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
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AN
INTRODUCTION
TO PHILOSOPHY

By J. L. STOCKS

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
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


AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

By J. L. STOCKS

Professor of Philosophy in the Victoria University of Manchester

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AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

NATURE

THE first problem on which those early Greek thinkers concentrated, from whom modern philosophy traces its descent, was the problem of conceiving the world as an order. The faith in which we now live so carelessly that everything that happens has its reason, a reason capable in the end of being discovered and expounded by human intelligence; this faith was once an achievement and, like every other achievement, had to be won. The mythology of the Greeks themselves and of the primitive races of our own day exemplify another and an earlier mode of explanation. A world which is the plaything of savage gods and their passions defies detailed analysis and understanding. An intelligible world is a world in which everything takes place according to law. "This world," said Heraclitus of Ephesus, "which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling and measures going out." A hundred and fifty years later it was one of Aristotle's favourite sayings that "Nature does nothing at random or in vain." Through the centuries the principle takes different forms as the methods vary by which the analysis of Nature is attempted; but once achieved it remains, for the conquests of thought are lasting.

Since those days the natural sciences have gradually come into being and declared their independence. It

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is their special task to formulate the laws on which the events of Nature depend. The philosopher is a critic and spectator, who, as he looks on at the work of the scientist, tries from time to time to restate it from a more general point of view or to analyze its methods and presuppositions. Thus in the middle of the nineteenth century Herbert Spencer attempted a comprehensive account of the universe, to be attained by generalizing and correlating the results of the particular sciences; and John Stuart Mill, analyzing the procedure of science, formulated the logic of induction as the process "in which the investigation of Nature essentially consists." Neither of these philosophers was himself actively engaged in scientific work, nor did either of them conceive philosophy as a science, possessing material of its own which might be mastered by treatment similar to that of other sciences. Philosophy to both meant an inquiry on a different plane from that of science—a secondary or subsequent inquiry, since the sciences found the material from which they started in experience, and philosophy found its starting-point in the sciences.

For us moderns, then, it seems reasonable to say that the problem of the order of the world has bifurcated. There is the scientific and the philosophical problem. Each group of inquirers conceives the problem in its own way and meets it with its own devices. The scientist, if Mill is right, searches for uniformities, determined to reduce an experience, which, on the face of it, never repeats itself, to an unending repetition of a few natural laws; and in this search he assumes without argument or question that the world is such as to make the search feasible, that every event has its cause in the events which precede it, that the same cause has always the same effect, that "the course of Nature is uniform." The philosopher may conceive his task, like Spencer, as a synthesis of the sciences, or more abstractly (as it may seem), with Mill, as an analysis of the methods and principles of scientific in-

quiry. On the former view there can be no more finality in philosophy than in science. Philosophy will need to be always at work revising and rewriting as new problems come to the front and new hypotheses gain acceptance. On the latter view perhaps something more permanent might be achieved, since principles and methods remain over long periods the same. But in either case the philosophic problem is distinct from the scientific, and remains to be settled when the scientific problem is solved.

The simplest possible conception of knowledge sees thought as occupied in making a map exhibiting in due relation all the things that men's experience fitfully and intermittently reveals to them. For this task co-operation and systematic record are necessary; for the experiences of many men at times and places far distant from one another must be brought together. The sciences, as we now conceive them and see them working, present precisely such a picture of systematic co-operation. The questions are grouped into great departments, each of which is called a science and has its own independent organization. Within the wider groups narrower groups are marked out and are given similarly a degree of independence. New sciences and sub-sciences continually claim recognition. But subdivisions and regroupings detract little from the impression of order and system which the busy hive of the scientists produces.

The simplest possible conception of philosophy sees the philosopher as architect and organizer of all this labour. It is a matter of common experience that a co-operative investigation requires a directing brain. How is overlapping and waste of effort to be prevented unless the several groups of questions are framed and thought out in mutual relation? And how shall the right supply of labour for each part of the inquiry be found unless some central organ gives each investigator his commission? The kingdom of the sciences requires, surely, like any other kingdom, a

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sovereign. If so, philosophy, which by tradition is restricted to no special province of reality, must take this place.

But few, if any, philosophers have at any time claimed this kind of authority for their decisions, and in our own day such a claim would be strenuously resisted in the name of freedom by the directors of scientific inquiry. It seems, in fact, that to claim so much would be seriously to overrate the power of mere thinking. Thought is no doubt always active in the interpretation of experience, but it cannot legislate in this fashion for experience. It is the boast of science that it approaches Nature with open eyes, as Francis Bacon advised, without prejudice or prepossession. Its procedure is inductive, which means, as Mill explained, that it makes experience its own test. Therefore the plan and method of inquiry must be framed by those in contact with fact at the suggestion of the facts themselves. Consequently a philosophy which would live at peace with the modern scientific spirit must place itself last, not first; it must be content to come in at the end rather than at the beginning; it must be inductive in spirit, as science is inductive—*i.e.*, the first and last word with it, as with science, must be the observed fact.

Assuming, then, that philosophy in its relation to the sciences is generally receptive rather than regulative, that it takes what science gives and makes what it can of it, we have to define on this basis the character of the philosophic problem.

Let us suppose a single volume which summarizes in separate chapters the main results of each several science. Suppose, further, that the volume contains an introduction, explaining the order to be followed in this survey, and an epilogue calling attention to the most striking features of the scene surveyed. What would be the character and value of such a volume? It is clear, surely, that each chapter, except the first and the last, would be merely an exercise in the parti-

cular science with which it dealt, and that, so far as these chapters are concerned, the reader would probably be better off if, instead of reading them, he procured and read a first-rate textbook of each science. So far, then, the answer to our question is that such a volume will be in character scientific, and in value negligible. There remains the prologue and the epilogue. If the volume is to contain anything distinctive and original, we shall find it here. But that is really to say that these are not merely what they pretend to be, mere prospect and retrospect, but something more. If, however, important new questions are raised when the world of science is viewed as a whole, clearly it is these questions that philosophy should discuss, and the formal *résumé* of the results of the sciences, which is at best second-hand repetition, can be dispensed with altogether.

This simple illustration is intended to bring out the point that a synthesis of the sciences needs no philosophy to bring it about. It already exists, by the efforts of the scientists themselves, in the sense that to make it is within the reach of any person who has the capacity to understand and the energy to assimilate the problems and theories of the various sciences of his time. It is not denied that such an omnivorous scientific appetite might be of value to the world. It is quite possible that its owner might be able to point the way to fruitful lines of scientific advance, which the more specialized inquirers would not have discovered or not have discovered so soon. The point is only that it does not cease to be scientific by becoming omnivorous; and that the benefits, if any, of its exercise will be scientific and not philosophical. The philosophical problem, if it is independent of the scientific problem, must at least lie in certain further questions, which arise when the scientific world is regarded as a whole.

If, again, one asks the question of fact: What have the natural sciences contributed in recent times to the

material of philosophy? the answer seems to show that questions concerning the relations of the sciences to one another, such questions as a general acquaintance with scientific advance over its whole field might be expected to elucidate, have not been prominent. Early philosophers were impressed by the mathematical method, and, in framing their conception of knowledge and of its possible extensions, were perhaps unduly influenced by this example. In the beginnings of modern philosophy attempts were made to apply a similar method in philosophy itself. Then, as the inquiries developed—which we now refer to as the sciences, inquiries professedly based on the analysis of observed fact—again the method was generalized and imitated. Locke tried to trace thought to its elements, having, no doubt, the chemical and physical examples in mind. Hume was similarly inspired when he described his *Treatise of Human Nature* as “an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects.” A successful method will always find imitators.

The scientific doctrines that have attracted the general attention of philosophers have not been very numerous: but in all cases they have been scientific novelties of fundamental importance to the sciences in which they originated. The most signal cases are the biological principle of the Evolution of Species and the physical principle of Relativity. The reason why these two doctrines have interested so many persons not primarily interested in the sciences to which they properly belong is twofold. In the first place, they affected the fundamental conceptions of these sciences, and the fundamental conceptions of any science are the common property of every science, and form part of the impalpable, but influential, intellectual background of every thinking man. And secondly, both principles seem capable of a wider application than the sciences themselves could give them. Philosophic discussion was undertaken, not to determine their

validity within the science which framed them or for its investigations, but in order to discover how wide their further scope was, and how far popular opinion was right in detecting an implicit challenge to certain articles in the working faith of humanity. The essence of Herbert Spencer's venture was the attempt to define precisely the principle of evolution and to apply it in fields far beyond the scope of its original intention.

It is evident that in the modern world philosophy is receptive of ideas from science, and common sense would hardly be satisfied if it were not. In the sciences we have a determined and sustained attack on the dark background of perceptual experience, which does much to clear up the conditions of that experience itself, and has progressively succeeded in widening the circle of illumination as well as, incidentally, in extending the range of man's practical competence. By this work, surely, if anywhere, something of the general structure of the universe should be revealed. But the philosophical problem is not correctly grasped until it is perceived that the philosopher is also under the obligation of accepting ideas from other sources. The striking discoveries of the scientists and their cumulative achievements have made such an impression on the modern world that men have often been tempted to think that there is no truth but science; and if this were so, there would be no room for philosophy. It is just because science represents but one of many contacts with reality that philosophy is needed; and for the same reason philosophy is neither a synthesis of the sciences nor itself a science. However important science may be to human life, it is only one element among others, and the philosopher must have the whole before him.

Man is not merely a scientist. He has to live and earn his daily bread; and though these activities are not, as such, like those of the scientist, directed to the discovery of truth, yet they imply doubts and cer-

tainties of fundamental importance, which cannot but affect the structure of any outgrowth from them, such as the scientific activity itself. The branch of philosophy called "Ethics" approaches the philosophic problem from this side. Further light may be sought from the expressions of man's gregariousness, finding its most obvious organized embodiment in the phenomena of politics. Another branch of philosophy takes this road of approach. Then within the field of knowledge itself the scientist has rivals or colleagues who cannot be ignored. The most impressive of modern achievements in the field of knowledge, apart from the sciences, is the development of the systematic study of history. In history and biography (which may be taken for this purpose as one) we have a form of knowledge which is sharply contrasted with that of the scientist in this, that it reveals to us a time, a period, a personality—in short, an individual—while science presents types, structures, laws—always something general and abstract. Finally, there are activities which are difficult to place, such as poetry, art, religion. These do not seem to aim directly at truth, like science and history, yet they claim often to possess or imply a higher truth in the name of which their devotees will defy science or history. Their incontestable power over the human mind necessitates an examination of this claim; and from the earliest times, with varying emphasis, philosophers have always made some attempt to put them too in their place.

Now, the philosopher, as a philosopher, is not entitled to lay down the law to any of these activities. In every department his attitude remains receptive, not regulative. He cannot tell the scientist or the historian or the artist what work they are to do or how they are to do it. He cannot tell men how to solve their practical problems. Like any other man, he may be asked for advice and may consent to give it; but such gifts as he may show in this direction are independent of his philosophy. In each sphere it is the central

commonplaces that interest the philosopher, because what he wants to discover is what each activity is and what each contributes to the whole which they together form—the human spirit on the one hand and the world which confronts it on the other. Thus in science he is not specially interested in the new discovery. For most purposes the science of a hundred years ago, which would be valueless to the scientist himself, would serve the philosopher as well as the science of to-day, since it might exemplify equally well the characteristic attitude and method of the scientific inquiry. It is this attitude that he seeks to distinguish and define, and he keeps watch on new developments only for signs of fundamental changes.

CHAPTER II

NUMBER

THE conquests of thought are lasting. But the step forward often brings with it a temporary distortion and displacement, lasting, perhaps, for many generations, due to excessive emphasis on the chief factor in the advance made. Men tend to press a successful principle beyond its capacity. The new principle takes its discoveries captive, and is seen by them as opening the royal road to the truth. The philosophy of a given time represents the attitude of that time to reality as a whole, so far as it is self-conscious; and the phenomena above referred to as distortions will find their characteristic expression in the emergence of a new philosophy, a new vision of the world (*Weltanschauung*, to use the expressive German term), under the dominating influence of some great departmental development whose significance is somewhat exaggerated.

The history of philosophical thought reveals few influences so potent and persistent as that of Mathematics. Mathematics is a relatively early creation of the human intelligence. The rapid arrival of geometry

was the great contemporary fact in the field of knowledge for Plato, and its development was actively and fruitfully pursued by Greeks long after Plato's time. Science, as we know it, is of much later birth. We are accustomed to think of science as essentially, or at least ideally, mathematical. The sciences all depend, we suppose, ultimately on a mathematical physics, and the degree of their perfection can be approximately measured by their ability to formulate their results in precise mathematical form. But the Greek world on which mathematics burst as a new discovery viewed it differently. That world was already familiar with the investigation of Nature as an attempt to classify and analyze the leading phenomena of the earth and of the heavens. With that inquiry these strange and fascinating demonstrations of quantitative relations seemed at first to have no direct connection. So far as the mathematical ideas were generalized or applied philosophically, they appeared as the rival, not the ally, of the older method. They represented a new clue to reality and tended to encourage a philosophical attitude in some respects sharply opposed to that of the early physicists.

The earlier physical speculations tended in a direction which may be conveniently described by the two modern terms "materialism" and "empiricism." That is, they tended, first, to produce the conviction that all the phenomena of the world, including those of life, could be explained without remainder by determining the properties and interactions of bodies, bodies being ultimately analyzable into a small number of elements or perhaps even reducible to differentiations by mechanical means of a single fundamental substance. They tended, secondly, to develop into a careful and systematic observation of natural processes, by which theories could be tested and verified, and further material for a general view of Nature accumulated. To both of these tendencies the initial influence of mathematics seems to have been hostile. Both Plato

and Aristotle laid great weight on the necessity of superseding or supplementing the material explanation. To matter they opposed form; and in the development of the notion of form the influence of mathematics was, without doubt, of cardinal importance. This opposition is, like most philosophical oppositions, less simple than it looks; for the matter to which form is opposed is an abstraction, not the visible body which to the materialist provides the explanation of all phenomena. But the assertion, common to both these great thinkers, that form, which is not matter, provides the true ground of explanation and understanding necessarily involves the view that the sovereign reality is not of the nature of body at all. We are therefore justified in connecting with the development of mathematics the assertion by classical Greek thought of a non-material reality.

The opposition to what was, after all, no more than a nascent empiricism is easily understood. In mathematics no laborious survey of an extensive field is demanded; truths valid universally are discovered by the mere operation of thought upon its own clear conceptions, and with such complete transparency of evidence that verification from experience may be dispensed with altogether. In the first enthusiasm which this new method aroused it might well seem that observation was waste of time and that the geometrical theorem was the type of all true knowledge. A classical expression of this exaggeration is the scheme of higher education in Plato's *Republic*. There the gateway to knowledge is mathematics, which is valued precisely for this, that it forces the student to leave the senses behind and rely on sheer thinking; and the development of mathematics into, *e.g.*, harmonics and astronomy is to be conceived as a purely mathematical development—a development in which the field is complicated by the addition of a new factor or dimension, the method remaining the same as before. Plato's astronomer is concerned with theorems about

solids in motion; he is to use his reason, not his eyes, and to "leave the starry heavens alone."

The example of mathematics forces attention to the problem of the nature of knowledge, and extorts from the philosopher the recognition of a certain duality in man's apprehension of the real which reappears in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Some distinction between appearance and reality must be as old as thought itself. So soon as men begin to think, they must become aware that things are not precisely what they seem to be. The earliest physics insists that processes apparently quite unlike are, in principle, the same, and that processes which seem identical are widely different. But in these cases the appearance is rejected as misleading or illusory; it is explained away, and only the reality behind the appearance is taken into the final account. The sun, which looks small, is really enormously large; the desert, which seems to shine with water, is really a sandy waste. Mathematics does not offer in this way a reinterpretation of experience, a correction of *prima facie* judgments. Its truths are capable, no doubt, of being illustrated in experience and applied to it. But it moves in a region remote from experience, operating with terms of its own. It compels our assent to its conclusions, but not at the cost of any denial of the trustworthiness of our senses. Thus in mathematics we have the example of the orderly and systematic achievement of truth by thinking, and side by side with it we have our senses and all that is built upon them. If mathematics is knowledge, is this knowledge too? If so, must we not recognize two kinds of knowledge? For this acquaintance with the facts of the world, though not wholly disorderly and disconnected, reveals a very different kind of order from that of the mathematician and by a very different method from his.

In this situation, clearly, a number of different lines of interpretation are open to philosophic specula-

tion. The dualism may be accepted and asserted, or it may be denied. The dualism is accepted if it is admitted that these are both kinds of knowledge. When we know, we apprehend reality; thus reality becomes dual, corresponding to the dual mode and method of apprehension. The dualism is denied if it is argued that one of the two contrasted constructions is not knowledge; and this denial has two main forms, according as the one or the other construction is refused this title. Further, since the negative is in this case a good deal less explicit than the affirmative, there is a large variety of sub-forms of the second alternative. That which is rejected may be dismissed as illusory, as mere appearance, or it may be regarded as an incomplete and partial view of that which is, or might be, wholly revealed under the other form. The dualism, again, may be regarded as final and necessary for the finite human mind, but yet not as ultimate: it may be conceived as transcended by a perfect and eternal intelligence, which views all things either under one of the two forms or in some better way in which the defects of each mode are removed.

The question at issue here is not primarily a question as to the place of mathematics, but a much more general question as to the tenability of an ideal of knowledge which the example of mathematics suggested. To Plato, in fact, mathematics itself was only a stepping-stone to the true knowledge in which thought, finally released from all dependence on the senses, enjoyed its freedom in the vision of reality. The claim of thought to such absolute autonomy is one pole. The other pole is the complete subjection of thought to the mastery of the senses; the view that such freedom as the mind has is only that of combining what experience separates and separating what experience conjoins, that the principles of these operations are themselves in some way derived from experience, and the result of their application only a more

perfect submission. To the one the type of knowledge is the perfect transparency of a systematic interconnection revealed to pure thought or reason; to the other, the basis is the indefeasible certainty of present sensation, and knowledge is whatever can be cogently linked on to that. Hence, the names commonly given to the two tendencies are rationalism and empiricism, and the extreme of empiricism, which subjects thought most strictly to the senses, is called sensationalism.

The question, "What do we know?" cannot be separated from the question, "What is real?" For, as we have already remarked, to say that such and such a body of doctrine is knowledge is to say that those who possess and understand it are so far acquainted with reality. The view that knowledge is only to be attained by the complete release of thought from dependence on the senses necessarily involves the view, negatively, that reality lacks the modes of determination distinctive of sense-experience, and, positively, that reality exhibits that kind of order which pure thought is able to discover.

The thought which is based on sensation is primarily occupied in determining the qualitative and quantitative relations and characteristics of bodies, and these bodies are viewed as continuously changing. Things and events make up the world of experience, and each is a unique individual fixed in its position by the co-ordinates of time and space. It is this unique individuality, tied to a definite—but more or less extensive—time and space, that seems to be the distinctive mark of the claimant for reality that thought based on the senses presents to us. It is this, then, that the type of doctrine we are considering will tend to reject, and it will thus be naturally led to deny the reality of time and space altogether. For the truths which pure thought, as exemplified in mathematics, reveals are not statements about individual things or events, and have reference to no particular place or time. "The square of 3 is 9." "The two

angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal." The reality with which such propositions acquaint us is a timeless or eternal reality. And while all statements descriptive of experience leave an unexplored margin—the before and after which is not described; that which lies beyond the field of observation; to say nothing of the obvious impossibility of exhausting what lies within the decreed limits—these propositions of mathematics move in a region which is exhaustively defined, and are capable of guaranteeing the completeness of their enumerations. The revelations of experience come piecemeal, and there is no end to them; but in the other sphere, though all may not be known, our partial knowledge acquaints us with a whole or system. This type of doctrine will regard reality, positively, as such a whole and its metaphysics will aim at a correspondingly systematic character.

If this universe is really an eternal system, capable of being grasped as a whole by pure thought, then the multiplicity of things and events—which is the field of man's practical activity—must be relegated, together with that activity itself, to the level of appearance. But there is also the possibility that thought, in its advance, may ultimately get beyond this merely negative attitude to the first appearances. Common sense contrasts the abstractness of mathematics with the concreteness of sense-experience. The type of theory we have now in mind will admit that mathematics is abstract, but it will not admit that sense-experience is concrete. To it the first lesson of philosophy is the conviction of the inadequacy of the senses as a revelation of reality. But appearances cannot simply be dismissed: they must be explained away. These corporeal things and their spatio-temporal order must in some sense be accounted for, even if their reality is denied. Plato accorded to the furniture of the world a quasi-reality in virtue of its participation in the eternal forms. Modern philosophers have

seen the advance of thought as the overcoming of its initial abstractions and the progress towards a goal in which universality and individuality are reconciled. Thus, the timeless reality, though it cannot accept the transient individuals of our experience as they stand, may yet perhaps contain a real multiplicity of individuals as integral constituents of it.

The opposed empirical attitude starts, obviously, from the other end. Its aim will be to build up a theory of the general nature of reality on the basis of the fundamental certainties secured in the act of sense-perception. This starting-point dictates a certain empiricism of method, and gives a corresponding stamp of incompleteness or contingency to the results obtained. To the rationalist attitude, as above described, it is vital that metaphysics shall be systematic and present reality as a whole. Metaphysics, on this view, as Kant observed, is nothing if it is not complete—*nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum* ("thinking nought done if aught remained to do"). But to the consequential empiricist all thought is but the echo of experience, and each item of experience carries its guarantee within itself. Knowledge is, therefore, built up piecemeal, and failure in one part of the field throws no doubt on success in another. The starting-point does not determine the character of the result, except so far that the empirical philosopher, however far from his starting-point he may travel and however wide his generalization may be, will still conceive himself as recording facts. There is great difficulty, as the history of philosophy shows, in determining what the primary certainties of sensation are. But however that question is solved, and however various the subsequent development may be, it may be taken as generally characteristic of the empirical attitude that in the description of reality the framework of space and time is retained. The empirical view, then, tends to present us with a world which is in principle inexhaustible, which is extended in

space and time, and which admits of being known only as matter of fact.

The difficulties which the empiricist meets in developing his position are naturally, since he starts at the other end, the reverse of those which face the rationalist. Mathematics operates with universals. In geometry we determine the properties of the triangle, the circle, the square. Our results apply to any and every particular example of these forms; but the peculiarities of the particular example are of no interest to the geometer except so far as they exemplify similar universals of narrower range. *E.g.*, it may be of interest to a geometer that a given triangle is isosceles, but its size cannot interest him. The difficulty, then, of a theory inspired by this example will be to bring individuality within its scope, to provide for a multiplicity other than that of species within a genus. Experience, on the other hand, offers particular things and events, each a unique individuality, which we are, in fact, accustomed to group together under general terms such as "earth," "animal," "battle," "explosion." The empiricist tends to argue that all general terms are to be considered as a useful economy dictated by man's practical needs. It would be exceedingly laborious to give each thing and each event a name. There is no reality which the various individuals called by the same name each exemplify; the universal is a common name and no more. Thus the empiricist starts with the assumption of the unique individual as given, and has to exert himself to account for significant thinking, like that of mathematics, from which such individualities are altogether absent. If he does not actually embrace this extreme of nominalism, by which universals can have no more than a symbolic status, he will certainly always tend towards such a view and will be much concerned to explain the success of the mathematical method in its own sphere and to restrict narrowly the possibility of its extension.

In the foregoing I have sketched roughly two opposed types of theory under the names of rationalism and empiricism, each of which refuses to accept the duality in man's apprehension of the real, the existence in his judgments side by side of rational and empirical elements, as evidence of a duality in the real itself. The one maintains that the real is only known so far as it is apprehended rationally, the other that it can only be known empirically. It must not, of course, be supposed that philosophers can be classed simply as adherents of the one or the other of these views. All sorts of compromises and combinations are possible; and, in fact, when a philosopher is called rationalist or empiricist, no more is commonly meant than a certain emphasis or preponderance of the one tendency over the other.

CHAPTER III

MIND

A FURTHER complication is introduced into the philosophical field when it is realized that the problem of knowledge cannot be properly presented without an examination of the nature of mind. By its very conception mind is that which makes thought, belief, knowledge, possible. The nature of mind, then, will affect every assertion that any man makes about the world, and to discuss these assertions without discussing what mind is will be to take this central fact for granted. But the philosopher boasts that he takes nothing for granted and leaves nothing out. Therefore he cannot avoid this question when once it is raised, and the fact that the mind is at work in every assertion may tempt him to believe that the exploration of mind is the royal road to the truth, containing the solution of all the other problems within itself.

The necessity of some examination of the nature of mind arises, first, in the effort to meet certain kinds of

scepticism. We are all familiar with the fact that changes in our individual condition alter the face of things for us, and lead us, if we are not careful, to say the opposite one day of what we said the day before. A cold in the head, a headache, a bad night's sleep—few are so prudent and cautious that they escape all distortion of judgment on such occasions. But these are passing states, easily detected by the sufferer, the effect of which can with sufficient effort be discounted. How shall we discount the factor of our own personal idiosyncrasy, which we necessarily carry with us into every judgment and every effort of thought? Perhaps by communication with other persons—though in our view of them, too, this constant factor cannot be escaped—a certain standardization may be effected. But what of this standard itself? Is it more than the "lie agreed on" among men? Pressing the suggestion of individual distortion the sceptic will argue that there is, and can be, no truth absolute or universal, but for each person a private, incommunicable truth and world, different from that of every other; and, pressing the suggestion of a specific human distortion, he will argue that the world which men present to themselves, after the best and most careful use of their capacities, as their agreed science or history, is only, after all, the expression of their human nature; it is at most human truth, what satisfies the human mind, private to the human race, useful, perhaps, to it, but of no interest to any other kind of creature, even if it could be communicated.

Thus a consideration of the limitations of the human mind, of the degree of its isolation, of its capacity to overcome these limitations and break down this isolation, is forced upon the constructive thinker as an incident in his effort to render an account of reality in its whole range. He has, in short, to prove the possibility of knowledge. At first this task presents itself as merely a defensive or precautionary preliminary. He will prove his competency in reply to

hostile attacks upon it, or he will find out, before he starts, what regions offer real hope of achievement, so that he may not waste his time over unanswerable questions. For many philosophies this remains a preliminary task; but for others the investigation of the nature of mind becomes philosophy itself. Kant presented his Critical Philosophy as an alternative to Dogmatism, which he described as "the dogmatic procedure of pure reason *without previous criticism of its powers.*" These words suggest that the criticism is a preliminary. But he also claimed for his *Critique of Pure Reason*, devoted, as its title indicates, to this task, that "there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here." Before Kant, Locke had attempted a similarly conceived criticism of the instrument, but his execution was very different and he claimed much less for his results. Two generations later David Hume, continuing Locke's work on Locke's lines, announced in the introduction to his *Treatise* that "there is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the science of man." In Germany, Hegel, continuing in his fashion the work of Kant, rejected the notion of a *previous* criticism of mind altogether, and maintained that "thought alone constitutes the essence of all that is." Thus mind, once introduced into the philosophical field as a subject for investigation, refuses to remain a mere part of the problem, and for thinkers as far apart as Hume and Hegel claims a monopoly of attention.

By the time attention is turned to the nature of mind it may be presumed that the opposition between empiricism and rationalism, treated in the last section, has already declared itself. A *prima facie* dualism will have been recognized in human thought—on the one hand, constructions depending directly on the evidence of the senses; on the other hand, constructions, like those of mathematics, which claim at least relative independence. The question as to the pedigree and

provenance of these last is bound to arise. The Pythagorean-Platonic myth of recollection is an early answer to this question. The Soul has timeless or eternal existence, and the World is at bottom a timeless or eternal order. With that order the Soul has, or had, acquaintance, but becomes forgetful of it as a condition of birth in human form. All true knowledge is the recovery or recollection of that forgotten vision. Thus a direct contact outside this human life between a real soul, which is pure intelligence, and a real world, from which time and space and change are excluded, is postulated to account for the power of human thought to pass beyond experience or lay down the law to it. The suggestion, as it stands, has the defect that it leaves its two reals, the Soul and the World, related only so far that the one knows the other. How is knowing, the act or attitude which is the special characteristic of the real Soul, brought within the real world? What reality has Soul itself?

The modern movement, on the other hand, of which Descartes is the originator, begins from the thinking mind as an indubitable certainty. However far doubt is carried, argued Descartes, it cannot be carried so far as to deny the reality of the thought which doubts. Of the existence of a thinking mind, then, we are certain; and this primary certainty is wholly independent of the evidence of the senses. With this starting-point are connected two tendencies very prominent in the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: first, the tendency to assert that mind is known directly and all else indirectly; secondly, the tendency to connect the mind's capacity to attain truth independent of the senses with its knowledge of itself.

What mind's knowledge of itself might amount to was a matter in dispute between rival schools of thought; but that all else was known indirectly, by means of representatives which were called ideas, was an article of faith almost undisputed at that time.

Now an idea is a mental fact, something that comes to birth in the mind and can appear nowhere else. It is a phase of the mental life having reference always outside its own being, to the surrounding world, or, it may be, to the mind's own past or future in that world. Thus we have an "idea," conceived primarily as furniture of the mind, and its relation to a world without becomes problematic. There was, indeed, a general presumption that the course of events within the mental field was in some sense determined by the course of events without it. Descartes and Locke, for instance, who differed fundamentally in their interpretation of the fact of knowledge, agreed in postulating a causal relation between the ideas of the human mind and the components of the real world. But this general postulate did not guarantee that there was a reality corresponding to every idea. Thus the "new way of ideas" (if we may apply to both the phrase that was directed specially against Locke) yielded a mental series which was, within its limits, a mirror of the real world; in general, it was determined by the real, and so far as it satisfied its own pretensions, every item in it would correspond precisely with an element of the real; but this correspondence could not be taken for granted. The existence of a reality corresponding to an idea required to be proved. Thus the fundamental problem of knowledge was to find an idea which, by its presence in the mind, guaranteed the existence of a corresponding reality. Descartes found such a basis in the idea of God, Locke in the "simple idea" of sensation and reflection. From these primary certainties all other certainties had to be derived.

The inference from the mental series to a reality independent of it was not left unchallenged. On the negative side of their teaching, Berkeley and Hume showed what a precarious foundation the representative idea provided. Berkeley's youthful discovery that "after all, nothing can be like an idea but an idea"

led him to attack the whole notion of correspondence between ideas and reality, and to propound the view that the corporeal world is only ideas and has its being in being perceived. Thus Berkeley cut out matter as cause of ideas, and tried to construct an autonomous spiritual world. Hume accepted the negative side of Berkeley's argument, and questioned further the conception of spirit which was the basis of Berkeley's affirmations. His analysis revealed nothing for certain but the mental states themselves, discrete existences of unknown origin, and offered on that basis no prospect of scientific progress except by determining the laws of their sequence and combination. Thus philosophy was resolved into a "psychology without a soul." The final account of reality became an exposition of the laws of the association of ideas.

In the speculation of the seventeenth century, it was common, and even usual, to refer a priori elements of thought to innate ideas or innate principles. Ideas and principles which seemed not to be derived from experience were ascribed to an inborn capacity for framing them which had no direct connection with the power of sense-perception. Locke began his *Essay* with an argument against the legitimacy of such a postulate. But his Continental predecessor, Descartes, who chiefly provoked him to his philosophy of ideas, and his contemporary, Leibniz, whose elaborate criticism of Locke in the *New Essays* turned largely on this very point, both attempted to incorporate the notion of innate ideas into their philosophical systems. Leibniz's justification of the conception in controversy with Locke connects innate ideas definitely with the knowledge of self. The point on which he seizes is that Locke's ideas of reflection assert the mind's knowledge of itself, a knowledge which does not come by way of the senses. "We are, so to speak, innate to ourselves, and in ourselves there are being, unity, substance, duration, change, activity, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our

intellectual ideas." The suggestion clearly is that, while the intellect may have no direct access to other things, in virtue of man's self-consciousness it has direct access to itself, and therefore has at its command for the general interpretation of reality whatever fundamental characters mind itself exhibits. Mind exists; mind has unity and duration; mind is active. These predicates stand for ideas which are intellectual in a double sense; first, as incapable of originating in sense-perception, as pertaining to thought, not to sense; secondly, because it is as characterizing mind or intellect that these attributes are revealed, in virtue of mind's awareness of itself. Thus the categories or fundamental conceptions, with the aid of which we seek to understand the world, have their source and verification within the mind.

Locke, if he had lived to read Leibniz's criticism, might have replied that this statement is, in effect, an admission of his own principle that all ideas originate in experience, all conceptions are obtained from perceptions; that the argument, if granted, merely shows the more fundamental conceptions to be derived from the use rather of the internal sense than of the external senses, from the mind's perception of itself rather than from the mind's perception of bodies; and that it in no way shows that these ideas of being, duration, activity, etc., are any more innate than the ideas of heat or colour or any other ideas directly associated with the external senses. The controversy might develop on a variety of lines, but sooner or later it would come back to the fundamental point of difference that, for Leibniz, mental activity is the type of all real existence, while Locke postulates a reality divided into mind and matter.

Now, we have already seen that Locke's "way of ideas" failed to establish this dualism on a basis strong enough to stand against criticism. In spite of his efforts to put matter and mind on a footing of equality, and in spite of a number of passages in

which he claims to have done so, his starting-point forced on him the admission that mind knew mind directly, not through representative ideas. But if there is a difference in kind between the mind's knowledge of itself and its knowledge of other things, an opening is at once offered for claiming a special status in reality for mind. Of this opening both Berkeley and Hume, in their different ways, took advantage. The common starting-point of all three thinkers, as well as of their Continental predecessors and contemporaries, was, as has already been said, the conception of a mind faced with ideas and speculating about them, and their relation to reality. If this starting-point is accepted, it is not easy to deny the further assertion that every idea, and every development of ideas, reveals directly the nature of mind and only indirectly the nature of what lies beyond it.

In the picture of mind which we have just drawn mind is ascribed a dual function. It is a mirror of Nature and it is also a critic or judge of the pictures which the mirror presents. It perceives or has ideas; it also reflects upon its perceptions and ideas. Thus for Berkeley "idea" and "thing" are equivalent terms, and Hume refers to concrete features of the common-sense world, such as tables or fireplaces, as "perceptions." The passive mind has forced upon its notice a variety of objects, which by its own activity it seeks subsequently to bring into relation. It was one of the main motives of the reinterpretation offered by Kant to destroy this view of knowledge, by insisting that the activity of thought is present not merely, where everyone recognizes it, in the conscious effort to remove a doubt or find ground for assertion beyond the limits of observation, but also in the observation itself on which, as basis, such effort rests. If perception is opposed to thought and excludes it, then things are not perceived. Thought does not receive ready-made ideas, as objects on which to exercise its activity of interpretation; it is active from the beginning in

creating the object on which it works, and the further operations are only the continuance of that creative activity. The true sense of Kant's "Copernican revolution" is his insistence on mental activity as essential to knowledge, on mind as creative of its object. While his predecessors were able to think of truth as consisting in the correspondence or resemblance of the idea which is before the mind to the actual thing which is its original, for Kant no such correspondence is now possible. For that which is made by mind and expresses its special nature cannot be proved genuine by its similarity to that which is not made by mind and does not express its nature. Thus Kant's correction includes Berkeley's point that an idea can be like nothing but an idea, but goes far beyond it. It rejects the representative idea, and with it the correspondence theory of truth; but, further, it rejects the new way of ideas altogether. There is no stock of ideas, among which one may distinguish some as innate, some as acquired, and some as invented, representing the capital of thought's industry. The mind is unceasingly active creating according to its own laws out of the material which the senses provide, and the test of its success in this activity can be nothing else than its ability to satisfy its own demands and aspirations.

From this new point of view it is no longer necessary to assert either that the mind has any specially direct and intimate acquaintance with itself and its own characteristics, or that the ground of any knowledge independent of the use of the senses is to be sought in such acquaintance with the self. In fact, Kant argued that the knowledge of the self and of the not-self grew up together in reciprocal interdependence, and that the chief vice of the way of ideas—"idealism," as he called it—was its assumption of the priority of knowledge of self. Thus something like Locke's dualism of material and spiritual substance is restored; but the gap through which criticism previously entered is closed.

With the other point, the basis of a priori knowledge, Kant is much concerned. Indeed, in his Introduction he represents it as the main problem of his first *Critique*. The main lines of Kant's solution follow from what has already been said. Thought is a creative activity, but it cannot create out of nothing. Its continuous occupation is the interpretation of experience, for which the senses provide the material. What is there besides this, what opening for knowledge independent of experience? By careful analysis, no doubt, of the facts of knowledge, such as is undertaken in the *Critique* itself, it is possible to discover the principles of thought's creative activity; but this will merely yield a formal account of the conditions of all knowledge whatever. It will not yield a body of truth, like the mathematical sciences, which has application throughout Nature. If there is a priori knowledge, other than that which the Critical Philosophy in its analysis of thought provides, that must be because thought has somehow at its disposal material independent of experience on which to exercise itself. In the section of the *Critique* called the "Æsthetic," Kant argues that such material is provided by the "a priori intuitions" of space and time, and he nowhere suggests that it is to be found anywhere else. Mathematical science is thus accounted for, but the possibility of extending the mathematical method into other fields is implicitly denied.

Finally, from this new point of view the criticism of the powers of mind becomes, as we remarked at the outset, no longer a mere preliminary to metaphysics, but metaphysics itself. For investigating mind in its characteristic expression, knowledge, the laws and principles which it will discover will be those by which mind brings order into the material on which it works, and these laws, otherwise regarded, will be the constitutive principles of the world which the mind presents to itself. By "a criticism of the powers of mind" might, of course, be meant a psychological investiga-

tion, which takes into account the differences between one mind and another, and the passions or prejudices by which thought is often distorted. Such a criticism might be of value, but it would not be metaphysics. But if by criticism is meant an account of mind in its efficiency, as it operates to its own satisfaction in knowledge, then criticism of mind is the basis of the only metaphysics within man's reach.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIETY

AN account of mind cannot confine itself to the field of knowledge. Mind is active and creative, as well as reflective. Man does not merely contemplate the world in which he finds himself; he also strives to control and alter it. He will make it better to live in and more beautiful to look at. He claims also that through these practical and creative activities he gains a certain insight into the nature of the world, which, though it cannot be called knowledge in the primary application of the word, must yet be given its due weight when the philosopher makes up the final account. A similar claim is advanced even more strongly in the name of religion, which speaks with assurance on the ground of its special experience as to the organization of reality, and is quite prepared to reject all so-called knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the implications of its revelation. Thus the purely theoretical activities of the human mind exist in complicated interconnection with other activities, directed primarily to other ends, but capable also, it seems, of contributing on their own account to the theoretical construction. A philosopher to whom the account of mind is fundamental must try to determine the relations of these activities to one another and must attempt some synthesis which will do justice to the contribution of each. We will consider first the field

offered by men's collective efforts in the field of social organization.

Social and political forms have occupied the attention of philosophers for a very long time; but they have been considered at different times with very different motives and on very different lines. In ancient Greek thought the political and ethical problems were very closely connected. They occupied a prominent place in the Academy and Lyceum; but neither Plato nor Aristotle regarded them as falling within the field of philosophy proper. Their prominence was not due to any idea, such as we have outlined in the last paragraph, that in the theory of the state or the analysis of the problems of conduct important aspects of the activity of mind may be discovered which throw light on the theoretical activity itself and contribute valuable material for its exercise. To them these were practical problems, in which theory was involved only as common sense always regards theory as contributing to practice, by defining in advance the general nature of the problems to be solved and laying down in principle the kind of solution to be sought. The philosopher was involved for the guidance he was able to give, not for the evidence he was to receive, from this important branch of human experience. He could give guidance because, having the whole world in his view, he, if anyone, could define the ultimate values to which human effort was fundamentally, though for the most part unconsciously, directed, and thus provide the necessary orientation for the work of the statesman. The knowledge of the philosopher was for the statesman what astronomy was for the navigator, a purely theoretic activity which would incidentally be of practical service by providing marks of absolute reliability.

There is one famous passage in the *Republic* of Plato which might seem to open the way to a different view of the importance of politics—the passage in which Socrates turns from the individual to the city,

because there, as he says, we shall find written in large letters what is written very small on the human soul. The metaphor does, it is true, imply that we shall find nothing else written there but what we might find with sharp enough sight in the individual; but that implication does not amount to the denial of any special or distinctive contribution on the part of the state to human experience; it only asserts that any such contribution must be grounded ultimately in the nature of the human mind. For, as Plato says, a city is not found fixed like a rock in the earth or growing like an acorn on an oak-tree; it springs from the will and character of men. But if social institutions are the collective self-expression of humanity, then, on the one hand, their place is assured in a theory of mind, which clearly must explore every mode of self-expression, and, on the other hand, the relation of theory and practice in this field is complicated by the necessary recognition that the theorist—conceived, in the Greek fashion, as legislator or statesman—is free in any given situation only within strict limits defined by the existing facts.

Since Greek philosophy never reached the point of attempting to construct a general theory of mind, the first of these two points never obtained recognition in the Greek world. The second point, the relation of political theory and practice, was cardinal to the thought of Aristotle, who shows himself here, as elsewhere, a faithful but critical exponent of Platonic principles.

When Aristotle argues that the city has its ground in human nature and contributes something essential to full manhood, he is not only true to Plato, but also asserting a principle fundamental to every subsequent attempt at a philosophical theory of the state. It seems to follow directly from this principle that the legislator or statesman requires, first and foremost, a knowledge of what completed human nature is; and the attainment of such knowledge is the goal of ethics. Thus

politics is subordinated to ethics in that the end to which the political activity is directed—man's full development—is defined in the ethical inquiry. So far as Aristotle follows out this line of thought, he regards himself as occupied in his political speculations with the task of defining the social conditions which will get the best out of the best men; in short, with the construction of an ideal city. Such a conception is, no doubt, in general Platonic; but a fundamental difference between master and pupil is already apparent in this, that for Aristotle the basis of the whole political construction is a knowledge of human nature, while the Plato of the *Republic* had rested it upon philosophy, which is a knowledge of man only so far as it is a knowledge of the eternal foundations of all things.

Plato's conception of the philosopher-king involved no subordination of politics to ethics. The title of his philosopher to rule was that by the power of dialectic he had freed himself from the "wheel of birth" and reached eternal verities: his rule was thus based beyond experience. Aristotle's ethical truth pretends to no such absolute validity. For him the trained intelligence of the good man sets the goal and standard of human conduct, not by metaphysical inquiry, but as the last fruit of disciplined character and conduct, by reflection on the principles of that discipline. Since he conceived Nature, not in the modern evolutionary fashion as a story which is still being told, but as a finished system of forms which only fails to present itself as such because of defects in the matter in which it finds embodiment, Aristotle was able to postulate a single definable ideal for every man and for every city. But his conception nevertheless involves for the isolated individual complete relativity of moral judgment. He cannot by thought escape from himself; he can only come to consciousness of the principles implicit in his own character and conduct. "Each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others

most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being, as it were, the norm and measure of them." Thus the philosopher is deposed. Truth and freedom in these matters is to be won, not by dialectic, but by practical observance of the mean in act and emotion.

It is natural that Aristotle should be led to lay even greater emphasis than Plato had on the educational function of the state. The individual is, in fact, not isolated, but a member of a community; and if he is to be saved from his own deficiencies, it can be only by his membership of a community in which those deficiencies are made good. The fundamental political problem is that of so organizing a city that the knowledge and experience of those who have come to full manhood may become a power to draw those who have not along the same path of development. This is the central problem to which in Aristotle's treatment the others are all subsidiary. Aristotle maintains the single ideal and starts describing his ideal city; but for cities, as for individuals, he has to recognize the relativity of good, and in the *Politics* the emphasis of this recognition is so great that the single ideal almost disappears from view. Political thought is powerless to free any community from itself, and political institutions must, in the main, register, and by registering reinforce an actual judgment of value and an existing distribution of powers. The constitution of the city is often referred to as the determination of the ideal of life for the citizens; but we also read that "a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess." Modern realism could go no farther. The ideal seems here to collapse before the might of fact, and the educational mission of the state is in danger of appearing as a tyranny over the individual which may as well distort as assist his growth.

It cannot be asserted with any confidence that modern thought has succeeded in freeing the political

problem from the ambiguity in which the classical thought of ancient Greece left it. Philosophers have continued and still continue to concern themselves with it, but why and to what end has often seemed obscure. In England in the seventeenth century Hobbes claimed that the foundations of "Civil Philosophy" were laid afresh by his *De Cive*, as those of astronomy had been by Copernicus and of physiology by Harvey. But to his common-sense realism, as to Bentham much later, man was just one denizen of the natural world, and the task of the inquiry was that of defining the laws of man's peculiar movements with a view to controlling them. Many of the earlier modern philosophers, like Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley, left the political problem on one side. John Locke's important and influential *Essay on Civil Government* was avowedly inspired by practical rather than theoretical interests, and contains, characteristically, no indication of the relation in which he conceived it to stand to the metaphysical discussions of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. In the same generation Spinoza's preoccupation with political questions is justified by the importance of these questions to human happiness. To him, as he expressly indicated by calling his great metaphysical treatise the *Ethics*, the problem of conduct was fundamental: philosophy was the reflective effort by which man won and kept his freedom. The principles, therefore, on which human societies should be organized came up inevitably for treatment as part of the general question as to the principles on which human life should be organized. Thus for Spinoza the political problem comes to be incorporated in philosophy, not because some special philosophical method or set of principles is applicable to it, but because man's welfare depends on its solution; and it is in this overriding practical aim that all Spinoza's writings find their unity. Some such conception of the relation of the political to the general philosophical problem may, perhaps, be said

with truth to represent the predominant view up to the end of the eighteenth century, when Kant and the German idealists gave a new turn to philosophical speculation.

The Kantian revolution had reference primarily, as has already been explained, to the problem of knowledge; but in calling for an exposition of mind in its activity it could not—and did not—exclude the will as organizing individual and social life. Rather it opened a point of view from which for the first time the ethical and political inquiries became essential ingredients of the philosopher's speculative task. In passing from the traditional metaphysical topics to such questions the philosopher was no longer descending from the cool heights of theory to mingle as adviser or partisan in the confused *mêlée* of practical expediences. His interest and his problem remained theoretical or metaphysical. Here, as in the field of knowledge, his task is to define the nature of mind and the principles of its activity; and if the structure of society offers no evidence relevant to this task, then, though he may still be concerned with it as a citizen, it will not detain him as a philosopher. A philosophic theory of the state promises no assistance for statesmen or legislators. It is not concerned to invent exemplary systems of law or ideal types of social organization. It is attempting to detect and expound the nature of a familiar actuality, distinguishing the essential from the accidental, and so displaying the factors on which all successful societies depend. Even in claiming universality for his theorems the philosopher will be cautious, for fear of seeming to dictate to practice or set limits to human invention; but if politics is to be a field of philosophical speculation at all, its endless variety must conceal certain fundamental themes or forms which it does not exhaust and which are accessible to reflective analysis.

This attitude finds its fullest and most precise expression in writers like Hegel, who construct a

comprehensive metaphysical system round the conception of Mind or Spirit; and its best exemplifications in England have been directly inspired—as, for instance, Bernard Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*—by Hegel's example. But it has also, in a more or less modified form, gained a much wider currency among writers who have little or no sympathy with the Hegelian metaphysic. Political philosophy becomes an attempt to analyze and understand the forms of organization which men have created for themselves, and through them the spirit of the men who made and maintain them. There is a large and growing body of writing, largely the work of professed philosophers, discussing the fundamental political conceptions—the nature of the state and sovereignty, the rights and liberties of the citizen, law and property, the democratic principle and its alternatives, the principles underlying the various forms of representative government, and so on—which has, in the main, this purely theoretical object.

To some writers in this field the questions they treat seem to present themselves mainly in terms of right and wrong, as though it were a kind of extension of ethics. They are faced with problems as to the behaviour proper to the citizen as citizen, or to the duly constituted authorities as endowed with power over the citizens. For these the conception of social justice takes a prominent place, and the individual citizen, rather than the state or the citizen body, occupies the centre of the picture. For others, the nature of society and the social order is the central question, and society tends to be conceived as a being of higher complexity, built upon the lives of individuals but obeying laws of its own which could never be detected or explained by a study of the lives of its members. These two tendencies may be conveniently described as individualist and collectivist respectively. The latter has been much influenced by Rousseau's theory of a General Will, and in recent

times it has often attempted to make use of the biological conception of organism. Both tendencies are clearly evident side by side in unstable equilibrium in the political writings of Herbert Spencer; but this curious internal conflict in his attitude really represents a conflict between the consequences which he drew from his general evolutionary theory of life on the one hand and the lessons of political experience as he understood it on the other.

In much of this political theory the descriptive element preponderates, often so greatly that the affiliation to any kind of philosophy remains doubtful. We have really a collection of data which may serve as a starting-point for a number of different theoretical inquiries. But, generally, the theoretical interest seems inclined to work to two main centres, which it will be worth while, in conclusion, briefly to characterize. If two more descriptive labels may be excused, I take leave to divide these theorists into Humanists and Sociologists.

The Humanists are those who regard philosophy as a systematic reflection of man upon his experience as a whole. Man is artist, poet, thinker, worshipper and much else, besides citizen or politician; in his life these various activities cross and mingle, and at least so far find unity that their variety does not destroy the unity and the continuity of his life. These activities, then, actually and—so to speak—biologically, possess a certain unity; but it is only by a prolonged and difficult reflective effort that man can hope to achieve consciousness of their unity and interrelation, and until he has achieved this he is not properly master of himself nor entitled to speak of the world to which he and his activities belong. Thus, philosophy is the culminating activity of the human mind, by which that mind completes its freedom, a kind of intellectual conscience or principle of reflection, which (to adapt Butler's words) passes in review all other principles and activities, each a partial

expression of human nature, not with a view to approving and disapproving, accepting and rejecting, but with a view to assessing the place of each in the whole and the whole which they together form. In this assessment the political activity will require an emphasis precisely proportioned to its importance in human life.

The Sociologists represent a different tradition, and one more sceptical of the value of philosophy as it has been commonly practised. They have a certain sympathy with the view of philosophy, discussed earlier (in Chapter I.) as an attempt to achieve a conspectus of the sciences, and tend to advocate the method of inductive generalization. They would lay under contribution every departmental inquiry which has any light to throw upon the situation of man in society. The anthropologist and the geographer, the historian and the economist, the biologist, and the psychologist, will be asked to report his findings, and, after hearing them all, the sociologist will give judgment. The various human activities will be exhibited in relation to one another in the social scene, but with a different interest and emphasis from that of the humanist; not with a view to determining the spiritual unity of which each is a facet, but with a view to completing the picture of this planet on which human life is the highest and most complex phenomenon. The metaphysical point of view of the natural scientist is, in short, presupposed and taken as final.

CHAPTER V

CONDUCT

THE philosophic account of conduct, which is known alternatively as Ethics or Moral Philosophy, has been closely connected through most of its historical development, as we saw in the last chapter, with the account of the state and its forms. Its establishment

as an integral part of speculative philosophy has probably been more complete, where the general philosophical outlook made it possible, than that of politics, but the obstacles to its recognition have been much the same; and its fullest acceptance has been won from the same philosophical schools or tendencies. Therefore, much that was said in the last chapter has its obvious application here, and need not be repeated. Ethics, like politics, came into existence to meet a practical demand rather than to satisfy a speculative interest. Men had been accustomed to believe in and approve of certain lines or principles of conduct and to disapprove of others. These judgments came to be questioned. The philosopher was called in to give these beliefs a solid foundation or provide rules better founded. "No chance topic," as Socrates remarks in the course of the discussion in Plato's *Republic*, "but a question of the fashion in which a man should live."

This practical emphasis did not grow weaker, as time went on, in the Greek philosophic schools, but rather stronger. It is often said that to the Greeks generally philosophy was no mere intellectual adventure, but a way of life. This is true for Plato, for whom the phrase may be given an almost religious colouring; it is less true for Aristotle, because his belief in the supreme value of philosophic thought was combined with a disbelief in its applicability to practical problems. It is true, again, for the two most influential schools of the succeeding period, the Stoics and the Epicureans, but for them in the quite simple and direct sense, that each conceived its main task to be that of giving to its members an ethic, a rule of life, and each considered its logic and physics and metaphysics as strictly subordinated to that practical end. It was by the way of living that they preached and practised, not by any logical or metaphysical principle, that these later schools were differentiated to the Hellenistic world. In these days an ethics

divorced from politics dominated the philosophic field, but its domination meant not so much a recognition of the speculative importance of the problem of conduct as an assertion of the practical importance of a right view of the world.

In this connection, the coming of Christianity was plainly a decisive factor. The direction and instruction of conduct, for which the pre-Christian world had largely looked to the philosopher, was now in the hands of the Church, which tolerated no rivals, whether they came forward in the name of religion or in the name of philosophy. The forms of religion with which the Greeks and Romans were familiar did not, for the most part, contemplate any general regulation of the life of the conformer; they only controlled his behaviour in certain localities and on special occasions; but this new religion followed its devotees into every department of life with general rules and principles of conduct. In the surviving documents of the Epicurean school more than one devoted adherent of the creed is found addressing its founder, Epicurus, as a true saviour, whose teaching has brought healing to the sick and light to the blind; and though the Stoic school had no similar personal devotion to a single figure, no reader of Marcus Aurelius or Epictetus would deny a general similarity of attitude on their part to the Stoic faith. In other respects, also, the general acceptance of Christianity was bound to make life difficult for the pagan schools of philosophy; but on this side it superseded them altogether.

If ethics is conceived as a contribution to practice, then the form of its utterances will be fundamentally imperative. The business of the ethical writer will be to tell men in general how to act, what to do. Thus, he will deliver himself either in precepts or in reasoned judgments sharing the general character of ordinary practical deliberation. Such deliberation tends to take the form of the calculation of means

to an end. Something, say wealth or victory, is posited as good, as worth having or bringing about, and the question is as to the steps by which it may be most quickly and economically secured. Questions like this, which are raised and settled every day by the normal intelligent man in dealing with the particular problems which confront him, will be raised and settled in general terms by the moralist, who should be able, as the result of his inquiries, to present the practical man with a body of doctrine valid for all times and places where it finds application.

Thus, Epicurus maintained that there was a single ultimate end and good—viz., for each his own pleasure. He then discussed the ways in which pleasure might be realized; and for the greater security of his followers he enshrined the general results of this discussion in four concise maxims, which he recommended them to learn by heart and carry everywhere with them. Similarly, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of modern Utilitarianism, is chiefly occupied, in his *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, in instructing the reader how to spread and increase pleasure, how to restrict and diminish pain; and in the second edition of his book he inserts in a footnote certain “memoriter verses,” which, he says “were framed in the view of lodging more effectually in the memory these points (as to the valuation of a given pleasure or pain), on which the whole fabric of morals and legislation may be seen to rest.”

“*Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—*
 Such marks in *pleasures* and in *pains* endure.
 Such pleasures seek, if *private* be thy end :
 If it be *public*, wide let them *extend*.
 Such *pains* avoid, whichever be thy view :
 If pains *must* come, let them *extend* to few.”

On this view, ethics is describing some goal, which may be reached or approached by suitable action, and indicating the kind of action which is suitable.

Pleasure (or happiness) is the most obvious claimant to the title of general goal or end, and the hedonists or utilitarians, who argue that all action is, or should be, organized under this notion, provide the readiest and most complete examples of this conception of ethics. Complications arise when other notions are introduced, such as justice, honesty, or virtue, unless these can be strictly subordinated to the general end as contributory to it. Hedonists and utilitarians insist on their subordination. Such attributes of action and character, they argue, are rightly praised because they make for human happiness, private or public or both. Their opponents in all ages argue that this subordination is illegitimate; justice must be done, even though the heavens fall. If the demand to furnish a practical goal is accepted, and the claims of pleasure to this office are rejected, an alternative thus offers itself in the notion of virtue. In action a man not only tries to secure something for himself or others, to bring something about, but he also reveals his own character. Expression of character is thus a universal feature of all action, as well as effect on happiness; and if the notion of happiness will not provide the general criterion of success and failure which is desired, character is naturally asked to supply it. It was this alternative, in effect, which the Stoics advocated against the Epicureans, and Aristotle's reply to an earlier hedonism was not dissimilar.

Formally, both the Aristotelian and the Stoic replies conform to the convention of exhibiting the doctrine as an answer to the question, What is the supreme good with reference to which all action whatever should be tested? Aristotle laid it down at the outset, practically without discussion, that every intelligent action would and should be directed ultimately to the agent's own happiness. The Stoics said that the goal was life according to Nature. But the subsequent argument in both cases tended to show that this goal was not so much something brought about by action

and justifying the expenditure of effort by which it was purchased, as a property necessarily attaching to all activity of a certain type. Human beings are, of course, in large measure immature and imperfect, and so far as they set themselves the task of growing into their full stature, in which, for the first time, the happy or natural activity will be possible to them, so far the goal is something to be approached gradually, by means different in character from the end to which they are directed. But, so far as moral maturity is attained, so far as the agent possesses virtue, means differ from end only as particular from universal; the particular act is that specification of happy or natural activity which the actual situation makes possible. Thus the practical activity is really asserted to have its value in itself, not in something else which it produces. To the question, "What ought I to try to attain by action?" we get the answer, "Your action is judged and valued, if it is judged and valued rightly, not by what it attains, but by its own intrinsic character." The presentation of the doctrine in terms of an ultimate end becomes inappropriate and even misleading.

This is the ground of the accusation of inconsistency which Herbert Spencer brings against Aristotle. He says that in word Aristotle makes happiness his end, but in fact his end is virtue. But Aristotle's happiness is not virtue, but virtuous activity; and there is no inconsistency. To live is to be active in certain definable ways, and the view that happiness of life is realized so far as these activities maintain certain forms is at least as plausible as the view that it depends upon their assuring certain results. What we really have, comparing Aristotle or Zeno with his opponents, is a fundamental change of direction partly concealed by a deceptive similarity of terminology. Attention is transferred from the causal efficacy of action, considered as an interference with events, to the significance of action as the expression of a personality. Both aspects

of action are real enough; but when action is considered as causally effective, its value is found in something other than itself: when action is considered as expressive of character, it cannot but be valued according to the character expressed in it. Much of the divergence of ethical theories, both ancient and modern, may be accounted for by a difference in the adjustment of these two estimates to one another.

Modern philosophy in its early days was not much concerned with the problem of conduct. In modern Europe, as in ancient Greece, natural science and metaphysics claimed attention first, and, emerging from them, the problem of knowledge. On the practical side, politics preceded ethics, and the conception of a law of Nature seemed to offer a common foundation for the two inquiries. It was not till the eighteenth century that Ethics cut any great figure before the world, and as it came into prominence its connection with politics became more distant. The astonishing outburst of ethical writing which marks the eighteenth century (particularly the first half of it) in England was occasioned by the apparent weakening of moral principle in the life of the time immediately preceding. The writers of this period conceived themselves, almost without exception, as engaged in re-establishing morality on new foundations, independent equally of religious and political authority, and directed their arguments primarily against the teachers of moral scepticism, particularly Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rochefoucauld, to whom Epicurus is often added, and, after the publication of the *Fable of the Bees* (1723), the Dutch-English physician, Bernard Mandeville. Machiavelli was taken as representing the view that any crime is justified when the interest of the state is served by it; Hobbes, that morality is the creature of law; Rochefoucauld, that all actions are the expression of self-interest, more or less disguised; while Mandeville avowed it his aim to prove "private vices public benefits." Inevitably the defenders of morality became

involved in controversy with one another. For a number of them the ethical inquiry was part of a general philosophic enterprise; for a few (like David Hume) the theoretical interest clearly outweighed the practical. But in the main this writing is practical in its aim; it is directed to restoring men's faith in moral principles, to convincing men by argument that life need not be mere greed and selfishness, even where law and religion lose their hold on men.

The situation from which the eighteenth-century moralists started was thus not unlike the situation from which Socrates is represented as starting in Plato's *Republic*, when Thrasymachus has said his say and Glaucon and Adeimantus have exerted themselves to show the need of a more thorough answer than is usually given to such criticisms of morality. But the development of the reply is very different in the two cases. Plato's famous argument retains throughout the closest touch with the social context, and seeks to exhibit morality as the organizing principle on which the healthy life of men and cities depends. By comparison Shaftesbury and Clarke, Hutcheson and Butler, seem to be working in a small and restricted field. Society is presupposed, no doubt, but its organization and character are not in question; and it often seems that the discussion touches the individual only in an isolable department of his life and thought. Their problem was at bottom a practical problem, as we have said, but it was nothing like so directly and urgently practical as that of the Greeks. There were other supports for morality besides philosophy in the eighteenth century, and the philosopher was not called upon, as in ancient Greece, to formulate an ideal of life by which men could live. He was not asked to enlighten the will by providing a sovereign criterion of good and bad. Rather he was expected and tended to assume that every normal man had in himself the power to make such distinctions accurately, if he would but use it; and the question at issue was as to

the origin, nature, and value of this power. What morality means in practice tends to be taken as known. It is not so much false advice that has to be countered, as misinterpretations which distort the spirit and depreciate the value of the moral judgment.

When, therefore, the historian of philosophy attempts to classify the British Moralists according to the general tendency of their teaching, his division depends, not on the end recommended, but on the nature of the power by which men are thought to discriminate between good and its opposite. Some maintained that this distinction was discoverable by thought and reasoning, like any other fundamental distinction between things. Others maintained that a special sense, which they called a moral sense, was needed to account for it. Such a classification is justified, since it emphasizes the point on which in most cases the chief emphasis falls. It cannot, however, be carried through completely, because a gradual revival of hedonism, which gathered strength as the century went on, produced writers not much interested in this question, but chiefly concerned to show that action might be interpreted as a search for pleasure, without any danger or discredit to morality. Of this movement was ultimately born the utilitarian doctrine which dominated the early nineteenth century.

Long before the close of the eighteenth century the original impulse which had given this ethical speculation its vigour had failed. There was in England no metaphysical synthesis capable of continuing the discussion on broad philosophical lines, and the movement towards psychology which was heralded by the writings of Hume and Adam Smith did not lead to important issues in the hands of their successors. It was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that ethical thought in England recovered its vitality, and then chiefly under the influence of Kant's ambitious attempt to bring the whole of human experience within the orbit of the Critical Philosophy.

In the second and third *Critiques* Kant set himself to complete the scheme initiated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and his contribution to ethics has an importance not less decisive than his contribution to metaphysics. Croce says that "after Kant no serious philosopher can be anything but a Kantian in ethics." This may go too far; but with regard to his *conception* of ethics, which is what we are here more particularly concerned with, it is probably true to say that it has been the starting-point of all subsequent attempts at a philosophy of conduct.

Ethics is conceived by Kant as a necessary part of philosophy. In passing from the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the *Critique of Practical Reason* he is not passing from a theoretical to a practical enterprise; he is merely opening another chapter in the great theoretical task of revealing the presuppositions on which human experience rests. The new chapter has for subject will instead of thought, or, as he prefers to say, reason in its practical as opposed to its theoretical use. The task is in principle the same as that of the first *Critique*. He was not there trying to improve or reform the practice of thinking, either in science or in everyday life; he was trying to show what it meant or involved. So here he is not giving directions to conduct. The imperatives in which he seeks to define the moral law are not precepts, rules of life which he recommends for adoption; they claim to be the principles actually operative in conduct so far as it is good. The first *Critique*, again, was not a psychological investigation of the equipment which man possesses for the discovery of truth, taking mind as one object among others in the context of the world of science or common sense, and hoping to lead ultimately to the improved control and enhanced utility of the instrument. Mind was investigated in its cognitive activity as creative of this real world and finding expression in its creation. Kant was fairly familiar with the writings of the British Moralists, and he had no inclination to

follow them into the psychology of conduct into which their thought tended to develop. Such an inquiry might well have its value, but it was not to the purpose of his argument. What his argument needed, and what he tried to give, was an account of the metaphysical implications of the practical activity. The essential point was to grasp the nature of the practical activity, considered in itself and in its relation to the theoretical, and to exhibit the one as the necessary complement of the other. The unity of philosophy demands that the theory of knowledge and the theory of conduct shall be interdependent, and that both shall issue in an account of the ultimate reality.

According to this Kantian conception, ethics is incorporated in philosophy as it never had been before: philosophic ethics come into being. There are, of course, other philosophies besides that of Kant; and there are many other conceptions of ethics. But at that point we will leave for the present the problem of conduct.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION

IF the conception of philosophy which we have connected primarily with the name of Kant is a sound one, if the philosopher's task is that of examining human experience in its main varieties with a view to exhibiting the metaphysical implications of each and their relations to one another, it would seem that the religious experience could hardly fail to make an irresistible claim for consideration. Historically there are few influences stronger or more pervasive than that of religion; and the fact that in the name of religion at all times and in every country statements are made about the nature of reality which are formally indistinguishable from philosophical statements would seem to constitute a challenge to the philosopher which he

could hardly ignore. Thus one may ask whether there ought not to be a Critique of the Religious Consciousness subjecting religion to the same kind of examination as thought and conduct.

Kant lived at a time when the Deistic movement had accustomed men to the idea that the philosopher was entitled to be heard on the subject of religion. Deism tended, it is true, to be confused in the popular mind with "free thought" and atheism; but it was actually a claim, and in many cases at least a perfectly sincere claim, that religious truth was accessible to the human reason quite independently of any historical event or express revelation of God. The attitude is well instanced in the titles of two celebrated English books, which were landmarks in the controversy—John Toland's *Christianity not Mysteriorious* (1696) and Matthew Tindal's *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (1730). What fails to find expression in either title is the tendency, which became particularly marked in Tindal's book, to bring religion into the closest possible connection with—one might, perhaps, say, into dependence upon—morality. (This tendency is very prominent in Kant's writings concerning religion.) The controversies were dying down somewhat when Kant came to maturity; but the ferment was still working; and so far the situation was favourable for a bold restatement of the relation of philosophy to religion and an assessment of the contribution of religion to human life and thought.

In another sense, however, the situation was much less favourable. It is difficult to speak confidently about the intimate life of past generations, but it seems to be fairly certain that in Kant's day religion itself was at a rather low ebb, and that these attempts to formulate a religion of reason were to some extent a symptom and a confession of that state of things. Further, the Deistic movement did not succeed, for all its vigour, in throwing up thinkers of sufficient calibre to stimulate Kant's speculative genius to its highest

flights. The controversy was, in fact, something of a failure, in the sense that it left no permanent mark either on philosophy or on religion. The renewal of the religious spirit was to come from the side of practice; but it was precisely the detachment from religious practice that was the essential weakness of the Deistic movement. Reason cannot create out of nothing. If there is a "natural light," it is surely such that it will not shine until the appropriate experience gives it occasion. Only a barren dialectic can result from a mere examination of theological concepts before the bar of reason. If thought is to make progress, it must be in touch with experience. Therefore these exponents of the religion of reason, finding insufficient foundations for their speculations in religious experience, fell back on to the more solid ground of moral experience. But this is only an evasion of the problem; for, however closely religion and morality are intertwined in men's lives, religion has its own source, which is independent of that of morality, and neither is an imperfect activity which is continued and completed in the other.

Philosophy has never lived on very easy terms with religion. The Greek philosophers, from early times, were often at odds with the current theology for its inadequate conception of Deity, directing their attacks chiefly against the poets, who, in the absence of a priesthood, were the chief repository of religious doctrine. This is the "ancient feud," which Plato speaks of as separating philosophy and poetry. The philosophers tended to appropriate the language of religion to themselves. On the whole, the Greek philosopher, while recognizing a place for religion and accepting the conception of the Divine, found himself dissatisfied with the existing forms of religion and tried after a fashion to frame a religion for himself. He would sometimes see in current beliefs and usages half-realized intuitions of important truths. Sometimes, like Epicurus, he would see rather a mass of super-

stition, darkening life and death, from which men called for deliverance. Every reader of Lucretius will remember his passionate plea for this freedom. No Greek pre-Christian philosopher could point to a religious communion, existing independently of his school, as having a call upon his service in thought and deed. He would probably recognize and scrupulously fulfil such ritual duties as custom or order required of him: loyalty to the city would be felt as demanding this. Nevertheless, the freedom of his speculation in religious and political matters, together with the tendency of philosophical schools to claim some special privileged access to the gods, would be likely to earn him the name of an innovator in religion, or an enemy of it, and a bad citizen.

When Christianity conquered the western world, new difficulties beset the relation of philosophy and religion. As a universal religion with uniform tenets and usages, Christianity allowed the philosopher no escape from the laws and customs of the city to a law of Nature in which all varieties of practice and doctrine found their common source. As a dogmatic religion with an organized priesthood, it was prepared to expound its own revelation of God and unwilling to tolerate rival interpretations. It was prepared to use the force of the state to punish and silence any whose teaching might seem to conflict with or endanger the fundamental verities of which it was the custodian. The ingenuity of the human intellect is considerable, and in various ways the difficulty may be and has been more or less satisfactorily surmounted; but there must always surely be a certain tension between the spirit of free inquiry, which is philosophy, and an organization which asks men, as it were, at the point of a pistol to accept certain statements as enshrining final and unquestionable truth. The difficulty was not fully felt so long as philosophy remained in the hands of the priesthood, and before the philosophy of Greece was rediscovered in what we call the Renaissance, but with

the arrival of the New Learning it became acute. At some times and places there was more, at others less, freedom for thought; but generally in the early days of modern philosophy a philosophical examination of religion was out of the question. In view of the real dangers created by religious bigotry, reinforced by the thinker's own loyalty to the Church of his fathers, a certain evasiveness came into philosophic thought on this side which sometimes gave the impression of dishonesty or deceit.

It is part of the evidence for the truth, or at least for the necessity, of a humanistic philosophy that an influence cannot be escaped by the mere refusal to face it. Whatever belongs to the human spirit will struggle for expression in the philosopher's view of the world. A given thinker may decline the direct examination of conduct or of society, or of the æsthetic or of the religious interest; but, avowed or unavowed, these represent forces at work upon his own life. And the unity of the human mind is such that the degree of their efficiency cannot be measured by the extent of the activities specifically devoted to them. Each of the main human activities refuses restriction to a mere department and claims, in a sense, the whole of life. The artist is quite aware that there are other activities besides his, and that for some they may be more important than art; but he is also deeply conscious that in his work as poet or painter or musician he is striving to express in his own special fashion every side of human nature, and that so far as he fails to achieve this universality his effort falls short of success. And if such a demand presses half unconsciously on the artist, it will press with all its force on the thought of the philosopher, whose declared aim is the knowledge of the universal. According to the humanist view, knowledge of the universal is only achievable in and through the knowledge of man; philosophy is the culminating effort of human self-consciousness. Here every factor of human nature should find avowed ex-

pression: the presence of any surd or hidden determinant can be only a sign of defect and defeat. Philosophy must aim at completeness and remain open on all sides. A factor which is not reckoned with is bound to disturb the reckoning.

It is therefore not surprising to find that religion has, in fact, exercised a continuous and important influence on philosophic doctrine. It has been specially influential at the most vital point, upon the general conception of the world order which forms the framework of the whole. From the earliest times the philosopher has felt it incumbent on him to give some philosophical definition to the notion of God and the divine. The term to be defined is borrowed, of course, from the language of religion; but, as treated by the philosopher, it acquires a curious unreality from his reluctance to draw any content for it from religious experience. A philosopher might as well, one would think, seek to define will without reference to action, or art in abstraction from artistic products and production. A religious reader who searches the writings of the philosophers for light on the conception of God is apt, in consequence, to be baffled and disappointed. He sees no evidence that the Being of whom the philosopher writes is the same Being to whom he prays and in whose providence he trusts. The philosophic reader, on the other hand, is equally baffled. He finds the path of the argument crossed by a concept which is not fully in the power of the argument, but rises richly equipped from some unavowed source with attributes, like omnipotence and omniscience, which must apparently be taken on trust.

The concepts with which the philosopher is accustomed to deal are mostly of one of three kinds. There are those, like tables and chairs and the common animal, vegetable, and mineral classes, which have their assured and familiar place in the world of common sense. They are the known and trusted signposts of man's practical life, in which, as such, the philo-

sopher has no great interest and with which he would not venture to take any great liberties. Then there are others, like triangle and circle, atom and electron, neurone and synapse, which have their place no less firmly established and much more carefully defined in some recognized department of knowledge as the tried and accepted tools of inquiry within a given field. With these, again, he is not free to take liberties. If the philosopher uses them at all, he must use them according to the established convention of the inquiry to which they belong. If he questions or criticizes them it is as an expert in that inquiry, not as a philosopher. Finally, there are those which belong to philosophy itself, and in dealing with these the philosopher claims his freedom to reshape and re-define according to the needs of his argument. Such are the ultimate categories of thought in its various departments, and terms, like individuality or reality itself, which by their very nature override the boundaries of departments and pervade them all.

Now, the conception of God, as it figures in philosophy, is apt to oscillate uncomfortably between these classes. It owes its place in our vocabulary to the pious usage and belief of countless generations; it has received a kind of definition in creeds and theologies; and at times at least in many philosophies it seems to become a purely philosophic conception with which the philosopher may deal as he pleases. The substitution for the term "God" of some term invented by philosophers, such as the Unconditioned or the Absolute, relieves but does not remove the difficulty. In this way the associations of a familiar word are avoided, and this is, no doubt, a gain so far as these are irrelevant and tend to arouse illegitimate expectations. But if the new term is felt to be a mere substitute for the old, and if the metaphysical conception for which it stands in its philosophic context is really of religious origin, the gain is at bottom unreal.

The precise nature and direction of the influence

which religious belief has exercised upon philosophical thought must obviously be difficult to define. But it seems reasonable to suppose that in general the religious spirit has been continuously influential in support of an interpretation of experience different from what the spirit of scientific analysis or of historical research, if these had developed without it, would have encouraged. The conception of an eternal world order, of which the temporal series is in some sense the expression or manifestation, is one foreign equally to science and to history; and its persistence in philosophy must be connected with man's belief in the divine. A certain other-worldliness has always been implicit in the religious spirit, an emphasis on the unseen as against the seen, an assertion of the impossibility of finding a true centre for life or thought by the mere scrutiny of the evidence of the senses or by the most far-sighted handling of the practical problem in the light of future probabilities. Plato's powerful advocacy of the view that knowledge and happiness depend on finding a firm anchorage for thought and conduct beyond time and change was deeply influenced by the religious spirit of his time and has appealed profoundly to the religious spirit of later times.

In the field of metaphysics such ideas must meet and settle their account with other ideas drawn from other sources; and especially with ideas drawn from the two fields mentioned above, science and history, the fields of inquiry most intensively and most successfully cultivated in the nineteenth century. It was a characteristic expression of the results for a certain section of nineteenth-century thought when Auguste Comte and his positivist followers asked that the development of civilization should be conceived in terms of their law of the Three Stages. First came the theological stage in which men personified the controlling forces as gods; then the metaphysical, in which they substituted for personal gods such conceptual abstractions as the Love and Hate of Empedocles or

the eternal forms of Plato. Finally, thought becomes positive, accepting the scientific method by which experience is made its own test. A religion of humanity in this last stage will enable men still to satisfy the religious impulse without passing beyond the limits of experience. What is worshipped is the "Great Being," the collective achievement of men, what man is and what man is still to be, as presaged or exemplified in a Socrates, a Moses, a Jesus, and the other great prophets and benefactors of the race. The thought of anything perfect, complete, or absolute is thus to be put aside as a childish thing. Philosophy can provide no pole-star, no unshakable basis of calculation; all is relative. Comparing one thing with another and distinguishing better from worse, we can hope to see and work our way to a better still. The direction already followed gives the clue to the direction to be pursued. Science and history have the last word.

This conflict of ideas finds its most general expression in the various attitudes taken by philosophers to the question of the reality of Time. If experience is to provide its own explanation, space and time will be the framework of reality; and if space and time are taken as thus ultimate, every absolute seems to be put beyond man's reach. The most that thought can hope for is to extend ever farther its conquests into the illimitable past and so to meet with increased assurance the impenetrable future, and by means of evermore subtle analysis of the immediately presented to conjecture with increasing precision the nature of the infinite expanses of space which surround it on every side. The historical series as outlined by astronomy, geology, and biology, and as presented in greater detail for a few thousand years by history proper, is only an extract, and an extract from a process without beginning or end. It is not the part of a whole, from which one might hope conceivably to reconstruct in thought the whole to which it belongs. There is no

whole, and the thought of one is just the dream of an absolute which has to be surrendered. But such a theory has in the end to fall back into relativity or scepticism. It cannot consistently speak of ultimates or of reality. If it asserts that space and time are the framework of reality, it is in danger of erecting space and time—or, in the term now fashionable, space-time—into an absolute, an offence aggravated by the inability of space-time to prove its own absoluteness by ordering all else within itself. It cannot even consistently say that space-time is ultimate for us, that man can interpret experience in no other terms; it can at most say that the thought of the time appears to be thus limited. But that is to deny the fact or the present possibility of a metaphysic; it is to substitute a world sequence which cannot be reduced to a world series for a world order.

The opposition to such relativity and positivism, the belief in an absolute which is a discoverable timeless world order, has been a chief inspiration of philosophy from the earliest times, and it has been largely nourished and sustained by the religious spirit. Religion has nourished equally the opposition in the field of ethics to the doctrines of hedonism and utilitarianism, which are the positivistic interpretations of conduct. There have, of course, been religious men who have been hedonists and utilitarians; equally, there have been anti-hedonists and anti-utilitarians who would not have called themselves religious. There have been, and are still at the present day, thinkers who seek to reconcile an absolutist philosophy with the reality of time. But in the main the general idealist tradition refuses to accept space and time as ultimate and seeks to expound a timeless world order. It would interpret human experience in terms of a whole or system. In so doing it may be said, however little direct connection it may have with religious teaching or practice, to draw its appeal largely from that source.

CHAPTER VII

VALUE

ATTEMPTS have been frequently made in recent times to group together several of the problems which we have passed in review, with others which we have not treated or merely alluded to in passing, under the notion of Value, and to demand of philosophy, as at least an important part of its task, a Theory of Value. This appears to be a growing tendency, and in its most extreme form it claims Value as the special and peculiar object of philosophical thinking and therefore presumably as the organizing principle of reality.

"Every art," says Aristotle, "and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." This is the sentence with which Aristotle begins his treatment of ethical and political questions. In his *Ethics* and *Politics* Aristotle is defining a good man, a good citizen, and a good city, and discussing the conditions on which their existence depends. Similarly, when he turns to poetry in the *Poetics*, he describes his aim at the outset as that of determining the function of the various kinds of poetry and the conditions, in respect of structure and composition, on which the existence of good poetry depends. In such cases good and, with good, ought enter as fundamental factors into the discussion. There is an activity with its characteristic aim, ultimate for anyone engaged in the activity and justifying the detail of it, and ought arises so far as the conditions of achievement can be defined. Each activity has its own good, and in terms of that good defines its own obligations. Is there a general good at which, perhaps somewhat obscurely or unconsciously, all activities aim, or must each activity retain its autonomy? The statement from which we

started suggests that there is; and Aristotle's master, Plato, when he called the sovereign principle of reality the Form of the Good, would seem to assert that good and ought are needed, not merely to unify human activities, but to make sense of the world. A good is what has value in itself and bestows value on other things: its recognition generates an ought. We seem to come near to Wordsworth's apostrophe to Duty:

"Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh
and strong."

The method of approach through the notion of good, as something to be achieved and maintained, tends to set the problem in all these cases as one of defining an ideal. The materials out of which the ideal is to be constructed are, no doubt, in a sense to be sought within the actual. Logic does not set out to make men logical for the first time; and the ideal state is not free improvisation. The ideal will be presented as something which, once formulated, is seen to have been struggling all the time for expression in the actual; and the best proof that it is correctly formulated will be its promise of removing the chief defects of existing examples while preserving or enhancing their characteristic merits. It was in some such sense as this that Plato and Aristotle understood their own attempts to construct an ideal city. Now, assuming that there is a real unity in these various human activities, the general problem to which they all contribute will be, in the widest sense of the word, a practical problem. It will be that of defining the order and structure of a life in which each finds its due place.

Such considerations point towards a development which did not actually take shape in the ancient world, but has been promised, if not satisfactorily achieved, by some modern writers. There are specific values attaching to conduct which are distinct from

any others, and with these it is the special task of ethics to deal. But since every life must include some relation to other values than these, ethics would appear to require for its completion an inquiry of wider scope, a general theory of values, an axiology, as it is sometimes called, which will not merely bring the different forms of value into relation to one another, but also investigate their metaphysical foundations. A prominent place in this connection is often given to religion, sometimes as co-ordinate with these other activities, as revealing a distinctive good and value comparable with the values of art and conduct, more often, perhaps, as an activity of a different or higher order in which all human values find confirmation by their reference to a ground beyond experience. The simple, practical conception, however, which we have been following out is inadequate to explain modern theories of value. The whole intellectual situation has profoundly altered, and it is necessary to take other factors into account.

Here, as always in comparing modern with ancient ideas, it is necessary to remember the triumphant progress of modern science and the almost irresistible authority of its decrees. An occasional philosopher may question and dispute; but in general science is taken as giving us the facts, as telling us what the world is. Art and morality and religion, so far as they tell us something else, are telling us what the world is not, but might be; an ideal, if you like—that is, what we should like it to be. That the world often shows itself callous to human suffering and inhospitable to human ideals is no modern discovery; but in ancient times the belief could still be held that man was the favourite child of Nature and that this earth was the centre of the whole. Copernican and Darwinian revolutions have changed all that.

Science now shows us man as the precarious and accidental tenant of an infinitesimal estate. As to the inhospitality of Nature to his dreams and aspirations,

modern literature is full of declamations, bitter, pathetic, or resigned, upon this theme. From the philosophers we have, for example, J. S. Mill's essay on "Nature" in his *Three Essays on Religion*, and, more recently, Mr. Bertrand Russell's *The Free Man's Worship*. To Mill Nature, that is the world as science reveals it, is an enemy with whom man is perpetually at war; to Mr. Russell it is omnipotent matter, "blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction," a field of irresistible forces which "tolerate for a moment" man's vagaries. The sting is that this world is one to which thought and consciousness, if they make any contribution at all, make one that is small beyond reckoning, and in which the things that stimulate the human mind to ardours and endurances have, in their own right, no place at all. Thus the problem is, beside the "fact" to find a place for value. And here comes in religion, with its assurance that matter is not omnipotent, that life is no mere accident, and that, however vast the world may be, its government is not indifferent to the aspirations of the least thing in it.

In reference to this modern conflict we may usefully consider briefly two points: (1) The possibility of a general theory of value; (2) the claim that value is the clue to the nature of reality.

A general theory of value has to begin by determining what the values are. In order to simplify the question and avoid difficulties, let us take as the typical (though not necessarily the sole) values the trio: truth, goodness, beauty. These are the values characteristic of the three spheres: the theoretical, the practical, and the æsthetic, respectively. What promise, we may ask, is there of an advance in the understanding of each of these when we bring them together by means of the more general term, value?

We may note that the bringing of them thus together is not an uncontroversial operation. In particular the co-ordination of truth with goodness and

beauty is questioned. The true statement, it will be said, is a statement of fact, which is objective, no personal or subjective affair like our reaction to poetry or natural beauty. Whatever may be thought to be the correct answer to such an objection, it will be seen that the very existence of the objection is a refutation of the view that the introduction of the term "value" is nothing more than a verbal complication. Clearly, to bring them together is at least to invite comparison between them. Such comparisons may well be highly suggestive, revealing perhaps a feature in one sphere which might well have escaped observation altogether unless an analogy from another sphere had brought it to light, or forcing common sense out of its prejudices, especially out of those created by its constant tendency to exaggerate differences and over-emphasize the practically significant. But mere likeness, with the possibility of fruitful analogies, is not enough. If a real advance is to come from bringing these things together, there must be a genuine unity underlying their differences, which a theory of value will detect and expound.

It is open to doubt whether the notion of value will bear the weight which thus falls on it. Values are often said to be qualities; and sometimes philosophers, having discriminated primary and secondary qualities, call them tertiary qualities. Now the ground of a quality, where it is truly attributed, is found in the nature of the thing which possesses it. It would seem, then, that the unity underlying these different values can only be exhibited by exhibiting the underlying unity of the different things which have them. What, then, is it that is true, or good, or beautiful? A statement is true, an act is good, a natural object or a work of art (these possibly in rather different senses) is beautiful. These are not the only applications of the terms. True is also applied to facts and to reality. Philosophers have maintained that only pleasure is strictly good; and poets have claimed the identity of

beauty with truth. But let us suppose that these are the standard or fundamental references from which the others are derivatives or deviations. It is, then, the unity of these valuable things, if we are right, that has to be shown. It seems plain that we may consider statements, acts, works of art, as long as we please—in themselves and in comparison with one another—and never get beyond the structure of each and, as the result of comparison, certain analogies between them, until we regard them as expressions of the human spirit, when at once we open the prospect of seeing their unity in their common ground.

We are thus brought back to the philosophy of mind. And when the question is transferred to this field, we begin to ask whether, in the last resort, what is valued is not always fundamentally an activity of mind. Certainly in all these cases there is involved a reference to the not-self. Truth is discovered when the true statement is made; the good act derives its meaning from its causal efficacy on a given situation; the work of art in which beauty is found stands there for all to see. Some say that the value, this so-called tertiary quality, is neither in the thing said to be valued nor in the mind which attributes value to it, but is a relation between the two. But, if so, it is surely a one-sided relation, involving for the mind activity and effort; and the significance of the statement or work of art is as a record of such effort and an occasion for its repetition. We suspect, then, that values are not merely *for* a mind, but also *of* a mind, as pertaining to it, their recognition in various forms being at bottom nothing but the self-affirmation of self-conscious mind in its fruitful activity.

The relation of the various forms of spiritual activity to one another is an interesting and important question; and here there is a certain danger in the introduction of the term "value" in so far as it tempts us to force upon the operations of mind in these various fields a symmetry which the facts do not

warrant. This may be due to a logical prejudice, based on traditional notions of genus and species and their relation. But, in any case, the danger is much diminished when the notion of value is subordinated to that of mind, and the concrete unity of mind is substituted as the field of investigation for the abstraction of value. We conclude, then, on this first question of the possibility of a general theory of value, that if it is possible, it is possible within a theory of mind; in any other context we question its ability to make good.

We now turn to the second question—the claim that value is the clue to the nature of reality. This claim may be so presented as to seem merely a groundless optimism. In experience the values are everywhere faced with their opposites, the disvalues or unvalues; truth is at war with falsehood, good with evil, beauty with ugliness. The realization of truth or good or beauty is felt as a victory over the enemy in a warfare that has no conceivable end. Thus the enemy seems to be assured a permanent place in the scheme of things. So Socrates says in Plato's *Theætetus*—"Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something that is antagonistic to good. . . . Of necessity, they haunt this mortal nature and this earthly sphere." According as we are pessimists or optimists we shall believe that the one or the other has the upper hand in this secular conflict. To assert that the values are the clue to reality is to go far beyond such relative optimism as this. It is to deny in some sense the very existence of the enemy; to assert that only the good, the valuable, is real. The very same passage in the *Theætetus* suggests some such view, when Socrates says that evils "have no place among the gods in heaven," and that it is possible for men to escape from earth to heaven, and by holiness, justice, and wisdom to "become like God." To say that reality has no room but for what is true and good and beautiful—what is

this, it will be asked, but the arbitrary substantiation of our desires, the reiteration in the face of all the evidence of an "it *must* be so"? The obvious retort is that, however precious these things may be, they are not thereby proved more real than anything else, and that those who aim at knowledge prefer fact undiluted, not distorted for their comfort or edification.

But this interpretation depends on keeping to the common-sense scheme with its framework of space-time. Within that scheme values remain demands and desires, at war with the facts. The most that can be done for them is to give them their place in the historical scheme, to show them as products of evolution, and possibly to demonstrate their solidity as falling on the central line of development and pointing the way to further advance. Such demonstrations, however, will never give us value as the clue to reality. They will at most assure us that where the values are realized we have *pro tanto* a more solid, durable, effective existent than where they are not. If value is to become the central metaphysical conception, its opposition to fact must be broken down; existence, as these writers sometimes say, must be placed among the values, and the empirical order must be viewed as the partial and fragmentary manifestation of an eternal order on which it depends. If the empirical order is retained as ultimate, one can only hope to find a place in existence for values; if its ultimateness is denied, then it may be possible to order empirical existents under the notion of value in a timeless reality. It seems that the general line of argument must be something like this. The general conception of an eternal order being established by the inability of experience to satisfy without its aid those conditions of intelligibility on which the mind insists, it will be argued that the only legitimate ground for ascribing any positive character to that eternal order is the nature of truth, goodness, beauty—of the supreme values apprehended

in finite human experience. In actual human experience, no doubt, these are only fitfully revealed, mixed with defect, and in conflict with their opposites. That is not denied. It is not asserted that in "this earthly sphere" the good reigns supreme and unopposed, nor even that its increased predominance over evil is assured. But it is asserted that this is not the last word; that ultimately what is is good; and that, while knowledge may be possible after a fashion on other terms, to understand the world would be to see it as good.

A philosophy developed on some such lines as this could claim a long and imposing ancestry; and, indeed, some of the theorists of value almost boast that nothing is new in their theories but the word, and that in substance they are merely expounding afresh the burden of the great central philosophical tradition. Again, a doubt arises whether the new term has any important advantages. Croce has suggested that philosophy has only taken refuge in values because the empiric has been allowed illegitimately to usurp for his own classificatory abstractions terms like "fact" and "actuality," much as an honest man might be led to change his name by reason of the disgraceful behaviour of a member of his family. It is high time, he thinks, that philosophy claimed its rights and took for its own the solid ground of fact instead of contenting itself, whether out of pride or modesty, with "airy values." The protest is not without its justification. But a man may also change his name to prevent awkward confusion of identity; and empirical truth in its place is entitled to every respect. So that if the new name is a suitable one, the change may be welcomed. A suspicion of evasiveness, however, still clings to a change of name, whatever its justification. The difficulty may be illustrated by the promised reduction of existence to value; and this will give us the opportunity of asserting once more the main point for which we are here concerned.

Existence, we are told, is to be reduced to value or shown to involve valuation. This thesis, as it stands, might cover an attempt to confound the practical and theoretical interests by asserting, *e.g.*, that the true is the useful. But that means the end of truth. Assuming, then, the autonomy of the theoretic interest, as directed to its own specific object, truth, we shall expect to find it maintained that when we perceive and interpret our perceptions, thus acquainting ourselves with the existent, we are not merely, as we are apt to think, registering a given; we are achieving a special value—viz., truth—in a mental activity as free as that in which we appreciate the features of a poem or a play. So far, so good. We have an intelligible protest against the view that reality is something stretched out before the mind in space and time, and merely recorded by it—a protest akin to Kant's protest against the view that mind had to conform to objects. But what follows from the point of view of value-metaphysics? Philosophy is a theoretical adventure. It is out for truth, and will not accept beauty or goodness instead. We may remind ourselves, of course, that things beautiful and good exist and are open to inspection, and also that for many philosophers existence is only a restricted mode of being, which may be distinguished from validity or subsistence within the total reality. But truth is not truth except so far as its attainment means understanding reality, and all distinctions necessary to that understanding must fall within its scope. Beauty and goodness must be known if they are to contribute to metaphysics; and by some doctrine of degrees of truth and reality the different orders of being must be finally brought to the unity which thought demands.

This brings us to our last point. It does not seem possible to find solid ground for such a metaphysic except in mind or spirit. A reality in which value is fundamental must be a spiritual reality.

CHAPTER VIII

REALISM

As fact is opposed to value, so real is opposed to ideal and realism to idealism. The modern movement called realism is primarily a movement of revolt against those general philosophical developments which it has been the chief aim of the preceding sections to make intelligible. Their tendency was towards the conception of philosophy as the attempt to exhibit a timeless spiritual system, its departments corresponding to the different facets of man's spiritual life, each investigated for the light it might throw on the nature of this system. This may be called generally the idealist tradition. It is met by its opposite in realism.

The negative emphasis can hardly be escaped if we try to seize the meaning of the term Realism itself. Idealism is readily interpreted as involving the assertion that reality is in some sense ideal. But clearly there are not two parties in philosophy, one of which maintains that reality is ideal and the other that it is real. Real must have a more restricted reference, determined by the controversy in which it occurs. The name "realism" was first applied to the view that universals have a reality independent of the individual things which exemplify them, as opposed to the nominalism which denied this. The question of dependence on a thinking mind entered into this controversy only as a secondary incident. The modern development brings mind into the forefront, and thus this question becomes primary, while the question of the status of universals has become a secondary issue. Realism now asserts a reality independent of mind, as opposed to the doctrine which views reality as mind-dependent or identifies mind and reality. Obviously the general aim of a realistic, as of any other, philosopher will be to give an account, so far as may be, of

reality in its completeness; but the special feature of his account is not the assertion of a particular kind of non-mental reality, but the attempt to reduce mind to its proper subordinate place in the scheme of things.

From this general attitude important consequences follow. It will be convenient to exhibit these by reviewing shortly the main topics discussed in the preceding sections, keeping to the same order of treatment.

(I) *Nature*.—One would expect realism to tend towards naturalism. Resisting the pretensions of mind, it will necessarily exalt proportionately whatever is not mind, which is, traditionally, matter or body. The authoritative account of matter is to be found in physics and natural science. In exalting matter, then, it will exalt science. The relation of matter to mind has, of course, to be determined; and there are sciences, such as biology and physiology, which to some extent seek to determine it, on the general presumption that in the study of matter the conditions will be revealed on which the intermittent occurrence of mind depends. The realist will be inclined to derive his general idea of the framework of reality from the sciences, and to attempt to find for mind in this sense a place in Nature. Naturalism is commonly taken to stand for a view which regards Nature as ultimate and self-explaining, and resists the introduction of any supernatural element. The negative part of this, modified to suit the philosophical context, would be resistance to the conception of a timeless order on which the temporal is said to depend, or, positively, an acceptance of the spatio-temporal framework as metaphysically sufficient and satisfactory.

The realist conception of the relation of philosophy to science will differ widely from the view expressed at the end of our first section. Philosophy was there credited mainly with what might be described as a formal interest in the sciences, being occupied in finding for science its place in the life of the mind.

Realism offers the alternative of a material dependence on the sciences. Philosophy for it can have no other method but that of science, and no other object, except so far as the lack of restriction to any particular field constitutes a difference. Its task is to continue the work of science by probing in the scientific spirit questions which no single department can adequately handle.

(II) *Number*.—This means that realism will also tend towards empiricism, if empiricism is taken in a fairly generous sense. So much is assured by the acceptance of the space-time framework and by the general reliance on the work of the sciences. But the recognized importance of mathematics to science is a powerful influence against any tendency to sensationalism in a philosophy based upon science. The general empiricism of attitude finds its clearest expression in the controversy as to the nature of truth. Empirical truths are ascertained separately, and each stands, so to speak, on its own legs. I can assure myself that someone is in the room without knowing who he is, why he is there, where he came from or intends to go next. Doubt as to the answers to these questions does not infect with any uncertainty the observed fact that a man is in the room. Thus empirical knowledge can be built up piecemeal. The progress of science is organized on lines which presuppose a similar discreteness in the structure of truth. Discovery is added to discovery; workers far separated and largely ignorant of one another's work make their separate contributions; and so scientific truth is built up piecemeal. Consistency, of course, has to be secured and contradiction avoided. Occasionally the inconsistency of two apparently well attested observations will show that there is something wrong with one or other or both of them. But the primary and ruling test is that of the senses. Each such statement must show its own conformity with fact. Thus truth seems to consist in the accurate correspondence of ideas to facts.

Such a view of truth has found support at most times. But it has always been opposed to the metaphysical demand for a stricter unity in knowledge; and the internal test of coherence has been urged, as against the external test of correspondence, as the criterion of truth. This coherence theory is only the modern version of the demand for system which found expression earlier in Kant's saying that philosophy should think "nought done if aught remained to do," and Plato's assertion that nothing was known save in the light of the Form of Good.

(III) *Mind*.—It has already been explained that a main ground of the realist's opposition to idealism is resistance to the tendency to make mind the centre of philosophical discussion. One may regard the difference between the realist and the idealist on this side as the contrast between two opposed procedures, of which both may seem equally promising. The initial situation, from which both start, is a human mind perceiving, in samples or extracts, a world which includes itself. From this situation investigation may proceed along two lines. It may explore that which is perceived and reach out into all that is continuous with it, or it may explore the perceiving and its continuations and extensions in thought, imagination, and other mental activities. Each of these avenues seems promising, and along either, it seems, the whole story might ultimately be revealed. For the perceived world is regarded always—apart from some metaphysical paradox—as including minds: they have their place and function within it: and, therefore, by an analysis of the perceived, we may legitimately hope ultimately to make this place and function quite clear and precise. And, in a different sense, the perceivings and their continuations include whatever is not mind, since there can be no recognition of an existent which is not a perceiving or an act in continuation of perceiving. Of these two roads, the realist chooses the first, the idealist the second. To the realist, the philosophic

judgment is a direct continuation of the judgment of perception or common sense, which is occupied in assessing the object presented to it. To the idealist, the philosophic judgment requires a reversal or reflection of mind upon itself, so that, instead of just seeing a tree and asking what a tree is, it sees itself seeing a tree and asks what that object is or signifies. On the one view philosophy is the same in kind as science; on the other view it is different. Philosophy to the idealist is based on reflection in the sense which Locke gave to that word; it belongs to mind's self-consciousness; and this the realist denies. For him the only legitimate development of such reflection would be into psychology: it would be introspection, supplementing the evidence as to the nature of mind which external observation provided.

(IV) *Society*, and (V) *Conduct*.—It will be evident from what has already been said that the realist will attach much less importance than the idealist to political and ethical questions. These have their obvious place in a philosophy of mind. But mind, when it is reduced to its true dimensions as one among other natural objects, becomes the object of a science or a group of sciences, with which philosophy is in principle in the same relation as with physics or any other natural science. To these scientific analyses of mind the realist will be ready to assign in his synthesis a prominence corresponding to their place in the field of the sciences. But what degree of prominence will that be? What is the criterion of importance? Here we reach another polar opposition between the two schools.

It was a commonplace of classical Greek philosophy that the world was everywhere (so to speak) stratified after a certain fashion. The lower stratum supplies always the condition for the existence of the higher, and the higher supplies in return the condition for the understanding of the lower. The superiority of the higher strata may be determined, independently of

any direct qualitative judgment, by the mere fact that its existence presupposes the fulfilment of more complex conditions. It will naturally follow, in a world of experience co-ordinated by space and time, that the lowest stratum is to be found present everywhere, while the higher strata occur intermittently. A good example of this stratification is the soul, or principle of life, present in plants and equally, but in greater perfection, in man. The basis here is the continuous and unintermittent performance of certain organic functions on which life depends. On this basis is built in the animal world the more intermittent activities of sensation and desire, on which, again, in man are built activities still rarer and more intermittent than these—thought and will. Plato and Aristotle argued that the life-principle and, equally, the empirical world as a whole, is to be understood as the cradle or nurse of the highest that finds place in it. There was in their day a line of inquiry which took the opposite direction, which sought to exhibit the higher as the necessary resultant of arrangements or configurations of the lower. They maintained that this was no explanation; that it at least needed correction from the other point of view, and when so corrected would represent no more than a subordinate element in the total account; that the interpretation of the lower in terms of the higher was the road to philosophical understanding.

These two alternative modes of interpretation are still with us. The one, which starts from the lowest and simplest and most omnipresent, is the method of science; and will necessarily be that of a realistic philosophy so far as it continues the work of science; the other, which starts from the highest and empirically rarest, is characteristic of the idealist tradition. The pride of place, which falls on this view to mind, falls on the other to the atom or to some yet simpler and more pervasive entity, such as space-time. For the scientist, man lies a long way down the road, and

it may be centuries before he reaches him. So far as realism does concern itself with these matters, its tendency should be, for reasons already given, to lean to the sociological point of view, and, generally, to exhibit will in its dependence on instinct and desire, and political organization as a function of economic forces and individual self-maintenance.

(VI) *Religion*.—The realist cannot detach himself as easily or as completely from contact with religion as he can from ethics and politics. A fully developed sociology would presumably include religion in its scope as a social factor; and, besides that, a realist metaphysics would wish, like any other, to examine current theological constructions. In this last task realism is hampered by its general prepossessions. It is not that there is any necessary conflict between the realistic and the religious attitude; but rather that they have not enough in common to come into effective connection at all. If, one might say, it is a long way from the atom to man, it is an even longer way from the atom to God. But God has never been conceived, either by philosophers or by theologians, as to be reached by a mere prolongation to infinity of the evolutionary line which leads through man. The difficulty springs from the realist's adoption of the scientific attitude and method, which applies itself to the analysis of the perceived. There is no more reason to expect to find a substantiation or refutation of the belief in God by an analysis of the perceived than to expect to arrive in this way at a theory of poetry. In both of these cases the thinker requires to have had a certain type of experience—poetical or religious, as the case may be—and then, as an intelligent and self-conscious being, to submit this experience to intellectual analysis. What is wanted, in short, is a reflective judgment in the sense already explained.

(VII) *Values*.—There is not much to add to this when we turn to the field of values. Evidently the realist will have very little sympathy with value-meta-

physic. He will suspect this whole tendency of anthropomorphism, of consolation and edification. The realist will, however, enter this field, partly for controversial purposes, partly as feeling an obligation to give an account of what he finds in art or literature or some other part of it. When he does, it may be presumed that he will attempt to carry through, so far as possible, his thesis that in every reliable mental act some real thing is apprehended, which really has, even when no mind is in touch with it, the characteristics which the mind finds in it. Truth and beauty and goodness, he will argue, are not creatures of thought, nor dependent on mind for their existence. Reality includes in some sense true propositions, good things and states, beautiful objects, which the mind by properly directed effort may find in their truth, goodness, and beauty. In our discussion of values we suggested that these were, perhaps, ultimately not only *for* mind, but also *of* mind. The *for* a realist might, perhaps, accept; the secondary qualities already create an obstacle to asserting the object's complete independence of mind; but the *of* he would certainly deny. The ground of all true assertion is to be found in the thing perceived; and the thing perceived exists independently of the mind which perceives it.

It would be a pity to end with the differences of philosophers among themselves. I should like to make, in conclusion, some remarks about the place of philosophy in the economy of human life—remarks which hold, as I believe, of all genuine philosophic thought, to whatever date or school it may belong. Man is a creature of habit. His life and thought are deeply, perhaps increasingly, departmentalized. The tradition of philosophy represents the one serious and systematic effort by the power of thought to overcome these divisions, and so to loosen the chains which habit forges. The philosopher is thus the general custodian of human freedom. His faith is the trust-


worthiness of thought, and his weapon is a pertinacity in questioning, of which the activities of Socrates in the market-place of Athens are the prototype. Every claim to truth and insight must be submitted to unsparing and unprejudiced examination. He must go to all and speak to all in language that they can understand. He will go to the experts and show them the nature and limits of their expertise. He will go to the statesmen and show them a wider horizon than the choice of expedients and the conciliation of interests in which they live. He will convict experience of lack of knowledge, and knowledge of lack of experience. Sometimes he will be the champion of tradition against innovation, of common sense against the specialist, of "faith" against "reason"; but he will be thought usually a dangerous ally, one who may at any moment go over to the other side. His influence will be felt to be unsettling, for he is always showing that supposed certainties are by no means the certainties they are taken for, and reviving alternatives that sensible people have long ago decided to reject. He will be accused of parading a certain superiority and detachment, shading off into the arrogant perversity which insists on trimming the ship by always joining the minority, and makes him the friend of "every century but this and every country but his own." But, popular or unpopular, he will be at work all the time, if he is true to his name, in keeping the spirit of critical reflection alive over the whole field of human life and thought, and so helping to give man his freedom.

The freedom which man needs, and which thought alone makes possible, is freedom from his foreground. The present moment and its pressing needs, the things that are most clearly and most often seen, the familiar routine and the established authorities, the intellectual catchword of the day, the fashion in dress, books, pictures, plays—all this and much else make a foreground by which man is apt to be unduly dominated. They have a certain friendliness, even when obviously

open to criticism and improvement, and in general an air of rightness. It is only by a determined and persistent effort of thought that they can be seen in due proportion, with proper allowance for the effect of perspective; and the organization of this effort rests with the philosopher. But freedom from this and that is a negative which requires a positive ground. Hence all these ambitious attempts at systematic metaphysical construction. The philosopher will not merely free man from his foreground; he will also, if he can, make him free of the reality in which that foreground disappears or sinks into insignificance. A purely sceptical treatment, which merely shows the unsoundness of much that passes for true and certain, has never had much hold either on philosophers or on their public. Where the solvent of thought operates destructively, some compensating solid is rightly demanded and offered, even though it may fall far short of that rounded wholeness of which the more confident speculators dream. Even the most sceptical philosophy aims at making men more secure in the possession of their exiguous store of knowledge.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

THE reader is advised, if he wishes to continue the subject, to read and meditate the works of the great philosophers, which are readily accessible in the original and in translations. Especially, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. To fill in the background and the gaps in this great historical development he must have recourse to histories of philosophy and other secondary sources. Contemporary tendencies can best be appreciated by concentration on representative thinkers—*e.g.*, on Bradley, Bosanquet, or Croce as representing idealism; and for realism S. Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* gives the broadest and best foundation.



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