 4. passage—‘from which (Brahman)
speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it.’ For even
if it be held that Self is made known by the Veda, the same
contradiction will result (in regard to the above passage, where
speech is said to turn away from Brahman). (And there is no
contradiction) because the above passage is intended to deny that
the Self can be made known by *human* utterance, and by a mind
unpurified by Vedic purifications (sc. hearing, pondering &c. the
Veda-word).

* The view of Vāchaspati Miśra : cf. Bhāmatī pp. 86, 114.

तन्न । आगमस्यैवात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वात् तं त्वौप-
निषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामीति श्रुतावात्मन्येवौपनिषदत्वविशेषणश्रवणात् ।
तच्चेतराविषयत्वे सति तन्मात्रविषयत्वे समञ्जसम् अन्यथा प्रमाणा-
न्तराव्यावर्तकत्वे विशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् । लौकिकस्यापि वाक्यस्य दशम-
स्त्वमसीत्यादेरात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वस्यैव दृष्टत्वात् । प्रमाणस्व-
भावहानिः स्यादिति चेन्न । प्रमेयानुसारित्वात् प्रमाणस्वभावस्य प्रमे-
यस्य च नित्यापरोक्षत्वात् ।

The above view must be rejected; for the Veda *alone* brings about intuitional knowledge of the Self, since in the passage

Met : It is the character of the object to be known (prameya) that determines the character of the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), and not *vice versa*: Self (Brahman) being an eternally self-presented entity, all knowledge of it must be *immediate*; and such knowledge of it the Veda can afford, if the sentences be taken in their *implied* and not in their *literal* sense.

'I ask for that person (purusha) which is made known in the Upanishads,' (Bṛihad Up. III. 9. 26) a qualification is declared as to the Self, sc. that of being made known by the Upanishads.

And this qualification justly applies to Self, provided that the Self, while it is not made known through any source but the Upanishads (itarāvishayatve) is made known through them alone; otherwise the qualification is unnecessary, if it does not exclude other sources of evidence for the Self. (And) because it is a fact of experience that human utterance too, sc. Thou art the tenth man, &c. * does indeed bring about intuition of one's Self (when this is regarded as dwelling within one's body.)

Nor is it to be argued that (as a consequence of our view) the special character of the pramāṇa would be lost (sc. in bringing about intuition, the śabdapramāṇa would cease to be what it is and would become pratyakshapramāṇa): for the character of a pramāṇa depends on the object to be known †; and the Self, the object in this case, is eternally (self-presented).

* cf. Panchadaśī. Pandit Vol. VIII. p. 589.

† cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. pp. 467 et seq.

न च ज्ञानगतो धर्मो ऽपरोक्षत्वं यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्माय-
मात्मा सर्वान्तर इत्यात्मनोऽप्यपरोक्षत्वश्रवणात् । किं तदपरोक्षत्व-
मिति चेत् वस्तुतः प्रमात्रव्यवहितत्वमेव । तच्च प्रमातरि विश्रान्तं
यावद्यावत्प्रमातुर्विप्रकृष्यते तावतावत्परोक्षत्वात्कर्षदर्शनात् तथा
चापरोक्षस्वभावे आत्मनि परोक्षज्ञानं जनयन्वेदो भ्रान्तिमेव जनयेत्
अन्यथास्थितस्यान्यथाबोधनात् । मोक्षसाधनीभूतस्य चात्मसाक्षा-
त्कारस्य मनोजन्यत्वे व्यभिचारिकरणजन्यतया ऽप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः ।

Nor is it to be urged that intuitional character is an attribute
only of the cognition (and not of the thing cognised); for
intuitional character is declared of the Self also in the passage—

Bṛihad. Up. III. 4. 1.

‘the immediately presented, the
positively presented Brahman,

the Self which is within all.’

What then, it may be asked, is this immediacy (or intui-
tional character of the object)? It consists in the object cognised
not being really divided off from the cogniser, (*i. e.* the object is
directly cognised, without the intervention of any second
cognition). And this *not being divided off from the cogniser*,
has its end in the cogniser*; for it is a common fact that the
farther the object cognised is removed from the cogniser, the
more is its mediate (non-intuitional) character increased. And
thus, if the Veda gives rise to mediate knowledge of the Self;
which is by nature immediately presented, it gives rise to error,
for it makes known a thing as other than it is (*sc.* the Veda,
on this supposition, declares as mediately known the Self,
which is really immediately known). And if intuition of Self,
which is the means to final emancipation, is effected through
the mind, its untrustworthiness follows, since it is effected through
an instrument which does not always attend (*vyabhichāri*) right
knowledge (*sc.* the mind is sometimes the instrument of error).

* Jiva the cogniser, and Brahman the cognised, become one ;
cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. IV. pp 396 et seq.

न च वेदमूलतया प्रामाण्यम् अपरोक्षतया वेदेनानवबोध-
नात् बाह्यनसातीतत्वश्रुतिव्याकोपाच्च । न च लौकिकविषयत्वं मुख्ये
बाधकाभावात् । न च श्रुतिविषयत्वे ऽपि समानो दोषो लक्षणयैव
तद्बोधनात् ॥

१८ ननु तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये लक्षणैव न युक्ता भागलक्षणया
एकदेशपरिग्रहे श्रुतार्थपरित्याग प्रसङ्गात् ।

Nor can its trustworthiness be urged on the ground that it is based on Veda; for (your contention is that) the Veda does not furnish intuitive (but only mediate) knowledge of the Self. And because your view (that mind is the organ of intuition of the Self) contradicts the Śruti passage, which declares that Self is beyond speech and mind. Nor can you urge that this passage refers to a worldly mind (unpurified by *hearing &c.*); for there is no reason why the primary meaning of the passage should be rejected. Nor can you urge that even if the view that Self is made known by Veda be adopted, the same fault will apply, sc. that of contradiction in regard to the above Śruti passage. For (we hold that) Self (*tat*) is made known through the relation technically termed *implication* (*lakṣhaṇā*).

18. Here it may be objected that *implication* does not

Objections :—(a) to take the mahāvākya 'that thou art' in an *implied* sense is to surrender the paramount authority of Veda to that of perception, inference and the other *pramāṇas*.

apply to such sentences as 'that thou art'; for if a part of the meaning of the words be accepted through what is technically term-

ed *bhāgalakṣhaṇā* (whereby a part of the meaning is abandoned and a part retained*), the abandonment of what is directly enounced in Śruti follows as a consequence.

* cf. Ved. paribh. Vol. VII. p. 217.

न च पदयोरैकविभक्त्यन्तनिर्दिष्टयोः सामानाधिकरण्यपरामर्शानन्तरं पदार्थयोरभेदो वाक्यार्थस्तावत्प्रतीयते स च विरुद्धस्वभावयोः संसार्यसंसारिणोर्जीवपरमात्मनोर्न संभवतीति मुख्यार्थानुपपत्त्या लक्षणा युक्तेति साम्प्रतं श्रुतिसिद्धे अनुपपत्त्यभावात् । न च विरुद्धस्वभावयोर्भेदग्राहिमानान्तरविरोधेनाविरुद्धयोरंशयोरभेदो बोध्यत इति वाच्यम् । श्रुतिविरोधेन भेदग्राहिप्रमाणस्यैवाप्रामाण्यात् अन्यथा लक्षणया ऽप्यखण्डाद्वितीयप्रत्यगात्मबोधनं न स्यात्सकलभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात् ॥

Nor can it be urged against this view that as soon as it is observed that two words standing with the same case-affix refer to a common subject, the identity of the things denoted by the two words—which identity is the meaning of the whole sentence—is perceived ; and since this identity is impossible in the case of *jīva* and *Paramātmān*, two things with opposed attributes, sc. *jīva* is the transmigrating Self, and *Paramātmān* is the non-transmigrating Self, the primary (or direct) meaning (of such sentences) becomes impossible, and therefore *implication* may rightly apply to them. For impossibility (contradiction) cannot hold in regard to the meaning (or thing) established in a Śruti passage (sc. that *must* be which Śruti declares).

Nor can it be argued that the identity of the two non-opposed parts (of *that* and *thou*, sc. pure Intelligence) is made known (by Śruti,) by reason of the contradiction resulting from the exercise of the other sources of evidence (perception) inference &c. which declare a difference between the two naturally distinct things (sc. *jīva* and Brahman). For the source of evidence which declares for a difference is itself untrustworthy as being in opposition to Śruti. Otherwise (sc. if perception, inference, &c. are not to be set aside by Śruti) a knowledge of the impartite, One without a second, the Self within all things, could not result from Śruti even by implication, as being contradicted by perception inference &c. which make known difference (duality) in all its forms*.

* Bheda commonly divided into *sajātiya*, *vijātiya* and *svagata*, for which terms cf *Panchadaśī*: Pandit Vol. V. p. 667.

तथा च मुख्यार्थे नानुपपत्तिः । न च शक्यलक्ष्ययोः सम्बन्धो लक्ष्यस्यात्मनो ऽसङ्गत्वात् । न चासङ्गेन किञ्चित्सम्बद्ध्यते न चासम्बद्धो लक्ष्यते तथा ऽदर्शनात् । न च सर्वथानभिधेयार्थो लक्ष्यत-
इति दृष्टं लक्ष्यपदार्थे मूकताप्रसङ्गात् तत्रापि लक्षणायां लक्षणानव-
स्थाप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्च पदाभ्यामेकार्थो लक्ष्यते अर्थद्वयं वा । नाद्यः ।
एकपदवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् पदार्थवाक्यार्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च । विशेषे वा
अखण्डो वाक्यार्थो न स्यात् । अत एव न द्वितीयः । लक्षणाऽभा-
वप्रसङ्गाच्च । न हि विरुद्धयोरभेदानुपपत्त्या कृता लक्षणा भिन्नयोर-
भेदे पर्यवस्यति ।

And so there is no impossibility in regard to the primary meaning (of the sentence 'that thou art'). Nor can there be a connection between the literal and implied meanings of the words; for the thing implied, sc. Self is unrelated. Nor can anything be related to the unrelated; nor can the unrelated be *implied*; for this is not supported by experience. Nor is it a fact that an object, which is absolutely unnameable, can be made known by implication; for, in regard to such implied object, silence must follow (—the object being nameless). If in regard to the implied object (tatra) a further relation of implication* be maintained, then the series of such relations becomes endless.

Further, is one thing implied by the two words (*that* and *thou*), or are two things implied? Not *one* thing; for then one of the two words is unnecessary, and it follows that there would be no difference between the meaning of the words and the meaning of the sentence. Or if there be a difference, then the Impartite (undifferented Brahman) could not be what the sentence means, (—the difference, whatever it might be, would become an attribute to Brahman of which it might be predicated; but the sentence is supposed to teach the attribute-less, predicate-less Brahman). Hence also the second alternative (sc. that *two* things are implied by the two words) will not hold; and also because there would then be no such relation as *implication* between them. For implication, which is postulated to remove the contradiction which results when the identity of two opposed things is maintained, does not fulfil its function in teaching the identity of the two distinct things.

* The technical *lakshitalakshanā* is here meant: cf. Ved. paribh. pandit. Vol. VI. p. 97.

किं च वेदान्ते तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमेव प्रधानमितरत्सर्वं तदुपकरणमेव तथा च प्रधानवाक्ये एव कथं लक्षणा तच्चासमवेतार्थत्वेनेतरचैव सा युक्ता । गुणे त्वन्याय्यकल्पनेति न्यायात् । अत्र केचित् । तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये लक्षणेव तावन्नाङ्गीक्रियते । न च विरुद्धोर्जीवपरमात्मनोः सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिः रज्जुसर्पयोरिव एकस्य बाधेनापि तदुपपत्तेः । न चानयोर्मध्ये कस्य बाध इति विनिगमकाभावे यदि परमात्मन एव बाधमाशङ्केत तदा शास्त्रमपुरुषार्थे जीवे पर्यवसितमिति न प्रमाणं स्यादिति वाच्यम् ।

Moreover, in the Vedānta, such sentences as 'that thou art' &c. are *primary* to which all others are merely *ancillary*. And so, implication cannot apply to a primary sentence; it applies only to secondary sentences (*itaratraiva*), since these do not have their objects in constant connexion with the primary sentences (*tatra*); according to the maxim that 'the assumption of an irregularity (such as that of putting aside the *literal* for an *implied* meaning) is to be made only in regard to a secondary sentence.

In regard to this some teachers hold that in a sentence such as 'that thou art' implication is not admitted. Nor can it be argued that (according to their view) the relation of identity (sc. that of referring to one and the same substrate) cannot attach to *jīva* and *Paramātmān* opposed as they are. For this relation is possible when one of the two things has been proved false, as in the case of the rope and the snake mistaken for it. Nor is it to be objected that since in answer to the question,—Which of the two, *jīva* or *Paramātmān*, is to be rejected as false?—no compelling reason for the adoption of one or other alternative is forthcoming, one might urge that the *Paramātmān* should be rejected as false, in which case *Śruti* (*Śāstra*) would terminate with (teaching the reality of) *jīva* which is not the aim of man, and would therefore cease to be a source of right knowledge.

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति मन्त्रवर्णात् ब्रह्मणः सत्यत्वे अवधारिते परिशेषाज्जीवस्यैव संसारिणो बाधात् । ननु कोऽयं जीवः चैतन्यं जडो वा आद्ये ब्रह्मैवेति बाधानुपपत्तिः । द्वितीये घटादिवद्भोक्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् नैष दोषश्चैतन्याभासत्वेन तस्य प्रसिद्धजडाजडविलक्षणत्वात् । न च नीरूपस्य चैतन्यस्याभासानुपपत्तिः नीरूपस्यापि गगनस्य स्वच्छे जले आभासदर्शनात् रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूवेति श्रुतेश्च । तथा चेदं सर्वं यदयमात्मेति शास्त्रात्सर्वस्याज्ञानतत्कार्यस्य बाधे केवल आनन्दरूपः परमात्मैवापवर्गे ऽवशिष्यतइति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ।

For from the passage, 'Brahman is Existence, Intelligence the Infinite,' the reality of Brahman is ascertained, and therefore the rejection of the transmigrating jīva as false follows by a process of exclusion.

What (it may be asked) is this jīva? Is it intelligent, or unintelligent, If intelligent, jīva is indeed Brahman, and therefore its rejection as false is impossible. If not intelligent, then jīva, like earthen pots &c. cannot be an enjoyer. It may be answered, there is no fault here; for since jīva is a reflexion of Intelligence, it is not what is commonly known either as Intelligent or as unintelligent (sc. it is an inexplicable product, anirvachanya, and therefore unreal). Nor can it be argued that a reflexion of the formless (colourless) Intelligence, (Brahman)—is impossible, for a reflexion in clear water of formless (colourless) ether is a common fact; and because of the Śruti passage—'He

Bṛihad. Up. II. 5. 19.

(Īśvara) became like unto every form'. And when, in accordance with the passage, 'this every thing, all is that Self,' all things

Bṛihad. Up. II. 4. 6.

sc. Nescience and all its products, have been rejected as false, then the Highest Self alone, pure Bliss, remains behind in the state of final emancipation. Thus, (in the above view) nothing is left unexplained.

तन्न । बन्धमोक्षयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः मोक्षार्थिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च
न ह्यन्यस्य मोक्षार्थमन्यो यतते न वा स्वनाशः पुरुषार्थः । न
च दुःखनिवृत्त्या दुःखाभाव एव पुरुषार्थः । कस्यायं पुरुषार्थः स्यात्
स्वस्यैव बाधितत्वात् । न च जीवात्मा ऽसत्यः अनेन जीवेना-
त्मनेति सत्येन परमात्मना अभेदश्रवणात् नान्योतोस्ति द्रष्टेत्या-
दिना भेदप्रतिषेधान्न । न च स्वतो ऽसंसारिस्वभावस्य परमात्मनः
संसारिस्वभावजीवात्मतानुपपत्तिः अविद्याद्युपाधिसम्बन्धान्नभोनी-
लिमवदुपपत्तेः ।

But the above view (say others) is to be rejected ; for from it follows that bondage and emancipation do not refer to the same individual (sc. the *bound* one is the unreal *jīva* : the *emancipated* one is Brahman) : also that striving after emancipation on the part of an aspirant is impossible ; for none strives after the emancipation of another, nor can his own destruction be the aim of man. Nor can it be urged that because there is an end to pain (when one is destroyed), the absence of pain is indeed the aim of man. For to whom can this be an aim, since the man himself (or *jīva*) is (by supposition) set aside as false ?

And *jīva* is not unreal, for its identity with the real Self (the Highest Self) is declared in the passage, 'let me enter with this
Chānd. Up. VI. 3. 2. living Self (*jīva*)'

And because a difference between them is denied in the
Bṛihad. Up. III. 7. 23. passage, 'there is no other seer
but that one' ;

Nor may it be objected that to the Highest Self, which is by nature beyond the bonds of transmigration, cannot pertain the character of *jīva*, which is by nature subject to those bonds. For this is possible through the connexion (of the Paramātmān) with certain adjuncts such as Nescience &c., just as dark colour is falsely ascribed to ether.

न च रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूवेतिवाक्यादाभासरूपत्वं जीवस्येति वाच्यं तत्र हि तत्तन्मनुष्यत्वाद्याक्रान्ततत्तच्छरीरसादृश्य-स्यैव प्रतिरूपपदेन विवक्षितत्वात् । भवतु वा प्रतिबिम्बस्तथापि नासत्यः प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरभेदग्रहात् । कथं तर्हि भेदव्यवहारः । एकस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपे सर्वकल्पनारहिते मुखचन्द्रादौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बस्वरूपमिति त्रिविधव्यवहारस्योपाध्यनुप्रविष्टत्वारोपानन्तरं दर्शनात् । तस्मात्तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये बाधायां सामानाधिकरण्यामिति कल्पना वेदबाह्या न न्याय्या । अतो लक्षणया परिपूर्णसच्चिदानन्दप्रत्यगात्मावबोधनमनुपपन्नमिति ।

Nor from the passage, 'He (Īśvara) became like unto every form,' can it be maintained that jīva is a reflexion; for by the word prātirūpa is meant only the likeness (of the Self) to all bodies whatever, as possessing all attributes, human and the rest. Or granting that jīva is a reflexion, it is still not unreal; for the identity of the reflected object and the reflexion is recognised (and the reflected object is real). How then, it may be asked, does the consciousness of these as different arise? The reply is that in regard to the own nature of a thing (svarūpa) which is really one and without any attributes, (cf. p. 64.) e. g. a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and own nature of the thing is observed to arise, after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and certain limiting adjuncts has been imagined. Hence the hypothesis, that in regard to such sentences as 'that thou art' community of reference (*i. e.* identity of *that* and *thou*) obtains after one or other of the two has been rejected as false, is beyond the tenor of the Veda and irregular (for, as shown above, both Paramātmān and jīva are real).

Hence it has not been proved that knowledge of the Self, the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss, results from such sentences though implication.

१६ अत्रोच्यते ।

विरुद्धयोरभेदो हि न वेदेन प्रमीयते ।

अनन्यगतिकृत्वेन मानान्तरस्य बाधनम् ॥ ३७ ॥

यदत्रोक्तं मुख्यार्थानुपपत्त्यभावात् लक्षणेति तन्न विरुद्ध-
योजोवपरमात्मनोरभेदस्य प्रमाणेन बाधितत्वात् न हि विरुद्धयोर-
भेदः क्व चित्प्रमाणेन दृष्टः न च मानान्तरस्य वेदेन बाधितत्वा-
न्नानुपपत्तिः न हि बाध्यमित्येव बाध्यते किं तु स्वविषयसिद्ध्य-
न्यथानुपपत्त्या

19. To this it is replied :—

The identity of two opposed things is not indeed made known by the Veda. The rejection of the other sources of evidence (sc. perception, inference) takes place, when no other course is possible (than that of their rejection in favour of Veda)...XXXVII.

What was said in regard to this point, viz. that since there is

Reply: the authority of perception, inference, &c., must be maintained so long as these can be reconciled with Veda: this is possible by taking the implied meaning of Veda.

no impossibility (contradiction) attaching to the primary meaning, implication will not apply (to such sentences as 'that thou art'),

cannot be accepted. For the identity of the two opposed things, viz. jīva and Paramātmā is overthrown by a trustworthy source of evidence, since no genuine source of evidence makes known the identity of two opposed things. Nor can it be argued that there is no impossibility (in regard to the primary meaning), since the Veda overthrows all the other sources of evidence. For a thing (sc. cognition) is not rejected as false merely by saying, it must be rejected; but it is rejected because in no other way can the establishing of its object (sc. that which it makes known) be saved from contradiction.

इह तु वृत्त्यन्तरेणापि तदुपपत्तेर्मुख्यार्थे ऽनुपपत्तिरेव अन्यथा सर्वत्र लक्षणाच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । लोकेपि निश्चितप्रामाण्ये एव लक्षणा । तथा च तादृशवाक्यविरोधेन विरोधिमानान्तरस्य बाधितत्वादनुपपत्त्यभावान्न लक्षणा स्यात् ।

न च लक्ष्यार्थस्यासङ्गस्य वाच्यार्थेन सम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः स्वतो-
ऽसङ्गस्याप्यविद्यान्तःकरणाद्युपाधिसंसर्गस्याविद्याध्यारोपितस्य दिवा-
न्धपरिकल्पितसवितृतमः संसर्गवदुपपत्तेः ।

But whereas in the present case, the thing to be proved (tat, sc. that the sentence 'that thou art' teaches the identity of jīva and Brahman) can be proved in another way, sc. through implication, contradiction does certainly attach to the primary meaning of such a sentence (*i. e.* the Vedic sentence 'that thou art' does not overthrow the other sources of evidence). Otherwise (*i. e.* if perception and the other sources of evidence, which contradict the literal meaning of a sentence, are to be rejected in favour of the literal meaning) it will follow that implication will be altogether done away with: for, as concerning worldly usage also, implication obtains only in the case of a sentence whose authority is certain—(if the sentence itself be of doubtful authority, no attempt is made to explain its implications). And so, when the other sources of evidence, which contradict the literal meaning of a sentence, are rejected as false because they are contradicted by such a sentence, it follows that there will be no contradiction in regard to the sentence (*i. e.* it will have to be understood literally) and therefore no implication will obtain in regard to it.

And the connexion of the unrelated (sc. Self), which is the implied meaning of the words, with the literal meaning is not impossible; for there can be a connexion surmised by Nescience between even that which is itself unrelated and certain limiting adjuncts, sc. Nescience, internal organ &c., just as owls that cannot see by day imagine that a connexion exists between the sun and darkness.

कल्पितसम्बन्धेन लक्षणा पारमार्थिकी न स्यादिति चेत्
नोच्चैर्वाच्यम् अद्वैतविरोधेनैव द्वैतस्यासत्यत्वेऽद्वैतवादिनां सिद्धा
न्ताविरोधस्याऽतिस्पष्टत्वात् ।

न च लक्ष्यपदार्थे मूकताप्रसङ्गः पदार्थप्रतिपादकविज्ञानमानन्दं
ब्रह्मेत्यादिनैव तत्पदार्थप्रतिपादनात् तत्र च लक्षणाभावान्नानवस्था
न च ज्ञानत्वादिसामान्यवैशिष्ट्ये निर्दुर्मूलकलक्ष्यपदार्थासिद्धिः नानो-
पाधिसम्बद्ध्यत्यतिरिक्तसामान्यानभ्युपगमात्

An opponent may here object that if (as supposed above) implication is to apply through a falsely surmised connexion, then such implication cannot be *real* (and, therefore, the resulting intuition of Self will be false also). Do not speak so loud (we reply) as if announcing something new! For it is abundantly clear that there is nothing repugnant to the grand tenet of Monists in maintaining (as we do here) the falsity of duality, just because duality is contradictory of Monism (non-duality).

Nor will silence follow in regard to the thing implied (by the words *that* and *thou*, cf. p. 93); for the meaning of the word *that* is made known by such passages as 'Brahman, which is Intelligence, Bliss' which are explanatory of the word. And since implication does not attach to the words Intelligence &c. in the above passage, (*tatra*, sc. these words make known Brahman, *directly*, by *abhidhā*) there is no endless series of implications (cf. p. 93). Nor can it be argued that since (in the above passage) an attributive relation (*vaiśiṣṭya*) is made known (between Brahman) and certain class-attributes (*sāmānya*), sc. *the possessing intelligence &c.* the thing implied, viz. the attributeless (Brahman) cannot be proved by such passages. For we Vedāntins do not admit any such thing as class-attribute (generality) distinct from the individual thing, which is in relation with many limiting adjuncts.

अनुगतव्यवहारस्यानुगतव्यक्त्यैवोपपत्तेः प्रतिबिम्बेषु बिम्ब-
वत् । त्वमर्थस्तूक्तविधया साक्षादिपदैर्न वक्तुं शक्य एव ।

न च साक्षिणि विप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वप्रमाणव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्
अज्ञातस्याप्रमाविषयस्य साक्षिव्यतिरेकेण सिद्धभावात् प्रमाणसिद्धत्वे
ऽज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिर्न स्यात् तथात्वे वा प्रमाणवैयर्थ्यात् प्रमाणकृताति-
शयाभावात् भ्रमसिद्धस्य प्रमाणविषयत्वविरोधात्

Since a persistent consciousness* is due simply to the individual
which persists in (or pervades) the consciousness; just as the one
reflected thing, sc. the moon, pervades the many reflexions of
the moon (and so gives rise to the persistent consciousness 'This
is the same moon reflected in the many waters').

And the thing implied by the word *thou* can be declared by
such words as *witness* &c., in the manner already shown (by
bhāgatyāgalakṣhanā cf. p. 91).

Nor can there be any controversy as to the existence of the
Witness: for (if the Witness exists not) it follows that there is an
end to the exercise of all sources of evidence; since, in the absence
of the Witness, an *unperceived* object, sc. one not declared in any
true cognition, could not be proved to exist, (and if no *unperceived*
object exists, the *pramāṇas* have nothing to energise in regard to).
If it be held that Nescience is proved by a source of evidence, then
there can be no destruction of Nescience; (for no *pramāṇa* can
destroy the thing which it makes known, and Nescience is in this
case the thing made known). Or if this be granted (sc. that Nes-
cience is not destroyed), then a source of evidence is useless, for in
this case no special result (*atiśaya* = *ajñānanivṛtti*) has been effected
by it (*pramāṇakṛita*, sc. the object would still remain *unperceived*,
ajñāta). (Nor can it be said that an unperceived object is proved
by error, i. e. its unperceivedness is a mistake simply), for such
an object (being nothing) cannot be vouched for by any *pramāṇa*.

* For *anugatavyavahāra* and the *Vaiśeṣika* proof of *sāmānya*,
see note p. 108 *infra*.

तथाच प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेवाज्ञातत्वेन साक्षिणा साधितमेव प्रमेयं प्रमाणं विषयीकरोतीति युक्तम् अतो नात्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । तथाच सुरेश्वरः ।

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।

कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसम्भावना कुतः ॥

न च पदयोरेकार्थत्वानेकार्थत्वविकल्पः एकार्थत्वे ऽपि वाक्य-
प्रमाणजन्यस्यैव ज्ञानस्य भेदभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात् । न चैकपदवैयर्थ्यं
तेन विना विरोधाभावेन लक्षणया ऽखण्डवाक्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादयितु-
मशक्यत्वात् पदमात्रस्याप्रमाणत्वाच्च

Accordingly, the right conclusion is that a source of evidence makes known an object (prameya), which, as something unperceived, had been vouched for by the Witness, even previous to the exercise of the source of evidence. Hence there is no conflict as to the existence of the Self (atma). And thus Sureśvara

Taitt. Up. Bhāṣyavārtika, p. 167. śl. declares: 'How can that not
19. ed. Apte. Poona 1889. exist in regard to which (yatra)

sources of evidence, false sources of evidence and counterfeit cognitions, all alike declare truly (sc. all these testify to the Witness or eternal Cognition *per se*, without which they could not be)'.
exist in regard to which (yatra)

Nor is there any uncertainty as to whether the two words ('that' and 'thou') mean only one thing or more than one thing; for even if the two words denote one thing, it is only the knowledge effected through a sentence as a source of evidence that can destroy the erroneous notion that the two things meant by the words are distinct (*i. e.* there must be the two words to make up the requisite sentence). Nor is one of the two words useless, since in the absence of the second word there would be no contradiction as to the literal meaning, and, therefore, the Indivisible (Brahman) which is the thing meant by the sentence could not be made known through implication. And because a word alone is not a source of evidence.*

* A word serves only to recall an object previously known and does not testify to its reality, cf. Ved. paribh. where *smṛiti* (recollection, is excluded from *pramā* (right knowledge).

न च प्रधानवाक्ये लक्षणानुपपत्तिः इतरानुपसर्जनार्थप्रतिपादकत्व-
मेव हि प्रधानत्वं नाम तच्च लक्षणया मुख्यया वेत्यन्यदेतत् न
च न्यायविरोधः यच्च प्रतिपादयस्यार्थस्य शब्दशक्तिगोचरत्वं तच्च
न्यायावतारात् ।

२० ननु कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वाद्यनेकसंसारधर्मभ्यो
निष्कृष्टस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो ऽवस्थात्रयानुगतस्य शुद्धस्य चिदंशस्य परमा-
त्मना जगत्कर्तृत्वादिभ्यो निष्कृष्टेनाऽऽकाशाद्यनुस्यूतेन शुद्धेन परि-
पूर्णसच्चिदानन्दस्वभावेनाभेदे लक्षणया बोध्यते इति प्रतिपादितम् ।

Nor is implication impossible in regard to a primary sentence. For the primary character of a sentence consists in the sentence making known something which is independent of something else. And this primary character is independent of the question whether the sentence is to be understood literally or through implication. Nor does this view contradict the maxim (sc. irregularity is to be assumed in regard to a *secondary* sentence only) for the maxim applies where the thing made known is made known by the power of the words (i. e. literally).

20. Here it may be objected that what has been established

Objections by a bheda-vādin (who maintains that duality is real as given in perception, inference &c.): (a) Veda, while it teaches the identity of Jiva and Paramātmā, does not teach the unreality of the world; for the own nature of a thing, svarūpa, constitutes bheda, difference, and is vouched for by all the pramāṇas :

is that (from such a sentence as 'that thou art'), through *implication*, the identity is made known of the Self within (pratyagātman),—or that portion of pure Intelligence which pervades the

three states (of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep), and is free from the various attributes of the transmigratory spheres, sc. agency &c., and the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss,—or pure Intelligence, which pervades all products beginning with ether, and is free from the various attributes, sc. *the being the cause of the world, &c.*

तथा च सर्वो भेदो न निराकृतः स्यात् अनात्मभेदस्य तदव-
 स्थत्वात् । न चात्मपरमात्मनोर्भेदग्राहकप्रमाणवदनात्मभेदग्राहक-
 स्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाण्यमेवेति साम्प्रतं दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः न ह्यात्म-
 परमात्मनोर्भेदग्राहकं मानमस्ति तयोः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन मानाविषय-
 त्वात् विशिष्टविषयस्य मानस्य विशेषणभेदगोचरत्वेनान्यथासिद्ध-
 स्यात्मात्मपरमात्मभेदासाधकत्वाद्विशेष्याभेदग्राहकेण तत्त्वमस्यादिप्र-
 माणेन बाधितत्वात् न चानात्मभेदग्राहकस्य प्रत्यक्षादेर्बाधकमस्ति ।

But in this way all *difference* (duality) has not been overthrown, for there still remains a difference constituted by the not-Self, (which remains as the difference, or negation, of the Self affirmed above). Nor is it correct to say that perception, inference &c., which make known a difference between not-Self (and Self), are untrustworthy, just as the evidence which declares a difference between Self and the Highest Self is untrustworthy, since the confirmatory example (now adduced) cannot itself be proved. For there is no evidence declaratory of the difference between Self and the Highest Self, inasmuch as these two are self-luminous and cannot therefore be made known by a source of evidence. And because a source of evidence which makes known certain subjects as qualified by attributes, and which has fulfilled its function already (anyathāsiddhasya) by making known the difference between these attributes, cannot make known a difference between Self and the Highest Self* (or the subjects). And because such a source of evidence is overthrown by another source of evidence, sc. the sentence 'that thou art,' which makes known the identity of the (two) subjects (*that* and *thou*). Nor can it be urged that there is something to overthrow perception, and the other *pramāṇas* which make known a difference between Self and not-Self.

* cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. p. 460 et seq.

न चानात्मस्वरूपगोचरत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादेर्न भेदगोचरत्वं धर्मिप्रतियोगिभेदानां ग्रहे क्रमयोगपद्यादिविकल्पप्राप्तावन्योन्याश्रयात्माश्रयानवस्थाप्राग्लोपाविनिगम्यत्वाद्यनेकदोषग्रासादिति वाच्यं ।

अतिरिक्तभेदागोचरत्वेऽपि स्वरूपभेदगोचरत्वस्य दुरपह्वत्वात् न च स्वरूपं भिन्नमिति प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिः राहोः शिरः आत्मनश्चैतन्यमितिषदुपपत्तेः ।

Nor again that perception, inference &c., although they make known the not-Self *per se*, do not make known a difference (between Self and not-Self); because, whenever there is a knowledge of a difference (bheda), and of a locus (dharmi) in which the difference resides, and of a counterentity (pratiyogi) there arises the doubt whether these are known successively or simultaneously, and either alternative is exposed to the vices of a see-saw, or self-dependence, or an infinite regress, or omission of a former supposition as useless, or of absence of a reason to compel the adoption of one of two alternatives &c.*

(The above objections are not to be urged) because, even if perception and the other *pramāṇas* make known no difference other than that of the own nature of a thing, it cannot be denied that they do make known the difference (constituted by) the own nature of thing (svarūpa). Nor is it to be argued that (if svarūpa is itself a bheda) the common experience 'this svarūpa is different from that svarūpa' becomes impossible (which experience implies that svarūpa is the *locus* in which a bheda resides); for this experience may be explained as certain other experiences, viz. the head of Rāhu' (which is all head), 'the intelligence of Self' (while Self really is intelligence), are explained (*i. e.* by the assumption of an attributive relation between things that are really identical).

* For the general form of the argument cf. pp. 40-45 *supra*. current defs. are :—अन्योन्यस्य अव्यवहितान्योन्यापत्तित्वम् अन्योन्याश्रयः ॥ उत्तरोत्तरेणैव पूर्वपूर्वकार्यसम्भवे पूर्वेषामन्यथासिद्धिः प्राग्लोपः ॥ (उत्तरोत्तरेण=कारणेन पूर्वपूर्व *sc.* पूर्वस्य कारणस्य) । एकतरपक्षपातियुक्तिविरहो विनिगमनाविरहः ॥ विनिगमन = निश्चयकारणम् ।

न च भेदस्वरूपशब्दयोः पर्यायत्वापत्तिः स्वव्यवहारे इतर-
सापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वाभ्यां विशेषात् न चाभेदे तदनुपपत्तिः एकस्मिन्नपि
देवदत्ते पितृत्वादिव्यवहारार्थं पुत्राद्यपेक्षादर्शनात् न च प्राप्ताप्राप्तवि-
वेकेन सापेक्षत्वमेव भेदोऽस्त्विति वाच्यं तस्यापि स्वरूपानतिरेकात्
न च स्वरूपाद् यस्य भेदस्तस्य निःस्वरूपत्वापत्तिः अन्यथा स्वरूपमे-
वाखण्डमिति वाच्यं घटात् घटस्य भेदेऽप्यघटत्वाददर्शनात् ।

Nor does it follow on this view that the terms svarūpa and
bheda are synonyms: for there is a difference of usage in regard
to the term sva (which stands both for svarūpa and bheda)
according as dependence on other things (sc. pratiyogi and anu-
yogi) is intended (when the term bheda is used), or independence
(when the term svarūpa is used). Nor can it be said that this
difference of usage is impossible, if svarūpa and bheda are identical
(abheda); for it is observed that in regard to the individual Devadatta
our experience of him as a father depends on his having a son. Nor
must it be argued that only that which is known through induction*
as dependent on something else is bheda. For this *dependent* bheda
is identical with svarūpa. Nor must it be argued that from this it
will follow that that which is different from svarūpa† is itself des-
titute of svarūpa, otherwise svarūpa becomes a unity indivisible
(akhaṇḍa, in regard to which no predication of difference what-
ever would be possible cf. p. 64.). For even when a difference
between two earthen jars is perceived, the jariness (or svarūpa)
does not cease to be perceived.

* Prāpta, aprāptaviveka (a nyāya of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) =
discrimination of matter which has been already established from that
which has not been thus established. In this case the ghaṭasvarūpa
is prāpta sc. when ghaṭa is known, its svarūpa is also known, prāpta;
and ghaṭasvarūpa as bheda is aprāpta, because something else must be
known in order that ghaṭasvarūpa may constitute a difference between
the ghaṭa and that other thing. तथा च प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकात्सापेक्ष एव पदार्थ
(thing) भेदशब्दवाच्योऽस्तु न स्वरूपं स्वरूपस्य निरपेक्षत्वात् । gloss.

† If svarūpa is bheda, then paṭa as different from ghaṭa must be
niḥavarupa or a mere nothing. If paṭa also possesses svarūpa, then
svarūpa ceases to be a bheda and becomes a unity indivisible. स्वरू-
पात्=घटस्वरूपात् । यस्य तस्य,=घटस्य

न च घटादेकस्मात् घटान्तरे किं चिद्वैधर्म्यमस्त्येवेति वाच्यं स्थितस्यापि तस्योक्तदोषेण भेदत्वानङ्गीकारात् न च वैधर्म्यं सत्येव स्वरूपं भेद इति वाच्यम् । अनात्मस्वरूपाणामपि वैधर्म्यव्याप्तत्वात् ।

यत्तु कैश्चिदुक्तं यथायथं चित्तमेव भेदो यथा घटादौ स्वरूपमन्योन्याभावो वैधर्म्यं च सामान्यादौ च द्वयमेव वैधर्म्याभावात् अभावे स्वरूपमेवेतरासम्भवादिति तन्न

Nor must it be argued that the one jar possesses special attributes (or individuality)† different from those of the other jar. For though this *possession of special attributes* exists, it is not admitted as a *bheda* because of the already mentioned vices which result in regard thereto.

Nor can it be argued that svarūpa is a bheda only in the case where this possession of different attributes is found. For the svarūpas of things B. C. D. other than A (anātmavarūpa)* are also pervaded by this vaidharmya.

But the view of some teachers is to be rejected sc. that bheda is rightly three-fold; to jars &c. i. e. to substances, qualities and action pertain svarūpa, anyonyābhāva (the non-existence of one thing in another) and vaidharmyā; to class-generalities (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and intimate relation (samavāya) pertain only the two, svarūpa and anyonyābhāva, because to these three (as being void of attributes,) vaidharmya cannot attach; to negation (abhāva) pertains only svarūpa, for to it the other two cannot apply. †

† Vaidharmya here = *tadvyakṛitva*, individuality, or that which makes *this* jar what it is, as distinct from jāti, class-generality or jar-ness, which inheres in all jars alike.

* ātmavarūpa = ghaṭavarūpa : anātmavarūpa = paṭavarūpa.

† cf. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā p. 111, (Benares, 1888).

स्वरूपभेदस्यावश्यकत्वात् इतरयोश्च व्यभिचारात् भेदव्यवहाराप्रयोजकत्वेनाङ्गीकारवैयर्थ्यात् एकाकारव्यवहारस्य चैकरूपविषयसाध्यत्वनियमात् न च स्वरूपभेदपक्षे स्वस्मादपि स्वस्य भेदः स्यादिति वाच्यं स्वस्य प्रतियोगिकोटिनिवेशेनान्यस्य धर्मिणो विरहात् धर्मिकोटिनिवेशेन वा प्रतियोगिनोऽभावात् न च भेदस्वरूपयोः परस्परान्तर्भावेनान्यतरपरिशेषापत्तिः । भेदस्य स्वरूपानतिरेकात् ।

(The above view is rejected) because svarūpabheda is essential, and the other two fail to apply in all cases. For it is useless to maintain the two latter in that they are not the cause of a perception of difference ; and because the rule is that a consciousness whose form remains unchanged has been brought about by an unchanging object, *i. e.* by one whose form remains unchanged.* Nor can it be urged that on the view that svarūpa is a bheda (*i. e.* the cause of a perception of difference) it follows that svarūpa should make known a difference between itself and itself (svasya svasmāt). For if svarūpa (svasya) be inserted in the place of (*i. e.* be regarded as) the *counterentity*, there remains no *locus* for the difference : again, if svarūpa be regarded as the *locus*, no *counterentity* remains. Nor does it follow that of the two, svarūpa and bheda, one or other must remain by a process of exclusion, since one must fall within the other. For bheda is not something different from svarūpa.

* एकाकरेति । यथा घटोऽयं घटोऽयम् इति व्यवहारे अनुगतं घटत्वं सामान्यमेव प्रयोजकं न व्यक्तिरनुगतत्वात् । अन्यथा जातेरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । gloss. While individual jars vary (techn.—are ananugata, non-pervasive), the form of the perception in each case is unchanged, thus, *this is a jar, this is a jar*. This unchanged form of perception must therefore be due to an unchanging, pervasive cause (anugatam prayojakam) sc. to the sāmānya (class-attribute) jariness. The Vaiśeṣhika thus proves the existence of sāmānya as a separate category. Applying the above argument the text urges that the unchanging element in regard to a perception of difference is svarūpa.

न च स्वरूपभेदः किं भिन्ने भेदव्यवहारप्रयोजको ऽभिन्ने वेति विकल्पावकाशः उपस्थितवस्तुमात्रे धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षानपेक्षाभ्यां भेदाभेदव्यवहारयोजायमानत्वात् ।

नन्वज्ञानकार्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य पूर्वमुक्तं तत्कथं प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुरोधेन भेदाशङ्का इति चेत् न तस्यैवासिद्धेर्ब्रह्मकार्यत्वस्य बहुशः श्रवणात् सदेव सोम्येदमग्न आसीत् यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः आकाशः संभूतः यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा एवमेतस्मादात्मनः सर्वे देवाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे एते आत्मानो व्युत्तरन्तीत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः जन्माद्यस्य यत इति न्यायाच्च ।

Nor is there room here for the doubt whether bheda in the form of svarūpa is the cause of the perception of difference in regard to a locus A *different* from or *identical* with (counterentity B).

For in regard to an object merely as presented the consciousness of its difference from or identity with (something else) is effected by the necessity or absence of necessity for the knowledge of (*i. e.* by the presence or absence of a desire to know) the locus and counterentity.

Again, it may be objected that it has already been shown (pp. 38-40 supra) that the world is a product of Nescience *i. e.* is false, is a product of Nescience: hence in fact opposed to many Vedic passages. the argument for duality (lit. bheda or the world as different from Self), based as it is on the authoritativeness of perception and the other sources of evidence (anurodhena) can find no place.

This objection is set aside; because it is not proved that the world is a product of Nescience (tasya), since many Śruti passages declare the world to be a product of Brahman:—

Ch. Up. VI. 2. 1.

Taitt. Up. III. 1.

” ” II. 1.

‘From that Self (Brahman) sprang ether’, ‘As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all Devas, all worlds; all these beings come

‘In the beginning, my dear, the existent was *this*,’ ‘That from which these beings are born,’

forth from that Self’: and so also the sūtra declares—‘From which (Brahman) the production, &c. of this (world).’

Bṛihad Up. II. 1. 20.

Ved. Sū. I. 1. 2.

नन्वज्ञानकार्यत्वमपि बहुषु श्रूयते मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत्-
 द्वेदं तद्व्याकृतमासीत् इन्द्रे। मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते मायां तु
 प्रकृतिं विद्यात् नासदासीन्नासदासीनम आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः माया-
 मात्रं तु कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वादिति न्यायाच्च एवं तर्हि
 श्रुतीनां परस्परं विरोधान्नाभयमपि कारणमस्तु किं तर्हि जगत्कार-
 णमिति चेत् यथायोग्यं परमाणवादिकमेव । तस्मादनात्मभेदे प्रत्य-
 क्षादिसिद्धे जागरूके कथमद्वैतसिद्धिः तदयं संग्रहः ।

आत्माऽभेदप्रमित्यापि नाद्वैतं ते प्रसिद्ध्यति ।

अनात्मभेदसंसिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रमाणतः ॥

Again it may be objected that in many Śruti passages the fact of the world being a product of Nescience is declared, thus:—

(c) discrepancy of Śruti passages in regard to the cause of the world.

by death.' Now all this was then undeveloped.' 'Indra of many forms goes along by his magic powers.' 'Know that the material cause of the world is Māyā.' 'Non-entity was not, entity was not, darkness, (Nescience) was'—and it also follows from the reason laid down in the sūtra, 'On the con-

Bṛihad Up. I. 47.
R. V. IV. 47. 48.

Śv. Up. IV. 10.

R. V. X. 129.

Ved. Sā. III. 2. 3.

trary, it (the dream-world) is Māyā merely, for its nature is not presented fully.'—thus, then, since the Śruti passages contradict each other, let it be granted that neither Nescience nor Brahman is the cause of the world. What then is the cause? Reply:—ultimate atoms, or any other appropriate cause (sc. pradhāna, matter &c. as proposed by various thinkers). Hence since duality, lit. the difference of not-Self from Self, which has been proved to be real by perception and the other sources of evidence is on the alert (against all attacks), it is not possible to prove (Vedan-
 tic) Monism (sc. Self alone is).

२१ मैवं श्रुत्यभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् न हि तत्त्वमस्यादिश्रुत्या अनात्मानं पृथक् स्थापयित्वा शुद्धांशयोरभेदे बोध्यतइति श्रुत्यभिप्रायः किं तु प्रत्यक्चैतन्ये कूटस्थे जागराद्यवस्थात्रयं कर्तृत्वाद्यनर्थजातं च व्यभिचारि सर्वं तत्रैवानुगते साक्षिण्यध्यस्तमित्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तदतिरेकेण तत्स्वरूपं नास्तीति निश्चित्य शुद्धेन प्रत्यगात्मना ब्रह्मणो ऽभेदसिद्ध्यर्थं ब्रह्मण्यपि जगत्कर्तृत्वपरोक्षत्वादि आकाशादिकं च जगज्जातमननुगतमनुगते तस्मिन्सच्चिदात्मन्यध्यारोपितमसद्भ्रान्त्यैव प्रतिपन्नमित्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामध्यारोपापवादमाश्रित्य प्रवृत्तसृष्टिवाक्यसमनन्तरप्रवृत्तेन नेतिनेतीत्यादिवाक्येन चावधारयति । ततः शुद्धयोस्तत्त्वंपदार्थयोर्लक्ष्यांशयोर्निरस्तानात्मसम्बन्धयोर्भेदेऽ-

Wherefore the opponent's view may be summed up thus :— Your view of Monism is not proved even by the certain knowledge that Self is identical with Brahman. For through perception and the other sources of evidence the existence of the not-Self as distinct from Self is assured.

21. The above view is to be rejected because the opponent

has not understood the meaning

Met: the opponent has misunderstood the bearings of Śruti passages.

of the Śruti passages. For the

import of these is not that such

a passage as 'that thou art' establishes the not-Self as something distinct, and then goes on to declare the identity of the two *pure* (attributeless) portions (sc. Intelligence or Brahman underlying what is meant by 'that' and 'thou'). But when an aspirant of the highest order (*paramajjñāsu*, sc. one who desires intuition of Brahman as the Self within) is convinced that the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and the complex of evils beginning with agency—all of which fail to attach (*vyabhichāri*) to the unchanging Self within—are erroneously surmised in that very Self (*tatraiva*), the pervading Witness; that, therefore, by the inductive method of

भेदे वा प्रमाणमपश्यन्संदिहानः संसाररोगराजानुचरगर्भवासाद्यने-
करोगसमुद्भूतदुःखत्रातानुभवासादितोद्वेगः ब्रह्मलोकप्रभवमपि सुखं
विषमिव मन्यमानस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति श्रुत्या संसारदावानलप्र-
सूतसन्तापशमनामृताब्धिमात्मविद्यामजानानः परमजिज्ञासुः स्वरू-
पापरोक्षदर्शिनं परमकारुणिकं गुरुमुपसर्पति

conjoint presence and absence, it is proved that the world as described above (tat) has no existence of its own (svarūpa) apart from the Self (tat): and further when, in order to prove the identity of Brahman with the pure (attributeless) Self within, he ascertains beyond doubt that *the being the cause of the world and the not being positively presented* and other attributes, and also the whole world beginning with ether—all of which are not pervasive as regards Brahman also—are surmised to exist in that pervasive Self which is Existent (sat, real), Intelligence,—are unreal (asat) as being surmised through error, (and this he can do) in accordance with the method of conjoint presence and absence, and by having recourse to the method of unreal predication and annulment of the same in accordance with such negative passages as 'Brahman is not this, not this' which find place immediately after passages setting forth the creation of the world. Then, finding no certain evidence for the identity or non-identity of the two entities which are implied by the words *that* and *thou*, and from which all relation with the not-Self has been removed (by the processes described above), the aspirant begins to doubt; and being pained by his experience of all those pains which spring from the many diseases of gestation onwards and which attend on transmigratory life (as servants) on a rājā, and deeming as poison even that pleasure which accrues in the world of Brahmā, and not knowing that a knowledge of Self is the nectar-sea that quenches the fire of the world-conflagration, as declared in the passage, 'He who knows Self passes beyond sorrow', he approaches his most merciful guru who has attained to intuition of the Self.

तेन च शुद्धयोस्तत्त्वंपदार्थयोरभेदे तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन
नित्यनिर्दोषेण बोधिते स्वयमेवाद्वैततत्त्वं साक्षात्कृत्य स्वानन्दतृप्त
आत्मारामो भवति अतः श्रुत्यभिप्रायापरिज्ञानविजृम्भितमेतत् य-
दनात्मभेदेनाद्वैतज्ञतिरिति ।

यच्च स्वरूपं भेदः प्रत्यक्षादिगोचर इति तदतितुच्छं प्रत्य-
क्षादेरसद्विषयत्वेन स्वरूपागोचरत्वात् स्वरूपस्य भेदत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।
कुत इति चेत् शृणु किं शुद्धं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तं स्वरूपं भेदः किं वा
विशिष्टम् ।

And being taught by the guru, by means of that eternal
faultless sentence 'that thou art', that the two *unrelated* (śuddha)
things implied by the words *that* and *thou* are really identical,
the aspirant himself attains intuition of the one reality without a
second, and becomes self-contained in that Bliss which is his
own nature, and delights in his Self (alone).

Hence the statement, that (Vedantic) Monism is overthrown
by the fact that not-Self exists distinct from Self, was made
through misunderstanding the meaning of Śruti.

And as to the opponent's statement that *svarūpa* is a *bheda*

His view that the *own nature* of a thing
is *difference* is self-contradictory:

made known by perception and
the other sources of evidence,—
that is utter nonsense. For since
perception &c. make known the

unreal (*asat*) they cannot make known *svarūpa* or that which
is: and further, because *svarūpa* cannot be proved to be *bheda*.
Why not, you ask? Then listen, and say whether you mean that
svarūpa, pure and simple, sc. destitute of all attributes, is *bheda*;
or as qualified by attributes.

आद्ये व्यवहारहेतुत्वमपि तस्य नास्तीति वक्तव्यं तथाच सर्वव्यवहारानास्यदं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तमस्यूलानवादिशास्त्रसिद्धं स-
दात्मकं ब्रह्मैव नामान्तरेण प्रत्यक्षादिगोचर इत्युक्तं स्यात् न च
तदप्युपपद्यते न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नैव वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा
वेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधप्रसङ्गात् द्वितीये विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्भेदे विशिष्टं
स्वरूपान्तरं भेद इति वाच्यं तथा च तत्राप्यन्यतत्राप्यन्यदिति
सैव दुरुत्तराऽनवस्था अभेदे वा विशिष्टस्वरूपासिद्धिः ।

If the first, then you will have to declare that such svarūpa could not be the cause of any experience (vyavahāra*), and thus you would have to declare that what is made known by perception &c. is indeed Brahman under another name, sc. bheda,— (Brahman) which is not the object of any experience whatever, which is free from all attributes, which as proved by Śruti is neither great nor small, which is the Existent. But this will not hold good as being contradicted by the Śruti—‘It is grasped not by the eye, nor by speech nor by the other devas (senses), not by penance or

Mu. Up. III. 1. 8.

work.’ On the second alternative

sc. that svarūpa, qualified by at-

tributes, is bheda, if it be maintained that subject and attribute are different, then you will have to declare (as the cause of this difference) a second qualified-svarūpabheda and for the second a third, and so you will not escape the vice of an infinite regress. If subject and attribute be regarded as identical (abhede vā) then your *qualified* svarūpa does not exist! Nor again is your *qualified* svarūpa made known by perception and the other sources of evidence; for it is attributeless, as is the svarūpa of a thing in itself, since the attribute colour does not pertain to a *coloured* object, and so with other attributes.

* व्यवहारः = ज्ञानजन्यप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः action, or cessation from action, consequent on knowledge.

न वा विशिष्टं स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरः तस्यापि शुद्धवस्तुस्वरूपवन्निर्द्वैतकत्वात् न हि रूपादिविशिष्टे रूपादयः सन्ति । न च विशिष्टं नाम किञ्चिद्वस्तुस्ति विशेषणविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धातिरिक्तस्य तस्याननुभवात् तेषां च प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां विशिष्टव्यवहाराजननात् न च सम्बन्ध एव विशिष्टं विशेषणविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धा इत्यत्र सम्बन्धे ऽपि तद्व्यवहारादर्शनात् । विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्तद्व्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गात् । न च वस्तुस्वरूपं भेद इति शङ्कितुमपि शक्यं तस्य विदारणात्मने भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपनाशरूपत्वान्नाशतत्प्रतियोगिनोरभेदासम्भवात् न हि पट-विदारणं पटस्वरूपं वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तस्य च भेदस्य तस्य निःस्वरूपस्य निराश्रयस्यासिद्धिरेव ।

Nor is your *qualified* svarūpa an entity at all, for it is unperceived apart from subject, attribute and the relation between these ; and because a qualified (determinate) judgment in regard to these three (*i. e.* one in which these three are combined) cannot be effected through them singly or taken together. Nor is it *relation* simply that constitutes (your) *qualified svarūpa*, for when all three are present to the mind, thus, *subject*, *attribute*, and *relation*,—no determinate judgment is observed to result, although the relation (between subject and attribute) was present to the mind. And because it would follow that there could be no determinate judgment in regard to the subject and attribute (if relation by itself were the qualified svarūpa).

Nor can it be argued at all that *the thing itself* is *bheda*: for since *bheda* (*tasya*) implying *tearing asunder* consists in the destruction of the thing itself, it is impossible for the destruction and its counter-entity (*sc.* the thing which is destroyed) to be identical. For the tearing of a piece of cloth is not the cloth itself: in fact, apart from the thing itself, or piece of cloth, this character-less, baseless tearing cannot be affirmed at all (*asiddhi*). Nor can that which is divided *bhinna* *sc.* destroyed, be the substrate of anything: otherwise a *broken* jar might be regarded as a receptacle for water!

न हि भिन्न आश्रयो भवति अन्यथा ध्वस्तोपि घटो जलाधारः
स्यात् अभिन्ने त्वाश्रये भेदो विरोधादेव न वर्तते ।

तस्मादलमनेनानात्मविचारेण सर्वथा प्रत्यक्षादेरात्मानात्म-
भेदगोचरत्वं नास्तीति सिद्धम् ।

२२ यदुक्तं जगत्कारणत्वविषयश्रुत्योरज्ञानब्रह्मगोचरयोर्मियो
विरोध इति तन्न

ब्रह्माज्ञानाज्जगज्जन्म ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वतः ।

अधिष्ठानत्वमात्रेण कारणं ब्रह्म गीयते ॥ ३८ ॥

दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानसिद्धानिर्वचनीयस्य जगतोऽनाद्यनिर्वचनीया
अविद्यैव कारणं न ब्रह्म तस्य कूटस्थस्य कार्यकारणविलक्षणत्वात् तदेत-
द्ब्रह्माऽपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम् अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूरिति श्रुतेः ।

But if the substrate or thing in itself is undivided, *bheda*, divi-
sion, cannot reside in it—for that would be a palpable contradiction !

To conclude this discussion of the not-Self. We have proved
that perception and the other sources of evidence in no way declare
a difference between Self and not-Self.

22. Thus, we must reject the statement that the two sets of
Śruti passages, which deal with the cause of the world and declare,
the one that Brahman is, the other that Nescience is, the cause
contradict each other.

Through Nescience, Brahman is (said to be) the cause of the
world ; for to Brahman causality does not pertain. Brahman is
said to be cause as being simply the substrate (of Nescience which
is the cause of the world).....XXXVIII.

Nescience, eternal ab ante, inexplicable (cf. note p. 28), is
indeed the cause of the world, which is inexplicable and which is
proved by reason of its visibility &c. Brahman is not the cause ;
for the unchanging one (Kūṭastha) is neither cause nor effect, as
declared in the Śruti passage—'This is the Brahman, without

Bṛihad Up. II. 5. 19.

cause and without effect, without
anything inside or outside : this

Self is Brahman, omniscient.'

कथं तर्हि ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं श्रुतौ प्रसिद्धं जगत्कारणाधिष्ठा-
नत्वेन कारणत्वोपचारात् ब्रह्मकारणश्रुतेरन्यार्थत्वाच्च एकमेवाद्वि-
तीयमिति श्रुतेरद्वितीयत्वं तावद् ब्रह्मणः सिद्धं तत्कथं सम्भाव्य-
तामिति कार्यकारणयोरभेदस्तावन्नोक्तप्रसिद्धः ब्रह्मापि जगत्कारण-
मिति कथमसम्भावना स्यादित्यद्वितीये सम्भावनावुद्धिमात्रप्रयोजन-
त्वात्तस्याः न चाज्ञानमपि जगत्कारणं श्रुत्या विवक्षितं । तस्य
भ्रमनिमित्तमात्रत्वेनैवोक्तत्वात् कार्यकारणवादस्य वेदान्तबहिर्भूत-
त्वात् विवर्तस्यैव वेदान्तवादत्वात्

How then is Brahman declared in Śruti to be the cause of the world? Because to Brahman as the substrate and cause of the world causality is by a metaphor ascribed. And because the Śruti passage declaratory of Brahman as the cause has a further purport. From the Śruti passage—‘ (In the beginning) there was that

one only, without a second,’

Ch. Up. VI. 2. 1.

—is proved the unrelated nature

of Brahman. But how is a notion of the unrelated Brahman (tat) possible? The well-known fact of common experience, sc. that cause and effect are identical, (steps in to meet this difficulty)—thus it is not impossible to conceive of Brahman also as the cause of the world. And so the above passage (tasyāḥ) finds its purport in merely making possible (for us) a notion of the unrelated Brahman (sambhāvanābuddhi cf. p. 47 supra). Nor does Śruti imply that Nescience also is the cause of the world. For causality is affirmed as simply due to error (sc. the notion of cause depends on that of duality, which again is the outcome of Nescience). For a theory of cause and effect (as implying duality) lies outside the Upanishads, in that these confine their teaching to that of *illusory manifestation* * (vivartta).

* The Vivarta-vādins or Māya-vādins or Vedāntins of Saṅkara's school hold that the cause only appears to pass, but never really passes into a second state, sc. *the effect* which is therefore only an

किं जगतः कारणमिति पृष्ठे प्राप्ताप्रतिभानिवृत्तिमात्रप्रयोजनतया
अज्ञानं कारणमित्यभिहितत्वाच्च

२३ नन्विदमज्ञानं कार्यमकार्यं वा आद्ये किमस्य कारणं
अज्ञानं ब्रह्म वा नाद्यः तेनैवे तज्जनने आत्माश्रयात् अज्ञानान्त-
रानुसरणे त्वनवस्थादिप्रसङ्गात् न द्वितीयः ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वात्
अनिर्मात्रप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

And because the statement that Nescience is the cause of the world is made with the view merely of obviating the awkward silence (apratibhā)* that ensues when one is asked the question, What is the cause of the world ?

23. Now arises the question whether this Nescience is, or is not, a product. If a product, what is its cause? Nescience or Brahman? Not Nescience; for the vice of self-dependence follows on Nescience being produced by Nescience. If recourse be had to a second Nescience (as a cause of this Nescience), an infinite regress and the other vices result. Nor can Brahman be the cause; because causality does not pertain to Brahman, and because emancipation would become impossible (on the assumption of Brahman being the cause of Nescience, since the eternal Brahman as cause would ever bring about Nescience).

illusory manifestation (vivartta) of the cause: the rope, lying on the road at right, *appears to be* a snake. The world is an illusory manifestation of Brahman, the only Real, due to Māyā the *inexplicable* power of Brahman.

For ārambha —, pariṇāma-vādin and cognate terms *vide* Pandit Vol. VIII p. 488. Panchadaśī, note, also Cap. XIII śl. 6 *et seq.* of the latter.

* cf. Nyāyasūtravṛtti p. 261.

द्वितीये त्वनादिभावस्याऽनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गे ब्रह्मवत् । न च कल्पितत्वाकल्पितत्वाभ्यां विशेषः कल्पनासामग्र्यभावेन कल्पनानुपपत्तेः न चानादिरयमध्यासः अध्यासत्वासिद्धेः विद्याबाध्यत्वात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न अन्योन्याश्रयात् । न चैते दोषा वस्तुनो वस्तुत्वापहारकाः कल्पितस्य चाज्ञानस्य किमेते कुर्युः स्वत एव तस्य वस्तुत्वाभावात् अत एवोक्तमलङ्कारोद्दयमस्माकं यद्युक्तिप्रमाणाभ्यां दुर्घटत्वं सुघटत्वे कल्पितत्वं दुर्घटं भवेदिति वाच्यं कल्पितत्वस्यैवाद्याप्यसिद्धत्वात् धर्मिण एवासिद्धेः ।

Again, if this Nescience is not a product, then, as in the case of Brahman, there would be no cessation of this positive entity (bhāvasya), eternal ab ante. And it cannot be urged that there is a difference between Nescience and Brahman, in that the former is falsely surmised (*i. e.* is unreal). For erroneous surmisal is impossible, in the absence of certain means whereby the surmisal is effected.* Nor (to escape the difficulty can it be urged that) this false surmisal is eternal ab ante, for the fact of there being false surmisal at all is not established. It is proved (the Vedāntin may urge), because true knowledge proves the surmisal to be false. Not so; for this involves a logical see-saw, (*sc.* if there be false surmisal, it is proved false by true knowledge; and, if it be proved false by true knowledge, it is false surmisal). Nor can it be urged (by the Vedāntin) that these logical fallacies serve to disprove the reality (vastutva) of the thing under discussion (vastunaḥ) and can effect nothing in regard to Nescience which is falsely surmised, for Nescience itself is not real: hence it has been declared (the Vedāntin continues) that what we Vedāntins prize highly in our system is this, viz. that Nescience is hard to prove by argument and pramāṇa: if by these it were proved easily, the falsity (kalpitatva) of Nescience would be hard to prove. The above argument is to be rejected, because the unreality of Nescience is not yet proved, since there is no *proof* for the *subject* itself (*sc.* Nescience, in which the *attribute* of unreality may be supposed to reside).

* The means are (a) similarity of two things of which one is mistaken for the other; (b) a previous mental retentum by which one

ननु केयं सिद्धिः उत्पत्तिर्ज्ञप्रिर्वा नाद्यः अनादेस्तदभावस्येष्टत्वात् न द्वितीयः साक्षिसिद्धत्वेन तदभावात् । मैवम् अज्ञानस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्व साक्षिणो ऽसङ्गत्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् सम्बन्धं विना चाऽप्रकाशकत्वात् । न च पारमार्थिकसम्बन्धाभावे ऽपि कल्पितः सम्बन्धो ऽस्त्येवेति वाच्यं सम्बन्धसम्बन्धिनामन्यतमस्य कल्पकत्वे आत्माश्रयान्योन्याश्रयकूटस्थत्वहान्यसङ्गत्वक्षतिमोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गानां यथायथं प्राप्तेः ।

(The Vedāntin again interposes with the question) What do you mean by *proof*? Production (sc. the production of an effect from a cause)? Or cognition (implying *pramāṇa*, instrument of cognition)? The first meaning will not serve your purpose; for, in regard to a thing eternal *ab ante* (as Nescience is) the absence of proof *i. e.* of *production* (*tat*) is precisely what I am prepared to admit. Nor the second meaning; for there is absence of proof, *i. e.* of cognition (*tat*) because Nescience is proved by the Witness (and not by any *pramāṇa*). Again, no, (replies the opponent). For if Nescience is proved by the Witness, the unrelated character of the Witness is overthrown; and because the Witness could not make known (lit. illumine) Nescience without entering into relation with it. Nor may the Vedāntin urge that though a *real* relation (between the two) is impossible, a relation may be falsely surmised. For either the relation or the related things must be the surmiser of such surmisal; and thus would follow, in order, the faults of self-dependence, logical see-saw, loss to the Witness of its unchanging character and overthrow of its unrelated character, and the impossibility of final emancipation.

of the two things is now recollected; (c) some defect either in the object or in the instrument of knowledge. The gloss continues:—
न चात्माज्ञानयोः सादृश्यमस्ति निरवयवत्वात् । न वा पूर्वसंस्कारो दोषो वास्ति तयोरज्ञानपूर्वकत्वेन अज्ञानात्प्रागसिद्धेरित्यर्थः । Both (b) and (c) presuppose Nescience.

न चाविद्याऽध्यासवत् तत्सम्बन्धाऽध्यासस्याप्यनादित्वेना
विद्यादिहेत्वजन्यत्वे ऽपि तत्तन्त्रतया तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिः स्यादिति
वाच्यं तस्यानादेरुत्पत्तौ निरपेक्षस्य साध्यधीनज्ञानस्याज्ञानानपेक्षतया
तत्तन्त्रत्वानुपपत्तेः न च सम्बन्धिज्ञानाधीनं सम्बन्धज्ञानं लोके
दृष्टमिति वाच्यं तस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धस्य तत्सापेक्षत्वेऽपीह सम्बन्धिनो-
प्यज्ञानस्य साक्षिसम्बन्धसापेक्षस्फूर्तिकत्वेन वैपरीत्यात् न च सम्बन्धः
स्वस्थित्यर्थं सम्बन्धिनमपेक्षते इति वाच्यं लब्धसत्तास्फूर्तिकस्यैव
स्थित्यपेक्षणात् हेत्वनपेक्षत्वे इतरानपेक्षस्थितिकत्वाच्च

Nor may the Vedāntin urge that just as that erroneous surmisal which is itself Nescience is eternal *ab ante*, so if an erroneous surmisal of connexion with Nescience be regarded as eternal *ab ante*, then although this surmisal of connexion is not the product of Nescience &c. as the cause, yet by being dependent on Nescience (tat) it will come to an end on the cessation of Nescience (tat). For this erroneous surmisal of connexion which is eternal *ab ante*, sc. independent of production (*i. e.* of a producing cause), and a knowledge of which depends on the Witness, could not be dependent on Nescience (tat) as in no way standing in need of Nescience. Nor may be urged that the common fact of experience is that the knowledge of a relation depends on the knowledge of the things related. For although the knowledge of a relation as given by perception &c. depends on a knowledge of the things related (tat), yet here the reverse is the case, since Nescience, though it is one of the related things, must be in relation with the Witness in order to be known at all. Nor may it be urged that for the sake of its own persistence a relation demands some related thing. For only that which exists and is present in consciousness needs to persist. And because that which is independent of a cause does persist independent of aught else. (The Vedāntin assumed above that the sambandhādhyāsa was uncaused).

न चाज्ञानस्य ग्रहप्रागभावरूपस्य ग्रहानुपलम्भादुपलम्भ इति वाच्यं
नित्योपलम्भरूपस्यात्मनोनुपलम्भानुपपत्तेः भावरूपजगदुपादानस्य
चाज्ञानस्याभावरूपत्वानुपपत्तेश्च तथा चाज्ञानस्यैवाभावात् कथं
तज्जगत्कारणत्वेनोपन्यस्यत इति ।

मैवम् ।

प्रश्नस्य ज्ञानपूर्वत्वादाक्षेपे प्रतियोगिधीः ।

अवश्यं भाविनी पूर्वा विरोधः स्यादितोन्यथा ॥ ३६ ॥

कथमज्ञानसिद्धिरिति वदन्प्रवृत्त्यः किमयमज्ञानस्वरूपविषयकः
प्रश्नः किं वा तत्स्वरूपाऽऽक्षेपः तत्स्वरूपसाधकप्रमाणप्रश्न एव वा
अयम् । आद्ये अज्ञाते स्वरूपे प्रश्नानुपपत्तेः प्रश्नात्पूर्वमज्ञानस्वरूप-
सिद्धेरवश्यंभावान्तवैवाज्ञानस्वरूपं सिद्धमिति कोच प्रश्नः ।

Nor may it be urged that Nescience, which is the antecedent negation* of knowledge, is known through the non-perception* of knowledge. For there can be no non-perception of the Self, which is itself eternal perception. Nor can Nescience, which is the material cause of a *positive* entity, sc. the world, have itself a *negative* character.

And thus since Nescience does not indeed exist, how was it declared to be the cause of the world?

Not so (replies the Vedāntin): Because knowledge must precede a question; and for a negation a previous knowledge of the thing denied is essential. Otherwise contradiction follows from question and negation (itah).....XXXIX.

The opponent who puts the question, How is Nescience proved? must be asked whether

Met: Nescience, though inexplicable by any *pramāṇa* is vouched for by the Self or eternal Witness.

his question concerns the nature of Nescience, or is a denial of

Nescience, or asks for the evidence (*pramāṇa*) which proves Nescience. In the first case, if the nature of Nescience were unknown, his question would be impossible; for since a knowledge of the nature of Nescience is necessary previous to the question, that nature is known already to the opponent (*tava*) and therefore the question is unnecessary.

*For *prāgabhāva* and *anupalabdhi* (or the sixth *pramāṇa* of the Vedāntins) cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. pp. 318-326.

न च सामान्यज्ञानाद्विशेषजिज्ञासा युक्ता उक्तदोषात् न चाक्षेपो युक्तो ऽभावज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानपूर्वकत्वनियमेनाज्ञानस्वरूपसिद्धेः पूर्वमेव घृतत्वात् न च भ्रमोपस्थितस्याज्ञानस्याक्षेपो न्याय्यः यतः केन कुत्र भ्रम इति पृष्ठे परोक्तशब्दाभासेनाज्ञानविषयक इत्येवोत्तरं तथा च भ्रमस्य स्वसमानविषयकाज्ञानोपपादकत्वादज्ञानविषयकापराज्ञानस्वीकारेऽनवस्था दुर्वारा । हन्त तर्हि एकाज्ञानासहिष्णुतया ऽऽक्षेपं प्रयुज्ज्ञानस्यानेकाज्ञानस्वीकरणे मदोन्मतस्य स्वव्याघातगौरववैयर्थ्यादिदोषमपश्यतः स्वपक्षनिर्वाहे व्याहत एव ।

And he may not reply that the desire for special knowledge, following on general knowledge, is proper ; for the fault mentioned above (sc. the desire is unnecessary) applies here. Nor is a denial of Nescience proper ; for, in accordance with the rule that the knowledge of a negation must be preceded by a knowledge of the counter-entity (or thing denied), a knowledge of the nature of Nescience (the thing now denied) must have existed previous (to the denial of Nescience). And he may not reply that of Nescience as something known through error (*i. e.* false) a denial is proper. For when asked the question,—By what, and in regard to what, is this error effected?—his only reply will be, This error relates to Nescience and is effected by means of the false words uttered by some one else. And thus since the error is effected through Nescience which relates to itself, a second Nescience relating to the first Nescience is admitted, which gives rise to an inevitable regressus in infinitum. Alas, then, for the opponent who denies Nescience and, because of his impatience of (our theory of) a single Nescience, assumes a plurality of Nesciences, and in his pride fails to see the defects of this view sc. contradiction, combrousness &c.—the free course of his view is indeed overthrown !

न चैवं क्वचित्वापि प्रश्नाक्षेपयोः सत्त्वातुल्यः पर्यनुयोग इति वाच्यम् अज्ञाततया साक्षिसिद्धेऽज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थे प्रमाणप्रश्नस्य प्रमाणादर्शनेन स्वरूपतिरस्काररूपस्य चाक्षेपस्य कर्तुं सुकरत्वात् । अस्तु तर्हि ममापि साक्षिसिद्धेऽज्ञाने प्रमाणप्रश्नः समञ्जसः एवं तर्ह्यज्ञानसाक्षिणोः सम्बन्धोऽपि वाच्यः अन्यथा साक्षिणः साधकत्वमुपपत्तेः तथाऽज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धयोरनादित्वमपि वाच्यम् अन्यथा पूर्वमुक्तस्येदानीं संसारोपलम्भः स्यात् न च पूर्वमप्यज्ञानान्तरमेवेति वाच्यम् अज्ञानपरम्परातः एकस्यैव लघुत्वात्

Nor may he retort that thus a similar objection will apply to any question or denial of ours in regard to anything whatever. For we may well put a question in regard to an object, which as something unknown is vouched for by the Witness, in order to destroy the Nescience investing that object ; or we may make a denial, *i. e.* a rejection of the reality (*svarūpa*) of that object because no *pramāṇa* for the said object is observed to exist. Well then (replies the opponent) my question as to the *pramāṇa* for Nescience, which is vouched for by the Witness, may be considered to the point also. Very well then (we reply), you must admit a relation between Nescience and the Witness otherwise the Witness could not be a voucher for Nescience. Likewise you must admit that Nescience and the relation of the Witness with it are eternal *ab ante* : if not, a soul emancipated previous to this relation being formed would now be conscious of the world. Nor can it be said that even previous to this relation there was another Nescience (which as cause brought about a connexion between the second Nescience and the Witness) ; for it is easier to assume a single Nescience rather than a series of Nesciences.

तच्च यद्येन विना ऽनुपपन्नं तत्सर्वं सम्बन्धित्वमनादित्व-
मनिर्वचनीयत्वं भावरूपत्वं विचित्रशक्तिकत्वमेकत्वमन्यद्वा यत्कि-
ञ्चिदपेक्षितं स्वापपादकत्वेन सर्वं कल्पयतीत्यपि वाच्यम् तथाच
प्रमाणप्रश्ने अनर्थक एवाज्ञानस्य साक्षिणैव सिद्धत्वात् न चाज्ञान-
विषयाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रमाणप्रश्ने युक्त इति वाच्यं तदभावात्
अज्ञानस्य प्रमाणेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वाच्च तेन तस्य विरोधात् । तदयं
तमोदीपन्यायः तथाहि ।

अज्ञानं ज्ञातुमिच्छेद्यो मानेनात्यन्तमूढधीः ।

स तु नूनं तमः पश्येद्वीपेनोत्तमतेजसा ॥

Hence also it must be granted that Nescience which can-
not be accounted for save through something else, sc. through
relation (of Nescience with the Witness), its own eternal-ness *ab*
ante, its inexplicability, its character as a positive entity and as
a unity possessing manifold powers, or through any other character
which may be necessary to account for Nescience (*sva*), leads us to
infer (*kalpayati*) all these characteristics.

Thus the question whether there is any *pramāṇa* for Nes-
cience is quite useless, since Nescience is vouched for only by the
Witness. Nor can it be urged that the question whether a *pra-*
māṇa for Nescience exists may be rightly put with a view to de-
stroy the Nescience relating to Nescience. For there is no such
thing as Nescience relating to Nescience ; and because Nescience
cannot be cognised through a *pramāṇa*, since Nescience and *pra-*
māṇa are contradictory, sc. *ajñāna* is put an end to (*nivarttya*) by
pramāṇa (*nivarttaka*). Hence the well-known illustration of dark-
ness and the lamp :—thus, ‘ That dullest of dull-heads who would
cognise Nescience by means of a *pramāṇa*, would forsooth go
looking for darkness with a brilliant lamp ! ’

तथा चाज्ञानं कथमिति प्रष्टुं वात्माज्ञानमुपपादनीयमिति स्वानुभवसिद्धे कथं ताऽनुपपत्तिरेव । कुतस्तर्हि मे मुक्तिः कर्तृत्वाद्य-
शेषानर्थव्रातप्रसवबीजस्यात्माज्ञानस्य स्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् तत्त्वमस्या-
दिवाक्यजन्यापरोक्षब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारेणाज्ञानबाधादेवेति गृहाण ।

२४ ननु को ऽयं बाधः तत्र पूर्वप्रत्ययस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकार-
कत्वनिश्चय इत्यन्ये तन्न अन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारात् अज्ञानस्याबा-
धापत्तेश्च । सविलासाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरित्यस्मदीयाः केचित् तदप्यापा-
तरमणीयं प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यामव्याप्रेः ।

Well then, (some one may ask) how is Nescience proved? The questioner himself must prove the Nescience which relates to his Self: thus the question of *How* is impossible in regard to Nescience which is proved by one's own consciousness. Whence then emancipation for me (he may ask), since my own consciousness is a proof of that Nescience which relates to Self, and which is the seed whence grows all that complex of evils beginning with (the false notion of) agency &c? Know then (we reply) that emancipation follows on the destruction of Nescience through an intuition of the identity of Self with the immediately presented Brahman—(intuition effected) by means of the passage 'that thou art.'

24. What is this *destruction* of Nescience? Some teachers.

Bādha, destruction of error, explained according to the Vedantic anirvachaniya-khyāti, to the rejection of other current views, e. g. akhyāti, asatkhyāti, &c.

(Naiyāyikas) define it as the conviction that a previous cognition had (as its predicate portion) a predicate which (really) belonged to another subject. This definition we reject because we do not admit the technical *anyathākhyāti* or mistaken cognition; and because it would follow on this view that there was no destruction of Nescience.

Some of us Vedāntins* hold that it is the cessation of Nescience together with its products. This view too commends itself at first sight only, for the definition fails to apply to Nescience and its products, if these are taken singly or together.

* The view of the Panchapādikāvivarana :—'अज्ञानस्य स्वकार्येण वर्तमानेन प्रविलीनेन वा सह ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिर्बाधः' ।

किञ्च केयं निवृत्तिः ध्वंसमात्रं वा ज्ञानसाध्यः स एव वा पदार्था-
न्तरमेव वा आत्मस्वरूपं वा । नाद्यः सुदूराद्याघातजन्यघटादि-
ध्वंसेतदव्यवहारात् । न द्वितीयः उत्तरज्ञानसाध्यपूर्वज्ञानध्वंसे
तथात्वापत्तेः ज्ञानमात्रध्वंसे ऽतिव्याप्रेष्य । न तृतीयः तद्ध्वंसा-
व्यापनात् तदनिवृत्तावद्वैतक्षतेः । न चतुर्थः तस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वेन
ज्ञानवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः । तस्माद्बाधस्यैव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् कथमज्ञान-
तत्कार्यबाधान्मोक्ष इति ।

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

साक्षात्कृते त्वधिष्ठाने समनन्तरनिश्चितिः ।

अध्यस्यमानं नास्तीति बाध इत्युच्यते बुधैः ॥ ४० ॥

Further, what is meant by this cessation ? Is it to be defined as destruction merely ? Or as destruction effected by knowledge ? Or as something else ? Or as the Self ? Not as the first ; for in regard to the destruction of a jar effected by the strokes of a pestle the word *bādha* (*tat*) is not applied. Nor the second ; for then *bādha* would apply to the destruction of the earlier cognition effected by the later cognition, and because the definition extends too far to destruction of cognition merely. Not as the third ; for the definition will not apply to the destruction of that (something else supposed to be destruction, since a thing cannot be its own destruction) : and if there is no destruction of this something else, Vedāntic Monism is overthrown. Not the fourth ; for since Self is eternally established, it follows that knowledge (in regard to Self) is unnecessary.

Hence, since the very term *bādha* cannot be explained, how is it possible that emancipation should follow on *bādha* of Nescience and all its products !

To this objection we reply :—

The wise have declared that *bādha* is conviction, expressed in 'the falsely surmised object *is not*' following immediately on an intuition of the substrate (in which the thing was surmised)...XL.

शुद्धेऽधिष्ठाने विपरीतमध्यस्य प्रवर्तमानस्य निवर्तमानस्य वा यदधिष्ठानविषयकं बाधकज्ञानं परोक्षमपरोक्षं वेत्यन्नं तदनन्तर-
मिदमिह कालत्रयेऽपि नास्तीति योऽयं निश्चयः स एव बाध इति सर्वजनानुभवसिद्धम् । न चान्यथाख्यातिवादेऽप्यस्यार्थस्यार्थात् पर्यव-
सानमस्तीति वाच्यं तत्राध्यस्यमानस्यान्यत्र सत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् एवं ब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारे जाते अज्ञानं तत्कार्यं च सर्वं यावत् किञ्चित्त्रा-
ध्यस्तं तत्सर्वं तत्र कालत्रयेऽपि नास्तीति यो निश्चयः स्वानुभवसिद्धः स एव तस्य तत्र बाध इत्युच्यते अत एव प्रतिपन्नेषां निषेधप्रति-
योगित्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति समुदायविदां लक्षणमपि समञ्जसम् ।

If after a man has falsely surmised something in regard to an unrelated substrate, whether he energise or not in regard to the surmised object, there arises for him a knowledge, be it mediate or immediate, concerning the substrate and destructive of the surmised object, then after this knowledge there comes to him the conviction—this surmised object *is not* in time present, past and future,—which conviction is what the word *bādha* means, as vouched for by the common experience of men.

And it cannot be urged that this meaning (of the word *bādha*) applies also to the *anyathākhyāti* view as shown by the context. For this view holds that the surmised thing (e. g. silver) exists elsewhere (while it is being surmised in the nacre—which the Vedāntin denies).

Thus, when intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self has been attained, there arises the conviction, vouched for by one's own consciousness, that Nescience and its products, absolutely everything surmised to exist in Brahman (*tatra*) as substrate, do not exist in Brahman even in trinal time—this conviction is termed the *bādha* of Nescience (*tasya*) in regard to Brahman the substrate (*tatra*). Hence also the definition of *inexplicability* given by those who know the traditional teaching is adequate: it runs thus:—*inexplicability* consists in the being the counterentity to a negation made in regard to the substrate of that which is erroneously surmised.*

* cf. Chitsukhī, Pandit Vol. IV. p. 484, and Ved. paribh. Vol. V. p. 660.

न चेत्तरकालीननिषेधप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि वर्तमानातीतकालयोः
सत्त्वान्न चैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति वाच्यं
अनिर्वचनीयत्वापरिज्ञानात् न हि कादाचित्कत्वमात्रेणानिर्वचनीयत्वं
भवति पराभिमतसत्यस्यापि घटादेस्तथात्वात् न चाविद्यकत्वेन
विशेषः कारणस्य नामान्तरकरणापत्तेः न च ज्ञानबाध्यत्वेन विशेषः
तस्यापि सतो नास्तित्वप्रमित्यनुपपत्तेः न च सकलकार्यकारणबाधरू-
पस्य नास्तीतिप्रत्ययस्य बाधान्तरं मृग्यमन्यथा ऽद्वैतक्षतिरिति वाच्यम्

Nor can it be urged that in the above definition the negation cannot hold as to *trinal* time; for, although the negation concerns future time, the surmised object did exist in time past and present. This objection is due to a misunderstanding of the term *inexplicability*. For *inexplicability* is not constituted merely by the *temporary character* (of the object), since temporary character (*tathātva*) belongs to jars and like objects, although such objects are regarded by non-Vedāntins (*para*) as real things. Nor can it be urged that (between real objects like jars. &c. and unreal objects like the snake and silver of the stock example) there is a difference, constituted by the qualification of *being products of Nescience* (in the case of the snake and silver). For what follows from this objection is that a new name, sc. Nescience, has been given to the cause (of things). Nor is there a difference (between these two classes of things) constituted by the fact of the (latter class) being destroyed by knowledge. For it would follow that in regard to this difference also (*tasyāpi*), if it were something real, the certain knowledge of its non-existence could not arise. Nor can it be urged that some further destruction must be sought for this conviction of the non-existence (of the world)—which conviction (the Vedāntins teach) is destruction of all causes and effects: otherwise (sc. if this conviction be admitted as real, *sat*) Vedantic Monism is overthrown (*i. e.* there would in this case be two realities, viz., Brahman and the conviction that the world is false).

ब्रह्मातिरिक्तसर्वबाधरूपस्य तस्य स्वान्तर्भावेनैव तथात्वात् न च ब्रह्मातिरिक्तमस्ति नास्ति वेति विकल्पावकाशः अनिर्वचनीयत्वेन परिहृतत्वात् । अख्यात्यात्मख्यात्यसत्ख्यातिवादिषु भ्रमबाधव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः अन्यथाख्यातिवादिनैव दर्शितत्वात् नेह यत्यते ग्रन्थ-गौरवभयात् अनात्मविचारत्वाच्च

For this conviction (*tasya*) consisting in the destruction of *all that is not Brahman* is destruction inasmuch as it includes itself * (within the *all*). Nor is there room for the doubt whether the (world as) distinct from Brahman *is* or *is not*; for we have overthrown this doubt by showing the *inexplicability* of the world (cf. pp. 38, 39.)

And because the holder of the *anyathākhyāti* view has shown that neither error nor the destruction of it can be satisfactorily accounted for on the views of *akhyāti*, *ātmakhyāti* or *asatkhyāti*, † no attempt has been made here to discuss these views for fear of extending our book; and because this discussion does not directly treat of the Self.

* ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्यमानं सर्वं कालत्रये नास्तीति निश्चयस्य अस्ति रूपद्वयमेकं बाधा-त्मकम् अपरमध्यस्यमानत्वम् । तत्राध्यस्यमानत्वेन रूपेण स्वविषयत्वम् । बाधत्वेन विषयित्वमिति नात्माश्रय इत्यर्थः तथा च नाद्वैतवृत्तिरिति भावः । N. D.'s gloss.

† Nānālikshita thus states and refutes these views, borrowing sometimes even the words of the *Bhāmātī* (Biblio: Ind: pp. 11-18):—

ननु अविविक्तव्यवहारप्रसज्जकं स्मरणादग्रहीतभेदं ग्रहणमेव भ्रमत्वेन व्यवह्रियते न च तद्विषयोऽनिर्वचनीयः पुरोवर्तिनः सत्यत्वात् । तथा नेदं रजतम् । इति बाधप्रत्ययोऽपि व्यवहारमात्रं बाधते न भ्रमविषयस्य कालत्रयाभावं बोधयति । तत्कथमनिर्वचनीयवाद इत्यख्यातिवादिनो मन्यन्ते । “The holders of the *akhyāti* view maintain as follows:—that same perceptive cognition, whose difference from recollected knowledge is not cognised, and which brings about the indiscriminate experience—‘*this (nacre) is silver*’—where the knowledge of nacre is not discriminated from that of silver—is commonly regarded as *erroneous cognition*. And the object declared by this cognition is not (what the Vedāntins technically term) *anirvachanīya*, *inexplicable*; for the object lying before us does exist. And so too the knowledge of destruction conveyed in *this is not silver* puts an end to the activity merely (which followed on the earlier cognition—sc. *this is silver*—) but does not (as the Vedāntins declare) certify to the non-

existence, in time present, past and future, of the object (sc. silver) made known in the erroneous cognition (—this is silver—). Hence the anirvachanīyakhyāti view of the Vedāntins; sc. that, at the time of error, anirvachaniya, or unreal silver is produced, is untenable.”

The akhyāti view of the Prābhākaras, it may be remarked, follows from their siddhānta that all cognition, jñāna, as being self-luminous, self-evidencing, svaprakāśa, is true, yathārtha. Thus the consciousness expressed in idam rajatam is not (as is commonly supposed) erroneous cognition, bhrama; for both its factors, the one perceptive and embracing the idam, the other memorial and embracing the rajatam, are true. But here is akhyāti, non-discrimination, of the two factors as distinct. Such non-discrimination is of course due to some defect (dosha) visual or otherwise, and to the co-operation of the similarity between śukti and rajata which awakens the mental retentum, saṃskāra, of the rajata previously cognised. Cf. Bhāmatī, p. 15.

He continues : अख्यातो तावद् ग्रहणमेव स्मरणदृष्टीतभेदं बाध्याभेदव्यवहारप्रसज्जकत्वात् भ्रम इति व्यवस्थापितम् । तदसत् । ग्रहणस्मरणे भासेते न वा । न चेद्विज्ञानस्तः । त्वन्मते ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वादभासने स्वरूपाभावनियमात् । भासेते चेत् कथं तर्हि तयोर्भेदाग्रहे भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वात् । अत एव न अभेदव्यवहारप्रसज्जकत्वम् । ततः कथं भ्रमव्यवस्थापनम् । तथा बाधव्यवस्थापनमप्यनुपपन्नम् । यत्र त्यक्तेषणस्य व्यवहार एव नोदेति तत्र नेदं रजतम् इति ज्ञानस्य बाधकत्वं न स्यात् । तस्मादख्यातो भ्रमबाधव्यवस्थापनानुपपत्तिरिति । “On the akhyāti view error is thus accounted for—*perceptive* cognition, whose difference from *memorial* cognition has not been perceived, is error, in that it leads to the experience of the thing hereafter to be rejected, sc. silver, as identical with the thing perceived, sc. nacre. This is wrong. Do the two, sc. the perceptive and memorial cognitions, appear in consciousness or not? If not, they exist not. For since you hold that knowledge is self-luminous (self-evidencing), it follows necessarily that when knowledge shines not, it exists not (svarūpa = sattā). If both the above cognitions shine forth in consciousness, then non-perception of the difference between them is impossible; for this difference does exist as cognition (svarūpatvāt = jñānātmakatvāt). Hence also (to the perceptive cognition) does not belong (as you maintain) the power of bringing about the experience of *identity* (of silver and nacre). Therefore it is impossible, on this view, to account for *error*. So too your grounding of bādha, or destruction of error, is contradictory. For where, in the case of a desire-less man, no activity follows (on his error in regard to the nacre), the cognition expressed in ‘this is not silver’ would not be

the destroyer of his error (because you hold that this cognition destroys only the activity in regard to the silver; and therefore this man, having no desire for silver, would remain inactive and still continue to regard the nacre as silver). Hence, on the akhyāti view, neither error nor the destruction of it can be satisfactorily accounted for."

आत्मख्यातिवादिनोऽपि न रजतमध्यस्तम् इत्याहुः किं तु संप्रयोगमन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् संविदात्मकत्वेनान्तरस्य रजतस्य बहिष्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्भमः । नेदं रजतम् इति बाधोऽपि न रजतासत्त्वमावेदयति किं तु तत्र इदंतात्परपर्यायं बहिष्त्वं प्रतिषेधति धर्मधर्मोभयनिषेधापेक्षया धर्ममात्रनिषेधे लाघवात् इत्येवं संगिरन्ते । "The holders of the ātmakhyāti view also declare that the silver is not erroneously surmised (as the Vedāntins hold), but that since the silver is immediately perceived without any intercourse (of sense-organs &c. with it), it consists of knowledge (samvit = vijñāna): that of this *internal* silver (as thus constituted) there is a cognition under the form of externality: that *this* cognition is false. Further that the bādha, expressed in 'this is not silver,' does not certify to the non-existence of silver but denies in regard to silver (tatra) externality, which externality is another synonym for *this-ness*; because the denial of the attribute, sc. this-ness or externality, is, in accordance with the law of parsimony, preferable to the denial of both the subject, sc. the silver, and the attribute, sc. its externality."

आत्मख्यातावपि किं ज्ञानाकारता बाह्ये अध्यस्यते ज्ञानात्मनि रजते वा बहिष्त्वं । नाद्यः विज्ञानवादिमते बाह्यस्य अलीकत्वादसत्त्वेन अधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेः । तथात्वे वा इदं रजतमसत् इति प्रतीतिः स्यात् । ननु सत् इत्युल्लेखाभावात् असदेव इति चेन्न । तथात्वे रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । अथ रजते बहिष्त्वं समारोप्यते । तर्हि तस्याप्यसत्त्वात् तद्विषयज्ञानस्य अपरोक्षता न स्यात् । असत्ख्यात्यापत्तेश्च । रजतस्य ज्ञानाकारत्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च । न च नेदं रजतम् इति बाधप्रत्यय एव लाघवानुगृहीतो रजतस्य बाह्यत्वनिषेधेन अर्थादान्तरत्वमावेदयति इति साम्प्रतम् । इदंत्वं हि सन्निहितत्वम् । तच्चेन्निरूप्यते तर्हि असन्निहितमेव रजतं स्यात् तस्य प्रतिपत्तात्मकं सन्निहिततमत्वं कुतस्त्यम् । न च संप्रयोगमन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् तस्य ज्ञानात्मकत्वम् । दोषवशाद्वेशान्तरवर्तिन एव रजतस्य इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षोपपत्तेः । संप्रयोगमन्तरेण इति विशेषणासिद्धेः । यत्तु नेदं रजतम् इति बाधो बाह्यमिदंत्वं निषेधति न रजतम् इति तत्र । बाधो नोभयमपि निषेधति किं तु तयोस्तादात्म्यम् । तस्मिंश्च निषिद्धे इदंत्वं पुरोवर्तिनि स्यात्यति रजतं रजतत्वं च देशान्तरे रजते च इति तन्मते भ्रमबाध व्यवस्थापनमनुचितमेव । "According to the ātmakhyāti view also, either the form of knowledge is erroneously imposed on external (silver), or externality is imposed on the silver which really consists of knowledge? Not the first alternative; for since according to vijñānavāda (sensa-

tionalism) no external object exists, it is impossible to regard the silver as a substrate (in which something might be surmised), for it exists not. Or even if the former alternative be admitted, our perception ought to take the form 'this silver is unreal' (and this form it does not take). And against this it cannot be argued that since the term *real* is not applied (to the silver under discussion) the silver must of course be *unreal*. For if this were the case, one would not attempt to grasp the (unreal) silver. Then, the other alternative remains, sc. externality is imposed on the silver (which is nothing more than a sensation). In this case, since externality also exists not, the knowledge of it could not be perceptual (for perception deals with *satvishaya* or an existing object); and because on this view would follow *asatkhyāti* or perception of blank non-entity; and because there is no evidence to prove that the silver consists of *jñāna* sc. is a sensation. Nor is it correct to say that the knowledge of *bādha* conveyed in 'this is not silver,' accepted in accordance with the law of parsimony, declares by implication the *internal* character of the silver, in denying its externality. For *this-ness* is *nearness* (*this* represents the object immediate, *most nearly* perceived): and if *this-ness* be denied (of the silver, cf. *supra*), then the silver must be something distant: however then could that maximum of nearness, which constitutes the knower, pertain to silver (which the *vijñānavādin* declares to be *internal*)? Nor does the silver consist in knowledge, because it is immediately perceived without any intercourse of sense-organs &c.; for the qualification *without any intercourse* &c. is unproved, since intercourse with sense-organs (—though of the *alaukika* kind, technically termed *jñāna-lakṣhaṇā pratyāsatti*) due to some defect visual or otherwise, must be admitted in regard to silver existing elsewhere.

Nor is it correct to say that the *bādha* expressed in 'this is not silver' denies external *this-ness* and not the silver. The *bādha* denies neither, but it does deny the identity of the two. And when this identity is denied, the *this-ness* will continue to exist in the presented object, sc. the nacre, and the silver and the silver-ness will exist in some other place and in some silver respectively. Hence the grounding of error and its destruction according to the *ātmakhyāti* view is quite untenable."

It would appear from *Bhāmātī* p. 15, that the *ātmakhyāti* view belongs to both the *Sautrāntikas* as well as to the *Vijñānavādins*.

असत्ख्यातिवादिनोऽपि न अनिर्वचनीयं रजतम् इत्याहुः किं तु निस्तत्त्वमसदेव

तस्माद्बाधकप्रत्ययोत्तरमध्यस्तस्य चैकालिकासत्त्वनिश्चयो बाध इति सिद्धम् । तथा च सुरेश्वरः ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ।

अविद्या सह कार्येण नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥

It has therefore been proved that bādha is the conviction as to the non-existence in trinal time of that which was surmised, consequent on the knowledge of a bādhaka, or destroyer of the surmisal. And thus Sureśvara declares:—‘Nescience with its products was not, is not, nor will be, whenever perfect knowledge is produced from sentences as ‘that thou art.’*’

रजतम् । ज्ञानादेवासत्प्रकाशनसमर्थाद्रजतं भासते अत एव बाधोऽपि रजतासत्त्वमेव बोधयति नेदं रजतमिति । The asatkhyātivādins (Śūnyavādins or Mādhya-mikas) also maintain that the silver is not anirvachanīya but a blank non-entity. That the silver appears to consciousness is due solely to cognition, which can illumine (*i. e.* make known) non-entity. Hence even bādha makes known the non-existence of silver thus—‘this is not silver.’”

यत्तु असत्ख्यातौ असदेव असत्प्रकाशनसमर्थं ज्ञानं भासयति इति तदप्यसत् । असतोऽपरोक्षप्रतीत्यदर्शनात् । सामर्थ्यस्य च कुत्र सामर्थ्यम् इति विषयसापेक्षत्वेन विषयस्य असतश्च कार्यज्ञाप्यविकल्पासहत्वात् असतो एव असत्ख्यातिः । यदपि बाधो रजतासत्त्वमेवावेदयति इति तदप्यन्यथाख्यातिवादिमते पूर्वमेवात्मख्यातिनिराकरणप्रसङ्ग एव परिहृतम् । ततो न ख्यात्यन्तरं युक्तमित्यर्थः ।

‘Then also the statement, on the asatkhyāti view, that cognition which can illumine non-entity, makes the non-existent silver shine forth in consciousness, is incorrect. For immediate perception of a non-entity is unknown. And since power implies an object—thus, power in regard to what?—and since in regard to a *non-existent object* it cannot be affirmed either that it is an existing effect (kārya) or logical effect (jñāpya *sc.* something made known), it follows that the asatkhyāti view is wholly erroneous. And the statement that bādha declares the non-existence of silver has been already refuted by the anyathākhyātivādin, when treating of the ātmakhyāti view.”

* The verse runs thus:—

कल्याणविद्यैव मत्पक्षे सा चानुभवसंश्रया ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्यमात्रतः ॥

Sansk. Coll. MS. 9. fol. verso.

२५ अथ कथं विद्याया अविद्याबाधकत्वम् विरोधादिति चेत्
कस्तर्हितयोर्विरोधः किमेककालानवस्थितत्वमुतैकदेशानवस्थितत्वम्
आहोस्वित् वध्यघातकत्वम् अथवा भावाभावात्मकत्वम् । नाद्यः
पूर्वभाविन्याऽविद्याया सह विद्याया एककालावस्थितत्वात् विद्योत्त-
रमविद्यानिवृत्तेः अन्यथा विद्यावैयर्थ्यात् । न द्वितीयः व्यधिकरण-
योर्विद्याऽविद्यायोर्विरोधाभावेनैकाधिकरणत्वस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यत्वात् ।
तृतीये वध्यस्य घातो वाच्यः । यत्कर्तृत्वं घातकत्वं ध्वंसे घातस्त-
त्कर्तृत्वं घातकत्वमिति चेत् स तर्हि वध्याद्विन्नः स्वतन्त्रः पदार्थः
कश्चित् उत तद्गुणः तदात्मैव वा । आद्ये वध्यस्य ध्वंसे न स्याद्वि-
मवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव परस्परासम्बन्धात् । द्वितीये धर्म एव धर्मिणो दीर्घा-
युष्मानयति अन्यथा निराश्रयो धर्म एव न स्यात्

25. Now the objection may be raised :—How can Knowledge be the destroyer of Nescience? Because (the Siddhāntin replies)

Objection : the supposed opposition between Knowledge and Nescience cannot be intelligibly stated : they are opposed. What, then, is the opposition between them?

Does it consist (i) in the impossibility of their existing at the same time? Or (ii) in the same place? Or (iii) in the one being the destroyer of the other, sc. that which is to be destroyed? Or (iv) in the positive and negative characters respectively of knowledge and nescience?

Not the first: for knowledge must exist at the same time along with Nescience which preceded, because the destruction of Nescience is subsequent to knowledge; otherwise knowledge would be useless. Not the second: since (to prove his point of mutual opposition*) the Siddhāntin is bound to declare that Knowledge and Nescience have the same locus, because there would be no opposition between Knowledge and Nescience, if they had separate loci. On the third alternative, the destruction (ghāta) of that which is to be destroyed must be maintained. If it be replied that ghātakatva implies agency:—thus, it is that which brings about ghāta, i. e. dhvamsa, destruction; then it may be asked whether (a) this ghāta is an independent something, distinct from that which is to be destroyed (vadhya) or (b) is an attribute of the vadhya or (c) is the vadhya itself?

If (a), then destruction of the vadhya would be impossible,

* वक्तव्यत्वात् । विरोधसिद्ध्यर्थमित्यर्थः । gloss.

तृतीये तु विद्याऽविद्यात्पादिकैवेति कुतो विरोधः । न चतुर्थः विद्याऽविद्ययोर्भूयोरपि भावरूपत्वात् अविद्यायाः प्राग-भावरूपत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात् अन्यथा एककालावस्थानं न स्यात् । तस्माद्विद्याऽविद्ययोर्विरोधस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्कथं विद्याया अविद्याबाधकत्वं विपरीतं वा किं न स्यादिति । अत्रोच्यते ।

उपमर्द्यस्वभावत्वमविद्याया विरोधिता ।

तत्कर्तृत्वं तु विद्यायाः प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥ ४१ ॥

यद्यपि विरोधान्तरमिह निर्वक्तुमशक्यं तथाप्युपमर्द्योपम-
र्दकभावलक्षणोऽयं विरोधः शक्यत एव निर्वक्तुम् अविद्योपमर्द-
कत्वस्य विद्यास्वभावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

for the two are as unconnected as the mountains Himālaya and Vindhya. If (b) then the attribute prolongs the existence of its substrate, otherwise a substrateless attribute could not exist. If (c) then Knowledge itself brings about Nescience; and thus their would be no opposition between Knowledge and Nescience. Not the fourth; for both Knowledge and Nescience are positive entities, in that we have refuted the view that Nescience is the antecedent non-existence (negation) of knowledge: if this were not so, knowledge and nescience could not exist at the same time. Hence (argues the opponent) since the opposition between Knowledge and Nescience cannot be intelligibly set forth, why should Knowledge be regarded as the destroyer of Nescience, or why should not the reverse be held, sc. Nescience is the destroyer of Knowledge?

To this we reply:—

Nescience is by nature the thing to be destroyed; whereas (destroying) agency belonging

Met: they are by nature opposed, as light and darkness: and the nature of things is not to be called in question.

to Knowledge constitutes the opposing character of Knowledge, just as this is exemplified in the case of darkness and light...XLI.

Although in this case no other opposition can be intelligibly maintained, yet the opposition indicated above as the relation of destroyer and thing to be destroyed can certainly be thus maintained, in that it is generally admitted fact of induction that Knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience.

न च विरोधिताऽविशेषे विद्योपमर्दकत्वमेवाविद्यायाः किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तथा सति विद्योत्पत्तिरेव न स्यात् । उपमर्दकाया अविद्यायाः पूर्वमेव स्थितत्वात् प्रतिनियतस्वभावस्य पर्यनुयोक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च यथा प्रकाशतमसोः । न च तत्र वैपरीत्यं शङ्कितुं शक्यते दृष्टविरोधात् ।

न च वध्यघातकपक्षोक्तदोषप्रसक्तिः उपमर्दकस्य कालत्रयेऽपि नास्तीति प्रमितिरूपस्य बाधापरपर्यायस्य विद्योत्तरं जायमानत्वात् ॥

२६ नन्वविद्योपमर्दकस्वभावत्वं चेद्विद्यायास्तर्हि विदुषो विद्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरमविद्यायाः सकार्यायाः समूलकापं कषितत्वात्तदैव विदेहकैवल्यप्राप्तौ देहपातस्तात्कालिकः स्यात् तथा चोच्छिन्नः सम्प्रदायः स्यात्

Nor may it be asked by way of objection why Nescience should not be the destroyer of Knowledge, since the opposition between the two is quite the same, (whether Nescience or knowledge be considered). Because if this were so, Knowledge could not indeed arise, since Nescience, the destroyer, was already existing: and further, because the settled nature of a thing cannot be called in question, as in the case of light and darkness. Nor can the reverse of this be urged, as being opposed to experience. Nor will there follow (in regard to our view) the defects noted in regard to alternative (iii) pp. 135, 36, because it is subsequent to knowledge that the negation expressed in 'Nescience is not in trinal time' arises,—which negation is true knowledge, and is another synonym for bādha (destruction).

26. Here it may be argued that if knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience, then

Reductio ad absurdum of the Vedānta: emancipation, or the cessation of bodily existence, is possible only through a sacred teacher; but the teacher is an impossibility, if knowledge destroys Nescience of which bodily existence is a product:

consciousness of his body is at an end (videhakaivalya).* Since subsequent to the rise of knowledge Nescience together with its products is entirely destroyed. And thus the traditional line of teachers (of Brahma-vidyā) would be destroyed, (and without a guru no emancipation!).

* Videhkaivalya to be distinguished from jīvanmukti in which

न च प्रारब्धसामर्थ्याद्वेहपातो नास्तीति वाच्यं प्रारब्धस्याप्यविद्याकार्यतया तदभावे स्थातुमशक्यत्वात् तन्त्वभावे पटस्येव । न च प्रारब्धकर्मफलभोगनिर्वाहकतया कियत्कालमविद्याप्यनुवर्ततइति वाच्यं विद्याया अविद्योपमर्दकत्वस्वभावहानिप्रसङ्गात् । न चोत्तरकाल एव तथास्वभावः एकस्य स्वभावद्वयानभ्युपगमात् न चावरणशक्तिप्रधानमज्ञानं निवृत्तमेव विक्षेपशक्तिप्रधानं त्वनुवर्तते प्रारब्धनिर्वाहायेति वाच्यम् । अज्ञानद्वयाभावात् । न चैकमेव शक्तिद्वयविशिष्टम् । एकस्य युगपत्स्थितिनिवृत्त्योर्विरुद्धत्वात् । न च शक्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रमेव विवक्षितं शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदात् भेदे वा अज्ञानं न निवर्तत

Nor may it be argued against this view that corporeal existence does not cease because of the retributive efficacy of actions. For being a product of Nescience, this retributive efficacy cannot prevail when Nescience has ceased to exist, just as the cloth is at end when the threads have ceased to exist.

Nor may it be further urged that Nescience also continues to exist for a short time sufficient to bring about (for the individual) the fruition of the actions (by him) in earlier spheres of existence. For this view would imply the loss to knowledge of its nature as the destroyer of Nescience. Nor against the above is it to be urged that this character of destroyer belongs to knowledge only at a time subsequent (to that indicated above). For one and the same thing cannot have *two natures*. Nor again that Nescience *quâ* concealing power ceases (with the rise of knowledge, but *quâ* projecting power it continues to exist in order to work out the retributive efficacy of actions. For there are not two Nesciences. Nor again that though *one* only, Nescience is possessed of two-fold power. For that the one thing should at the same time both be and cease to be is contradictory. Nor again that the cessation of the power merely is implied (above). For the power and that which possesses power are identical: or if different, Nescience could not cease to be.

there is for the individual a consciousness (abhimāna) of his body in the form saṃskāra or mental retenta: cf. Yogasūtra, I. 1. 17-19.

न च प्रारब्धनिवृत्त्या तन्निवृत्तिः प्रारब्धनिवृत्तेः अप्रमाणत्वा-
त् । न च तदनन्तरं ज्ञानमेवाप्रतिबद्धं तन्निवर्तकमिति वाच्यं प्रार-
ब्धनाशे देहपातानन्तरं ज्ञानस्यैवाभावात् पूर्वज्ञानस्य च प्रारब्धेन
प्रतिबद्धत्वात् । न चाविद्यासंस्कारो लेशाविद्याशब्दाभिधेयो ऽनुवर्तत
इति वाच्यं तस्याप्यविद्याकार्यत्वात् । अविद्यामात्रत्वे च संस्कार-
शब्दप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यात् । जीवन्मुक्तिप्रतिपादकश्रुतिस्मृतिप्रामाण्याद्विदुषो
देहस्थितिः कल्प्यतइति चेन्न शास्त्रस्य जीवन्मुक्तिप्रतिपादने प्रयो-
जनाभावात् ।

Nor again that there is cessation of Nescience (*tat*) through
cessation of *prārabdha*. For the cessation of *prārabdha* is not a
source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*, and only Knowledge can put an end
to Nescience). Nor is it to be argued that after the cessation of
prārabdha, Knowledge being unobstructed (by *prārabdha*) puts
an end to Nescience (*tat*). For when following on the destruction
of *prārabdha* bodily existence has ceased, knowledge itself *is not*;
and because knowledge prior (to the destruction of *prārabdha*) was
obstructed by *prārabdha* (and could not therefore operate as the
destroyer of nescience). Nor again, that a mental retentum of
Nescience, technically termed *leśāvidyā*, continues to exist. For this
also is a product of Nescience (and must therefore perish along with
Nescience, its *upādāna* or material cause): and because it is useless
to apply the term *retentum* to that which really is Nescience.
Nor may it be argued that the continued existence of a body
for him who has gained knowledge is inferred on the authority of
Śruti and Smṛiti passages, which declare the (technical) *jīvan-*
mukti state or emancipation of one while alive. For it is not the
aim of the Śāstra to teach *jīvanmukti*.

मुमुक्षूणां श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्तिः प्रयोजनमिति चेत् अस्तु तर्हि श्रवणादिविधेरर्थवादस्तत् शास्त्रं तथाच लौकिकवैदिकप्रमाणविरोधात्तेन कथं विदुषो देहस्थितिः कल्प्यते । न च मुक्तेषु दृष्टान्तेन प्रारब्धस्थितिः साधितेति वाच्यं दृष्टान्ते वैषम्यात् तच्च कर्मोपादानस्येष्टोरनाशात् । न च जीवन्मुक्तौ सार्वलौकिकी प्रसिद्धिरव्याहतेति वाच्यं प्रमाणविरहेण प्रसिद्धेरन्धपरम्परारूपत्वात् । न चाप्रामाणिकस्य शास्त्रकारैरुपपादनमनर्थकमिति वाच्यं शिष्यस्याविद्वन्तया गुरावविश्वासपरिहारप्रयोजनतया तस्यार्थवत्त्वात् ।

If against this it be said that its aim is to urge those who seek emancipation to engage in *hearing* &c. then it must be granted that the passage in which *jīvanmukti* is taught (*tacchāstram*) is an *arthavāda* passage laudatory of the injunction (*vidhi*) to *hear* &c. and thus it is not possible to infer by means of the passage teaching *jīvanmukti* that the body of him who has gained knowledge continues to exist, for this is opposed to both natural and supernatural evidence.* Nor again is it to be argued that the continued existence of *prārabdha* is confirmed by the example of an arrow shot from a bow. The analogy is not strict; for in the former case, the arrow as the substrate in which the motion inheres is not destroyed (whereas Nescience, the substrate of *prārabdha*, is destroyed *ex hypothesi*). Nor again that the universal opinion (of teachers) in regard to *jīvanmukti* is untouched (by the above objection). For in the absence of proof, common opinion is but blind tradition. Nor again that that the exposition by the Śāstra-teachers of something unproved would be purposeless. For such exposition has its purpose in destroying the distrust in his teacher which the pupil through his ignorance might entertain.

* *natural*, sc. the destruction of the *samskāra* follows on the destruction of *avidyā* its *upādāna*, as is commonly observed in regard to cause and effects. *Supernatural*, sc. that afforded by such Vedic passages as 'the fetter of the heart is broken &c.' Mu. Up. II. 2. 8.

तस्माद्विद्याया अविद्योपमर्दकत्वस्य स्वाभाव्यात् विदुषः
सद्योमुक्तावुपदेष्टुरभावात् कुतो विद्योत्पत्तिः न चाचार्यनिरपेक्षैव
विद्येति साम्प्रतं आचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेद नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया
प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत आचार्यस्ते गतिं वक्तुं अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरत्र
नास्ति प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्टु इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । नैष दोषः ।

कल्पितोप्युपदेष्टु स्याद्यथाशास्त्रं समादिशेत् ।

न चाविनिगमो दोषो ऽविद्यावत्त्वेन निर्णयात् ॥ ४२ ॥

Hence (concludes the opponent) since Knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience, instant emancipation accrues to him who knows; and thus, in the absence of a teacher, the rise of Knowledge is impossible.

Nor is it correct to say that knowledge is certainly independent of a teacher. For as declared in Śruti passages,—So he who has a

Chānd. Up. VI. 14.
Kāṭha Up. I. 2. 9.
" " I. 3. 14.
Chānd. Up. IV. 14.

teacher knows: That knowledge is not to be obtained by argument: Having obtained your boons (sc. excellent teachers) un-

derstand them: but a teacher will tell you the way to another life: Unless it (Self) be taught by another there is no way to it:

Kāṭha Up. I. 2. 8.
" " I. 2. 9.

but when it is declared by another, then, O Dearest, it is easy to understand.

Our conclusion is not incorrect.

A teacher there can be, even though he be surmised: he can

Met: an unreal teacher can declare the Real, Brahman, just as the unreal face seen in water makes known the real face reflected therein.

teach, as the Veda teaches. Nor is there here the fault of proposing alternatives without giving a reason for the adoption

of one of them, for decision is arrived at though the fact that ignorance pertains (to one only, sc. the pupil, avidyāvattvena)....

यद्यपि विदुषस्तदानीमेव मुक्तत्वात् पारमार्थिकः कश्चि-
दुपदेष्टा नास्ति तथापि कल्पितेन गुरुणा विद्योत्पत्तिसम्भवात्
नानुपपत्तिः काचित् । न च कल्पितस्य कथं सत्यज्ञानजनकत्वमिति
वाच्यं शास्त्रवदुपपत्तेः प्रतिबिम्बवच्च । न च गुरुशिष्ययोर्मध्ये कतरः
कल्पक इत्यविनिगमो दोष इति वाच्यम् । अविदुषः कल्पकत्वात्
गुरोश्च विदुषः कल्पनाबीजाभावेन तत्त्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्माच्छास्त्रा-
चार्यप्रसादासादिततत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्पत्त्यात्कारेण मोक्षाविर्भाव-
प्रतिबन्धकाज्ञानतत्कार्यतिरस्कारसमनन्तरं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्व-
भावाऽद्वितीयानन्दोऽस्मीति मन्यते ततः कृतकृत्यो भवतीति ।

Although no real teacher exists, for (the teacher as) one who knows is at once emancipated, yet no contradiction finds place here, because knowledge can arise through an *imagined* teacher. Nor can it be argued that what is imagined (sc. the teacher) cannot bring about real knowledge. For this is possible as in the case of the Veda, and in the case of a reflexion. Nor again that our position is logically defective because a doubt exists as to which of the two, the teacher or the pupil, is here the surmiser. For the surmiser is he who knows not, and this character cannot belong to the teacher, because in him, as one who knows, the germ of surmiser (sc. avidyā) exists not. Hence when the pupil has gained intuition (of Self as Brahman) which comes from the sentence 'that thou art' through the favour of Veda and teacher, and has set aside Nescience and its products which are obstructive of emancipation, then he becomes conscious of himself as the Eternal, pure Intelligence, unrelated, one without a second, Bliss ; then for him all duties are at an end. Thus we rightly spoke (in the opening verse p. 1) of 'having directly through Śruti ascertained the Self which is bliss &c.'

अतः सुषूक्तमात्मानन्दं साक्षाद्विनिश्चित्येति । विज्ञानमा-
नन्दं ब्रह्म को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्याद्यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न
स्यात्सैषा आनन्दस्य मीमांसा इत्यारभ्य यश्चायं पुरुषे यश्चासा-
वादित्ये स एक इत्यन्तं भृगुर्वै वारुणिरित्यारभ्याऽऽनन्दो ब्रह्मेति
व्यजानादित्यन्तं यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्तीत्यादिश्रुति-
शतेभ्यः न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति आत्मनस्तु
कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति इत्यारभ्य न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय
सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवतीत्यन्तेन
व्युत्पादनाच्च आत्मनः परमानन्दरूपत्वस्य ।

And because Self has been proved to be absolute Bliss
in such many passages as 'Brahman is Intelligence, Bliss' and
in that beginning, 'who could breathe, who could breathe forth,

Taitt. Up. II. 7. 8.
" " III. 1. 6.

if that Bliss existed not in the
ether (of the heart) ? Now this
is an examination of Bliss';

and ending, 'that Bliss which is in man and that Bliss which
is in the sun, both are one'—and again in the passage beginning
Bhṛigu Vāruṇi (went to his father), and ending with 'He per-
'ceived that Bliss is Brahman.'—and again in the passage, 'that

Chānd. Up. VII. 23.

which is Infinite is Bliss. There
is no Bliss in anything finite'—

and in the passage beginning, 'Verily, a husband, is not dear that

Bṛihad Up. II. 4.

you may love the husband, but
that you may love the Self,

therefore a husband, is dear' and ending 'Verily, everything is not
dear that you may love everything, but that you may love the
Self, therefore everything is dear.'

२७ नन्वानन्दत्वादयो धर्मा आत्मनि सन्ति न वा आदौ ते किं सत्या असत्या वा नाद्यः द्वैतापत्तेः नेतरः धर्मिणोऽनानन्दत्वापत्तेः न हि रजतत्वं यचारोप्यते तद्रजतम् । न चानानन्दत्वमानन्दभिन्नत्वं तदपि नास्तीति वाच्यं तथाप्यानन्दरूपत्वासिद्धेः । न द्वितीयः आनन्दत्वानाश्रये आनन्दव्यवहारादर्शनात् न च सर्वव्यवहारातीतो ऽलौकिक एवायमानन्दः । लौकिकवैदिकपदार्थयोरेकत्वात् अन्यथा लोकवेदाधिकरणविरोधः ।

27. Here it may be asked by way of objection whether

Objection : Bliss, ānanda, implies blissful character, ānandatva, technically known as the jāti class-attribute or generality. Hence, over and above Brahman or Self, there exists ānandatva : and thus Monism (advaitavāda) is overthrown.

blissful character and the other attributes exist in Self or not. If so, whether they are real or unreal (*i. e.* surmised). Real they cannot be ; for this would imply duality (sc. Self, and the real

attributes). Nor can they be unreal ; for this would imply that the substrate (sc. Self in which these attributes are surmised) does not really possess blissful character : just as that substrate, sc. ²acre in which silver-ness is surmised is not really silver. Nor (in reply) may it be urged (by the Vedāntin) that the possession of a not blissful character = possession of a character other than blissful ; and that such character also does not pertain to Self. For the blissful character of Self would still remain unproved. And the second alternative, sc. that blissful character does not exist in Self, will not hold. For the term bliss is not applied to anything which is not the substrate of the attribute blissful. Nor can it be urged that this, the Bliss (or Brahman of Vedānta), is something transcending the common usage of the word. For the common and Vedic meanings of a word must be identical : to deny this (anyathā) would be to deny the adhikaraṇa (of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā I. 3. 30), teaching that words have the same meaning in Veda that they have in common speech.

न च वाक्यार्थ एवायमानन्दस्तेनाऽपि आनन्दत्वाप्रतिपाद-
नात् अखण्डे एव तात्पर्यात् । न च सर्वथा अलौकिके सुखे
कस्यापि कामना सम्भवति स्वर्गादेरपि लौकिकसुखसजातीयत्वात् ।
अत्र केचित् । अनानन्दव्यावृत्तिमात्रमानन्दत्वं न तु प्रसिद्ध आनन्द
एवात्मा धर्मधर्मिभावानभ्युपगमात् न च व्यावृत्त्यापि द्वैतापत्तिः
तस्या आश्रयानतिरेकात् । एतेन ज्ञानत्वादयो व्याख्याताः । तन्न
व्यावृत्तेरपदार्थत्वात् अपोहवादापत्तेः व्यावर्तकधर्मस्यावश्यं वक्तव्य-
त्वाच्च अन्यथा व्यावृत्त्यसिद्धेः ।

Nor is this transcendental Bliss what the sentence (as a whole, considered apart from its constituent words) means. For even so (the Vedic sentence) does not predicate blissful character as an attribute, since it is devoted to teaching the *impartite* (attributeless) Brahman. Nor is at all possible for one to desire transcendental bliss; for Paradise and like supersensuous objects of desire are also generically the same as worldly bliss. Here some teachers might interpose that blissful character is (predicated) merely with a view

The view of the Samkshhepaśāriraka I. 1. śl. 174 is unsatisfactory : to the exclusion of all that is not bliss; but it is not meant that bliss as commonly understood is Self, for the relation of subject and attribute is not admitted (in regard to the Self). Nor (continue these teachers) does dualistic doctrine follow logically on such exclusion (differentiation), for such exclusion is nothing other than the substrate (or Self). In this way the attributes of possessing knowledge &c. are (by them) explained. The above view must be rejected; for the *exclusion* urged above is nothing at all. And because thereon would follow the *view of universal negation* of the Vijnānavādins).*

* Apohavāda is the sensationalist's reply to the question—If

न च स्वरूपेणैव व्यावृत्तिः आत्मनोऽव्यावृत्तत्वात् अन्यथा
ऽब्रह्मत्वापत्तेः । अन्ये तु आनन्दत्वादयो धर्मा यत्र कल्पितास्ते
एव आनन्दादिपदार्था लोके ऽपि प्रसिद्धाः तत्राप्यानन्दत्वादीनां
कल्पितत्वात् न चैतावता आनन्दस्य का चित्त्वतिरस्ति धर्मस्यानु-
पादेयत्वात् तदाश्रयव्यक्तेरेवाभिलषणीयत्वात् । तदप्यापातरमणी-
यमिव प्रतिभाति विशिष्टस्यैवानन्दपदार्थत्वात् व्यक्तिमात्रे तदनुप-
पत्तेः कल्पितानन्दत्वाश्रयस्यानानन्दत्वप्रसङ्गानिवृत्तेश्च ।

And because some differentia or excluding attribute must be granted : if not, the differentiation remains unproved. And it cannot be said that the differentiation proceeds *per se*. For Self is the undifferentiated : if not, it cannot be Brahman.

Others again hold that the substrates, in which blissful character and like attributes are

Also that of the Panchapādikāviva-
raṇa.

surmised, are just what the words
bliss, (knowledge &c.), are com-

monly taken in this world to mean ; for in such worldly substrates also are surmised blissful character &c. Further, that on this view no harm is done to Bliss (sc. the Self as *the aim* of man), for the attribute (sc. blissful character) is not accepted as an object of desire ; since it is only an individual substrate (of certain attributes, tat) that is desired. This view also commends itself only at first sight. For the meaning of the word bliss attaches indeed to the individual as possessed of certain attributes (*viśiṣṭa*), because it cannot attach to the individual *per se*. And because it would for ever follow that non-blissful character pertains to that which is the substrate (sc. Brahman) of a surmised attribute, sc. blissful character.

no object exists apart from the sensation (*viñāna*), whence variety (*bheda*) of perceptions in the forms 'this is blue', 'this is yellow' &c.? He admits that blueness, yellowness &c. are the causes of the variety of perceptions, but denies that these attributes are anything distinct from the various sensations : every such attribute is the attribute of a sensation and is nothing more than the *negation of a negation of itself* (*svabhedābhāva*), that is to say, sensation is self-differentiating. Another definition of *apoha* is *atadvyāvṛitti* : here *tat* = *nīla* ; *atat* = *pīta* ; *vyāvṛitti* = *bheda*. cf. *Siddh : muktāv* : and *Dinakarī* to śl. 49 of *Bhāṣāpariccheda*.

न हि यो धर्मो यच्च न स्वाभाविकस्तदन्तर्भावितः पदार्थः
स सम्भवति अन्यथा शुक्त्यादेरपि रजतपदार्थत्वापत्तेः ।

अत्रोच्यते ।

उपाधिसंश्रयो ह्यात्मा आनन्दत्वं तदाश्रयः ।

विशिष्टशक्यपक्षे तु व्यक्तिर्वा शक्तिगोचरः ॥ ४३ ॥

यदि लोके आनन्दत्वविशिष्ट एवानन्दपदार्थस्तदाप्यात्मै-
वानन्दपदार्थो मुख्यः एकस्यैव नानोपाध्यनुप्रविष्टस्यानुगतव्यावृत्ति-
बुद्धिजनकतया जातिव्यक्त्युभयरूपत्वोपपत्तेः ।

For in a case where, in a certain substrate (yatra, sc. nacre,) an attribute (sc. silver-ness,) is not real (i. e. is falsely surmised), that substrate cannot mean that thing (sc. silver) which included within itself the surmised attribute: otherwise it follows that nacre would have to bear the meaning of the word silver.

We reply :—

On the view that the power* of a word attaches to an in-
dividual as possessing certain

Reply : blissful character is really
Self: jāti, generality, has no real ex-
istence apart from vyakti, individual:
cf. supra, pp. 100, 1.

attributes, Self is the substrate
of attributes; blissful character
is the substrate of Self (tat). Or

the view that it is only the individual that is declared by the
power* of a word may be adopted.....XLIII.

Although the word *bliss*, as commonly understood, means as individual possessing blissful character, yet Self is the primary meaning of the word *bliss*. For since a single substrate (ekasya), when in relation with many limiting adjuncts, can give rise to uniform, persistent knowledge (anugata, whence existence of jāti or class is inferred, cf. pp. 101, 8 supra) and to knowledge of difference, (vyavṛitti, i. e. of individual things), to that single substrate can belong both *class* character and *individual* character.

* For śakti, śakya cf. Ved. Peribh. Pandit Vol. VI. pp. 95 et seq.

यथा एकस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपे सर्वकल्पनारहिते मुखचन्द्रादौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बस्वरूपमिति त्रिविधव्यवहारस्योपाध्यनुप्रविष्टत्वारोपानन्तरं दर्शनादित्युक्तं लक्षणास्थले । अथवा व्यक्तिरेव सर्वत्र पदशक्तिगोचरोस्तु न च व्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात्पदशक्तिसम्बन्धव्यभिचारदोषप्रसङ्गः विशिष्टशक्यपक्षे ऽपि तुल्यत्वात् विशेषणाभेदे ऽपि विशेष्यभेदेन प्रतिविशेष्यं विशिष्टभेदात् । तस्मादशक्येनापि शक्यतावच्छेदकेनानुगतशक्यव्यवहाराऽशक्यव्यावृत्तिव्यवहारयोजनयितुं शक्यत्वात् ।

And thus we declared in discussing lakṣhaṇā (p. 97): 'in regard to the own nature of a thing (*i. e.* the thing in itself), which is really one and without any attributes (*cf.* p. 64), *e. g.* a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and the own nature of the thing is observed to arise after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and certain limiting adjuncts has been imagined.' Or let it be granted, that in all cases it is the individual alone that is made known by the power of the word. The objection to this view,—namely, that since the individuals are infinite in number, the connexion of the power of the word (with any one individual object) would sometimes fail (*vyabhichāra*)—will not hold good. For this objection would apply equally to the other view—namely, that the literal meaning of a word (*śākya* as coming directly from the *śakti* of the word) is the individual as possessing a certain attribute (*viśiṣṭa*). Because, although the attribute may be only one, the individuals possessing this attribute are many, as each is a subject,—there being many subjects. And since both views are on the same footing (*tasmāt*), both the knowledge of the persistent, (*sc. jāti*) which is the literal meaning of the word, and the knowledge of difference (*sc. vyakti*), can be produced through that attribute *sc.* blissful character, which, while it essentially constitutes the literal meaning, is not itself the literal meaning (of the word bliss).

तत्रापि शक्तिकल्पने मानाभावात् कारणस्वरूपबहिर्भूतकारण-
तावच्छेदकवत् । तस्मादानन्दरूपत्वे आत्मनो न काचिदनुपपत्तिः ।

आनन्दरूपमात्मानं सच्चिदद्वयतत्त्वकम् ।

अपूर्वादिप्रमाणोक्तं प्राप्याहं तद्वपुःस्थितः ॥ ४४ ॥

योहमद्वयवस्त्वेव सद्वये दृढनिश्चयः ।

प्राप्य चानन्दमात्मानं सोहमद्वयवियहः ॥ ४५ ॥

For there is no reason to assume that the word bliss possesses a power in regard to this essential constitutive attribute also (*tatrāpi* sc. *ānandatve*): just as it is unnecessary to assume causal power as residing in that attribute, which, while it is constitutive of causality, is outside (*i. e.*, is not) the cause itself.* Hence there is no contradiction in holding that blissful character pertains to Self.

Having gained intuition of Self, which is Bliss, Existence,
The teacher's Song of Joy. One without a second, made
known through that new and
originative source of knowledge (sc. the Witness, cf. p. 102), I am
become that Self....XLIV.

That same 'I' who, though really the One without a second, was once firmly persuaded of duality, am now identified with that One, having gained intuition of Bliss which is Self...XLIV.

* Taking the stock example of *daṇḍa* as the *kāraṇa* of *ghaṭa* *daṇḍatva* resides in *daṇḍa* and is the *kāraṇatāvacchedaka* or attribute which essentially constitutes the causal power belonging to the *daṇḍa* as being exactly co-extensive with it (*anyūnānatiprasakta*); but, on the other hand, *daṇḍatva* is not the *kāraṇa*. And so, while there is a relation technically termed *śakyatā* between the word *ānanda* and the individual, *i. e.* the Self which is Bliss, it would be incorrect to say that *ānandatva* which is the *śakyatāvacchedaka*, in this case, is the *śakya* or literal meaning of the word *ānanda*.

नास्ति ब्रह्म सदानन्दमिति मे दुर्मतिः स्थिता ।

क्व गता सा न जानामि यदाहं तद्वपुःस्थितः ॥ ४६ ॥

पूर्णानन्दाद्वये तत्त्वे मेवादिजगदाकृतिः ।

बोधे ऽबोधकृतैवासीदबोधः क्व गतोऽधुना ॥ ४७ ॥

संसाररोगसंयस्तो दुःखराशिरिवापरः ।

आत्मबोधसमुन्मेषादानन्दाब्धिरहं स्थितः ॥ ४८ ॥

योऽहमल्पेऽपि विषये रागवानतिविह्वलः ।

आनन्दात्मनि संप्राप्ते स रागः क्व गतोऽधुना ॥ ४९ ॥

यस्य मे जगतां कर्तुः कार्यैरपहृतात्मनः ।

आविर्भूतपरानन्द आत्मा प्रापः श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥ ५० ॥

‘Brahman the existent, Bliss, is not’—such was my mistaken judgment: but now that I have become that Brahman I know not whither that judgment fled.... XLVI.

The external world of Meru, &c., was through Nescience wrought in the One Reality which is perfect Bliss: but now that knowledge of Brahman has been attained, where is that Nescience gone?... XLVII.

Seized by the ills of life I became another, a mountain of pain, as it were; but now through knowledge of Self I am an ocean of Bliss.... XLVIII.

Then yearned I for little things and was much disquieted: but such yearning is no more, for now know I the Self which is Bliss.... XLIX.

That creator of worlds am I, whose Self was drawn away by the products of Nescience (sc. by mind, sense-organs &c.): now through Śruti my Self, the highest Bliss, has been manifested...L.

परामृष्टो ऽसि लब्धो ऽसि प्रोषितोसि चिरं मया ।

इदानीं त्वामहं प्राप्नो न त्यजामि कदा चन ॥ ५१ ॥

त्वां विना निःस्वरूपोहं मां विना त्वं कथं स्थितः ।

दिष्टेदानीं मया लब्धो योसि सोसि नमोस्तु ते ॥ ५२ ॥

देहाभिमाननिगडैर्बद्धो ऽबोधाख्यतस्करैः ।

चिरं ते दर्शनादेव चुटितं बन्धनं क्षणात् ॥ ५३ ॥

विशुद्धोऽस्मि विमुक्तोऽस्मि पूर्णात्पूर्णतमाकृतिः ।

असंस्पृश्य ममात्मानमन्तर्ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः* ॥ ५४ ॥

तत्त्वमादिवचोजालमावृतमसकृत्परा ।

इदानीम् तत्तत्तत्तदेव पूर्णानन्दो व्यवस्थितः ॥ ५५ ॥

Thou hast been pondered and gained : long wert thou absent from me : now have I gained thee, never to leave thee.....LI.

Without thee I cease to be : without me thou canst not be ; oh joy ! thou art what I now have gained : Hail to thee !...LII.

Bound was I in the bonds of conceit of body by those thieves, the many forms of Nescience : but at the very sight of thee that bondage was destroyed...LIII.

I am pure and emancipated, my form is more pervasive than the pervading† (ākāśa, ether) : let numberless worlds then be within me, they touch not my Self...LIV.

Formerly the whole collection of Vedic passages such as 'that thou art' was concealed (by Nescience) again and again ; but now absolute Bliss remains constant through the 'hearing' of the Veda...LV.

* Var. lec. तमात्मानं सन्तु ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः ।

† पूर्णाद्विभोराकाशादपि पूर्णतम इति त्रिविधपरिच्छेदगूढ इत्यर्थः । N. D's gloss. त्रिविध=देश, काल, वस्तु.

२८ ननु परिपूर्णानन्दस्वभावश्चेदात्मा कथं संसारावस्थायां न स्फुरति । न च परमप्रेमास्पदतयाऽऽत्मनः स्फूर्तिरेवानन्दस्वरूपस्य स्फूर्तिरिति वाच्यं तादृगभिमानाभावात् न हि मोक्षावस्थायां यादृगानन्दस्वरूपत्वमात्मनः श्रूयते एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि माचामुपजीवन्तीत्यादिश्रुतेस्तादृगानन्दात्माभिमानः कस्य चिदस्ति आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षे प्रतिष्ठितमिति मोक्षे एव तदभिव्यक्तिश्रवणाच्च संसारावस्थायां प्रतिबन्धसत्त्वाद्वासमानमप्यानन्दरूपत्वं नाभिमन्यत इति चेत्कस्तर्हि प्रतिबन्धः अज्ञानं तत्कार्यं वा आद्ये जीवस्य परस्य वा नान्त्यस्तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य निरवद्यस्य तदभावात् नाद्यस्तस्य परेणाभेदात् नान्योतोस्ति द्रष्टेत्यनेन जीवेनात्मना तत्त्वमस्ययमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

28. Here it may be asked by way of objection why Self, if it is by nature absolute Bliss, does

Objection : Self is not commonly known as Bliss. To argue that this is due to Nescience is to raise the question, Who knows Nescience?—to which no answer can be given.

not appear in consciousness during the transmigratory existence of the individual. Nor may the reply to this be that the appearance of Self in consciousness as

the object of our highest love is indeed the presentation of (Self as) absolute Bliss (cf. p. 10, note). For our consciousness (abhimāna) does not take this form (sc. I am pure Bliss). And further, because no one is conscious of such Bliss as that which Veda declares to be the nature of Self in the state of emancipation (moksha) in the passage :—all other creatures live on a part of this same Bliss &c.

And because the manifestation of bliss (tat) is declared by Śruti to take place only at the time of moksha in the passage :—Bliss is the form of Brahman and is fixed in moksha.

Again it may be urged that though Self as Bliss shines forth yet we are not conscious of it during transmigratory life, because of the hindrance then existing. What is this hindrance? Is it Nescience or a product of it? If Nescience, does it pertain to jīva or to Brahman (parasya)? Not to Brahman, for to that which is all knowledge and is blameless Nescience cannot pertain. Nor to jīva which is indential with Brahman, as declared in the passages :—‘there is no other seer but that one’; ‘(let me enter) with this living Self, jīva’; ‘that thou art’; ‘all is that Self.’

न च कल्पनामात्रेणैव जीवस्याप्यज्ञानं न वस्तुतो ऽस्तीति वाच्यं परस्मिन्नपि प्रसङ्गात् न च चिन्मात्रनिष्ठमज्ञानं तत्सर्वात्मना प्रतिबध्नात्येवेति वाच्यं यदि संसारावस्थायामप्रतिबद्ध आनन्दो नास्त्येव कस्य प्राप्या तर्हि प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिः स्यात् न हि संसारिप्राप्या संसारनिवृत्तिः सम्भवति न चाप्रतिबद्ध एवानन्दः संसारावस्थायामप्यस्त्येव केवलमज्ञानसमुद्भूतद्वैतान्तःपातिशब्दादिविषयविषयविषयणस्य तद्दर्शनातिलालसमानसस्य तद्दर्शनवेलायामप्यत्यन्तभावनासमुत्थापितविषयवडिशकृष्टहृदयस्य परमप्रियतमं जगदीश्वरं सर्वाङ्गप्रोततया ऽतिसन्निहितमप्यात्मानमीक्षितुं क्षणमलभमानस्य स्वर्गीवास्यैवेय-
काद्यनवधानवटनवधानमात्रमात्मनि प्रतिबन्धः न वस्तुतः प्रतिबन्धो ऽस्तीति वाच्यम् ।

Nor may it be replied that Nescience does not really pertain even to jīva but by a mere fiction. For the same would apply to Brahman also. Nor can it be urged (as in Saṃkṣhepaśārīraka cf. p. 14, supra) that Nescience which has undifferentenced Intelligence as its locus, obstructs *completely* (i. e. both jīva and Brahman). If unobstructed Bliss exists not during transmigratory life, there is nothing by the attainment of which an end may be put to the obstruction (of Bliss). For transmigratory life cannot be put an end to by the attainment of anything that pertains to the transmigratory life (sc. jīva). Nor may it be urged that even during transmigratory life unobstructed Bliss exists; that the obstruction is not real but consists entirely in inattention to (non-discrimination of, anavadhāna) Self, just as inattention makes one lose sight of the jewel round one's neck; (that this inattention) pertains to him who is overcome by the poison of sensuous objects, sc. sounds and the rest, which fall within the duality wrought by Nescience, and whose mind eagerly desires the sight of Self, and whose heart is drawn away, even while he beholds Self, by the bait of sensuous objects awakened by the firm impressions (these had left behind in his mind), and who thus finds no time to recognise that Self most dear, the lord of the universe, who as the web entering all things is very near to him.

तद्वर्णनरूपस्य प्रतिबन्धस्याश्रयनिश्चयासामर्थ्यात्तथा हि कोसौ
 द्वैतद्रष्टा किं परमात्मा किं वा जीवः किं वा परः कश्चित् नाद्यः
 तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य भ्रमबीजाज्ञानाभावेन द्वैतदर्शनानुपपत्तेः यस्याज्ञानं
 भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक् च वेति स इति न्यायादज्ञानमिथ्याज्ञान-
 सम्यग्ज्ञानानां समानाधिकरणत्वनिश्चयेनाविद्यावत् एव तत्सम्भ-
 वात् अस्तु तर्हि जीवस्याविद्यावतो द्वैतद्रष्टृत्वम् । न । तस्य परेणा-
 भेदस्योक्तत्वात् न चाभेदे पि बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बव्यवस्थया सर्वज्ञत्वद्वै-
 तद्रष्टृत्वयोरुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यं वैषम्यात् ।

For of this obstruction, consisting in the contemplation of those things * (sc. pain, duality &c.), the substrate cannot be known with certainty. To explain—who is the seer of duality? The supreme Self (Brahman)? Jīva? Or some third? Not Brahman: for Brahman, consisting of all knowledge, cannot have a vision of duality, since Nescience, the cause of error, is absent. For according to the rule that errors pertains to him to whom Nescience pertains, that the deluded one knows truly (afterwards), it is ascertained that Nescience, false and true knowledge, refer to one common substrate (or person) and therefore vision of duality (tat) can belong only to that which possesses Nescience. Next suppose that jīva, as associated with Nescience, is the seer of duality. This cannot be. For the identity of jīva with Brahman has been declared (in Śruti). Nor may it be urged that though Brahman and jīva are really indetical (abhede'pi), the characters (belonging to them respectively) of consisting of all knowledge and of being the seer of duality may be satisfactorily accounted for by recourse to the settled relation of reflected thing and reflexion of that thing. For there is a difference here.

* The gloss explains that this is the refutation of the second alternative, sc. that obstruction is a product of Nescience,—inattention being the product of Nescience.

तत्र हि पूर्वसिद्धे उपाधौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावान्तरं प्रतीयमानयोर्मलिनत्वस्वच्छत्वयोर्व्यवस्थयोपपत्तिर्युक्ता इह तु द्वैतदृष्ट्यापितद्वैतस्यैवोपाधितया तदनुप्रवेशेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावकल्पनायां ततः पूर्वं द्रष्टृव्यवस्थापकानुपपत्तेः न चानादिसिद्धाऽज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बस्याप्यनादितया ततः पूर्वमिति पर्यनुयोगानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् अनादिसिद्धाऽज्ञानद्रष्टुरप्यनादिसिद्धस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वात् । न चासौ वक्तुं शक्यः न च साक्ष्येव तथा तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य स्वाविद्याविरहेण तद्द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Thus, in the latter case, since the limiting adjunct (sc. the mirror) is already in existence, it is proper, after the relation of reflected object, sc. the face, and reflexion of the face in the mirror) has been formed, to account for the perceived characters of purity and impurity (belonging respectively to the face and the reflexion of it) by recourse to this settled relation. But since in the present case, that very duality which has been brought about by the vision of duality, is the limiting adjunct through whose influence the surmisal of a relation as between reflected object (sc. Brahman) and reflexion (sc. jīva) is made, there could be nothing to constitute a seer (of this duality) previous to that duality (or Nescience, *tatah*). Nor may it be replied that the objection implied in the words '*previous to that*' cannot be raised, since the reflexion in Nescience, which is eternal *ab ante*, must also be eternal *ab ante*. For then an eternal seer of this eternal Nescience would also have to be maintained; but such an eternal seer cannot be maintained. Nor can it be said that the Witness is such an eternal seer (*tathā*). For to the Witness itself as consisting of all knowledge Nescience cannot attach, and therefore power of seeing that Nescience (*tat*) cannot belong.

न च सर्वज्ञस्याप्यन्याऽविद्याद्रष्टृत्वेनाविरोधः स्वभिन्नाऽविद्याद्रष्टृत्वेन परमात्मनो भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्गात् नान्योतो ऽस्ति द्रष्टेति शास्त्रविरोधाच्च न च सर्वज्ञत्वं नाम स्वरूपचैतन्येन स्वाध्यस्तसकलभासकत्वं तच्चाविद्यावत्त्वेऽपि न विरुध्यत इति वाच्यं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनमिति श्रुत्या अविद्याया अपि तच्च निषिद्धित्वात् न च वस्तुभूताऽविद्यानिषेधः न तु कल्पिताया अपीति वाच्यं साधारणनिषेधात् वस्तुभूताऽविद्याऽप्रसिद्धेश्च जीवस्य चाविद्योत्तरभावितया ऽनादित्वानुपपत्तेः अन्यथा ऽविद्यानिवृत्त्यापि जीवभावो न निवर्तत । न तृतीयः जीवपरमात्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यैव जडत्वेन द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Nor can it be said that there is no contradiction in holding that the Witness, although consisting of all knowledge, is the seer of that Nescience which attaches to something other (than the Witness). For it would follow that the Highest Self is subject to error in thus beholding that Nescience which attaches to something other (than Self); and because this would contradict the passage—'there is no other seer but this one.' Nor again that *consisting in all knowledge* means the illuminating by Intelligence *per se* (Brahman) of all that is erroneously surmised in it, and that this character (tat) is not opposed to that of being associated with Nescience (avidyāvattvena). For by the passage—'without fault, without taint', Nescience is also denied in regard to Brahman (tatra). Nor may it be replied that this prohibition extends to a *real* and not to an *unreal* (surmised) Nescience. For the prohibition is general, and because a *real* Nescience is not a fact of experience. And because to jīva, as being something subsequent to Nescience, eternal-ness *ab ante* cannot belong: otherwise the jīva state would not be put an end to by the cessation of Nescience, (according to the maxim that a positive entity, sc. jīva, eternal *ab ante* is eternal *without end*—and thus emancipation would be impossible). Nor will the third alternative hold. For everything that is different from jīva and the Highest Self is unintelligent (jāda) and could not therefore possess the power of vision.

न चोभयानुगतचित्सामान्यस्यैव द्रष्टृत्वमिति वाच्यं तथा च सति अविद्याया अपि तत्रैव वक्तव्यतया जीवस्य निरवद्यस्याऽभ्रान्तस्य परमात्मवन्नित्यमुक्तत्वसर्वज्ञत्वाद्यापत्तिः उपाधिसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वाच्च त्रितयविभागस्य । न चाविद्यानङ्गीकारे तद्विषयकप्रश्नाक्षेपानुपपत्त्या तत्रैव प्रष्टुराक्षेपपूर्वा ऽविद्याद्रष्टृत्वं युक्तमिति वाच्यं तस्यैव ममाप्यविद्याद्रष्टुः स्वरूपस्येदानीं त्वया तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थं वक्तव्यत्वात् न च यस्त्वं स्वात्मस्वरूपमपि न जानासि अयमहमिदं पृच्छामिति तस्य तव प्रश्न एव कथं स्यादिति वाच्यं प्रश्नविषयाऽज्ञाने सत्येव प्रश्नोपपत्तेः अन्यथा प्रष्टव्यार्थज्ञानाज्ञानविकल्पेन प्रश्नाभावेन नाऽपृष्टः कस्य चिद् ब्रूयान्न चान्यायेन पृच्छतः जानन्नपि हि मेधावी जडबल्लोक आचरेदिति न्यायेन स्वयं वक्तुमशक्यतया सर्वं शास्त्रमरण्यरुदितं स्यात् ।

Nor may it be argued that power of vision belongs indeed to that pure Intelligence which pervades both (jīva and Brahman). For if this were so, Nescience would have to be admitted also in regard to that pure Intelligence (tatrāpi;) and so to jīva, (which would then have to be regarded as) faultless and undeluded, would pertain the characters of being ever free and of consisting of all knowledge, as is the case with the Highest Self. And because this threefold division * must be, in point of time, subsequent to the existence of the limiting adjunct (sc. Nescience).

Nor may it be urged that the power of seeing Nescience is rightly predicated of you, whether you question or deny; for if you do not admit the existence of Nescience, your question or denial in regard to it is impossible. Because, to ascertain the truth, you must declare what the true nature is of that very seer of Nescience, sc. myself. Nor again, that you who know not the nature of your Self, thus, *this I* am asking about *this* (nature of Self) could not ask a question. For a question is possible only when Nescience exists as to the matter of the question: otherwise, by admitting as alternatives knowledge or Nescience of the matter in question, there would be no question at all; (and then) in accordance with the maxim that one unquestioned should not address another, &c. (Manu, II. 110) the whole Veda would be a crying in the wilderness, for of itself it could not speak (until questioned).

न च प्रश्नविषयापरिज्ञाने कथं तद्विषयकशब्दरचना न हि संसर्गमज्ञात्वा शब्दरचना नामेति प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं स्तोभशब्दवत्सार्थकस्यापि शब्दस्य तत्स्वरूपज्ञानादेव रचनोपपत्तेः सर्वत्र शब्दस्वरूपज्ञानस्यैव शब्दरचनाहेतुत्वात् संसर्गज्ञानस्य च शब्दरचनाहेतुत्वेन प्रसिद्धोपातस्य प्रमाणशब्दप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकतया ऽन्यथासिद्धेः न च देहादीनां बुद्धिपर्यन्तानामहम्प्रत्ययालम्बनीभूतानामितराऽनात्मव्यावृत्ततया प्रतीयमानानां मध्ये ऽन्यतमं तत्समुदायो वा तत्र स्वरूपमिति वाच्यं ।

Nor may it be argued that, if the matter of a question is unknown, the employment of words in regard to that question is impossible, in accordance with the well-known fact that words are not employed where a certain relation has not been perceived. For even a word with a meaning can be employed when there is simply a knowledge of the form of the word, as is the case with meaningless words technically termed *stobha* (e. g. interjections), since in all cases it is simply a knowledge of the form of a word that is the cause of its employment. And because the knowledge of a certain relation, (which knowledge is) commonly accepted as the cause of the employment of a certain word, is the cause (or logical reason) determining the correctness (*prāmānya*) of the word which is here the *pramāṇa*, it is *not* the true cause (of the employment of that word).* Nor can it be said that the real nature of your Self is one of the following, or these taken together, viz. those things beginning with the body and ending with the mind, which are the objects of the consciousness expressed by the word I, and are perceived as different from the not-Self which is other than they are.

* To decide whether a certain word has been rightly used we must know the relations of things which that word is intended to convey; but merely to enounce it, all that we need know is the form, i. e. letters, inflection &c. of the word.

तेषामप्यज्ञानकार्याणां मद्भोगोपकरणतया ममप्रत्ययविषयाणां
छत्रचामरादीतरभोगसाधनवन्मदुपसर्जनतया प्रतीयमानानां प्रत्येक
समुदाययोः कार्यकारणविलक्षणाऽहेयानुपादेयस्वभावममप्रत्ययाविष-
यपरमप्रियतमस्वातिरिक्तसर्वावभासकसर्वदाऽव्यभिचार्यात्मवस्तुस्व-
रूपत्वानुपपत्तेः न च देहादिबुद्धिपर्यन्तेभ्यो यत्स्वरूपं त्वया परिशे-
षितं तदेव तव स्वरूपमिति गृहाणेति वाच्यं तस्याप्यज्ञातत्वात्
न चाज्ञानं परित्यज्य तद्विषयस्वरूपमात्रं प्रत्यक्तत्वं ग्राह्यमिति वाच्यं
तस्यापि जीवेश्वरतद्विन्नत्वादिरूपेण निर्णेतुमशक्यतया सन्देहाक्रा-
न्तत्वात् न च किं नाम निर्णयेन वस्तुस्वरूपं तु निर्णीतमेवेति वाच्यम्
अशेषविशेषेण तत्त्वबुभुत्सुमत्येतस्यानुत्तरत्वात् ।

For these things are products of Nescience, are known under the word *my* so far as they minister to *my* enjoyment, are known as subordinate to me, just as the umbrella &c. are, the means of comfort to another (sc. the raja); hence these things, singly or together, cannot possibly constitute that Self, which is neither cause nor effect, which in its own nature is not to be rejected or accepted as an object of desire, which is not made known by the word *my*, which illumines all that is different from itself most dear, which at no time fails to pervade all things. Nor may it be replied thus—Accept as your own nature (Self) that thing (svarūpa) which was distinguished by you from body &c., down to mind. For that thing also, the Self within, or Witness, is unknown. Nor again that putting Nescience out of view, we should accept as Self the Reality within, which *per se* is the object concealed by Nescience (tat). For doubt attaches to that Reality also, in that it cannot be discriminated as *jīva* or *Īśvara*, or as something different from them. Nor may it be urged that such discrimination is unnecessary since the Reality itself is ascertained. For this is no reply to the man who desires to know that Reality *in toto*.

न च सामान्यविशेषशून्ये विशेषबुभुत्सैवानुपपन्नेति वाच्यं तस्यैव सामान्यविशेषशून्यस्य वक्तव्यत्वापत्तेः न चाज्ञानव्यतिरिक्ततया निश्चिते स्वरूपे सन्देह एव नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम् अज्ञानस्याद्याप्य निवृत्तत्वात् स्थिते एवाज्ञाने विवेकदृष्ट्या तद्विविक्तस्वरूपनिर्णये ऽपि तेनैवाज्ञानेन विषयीकृते सन्देहोपपत्तेः न चाध्यस्ताज्ञानस्वरूपे स्थिते तदधिष्ठानस्यात्मनो विवेको ऽशक्य एवाधिष्ठानभेदेनाध्यस्तस्य पृथक्-स्वरूपाभावात् ततो यदि विवेकदृष्ट्या ऽधिष्ठानस्वरूपमात्मतत्त्वं निश्चितं तदा तवाध्यस्तमज्ञानं तत्कार्यं वा ततो भेदेन तत्र नास्तीत्यवधार्य विनिश्चेतव्यं तथा च तवाज्ञानविरहात्सन्देहानुपपत्त्या प्रश्नानुपपत्तिरेवेति वाच्यम् ।

Nor to this may it be answered that, in regard to that which is destitute of both general and special attributes, the very desire for special knowledge is impossible. For it follows that that something destitute of general and special attributes must be declared by you to exist. Nor, again, that no doubt is possible in regard to this reality (svarūpa), since it has been ascertained as something different from Nescience. For a doubt is possible in regard to that Reality which has been invested by Nescience, even though the Reality may have been carefully discriminated from Nescience (tat), in that the latter is existing, since even up to this time Nescience has not been destroyed. Nor again may it be argued that since Nescience is proved to be something surmised, it is quite impossible to discriminate it from Self which is its substrate, for that which is surmised has no existence apart from the substrate in which it is surmised: hence when by discrimination the real nature of Self as the substrate of all things has been ascertained, then a further conviction should arise in the form—Nescience and its products, surmised in the Self (tatra), have no existence apart from the Self: and thus since Nescience exists not in Self, doubt is impossible, and question (in regard to Self) is also impossible.

एतावता ऽपि द्वैतद्रष्टुरव्युत्पादनात् न हि शुद्धस्य कूटस्थस्य द्वैतद्रष्टृत्व-
मुपपद्यते मोक्षकाले ऽपि द्वैतदर्शनप्रसङ्गात् । ननु मोक्षस्य नित्यत्वेन
सर्वदा सत्त्वात्सर्वो हि कालो मोक्षकाल एव विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते इति
शास्त्रात् अन्यथा मोक्षस्य कादाचित्कत्वेनानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः तथा च
मोक्षकाले द्वैतदर्शनप्रसङ्गो नानिष्ट इदानीं तद्दर्शनादिति चेन्न सार्वलौ-
किकानुभवाविरोधात् न हि द्वैतदर्शनकाले कश्चन मोक्षमनुभवति न हि
सर्वलोकविरुद्धमर्थं श्रुतिरपि प्रतिपादयति अन्यथा शिलाप्लवनवाक्या-
नामपि स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । ततो न सर्वः कालो मोक्षकालः सर्वलो-
कानुभवविरोधादिति । हन्त तर्हि ये सर्वेऽनुभवितारस्ते एव द्वैतद्रष्टा-
रस्त्वयैव निश्चितास्तथा च स्वाधीननिश्चये द्वैतद्रष्टुरि कः प्रश्नः ।

The above argument is rejected because it does not explain the original question, sc. Who is the seer of duality? For the unrelated, unchanging Self or Witness cannot be the seer of duality; if this were so, there would be a vision of duality even at the time of moksha, emancipation.

Here one (sc. the pupil) may argue that the above conclusion, viz. a vision of duality at the time of moksha, is not an unsatisfactory one, as duality is seen now (during moksha); for since moksha is eternal it exists always, hence the time of moksha is *all time* according to the passage—and the freed is free—otherwise, if moksha were *occasional*, it would be non-eternal. The above is to be rejected because it contradicts universal experience, for while knowledge of duality lasts no one experiences moksha. Nor does Veda teach what contradicts common experience: if such were the case it would follow that (Vedic) sentences declaring that stones float would have to be regarded as literally true; hence the time of moksha is not *all time*, for this would contradict common experience. Well then, since you have yourself ascertained that all who know duality are seers of it, you cannot ask a question in regard to the seer of duality thus proved by you (sva) to exist.

किमत इदमतो भवति एतेषां यद् द्वैतदर्शनं तदेव सच्चि-
दानन्दपरिपूर्णात्मस्वरूपमोक्षाविर्भावप्रतिबन्धकमिति गृहाण । अस्तु
तर्हि तेषां प्रतिबन्धो मम द्वैताऽदृष्टः कुतो न मोक्ष आविर्भवतीति
चेत् तर्हि त्वं किमेतेभ्यो भिन्ने येन द्वैताऽदृष्टत्वं भवेत् । कः संशयः
न हि तानात्मत्वेनानुभवामि तेषां सुखदुःखादीनां मम लेपाभा-
वात् । अहो आश्चर्यं ताननेकविधानेव देवतिर्यङ्मुण्यादिभेदभि-
न्नान्यश्यन् द्वैतं न पश्यामीति वदतस्ते वचः कथं श्रद्धेयं स्यात्
न हि मुमुक्षोः संन्यासिनस्तत्त्वबुभुत्सोरिदमुचितं यदसत्याभिधान-
मिति । ननु त्वतोऽभिन्न एवाहं तथा च ममासत्याभिधानमापाद-
यतस्तवैवासत्याभिधानमायातीति चेत् तर्हि कोहं त्वयात्मत्वेन
दृष्टः किं सद्वितीयोऽद्वितीयो वा ।

What follows from this, you ask? This, namely, that the vision of duality those seers have is just that (already mentioned) hindrance to moksha whose manifestation is the absolute Self, (Sachchidānanda): thus understand. A hindrance may exist (the pupil replies) in the case of those seers of duality; but why is moksha not manifest to me who am not a seer of duality (having been taught by Veda through you my teacher)? What! (asks the teacher) are you different from those persons that you say you are not a seer of duality? Doubtless I am! For I do not know them as myself: their joys and sorrows touch me not. Strange indeed! What trust can be placed in your statement; for while you behold those persons sc. that varied complex of gods, men and animals, you say, I see not duality! Such untruthfulness is improper in one aspiring to moksha, a Sannyāsin and seeker after Reality! Since I am identical with you (retorts the pupil) the charge of untruthfulness recoils on you. The teacher replies, in knowing me as identical with yourself, was I known as one with a second; or as one without a second?

यद्याद्यस्तर्ह्ययमप्यपरो दोषो यत्त्वं विद्वांसं तवैवाचार्यं मां
ब्रह्मरूपेण पर्यवसितं द्वैतवार्तानभिज्ञं सद्वितीयं कल्पयसि एकमेवा-
द्वितीयं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन इतिशास्त्रविरोधश्च । अस्तु तर्हि अद्वि-
तीयपक्ष उक्तदोषविरहादिति चेत् । हन्त तर्हि कुतो मामद्वितीयमा-
त्मत्वेन ज्ञातवानसि । त्वद्वचनादुदाहृतशास्त्राच्चेति चेत् एवं तर्हि
प्रबुद्धोसि नातः परं प्रष्टव्यमस्ति न ह्यात्मनि विदिते ऽपरमविदितं
वस्त्वस्ति यत्प्रष्टव्यं स्यात् । अस्त्यनात्मेति चेन्न आत्मनो वा अरे
दर्शनेन श्रुत्या मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितमिति श्रुत्या आत्मदर्श-
नेनेतरत्सर्वं दृष्टं भवतीति उक्तत्वात् । ननु इदमनुपपन्नं यदात्मदर्श-
नेनेतरत्सर्वं दृष्टं भवतीति कुत इति चेत् तथा हि किमितरत्सर्व-
मात्मनो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा ।

If the former, a further fault of yours is that me, your teacher attained to Brahman-hood and unconscious of the least trace even of duality, you imagine to exist as one with a second: and your view contradicts the Veda passage—One without a second: there is no duality here. Grant then the second alternative, because from it the above fault is absent. Then (rejoins the teacher) how do you know me one without a second as identical with Self? Through your statement and that of the Veda text quoted above. In this case you have attained the highest knowledge: nothing remains for you to question: when Self is known, nothing remains to be questioned. The not-Self remains (says the pupil). No! For we have declared that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, in accordance with the passage—Indeed by seeing, hearing, pondering, knowing Self, all this becomes known. The pupil again argues that it is impossible that by the knowledge of Self all else should become known. To the teacher's question, Why so? —he replies:—Is all else different from or identical with Self?

नाद्यः अन्यदर्शनेनान्यस्य द्रष्टुमशक्यत्वात् न हि घटे दृष्टे पटो दृष्टो भवतीति शक्यं वक्तुम् अन्यथा तयोरभेदापत्तेः । न द्वितीयः आत्मानात्मनोर्विरोधात् परमार्थसत्यात्माऽभिन्नस्य नेतिनेत्यादिना निषेद्धुमशक्यतया बाधानुपपत्तेश्च अन्यथा आत्मनोऽपि बाधित-तया शून्यमेवावशिष्येत । तस्मादात्मदर्शनेन सर्वमेव दृष्टं भवतीत्यनुपपन्नम् । नैष दोषः ।

आत्मसत्तैव द्वैतस्य सत्ता नान्या यतस्ततः ।

आत्मन्येव जगत्सर्वं दृष्टे दृष्टं श्रुते श्रुतम् ॥ ५६ ॥

आत्मसत्तातिरिक्ताया द्वैतसत्ताया अभावात् आत्मनि दृष्टे सर्वं द्वैतं दृष्टं भवति यथा रज्जुस्वरूपे दृष्टे तत्राध्यस्तानां सर्गदण्डादीनां स्वरूपं दृष्टं भवति तद्वत् आत्मनि दृष्टे सर्वं दृष्टं भवतीति नानुपपन्नम् ।

Not different. For by seeing one thing a second thing cannot be seen; thus, a piece of cloth cannot be said to be seen when an earthen pot is seen: if so it would follow that the pot and the cloth were identical. Nor can it be said that all else is identical with Self. For Self and not-Self are contradictories; and because sublation of not-Self would be impossible, since that which is identical with the absolutely real Self could not be negated as in the Śruti passage—Not this, not this:—otherwise, on Self also being proved false, blank non-entity (śūnya) would remain. Hence the statement, that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, is untenable.

There is no fault here replies the teacher:—

Since the existence of duality is indeed the existence of

Reply: Self, Brahman, is All. To know Self, is to know All: this is Eman-

Self and no other, all the world is seen and heard when Self is seen and heard....LVI.

For duality has no existence apart from that of the Self; hence when Self is known, all duality is known; for just as when the rope is known, the things surmised in it sc. the garland or stick (which may be mistaken for it) are also known, so too it is not contradictory that when Self is known all else should be known.

अत एव विधिनिषेधशास्त्रयोरपि नानुपपत्तिः तद्यथा इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् । ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति । यच्च त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् । नारायण एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् इत्यादि-विधिशास्त्रं तथा निषेधशास्त्रमपि नेह नानास्ति किञ्चनेति अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति । अतो-न्यदार्तं । न तु तत् द्वितीयमस्ति नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् । नासदासी-न्नोसदासीदित्यादि । भवति हि लोके रज्ज्वां स्रगाद्यध्यासिनं प्रत्युपदेश इदं सर्वं रज्जुरिति नेह स्रगादिरस्तीति तथाप्युभयोरुपदेशयोर्मध्ये कतरः श्रेयानिति चेत् यद्यप्युभयोरेकार्थत्वमेव तथापि विधेरस्ति कश्चिदतिशयः ।

Hence also no contradiction attaches to the injunctory and prohibitory Śruti passages. Of the former kind are the following:—This everything, all is that Self. O dear One! Existent alone was this in the beginning, one without a second. All this consists of this Self. Brahman, indeed, was this in the beginning. (Seeing this, the Rishi thought):—I was Manu and the sun. But when to one all has become Self. All this that is, and is to be, is Nārāyaṇa. Of the latter kind are the follow- ing:—There is no diversity here. Now follows the declaration, No! No! For beyond this No there is nothing. Other than this (Brahman) is perishable. There is no second. There was no diver- sity here in the beginning. Entity was not, non-entity was not.

Indeed, in every day life, the instruction given to the man who mistakes a piece of rope for a garland or the like is either— all these imaginary things are that rope, or—no garland or the like exists here. Still it may be asked, which of these two forms of instruction is the better? Though both perform the same function, the injunction has the advantage.

तत्र हि परिदृश्यमानानां या सत्ता सा आत्मैवेत्युक्ते तदन्यन्नास्त्येव आत्मैव परिपूर्णं इतिज्ञानं साक्षादेवाविर्भवति निषेधे त्वर्थान्निषेधाधिष्ठानतया । कथं तर्ह्युभयप्रवृत्तिः विधिनैव पुरुषार्थस्य पर्यवसितत्वादिति चेन्न अधिकारिभेदेनोभयोरुपयोगात् । कश्चिद्वि संसारदुःखेनात्यन्तमुपहतचेतास्तन्निवृत्तिमेव प्रथमतः कामयते तं प्रत्यादौ निषेधवाक्यमेवोपयुक्तं विधिवाक्यं तु पश्चात् यथा सर्पमारोप्य भिया कम्पमानं प्रति नायं सर्प इतिनिषेध एवादौ न तु विधिः । यस्त्वत्यन्तमनुद्विग्नः किमस्य जगतस्तत्त्वमित्येवं जिज्ञासते तं प्रतीदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा इत्येवोत्तरं न्याय्यं निषेधस्तु पश्चात् ।

For in this case when it is enjoined that the existence of all things seen is indeed the Self, then the knowledge that nothing other than Self exists, that Self is absolute, directly manifests itself: whereas in the case of the negation the knowledge is gained indirectly through inference that Self is the substrate to which the negation refers. How then it may be asked, do both find scope: since the aim of man (sc. moksha) would be reached through the injunction alone? Not so, for both forms of instruction are of service according to the varying qualifications of those who seek moksha. Thus, he whose mind is utterly overthrown by the pains of life desires first of all the cessation of these pains: in his case the prohibitory text is certainly the first to be of service, after which the injunctory text avails. To illustrate:— he who fancying he sees a snake trembles with fear needs, in the first instance, the prohibition sc. this is no snake that you see—, but does not need the injunction sc. this that you see is a rope or stick &c. Again in the case of the man who quite undisturbed by this world, desires to know what reality underlies it, the fitting answer is—All this world is Self. After this may come the prohibitory text.

यथा सर्पमध्यस्य तत्प्रतीकारज्ञानान्निर्भयः पृच्छति किमिदं पुरोवर्तीति तं प्रति रज्जुः इत्येवोत्तरं न तु निषेधः । तस्मादवस्थाभेदे-
नोभयोरुपयोगान्न कस्यापि वैयर्थ्यमतो विधिनिषेधाभ्यां परिपूर्णसन्नि-
दानन्दः प्रत्यगात्मेति सिद्धम् ।

२६ ननु तथापि कोसौ द्वैतदृष्टेति अद्यापि न निश्चितम् इति चेत् यस्त्वं पृच्छसि । कोहमिति चेत् ब्रह्मैव । एवं तर्हि ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वापत्तिरिति चेत् कोयं विकारो द्वैतं तद्वृष्टिर्वा । नाद्यः द्वैतस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य निषिद्धत्वात् न हि यन्नास्ति तत्कस्य चित्प-
रिणामः यथा नरशृङ्गम् । ततोस्य वैलक्षण्यं दृष्टिरेवेति चेत् तर्हि प्राप्ताप्राप्तिविवेकेन दृष्टिरेव परिणामोस्तु तदतिरिक्तदृश्याभावात्

Thus for him who fancying he sees a snake and knowing the antidote for its poison can fearlessly ask,—What is (really) this thing before me?—the fitting answer is—You see a snake—and not the prohibition, sc.—This that you see is no snake. To sum up—neither form of Śruti is useless, for both find scope under varying circumstances. Hence it has been proved by both in-
junctory and prohibitory texts that the absolute Intelligence, Existence, Bliss, is the Self within.

29. But the pupil may again urge that the question, who
Objection: Parīṇāma-vāda follows: Self this seer of duality is, has
must be *materially* changed into not-Self; not yet been decided. You
for duality is a fact of experience. Reply: not
No! the change is illusory—Vivartavāda who question me are that
—For the indivisible Self could not be seer of duality says the teacher.
materially changed. Then who am I? asks the pupil—You are really Brahman. Then
(rejoins the pupil) it follows that Brahman suffers modification.
What (inquires the guru) is this modification? Is it duality;
or the vision of duality? Not the former, for all duality as
distinct from Brahman has been negated (by Veda); nor in-
deed can the non-existent, e. g. the horns of a man, be a modi-
fication of anything. It may be said, the difference between duality
(asya) and the above example (tataḥ) is the fact of a vision of dual-
ity. Well then, it follows through induction (praptāpraptaviveka
cf. p. 106) that vision *only* is the parīṇāma, material modification,
of Brahman; for apart from it things visible exist not.

ओमिति चेन्न दृष्टेः फलरूपाया आत्मरूपान्तर्भावेन तत्परिणामत्वानुपपत्तेः न हि स्वयं स्वस्य परिणामः कात्स्न्यैकदेशविकल्पेन परिणामपक्षानुपपत्तेश्च । ननु विवर्तपक्षेऽप्ययं दोषः समान इति चेत् न विवर्तस्वरूपापरिज्ञानात् न ह्यधिष्ठानस्वरूपातिरिक्तं विवर्तेनाम किञ्चिद्वस्त्वस्ति यदाश्रित्य कात्स्न्यैकदेशविकल्पावतारः स्यात् किन्त्वधिष्ठानमेव दोषवशाद्विलक्षणाकारेण भासमानं विवर्त इत्युच्यते । स एव विलक्षणाकारः कस्येति चेत् वस्तुतो न कस्यापि अधिष्ठाने तस्य बाधात् अन्यत्राप्रतीतेः । भङ्गान्तरेणासत्ख्यातिव्युत्पादनमेवैतदिति चेन्न ख्यातेरप्यध्यस्तत्वात् असत्ख्यातिर्वादिना च चार्वाकेण तथाऽनभ्युपगमात् सर्वशून्यवादिनस्तु पूर्वं निरस्तत्वात् ।

This is so, replies the pupil. No! (rejoins the guru) for it is impossible that this vision or product, as included within the Self, should be at pariṇāma of Self: since a thing is not a pariṇāma of itself; and because the pariṇāma view is vitiated by the alternative assumptions of whole or a part of Self undergoing pariṇāma. (cf. Ved. Sū. II, 1,26.) Nor may it be argued that the same fault attaches to the vivartta view; for you have not understood the meaning of vivartta. A vivartta, forsooth, is no reality existing apart from its substrate, in regard to which the above alternatives may find place; but what is termed a vivartta is nothing but the substrate itself, which through some defect appears under a different form. But *different form* of what? asks the pupil. Of nothing really; for this *different form* has its destruction in, *i. e.* by knowledge of, its substrate (Self), since this *different* or not-Self form, is not perceived in another substrate. Then (rejoins the pupil) this is simply a teaching of asatkhyāti under another guise. Not so, says the guru; for in our view the khyāti (perception) also is illusory, which the Uḥārvāka or holder of asatkhyāti will not admit (as he holds that the khyāti is real): moreover we have overthrown him who holds to a universal blank (cf. p. 72).

किमिदं ख्यातेरध्यस्तत्वमिति चेत् वस्तुतो निष्प्रकारिकायाः
सप्रकारकत्वेन भानमेवेति गृहाण । तस्यैव प्रकारस्य स्वरूपं वाच्य-
मिति चेत् वस्तुतो निर्विकल्पकख्यातिस्वरूपमेव । तथैव तर्हि प्रत्येत-
व्यमिति चेत् उचितमेव तद्विज्ञस्य न तु भ्रान्तस्य तस्य भ्रान्तत्वादेव ।
किं तेनाधिकं प्रतीतमिति चेत् न किमपि । कथमसौ भ्रान्त इति चेत्
अन्यप्रतीतेरन्यविषयत्वाभिमानादेव यथा लोके रज्जुं प्रत्येति सर्प-
मभिमन्यते अयं सर्प इति । कोसावभिमान इति चेत् परमार्थस्थि-
तविषयस्य भासमानस्याप्यसत्त्वनिश्चयः । यदि वस्तुतो रज्जुप्रत्यय
एव कथं तर्हि सर्पल्लेखितया स प्रत्ययः परिस्फुरतीति चेत् आकार-
साम्यात् दोषवशाच्चेति वदामः ।

But what is this illusory character of perception ? Know (replies the guru) that it consists in the appearing in consciousness of that which is really predicateless as possessing a predicate (khyāti, here = chaitanya, Self). But (rejoins the pupil) the nature of the said predicate you should explain. It is really nothing but the predicate-less Self (khyāti). Then it should be perceived as such. True enough (rejoins the guru) in the case of him who knows Self (tat); but not in the case of the deluded man, simply because he is deluded. What, then, over and above (the real substrate) does this deluded man perceive ? Nothing really, Why then call him deluded ? Because he fancies that his perception of one thing makes known something different : thus, in common life, he sees a rope and fancying it to be a snake, says—this is a snake. But what is this fancy of his ? It is his conviction as to the non-existence of a really existing thing, sc. the rope which is even present to his consciousness. But if he really has a perception of the rope, how does that perception present itself to him so as to make him use the word snake ? This, we reply, is due to similarity (between rope and snake) and to certain defects (of eye-sight &c., which stand, generically, for Nescience).

अत एव बाधोत्तरं मन्यते रज्जुरेव सर्पतया मया प्रतिप-
न्नेति । तत्किं सर्पः न प्रतिपन्न एव । कः संशयः । एवं तर्ह्यनुभव-
विरोध इति चेन्न भ्रान्तानुभवविरोधेऽप्यविरोधात् तस्य किं प्रतीतिं
किं न प्रतीतमिति विवेकविरहात् अभ्रान्तस्य तदनुभवाभावेनानुभ-
वविरोधाभावात् ।

३० नन्वेवं सति अधिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्चेति द्वयमेव दृष्टान्ते
अतिरिक्तप्रतीतिप्रत्येतव्ययोरसत्त्वस्य व्युत्पादनात् दार्ष्टान्तिके त्व-
धिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्च द्वयमप्यात्मैव स्वयंप्रकाशे प्रतीत्यन्तरान-
भ्युपगमात् तथा च तदतिरिक्तस्य विवर्तस्य दर्शयितुमशक्यतया
गतं विवर्तवादेन ततोतिस्फुटः स्वसिद्धान्तपरित्याग इति चेत्

Hence after the false perception of the snake has been de-
stroyed, his consciousness takes the form—this rope indeed was
perceived by me in the shape of a snake. What ! did he not per-
ceive a snake at all ! Certainly not. Then, in this way conscious-
ness is violated. Not so ; because in contradicting the conscious-
ness of a *deluded* man, no violence is done, for he does not
discriminate between what he perceives and what not ; and because
no violence is done to the consciousness of the *undeluded* man,
in that he was not conscious of the snake at all.

30. The pupil argues that since the rope alone is perceived

Objection : Vivarttavāda, then, is false
also.

Reply : Yes ! false for him who knows
the truth ; but a way to the truth for him
who knows it not. cf. pp. 116-7.

(evam sati, cf. supra) there are,
in the example, two things
only, viz., substrate or rope, and
the cognition of it ; for the

non-existence of any cognition or cognised object other than
these has been taught : whereas, in the illustrated case, both
substrate and cognition of it are the Self alone, for in regard to
self-luminous Self, a second cognition (making Self known) is
not to be assumed. And so, (continues the pupil) since a vivartta
distinct from Self cannot be shown, the vivartta doctrine is done
away with : hence the teacher clearly abandons his own doctrine.

न । तस्य बालव्युत्पत्तिमात्रप्रयोजनतया उपनिषत्तात्पर्याविष-
यत्वात् अन्यथा विपरीतदृष्ट्यैव द्वैतापत्तेः । मिथ्यैव सा दृष्टिरिति चेत्
किमिदं मिथ्यात्वं कैकालिकासत्त्वम् असत्त्वाविशेषे ऽपि कदा चित्प्रती-
यमानत्वं वा । नाद्यः इष्टापत्तेः । न द्वितीयः तत्प्रतीत्यैवाद्वैतक्षते-
स्तादवस्थात् । साध्येव तत्प्रतीतिरिति चेत् न तस्यासङ्गत्वात्
असङ्गे ह्ययं पुरुष इति श्रुतेः साक्षिणः कादाचित्कत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

No! (replies the latter) for vivartta doctrine is not the final aim of the Upanishads, in that it serves only to instruct the uninitiated: otherwise, from the false perception of duality would follow duality as something real. But (replies the pupil) that perception is false. What does falsity mean? Does it mean non-existence in time, present, past and future? Or, since non-existence is a unity indivisible, does falsity mean that the object is perceived temporarily, (occasionally)? * The former definition will not avail you (says the guru), for that is the meaning of the term accepted (by us Vedāntins). Nor will the latter avail, for even through such occasional perception, Monism (the final teaching of the Upanishads) is overthrown all the same. But (argues the pupil) that occasional perception is the Witness itself. No, because the Witness is unrelated, as declared in the passage—For this Person is unrelated:—and because temporary character cannot attach to the Witness.

* असत्त्वं मिथ्या इत्युक्ते गगनकमलादौ अतिव्याप्तिस्तच्चिवारणाय कदा चित्प्र-
तीयमानत्वमिति कादाचित्कप्रतीतिविषयत्वम् इति यावत् । प्रतीतिरत्र अपरोक्ष विव-
क्षिता । असत्त्वं नाम सद्विलक्षणत्वम् । कादाचित्कप्रतीतिविषयत्वं वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन
आत्मन्यप्यस्ति इति तदर्थे विशिनष्टि असत्त्वाविशेषेणेति । N. D's gloss.

The qualification *occasionally* excludes a sheer non-entity, sc. a sky-lotus, which is never perceived. Again, perception of Self as an object, effected as this is through a *vṛitti* or modification of the *antaḥkāra* (*vṛittivyāpyatvena*) might be considered *occasional*, but is excluded from the context by the mention of non-entity.

किञ्चात्मनो द्वैतदृष्टिः प्रमाणसिद्धा भ्रान्तिसिद्धा वा । नाद्यः
 अद्वैतागमविरोधात् । नेतरः भ्रान्तिसिद्धपदार्थस्यासत्त्वनियमात् ।
 अन्यथा भ्रान्तित्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा चात्मनो द्वैतदृष्टिः कदा चिदपि
 नास्त्येव । तथा च श्रुतिः यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन् वै तन्न पश्यतीत्यादि
 आत्मनो ऽविलुप्तदृष्टिस्वभावस्य द्वैतदृष्टिं वारयति ।

बालान्प्रति विवर्तयं ब्रह्मणः सकलं जगत् ।

अविवर्तितमानन्दमास्थिताः कृतिनः सदा ॥

इति स्मृतिरपि आत्मनो द्वैतदर्शनाभावमनुमन्यते ।

Further, is this vision of duality pertaining to Self effected by a *pramāṇa* (trustworthy source of knowledge), or by an erroneous cognition? Not by the former, for this would contradict Śruti passages teaching *advaita*; nor by the latter, for the rule is that the thing made known by erroneous cognition is non-existent; otherwise the cognition could not be said to be erroneous. Thus vision of duality never indeed pertains to Self. So also Śruti debars vision of duality from Self whose nature is unbroken vision, as in the passage,—when he does not see, he still is seeing, though he sees not.

Smṛiti also approves the same, thus,—‘For the uninitiated it is taught that the whole world is this *vivartta* of Brahman. The wise hold it to be Bliss unmodified.’

३१ नन्वात्मने द्वैतदर्शनाभावे नित्यमुक्तस्यासंसारिणः शास्त्रसा-
ध्यप्रयोजनशून्यतया शास्त्रानार्थक्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् न नित्यमुक्तस्या-
संसारिणः अत्यन्तासत्संसारनिवर्तकत्वेन शास्त्रप्रामाण्योपपत्तेः ।
अत्यन्तासतो नित्यनिवृत्ततया तत्र शास्त्रव्यापारो ऽनर्थक इति चेत्
न सत्यस्यापि तुल्यत्वात् न हि सन्निवर्तयति शास्त्रमिति क्व चिद् दृष्टम् ।
अनिर्वचनीयं निवर्तयितुं शास्त्रमिति चेन्न तत्राप्यदर्शनस्य तुल्य-
त्वात् न ह्यनिर्वचनीयं निवर्तते इत्युभयसंप्रतिपन्नं स्थलमस्ति
तस्माद्विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते निवृत्तं च निवर्तत इत्यादिशास्त्रादत्य-
न्तासत्संसारनिवर्तकत्वेनैव शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम् ।

31. If to Self vision of duality pertains not, Self, as being

Objection: (a) Veda is useless, if Self is an unrelated Unity. Reply: Not use-
less ; for it puts an end to Nescience or the false knowledge of duality, which is sheer non-entity.

ever free and uninvolved in transmigratory existence, will lack the motive sc. desire of moksha, which Veda is to ac-

complish : hence Veda will become useless. Reply : Not so ; for even to the ever free Self Veda becomes a source of right knowledge by destroying (the false knowledge of) an absolutely non-existent world. But the function of Veda, it is urged, would be vain in regard to such a world, for the absolutely non-existent has ceased to be eternally. No ; for the argument would apply equally to a real world, since no instance is found in which the Veda puts an end to a real object. Then, it may be urged, Veda aims at destroying (what the Vedāntins term) anirvachanīya or inexplicable object. No ! we reply, for here too no confirmatory instance is found, since what ceases to be is not the anirvachanīya object (e. g. false snake, which never existed at all ; but the false knowledge in regard to the snake comes to an end). Thus both cases are propounded. Hence Veda is authoritative in putting an end to the false knowledge of an absolutely non-existent world, according to the passage,—‘the free is freed, that ceases to be which has ceased to be.’

नित्यबोधपरिपीडितं जगद्विभ्रमं नुदति वाक्यजा मतिः ।

वासुदेवनिहतं धनञ्जयो हन्ति कौरवकुलं यथा पुनः ॥

इति स्मृतिरपि जगदात्मकस्य विभ्रमस्य नित्यबोधस्वभावस्यात्मनः स्वरूपं पर्यालोच्यात्यन्तासत्त्वमेवाह । किञ्च ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं शास्त्रसत्त्वमस्तीति ये मन्यन्ते तान्प्रति भवतु शास्त्राप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गे दोषः तस्य प्रमाणैकस्वभावत्वात् । ये तु मन्यन्ते सदा अद्वैतमेवास्ति द्वैतवार्ताऽनभिज्ञास्तान्प्रति कथमयं दोषः स्यात्तैः शास्त्रस्य वा तत्प्रामाण्यस्य वा ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्यानभ्युपगमात् अन्यथा ताभ्यामेवाद्वैतक्षतिः स्यात् । न च वेदप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे पाखण्डत्वप्रसङ्गः तदप्रामाण्यस्याप्यनभ्युपगमात् ।

Smṛiti also, observing the reality (svarūpa) of Self whose nature is eternal Knowledge, declares the absolute non-existence of that error (termed) the world—thus: 'Knowledge, effected through Vedic sentences destroys that error termed the world,

Samkshepaśārīraka II. śl. 38.

which had already been destroyed by eternal Knowledge (Self,

Brahman): just as Arjuna slays again the Kuru race already slain by Vāsudeva.' Moreover, against those who hold that Veda is a reality apart from Brahman the charge of making Veda untrustworthy may be brought, since the sole character of Veda (tasya) is that of a pramāṇa or trustworthy source of evidence. But the charge cannot be brought against those who, unconscious of the least trace of duality, hold that Brahman *alone ever is*, since they do not admit Veda or its trustworthiness as existing apart from Brahman; otherwise Vedantic Monism would be violated by the separate existence of these two sc. Veda and its trustworthiness. Nor can we be charged with heresy in not holding the trustworthiness of Veda; for we do not (as the heretic does) hold the untrustworthiness also of Veda.

न च वेदप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे ऽद्वैतस्याप्रामाणिकत्वप्रसङ्गो दोषः
द्वैतदर्शिनं प्रति प्रमाणाधीनसिद्धिके आत्मनि च तस्य दोषत्वात् ।
ननु द्वैतदर्शित्वं किमात्मनो धर्मः स्वभावो वा नाद्यः द्वैतापत्तेः ।
नेतरः द्वैतजातस्य सर्वस्य स्वतःसिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति चेत् न श्रुतिसि-
द्धात्मस्वरूपानुरोधेन द्वैतजातस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छत्वात् । न हि तुच्छस्य
स्वतःसिद्धिः सम्भवति तस्य निरस्तसमस्तसामर्थ्यस्य स्वतः परतो
वा सेदुमशक्यत्वात् । नन्वात्मभिन्नस्य जगतस्तद्वर्णनस्य च तुच्छ-
त्वं लौकिकानामभिमतं परीक्षकाणां वा ।

Nor while not holding Veda as reliable, can we be charged with leaving Monism without any evidence; for this charge would lie against the seer of duality (with whom) the existence of Self has to be proved by some *pramāṇa*. Here an opponent may ask whether the character of being a seer of duality is an attribute of Self or is the own nature of Self. Not the former, for then duality is established; (for this attribute, he argues, must be assumed to be a reality; a non-existent attribute would be nonsense—). Not the latter for then it follows that the whole complex of duality is self-proved (*i. e.* is *svaprākāśa*, as Self is, into whose nature duality enters, on the above assumption, as a *viśeṣhaṇa* or necessary predicate, thus—*dvaitasya drashtā* cf. p. 70 n.) No! we reply. For in accordance with the nature of Self as proved in Veda, all duality is sheer non-entity. Nor can non-entity prove itself, for being absolutely destitute of power it can neither prove itself nor be proved by something else.

Here it may be asked by way of objection whether the view that the world as distinct from Self, and the vision of the world, are

Objection : (b) But the above doctrine of *Māyā* is held only by the Vedāntin whose evidence is obviously inadmissible.

Reply: The final appeal for all doctrine is to Veda, which certainly teaches *Māyā*.

sheer non-entity, is one held by the vulgar or by trained thinkers.

नाद्यः तेषामबाधितत्वबुद्धेस्तत्राव्याहतत्वात् तुच्छत्वस्य दूरनिरस्तत्वात् । नेतरः परीक्षकाणां सर्वेषामैकमत्याभावात् सर्व-
शून्यवादिना निःशेषप्रमाणप्रमेयापलापिना ऽप्रमाणिकेन अशेषस्य तु-
च्छत्वस्वीकारात् । तद्विरुद्धस्य नित्यानित्यविभागेन सार्वदिकका-
दाचित्कत्वस्याक्षरकणभुगादिभिः स्वीकारात् तद्विरुद्धस्य च
सर्वदा सर्वसत्यत्वस्य सांख्यादिभिरभ्युपगमात् तस्मात्परीक्षकाणां
सर्वेषां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तेरात्मातिरिक्तस्य तुच्छत्वमसम्प्रतिपन्नमेव ।
तथा च लौकिकपरीक्षकविरुद्धं जगतस्तुच्छत्वं कथमङ्गीकारपथमा-
रोहति न च परीक्षकाणां मतमपि प्रत्येकं परस्परविरुद्धतया हेयमेवेति
वाच्यं तावता ऽप्येकैकारस्य तत्र तत्राव्याहतत्वानुच्छत्वे तद-
भावात् ।

Not by the vulgar (continues the opponent), for since their notion of reality (abādhitattva) is not destroyed in regard to the world and the vision of it (tatra), the view that these are non-entity is completely rejected by them. Nor by philosophers, for these are not unanimous. Thus, the unreliable Nihilist (Śūnyavādin), denying all sources, and objects, of true knowledge, holds that all is sheer non-entity. In opposition to this view, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣhikas and others hold that existence is both eternal and temporary, by dividing substances into eternal and non-eternal. Opposed to this again is the view of the Sāṃkhyas and others that the existence of all things is eternal. And since all these trained thinkers are disagreed, the view that the world as distinct from Self is sheer non-entity is clearly unproved. This view, then, rejected as it is by the common man and the philosopher alike, cannot be accepted by us. Nor may it be urged that each and all of the above views should be rejected as mutually opposed. For in spite of such opposition (tāvatāpi), in each of the above cases (tatra tatra) the acceptance of some one view or other is an incontrovertible fact; whereas the acceptance of the world as sheer non-entity is found in no case whatever (tadabhāvāt).

न चात्रापि ममाङ्गीकारोऽस्त्येवेति वाच्यं तत्राप्रामाणिकत्वात् तुच्छ-
त्वग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् । न च परीक्षकाणामपि परस्परविरुद्धानां मध्ये
कस्य मतं समीचीनं कस्याऽसमीचीनमिति विनिगमकाभावात् एकमपि
न ग्राह्यमिति वाच्यं नित्यनिर्दुष्टवेदमूलकत्वभावाभावाभ्यां विशेषात्
यस्य हि मतं वेदमूलं तद्ग्राह्यं यस्य तु तन्नास्ति तत्त्याज्यं यथा पाख-
ण्डानां मतम् । हन्त तर्हि अन्ततोपि गत्वा श्रुत्यैव विश्वासश्चेत् श्रुति-
सिद्धमेव मतमदुष्टं ग्राह्यमिति तदितरदग्राह्यमेवाप्रामाणिकत्वात् श्रुति-
विरुद्धत्वाच्च । श्रुतिस्तु सदेव सौम्येदमग्रे आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं स
एष नेति नेतीति अथ तस्यायमादेशः अमावश्चतुर्थीऽव्यवहार्यः प्रप-
ञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत इत्येवंप्रकारिका सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशू-
न्यमात्मानं बोधयन्ती आत्मातिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छत्वमभिमन्यते ।

Nor may the Vedāntin urge that of this latter view also (atrāpi) *his* acceptance is forthcoming. For the Vedāntin is untrustworthy, because there is no evidence for the non-entitative character of the world. Nor may it be argued that no single view of the above opposed schools should be accepted, because no compelling reason for the adoption of any one as *the true* view exists. For there is a difference between these views according as they are, or are not, based on the eternal faultless Veda. Thus a tenet based on Veda must be accepted, of whatever school it may be; but a tenet not thus based must be rejected, e. g. the tenet of heretics must be rejected. Well then, we Vedāntins reply, if your final position is that trust (in a particular tenet) follows through Veda alone, you must accept as faultless only that tenet which is vouched for by Veda, and reject all others as being without proof and contradictory of Veda. But Veda by making known Self as free from all differentiation, * as in the passages,—Existent only was this in the beginning, one without a second. There is no diversity here. That Self is to be described by No, No! And the fourth is without parts, is not an object of experience, is the cessation of experience, is the blessed One without a second—approves the view that all that is other than Self, is sheer non-entity.

* Svagatabheda, inherent variety, e. g. the leaves, flowers and

तदतिरिक्तस्य कथं चिदपि सत्त्वे ऽद्वैतव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् तस्माज्ज-
गतस्तुच्छत्वं श्रुत्यनुमतमेव । तदुक्तं गौडेः ।

तुच्छाऽनिर्वचनीया च वास्तवी चेत्यसौ त्रिधा ।

ज्ञेया माया त्रिभिर्बाधैः श्रौतयौक्तिकलौकिकैः ॥

वसिष्ठोपीममर्थं साश्चर्यवदाह

अहो नु चित्रं यत्सत्यं ब्रह्म तद्विस्मृतं नृणाम् ।

यदसत्यमविद्याख्यं तत्पूरः परिवर्त्तति ॥

तथा

अहो नु चित्रं पद्मेत्यैर्बद्धास्तन्तुभिरद्वयः ।

अविद्यमाना या ऽविद्या तया विश्वं खिलीकृतम् ॥

तस्माद् द्वैततद्दर्शनयोस्तुच्छत्वात् स्वतःसिद्धशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तप-
रिपूर्णानन्दात्मनो ऽदृष्टद्वयत्वमुपपन्नतरम् ।

For if apart from Self, anything existed in any form whatever, advaita would necessarily be overthrown. Hence the non-entitative character of the world is certainly approved by Veda. This view has been declared by Gauḍapāda :—‘Māyā is to be regarded under three aspects as sheer non-entity, or as inexplicable, or as something material, in accordance with the three (sources of) knowledge, sc. Veda, ratiocination and the common (or unphilosophic) consciousness.’ This Vāsishṭha also declares as something wonderful—‘Strange it is that Brahman, that which is, should be forgotten by men, while that which is not, sc. Nescience, dances before them.’ Again, ‘Strange it would be for mountains to be bound by lotus-fibres, and (stranger still it is) that the world is destroyed by Nescience which is really nothing.’ Hence, since duality and the vision of it are sheer non-entity, it is all the more clearly established that no second is known to that Self which is absolute Bliss, self-existent Intelligence and unrelated.

^ffruit of a tree : sajātiya, specific difference, distinguishing it from any other tree : vijātiya, class-difference, excluding it from unlike classes, e. g. stones, &c. For ref. cf. note p. 92 supra.

तथा च श्रुतिः

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

तदेव निष्कलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पं निरञ्जनम् ।

तद् ब्रह्माहमिति ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते ध्रुवम् ॥

निर्विकल्पमनन्तं च हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम् ।

अप्रमेयमनादिं च यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बुधः ॥

इत्येवमादिका आत्मने द्वैतदर्शनशून्यत्वमाह । तस्मात् ।

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं च पूर्णमानन्दविग्रहम् ।

मान्त्रवर्णिकमात्मानं विनिश्चित्य विमुच्यते ॥ ५७ ॥

न चैतादृशमात्मज्ञानं न जायत इति साम्प्रतं साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्य विविदिषोर्मनननिदिध्यासनाभ्यामुपकृतश्रवणानुष्ठानसमन्तरमेव तदुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अन्यथा तादृशात्मप्रतिपादकागमाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः ।

And so also Śruti declares that to Self vision of duality pertains not, in such passages as—‘this is the absolute truth that there is no such thing as destruction and production (of the world), nor fettered soul, nor (Vaidic) sacrifices, nor soul seeking emancipation or emancipated. He who knows himself as that Brahman, without parts or attributes or passions becomes unchanging Brahman. That wise one is emancipated who knows that which is without attributes, endless, uncaused, unique, not to be known through a *pramāṇa*) without a beginning.’ (Brahmavindūpanishad 8, 9.)

Hence, he is emancipated who recognises himself as identical with that Self described in the mantra * as Existence, Intelligence, infinity, absolute bliss by nature...LVII.

Nor is it right to say that such knowledge of Self is not brought about. For the production of such knowledge is observed in the case of him who is desirous of knowing the truth and is provided with the four means (cf. Ved. Sū. I. 1. 1.), but only after he has performed *hearing* aided by *pondering* and *profound contemplation*. If this were not so, it would follow that Vedic passages declaring such a Self are untrustworthy.

* cf. Ved. Sū I. 1. 15.

न च जातमपि ज्ञानं साधनान्तरापेक्षया फलदानाय विलम्बत इति वाच्यं तद्वैततत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे अहं मनुरभवं गन्धर्वः सूर्यश्चेति ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति तरति शोकमात्मविदित्यादिश्रुतिभ्य आत्मज्ञानतत्फलयोः समानकालनिर्देशात् मध्ये साधनान्तरकालविलम्बयोरभावप्रतिपत्तेः तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यते ऽयनायेत्यादिसाधनान्तरप्रतिषेधश्रवणाच्च । तस्मात्संन्यासात्मज्ञानमेवामृतत्वसाधनं यत्नतः सम्पादनीयं तदभावे यतो महती विनष्टिः श्रूयते इह चेदवेदीदय सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिरित्यत्र । उत्पन्ने च ब्रह्मात्मज्ञाने विदुषः फलेन सह विद्योद्गारः स्मर्यते ।

Nor may it be urged that even when knowledge (of Self) has been effected, the result (sc. moksha) is delayed owing to the need of some means besides knowledge. For knowledge (of Self) and its result are declared to be simultaneous in such passages as—seeing it (Brahman) the Rishi Vāmadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the Sun. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. He who knows the Self overcomes grief—because the absence of any other means and of any time-pause intervening between knowledge of Self and moksha is made known (by such passages): and because the negation of any other means that knowledge is enounced in the passage—a man who knows him (Self) truly passes over death; there is no other path to go. Therefore knowledge of Self together with renunciation of the world must be carefully acquired as the means to immortality; since, in the absence of knowledge, great is the destruction, a declared in the Śruti passage—‘If a man know this here, that is the reality (true end of life); if he does not know this here, then there is great destruction (new births).’ And the out-pourings of the wise man’s knowledge, with its result, when knowledge of Self as identical with Brahman is attained, are set forth in the Smṛiti:—

विद्याविग्रहमग्रहेण पिहितं प्रत्यञ्चमुच्चैस्तरा-
 मुत्कृष्यात्तमपूरुषं मुनिधिया मुञ्जादिषीकामिव ।
 कोशात्कारणकार्यरूपविकृतात्पश्यामि निःसंशयं
 नासीदस्ति भविष्यति क्व नु गतः संसारदुःखादधिः ॥
 पश्यामि चित्रमिव सर्वमिदं द्वितीयं तिष्ठामि निष्कलचिदेकवपुष्यनन्ते ।
 आत्मानमद्वयमचिन्त्यसुखैकरूपं पश्यामि दग्धरशनामिव च प्रपञ्चम् ॥
 अद्वैतमप्यनुभवामि करस्यबिल्वतुल्यं शरीरमहिनिर्त्वयनीव वीक्षे ।
 एवं च जीवनमिव प्रतिभासनं च निःश्रेयसाधिगमनं च मम प्रसिद्धम् ॥
 आश्चर्यमद्य मम भाति कथं द्वितीयं नित्ये निरस्तनिखिले शिवचित्प्रकाशे ।
 आसीत्पूरेति किमिमाः श्रुतयो न पूर्वं येन द्वितीयमभवत्तिमिरप्रसूतम् ॥

The Self within, the Highest Self, consisting of Intelligence,
 closely concealed by Nescience,
 I now behold without a doubt,
 having with the sage's mind discriminated it from the sheaths of
 Self which are a complex of causes and effects; just as one draws
 out a reed from its (enveloping) sheath. Lo! where was, and is
 to be, this ocean of world-pain!

This world I now regard as a picture (sc. a mere semblance
 of reality). I take my stand on the Infinite which is Intelligence
 alone, and without parts. I behold Self, one without a second,
 infinite bliss by nature; and the world I regard as I would a
 burnt rope.

I am directly conscious of the one Self as if it were a Vilva
 fruit lying in my hand: my body I look on as the cast off skin of
 a snake. And thus, as the appearance of my being alive, so the
 gaining of moksha, are both quite clear to me.

Strange it is how even now duality appears before me in that
 eternal, unrelated, blessed, luminous Self. Duality existed once—
 can I say this? what! was not the eternal Veda existing then, that
 duality was wrought by Nescience!

एवं शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादापरोक्षीकृततीव्रब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वस्य गुरु-
भक्त्यभिनयोपि स्मर्यते अतोपीयं विद्या जायत एव । तथा हि
त्वत्पादपङ्कजसमाश्रयणं विना मे सन्नप्यसन्निव परः पुरुषः पुरासीत् ।
त्वत्पादपद्मयुगलाश्रयणादिदानीं नासीन्न चास्ति न भवष्यति भेदबुद्धिः ॥
यस्मात् कृपापरवशो मम दुश्चिकित्सं संसाररोगमपनेतुमसि प्रवृत्तः ।
त्वत्पादपङ्कजरजः शिरसा दधानस्त्वामाशरीरपतनादहमप्युपासे ॥

ननु विद्यया ऽविद्योपमर्दे ऽपि कथं संसारस्येह लोकपरलो-
कसञ्चारलक्षणस्य नानाविधयोनिप्राप्तिपरिहाराभ्यामनेकविधदुःखस-
ङ्कुलस्य निवृत्तिः स्यात् तद्वेतोः कामकर्मादेस्तदवस्थत्वात् ।

And so the Smṛitis goes on to describe the adoration of the
Guru by the pupil, who through the grace of Veda and teacher
has gained a clear intuition of the truth that Brahman and the
Self are one. Thus it is a fact that this knowledge (leading to
moksha) is something brought about as a product.

The Highest Self, though indeed it exists, was for me non-
existent, until I had recourse to
Samskhepaśārīr : IV. śl. 58, 59. thy lotus-feet. Finding shelter
there, I can no more be conscious of duality.

Placing the dust of thy lotus-feet upon my head, I will serve
thee till death; for in pity of me thou hast undertaken to remove
this world-disease, hard to cure.

32. An opponent may here urge that even if destruction of
Nescience takes place through
knowledge, cessation of trans-
migratory existence, which con-
sists in the passage into this
and the next world and is a
complex of pains effected by the assumption and laying aside
of many forms of life, is impossible because the causes of
transmigratory existence, sc. desire and action, continue to exist.

Objection : Human effort is vain ; for
knowledge through Veda can destroy
Nescience (cause) but not the world
(effect). Reply : Veda and all human
experience teach that knowledge *does*
put an end to the world.

न चाविद्यानिवृत्त्या तदुपादेयस्यापि सर्वस्य निवृत्तिरावश्य-
कीति वाच्यम् । वैशेषिकाणामुपादाने निवृत्तेऽपि क्षणं कार्यावस्थानव-
दनिवृत्तिशङ्काया दुरपन्हवत्वात् न च क्षणान्तरे नङ्ग्यत्येवेति न दोषः
तत्क्षणवदुत्तरक्षणेऽप्यनुपपत्त्यभावस्यानुमातुं शक्यत्वात् तस्मादज्ञाने
निवृत्तेऽपि संसारो न निवर्तिष्यते प्रमाणाभावादिति व्यर्थः प्रयासः मैवं
कर्म मूलमनर्थानां तच्च ज्ञानेन बाध्यते ।

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥ ५८ ॥

ज्ञाने जातेऽपि कर्ममूलकः संसारोऽनुवर्तिष्यत इति यदुक्तं
तन्न अविद्यावत्कर्मणोऽपि ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् अविद्यावत्तत्कार्य-
णापि विद्याया विरोधित्वा विशेषात् ।

Nor (continues the opponent) may the reply to this be that the cessation of every product (upādeya) of Nescience follows necessarily on the cessation of Nescience itself. For, as with the Vaiśeṣhika school, an effect is held to exist for a moment of time after the destruction of its material cause, so the objection here urged that the effects of Nescience do not cease to exist is one that cannot be lightly set aside. Nor to obviate the difficulty can it be said that the effect will perish at some later time. For the possibility of the effect's existence, as well in the subsequent as in the preceding moment, may fairly be inferred. Hence (concludes the opponent) even when Nescience has ceased to be the world will not cease to be—there being no evidence for such non-existence of the world—and therefore human effort is vain.

Not so, we reply. Action is the root of all evil ; and action is destroyed by knowledge. And thus Śruti teaches—'And his works perish.'...LVIII.

The opponent's statement, that the world which has its root in action will continue to exist even after knowledge has been gained, will not hold. For action as well as Nescience is destroyed by knowledge, because knowledge is as much the contradictory of the effect of Nescience, sc. action, as of Nescience itself.

न हि सम्भवति रज्जुसाक्षात्कारे तदविद्यानिवृत्तौ तत्कार्यं
सर्पाद्यनुवर्तत इति न च यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमित्यव-
धारणं शास्त्रकाराणामेवं सत्यसमञ्जसमिति वाच्यम् । अज्ञानकार्य-
स्याप्यज्ञानानतिरेकात् तदभावे तत्सत्त्वानुपलम्भात् न चात्र प्रमा-
णाभावः भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः क्षीयन्ते चास्य
कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे इति श्रुतेः । न चैतद्वाक्यमशुभकर्मनिवृ-
त्तिपरमेवेति वाच्यं कर्मशब्दस्य शुभाशुभसाधारणत्वात् विद्यासाम-
र्थ्यस्य चोभयत्र तुल्यत्वात् ।

ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं शब्दं दैशिकपूर्वकम् ।

बुद्धिपूर्वकृतं पापं कृत्स्नं दहति वह्निवत् ॥

इत्यत्र बुद्धिपूर्वकृतपापस्यापि ब्रह्मज्ञानेन दाहस्मरणात् ।

Since it is impossible that the effect, *e. g.* the snake or the like should continue to exist after the Nescience concealing the rope has come to an end on the rope being perceived. Nor can the opponent urge that if this is so, the conclusion of the founders of the (Vedānta) Śāstra, *sc.* knowledge puts an end to Nescience alone, is improper. For the products of Nescience do not differ from Nescience itself, since when Nescience exists not, the existence of its products is not perceived. And proof for our position is not wanting, for Śruti thus declares:—‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, his works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower.’ Nor may it be argued that this passage implies the destruction of evil actions only. For the word action is common to both good and evil actions, and the power of knowledge is equally operative in regard to both kinds of action. Thus in the Smṛiti passage—‘The knowledge of Self and Brahman as identical, gained through Veda and attendance on a Guru consumes like fire every evil deed (though) done intentionally’—the consuming of even an intentional evil deed by the fire of) knowledge of Brahman is declared.

यथैधांसि समिद्धेऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन ।

ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ॥

इत्यत्र सर्वशब्देनाशेषपुण्यपापे गृहीत्वा तस्य सर्वस्यैव ज्ञानाग्निना दाहस्य भगवताप्युक्तत्वाच्च । किञ्च यस्य दर्शनमात्रादन्येषामपि पापक्षयो जायते का कथा तस्य ब्रह्मीभूतस्य पापक्षये तदाह भगवान् वसिष्ठः

यस्यानुभवपर्यन्तं तत्त्वे बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ।

तद्दृष्टिगोचराः सर्वे मुच्यन्ते सर्वपातकैः ॥

तथा च कुलपाविच्यहेतुत्वमपि ब्रह्मविदः स्मर्यते ।

कुलं पविचं जननी कृतार्था विश्वम्भरा पुण्यवती च तेन ।

अपारसंवित्सुखसागरे ऽस्मिन् लीनं परे ब्रह्मणि यस्य चेतः ॥

तस्माद्यथोक्तब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेन कृतकृत्यो भवतीति नात्र विवदितव्यम् इति ।

And in the passage—‘As kindled fire reduces fuel to ashes O Arjuna ! so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes’—the Divine Krishna, understanding by the word *all* both good and evil deeds, has declared that all action is consumed by the fire of knowledge. Further, need it be said that the sins of the man who has become Brahman are destroyed, when by the mere sight of such an one the sins even of other men are destroyed ! This his reverence Vasishṭha declares—‘All men are freed from their sins who come within the sight of him whose mind is engaged with Brahman till intuition (of Brahman) arises.’ And Smṛiti too declares that he who knows Brahman purifies his own family—‘He whose mind has melted into that infinite ocean of Intelligence and Bliss, the absolute Brahman, has purified his family, fulfilled his mother’s desires and sanctified the earth.’

To conclude, then,—our statement, that a man realises all desires through the aforesaid knowledge of the identity of his Self with Brahman, is indisputable.

प्रकाशानन्दयतिना कृतिना स्वात्मशुद्धये ।
 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावल्येषा रचिता रन्ध्रवर्जिता ॥
 अद्वैतानन्दसन्दोहा सत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणा ।
 नारायणसमासक्ता श्रिया सापव्यदूषिता ॥
 शृणु प्रकाशरचितां सद्वैततिमिरापहाम् ।
 वादीभकुम्भनिर्भेदे सिंहदंष्ट्राधरीकृताम् ॥
 वेदान्तसारसर्वस्वमज्ञेयमधुनातनैः ।
 अशेषेण मयोक्तं तत्पुरुषोत्तमयत्नतः ॥

स्नातं तेन समस्ततीर्थसलिले सर्वापि दत्ताऽवनिर्यज्ञानां च कृतं
 सहस्रमखिला देवाश्च सम्पूजिताः । संसाराच्च समुद्धृताः स्वपितरस्त्रै-
 लोक्यपूज्योप्यसौ यस्य ब्रह्मविचारणे क्षणमपि स्थैर्यं मनः प्राप्नुयात् ॥

इति श्रीपरमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीज्ञानानन्दपूज्यपादशिष्य-
 श्रीप्रकाशानन्दविरचिता सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली समाप्ता ॥

To purify his Self the good ascetic Prakāśānanda composed this Siddhāntamuktāvalī, flawless, a mass of pure Bliss, sharing the nature of (Brahman sc.) Existence and Intelligence, and (as a garland) dedicated to Nārāyaṇa (and thus) tainted by rivalry with his consort Lakshmi. Listen to the work written by Prakāśa (the Luminous) which destroys darkness (sc. Nescience) and duality, and surpasses the tooth of a tiger in tearing open the forehead of an elephant, i. e. a non-Vedāntin opponent. With Nārāyaṇa's aid I have fully declared the very essence of Vedānta unknown to men of the present day. That man whose mind remains fixed in the contemplation of Brahman even for a moment, has bathed in the waters of all the tīrthas, and offered all the earth (as his dāna) and performed a thousand sacrifices, has honoured all the gods and extricated his fathers from transmigratory bondage, and is himself worthy of honour in the three worlds.

Here ends the Siddhāntamuktāvalī composed by Prakāśānanda, the pupil of his reverence Jñānānanda, paramahansa parivrājakāchārya.

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ADṚISHṬA : p. 3.

AJNĀNA : a unity and *assumed*
only, pp. 14, 15.

„ : an upādhi and not a
viśeṣhaṇa of jīva,
p. 18.

„ : as the cause of the
world, described—
p. 39.

AJNĀTA : in the technical sense
to be applied only
to Intelligence or

„ : Brahman, pp. 33, 58.

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ANUYOGIN : p. 13 note, add :—
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of difference, q. v.

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cality) p. 118.

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ĀTADVYĀVRITTI = Apoha. q. v.

ĀTMAN = Self or pure Intelli-
gence, the *all* that
is, p. 65.

„ = svarūpa, p. 55 note.

ĀTMĀŚRAYA : (a logical vice)
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pp. 59, 89.

AVINIGAMADOSHA = Vinigama-
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AVACHCHHEDAKA.

[For the general bearings of this and the cognate terms svarū-
pasambandha, viśayatā, &c. *vide* Prof. Cowell's valuable notes to
Kusumāñjali, pp. 13, 23, 61.]

To begin with SVARŪPASAMBANDHA—defd. as सम्बन्धान्तरेण
विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननायोग्यत्वम् (Bhīmāchārya's *Nyāyakośa*), *i. e.* it is the
relation which must be held to exist in a case where a determinate know-

ledge or judgment (*viśiṣṭāpratiti* = *viśiṣṭajñāna*, q. v. Index) could not have been effected by any other relation (sc. *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*, which find a place under the seven *padārthas*). In other words, this relation must be either the subject itself (*anuyogin*) or predicate itself (*pratiyogin*) of the said judgment—*अनुयोगिप्रतियोग्यन्यतरस्वरूपः सम्बन्धविशेषः* (*N. kośa* p. 260 note). For example take the judgment *घटं जानामि*—into which three factors enter ; (α) *ghaṭa*, (β) *ghaṭavishaya-kajñāna*, sc. *jñāna* which has *ghaṭa* as its *vishaya* or object, (γ) *ātman*, the knower, or the *āśraya*, substrate of the *jñāna*, represented by the termination *mip*. Between β and γ the *samavāyasambandha* holds (acc. to *Nyāya*); for *jñāna* is a *guṇa* of the individual *ātman*. Between α and β some sort of relation must also hold, in order that this particular judgment rather than any other, e. g. *paṭam jānāmi*, should result. But the relation cannot be *samavāya*, because the *ghaṭavishaya-kajñāna* is a *guṇa* of *ātman* and not of *ghaṭa*. Nor can it be *saṃyoga*; for this relation holds only between *dravyas*, and β is a *guṇa*. Hence the only possible determining cause, *niyāmaka*, of this judgment is the *ghaṭasvarūpa* or *ghaṭa* itself. This may be expressed variously :—thus, *घटं जानामि इत्याकारकविशिष्टबुद्धिनियामको घटः*, or thus, *घटे ज्ञानगत-घटवैशिष्ट्यनियामकता वर्तते* ।

The obvious objection to making the *ghaṭa* itself into a *sambandha*, sc. that the distinction between *relation* and *related thing* is thus obliterated (vide Index, s. v.), is met by maintaining that the *ghaṭa quā ghaṭa* is not the *sambandha*, but *quā* object of knowledge. Thus, *सम्बन्धविशेषणीभूतो यो धर्मः तेन धर्मेण सम्बन्धत्वं न भवति किन्तु तदन्यरूपेण । घटविशेषणीभूतघटत्वान्यविषयतात्वेन सम्बन्धत्वं भवति । अर्थात् प्रतियोगिनो घटस्य ज्ञानं घटत्वेन भवति । सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानं तु विषयतात्वेन भवति । घटो विषयश्च एक एवपदार्थः ॥* [Here *sambandhin* = *ghaṭa* and *viśeṣaṇībhūta* = *ghaṭatva*].

AVACHCHHEDAKA is defd. as that which may be considered as an essential, constitutive attribute or predicate :—*विशेषणीभूतो धर्मोऽवच्छेदको भवति । तस्मिन्वच्छेदके अवच्छेदकता वर्तते* । [Dharma in the preceding definition means not merely the technical *guṇas* but anything which as predicate will serve to define a subject, e. g. *daṇḍa* is an *avachchhedaka* in the judgment *daṇḍavān puruṣo'yam*.] This AVACHCHHEDAKATĀ relation is a case of SVARŪPASAMBANDHA, because (as already shown) *samavāya* and *saṃyoga* will not apply to such cases. All instances of AVACHCHHEDAKATĀ may be brought under either VISHAYATĀ or PRATIYOGITĀ: under the former, if

the relation considered be that of knowledge, sc. of the relation between subject and predicate in a judgment, in which case the avachchhedaka may be atiprasakta, thus, in ghaṭam jñāmi, ghaṭatva the avachchhedaka is *not* definitely limited in its application (anatiprasakta); for ghaṭatva is found in ghaṭas other than the particular ghaṭa now perceived: under the latter, if determination by negation be under consideration, in which case the avachchhedaka must be of duly limited application, anyūnānatiprasakta:—अवच्छेदकत्वं द्विविधं स्वरूपसम्बन्धत्वरूपमनूनानतिप्रसक्तत्वरूपं च । आद्यं विषयानिरूपितं द्वितीयं प्रतियोगितानिरूपितम् । [Nirūpita here = prakāśita, *explained by*. The effect of this word in a long samāsa is usually nothing more than to convert the immediately preceding word into the genitive case].

To illustrate VISHAYATĀ, take again घटं जानामि. This judgment may be expressed thus (1) घटवृत्तिविषयतानिरूपकं ज्ञानम्. Here, in ghaṭa exist both ghaṭatva which is avachchhedaka, and the vishayatā which is represented by termination अम् of घटम्. Between ghaṭa and vishayatā the *vṛttitvasambandha* holds:—अमर्थविषयतायां घटस्य वृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन अन्वयः । Between vishayatā and jñāna the *nirūpakatvasambandha* holds:—विषयतायाः ज्ञाने निरूपकत्वसम्बन्धेन अन्वयः [Nirūpaka = prakāśaka]. Or (2) the judgment may be expressed thus:—घटत्वावच्छिन्ना घटवृत्तिः या विषयता तन्निरूपकं ज्ञानम् । Since in this case the vishayatā is dependent on its locus, the ghaṭa, and the ghaṭa in its turn is essentially constituted by (avachchhinna) ghaṭatva, the relation between ghaṭatva and vishayatā is termed *avachchhinatva sambandha*:—घटविशेषणीभूतघटत्वस्य विषयतायां धर्मिण्यतन्त्र्येण अवच्छिन्नत्वसम्बन्धेन अन्वयः । Since also ghaṭatva is avachchhedaka and therefore possesses avachchhedakatā, घटत्वावच्छिन्ना may be expressed by घटत्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकतानिरूपिका । where निरूपिका qualifies विषयता.

[It may be added that Gadādhara in his Vishayatāvāda declares the modern view to be that vishayatā is *not* a form of svarūpasambandha but a distinct sambandha. The modern school of Nyāya in denying that vishayatā is a svarūpasambandha distinguishes it from vishayitā; the former is a dharma pertaining to object known, vishaya; the latter is a dharma pertaining to cognition, jñāna, or to desire, ichchhā, or to volition, kṛiti.]

PRATIYOGITĀ or determination by negation (abhāva) is the relation between positive entities (bhāva) and their negations. The dharma which serves to exclude any particular bhāva from another is termed pratiyogitāvachchhedaka; and the pratiyogitā is said to be taddhar-

māvachchhinnā. Thus the negation घटो नास्ति may be expressed by घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽभावः । Under pratiyogitā may be brought the causal relation, kāryakāraṇabhāva; acc. to defs. of cause and effect; thus, कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणवृत्त्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिता कारणता, the being a cause consists in not being the counterentity to any absolute non-existence which might find place in the moment of time immediately preceding the (existence of the) effect, i. e. a cause is that which *must* precede the effect: and प्रागभावप्रतियोगिता कार्यता—the effect is the counterentity to its own precedent non-existence. And the avachchhedaka of both kāraṇa and kārya is anyānūatiprasakta, as was shown above to be necessary:—यथा घटकारणतावच्छेदकं दण्डत्वमेव न तु द्रव्यत्वं नीलदण्डत्वं वा । एवं दण्डकार्यतावच्छेदकमपि घटत्वमेव न तु नीलघटत्वं द्रव्यत्वं वा आद्यस्य नूनवृत्तित्वात् अन्यस्य अतिप्रसक्तत्वात् ।

The precise usage of *avachchhedakāvachchhinna* remains to be noted. The ungainly compound is employed to include *all possible cases* of any sambandha. Thus, if we wish to turn the maxim, 'From negation of cause, negation of effect—kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvah—' into the current coin of the Nyāya, we must define it more closely in terms of certain sambandhas, without depriving it of its universality by the mention of any special cause e. g. tantu, or any special effect, e. g. paṭa; and this may be effected by using the above compound, thus:—कारणतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावप्रयोज्यः कार्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नाभावः । [प्रयोज्यः=जनितः] But if the avachchhedaka is specially named in any case, e. g. tantutva or paṭatva (in the above example), the word *avachchhedaka* is omitted as unnecessary.

AVACHCHHEDAKATĀ: p. II *supra*.

AVACCHINATVASAMBANDHA: p. III.

BĀDHA: defd. p. 127, to be distinguished from Nivṛitti.

BĀDHASĀMĀNĀDHIKARĀṆYA: p. 94.

BAHVANUGRAHANYĀYA: p. 84.

BRĀGALAKSHAṆĀ: p. 91.

BHEDA: defd. p. 13 note.

” : aupādhika and svābhāvika, p. 11.

” : =duality, and not to be proved by any pramāṇa pp. 40, 41 note.

” : cannot=svarūpa or 'thing in itself' p. 115.

BHEDA: of 3 kinds, pp. 177-78 note.

BHEDAPRATIYOGIN: p. 42 note.

DHARMIN=substrate or subject, p. 65.

DHARMIGRĀHAKAMĀNA: p. 36 note.

DRISHTISRISHTIVĀDA: Pref. p. II.

EKAJĪVAVĀDIN: p. 16.

GUṆE ANYĀYYAKALPANĀNIYAMA: p. 94.

GRĀHAKA: p. 67.

GRĀHYA: ” ”

ICHCHHHĀVISHAYATĀ: p. 70 and note.

JAPA: cannot be said to be

- ajñāta in technical sense, p. 33.
 JĪVA : one only and identical with Brahman, p. 9 : defd. thus acc. to view of Ekājīva-vādins, pp. 15, 16.
 „ : a plurality of—p. 5.
 JÑĀTASATTĀVĀDA : Pref. p. II.
 KĀRAṆATĀVACHCHHEDAKA : pp. 149. and p. IV. *supra*.
 KHYĀTI = Self, chaitanya, p. 169.
 KRĪTAHANYAKRĪTĀBHYĀGAMA : p. 2.
 KŪṬASTHANITYA : p. 3.
 LAKSHAṆĀ : p. 91.
 LEŚĀVIDYĀ : p. 139.
 LOKAVEDĀDHĪKARAṆĀ (OF PŪ. MĪMĀMSĀ) : p. 144.
 MITHYĀTVA : p. 171 and note.
 NIRVIKALPAKĀJÑĀNA : p. 41 note.
 NIRŪPAKATVASAMBANDHA : p. III.
 NIVṚTTI : p. 127.
 PĀRAMĀRTHIKĪ (SATTĀ) : p. 25, note.
 PARĪṆĀMAVĀDA : p. 167 note.
 PRAGLOPA : (logical vice) defd. p. 105 note.
 PRĀPTĀPRAPTAVIVEKANYĀYA : p. 106 note.
 PRĀTIBHĀSIKĪ = (Prātītikī) SATTĀ p. 25 note.
 PRATIPANNOPĀDHI : p. 8 note.
 PRATIYOGIN : p. 13 note.
 PRATIYOGITĀ : p. III *supra*.
 PRATIYOGITĀVACHCHHEDAKA : „
 PRATYABHIJÑĀ (recognition) p. 29.
 SĀDHĀRAṆAKĀRAṆA : p. 37 note.
 SAJĀTĪYABHEDA : p. 178 note.
 SĀKSHIN : pp. 101, 2.
 SĀKSHISIDDHA : pp. 124, 25.
 SĀMĀNYA (OF VAISĒSHIKA) : how proved—p. 108 note.
 SAMAVĀYIKĀRAṆA : p. 67 note.
 SAMBANDHA : or relation in technical sense—p. 13 note. Add technical def:—sambandhibhinnaṭve sati sambandhyāśritaḥ sambandhaḥ.
 SAMBHĀVANĀBUDDHI : p. 117.
 SATTĀ : of 3 kinds—p. 25 note.
 SATTVA = BUDDHI p. 39 note.
 ŚRĪṢṬIDṚṢṬIVĀDA : Pref. p. II.
 STOBHA : p. 158.
 SVAGATABHEDA : p. 177 note.
 SVAPRAKĀŚA : defd. p. 61.
 „ : to be affirmed of the unconditioned Ātman only, p. 62.
 SVARŪPA = Sattā p. 131.
 SVARŪPASAMBANDHA : pp. II, III. *supra*.
 SVATOVYĀVṚTTITATVAM = self-differentiation, p. 50.
 TADVYAKTITVA = individuality, p. 107 note.
 TANTRATVA : of 3 kinds, p. 13.
 TARKA = method of argument to confirm Veda, p. 1.
 UPĀDHI = adhiśṭhāna p. 8 note.
 „ = a limiting but *not* an *essential* condition or attribute, thus technically distingd. from viśeṣhaṇa and upalakṣhaṇa—pp. 18 and 70 note.
 UPALAKSHAṆA : p. 70 note.
 VAIDHARMYA = Tadvyaktiva q.v.
 VIDEHAKAIVALYA : distgd. from Jīvanmukti, p. 137 note.
 VIJĀTĪYABHEDA : p. 178 note.
 VINIGAMANĀVIRAHA : (logical vice) defd. p. 105 note.
 VIŚESHANA = essential attribute, p. 70 note.
 „ = attribute or predicate of a judgment, pp. 41, 42 note.

VIŚESHYA : p. 42 note. cf. also
Anuyogin.

VIŚIṢṬAJÑĀNA : defd. pp. 41,
42 note.

VISHAYATĀ : p. III *supra*.

VIVARTTA : defd. p. 168.

VIVARTTAVĀDIN = Māyāvādin,
pp. 117 note, 170.

VṚITTIVYĀPTATVA : p. 171.

VYĀVAHĀRA : defd. p. 114 note.

VYĀVAHĀRIKĪ (SATTĀ) : pp. 25,
26 note.

VYĀPTI : explained as different
from the Nyāya technicality
—p. 67 note.



