Race and democratic society / Franz Boas.

RACE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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

FRANZ BOAS

RACE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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Foreword

When, in 1940 Franz Boas published a volume of his collected scientific papers, he chose such of his writings as would illustrate and prove the validity of his point of view in anthropology, in particular that an understanding of the culture and behavior of man under conditions fundamentally different from our own, can help us to a more objective and unprejudiced view of our own lives and our own society. Subsequently some of us urged him to prepare a parallel volume containing some of the papers and addresses that he had directed at lay audiences. At first he evinced no great enthusiasm for this project, and when, early in 1942, I began a selection and collation of his publications for this purpose, and discussed the work with him, he said on a number of occasions, "I really think you are wasting your time. I do not believe that publication of these papers is of sufficient importance." But he finally agreed to the project because he became ever more convinced of the urgent need for the dissemination of ideas based on scientific facts. As he himself said in an address in 1941: "No longer can we keep the search for truth a privilege of the scientist. We must see to it that the hard task of subordinating the love of traditional lore to clear thinking be shared with us by larger and larger masses of the people."

Deeply grooved within him was the need to question everything; not to accept any statement without authority, not to be misled by superficial observation and analogies, but to keep alive "The ice-cold flame of the passion for seeking the truth for Truth's sake."

Yet this rigid discipline of thought did not lead to sterile scepticism, for he had the flash of insight that enabled him to see and formulate significant relationships. At the age of 27, returning from the Arctic where he had gone to study the Eskimo, he had written, "Under the strange and foreign mode of life we recognize the thinking sensient human being, who resembles us in character more than we could imagine from our first superficial impression." He had observed that under the veneer of their habits and of their mental and emotional patterns, human beings were much alike in all cultures, with similar individual behavior and like reactions.

For 57 years until his death he continued his studies of race, and searched to distinguish between cultural patterns and innate human behavior. Through basic scientific studies he disproved the prevailing theories of race; he demonstrated that there is no pure race, and showed how acquired cultural habits are mistaken for fixed hereditary characteristics.

He applied his concepts not only to primitive peoples, but to the society within which he lived, and tried to distinguish those elements in our thinking and beliefs that are culturally determined, and so of no absolute validity, from the more basic human ones. This point of view illuminated his thinking and writing concerning crises in our own civilization that arose in his lifetime. He once remarked that his conscious efforts to spread his ideas in wider circles, beyond those of the scientific world, began in 1914 during the first world war. He did not remain cloistered in his study; when issues arose he spoke out fearlessly from his deep knowledge and convictions.

During his last years, largely as a result of the impact of Fascist and Nazi ideology, he became convinced of the urgent need for popular education, of the vital importance of explain-

ing to the man in the street the basis of our culture, and the roots of democracy; and of demonstrating the scientific falsity of much of our thinking and of many of our prejudices. He insisted again and again that "a moral obligation to enlighten the minds of the people rests on scientists and educators, to impress the millions whom they reach by the spoken and written word, that the dignity of the individual can be safeguarded only when we recognize the equal rights of individuals, and condemn regimentation of thought by authoritarian commands or by intolerant majorities."

With him conviction always led to action. He realized that it would take far more than his writings and those of other scientists to bring light and truth to the people in the fundamental matters that actually govern their very living. So he sought with what means he had to invoke the channels of public information and education in this major task. This explains his great concern with teaching and education. He endeavored to interest writers and newspaper men and to invoke the use of the radio to spread these ideas. During the last years of his life, though frail in body he gave freely of his time and of his scanty physical resources, spoke frequently in public and over the radio, and tried to interest others to carry on the work.

He died before these strivings could get well under way. This volume of his collected writings is published now to carry on the work that was so close to his heart, and that is so essential to the survival of democracy.

He had reviewed and approved the selection of the articles that are included in this volume, and had carefully reread and edited the first twelve papers. He died before he had completed the task.

Ernst P. Boas



I

Introduction

Friends, fellow scientists:

Who among us, when trying to solve some theoretical problem, has not felt some time or other that his problems are puny and irrelevant when the whole world is aflame, when millions are dying by the sword, by bombs, by starvation? Who has not felt the irresistible urge to do his share in the defense of freedom, in the battle waged for saving our intellectual integrity from the domineering spirit that would fetter the freedom of thought by subjecting it to the control of prescribed opinion? It is right that we should search our hearts and decide whether it is our duty to lay aside our studies for the time being and enter heart and soul the battle for democracy and intellectual freedom. It seems to me that there is only one possible answer to this question. We cannot give up our work as scientists without irreparable damage to our culture, no matter how remote our subject may be from the urgent, practical needs of our time. The ice-cold flame of the passion for seeking the truth for truth's sake must be kept burning, and can be kept alive only if we continue to seek the truth for truth's sake.

But a new duty arises. No longer can we keep the search

International broadcast over National Broadcasting Company networks, September 27, 1941, during International Conference on Science and the World Order of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

for truth a privilege of the scientist. We must see to it that the hard task of subordinating the love of traditional lore to clear thinking be shared with us by larger and larger masses of our people. We must do our share in trying to spread the art, and to engender the habit of clear thinking. It is not the spread of a superficial knowledge of the results of science that will accomplish this end. We must do our share in the task of weaning the people from a complacent yielding to prejudice, and help them to the power of clear thought, so that they may be able to understand the problems that confront all of us. Hasty discarding of the past and stubborn insistence upon old patterns are born of emotion, not of thought.

It must be our task to see to it that those who control education are permeated by the conviction that it is one of their prime duties, to set free the minds of the youth of our generation, so that the young may learn to recognize bias and prejudice, that they may become respectors of truth for the sake of truth. A people, so educated, will be free in the fullest sense of the term. It will more nearly approach the ideal of democracy than has been attained by any of us.



RACE

The behavior of an individual is determined not by his racial affiliation, but by the character of his ancestry and his cultural environment.

II

Race: Prejudice

In large American cities, Negroes must live in quarters as sharply defined as were the ghettos of olden times. On the Pacific coast, Asiatics are regarded as aliens so undesirable that their immigration to this country is restricted by law. There are country hotels, apartment houses, and clubs that exclude Jews. To the great mass of Americans, Mexicans are "greasers", Frenchmen "frogs", Italians "wops." Yet ours is a democracy which asserted at the outset that it recognized no social or political inequalities.

We in America are particularly given to racial injustice and for the very reason that this country was long a haven for those who yearned to breathe a freer political air or to make the most of freer economic opportunity. Germans, Swedes, Russians, Finns, Levantines, groups of widely different descent and tradition, flock hither. They look down on one another, as close neighbors have always done from time immemorial, and they are looked down on in turn by the long established "native" population.

Even when the Declaration of Independence was signed there was race prejudice, and this because there were Negro slaves. In that day, slavery was justified on the supposed obvious superiority of whites over Blacks and on mental and social differences that were believed to be innate and un-

Race Prejudice from the Scientist's Angle. An interview in the *Forum*, August, 1937.

changeable. Outside of Germany, few anthropologists or sociologists would defend such arguments today. In George Washington's time, there was no adequate scientific basis for the discussion of race. Now it is recognized that the problem presented is social rather than biological. Both the heredity and the reaction to a given environment of each member of a class or group must be studied. Yet the same old question is put in the same old way. We ask: What are the characteristics that differentiate Jews from Anglo-Saxons, whites from Blacks? But the right question is this: Are Jews and Anglo-Saxons, whites and Blacks, Asiatics and Englishmen so fundamentally different, because of the stocks from which they spring, that they and their children cannot adapt themselves to a new social environment?

To many it may seem that the second question hardly requires scientific study. Is it not obvious that the "Negro" behaves differently from the "North European" and the "North European" in turn differently from the "Italian"? Even if we assent, it does not follow that there is something in his bodily organization that inevitably makes every Negro or every Italian think and conduct himself in ways that characterize all Negroes and all Italians. So we must test our impressions. Are they valid? Do they hold good for every member of a given alien group? Is a way of life, a way of thinking inherited like kinky hair and a black skin, and is it therefore something inevitable? When we ask such questions we touch the core of the problem of "race."

II

Modern biology has long insisted that we are what our parents and grandparents have made us, that heredity counts for more than social opportunity, that the members of groups which have been segregated for long periods have intermarried and thus developed common hereditary ways of life. Not only is it impossible for the Ethiopian to change his skin, but he cannot change his outlook, his mode of thinking or behavior, because these too are hereditary. Thus runs the biological argument.

It is fair to assume that the biologists, inasmuch as they are scientists, must have some reason for thus strengthening the popular prejudice against alien strains. But the reason will not stand analysis. Having discovered that good and bad physical characteristics are passed from father to son, the biologist extended the influence of heredity from the family to the whole population. If it were recognized that populations are composed of divergent family lines, that diverse families by no means share the same good and bad characteristics, racial heredity in the biological sense would lose all meaning. A member of one family cannot inherit insanity or the bleeding sickness called hemophilia from a family to which he is not intimately related. Granted that imbecility and color blindness run in some strains, there is no justification for supposing that even a large and apparently uniform population is similarly afflicted.

Once upon a time it might have been said of a small, isolated tribe that any of its members typified the rest. When the first peasants attached themselves to the European soil, when feudal lords forbade their serfs to migrate, when, later still, families of gentry lived on the same estates for centuries, the members of these groups had a fair degree of similarity in physical appearance. All these groups were inbred. If the ancestors were uniform, the descendants were almost bound to be uniform. On the other hand, though diverse ancestry may produce families that look alike, brothers and sisters in the same family may resemble one another very little. When it comes to a nation, it is never possible to generalize from the random wayfarer to the whole population. What is true of inbred village communities and noble families is not true of the larger community to which they belong. For, the larger the population, the less inbreeding do we find.

III

Not only do the biologists assume that the traditional behavior of a population is accounted for physically, but they are unwilling to study the variability of human behavior under different social conditions. All the evidence available

argues against the theory that a people must conduct itself in a certain way merely because of its physique. Even identical twins, when brought up in different environments, behave differently. Why, then, do the biologists persist in their view? To prove their point they cite different breeds of dogs, brought up under similar conditions and environment, yet adhering to their own pronounced types. Because the bulldog invariably maintains his racial traits distinct from those of a French poodle, it does not follow that human groups do the same. Obviously the dog in this instance corresponds not to a nondescript population but to an inbred family line. What we have here is merely the result of long inbreeding. Some families have personalities that are also the result of inbreeding. Our populations are so mixed and consist of so many family lines that their common likes and dislikes, their common interests and hopes are not to be accounted for by any simple biological formula.

It is true that whites surpass Blacks in meeting intelligence tests. But how good is the evidence? Can we be sure that this mental inferiority of the Negro is real? The fact that country Negroes are more uncouth than city Negroes raises doubts. When we discover that the intelligence quotient of rural Negroes who have just come to town is low and that Negroes who have lived in town for one, two, three, and more years not only improve in intelligence but finally reach the level of Whites of the same social class, we must decline to admit that mental superiority depends on the color of a person's skin. There is not the slightest scientific proof that "race" determines mentality, but there is overwhelming evidence that mentality is influenced by traditional culture.

Certain traits of Asiatics, Jews and Mediterraneans are both popularly and politically branded as "racial." Here "race" is confused with "nationality." It must be clear to everyone that Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, and other nationals are alike only because they speak a common language and because their social habits are similar for given social strata. The nationals of any groups are not alike in bodily form.

North and South Italians, North and South Germans, North and South Frenchmen differ physically. If we are to test our impressions of "race" and, above all, to test the assumption that bodily organization goes hand in hand with a certain way of life and way of thinking, we must test selected groups of the same physical stock. And these groups are not identical with nationalities. Jews, for example, may be British, American, French, Dutch, or Hungarian by birth or acquired citizenship. It is the stock with which we are concerned, when we study "race"—not the nationality.

Nevertheless, many still argue that Jews, for example, behave socially very much alike, wherever they may be born or brought up, and this because they all inherit much the same traits from their forebears. If all this were ever true, it certainly could not have been true in historic times, for the good reason that there is no pure human race anywhere. For centuries, tribes wandered back and forth between Europe and Northern Africa. We have had the Celtic and Teutonic migrations, the conquest of Spain by the Moors, the descent of Asiatic hordes on northern Europe, the Turkish invasion and domination of southern Europe, the later colonizations of thinly populated regions, the expulsion of the Huguenots from France and of Protestants from Salzburg, the importation of Walloon miners by Sweden. Thorough indeed has been the scrambling of stocks. What happened in Europe through the force of arms or religious oppression is happening in the United States today more peaceably, more rapidly, more extensively.

IV

Race, what does the word mean? To some, a people descended from the same stock, with each family line incorporating all the physical and mental traits of common ancestors and with individual differences narrowly limited. There is no such race on earth today. Populations are so heterogeneous that even family lines differ. Hereditary characteristics found in one family are absent in another. Moreover, there are strange resemblances where we least expect to find them—

Swedes who look like Italians, for example, or Northern Italians who look like Swedes; Jews who have blond hair and blue eyes and pass for North Germans. Individual appearance as a test of race has long since been abandoned by anthropologists. It is too inaccurate, too untrustworthy. To be sure, Negroes and East Asiatics are fundamentally different from Europeans. Yet even among the black-skinned Negroes or slant-eyed Mongols the variations are wide.

Is there any way, then, of distinguishing one people as a whole from another people as a whole by mere physical appearance or build of body? Not in Europe. Anatomical traits are too varied. And they overlap in populations. In other words, if we decide that fair hair, long heads, blue eyes, and tallness are the unmistakable traits of a Scandinavian, what shall we say when we discover that many Northern Italians are also fair-haired, long-headed, blue-eyed, and tall? If olive skins and dark hair are to characterize Mediterranean peoples alone, we are bound to be discomfited when we discover Englishmen and Americans who might easily pass for conventional Italians, Spaniards, or Greeks. To distinguish one European population from another, we must proceed statistically. In other words, we must set up standards or types and then find out how many members of a population conform with each in different regions. The best that we can do is to say that there are more blonds for each 1,000 of the population in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark than there are in Italy or Greece and that there are more swarthy, dark-eyed men and women among 1,000 Italians than among 1,000 Englishmen. But this is very different from assuming that all Scandinavians are fair and all Mediterraneans dark.

Since it is futile to judge a man's stock by his looks, we turn to his manner. How far is that determined by his bodily constitution? The first mistake that we are likely to make is to assume that, because bodies are stable, bodily functions must also be stable. It is true that, when maturity is reached, the body remains essentially the same for years. But the functions? With exertion, hearts beat faster, the breath comes and

goes more rapidly. Digestion is good or bad depending on the food we eat and the exercise we take. Whether or not we see sights or hear sounds depends on our degree of attention. If we are rested, we enjoy life more than when we are tired. Transfer a bookkeeper whose days are passed in a city office over accounts to a mountain peak and hard outdoor labor, and his body responds functionally to the change. Or drop two populations as different in stock as the Japanese and Italians into precisely the same environment, and their bodies will respond in much the same way. Evidently the functions of the body are adaptable. But it is the way of life that dictates what the body shall do, and not the body what the way of life shall be.

What is true of the body is also true of the mind and therefore of social behavior. In a firmly knit community, people think very much alike, dress very much alike, live in houses furnished more or less alike, act very much alike when there is a death or a fire or a wedding, and conform in general to a social pattern or an unwritten social code. To be sure, there are departures from what "decent" people or "good" citizens do in given circumstances—but slight departures. In some inexplicable way, each of us bows to the will of the community. Bodily conformation has nothing to do with all this. His anatomical structure, meaning his six feet of slim body, blue eyes, and long head, cannot make a European of a man born of German parents in the African jungle and committed from birth to the care of natives.

We have only to look about us and see what has happened before our eyes in any large American city. Newly arrived Italian peasants, Jews from Hungary or Rumania, Japanese, or Greeks may have found it difficult to learn American ways. But the second generation, when fully subjected to American social influences, is American, because it has fully responded to the American environment. So true is this that we behold the second-generation Japanese with no feeling for the culture of their fathers, thoroughly American in their mode of life and thought, yet repulsed by the whites with whom they should associate. Even the Negroes are better off; for at least

they think and feel as their parents do. If there were any truth in the belief that social behavior is conditioned solely by bodily structure, the United States would be an aggregation of a hundred different human stocks and cultures instead of a single nation with a common ideal.

V

Man is a highly unstable animal. He is changing—visibly changing. The evidence is not based on the astuteness of European hotel porters and shopkeepers who begin to speak English as soon as they see a second-generation Italian-American, because his clothes, his manner, his gestures, his speech are American, but on accurate measurements and comparisons. There is no doubt that immigrants and their children are physically not quite the same. Because of some obscure influence exerted by the American social and geographic environment, appreciable physical differences have been established. This is also true of animals. Lions born in captivity differ somewhat in bodily form from the jungle stock from which they came. If bodies thus change, what becomes of the argument that social behavior is stable?

Apart from the plastic influence of environment, we must also reckon with the uses to which our bodies are put. If the large and brawny arms of the village smith differ from the more delicate hands and arms of Kreisler, it is certainly because of the different demands made on muscles and ligaments. So with social influences. Dr. Foley has observed that the movements of New Yorkers are more rapid than those of farmers or even of those who live in small towns. Factory machines, too, have their effect. Those that run at a rapid and constant speed affect the operator differently than do machines that run at slower or variable rates.

Change the environment, and the social man changes too. There are even complete reversals in behavior. The gesticulations of Italians and East European Jews are supposed to be "racial" and therefore more or less fixed traits. But Dr. Efron and S. Van Veen have shown conclusively that thoroughly

assimilated Italians and Jews no longer gesticulate in the expected "racial" fashion. On the other hand, Englishmen who have spent most of their lives in Italy have been known to use their hands as if they were Italians. Why this should be so is easily explained. We either unconsciously imitate friends or associates whom we esteem or consciously repress mannerisms that set us apart from the rest of the community and perhaps hold us back economically or socially.

Even the records of crime teach the lesson that, in the end, the environment is irresistible. When the descendants of immigrants violate the law, they run more or less true to American form. If kidnapings account for x per cent of all crimes committed by Americans of Anglo-Saxon ancestry, then kidnapings will amount to approximately x per cent of all the crimes committed by second-generation Italians. Dr. Stofflet has brought this out by comparing the transgressions of immigrants and their children. If the second generation is more criminal than the first, the explanation is to be sought in the difficulty of overcoming social and economic obstacles.

VI

The tragedy of these undemocratic prejudices lies in their absurd falsity. Just as there is a stage Jew, a stage Frenchman, a stage Chinese, so in real life there is a symbolic Jew, a symbolic Frenchman, and a symbolic Chinese. We carry this method of generalization so far that we also have a symbolic socialist, a symbolic college professor, a symbolic longshoreman. Each symbol stands for a whole group, and each member of the group is supposed to be the mirror image of the symbol. And, the stronger the popular belief that each class constitutes a clearly defined social group, the more readily is every one tagged with a class label.

The nazis have driven this form of logic to its fanatical extreme. They ignore the elementary facts of anthropology; they confuse race and nation; they seem to believe that languages are inborn, so that Jews or Japanese, even though born

and educated in Germany, can never hope to speak German faultlessly. Nazi physicists repudiate relativity because it was formulated by Einstein, a Jew. Professor Bieberbach of the University of Berlin insists that there is a Jewish approach to mathematics. And Professor Lenard, Nobel Prize winner, proclaims his deep conviction that only the "Nordics" have made valuable contributions to science.

We are not free from these tendencies in the United States. There is a rising tide of race prejudice and especially of anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism. The obvious remedy is education—teaching the indisputable fact that color of skin, class, religious belief, geographical or national origin are no tests of social adaptability. Yet, in the face of this need, we find schools and colleges limiting the number of Jewish teachers and students. It is time to restate the beliefs of the founders of this nation and drive home again the democratic principle that a citizen is to be judged solely by the readiness with which he fits himself into the social structure and by the value of his contributions to the country's development.

There is not the slightest scientific proof that "race" determines mentality, but there is overwhelming evidence that mentality is influenced by traditional culture.

III

Race: Class Consciousness

In the summer of 1914 when I taught anthropology in Berkeley at the University of California I spoke of the sources of race prejudice. At the end of these lectures a student came up to me and said that I had convinced him of the unreasonableness of the arguments brought forward in support of an innate antipathy. He accompanied me on my way home and when we passed some Japanese he suddenly broke out in great passion, saying, "How I hate these Japanese! It makes my blood boil to see them on our farms and in our cities!" Could we have a better example than this to prove that such antipathies are based on emotion, not on reason?

A little later (I believe it was in Oregon or Washington), I got into a conversation with a fellow passenger in a Pullman car. He spoke about the lumber industry and said, "Would you believe it? There is not a single white man among the lumbermen?" I asked, "What are they?" and he replied, "They are all Swedes and Norwegians." I was unable to convince him that they were white men like himself. In his opinion their habits of life were distinctive racial characteristics.

Still another little incident strikes me as highly characteristic. In 1897 I was traveling with a pack train in the mountains of British Columbia and camped at night near a rather

Class Consciousness and Race Prejudice. The Christian Register, Vol. 122, 1943, p. 5.

isolated Indian home. I do not remember how the conversation happened to turn that way, but the Indian, speaking through an interpreter, remarked, "The Jews are a bad people. They cheat us Indians." I asked, "Have you ever seen a Jew?" No, he had not, and had never had any dealings with one "but that is what they say." That those who actually exploited him were Scotch and half-breeds did not influence his opinion.

Evidently reasoned thinking has little to do with race antipathies. Then, what are the reasons for its existence and its strength?

I do not believe that its sources can be understood if we confine ourselves to the racial aspect and do not consider other class conflicts. In very primitive societies in which all individuals of the same sex follow the same occupations and participate in the same culture, there is no class conflict, only a certain conflict between the sexes which is moderated by their mutual interdependence and common interests. Antagonism is directed against strangers, because they are potential enemies.

Within such tribes we find the nearest approach to a classless society. A division in classes may develop in various ways. When one tribe conquers another, or attains in some other way a position of prestige in a union of two tribes, their differentiation of occupation may lead to differences in economic status and these lead to the formation of classes; this tends to reach its highest development in our civilization. How far the introduction of the machine in almost all aspects of modern life may counteract this tendency does not need to be discussed here. When such classes differ in their habits we find commonly a disapproval of intermarriage, a tendency to transfer differences that have arisen on social grounds to assumed biological differences, as though the differences between the groups were determined by their descent, not by the conditions under which they have grown up. The tendency to proscribe intermarriage is common to most of these groups, no matter whether they are based on economic, religious, or political considerations. Such intermarriages may entail serious social difficulties and may be first of all shunned for such

reasons, but they have been frequently transferred to the biological field.

In intertribal wars it happens that either one tribe is conquered by another, or that the one subjects itself in some way to the protection of the other. Such was presumably the origin of the relation between the Roman patricians and plebians who were certainly biologically of the same descent and still were forbidden to intermarry until the plebians, after long fights, gained that right. Such was certainly the division of aristocracy and common people in Europe which was in time translated into an assumed difference in descent. It does happen in cases of this kind that there is an actual difference in type between the conquering people and the conquered, which may be continued for a long time when intermarriage is forbidden. This occurs particularly when the vanquished group is enslaved or kept in a position of social and economic inferiority. The relation between the Spaniards and the Indians of the Andean plateaus, between our own people and the Negroes, and those between the castes in countries in which caste systems prevail or prevailed are of this type.

We must remember in all these cases that the difference in descent is not the primary cause, and that the prejudice of one group against the other is merely emphasized and kept in force for a longer period, because the social difference is made more striking by the ease with which a member of the socially inferior group is compelled to wear some kind of mark by which he can be recognized, such as the yellow band of the Jew, or by being forbidden to wear the costume of the socially superior group. It cannot be overemphasized that the contempt with which these groups are treated is primarily social, and only accidentally emphasized by difference in bodily form, and that the conclusion that the inferior group belongs to an inferior race is merely a rationalization of our behavior.

We forget too often that the group to which we belong and to which we are loyal is not a matter of reasoning choice, but a result of our bringing-up. It would be absurd to assume that

in Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, or Buddhist countries everybody adheres to his religion on account of reasoned thought. He follows the religious body in which he has grown up and, if he thinks at all, his reasons are invented to justify his position. The same may be said, although perhaps to a lesser extent, of political parties. Their geographic distribution shows also the power of traditional local thought and individual thinking and the same rationalizing tendency to justify one's position.

We forget too often that we feel first and then explain our feeling by rationalizing. This may be observed in particular in what we call "good manners," by which we differentiate all too readily those who do not belong to our class. For a man to keep his hat on in a house, particularly in company with ladies, to eat with a knife, to smack his lips, to clean his hands at the table after eating, to wear clothing of a very unusual cut, and particularly to perform any act that in our society is considered immodest, is more fatal to his social position than ignorance and stupidity. Our "manners" have a strong emotional appeal, but it is easily seen that the explanation of what we call good manners is always based on rationalization and on the demand for conformity. Actions that are opposed to customary behavior of our social group cannot be performed without overcoming a strong inner resistance. It does not help us to be aware that other societies may have entirely different standards, to which they conform, that are equally illogical and founded entirely on their emotional or, if you will, esthetic appeal in a society that demands uniformity. It might be said that racial antipathies are partly based on the fact that unusual appearance shows a lack of conformity. Pronounced ugliness is often a social stigma. The dark pigmentation of the Negro, the slant of the Mongol eye strikes the European as a lack of conformity that is resented. A famous African explorer told me once that when he was bathing with African Negroes in a river near the Congo he felt immodestly naked and ashamed of his white skin!

If we ask the question whether there is any valid scientific

proof for the contention that different races have any kind of genetically determined constitutional disabilities or abilities, we can safely say that we have no evidence supporting this view. Every race has its mentally strong and weak individuals, its great intellects and its idiots, its men and women of strong and weak will power. The existence of any pure race with special endowments is a myth, as is the belief that there are races all of whose members are foredoomed to eternal inferiority.

The existence of any pure race with special endowments is a myth, as is the belief that there are races all of whose members are foredoomed to eternal inferiority.

IV

Race: What it is

The intensity of race consciousness in our country is not entirely due to the presence in large numbers of various non-European races, for even a hasty review of the attitude of many European nations reveals a phenomenal growth of the feeling of racial antagonisms. The belief in organic difference between the European and the Negro, or the European and the Chinese, has come to appear as so fundamental that social and political relations are determined by it. We no longer demand any careful examination of the reasons for the feeling of difference, but accept it as an instinctive, unavoidable effect of the contact of different races.

The theory that mental traits are determined by race is old. In earlier times it was not clearly differentiated from the assumption of an immediate influence of environment upon body and mind. In the eighteenth century we hear of the belief that the type represented by the nobility is organically superior to the type represented by the commoners. In the nineteenth century the theory of the racial determination of mental traits made rapid headway. It was a convenient prop for supporting slavery and was, therefore, used as the strongest argument against the aims of the Abolitionists. But aside from this students of the history of civilization became impressed with the evident differences of mental behavior in

What is a race? The Nation, January 28, 1925.

large divisions of mankind. Gustav Klemm in his "Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit" discusses at length the aptitudes of different racial types. Carus tried to explain the history of nations on the basis of their organic character, but the whole problem received its principal impetus by the publication of Comte de Gobineau's "L'Inégalité des Races Humaines." In the course of time the arguments by which he tried to prove the superiority of the blond North European type over all other European groups made a deep impression, and since that time the conviction has grown apace that fundamental, organically determined psychical differences exist between human races and even between closely allied groups.

On the other hand an equally voluminous literature has developed, intended to maintain the irrelevancy of racial affiliation in cultural and mental life. Much of this literature is due to an effort to combat the anti-Semitic drift of our times.

Quite aside from this discussion certain ethnologists have based their work on the assumption of an essential sameness of the mental life of all races. Inquiries into the development of civilization like those of Theodor Waitz, E. B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer, or Adolf Bastian were conducted without any regard to racial affiliations, but dealt with mankind as a whole and emphasized the unity of mental behavior of man.

Whatever the outcome of scientific discussion may be, the existence of racial antagonisms among ourselves cannot be denied. The inquiry should be directed toward an investigation of the conditions under which they have grown up and of the soundness of the arguments supporting racial discrimination.

It is generally assumed that race consciousness and race antagonisms are instinctive, that is to say, organically determined. It is fairly obvious that for individuals this rule does not hold good. The numerous cases of racial mixture between whites and all other races show clearly that there is no fundamental racial antipathy that would prevent the closest and most intimate relations between individuals of the most diverse races. Furthermore it is important to note that race

antagonism is not by any means a universal trait of mankind. While it is very pronounced among Anglo-Saxons, it is weak among most of the people of Romance tongue. The French policy of treating the African Negroes as Frenchmen has for its basis a theoretical denial of essential racial differences and is possible only on account of the lack of a strong, widespread feeling of race antagonism. The weakness of race consciousness among people speaking Romance languages is shown also by the social conditions in many South American countries.

Still more striking is the attitude of Mohammedans, among whom racial affiliations count very little as against religious unity. A convincing proof of this attitude in early times is the description of inter-racial relations in Arabian literature.

A study of the behavior of children shows also that while a consciousness of race difference may be present, it does not include necessarily any feeling of racial antagonism. As the child grows up the dividing line between the races is impressed upon it and in this way the race consciousness develops until it becomes a purely automatic reaction which evokes the same intensity of feeling as the so-called instinctive reactions. Nevertheless the two are fundamentally distinct. If racial antagonism were instinctive it would appear among all members of mankind, not necessarily in earliest youth, but certainly at the time of adolescence. If, on the other hand, it is a behavior that is developed as a social pattern it will be present only where this pattern prevails and will become more automatic and therefore emotionally stronger the more pronounced the social pattern. It is also instructive to see that in the castes of India the same kind of antagonism and feeling of repugnance develops even when it is not founded on racial differences.

Numerous attempts have been made to give a scientific status to the feeling of racial difference and particularly to the claim of Nordic superiority. In these attempts use is made of historical data, of descriptions of national character and of psychological tests to which individuals of different races have been subjected. In none of these discussions, however, do

we find a concise and definite answer to the question of what constitutes a race.

Unfortunately the concept of race is not at all clear. The terminology adopted by our immigration authorities has added greatly to the confusion because they designate people speaking different languages and of different political associations as races without any regard to their biological characteristics.

When we speak of innate characteristics of races we mean by the term race a group of people descended from a common ancestry and for this reason alike in anatomical form. Likeness does not mean identity. In no species or variety of animals or plants are all individuals strictly of the same form. Differences in size and form are ever present and variability within certain limits is one of the prime characteristics of organic nature. Individuals of the same variety are not identical and a variety derived from the same ancestry will always embrace many distinctive individual forms. A whole racial group can never be described by a few descriptive terms, because there will always be many individuals of deviating types. It is our impression that the Swede is blond, blue-eyed, tall, and longheaded; but many Swedes do not conform to this description.

When these variations are sufficiently pronounced we are very much inclined to consider the extreme variants as types of which the population is composed and to believe that the rather indifferent but frequent middle group originates from an intermixture of the two extreme types. When practical questions are involved this view is useful. The physician who distinguishes between the asthenic and eusthenic type or between other constitutional types is confronted by a practical problem. His classification of types does not imply that the individuals of different constitution are distinct types which intermingled and from which the middle type of indifferent constitution developed. In the same way the occurrence of long heads and short heads in Sweden does not prove by itself that we *must* have a mixture of two fundamental types. The

extreme forms may as well be interpreted as variants of a single ancestral type.

On the other hand extensive migrations have occurred since very early times the world over and mixtures of distinct types have been common. The period of isolation in which the differentiation of local types developed must lie in a very remote time. The present conditions show gradual transitions between types inhabiting adjoining areas, due largely to intermixture. Local types exhibit everywhere similar degrees of variability, so that it is difficult if not impossible to determine the characteristics of the earlier purer types that developed by isolation.

Unless the component races are fundamentally distinct, the attempt to isolate in an old stable population distinctive racial types determined by descriptive characteristics is, therefore, an almost insoluble task. We cannot assign one individual to one race, another to another, because we do not know the degree of variability found in the ancestral isolated race, and on account of the long-continued mixture the characteristics of the parental races will appear in varying combinations in each individual. All attempts to establish among members of the same social group correlations between mental character and bodily form have failed.

When we speak of racial heredity we mean certain characteristics in which all members of a race partake. The white skin-color of the European and the dark skin-color of the Negro are racial hereditary traits, because they belong to all the members of each race. On account of the great variability of forms fundamental differences between various races are not always found. Size and complexity of the brain, stature, head form, physiological functions and mental reactions vary enormously in each race, and many features that are found in one race are also found among individuals belonging to other races. Thus it happens that judged by the size of his brain or by his physiological or mental functions an individual may as well belong to one race as to another. In such cases it is obviously impossible to speak of hereditary racial characteristics

because the traits characterizing any individual occur in a number of human races.

The importance of this observation becomes still clearer when we consider the individuals not only as members of a race as a whole but as descendants of a certain ancestral group. The racial type is what is called by biologists a phenotype, that is to say, an assembly of individuals that belong to quite distinctive lines of descent. The phenotype, however, may be subdivided into a number of genotypes, or groups of individuals having a common ancestry. In other words, we must consider the whole race as constituted of a large number of family lines. When we have a population that has been inbred for a very long time, such as certain village communities in Europe or small isolated tribes of primitive people, the whole community may represent, more or less strictly speaking, one genotype, because they are all descended from the same ancestral group and every family line existing at the present time goes back to the same ancestry. We may note that even in these cases, so far as they have been investigated, the family lines are not by any means identical in type, but that considerable differences among them are found. Even long inbreeding does not produce an identity of family lines. Purity of type would entail a great similarity between different family lines and at the same time a great similarity between the brothers and sisters belonging to each family. As a matter of fact, great uniformity in either respect does not exist among any known group. Similarity of family strains is characteristic of inbred populations no matter what their ancestral composition may be, while great disparity of family lines is found in new populations of mixed origin such as are found in our modern cities or in countries with immigration drawn from a large area. Great similarity among brothers and sisters in each family is dependent upon the uniformity of the ancestry, but it is not necessarily connected with long-continued inbreeding. To give an example, the mulatto population of South Africa, descendants of Negroes and Dutch settlers, has developed largely by inbreeding. Therefore the family lines

are alike, while the children of each family vary very much among themselves and exhibit a mixture of Negro and white traits.

A more detailed study of the constitution of a single race shows that its family lines vary considerably in anatomical and functional characteristics. The pigmentation of one family line may be quite distinct from that of another. Pathological traits appear in some strains of the population. Mental traits characteristic of certain family lines will not be shared by others.

When comparing different races it is found that the variability of the genotypes comprising each race is so great that a family line might find its proper place in several races. In other words, many hereditary characteristics are not racial in character, but must be assigned to genotypical lines, to family strains.

If this is true, it is clear that any generalized characterization of a race must be misleading. It may be possible to characterize family lines, but the assumption of general racial characteristics, anatomical, physiological, or mental, excepting those that belong to the race as a whole, is arbitrarily made.

The actual problem, therefore, from an objective standpoint, resolves itself into the question whether any characteristics, aside from purely anatomical ones, can be found that differentiate races so that they are common characteristics by which the racial position of all individuals and all family lines may be determined.

There is no doubt that social groups show essential differences in their appearance and their behavior, but this does not imply that these characteristics are hereditarily determined. Individuals of quite distinctive anatomical build adopt the same functional habits with great ease. We find among people speaking the same language the most diverse forms of articulating organs; but the mode of pronunciation depends upon anatomical conditions only in extreme cases. It is determined by the social environment in which the individual grows up.

The characteristic motor tendencies of large divisions of mankind are not determined by the special form of the skeleton and of the muscular system, but by historically determined motor habits. An example of this is the distribution of different methods of the use of bow and arrow which is characteristic of enormously wide areas. Proof of the socially determined character of mental reactions is also found in the difference in the behavior of a people in different periods. The descent of the Elizabethan English and the modern English is practically the same. Nevertheless the early free and easy-going life contrasts strongly with the social restrictions and prudery of the middle of the past century.

No convincing proof has ever been given of the hereditary character of complex functions that are found prevailing among a given people at the present time. We rather see that all racial strains, when subjected to the same social environment, develop the same functional tendencies. The plasticity of function is so great that it may overcome to a great extent the difference in organic form.

Nevertheless individual differences in function and family characteristics of function may very well exist and be recognized, but the variability of the family lines constituting each race will be found so great that in this case also we have no right to speak of racial hereditary traits.

The occurrence of hereditary mental traits that belong to a particular race has never been proved. The available evidence makes it much more likely that the same mental traits appear in varying distribution among the principal racial groups. The behavior of an individual is therefore determined not by his racial affiliation, but by the character of his ancestry and his cultural environment. We may judge of the mental characteristics of families and individuals, but not of races.

V

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Racism

The history of mankind proves that advances of culture depend upon the opportunities presented to a social group to learn from the experience of their neighbors. The discoveries of one group spread to others and, the more varied the contacts, the greater are the opportunities to learn. The tribes of simplest culture are on the whole those that have been isolated for very long periods and hence could not profit from the cultural achievements of their neighbors.

However, man has never recognized the debt he owed to outside groups. History shows us every society as a self-contained group that recognizes mutual obligations but is hostile to outsiders, ready to advance its own interests and disregard those of other groups. To primitive tribesmen the outsider is an enemy, like a beast of prey, and he and his society had best be destroyed. In Greek antiquity allegiance to the city implied a group solidarity and enmity against rival cities. In feudal times allegiance to the feudal lord welded the vassals and serfs into a unit; for the Mohammedan, Islam binds together the believers against the infidels; modern nations are arrayed against one another, basing their policies on the principle that the rights of nationals are different from the rights of aliens.

The most modern form of hostility against the outside

Racial Purity. Asia Magazine, May, 1940. Slightly revised, Nov., 1942.

group is expressed in racial theories, in the ready belief in the superiority of one race over another.

Racism as a basis of social solidarity as against the cultural interest of mankind is more dangerous than any of the other groupings because according to its claims the hostile groups are biologically determined, and therefore permanent, while all the other groupings change with the change in cultural pattern. As the tribal organizations, the individuality of the city, loyalty to the feudal lord, religious or national enthusiasm break down and give way to other groupings such as the economic groupings of modern times, the groups shift and individuals may choose their places according to their own allegiances, enmities or convictions. These groups are not immutable. The status of a group assumed to be biologically determined cannot change.

It is easily understood how the belief arises that the form of a culture depends upon race. We are impressed by the differences between the cultures of the whites, Negroes, Chinese and Australians, and we see that at the same time each represents a distinct human type. Even in human groups more nearly alike in appearance characteristic differences in cultural behavior are found. The vivacity of the brunette South European is contrasted against the phlegm of the blond North European; the servility of the East European against the independence of the West European.

In the United States racism finds its strongest expression in the relations between whites, Negroes, and East Asiatics. The apparent difference in outer appearance plays its rôle in keeping these racial groups apart, but the feelings would be quite different if economic and social forces were not active. The social gap that separated the Negro slave from the free white man, the low standard of living that made the Asiatic a dangerous competitor of white labor embittered the relation between the racial groups.

Race consciousness is always connected with a belief in the superiority of one's own race, and even among those who

stand for race tolerance there is all too often a feeling of condescension when they defend the rights of others.

It is easy to show that racism has no scientific standing. It is based fundamentally on two misconceptions: the one, the confusion of heredity in a family and heredity in a population; the other, the unproved assumption that the differences in culture which we observe among peoples of different type are primarily due to biological causes.

We do not deny that relations exist between the biological make-up of an individual and his mental characteristics. The behavior observed in extreme pathological cases is sufficient to show that the operation of the mind depends upon the health of the body. Investigations of personality also indicate differences which can be explained only on a biological basis. It is furthermore probable that mental characteristics dependent upon anatomical structure may be hereditary. The best proof of the correctness of this opinion is found in domesticated animals bred by careful selection. The mental behavior of different breeds of dogs or horses shows that within a limited range each breed has a personality of its own. The difference in behavior of a poodle and a bulldog or bloodhound may serve as an example. If we claim that a human "race" has such characteristics it would be necessary first of all to prove that a human "race" is genetically as uniform as a race of poodles or of bulldogs. In other words, we should have to prove that each "race" is so strongly inbred that anatomical characteristics which determine behavior would be inherited by all its members, or at least that they are so common that they will give a certain stamp to the behavior of the whole group. It is, therefore, important to know how far a population develops by inbreeding.

Among small isolated tribes, particularly among those with preferential cousin-marriage, there must be a considerable amount of inbreeding, but we have no records that would allow us to determine the degree of relationship of the members of the living generation. Some data of this kind may be obtained for European villages. For instance, according to the

records of marriages in one German village, fifty per cent of all marriages in 1830 were among individuals who had some ancestors in common. The degree of inbreeding may also be judged by the "loss of ancestors." Thus the former German Emperor had at most five hundred and thirty-three ancestors twelve generations back, instead of four thousand and ninety-six as he would have had if all his ancestors had married unrelated wives. A high degree of inbreeding requires a great stability of population. Such stability occurs in the peasant population in regions where the land descends from father to eldest or youngest son, who marries a woman of the same village, while the other sons and daughters may settle in distant parts of the country. The greater the freedom of travel, the greater will also be the intermingling of unrelated strains.

Since it is impossible to obtain exact data regarding the ancestry of the people inhabiting a certain area, the question of homogeneity of the whole population must be solved by an objective study of the hereditary lines which exist in each population. If it can be shown that each family line differs in its hereditary traits from all others then it would be impossible to speak, in such a population, of hereditary traits common to the whole group. All the available material proves that, even in the most closely inbred groups, the diversity of family lines is so great that no sharp distinctions can be made between various European populations.

The history of mankind is such that this result might be expected. We know only a small fragment of human history, but anthropological and archeological research permits us to determine in broad outlines what has happened in the remote past. In the later part of the Old Stone Age Europe was swamped by a new race which presumably came from Asia. A little later man began to swarm over the previously uninhabited American continent and had reached, not later than three or four thousand years ago, its extreme southern points. Later on, we can follow his migrations more in detail. Tribes of northern Europe migrated in the second millennium B.C. into the Mediterranean countries; others left their western

Asiatic homes and invaded India. In America tribes of the interior of Alaska swept down the Pacific Coast. South American tribes spread from southern Brazil to the West Indies; in Africa the Bantu, who probably lived first near the sources of the White Nile, spread over the greater part of Africa south of the Sahara.

In historic times the picture is clearer, and we see that Europe, North Africa and western Asia were the scene of constant migrations. The Keltic people moved from Gaul into Spain and Italy and extended their migrations in later times as far as Asia Minor. The Teutonic tribes left their eastern home and invaded Gaul and Italy and swept over Spain and parts of North Africa. Others settled in England. The Arabs swept over large parts of western Asia, over North Africa, and established their empire in Spain and invaded France. Waves of migration came from Far Eastern Asia; the Huns, the Avars, Turks, Finnish people like the Magyars, hordes of Mongols, kept a large part of Europe in constant turmoil. The Crusades also contributed to an intermingling of peoples. The absorption of the migrants who had established themselves as political masters of the country shows that all these migrations were accompanied by intermarriages.

Mixture was also favored by colonization. Phoenician, Greek and particularly Roman colonization brought about more intimate contact between people derived from diverse regions than did sudden warlike expeditions. Furthermore, slavery favored the rise of populations of mixed origin.

The modern distribution of languages proves also that extended intermingling of peoples must have occurred. There are a few languages which have attained a wide distribution. Such are the Indo-European group of languages, Chinese, Arabic and Bantu in Africa, Malay in southeastern Asia, to mention only a few. These languages must have superseded, in many cases, older idioms. Exchange of languages requires the most intimate intercourse, which presupposes extended intermarriages.

A greater stability of populations developed in feudal times

when the people became attached to the soil, either as overlords or as serfs.

For these historical reasons it would be futile to look in Europe for a "pure" race. We do find in small villages, with stable landholding, inbred groups in which all the families are much alike, but they do not represent a pure race. The individuals comprising such a community are descendants from many distinct ancestral types. There is no reason to believe that in course of time a pure race would develop, that is to say, that by inbreeding a population would become as stable as a select breed of domesticated animals. As a matter of fact, even in those regions in which we suppose that the "purest races" occur, the individuals representing the type form only a small part of the population. Thus the "Nordic" type is said to be characterized by long and narrow heads, tall stature, blue eyes and blond hair. In Sweden this type occurs with greatest frequency in the province of Dalsland, where it forms eighteen per cent of the whole population. It is obvious that if some other characteristic features of this type, like form of the nose and ear, were added, the percentage of representatives of the "pure" type would be even lower.

In short, then, the claim that any type represents a pure race, essentially different from all others, with all members having the same characteristics, is quite untenable. Neighboring groups are so little different in their average characteristics and contain so many varying types that no fundamental differences between them can be found.

Notwithstanding the absence of pure types it is claimed that the physical differences between more remote types, like the whites, East Asiatics and Negroes, are so great that they must be reflected in their behavior. In other words, it is claimed that there is a close relation between behavior and bodily build and that, therefore, individuals of distinct racial types will always behave differently.

We have already said that individually there is a relation between bodily build and mental behavior. The question is

how far such a relation is manifested in a whole population, which embraces many distinct genetic lines.

It is essential to realize that behavior is much more strongly influenced by outer conditions than bodily build. We have clear evidence showing that the bodily build of a family line will undergo slight changes with changing environment. The extent of these changes, which are presumably not hereditary, cannot be determined in the present state of our knowledge. Bodily build does not undergo material changes during early adult life, before senile decay sets in. Not so with the functioning of the body, which is markedly influenced by physiological needs. We all know by personal experience that climate influences our reactions. Our general physiological state is different in crisp winter weather from what it is on a hot, sultry summer day. When we are hungry and tired we react differently from the way we behave when we are rested and satisfied. Removal from sea level and a sedentary life to high altitudes and hard physical labor requires readjustments of the whole organism. The body is able to adjust its functions to quite varied demands, but the same organism under sufficiently different conditions will give impressions so different that they might characterize different individuals. The organs of the body are adjustable to a wide range of environmental conditions.

What is true of the physiological reactions of the body is equally true, perhaps even more so, of mental behavior. The mind can react only within the range of experience. Our bodily build does not give us any material with which our mind can operate. This is furnished by our experience, and therefore our minds, however different they may be organically, can operate only with impressions received in life. When we try to estimate the intelligence of an individual we must base our tests on situations with which he is familiar. When we want to study his emotional reactions we must know what kinds of emotional reactions are valued or rejected in the culture in which he lives. The observation of individuals transplanted from one culture into another and the accompanying

changes of behavior prove how little mental attitudes are determined by bodily build. Individually the cultural experience may be reflected in different ways. A person attuned to rapid, unhesitating response will react differently from another one whose reaction is slow and hesitating; but they can operate only within their cultural setting.

Changes of personality without change in heredity may be observed in the history of many peoples. The impoverished Indian who has become a laborer is the descendant of his daring, warlike ancestors.

Many characteristics of the mental life of man may be based on the structure of the organism. As each species of birds has its own song, which is somewhat subject to modification by experience but still remains a bird's song, so man has the gift of song, but what he sings is determined not by his bodily build but by the culture in which he has grown up. Modesty is characteristic of man all over the world, but what is modest, what immodest, depends upon the culture in which man lives.

It has not been possible to discover in the races of man any kind of fundamental biological differences that would outweigh the influence of culture. As we have seen before, every "race" includes many genetically distinct lines, the range of which is not very different in different populations. No differences to speak of have been discovered in the functioning of the sense organs of different races. The most diverse degrees of intelligence among the individuals of the same race have been found, and the intelligence of alien races such as the Negro has been proved to depend upon their adjustment to their cultural environment. I believe that every investigator who knows intimately individuals belonging to different racial groups has been struck by the fundamental likeness of his own forms of thinking, feeling and acting and theirs, provided he has learned to differentiate between the basis of their mental attitudes and the manifold forms they take under the stress of particular cultures.

The biological conditioning of behavior of the individual is admitted, but we must remember the great variety of biologi-

cal types constituting any one population however inbred it may be. Quantitative differences in the functioning of the bodies of different races may exist, but these are of such character that no individual can be identified as a member of a certain race by the physiological or psychological functioning of his body alone. Adding to this that the particular form in which the functioning of the organism expresses itself depends entirely upon the social environment in which individuals of diverse bodily form live, we infer that no conclusion can be drawn from culture in regard to a biologically determined racial character.

It might be claimed that the definition of "race" which we have used is not what is meant, that, rather, a physical type is meant which is spread among many different populations and which may be recognized by its physical traits. It might be claimed, for instance—as is being done—that the blond, blue-eyed, tall, long-headed race, wherever the type may be found, forms the true racial unit. Observations on the bodily form, the functioning of the body and mental behavior are no more favorable to the claim that there is an intimate relation between bodily build and behavior in a group defined in this manner. We have no evidence that would show in how far the selected features are significant characteristics of a pure type. Lack of pigmentation is probably strictly hereditary, but we do not know of any relation between behavior and pigmentation. A white poodle behaves like a black one. There is quite clear evidence that in human populations, which are all of mixed origin, the bodily form of an individual who is a member of one population is genetically not identical with an individual of identical type who belongs to another population. When two such pairs of individuals differ from the prevalent type of the population, their offspring will tend to approach somewhat the average of the general type to which each pair belongs.

Furthermore, the cultural evidence is not at all in favor of such a theory. It has been remarked before that the same hereditary type under different cultural conditions will show

entirely different characteristics: much more so the parallel types, whose genetic relationship is at best very distant. The primitive Chukchi and the Mongol monk may belong to the same type; their behavior is determined by the culture in which they live.

The claim is not tenable that mental qualities of races are biologically determined. Much less have we a right to speak of biologically determined superiority of one race over another. Every race contains so many genetically distinct strains, and the social behavior is so entirely dependent upon the life experience to which every individual is exposed, that individuals of the same type when exposed to different surroundings will react quite differently, while individuals of different types when exposed to the same environment may react the same way.

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VI

The Jews

People who concern themselves with the so-called "Jewish question" are accustomed to consider the Jews as a homogeneous race with definite characteristics different from the European groups among whom they live, and possessed of definite anatomical and mental traits which are hereditary features of the race. This view is based upon a complete misconception of what constitutes a race and of the inter-relation between mental qualities and racial characteristics.

Race enthusiasts who are proud of being members of the Northwest European race, or nationalists who dwell on the excellences of the Teutonic or Latin race, would do well to consider that there is no such thing as that racial purity which stimulates their emotional life. In times past England with its tall, blond, blue-eyed stock has been overrun by groups of very divergent racial characteristics. There was a prehistoric immigration of an unnamed people of a quite distinctive type. Then there was an invasion of Celtic people from France, followed by the Roman conquest and still later by waves of immigration from various parts of Northern Europe. All these elements have contributed to the modern population of the British Isles.

In another way the French who pride themselves on their national characteristics are racially composed of entirely dis-

Are the Jews a Race? The World Tomorrow, Jan., 1923.

tinctive elements. In the north we find a prevalence of tall, blond, long-headed Northwest Europeans. In central France we find people who show the same characteristics as Bavarians and other South Germans. In the south are people who according to their traits should be classed with the South Italians. Analogous conditions prevail in Italy. There is no Italian race. The North Italians belong with the Swiss, Bavarians, Bohemians and Austrians. The South Italians are akin to the people of Southern Spain and Greece. There is also no German race. The North Germans resemble in type the Scandinavians and English. The South Germans are of the same type as their enemies, the Central French and the Czechs.

In other words, in practically every nation there is a mixture of different types that in some cases intermingle and scatter through the whole country. In other regions the diverse racial groups inhabit different parts of the country, while all participate in the same culture.

What is true of the nations of Europe is equally true of the Jews. It is most important to realize that even in antiquity, while the Jews still formed an independent state, they represented a thorough mixture of divergent racial types. Palestine is so situated that it is not far removed from the highlands of Asia Minor, and it is also not distant from Arabia. The human types of Asia Minor and of Arabia are distinct in features. The people of Asia Minor are best represented by the Armenian type, a moderately tall people with very high heads, flat in back, with narrow high noses. The Arabs of the Arabian peninsula have long and low heads and much more delicate faces. To these must be added a third element which inhabits the most eastern portion of Asia Minor, and is represented now by the blue-eyed Kurds. These three elements were represented in the ancient Jews, and it is evident from anatomical observations that for a very long period a thorough intermingling of these three racial types has been going on in Palestine and in neighboring countries.

It is interesting that exactly the same thing has occurred among the Greeks who live on the coasts of Asia Minor. They

represent an intermingling of the same types, to which is added the somewhat distinctive type of the Western Mediterranean. Armenian, Arab and Mediterranean types may be clearly recognized among the Greeks of Asia Minor, who for this reason must be classed as of practically the same descent as the Jews. As a matter of fact, the racial composition of the various populations of the westernmost parts of Asia is the same wherever this mixture of fundamental types has occurred. Even in antiquity, therefore, we cannot speak of a Jewish race as distinct from other races in Asia Minor. All we can say is that the Jews living at the border between the Armenian and Arab types represented an old mixture of these types, parallel to other people living in similar locations. What we ordinarily designate as a Jewish type is, as a matter of fact, simply an Oriental type.

The dispersion of the Jews all over the world has tended to increase considerably the intermixture. A comparison of the Jews of North Africa with those of Western Europe and those of Russia, not to speak of those of Southern Asia, shows very clearly that in every single instance we have a marked assimilation between the Jews and the people among whom they live. This contradicts the idea that there has been no intermixture between Jews and their neighbors. No matter how rigid prohibition laws and customs may be, races living in the same area will always intermingle. Our Southern states have found it expedient from their point of view to pass laws forbidding the intermingling of whites and Negroes. This is evidence that such intermingling does occur, notwithstanding the supposed race aversion. The rigid system of India with its severe penalties for the intermingling of castes has not been able to prevent the intermingling of racial groups, which is shown at the present time by the similarity between the lower castes of eastern India and the aboriginal population, while the upper castes have preserved in greater purity their West Asiatic type. The Jews of North Africa are, in their essential traits, North Africans. The Jews of Europe are in their essential traits, Europeans, and the black Jews of the

East are in their essential traits members of a dark-pigmented race.

The assimilation of the Jews by the people among whom they live is much more far-reaching than a hasty observation might suggest. In stature as well as in head form and in other features there is a decided parallelism between the bodily form of the Jews and that of the people among whom they live.

Part of this assimilation may be due to the influence of environmental factors to which both Christian and Jew of a given area are subject, but environment alone can hardly explain the situation. The constant infiltration of foreign blood must be taken into consideration.

It is often claimed that the Jews have certain mental characteristics which are due to hereditary causes. There may be a certain truth in this statement, but not in the sense in which it is generally taken. Among all the Jews there are certain rather small groups which are thus characterized—the merchants of Europe and America, the journalists, musicians, etc. It must be recognized that the groups to which these individuals belong represent on the whole a very small, closely inbred portion of the Jewish population of the world. The amount of inbreeding which occurs in human life is generally very much underestimated. Statistical inquiries in regard to the increase of population show that the European nobility and the European peasantry are both closely inbred, while the lack of inbreeding is rather characteristic of our unstable industrial population, particularly of our modern city populations. The inbreeding which occurs among the Jews may, therefore, have produced a number of small groups representing certain hereditary strains who are characterized by certain physical and mental characteristics, probably in the same way as in ancient Athenian society the smallness of the group and the consequent inbreeding developed a number of strains characterized by very definite mental traits. Taken as a whole, however, the Jews do not show any such traits that cannot be adequately accounted for by the influence of the social en-

vironment in which they live. The mental characteristics of certain strains must not, of course, be taken to mean that the actual mental life of the individual is determined solely by these hereditary traits, but rather that under certain social conditions these will become operative in one way or another.

There is certainly nothing that would indicate the existence of any definite mental characteristics which are the common property of the Jews the world over, or even of a large part of the Jews of any one community. The mental reactions of the Jews in each community are determined by the social conditions under which they live.

Summing up the whole evidence we may conclude that we have just as little right to say there is a Jewish race as that there is a French, a German or a Spanish race. All of them are descendants of various strains which have developed anatomically and mentally according to the historical fates which each nation has undergone.

VII

We have just as little right to say there is a Jewish race as that there is a French, a German, or a Spanish race.

The "Aryans"

The present policies of the German government are based on the assumption that an "Aryan" has certain biologically determined qualities that are entirely foreign to every "Non-Aryan." All members of each race, it is claimed, have certain unescapable hereditary characteristics which determine their mental life and their social behavior.

These beliefs are based on a complete misunderstanding of what constitutes a race and of the way in which we arrive at the concept of a racial type. The population of many parts of the world has remained stable for a long time and there are certain bodily traits that occur with great frequency. In Sicily, for instance, we find among other traits, short stature, brunette complexion, dark hair, and brown eyes. From these general impressions we construct a type of the true Sicilian. If we should search through the whole population for individuals who conform strictly to our ideal, we should find that there are very few only, the fewer, the more sharply we define the type by taking into consideration numerous traits. The reason for this is that many of the traits that strike the observer, because they are very frequent, are quite variable. There are Sicilians who are tall and short, brunette and light, brown-eyed and gray-or blue-eyed, but these are disregarded in

Aryans and Non-Aryans. Mercury, June, 1934. Reprinted in pamphlet form by Information and Service Associates.

what we call the "race." In other words, every "race," even the most homogeneous one we know, consists of individuals differing considerably in bodily form.

That unity of race, which is the foundation of the policies of the German government, does not exist. A race consists of individuals diverse in bodily build; and heredity is a matter that is important in the study of the forms of the offspring, but there is no such thing as racial heredity even in relatively pure groups in regard to those traits that occur in many different forms in that group. Furthermore, similarity of a few traits does not prove homogeneity of descent, for there are often other fundamentally different traits not so readily observed that prove distinctness of origin. Thus the hereditary characteristics of the blood of the "Nordic" race are decidedly different in different regions and this may well be more significant than blondness. If we want to speak of racial heredity we should have to prove that *all* members of the race partake of the same characteristics as opposed to those of another race, and for the European and West Asiatic races this cannot be done. The eminent German anthropologist, Eugen Fischer, went so far as to say—before the Hitler revolution—that every individual is a racial unit.

What is an Aryan? Aryan is a linguistic term. Most of the European languages and a number of Asiatic languages such as Armenian, Persian, and Hindustani, are called Aryan because they have in common certain traits which indicate that there was once one language, nowadays called the Aryan language which gradually spread over a large area, not without assimilating many foreign linguistic elements, and developed into all the different "Aryan" languages spoken today. In this sense an Aryan is anyone who speaks an Aryan language, Swede as well as American Negro or Hindu. In other words Aryan is a linguistic term and has nothing to do with race. In speaking of the Aryans as a race we are merely following the undemonstrable hypothesis of certain students who claim that the type of man which inhabits northwestern Europe, usually known as the Nordic type, spoke Aryan and

no other tongue before this language was scattered far and wide. The word Aryan is used to designate the blond North European.

Whether the blond North Europeans really spoke Aryan no man can say. The origin of the "primitive" languages reconstructed from later forms of speech lies far back, and in view of the constant migrations of mankind and the fluctuation between periods of intercourse and those of isolation, it is quite impossible for anyone to state what language was spoken by men who lived 10,000 years ago or still earlier. We can find out what kind of stone implements, bone carvings or pottery they produced, but there is nothing to tell us what language they spoke. Methods used in basket-weaving and pottery-making often cling to the soil with incredible tenacity and are transmitted from one people to another, so that even the identification of a people from its manual products often leaves room for doubt.

The view of the present German government is to regard the terms Aryan and non-Aryan as biological terms of hereditary significance. Hence we may dismiss the question of which language was spoken by the forbears of the Germans and simply make the point that the use of the terms Aryan and non-Aryan is based on ignorance of their meaning.

Roughly speaking, we may perhaps divide the population of Europe into three groups, which are situated in strata extending from west to east; in the north the tall, blond, blue-eyed Northwest Europeans; in the middle, in the region of the Alps and east and west of them, the darker Alpine type; and in the south the small, dark Mediterranean type of Spain, Italy and Southern France. Of course, there are other local types which do not conform well with such a hard and fast classification.

We do not know the age of these larger groups. By analogy with the development of animal forms we may assume that in very early times groups of human beings came to be isolated long enough to develop certain types through inbreeding, selection and through the influence of the environment in

which they lived. How this process took place is hard to say. We only know that closely related animals long isolated by natural conditions frequently exhibit slight differences of form. For instance, in the case of land animals on isolated islands we can find distinguishing characteristics on every single island. These, however, are not necessarily present in all individuals.

Besides the occurrence of local varieties, we find in the case of human beings that many racial forms are quite comparable to those of domesticated animals. Blondness, the deep blackness of skin and the curliness of hair in the Negro are analogous to the same features in domesticated animals. Eugen Fischer and B. Klatt have proved conclusively that blondness and blueness of the eyes are characteristics of domesticated animals and very rare in wild animals. We have blond horses, rabbits, and pigs. We have black poodles, with tightly curling hair. These forms, too, hardly ever occur among wild mammals. Anatomically, human blondness is exactly parallel to the blondness of domesticated animals. The occurrence of blondness in all kinds of domesticated animals proves that blondness may have developed independently in different races, as in those of western and eastern Europe.

Now the taming of animals is based essentially upon change of diet and upon protection against climate and enemies. In the earliest type of domestication artificial breeding of certain strains hardly played a part. We know that even in the glacial period, perhaps 50,000 years ago, man prepared his food by the use of fire, and knew how to protect himself with weapons. Therefore we might say that man is the oldest domesticated animal, self-domesticated through the use of fire and weapons.

The complete isolation essential for the development of fixed types did not last up to recent times, certainly not even up to the end of the glacial period.

All that we know of the history of mankind points to constant migration. During the glacial period the severe climatic changes forced man to abandon the ice-covered regions. The

dessication of Central Asia drove him to outlying districts, into Europe and southern Asia. From Asia man went to America and occupied the New World from the extreme north to the extreme south, passing from the arctic through the temperate zone, through the tropics and as far as the inhospitable southern end of South America. The Negroes of the upper Nile region overflowed the greater part of South Africa. Probably much later the Malays traversed the whole width of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and reached Madagascar.

Even the distribution of modern languages is indicative of the restlessness of man, for the dissemination of languages requires personal contact between peoples. In America the native of New Mexico speaks a language closely related to the language of Alaska. The language of the Caribs is spoken in Southern Brazil and in the West Indies. Russia today harbors many tribes speaking Finnish languages, an indication of the recent expansion of the Russians toward the east. In the Middle Ages Arabian became the dominant language of North Africa. All these migrations have led to a mixing of tribes.

In Europe conditions were similar. Germany in particular has always been the scene of migrations: from north to south, from east to west and vice versa, swarms of people passed through the country. Assimilation of eastern, Slavic people through colonization was a later phase of the process of mixture. What we see now is the result of these historical events.

Even the bodily structure of man of former periods testifies to the importance of early migrations. England was once inhabited by a people characterized by long, narrow heads. Then came a people among whom broad, round heads predominated and who brought with them a different civilization. This type disappeared and was replaced by the blond northwest Europeans who occupied the greater part of the country. Only in Wales and in several other districts do we find types rather suggestive of the types of Portugal. In Norway, which is commonly regarded as a purely northwest European country, the South is inhabited by people of a different type, of darker skin and hair-coloring and of a different

build. In America we find one native type which occurs sporadically from Mexico to North California.

A settled life developed at a time when land became personal property, either of the free peasant or of the lord whose serfs were bound to his property. Since that time more definite, local types of man have developed which are all based, however, on the racial mixtures formed during the period of migrations.

Within a village in which landed property is handed down from father to son, where the wife is selected from the same village, pronounced local types may develop through inbreeding, although the differences among the ancestors will still make themselves felt in the individuals composing each family.

We are too much inclined to suppose that if all the individuals of such a group are similar in regard to color of their hair and eyes and physical build, they must be similar in all other respects. This is not at all the case. The physical attributes of the body are not so closely bound together that they are inherited en masse. On the contrary, the study of heredity shows that physical form is never inherited as a whole but that the characteristics of a long line of ancestors recur in ever-new combinations.

It might be supposed that the high nobility of Europe represents a purer race, but the opposite is true. The genealogies show that here particularly mixtures from all parts of Europe are the rule. The nobility of Sweden, for instance, is largely of foreign origin.

It is fiction to speak of a German race. We should rather ask what types of physical build are represented among the Germans. Here we encounter a complete lack of unity. Blonds with long heads in the North, darker people with short heads in the South; broad faces here, narrow ones there; noses turned up and aquiline, the general build tall and short, broad and slight. There is no "German race"; there are only local types which are very different one from another, each of which comprises individuals of different characteristics, so

that representatives of all these types may be found in any part of Germany and of the neighboring countries. The East German is closer to his Polish neighbor than to the Frisian; the Tyrolese shows more similarity to the East Alpine Slav than to the North German, the Rhinelander more to the neighboring Frenchman than to the German in more distant parts.

National groups and local types have nothing in common.

Since the Jews are considered as a thoroughly different element, we must define their racial position. There is no more a Semitic than there is an Aryan race. Both terms define linguistic groups, not human beings. We can speak only of Near Eastern types. There are at least two or three very different Near Eastern types: dark Armenians, lighter Kurds, and the long-headed Southern type. As long as we have known Jews at all, all three—and perhaps even other European strains—have been represented among them. The Jews are not a uniform race. The Armenoid type is very closely related to that of the Dinaric peoples, the inhabitants of the region east of the Adriatic Sea, so much so that in some cases the Tyrolese and the Armenoid can hardly be distinguished with certainty. Similarly, a relationship exists between the Syrian and the Mediterranean types. The contrast between the blond Northwest European and the dark Southeast German is just as great as the difference between the latter and the Armenoid Jew.

This statement does not mean that there are no finer distinctions in physical build between most Jews and most non-Jewish Europeans; the differences, however, are not fundamental. It is well known that dark Syroid Jews are often taken for Spaniards or Italians, Armenoids for South Slavs or other Alpines, and blond, blue-eyed Jews for Northwest Europeans.

In addition to all this, the Jews of different countries are not similar in their physical characteristics and, moreover, a certain similarity exists between them and their neighbors. To us this fact is most strikingly apparent in the case of the old East African and Asiatic Jews, who closely resemble the people among whom they live or lived.

Toward the end of antiquity and in the early Middle Ages, when Jews as well as Christians converted people of other beliefs, miscegenation was not rare. Jews converted their slaves to Judaism and made proselytes just as the Christians did. Likewise, in the first centuries of our era marriages between Jews and Christians were frequent. In the year 633 the Council of Toledo decreed that marriages between Jews and Christians should be dissolved unless the Jew embraced the Christian faith—a clear proof that such marriages were quite common. In southern Germany it has happened that a whole ghetto was driven into a river and forcibly baptized. With that they became marriageable.

Intermarriage is probably not the sole factor which led to the development of local types among Jews. The human body is not absolutely independent of its environment, and it is probable that the local types depend in part on the natural and social environment to which the inhabitants of a certain sector are exposed.

It follows from all this that we cannot draw sharp lines of distinction between present-day European groups, and that in larger groups—German, French, Jewish, Finnish, Hungarian, etc., there exist many hereditary lines with similar characteristics, so that even when physical attributes such as blondness occur with great frequency, other physically conditioned characteristics vary widely.

Nevertheless, all this is merely the background for the question on which is based the whole "Aryan" theory of the uniqueness of the German character; that is, to what extent psychic behavior is dependent upon physical form. That there do exist individual relations between physical build and mentality cannot be doubted. A human being whose brain contains anatomical defects and therefore does not function properly cannot be mentally normal. A genius cannot be made out of an idiot.

It is rash, however, to maintain that any difference in physical build is inevitably connected with a difference in psychic

life. The functions of the body are extraordinarily adaptable. All the bodily functions alter considerably with the environmental conditions. This is equally true in regard to mentality. Social conditions most emphatically influence the mental attitude as a whole. Attempts have been made to correlate the mental behavior of a man with his physical build, to find out, for instance, whether a long-headed, blond person will have reactions different from those of a round-headed, dark-skinned individual. All strictly scientific experiments of this nature prove that within the same social background such relations do not exist. Even the studies of human constitution, in which the relations between abnormal mental phenomena and physical build are investigated, do not show that every human being of a certain extreme physical build *must* suffer from mental disturbances. These occur with greater frequency among extreme physical types. But no group consists of extreme types only. On the contrary, the intermediate, average types are the most common, and in regard to them no relation between physical build and mental behavior is demonstrable.

Of course it cannot be denied that groups like the Swabians and the Frisians are mentally not alike. It may even be admitted that Frisian and Swabian peasants who have been settled for a long time and have multiplied through inbreeding, may show mental differences based upon physical factors. It can easily be shown how dependent mental differences are upon social conditions. For instance, exact observations have been made on Negroes who have moved from the country to the city and it has been shown that assimilation of these people to the behavior of the city population takes place within a few years. Likewise it has been shown in the case of Italian immigrants that they grow to resemble the Americans in behavior the longer they have been in this country. One of the most instructive illustrations of this assimilation is the ease with which children adopt the dialect and manner of expression of their environment. Similarly, thorough-going studies of families show how deeply dependent the character

and behavior of each individual member of the family is upon his personal relations within the family.

Naturally, bodily forms are not alike in separate regions or in different classes of society, but in every population there are to be found such utterly different types that it would be difficult to assign any one individual with certainty, solely by means of bodily form to the local or social group to which he belongs. Also, every region and every group has a fairly definite mental character. It has never been proved that this is determined by the physical type of the people, but there are many observations indicating that it is due to the cultural bond which unites the people. Heredity may explain a part of the pronounced mental similarities between parents and children; but this explanation cannot be transferred to explain on hereditary grounds the similarity of behavior of entire nations in which the most varied hereditary lines occur. These assume their characteristic forms under the pressure of society. The extent to which the type of civilization conditions the manifestations of mental life may be observed in phenomena such as the epidemic mental disturbances of the Middle Ages. Whole masses of the people fell victim to ecstatic dances, such as we may still witness in revival meetings. In how far in our times such ecstatic behavior could be repeated on a large scale is a question that, in view of prevailing hysterias, we may well hesitate to answer. The religious fanaticism of the Crusades could probably not be called forth today; but at the present time other types of fanaticism have taken its place.

The attempt that is being made by those who are in power in Germany to justify on scientific grounds their attitude toward the Jews is built on a pseudo-science. No one has ever proved that a human being, through his descent from a certain group of people, must of necessity have certain mental characteristics. A nation is not to be defined by its descent but by its language and customs. Otherwise Germans, Frenchmen, and Italians would not be nationalities. Language and customs are determined far more by the environment in which the child grows up than by its descent, because the physical

attributes, so far as they have any influence at all, occur with extraordinary variety within every group.

Just as the Germanized Slavs and French have become German in their culture, as the Frenchified Germans have become French, the Russianized ones Russian; so have the German Jews become Germans.

No one has ever proved that a human being, through his descent from a certain group of people, must of necessity have certain mental characteristics.

VIII

The Negro in Africa

In our discussions of the capabilities of the Negro race, we generally confine ourselves to a consideration of the social status and cultural achievements of the Negro in America, of the work he accomplished as a slave, and of his advances since he obtained freedom. It seems hardly fair to form a judgment of the whole race by considering what it has done under trying conditions; we ought rather to look at the Negro in his own home, and see what advances in culture he has made there. It seems admissible in a general review of this kind to compare the achievements of the African tribes with those of the tribes of northern Europe at a period before they had come under the influence of Mediterranean culture.

The Negro all over the African Continent is either a tiller of the soil or the owner of large herds; only the Bushmen and a few of the dwarf tribes of Central Africa are hunters. Owing to the high development of agriculture, the density of population of Africa is much greater than that of primitive America, and consequently the economic conditions of life are more stable. Arts and industries have developed to a great extent, and it is particularly important to note that the use of iron is common to all the Negro tribes, with the sole exception of the Bushmen, who, in many respects, occupy an isolated position. We may safely say, that at a time when our own ances-

What the Negro has done in America. The Ethical Record, Vol. 5, pp. 106–109, March, 1904.

tors still utilized stone implements, or at best, when bronze weapons were first introduced, the Negro had developed the art of smelting iron; and it seems likely that their race has contributed more than any other to the early development of the iron industry. The beautiful iron weapons of Central Africa, which excel in symmetry of form, and many of which bear elaborate designs inlaid in copper, are of admirable workmanship.

The possession of iron tools has also enabled the Negro to bring to a high degree of perfection the art of wood-carving; and many works of the carver that have been brought to our museums by travelers from remote parts of the continent, excite our admiration.

It may safely be said that the primitive Negro community —with its fields that are tilled with iron and wooden implements, with its domestic animals, with its smithies, with its expert wood-carvers—is a model of thrift and industry, and compares favorably with the conditions of life among our own ancestors.

One of the features of Negro social life that deserves especial mention is the legal trend of mind of the people. No other race on a similar level of culture has developed as strict methods of legal procedure as the Negro has. Many of his legal forms remind us strongly of those of mediaeval Europe. For instance, it is hardly a coincidence that the ordeal as a means of deciding legal cases when all other evidence fails, has been used in Europe as well as throughout Africa, while it seems to be entirely unknown in ancient America.

Local trade is highly developed in all parts of Africa. Throughout southern Africa we find regular market-days and market-places where the people assemble with their goods. The market-place is considered sacred. No strife is permitted there, so that the exchange of commodities can go on without interruption. Extensive intertribal trade does not seem to have developed except on the east coast of the continent, and there probably only under the influence of a Mohammedan culture. When, in the twelfth century, a great empire was founded on

the east coast, caravans began to visit the countries of the interior of the continent, and thus were established the important caravan-routes into the center of Africa which have played so important a part in the history of its discovery.

The power of organization that manifests itself in Negro communities is quite striking. Travelers who have visited Central Africa tell of extended kingdoms, ruled by monarchs, whose power, however, is restricted by a number of advisers. The constitution of all such states is, of course, based on the general characteristics of the social organization of the Negro tribes, which, however, has become exceedingly complex with the extension of the domain of a single tribe over neighboring peoples.

The Lunda Empire, for instance, is a feudal state governed by a monarch. It includes a number of subordinate states, the chiefs of which are independent in all internal affairs, but who pay tribute to the emperor. The chiefs of the more distant parts of the country send caravans carrying tribute once a year, while those near by have to pay more frequently. The tribute depends upon the character of the produce of the country. It consists of ivory, salt, copper, slaves, and even, to a certain extent, of European manufactures. In case of war the subordinate chiefs have to send contingents to the army of the emperor. The succession in each of the subordinate states is regulated by local usage. Sons and other relatives of the subordinate chiefs are kept at the court of the emperor as a means of preventing disintegration of the empire.

A female dignitary occupies an important position in the government of the state. She is considered the mother of the emperor. She has a separate court, and certain districts pay tribute to her. Both the emperor and the female dignitary must be children of one of the two head-wives of the preceding emperor. The emperor is elected by the four highest counsellors of the state, and his election must be confirmed by the female dignitary; while her election takes place in the same way, and she must be confirmed by the emperor. The office of counsellors of the state is hereditary. Their power is important,

because four among them have the privilege of electing the emperor and the female dignitary, as described before. Besides this, there is a nobility, consisting, as it would seem, of the wealthy inhabitants, who have the privilege of expressing their opinion in regard to the affairs of the state. This empire is known to have existed since the end of the sixteenth century, although its extent and importance have probably undergone many changes. It would seem that sometimes the boundaries of the state were limited, and that at other times many tribes were subject to it. In 1880 the state was about as large as the Middle Atlantic States.

One of the most important considerations in judging the capabilities of the Negro is his ability to assimilate foreign cultures. It is particularly the striking difference between the uneducated Negro and the educated white that is brought forward as a proof of inability, on the part of the Negro, to reach higher levels. In this respect, also, Africa may give us some valuable lessons.

At the present time the distribution of Negro culture in Africa is such that in all the regions where the whites have come in contact with the Negro, his own industries have disappeared or have been degraded. As a consequence, all the tribes that live near the coast of Africa are, comparatively speaking, on a low level of industrial culture. This phenomenon, however, is not by any means confined to the Negro race. The process that brings about the degradation of native culture is the substitution of machine-made European products for the more artistic native products, the manufacture of which takes a great deal of time and energy. It is but natural that the blacksmith who can exchange a small lump of rubber picked up in the woods for a steel knife, prefers this method of obtaining a fine implement to the more laborious one of making a rather inefficient knife of soft iron with his primitive tools. It is not surprising that the cheap cotton goods replace the fine grass-cloth and the bark-cloth which the African women prepare. The European trader carries to the coast of Africa only the cheap products of European factories, but

nothing that would give to the Negro the White man's method of work.

Quite different from the effect of European civilization on the African Negro has been that of Mohammedanism. At an early time, probably between the first half of the eighth century and the eleventh century of our era, the Sudan was invaded by Mohammedan tribes of Hamitic origin, and Mohammedanism was spreading rapidly throughout the Sahara and the western Sudan. Large Negro states similar to those of South Africa existed in these regions before the Mohammedan invasion; but since that time we have historical records of the rise and disappearance of numerous states. A relatively high degree of culture has been attained throughout the Sudan. The invaders intermarried with natives, and although the Hamitic blood was gradually swamped by the large numbers of aborigines, their higher culture has persisted. Thus it happens that the empire of Ghana, south of the Niger, a region from which many of our slaves come, and the Hausa States, east of the Niger, attained a culture which may well be compared with that of the Semitic people of Arabia.

It is very instructive to us that the Mohammedans have been able to civilize these tribes, and to raise them to nearly the same standard that they themselves had attained, while the whites have not been capable of influencing the Negro of Africa to any considerable extent. Evidently this difference is due to the different method of introducing culture. While the Mohammedans have influenced the people in the same manner in which the Romans and Greeks civilized the tribes of northern Europe, the whites are sending only the products of their manufacturers and a few of their representatives into the Negro country. A real amalgamation between the Negroes and the better class of the whites has never taken place, while the amalgamation of the Negroes and the Hamitic Mohammedans is brought about by the institution of polygamy, the conquerors taking native wives, and raising their children as members of their own families.

The history of the kingdoms of Ghana and Songhai, two

Negro kingdoms, is particularly interesting. The accuracy of the tradition which has been handed down in writing, the records of which were discovered by Barth, is in itself proof of the high degree of culture attained in this area. Without a considerable amount of stability, it would be impossible that chronicles extending over so long a time should be preserved. The legendary history of the state begins with the fourth century of our era. Early in this period the Mohammedan tribes established themselves among the Negroes, and it is said that about the year 680 they had a considerable number of mosques in the capital of the empire. In 1235 the capital was transferred to Melle, which in the beginning of the fourteenth century became the most powerful state of the Sudan. It extended over almost the whole of the western Sudan, including the important trading centre, Timbuktoo, at the north bend of the Niger. It is stated in the chronicles that the king of Melle at this time sent embassies to the emperor of Morocco, and that he made a pilgrimage to Mecca.

About the year 1500 the capital was captured by the king of Songhai, and gradually the center of Sudanese culture was transferred to a region farther east. At the present time the greater part of the ancient state of Ghana is under French jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that the French describe the people as industrious, and generally of a much higher culture than the smaller tribes of this area, and that they consider them as destined to take a position of ever-increasing importance in the Sudan.

Owing to the character of its government the political power of the Negro state depends wholly upon the personality of the king. Under a weak king the state falls to pieces, while a strong man may raise it to a high level. The number of strong African kings met by explorers is remarkable. They are found in South Africa as well as in Central Africa and the Sudan. They are the best proof that among the Negro race men of genius and of indomitable will-power exist. According to the chronicles—King Askia of Songhai, who overthrew the Kingdom of Melle, was such a man. Barth, who discov-

ered these chronicles, and who knew the Sudanese Negro through long and intimate intercourse, says in regard to him: "King Askia—perhaps the greatest sovereign that ever ruled over Negroland—was a native of the very country. He set us an example of the highest degree of development of which Negroes are capable. The dynasty of the Askia was entirely of native descent; and it is the more remarkable, if we consider that this King was held in the highest esteem and veneration by the most learned and rigid Mohammedans. It is of no small interest to a person who endeavors to take a comprehensive view of the various races of mankind, to observe how a Negro king in the interior of the continent not only extended his conquests far and wide, but also governed his subjects with justice and equity, caused well-being and comfort to spring up everywhere within the borders of his extensive dominions, and introduced such of the institutions of Mohammedan civilization as he considered might be useful to his subjects."

These brief data seem sufficient to indicate that in the Sudan the true Negro, the ancestor of our slave population, has achieved the very advances which the critics of the Negro would make us believe he cannot attain. He has a highly developed agriculture, and the industries connected with his daily life are complex and artistic. His power of organization has been such that for centuries large empires have existed which have proved their stability in wars with their neighbors, and which have left their records in the chronicles.

The achievements of the Negro in Africa, demonstrate that the race is capable of social and political accomplishments; that it will produce its great men here, as it has done in Africa; and that it will contribute its part to the welfare of the community.

In the Sudan, the true Negro, the ancestor of our slave population, has achieved the very advances which the critics of the Negro would make us believe he cannot attain.

IX

The Negro's Past

The broad outlook over the development of mankind which the study of the races of man gives to us, is often helpful to an understanding of our own every-day problems, and may make clear to us our capacity as well as our duty. I shall speak to you from the standpoint of the anthropologist, of one who has devoted his life to the study of the multifarious forms of culture as found in different races.

Modern life makes certain definite demands upon us and requires certain qualities of character. In judging the work of men, it is, however, well to remember that there have been cultures different from ours and that the qualities that are today dominant and most highly esteemed, and the possession of which makes a person a most useful member of society, have not always had the same value; and may at a later period be superseded by others not so highly valued now. In early ages brute force was one of the highest qualities of man. Sagacity counted little. At the present time energetic self-assertion counts for most, while in the age of early Christianity humility won the highest praise. Such differences in the valuation of our activities are also found at the present time in countries that have developed untouched by the influence of modern civilization.

Our gifts, our wishes and our ideals are determined not

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alone by the demands of the civilization in which we live, but each of us has his own individuality which makes him more or less fit to adapt himself to the demands of life. Therefore it behooves young men and young women to tarry long enough before rushing into the activities of a busy life, to know what powers are given to them, what they are able to achieve and what place their work is to occupy in the conflicting interests of modern life.

On the day when the student leaves the protecting wings of the institution which has nurtured and trained his mind, he naturally halts with a last glimpse backward. Then he looks forward timidly, but at the same time with the exuberant joy of having acquired the right of independent action, and now he is in the midst of the struggle which even to the best, is not all sweetness of success, but bound to bring the bitterness of disappointment. Then will come the test of your strength, of your loyalty to the ideals that your instructors have tried to instil into you.

If these trials are not spared to the youth who is a member of a homogeneous people, they will be encountered with even greater certainty in communities where diverse elements live side by side, and have to work for their joint welfare as well as for the protection of their separate interests.

This is to be your future. The more clearly you recognize the tasks it involves, the better you will be fitted to fill your place in the life of the nation.

The fundamental requirement for useful activity on your part is a clear insight into the capabilities of your own race. If you did accept the view that the present weakness of the American Negro, his uncontrolled emotions, his lack of energy, are racially inherent, your work would still be a noble one. You, the more fortunate members of your race, would give your life to a great charitable work, to support the unsteady gait of your weak brother who is too feeble to walk by himself. But you have the full right to view your labor in an entirely different light.

The achievements of races are not only what they have

done during the past two thousand years, when the total amount of invention based on application of knowledge developed at an ever increasing rate. In this the European, the Chinaman, the East Indian, have far outstripped other races. But back of this period lies the time when mankind struggled with the elements, when every small advance that seems to us now insignificant was an achievement of the highest order, as great as the discovery of steam power or of electricity, if not greater. It may well be, that these early inventions were made hardly consciously, certainly not by deliberate effort, yet every one of them represents a giant's stride forward in the development of human culture. To these early advances the Negro race has contributed its liberal share. While much of the history of early invention is shrouded in darkness, it seems likely that at a time when the European was still satisfied with rude stone tools, the African had invented or adopted the art of smelting iron.

Consider for a moment what this invention has meant for the advance of the human race. As long as the hammer, knife, saw, drill, the spade and the hoe had to be chipped out of stone, or had to be made of shell or hard wood, effective industrial work was not impossible, but difficult. A great progress was made when copper found in large nuggets was hammered out into tools and later on shaped by smelting, and when bronze was introduced; but the true advancement of industrial life did not begin until the hard iron was discovered. It seems not unlikely that the people that made the marvelous discovery of reducing iron ores by smelting were the African Negroes. Neither ancient Europe, nor ancient western Asia, nor ancient China knew the iron, and everything points to its introduction from Africa. At the time of the great African discoveries toward the end of the past century, the trade of the blacksmith was found all over Africa, from north to south and from east to west. With his simple bellows and a charcoal fire he reduced the ore that is found in many parts of the continent and forged implements of great usefulness and beauty.

Due also to native invention is the extended early African

agriculture; each village is surrounded by its garden patches and fields in which millet is grown. Domesticated animals were also kept; in the agricultural regions chickens and pigs, while in the arid parts of the country where agriculture is not possible, large herds of cattle were raised. It is also important to note that the cattle were milked, an art which in early times was confined to Africa, Europe and northern Asia, while even now it has not been acquired by the Chinese.

The occurrence of all these arts of life points to an early and energetic development of African culture.

Even if we refrain from speculating on the earliest times, conceding that it is difficult to prove the exact locality where so important an invention was made as that of smelting iron, or where the African millet was first cultivated, or where chickens and cattle were domesticated, the evidence of African ethnology is such that it should inspire you with the hope of leading your race from achievement to achievement. I remind you of the power of military organization exhibited by the Zulu, whose kings and whose armies swept southeastern Africa. I remind you of the local chiefs, who by dint of diplomacy, bravery and wisdom united the scattered tribes of wide areas into flourishing kingdoms, of the intricate form of government necessary for holding together the heterogeneous tribes.

If you wish to understand the possibilities of the African under the stimulus of a foreign culture, you may look toward the Soudan, the region south of the Sahara. When we first learn about these countries by the reports of the great Arab traveller Iben Batuta, who lived in the 14th century, we hear that the old Negro kingdoms were early conquered by the Mohammedans. Under the guidance of the Arabs, but later on by their own initiative, the Negro tribes of these countries organized kingdoms which lived for many centuries. They founded flourishing towns in which at annual fairs thousands and thousands of people assembled. Mosques and other public buildings were erected and the execution of the laws was entrusted to judges. The history of the kingdom was recorded by

officers and kept in archives. So well organized were these states that about 1850, when they were for the first time visited by a white man, the remains of these archives were still found in existence, notwithstanding all the political upheavals of a millenium and notwithstanding the ravages of the slave trade.

I might also speak to you of the great markets that are found throughout Africa, at which commodities were exchanged or sold for native money. I may perhaps remind you of the system of judicial procedure, of prosecution and defense, which had early developed in Africa, and whose formal development was a great achievement notwithstanding its gruesome application in the persecution of witchcraft. Nothing, perhaps, is more encouraging than a glimpse of the artistic industry of native Africa. I regret that we have no place in this country where the beauty and daintiness of African work can be shown; but a walk through the African museums of Paris, London and Berlin is a revelation. I wish you could see the scepters of African kings, carved of hard wood and representing artistic forms; or the delicate basketry made by the people of the Congo river and of the region near the great lakes of the Nile, or the grass mats with their beautiful patterns. Even more worthy of our admiration is the work of the blacksmith, who manufactures symmetrical lance heads almost a yard long, or axes inlaid with copper and decorated with filigree. Let me also mention in passing the bronze castings of Benin on the west coast of Africa, which, although perhaps due to Portuguese influences, have so far excelled in technique any European work, that they are even now almost inimitable. In short, wherever you look, you find a thrifty people, full of energy, capable of forming large states. You find men of great energy and ambition who hold sway over their fellows by the weight of their personality. That this culture has, at the same time, the instability and other signs of weakness of primitive culture, goes without saying.

To you, however, this picture of native Africa will inspire strength, for all the alleged faults of your race that you have

to conquer here are certainly not prominent there. In place of indolence you find thrift and ingenuity, and application to occupations that require not only industry, but inventiveness and a high degree of technical skill, and the surplus energy of the people does not spend itself in emotional excesses only.

If, therefore, it is claimed that your race is doomed to economic inferiority, you may confidently look to the home of your ancestors, and say that you have set out to recover for the colored people the strength that was their own before they set foot on the shores of this continent. You may say that you go to work with bright hopes, and that you will not be discouraged by the slowness of your progress; for you have to recover not only what has been lost in transplanting the Negro race from its native soil to this continent, but you must reach higher levels than your ancestors had ever attained.

To those who stoutly maintain a material inferiority of the Negro race and who would dampen your ardor by their claims, you may confidently reply that the burden of proof rests with them, that the past history of your race does not sustain their statement, but rather gives you encouragement. There is no anatomical evidence available that would sustain the view that the bulk of the Negro race could not become as useful citizens as the members of any other race. That there may be slightly different hereditary traits seems plausible, but it is entirely arbitrary to assume that those of the Negro, because perhaps slightly different, must be of an inferior type.

The arguments for inferiority drawn from the history of civilization are also weak. At the time when the early kingdom of Babylonia flourished, the same disparaging remarks that are now made regarding the Negro might have been made regarding the ancestors of the ancient Romans. They were then a barbarous horde that had never made any contribution to the advance of that civilization that was confined to parts of Asia, and still they were destined to develop a culture which has become the foundation and an integral part of our own. Even later the barbarous hordes of northern Europe,who at the time of the ancient Romans were tribal groups without

cultural achievements, have become the most advanced nations of our day.

Thus, impartial scientific inquiry tells you to take up your work among your race with undaunted courage. Success will crown your endeavors if your work is carried on patiently, calmly and consistently.

But in taking up your position in life you must also be clear in regard to the relation of your work to the general life of the nation, and here again anthropology and history will help you to gain a healthy point of view. It is not the first time in human history that two peoples have been brought into close contact by the force of circumstances, who are dependent upon each other economically but where social customs, ideals and—let me add—bodily form, are so distinct that the line of cleavage remains always open. Every conquest that has led to colonization has produced, at least temporarily, conditions of this kind. The conquest of England by the Normans, the Teutonic invasion of Italy, the Manchu conquest of China are illustrations of this point. But other instances are more typical. The position of Armenians and Greeks in Turkey, and the relations of the castes of India, bring up the same problem.

The best example, however, is that of the Jews in Europe, a people slightly distinct in type, but originally differing considerably in customs and beliefs from the people among whom they lived. The separation of the Jew and the Gentile was enforced for hundreds of years and very slowly only were the various occupations opened to him; very slowly only began to vanish the difference in customs and ideals. Even now the feeling of inequality persists and to the feeling of many the term Jew assigns to the bearer an exceptional position. And this is so, although the old barriers have fallen, although in the creative work of our times, in industry, commerce, science, and art, the Jew holds a respected place. Even now there lingers the consciousness of the old, sharper divisions which the ages have not been able to efface, and which is strong enough to find expression as antipathy to the Jewish type. In

France, that let down the barriers more than a hundred years ago, the feeling of antipathy is still strong enough to sustain an anti-Jewish political party. I have dwelt on this example somewhat fully, because it illustrates the conditions that characterize your own position.

Even members of the same people, when divided by social barriers, have often been in similar relations. Thus has the hereditary nobility of Europe, although of the same descent as the people, held itself aloof for centuries and has claimed for itself superior power and a distinct code of honor. In short, you may find innumerable instances of sharp social division of a people into groups that are destined to work out jointly the fate of their country.

You must take to heart the teachings of the past. You observe, that in the case of the Patricians and Plebeians in Rome, of the nobility and the townspeople of more modern times, it has taken centuries for the exclusive groups to admit the ability of the other groups, and that after this had been achieved, it was impossible for long periods to break down the constantly recrudescent feeling of difference in character. You observe furthermore, that when there is such a slight difference in type as between European and Jew, the feeling of distinction persists strongly, long after the reasons that created it have vanished. You must, therefore, recognize that it is not in your power, as individuals, to modify rapidly the feelings of others toward yourself, no matter how unjust and unfair they may seem to you, but that, with the freedom to improve your economic condition to the best of your ability, your race has to work out its own salvation by raising the standards of your life higher and higher, thus attacking the feeling of contempt of your race at its very roots.

It is an ardous work that is before you. If you will remember the teachings of history, you will find it a task full of joy, for your own people will respond more and more readily to your teachings. When they learn how to live a more cleanly, healthy and comfortable life, they will also begin to appreciate the value of intellectual life, and as their intellectual

powers increase, they will work for a life of greater bodily and moral health. The vastness of the field of improvement and the assurance of success should be an ever present stimulus to you, even though it will take a long time to overcome the inertia of the apathetic masses. On the other hand, if you carry on your work with side glances at your white neighbor, waiting for his recognition or support of your noble work, you are destined to disappointment. Remember that in every single case in history the process of adaptation has been one of exceeding slowness. Do not look for the impossible, but do not let your path deviate from the quiet and steadfast insistence on full opportunities for your powers.

Your advance depends upon your steadfastness of purpose. While the white man may err from the path of righteousness and, if he falls by the wayside, will have to bear the blame for his weakness individually, any failure of one of your race, and particularly any fault of one of you who have enjoyed the advantages of education, will be interpreted only too readily as a relapse into the old ways of an "inferior race." If, therefore, you want to overcome the old antagonism, you have to be on your watch all the time. Your moral standards must be of the highest.

Looking at your life work thus, everything should combine to make you happy idealists. A natural goal has been set before you, which although it may lie in the dim future—will be attained, if every one of you does his or her duty; in the fullfillment of which you are supported by the consciousness of your responsibility. May happiness and success be the reward of your endeavors!

X

You have set out to recover for the colored people the strength that was their own before they set foot on the shores of this continent.

The Negro in America

Race antagonism may be considered from two points of view. It may be asked how much truth there is in the assumption of superiority of one race over another, and an enquiry may be instituted into the mental differences between races. Or the sources of race antagonism, aside from the question of actual race differences, may be subjected to investigation.

In a discussion of the mental differences between one race and another, it should be borne in mind that when we talk about the characteristics of a race as a whole, we are dealing with an abstraction which has no existence in nature. From those traits that are most widely distributed among the individuals constituting it, we form the picture of an ideal personage who combines in himself the striking traits of the race. Thus the North European is conceived as tall, blue-eyed, with a long head and a narrow face, energetic, but restrained. The Italian is thought of as short, dark-eyed, dark-haired, of dark complexion, with a long head; vivacious and unstable. We disregard the variability of individuals; we forget the differences from the ideal picture in bodily form and make-up among the persons that compose each people. We do not think of the brunette South Norwegian, or of the many blond and blue-eyed Italians. These are regarded as exceptions and are ruled out in the ideal picture that is present in our minds

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when we speak of these races. Obviously, ideal types are misleading. The picture is truer if we consider all the individuals comprising a racial type and describe it as composed of many types, which, while differing among themselves, cluster around a certain most common type that is almost always near the middle between the extremes.

The degree of variability in each race is very great. In Northern Europe we see short, dark-eyed individuals as well as very tall people who are exceedingly blond. There are those who are mentally inert and those who are alert and full of energy. In every population we find persons who are stupid and intelligent, weak and strong, moral and immoral. Obviously, we must include these variations in our description of racial types. When we compare one European type with another, it is easily seen that the range of variation which occurs in each is so great that the assignment of any single individual to any one European type is quite impossible. In Spain and Italy there are individuals who might just as logically be members of a North European population, and in Norway, individuals who fit into a South European group. One country in Europe differs from another merely in the relative frequency of the various types.

When we turn to racial types that are more fundamentally distinct, the biological question seems simpler. For instance, in a comparison between the Negro and the North European we may safely say that the traits of the Negro are so characteristic that they are not duplicated among the whites and that there is a distinct gap between the extreme variants in these two cases. Yet while this is true with regard to the pigmentation of the skin, the form of the hair, the nose, and perhaps even the mouth, we cannot follow out the racial differences in the same detail in regard to internal organs. It seems reasonable to suppose that there are certain differences in these also. In fact some have already been pointed out. Professor Bean has shown that the liver and the spleen of the Negro are on the average smaller than those of the white. The differences between the averages are, however, small when compared to the

differences between the individuals composing each racial series, so that the conclusions are quite similar to those drawn from a comparison of the features of the various local types of the European race.

For our purpose it is essential to prove that the existing anatomical differences are functionally significant. In approaching the subject, we must remember that the human body is so constituted that organs varying considerably in form are capable of performing the same functions. This fact appears very clearly in the functions performed by the organs of articulation. We know that the variety of forms of the mouth, nose, lips and tongue in each racial type is very great indeed. Nevertheless, the articulation of a particular dialect is affected only to a slight extent by this diversity. Almost every tongue and every mouth are capable of enunciating the same sounds, provided the social environment imposes a definite pattern of pronunciation. Only in a very few extreme cases are the anatomical or physiological conditions such that strong individual characteristics of pronunciation develop. The same thing is true with regard to the functions of the organs of respiration and digestion. The range of adaptability to differences in temperature, moisture, air pressure, and kinds of food is very wide indeed. There is a generous margin of safety which permits the adaptation of the organs of the body to the varying conditions under which they have to perform their functions.

Moreover, the differences in the form and size of the internal organs that have been observed among the various races are not very great as compared with the variability which is found within each race. Hence if it is true that the majority of the individuals of one race can adapt themselves to certain geographical and cultural forms of environment, it is equally true that many members of different races will be capable of such adaptation.

In a discussion of the physiological side of the Negro problem we are most immediately interested in the functioning of the brain. It is true that, on the average, the brain of the

Negro is slightly smaller than the brain of the European. But here the enormous variability in the size and structure of the brain in both the white and the Negro races should be borne in mind. This high degree of variability makes it very difficult to establish any characteristics that would allow us to differentiate definitely a Negro's brain from the brain of a European, particularly when we compare heads which have approximately the same form. Whether or not there is a difference in the number of cells and connective fibres in the brains of the two races is an open question. We may, however, safely infer from what is known that no fundamental differences will be found that would differentiate all the individuals of the one race from all the individuals of the other. Furthermore, the same functional adaptability pertains to the brain that pertains to other internal organs, so that the response on the part of brains of different structure and size to the demands of life may be very much the same.

These remarks must not be interpreted as meaning that the body of every person of every race can perform the same tasks. It is obvious that weakly developed respiratory organs, intestinal tract, or brain will not do the same work as those that are well developed; but the point to be emphasized is that there are weak and well-developed individuals in every race, and that the essential differences between races are based upon the unequal distribution of various forms.

There is also to be considered in the Negro problem the question of heredity. We speak commonly of hereditary characteristics of various races. This phrase can mean only that the characteristics of one generation of a race will be repeated in the same distribution in the following generation. It does not say anything with regard to the hereditary relations of individuals. There is not the slightest doubt that bodily form and functional tendencies are inherited by children from their parents, so that, for instance, the children of eminently well-developed individuals in any race will inherit similar qualities, while children of weak parents will also inherit their qualities. Although not all the morphological and physiolog-

ical characteristics of parents are transmitted with equal intensity, we recognize a general tendency to hereditary similarity between parents and children. From the great variability in each race, we must conclude that there are excellent strains in the Negro race as well as in the white race and that both races contain also inferior strains.

Some attention has been given in recent years to investigations of the mental reactions of Negroes and whites, particularly of Negro children and white children. Certain definite differences have been found among different classes of whites and among different classes of Negroes, and between Negroes and whites compared by race. I am not convinced that the results that have been obtained are significant in regard to racial ability as a whole. The variability of the results is also very marked, and there is an overlapping of racial traits. But we can undoubtedly find among Negroes strains which are mentally stronger than other strains which are to be found among whites.

Mr. M. R. Trabue in an article on the intelligence of American Negro recruits in the First World War shows that the army tests of a considerable number of Louisiana Negroes, Mississippi Negroes, and Whites from the same region, indicate very material divergence in intellectual achievement. In this respect, the results differ from those obtained in the study of Negro and white school children. Mr. Trabue draws the most far reaching conclusions from his data, assuming that they demonstrate a hereditary difference between the races, not a difference due to the social standing of the individuals investigated. The same army investigations have shown that Northern Negroes are very much superior to Southern Negroes. Mr. Trabue explains this by saying that only the gifted Southern Negroes emigrate; yet, in the absence of sound proof, this superiority may just as well be explained by the assumption that Northern Negroes are exposed to more favorable social conditions and to a wider range of experience than Southern Negroes. Anyone who knows the abject fear of Southern Negroes who are put under the control of an un-

known white officer in foreign surroundings, anyone who knows the limitations of early childhood and of general up-bringing of Negroes in the South, will accept these findings, but will decline to find in them a convincing proof of the hereditary inferiority of the Negro race.

It does not seem justifiable to popularize an ill-founded interpretation of these findings so long as good grounds may be brought forward which would explain the results entirely or almost entirely on the basis of social environment. It may be granted that under peculiar social conditions a residue of individuals unfavorably equipped mentally may remain in a community, and that a particular mode of life will favor the retention of individuals that have a definite mental make-up. I presume that this is the explanation of the striking differences found in the army tests between the Scottish and the Irish or between the Irish and the Jews. This, however, does not prove that if the social conditions were equalized there might not be a regression of the whole population towards much less distinctive standards.

Owing to the great difficulty of excluding the effects of social environment, the significance of mental tests is always open to doubt. Psychologists claim that modern methods give us an exact measure of the innate mental characteristics, but I am not convinced that this aim has been achieved. When, for instance, Miss Murdoch finds in the schools of an unfavorably situated district in New York City that American and Jewish children rank about equally in intelligence, and that they are followed by Negroes, and then by Italians who are much lower in the scale, we may well ask whether the tests do not show that the up-bringing of the children fits some of the groups better for the kind of reaction demanded in the test than others; and we may infer that the test does not give us an absolute expression of mentality. The few preliminary statements regarding psychological tests made in the army, which are said to bring out material differences between Irishmen and Englishmen, between Poles and Germans, also make us doubt the success of psychology in eliminating the factor of

the social milieu. For this reason, the generalized results of the standing of Negroes as compared with whites are not convincing as proof of innate mental inferiority, although they do show less satisfactory reactions to particular kinds of tests.

In relation to this question of the mental ability of the Negro, the study of primitive life in Africa seems most significant. The contrast presented by African industrial and political conditions and conditions among our poor Negroes is very striking. Instead of shiftlessness, we find in Africa highly developed native arts. Excellent work in weaving, carving, pottery, blacksmithing, and even metal casting and glass blowing, is done by the black races either all over the African continent or at least locally. Industrially, the African Negro is in advance of most other primitive tribes. His political organization reminds one strongly of the political conditions in mediaeval Europe. The germs of large feudal states are to be found in African society; and in the Sudan as well as in the Congo region and in South Africa there are Negro rulers whose genius for organization has enabled them to establish flourishing empires.

It is often claimed that the very fact that the Negro has never succeeded in developing a civilization similar to our own is a proof of his inferiority. Are we willing to admit this argument as cogent when we remember that it could be applied to our own ancestors, who were uncouth barbarians at a time when the Egyptians and the Babylonians had a flourishing civilization? Does the lack of achievement on the part of the Negroes today place them on a lower level of ability than that of the whites?

An important phase of the Negro problem in this country relates to the position of the mulatto. The common saying is that he inherits all the bad qualities of both races. Socially this may be true in many cases, and it can readily be understood. If, however, the attempt is made to prove the biological inferiority of the mulatto, we are confronted by the fact that no evil results are found in the mixed populations of Africa in the northern borderland of the Negro country, where

Mediterranean races and Negroes have intermarried, and also by the fact that under favorable conditions the mulatto is healthy and may attain to great eminence, as in the cases of Dumas and Pushkin. For the great mass of mulattoes in our own country, the relatively unfavorable conditions of life must be taken into consideration.

If we are to understand our mulatto population, we must understand the kind of race mixture which has given rise to it. The mulattoes are almost exclusively descended from white fathers and Negro mothers. Most quadroons are descended from white fathers and mulatto mothers. Although it is not possible to give exact numerical proof of this statement, its correctness cannot be doubted. In order to appreciate the effect of this one-sided race mixture, it should be remembered that the total number of possible children depends on the mothers rather than the fathers. If, therefore, Negro mothers bear mulatto children, the number of full-blood Negroes must decrease, while there is no decrease in the number of white children born. Only in case the mortality among the children of mixed blood were unusually high could the Negro race escape being impregnated with white blood. The difference between this condition and the bilateral mixture between Indian and white man in Mexico is striking. There the result of the equal mixture of Indian and white males and females is not the preponderance of the white type, but the development of a mixed type in which both lines are equally represented. In the United States this does not occur in mixtures of whites with Negroes or Indians. The fate of a mulatto child is likely to vary according to sex. The male will marry a mulatto or a full-blood Negro, while the female will frequently marry a white man or a person of lighter color than herself.

Even if there is neither a biological nor a psychological justification for the popular belief in the inferiority of the Negro race, the social basis of the race prejudice in America is not difficult to understand. The prejudice is founded essentially on the tendency of the human mind to merge the individual in the class to which he belongs, and to ascribe to him

all the characteristics of his class. It does not even require a marked difference in type, such as we find when we compare Negro and white, to provoke the spirit that prevents us from recognizing individuals and compels us to see only representatives of a class endowed with imaginary qualities that we ascribe to the group as a whole. We find this spirit at work in anti-Semitism as well as in American nativism, and in the conflict between labor and capitalism. We have recently seen it at its height in the emotions called forth by a world war.

It is not by any means the class consciousness of the segregated group that determines this feeling. It is rather the consciousness of the outsider who combines a large number of individuals in a group and thus assigns to each the same character. The less feeling of unity the heterogeneous members of the group possess, the harder it is for them to bear the discrimination under which they suffer.

This is obviously the psychological basis of the present situation of the American Negro. To the popular mind, the Negro appears as a class, and the impressions made by the life of the poor Negro are generalized by the white man and are combined with dogmatic beliefs regarding the physical and hereditary mental make-up of the race. The consciousness that the Negro belongs to a class by himself is kept alive by the contrast presented by his physical appearance with that of the whites. For the descendants of the Teutonic peoples of Northern Europe, this consciousness has attained a high emotional value. It is natural that the stronger the individuality of a person who is thus assigned to a class with which he has little in common, the stronger must also be his resentment against those who refuse to take him at his individual worth. Every moment of his life, the self-respecting Negro feels the strain of his inability to overcome the prejudices that merge him in a type. This resentment will grow in extent as individual achievement develops among the Negroes while they are still not valued as individuals.

It is claimed by many that the Negro problem is economic

rather than racial, that the fear of Negro competition causes racial opposition. Obviously, this explanation also would not hold good if the tendency did not exist to treat the Negro as a class, not as an individual. I do not wish to deny that the economic conflict may be a contributing cause that accentuates the pre-existing feeling of the contrast between whites and Negroes. This feeling may be emphasized in many ways—by economic interest, by questions of social privilege, or by any other social process that brings about conflicts of interest between large groups of whites and Negroes. It would, however, be an error to seek in these sources the fundamental cause for the antagonism; for the economic conflict, as well as the other conflicts, presupposes the social recognition of the classes.

It is easier to point out the causes of conflict between whites and Negroes than to formulate a remedy. If my view is correct, it is clear that the only fundamental remedy for the situation is the recognition that the Negroes have the right to be treated as individuals, not as members of a class. But how can this be brought about in a population that is so deeply saturated with class consciousness as our own? Even if, in the education of the young, the importance of individual differences were emphasized so that an intelligent understanding could be attained of the irrationality of the assumption that all Negroes are inferior, we should not effectively overcome the general human tendency of forming groups that in the mind of the outsider are held together by his emotional attitude towards them. In other words, the hostile feeling of each individual to foreign social groups would not be eradicated.

Mankind has travelled a long road from the time when every stranger was an enemy. According to our modern theoretical standards, we maintain that justice should be given to the individual, that it should not be meted out to him as to a representative of his class. And still, how very far removed are we from the realization of this ideal! The natural habit of protecting ourselves against a supposedly hostile foreign

group determines our life in great matters as well as in small details, and the life of nations as well as the life of the individual and of the family.

For this reason there is no great hope that the Negro problem will find even a half-way satisfactory solution in our day. We may, perhaps, expect that an increasing number of strong minds will free themselves from race prejudice and see in every person a man entitled to be judged on his merits. The weak-minded will not follow their example.

But the greatest hope for the immediate future lies in a lessening of the contrast between Negroes and whites which will bring about a lessening of class consciousness. As I have already pointed out, under present conditions a penetration of the white race by the Negro does not occur, while the effects of intermixture in which the fathers are white and the mothers Negro will lead in all probability to an increase of the amount of white blood in the Negro population. This should allay the fears of those who believe that the white race might deteriorate by race mixture. On the other hand, intermixture will decrease the contrast between the extreme racial forms, and in the course of time, this will lead to a lessening of the consciousness of race distinction. If conditions were ever such that it could be doubtful whether a person were of Negro descent or not, the consciousness of race would necessarily be much weakened. In a race of octoroons, living among Whites, the color question would probably disappear.

There is absolutely no biological evidence which would countenance the assumption that race mixture of itself would have unfavorable results, that the children of white fathers and of mulatto or quadroon mothers would be inferior to their Negro ancestors. It would seem, therefore, to be in the interest of society to permit rather than to restrain marriages between white men and Negro women. It would be futile to expect that our people would tolerate intermarriages in the opposite direction, although no scientific reason can be given that would prove them to be detrimental to the individual. Intermixture between white males and Negro females has

been common ever since Negroes were brought to our continent, and the efficacy of the modern attempts to repress this intermingling is open to grave doubt.

Thus it would seem that man being what he is, the Negro problem will not disappear in America until the Negro blood has been so much diluted that it will no longer be recognized just as anti-Semitism will not disappear until the last vestige of the Jew as a Jew has disappeared.

XI

Antipathies are based on emotion, not on reason. We feel first and then explain our feeling by rationalization.

The American People

The development of the American nation through the amalgamation of diverse European nationalities and the ever-increasing heterogeneity of the component elements of our people have called attention to the anthropological and biological problems involved in this process.

Let us first represent to our minds the facts relating to the origins of our nation. When British immigrants first flocked to the Atlantic coast of North America, they found a continent inhabited by Indians. The population of the country was thin, and vanished comparatively rapidly before the influx of the more numerous Europeans. The settlement of the Dutch on the Hudson, of the Germans in Pennsylvania, not to speak of other nationalities, is familiar to all of us. We know that the foundations of our modern state were laid by Spaniards in the Southwest, by French in the Mississippi Basin and in the region of the Great Lakes, but that the British immigration far outnumbered that of other nationalities. In the composition of our people, the indigenous element has never played an important role, except for very short periods. In regions where the settlement progressed for a long time entirely by the immigration of unmarried males of the white race, families of mixed blood have been of some importance during the period

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of gradual development, but they have never become sufficiently numerous in any populous part of the United States to be considered as an important element in our population. Without any doubt, Indian blood flows in the veins of quite a number of our people, but the proportion is so insignificant that it may well be disregarded.

Much more important has been the introduction of the Negro, whose numbers have increased many fold so that they form now about one-eighth of our whole nation. For a time the immigration of Asiatic nations seemed likely to become of importance in the development of our country. More recent is the problem of the immigration of people representing all the nationalities of Europe, western Asia and northern Africa. Until late in the second half of the nineteenth century the immigrants consisted almost entirely of people of northwestern Europe, natives of Great Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and France, but subsequently the composition of the masses changed completely. With the economic development of Germany, German immigration dwindled; while at the same time Italians, the various Slavic peoples of Austria, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, Hungarians, Roumanians, east European Hebrews, not to mention the numerous other nationalities, arrived in ever-increasing numbers. There is no doubt that these people of eastern and southern Europe represent a physical type distinct from the physical type of northwestern Europe; and it is clear, even to the most casual observer, that their present social standards differ fundamentally from our own. Since the number of new arrivals could be counted in normal years by hundreds of thousands, the question may well be asked, What will be the result of this influx of types distinct from our own, if it is to continue for a considerable length of time?

It is often claimed that the phenomenon of mixture presented in the United States is unique; that a similar intermixture has never occurred before in the world's history; and that our nation is destined to become what some writers choose to

term a "mongrel" nation in a sense that has never been equaled anywhere.

When we try to analyze the phenomena in greater detail, and in the light of our knowledge of conditions in Europe as well as in other continents, this view does not seem to me tenable. In speaking of European types, we are accustomed to consider them as, comparatively speaking, pure stocks. It is easy to show that this view is erroneous. It is only necessary to look at a map illustrating the racial types of any European country—like Italy, for instance—to see that local divergence is the characteristic feature, uniformity of type the exception. Thus Dr. Ridolfo Livi, in his fundamental investigations on the anthropology of Italy, has shown that the types of the extreme north and of the extreme south are quite distinct—the former tall, short-headed, with a considerable sprinkling of blond and blue-eyed individuals; the latter short, long-headed and remarkably dark. The transition from one type to the other is, on the whole, quite gradual, but, like isolated islands, distinct types occur here and there. The region of Lucca in Tuscany and the district of Naples are examples of this kind, which may be explained as due to the survival of an older stock, to the intrusion of new types, or to a peculiar influence of environment.

Historical evidence is quite in accord with the results derived from the investigation of the distribution of modern types. In the earliest times we find on the peninsula of Italy groups of heterogeneous people, the linguistic relationships of many of which have remained obscure up to the present time. From the earliest prehistoric times on, we see wave after wave of people invading Italy from the north. Very early, Greeks settled in the greater part of southern Italy and Phoenician influence was well established on the west coast of the peninsula. A lively intercourse existed between Italy and northern Africa. Slaves of Berber blood were imported and have left their traces. Slave trade continued to bring new blood into the country until quite recent times, and Livi believes that he can trace the type of Crimean slaves who were introduced late in

the Middle Ages in the region of Venice. In the course of the centuries, the migrations of Celtic and Teutonic tribes, the conquests of the Normans, the contact with Africa, have added their share to the mixture of people on the Italian peninsula.

The fates of other parts of Europe were no less diversified. The Pyrenaean Peninsula, which at present seems to be one of the most isolated parts of Europe, had a most checkered history. The earliest inhabitants of whom we know were presumably related to the Basques of the Pyrenees. These were subjected to Oriental influences in the Pre-Mycenaean period, to Punic influences, to Celtic invasions, Roman colonization, Teutonic invasions, the Moorish conquest, and later on to the peculiar selective process that accompanied the driving-out of the Moors and the Jews.

England was not exempt from vicissitudes of this kind. It seems plausible that at a very early period the type which is now found principally in Wales and in some parts of Ireland occupied the greater portion of the islands. It was swamped by successive waves of Celtic, Roman and Anglo-Saxon migration.

The history of the migrations of the Goths, the invasions of the Huns, who in the short interval of one century moved their habitations from the borders of China into the very center of Europe, are proofs of the enormous changes in population that have taken place in early times.

Slow colonization has also brought about fundamental changes in blood as well as in diffusion of languages and cultures. Perhaps the most striking recent example of this change is presented by the gradual Germanization of the region east of the Elbe River, where, after the Teutonic migrations, people speaking Slavic languages had settled. The gradual absorption of Celtic communities, of the Basque, in ancient times the great Roman colonization, and later the Arab conquest of north Africa, are examples of similar processes. Intermixture in early times was not by any means confined to peoples which, although diverse in language and culture,

were of fairly uniform type. On the contrary, the most diverse types of southern Europe, northern Europe, eastern Europe and western Europe, not to mention the elements which poured into Europe from Asia and Africa, have been participants in the long-continued intermixture.

There is, however, one fundamental difference in regard to the early European migrations and the modern trans-Atlantic migration. On the whole, the former took place at a period when the density of population was, comparatively speaking, small. There is no doubt that the number of individuals concerned in the formation of the modern types of Great Britain were comparatively few as compared with the millions who come together to form a new nation in the United States; and it is obvious that the process of amalgamation which takes place in communities that must be counted by millions differs in character from the process of amalgamation that takes place in communities that may be counted by thousands. Setting aside social barriers, which in early times as well as now undoubtedly tended to keep intermingling peoples separate, it would seem that in the more populous communities of modern times a greater permanence of the single combining elements might occur, owing to their larger numbers, which make the opportunities for segregation more favorable.

Among the smaller communities the process of amalgamation must have been an exceedingly rapid one. After the social distinctions have once been obliterated, pure descendants of one of the component types decrease greatly in number, and the fourth generation of a people consisting originally of distinct elements will be almost homogeneous. I shall revert to this phenomenon later on.

It might be objected to this point of view, that the very diversity of local types in Europe proves the homogeneity of race types—as, for instance, of the northwestern European type, the Mediterranean type, the east European type, or the Alpine type; but it must be remembered that we have historical proof of the process of mixture, and that the relative num-

ber of component elements is sufficient to account for the present conditions.

I think we may dismiss the assumption of the existence of a pure type in any part of Europe, and of a process of mongrelization in America different from anything that has taken place for thousands of years in Europe. Neither are we right in assuming that the phenomenon is one of a more rapid intermixture than the one prevailing in olden times. The difference is based essentially in the masses of individuals concerned in the process.

If we confine our consideration for the present to the intermixture of European types in America, I think it will be clear, from what has been said before, that the concern that is felt by many in regard to the continuance of racial purity of our nation is to a great extent imaginary. The history of Europe proves that there has been no racial purity anywhere for exceedingly long periods, neither has the continued intermixture of European types shown any degrading effect upon any of the European nationalities. It would be just as easy to prove that those nations that have been least disturbed have lacked the stimulus to further advance and have passed through periods of quiescence. The history of Spain might be interpreted as an instance of an occurrence of this kind.

The question as to the actual effects of intermixture will not, however, be answered by a generalized historical treatment such as we have attempted here. The advocates of the theory of a degradation of type by the influx of so-called "lower" types will not be silenced by reference to earlier mixtures in Europe, the course of which can no longer be traced in actual detail, for we do not know to what extent actual intermarriages have taken place, and what the development of families of mixed descent as compared with those of pure descent has been. It seems necessary that the problem should be approached from a biological standpoint. A knowledge of the events of the past may allay apprehensions that fill the observer with a strong bias for the results which he fears or desires.

Two questions stand out prominently in the study of the

physical characteristics of the immigrant populations. The first is the question of the influence of selection and environment in the migration from Europe to America. The second is the influence of intermixture. A beginning of a thorough study of the former question was made as early as the time of the Civil War, when Gould and Baxter, in their statistics of the enlisted soldiers, proved that the immigrant representatives of European nations were always better developed than the corresponding people in Europe. It has not been possible, up to the present time, to learn whether this difference is due to better development here or to a process of selection by which the weaker elements are eliminated before leaving their home country. It would be easy to ascertain the facts by an investigation of the arriving immigrants. That there is good reason to suppose that more favorable social surroundings in the United States have much to do with the better development of the immigrants is proved by the anthropometrical statistics collected by Bowditch in Boston and by Peckham in Milwaukee, who found that children growing up in America are better developed than European children. Although much additional material has been collected on the old lines, the fundamental questions which are involved in this investigation have never received adequate attention. Statistics which I had occasion to collect seem to show that the development of children of immigrants is the better the longer their parents have been in the United States. I presume this merely suggests that the economic well-being of the immigrants increases, on the whole, with the length of their stay here, and that the corresponding better nutrition of the children results in better physical development. Whether, however, the whole change can be explained adequately in this manner is open to doubt. It is quite possible that the type may undergo certain changes due to environment.[1]

[1]In studies published subsequent to the writing of this paper Boas proved that there is a far-reaching change in type of descendants of immigrants due directly to the influence of environment.

Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants. Report of the Immigration Commission Senate Document No. 208. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1911.

The fundamental question that must be asked is, whether the mixture of two distinct types of man tends to produce an intermediate homogeneous type in which certain of the characteristics of the parents appear blended, or whether the resultant tends to exhibit reversion to the parental types. This reversion may again be two-fold. We may either find a complete reversion to one of the component parental types, or we may find a mixture of traits, some resembling the one parent, some the other parent. Obviously this question is most intimately related to the whole study of Mendelian inheritance, which occupies such a prominent place in the work of modern biologists. So far, the results obtained from a study of human types are few in number. I believe the earliest observation in regard to this subject was made by Felix von Luschan, who found as early as 1884 that the inhabitants of the south coast of Asia Minor, who are descendants of intermarriages between a short-headed type of the central parts of Asia Minor and of the long-headed south coast type—a mixture which has continued for thousands of years—show clear evidence of alternating inheritance. In 1895 I was able to show (utilizing fairly extended observations) that the mixed blood resulting from unions of American Indians and Whites shows, in regard to certain traits, a clear tendency to reversion to either parental type; while in other respects (for instance, in stature) new characteristics seem to develop. A recent inquiry into heredity among east European Jews shows that here also the children show a tendency to revert either to the father's or to the mother's type. This result is interesting, because it bears upon unions inside of a fairly uniform type of man. Other observations relate to the inheritance of abnormal traits, all of which seem to suggest, if not true Mendelism, at least the occurrence of alternating inheritance. However, the observations on mixtures of Indian and White have shown that while alternating inheritance may be found in regard to such traits as the form of the head and face, the development of the bulk of the body follows different laws. Notwithstanding these observations, the whole problem of the effects of race

intermixture upon the various characteristic traits of human types is entirely unsolved.

The problem is one in regard to which speculation is as easy as accurate studies are difficult. Basing our arguments on ill-fitting analogies with the animal and plant world, we may speculate on the effects of intermixture upon the development of new types—as though the mixture that is taking place in America were in any sense, except a sociological one, different from the mixtures that have taken place in Europe for thousands of years; looking for a general degradation, for reversion to remote ancestral types, or towards the evolution of a new ideal type—as fancy or personal inclination may impel us. We may enlarge on the danger of the impending submergence of the northwest European type, or glory in the prospect of its dominance over all others. Would it not be a safer course to investigate the truth or fallacy of each theory rather than excite the public mind by indulgence in the fancies of our speculation. That these are an important adjunct in the attainment of truth, I do not deny; but they must not be promulgated before they have been subjected to a searching analysis, lest the credulous public mistake fancy for truth.

If I am not in a position to predict what the effect of mixture of distinct types may be, I feel confident that this important problem may be solved, if it is taken up with sufficient energy and on a sufficiently large scale. An investigation of the anthropological data of people of distinct types—taking into consideration the similarities and dissimilarities of parents and children, the rapidity and final result of the physical and mental development of children, their vitality, the fertility of marriages of different types and in different social strata—such an investigation is bound to give us information which will allow us to answer these important questions definitely and conclusively.

The final result of race mixture will necessarily depend upon the fertility of the present native population and of the newer immigrants. It has been pointed out repeatedly that the birth-rate of Americans has declined with great rapidity, and that

in the second and third generations of immigrants the same decline makes itself felt. It will therefore be important to know what the relation of fertility of different types may be.

If the fertility of foreigners continues high without a corresponding higher death-rate of children, we may anticipate a gradual increase of the physical influence of the more fertile type. The immigration of the divergent types of southern and eastern Europe is, however, so recent, that this question cannot be answered until at least twenty years more have elapsed.

No less important than the fertility of each immigrant type by itself is the question, to what extent they tend to intermarry. The data present in our census reports do not give a clear insight into this tendency among various nationalities. The difficulties of collecting significant statistics on the problem are very great. They appear particularly clear in the case of Italians. Married men from Italy come to the United States, earn some money, and go back to rejoin their families. They may come again, and, when conditions are propitious, they may finally send for their families to follow them. Thus we find among the Italian immigrants very large numbers who were married before they came here. It seems almost impossible to separate the contingent of couples married before their arrival here from those married after their arrival, and the chief point of interest to us lies in the intermarriages of children born in this country. It is natural that in large cities, where nationalities separate in various quarters, a great amount of cohesion should continue for some time; but it seems likely that intermarriages between descendants of foreign nationalities are much more common than the census figures would make it appear. Our experience with Americans whose grandparents immigrated into this country is, on the whole, that most social traces of their descent have disappeared, and that many do not even know to what nationalities their grandparents belonged. It might be expected—particularly in Western communities, where a rapid change of location is common—that this would result in a rapid mixture of the descendants of various nationalities. This inquiry,

which it is quite feasible to carry out in detail, seems indispensable for a clear understanding of the situation.

It is somewhat difficult to realize how rapidly intermixture of distinct types takes place, if the choice of mates is left entirely to accident. I have made this calculation; and I find that in a population in which two types intermingle, and in which both types occur with equal frequency, there will be in the fourth generation less than one person in ten thousand of pure descent. When the proportion of the two original types is as nine to one, there will be among the more numerous part of the population only eighteen in one thousand in the fourth generation that will be of pure blood. Taking these data as a basis, it is obvious that intermixture, as soon as the social barriers have been removed, must be exceedingly rapid; and I think it safe to assume that one hundred years from now, in the bulk of our population, very few pure descendants of the present immigrants will be found.

No material whatever is available to answer the question whether mixture of types is favorable for the physical development of the individual, or unfavorable. Statistics collected in the Argentine Republic tend to show that with a mixture of similar types, but from remote countries, considerable changes in the proportions of the sexes develop. Observations on half-breed Indians show that a type taller than either parental race develops in the mixed blood; that the fertility of the mixed blood is increased; and I cannot find any evidence that would corroborate the view, so often expressed, that the hybrid of distinct types tends to degenerate.

I have devoted attention essentially to the biological problems presented by the immigration of European nations, but I must not conclude my remarks without referring at least to the serious problem presented by the Negro population of our country. When compared with the contrast between the Negro and the white, the differences of the European types seem insignificant; and the unity of the European race, as contrasted with the Negro race, becomes at once apparent.

I do not intend to take up the whole question of racial in-

feriority, which cannot be treated adequately in the brief time that I can devote to this subject. I must confine myself to a statement of my opinion, which I have repeatedly tried to substantiate. I do not believe that the Negro is, in his physical and mental make-up, the same as the European. The anatomical differences are so great that corresponding mental differences are plausible. There may exist differences in character and in the direction of specific aptitudes. There is, however, no proof whatever that these differences signify any appreciable degree of inferiority of the Negro, notwithstanding the slightly inferior size, and perhaps lesser complexity of structure, of his brain; for these racial differences are much less than the range of variation found in either race considered by itself. This view is supported by the remarkable development of industry, political organization, and philosophic opinion, as well as by the frequent occurrence of men of great will-power and wisdom among the Negroes in Africa.

I think we have reason to be ashamed to confess that the scientific study of these questions has never received the support either of our government or of any of our great scientific institutions; and it is hard to understand why we are so indifferent towards a question which is of paramount importance to the welfare of our nation. The anatomy of the American Negro is not well known; and, notwithstanding the oft-repeated assertions regarding the hereditary inferiority of the mulatto, we know hardly anything on this subject. If his vitality is lower than that of the full-blooded Negro, this may be due to social causes as much as to hereditary causes. Owing to the very large number of mulattoes in our country, it would not be a difficult matter to investigate the biological aspects of this question thoroughly; and the importance of the problem demands that this should be done. Looking into a distant future, it seems reasonably certain that with the increasing mobility of the Negro, the number of full-bloods will rapidly decrease; and since there is no introduction of new Negro blood, there can not be the slightest doubt that the ultimate effect of the contact between the two races must necessarily be a con-

tinued increase of the amount of white blood in the Negro community. This process will go on most rapidly inside of the colored community, owing to intermarriages between mulattoes and full-blooded Negroes. Whether or not the addition of white blood to the colored population is sufficiently large to counterbalance this leveling effect, which will make the mixed bloods with a slight strain of Negro blood darker, is difficult to tell; but it is quite obvious, that, although our laws may retard the influx of white blood considerably, they can not hinder the gradual progress of intermixture. If the powerful caste system of India has not been able to prevent intermixture, our laws, which recognize a greater amount of individual liberty, will certainly not be able to do so; and that there is no racial sexual antipathy is made sufficiently clear by the size of our mulatto population. A candid consideration of the manner in which intermixture takes place shows very clearly that the probability of the infusion of white blood into the colored population is considerable. While the large body of the white population will always, at least for a very long time to come, be entirely remote from any possibility of intermixture with Negroes, I think that we may predict with a fair degree of certainty a condition in which the contrast between colored people and whites will be less marked than it is at the present time. Notwithstanding all the obstacles that may be laid in the way of intermixture, the conditions are such that the persistence of the pure Negro type is practically impossible. Not even an excessively high mortality and lack of fertility among the mixed type, as compared with the pure types, could prevent this result. Since it is impossible to change these conditions, they should be faced squarely, and we ought to demand a careful and critical investigation of the whole problem.

It appears from this consideration, that the most important practical questions relating to the Negro problem have reference to the mulattoes and other mixed bloods—to their physical types, their mental and moral qualities, and their vitality. When the bulky literature of this subject is carefully

sifted, little remains that will endure serious criticism; and I do not believe that I claim too much when I say that the whole work on this subject remains to be done. The development of modern methods of research makes it certain that by careful inquiry, definite answers to our problems may be found. Is it not, then, our plain duty to inform ourselves that, so far as that can be done, deliberate consideration of observations may take the place of heated discussions of beliefs in matters that concern not only ourselves, but also the welfare of millions of Negroes?

Facts that could help us to shape our policies in regard to our race problems are almost entirely wanting. It has been my endeavor to show that by proper investigations much can be done to clear up these problems, which are of vital importance for the future of our nation.

UNITS OF MAN

XII

The feeling of nationality, and the feeling of the solidarity of the horde are of the same order.

Units of Man

In the early days of mankind, our earth was thinly settled. Small groups of human beings were scattered here and there; the members of each horde were one in speech, one in customs, one in superstitious beliefs. From place to place they roamed, following the game that furnished their subsistence, or digging roots and picking the fruits of trees and bushes to allay the pangs of hunger. They were held together by the strong bands of habit. The gain of one member of the horde was the gain of the whole group, the loss and harm done to one, was loss and harm to the whole social group. No one had interests at stake that were not also the interests of his fellows.

Beyond the limit of the hunting grounds lived other groups, different in speech, different in customs, perhaps even different in appearance, whose very existence was a source of danger. They preyed upon the game, they threatened inroads upon the harvest of roots and fruits. They acted in a different manner; their reasoning and feeling were unintelligible; they had no part in the interests of the horde. Thus they stood opposed to it as beings of another kind, with whom there could be no community of interest. To harm them, if possible to annihilate them, was a self-evident act of self-preservation.

Thus the most primitive form of soceity presents to us the

An Anthropologist's View of War. Bulletin, American Association for International Conciliation, March, 1912; No. 52.

picture of continuous strife. The hand of each member of one horde was raised against each member of all other hordes. Always on the alert to protect himself and his kindred, man considered it an act of high merit to kill the stranger.

Human inventions improved. The herd of hunters learned the art of better providing for its needs. The people learned how to store up food and thus to provide for the future. With the greater regularity of the food supply and a decreased frequency of periods of starvation the number of members in the community increased. Weaker hordes, who still followed the older methods of hunting and food gathering, were exterminated or, profiting by the example of their neighbors, learned their new arts and also increased in numbers. Thus the groups that felt a solidarity among themselves became larger and by the extermination of small, isolated hordes, that remained in more primitive conditions, the total number of groups that stood opposed to one another became gradually less.

We do not venture to trace with any degree of certainty the steps by which the homogeneous groups became diversified, or by which the opposing groups came into closer contact. We may imagine that the widows and daughters of the slain, who became a welcome prey to the victors, established in time friendlier relations between their new masters and their kin; we may imagine that the economic advantage of peacefully acquiring the coveted property of neighbors rather than taking it by main force added to establishing kindlier relations; we may attribute an important influence to the weakening of old bonds of unity, to the gradual dispersion of the increasing number of members of the community. No matter how the next steps in political development happened, we see that, with increasing economic complexity, the hostility between the groups becomes less. If it was right before to slay everyone outside of the small horde, we now find tribes with a limited community of interests, that, under normal conditions live at peace, although enmities may spring up at slight provocation. The group that normally lives at peace has much increased in

size, and while the feeling of solidarity may have decreased, its scope has become immensely wider.

We may give a few examples of these conditions among the primitive members of mankind. The Bushmen of South Africa are a people that is being exterminated, because everybody's hand is raised against them, and theirs against everybody. Their small bands are being annihilated by the tribes of more advanced type of culture that surround them. They feel themselves a group different from the rest of the world, and for them there is no place in the life of their neighbors. So a bitter war has been waged for centuries and is on the point of ending with the extinction of the Bushmen. Similar conditions prevail in parts of South America where the hunting Indian is outlawed like the wild South African

Not so in more advanced types of society. Notwithstanding the cruel wars between the natives of our northern continent there had been laid the germs of larger political units among which peace normally reigned. The fierce Iroquois created a desert around them, but for themselves developed a large industrious community. The Zulu of South Africa, the terror of the country, formed a unit infinitely larger than any of those that existed before.

This process of enlargement of political units and the reduction of the number of those that were naturally at war with one another began in the earliest times, and has continued without interruption, almost always in the same direction. Even though hostilities have broken out frequently between parts of what had come to be a large political unit, the tendency of unification has in the long run been more powerful than that of disintegration. We see the powers at work in antiquity, when the urban states of Greece and of Italy were gradually welded into larger wholes; we see it again at work after the breaking up of ancient society in the development of new states from the fragments of the old ones; and later on in the disappearance of the small feudal states.

In the nations of our days in which law rules supreme, we find the greatest numbers of people united in political units

that the world has seen. Here war is excluded, because all members are subject to the same law, and excessive strains in the community, that lead to internal bloodshed, have become less frequent, although perhaps not less violent.

Thus the history of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size that live together in peace, and that are ready to go to war only with other groups outside of their own limits. Notwithstanding all temporary revolutions and the shattering of larger units for the time being, the progress in the direction of unification has been so regular and so marked that we must needs conclude, that the tendencies which have swayed this development in the past will govern our history in the future. The concept of nationalities of the size of our modern nations would have been just as inconceivable in the early history of mankind, as the concept of unity of interests of all the peoples of the world, who share the same type of civilization and are subject to the same economic conditions appears to be today. Historical development shows, however, that such a feeling of opposition of one group toward another is solely an expression of existing conditions, and does not by any means indicate permanence of these conditions.

The practical difficulties that seem to stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for nought before the inexorable laws of history. The factors that have kept political units apart are manifold, but none of them have resisted the attacks of changing conditions. In modern times that abhorrence of members of a strange horde which sprang from the idea that they are specifically different is on the point of vanishing. We still find it in the so-called race instincts of the whites, as opposed to the Negro and Asiatic, and in the anti-Semitic movement, but in most of these cases rather as an element of internal strife than as one that leads to war. It is still active in the wars of extermination that are waged against primitive tribes, but these are nearly at an end, owing to the approaching extinction of the weakest tribes. In course of

time differences in customs and beliefs, differences in form of government and social structure, devotion to ruling dynasty, community of economic interests, sameness of language, have been held as causes that separate distinct communities and compel them to take hostile attitudes toward one another.

Thus it appears that it is not any rational cause that forms opposing groups, but solely the emotional value of an idea that holds together the members of each group and exalts their feeling of solidarity and greatness to such an extent that compromises with other groups become impossible. In this mental attitude we may readily recognize the survival of the feeling of specific differences between the hordes, transferred in part from the feeling of physical differences to that of mental differences. The modern enthusiasm for the superiority of the so-called "Aryan-Race" . . . can only be understood in this light. It is the old feeling of specific differences between social groups in a new disguise.

It is easy to show that this feeling is not based on any real racial relationship, but that it is merely an expression of a strong emotion that is connected with a vague idea of supposed relationship.

Recent investigations of anthropologists have demonstrated that no "Aryan-Race" exists, but that the people of Europe are related by descent, no matter what language they speak. And, how great is the heterogeneity of descent of the people of the United States, whose ancestors will embrace more and more all the nationalities of Europe? Students of Anthropology unanimously discard the idea of the unity of descent of each nation, and reject the pride in the purity of descent of any one particular type, which gives to the individuals representing that type the right to place themselves on a plane high over that occupied by all other members of mankind. The lack of an objective basis of unity becomes clearest when the interrelationship of all blondes or of all the brunettes is claimed, which is obviously not accompanied by any true feeling of kinship.

It seems, however, that in our present period, community

of language is a strong bond that holds nations together. It is, however, not very long that the bonds of language have been felt so intensely. Language establishes a basis of mutual understanding on which a community of interests may arise. The pleasure of hearing one's own tongue spoken in a foreign country, creates at once between its speakers a feeling of comradeship that is quite real, and in proportion to the smallness of the number of speakers of the idiom. The necessity of easy communication between the members of one nation has also led generally to the endeavor to make one language the ruling language throughout the whole state. When there has been a great difference of languages, as in Austria, the national unity seems to us feeble. One of the few exceptions in which language is not the controlling bond of the members of a nationality is Switzerland.

Nevertheless we may recognize that unity of language is also more an ideal than a real bond; not only that divergence of dialects makes communication difficult, but community of thought among the members of different social classes is also so slight that no communication of deeper thought and feeling is possible. The Provençal and the North French, the Bavarian and the Westphalian peasant, the Sicilian and the Florentine are hopelessly divided, owing to differences of language; and the educated Italians, Frenchmen, Englishmen and German have more in common than each has with uneducated classes of his own community.

Thus it appears that the feeling of solidarity among the members of each nation is not based by any means on objective traits common to all of them—although the manner of thinking and living may impose certain mental forms upon each community—but upon subjective ideals that possess a strong emotional value. From primitive times on such ideals have existed, but in ever changing form. Now one idea has been the center of public sentiment, then another. With them the political groupings of mankind have changed. All have had the power to create passions that have led each community to defend what it believed to be ideal against foreign at-

tacks, or even to attempt to force its ideal upon unwilling neighbors.

Thus the study of all types of people, primitive as well as advanced, shows two peculiar traits; the one the constant increase in size of the social units that believe in the same ideal; the other the constant variation of these ideals. Thus we are led to the important conclusion that neither is the belief justified that modern nations represent the largest attainable social units, nor that the ideals of the present groups—and indeed the groups themselves—will be permanent.

Most important of all, if we understand that the feeling of opposition to the stranger which accompanies the feeling of solidarity of the nation, is the survival of the primitive feeling of specific differences, we are brought clearly face to face with those forces that will ultimately abolish warfare as well as legislative conflicts between nations; that will put an end not only to the wholesale slaughter of those representing a distinct ideal, but also prevent the passage of laws that favor the members of one nation at the expense of all members of mankind.

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XIII

National Groupings

In Europe, the occurrence of local types has led to the concept of distinct races, identified with certain national groups: the blond representing the Teuton; the heavy, darker type, the Slav; and the Mediterranean, the typical Spaniard or Italian.

On account of the peculiar position of the blond type, it has been pre-eminently identified with the so-called Aryan race. As is well known, most of the languages of Europe are derived from one ancient form of speech—the parental Aryan language. Slavic, Teutonic, and Romance languages are the most important modern divisions of this group in Europe, to which Greek, Celtic, Lithuanian, and Albanian also belong. Among European languages, only Finnish and its relatives on the Baltic, Magyar, Turkish, and Basque, do not belong to this extended group. Aryan languages are spoken by people of the most diverse racial types; nevertheless there are scientists who try to identify the blond north-European with the ancient pure Aryan, and who claim for the race pre-eminent hereditary gifts, because the people who at present and in our concept are the leaders of the world speak Aryan languages.

Scientific proof of these contentions cannot be given. They

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are rather fancies of north-European dreamers, based on the complaisant love of the achievements of the blondes. No one has ever proved either that all the Aryans of the earliest times were blondes, or that people speaking other languages may not have been blond, too; and nobody would be able to show that the great achievements of mankind were due to blond thinkers. On the contrary, the men to whom we are indebted for the basic advance of civilization belong to the dark-complexioned human types of the Orient, Greece, and Italy, and not to our blond ancestors.

How deep and emotional a hold this idea has in the minds of some scientists appears when some investigators try to show us that Christ cannot have been a Jew by descent, but must have been an Aryan.

The idea of the great blond Aryan, the leader of mankind, is the result of self-admiration that emotional thinkers have tried to sustain by imaginative reasoning. It has no foundation in observed fact. This, however, does not decrease the emotional value of the fiction that has taken hold of minds wherever the Teutonic, German, or Anglo-Saxon type—however it may be called—prevails.

It is not the pre-eminence of the blond alone that appeals to the fancy in northwest-European countries: all over Europe we find the idea of racial purity, and of the existence of certain features inherent in each race that makes it superior to all others; while it is assumed that the mixed, "mongrel" races are doomed to permanent inferiority. This notion prevails among ourselves with equal force, for we shake our heads gravely over the ominous influx of "inferior" races from eastern Europe. Inferior by heredity? No. Socially different? Yes, on account of the environment in which they have lived, and therefore different from ourselves, and not easily subject to change provided they are allowed to cluster together indefinitely. Equally strong is our fear of the mongrelization of the American people by intermixtures between the northwest-European and other European types.

Scientific investigation does not countenance the assump-

tion that in any one part of Europe a people of pure descent or of a pure racial type is found, and careful inquiry has failed completely to reveal any inferiority of mixed European types.

In our imagination the local racial types of Europe have been identified with the modern nations, and thus the supposed hereditary characteristics of the races have been confused with national characteristics. An identification of racial type, of language, and of nationality has been made, that has gained an exceedingly strong hold on our imagination. In vain sober scientific thought has remonstrated against this identification; the idea is too firmly rooted. Even if it is true that the blond type is found at present pre-eminently among Teutonic people, it is not confined to them alone. Among the Finns, Poles, French, North Italians, not to speak of the North African Berbers and the Kurds of western Asia, there are many individuals of this type. The heavy-set, dark East-European type is common to many of the Slavic peoples of eastern Europe, to the Germans of Austria and southern Germany, to the North Italians, and to the French of the Alps and of central France. The Mediterranean type is spread widely over Spain, Italy, Greece, and the coast of Asia Minor, without regard to national boundaries.

In western Europe, types are distributed in strata that follow one another from north to south—in the north the blond, in the center a dark, short-headed type, in the south the slightly built Mediterranean type.

National boundaries in central Europe, on the other hand, run north and south: and so we find the northern French, Belgian, Hollander, German, and Russian to be about the same in type and descent; the central French, South German, Swiss, North Italian, Austrian, Servian, and central Russian, to be all the same variety of man: and the southern French, to be closely related to the types of the eastern and western Mediterranean area.

During the period of Teutonic migrations, in the first few centuries of our era, the Slavs settled in the whole region from which Teutonic tribes had moved away. They occupied the whole of what is now eastern Germany. In the Middle Ages,

with the growth of the German Empire, a slow backward movement set in. Germans settled as colonists in Slavic territory, and by degrees German speech prevailed over the Slavic. In Germany, survivals of the gradual process may be found in a few remote localities where Slavic speech still persists. As by contact with the more advanced Germans the cultural and economic conditions of the Slav improved, his resistance to Germanization became greater and greater—earliest among the Czechs and Poles, later in the other Slavic groups.

This process has led to the present distribution of languages, which expresses a fossilization of German colonization in the east, and illustrates in a most striking way the penetration of peoples. Poland and part of Russia, Slavonic and Magyar territories, are interspersed with small German settlements, which are the more sparse and scattered the further east they are located, the more continuous the nearer they lie to Germany.

With the increased economic and cultural strength of the Slav, the German lost his ability to impose his mode of life upon him, and with it his power to assimilate the numerically stronger people in its own home. But by blood all these people, no matter what their speech, are the same.

The so-called racial antipathies are feelings that have grown up on a basis of fictitious racial interpretation. It may not be amiss to say a word on the fact that we may distinguish with more or less uncertainty individuals that belong to distinct nationalities. This common experience might seem contradictory to what has been said before; but we form concepts of national types partly from essential elements of the form of the body, partly from the mannerisms of wearing hair and beard, and also from the characteristic expressions and motions of the body, which are determined not so much by hereditary causes as by habit. On the whole, the latter are more impressive than the former, but no fundamental traits of the body occur that belong to one nation to the exclusion of the others.

It is clear that the term *race* is only a disguise of the idea of *nationality*, which has really very, very little to do with racial descent.

If community of racial descent is not the basis of nationality, is it community of language?

When we glance at the national aspirations that have characterized a large part of the nineteenth century, community of language might seem to be the background of national life. It touches the most sympathetic chords in our hearts. Italians worked for the overthrow of all the small local and great foreign interests that were opposed to the national unity of all Italian-speaking people. German patriots strove for the federation of the German-speaking people in one empire. The struggles in the Balkans have been largely due to a desire for national independence according to the limits of speech.

Still this does not comprise the whole of nationalism, for no less ardent is the patriotism of bilingual Belgium and of trilingual Switzerland. Even here in America we see that the bond of tongue is not the only one. Else we should feel that there is no reason for a division between Canada and the United States, and that the political ties between western Canada and French Quebec must be artificial.

Neither the bonds of blood nor those of language alone make a nation. It is rather the community of emotional life that rises from our every-day habits, from the forms of our thoughts, feelings, and actions, which constitute the medium in which every individual can unfold freely his activities.

Language and nation are so often identified, because we feel that among a people that uses the same language every one can find the widest field for unrestricted activity. Added to this is the powerful idea of political unity, which emphasizes the interests of the citizen as opposed to those of the foreigner. These beliefs combine to create a sense of national unity. Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that there is no individual, nor any group of individuals, that represents the national ideal. It is rather an abstraction based on the current forms of

thought, feeling, and action—an abstraction of high emotional value, that is further enhanced by the consciousness of political power.

It is well to bear in mind that nationality is not necessarily based on unity of speech; for when the same type of cultural ideals prevails in a polyglottal area, in which each group is too weak to give to the individual a free field of action, this can be attained only by the development of a union of the independent groups.

For the full development of his faculties, the individual needs the widest possible field in which to live and act according to his modes of thought and inner feeling. Since, in most cases, the opportunity is given among a group that possesses unity of speech, we feel full sympathy with the intense desire to throw down the artificial barriers of small political units. This process has characterized the development of modern nations.

When, however, these limits are overstepped, and a fictitious racial or alleged national unit is set up that has no existence in actual conditions, the free unfolding of powers, for which we are striving, is liable to become an excuse for ambitious lust for power. When France dreamt of a union of all Latin people in a Pan-Latin union under her leadership, the legitimate limits of natural development were lost sight of for the sake of national ambition. When Russia promoted a Pan-Slavistic propaganda among diverse peoples, solely on the ground that the Slavs are linguistically related, and assumed a fictitious common racial origin, the actual usefulness of the nationalistic idea was lost sight of, and was made the cover for desire of expansion of power.

There is no doubt that the idea of nationality has been a creative force, making possible the fuller development of individual powers by widening the field of individual activity, and by setting definite ideals to large co-operating masses; but we feel with Fichte and Mazzini that the political power of a nation is important only when the national unit is the carrier of ideals that are of value to mankind.

Together with the positive, creative side of nationalism,

there has developed everywhere another one, which forms the basis of the passions that are blinding people to the high aims of humanity. Instead of seeing in each nation one of the members of mankind that contributes in its own way toward the advance of civilization, an aggressive intolerance of all other units has grown up. It is strengthened by the inadaptability of governmental machinery, which favors national isolation.

On a larger scale the conditions are repeated now that less than a century ago prevented the ready formation of modern nations. The narrow-minded local interests of cities and other small political units resisted unification or federation on account of the supposed conflicts between their interests and ideals and those of other units of comparable size. The governmental organization strengthened the tendency to isolation, and the unavoidable, ever-present desire of self-preservation of the existing order stood in the way of amalgamation. It was only after long years of agitation and of bloody struggle that the larger idea prevailed.

Those of us who recognize in the realization of national ideals a definite advance that has benefited mankind cannot fail to see that the task before us at the present time is a repetition of the process of nationalization on a larger scale; not with a view to levelling down all local differences, but with the avowed purpose of making them all subserve the same end.

The federation of nations is the next necessary step in the evolution of mankind. It is the expansion of the fundamental idea underlying the organization of the United States, and of Switzerland.

Such federation of nations is not a Utopian idea, any more than nationalism was a century ago. In fact, the whole development of mankind shows that this condition is destined to come. Progress has been slow, but almost steady, in the direction of expanding the political units from hordes to tribes, from tribes to small states, confederations, and nations. The concept of the foreigner as a specifically distinct being has been so modified that we are beginning to see in him a member of mankind.

Enlargement of circles of association, and equalization of

rights of distinct local communities, have been so consistently the *general* tendency of human development, that we may look forward confidently to its consummation.

It is obvious that the standards of ethical conduct must be quite distinct as between those who have grasped this ideal and those who still believe in the preservation of isolated nationality in opposition to all others. In all countries the standards of national ethics, as cultivated by means of national education, are opposed to this wider view. Devotion to the nation is taught as the paramount duty, and it is instilled into the minds of the young in such a form that with it grows up and is perpetuated the feeling of rivalry and of hostility against all other nations.

If our public conscience is hardly strong enough to exact the faithful performance of the terms of a treaty in which only commercial interests are at stake, if we are restrained with some difficulty from aggression for the sake of economic advantage, it is at least intelligible why a government that sees the very existence of the nation endangered should, in a conflict of duties, reluctantly decide to set the safety of the nation for which it is responsible higher than the performance of a treaty inherited from a previous generation.

We must acknowledge that in such a case the demands of national and international duty are hopelessly at variance, and what line of action is chosen depends upon the conception of responsibility and upon the value given to the preservation of national existence.

Those who look forward to the federation of nations must work together to teach their ideals to the young, to teach that no nation has the right to impose its individuality upon another one, that no war is justifiable except for the defence of the threatened integrity of our ideals.

The federation of nations is the next necessary step in the evolution of mankind. The whole development of mankind shows that this condition is destined to come.

XIV

Nationalism

It has become evident that unity of racial descent does not bring about national cohesion, and that distinct racial elements may combine and form a nation of great solidarity. We also recognize that between the members of a nationality, language is a firmer bond than race, although it does not necessarily coincide with national boundaries.

Since at the present time we lay great stress upon the rights of nations, it seems desirable to obtain a clear understanding of what we mean by the unity of a nationality. In order to answer this problem, we must understand the basis of all actions based on social solidarity. In early times mankind was divided into small hordes or tribes that lived in isolation and in constant fear of enemies, beast as well as man. Whoever was not a member of the tribe was a potential enemy, a being of a different order that was chased away and slain, if he did not yield. The extreme hostility against the stranger, and the utter disregard of the stranger's life which characterize the behavior of many primitive tribes, point to the early feeling of specific difference between the member of the horde and the outsider. In the progress of times contact between the isolated bands became more frequent and economic life developed in such a manner that no tribe was entirely independent of all its neighbors. Thus the feeling of specific difference

Condensed from "The Dial", March 8, 1919; p. 232.

gradually wore off and, although the attitude toward the stranger retained a background of hostility, a certain amount of mutual toleration developed. Behavior, however, continued to be based on the existence of a contrast between the tribe and the outsider. A person may struggle against other members of his own band and defend his own interests. Against strangers he reacts first of all as a member of the tribe and defends himself against real or supposed encroachments by defending the social unit to which he belongs.

We have not progressed far beyond these limits. Human interests that know no national boundaries have increased. Art, science, and commerce form ties that bind together mankind regardless of nationality, but nevertheless there persists the contrast between members of different national groups that makes it right for one nation to promote the well-being of its own citizens regardless of the effect that its actions may have upon the rest of mankind, to set their welfare higher than that of others, and to look with poisonous envy upon the growing power and successes of members of foreign nations.

Group solidarity has expanded from the small horde or tribe to communities of ever increasing size. This development has not been steady, for periods in which large and heterogeneous masses formed units that acted conjointly against foreign groups were followed by others in which the large structures disintegrated, the smaller units forming centers from which new, larger social units developed. The history of the Alexandrian Empire, of Rome, of the Spanish World Empire illustrates the growth and decline of large communities. The development of the modern European states from the disintegrating tendencies of feudal times and from the rise of independent cities, illustrates another phase of expansion of the smaller units into larger ones.

In all cases of group solidarity the unifying force is the will of the members of the group to maintain their society against foreign groups. In its simplest form this mode of action of man as a member of a social group is strictly analogous to that of a herd of animals that maintains the integrity of its

habitat against other herds. It is the instinctive feeling of the unity of the herd or pack that is manifested by all gregarious animals. In many cases, as among modern primitive tribes, the analogous reaction is entirely spontaneous and automatic. It may be observed that the less automatic their reaction, the more will people endeavor to reason out their motives; and the more automatic a reaction, the less will there be felt any need of a reasoned interpretation. Among primitive tribes the actions springing from the solidarity of the tribal group are so little conscious that they do not call for explanation, and the rights of foreigners are no subject of thought.

It is not difficult to see that the same instinct continues to sway us. Under normal conditions the family is a loose unit in which each member goes more or less his own way. If, however, a member of the family comes into conflict with outsiders, the natural reaction is for the members of the family to stand together. When a gang of youth infests a city street, it will not allow other gangs in the same street. The stronger the feeling of solidarity in the group and of sameness of form and purpose of the conflicting groups, the more violent are also their reactions against one another.

In more complex social units in which conflicting social instincts make the social affiliations less automatic and more often determined by choice, the subordination of the individual under a social group becomes the subject of retrospective thought and interpretation and thus assumes forms and shades of meaning that obscure its instinctive origin. It may be called allegiance to a race, to the personality of a chief or family, to a god, or to an ideal. The substratum on which it arises is always the same instinctive social reaction.

We shall attempt to characterize those elements that set off nationality from other similar units. One of the main difficulties in the way of clear understanding of the significance of nationality lies in the confusion between the aims of a nation and of a nationality. The nation is the state, and national feeling is bound up with the political power of the state. Nationality and state do not need to coincide. The nationali-

ties in a complex state may have political aspirations and may strive to become independent states. The question must be answered: what constitutes these nationalities? They are not adequately defined as racial or linguistic units.

It is helpful to observe how the concepts of both "nation" and "nationality" are reflected in different classes of a population. In most modern states in which compulsory education prevails both ideas have permeated the whole body of the people. Not so in simpler communities. It is not so very long ago that the mountaineer of the southern Appalachian region had only the vaguest ideas of the United States as a nation, and that his social interests rather centered in his family group. There are many regions in Mexico in which the very existence of Mexico is unknown and where the social interests of the people are confined to the village of their fathers. The feeling of national political unity requires first of all a knowledge of the nation and its work. In all large units the existence of which is not manifested in the narrow cycle of everyday life, this knowledge must necessarily be based on education.

The self-consciousness of nationalities is similarly restricted. When a knowledge of communities of different speech, habits and appearance is lacking, the feeling of differentiation between small units must necessarily prevail. When communities of alien descent, of foreign language, or of unfamiliar customs are known, the feeling of relationship of those who are the same in race, language or custom may develop. The limits of modern nationalities are not determined by these elements, for nationalities include people who show marked differences in all these respects. The habits of life, speech and bodily form of the Sicilian peasant are quite different from those of the Venetian peasant, and there is little that he has in common in his conduct of life with the Florentine artist or scientist, or with the Roman politician. The Galician and the Catalan peasants and the Spanish scientist, merchant and laborer; the peasants of the Provence and of Normandie, and the educated

Parisian; the Swabian peasant, the Frisian fisherman and the German composer and scientist have little in common.

In the most strongly localized groups, as in the peasantry, modern nationality exceeds the experience of daily life and can become conscious only by educational agencies that originate outside of the social group. In those groups of men that deal with science, art, and commerce, which are in their nature essentially international, the idea of nationality is more restricted than the universality of interests which is prominent in their daily life. In neither group does it spring from everyday experience.

It is fairly obvious that in modern times the nationalistic feeling cannot be separated from the desire for political power—at least for the power of a group to shape its own mode of life according to its own wishes, for the right to use its own language, follow its own customs and formulate its own laws. Therefore nationalistic aspirations are nowhere stronger than in suppressed nationalities. In these local phases the nationalistic feeling is easily intelligible because it is based on the reaction against outside interference on the part of a fairly homogeneous group that is held together by common language, customs and interests. At the same time these areas present problems of national antagonism in many cases not capable of solution.

Psychologically quite different are the sources of national feeling in countries that seek national unity, not to free themselves of the yoke of foreign mastery but in an attempt to break down barriers between those who are of the same nationality and who are separated by political boundaries that have no nationalistic meaning. These feelings prevailed with particular intensity in Germany and Italy before each became a united state. Among the Poles, Greeks, Servians, Roumanians, Lithuanians and Little Russians they are complicated by the feelings engendered by the intermingling of nationalities to which we referred before.

In an uneducated person who has no historical perspective

and no knowledge outside of that which his daily experience presents to him, the aspiration for national unity could not possibly arise, because it must be based on a unity of feeling that does not manifest itself in a tangible form in daily needs and wishes. We have already seen that the Sicilian and the Venetian, or the Bavarian and Westphalian peasants, if they should meet and converse solely in regard to matters of everyday life, would find so little in common that the feeling of national unity would not arise on this basis. The relation of the Sicilian to the Friulese or Romansh, of the Bavarian to the Dutch, corroborates this view. Administrative regulations making intercourse difficult between neighbors may have fostered the desire to do away with artificial boundaries, but it does not account for the intense desire for national unity.

In the cases of Italy and Germany it is particularly clear that two sources have molded this feeling: the memory of times in which the nation had great political power and the desire to bring back these times, and the consciousness that a certain literature and art is the common property of all those who constitute the nation. For the Italian the greatness of Rome, both in the history of antiquity and in the history of Christianity, is a leading idea that makes him long for national greatness; and Italian literature and art are the common property of the whole people of which they are proud. This is no less true of Germany. Without the memory of Germany's political history, without the works of the great Germans, there would be no German nationality. These are the expression and at the same time the outflow of a mode of thought which is felt by the nation as its very soul. Ideals of this kind can arise in the educated to impress nationalistic ideas upon the mass of the people; school and literature constantly cooperate to keep alive and strengthen these ideals.

For these reasons nationalism in large states cannot flourish unless it is continually rekindled by education, and preached in and out of season; and for these reasons it finds its home chiefly among the educated classes, while the masses merely follow the impetus that is given to them.

It might be thought that common political activitity as members of a state, and particularly common dangers encountered in warfare, bind the members of a state together, but it seems that this is the case to a very limited extent only. Political dissension is often a dissolving agent rather than a unifying force, and the rapidity with which fellows in arms fall apart and enemies join hands shows the weakness of fellowship engendered by war as compared with the stability of national sentiment.

Modern nationalism is based on the dogma that political power and national individuality are inseparable; that a people that is politically weak cannot develop a strong national individuality; that a people that is politically strong must also be a strong nationality. The history of civilization proves this belief to be entirely erroneous. Italy's greatness belongs to the period of political dissension, to a time when numerous small independent states prevented Italy from being a great political power, but when intellectual life was a unit notwithstanding the atomization of political organization. The period of Germany's greatest achievements in the domain of art and literature coincided with the lowest ebb of Germany's political power. Turkey, on the other hand, although a political power of great magnitude, has never developed into a powerful nationality, and only with the decadence of its political greatness has there been the beginning of a national life. It is true, however, that under favorable conditions political greatness may strongly stimulate national life. When the forces of a nation are centralized in one focus and when the great minds are attracted to the center of the state and form a nucleus that persists for long periods, the soil for cultural progress and for the development of a strong national individuality may be exceptionally favorable. These conditions have given to Paris its position in the life of France and in the history of human civilization. The many local centers of Italy of the Renaissance and of Germany of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries prove, however, that political centralization is not a necessary condition for an active and

fruitful cultural life provided the small centers can draw upon the mental resources of a numerous people that have the same cultural background.

The conditions for the development of economic life would seem to be more closely connected with the political power of nations, because the field of economic activity is almost everywhere restricted by legislative discrimination against the foreigner, while its full development requires free access to the resources of large territories and the opportunity of unrestricted distribution. The more nations are in fear of having their food supply cut off by hostile neighbors, the more difficulties they encounter in free access to foreign countries, the more they are bound to protect and foster their own resources and the more strongly develops the sense of the community of interests of the nation. If this is superadded to the feeling of cultural unity, the characteristic imperialistic tendencies of modern times develop, which are dominated by the desire for economic and political power.

The cultivation of national cultural ideals has little in common with these tendencies, and in the purest national fervor there is no tinge of the lust of dominion that characterizes imperialistic nationalism. It is merely the expression of the intense desire to develop freely the national cultural ideals. It seems a curious contradiction that the educated classes who have the widest knowledge of the world and who are alone in a position to appreciate the achievements of foreign nations, should be everywhere the carriers of imperialistic nationalism.

This phenomenon is not difficult to understand if we remember that the historical facts on which nationalistic feelings are founded and the emotional setting in which they are presented are impressed upon the educated classes much more vigorously and persistently than upon those whose period of scholarship is short and irregular and who are not subject to similar influences out of school. It is a general observation that when a segregated class exists which is subject to its own special traditions, it will set class interests higher than

general human interests which are always, even in simple tribal life, present among the mass of the people. The nation is a segregated class in this sense. The characteristic feature of nationalism is that its social and ethical standards are considered as more fundamental than those that are general and human, or rather that the members of each nation assume that their ideals are or should be the true ideals of mankind. On account of the long subjection to these influences, the thought of those whom we call the educated classes is controlled essentially by those ideals which have been transmitted to us by past generations. Particularly among the heterogeneous poor population of our cities, that is tied to the past only by the slightest bonds, a vigorous and persistent propaganda is necessary to arouse strong patriotic emotions.

We may, then, decline to accept the teachings of an imperialistic nationalism and still be devoted to the ideals of a nationality. The problems of mankind are manifold and their solution is difficult. They may be approached in many different manners and satisfactory solutions may be found by different lines of approach. The same solution is not satisfactory to all minds, but what is dear to one will always remain repugnant to another one. The character of a person is molded by the social medium in which he lives and his ideals and wishes reflect the national temper. Progress results from the peaceful struggle of national ideals and endeavors, and from the knowledge that what is dear to us is for that reason not the best for the rest of mankind, that we may cultivate our most valued ideals without ever harboring the wish to impose them upon others—unless they adopt them by their own free will. This thought has been clearly expressed by Eduard Meyer, who says: "Very gradually, in course of the ascending historical development, and at first half unconsciously, develops the feeling of a closer relationship, the idea of the unity of a people. Its most elevated form, the concept of nationality, is the most refined and complex structure that can be created by historical development; it transforms the unity that actually

exists into the conscious, active, and creative will to be and to live as a unit specifically distinct from all other social groups." In other words, the background of nationality is social individuality that neither brooks interference from other groups nor possesses the wish to deprive other nationalities of their individuality.

Conceived in this way nationality is one of the most fruitful sources of cultural progress. Its productiveness lies in the strength that the individual derives from being able to act in a large homogeneous social group which responds readily to his thoughts and actions because he shares with it the same cultural background. There is no doubt that the greater the social group, the greater will also be the effectiveness of the response and its cumulative influence. For this reason the state, and nationally organized society have seized upon the nationalistic idea and make it the dominant tone of public education, not only in compulsory, state-supported schools, but also in private schools, by impressing upon the teacher the importance of instilling national ideals into the minds of the children. In this lies undoubtedly a danger for cultural progress. First of all the kind of nationalism that is taught is not the nationalism of ideas but the imperialistic nationalism of political and economic power; it is not the nationalism that endeavors to understand and appreciate foreign patterns of thought, it is the intolerant nationalism that sets its own kind over and above every foreign form of feeling. Only too often is the dogmatic adulation of national political and cultural form and ill-concealed contempt of foreign forms impressed upon the plastic minds of the young, whose lifelong behavior is thus determined.

A further danger lies in the uniformity of patterns of thought that is the result of this type of education, and which in modern times, is still further sustained by the daily press and by public oratory. The attempt of the State to set definite ideals for its system of education is a hindrance to cultural advance. In every country it tends to stabilize existing condi-

tions and hinders progress by preventing the development of independent habits of thought. The more rigidly the system is confined to the teaching of national ideals and the more intolerant it is of foreign ideals, the more unfavorable must be its influence upon the growing generation. It is true that the greater the mass of people imbued with one dominant idea, the stronger will be their reaction to its emotional appeal. In former times, religion was the chief sentiment thus appealed to, a sentiment that transcended all boundaries of nationalities and appealed here to Christians, there to Mohammedans, without regard to language, race, or national affiliation. During the present period it is the national feeling that makes the strongest appeal and finds the readiest response, because it is cultivated with the most refined means of education and is constantly kept before our minds. Its natural basis is the common interest of the people in the history of their ancestors, in the participation of all in the work, pleasures, and ideals of truth and beauty that are expressed in the work of the great men of the nation and that influence the life of even its humblest member. From these forces we cannot escape, even if we wish to do so. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the teaching of intelligent love of our national environment that must be the basis of fruitful action, and the playing upon the sentiments of the young by teaching devotion to nebulous symbols of greatness that elicit only passionate reaction and prevent the growth of constructive ideas. Love for our nation does not exclude admiration of foreign modes of life; it should not blind us to an intelligent understanding of the basis of our own life, of its merits, and of its defects.

The one-sided emphasis laid upon the attempts to secure a purely emotional devotion to our social, political and geographical environment is liable to produce an unwholesome uniformity of thought. A safer basis might be reached if it were our endeavor to give an intelligent basis to our devotion to our country, balanced by an appreciative understanding of

the reasons why other nations are equally devoted to their countries and to their ideals, and if the greatest freedom were given to the teaching of social and political ideals. It is a sign of weakness to dread that critical attitude towards the basis of national institutions which is the only basis of sound progress.

We may then decline to accept the teachings of an imperialistic nationalism and still be devoted to the ideals of a nationality.

XV

Solidarity

An eminent anthropologist, Adolf Bastian, used to say that in order to understand a modern philosopher it was necessary to study the philosophic systems of primitive man. His meaning was that the human mind is so much the same, that the same fundamental thoughts spring up under all cultural conditions, and that the total range of fundamental ideas is confined to a limited number of forms. Absolute truth, he held, is therefore an unattainable ideal.

While at the present time we should not be willing quite to subscribe to these opinions, they contain a great underlying truth; namely, that the individual, notwithstanding his most energetic efforts, cannot free himself entirely of the form of thought and action imposed upon him by his social environment, neither in primitive society nor in the highest civilization that we have attained, because the ideals and convictions of each period are never entirely rational, but contain many elements that are a reflection of the prevalent social status.

This observation suggests that the study of cultural types entirely distinct from our own may be a great help in the endeavor to form a correct judgment of our own conduct. The mental adjustment required for a thorough understanding of strange forms of thought is the best approach to the develop-

The Primitive Mind and the Present Hour. Read at St. Clark's Church, Thanksgiving Sunday, 1917.

ment of an objective view of our own civilization, for it gives us the power to assume a standpoint outside the limits of our own civilization.

It is with this thought in mind that I wish to bring before you two aspects of primitive life that I believe illuminate some of our own actions and tendencies.

The first of these relates to the primitive concept of what constitutes a stranger, and to the ethical ideas connected with it. There is no place in the world where the individual does not form part of a definitely organized society. No matter how small a tribe, the bonds between the members of the community are well recognized, and the feeling of solidarity is exceedingly strong. The languages of primitive man bear evidence of this feeling. In a great many cases, only the members of the tribe are called human beings; or at least the individuals that speak a certain language are those who are designated by the term "human beings," while all others stand outside the human species. Thus our American Eskimo, some of the tribes of Alaska, those of the Northwest Territories, and some tribes of the Southwest, designate themselves by the term "human beings." The concept of the contrast between the fellow tribesmen and outsiders may even go so far that it is reflected in grammar. The people speaking a certain Californian language use one grammatical form to designate the adult males of their own tribe, another grammatical form for females and children of their own tribe, and for all outsiders, animals, and inanimate objects. The very existence of these words and forms shows clearly that the members of the tribe feel a specific distinction between themselves and the rest of the world. Perhaps it would be saying too much if we should claim that at the present time this idea of specific distinction is carried in any tribal community to its extreme logical end, but the underlying belief exists that those who are not members of the tribe are not human beings. Owing to mutual suspicions and to the fear for the safety of the members of the tribe, this has led to the systematic killing of all outsiders who venture to approach the tribal habitat. They are treated like any kind

of noxious animal. The traces of this ancient attitude may be recognized in primitive society all over the world. In recent times it has appeared most clearly in the behavior of the South African Boers towards the native Bushmen, who were hunted like wild animals because they were different, and because they were dangerous to the large herds of cattle. We have been guilty of it in the slaughter of the Californian Indians. It is also expressed in the long-continued discussions of earlier centuries regarding the question whether the Indians of America had a soul or not.

It might be said that in these cases economic interests and selfishness determined the attitude of those who persecuted and oppressed the more primitive tribes; but the same view appears with equal clearness in the relations between primitive peoples. Many cases are known in which men will go out on the warpath in the same way as they go hunting, to show their prowess or to bring home spoils, without thinking of the fact that their victims are human beings, and without realizing that the deeds in which they glory would appear as brutal assault if they themselves were not the victors, but the killed and vanquished. The idea that the members of another tribe are human beings like themselves hardly ever seems to enter their minds. If they do recognize that they are human beings, still their happiness and unhappiness appear entirely immaterial, and do not weigh in the balance against their own whims and caprices.

It is interesting to note that with the increasing complexity of life the sharpness of this contrast decreases. On the whole, in the course of human history, the size of the tribal community among which social bonds are recognized has increased, and at the same time the feeling of contrast between the privileges of the tribe and those who do not belong to it has lost in intensity. However, it has not disappeared. In the time of ancient Greece the emotional connotation of the terms "Greeks" and "Barbarians" is witness of its persistence, and it has clearly survived in all those cases in which there is a contrast between a free population and slaves.

It would lead us too far to follow out the development of intertribal relations in detail; but let us remember that in the early times of intense mutual distrust intertribal trade was conducted in such a way that tribes that wished to exchange commodities avoided all contact, and simply deposited their goods at a certain place, and waited for the other party to come to exchange them for their own goods, which were either accepted, or left as an indication that the exchange was not satisfactory. From this period of extreme distrust there has been a long and slow development to the establishment of intertribal markets, at which free intercourse exists, and where the customs of the tribe require the avoidance of all military display, in order to prevent the development of quarrels and murder.

It is a peculiar fact that, notwithstanding the slow rise of the concept of the equality of rights of different tribal units, interchange of ideas has been constantly going on, and that the mutual distrust has never been able to prevent the dissemination from tribe to tribe, and over enormous distances, of new inventions and advances in the art of living; so that even in those times theory and practice were not by any means in accord. While we see, on the one hand, the most ruthless disregard of the rights of the outsider, we find at the same time a constant flow of ideas from tribe to tribe, from people to people, from race to race.

When tribal society advances to such an economic stage that larger political confederations become possible, or when large centralized states are founded, the mutual distrust within the limits of the confederation of state is bound to lose much of its intensity; but it is apt to turn into an intense contempt of the outsider, whose only salvation lies in being brought under the influence of the particular political organization. Thus have developed the characteristic cases in which a confederation or a state set out with the definite intention of becoming the law-giver and peace-maker for the world—with the effect that the wars that it waged for the sake of peace devasted wide stretches of land. Examples of this kind are the

Iroquois Indians of New York and some of the Negro tribes south of the Congo River. An idealistic policy of enforcing peace made them the most ruthless devastaters.

The psychological basis for the feeling of solidarity is not difficult to understand. It is obviously the same instinctive feeling that compels the members of an animal herd to act conjointly for protection or attack. We can readily understand that the instinctive reaction of the primitive human horde surrounded by enemies was based on the attempt to keep away whatever might have brought danger to themselves. How deep-seated this feeling is, may be recognized even now in the reaction of members of one family. No matter by how many internal dissensions they may be estranged from one another, as soon as a family is attacked by a stranger, its members will almost always stand together against outside interference. A similar attitude may be observed in other social groups. They are liable to act jointly against outside attacks, no matter what their internal dissensions may be. It is an exceedingly difficult task for all of us, when we are placed in such a position, to understand clearly that we are confounding individual and social responsibility, and that we are simply following the old lines of social cohesion, in which each individual places the interest of the members of his own group higher than the legitimate interests of outsiders.

It is important to make it clear to ourselves in how far our own actions are still swayed by this ancient impulse, and in how far our reasoning, that compels us to recognize equal rights for all individuals, succumbs to the emotional feeling of the solidarity of the group. The point to which I refer appears clearly in what we call "racial prejudice." It is perfectly obvious that racial prejudice is based primarily on the feeling of solidarity of the members of a race, not on the knowledge of the community of their interests. I believe it is perfectly safe to say that the numerous attempts that have been made to prove the superiority of the white race over all others are not the result of a careful investigation of facts, but rather attempts to find an excuse for an emotional attitude

by an accumulation of facts that are supposed to support it.

Still clearer is the survival of this attitude in international relations between states. The theory on which we proceed is, on the whole, that any act that will advance the interests of the members of our own nation must be considered from a purely national standpoint. The question in how far it may damage the interests of other nations hardly ever enters into our consideration, unless we are prevented by legal requirements from acting with complete freedom. The discussion of our immigration problems centres entirely upon the question what the effect of immigration may be upon our own nation. It does not deal with the question what the effect of immigration may be upon those people that remain in their own country. When we protect our own industries, we are thinking entirely of the advancement of the interests of our own citizens. We do not consider what effect protective tariffs may have upon the population of other states. In other words, in many of our modern attitudes the same fundamental difference prevails between the valuation of the interests of a country and those of a foreigner, that is characteristic of the estimation of the foreigner in primitive life.

It is of course undeniable that individuals as well as groups must first of all guard their own interests. However, when acting as individuals, we believe that we should not promote our own interest at the expense of the rights of others. Perhaps we do not live up to this standard; but we profess it, at least, as our ideal. Not so in the life of States. The value of a contribution to the welfare of a nation is measured only by what it adds to its own well-being, regardless of what it may take away from the well-being of others. What little restriction of these tendencies there is through trade agreements and other pacts is no more than a weak awakening of our social conscience, and founded more on fear of retaliation than on the clear recognition of human rights.

It is a curious feature of the feeling of hostility against the foreigner, or at least of indifference to his interests, that it is found in groups which are combined in the most irregular manner. Neither community of descent nor community of

language determines national groupings. In primitive society, language does not establish a national bond. Real or imaginary relationship is often much more important. In more advanced society, community of political interests may bring together people speaking different languages against other branches of the same linguistic groups. In modern society we have to shift the meaning of nationality constantly, according to the conditions of each country. The idea of a community of descent of the members of one nationality is quite untenable. The French, the Germans, the Italians, all embrace elements of quite distinct descent. Community of language may seem to hold in France, Sweden and Portugal; but it breaks down in countries like Belgium and Switzerland, where political unity welds people of different languages into one nation. Neither does it apply in cases in which the same language is spoken in several States; as English among ourselves and in England, German in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Again, when we speak of small nationalities, particularly of those of eastern Europe, we think of those communities that speak the same languages and have no political independence, but wish for it. We think of these often, without considering the impossibility of solving their problem on account of the inextricable manner in which these languages are intermingled—an impossibility that will last as long as the present enmities and rivalries persist.

It is difficult to see any one general principle that covers these groupings and the existing antagonisms. These are the results of long-continued historical growth, and due to a multitude of causes, but always centre around the feeling of contrast between native and foreigner. They can be understood only from the point of view that every member of a community, from childhood on, is taught by his friends and neighbors to set nothing higher than the interests of the group to which he belongs. On a purely rational basis, it is hard to see why we should protect a Californian against a Canadian and not against a New Englander. We do so because we ascribe a higher value to the national unit than to any other human grouping, perhaps also in order to enhance the consciousness

of solidarity of the political group. Certainly the common type of nationalistic standpoint is entirely opposed to the equality of rights of human beings, in which we profess to believe.

You will allow me to repeat here a few words in which I expressed these convictions eight years ago, thinking at that time particularly of our own attitude towards Spanish America and Eastern Asia. I said at that time:[2] "When we analyze the strong feeling of nationality which is so potent at the present time, we recognize that it consists largely in the idea of the pre-eminence of that community whose member we happen to be—in the pre-eminent value of its language, of its customs, and of its traditions, and in the belief that it is right to preserve its peculiarities and to impose them upon the rest of the world. The feeling of nationality as here expressed, and the feeling of solidarity of the horde, are of the same order, although modified by the gradual expansion of the idea of fellowship; but the ethical point of view which makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the well-being of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value one's own civilization as higher—not as dearer to us—than that of the whole rest of mankind, are the same as those which prompt the actions of primitive man, who considers every stranger an enemy, and who is not satisfied until the enemy is killed. It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that we participate in it, and that it has been controlling all our actions since the time of our birth; but it is certainly conceivable that there may be other civilizations, based perhaps on different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up under their influence. The general theory of valuation of human activities, as developed by anthropological research, teaches us a higher tolerance than the one which we now profess."

[2]Mind of Primitive Man; Macmillan, 1911; p. 207

I should always be more inclined to accept, in regard to fundamental human problems, the judgment of the masses rather than the judgment of the intellectuals which is much more certain to be warped by unconscious control of traditional ideas.

XVI

The Mental Attitude of the Educated Classes

When we attempt to form our opinions in an intelligent manner, we are inclined to accept the judgment of those who by their education and occupation are compelled to deal with the questions at issue. We assume that their views must be rational, and based on intelligent understanding of the problems. The foundation of this belief is the tacit assumption not only that they have special knowledge but also that they are free to form perfectly rational opinions. However, it is easy to see there is no type of society in existence in which such freedom exists.

I believe I can make my point clearest by giving an example taken from the life of a people whose cultural conditions are very simple. I will choose for this purpose the Eskimo. In their social life they are exceedingly individualistic. The social group has so little cohesion that we have hardly the right to speak of tribes. A number of families come together and live in the same village, but there is nothing to prevent any one of them from living and settling at another place with other families. In fact during a period of a lifetime the families constituting an Eskimo village community are constantly shifting about; and while they generally return after many years to

The Dial, September 5, 1918; p. 145.

the place where their relatives live, the family may have belonged to a great many different communities. There is no authority vested in any individual, no chieftancy, and no method by which orders, if they were given, could be carried out. In short, so far as law is concerned, we have a condition of almost absolute anarchy. We might therefore say that every single person is entirely free, within the limits of his own mental ability, to determine his own mode of life and his own mode of thinking. Nevertheless it is easily seen that there are innumerable restrictions that determine his behavior. The Eskimo boy learns how to handle the knife, how to use bow and arrow, how to hunt, how to build a house; the girl learns how to sew and mend clothing and how to cook; and during all their life they use their tools in the way they learned in childhood. New inventions are rare, and the whole industrial life of the people follows traditional channels. What is true of industrial activities is no less true of their thoughts. Certain religious ideas have been transmitted to them, notions as to what is right and wrong, certain amusements, and enjoyment of certain types of art. Any deviation from these is not likely to occur. At the same time it never enters into their minds that any other way of thinking and acting would be possible, and they consider themselves as perfectly free in regard to all their actions. Based on our wider experience, we know that the industrial problems of the Eskimo may be solved in a great many other ways and that their religious traditions and social customs might be quite different from what they are. From the outside, objective point of view we see clearly the restrictions that bind the individual who considers himself free.

It is hardly necessary to give many instances of these occurrences. It seems desirable however to illustrate the great strength of these ideas that restrict the freedom of thought of the individual, leading to the most serious mental struggles when traditional social ethics come into conflict with instinctive reactions. Thus among a tribe of Siberia we find a belief that every person will live in the future life in the same

condition in which he finds himself at the time of death. As a consequence an old man who begins to be decrepit wishes to die, in order to avoid life as a cripple in the endless future, and it becomes the duty of his son to kill him. The son believes in the righteousness of this command but at the same time feels the filial love for his father, and many are the instances in which the son has to decide between the two conflicting duties—the one imposed by the instinctive filial love, the other imposed by the traditional custom of the tribe.

Another interesting observation may be deduced from those somewhat more complex societies in which there is a distinction between different social classes. We find such a condition, for instance, in North America, among the Indians of British Columbia, in which a sharp distinction is made between people of noble birth and common people. In this case the traditional behavior of the two classes shows considerable differences. The social tradition that regulates the life of the nobility is somewhat analogous to the social tradition of our society. A great deal of stress is laid upon the strict observance of convention and upon display, and nobody can maintain his position in high society without an adequate amount of ostentation and without strict regard for conventional conduct. These requirements are so fundamental that an overbearing conceit and a contempt for the common people become social requirements of an important chief. The contrast between the social proprieties for the nobility and those for the common people is very striking. Of the common people are expected humbleness, mercy and all those qualities that we consider amiable and humane.

Similar observations may be made in all those cases in which, by a complex tradition, a social class is set off from the mass of the people. The chiefs of the Polynesian Islands, the kings in Africa, the medicine men of all countries present examples in which a social group's line of conduct and of thought is strongly modified by their segregation from the mass of the people. On the whole, in societies of this type, the mass of the people consider as their ideal those actions which

we should characterize as humane; not by any means that all their actions conform to humane conduct, but their valuation of men shows that the fundamental altruistic principles which we recognize are recognized by them too. Not so with the privileged classes. In place of the general humane interest the class interest predominates; and while it would be wrong to say that their conduct is selfish, it is always so shaped that the interest of the class to which they belong prevails over the interest of society as a whole. If it is necessary to secure rank and to enhance the standing of the family by killing a number of enemies, there is no hesitation felt in taking life. If the interests of the class require oppression of the rest of the people, then they are oppressed. If the interest of the class requires that its members should not perform menial occupations but should devote themselves to art or learning, then all the members of the class will vie with one another in the attainment of these achievements. It is for this reason that every segregated class is much more strongly influenced by special traditional ideas than is the mass of the people; not that the multitude is free to think rationally and that its behavior is not determined by tradition, but that the tradition is not so specific, not so strictly determined in its range, as in the case of the segregated classes. For this reason it is often found that the restriction of freedom of thought by convention is greater in what we might call the educated classes than in the mass of the people.

I believe this observation is of great importance when we try to understand conditions in our own society. Its bearing upon the problem of the psychological significance of nationalism will at once be apparent; for the nation is also a segregated class, albeit segregated according to other principles; and the characteristic feature of nationalism is that its social ethical standards are considered as more fundamental than those that are general and human, or rather that the members of each nation like to assume that their ideals are or should be the true ideals of mankind. At the same time it illustrates clearly that we should make a fundamental mistake if we

should confound class selfishness and individual selfishness; for we find the most splendid examples of unselfish devotion to the interests of the nation, heroism that has been rightly praised for thousands of years as the highest virtue, and it is difficult to realize that nevertheless the whole history of mankind points in the direction of a *human* ideal as opposed to a *national* ideal. And indeed may we not continue to admire the self-sacrifice of a great mind, even if we transcend to ideals that were not his, and that perhaps, owing to the time and place in which he lived, could not be his?

Our observation has also another important application. The industrial and economic development of modern times has brought about a differentiation within our population that has never been equaled in any primitive society. The occupations of the various parts of a modern European or American population differ enormously; so much so, that in many cases it is almost impossible for people speaking the same language to understand one another when they talk about their daily work. The ideas with which the scientist, the artist, the tradesman, the business man, the laborer operate are so distinctive that they have only a few fundamental elements in common. Here it may again be observed that those occupations which are intellectually or emotionally most highly specialized require the longest training, and training always means an infusion of historically transmitted ideas. It is therefore not surprising that the thought of what we call the educated classes is controlled essentially by those ideals which have been transmitted to us by past generations. These ideals are always highly specialized, and include the ethical tendencies, the aesthetic inclinations, the intellectuality, and the expression of volition, of past times. Their control may find expression in a dominant tone which determines our whole mode of thought and which, for the very reason that it has come to be ingrained into our whole mentality, never rises into our consciousness.

In those cases in which our reaction is more conscious, it is either positive or negative. Our thoughts may be based on

a high valuation of the past, or they may be a revolt against it. When we bear this in mind we may understand the characteristics of the behavior of the intellectuals. It is a mistake to assume that their mentality is, on the average, appreciably higher than that of the rest of the people. Perhaps a greater number of independent minds find their way into this group than into some other group of individuals who are moderately well-to-do; but their average mentality is surely in no way superior to that of the workingmen, who by the conditions of their youth have been compelled to subsist on the produce of their manual labor. In both groups mediocrity prevails; unusually strong and unusually weak individuals are exceptions. For this reason the strength of character and intellect that is required for vigorous thought on matters in which intense sentiments are involved is not commonly found —either among the intellectuals or in any other part of the population. This condition, combined with the thoroughness with which the intellectuals have imbibed the traditions of the past, makes the majority of them in all nations conventional. It has the effect that their thoughts are based on tradition, and that the range of their vision is liable to be limited. Even the apparent exception of the Russian intellectuals, who have been brought up under the influence of West European ideas, does not contradict our general conclusion.

There are of course strong minds among the intellectuals who rise above the conventionalism of their class, and attain that freedom that is the reward of a courageous search for truth, along whatever path it may lead.

In contrast to the intellectuals, the masses in our modern city populations are less subject to the influence of traditional teaching. They are torn away from school before it can make an indelible impression upon their minds and they may never have known the strength of the conservative influence of a home in which parents and children live a common life. The more heterogeneous the society in which they live, and the more the constituent groups are free from historic influences, or the more they represent different historic traditions, the less strongly will they be attached to the past.

It would be an exaggeration if we should extend this view over all aspects of human life. I am speaking here only of those fundamental concepts of right and wrong that develop in the segregated classes and in the masses. In a society in which beliefs are transmitted with great intensity the impossibility of treating calmly the views and actions of the heretic is shared by both groups. When, through the progress of scientific thought, the foundations of dogmatic belief are shaken among the intellectuals and not among the masses, we find the conditions reversed and greater freedom of traditional forms of thought among the intellectuals—at least in so far as the current dogma is involved. It would also be an exaggeration to claim that the masses can sense the right way of attaining the realization of their ideals, for these must be found by painful experience and by the application of knowledge. However, neither of these restrictions touches our main contention, namely, that the desires of the masses are in a wider sense more human than those of the classes.

It is therefore not surprising that the masses of the people—whose attachment to the past is comparatively slight and who work—respond more quickly and more energetically to the urgent demands of the hour than the educated classes, and that the ethical ideals of the best among them are human ideals, not those of a segregated class. For this reason I should always be more inclined to accept, in regard to fundamental human problems, the judgment of the masses rather than the judgment of the intellectuals, which is much more certain to be warped by unconscious control of traditional ideas. I do not mean to say that the judgment of the masses would be acceptable in regard to every problem of human life, because there are many which, by their technical nature, are beyond their understanding. Nor do I believe that the details of the right solution of a problem can always be found by the masses; but I feel strongly that the problem itself, as felt by them, and the ideal that they want to see realized, is a safer guide for our conduct than the ideal of the intellectual group that stands under the ban of an historical tradition that dulls their feeling for the needs of the day.

One word more, in regard to what might be a fatal misunderstanding of my meaning. If I decry unthinking obedience to the ideals of our forefathers, I am far from believing that it will ever be possible, or that it will even be desirable, to cast away the past and to begin anew on a purely intellectual basis. Those who think that this can be accomplished do not, I believe, understand human nature aright. Our very wishes for changes are based on criticism of the past, and would take another direction if the conditions under which we live were of a different nature. We are building up our new ideals by utilizing the work of our ancestors, even where we condemn it, and so it will be in the future. Whatever our generation may achieve will attain in course of time that venerable aspect that will lay in chains the minds of the great mass of our successors and it will require new efforts to free a future generation of the shackles that we are forging. When we once recognize this process, we must see that it is our task not only to free ourselves of traditional prejudice, but also to search in the heritage of the past for what is useful and right, and to endeavor to free the mind of future generations so that they may not cling to our mistakes, but may be ready to correct them.

The point of view which makes it justifiable to increase the well-being of one nation at the cost of another is the same as that which prompts the actions of primitive man, who considers every stranger an enemy.

XVII

The International State

The common interests of man that transcend national boundaries are those of labor, commerce, science, and art. With the enormous development of the first three, international interests have grown to such an extent that isolation has come to be impossible. The conditions of labor and commerce of one part of the world affect all the others, the progress of science depends upon the work of investigation in all nations, and the highest types of art know no national boundaries. All this is common knowledge and does not require discussion. On the basis of this community of interests the idea of internationalism has developed, and its political consequences have been drawn particularly by the representatives of Labor, whose ideal is the international State. The general human interests are felt to outweigh those of the nations and a new ideal has emerged—that of the community and sameness of human aspirations and needs, against which national ideals appear insignificant and artificial.

The basis of this type of internationalism is our consciousness of the existence of certain fundamental truths which are valid always and everywhere, that are neither confined to any particular historical period, nor to national boundaries nor other local and ethnic divisions of mankind. So far as these

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exist, political organizations and cultural movements have a common, international basis.

It may be observed that in all social groups the tendency prevails to set the interests of the class over those of mankind and that on all cultural levels this tendency overshadows the general humanitarian altruism that appears in much the same form among the lowly of all tribes and nations. The uniformity of humanitarian altruism as against the multiplicity of interests that develop in segregated classes; and the appearance of analogous altruistic tendencies in each class, but applied to members of the class alone, give proof of the general validity of altruistic instincts. Their essential basis is the feeling of solidarity of the social group, which finds emotional expression in the desire for helpfulness; on more advanced levels in the principles of justice and in the demand for equal opportunity for every child.

The internationalists are right in so far as every State or nation should be required to subordinate its own needs to general, human interests. If we agree on principle to do away with privileges of classes, then we have to go a step farther and do away with privileges of nations, for nations are also classes; if the principle is accepted that each child shall have the fullest opportunity to develop according to its gifts—a principle that we proclaim in theory but which we do not carry out in practice—then the privileges of the citizen as against the foreigner must disappear, as many other privileges conveyed by birth have disappeared. No matter how violent nationalistic opposition to this principle may be, it will, by the natural growth of humane sentiment, lose against the clear recognition of the principles of justice.

If this exhausted the possibilities of cultural development, the internationalist would be right in demanding one universal all-comprising State.

This, however, is not the case. Owing to the social instincts of man each unit, and particularly each stable administrative unit, acquires an individual character which is a result of the cumulative effect of the thoughts and actions of leading

individuals, and of local activities as determined by historical and geographical environment. From these sources spring interests and emotional attachments that determine the behavior of each group and differentiate it from others, but which, although of greatest importance in the life of the group, have no claim to general validity. Nevertheless, these local differences are of the greatest value to mankind as a whole, because they make for that variety in cultural life that is the necessary condition for a life worth living. A leveling down of cultural differences would be just as fatal to human happiness and human progress as equality of interests and occupations of all individuals in a community is tantamount to the death of its intellectual and moral virility.

In so far as cultural individuality enters into the constitution of the State, it runs counter to the ideal of a universal State, the scope of which is necessarily limited to those principles that are acknowledged by the whole of humanity and which can be expressed in laws regulating behavior and in administrative practice.

The significance of these divergences as obstacles in the way of a realization of the universal State is not clearly recognized, on account of the difficulty of distinguishing between those things that are universally valid and those that are valued because they are founded in our particular cultural environment, and that are dear to us for this reason.

This difficulty can best be appreciated when we abstract from present-day conditions and try to understand the attitudes of earlier times. To the Mohammedan or to the mediaeval Christian orthodoxy was such a self-evident condition of human perfection, that a heterodox or heathen community was outlawed and war was waged against it, until it submitted to the religious standards of the time. Although religion has often served as a pretext for greed of power, there is no denying that the religious motive has many times incited people to attempt the forcible subjection of foreign cultural types. At the present time, when religious dogmatic fervor has abated and religious tolerance has come to be a

dogma, although not a fact, we begin to understand that, what was considered at a time as a generally valid basis of the conduct of human society, was a special cultural form, subject to change, and an expression of a sentimental attitude rather than of eternal truth.

While we may recognize the error committed by our ancestors whose strength of emotional attachment to religious dogma we no longer share, it is much more difficult to see the lack of general validity of those phases of social life that we are taught to revere, and which lead us to demand these as the basis of a universal covenant.

In order to gain clarity in regard to these points, we should ask ourselves first of all, what are the general principles that we try to attain, and in what does the progress of our modern views consist. We want to legislate and administer the affairs of State so that they meet the needs and wishes of the people who constitute the State. We do not wish to conceive the State as a power that unnecessarily restrains the freedom of the individual and that can dictate his actions. We claim equal rights for all citizens; and demand the greatest possible individual freedom that is compatible with the well-being of society as a whole. We believe that with the rise of the general cultural level this ideal will be more fully attainable.

The way in which these general principles are realized in our modern States will determine to a great extent the general attitude of the public mind. Among ourselves universal and equal suffrage is assumed to protect the people against the encroachments upon their rights by the State as opposed to the people.

A candid consideration of the history of our political system makes it clear that our methods are not by any means the logical outflow of the principle of human rights, as we are taught to believe, but that their form is the result of reaction against feudal and later autocratic institutions. Their undertone is that of distrust between people and legislative and administrative powers, which lays stress upon the necessity of their complete popular control in order to avoid the growth

of a legislative and administrative machine which feels itself master of the people and disregards their rights. The control is furthermore insured in one particular manner which is supposed to guarantee the full expression of popular will. When we ask ourselves in how far these ends are attained in the particular form of parliamentary government that we enjoy, we must recognize that success is partial only. It is only necessary for every voter to ask himself in how far he votes intelligently, in order to see that his own will is recorded very imperfectly. A system of elections that has grown up under rural conditions, when neighbors were well acquainted and one man may have known the merits of all the other members of his rural community, has been transferred to immensely more complex units, complex in part on account of their greater size and diversity of occupation, in part on account of the development of cities in which people who inhabit neighboring houses may have no interests in common—except cleanliness of the street and health, the supplying of their daily needs and other interests that are bound up with their habitations. When called upon to elect a representative for State or Nation, there is no point of contact between them, and intelligent choice becomes impossible, so that the management of the choice falls more and more into the hands of self-constituted and self-continued Committees, whose word must be taken as authority. The intelligent voter may turn to published records and recommendations, but in the majority of cases he has to take these as authoritative and believe that the men for whom he votes stand for certain principles and ideas which he accepts.

There are other groupings of men in modern life that give at least the possibility of a more intelligent selection, groups based on sameness of interest and occupation, combined in some cases with community of local interests. Although the experience of labor unions and of professional societies shows that in these cases also it is not necessarily the best man who will be chosen to represent the group, at least no one can be selected who is not thoroughly familiar with the problems

that confront the whole group. The Russian Soviets represent an attempt to reach in this manner a truer and clearer expression of the wishes of the people than can be attained by the older means.

Besides the difficulties that beset the selection of the right men for the right place, the conscientious voter will often doubt his competence to decide questions, which on account of their technical character are beyond the pale of his judgment. Detailed economic questions are often of this character, such as questions of monetary systems, and of methods of taxation; of the conservation of natural resources and of the development of waterways, roads, and railways; of the development of educational systems and many others. The voter who takes his duty to heart and who has the modesty that is engendered by the thorough mastery of *one* subject, will confess willingly that he does not know how to solve the problems with which he is unfamiliar, and will act according to the advice of some person who has his confidence. Many, however, will be satisfied with the repetition of the commonplaces that are spread as the doctrine of their party, and act accordingly.

In other fields of human activity we demand more and more of those entrusted with their conduct both technical knowledge and reliable character. We do not consider it feasible, that the public should be familiar with the conduct of a factory or of other technical institutions so as to be able to select the person to whom the conduct of the establishment can be entrusted. In political matters we act differently. No matter how much technical knowledge may be demanded, we expect the voter to form an opinion of his own and to decide on administrative questions, many of which are of a highly technical character. It is considered as part of the education of the people to make them understand these matters that are remote from their daily pursuits and thoughts.

No development of representative government on the present lines can obviate these difficulties. What we want is easily formulated, and is formulated in almost identical terms by all

nations: a clean legislation and administration which is governed by the needs of the people as a whole; who are willing to subordinate class interest to the interests of the whole people and who will always be conscious of being servants, not masters. It is, however, a self-deception if we believe that we have found an adequate solution of this problem which must be adopted by all the nations of the world. Only too often is democracy, in the sense of a government in which the rights and the well-being of the individual citizen are the guiding principles of political organization, and in which the State is subordinated to the individual citizen, confounded with the particular form of governmental regulation which has developed as a reaction to feudalism and absolutism.

I have selected this instance, because at the present time those countries that have adopted the parliamentary system to the fullest extent are the ones that demand loudest the adoption of their system as the basis of all internationalism—and mistake one particular attempt at a solution of great problems as the final attainment of liberty, and forget that autocracy and the elevation of the State to a power than can throttle the individual flourishes as much in parliamentary or republican as in bureaucratic States. They forget that a new definition of property rights, a new method of selecting representatives, a spiritual awakening among the experts who must conduct most of the administration of a nation may do much more than the fear of loss of confidence of the voter. The problem of organizing legislation and administration on a satisfactory basis still awaits its solution which does not necessarily follow the lines that we have adopted.

It may be difficult to make it clear to ourselves that, when we speak of democratic control, we no longer mean the fundamental principles on which modern mankind is agreed, but a particular form in which we have grown up and which we desire to extend over other countries.

This attitude is naturally shared by other communities whose habits of thought run in other channels because they have grown up under different conditions, and who also mis-

take the special form of their life for fundamental principles.

Under present conditions, if nothing else should make impossible an international organization that would take the place of the single nations, it would be wrecked on this unavoidable misunderstanding, because what seems essential to one people, does not appear so to another. Only when the international State could be based on the widest generally recognized principles, and each people were allowed to work out all details in its own way, could we hope for its realization.

There is another form of international life, the germs of which have long lain dormant. It is that form in which all nations agree to form a union in which all disputes will be settled in the same way as they are settled among individuals in all civilized countries, namely by legal procedure which is assumed to decide between right and wrong, and in which the social needs of nations are met by legislation as the social needs of groups of individuals are met in state legislation.

That an arrangement of this type should be reached stands to reason. The difficulties in the way of its practical attainment must be met on the basis of a clear understanding of the psychological basis of the relations of nations.

The development of Italy and of Germany during the last century shows by what steps consolidation of interests may be attained. In Italy, particularly, the consciousness of unity was very slightly developed among the uneducated classes. The idea was carefully cultivated by the educated Italians who remembered Italian greatness, and who were devoted to the ideals that found expression in Italian art and literature. The same conditions prevailed in Germany. We might call the powerful desire for national unity an artificial growth that was developed among the masses of the people by the enthusiasm of the educated classes, which, however, found ready acceptance among the people. For purely political reasons the German movement stopped short at the boundaries of Switzerland and of Austria. If it had not been for the conflict of dynastic interests and of other political affiliations, the divi-

sion of Austria and Prussia could not have developed; if it had not been for the contrast of republican and monarchical forms of government and for the long continued political separation of Switzerland, which has established new affiliations, a purely cultural movement for development would undoubtedly have included these countries as well as the cities of Lithuania.

It would seem that the educated groups of all nations, by emphasizing the unity of international interests rather than the differences, have the power to lead us to a cultural consolidation of nations that must be the background of a successful league of nations.

The forcible unification of Italy cannot serve as an example for a league of nations, because complete centralization could not be attained, and would not be desirable on account of the existing differences in language and habits of thought. A confederation like that of the United States of America, however, seems entirely feasible, provided the educated class will become inspired by the thought of the unity of cultural interests which are entirely compatible with the retention of national individuality. The example of the American confederation, to a less extent that of England and her self governing dominions, shows that a certain amount of community of administration can go hand in hand with the retention of considerable local differences.

An essential condition for the formation of a fruitful league must be the development of a consciousness among the educated of the unity of cultural endeavor. This spirit is not sufficiently clearly reflected in the current of present day thought to allow us to be very hopeful for the immediate future. This, however, merely imposes the duty upon those who hold a wider vision to teach and to preach the equal rights of mankind, regardless of national boundaries.

The development of the cultural background which must be the basis of a league of nations is not easily attained because the majority of people are still swayed by the feeling of solidarity of nationalities—the survival of earlier periods of

human history. As long as the individualities of nations are conceived as entailing conflicts of property rights which must be settled according to a legal code, some of the most fundamental difficulties will not be overcome.

While some nations languish and hardly utilize the soil that they occupy, others increase but are held in the narrow limits of their domain. In order to live many of the individuals must leave their homes and merge themselves in another nation. Many of these do so unwillingly and, by the nation as a whole, their loss is felt as due to an unjust division of the world. In private life we are beginning to learn by hard lessons, that room must be given to unfold their powers to those who are oppressed by others; that possession of land in the hands of a few who do not utilize it while others are precluded from its use can no longer be tolerated. In international life this problem is most acute at the present time. Will those nations that possess almost unlimited land be willing to give others an opportunity to expand? Or will they sit still, *beati possidentes*, and deny to others access to the wealth that they have appropriated? International organizations intended to protect the great states by the assumption that the present national boundaries must be stabilized for all time must come to grief, because the peoples are not stable, and changes, such as we have observed in the past, may be anticipated in the future. If an international organization is to survive, it must be based on principles that will do justice to the changing demands of the times. The unyielding insistence on property rights of the property-holding class against the just demands of those who do not own property leads to bitter strife, ay, to revolution. The same insistence in the life of nations must lead to unrest, quarrels and war.

It would seem, therefore, that the fundamental condition for the development of internationalism would be the establishment of principles that will permit justice to the needs of each nation. A purely legal agreement of guaranteeing to each what he has, will not meet the problem, because it will not overcome the causes that lead to strife. It may easily become a a covenant for the perpetuation of injustice.

Attempts at a judicial settlement of international disputes seem, therefore, futile, as long as they are only intended to adjust legal misunderstandings and do not take into account the ever-changing needs of the nations. It requires administrative power to adjust these matters on the basis of justice, which will not be attained as long as the ideas of prestige and of sovereignty stand in the way. It is clear that this step forward cannot be made by a nation which claims for itself the right to control the foreign policies of other states, as we do with the Spanish-American republics, but that it requires a general readiness to give up certain sovereign rights.

Who would deny that an international organization that is not only judicial in character but that has certain legislative powers, might be an immense step forward and might avoid many conflicts—provided its decisions were determined by a compliance with elemental needs rather than with the maintenance of the present status?

A systematic breaking-down of the economic barriers that separate nations would, however, do much to let the causes of friction disappear. It must be borne in mind that any kind of national protective tariff is the survival of those periods in which the rights of the citizen or of the tribesman were set higher than those of the foreigner; in which two standards of justice were recognized, the one for members of the social unit, the other for the outsider, a condition which in still earlier times led to the concept that the outsider had no rights whatever and must be slain for the sake of the safety of the community. Gradually the social units which recognized equal rights have expanded, and the contrast between the unit and the outside world has lost some of its rigor, but the wide concepts of international obligations still retain the remnants of the distinction between the ethical duties towards the fellow citizen and those towards the foreigner.

A fundamental condition for the abolition of economic separation is the removal of the possibility that the supplying of food and raw materials necessary for the life of a people can be cut off by another nation. This means absolute freedom of the seas at all times. Without it every nation will be com-

pelled to protect its home production in order to retain its power to produce those things that are of vital importance to life, although they might be produced much more easily in other parts of the globe.

A league of imperialistic nations will never lead to lasting peace. The rights of citizens of each nation to free existence according to their mode of life must be recognized. No one State should be given the right to monopolize all lands for the benefit of its own citizens. No one member should be able to control the food supply of the world. Custom barriers must fall. Equality of rights of members of mankind, regardless of nationality, must be the foundation on which a permanent international league is established.

DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

XVIII

Ideals of the State

The foremost duty of every individual and every country is to serve the interests of mankind.

While the nearest duty of each State is to its citizens, no State has the right to perform acts the evil effects of which upon mankind outweigh the benefits accruing to the citizens of the State.

It is nobler to suffer injustice than to act unjustly. For this reason we should be slow to maintain our rights by force when patience promises redress by peaceful means.

War is justifiable only in self-defense and for the maintenance of great principles acknowledged by the concensus of opinion of the best of mankind.

There are higher duties than patriotism as at present generally conceived. Nevertheless we recognize that mankind as a whole has not advanced so far that it can understand this truth, in that the majority of men continue to praise devoted patriotism as the highest virtue, as has been done for thousands of years.

I wish to see the United States of America the exponent of the highest ideals of the State as the servant of mankind.

From a letter written March 30, 1917. Not previously published.

Certain fundamental truths are valid always and everywhere, are neither confined to any historical period, nor to national boundaries nor other local and ethnic divisions of mankind.

XIX

Patriotism

My opinions are founded to a great extent on the truths taught by the retrospect upon the history of mankind, the study of which is the business of my life. We see in primitive society the feeling of solidarity confined to the small horde, while every outsider is considered a being specifically distinct, and therefore as a dangerous enemy who must be hunted down. With the advance of civilization, we see the groups which have common interests, and in which the bonds of human brotherhood are considered binding, expand until we reach the concept that all men are created with equal rights. Socrates, Buddha, and Christ are the milestones which indicate the birth of this great idea. The two thousand or more years which have elapsed since their time have not sufficed, however, to bring about the realization of these ideals. Based on this knowledge, it is my opinion that our first duties are to humanity as a whole, and that in a conflict of duties our obligations to humanity are of higher value than those towards the nation; in other words, that patriotism must be subordinated to humanism.

A second principle to which I hold is also based on anthropological knowledge. We see everywhere that the form of thought of man is determined by the prevailing emotions

Preserving our Ideals. Read at Columbia University, March 7, 1917, after appointment of a committee to investigate the loyalty of the faculty. Condensed.

which are intimately connected with the traditional mode of thought. The fact that certain ideas are held sacred in a community, and that they are upheld by intelligent thought, is no proof of their truth; for we know that in every society the development of thought is shaped more or less by traditional attitudes; that men are more likely to justify their way of feeling and acting by reasoning than to shape their actions and to remodel their emotions on the basis of reasoning. Only the greatest minds can free themselves of this tendency, and they are the ones who in course of time revolutionize the course of our civilization. We should bear in mind all the time the difficulty of developing such strength of character and of reasoning-power as to free ourselves of the prejudices that are the foundation of our whole life.

I consider it of fundamental importance to bear in mind all the time these conditions of human thought, and to watch that in the education of the young the respect and love for ideals be tempered by a rational understanding of the principles on which these ideals are based.

For this reason I believe that the purely emotional basis on which, the world over, patriotic feelings are instilled into the minds of children is one of the most serious faults in our educational systems, particularly when we compare these methods with the lukewarm attention that is given to the common interests of humanity. I dare say that if all nations cultivated the ideals of equal rights of all members of mankind by emotional means such as are now used to develop passionate patriotism, much of the mutual hatred, distrust, and disrespect would disappear. The kind of patriotism that we inculcate is intended to develop the notion that the members of each nation, and that the institutions of each nation, are superior to those of all others. Under this stimulus the fact that in each country, normally, people live comparatively comfortably under the conditions in which they have grown up, is too often translated by the citizens of that country into the idea that others who live under different conditions have a civilization or institutions of inferior value, and must

feel unhappy until the benefits of his own mode of feeling, thinking and living have been imposed upon them. I consider it one of the great objects worth striving for to counteract this faulty tendency. If it is not sufficient to train children to an intelligent understanding of the institutions and habits of their country, if these have to be strengthened emotionally by waving of flags and by singing of patriotic songs, then this emotional tendency should be supplemented by equally strong emotional means intended to cultivate respect for the love that foreigners have for their country, and designed to instil into the minds of the young respect for the common interests of humanity. I should prefer, however, to inculcate intelligent love and respect for all human endeavor, wherever found, without trying to destroy the possibility of clear, intelligent thought by emphasizing the emotional side of patriotism.

These opinions bring it about that I am uncompromisingly opposed to all legislation, such as protective tariffs, that is intended to advance the interests of citizens at the expense of foreigners. I recognize that there are certain conditions under which the resources of a limited district may be developed by protective measures; but I should always consider these ill-applied if the local development is secured at an avoidable serious loss to other communities. The natural course of industrial development brings about a sufficient amount of suffering, owing to the depreciation of the resources of some areas when new kinds of products come into demand, or when ampler, newly discovered resources are made available; and we should try to alleviate hardships of this type rather than to accentuate them.

Neither can I share in the feeling that it is necessary to protect one race against others. I can imagine myself much more at home in a company of sympathetic Chinese, Malay, Negroes and whites who have interests and ideals in common than in a bigoted or presumptuous company of whites who might grate on my feelings by every word and action. As long as a foreign race respects the individuality of a nation, I can-

not see any reason why it should be discriminated against. From an anthropological point of view, I consider the laws forbidding intermarriages between whites and Mongols and Negroes as absolutely untenable, and therefore as vicious, because they accentuate antagonisms for which, however strongly they may be felt, there is no valid reason.

I ought to add, that these views do not necessarily imply that I consider absolutely unrestricted immigration as right, because the very respect that I have for the individuality of each nation implies that each has the right to maintain its individuality if it seems threatened by the course of human migration.

The kind of patriotism in which most of our fellow-men believe honestly and out of the fullness of their hearts is clearly antagonistic to the points of view that I hold. Nevertheless, I should consider myself entirely wrong if I should take the position that those whose actions are dictated by loyal patriotism, and who elevate the self-interest of their fellow-citizens over that of the whole rest of mankind, are wrong. If a minority—to which I belong, and which I believe to be in advance of the thoughts of the majority of mankind—hold ideals contrary to those of our times, we have not the right to stamp everything as heinous crime that for well-nigh three thousand years has been counted as the highest virtue. Patriots are morally wrong just as little as the persecutors of witchcraft, who merely followed out their honest convictions; and, much as we may like to convert them, there is no justice in impugning their moral character.

This leads me to the last and perhaps most important point in our considerations. As I grant that the patriot who cannot free himself from the prejudices of exalting his own environment may be morally as righteous as the cosmopolitan, so I grant to each nation that in a conflict of opinions we have no right to interpret their mode of thought that differs from our own, as due to moral depravity, but that we must try to understand it from the point of view of their national life and the exigencies of their situation.

XX

It is a sign of weakness to dread that critical attitude towards the basis of national institutions which is the only basis of sound progress.

Principles of Government

The present political conditions impel me to formulate the principles that determine my thoughts and my conduct.

I believe in the obligation of every citizen to obey the law, even when he disapproves of it. It is, however, a principle more fundamental than law, that the individual shall retain freedom of thought, and freedom of expression of opinion; and it should be our first duty to abrogate any law that restrains this freedom. If serious and patient endeavors in this direction fail, it becomes our duty to resist the law.

My own ideas of freedom of the individual go further than do current concepts. Not only must freedom of thought and expression be jealously guarded, but we should strive for such limitation of the powers of the State that no volitional actions could be demanded that violate the fundamental convictions of individuals.

In particular, the State should not have the power to compel individuals to perform actions for the sake of the State that would be considered immoral in private life. Furthermore education should be freed entirely of those legal and social restrictions that require it to be based on orthodoxy of political opinions. A State that serves the best human interests of its citizens will give the same freedom to the school in matters

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pertaining to public policy that we are supposed to have attained in matters concerning religious opinion.

The State in which laws are enacted by majority vote, must always demand the right to restrain the individual from actions, not from thoughts and their expression, and may impose duties the performance of which does not entail an act that would be immoral in private life. In regard to military service the justice of the demand in my opinion is equally valid. In public education we insist on a type of uniformity that is fundamentally opposed to freedom of thought. Since these principles are not yet recognized, I believe that it is our duty to work towards them, but that the attainment of these ideals will not be helped by resistance until a very large number of citizens become convinced of their justice.

Under normal conditions, freedom exists in every State. The crucial test of a State comes only in times of stress. At the present time no State can claim to have attained freedom, because all are so conscious of their own weakness, that in times of stress they feel compelled to suppress the freedom of thought, speech, and legitimate action.

I thoroughly believe in the right of the State to demand services to the community, and I believe that for the well-being of society and for the promotion of the welfare of the whole, every citizen should be expected to do for a certain length of time some kind of work of public utility. It might seem that this opinion is opposed to that freedom that I demanded before. It is not, because no conscientious objection can be raised by any one against the performance of productive work, useful to the community, the general field of which would be determined by the ability and interests of the individual.

From this point of view, the refusal of a person to do peaceful work demanded by the State in war times because by this activity he would help the war, has no claim to consideration; for, no matter what we may do, the very fact that we live as members of society helps whatever activities the State may engage in, no matter whether we approve of the m or not

I believe that individual freedom should be a recompense for the ability to do fruitful work. An approach to unrestricted freedom is possible only when the individual can separate himself from the society in which he is placed, and shift to a new environment before he becomes enmeshed in new social ties. Therefore it can only be realized in countries that have abundance of space and of opportunity. Great Britain with her colonies, the United States, and in part South America and Russia, present the social conditions in which individual freedom is most readily attained without bringing about conflict with existing society. At the same time we can see that increase of population leads unavoidably to the restriction of individual freedom. The necessity of compulsory order and discipline increases with the density of population. Nobody has the right to object to this discipline. The problem before us is how to safeguard freedom of conduct and thought, notwithstanding the necessary subordination of the individual. The more clearly the State is recognized as a means to further the well-being of man as a member of society, and not felt as an end in itself, and the more society refrains from imposing its arbitrary shackles upon the individual, the better will this condition be attained. The concept of the State as an end in itself is deeply ingrained in human nature, for we are in the habit of raising any established organization to the rank of an independent being endowed with its own will and purposes; and our emancipation from this concept is progressing slowly and laboriously.

A third fundamental principle is that every child should have the same opportunities. Advisedly I say every child, not every individual, for I consider this kind of equality unattainable, on account of differences in bodily make-up, mental ability and character. I am not inclined to believe that mankind will prosper, if there is no material incentive to industry, energetic concentration, and strength of character.

We cannot claim to have reached that stage in which equal opportunities are granted to every child; and we shall not be in that condition until all expenses of education and main-

tenance are carried by the community, and until all inequalities due to inherited privileges have been removed. I do not challenge the right of the individual to wider opportunities which should be the fruits of his labor, but equal chances for the young will not be reached until everyone must stand or fall on his own deserts. The attainment of this ideal presupposes a radical social readjustment.

The fourth principle to which I hold is that no individual or State has the right to impose his own views upon other individuals or States. An impassable gulf separates my views from those who claim that since we hold certain ideals for ourselves, it is right that we should also hold them for others. I do not consider our own views as possessing such absolute virtue, that every conflicting view must be held to be wrong, and that we have the right to compel others to adopt a course of conduct that we chose for ourselves. On the contrary, I believe in the fundamental importance of freedom for all societies to develop their own ideals. This view is founded on the deep conviction that there is no person in existence whose whole mode of thought and whose ideals are not founded on traditional teaching, that those things that are most sacred to us are in most cases imposed by early environment, and that we cannot free ourselves of these early impressions.

The tasks of mankind have undergone a fundamental change since the development of the new industrial conditions, and since the over-emphasis that has been laid upon the purely intellectual side of life and upon material well-being. These have only very remote relation to the form of government of the State. The solution of these problems depends upon the degree to which legislators feel their responsibility for the welfare of the masses, and upon the spirit with which an administration takes up the problems that present themselves. They are full of perplexing difficulties, and will not be solved except by many independent experiments, that are in progress now in every civilized State. The more independent attempts are made, the more quickly may we hope to find their solution.

The assumption that we have attained the only adequate method of expression of popular will, and that all other nations must follow our example, cannot be maintained. It is a political problem of first magnitude to make the Administration serve the people, not the head of the Administration or the State. The principle that the Administration must serve the people is accepted everywhere, not so the second principle. Service to the State as opposed to the people is still demanded as a principle; and service to the Administration—Sovereign or President—is, if not demanded in principle, rendered a condition of office-holding. Neither republics nor monarchies have freed themselves of this doctrine. Our task is to secure expert administrators in such a way that they will not feel themselves as masters of the people, but as their servants. It cannot be claimed that the problem has been solved in any country. Attempts have been made, on the one hand by educating the bureaucracy to a consciousness of its responsibility and by the endeavor to subject it to the public control; on the other hand by dispensing with a bureaucracy altogether and by assuming that expert knowledge is an unnecessary condition for performing public office. The solution of the problem remains a task of the future.

XXI

In the purest national fervor there is no tinge of the lust of dominion that characterizes nationalism.

Social Justice—Nations

I do not think it is possible to give a general answer to the question as to what constitutes the ideal of Americanism, for our ideals do not depend solely upon our social environment but also upon our individual make-up, and every one will choose as essential from the multiplicity of forms that characterize American life, those that touch most intimately the chords of his feelings. To my mind the idea of social justice appears as the foundation of Americanism. While almost all European countries, no matter whether the form of their government is monarchial or republican, are struggling towards the concept of equal rights against the formidable forces of a tradition which is based on the existence of privileged classes, the very foundation of our commonwealth rests on the acknowledgment of equal rights for all. I hold, therefore, that progressive Americanism must lie in the attainment of this ideal. It is not true that all men are created equal. On the contrary, their natural gifts are immensely diverse; but each should be given the fullest opportunity to develop his natural endowment. We like to point with pride to our system of education, that assures this privilege to every child; but we should not deceive ourselves. Free schools are not equal opportunities. The well-to-do can select a school, his children are well nourished and well cared for. They do not need to

Manuscript, 1916

help the family income. They command the careful shelter that is denied to the poor. We may learn much from the school administration of the industrial cities of northern France in regard to these matters, and much remains to be done to approach more nearly to what we set before us as our ideal.

A necessary correlate of justice to all is the freedom of individual development. This freedom implies two fundamental ideas—one, that each man is to be treated according to his individual worth, no matter what his racial, national, or religious affiliations may be; the other, that there should be no tyranny of public opinion that may shackle the freedom of individual thought. Here also is room for progressive Americanism.

From the requirements of justice to all and individual freedom arise unavoidable conflicts that must be settled; and in these according to my views, the demands of justice are higher than those of individual freedom and we must cultivate voluntary subordination of the individual to public needs.

These appear to me as the great contributions that America can make to the advance of mankind, more easily than other countries because the State itself is formed on these concepts.

There is also an application of these principles to international affairs. Justice to all means the right of each nation to develop in its domain according to its own ideals. It requires, therefore, first of all, restriction of the sphere of activity of the State to its own affairs, and restraint from any attempts to interfere in the affairs of others. It also implies resistance against interference by others. No policy of expansion at the expense of other nations can be justified under our leading principles.

I am clear in my own mind that these fundamental principles do not solve a number of problems that are bound to arise in the history of human development. The mere fact that a nation exists does not give it the right to continue its existence for infinite times. The demands of justice to mankind as a whole may be opposed to the demands of a single nation. The needs of expansive nations like China, Japan,

Russia, Germany, Italy, are different from the needs of stationary nations like France. How to adjust these needs is an urgent problem, for which a new solution should be found. We are convinced that the crude and cruel appeal to arms is inconsistent with the aims and methods of modern civilization. Americanism has no solution to offer, because in international affairs Americanism is but one form of nationalism. The only solution that can be found must be looked for in a form of international administration, in which the principles of justice as developed for the individual are applied to nations. The conflict between individual liberty (that is sovereignty) of the nations and justice to the interests of mankind must be solved in the same way as the conflict between individual freedom and justice to all members of the community.

XXII

I believe in the fundamental importance of freedom for all societies to develop their own ideals.

Social Justice—Individuals

At the time of my arrival here, more than thirty years ago (1884), I was filled with admiration of American political ideals. While in Europe I had grown up under the pressure of national contentions and conflicts of interests that were difficult to harmonize. I had been taught to look upon the United States as the one country that had the good fortune to be free from the pressure produced by great density of population, and that sought satisfaction in perfecting its inner development. I thought of it as a country that would not tolerate interference with its own interests, but that would also refrain from active interference in the affairs of others, and would never become guilty of the oppression of unwilling subjects. Events like the great movement westward, and the Mexican war, appeared rather as digressions from the self-imposed path of self-restraint.

A rude awakening came in 1898, when the aggressive imperialism of that period showed that the ideal had been a dream. Well I remember the heated discussions which I had that year with my friends when I maintained that control of colonies was opposed to the fundamental ideas of right held by the American people, and the profound disappointment that I felt when, at the end of the Spanish war, these ideals lay shattered. The America that had stood for right and right

Extracted from a letter to the New York Times, January 7, 1916.

only, seemed dead; and in its place stood a young giant, eager to grow at the expense of others, and domineered by the same desire of aggrandizement that sways the narrowly confined European States. The hope that the United States would guide the world to a saner concept of national aspirations seemed gone. What wonder if, during the period of ambitious attempts to extend our political power, many took the view that control of alien peoples is destructive to the principles on which our nation is founded; that we have a higher duty to ourselves than to those whom, flattering ourselves, we like to call the wards of the nation. I still admire the keen insight of Carl Schurz, who, when this question first came to the front, recognized the importance of this issue, and subordinated to it all other questions as momentarily of minor importance. My political faith is still founded on the conviction that self-restraint should be the foundation of our policies.

My position in regard to other closely allied questions is determined by another consideration. In my youth I had been taught in school and at home not only to love the soul of my own country but also to seek to understand and to respect the individualities of other nations. For this reason one-sided nationalism, that is so often found nowadays, is to me unendurable. The question whether this tolerant spirit is found in other nations does not concern us here. The point that concerns me is that I wish to see it realized in the country whose citizen I am. As a matter of fact, the number of people in our country who are willing and able to enter into the modes of thought of other nations is altogether too small. The American, on the whole, is inclined to consider American standards of thought and action as absolute standards; and the more idealistic his nature, the more strongly he wishes to "raise" everyone to his own standards. For this reason the American who is cognizant only of his own standpoint sets himself up as arbiter of the world. He claims that the form of his own Government is the best, not for himself only but also for the rest of mankind; that his interpretation of

ethics, of religion, of standards of living, is right. Therefore, he is inclined to assume the role of a dispenser of happiness to mankind. We do not often find an appreciation of the fact that others may abhor where we worship. I have always been of the opinion that we have no right to impose our ideals upon other nations, no matter how strange it may seem to us that they enjoy the kind of life they lead, how slow they may be in utilizing the resources of their countries, or how much opposed their ideals may be to ours.

Our intolerant attitude is most pronounced in regard to what we like to call "our free institutions." Modern democracy was undoubtedly the most wholesome and needed reaction against the abuses of absolutism and of a selfish, often corrupt, bureaucracy. That the wishes and thoughts of the people should find expression, and that the form of government should conform to these wishes is an axiom that has pervaded the whole Western world, and that is taking root even in the Far East. It is a quite different question, however, in how far the particular machinery of democratic government that we have developed is identical with democratic institutions. We are not satisfied with the expression of the popular will, but, by an enormous extension of the number of elective officers, we subject the details of administration to popular control. The disadvantages of this method have led us here and there to substitute for the many elective officers a single one with almost dictatorial powers. This example shows that there is nothing sacred in the particular kind of popular control that is chosen. The technical difficulties of organizing democratic control of the government have found a different solution in different countries. To claim, as we often do, that our solution is the only democratic and the ideal one, is a one-sided exaggeration of Americanism. I see no reason why we should not allow other nations to solve their problems in their own ways, instead of demanding that they bestow upon themselves the benefactions of our regime. The very standpoint that we are right and they are wrong is opposed to the fundamental idea that nations have distinc-

tive individualities, which are expressed in their modes of life, thought and feeling.

Our self-sufficiency is also apt to obscure our view in regard to the attitude of various nations toward individualism and collectivism. It is rather a fortunate accident than conscious choice that enables us to allow to the individual as much freedom of action as we do. A new country, rich in resources, sparsely settled, provides openings without number. The advantages that we possess in our country are provided in England in her vast colonial possessions. On the contrary, a country as thickly settled as Germany is compelled much sooner to husband her resources and to restrict the freedom of action of the individual, because co-ordination is necessary to the well-being of the community. If we think the ends desirable we do not hesitate to regiment the free will of the individual. The whole conservation movement can be successful only with regimentation, and it does not require much acumen to see that during the last thirty years there have occurred constant encroachments upon the freedom of action of the individual, which have been forced upon us by the exigencies of our economic situation, and it is safe to predict that these will constantly increase. Why, then, should we set up the individualism of the thinly settled young country as the standard by which the institutions of others are to be measured? I confess frankly that it was this individual freedom, that will always be dear to the young, that attracted me here; but maturer years have shown to me the necessity that this freedom should be co-ordinate with the necessary amount of subordination of the actions of the individual to society.

The organization of our government, business and school must be such that action results from the cooperation of free men who respect one another's opinions and needs.

XXIII

Human Resources

There are two kinds of efficient society. In the one, every one is given full opportunity to develop his abilities, and to coordinate, by means of proper agencies, his work with that of others. Every one is placed where, according to his nature, he can be most serviceable. This kind of efficiency stimulates and broadens the mental life of every individual.

In the narrower sense, and we think altogether too often of efficiency in this way, it signifies the development in each individual of the highest degree of ability to do a certain routine work. It is attained by the conscious endeavor to make every man a machine that performs automatically a small group of actions that are repeated without end, so that they can be accomplished with the least amount of mental effort. It is the mechanical efficiency which is cultivated in our factories, and insures the greatest productivity according to established standards. It develops clock-like regularity of habit, eliminates all unnecessary effort, but it degrades the mental life of a workman. It is opposed to the stimulation of inventive genius, that used to be the pride of the American workman.

It is not only in manual labor where this kind of efficiency is sought. It is cultivated in administrative affairs and in the routine work of scientific pursuits. We are inclined to over-

Illinois Staats Zeitung, February 18, 1917.

estimate the efficiency of the person who solves every day, according to the established routine of his office, all the administrative problems that come up to him for decision, and who does so without much ado and without fatiguing thought. Slowness of procedure, and failure to find an immediate solution of difficult problems, are often considered marks of inefficiency rather than proofs of caution and wisdom. We tend to be worshippers of action, and are inclined to believe in efficiency where we see motion, without much thought as to its ultimate effects.

When conceived in this sense, I am inclined to rank efficiency very low, for it is likely to be a sign of lack of mental freedom. The more strictly each person is assigned to a narrow field of work, in which he attains perfection, the more likely it is that this will be a mechanical perfection.

We may perhaps recognize the difference between the two points of view in the differences between American and European methods of business training. In America the young apprentice is kept in one particular branch of the business he enters, without learning the interrelation of its parts, unless his own initiative carries him beyond the prescribed limits. In Europe the apprentice passes systematically through all the different branches of the establishment so that he may become familiar with it as a whole.

In medicine, and in part in engineering, where educational agencies have gained practical control of the training, we employ methods designed to develop power of intelligent coordination rather than mechanical precision.

It seems to me that when we speak of efficiency, or of an efficient person, we think too often of people who will accomplish an assigned task intelligently, promptly, and correctly, without waste of superfluous energy, but who do not look beyond the assigned task. A higher kind of efficiency is demanded of the person who, while perhaps inferior in mechanical skill, understands the organization and purposes of the work, in which he is concerned, and knows why he must subordinate his own labors to the general purposes, and how he can accomplish this end.

We cannot understand the attitude to which I referred just now, without considering the stress which in our times is laid upon service to the community. It has come to be customary to say that the value of each person and of each institution is to be estimated by the service that it renders. Service in what sense? In the sense of ministering to the needs of society, of alleviating pain, improving the material conditions of life, spreading knowledge, increasing capacity for productive work, and creating sources of pleasure. It is throughout the wish of giving to others what we possess, and of making them capable of participating in the fruits of our labors—altruistic work in the best sense of the word, that ennobles our beginnings. It is but natural that in such a world, that is controlled by altruism, the self-centered searcher for truth, and still more he who creates a word of beauty for himself, is held in slight esteem; for he does not work for universal happiness, but is guided by the needs of his own soul. He is the egotist in a world of mutual helpfulness.

I cannot but think that, lovable as this attitude may be, it is an expression of the ethics of mediocrity; for he who cannot create must see his highest aims in the diffusion of the advantage that he enjoys. The most sacred duty of the creative genius, however, must be the cultivation of the gifts which have been bestowed upon him; and for the greatest genius the greatest selfishness become the highest fulfillment of his duty to mankind, to whom he gives new aims and new thoughts. As mediocrity gives its all to the community, so the community should give of its wealth to genius, as to a rare flower, whose beauty and fragrance will benefit all. The germ of some kind of ability is present in a much larger number of people than we are inclined to believe, and therefore our insistence on altruism is a very imperfect way of making ourselves useful to the world. In an ideal society the best interests of society would be subserved by the thorough development of the gifts of each individual, and by the adaption of society to the abilities of its members.

Each man is to be treated according to his individual worth, no matter what his racial, national, or religious affiliation may be. There should be no tyranny of public opinion that may shackle the freedom of individual thought.

XXIV

Intellectual Freedom

The complexities of modern life compel us to recognize that the economic actions of each individual have such a profound influence upon the well-being of our fellow citizens, even of members of foreign nations, that we cannot indulge in that robust individuality characteristic of earlier days, when every household was much more nearly self-sufficient than it is now. The causes of this change are well known and primarily due to the achievements of science.

The restrictions which we accept as unavoidable consequences of the inventive genius of mankind and the size of our population do not extend over the domain of thought. Even if we wanted to do so, we cannot maintain absolute individualism in social and economic life, but it is the goal to which we strive in intellectual and spiritual life. It took us a long time to free thought from the restraints of imposed dogma. This freedom has not by any means been achieved completely. The thoughts of many are unconsciously or consciously so restrained, and attempts at forcible repression of thought that runs counter to accepted tenets of belief are still all too frequent. A bigoted majority may be as dangerous

Democracy and Intellectual Freedom. Address delivered at a meeting sponsored by the Lincoln's Birthday Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City, on Sunday, February 12, 1939. This address was broadcast over station WHN. The American Teacher, March, 1939.

to free thought as the heavy hand of a dictator. For this reason we demand fullest freedom of expression, so that our youth may be prepared for an intelligent use of the privileges and duties of citizenship.

Notwithstanding all the lapses of which we may have been guilty, the ideal of our democracy is freedom of thought and expression. This is clearly expressed in the Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of Rights; free speech, free assembly, free press prove that our aim is to strive for intellectual freedom. Science certainly cannot live in an atmosphere of restraint. In democratic states it has largely succeeded in shaking off the chains of dogma, at least insofar as the natural sciences are concerned. We still have to learn much in regard to freedom of research and expression in the social sciences, but at least we have the will to achieve it. The disposition to consider as heresy a view different from that in vogue and to incite passionate persecution of those holding it must be overcome. If we wish to fight prejudice, the results of honest research, whatever they may be, must become accessible to all.

There was a time when in absolute monarchies science was free as long as it did not interfere with the autocratic government, when the results of research did not find their way to the masses but remained confined to the small group devoted to intellectual pursuits.

The modern totalitarian states take a different view. They ordain what the results of scientific research shall be and do not allow work to be carried out or results to be published that run counter to their preconceived notions. Whole branches of knowledge that seem to them dangerous or irrelevant are suppressed. The value of scientific research is not measured by its intrinsic value but by the question whether the investigator is acceptable to the dictator or not.

The evil effects of such a policy are not confined to science. The tyranny extends over everyday life. No criticism, no divergent opinion is allowed and since Draconic punishments are meted out to transgressors, the people become cowards;

even more, since denunciation of opponents is considered a virtue, their whole morale is undermined.

The uninformed among ourselves are too apt to overlook the sacrifices by which the successes of totalitarian states are purchased, and there is danger that the apparent security may allure weak souls to search for similar remedies. Irresponsible propaganda is at work to exploit such disposition.

For this reason it is our duty to be on guard. We deem intellectual and spiritual freedom the inalienable right of every individual. Democracy as conceived in our Constitution and as expressed in our daily life is a treasure that we are determined to guard under all circumstances. We have not attained the fullest measure of such freedom, but where it is not fully realized, we struggle to develop it. We consecrate ourselves to its perfection, to fight every form of censorship, exerted by government, church, vested interests, irresponsible control by governing individuals or bodies, and all other forms of suppressing freedom of expression. Our democracy gives us the right and imposes upon us the duty to devote ourselves to the development of intellectual freedom.

Today we can express our convictions only in words, but you may rest assured that we shall create an organization to strengthen democracy; that steps have been taken which will lead to the realization of this end.

XXV

We must do our share in trying to spread the art, and to engender the habit of clear thinking.

Freedom of Thought

On the whole, I do not try to apply the conclusions of our discussions to specific problems of the day, assuming that when you think attentively about these matters, their application will seem obvious to you. At present, however, when in the University and outside of the University we are called upon constantly to restrict the freedom of our thought in conformity with the current opinions of the day, I think I ought to state frankly and as clearly as I can my position in regard to this demand. It has taken a long time for the scientist who investigates astronomical, geological, or biological problems to obtain the freedom of following out rigidly his line of thought without any regard to tradition and without any regard to dogmatic opinions held by others. It has come to be self-evident that any interference with the freedom of thought and speech of the scientist would be considered intolerable. A sharp division, however, is drawn between a scientific investigator and an investigator of phenomena that relate to human conduct. Evidently the fact has not permeated society that these phenomena must be and can be investigated with the same kind of scientific spirit that dominates investigation in other lines. To any one who has reached this standpoint, restriction in the freedom of thought and expression in regard

Lecture before Barnard College class in anthropology, Nov. 1917. Not previously published.

to psychological and social phenomena is just as unbearable as would be the demand for conformity in regard to opinions relating to science in the narrower sense of the term.

If I have succeeded in making clear the fundamental data of anthropological research, you will understand that from my point of view the most essential requirement for obtaining clearness of thought and individual freedom must be the ability to understand the obscure emotional motives that determine our conduct and our way of thinking. I have tried to show to you how intimate is the relation between our feeling and our thinking and those fundamental ideals that are instilled into our minds in earliest youth. If we once clearly recognize this fact, then you will understand that the idea of freedom, of which we like to speak so much, attains an entirely new meaning. That we want to have freedom from interference with our individuality is obvious, but there are very few people even at the present time who understand that true freedom means that we ourselves should be able to rise above the fetters that the past imposes upon us; that we should understand what actions that we perform are simply due to habit and to the emotional value that habitual actions acquire, and how much is due to true rational thought. We ought to understand that the foundations of individual freedom are not easy to attain for the very reason that it requires hard mental work and the willingness to overcome emotional resistances even to know that some of those cherished ideas with which we operate are traditional phrases without any kind of rational significance, that it is difficult to raise them into consciousness and to make them the subject of examination. You will readily recognize that therefore the whole basis of an anthropological viewpoint is the willingness to take the position of the non-conformist, not to take anything in our social structure for granted, and to be particularly ready to examine critically all those attitudes that are accompanied by strong outbursts of emotion, the more so the stronger the accompanying emotion. For this reason I cannot possibly ac-

cept any kind of position in which the freedom of non-conformist thought should be restricted.

As students of human society we must demand that here as well as in the physical sciences we should accept the results of critical thought without any regard to current opinion. That it is more difficult in social sciences to free ourselves of traditional bias is no reason why we should restrict ourselves. On the contrary, the very greatest freedom of thought and of expression is needed in researches in which we recognize that it is so difficult to obtain an entirely unbiased point of view.

I should like to call your attention to a few practical applications of the discussions which we have had during the past few weeks. One of these refers to the feeling of contrast that prevails among practically all members of mankind in regard to the personal obligations of individuals toward members of their own community and to strangers. You will remember that I told you that among primitive man the stranger is considered as a being specifically different from ourselves. I also tried to show you how the size of the unit has gradually increased, and how the feeling of specific difference has gradually been toned down, until we recognize at the present time certain rights of the stranger. The primitive feeling that in our ethical conduct the interests of members of our own community are more important than those of outsiders persists. It is easier to look at these matters, not in the light of feelings developed during war, but on the basis of our conduct during times of peace. When we once recognize that the general trend of development is towards the recognition of equal rights of every member of mankind, then there is no ethical basis which could allow us to impose protective tariffs for the purpose not only of furthering the interest of members of our own community, but also, if that is possible, of damaging the interests of the stranger. It would be permissible to devise means of furthering the economic well-being of one particular area or social group, provided it could be done without unjust discrimination against another one; but that is not our modern point of view. I can understand why it may be of im-

portance to further the economic well-being of California by some artificial stimulus, but I cannot see why that artificial stimulus should be directed against Canadians, and not against New Englanders, who may have much more power to disturb the development of southern California than the Canadians have. The objection to this argument would of course be that the Californians and New Englanders are members of one nation, to which the Canadians do not belong; but you will readily see that this takes us back to the argument that we have the right to damage the foreigner if that is for the benefit of the members of our own nation, and that we also wish to re-enforce the idea of national unity by our actions. From a general point of view of fair play to all, I should always be in principle opposed to all kinds of national protective tariffs.

I should like to give you another instance, in order to illustrate to you that this point of view does not imply by any means the total surrender of what we like to call national ideals. As you are aware, one of our most troublesome questions is that of East Asiatic immigration. From a general human point of view, I should wish that all barriers against human migration could be abolished. It is clear, however, that in a sparsely settled country with unrestricted immigration of a cultural type entirely distinct in character, that type of life which we call our civilization may be swamped completely by that of the foreign immigrant. Here I think is a point in which the members of a nation have the right to defend their national life against the inroads of foreign ideas and of foreign mode of life, provided this can be done without injustice. It is the same condition that would have justified the Spanish colonists of California, Arizona, and New Mexico in imposing restrictions upon American immigration at the time when, during the middle of the last century, it became obvious that the sparsely settled communities would be swamped by us. If, on the other hand, we take the point of view that it was right at the time to swamp the Spanish countries of our continent, then we ought to take the point of

view also that it would be right for Japan or China to swamp us, if they are economically and culturally in a position to do so.

My point of view in regard to these matters is determined very largely by the fact that I know how thoroughly the ideals of every particular nation are determined by its own historic tradition. History is never rational, and for this reason desirable and undesirable elements are intermingled in the tradition of every single nation. If we want to obtain clarity of view, nothing is more important than to be able to recognize the traditional basis of our own thought by comparison with foreign types of thought; and if it were for no other reason, it would be for this reason, that I should want to see maintained the individuality of nations.

In other words, as long as we know that the mass of mankind would never free itself from the fetters of tradition, progress requires the persistence of national characteristics. Nothing could be further from the truth than to assume that if we could only impose our own ideals upon the rest of mankind, then the whole progress would be plain sailing. I should say that in all probability it would be the best way of obtaining stagnation. It is obvious that on account of this attitude, which I believe is the only one that is justifiable by anthropological experience, I am exceedingly sceptical in regard to the absolute values of so-called national ideals. Obviously all of them contain things that are good, but it is quite as certain that all of them contain things that are of the most dubious value.

If we want to understand the truly human ideals, these should not be based on the specific national ideals but upon those ideals which we find expressed everywhere where man is least restrained by historic tradition. You will remember that I explained to you that this condition prevails particularly among the masses of the people, much less among the segregated classes. Segregated classes exist not only in a national or tribal unit. The intellectuals, who are steeped in historical tradition, and are therefore, on the whole, little able

to think clearly, belong to this group. The rich, the nobility, the scientist, the artist, the clergyman, all belong in their great mass to such segregated groups; but it is no less true that each nation is in the same sense a segregated group, in which certain types of thought have developed entirely by tradition; in which the thought, couched in a catch phrase, is an almost elemental power, stimulating man to activity without any attempt to think out clearly what the catch phrase may mean or whether it does mean anything.

I believe, therefore, that national ideals must be scrutinized in the same way as we scrutinize the social ethics that develop in any segregated class; and I consider the national ethics as of inferior value when compared to the human ethics, which are based on generalized concepts, free from the specific social setting that determine their form in each particular case. We might examine from this point of view some of the passionate convictions that determine our conduct in times of war. We ought to be clear in regard to the point that our judgement is not a rational judgement, but based on certain premises in which only one of the two parties shares. The assumption made on either side, that a whole people or even a large fraction of a people are scoundrels, barbarians and hypocrites, or whatever else it may be, seems to my mind entirely unjustifiable from an anthropological point of view. The action of all of us is determined by the emotional background from which we start; and when the emotional background is different, we can never reach the same results.

A similar point appears if we examine carefully the historical development of what we choose to call democracy. As I tried to explain to you several times, the ultimate basis of our conduct should be the preservation of the equality of rights of every new-born individual and the freedom of a social unit to develop in its own way. Historically our modern democracy has very little to do with this fundamental question. It has developed as a natural and necessary action against outside interference with the freedom of the individual and local units. Fundamentally its character is negative, insofar as it

declines the control of a group of people by outsiders, and insofar as its forms are expressions of distrust against those who happen to be in charge of the execution of its laws. On the basis of these negative elements, positive constructive methods have developed. It is, however, quite striking that the most important changes which have occurred of late years are not by any means determined by these democratic forms, but rather by the fundamental human ideals to which I referred before. There seems to be very little relation between the two. I am inclined to think that we restrict the possibility of advance by giving modern democracy a universal and permanent value, for the permanent values are clearly far in advance of the negative character of what are commonly called democratic ideals. Certainly nobody who knows the conditions of life of the rich and the poor could claim that we offer equal opportunities to all.

To sum up, then, I want to say that if we yield to the community the right to restrict freedom of thought and freedom of expression, we close the possibility of scientific progress; that, on the contrary, freedom of thought can be obtained only by the most searching scrutiny of current opinion and of our own minds, whose activities are so closely associated with current opinion, that it requires hard and courageous work to recognize where the irrational prejudices of the day take the place of rational thought.

Freedom of thought can be obtained only by the most searching scrutiny of current opinion and of our own minds. It requires hard and courageous work to recognize where the irrational prejudices of the day take the place of rational thought.

XXVI

Academic Freedom

The Puritans came to America seeking freedom from persecution, freedom to follow their religious convictions. Like other religious minorities who had come into power they forgot their own desire for freedom and became intolerant oppressors. They had not learned the great principle of spiritual freedom.

The settling of the West demanded the development of individual strength and self-reliance which gave the great impetus for the desire for individual freedom that has characterized the greater part of our national history. It is a worship of freedom different in character from that of the Puritans, opposed to social restraint, emphasizing individual initiative and self-determination.

With the development of commerce and industry, with increasing complexity of economic life, the manifestations of this passionate desire for individual freedom have become weaker and weaker. The number of those who have to rely on employment and the consequent limitations of their freedom is constantly increasing. Security without personal effort in government employment, acceptance of the sacrifice of intellectual independence in a bureaucracy, a factory or a commercial enterprise undermine the desire for individual freedom.

Freedom Defined. The New York Teacher, June, 1941.

To regain part of their freedom the employed are joining together, desirous of regaining part of their self-determination, freedom from their complete dependence upon their employer. The consciousness that individual freedom can be attained only in the framework of society as a whole is gaining. The employee wants to gain not only economic security but also the consciousness that he is an active element in our cultural life, not merely a wheel in a machine that is set in motion by others. The desire for greater economic independence and for intellectual participation in the work of humanity compel the employee to seek its fulfilment by cooperation.

The conviction of the necessity of cooperative work for the purpose of receiving greater freedom is weakest among those who participate, although in a minor role, in the intellectual or spiritual work of our times, but the necessity for joint action is felt by many.

It seemed necessary to bear these general aspects of freedom in mind when defining what is meant by academic freedom. There is no need of saying that the scientist who is searching for truth and adding by his work to our fund of knowledge must be free from all outer coercion and that it is his duty to free himself, as far as humanly possible, of prejudice and bias. This refers not only to research in physics, chemistry and biology, but equally in psychology and social sciences. The closer scientific inquiry touches upon our social life the greater is the danger that the work of the scientist will be hampered or helped by outer pressure, economic or otherwise, as well as by his own emotional bias.

The function of the teacher is too often misunderstood, both by the public and by too many of the teachers themselves. The teacher must be not only an instructor who imparts knowledge of facts. He must be also an educator of personalities. He must develop will-power and control of emotional life of the youth entrusted to him no less than impart factual knowledge.

It is not our concern at present to discuss what this means for the organization of the schools. The important problem is

under what conditions teacher and pupil must live in order to make possible the achievement of his task.

The primary question is whether we want to educate the young to personal freedom or to become subservient tools of the employer, be it the state, an individual, or a commercial, intellectual or spiritual organization. I hope that our devotion to the higher aims of humanity is still strong enough to answer such an ideal with an emphatic No. There must be no indoctrination. On the contrary we must try to develop intellectual freedom and a sound coordination of reason and emotion. This can be done only when both teacher and pupil are living in an atmosphere of freedom. The teacher must be in sufficiently close contact with all the forces that are moving our social life to give to the young in his charge a feeling for the ideals moving our society and of the cross-currents that are produced by the conflicts of ideals. He will adjust his teaching to the comprehension of the young. His own understanding of the phenomena of nature and of human society will depend upon the freedom of his own mind. The less the bureaucratic restraint under which he labors, the more successful will be his work. It is likely that under his guidance the young will choose enthusiastically one or the other ideal, until by experience their thoughts and actions will be directed to a moderate course. We should remember Goethe's words with which he characterizes the idealism of youth:

"Yet even from him we're not in special peril;
He will, erelong, to other thoughts incline:
The must may foam absurdly in the barrel,
Nathless it turns at last to wine."

It goes without saying that any attempt to select teachers not according to the standards here outlined, but according to political, religious or, most intolerable of all, racial affiliation must be resisted to the utmost; that any encroachment upon the political rights that the teacher enjoys with other citizens, to single him out as one who has to conform to the political or religious standards of the school administra-

tion is subversive of the most fundamental principles of a school intended to educate free citizens of a free country.

Academic freedom means freedom of research, freedom of opinion and freedom of the action of the teacher as a citizen. It means the duty to develop in the pupil a feeling for the obligation to think independently and to control his emotions by reason. For the student it means the right to be informed in regard to the manifold currents of life so that he may form an intelligent judgment in regard to his own place in society.

Our democracy gives us the right and imposes on us the duty to devote ourselves to the development of intellectual freedom.

XXVII

Education—I

A democracy can survive only when the young are adequately trained for assuming the responsibilities of the citizen. A bigoted democracy may be more intolerant, more oppressive, than any other form of government. *Its functioning must be based on the freedom of thought of the individual.* An education that teaches slavish subjection to symbols cannot be the basis of democratic life. The aim of education must be the training of free minds, to give them the power to examine critically the social and political structure of our lives, to evaluate the work of our fellow-citizens and to enable the young to find their proper place of activity in our complex social structure.

The very foundation of a democratic education is the requirement that every child should be given the opportunity to develop as fully as possible the powers given to him by nature. How far removed are we from fulfilling this elementary demand! The undernourished, ill-clad child of the slums, the isolated child in a remote valley, the Negro child in the South is not in a position to develop freely the resources that lie in his mind and body. The communities to which such children belong are so poor that they cannot give adequate help, even if they knew how to do it. Without federal help

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this situation will never be remedied. Just as little as the needs for an adequate health service can be met without federal help can our fundamental educational needs be met by the inadequate resources of local communities.

With the increasing complexity of our industrial life and frequency of gainful occupation of both parents, the tasks of the school have increased in many ways. More than ever is it the duty of the school not only to teach—that is, to impart information—but to educate. This requires an intimacy between teacher and student that can be attained only in small classes, and requires great elasticity of the teaching program, implying a considerable increase of the school budget. The needs of the student also demand adjustments in other ways. Not all are fitted for purely academic pursuits, although fully capable of becoming competent members of our society. Adequate provision for their needs requires the establishment of special, diversified teaching.

Equal opportunity for all implies also that the health and nutrition of the young should be adequately protected, which means that medical supervision and, wherever necessary, adequate nourishment must be provided.

The influence of the school upon the child is often overestimated. The attitude of the social group in which the child lives exerts a greater power than five days weekly at school for part of the year. To be effective the school must be able to cooperate with the home group. Hence the need of real cooperation with parents and particularly, also, the need of adult education. The adult must be made familiar with the aims of the school, and needs information which in all too many cases he has been unable to acquire in youth. In the long run the beliefs and prejudices of the social group are stronger than the influence of the school. It is, therefore, indispensable to develop harmony between the school and the homes.

If we are to defend our democratic ideals effectively, we must do away with the niggardly restriction of school funds. We must do away with the timid fear which would protect the young against acquiring knowledge of conflicting ideas;

we must do away with the unthinking worship of symbols. Emotional devotion to ideals should not be suppressed, but controlled by healthy, critical thought. If we succeed in educating a generation devoted to these principles, we shall have conquered the inner foe of democracy who threatens our freedom by concentrating his thought on military and industrial efficiency without thinking of the people who are the life and substance of the state—which, without them, is an empty shell.

XXVIII

We must rely upon education to help us to maintain intellectual freedom.

Education—II

Our school system is based on the theory that there shall be equal educational opportunities for each child, regardless of the economic position of the parents. It is well known that free schools with free text books, which are provided for by our states, do not by any means fill this most elementary requirement of a democratic society. The same conditions for all children cannot entirely be produced, because teachers differ in their ability to impart knowledge and to build up character and, what is even more important, not all parents can or will bestow equal care upon the development of their children. This inequality will always exist. It might in part be overcome by placing children in institutions, but it may be hoped that this will never be attempted, because all experience goes to show that institutions are a poor substitute for parental care and do not favor the physical, intellectual and moral development of children. Notwithstanding the difficulties that may seem to be in the way, the state should provide equal educational opportunity so far as it is attainable.

Conditions being what they are, the child of the poor is severely handicapped in its schoolwork. Insufficient time at home for study on account of the necessity of helping in household duties occurs in many families of moderate means. Among the poor this is aggravated by the necessity of early

Program for Equal Education Opportunity. Call Magazine, December 7, 1919.

employment in gainful occupations, by malnutrition and lack of proper clothing. When a family in cramped circumstances can prove that additional income is needed, the law permits the issue of working papers to a child that has reached a certain educational stage and a certain age. If equal opportunity is to be given, these children should be enabled to continue their school studies. This can be accomplished only if society supplies the income that the child would earn. A first step in the extension of educational opportunity should be, therefore, the repeal of all laws allowing the issue of working papers and the substitution in their place of laws granting full maintenance to those children who are now allowed to take out working papers, and such additional compensation as will pay for the room that they occupy in the home.

This, however, is only a small beginning. The children of the poor are physically unable to compete with the children of the well-to-do. It should, therefore, be our endeavor to overcome this serious handicap. In other words, the minimum of opportunity, which consists now in the establishment of free schools and the furnishing of free text books, is insufficient. We must see to it that all children receive such maintenance, such clothing and such housing that they can use their childhood effectively for study. This implies the introduction of free school meals, of free clothing and of support for decent housing.

The customary outcry that this means pauperization of the parents has no bearing upon this question as long as we consider equal educational opportunity as the foundation of a democracy. Furthermore, the assumption of new duties on the part of society as a whole in no sense pauperizes its members. It is rather a step in the direction of healthy cooperation.

The reorganization of a school system on this basis should not entail a loss of opportunities to those who are nowadays able to attend expensive private schools. It should be, rather, a stimulus for raising all schools to the highest standards. This would imply smaller classes, more teachers and better teachers. Better teachers would mean also more pay for teachers.

A program of justice to the children requires, therefore, exceedingly large expenditures; in fact, so large that ordinary taxes would hardly cover it.

The problem, however, should be looked at from a wider point of view. If the program were carried out consistently, society as a whole would provide entirely for the preparation of the child for life. The child would be in no sense an economic burden upon the family. If education were carried so far that the child could stand on its own feet economically, one of the fundamental reasons for the transfer of property by inheritance would disappear. If we should develop at the same time a satisfactory protection against inability to earn owing to sickness, old age and involuntary unemployment, the whole reason for the transfer of inheritance to individuals would disappear, except in so far as objects of purely sentimental value are concerned. It seems, therefore, logical that the funds for the reorganization of schools should be obtained from inheritance taxes.

The educational and financial problems present still another important aspect. We are altogether too much accustomed to consider schooling as a right and to forget that the services rendered by society to the individual entail also duties on the individual to society. One part of this duty is the diligent use of the opportunities offered in an effort to become a useful member of society. We might, therefore, well insist that the youth who enjoys the advantages of a long education that fits him for life should contribute by some kind of productive work toward the maintenance of the educational system. This proposition is founded on educational considerations. Its economic advantages to the school are secondary only. Even if the economic work of the youth should be of no direct benefit to the school system, but useful in some other way, it should be demanded, and its detailed organization should be based primarily on educational not on financial considerations. Work on the farm, in various trades, domestic work—all of these can be so organized that they are of high educational value as manual training, as well as for the pur-

pose of awakening the sense of obligation to society. The feeling of interdependence of all the component elements of society and the intelligent understanding of the solidarity of social interests will be developed when the scholar understands that the educational opportunities which he enjoys are made possible by his own contributions to their maintenance. At the same time the resources made available by the work of the pupils will materially decrease the financial difficulties that stand in the way of the establishment of an equitable and efficient school system.

The manual and economic work in the school is one important aspect of its organization. On the other hand, we should not forget that the conditions of labor tend rapidly toward the reduction of the hours devoted to industrial work and that the time available for recreation is constantly increasing. The laborer is no longer expected to work 10 or 12 hours a day and to return to his home in the evening completely exhausted and unable to enjoy the few short hours that remain to him. We are rather endeavoring to cut down the time of hard work to an amount consistent with the possibility of the enjoyment of life. Under these conditions, the school should prepare the individual not only for practical work, but also for a sensible use of the time of recreation. The more time becomes available for this purpose, the more important will it become that this point of view should be born in mind in the organization of teaching.

Such a school, with a body of teachers who enjoy perfect intellectual freedom and consider the education of the young as a life task, not as a passing avocation, with an honored position that would attract men as well as women, would do much toward the establishment of society on a sound basis.

XXIX

Our minds must remain free, if for no other reason but that free minds are needed for the solution of our problems.

Freedom for the School

Educators like to flatter themselves with the belief that through the schools they control the current of human thought, and that through their work they can make and unmake the ideals for which mankind is striving.

The history of education does not countenance this view. Systems of education reflect cultural currents, they do not create them; and the educator who believes that he himself is developing new ideals merely impresses the thought of his time upon the growing generation. For this reason the school is more often a conservative agency that crystallizes and emphasizes cultural currents than a creator of new ideas. The larger the school system, the more this is true. An individual who controls a school may impress his own personality upon it, but the schools of a large social unit, which are controlled by governmental agencies, reflect the status of the society to which they belong and its ideals.

True education should free the mind of the young of the shackles of unthinking conservatism and willing subordination to tradition. It should endeavor to develop independent thought, albeit tempered by the modesty engendered by the knowledge of our own limitations. Therefore it must be one of its fundamental problems to safeguard the young against the danger of being brought under the sway of a single dominant idea, which, however potent, has only temporary and local

School and Society, Vol. 8, No. 208, pp. 739–740, Dec. 21, 1918.

applicability. In such subjection lies the retarding influence of education regulated by religious agencies; in it lies the danger of state-controlled education and of the endeavors to make the schools conform to the public opinion of the day.

This condition is particularly clear at the present time when aggressive nationalism as against internationalism is demanded as the background of school-teaching; or when present governmental principles are set up as ideals to be worshipped, not understood, as against forms of government of the past, or against those that we see emerging and that may become the forms of the future.

It should be one of the fundamental tasks of education to teach the coming generation to examine coldly and dispassionately problems which are amenable to rational discussion but which are liable to be obfuscated by being accompanied by intense emotional feelings. It may be that the conscious suppression of the emotional excitement that is deliberately cultivated in our schools would make it less easy to arouse mass action by bringing into play those ideas around which the emotional excitement clusters; but against this loss of power must be set the gain obtained through the possibility of intelligent discussion and action.

In the schools controlled by organized society, particularly by state or church, the governing body is always liable—if not bound—to scrutinize the orthodoxy of the teacher in all matters that seem to demand the development of unthinking emotional devotion. It does not matter whether this orthodoxy relates to matters religious, political, economic or to those belonging to other manifestations of social life. In all of them, the demand is made that the teacher must be unflinchingly devoted to those dogmatic principles that control the social body—and the more so, the stronger the emotional tone of the dogma.

The conventionalism and lack of independence of the educated classes is largely due to their subjection to an education of this type. During twenty years of formal education, young people are held under this emotional control. It is reinforced by the conventionalism of the society in which they move. It

is no wonder that after this time, they are no longer conscious of the dogmatic character of their opinions and consider as absolute truth ideals that are valid only if certain premises are accepted.

It cannot be denied that it is a beautiful spectacle to see a whole people imbued with the same idea and developing such enthusiastic love for it that no labor and no sacrifice seem too great to attain its realization; but what if the ideal is based on error, when it means suppression of freedom of thought and action, and injustice to those who hold other ideals? Is it not safer to cultivate freedom of critical thought and sacrifice the elemental power of mass-action to the freedom of the individual?

If we are true to our belief in individual freedom, then there can be no doubt as to our choice. We should banish emotional dogmatism and endeavor to give mental freedom to the young. No matter how hard we may try, it will never be given to all to think clearly and to free themselves of prejudice determined by personal likes and dislikes; but by making clear the way to freedom of thought, we can help the strong to attain freedom, the weak at least to understand its meaning.

The policy that will be most helpful for the attainment of these ends must be founded on the freedom of the teacher from control of his opinions, so that there may be an opportunity for the young to receive impressions from different points of view. This freedom is the only air in which the teacher can breathe who loves his charges and who is devoted to his great and responsible task. For the "educated classes" a more profound teaching of history will be most helpful, not of the kind intended to extol one particular people or state, but one that attempts to elucidate the dominant ideas that have determined the actions of states, churches and peoples. The wider and more diversified the field of view, the clearer will become the intelligent understanding of the dependence of our mode of thought upon historical tradition, the greater will be the tolerance of foreign forms of thought and the readier will be the mind to attack by intelligent thought, not by blind passion, the problems that confront our generation.

True education should free the minds of the young from the shackles of unthinking conservatism and subordination to tradition.

XXX

Freedom in Teaching

The revolutions in foreign lands with their ever widening assault upon the cultural values which we have gained through centuries of slow and arduous labor, and their repercussions in our own country have made all of us conscious of the necessity of a vigorous defense of our ideals. We are not willing to give up individual freedom for serfdom, to let the State become a monster that swallows up our manhood and compels us to give up our intellectual and moral integrity to the authoritarian will that knows no law, and that can thrive only by keeping the masses in a constant state of turmoil, by attacking one after another the ideals that stand in its way.

We must not confuse intellectual and spiritual freedom with the necessary restrictions of our activities that are brought about by the complexity of our social life. Under simpler conditions the individual had the right to actions that would nowadays endanger the well being of his fellow citizen. The economic activities of one person may endanger the very sources of existence of his fellow citizens. We all recognize that there are problems of social adjustment undreamt of fifty years ago which must be solved if our society is to survive. It is not likely that these will be solved without much experimenting and much suffering.

Untouched by these problems is that of intellectual and

Education and Democracy. Condensed from The American Teacher, September, 1939; p. 12.

spiritual freedom. Even if our actions must be restricted by the demands of society, our minds must remain free, if for no other reason but that free minds are needed for the solution of our problems.

Freedom of the mind presupposes equal rights for all, that is, a democratic organization. It must be understood that democracy alone will not guarantee intellectual freedom, for a bigoted democracy can be as oppressive as an authoritarian state. Not so an enlightened democracy, and it is our duty to enlarge that freedom of mind that will develop an enlightened democracy.

It is not sufficient to free the intellect. We know that unless the emotional life is disciplined by the intellect and the intellect stimulated by emotional stress our efforts may be barren.

We must combat all attempts to deny man's right to express his opinions freely and to share in the choice of his government; we must resist the dissemination of false racial theories which deny the equality of man's birthright and set man against man according to the color of his skin or the name of his grandfather; we must insist that foreign-born aliens receive equal protection of the laws that the Constitution guarantees them, for the infringement of their rights is a stepping stone to the destruction of rightful immunities of all persons.

It is not enough to bring these issues to public attention. Constructive action must be taken to insure that the schools are free to instil democracy in the young.

If the teacher is to fulfill his function satisfactorily he should be familiar with all the cross currents of our social life in order to prepare the youth with whose education he is charged to meet adequately the manifold conflicts to which he will be exposed. The life and the exacting duties of the teacher bring it about that he becomes somewhat isolated from many parts of the community.Ordinarily he is not in close contact with the world of business, with manufacture, with agriculture. Those aspects of our complex life with which he becomes familiar by his own experience depend upon the character of the community in which he lives, and upon the home

environment of his pupils. Therefore a systematic effort to bring about a closer relation between all sides of our public life and the teaching profession seems eminently proper. It is also appropriate that stress should be laid upon the contribution that such cooperation may bring to the development of our democratic institutions, to the training for intellectual freedom and for strength of character that enables man to stand up for his convictions and not give way to the temptation to subordinate himself unduly to convention.

On the whole our schools are administered on purely authoritarian principles. The Board of Trustees or Board of Education controls the principal. The principal controls the heads of departments, the heads of departments control the teachers. This is all too frequently the type of administration of large schools, colleges and even universities, a system which precludes a healthy development of intellectual and spiritual freedom. It has come about that in many an institution the subjection of the teacher has gone so far, that if the faculty were given the opportunity to decide on issues of policy they would not know what to do.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. In the development of our educational systems we owe much to the foresight of our ancestors and to the liberality of benefactors. We are only too glad to acknowledge our obligation to them. The necessity of taking care of the funds that were given to schools by communities or by individuals has brought it about that those in charge of the funds have taken over the function also of directing the policies of the school; or they subordinate their judgment to that of the President, Superintendent or Principal in whom they have confidence and who, unless a person of strong democratic convictions, becomes the authoritarian head of the school.

It is our business to express ourselves clearly and emphatically and proclaim that these methods are not conducive to the advancement of intellectual freedom without which a democracy and a representative government are inconceivable. If democracy is to succeed, our whole body politic must be-

come saturated with the idea of intellectual freedom, and the organization of our government, business and school must be such that action results from the cooperation of free men who respect one another's opinions and needs.

If such is our view we may ask what should be our policy. The groups that favor authoritarian control in the school system are united, while those who would liberalize conditions are too often hopelessly divided by issues that have nothing to do with their main objective. It has always seemed to me that, if I agree with a person in regard to one specific problem in which we wish to cooperate, his political, religious or social views in regard to other matters are irrelevant. We have a well-defined task, to develop the efficiency of our schools and to protect the teaching profession against unwarranted interference in their work. There is no reason why political or religious differences should interfere with our united work in this field in which we agree in regard to the main issue. Differences of opinion in regard to other questions not germane to this field should be fought out in those fields to which they belong. By concentrating our attention upon the main issues of our program and stoutly declining to have other issues brought in we shall grow in unity and in power.

We know from experience that the position of the teacher who is suspected of radical, often even of liberal tendencies, or who discusses the social forces that are at work in our times, is most insecure on account of the timidity of his superiors who do not understand that free citizens, to exercise their civic rights intelligently, must know the problems that confront our society. Who has ever heard of insecurity of a teacher because he disregards all social problems and leads the youth in his charge to think that all is well, and that all we have to do is to think that if our institutions were stable there would be nothing to worry about. Let us realize how much the social outlook has changed during the last thirty years. Social security which is at present recognized as a fundamental necessity would have been considered an intolerable attack upon individual liberty, as in early days compulsory schooling

was condemned as contrary to individual freedom. We shall always insist on the right to educate our youth to a clear understanding of the problems of our times, and in order to be able to do so we demand fullest freedom for the teacher. We shall be prepared to defend it against all attacks, no matter from what side they come. If a radical party should try to restrain us in the same way as do those who do not understand that society is always changing, they would find us as unalterably opposed as we are now to the forces that fear in every free word a danger to the public weal.

XXXI

The aim of education must be the training of free minds.

The University

Owing to repeated conflicts between trustees and faculties of universities, we have heard much about the need of academic freedom in the sense that teaching and research should be free of outside interference, and that the personal freedom of members of the faculties should not be restricted by boards of trustees. There are other aspects of the subject, however, which have not received much attention, and which are vital for a healthy development of university life. Boards of trustees are not the only potential enemies of the freedom of the teacher. The faculties themselves are so constituted that the academic teachers are apt to consider themselves a privileged class in whose hands the development of university teaching and the advance of science rests. Universities cannot be the home of *universitas literarum*, of the world of knowledge, if their faculties are closed corporations, and if university research and instruction are a monopoly of those who have secured recognition by appointment by the board of trustees of an established university. The younger men of this class are generally appointed on recommendation of the faculty, which, by this means, controls the character of the coming generation of teachers and investigators. A person who has knowledge that he desires to impart, but who stands outside the academic circle, has no opportunity of reaching academic stu-

Freedom to Teach. The Nation, vol. 108, no. 2794, Jan. 18, 1919.

dents. The limitation of usefulness brought about by these conditions is most evident in cities of the size and character of Boston, Chicago, or New York. In these cities live numerous scholars of high accomplishment, many of whom would welcome the opportunity to formulate the results of their studies. Every serious student knows the advantage that he himself derives from the opportunity to present the result of his researches in an orderly manner, the clarifying effect of such teaching for the instructor, and the stimulating effect that it has upon the young student who is privileged to listen to such an exposition of original work. To these men the opportunity should be given to offer advanced instruction whenever they wish to do so. The university should stand for the freedom of teaching of all those qualified to teach.

It will be objected that such a policy would open the doors of the university to cranks. I do not believe that this danger is great. It might easily be guarded against if, in each science, a committee existed which could grant to investigators permission to give university instruction according to the merit of their scientific work. Such a committee should not be a faculty committee, because the very object of the plan would be to make the admission to teaching free of faculty control and to place it entirely on the basis of meritorious work. In most sciences there exist societies which have a standing sufficiently high so that a committee consisting, let us say, of their past presidents could pass on the merits of individuals; or committees consisting of representatives of various universities might perform their task. Both methods would minimise the danger that local university interests might influence the decision. It would be well if the right of affiliation with a university might be bestowed as an honor, without application, merely as a recognition of work that has reached a certain standard of excellence.

All this means that our universities ought to take the necessary steps to give up their isolation and grant to other educational and scientific agencies a voice in the control of their affairs. Without such steps no real progress is possible. We

cannot continue to allow our educational affairs to be dictated by isolated bodies of trustees and faculties who necessarily look after the interests of their own institutions, without any attempt at coordination with the work of other institutions. At the present time, this method has strained our whole system well-nigh to the breaking point.

Competition of the type here advocated is unwelcome to many faculty members who like to control the work offered in their departments. In some cases there may be a dread of opposing theory or opinion, in others the fear of distracting students from the course of instruction that has been laid out for them. In still other cases the fear of losing students through outside competition may play a role. None of these objections, however, should stand in the way of the liberalization of the academic staff, because the control of opinion, the rigid determination of a course of study, and jealousies of competing teachers are all equally opposed to progress.

The realization of such a plan as that suggested is beset with certain financial difficulties. In those sciences in which laboratories or other costly apparatus are needed, additions to the material equipment might be necessary. The volunteer instructor should be entitled to a remuneration, the amount of which should depend on the number of his students, although allowance should be made for the total number of students in the country who devote themselves to the subject in question. If this remuneration had to be provided by the university, it might place an additional burden upon its sorely tried shoulders. On the other hand, if the attempt were made to replace some of the necessary routine teaching by the volunteer teaching here advocated, the very purpose of the move would be frustrated. The additional intellectual force should not be harnessed to routine work and used to reduce the regular university staff, but it should be rigidly confined to the kind of teaching that the individual investigator may choose for himself.

For this reason I believe that a great step in advance might be achieved if one of our many wealthy benefactors of science

were to establish a fund for the remuneration of volunteer teachers who should be admitted according to the principle of merit, and whose remuneration should be determined by the success of their work. It seems probable that such a fund would be the means of giving to academic freedom an entirely new meaning. It would break down the social barriers that are raised around the academic teacher, make a clear separation between scientific achievement and social standing, and thus further the free advance of science by placing on a level of equality the academic profession and the investigators who are engaged in other occupations.

A new freedom is needed, not only for teaching but also for learning. We are wont to speak of academic freedom as freedom of the teacher, but greater academic freedom is needed also for the student. The tradition of the college and the school, in which the course of study is hedged in by innumerable rules and regulations, is still controlling in the university. Even the college student, during the last two years of work, longs for freedom to study what he wants, not merely what a faculty which believes that it knows better prescribes; and as much or little as he likes, not the amount that a faculty considers wise. This restriction of the freedom of the student is brought about, in part at least, by the rigid administrative organization of departments of instruction. Although in theory these are conceived of as purely administrative divisions, they very often work out in reality as separate schools which prevent the student from looking beyond the narrow walls that are built up around him. It would be unfair to charge the university alone with this restriction of freedom; it is to a great extent due to the attitude of the student himself, who is not ready to assert his own will and choice. Nevertheless, it remains true that the departmental organization of faculties is a hindrance to the freedom of the student. Laboratories and well-arranged seminars require administrative control, but this need not include the prescription of a detailed course of study.

One of the most potent causes of the restriction of freedom

in academic life is the fact not only that the university prepares investigators and certifies by its diploma that a student is capable of conducting scientific research, but that the university diploma is also to a great extent a professional certificate. The practice of a profession requires a definite fund of knowledge, while mastery of the method of research is of lesser importance. The university diploma should be based on the mastery of a method of investigation which presupposes a knowledge of basic facts, not according to the needs of a profession, but according to the needs of research. The more sharply these two objects can be separated, the better will the university perform its task and the freer will be the student in his field of work.

XXXII

A new freedom is needed, not only for teaching but also for learning.

University Government

The establishment of our universities and of institutions devoted to science and art is due almost entirely to the generosity of individuals who appreciated the importance of scientific and artistic advancement, and who gave or bequeathed large funds for these purposes. Only much later were these institutions supplemented by others maintained by public funds. Thus it happens that almost the whole development of higher education and of scientific work is in the hands of trustees, whose primary function is the administration of the funds by which the institutions are maintained. It is but natural that the trustees of each establishment should devote thought and energy to what they consider best for the particular work of their charge, and that coordination of various institutions and the wider interests of education should receive only scant consideration. The general conditions of scientific work exhibit clearly the effects of this lack of systematization. Duplication of work and wide gaps in the organization of scientific enterprise are the rule. Personal interests of wealthy donors, or energetic presentation of the claims of certain subjects by able representatives, determine the development of the various branches of knowledge. A careful weighing of the claims of those subjects which are of importance, but which do not attract particular public atten-

Scientific Progress and University Government. The Nation, May 4, 1918; Vol. 106; p. 539.

tion, or which are as yet in the infancy of their development, is almost impossible. It is, for instance, striking that, with the great importance of a more intimate knowledge of eastern Asia, no serious effort has yet been made to develop a centre in which matters pertaining to this subject can be studied. It is quite clear that the chance establishment of a single professorship, or the development of East Asiatic collections in a single museum, cannot solve this problem, but that systematic efforts have to be made to attract able young men to work of this type, and that the patient development of an institution planned on a large scale will be necessary. Conditions are similar in regard to our knowledge of the Slavic peoples of Europe. In the domain of science the most abstract subjects, which have only slight relation to practical questions, find difficulty in receiving adequate attention.

It is also due to this fact that we have so many instances of enthusiastic beginnings of inquiry in some line of scientific investigation, followed by discontinuation as soon as the most striking results have been attained. Permanent exhaustive work is not ordinarily undertaken, unless it happens that there exist institutions founded for one particular purpose only; institutions like, for instance, the branches of the Smithsonian Institution, those of the Carnegie Institution, astronomical observatories, and biological stations.

A study of the situation in the whole field shows clearly that intolerable conditions result from the present lack of coordination of scientific agencies and of institutions devoted to higher education, and from the complete abandonment of these interests to isolated boards of trustees. However well meaning such boards may be, they must necessarily shape their course in accordance with conditions in the institutions in their charge, not with a view to the needs of the nation. It seems indispensable to devise some method by which the individual institutions can be made to serve the whole community.

It must not be forgotten that these private institutions fulfill functions of vital interest to the nation. If, therefore, the

existence of a large number of independent boards of trustees leads to an inadequate performance of their duties, the public has the right to seek a remedy for such unsatisfactory conditions. The position is somewhat analogous to that of public-service corporations, whose activities also need control, and are controlled, according to the requirements of public life.

As a matter of fact, the boards of trustees not only administer the private funds left in their charge, but also receive assistance from public funds in the form either of remission of taxation or of appropriations from public funds, which are placed at their disposal and expended without corresponding public control.

The attempts that have been made to contribute to the solution of this problem by the establishment of a Museum Association and an Association of Universities are quite inadequate. These bodies lack the power of deciding the policies of the individual institutions.

It goes without saying that coordination as is here advocated should not consist in a standardization of higher education under state control. The freedom of the individual institution as well as that of the individual teacher is an essential condition for sound work and must be jealously guarded. While an orderly procedure in the development of the field of education is necessary, methods and ideals of the teacher must be free. State-controlled ideals of education are perhaps even less endurable than control by current public opinion as expressed in the point of view of boards of trustees.

No less important to the nation than the general planning of the work of these institutions is the general administrative policy pursued by them. There still survives from early times the idea that their whole work is done at the pleasure of the trustees. The selection of the field of activity within the limits of the endowment depends upon the trustees. At one time the energies of the institution may be devoted to the advancement of learning; at another time they may be directed to the development of elementary public instruction. There is constant danger of discontinuity of policy, due largely to the peculiar

relations between the trustees and the administrative officer in charge of the institution, who is appointed by the board of trustees, and whose personal views are therefore likely to determine the work of the whole establishment. Those who are familiar with the work of American institutions of learning will readily recall numerous cases of complete changes of policy that have been very detrimental to the development of scientific activity.

Closely connected with this condition is that of the insecurity of tenure of members of the staff. Haphazard changes of policy are likely to lead to conflicts and to undesirable interference with the freedom of action that is indispensable to the seeker for truth. According to the statutes of most institutions and universities, officers may be appointed and removed by the trustees according to their pleasure.

The development of our public-school system shows clearly that this principle of administration is not in conformity with the best interests of the community. In those States in which educational administration has advanced to higher levels, laws have been passed which secure the tenure of office of teachers in the public-school system, so that they cannot be removed without charges being preferred and without proper investigation of such charges. If we are ever to develop a body of investigators and teachers of high character, it is absolutely necessary that the power of arbitrary removal exercised by the trustees should be ended. As a matter of fact, there is a peculiar contradiction in modern conditions, in which university teachers and museum officers hold office at the pleasure of the trustees, but at the same time are entitled to a pension on reaching a certain age limit. It is true that great care should be taken in protecting scientific positions against the accumulation of men who are incapable of a proper performance of their duties, but proper precautions should be taken before permanent appointments are made. After such appointments have been made, the greatest possible security of tenure of office is indispensable for the development of a body of men who will perform the high duties that are expected of them.

The most serious effect of the subjection of the investigator or teacher to the pleasure of the trustees is the creation of an unhealthy atmosphere in the life of scientific institutions. Consciously or subconsciously, it calls forth the ever-present doubt in the minds of the officers whether their activities, the results of their inquiries, or the field of their work may be agreeable to the governing board—a mental attitude that is fundamentally opposed to the development of a true scientific spirit and to that staunch independence of thought that is the first requisite of the true scientist and of the teacher who is to instil into the minds of his students his enthusiasm for the search after truth.

The general feeling of uncertainty engendered by the dependence of the officers upon the good will of the trustees has a retarding effect upon healthy scientific thought, even where actual interference is not attempted. It is an undeniable fact, however, that in a number of institutions inquiries have been conducted by the governing boards looking into the orthodoxy of the conclusions reached by the investigator or of the subject-matter taught—investigations which in certain cases have led to the dismissal of officers.

It has taken many years for the natural sciences to obtain complete freedom of investigation, regardless of any conflicts that might arise between their researches and current opinions of the day. At the present time nobody would advocate a policy by which the investigator in pure science would be prevented from furthering his inquiries, wherever they may lead, and from applying the result of his inquiries in public life. Not so, however, with the sciences that deal with the mental activities of the individual and of society. The freedom of the investigator to carry on his researches without regard to current opinion and to apply his results in public life is not recognized. The problem is the same as the one that confronted science in earlier times, when the same kind of objections to freedom of scientific investigation were raised in the domain of natural sciences as are now placed in the way of the investigator who deals with the activities of mankind.

We may then ask by what methods the present difficulties are to be overcome. The interests of science and education demand that the officers of scientific institutions be so placed that no consideration of dependence upon governing bodies should restrict their freedom of thought and expression. Whatever control may be needed to protect the institutions from the vagaries of irresponsible individuals should be exercised, not by discipline of an appointing body, but by proceedings of judicial character, conducted by the officers.

The important problems arising from the isolation of the institutions cannot be overcome by voluntary cooperation of different boards of trustees alone. It is true that financial problems of great magnitude are involved in the national organization of scientific work, but of even greater magnitude are the scientific problems involved. It would therefore seem that a feasible solution would lie in the establishment on the one hand of a central organization, in which should be represented the financial interests of endowed institutions, for the solution of financial problems; on the other hand, of a technical commission composed of representatives of the various branches of science, for decision of scientific problems. In addition to this, we need legislation defining on a new basis the rights of trustees of endowed institutions and of the men who are carrying them on.

Once such a policy has been inaugurated, those institutions, the trustees of which, by their charters, enjoy greater privileges will be compelled by the course of events to shape their course accordingly, and to accept those limitations that the advance of our social conditions makes necessary.

Academic freedom means freedom of research, freedom of opinion, and freedom of the action of the teacher as a citizen.

XXXIII

Role of the Scientist in Democratic Society

The organization of scientific workers is one of the indications of our consciousness that scientists can no longer work remote from the social problems of our time, that it is necessary both for the commonweal and for the interest of science that we become more keenly aware of the impact of scientific discovery upon our social structure and of the influence of social life upon the progress of science.

We formulate our problem generally under the term of the close relation between democracy and intellectual freedom.

Democracy is a vague term and we ought to be clear as to what we mean. It would be an error to maintain that every form of democracy guarantees intellectual freedom. It is equally untrue that an absolute monarchy, feudalism, or any form of oligarchy prevents scientific work. In Czarist Russia, in Germany before the constitutional government was introduced, in the aristocratic republics of Italy, science and art flourished under the patronage of the governing bodies. They flourished in so far as they did not oppose the governing class, and since science in general did not deal extensively with political or social problems the governing body was not particularly interested in its control. The period preceding the French revolution, and again the long period of reaction fol-

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lowing the Napoleonic wars present another picture—repression of freedom, not only in science but in all forms of public life.

On the other hand, political democracy is no guarantee of intellectual freedom. The narrowness of the early New England settlers, the restrictive policies of some of our states in our own time, are forceful reminders that political democracy alone is no protection of intellectual freedom. A bigoted democracy may be as hostile to intellectual freedom as the modern totalitarian state which casts all thought into a Procrustean bed. In both of these forms the attempt is made to subject individual thought rigidly to the standards accepted in the one case by a majority or a leading minority, in the other case to the whims of the rulers. Totalitarian states are more successful in enforcing their standards by oppression and terror.

The bigoted democracy, although not as powerful as the totalitarian machine, is for all that no less a danger to intellectual freedom. It is well to bear in mind the fundamental difference between these kinds of control and the relative freedom that science and art may enjoy in monarchical, aristocratic or plutocratic states, for it shows us clearly the aims towards which we must strive.

If we speak of democracy we mean one in which civil liberties have been attained, where not only thought is free, but where every one has the right to express his opinions, where censorship is shunned, where the actions of the individual are not restricted as long as they do not interfere with the freedom and welfare of his fellow citizens. We affirm that only in such a society can fullest intellectual freedom be attained.

We unite at the present time to act because we are stimulated by the consciousness that such freedom as I just described has not yet been fully achieved. The ideal is embodied in our Constitution and in the Bill of Rights, but it remains an ideal.

Since the people are the source of authority, it is essential that they should be able to think clearly and that every form

of bigotry, every form of self-righteousness that assumes to have found the only right way, should be combatted. Therefore it is our duty to see to it that the masses of our people should be enabled, as far as may be, to form deliberate judgments, that they should be educated to withstand the appeals of demagogues, of catch-words and of slogans. In other words we must rely upon education to help us maintain intellectual freedom.

If I speak of the masses of the people, I do not mean those who are placed unfavorably. I mean everyone including scientists. Can we say conscientiously that scientists are not influenced by demagogues, catch-words and slogans? Is it not rather true that a great many of us, who may be clear thinkers in our own fields, are so little versed in public affairs, so much confined in our narrow field, that we are swayed by passionate appeals to outworn ideals or to a selfish interest that runs counter to the interest of the people. So when we speak of the need for education do not let us forget that we have to educate ourselves. Uncontrolled emotionalism is the greatest enemy of intellectual freedom. To educate people to rational ideals without destroying their emotional life is one of the great and difficult tasks of our times.

We may ask ourselves how far science itself has reached that freedom that we demand for the people. Is the scientist at least free to follow his work unhindered by outer circumstances?

In order to understand our conditions we have to consider the historical development of our scientific institutions. The need of humanistic and scientific knowledge was early felt and there is hardly another country in which equally much has been done by liberal individuals for establishing scientific institutions. From early times on, the number of those who have willingly given time and money for the development of scientific work is legion. Whenever institutions were founded for this purpose, the administration of the endowment was placed in the hands of Trustees upon whose judgment and farsightedness the donor relied. In the nature of the case most of

these were men whose interests were remote from the main objects of the Foundation and who brought to it their experience as business men. Business was and still is to a great extent controlled by a single head whose orders are executed by his employees. It is only in most recent times that, in industry at least, the employees have to a certain extent an influence on some aspects of the conduct of the organization. It is therefore but natural that, in contrast to the medieval universities, which were associations of scholars, our modern institutions took on to a great extent the tinge of business enterprises in which the Trustees engaged and dismissed their men. The custom of one-year contracts for scientists and teachers is one of the evil results of this tendency which is historically easily intelligible, but most undesirable for the development of sound scholarship. It follows also from this type of organization that the policies of the institution are dictated by the Trustees, not by the body of teachers or scientists. A change in the interests of the Trustees may upset the whole policy of the institution and cripple the work of teachers and investigators.

It would be ungrateful, if we were to harp on the difficulties that have resulted from the establishment of institutions due to personal initiative of wealthy donors. The advance of science is so largely due to their foresight and liberality, that it would ill become us to decry the great services that they have rendered and that they are rendering. Our gratitude, however, should not hinder us from pointing out the difficulties to which this system has led and from seeking for remedies. The choice of the kind of scientific or educational work depending upon the interests of individuals cannot be systematic, so that it easily happens that certain branches of knowledge are overworked, others neglected. More important than this is the shifting interests of bodies of men who are not themselves workers in the field they control, often unfamiliar with the details of the work. Owing to this it has happened that there is perhaps no other country in which there are so many brilliant beginnings of scientific work that suddenly come to a stop and remain fragments. A healthy

development of science requires a fuller participation of the working staff in the fundamental policies of the institutions than they now enjoy.

I believe we may look with some degree of satisfaction upon the many attempts that have been made to alleviate the difficulties just described. The faculties of universities have varying degrees of freedom according to the character of the institutions and the wisdom of Trustees and President, but a much greater extent of freedom is needed. First of all we have not yet attained that certainty that every member of a faculty should have absolute intellectual freedom. I do not wish to cite examples, but there are cases in which the members of faculties are intimidated, even terrorized, to such an extent that their public utterances are extremely guarded—if they dare at all to express their convictions. Progress is also indicated in the work of the various Research Councils which, although dependent upon the good will of donors, are in a position to obtain a greater continuity of effort than might otherwise be possible.

There is much to be done. The scientist has to become more conscious of his duties; we must extend the field of education so as to overcome bigotry; while grateful to the donors who have established scientific institutions, we must insist on a closer participation of the scientific staff in shaping the policies of work.