

Euthanasia : and other aspects of life and death / by Harry Roberts.

Contributors

Roberts, Harry, 1871-1946.

Publication/Creation

London : Constable & co., ltd, [1936]

Persistent URL

<https://wellcomecollection.org/works/s7sszg9b>

License and attribution

Conditions of use: it is possible this item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).



Wellcome Collection
183 Euston Road
London NW1 2BE UK
T +44 (0)20 7611 8722
E library@wellcomecollection.org
<https://wellcomecollection.org>


10



22500274360

Med
K40364

William



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2017 with funding from
Wellcome Library

<https://archive.org/details/b29816671>

EUTHANASIA
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LIFE
AND DEATH

THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION

by DR. BEN REITMAN.

With an Introduction by Harry Roberts.

THE ROAD TO BUENOS AYRES

by ALBERT LONDRES.

With an Introduction by Theodore Dreiser.

A ROOM IN BERLIN

by GUNTHER BIRKENFELD.

EUTHANASIA
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LIFE
AND DEATH

BY
HARRY ROBERTS

CONSTABLE & CO LTD
LONDON

1878561

PUBLISHED BY
Constable and Company Ltd.
LONDON

The Macmillan Company
of Canada, Limited
TORONTO

First published 1936

| | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| WELLCOME INSTITUTE LIBRARY | |
| Coll. | welviQmæc |
| Call | |
| No. | WM |
| | |
| | |
| | |

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| FOREWORD | vii |
| EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE : | |
| VOLUNTARY DEATH | 3 |
| THE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (LEGALISATION) BILL | 19 |
| THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE | 27 |
| LOVE AND SEX : | |
| SEX AND ÆSTHETICS | 35 |
| THE SEX OBSESSION | 50 |
| LOVE, MARRIAGE AND ECONOMICS | 57 |
| THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED | 65 |
| CRIME AND PUNISHMENT : | |
| THE CRIMINAL MIND | 75 |
| ALL SORTS OF LAW-BREAKERS | 83 |
| CRIME AND PUNISHMENT | 90 |
| THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER | 98 |
| MURDER AND THE PUBLIC MIND | 104 |
| PRISON | 110 |
| MIND AND REASON : | |
| SOCRATES : HIS SIGN | 121 |
| THE BORDERLINE | 128 |
| SIN : HOW MUCH DOES IT MATTER ? | 139 |
| NERVES AND NOMENCLATURE | 147 |
| SELF-EXPRESSION | 157 |
| THE DISEASE OF INDECISION | 164 |
| THE PROBLEM OF PAIN | 170 |
| FAITH AND THE DOCTOR | 175 |
| THE FACULTY OF SELF-DECEPTION | 183 |

CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| EDUCATION AND THE CHILD : | |
| A WORD FOR MR. SQUEERS | 193 |
| PHYSICAL ILLITERACY | 198 |
| CHARACTER IN THE MAKING | 207 |
| THE MIND OF THE CHILD | 214 |
| CRUELTY TO CHILDREN | 221 |
| SOCIOLOGY : | |
| STERILIZING THE INEFFECTIVE | 233 |
| CONSTITUTION AND IDIOSYNCRASY | 245 |
| THE AUTHOR AND SOCIETY | 250 |
| THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARCHITECTURE | 255 |
| THE NOBLE SAVAGE | 261 |
| THE CURSE OF ADAM | 268 |

FOREWORD

MUCH of the matter contained in this book has appeared at various times in *The Nation*, *The New Statesman*, *The Spectator*, the old *Saturday Review*, *The Week End Review*, the *Times Literary Supplement*, *The Author* and other papers. To the editors of all these periodicals I make due acknowledgement.

The essays were written from time to time in the intervals of non-literary work—medical and horticultural—and therefore are not necessarily sequential. But this at least can be said for them—that they express opinions based far more on personal experience and personal observation of ordinary people and ordinary worldly circumstances than on abstract theories or ethical conventions—orthodox or heterodox.

The trouble with many writers is that their human contact is almost entirely with other writers. The result is apt to be a sort of technical efficiency purchased at the price of earthly realities. Well, I can plead “not guilty” to that charge. I number writers among the dearest and the most interesting of my friends, but ninety-nine per cent of all the people with whom I have come into comparatively intimate relation have never been responsible for a line printed in book or newspaper.

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

VOLUNTARY DEATH

IN his Memoirs, Berlioz speaks of the death of his sister : “ from cancer of the breast, after six months of horrible suffering . . . And not a doctor dared have the humanity to put an end to this martyrdom by letting my sister inhale a bottle of chloroform. This is done to save a patient the pain of a surgical operation which lasts a quarter of a minute : but it is not done to deliver one from a torture lasting six months. . . . The most horrible thing in the world, for us living and sentient beings, is inexorable suffering ; and we must be barbarous or stupid, or both at once, not to use the sure and easy means now at our disposal to bring it to an end.”

Some time ago, in the course of an article, I referred to a letter I had just received from a patient of mine. It is so relevant that I do not hesitate to reprint it here :

“ Dear Dr. Roberts,—As I anticipated, I can no longer swallow milk. My poor starved bones are sore. I am so weak that I hope you will assure my wife that my life is now very short. I thank you for your kind attention, and I want to make one last request of you. I trust you will grant it. You know the torture I am in, and you know that in any case I can live but a very

short time. Will you save me from this painful death ? I am, yours gratefully, ——."

This letter speaks for itself. Every doctor who has been many years in practice must have again and again been confronted by an essentially similar request. What is his reaction ? It varies according to his emotional make-up. The degree of sympathy, of imagination, of courage, of law and convention abidingness—each helps to determine the course taken. It is one of the many dilemmas with which we are faced. The law of our country and the acknowledged code of our profession are in clear enough agreement. Our consciences are not always thereby set at rest. We are haunted by the reminder : "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you."

What are we doctors to do in these circumstances ? If we accede to our patient's wish, we are, as the law stands, guilty of the crime of murder. Consequently, it is often cowardice, rather than conscience or professional honour, that leads us to observe the established convention. I suspect, however, that very many doctors do, on occasion, allow their sympathy and their feeling of pity to override their prudence. To a humane man, the inclination to administer the merciful overdose is often almost—not infrequently, quite—irresistible.

In its administration, there is, however, more common sense in the English law than is generally recognized. Motive is very seriously taken into account both by judges and by juries.

In 1927, a man was tried for murder. His wife had died earlier in the year, suffering from tuberculosis and

VOLUNTARY DEATH

curvature of the spine. Of the five children left, one, a little girl four years old, contracted tuberculosis, and then developed gangrene in the face, after an attack of measles. The doctor expressed the opinion that the child could not possibly recover. The father—to quote the *Lancet* report—“nursed the child with devoted care,” but one morning, after sitting up all night with her, he could no longer bear to see her suffering. He drowned the child in the bath, and gave himself up to the police. The medical evidence was such as to enable the jury to turn a Nelsonian eye to the facts, and to return a verdict of “not guilty.” In the course of his summing up, Mr. Justice Branson said: “It is a matter which gives food for thought when one comes to consider that, had this poor child been an animal instead of a human being, so far from there being anything blameworthy in the man’s action in putting an end to its suffering, he would actually have been liable to punishment if he had not done so.”

We are all agreed about our duty to a mortally-wounded dog or cat lingering in a painful death-struggle. Law and conscience are here at one. Why these differences in the official conception of humanity and of duty? The issue can scarcely be that of the sacredness of life, or even of the peculiar sacredness of human life; for, through greed, fear, or motives of expediency, we subsidize professional soldiers and professional hangmen. The basic postulate is hard to come by.

It is not altogether safe to apply to inter-human relations the conventional moral code applicable to the lower animals. Most of us would not care to have

applied to us the accepted code of correctness even of the most humane man to his sheep or his oxen, or to the wild creatures of his woods.

Are we to regard human life, *per se*, as a sacred thing having a value and a significance not measurable entirely in terms of pains and pleasures? Whatever theories we may hold, such measurement is as far as we go in practice in our relations with wild and domestic animals. Is that to be the whole of our attitude to men and women?

Public attention has recently been drawn to this question of facilitating the voluntary death of those suffering from incurable and painful disease. So long ago as 1873, the Hon. Lionel Tollemache contributed to the *Fortnightly Review* an article, titled "A Cure for Incurables," in which he pleaded that the subject of voluntary euthanasia should be considered with an unprejudiced mind so that "reform" in some future age might be made possible. In 1907, Dr. C. E. Goddard read before the Willesden and District Medical Society a paper entitled "Suggestions in favour of terminating Absolutely Hopeless Cases of Injury or Disease." After describing a number of painful cases in which he considered a lethal dose the only sound prescription, Dr. Goddard went on to say: "I am satisfied of this, that when once it was recognized that it was lawful to accept the means of relief at all, it would be gratefully accepted by thousands of suffering creatures in the years to come as a God-given escape. I am sure that more than half the opposition will arise from cruel prejudice." Later, he added, "I am convinced that, if the operating surgeons were witnesses to the last sufferings of some of their

VOLUNTARY DEATH

patients, they would not ignore the subject in their many text-books."

But perhaps the most effective recent publicity work in connexion with Euthanasia has been performed by Dr. C. Killick Millard, of Leicester. In 1931, he delivered the Presidential Address to the Society of Medical Officers of Health ; and he chose as his subject, " A Plea for the Legalization of Voluntary Euthanasia." The address has been reprinted as a booklet, a number of expressions of opinion—favourable and unfavourable—being added as an Appendix. The possibilities of Euthanasia were recently discussed at the annual Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute ; and on December 10th, 1935, the inaugural meeting of a new organization, the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society, was held in London, with Lord Moyniham in the chair. Mr. C. J. Bond, F.R.C.S., Canon Harold Anson, Canon " Dick " Sheppard, the Rev. F. W. Norwood (President of the National Free Church Council), the Rev. W. R. Inge, the Dean of St. Paul's, Lord Ponsonby, Miss Eleanor Rathbone, and other representatives of the Church, of politics, and of medicine, gave the Society their blessing.

So far as its defined objects go, most informed people outside the Catholic Church will be in general sympathy with the new Society ; but lovers of personal liberty may feel some of that suspicion which proved so well justified when the Eugenics movement was at its most enthusiastic height.

In the course of the discussion at the Royal Sanitary Institute Congress, two distinguished doctors urged the desirability of legalizing the painless destruction of

“human mental monstrosities” in whom improvement is unattainable; and at the inaugural meeting of the Euthanasia Legalisation Society, the Chairman of the Executive Committee said that “they were concerned to-day only with voluntary euthanasia; but, as public opinion developed, and it became possible to form a truer estimate of the value of human life, further progress along preventive lines would be possible. . . . The population was an ageing one, with a larger relative proportion of elderly persons—individuals who had reached a degenerative stage of life. Thus the total amount of suffering and the number of useless lives must increase.” Well might Dr. Hawthorne, who at this meeting opposed the proposal, say that, “once asserted, the principle was likely to have extensions. It had already been hinted that pain would not be a necessary condition, uselessness would equally serve.”

We need to discriminate very carefully between facilitating the death of an individual at his own request and for his own relief, and the killing of an individual on the ground that, for the rest of us, such a course would be more economical or more agreeable than keeping him alive.

Often have I heard friends of patients of mine say: “It would be a mercy if he could be taken out of his misery”; the patient all the time lying in a state of doped contentment, free from pain or anxiety. It is extraordinarily easy for the average person to humbug himself in this way, and to make out a very good case for the painless extermination of some useless or objectionable individual—from an undesired baby to an out-

VOLUNTARY DEATH

worn grandparent. I find myself in considerable sympathy with some remarks made by Mr. Justice Goddard at the Central Criminal Court, where a young woman was being tried for murder because she had, on her own confession, given to her mother, suffering from general paralysis of the insane, a lethal dose of medinal. Having given adequate expression to the sympathy with the prisoner that her situation aroused, he stressed the great danger of accepting as an adequate plea: "I killed in mercy," or "I killed in pity." He went on to suggest that it might be wise to alter the existing law so "that the passing of a person afflicted with an incurable disease either in mind or body might be expedited. But, assuredly, if it ever were to become law that help in passing might be given to a person, it could be given only under the most rigorous safeguards, and not left to the uncontrolled discretion of a relative. Many sick persons might otherwise be put into unmerited danger." Quite apart from any more sinister motives, we ought, I think, to remember that a condition which is "painful to watch" is often not at all painful to experience. Epileptic fits affords an illustration of this.

To me, the case of congenital imbeciles, for example, is far less pathetic than is that of those born with terrible physical deformities, yet with minds sensitive to the opinions and feelings of others. It is doubtful if congenital idiots experience much mental distress; and they are at least as "humanly" intelligent as many of those animals which ladies of fashion delight to pamper.

The business of a doctor, as such, is to save life and to prolong it. It is not for him to say whether this or

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

that life is desirable ; nor is it the doctor's business to do what he is asked, even to please his patient. It is his province to study disease and to cure it if he can—at any rate, to relieve it. This is the beginning and the end of his duty.

As a human being and a citizen, a man may act as his judgment and conscience dictate ; and, if this involves breaking the law, he must be prepared to bear the penalty if he does so. It doesn't follow that the law is a bad one, or that he acted wrongly in breaking it. Laws are essentially general in their application, whether they are embodied in Acts of Parliament or professional codes. Laws are necessary because the average man, doctor or layman, is not mentally or morally competent to make his own laws. Exceptional people may wisely do exceptional things ; but they must pay the price of doing them.

After all, man is a social animal ; and a certain measure of individual freedom has to be sacrificed to pay for the advantages of herd life.

If assistance is, in certain circumstances, to be officially afforded to a suicide, we must make sure that the suicide is voluntary. The interests of a man and of his nearest relatives do not always coincide ; their real wishes even more rarely coincide. It is one thing to ease the death of someone we care for and for whom we are responsible, at his own request and for his own relief ; it is another, and a very different thing to kill him because that seems to be the most economical or, to the survivors, the most agreeable way of dealing with him.

Self-deception as to one's motives, what the psy-

VOLUNTARY DEATH

chologists call "rationalization," is one of the most powerful of man's self-protective mechanisms. It is an old observation of criminal psychologists that the day-dreamers and the rationalizers account for a very large proportion of the criminal population ; whilst, in murderers, this habit of self-deception is often carried to incredible lengths. In the course of a lecture before the Medico-Legal Society, early this year, Dr. Norwood East, one of H.M. Prison Commissioners, analysed the mental condition of 300 Broadmoor homicides. Of these, 62 suffered from melancholia ; and Dr. East said that, commonly, these melancholic demented were led to kill near relatives in the belief that death was in the best interests of the victim. He quoted the case of a man who killed his wife with this motive. Desiring to make her last moments happy, he bought a ring for £180, placed it on her finger, and then shot her through the heart.

Again, to refrain from condemning or criticizing suicide is one thing ; to provide facilities for it, and officially to recognize it, is quite another, and it is very difficult to draw the line.

If suicide is "right" in one case, why not in another ? Who is to say that the prospects are worse, or the suffering greater, of a patient with incurable cancer, than of one whose heart is broken, or from whom the possibility of satisfying the primal needs of his nature is absent ?

I remember, when I was twenty years old, thinking that middle age, to say nothing of old age, was so futile and contemptible a period of existence that if I

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

retained a particle of courage I would take good care never to illustrate its futility. But when I was forty I felt no more inclined to empty Lethe's cup than when I was in my teens. I don't doubt that when I am seventy I shall feel just as reluctant to end it all.

The philosophers and theorists are almost unanimous in their commendation of euthanasia, and in their abuse of the physicians who hesitate to hasten and facilitate the passing of their suffering patients. "I esteem it," said Bacon, "the office of a physician not only to restore the health, but to mitigate pain and dolours; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage"; and he quoted the epigram composed of Epicurus, who, "after his disease was judged desperate, drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught of wine"—and then *Stygias ebrius hausit aquas*. In this matter, men of action are more hesitant. Napoleon, who must have witnessed more painful and hideous deaths than any doctor, held that "*au fond il vaut toujours mieux souffrir; qu'un homme finisse sa destinee quelle qu'elle soit.*" We may credit him with a willingness to act up to his own creed. Doctors, on whom would fall most of the responsibility for administering the *coup de grace*, should euthanasia become general and legal, are perhaps the least enthusiastic advocates; not from lack of sympathy, but because they know better than does the public the sinister possibilities attendant on the giving of increased licence to the less-reputable members of their profession.

What, then, is the moral of it all? Strict Roman Catholics will, for the most part, probably share with

VOLUNTARY DEATH

Napoleon the conviction that each one of us must "dree his weird." Most of us take a less absolute view. But the slope that starts with contraception and proceeds through abortion to the painless slaughter of undesirables is a slippery one, of which we cannot see the bottom. In many parts of China, female infants are said to be exposed or otherwise destroyed at birth. They, also, are undesired.

Different as may be our individual judgments as to the expediency and justifiability of such deliberate interruptions of the ordinary course of Nature, it is obvious that there is between them all an essential connection. They all are based on the notion that human life is something of which we are entitled to dispose as we think expedient, a gift we are at all times free to return to its giver.

The proposals of the eugenists, who advocate the sterilization of those individuals whose mental or physical characteristics are considered socially undesirable, are based on the same fundamental idea as to man's place in the universal scheme.

The traditional Catholic view is that life is something with which we have been entrusted, for the proper use of which we are responsible ; a trust for which we must, in due course, give account.

It is no slight matter to substitute at short notice, for such an attitude, one of cold practicality and expediency. There is a plausibility about the conclusions of utilitarian common sense that makes one hesitate to accept them without critical contemplation.

The initiating and the terminating of individual life

are about the most serious steps that a man may take. If these things are to be judged solely by standards of convenience, comfort, and economic expediency, it is difficult to see what of sacredness remains.

Obviously, if we are going to legalize the killing of other people, from whatever motive, adequate precautions must be taken. And here comes in a new difficulty. By over-elaboration of safeguards, we can defeat the whole purpose of the suggested reform. We all realize the intensified horror attached to the death-penalty by its accompanying formalities—from the phraseology of the judge's sentence, and his black cap, to the weight-gauging visit of the hangman to the cell, and the correct attendance at the final scene of the surpliced chaplain, the doctor, and the prison governor. This is not irrelevant to the problem of legalized euthanasia. I put to myself this hypothetical situation. I am suffering from carcinoma of the throat. Certain operations have been performed; the possibilities of radium have been exploited; there is nothing more to be done. I will not harrow my readers' emotions by describing the inevitable natural sequence of events. If my doctor were my true friend, what would I wish him to do in the circumstances? I myself am in no doubt. I hope that he would, without a significant word or gesture, make that necessary modification in my medicine which would hasten the pace over a bad bit of going. That would be real euthanasia. My exit would not be quite such a happy one if, as suggested in the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill, drafted by the new society, I had first had to make an application stating to the appropriate

VOLUNTARY DEATH

authorities that I had been informed by two medical practitioners, whose certificates I enclosed, that I was suffering from an incurable disease and that my nearest relatives had been notified; my request being duly attested by a magistrate; if, further, my application had then to be submitted to an official "euthanasia referee," after whose approval seven days must elapse to allow time for appeal by a relative to a court of summary jurisdiction, which may then cancel the permit. Only practitioners who had been named for the purpose would be eligible to act as euthanizers, and the administration must take place in the presence of an official witness. I can almost hear the cheerful announcement: "Please, ma'am, the euthanizer's come." As Bacon said, by bestowing "too much cost upon Death" we make "it appear more fearfull." I append to this chapter a copy of the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill, as drafted.

I bring up these objections and difficulties, not because I am out of sympathy with the aims of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society; but because I think that the time-delay, limitations, and conditions suggested are such as to make the Bill promoted by the Society of narrow applicability, even if it became law.

To quote a correspondent of the *British Medical Journal*: "What practising doctor would accept the provisions of the Bill either for his patient or for himself? The proposed official arrangements would seem suitable for the cremation of a dead body—in fact, they distinctly resemble those of the Cremation Act. But for a sentient being in mortal agony, what a week

of suspense to prolong his misery ! And the doctor worried from the first by distracted relatives—it is they, in my experience, who make the suggestions—going from one official to another till all the forms and all the authorities are properly obeyed ; and then the ‘ finishing off,’ a gross term but appropriate, of one who has hitherto looked to him for succour. It does not bear thinking about. The doctor will be placed in a fearful dilemma—either he must conform to a usage abhorrent to him or he will be exposed to the insinuation that he is unwilling to lose a lucrative patient.”

We read in Montaigne that “ Cæsar, being demanded which was the death he most allowed, answered the least premeditated, and the shortest ” ; whilst “ a short death (saith Plinia) is the chief happe of humane life.” The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill will have to be simplified if it is to approximate to these ideals.

“ When a good physician can keep life no longer in, he makes a fair and easy passage for it to go out,” wrote Thomas Fuller in *The Holy State* ; and such should I think be regarded as his bounden duty (whatever the law may say) of every practising doctor. Personally, I would not hesitate painlessly to end the life of an acquiescent patient at an advanced stage of such a painful and incurable disorder as cancer of the larynx or œsophagus—regardless of convention or of formal legality. I constantly find myself in positions involving both personal responsibility and personal risk, with nothing but my own code and scale of values to guide me. When my sympathy outweighs my fear of, and my respect for, the law, I obey the orders of the former.

VOLUNTARY DEATH

But, pagan that I am, I often wonder if we do not attach undue value to earthly life. Are we not, perchance, allowing ourselves to be deceived by our self-preservative tendency to rationalize a merely instinctive urge ; and to attribute spiritual and ethical significance to phenomena appertaining to the realm of crude biological utility ?

Surely, far and away the simplest solution of the whole matter consists in the removal of the legal stigma of criminality from the act of suicide—in this respect making our law correspond with that of Scotland, in which country suicide is not a criminal offence. It is hard to believe that anyone intent on suicide and with resolution and means to carry it out is ever dissuaded from his purpose by reason of its illegality. It is not unilluminating that in England the annual number of suicides is seventy-nine per million of the population, whereas in Scotland the figure is forty-five per million.

Objections are raised to the legalization of suicide on various grounds both of political expediency and of religion. To-day, the principal opponent is the Catholic Church. It is impossible to “argue” with those motivated by a religious conviction which one does not oneself share. I will merely quote as a characteristic expression of the Catholic case this passage from an article published in the present year, 1936, in one of our daily papers, by a priest of that church, Father Owen Dudley. “By suicide,” he writes, “for which voluntary euthanasia is only another word, a man repudiates God’s supreme dominion over himself. Reason alone, leaving aside ‘theological barbarism,’ shows us that

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

God created man, body and soul, and that therefore man's life belongs to God.

"He is given that life for a divinely appointed end to be accomplished here on earth; the reward for his service in its accomplishment being eternal happiness.

"A suicide rejects that service, and turns traitor and moral coward, and he does so against his own dictates of right reason, even if suffering from a painful and incurable disease."

I must leave that exposition of doctrine to be answered by someone to whom it conveys meaning.

THE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (LEGALISATION) BILL

MEMORANDUM.

THE object of this Bill is to legalise under certain conditions the administration of Euthanasia to persons desiring it who are suffering from disease of a fatal and incurable character involving severe pain.



A
BILL
TO

Legalise under certain conditions the administration of Euthanasia to persons desiring it and who are suffering from disease of a fatal and incurable character involving severe pain.

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in the present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

1. Subject to the provisions of this Act it shall be lawful for a person to receive, and for a medical practitioner duly licensed for the purpose under this Act to administer euthanasia, that is to say, the termination of life by painless means for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary suffering, if permission has been granted for that purpose in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Euthanasia to be legal if permission granted.

2. The conditions upon which permission may be granted are as follows :— Conditions on which permission may be granted.

(1) The person desiring to receive euthanasia (in this Act referred to as the patient) must not be less than twenty-one years of age and must be suffering from a

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

disease involving severe pain and of an incurable and fatal character ;

(2) The patient must make application in writing in the form set out in the Schedule to this Act and must sign the application in the presence of two witnesses of whom one shall be an official witness ;

(3) Before making the application the applicant must have consulted his nearest relative and have to the best of his ability set his affairs in order ;

(4) The application must within seven days after the date on which it is signed be forwarded to a euthanasia referee appointed under this Act together with two medical certificates in the respective forms set out in the said Schedule of which one shall be signed by the medical practitioner in attendance on the patient and the other by a medical practitioner having such special qualifications as may be prescribed.

Appointment
of Euthanasia
Referees.

3. The Minister may appoint one or more persons to act as a referee or referees for the purposes of this Act and any person so appointed is in this Act referred to as a euthanasia referee.

Procedure of
administration
of Euthanasia.

4. (1) A euthanasia referee to whom an application for permission to receive euthanasia has been submitted shall before granting permission satisfy himself by means of a personal interview with the patient and otherwise that the said conditions have been fulfilled and that the patient fully understands the nature and purpose of the application.

(2) Permission to receive euthanasia shall not operate until the expiration of seven days from the date on which the euthanasia referee sends the permit to the patient and the referee shall on sending the permit notify the nearest relative of the patient that permission has been granted.

THE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA BILL

(3) Within three days after the receipt of such notice the nearest relative of the patient may apply to a court of summary jurisdiction by letter addressed to the clerk of the court alleging that one or more of the said conditions upon which permission may be granted has not been fulfilled, and the court, if satisfied that the allegations are well founded may cancel the permit.

(4) Upon receiving notice of the application the clerk of the court shall forthwith give notice thereof to the patient and to the practitioner by whom euthanasia is to be administered and upon such notice being given the operation of the permit shall be suspended pending the decision of the court.

(5) Every application under this section shall be heard in camera and the euthanasia referee by whom the permit was issued shall be notified by the clerk to the court of the time and place of the proceedings and shall be entitled to attend and be heard.

5. (1) Euthanasia shall not be administered by any person other than the medical practitioner named in the permit, and shall be administered in the presence of an official witness.

Euthanasia
to be
administered
by Practitioner
named in
Permit.

(2) For the purposes of section three of the Coroners Act, 1889, a person receiving euthanasia shall not be deemed to have died a violent or unnatural death.

6. (1) The Minister may make regulations :—

Power to
make
Regulations.

(a) For the issue, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, to medical practitioners of licences to administer euthanasia, the renewal and revocation of such licences ;

(b) Prescribing the duties of a euthanasia referee and the fees payable to him in respect of his services under the Act ;

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

(c) Prescribing the procedure to be followed in administering euthanasia ;

(d) Prescribing the form in which permission to administer is to be granted and the form of any notice or other document to be used under this Act ;

(e) Prescribing any other matter which under this Act is to be prescribed, other than the form of certificates to be prescribed under sub-section (2) of this section.

(2) Every certificate of cause of death required to be given under section twenty of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1894, shall, in the case of a person receiving euthanasia, be in such form as may be prescribed by the Registrar General, with the concurrence of the Minister, and shall be signed both by the practitioner administering euthanasia and by the official witness.

7. In this Act :—

Interpretation. The expression “ the Minister ” means the Minister of Health ;

The expression “ medical practitioner ” means duly qualified medical practitioner ;

The expression “ official witness ” means a witness who is a justice of the peace, a barrister at law, a solicitor, a medical practitioner, or a clergyman or other minister of religion ;

The expression “ nearest relative ” means in relation to a patient the husband or wife of the patient if living with the patient, or if there is no husband or wife so living, such other relative, if any, as is living with and has the actual charge of the patient.

Short Title. 8. This Act may be cited as the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Act, 193 .

THE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA BILL
SCHEDULE.

VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (LEGALISATION)
ACT, 193 .

Form of Application for Permission to Receive Euthanasia.
To the Euthanasia Referee.

I,, of,
hereby declare as follows :—

1. I am.....years of age and am suffering from a disease involving severe pain, which, as I am informed, is of an incurable and fatal character.
2. I have consulted my nearest relative and have to the best of my ability set my affairs in order.
3. I have requested..... of
(who is a medical practitioner holding a licence under the Act) to administer euthanasia, if permission is granted, and he has consented to act.
4. I am desirous of anticipating death by euthanasia and hereby make application for permission to receive euthanasia.

Signed in the presence of.....

Signature and qualifications of official witness.....

.....

Signature of second witness.....

Date.....

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

FORMS OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

(Form to be used by the Patient's Medical Attendant.)

VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (LEGALISATION) ACT, 193 .

To the Euthanasia Referee.

I,, of,
hereby certify as follows :—

*State name
of disease.

1. I have attended....., of.....
(in this certificate referred to as the patient) since.....
2. The patient is in my opinion suffering from*.....
and I am satisfied that his condition involves severe pain.
3. In my opinion the disease is of an incurable and fatal character.
4. I am satisfied that the patient fully understands the nature
and purpose of the application in support of which this
certificate is issued.

Signature.....

Medical Qualifications.....

Date.....

(Form of Confirmatory Medical Certificate to be used by the
second Practitioner.)

To the Euthanasia Referee.

I,, of,
having the qualifications prescribed under section two of the
Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Act, 193..., namely,
.....hereby certify as follows :—

*State name
of disease.

1. I examined, of
(in this certificate referred to as the patient) on the.....
day of.....
2. The patient is in my opinion suffering from*.....
and I am satisfied that his condition involves severe pain.
3. In my opinion the disease is of an incurable and fatal character.
4. I am satisfied that the patient fully understands the nature
and purpose of the application in support of which this
certificate is issued.

Signature.....

Date.....

THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE

IT has always seemed to me strange that in a country like ours, neither Catholic nor totalitarian, in which the doctrine of individual liberty is almost a fetish, the one thing of which a man is not at liberty to dispose is his own life. He can misspend his days as he will ; but, no matter what his condition of mind or of body, no matter how useless or how painful may be his continued existence, if he attempts to withdraw from a world in which he is so miserable and so burdensome a visitor, he is branded as a felon ; whilst those who assist him to escape are liable to be charged as murderers.

To-day, I doubt if our law in this matter corresponds with any appreciable section of public opinion outside the Catholic Church. Suicide is more common than ever before, and the general reaction of the public is one of pity and sympathy rather than of condemnation.

There are, of course, differences of opinion as to man's status in the universal scheme—with corresponding differences as to his duty to whatever gods there be—whether they are within him or without. Among the philosophers, Stoic, Epicurean and Platonic, of Athens and of Rome, these differences of opinion were even more marked than they are among us to-day.

The Platonists mostly held that man, having been

appointed to his post by God, must not abandon it until his superior calls upon him to do so. Pliny, on the other hand, instanced as evidence of the benevolence of Providence the natural herbs whereby man may secure a quick and painless escape from the miseries and difficulties of his life. In Rome, especially in the tyrannous days of the Empire, indifference to death and suicide became commonplace. Lecky quotes many impressive passages from Seneca. "To death alone it is due that life is not a punishment, that, erect beneath the frowns of fortune, I can preserve my mind unshaken and master of itself. I have one to whom I can appeal. I see before me the crosses of many forms . . . I see the rack and the scourge, and the instruments of torture adapted to every limb and to every nerve ; but I see also Death. She stands beyond my savage enemies, beyond my haughty fellow-countrymen. Slavery loses its bitterness when by a step I can pass to liberty. Against all the injuries of life, I have the refuge of death." "Wherever you look, there is the end of evils. You see that yawning precipice—there you may descend to liberty. You see that sea, that river, that well—liberty sits at the bottom. . . . Do you seek the way to freedom?—you may find it in every vein of your body." "If I can choose between a death of torture, and one that is simple and easy, why should I not select the latter? As I choose the ship in which I sail, and the house which I shall inhabit, so I will choose the death by which I will leave life. . . . In no matter more than in death should we act according to our desire. Depart from life as your impulse leads you, whether it

THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE

be by the sword, or the rope, or the poison creeping through the veins ; go your way and break the chains of slavery. Man should seek the approbation of others in his life ; his death concerns himself alone. That is the best which pleases him most. The eternal law has decreed nothing better than this, that life should have but one entrance and many exits. Why should I endure the agonies of disease, and the cruelties of human tyranny, when I can emancipate myself from all my torments, and shake off every bond ? For this reason, but for this alone, life is not an evil—that no one is obliged to live. The lot of man is happy, because no one continues wretched but by his fault. If life pleases you, live. If not, you have a right to return whence you came.” He who waits the excitements of old age, said Seneca, is not far removed from a coward, “as he who drains the flask to the very dregs is justly regarded as too much addicted to wine.”

As for himself, he said, “I will not relinquish old age, if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to shake my mind, if it destroys its faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life but breath, I will depart from the putrid or the tottering edifice. I will not escape by death from disease, so long as it may be healed, and leaves my mind unimpaired. I will not raise my hand against myself on account of pain, for so to die is to be conquered. But if I know that I must suffer without hope of relief, I will depart, not through fear of the pain itself, but because it prevents all for which I would live.”

“Above all things,” said Epictetus, “remember that

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

the door is open. Be not more timid than boys at play. As they, when they cease to take pleasure in their games, declare they will no longer play, so do you, when all things began to pall upon you, retire ; but, if you stay, do not complain."

Than these utterances, I know none more noble in the literature of philosophy or in that of religion. The deliberate and dignified suicides of classic antiquity almost ceased during the centuries dominated by the pathological ecclesiastic structure erected on the simple story and philosophy of the Gospels. In the eyes of the Church, suicide was a crime at least as heinous as murder. The only forms of suicide about which there seems to have been appreciable difference of opinion among the ecclesiastical luminaries were those arising out of the dilemma presented by the alternatives of sexual violation or death. In his *History of European Morals*, Lecky quotes several examples, collected from such books as the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius, and the *De Virginibus* of St. Ambrose. Outstanding is the story of St. Pelagia, a girl of only fifteen, who has been canonized by the Church, and who was warmly eulogized by St. Ambrose and St. Chrysostom. She, having been captured by the soldiery, and having obtained permission to retire to her room for the purpose of robing herself, mounted to the roof of the house, and flinging herself down, perished by the fall. Another story concerns the two beautiful daughters of a Christian lady of Antioch, named Domina. Being captured during the Diocletian persecution, and fearing the loss of their chastity, they agreed by one bold act to free them-

selves from the danger, and, casting themselves into a river by the way, mother and daughters sank unsullied in the wave. A third legend tells how the tyrant Maxientius was fascinated by the beauty of a Christian lady, the wife of the prefect of Rome. "Having sought in vain to elude his addresses, having been dragged from her house by the minions of the tyrant, the faithful wife obtained permission, before yielding to her master's embraces, to retire for a moment to her chamber, and she there, with true Roman courage, stabbed herself to the heart."


The influence of the Church became, however, more and more socially potent, during the later Middle Ages ; with the result that even such " virtuous " suicides as these increased in rarity. The philosophic school in France brought about a radical change in intelligent opinion ; but, according to Lecky, " even in 1749, in the full blaze of the philosophic movement, we find a suicide named Portier dragged through the streets of Paris with his face to the ground, hung from a gallows by his feet, and then thrown into the sewers."

To one who does not accept the dogmas of Catholicism, or share its beliefs, it is hard to follow the ethical and philosophic objections sometimes raised to the act of suicide. Obviously, according to codes which most of us accept as valid, to kill oneself in order to escape the liabilities which we have voluntarily incurred, or the responsibilities which we have deliberately undertaken, is both cowardly and dishonest. But of how many of us is it true that the world or any part of it would be the loser were we to end our citizenship of

EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE

it ? In my opinion, of very few. Anyway, it seems to me a problem for each person to decide for himself, if any problem is to be left for individual solution. It is well that we should look upon other people's lives as their most sacred and their most personal possession ; but I doubt if it is nobility of mind that drives us to attack such cosmic and sacred significance to our own.

LOVE AND SEX



SEX AND ÆSTHETICS

WHEN I was a small boy the subject of sex was, in my conventional home, neither discussed nor forbidden. What were assumed to be the facts were taken for granted; and the rare open lapses from respectability that occurred from time to time among neighbours or relatives were treated as mere social *faux pas*, much like bankruptcy. One got the impression that they gave everyone a lot of trouble and embarrassment. Any condemnation implied belonged rather to the realm of etiquette than of ethics. As I entered my teens, certain of my hitherto quiescent endocrine glands presumably began to function; and I found that Tennyson's lyrics and the touch of my cousin's hand had a new fascination. From Tennyson I moved on to Shelley. A strange tenderness developed in me.

I was, at an early age, familiar with the fundamental physiology of bisexual propagation; it seemed to me no more mysterious than the processes of digestion and assimilation, whereby bread and beefsteak are converted into nerves, muscles and energy. Being a country boy, I was interested in natural history. Not unnaturally, therefore, I was early attracted to the discussion then going on about the theories of Charles Darwin. I was given to understand that the strange emotions conveyed

by the lyric poets, and already familiar to me at first hand, had been created by Nature in order to bring about unconsciously a material result essential to her scheme. It may have been a kind of æsthetic snobbery, or the mere impulse to rebel against external authority, that was responsible for the prejudice that grew up in my mind against submitting to the urge of instinct. At school I could not help noticing that the boys to whom what is called sex physiology most appealed were among the least attractive and the least sensitive. When, later, with the help of Whitman, I had acquired a more balanced—shall we say, tolerant—view, I still found myself—as I still find myself—unable to look upon the appetitive phenomena of sex as having other than accidental relation to the emotional states I had come to regard as sacred.

Modern writers on sex questions devote a good deal of time to proving that sex relations which do not directly impinge on the liberty of others are no business of morality. But everything depends on what is meant by morality. Most of the so-called rationalists regard it as concerned only with interhuman relations and the promotion of social happiness. Those, on the other hand, who believe or suspect that life has a mystic significance and that even more important than the attitude of man to man is the attitude of man to himself, or to the all-pervading being of which he is a manifestation, assign to morality a far wider field. Science cannot judge between the two views ; it can merely state them. Law, of course, has no business with them.

It is not irrelevant to remark that the pioneers of the movement for the establishment of greater freedom in sex relations and sex manifestations have been activated, not by horror at the waste of sensual pleasure which the conventional taboos involve, but by horror at the relegation of the spontaneous and spiritual impulses of love to a position of subservience to convention and habit as the justifiable basis of physical sex relations.

Love is one of those few words that we can ill spare. Yet I am not sure that clear-thinking people with any sense of relative values will not have to relinquish it. It is idle to go on using a word which conveys utterly different meanings to different readers or hearers. For this confusion, the Freudian psychologists are largely responsible. When we are told that the baby's search for the mother's breast, the gastrophily of the glutton, and the coitive urge of the cave-man with his club, are all of a piece with the adoration of embodied ideal perfection which passes all understanding, and that love is the appropriate term for all of them, the fundamental purpose of language seems to have been lost. One of the great distinctions between primitive and civilized man is that the emotions of the latter are more complex and more consciously tinged with imagination. In nearly all men and women, it is true, the coitive urge is tempered with some measure of love; and it is equally true that love between the sexes is nearly always associated with some crudely instinctive impulse, however attenuated. But ever so frequent coincidence does not constitute identity. A sonnet of Shakespeare's or a lyric of Shelley's gives a truer and more informing

account of love than is given by the mere sense experiences of all the fornicators of the world.

Though so often and so freely discussed, problems of sex are perhaps the most difficult of all problems to approach in the unbiased manner which science demands. So intimately involved with sex are the roots of half the things which we look upon as the most valuable possessions of man that many people have come to regard its accidentals, no less than its essential values, as inviolable and sacred. It may be a little cowardly, but it is not spiritually or æsthetically despicable, that in this matter a policy of hush—of peace at any price—has been fostered by sensitive, as well as by merely timid, humanity. Whether desirable or not, however, this policy is no longer a practicable one. What with Freud and the cinema and the enfranchised women writers, the susceptible mind has to-day become sex-conscious to the point of obsession. Many of my otherwise sane-minded contemporaries, including not a few whose lives have yielded a generous share of the more agreeable and exciting emotions, seem filled with anxiety lest, after all, in their pursuit and enjoyment of what they have come to suspect to have been spiritual shadows, they have let slip by them many of those fleshly joys which they are now half persuaded are the realities that matter.

A few years ago Messrs. Unwin published a substantial volume called *Sex in Civilization*, to which many of our best-known writers on sociology and psychology contributed essays. The central doctrine of Mr. Havelock Ellis' editorial preface is that "pretence is the key

to modern civilization," and that "men's ideals are fictions, in which they do not sincerely believe." That modern man carries too heavy a load of make-believe is certainly true; but that all his ideals and aspirations are amiable lies is a ridiculous over-statement. Perhaps the wisest editorial observation is that "the failure of the Church to treat sex and natural impulse with dignity and candour is the largest single fact in that disintegration of personal codes which confronts us in these hectic times; the inevitable swing of the pendulum from concealment to exhibitionism, from reticence to publicity, from modesty to vulgarity." We may agree in regarding even these unpleasantnesses of the transition stage as essentially wholesome as well as unavoidable, "for all their crudity and grotesquerie." As Mr. Havelock Ellis expresses it, "it is perhaps better to make the mistakes of facing life than to make the mistakes of running away from life." Like so many others, the problem is humanly soluble only by wise compromise. To quote Ibsen: "Suppress individuality and you have no life; assert it, and you have war and chaos."

Amateur theorists—and on this question most theorists are painfully amateur—usually take it for granted that the secrecy, reticence, and even prudishness which still characterize the attitude of most civilized people to the physical implications of sex are fruits of civilization itself. But, as Mr. Ellis points out, sex *taboos* are "even more emphatic without than within civilization; and sex repressions, such as we sometimes fancy are unwholesome artificialities and better abolished, are in full working order in what we call a 'state of nature.'" Nor

would there seem to be any more substantial basis for the rival doctrine that the civilized attitude to sex is distinguished from that of the savage by its greater delicacy, finer sentiment, and increased spirituality. Among uncivilized tribes, as much as with ourselves, sex ramifies into such romance, poetry and religion as inform their universe. To quote Bryk : "The negro woman in Africa feels her sexual life just like the white woman." Mr. Ellis reminds us that it is only in so far as we are able to contemplate sex objectively and impersonally that we differ in this matter from the savage, from ourselves of yesterday, or, it may be added, from the bulk of our contemporaries to-day.

And here exactly is where so much current sex-talk is wrong-headed and philosophically unsound. It is useful—indeed, almost necessary—for the ophthalmic surgeon to contemplate the eye not only as part of a living organism but also as a detached semi-mechanical object. In like manner is explained and justified the physicist's study of the electron, the quantum, and such other fragments of symbolic reality as the ingenuity of the human mind can momentarily detach from the universal flow. Mr. Havelock Ellis can safely consider and discuss "sex" in the same detached "scientific" spirit as that in which the physicist discusses his mythical entities. But ninety-nine per cent of the people who join in the discussion are not competent to handle the symbolic scalpel or to interpret its findings. In the dissecting-room the surgeon familiarizes himself with useful facts relevant to his craft ; but it is not there that he attains to knowledge of the nature of man.

The simplest savage knows more of this than all the laboratories of the world could teach the wisest of us. This is not to underrate the enormous value and importance of science ; but to point out that the method of science, applied by those who do not realize its inherent limitations and fundamental artificiality, leads to inevitable error. The sex-faddist is as ridiculous an object as the food-faddist, and is apt to be far more offensive to the æsthetic intelligence of sensitive neighbours.

Self-appointed reformers of social customs and accepted standards, while realizing the extent to which man's supremacy is due to his heritage of ever accumulating scientific and technical knowledge, are apt to overlook the parallel fact, that social morality is in no greater measure dependent on inherent instinct and self-trained impulse. In spite of legend, neither Rome nor the League of Nations was founded by wolf-nurtured architects and moralists. As Dr. McDougall, in an admirable and entertaining essay, tells us, it is only those subtly acquired moral sentiments which manifest themselves as sense of good form, reverence for *taboos*, or emotional repugnance, which keep nine-tenths of us away from dangerous perversions, against which average unaided reason raises no barrier. Infinity may afford an admirable environment for gods and demiurges ; but æsthetic and spiritual man can only function within limitations and under restraint. If there be a particle of truth—as there certainly is—in the suggestion that most of the peculiar achievements of man, material as well as psychic, are intimately connected with sublimations of an impulse which has manifest associations with sex, then we may

take it as certain that it is largely to the influence of restraining sentiments and *taboos* on sex expression that we owe the noblest creations of our race.

A lot of rubbish is uttered about the danger of curbing our instincts and of restraining the expression of our sensual impulses. But in our worship of the outer aspects of freedom we may easily lose that greater liberty which marks the highest life of man. Sex is not a mere matter of procreation or of recreation ; and, so long as it is discussed solely or mainly in terms of either of these ends, its real human significance will be misinterpreted and misunderstood.

Commonly there is confusion both in language and in thought between our blind appetites and the emotions which sometimes suffuse them. Love and the coitive impulse have nothing in common but their frequent coincidence. If, for convenience, we personify—as, whatever our theories, we all do in practice—the cosmic forces which we neither understand nor control, we may put it that Nature utilizes the most apt of our emotions for the strengthening of the more important of our biological reflexes. Every bisexual animal must, if it is to survive, have an impulse, however unconscious, periodically to copulate. As we rise in the divine scale, rival appeals and attractions inevitably tend to diminish the potency of blind impulses. Of the subtler or more complicated species, only those whose unconscious instincts are reinforced by emotional appeals proportionate to their stage of development are likely, in this keenly competitive world, to persist. Great as is the contribution of Freud to modern thought,

much of his potential service is modified by the hopeless confusion in the minds of both himself and his followers between the copulative urge and the emotions of love. In final analysis, does the love associated with the coitive urge differ from the love which often suffuses both the protective instinct of the mother and the herd instinct which lies at the base of comradeship? Of course, the blends of love with these several urges or appetites differ enormously, but the difference, it is suggested, is due only to the difference in one of the ingredients. There is good reason for suspecting that love is one of those cosmic ultimates, like the rays of light, which strangely alter the apparent nature of all things with which they blend or on which they fall.

The thesis calls for development and elaboration beyond that which space here allows; but even this synopsis may serve to define the issue. Those who agree with me will consider the transitory sensual pleasures of sexual coitus dearly bought, if they involve an appreciable loss of capacity for reacting to the radiant stimulus responsible for those emotions which the highest poetry attempts, by means of symbols, to express and to convey.

By the removal of Victorian sex taboos, and the popularization of contraceptive practices, have we added to beauty and happiness, or subtracted from them? Are we nearer to the realization of the dreams that stirred the libertarian poets and other idealists of the last century to revolt from, and to protest against, the sex crudities and smug grossnesses of their time? Is there, on the whole, more poetry and romance, or even more simple happiness, in sex relations to-day than

when the less spiritual urges of the self-indulgent were catered for by emotionless professionals, offering their services for money ; while the more sensitive attributed to sex union a spiritual and æsthetic significance that not only made easy for them physical self-control in the absence of love, but also made casual and loveless copulation seem gross and unthinkable ?

Forty-five years ago, when I was nineteen years old, I wrote a pamphlet, which was published by the sturdy "freethinker" Mr. George Standring, advocating the spread of contraceptive knowledge among the people. I thought, as I still think, the whole thing rather disgusting ; but I had a practical if contemptuous eye for obvious facts. Moreover, I thought the sex life and "sex rights" of the conventional married couples of my acquaintance so revolting that nothing could add to their ugliness. We live in a conditioned world—a world of compromise ; and, to-day, outside the Roman Catholic Church, nearly everyone recognizes the desirability, if not the necessity, of teaching people how they may by artificial means prevent pregnancy and the subsequent birth of a child from being the inevitable sequel of coitive intercourse.

Opponents of contraceptive propaganda have always told us that its inevitable outcome would be wholesale promiscuity, or, at least, widespread heterogamy. Extramarital coition is, in cultivated circles, no longer looked upon as a sin, or even, necessarily, as a *faux pas*. The change is, to my mind, all to the good ; for the approval or disapproval of the law and its policemen can never turn an ugly thing into a beautiful one, or an unspiritual

thing into a spiritual one. It is love and spontaneity, not marriage and custom, that make the difference.

But there is another criticism that has more reality in it. Spiritually and æsthetically, as well as eudæmonistically, many things lose much of their value if they are too easily obtainable. Motor-cars and reduced railway fares have made England's beauty spots easy and cheap of access ; with the result that many who formerly appreciated them now stay at home, rather than take part in their desecration. It is a little emotionally undermining to wake up on the cliffs at Gurnard's Head at dawn, and find oneself surrounded by broken beer bottles and empty Woodbine packets. Romance rarely attaches itself to commonplace acts, involving no difficulty, no risk and no restraint.

There is little enough romance in the life of the average man or woman :

Love wakes men, once a lifetime each
They lift their heavy heads and look ;
And, lo, what one sweet page can teach
They read with joy, then shut the book.

Bearing in mind the truth embodied in the poem from which this verse is extracted (never mind about "once a lifetime"), it is not difficult to understand the reluctance of many sensitive people to standardize and mechanicalize the physical expression of sex love.

As I have already said, making things cheaper and safer does not always add to the spiritual and æsthetic happiness of mankind. Physiologically and hygienically considered, there is nothing about copulation that essentially distinguishes it from the satisfaction of any

other appetite ; and I can find no rational argument for discriminating between sex appetite and the rest of our biological urges. Apart from tradition and convention, there is no essential difference between the coitive impulses of man and those of the dog and the donkey—or even of those “stupid tatouays,” who, as Letourneau tells us, “meet by chance, smell each other, copulate, and part, with the utmost indifference.” But I still feel that the tatouay misses something that we have, possibly through our social traditions and conventions, seemed to find in sex love, and in the moments of physical abandon which punctuate its course. Calculation, deliberation and mechanism still seem to me alien or even hostile accompaniments to this sacrament. I expect that we old stagers will have to accustom ourselves to doing without one more illusion. Doubtless we shall find fresh gods to worship and respect ; and, anyway, asceticism gets easier as we grow older. It does, perhaps, seem rather a pity to have to scrap all those now becoming meaningless collections of words associated with the names of Shakespeare, Keats, Shelley, Blake and Yeats. But the objects and acts to which we attach sacredness and beauty change with the times ; and I quite see that a newer generation may—without showing decadence—detach man-made abstract adhesions from the particular things hitherto thus garnished. Moreover, we shall get—possibly we are already getting—new poets more apt to the emotions and interests of twentieth-century men and women.

There is, however, one change in opinion and in practice of which I find it very hard to feel tolerant.

In my young days, among the non-romantic respectable, copulation was a self-indulgent routine habit—"Have you not forgot to wind up the clock?" To-day, I find it in intellectual circles commonly regarded as a hygienic exercise or as a tedious duty owed to one's pride. Non-existent biological impulses are aped in order to demonstrate virility. The theories of Freud, instead of being looked upon as the interesting scientific speculations they are, are taken as constituting a compendium of universal law and an inspired guide to conduct. There is no evidence to justify the widespread belief that voluntary sex continence leads to abnormal neurosis; or that therapeutic copulation is hygienically desirable—physically or psychically. It is a consciousness or fear of inferiority that lies behind most cases of morbid neurosis, and such sense of inferiority is generally due to the worship of false ideals and servitude to tawdry conventions of good form. Interestingly enough, it is in twentieth-century Bohemia that these conventions have their strongest hold. In such an atmosphere, love finds it difficult to breathe. If it is to have life and health, it demands not only freedom but also self-forgetful spontaneity.

Whilst I think that our modern psychologists absurdly exaggerate the part played by the sex instinct in the everyday life, the everyday thoughts and the everyday emotions of ordinary men and women, it must be allowed that the emotional by-products, and the semi-intellectual æsthetic by-products, of sex passion are altogether greater and, humanly speaking, altogether more important than those associated with any other

of our instinctive urges. To what extent his æsthetic and spiritual kingdom, which is man's best claim to animal supremacy, is based on the restraint—whether personally or socially imposed—of the coitive impulse raises, perhaps, the most important question of all. If the time comes when, having got rid of all our acquired inhibitions, and having overcome our personally or socially imposed hesitations, boys and girls, young men and maidens, and men and women of maturer years, copulate freely in the streets, as they now smoke cigarettes, without shame or æsthetic self-criticism, are we convinced that the hygienic and the eudæmonistic gain will more than balance the loss of certain sentiments which many are at present inclined to look upon as mere puritanic conventions? In the absence of love, the sensual pleasure of such union is both evanescent and æsthetically trivial. It is not in such crudities that poetry has its roots.

For centuries women have, with or without their consent, been entrusted with the responsibility for looking after the spiritual and ethical sides of the problem. One of their first acts, on gaining their liberty, has, not unnaturally, been to repudiate such forced "morality."

The deputy on whom man has counted to safeguard the sentimentalities necessary even for his sensual satisfaction has failed him, and he has thus been placed in a quandary. Unfortunately, susceptible and influenceable woman, nurtured in the tradition that man knows best, instead of asserting her spiritual independence, has slavishly copied the attitude and the habits of her former master and mentor. But it is all terribly unreal. Routine—almost ritual—coition unaccompanied by love

amuses average woman even less than average man. It is the antecedents and the post-cedents, rather than the crude incidents, of sex-union that give to sex-love its value, whether we are concerned with simple human pleasure or with more mystic emotions. *Per se*, copulation is as innocent and as "natural" as kissing, or holding hands or mere neighbourly companionship, and it is silly and childish to talk about it as a concern of ethics. The only real problem worth bothering about is that of the inter-relation of this particular psychophysical event with the æsthetic and spiritual edifice that has been constructed in so large a measure out of its diverted impulses.

Few of us have, in the bottom of our hearts, any doubts as to the double degradation of professional prostitution. Are we not essentially right in classing promiscuity with it? At first sight, the two things seem to be æsthetically and spiritually distinct. The first is, for one of the participants, a mere matter of drudgery persevered in as a means of livelihood; for the other, an easy and selfish way of securing the crudest of sensual gratifications. Nearly always, in professional prostitution, such things as mutual sentience and æsthetics have no place. Promiscuity, on the other hand, is presumed to imply something approaching an equal and eager mutuality. In fact, it rarely does. Such motives as vanity, desire to be in the swim, to be dashing and abandoned and unconventional, or, at the best, a feminine desire to do a kindly turn, or a masculine impulse to demonstrate virility, quite obviously play as frequent a part as is played by honest mutual lechery—to say nothing of such mystic emotions as that of love.

LOVE AND SEX

Yet those who are more concerned with spiritual realities than with elementary eudæmonistics have no reason to be dissatisfied with the way things are moving. If we will but look beneath the surface, there is ample and satisfying evidence that we are moving towards a real purity of the spirit or, perhaps it would be better to say, towards a spiritual view of reality, by the side of which the tawdry licensed monogamy and indecent pruriency of Victorianism, as well as present-day sex-casualness, will seem as crude and as vulgar as the open bawdyism of post-Elizabethans, or the less conscious brutality of the even darker ages. The newly acquired economic independence of women is, of course, at the bottom of the changing attitude to sex.

THE SEX OBSESSION

THE physical and psychologic facts of sex are no discovery of the twentieth century. At the same time, the prominence of the place they have recently come to occupy in public and private discussion is explicable enough. The emergence of woman from the seclusion of the traditional home into the arena and the market-place, and the decline of the simpler forms of religious faith, have together created such a new setting for these fundamental facts that the problems they present are indeed novelties worthy the attention of our ablest thinkers.

Mr. Bertrand Russell, whose *Marriage and Morals* was published a year or two ago, possesses what is admitted

to be in many ways one of the finest minds among us. Everything that he writes is interesting and provocative ; and this book is no exception. Its pages are spiced with rarely expressed and significant truths, embedded though these often are in a mass of *non sequiturs*. Everyone who can distinguish truth from fallacy will be usefully stimulated by the one and amusingly irritated by the other. In the bottom of his heart, like every other sensible, reflecting man, Mr. Russell realizes the essentially spiritual and intellectual aspects of love between man and woman, and is quite aware of the voluntary, almost unconscious, sacrifice of the lesser and cruder to the greater and more ethereal which its fulfilment demands. But his revulsion from conventional puritanism is such that, again and again, he allows it to be assumed that the physical side of sex is not merely simple, natural and a-moral, but is itself the very essence of sex-love. Not that he really believes that all human life is bound up with sex—even in its higher connotations : “ I do not regard science, either practical or theoretical, as connected with it,” he writes. “ It is love of power, at least as much as vanity, that makes a child work at his lessons and develop his muscles. The love of knowledge is the love of power.”

Elsewhere he says : “ Most of the greatest men, other than artists, have been impelled in their important activities by motives unconnected with sex. If such activities are to persist, and are, in their humbler forms, to become common, it is necessary that sex should not over-shadow the remainder of a man’s emotional and passionate nature.” Still, we shall all agree that “ sex is connected

with some of the greatest goods in human life," though it is questionable if there is in the logic of the spirit any true connexion between the fragrance of the rose and the soil from which the briar draws its nourishment, apt as such relevancies are to the gardener's art and to the philosopher's speculations. Such confusion of physiology with æsthetics and other humanities adds enormously to the difficulty of considering the new problems of sex in the cold and detached way in which they should be considered and discussed by the scientist. The question of birth-control, for example, should be contemplated with the single idea of making the birth of a child a rational, desired and deliberate event, rather than the accidental product of a momentary act of sensual indulgence. While, no doubt, its publicity and propagandist value has been thereby increased among the great body of the people, the Birth-Control Campaign has suffered a little in dignity by the involvement of what should be a purely economic and physiological question in a tangle of emotion and sentiment, which jars on the nerves of the sensitive and fastidious.

If we regard physical sex-union as in itself possessed of sacred symbolic character, we may well look upon the conscious practice of such self-indulgence for the pleasure it yields as a degradation of our humanity. But so obviously personal a view cannot, in practice, be usefully applied by sociologists or hygienists to the great majority of ordinary men and women. Questions of decency and indecency enter less and less into the contemplation of these matters by modern youth. A good deal too much has been made of the alleged psychic

and physical injuries brought about by restraint or sublimation of the primal sex urge. But we are bound to recognize enormous individual variation in this matter ; and also, as practical people, to take into account habit and tradition as well as inherent physiology. Many who, by general consent, ought not to have children, or ought not to have more children, cannot or will not abstain from having them unless their way is made easy. And there are to-day tens of thousands of men and women to whom mechanical contraceptives seem no more uncanny or "unnatural," and in practice prove no more harmful, than do *pince-nez* or artificial dentures.

Forty years ago, one might have gone the round of the respectable bookshops of London without finding a single book dealing with the physical relations of the sexes. The police, from time to time, seized certain sealed packets passing through the post—packets which contained a little simple anatomical and physiological information—and prosecuted the senders for indecency. A few ill-printed books and booklets about "sex"—from the Works of Aristotle to the Confessions of an Escaped Nun—were semi-clandestinely offered for sale in back streets off the Strand. But these publications were generally regarded, even by the "progressive" minded, as mere brothel literature. Practically everyone regretted the existence and circulation of these books, but free-thinking people urged that this was the price we had to pay for the superstitious secrecy and moral cowardice which were the outstanding characteristics of respectability's attitude towards sex. If this taboo were lifted, and frankness took its place,

they alleged, no one would want to bother his head about a perfectly natural phenomenon—the outward manifestation of a universal instinct.

The ban has been lifted, and few people would contend that there is much secrecy about sex to-day. But the result of this “frankness” has not been in accordance with prophecy. Look at the booksellers’ windows ; any one of which would have made a Holywell Street pornographic merchant of 1890 wonder what had happened to the police. Here are books giving detailed instructions whereby coitive pleasure may be increased ; others which tell with helpful precision how to make coition fruitless—even how, by the process of abortion, chance defects in contraceptive practice may be made good. All very frank and unashamed.

The birth-control issue is, outside the Roman Catholic Church, no longer one on which words need be wasted. The contraceptionists have won their battle, and established their regime. It is now a mere matter of relative efficiency ; and any intelligent reader can learn from books pretty much all that is at present known about contraceptive technique.

The fact that books such as these are being published in great numbers shows that they meet a public demand. Whilst it would be interesting to discover the nature, age, and sex, of this special public, in search of this instruction, it must be presumed that at least part of the demand comes from those who are seeking for information necessary to their happiness—information to which, from any sane point of view, they are entitled.

I take it that most of us in these days are agreed that

there is no case for withholding, from anyone interested, information about the normal events of human life, so far as they have been discovered. The case for broadcasting the revelations of the pathological laboratory and the mortuary is not quite so obvious. I do not pretend to be unprejudiced in this or in any other department of everyday life. I do not believe that whatever is "natural" is humanly desirable. As a doctor, I am called upon to contemplate and to handle many things that I think are unpleasant and unclean—things from contact with which the general public is rightly exempt. I do not mind dealing with these things, because I have been specially trained to deal with them for ulterior ends. When I begin to gloat over them and to take direct sensuous pleasure in handling them, I shall know that a fundamental and—as I think—degenerative change has taken place in me.

But there is another issue, raised by some of these authors, which seems to me important. A great point is made of the fact that they discuss "not only the technique of birth-control but also (what is quite as necessary) the technique of physical relationship." Who are they who need this instruction? If they are many, then it would indeed seem possible that the notable fall in our birth-rate is—as has been suggested—due rather to the progressive infertility of civilized men and women than to the deliberate adoption of contraceptive measures. Is "loss of appetite and potency" so widespread that information must be circulated as to means whereby desire may be artificially restored or simulated? Have we, indeed, reached that stage of biological decadence

when, as one writer tells us, we must look upon "marriage as a task" and must "constantly work at ourselves to improve our own marriage fitness"—even by using spirit washes, and by increasing the height of our shoe heels, "to increase our sexual attractiveness." There is in all this an echo of the old Arcades and Promenades, of paints and senile pawings; that to me is singularly unpleasant. I expect it is because I have "a Victorian mind," but I cannot see that anyone is the better or the wiser for these dissecting-room chats, this anatomical exhibitionism. To put the thing at its lowest, what gustator could gain increased pleasure through his awareness of the ups and downs of his intestinal loops?

For my own part (and I know what a prig and what a prude I must sound), I think that the conscious and deliberate pursuit of sensual pleasure through the instrumentality of sex is sheer blasphemy, and a denial of all spiritual meaning in human life. I agree with Thoreau that, as lovers, "unless we meet religiously, we profane one another." So far as the simpler phenomena are concerned, I sympathize with Montaigne's philosopher who, "being taken with the deed, was demanded, what he did: answered very mildly, *I plant man*, blushing no more being found so napping than if he had bin taken setting of garlike"; rather than with Sir Thomas Browne who "Could be content that we might procreate like trees, without conjunction, or that there were any way to perpetuate the world without this trivial and vulgar way of coition, the foolishhest act a wise man commits all his life." Any reader deriving his notions from some books I have lately seen in "cultivated"

drawing-rooms might, however, well come to Sir Thomas Browne's conclusion.

LOVE, MARRIAGE AND ECONOMICS

THE institution of marriage, as by law and custom established, holds in popular estimation a less stable position to-day than it occupied even a few decades ago. Is this due to a relaxing or to a tightening of our standards of sex relationship, and what are the factors mainly responsible? A change of attitude to marriage being granted, in what direction are we to look for conscious guidance? Are we, through thick and thin, to maintain or restore in all its integrity conventional marriage, as recognized by law and church for generations; are we to modify the accidental qualities of the institution, while preserving those which may be called its essentials; or are we to abolish formal marriage altogether?

Reforms have been inclined unduly to simplify this problem. Either the property aspect or the parental aspect on the one hand, or the satisfaction of the sex instinct on the other hand, has commonly been referred to in discussion, as though little else were involved—or, if involved, were no concern of society. Also there has been a too ready assumption that the success or failure of marriage may be judged by the personal gratification yielded. But, as Mr. Ernest Groves, dis-

cussing "The Marriage Crisis," points out, marriage represents an effort to consolidate and conserve various interests—social and racial, as well as individual. Individual failures, whilst affording good reason for inquiry, afford in themselves an inadequate argument for consigning marriage to the scrap-heap. Failure is just as likely to be due to faulty training—æsthetic or moral—as to flaws in the institution itself. It is always a question whether those who fail in marriage would have been more fortunate with an alternative arrangement. Moreover, when we think of scrapping, or even of modifying, any established order, it is wise to consider the probable effect of such alterations on those well suited to the existing state of things.

At the same time, when any institution has been devised to subserve certain ends, and the general attitude to those ends and their social significance fundamentally changes, it is nearly always advisable to reconsider, and often to remodel, the institution in accordance with the new needs and the new way of looking at things.

Mr. Groves summarizes the influences that are, in every civilized country to-day, leading to a changed attitude towards binding, life-long, monogamous marriage. He suggests that one of the most important of these influences is the general adoption of a pleasure-philosophy of life. "Widespread as this is at the present time," writes Mr. Groves, "it is nevertheless a relatively new type of social habit. There has never been a time when pleasure has not been eagerly sought by most men and women. But now a pleasure code provides ideals which are admired as well as followed."

It is obviously of great importance, if we are usefully to speculate on the true place in modern life and in the life of the future of an ancient institution like marriage, that we should analyse the several tendencies and motives—conscious and unconscious—that have led to its emergence, and to the peculiarities of its development. Only thus can we put ourselves in a position to distinguish the essential from the accidental, the temporarily expedient from the biologically permanent. We are apt to forget that not only may the same motive impel us at different times to different lines of activity, but that an outwardly similar course may, in different circumstances and in differing ages, be followed from very unlike motives. Neither romantic love nor crude animal lust had much to do with the existence or origin of marriage in early primitive times. The late Professor Muller-Lyer contended that, so far as mere sexual instinct influenced his conduct, primitive man would have found no reason to limit his freedom of momentary choice ; for he “knew neither sexual jealousy nor romantic love, and placed no value on the chastity of woman and as little on actual fatherhood.” He valued in woman “not the beloved but the worker.”

Primitive marriage, Muller-Lyer maintained, was nothing but the subjugation of woman. It was “comparatively durable because it was not founded upon an evanescent passion, but upon a permanent economic necessity.” It is certainly relevant and illuminating that, whereas the primitive husband willingly lends his wife, in her capacity of sex-mate, to any guest, as the merest act of hospitality, jealousy of ownership prevents

him from being so free-handed with her in her other capacity of slave or labourer. With the development of a more settled life and the accumulation of possessions that outlive the individual, the desire to perpetuate ownership through the instrumentality of legitimate heirs gave supplemental sanction to marriage. "We have prostitutes for pleasure," says Demosthenes, "concubines for the daily care of the body, and wives for the production of children and as trusty caretakers of our homes." In less-luxurious circles such division of function was, of course, impracticable. And yet it is out of such crude elements, with the advance of culture, of leisure, and—may one not add—of convention and formal restrictions, that romantic love has evolved. Love, as the modern mind conceives it, is, as it were, a revival or fresh manifestation of the social instinct, tinged with sublimated sex, and this time illumined by the full light of consciousness. With the sympathetic recognition of the mate "as a person and not merely as a labouring and propagating animal," economic considerations are playing and will play an ever lessening part in the motivation of marriage.

The danger in the economic status of woman has a very real relevance to the problem of marriage. Until the real nature of sexual differences had been analysed and their relevance to social organization determined, any dogmatizing as to what is and what is not the proper sphere of woman is bound to be based almost entirely on prejudice. A few years ago it was thought unwomanly to ride a bicycle, unwomanly to smoke a cigarette, unwomanly to leave an ankle exposed. We have sur-

vived those prejudices ; but not a few of the pompous utterances of to-day as to woman's place, woman's limitations, and the nature of womanliness, will strike another generation as equally foolish and foundationless.

No equalitarian has ever had the courage to affirm that men and women are anatomically and physiologically identical. In the light of present-day knowledge of the intimate and essential co-relation of mental and bodily processes, no informed person will contend that the psychological activities and needs of the sexes are the same. But, directly we begin to dogmatize about the nature of the differences, especially the psychic differences, we encounter as many opinions as disputants. Most women who generalize on the characteristics of their sex are but self-observers ; and men—though the nature of woman is an almost daily subject of reflection and conversation with them—commonly base their generalizations on their experience of one or two women with whom fate has associated them. Naturally enough, everybody finds that nearly all specimens subsequently encountered have to be looked upon as exceptions.

There is good reason for believing that, compared with their resemblances, the fundamental psychic differences between men and women are as few as are the differences between their physical needs—fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer. We may reasonably infer that such real distinctions as exist are directly traceable to the one great functional specialization of reproduction. The distinctive part which woman

plays in the pre-natal and early post-natal development of the child makes a far greater demand on her energy and on the years of her life than is made on the man. In her capacity of mother, woman has a direct biological responsibility to the race, and a proportionate biological—as distinct from social or “moral”—claim. It was in connexion with the primitive response to that claim that the institution of the family appeared and developed. No other human contrivance has so long survived. Yet, to-day, there may be observed in nearly every country, signs suggestive of its decay.

There is no doubt that many people nowadays include marriage and all its consequences among the “pleasurable undertakings of life.” Naturally, therefore, when the vein of pleasure begins to peter out, there is little, apart from possible children, to give the marriage any further meaning or value.

But, over and above this tendency of popular philosophy in the direction of a shallow hedonism, are more concrete influences, the importance of which it is difficult to exaggerate. The family is no longer a customary unit of industry, and economic interests no longer tend to draw together the family group. The satisfaction of individual ambitions, rather than the co-operative maintenance of family life, constitutes a usual aim. The wide dissemination of a knowledge of methods of birth-control, again, is a new factor that for millions of people alters the whole aspect of the marriage problem. From a purely sociologic and economic point of view, some measure of birth-control is, in the opinion of most students, desirable at this stage of civilization.

Had not the current ethical code coincidentally taken a eudæmonistic turn, a general knowledge of contraceptive methods might well have yielded æsthetic and even spiritual gains as well.

With the intellectual emancipation of women and the increasing recognition of their individuality, the altered position of wives as responsible co-operators and as equal companions has led to a new orientation of love, even within marriage.

Leaving aside the instinctive affectional needs which, according to differing opinions, it serves or starves, the family is commonly regarded as providing an almost essential condition for the constant renewal of a socially desirable population. A little wider acquaintance with social history, however, makes it less easy to dogmatize as to the unique merits of any particular social practice in the raising of a healthy and vigorous population. Our present system of tempered family responsibility has, in fact, led to a situation which most sociologists regard as alarming. The families which contribute the largest numbers to the next generation are the very ones that are economically worst equipped for rearing children. The social evils consequent on this disparity have become so flagrant that civilized communities find themselves increasingly pressed to take over more and more of those responsibilities which, hitherto, have been assigned to—have, indeed, formed almost part of the definition of—the traditional family. In other words, the environment of the family, and of the home built around it, affords but a very imperfect nurture ground for twentieth-century youth.

It is, however, as a means of satisfying the affectional needs of modern humanity that the family has been most frequently criticized and most vigorously attacked. With increasing differentiation of individuality, with the spread of intellectual culture and the consequent weakening of mere conventions, the part of life which the family can adequately frame inevitably lessens. For a very large number of men and women of to-day, the family fails utterly to meet either affectional or social needs.

Marriage, with the conventions and religious and emotional associations that grew round it, has, until lately, served as a moderately effective means of carrying on the race, of securing the preservation of child life, and of providing a reasonably suitable environment for the emotional, intellectual and physical training of the next generation. Few impartial observers whose professional duties or other circumstances have brought them into close contact with the intimate realities of other people's lives will, I think, differ from me in concluding that marriage in the old sense is, for a growing number of sensitive people, an outworn institution. The old patriarchal type of family has served its purpose and had its day. Already the schools and other collective organizations have taken a very large measure of responsibility, and therefore of pride, from the fathers and mothers of our children. Industry is no longer carried on in the home; indeed, for millions of people the home has become nothing more than a sleeping-place. There is nothing impossible in a man and a woman living together for the whole of their lives, voluntarily and deliberately, regardless of convention, regardless of

THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED

duty—bound together by no ties but those of affection and genuine mutual attraction. But such a phenomenon is a comparative rarity. It does not typify the union of the average married couple. “It is,” said Dr. Johnson, “so far from being natural for a man and woman to live in a state of marriage that we find all the motives which they have for remaining in that connexion and the restraints which civilized society imposes to prevent separation are hardly sufficient to keep them together.” Let us recognize the fact that, as socially useful instruments, marriage and the family are getting worn out. It is high time that we began to devise alternative machinery to take their place, in the light of new circumstances, new intellectual capacities, and new emotional demands. We need to remember that both occasional physiological sterility and the artificial sterility which an increasing number of people impose on themselves are of far less racial significance than is the emotional sterility and self-centredness for which our economic system, our schemes of education, and the debased religion which they have created, are mainly responsible.

THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED

WHEN Malthus proclaimed his celebrated Law, he was justified by the evidence available. In the light of contemporary knowledge, the same defence

cannot be offered to-day for those who continue pontifically to mutter his formula. Man's material environment may well have seemed in the eighteenth century to be, though slowly modifiable, ninety per cent determined by forces outside human control. In the last century and a quarter, however, applied science has moved at a pace unpredictable by its earlier apostles. Every year man becomes more and more remotely dependent on the physical legacy which extra-human Nature bestowed on him. Less and less has he to rely on the services of his animal and vegetable symbiotes for the conversion into utilizable materials of the inorganic elements of which the earth is mainly composed. No longer is he dependent on organic matter for his nitrogen, on animal fats for his illumination, on silkworms for his silk, or on horses for his transport. Although the population of the world has never been so great as to-day, the statesmen of nearly every country are preoccupied with schemes for destroying, or limiting the production of, foods and materials which human intelligence, in co-operation with Nature, has, so it is said, caused to exist in too great abundance ; and our power of bringing into existence commodities utilizable by man is still rapidly growing. Our Malthusian Cassandra, however, warn us that population will yet go on increasing, whilst Nature sets a final limit to potential scientific advance.

Contemporary facts are unkind to these prophets of woe. Though it is true that in every country but two the crude birth-rate is still a little higher than the crude death-rate, the population of nearly every country in

THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED

Europe is already showing signs of decline. At the present time, every four female children born in England and Wales leave on an average but three female descendants. In other words, if the present birth-rate continues, the number of potential mothers will diminish by one-quarter in every generation. No increase of longevity which hygienic science may effect can seriously modify the inevitable outcome of this trend towards sterility. At most, it might add a number of oldish people to the population of each decade, thus postponing by a few years the ultimate extinction of the race. It was said by Dr. Enid Charles, in her book, *The Twilight of Parenthood*, that, assuming no further fall to occur in the birth-rate—an assumption, by the way, which has few facts to support it—once a stable age-composition has been reached, the population of England and Wales will, in two hundred years, have fallen from 35,000,000 to 6,000,000—that is, to half the population of Greater London. Should, however, the net reproduction-rate fall to two-thirds of its present figure, our total population would, in three hundred years, drop to 45,000. In varying degrees, the population of most other European countries is tending rapidly in the same direction.

Altogether apart from economic considerations, many of us think that there are far too many people in the world—that, I suppose, is a matter of individual preference. Some of us may even feel indifferent as to the survival of European civilization, or of the human species itself. In any case, it is desirable that we should make ourselves sufficiently familiar with the relevant facts to prevent us from talking a lot of nonsense, and

from advocating measures calculated to lead to ends we do not desire. If we fail to realize the nature of the forces at work, it is idle to anticipate a sort of world Utopia, peopled by an ideal population, smaller than our present one, which, having reached the right stage of diminutiveness, will then remain practically static. Unless we understand the influences making for the decline, we shall not be in a position effectively to check it when the pace gets alarming.

The population question has many sides. To some, its quantitative, to others, its qualitative, aspect seems most important. Since Malthus set the ball rolling, public opinion has undergone profound metamorphoses, and the shock which the author of the *Essay on the Principle of Population* administered to early nineteenth-century society was as nothing to that which he himself would receive from the utterances of some of our contemporary High Court Judges. The principle of population, as contemplated by Malthus, would, to-day, need restatement; for the advance of science, as applied to the production and multiplication of things necessary for human well-being and enjoyment, has been more rapid even than the growth of our numbers. Population has not outgrown food supply, but it has outstripped political ability. Thus, in almost every country, the crude Malthusian question seems to be solving itself. It is the eugenic side of the problem which, to-day, chiefly interests the speculative mind.

The Darwinian theory and the surprising results of selective breeding obtained by gardeners and stock-farmers, naturally seized the imagination of members

THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED

of the "successful" classes, perturbed by the fertility of the occupants of the slums, whose dirt, ignorance, and illicit self-help they eagerly recognized as the consequences of Mendelian inheritance rather than of such circumstances as the absence of water-supply, of education and of a decent income. All sorts of remedies have been suggested, from the logical proposal of Mr. W. D. McKim, for the elimination of all who, "for one grave cause or another, are now supported or detained by the State," by means of "a gentle, painless death" from carbonic-oxide-gas asphyxiation, to the much-advocated surgical sterilization of mental defectives and habitual criminals. But statistics and experience offer little encouragement to such proposals. Eugenic experiments made in haste are apt to be, as Professor James A. Field pointed out in his *Essays on Population*, repented at leisure; and, though we may not feel inclined to go so far as Huxley, who saw "no hope that mere human beings will ever possess enough intelligence to select the fittest," we can but agree that, up to the present, the facts are on his side.

In civilized countries, the problem is not now so much the possibility of population outgrowing the materials necessary for its existence, as of its running counter to the maintenance of standards of living which have become conventional. And here a paradoxical situation arises.

"The economic process, whilst seemingly the minister to simple increase and sustenance, sets standards averse to reproduction. The system will not let man do certain things that we are accustomed to think it was first

devised to assist him to do. Thus, we find that the very classes which it enables to attain economic success, and thereby places in the best position to provide for children, have fewer children than the very poor."

Many of us are apt complacently to assume that relative success in the entirely artificial system that we have created is a measure of racial or biological fitness. But, as Professor Field asked, are we not making a "false assumption that there is a teleological purpose in the evolution of human institutions; that the economic system has been devised to ensure the perpetuation of the race? . . . An individualistic, competitive, specialized economic system sets the goals of human activity in proximate rather than in ultimate terms, in terms of the individual rather than the group, of the present rather than the future."

In other words, there is small reason to suppose that social success in the artificial conditions of the contemporary world coincides with what Field called "the best parental stock." There are more cogent reasons for supposing otherwise. "Superior" people are generally quick to see the desirability of limiting on eugenic grounds the multiplication of those whose social and cultural circumstances are clearly different from theirs. They are likely to favour types which have the virtues of their own class. "The case of the farmer breeding hogs is much simpler. After all, he is not breeding hogs for their sake, but for his own." If the "success" which eugenicists so commonly accept as their standard of desirability tends to lessen the capacity for, or the inclination towards, parenthood, is it possible to regard

THE POPULATION QUESTION RESTATED

it as truly sound in a biologic sense ? “ Can any stock be considered eugenically fit which does not perpetuate itself ? ” Adaptability and versatility, energy and endurance, tenderness and unaggressiveness, may well be more racially desirable than specialized cleverness, even when combined with many of those self-regarding impulses which make for dominance in society as we have hitherto organized it.

To discover the causes making for infertility we shall have to probe deeply. Not only our social conventions and our systems of education will need to be examined but also the whole structure of our industrial life. An operation may be, from a narrow point of view, highly successful, yet may end in the death of the patient. If we want the race to survive, we shall have to look at the very foundation stones of our civilization—our religion, our ideals, our basic notions of the purpose and meaning of human life.

The fact that those who achieve the greatest social and economic success in our community are the individuals with the lowest fertility rate is in itself of sinister import. Our educational system seems to have been devised for and by introverts ; and introversions and infertility are intimately related. A well-known eugenicist, Professor R. A. Fisher, has—somewhat ingenuously—warned his disciples that “ the reformer must expect to encounter deep-seated opposition in the classes on which he would naturally rely for an intelligent anxiety for the future of their country, owing to the fact that many in these classes owe the social promotion of their forbears, and their present prosperity, less to the value

of their services to society than to a congenital deficiency in their reproductive instincts.' There can be no doubt that at present we are offering rewards to the infertile, and hardships and difficulties to the fertile. A stock-breeder who worked on these lines would soon find himself in Queer Street. So, obviously, may we. Personal prudence—which is, in fact, a sort of cowardice—has been raised to the highest rank among the practical virtues. The pursuit of momentary self-indulgence and the avoidance of responsibilities are natural consequences.

From a sociological point of view, the popularization of birth-control may well prove to be the most important event of the century. The subject can no longer be dismissed as one for cranks and heretics alone. It is discussed freely from judicial benches and from high ecclesiastical rostrums ; and nothing is to be gained by further pretence that a practice long since widely adopted by the well-to-do has only a vicious or a pathological significance.

The extent to which the State has taken over the economic responsibilities of parents, and the steadily growing use of contraceptive methods by ordinary men and women everywhere, have so modified many of the traditional manifestations and materializations of paternal feeling and of sex-love, that certain of the structures built on them—prominent among them being the institution of the family—call for radical reconsideration.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON
FROM 1630 TO 1800
BY
JOHN H. COLEMAN
BOSTON: PUBLISHED BY
J. B. LEECH, 1850.

THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON
FROM 1630 TO 1800
BY
JOHN H. COLEMAN
BOSTON: PUBLISHED BY
J. B. LEECH, 1850.

THE CRIMINAL MIND

LOMBROSO'S "criminal type" with its occipital dimple, lobeless ears, sparse facial hair, and all those other physical stigmata on which such store was set but a few decades ago, has joined the Basilisk and the Noble Savage. But, like its fellow myths, it has vanished in form rather than in reality ; and it is worth while to investigate the reality which these forms disguise rather than display. Is there a distinguishable "criminal mind" ? Is the criminal, like the poet, born, not made ? Is criminality a Mendelian unit, represented by physical entities in the germ-cell, transmissible from one generation to another, like "black blood" or epilepsy ? On the other hand, are all of us potential criminals, lacking but the stimulus and the occasion ? Is "There, but for the grace of God, go I" the only honest reflection of every visitor to Dartmoor ?

Just as the notion of a criminal type rested on the conception of a "normal" type of man, so, usually, is the idea of a criminal mind based on the supposition of the existence of a normal mind. In truth, the so-called normal mind is but an average among the infinite variety of individual temperaments, characters and degrees of mental efficiency. It is to those who, by their acts and habits, betray themselves as most remote from that aver-

age that we apply such terms as "genius," "criminal," "saint," "half-wit" and "crank." Among these extremists, to the right as well as to the left of the centre, the majority of habitual criminals are to be found; so that, in a sense, it is true to say that, even though there is no such thing as a criminal mind, there are minds of varying criminal potentialities.

In its technical and narrower sense, a crime is but a punishable breach of the law of a particular community, thus differing from sin. There are, of course, crimes which, committed by a particular individual in particular circumstances, although legally punishable, would not by most people be regarded as sins; and, as we all know, there are plenty of sins, almost universally condemned as such, of which the law takes no cognizance. The committer of sinless crimes, whatever the lawyers may think, is far more likely to be a saint than, in any intelligible sense, a criminal. Of the remaining offenders against the adopted rules of society, there are, from the psychological point of view, two great classes, the habituals and the occasionals. Few of us but might, in exceptional circumstances, find ourselves in the latter class. The former are mainly recruited from far more specialized psychologic groups.

Although crime differs from sin, when we popularly speak of an act or a purpose as "criminal," we imply something more than law-breaking. As Baron Garafalo put it, "the element of immorality requisite before a harmful act can be regarded by public opinion as criminal is the injury to so much of the moral sense as is represented by one or the other of the elementary

altruistic sentiments of pity and probity." Given a violation of either of these sentiments, we have what may properly be called "natural crime." Most criminals, like most cranks, are fundamentally egocentric ; but so-called moral insensibility is often nothing more than moral eccentricity or moral unconventionality. Society, however, cannot always afford to take such philosophic subtleties into account ; for, although ethics, like laws, are local and temporary, they are but in small part artificial, being an outgrowth of such realities as climate, economic geography and racial genetics. But egoistic impulses and indifference to social welfare do not necessarily lead to criminal action. Another factor—the environmental one—is also needed ; for almost any of our inborn impulses can be developed or stunted by circumstance and habit.

The number of convicted delinquents who can truly be described as born criminals is small ; though, as with other professions, a certain homogeneity of attitude and of mental habit may be observed among seasoned recidivists. The potentialities are, of course, inherent ; but their development and the manner of their expression are largely determined by social and material circumstances—especially by those which environ youth. As showing how big a part environment plays in this development, one can but be struck by the enormous increase in juvenile criminality since the family began to dissolve, especially in those countries where that process is most advanced. Indeed, every step towards social disintegration—whatever new integration it may lead to—tends temporarily to increase crime.

A couple of American investigators, Dr. and Mrs. Glueck, put to themselves a few years ago the following questions : " What happens to the former inmates of our prisons ? What percentage of them become law-abiding citizens ? How many return to a life of crime and vice ? What effect upon their character and outlook does a penal institution bring about ? Is imprisonment a deterrent ? " Their findings they embodied in a book, the main part of which is devoted to a detailed history of 510 men who were liberated from the Massachusetts Reformatory during the years 1921 and 1922. The interval between the release of these prisoners and the date of the investigation was sufficiently long for reasonable answers to be given to the questions propounded, so far as this typical batch of inmates of one of America's best-reputed penal institutions is concerned. The important fact established in the book is that, out of these men, eighty per cent were not reformed five years later, but went right on committing crimes after their discharge.

It at first strikes one as significant that nearly one-half of all the individuals whose criminal careers have been traced by the authors left their homes under the age of fourteen. But, on further inquiry, we find that of the children thus early removed from parental influence over fifty per cent left home for the simple reason that they had been found guilty of offences too serious to be safely treated as " probation cases." As Dr. Glueck says, " it is at least questionable whether leaving the parental roof may not have been the lesser of two evils from the point of view of the boy and of society." It is

interesting and relevant that of these 510 men only eighty-one had ever, in their youth or later, been connected with any social or religious organization, trade union, political club, or other association for the constructive use of leisure. There was, in most cases, no wholesome group or circle "possessing legitimate ideals and objectives," whose approval or disapproval mattered. These youths, therefore, drifted into companionship with others equally unattached, equally without sense of loyalty to society. After all, most of us are far more sensitive and responsible to the opinion of our own intimates and our own set than to that of the world at large.

Dr. Richard Cabot, who wrote a foreword to Dr. Glueck's book, made the remark that habitual law-breakers do not easily lend themselves to the process of social reformation. "I am not at all sure," he said, "that the men studied in this book could have been reformed by any method now known, no matter how much money and intelligence was spent on them." In any event, we are not likely to effect reformation by the methods hitherto employed.

"Why should men thoroughly accustomed and habituated to crime, and to dissipated habits of living, men interested in no honest work, in no harmless recreation, men with but the feeblest of home ties—why should such men change all these bad habits and acquire good ones merely because they are confined for a little over a year in an institution where they are forced to do work in which they have little or no interest? A bad habit does not change as the result of a few months of forced, unpaid and unpalatable labour."

Dr. Cabot names three factors which he thinks might assist in restoring at least some of the disturbers of the peace to the ranks of good citizenship : a new interest in an honest job ; a new affection for someone for whose sake it seems worth while to behave more decently ; and a perception that crime doesn't pay. All attempts at remedial treatment must, to be successful, recognize that it is the mental attitude of the subject to his neighbours in society that needs to be corrected. Discipline and obedience are very different things. It is futile to try, in the words of T. M. Osborne, " to make men industrious by driving them to work ; to make them virtuous by removing temptation ; to make them respect the law by forcing them to obey the orders of an autocrat ; to make them farsighted by giving them no chance to exercise foresight ; to give them individual initiative by treating them in large groups ; in short, to prepare them again for society by placing them in conditions as unlike society as they could be made."

Bad habits are only broken when their evil consequences are brought home to their owner. In individuals whose social feeling and imagination are normally developed, this may result from their realization of the suffering their conduct brings on others. But there are plenty of persons, with minds more detached and with duller imaginations, to whom evil consequences are only manifest when they directly fall on themselves. For such, isolation and deterrence seem about the only possibilities of a penal policy. As Hamblin Smith has said, " for a certain proportion of offenders, the only solution is permanent segregation in a suitable institution.

THE CRIMINAL MIND

It is one of the painful adjustments which society has to make for its own health."

Certain conclusions will assert themselves. One is that our existing penal systems are far too inelastic, too unadaptive. We need a different and better classification, both of offences and of offenders. As with those diseases of the individual with which the doctor is concerned, so with social disorders, we need to discriminate between those which with our present knowledge and skill are curable or preventable and those which are neither. To apply the same treatment, or even the same sort of treatment, to these groups, merely because they have some superficial symptom in common, is but to temper our cruelty with ineffectiveness. A second conclusion is that, apart from mere deterrence, the potency of which is far less than is often assumed, whatever is to be done in the way of crime-prevention must be done in early youth.

As with many other disorders, prevention, rather than cure, is the policy of promise. But, until we have a clear understanding of the varying motives and imaginings which distinguish the criminal from his similarly circumstanced law-abiding neighbour, and of the conditions in which these motives and imaginings grew, our efforts at prophylaxis are likely to be unavailing. To call crime a disease, and to argue therefrom that punishment of the criminal is wrong, is rank stupidity. The disease is of society, just as cancer is a disease of the human being on whom it is parasitic ; and it is primarily the health of society which must be safeguarded. Naturally, for both civic and Christian reasons, we should, in

subordination to this prime consideration, do what is possible to help, rather than to injure, society's disharmonious units. When we realize how slightly most of these anti-social pirates differ innately from the rest of us, and how easily at appropriate stages their impulses might have been directed to harmonious social ends, we shall look upon our prisons and convict establishments as but an index of our educational and religious failures, just as some surgeons look upon their operative cases as an index of the diagnostic inefficiency of the physicians.

But, above all, we must beware of the fallacy that criminals are all of a kind. Among them will be found men of strong character and of weak character ; some with set purpose and firm will, and others without aim or ideal, without even lust or avarice. Some owe their criminal status as much to their courage as to the form of their ambition, while others are cowardly and purposeless. Not only is the recognition of these wide differences in mental and emotional outfit essential to the effective practice of preventive criminology, but it is even more necessary to intelligent and effective penology.

Many people to-day are questioning the basic justifiability of all legal punishment. Such speculators may be reminded that, whether we consider them from an ethical, a philosophic, or a political standpoint, punishments and rewards stand or fall together. In our zeal for the abstractions of science, or even for those of philosophy, we are apt to forget those deep-down fundamentals of our nature which, so far as we can judge, are as real as anything of which we have cognizance. We cannot dismiss the common man's sense of "justice"

ALL SORTS OF LAW-BREAKERS

by calling it a mere barbaric survival. After all, a penal code should satisfy the conscience of society.

ALL SORTS OF LAW-BREAKERS

OUR reaction from Lombroso's theory of the criminal type on the one hand, and from Kant's notions of retribution on the other, has landed many of us in an equally untenable position. Contemporary writers on crime and punishment mostly seem to have a sentimental regard for those who break the laws of their country, out of all proportion to their concern for those who observe them. The man or woman who has failed to abide by the rules of the game, and has had the bad luck to be detected, is pretty sure of a vocal sympathy rarely accorded to those conventional souls who are prepared to take their turn with the rest.

"You admit," I said to my friend, "that an organized society, like an organized game, must have rules of some sort; and that quite a lot of people, from one motive or another, will be inclined to disregard them. You will probably agree that the observance of these rules is so important to society's peace of mind and general well-being that penalties should be attached to their breach. Our custom is to send many of these law-breakers to prison. What would you do with them?"

"Well, I certainly wouldn't send anybody to prison," he replied. "If an individual failed to observe the agreed rules, I would have him thoroughly investigated by a psychologist, and afterwards scientifically treated

by a competent doctor or schoolmaster. Crime is as much a disease as is measles or diabetes, and it should be treated on fundamentally similar lines."

"Of course," I half agreed, "three-quarters of the people who are sent to prison ought never to be sent there ; but surely that is the fault of our economic system and of our laws ; and it is you and I who are responsible for the continuance of that system and of those laws."

Another friend of mine, one of the most generous-minded doctors I have ever come across, has written a book, *Psychology in Court*, in which he discusses this problem in the light of his experience as a doctor and as a Borough magistrate. I have just read that book, and a very interesting one I have found it. It well illustrates many of the difficulties, as well as many of the faults, of our judicial system, as it functions under the aegis of an unpaid magistracy. I defy any man with a human heart and human intelligence to practise medicine among working people without becoming obsessed by the idea that the poor rarely get a fair deal. When my doctor friend sits on the bench at the police court, he finds himself in an atmosphere almost diametrically unlike that of his consulting-room. The patients who consult him come, of their own free will, for help and guidance ; and he fully appreciates the privileges and responsibilities thus conferred or thrown on him. The individuals brought before him and his fellow-magistrates appear in the courts, not voluntarily, but perforce. They are there, not primarily to be helped, but to be tried, and, if thought necessary, to be punished. Many of them are poor and illiterate ; nearly all are unversed in the

technicalities of the law. In this book (which I advise everyone interested in these things to read) are adduced many pathetic and tragic examples of essential injustice, calculated to make any sympathetic observer question the soundness of the basis on which our whole judicial and penological system is built. But what is the alternative? Is it that suggested by the friend I first quoted—to abolish our formal judicature with its defined penalties; substituting a system of medical diagnosis, followed by whatever undefined treatment is considered by the expert diagnostician or his scientific colleagues to be appropriate to the case? Is the prospect thus opened up so very attractive? Can the record of the psychologists and the eugenists be characterized as reassuring?

Many persons who appear in the courts on criminal charges have no obvious character abnormalities; and differ from those of us who are still at large in little else but that they have been found out, or that they own spirits more courageous or adventurous. They stand in no more need of moral reformation than do the rest of us. There remains a considerable number of men and women whose criminal acts are essentially due to their abnormal emotional make-up. One or other of those potent impulses which are part of our common inheritance is absent, or inherently weak, or weak through lack of opportunity and use; or it is hypertrophied through inheritance or training. Weakness of the social instinct, or of the instinct of pity or tenderness, accounts for the greater part of the truly heinous crimes that can fairly be attributed to defective character.

Mr. Henry A. Geisert, an American prison chaplain,

who for eight years devoted himself to a systematic study of the psychology of the several thousand prisoners to whom he had privileged access, presented a few years ago some of the conclusions he drew from this wealth of material in the form of a book.

The first part of his volume is devoted to the ætiology of crime ; and in the first section of that part are reported the notions held by criminals themselves of their own psychology and of the circumstances to which they owe their criminal status. The rest is given up to an altero-spective analysis of the criminal's mind and of his reaction to the various "treatments" to which the law and its administration subject him. The author sets out to show that "the true cause for defection is found in the felon himself ; that all he alleges is only accidental, and that in his defective personality alone is to be found the substantial cause of his crime." The faculty for repentance, Mr. Geisert says, is absent from the psychic make-up of nearly every habitual criminal. The question, "Are you sorry that you did this wrong ?" generally elicits the answer, "Of course I am, for, had I not committed this crime, I should not now be in prison." This attitude, the author tells us, is so general that it may be accepted as characteristic of the criminal class. "It is the punishment that hurts, not the wrong committed." The occasional offender, or the man who commits a single crime, however grave, is, of course, an entirely different creature.

Still, the fact remains that, of two persons living in the same community, subject to the same social and natural "injustices," and exposed to equal temptation,

one will keep the law and the other will break it. The determining difference can lie only within the individuals themselves. The nature of this difference, however, is not always the same ; and the fundamental problem of criminal psychology is by no means simple. Whether we are regarding criminals as subjects for preventive treatment, as individuals capable of personal reformation, or as objects of punishment, it is clear that the first thing is to distinguish between those with feeble impulses, those who lack that hierarchic harmony of motives which is the meaning of character, and those who, with clear vision and strong will, choose and act in accordance with a master passion almost wholly egocentric. For among criminals we find men of strong character, frankly and steadfastly devoted to what we are bound to call evil ; men of weak character who readily yield to the temptation of the moment, the while such conscience as they possess feebly pricks them ; and men of practically no character, with little sense of right and wrong, having no compass and no rudder. It is probable that the first group would figure more largely than it does in our prison population were it not that it includes the shrewder and more capable enemies of society, a considerable proportion of whom evade the penalties of the law.

Common sense, honesty, determination and courage on our part, rather than maudlin attempts to "reform" either the unreformable or the victims of our own insincerity, are the things called for. It is, of course, true that neither a scientific criminology nor a scientific penology will ever be constructed until we get a good deal clearer in our minds the very varied motives that drive

different people to break the laws, and take these motives into serious consideration in allotting appropriate preventive or curative measures. We need to keep in mind that the prime object of laws is, or should be, the well-being of those—the majority—who are prepared to observe them, not the well-being of those who break them. Nobody to-day can seriously defend the infliction of pain unless it is going to do good to someone. Nobody wants to punish certifiable lunatics, even if they are homicidal ones, but obviously they must be imprisoned somewhere or somehow. Indeed, I don't suppose that any truly intelligent person, realizing that everyone acts as he (given his psychic make-up and his circumstances) must act, would attempt to justify any form of punishment other than on grounds of expediency. Inevitability, just retribution, and the enforcement of such restitution as is possible, should be the aims of law-makers and administrators everywhere. As Devon put it : " There is only one principle in penology that is worth any attention ; it is to find out why a man does wrong and make it not worth his while "—an axiom the implications of which are far subtler and more profound than may appear at first glance. Understanding, sympathy, and sound education may well be more important factors than what is ordinarily called punishment in determining the relative force of temptations.

That brings us to the real issue. Who are they whom it is expedient to punish ? How can they severally be most effectively punished with the minimum of injury to their health and character and ultimate well-being ; and what is the most useful treatment we can apply to

those whose breaches of the law are a kind on which punishment is likely to have little or no deterrent effect ? Once we have accepted this statement of the fundamental issues, I believe that any educated man of average sensibility is as capable of appropriate discrimination and of prescribing appropriate therapeutic measures as are nine out of ten doctors or professional psychologists. Technicians for advice on technical points by all means ; but criminal diagnosis can most safely be left in the hands of common men, like judges and jurymen, whose habits of thought are not so remote from those of the men and women brought before them. Their limitations and mistakes we all know ; but not all of us seem to be aware of the limitations of the doctors and psychologists. Applied psychology, regarded as a specialist technique, is a scientific novelty ; and the variety of its results gives food for scepticism. In any event, no man's morale is likely to be improved whilst he is confined within prison walls. If imprisonment is to have any meaning, it must inevitably be based on force, on destruction of liberty and spontaneity, on limitation of individual responsibility, and on extreme inequality of status. Whilst doing our best to abolish useless cruelty, even to the cruel, let us not waste a lot of time and energy in efforts to " reform " our prisoners. Such time and energy were far better devoted to amending our laws and remedying the social conditions and economic injustices which lie at the root of so large a proportion of the offences which land men and women in prison. The residual problem will then be more clear ; and by then it is possible that the psycho-therapists will have

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

brought their art to a stage that will make it possible for them to make a real contribution to the curative treatment of our social defectives and moral eccentrics.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

PEOPLE are apt to look upon crime as fundamentally an affair of ethics. If, however, we are usefully to consider the problems which it raises, we shall be wise to regard a crime as "merely an instance of behaviour which is prohibited by the criminal law." Only thus can we sensibly discuss the real issues of law and penology, the sole concerns of which should be the promotion of social well-being and the diminution of crime. In this department of politics, expediency and effectiveness are far sounder guides than moral indignation or ethical "taste." It is easy, again, to be betrayed into sentimentality in our desire to "reform the individual offender," forgetting the equally, or even more, urgent necessity of deterring other potential law-breaks. We should be clear in our minds as to the various purposes which the criminal law and its application are intended to serve; and no less clear as to which of these, often conflicting, purposes we hold to be of greatest value and importance. It is all a question of adaptation of means to ends; and those means which best subserve what we can but regard as a lesser end may actually hinder the greater.

Three or four years ago, two American Professors of Law, Mr. Jerome Michael and Mr. M. J. Adler, published a book on the inter-relations of Crime, Law, and Social

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

Science. Their views on this conflict of retribution and reform are interesting and sound.

“If,” they say, “retributive punishment is to be the final purpose of criminal justice, the character of the behaviour content of the criminal law will be determined by the capacity of behaviour to arouse our indignation. . . . If our dislike for any conduct is sufficiently strong, we will make it criminal ; and the seriousness of the resulting crime can be measured by the intensity of dislike for that type of conduct.”

There is a common idea that so-called retributive justice is upheld only by those unprogressive minds which still represent the primitive among us. But it would be truer to say that it is only those who dwell among abstractions who have openly defended retribution as the correct basis of criminal jurisprudence. It was Kant who said that “judicial punishment can never be administered merely as a means of promoting good society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime ; . . . for one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purposes of another. . . . Justice would cease to be justice if it were bartered away for any consideration whatever.”

Hegel also contended that the conception of punishment as preventive, deterrent, or reformatory, is superficial. But nearly every one who reflects on the matter to-day agrees with the writers named on the previous page that “the proper aim of the criminal law is the welfare of the State” ; and that “justice is not a final end. Laws are justifiable only to the extent that they serve as

means to the social good." Notions of what constitutes the social good, however, vary from community to community and from age to age. To-day, the spirit of realism makes it difficult to regard virtue, as the Stoics regarded it, as a final end. Most of us agree with Bentham that "punishments are so many evils which are not justifiable except so far as results from them a greater sum of good." Conceptions of the "public good" are, of course, by no means static; and it is because of this that neither legislators nor the administrators of laws can regard or execute their tasks in the spirit, or by means of the technique, of the physicist. There is no place for expediency in science; the applied arts of politics are inevitably subservient to it. Were our scientific knowledge of the ætiology of crime more adequate, and were our legislators reasonably immune from personal prejudice—as distinguished from what may be called communal prejudice—preventive criminology would leave relatively little work for our judges and our prison warders. If our laws and their administration were directed even by common-sense knowledge, as distinct from individual opinion, the penological problem would still be a comparatively small one. Just as it is sometimes said that the surgeon's work consists in dealing with the physician's failures, so it may be said that our courts and prisons afford a measure of the failure of our laws and of our psychologic science.

In fact, resentment and retribution still figure prominently both in our criminal legislation and in our penal practice. As Professor Sidgwick put it, "the principle that punishment should be merely deterrent

and reformatory is too purely utilitarian for current opinion." It is, of course, open to question if this principle of retribution—of "serve him right"—is not itself socially essential; for in its absence the sense of moral responsibility inevitably becomes weakened, and right and wrong are apt to be regarded as mere impersonalities, or, at best, as matters of immediate expediency. One cannot help suspecting that such a scientific attitude would provide but an ineffective cement for any human society. To quote Lord Haldane:

"Punishment should inculcate, for the criminal and the outsider alike, a recognition of the true nature and moral quality of the deed. The criminal must be led to say, if it be possible, not only that he has been a fool, but that he has been a sinner, and has been rightly served in the eyes of decent people. The educative effect of punishment thus depends on the recognition of its justice, and its justice does not depend merely on its educative effect."

The change that has taken place in the classical or objective theory of punishment—so far as it still survives—is that it generalizes resentment. It posits that reparation is due to society rather than to the particular individual immediately aggrieved; but retribution and reparation are still inherent in most legislative and juridical practice. The great revolution, however, that has taken place in our attitude to criminal law and punishment is the increasing recognition of the psychology and personality of the criminal. It is now generally felt that punishment or alternative forms of treatment should be aimed at the offender rather than at the offence.

Although both the responsibility and the right of personal avengement have been taken away from the aggrieved individual, in other directions the importance of the individual has been increasingly recognized. It has, more or less vaguely, always been understood that the purpose of law "should be to uphold the rights of the World or the State"; but it has commonly been assumed that the criminal himself has, of his own volition, placed himself outside this regard and this claim on social protection. Modern scientific humanism has emphasized the fact that the offender himself is also an individual—difficult and wayward, it may be, but still as much entitled as any of his fellows to the benevolent consideration of a civilized State.

The common attitude to criminals is a confused one, its main ingredients being fear, vindictiveness and sentimentality. Of these, the last is the most futile. If we are seriously to lessen crime, it is idle to build our hopes on the reformation of those already well-established in anti-social habits.

That our criminal laws, even those enacted in recent years, incorporate conflicting philosophies and penological theories, and consequently lead to a very confused administration of justice, has often been remarked. An American student of Criminal Law, Dr. Mekel Elliott, has made an exhaustive analysis of the legislation of thirteen American States during the first quarter of the twentieth century; in an endeavour "to discover the extent to which the ideas represented in the main by the conflicting points of view of the classical and positive schools" of penology have been written into that legis-

lation. The two points of view principally differ in the emphasis respectively laid on the social consequences of the criminal deed and the motive of the criminal doer. According to one theory, that held by conservative legalists, punishment, while ultimately justified as contributing to the welfare of society, is rightly based on principles of retribution and deterrence. According to the other theory, that held in its extreme form by a large school of modern humanitarians and many psychiatrists, the treatment of the criminal should be based not only on considerations of social well-being, regarded as an individual needing help and remedial treatment. More and more has the latter of these attitudes come to prevail both in common sentiment and in the framing and administration of laws. But the old attitude survives, co-existent with the new ; now exercising more, now less, influence ; little attempt being made to establish harmony between them, or even to arrange them in any intelligent order of priority.

Originally, no doubt, the issue between free-will and determinism was not clearly defined, reliance being placed on "common sense." It was taken for granted that no man need act as he does did he not choose to do so, but that some, owing to temperament or circumstance, are more tempted than others. Accordingly, at a fairly early stage, discretionary power was given to judges to take into account extenuating circumstances and to make due allowance for them in the imposition of penalties. Unfortunately, judges all too often proved to be possessed not only of super-normal logical capacity but also of a full share of human prejudices. Arbitrary judgments

based on such prejudices became increasingly a matter of popular criticism ; and the impartiality of the judges came to be more and more questioned. The diminution of discretionary power, however, while it lessened the frequency of the old abuses, prevented judges from tempering their decisions either with science or with humanity. Precision became a penological ideal ; and there was a general desire that crimes and punishments should be defined with the exactness and mechanical uniformity of a grocer's price-list. " Crime came to be regarded as an abstract juridical entity, quite without any appraisal of why criminals are criminals." This position was first clearly stated by the Italian writer, Beccaria, who looked upon laws as " prescribing a fixed, specific and definite penalty in such a way as to ensure a fixed proportion between crime and punishment." Hence, he reasons, " judges have no right to interpret penal laws, since such interpretation is tantamount to making laws, and judges are not legislators." Punishment, as conceived by the classical school, could only be justified on the ground that man is a free moral agent, with complete liberty of choice between " right " and " wrong." It was again an Italian, Lombroso, who delivered the first effective blow at this somewhat complacent notion of criminality. As a result of many observations, Lombroso came to the conclusion that the criminal is a distinct anthropological type, with definite physical marks by which he can be distinguished. Accordingly, he held, it is the criminal rather than the crime on which social attention should be concentrated. Lombroso's theory of specific anatomical stigmata naturally did not win

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

universal acceptance ; and Garofalo produced convincing evidence that, in the main, criminals are characterized by psychological rather than by physical abnormalities.

It is, however, probable that the emotional and mental characteristics of most of those who break the law differ but in small degree from those of the average law-abiding citizen. This is especially true of those who commit crimes against property. A large number of these crimes can be traced to social and other environmental conditions ; others to the possession of courage above the normal or to a somewhat over-developed ambition. It is when we come to crimes against the person that we are more often confronted with examples of congenital abnormalities of mind and impulse. Some are deficient in the social instinct ; others are lacking in all sense of tenderness and pity ; while a few suffer from strange lusts, hypertrophied to the point of insanity. Unfortunately, when we attempt to apply it to the practical necessities of penology our knowledge of psychology proves to be but crude and elementary.

Although some sentimentalists seem to overlook the fact, few people, on sober reflection, would deny that the necessities of social preservation afford the principal reason and excuse for punishment, in however attenuated a form. In other words, there is pretty general agreement that the prime purpose of law and punishment is the diminution of crime. Differences arise as to the means whereby this end may be most effectively attained ; and it cannot be overlooked that any course of public action which offends the general sense of fairplay, kindness and human consideration can be itself as des-

tructive of social health as are the evils it seeks to remedy or prevent. Thus is explained the compromise between humanitarian considerations and the sense of regrettable expediency which lies behind nearly all modern legislation. There is no escaping the fact that, if any complicated society, made up of dissimilar units, is to prosper or even to exist, it must have common laws ; and means must be found for securing the general observance of those laws. Of course, bad laws need amendment, and unnecessary laws should be abolished ; but that raises another question. Here we are concerned solely with the means whereby, and the spirit in which, those laws are to be administered. It is right that laws should inflict the minimum of hardship on individuals, but their prime purpose must not be overlooked. Solicitude for the criminal should not lead us to disregard the evil wrought on the victims, whether individual or collective.

THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER

MOST people think of youthful law-breakers as rather exceptional and perplexing recruits in the great criminal army. But it is in the period of youth, generally of early youth, that law-breaking, like tuberculosis, begins. About three-quarters of all so-called habitual offenders receive their first conviction before the age of twenty-five, and well over a half of them are first convicted whilst still in their teens.

The problem of juvenile crime, therefore, is to a very large extent the problem of crime itself. Could

THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER

we solve the former satisfactorily, there would be but a relatively small residue left. And we must bear in mind that even the age of the first conviction is rarely the age of the first breach of the law. There is, as one would expect, nearly always a long history of undetected offences against the social code, preceding the episode that leads to discovery and publicity. Indeed, some competent observers give six years as the average age for the first clear sign of criminality.

Psychologists, doctors, and people of humanitarian sympathies on the one hand, and practical administrators, "common-sense" men of the world and traditional legalists on the other, are at odds as to the measure of responsibility rightly to be attributed to, and the measure of punishment rightly to be meted out to, those who have committed crimes mainly as a consequence of their abnormal emotional and intellectual make-up. Whatever views we may hold as to the moral responsibility of reputedly sane adults, most of us can but feel considerable hesitation in assigning full responsibility to children, and the law itself makes considerable distinctions in this matter.

The idea of making special allowances for, and treating less harshly and more hopefully, youthful breakers of the law is not a unique product of twentieth-century humanitarianism. Long before the legal brutalities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, special consideration, both by enactment and in practice, was given to the plea of youth. King Athelstane, so far back as the tenth century, enacted that "men should slay none younger than a fifteen winters' man"; and provided

that "if his kindred will not take him, nor be surety for him, then swear he as the bishop shall teach him, that he will shun all evil; and let him be in bondage for his price. And if after that he steals let men slay him or hang him, as they do to his elders." In the Year Books of Edward I, again, it is recorded that judgment for burglary was spared to a boy of twelve years.

Our attitude to the criminal, especially to the young criminal, has undergone a very great change in the course of the last hundred years. It seems incredible that only in the last century a thirteen-year-old child who had broken into a house and stolen a spoon was sentenced to death by an English Court. We have grown more humane and more tolerant, but also we have grown more scientific. We are becoming convinced that for the majority of crimes we can discover causes well within our power of remedy or of prevention. We know that many of those who are found guilty of law-breaking are rather the victims than the conscious enemies of society. Naturally, therefore, increasing efforts have been, and are being, made to discover methods whereby character, at any rate partly formed or adolescent character, may be remoulded more in accordance with the basic principles of our society.

Comfortably off, conventional, law-abiding people are apt to think of crime as a unity, and of the "criminal classes" as a race apart—differently equipped, differently motivated—from themselves. These generalizations, which have no relation to fact, must be utterly dismissed from the mind. Crimes do not make up one class or group of ultimates, but are merely illegal or uncon-

THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER

ventional acts of almost infinite variety, indicative of almost every degree of moral obliquity. Nor is there any uniformity in the make-up of the individuals who commit these crimes and are brought before the courts. Nothing can be more absurd than to argue, as many quasi-scientific persons have argued and continue to argue, that criminality is an hereditary quality transmitted like black hair or blue eyes, by means of the germ-plasm, from one generation to another. From a human or moral point of view, there is little similarity between such an act as the stealing of a bun or a banana by a hungry child, and a piece of wanton cruelty like the pushing of a hairpin into a cat's eye, or the calm murdering of a small playfellow, for some such trivial reason as the reluctance of the latter to part with a toy. Yet all these three acts are technically crimes, and liable to bring their perpetrators before the magistrate or the judge.

The problem of criminality is as wide and varied as is the problem of physical disease. The parallel, indeed, is a very close one ; and, just as in the one instance we are confronted with a small number of individuals condemned from birth, by hereditary flaws, to disease and consequent mental or physical incapacity, or early death, whatever their environmental conditions ; so, in the other, we find a number—again a relatively small one—of children whose inherent instinctive make-up is such that no training and no external circumstances seem able to save them from the force of their impulse towards this or that unsocial or criminal line of conduct, impossible to be tolerated by any organized community.

But again, just as in the one instance, the larger amount

of physical and mental sickness is traceable to disharmony between inherent qualities and environmental circumstances—a disharmony entirely preventable by human prevision and intervention—or to acquired habits which might easily have been quite other ; so, also, as Dr. Burt, in his admirable book on *The Young Delinquent*, proves so convincingly, the great majority of juvenile crimes, and therefore of all crimes, might be prevented if we would use the intelligence and the knowledge which we even now possess.

Founders of philosophies, remote as they seem from popular life and popular interest, often have in the long run a considerable and sometimes unfortunate influence on popular opinion. Thus, a serious hindrance to the impartial consideration of crime and punishment is constituted by the general adoption of the Hedonistic or Utilitarian system of philosophy, the essence of which is that we are all motivated more or less clearly and definitely by a consideration of the pleasure or pain which alternative courses of action are usually likely to yield. Of course, in actual fact, not one out of a hundred of our acts is determined by any such calculation. Few indeed are the heroes or criminals whose reputations depend on their nice power of calculation.

Ultimately, we are dependent for the force which sets us moving in this or that direction on comparatively few native instincts ; which may, by training, be diverted or sublimated in a hundred ways, but can, by no effort of education or chance of circumstances, be created if they are absent, or abolished if they are present. A child born devoid of that impulse of pity or tender-

THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER

ness which, in its most pronounced form, we know as the maternal instinct, will be a danger to whatever society in which he is allowed to live at large. So with the child whose social instinct is so weak as to afford no check on the even more fundamental instincts of self-assertion and acquisitiveness.

Few children, however, are by nature handicapped to this extent. Many, probably most, of the boys and girls who find themselves convicted of crime have an inherent mental make-up differing little from that of their law-abiding fellows. Of the rest of these juvenile delinquents, most are possessed of all the usual impulses and instincts of humanity, but the relative strength of these represents a departure from the customary. If they are to be brought into harmony with society, special training and special circumstances are called for ; just as certain children are, from the point of view of health, more in need of an open-air life and all that goes with it, than are many of those so constituted as to lead a life of comparative healthiness even in a crowded slum.

In the opinion of Dr. Burt—an opinion based on a very wide experience and an exceptional power of critical sympathy—the two greatest factors in the making of delinquents are overcrowding, with consequent absence of facilities for recreation and the pursuit of hobbies, and faulty home discipline—over-severe on the one hand or over-lax on the other, in both cases unrelated to reasonable and appealing standards or ideals. This conclusion, if we reflect on it, will seem to affect the very root of our customary notions of crime and its treatment.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

Mr. Lawes, Warden of Sing Sing Prison, tells us that, of 1,393 new admissions to Sing Sing during 1931, 343 were graduates of juvenile homes and reformatories ; whereas of 3,307 children under sixteen years of age in New York City, who were given individual treatment and remained in private homes for from one to five years, only eleven were arrested for serious offences. All that a very large proportion of youthful offenders need for their socialization of habit is a better, a happier, a more cultivated and in every way more agreeable home and environment than they have hitherto enjoyed. It is doubtful if those who cannot be reformed by such means can be reformed at all.

MURDER AND THE PUBLIC MIND

NO constant student of the daily newspapers will be likely to challenge the statement that of all public events, murder has the highest "news value." Murders, and trials of persons suspected in connexion therewith, undoubtedly furnish the material of the literature swallowed with greatest eagerness by the majority of newspaper readers.

Is this widespread interest among the natural or normal characteristics of healthy mankind, or is it a symptom of mental malady ? Whether it be normal or morbid, is it a phenomenon desirably to be fostered, disregarded, or curbed ? Should the publicity now customarily given to murders be checked, either by legal intervention or by the pressure of organized public opinion ?

MURDER AND THE PUBLIC MIND

To these questions the answers are by no means so simple and certain as many sentimentalists might imagine. In this country, the people ultimately responsible for its laws and customs, for its codes of conduct and conventions generally, are the whole adult population, feebly and inadequately as they may use their power and fulfil their public duty.

The facts of lunacy and crime and the circumstances out of which they arise, including the temperaments and predisposition of the lunatics and criminals themselves, are very definitely matters of general concern. That most people approach them in a spirit the very opposite of philosophic and scientific, does not negate the proposition laid down. If it negates anything it is the possibility of sane democracy.

We no longer think—or, perhaps it would be truer to say, scientific observers no longer think—that criminals, or even murderers, constitute a distinct species of God's creatures. A slight difference in the proportional strength of our native impulses; a slight difference in our early environment—our home, our friends, the books that come our way—a slight difference in our circumstances, temptations and difficulties; and most of us are potential criminals of one sort or another.

Murderers, again, rarely seem to differ in any obvious way from other members of the community. All sorts of people who have for decades lived on intimate terms with their neighbours, whose everyday acts and interests are matters of general local knowledge, who have won the respect of their fellow-townsmen, and filled positions

of trust, suddenly startle everyone by appearing in the dock on a capital charge.

Since, then, there is nothing in appearance, in range of interests, in daily activities, or in domestic habits marking out murderers or potential murderers from other folk, what is it, apart from unusual provocation—which, by the way, but rarely affords an explanation—in a man or woman, that makes it natural to commit an act from which most people shrink with horror?

Is it some native, inborn, mental impulse, lacking in other people, or is it the absence of some restraining instinct which is generally present as an adequate inhibitory force; or is there something in the early training of these individuals which has led to the acceptance of a different standard of the desirable; or lastly, is it some combination of these possible factors?

We must bear in mind that the motive force behind every human act, as of every animal act, is some instinct or impulse inherited—possibly developed or dwarfed by training—and not any process of reasoning.

The function of reason is, firstly, to delay active response to a stimulus; and, secondly, to bring into consciousness a number of associations and potential consequences of alternative lines of action.

Before they have been modified by experience and by the influence of others—including racial conventions and traditions—our native instincts or impulses are comparatively simple.

There is the great impulse tending to the reproduction of our kind, with all its gradations of emotion, from lust to the most refined love. And there is the impulse

MURDER AND THE PUBLIC MIND

to protect the young and the weak—what is known as the maternal instinct, though it is not confined to women—with which is associated the powerful emotion of tenderness or pity.

These impulses we all possess, but not in equal proportion or in equal degree. As some men are shorter than others, so some are less tender or less self-regarding than others.

But it is not only quantitatively that our motive forces differ. According to our training, to our environment, and to the social influences that have been brought to bear on us, our sympathies and interests may be widened or narrowed and our ambitions and ideals correspondingly affected. So that, as a result, egoism may take on the noblest or the most sordid form, and pity may have as its object a single unit or the whole of animate creation. Between these extremes there is every graduation.

Now, though individuality remains a human characteristic, man is a social animal. In a lesser degree than in more completely socialized creatures, such as the bee, thought, emotion and action are, to a large extent, common or general in any given community. The mass of opinions are accepted opinions; the mass of emotions are customary emotions; the generality of acts are conventional acts. Religion, etiquette, public opinion, and “good form” determine for most people the outlets for their instincts and the nature of their ideals.

But, with the progressive development of the human intellect, an increasing number of people—not necessarily in any other way superior to their fellows—escape

from the thralldom of the customs and conventions of their society, recognizing them as having no validity beyond that of any other human invention. This is the state of mind on the one hand of most of those people who make the largest contributions to human progress, and on the other hand of those who commit the most appalling crimes.

For the most part, these latter have been trained by parents and teachers who still rely on the force of traditional laws and customs ; and consequently have neither attempted, nor been in the position, to instil into their pupils socially desirable ideals of conduct based on first-hand philosophy, or on what we may call the immediate religious sense.

Little wonder if some of these mapless and compassless souls sometimes manifest in ugly and anti-social ways the egoism and self-assertiveness that they share with all of us.

If, in addition to this handicap, such impulses of tenderness as they have are below the normal in volume, and narrow in their range of application, circumstances may easily arise in which murder offers to them what we can but regard as a natural outlet of expression.

The moral of it is that reason and intelligence are valuable tools, but may be safely entrusted only to those who have been trained to use them. The need for a fundamental revision of the rules and principles on which our whole system of education is built is becoming increasingly urgent.

Probably most crimes, even the most serious, are more the result of faulty education and faulty adapta-

tion than of inherent mental or emotional defects. And it seems to me that not only is there no harm in ordinary serious people reading the detailed reports of crimes and their attendant circumstances, but that it is their bounden duty to read them and to reflect on them.

When, as so often happens, grave crimes are committed for no other apparent reason than to overcome the difficulties which social conventions have wisely, or unwisely, created, it is well that we should realize the nature of the conflict ; it may be that the convention is nearly as much at fault as the crime. Possibly, it has outlived its utility ; possibly, for average human nature, it is premature ; or, a third possibility, it may be so opposed to the fundamental instincts of mankind that nothing but very careful training in youth can prevent its secret contravention.

There is thus a strong *prima facie* case for the familiarizing of a democracy with the nature of the ills which it inflicts or tolerates.

The question remains—does the reading of narratives of horrors so accustom the mind to their details and their potentiality as to lead those of weak character to reproduce them ? This is not a question that can be answered with an assured *yea* or *nay*. Imitation is undoubtedly a very real motive force in human life. But few of us are tempted to imitate those whose careers have ended in shame and contumely. Of crime that, in the egoistic sense, succeeds—crime, that is, which escapes detection—we naturally read nothing and hear nothing.

Detected crime presents no very fascinating ideal for

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

average men and women. There are, however, a few unbalanced persons to whom notoriety at any price seems a desirable goal. Reported crimes may for such furnish the form of their hunt for fame. For it is a matter of observation that certain types of crime do seem to have an epidemic character. Possibly, so far as these few individuals and their victims are concerned, it were to be wished that the horrors of the criminal courts were as secret as the horrors of the slaughter-house, but, on the whole, the gain of publicity outweighs the loss.

PRISON

“WELL, how did you get on ?” I asked my patient, who had just done three months for defrauding the local Public Assistance Committee. “Oh, I got on all right ; they are real gentlemen there, and they treat you like a gentleman. The only complaint I’ve got is that they don’t give you enough fat, and I’m very partial to fat ; but I spoke to the Governor about it, and he said he’d see what he could do.” “But wasn’t it all a bit monotonous ?” I asked. “Of course, there wasn’t much to do there ; but we had lecturers and singers and musicians down to entertain us ; and other times we used to sit on the floor round the fire and have debates. Some of the chaps there were fine talkers, and things used to get a bit lively at times.” It was evident to me that my patient was suffering from a mild nostalgia ; and that the “liberty” he had recovered

PRISON

was a doubtful exchange for the security and amenities he had lost.

Here is another experience. A young working-man of eighteen, who happened to be a neighbour of mine in the country, played some biological tricks with a young woman who worked at an adjacent farm. The facts were obvious and could not be disputed. I paid a barrister to do his best to get him sent to prison rather than for three years to Borstal. In this he succeeded, the sentence being six months in the county prison, a building of the old-fashioned sort. A month later I inquired of the lad's mother if she had any news of him. She told me that she got a letter from the matron nearly every week ; that the matron had told her he seemed happy and comfortable, in spite of a cold in the head. He had, however, been kept in bed for a couple of days, and was " now quite well again." He was doing bricklaying and was getting very good at it. At the end of his term of imprisonment this young man came to see me. I hardly recognized him. From a weedy, shifty-looking youth you wouldn't feel safe in leaving your cat with for a week, he had developed into a wholesome young man who could frankly look you in the face, giving the impression that he could be trusted to fulfil any responsibility he undertook. From that day to this he has not only been a good workman, but obviously has been getting more out of life than he ever did before. I would like, also, to talk about a friend of mine who was sentenced to eighteen months in Wormwood Scrubs. When I went to see him he said he had nothing to grouse about. " The only

people who have a rotten time in this prison are the warders. They've got a dog's job, and they're nearly all of them awfully decent chaps."

Heaven knows, there is plenty of scope for the improvement of English prisons ; but, on the other hand, I am sure that very few people have the least idea of the enormous changes that have taken place and are still taking place in prison administration. Much of the abuse that is poured out by well-meaning, but ill-informed, persons is no longer relevant. This sort of criticism not only does not help, but definitely hinders prison reform, and checks the development of an intelligent attitude to the problems raised by crime and its practitioners. How many people, for instance, know that the rightly condemned "separate system" has quite disappeared from our prisons ; or that all that remains of "hard labour" is that a prisoner so sentenced has to do without a mattress for the first fourteen days of his sentence ? If the prisoner is under sixteen or over sixty, or is a woman, even this deprivation is remitted.

Dr. Hamblin Smith, who for thirty-five years acted as Medical Officer in various English prisons, though far from complacent as to present penological practice, tells us that "much of what in prison life is regarded by outsiders as very horrible is not so regarded by the ordinary prisoner ; whilst much which such a prisoner finds very objectionable often appears to the outsider as trivial, or even admirable."

A good deal of the very general woolly-mindedness that exists over this business of law and punishment is due to the popular confusion of law-abidingness with

morality. A criminal is merely a person who has broken the law—the sinfulness or virtuousness of his act being, from a penological point of view, irrelevant. It will be generally agreed that no human society can be run without rules or laws ; and all experience and observations makes it clear that, no matter what the conditions of that society, certain individuals will observe the rules laid down by the majority only if penalties for their breach attach to them. That the problem of crime is not simply one of economic or social readjustment an hour's observation of the traffic on our main thoroughfares should convince the most sentimental. A determinist may plead that no man, being what he is, can, in given circumstances, act other than as he does. The answer to this is that considerations of expediency compel us so to modify those circumstances as to deter him from anti-social acts. If his egoism is excessive, or his impulses of *camaraderie* and consideration for others are weak, he must be deterred, out of care for his own skin, purse, or liberty, from creating social disharmony. Social well-being is more likely to be promoted by such means than by attempts to reconstruct the abnormal emotional make-up of an adult man. Dr. Hamblin Smith, although a convinced Freudian and an enthusiastic advocate of the full psychological investigation of every convicted criminal, with a view to his classification and appropriate treatment, warns us against assuming that "all criminal conduct can be obviated by psychological measures" ; and points out that "it is one thing to investigate a case in the light of the newer psychological theories,

but quite another matter to treat a case by one of the new psychological methods."

Dr. Squire, the Medical Officer to Sing Sing Prison, is more sceptical still of the value of psychologic diagnoses in prison life. He gives, in his book *Sing Sing Doctor*, telling portraits of two criminals whose futures, assuming suitable opportunity, he had ventured to prognose. One, a highly intelligent and accomplished man, he considered a model prisoner in every way, and as having reached the point in his life where he was both desirous and capable of adjusting himself to society. Consequently Dr. Squire took steps to secure his release and his establishment in a responsible position in New York. For the other, classified as a psychopathic criminal, Dr. Squire saw little hope. The subsequent careers of these two men convinced him of the futility of formulating anticipatory views upon the conduct of criminals. "My judgment was based on what I saw of them while I had them under observation in prison. I erred in my predictions in each instance." Dr. Squire concludes that the forces that determine human conduct, and the factors that turn the course this way or that, are too variable and complex for confident analysis or prognosis ; and he adds that none of us need congratulate ourselves any too much on our success in keeping out of prison. . . . Good management and good manners may have had something to do with it, but the chief reason most of us have escaped the stigma of criminality is that there has been in us a fair degree of balance between the expression and the restraint of our normal impulses.

And here are some conclusions of Dr. Hamblin

PRISON

Smith : "Improve social and economic conditions as far as may be, yet we shall still have individuals who cannot or will not fit in with the demands of society. It is not easy to see what alternative to imprisonment, as a final penalty, can be devised. Let us, by all means, make our prisons as humane, as healthy, and as little demoralizing as we can, short of destroying their deterrent effect—remembering that it is the certainty rather than the severity of punishment which is the important deterrent factor."

Mr. Lawes, for thirteen years Warden of Sing Sing, is all for humanizing prison life to the extreme limit. He believes that the customary methods of the law may well continue to be employed to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused person ; but that, guilt having been established, the treatment appropriate to each case should be prescribed, not in subservience to formal codes, but "by an impartial board of experts," skilled and experienced in penal therapeutics.

"Not years but accomplishment should be the measure of a prisoner's confinement. In essence, prison terms should be based upon the prisoner's ability to make himself useful to society—the unskilled worker to learn a trade ; the illiterate to acquire the education needed to hold a job ; the wanderer to find for himself a home and responsibility ; the deficient mentally to attain a better understanding of the values of life ; the cynic and perverse to adopt a saner attitude toward society and government."

He quite agrees that there are some minds so twisted or so long twisted that by no human effort can they

again be straightened ; “ for them there can be nothing but permanent segregation from society, just as we segregate the insane ” ; but he believes that such constitute but a small minority of those who commit crimes. He contends that the average prisoner does not need hospitals or armed camps or guns or bludgeons, but workshops and schools.

“ Doing tasks, rather than doing time, must become the objective of every prisoner if our corrective measures are to serve their purposes. Every task assigned to him should be treated with an eye towards vocational training. He should be paid for his work, and the amount of his earnings ought to govern his mode of living within the walls. Every prisoner should be made to pay for his keep. There should be nothing paternal about prison.”

Mr. Lawes argues, further, that prisoners should be encouraged to keep abreast of current events ; and, with this end in view, that they should be provided with current newspapers and allowed to discuss their contents, both among themselves and with their officers.

“ If prisoners want to laugh while they eat, let them. If they have the urge to discuss politics or economics, or the latest talkie, or recent sport events, or even the prison menu, at the mess-table, what harm is there in that ? If we are to return men to society we want to send them out as normal human beings.”

Let us reform our prisons ; but—far more important—let us concentrate our main efforts on so improving social and economical conditions as to make law-abiding life attractive to as many people as possible, and thus reduce the number of those who will be tempted

to commit punishable crimes. On the whole, facts and figures lend encouragement to penologic enterprise along these lines. The considerable social reforms of the last twenty years have coincided with a steady fall in the population of our prisons, especially in the number of those imprisoned for non-indictable—that is, relatively trivial—offences; the figure for 1931 being only about one-quarter of that which obtained before the war. On the other hand, the number of indictable offences, including housebreaking and shoplifting, reported to the police has pronouncedly increased. Here we are apparently dealing with a more determined type of anti-social individual, who trusts to his skill in evading arrest. Thus, in 1930, whereas 147,000 indictable offences were reported to the police, only 66,000 persons were proceeded against in respect of them; and of these about 10,000 were not convicted.

The fact that nearly one-half of the men and women sentenced for offences other than drunkenness have been in prison before has led to a widespread belief that a very big proportion of those whom we send to prison become recidivists. As a matter of fact, some ninety per cent of all first offenders do not return to prison at all. A significant statement in Mr. Fox's book, *The English Prison*, is that "a substantial part of the prison population consists of a stage army of individuals who pass through the prisons again and again," and he adds: "evidently some ten per cent of prisoners are neither reformed nor deterred by their first term of imprisonment." It is often assumed that the existence of recidivism proves the ineffectiveness of imprisonment

as a deterrent to law-breaking ; but this conclusion, as the above figures show, does not follow. Moreover, imprisonment acts as a deterrent on people who never go to prison at all. But for the fear of legal punishment, and the social ostracism that goes with it, who shall say how many of us would continue to place the well-being and harmony of society above our immediate personal interests ? Fellow-feeling on a world scale, or even on a national scale, is still with many people a weaker impulsive force than pride, greed, and love of comfort. We need to beware of over-sentimentalizing in this matter. We live in a conditioned world, and a human society without limitation of the expression of individual impulse is unattainable. Far more important and more urgent than the " reformation " of prisoners (most of whom are in no more need of moral reformation than are their law-abiding neighbours), or even of prisons, is the reform of our laws and of our social and economic systems so as to bring them into closer agreement with contemporary ideas of justice and fair play. To quote Dr. Hamblin Smith : " A well-ordered community would provide every one of its members with employment at a proper wage, and take steps to see that each member did his or her best in that employment. If he or she failed to do so, then the State should take drastic steps, far more drastic than those which it now takes against a few of its subjects. It must never be forgotten that for the vast majority of persons, in this and other ' civilized ' countries, economic security is non-existent. The surprising thing is, not that a few fall into crime, but that a vast number do not do so."

MIND AND REASON

SOCRATES: HIS SIGN

THAT philosophers are queer has always been the common opinion. The important questions are, how do they differ from the rest of us, and are the differences physiological or pathological? In other words, is the pursuit of philosophy a biologically useful specialization of human effort, or is philosophy to be ranked with the neuroses and the other psychic aberrations which the biologist is compelled to regard as morbid perversions?

The germ of all human potentialities is to be found in every man; and philosophy is no exception. But those whom we agree to call philosophers are so specialized as to be, with reasonable ease, marked off from their fellows. Philosophy is not strictly comparable with any of the natural or physical sciences. It has a strong emotional quality, which brings it into relation with art and religion, from which, indeed, it was once undifferentiated. There is, in every system of philosophy, a personal, temperamental element which is seldom observable in the sciences. At the same time, the scientific method has been found applicable to problems rightly classed as philosophic, equally with those more abstract ones with which the mathematicians and physicists are concerned. The world which the philosopher builds is,

however, warmer and more satisfying than any of the formal structures erected by the scientists. As Dr. Alexander Herzberg put it, in a very interesting book on *The Psychology of Philosophers*, philosophy enables the hypersensitive man to make for himself a world "in which he can live and be active," and obtain some measure of satisfaction for his impulses. By philosophy, man can surround himself with an artificial mental climate which he can carry with him, and is thus enabled to enjoy a psychic range comparable with the range of his geographic occupancy. This is a very different thing from the atmosphere of illusion with which the neurotic and the dement surround themselves. Philosophy satisfies; neurosis fails to satisfy. To the neurotics we owe nothing but our sympathy and our pity; to the philosophers we owe gratitude; for they, like great artists, create, for the similarly constituted though less endowed members of the public, magic pleasure-gardens, "affording recreation and health to many who have no plot of earth of their own."

Although, at times, Dr. Herzberg seems to take an almost Nordau-like view of the futility of philosophers and artists alike, contending that their pictures of the world are mere sour-grape images devised by people with "mighty longings and trivial practical abilities," his book is mainly devoted to showing the positive character of the native impulses and qualities that distinguish the great philosophers. It is, of course, obvious that in so far as any specialist is preoccupied with his peculiar interest, whether it be the gaming-table, or bibliomania, or Egyptology, his efficiency in what are

called practical affairs is likely to suffer. But it is not the predominance of the philosophic interest which is peculiarly responsible for the philosopher's unsuitableness for practical life. The records of the lives of philosophers do not, on the whole, show them to be, when occasion demands, less practically efficient than other men of their class and environment. Indeed, they have often manifested, in addition to their surplus output of organized abstractions, a worldly sense and ability well above the average.

Philosophers have nearly always been men of unusually strong impulses, the expression of which along ordinary lines has, by reason of external or internal obstacles, been difficult or impossible. William James aptly illustrated the fallacy of confusing strength of inhibition with feebleness of impulse :

"The man free from inhibitions will be the king of his company, sing all the songs, make all the speeches, lead all the parties, carry out all the practical jokes, kiss all the girls, fight the men, and, if need be, lead the forlorn hopes and enterprises, so that an onlooker would think he has more life in his little finger than can exist in the whole body of a correct judicious fellow. But the judicious fellow all the while may have all these possibilities and more besides, ready to break out in the same or even a more violent way if only the brakes were taken off."

The philosopher differs, by virtue of his intellect and his power of philosophic expression, from the neurotic, who also may have powerful impulses and excessive inhibitions, and manifest equal hypersensitiveness to the

unpleasant. As has been said, the outlet for pent-up energies which neurosis provides never affords positive satisfaction. By true sublimation, impulses whose primitive biological expression would take the form of action can be made to yield personal relief and joy. It is, as Dr. Herzberg says, "a highly developed capacity for sublimation which distinguishes the artist, the philosopher and the man of religion from the neurotic." The philosopher, again, differs from the artist in the preponderance of the critical faculty of his intelligence, and the relative smallness of his faculty of projection; while he differs from the religious mystic in the weakness of his instinct for submission to authority.

That intense inhibitions tend to disqualify a man for success in practical everyday life, and predispose to the seeking of psychic outlets for active impulses, is no new observation. In the "Apology," Socrates says: "This sign I have had ever since I was a child. The sign of a voice which comes to me and forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything; and this is what stands in the way of my being a politician." And it will be clear that in proportion to the force of the native impulse, to the measure of sensitiveness, and to the degree of intellectual clarity with which impressions are interpreted, the difficulty of satisfactory expression by action is multiplied, and the need for sublimation increased. Though philosophers are but men, great philosophers are great men, embodying in supreme degree some of man's highest and noblest qualities and faculties—inventiveness, intelligent criticism and co-ordination. It is absurd to regard as futile or

perverse an activity that not merely exercises but so adequately satisfies powerful human impulses and interests. If man is to climb the path up but a few steps of which he has already travelled, it is by the suffusion of common life with philosophy that the ascent will be made possible.

Man has a faculty for living in two or more worlds at once, and to his possession of this strange power must be attributed the seemingly endless conflict between psychologists as to his true nature and the true method of studying his activities. "We are only that amphibious piece between a corporeal and spiritual essence, that middle form that links these two together." It is interesting to find among the philosophers an increasing recognition of the limitation of nineteenth-century scientific methods, and a clearer understanding of the inadequacy of both the mechanistic and the consciously purposive explanations of human conduct. Since Newton's time, science, in dealing with the inorganic world, has dismissed all considerations of purposiveness, and has sought the cause of all phenomena in events antecedent. Consequences have been regarded as no part of an explanation. Precedent causes have been classed as "natural"; alleged purposes and goals as "supernatural". The latter have therefore been looked upon as coming within the realm of superstition—or, more tolerantly, as appertaining to theology or metaphysics. The astounding results certainly justified the method, which was gradually extended from the study of inanimate to that of animate nature. Here, again, the consequences of applying to physiology the logic and technique of chemistry

and physics exceeded the hopes of the most optimistic. The strange belief grew up that further investigation along these lines would ultimately "explain" all the phenomena of life ; and this belief is to-day consciously or unconsciously held by a large majority of unimaginative, unoriginal, cultivated people.

It were folly to deny or to underestimate the valuable practical results that have followed on, and almost certainly resulted from, the adoption by orthodox science of the mechanist conception of life. Nearly all that is good in modern hygiene has directly sprung from it. But the strikingly characteristic feature of human, as of all animal, activity consists, not in chemical and physical sequences, but in purposiveness. Consequences throw on the motives of human action at least as much light as is thrown by antecedents. When the common man asks why another behaved in such or such a way, he is more concerned with the "why" than the "how." It must be the experience of everyone that a very large proportion of his conscious doings is the result of a foresight of possible happenings, with a desire or impulse to bring about or to prevent those happenings. But we are discovering that those goals at which we consciously aim are few by the side of those towards which we are impelled or drawn with even greater force, though no anticipatory picture may have presented itself to our consciousness. It is, of course, possible to describe human action without reference to the end towards which it is directed—"the change of energy in the various parts, the sound-waves, and so on, outside the body." But, as Professor Leonard Russell has said, "a complete

description of what actually occurs, if we really act in view of ends, will have to take these ends into account, and show in what way our attitude toward them co-operates to determine the actual movements our body makes." Otherwise, the statement has the same character as that of the medical witness at the coroner's inquest who, having described various bruises and abrasions, concluded his evidence by stating that he found "no other signs of injury except of the neck, which was broken!"

Even in the realm of pure physiology, when we come to study the numerous phenomena associated with the maintenance of organic equilibrium, purposiveness of which we are entirely unconscious plays at least as important a causative part as do any of those forces which mechanical science contemplates. The automatic restoration and maintenance of the chemical and physical normal is, indeed, the most profound discovery of modern physiology; and it is one of the merits of the hormic psychology that, by its refusal to draw an uncrossable line between the conscious and the unconscious mind within us—or rather, between the psychic happenings of which we are aware and those of which we are unaware—it is able to bring under its formulæ not only those events commonly classed as psychological, but also others hitherto regarded as purely physiological. This purposiveness, this urge towards a goal, must be accepted as a basic fact in biology, incapable of being explained by, or analysed into, mechanical forces or physical conceptions. It is this urge which gives rise to our sense of values and "meaning"—two terms for

MIND AND REASON

which mechanistic biology has no use. Yet, to the ordinary person, it is this faculty for assigning values that is among the outstanding characteristics of human, and apparently of all animal, life. To quote H. S. Jennings: "Desires and aspirations are determiners in the operation of the universe on the same footing as physical determinants." All this business of enzymes, hormones, and so on, is interesting and valuable. But, as has been pointed out, it represents "not biology, but rather the application of physics and chemistry to the study of the modes of activity of the living organism." The difference between a run-away motor-car and a car under the control of a human driver would seem to be fundamental.

THE BORDERLINE

MENTAL sanity is a very different thing from cleverness or intellectuality; just as physical health is a very different thing from strength of arm. The essential characteristics of sanity, whether of mind or of body—or, to speak more correctly, of mind and body—are balance, harmony, appropriateness and adaptability. So-called practical men and women just as often "enjoy" poor mental health as do the dreamers and the imaginative; for the standards applicable to dynamic problems such as the grilling of a steak or the driving of a motor-car are as inappropriate to the solution of a problem in geometry or to the contemplation of abstract beauty as are the intrusions of speculative idealism into the execu-

tive work of the fire-brigade. The aeronaut should get his dreaming over before he starts on his flight, or leave it until his safe landing. But no less necessary is it that the mechanic and the financier remove their everyday shoes before entering the Temple of abstractions. A good sense of proportion is generally acknowledged to be a desirable possession, but proportion and value are often spoken of as though there were some permanently correct arrangement of mental furniture ; this, at most, calling for an annual spring-cleaning and refurbishing. But, like everything else in life, proportions and value are eternally fluctuant and undulant ; they change from moment to moment as circumstances and needs vary.

Few people have the faculty of sizing-up a difficulty, and of balancing it against their powers and their skill—gauging with reasonable accuracy what they can do and to what they must submit. Nine-tenths of the neuroses of the world are due to a cowardly reluctance to look difficulties and limitations squarely in the face. So many people endeavour to conceal, even from themselves, the disparity between the strength of their wills and the magnitude of the cosmic forces which confront them. A reasoned humility—which is something very different from self-depreciation—is almost the last word of wisdom ; being, indeed, as important a factor in the conduct of life as is pride itself. Just pride and true humility are not opposites ; at bottom they collectively represent a real appreciation of one's possibilities and limitations. They are the obverse, rather than the antithesis, of each other.

The neurotic is an individual who finds himself constantly faced with situations with which—through inherent mental defect, or as a result of prolonged physical illness or exceptional psychic difficulties—he feels himself unable to deal openly and decisively. He therefore buries his head in the sand ; in other words, he semi-consciously follows a path of less resistance, and substitutes for the true obstacle some physical disability for which the doctor can find no organic cause. Mental conflict between action and restraint is normal, being comparable with that between the extensor and flexor muscles of the limbs. It is when the conflict is inconclusive and integration incomplete that the situation becomes a pathological one. Neurosis is an attempt at self-protection and self-deception rather than at deceiving others. It differs profoundly from malingering, with which many people confuse it ; though, individually and socially, its effects may be as unfortunate as those of its worse-reputed sister. In spite of its innocent name, neurosis, indeed, should rightly be looked upon as a mild form of insanity.

Whenever we find ourselves confusing our day-dreams or wishes with representations of phenomenal actualities, it is high time to put on the brake and have a good look at our machinery. There is nothing wrong about day-dreams ; indeed, it is as day-dreams that all new ideas, all things which spring from man's imagination, the ingredients of civilization itself, first show themselves. It is the failure to recognize them as phantasies of the mind, which may or may not be directly realizable, that constitutes the danger. It is in such confusion, far

THE BORDERLINE

more often than in the inevitable tragedy of external events, that the roots of human misery are to be found. Hence suicide, and many an effort at escape almost as desperate.

Everybody understands that a man rushing about the streets firing a loaded revolver, or running naked into the midst of the traffic, must be restrained ; but they find it difficult to see much danger in the delusion of the otherwise sane individual that he is being watched and followed, and his character blasted ; or in the hallucination of the girl who hears voices believed by her to have divine authority. Yet the former may, any day, drive its victim to kill his supposed persecutor—as likely as not his best friend ; and the latter may receive an “ order ” the obeying of which may involve the verdict of “ Suicide while of unsound mind.” The dangerous and the harmless delusions and illusions are not always easy to distinguish.

There can be no doubt that we have at large no insignificant number of people, behaving normally in most of the ordinary circumstances of life, who have yet within their mind, dissociated from the rest, a little independent centre of mental activity full of dangerous potentialities.

Insanity, like physical disease, represents merely a slightly increased development of phenomena which manifest themselves almost every day in the lives of most of us. There is no clear line of demarcation between the healthy and the sick ; the sane and the insane. It is a matter of degree. And it is by studying the divagations from strict theoretic sanity in ourselves

and our so-called sane acquaintances that we can best understand the more pronounced departures in those whom we classify as insane.

There are two forms of insanity which stand apart. They are associated with actual physical undevelopment or physical degeneration of the brain itself; and their manifestation is not so much a change of mentality as a lack of mentality. They are known as *amentia* and *dementia*. Typical instances are offered by congenital imbecility and by the insanity which sometimes accompanies extreme old age. They do not differ essentially from ordinary physical diseases or defects.

But, even when we have excluded these two kinds, insanity presents itself in several classifiable forms. Three main groups especially strike one. There is first the individual suffering from what is called *acute mania*. He is in a state of the greatest excitement, generally moving about feverishly, with eager purposes which vary from minute to minute; commonly in the highest of spirits, and well pleased with himself. The mental energy he puts forth is usually terrific, and his logic is often excellent. It is merely his facts which are wrong. We know that there is no gold buried below the cellar; that those little dark shadows are neither snakes nor rats; that the footstep on the stair is not that of a murderer, and that the proffered cup of tea contains no hemlock. It will be seen at once that his symptoms differ only in degree from those of every enthusiast and every passionate lover; indeed, of everyone who temporarily confuses phantasy with everyday reality.

Then we have the *melancholic*. He sits or moves

THE BORDERLINE

about, filled with despair and self-reproach and utter misery. The picture he presents is the very reverse of that given by the last type. In ordinary life, melancholia is represented by those fits of depression from which on occasion we all suffer, when we have what is popularly called "the hump."

There is a third form of insanity, represented in every asylum, known as "stupor." Its mark is a profound apathy. The patient will sit for hours or days or weeks without moving, utterly indifferent to everything that goes on ; to everything said or done to him ; "dead to the world." But his mind is only inert, not impaired. The whole external world seems irrelevant to him. Except in so far as he is reminded of the existence of this world, he is not unhappy.

This state is represented in ordinary life by sulks, and, to some extent, by "absent-mindedness" and the seeking of solitude.

The great thing to note is that in all these forms of insanity, the reasoning power itself is not diseased. It acts in the insane much as it acts in the sane. It is in its attitude to the external world of phenomena that the insane mind is unreliable. And so we find hallucinations and delusions almost universal among the inmates of asylums.

Here, again, we shall be wise to check our complacency.

We are accustomed to boast of being reasoning animals, basing our judgments and opinions on facts and drawing sound conclusions from those facts. A very little study of ourselves and of our neighbours is sufficient to teach us how small a part such rational process plays in deter-

mining both our acts and our opinions. It is true that we use our reasoning powers extensively in connexion with both our deeds and our beliefs, but nearly always after the event, not to determine them, but to justify them.

It is not reason and observed facts that are responsible for the opinions and beliefs of the average Tory or Socialist, Christian or Agnostic, Conventionalist or Bohemian ; but quite another factor—the same factor, indeed, as that responsible for the somewhat more heterodox beliefs which seem to us so ridiculous in the insane.

This factor has two components : firstly, the natural or instinctive bias of our minds ; and, secondly, “ complexes.” A complex is a whole group of ideas and sentiments associated in our minds with something that for us has a strong emotional quality.

Often this complex is on the surface and quite obvious to ourselves and to others. Thus, to the enthusiastic gardener, nearly everything to do with weather, soils, and plant growth arrests the attention, and even influences the emotional life, to an extent that often seems absurd to those unaffected by this complex. Generally, however, the matter is not so simple as this, and the nature of the complex which is responsible for our intellectual and emotional bias may be concealed even from ourselves. It may have completely passed from our conscious mind, for instance, that the emotional effect of the smell of lilac is really due to its association with an extremely happy period of our childhood ; or that our keen sense of the injustice of landlordism is not unre-

lated to a severe snub received at a period when our sense of self-importance was at its height.

There is, indeed, a self-protective faculty in our mental make-up which tends to drive from our consciousness and from our memory events with unusually painful emotional effects. We encourage this faculty when we try to divert our minds from painful thoughts by work or play. So long as we know what we are doing, this is all to the good. But there are great dangers attendant on the policy or habit of burying our heads in the sand.

The great mark of health, both mental and bodily, is the capacity for classifying and co-ordinating our activities so as to bring about adjustment between ourselves and our surroundings. Hidden complexes, which have never been seriously faced and brought into proper relation with the central purposes and interests of our life, do not die, but carry on an active, subterranean life ; endeavouring to find expression wherever possible, no matter by what roundabout way. Thus we have the unsatisfied impulse of self-assertion, driven to manifest itself by resort to isolation and all sorts of eccentricity ; and unsatisfied sex showing itself as prudishness or pruriency.

To the gardener, as such, birds are a natural enemy. So long as he remembers the nature of his hostility, his attitude is a reasonable one. But if, regardless of his complex, he comes to feel and believe that birds are hateful objects, he is for all practical purposes, on this point, insane. Were his complex a different one, in which slim women with high heels took the place of birds, he might easily become a homicidal maniac.

The thin partitions that, to the simple observer, seem sometimes barely to separate genius from madness, have been, not infrequently, referred to by poets and philosophers. But the near alliance implied will not bear a very searching analysis.

Genius and insanity are terms commonly used very loosely ; on their definitions few would agree. Both represent wide departures from the average or normal of contemporary human mentality, but the nature of these abnormalities differs profoundly in the two instances. Whatever else it may mean, genius certainly indicates a high and unusual development of some quality or qualities which most of us would agree to class among the desirable and admirable properties of healthy men.

Where this exaggerated development is of a part of the psyche only, it may sometimes be paid for by a proportionate lack of development of other parts, leading to a lack of harmony and of general co-ordination. One-sided development is always dangerous for the individual. In such event, we may speak of the insanity as the price paid for the genius ; and history furnishes us with many illustrative examples. Their true relation is parallel to that between the heart lesion which the great athlete may incur as the price of his prowess and that prowess itself.

But, as I said, the term genius is commonly used with great looseness, and often bears not the slightest relation to accomplishments, tangible or idealistic. Many a man, reputed a genius by groups of his contemporaries, would be more aptly named a pervert or a deficient.

Physical and mental phenomena, when viewed from one aspect only, certainly present a very different picture from that seen by the eyes of what we call common sense. Such partial and abnormal views are often taken as implying genius ; but, although partial views often have their value if their partial nature is realized, they are, when this distinction is not made, to be regarded as evidence of faulty rather than of supreme mentality.

If the word genius is to have any value at all, it must be taken to imply the possession of a faculty for more profound, more complete and, therefore, truer insight than ordinary people possess. Clearly, it is something different from, and more than, talent. When these two things are combined in one individual, the world becomes enriched by additions to its store of those great creations—artistic or intellectual—which are the most valuable part of our common inheritance.

There is nothing particularly fine, admirable, or desirable in mere abnormality or eccentricity. It is confusing and obstructive to disregard the rule of the road—whether the road be the visible highway or any other convenient track along which human activities proceed. Geniuses, by reason of their mental prepossession, sometimes disregard these rules. Such omission is not a mark of their genius, but a defect of their quality. They may often be forgiven, just as we forgive the fire-brigade or the ambulance when it disregards the police regulations as to speed.

Insanity, again, is a term customarily used to cover a very wide range of phenomenal facts. It is as broad in its significance as the term “ill health,” with which it is

etymologically almost identical. It means an unsound, that is, an incomplete or unhealthy, mind. Its interpretation, therefore, must vary with our conception of health and of the function of the mind. Probably most of us agree that the healthiest mind, as has already been said, is that best calculated to harmonize the life of the individual with his environment, in the widest sense of both terms.

The man whose eyes are so constructed as to make him aware of the approach of a tiger is, to that extent, healthy in this sense ; because an approaching tiger thereby loses some of his hostile power. But a man whose eyes see tigers which have no tangible reality is to that extent unhealthy, and suffers from what we call hallucination or illusion. In other words, he is, in a degree, insane. The sane man may see a tiger with his mind's eye, and may use this vision for æsthetic or other purposes, but he clearly distinguishes between the product of his fancy and that of which his senses make him directly aware.

The activities of all of us are determined by desire ; and this applies to purely mental activities as well as to physical ones—if, indeed, this distinction has any real validity. In simple creatures, including simple men, these desires are adapted (by their relative strength) to the natural circumstances of their environment. But, with the growing force of reason, and the consequent delay in responsiveness to stimulus, potential difficulties arise side by side with great potential advantages.

A healthy-minded man is essentially humble, just as an insane person is essentially vain. This vanity, or exaggerated sense of self-importance, may take the form

SIN: HOW MUCH DOES IT MATTER:

of flamboyant swagger or of self-imposed martyrdom. The truly sane mind, almost unconsciously, at every moment, is aware, firstly, of the universal limitations of earthly life; and, secondly, of his own individual limitations. He neither believes that he can fly, nor grouses because he can't. There are quite enough things that he can do to occupy the very short time at his disposal.

There is no desire, just as there is no instinct, which is biologically adapted to its continuous exercise; and the very greatness of men like Newton or Einstein consists quite as much in their recognition of their limitations as in the unusual measure of their imaginative and logical faculties. Apart from sheer physical pain, three-fourths of the misery of the world is due to what might be correctly spoken of as mild insanity; that is to say, an inability to recognize and bring into proper proportion facts and possibilities on which healthy aims and desires are dependent.

SIN: HOW MUCH DOES IT
MATTER:

“LET me ask you, Critias, whether, if we take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes?—whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the General in war?”

“Quite so.”

“ ‘ And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting.’ ”

It is a reflection on the quality of the human intellect that, although nearly all of us, from morning to night, are busy judging our neighbours and deciding between good and evil—as manifested in their acts and lives—scarcely anyone stops to question the nature and validity of the code whereby he judges. Consequently, when a new and freshly inquiring generation comes along, and asks why certain things are right and others wrong ; why different standards obtain in different circles ; and why each individual is not entitled to decide for himself, without comment or criticism, what is good and what evil ; the traditionalists can but appeal to outworn theologies or to conventional sophistries, long since exposed for what they are. “ So much,” said Dr. Johnson, “ are the modes of excellence settled by time and place, that men may be heard boasting in one street of that which they would anxiously conceal in another.”

The progress of science has surpassed every dream. As it unlocked door after door, it seemed that the magic key was in our hands, and that all secrets were about to be revealed. The simplicity and innocence of man constitute much of his charm. His enthusiasm over each new toy is equalled only by his forgetfulness of his previous experiences. Science has given him a new earth ; he is surprised that heaven is so little nearer. To his chagrin, it is now explained to him that science is itself but a sort of toy model, a constructional curio, making no pretence of being other than an abstraction

like a Euclidean proposition. Possibly, the scientists, in their desire to curb too enthusiastic expectations, have understated the realistic element in their method and in their discoveries. For the contrast between science on the one hand, and philosophy, æsthetics and ethics on the other, is not that between the abstract and the real, but between the stage setting and the drama itself. It is not science that we should blame for the poverty of the spiritual crop, but the use that we have made of it.

A capacity for the objective observation of things is a valuable possession. But such an attitude is an entirely artificial and "technical" one. What really gives a thing human significance is its "value"; and it is with value that ethics is concerned. Like beauty and ugliness, virtue and sin are matters of taste; for ethics and æsthetics have much in common. Their similarity or identity might be suspected from the rarity with which sincerity enters into the discussion of either. Convention, far more than conviction or even personal preference, determines popular judgment in both departments. As the cynic has written: "Conscience is, in most men, but an anticipation of the opinion of others." We worship that "common sense" which always supports the existing state of affairs and the current point of view. It is this that safeguards the sterilizing formalities and expressions of religion, so offensive to the mind of cultivated twentieth-century man. Formal religion is indeed considered by many people to have come to be the gravest danger in the path of virtue.

Modern psychology is apt to forget its debt to Schopenhauer. His essay on "The Basis of Morality"

ought to have given the final blow to the doctrines of duties and virtues hitherto held by philosophers and moralists generally. Compassion—by which he meant an inherent motive force roughly corresponding to the social or herd instinct of the new psychology—was for Schopenhauer the essential characteristic of goodness of heart ; and goodness of heart was the only goodness which found a place in his ethical philosophy. “The essential feature of the character of a good man,” he wrote, “is that he draws less distinction between himself and others than is usually drawn.” It is strange that the professional exponents of Christianity should have left it to this critical philosopher to give modern expression to an ethical doctrine which made such a stir some eighteen hundred years earlier.

Every psychological theory must, perforce, be tested in the light of our own individual experience. If a sufficient number of people find a theory “true” of themselves, while few dispute it, it may justly be regarded as established—at any rate until a theory of even more nearly universal applicability replaces it. Moral judgment, as has been said, is comparable with æsthetic judgment ; and just as we feel one thing to be beautiful and another ugly, so we feel that one human act or human character is good and another evil. “We do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases,” wrote Hume, “but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty and tastes and sensations. Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey

to us." Ethics and æsthetics have biological foundations ; and virtue, like truth and beauty, has value in so far as it feeds inborn human aspirations. To quote Professor Alexander, who has done more than any other living writer to point out the true nature and biological origin of moral judgment and moral " taste " : " Art, science and virtue owe their value and their existence to their satisfying certain human needs which these values are constructed in order to satisfy. The marble is independent of us, but the statue made from it is made to satisfy the artistic need or instinct, and expresses the artistic emotion. Science is made to satisfy the theoretic instinct ; and morality, we must say, is made to satisfy the moral instinct." It is, of course, true that all genuine instincts had, at first, a purely utilitarian function. And this is as true of the social or gregarious instincts, out of which morality has arisen, as of that curiosity of which science is the humanized development. A similar utilitarian origin may be found for the sense of beauty ; and, in all three cases, the original purpose " lapses into a secondary position."

There is a notion about, based on a misreading of the hedonistic doctrine, that, since no one—being such and such a man, in such and such circumstances—can act other than as he does, we cannot reasonably discriminate between good men and bad men ; much less praise or blame, reward or punish them. This contention is constantly cropping up in humanitarian and medico-legal circles. The mistake lies in confusing sin with crime, wickedness with law-breaking, and punishment with moral condemnation. Lots of sins are not, and

ought not to be, regarded as crimes ; and plenty of breaches of the law—rightly regarded as crimes and rightly punished as such—are approved rather than condemned by the moral judgment. Crime is an artificial conception, relevant only to the convenience and smooth running of society. It has no necessary connexion with sin ; and judges exceed their duty—and generally their intellectual capacity—when they use their courts for the airing of ethical prejudices and ill-timed moralities.

Moral standards are excellent things, so long as they are our own moral standards. The blind acceptance of the standards of other people has nothing to do with morality. The force of convention is but an economical substitute for the policeman and the law-court ; and conventions should be judged as laws should be judged, not by their original motivation, but by their contemporary expediency. When people talk about “ present-day morality,” and the like, they are not really talking about morality at all. At the best, they are criticizing some fresh expression, or lamenting the disappearance of some outworn expression, of moral impulse. There is an old saying that you cannot make people moral by Act of Parliament. It is equally true to say that people do not become moral or immoral through the acceptance or rejection of conventional formulæ, or even of conventional practice.

The elimination of superfluity is to-day the subject of exhortations preached at us from every molehill. As to what constitutes superfluity, our vociferous orators are not explicit. Each of us, therefore, must decide for

SIN: HOW MUCH DOES IT MATTER?

himself what are the things he needs the most, and what those he can best do without. The lives of nearly all of us are, it must be admitted, unnecessarily complicated; and genuine simplification would add much to our freedom and much to our happiness. Simplifiers, however, rarely tackle the problem in the right way. They are apt to confuse simplicity with crudity; and to regard the simple life and the primitive life as pretty much the same thing. Life is not simplified by cutting out its conveniences; though this is a generalization that needs careful watching. A convenience to one person may be purchased at the price of a terrible sacrifice of convenience on the part of others; and, when we flatter ourselves on the time the express train has saved us, we would do well to remember that those sleepers and rails are no spontaneous gift of Nature, and that the force that pulls us was not handed over, "broken and quiet to ride," at the end of creation's six days.

The accumulated hoard of knowledge which has been built up by the small psychic savings of generations has made possible a spaciousness and a leisureliness of life utterly beyond the reach of primitive folk outside the tropics—or even within them. But we have almost neutralized the potential benefits of this accumulated wealth—material and mental—through the coincident accumulation of a mass of conventions, worldly and spiritual, which act like inherited mortgages, the interest on which has swallowed up almost all the revenue from our estate. The lives of most of us are conducted pretty much on the model of the litany-ruled creatures of Dr. Moreau's laboratory.

It is in the realm of convention that simplification is most urgently called for, and may most advantageously be exercised. Our social codes and our moral codes badly need de-bunking. What an economy it would be were we to cut out one-half of the things we strive to possess, and one-half of the things we do purely because other people expect us to do them. I am, of course, not here talking of the kindlinesses of life, but of our cowardly subservience to outworn conventions, our craven fear or envy wearing the mask of contempt. But even the virtues of kindness should not be taken too readily for granted. "What a foul subject," said Thoreau, "is this of doing good instead of minding one's life ; doing good as a dead carcase, which is only fit for manure, instead of as a living man—instead of taking care to flourish, and smell, and taste sweet, and refresh all mankind to the extent of our capacity and quality. If I ever did a man any good, in their sense, it was something exceptional and insignificant compared with the good or evil which I am constantly doing by being what I am."

One has only to compare the very definite principles of conduct laid down by the founder of Christianity with the acts, thoughts and real aspirations of ninety-nine per cent of the self-acclaimed members of the Christian Church, to be convinced that the roots of morality derive their nourishment from psychic levels more profound than those with which the language of orthodox propriety deals. Our problem, however, is not to get rid of conventions, but to overhaul them and to scrap those which no longer embody our true beliefs and our

NERVES AND NOMENCLATURE

real desires. A great many moral conventions are maintained long after they have ceased to correspond with moral actualities as conceived by spiritually-minded persons. Most of us seem, through long servitude, to have lost the faculty of individual initiative. Often, what we call the attainment of freedom, or the casting off of superstition, is but the changing of one task-master for another. The first thing we do on rising in the morning is to look at the slate to discover what are our orders for the day. The really free man seeks his orders from within himself, not from outsiders, however elaborately they may be organized as church, or caste, or state. Temporary self-subjection and voluntary submission to external discipline are often desirable—often indeed essential—for the attainment of specific ends ; but, when the occasion has passed, the splints and bandages should be removed, lest permanent stiffness and functional atrophy result.

NERVES AND NOMENCLATURE

THE doctors, having been deprived of many diseases which for centuries had kept them busy, have been driven to invent new ones to take their place. When inventiveness has failed, they have not hesitated to attempt annexation. With a boldness that one can but admire, it has even been claimed that crime should, henceforth, be classed as a disease, alongside diphtheria and typhoid fever, and be handed over to the medical profession for appropriate treatment.

The recent dramatization of psychology has opened up an enormous new field for profitable exploitation. It is doubtful if many of the disciples of Cagliostro, or even that great master himself, ever surpassed some of our contemporary thaumaturgists, safe within the inner fold of orthodoxy. Theirs is, indeed, a comfortable pathology. The seven deadly sins become therein but symptoms, innocent as a headache ; and, in their confessionals, moral lapses are explained and rationalized. Cowardice, infirmity of purpose, and even the more unpleasing perversions of sex, are there analysed and robed in the whiteness of a new nomenclature.

But, in our cynical amusement at these little victories of finance over science, we must not allow ourselves to react to a position of mere obstructive "common sense." The mind is, like the body, subject to disease ; and neuroses and malingering, though often confused, have really little or nothing in common. Not that it is always easy in practice to distinguish between them. When a man, as the result of an accident at work, suffers a surface abrasion, and, deliberately, by mechanical or chemical means, prevents that wound from healing in order that he may obtain compensation, there is, of course, no difficulty in applying the appropriate term to his action. But the matter is by no means so simple in the far commoner case, where an introspective, over-anxious individual, through the play of fear on his imagination, nourishes his ill, and thus postpones recovery. Here there may be no deliberate exaggerations of symptoms, or deliberate prolongation of disability. Dishonest purpose is almost the last thing with

which most of these victims of "nervousness" can justly be charged. Nor is it always easy for a doctor confidently to affirm that this or that symptom complained of is a purely subjective or neurotic one ; for there are plenty of organic lesions, obvious enough in the post-mortem room, that give little or no objective evidence of their existence during the life-time of the victim. Medical diagnosis is still largely an estimation of probabilities ; and the best diagnostician is he who is least often wrong in his estimates. When, as was recently reported in one of our medical journals, it is possible for "a well-developed man in the prime of life, treated in the casualty room of one of our big London hospitals for a fracture of the wrist," to "drop dead at the exit when leaving the hospital," "a most careful examination revealing no cause of death," the limitations of excusable medical dogmatism are obvious enough. Plenty of grave organic diseases, such as encephalitis and disseminated sclerosis, often manifest themselves in conduct and attitudes of mind long before any physical signs recognizable by the acutest physicians show themselves ; and, just as the disharmonic workings of an organ may show themselves in the emotional or psychic abnormalities of the patient, so, *vice versa*, may a psychic lesion present itself to the patient in physical guise. The entanglement is, indeed, even more involved. To quote Trotter : "Disharmonious mental states, such as those due to the clash of individual and social needs, are notoriously apt to interfere with bodily function to a degree and with duration and constancy that may simulate organic disease and perhaps initiate it."

In varying degrees of severity, what we doctors call "anxiety neurosis" is probably the commonest ailment in civilized countries to-day. The usual symptoms of this condition are diminution of hope and of enthusiasm, and consequent unhappiness. The manifest signs may be serious perversions (or abnormalities) of interpretation of external happenings. Our interpretation of events is largely dependent on memories ; and memories depend for their strength on emotional contexts. Disturbances of the emotional balance give queer twists to memory, with resultant changes in sensory impressions and intellectual judgments. A person suffering from neurosis is mildly insane. Between such an individual and those who are technically spoken of as certifiable no strict logical line can be drawn. The neurotic man lives in a world that is unfamiliar and unfriendly ; and, almost unconsciously, he endeavours to slip from it into a world either of nescience or of day-dreams—a world, that is, of his own making. There he may find, if not positive happiness, at least a relative escape from unhappiness.

The reasoning faculty is, in evolutionary history, a comparatively recent innovation. It is not evenly distributed among us. Conduct and fashions, deliberately initiated by exceptional individuals, are almost unconsciously imitated and adopted by masses of people to whom their significance is a closed book. There is no true hierarchic relation between such people's thoughts and aspirations on the one hand, and their instinctive urges on the other ; their scales of value are fictitious ; and, in a world seemingly indifferent to individual

difficulties, they, naturally enough, are constantly being overwhelmed by disappointment and lack of confidence. They were never captains of their own souls, yet have learned to mistrust instinctive guidance. Desired aims seem unattainable; hope and faith wither and die; enthusiasm is in such circumstances impossible. They have, in fact, fallen into that one of the Seven Deadly Sins known to the Mediævalists as *accidie*. Sin and ill-health are, after all, not such very different things. John Wesley said, "I would as soon curse and swear as worry. It is doubting God."

The illness of the neurotic, of the emotionally unhealthy, is not an exclusively psychic aberration. Emotional disturbances influence bodily functionings—even bring about chemical changes in the body. The chemistry of a man who has fallen in love, or has found religion, is different from his chemistry when paralysed by fear or by hopelessness. This throws light on the saying that faith and hope are better weapons against bodily disease than are all the serums and drugs in the pharmacopœia.

In his handbook on *Modern Psycho-therapy*, Dr. Emanuel Miller reminds us that the relationship between mental and physical states is constantly illustrated in the mutual influence of body postures and mental conditions. "The bend of dejection, the erect attitude of pride, the sagging facial muscles of despair, the tonic expression of an eager optimism." The sympathetic nervous system, which regulates secretion, circulation and digestion, is actively responsive to emotional states. Anxiety or other emotional disturbances may thus seriously upset

the functioning of kidneys, stomach, or heart ; and, if the disturbance be prolonged, obvious organic changes may be produced. There is a good deal of evidence suggesting that long-continued worry and anxiety may, by exhausting the thyroid and the adrenal glands, bring about in some individuals the definitely "organic" disease, diabetes.

A true neurosis is indicative of a failure mentally to adopt oneself to the circumstances and difficulties of one's life. The abnormality may be in our own make-up, or it may be in the special difficulties that confront us. The former explanation is far the commoner ; for it is generally found that only one out of a considerable number of individuals confronted with almost identical difficulties finds an outlet in neurotic manifestations. Probably the most striking characteristic common to most neurotic individuals is their pronounced introspective self-centredness. The neurotic is often the very opposite to vain ; it is usually his feeling of the need for self-justification and self-excuse that drives him, unconsciously, to hug any illness or symptom of illness that may win the sympathy of others and "explain" his imaginary "failures."

All sorts of views are held, even by distinguished physicians, as to the appropriate treatment of neurosis. The very multiplicity of the treatments, with undoubted cures to their credit, proves the presence of a common factor behind the scenes. As Dr. T. A. Ross tells us : "Fifty years ago, these patients were being cured by minor gynæcology ; later they were cured by the Weir-Mitchell treatment ; at another time by the Salis-

bury diet ; just as effectually as they are now by the extraction of teeth or tonsils, or by the administration of poly-glandular preparations."

It is well known that serious emotional disturbances are liable to bring about marked alterations of conduct ; sometimes to provoke those extreme perversions which are regarded as manifestations of insanity. Our capacity for prompt adaptation to familiar demands depends very largely on the orderliness of what we may call our emotional associations ; for memory is mainly, if not wholly, a function of the emotions, rather than of the intellect. It is the emotional aura of a thing or a person or an event which, recurring, revives the sensory and intellectual phenomena of the original association. It is because the explanation of mental perversion so commonly lies within the affective realm that the reasoning of acutely insane persons is often so logical and clear.

In the light of our present knowledge, we can no longer look upon the mind as an expression of the activities of the brain alone ; rather is it one expression of the activities of the whole body. A sane mind is indicated by conduct, and not solely by intelligence. It is possible to have an excellent brain, and yet not to have the capacity to use it properly. So long as we look upon mind and body as dissociate things, or as but loosely related as master and servant, it is impossible either to form a clear idea of health, or effectively to tackle the problem of adapting ourselves and our lives to the constantly varying circumstances that environ us. There is considerable danger in our habit of separating our activities into mental and physical, necessary though

that separation is, on occasion, and for special purposes. But we altogether over-value those mere mental tricks with words, which are commonly confused with real thought. Few of us have, in fact, more than a very elementary capacity for abstract thinking ; and when our minds get out of sight of our muscles we are all too apt to flounder in a confused medley of day-dreams and reality, between which we soon lose the power to distinguish. It takes a truly sane mind safely to indulge much in day-dreaming or undirected wishful thinking. Healthy, active life involves constant self-adjustment ; and the further our imagination travels from that to which we are accustomed, the more difficult does that adjustment become, and the more powerful and orderly must be the higher controlling faculties of the mind.

In the speculations of scientists and philosophers, life and health are emerging from the test-tube and are being recognized once more as the miracle they are. "The healing of the body and the healing of the soul are different aspects of one and the same mystery of rejuvenation." I spoke earlier of "anxiety neurosis" as being a common ailment of to-day ; but, evidently, it is an ailment not peculiar to our times. Burton tells us that "Mahomet the Turk, he that conquered Greece, at that very time when he heard ambassadors or other princes, did either cut or carve wooden spoons, or frame something upon a table. This present sultan makes notches for bows. . . . But amongst us the badge of gentry is idleness ; to be of no calling, not to labour, for that's derogatory to their birth, to be a mere spectator, a drone, *fruges consumere natus* . . . and thence it

NERVES AND NOMENCLATURE

comes to pass that in city and country so many grievances of body and mind, and this feral disease of melancholy so frequently rageth, and now domineers almost all over Europe amongst our great ones."

This quotation, illustrative of past experience, is not irrelevant to our present situation. Why are so many people morbidly anxious to-day? Are the causes entirely within our individual selves, or have we collectively misinterpreted the fundamental laws of emotional hygiene? The fashionable psychologists of the moment seemingly would assign responsibility almost entirely to sex-repression. I read, in the textbook of one world-reputed psycho-therapist, that even the little child who is afraid of the dark is really bursting to get an answer to the question: "Where do children come from?" I wonder if gun-shy dogs are similarly sublimating an anxiety arising from their ignorance (amusingly asserted by Stella Benson) of where puppies come from. There are, of course, adolescents and adults in whom sex repressions provoke that feeling of stultification which is at the bottom of nearly all neuroses. Unwilled subservience to any convention not corresponding with one's own genuine impulses and beliefs inevitably gives rise to a sense of inferiority. But the point is that, even in these cases, it is not the curbing of sexual appetite that is the cause of the emotional trouble, but the feeling of personal defeat and self-negation. So far as my observation goes, however, sex plays no direct part in bringing about more than a very small proportion of the anxiety neurosis we meet on every hand. It was among the

“great ones” that, according to Burton, melancholy raged in his day. The new, or newly apparent, phenomenon is the prevalence of melancholy, hopelessness, lack of faith and enthusiasm, among all classes. What is the fresh fact that has of late been operative? Partly, it may reasonably be assumed, the almost universal subjection of children to a scheme of education formulated by, and especially adapted to, that small minority of human beings prone to abstract thought and abstract speculation. For ninety-nine per cent of all living men and women, abstract thought is near enough to impossibility. Conventional education for such as these simply muddles and creates biologic disharmony. We have not yet fully realized the price we may have to pay for the construction of the much-applauded economic ladder—available to all who can climb and push—which seems to be of the very essence of the democratic ideal.

Whatever the root cause of his condition, it is doubtful if a genuine neurotic can ever be cured until he has been convinced that he is himself largely responsible for his illness; and that it is his own mental attitude, rather than—or in addition to—his circumstances, that calls for readjustment. He must be got into such a state of mind that he is “prepared to take the consequences of being well.” The ideal treatment of neurosis, as of every other disease, is, of course, preventive; but this brings us within the provinces of education, industrial organization, and religion, rather than of medicine proper. Again, as with most other illnesses, it is much more hopefully to be treated in its early

SELF-EXPRESSION

stages, than when it has become well established. Indeed, it is probable that a confirmed neurosis, fostered by years of conventional medical mollicoddling, is never really recovered from. The worst possible treatment, in most cases, is to relieve the neurotic individual of his work and of his responsibilities. It is a matter of general observation that, nine times out of ten, it is the man or woman with the greatest need or wish to get busy again who most quickly recovers from illness of any sort. As a famous Victorian doctor put it : " The best way to live well is to work well. We were not intended to pick our way through the world trembling at every step. One-half of the confirmed invalids of the world could be cured of their maladies if they were compelled to live busy and active lives, and had no time to fret over their miseries."

SELF-EXPRESSION

BY men of vigorous temperament and physique, ethical or moral considerations are apt to be classified with Sunday clothes as somewhat trivial things, but little related to daily life. Nor is this matter for wonder, when we remember the customary way of looking upon moral rules and moral principles.

According to this convention, morality is, indeed, a definite limitation of, often even a direct antithesis to, individuality and self-expression.

This is a shallow view. Real morality is far from being an effeminate business ; and, so far from being

in any way opposed to self-manifestation, it is, at least, as much involved therein as are physical health and mental sanity. We must rid our minds of the notion that goodness and badness are terms applicable only to obedience or disobedience to some externally imposed laws.

We need to get nearer to the old Greek idea of virtue as belonging to the same category as valour, health, and beauty—all desirable things, alike from the most egoistic standpoints and the most altruistic. The sanctions of goodness and badness are, in the widest sense of that much misused word, utilitarian. Otherwise, they would be without meaning to an intelligent person. Not necessarily utilitarian in the sense of measurableness by material gains, or even by gains of obvious happiness, but tending to promote the real interests of the individual, or of mankind as a whole.

The modern over-worship of self-expression and self-assertion is really a reaction from that futile self-repression or self-stultification which was, for so many centuries, held up as a religious ideal, regardless of its consequences. Self-suppression, however, is one thing ; self-regulation or self-control quite another.

Self-expression is too often but a vain term for self-indulgence. For good or ill, man is endowed with the consciousness of having a faculty of deliberate choice. And rare indeed are the occasions on which we find ourselves impelled or pulled by one instinct only. Just as, when we flex our arm, the extensor muscles are also brought into action, moderating and steadying the act of bending ; so, also, at any rate at the beginning

of its manifestation, is nearly every impulse modified by its contrary.

All of us, by virtue of our manhood, have some scale of values, however slight and tawdry it may be. One thing does seem higher or more desirable than another. And, surely, it is no more "self-expressive" to crush this idealization and to pander to our "lowest" and most primitive instincts than to act in accordance with our individual aspiration, however humble.

In the absence of self-control, it is difficult to see what basis remains for human pride. That tiny spark of the divine is, surely, man's supreme possession. His peculiar privilege is that he can regulate and adapt his instincts to serve nobler ends—more truly satisfying ends—than the grabbing of food or the saving of his own skin.

The inability or failure to exercise self-control is the mark of the slave—the inferior. No aristocratic pedigree can alter this fact. The man who, according to the talents with which Providence has endowed him, weighs, in such scales as he has, his own capacities and the circumstances that environ him—interpreting and valuing all by the light of that spark of divinity which he cannot fail to recognize within him—and moves confidently and unhesitatingly towards his practical goal along a road which he himself perforce must make, is the true and only aristocrat of humanity.

Such a man will neither foolishly seek, nor, as a coward, shirk, responsibility that comes his way. Difficulties may confront him and temporary failures set him back, but ultimate success he cannot fail to attain, though few or none may mark it. He will not be the

sort of man to talk much, or even think much, about morality—about good and bad, about right and wrong. He will seem to himself merely to be taking the only sensible course for an intelligent being.

One cannot help asking oneself how, and in what degree, our methods of education and our political system tend to foster the production and development of such citizens as these. To me, at any rate, the answer to the question is not very comforting or reassuring. The habit of straight, clear thinking is far and away the most valuable fruit of wise education, and this fruit is best grown and matured on an educational system in which learning and doing are coincident.

In the execution of a drawing, the making of a cabinet, the growing of vegetables, or the construction of a map-to-scale of one's village or neighbourhood, no hiding from reality in the treacherous bosom of convention is possible. We are, at once and inevitably, exposed to the criticism of the ill-done deed.

There can be no higher object of education than the cultivation of a personal sense of proportion. Yet, how rarely is this recognized in practice. The world in which we live is a conditioned world, calling for constant choice, and as frequent rejection. We cannot both eat our cake and keep it ; and, for nearly every pleasure and gratification, a price has to be paid.

The constant problem with which we are confronted is whether this or that thing is worth its price. And it is to modern education, which so often fails to instil this law, that much of our mental illness, and probably of our physical illness also, is ultimately due. Attention,

concentration, perseverance, endurance, interest and satisfaction are a closely-related series.

It is because they involve these secret psychic processes that manual arts and crafts have such educational value. In the making of a table, or the painting of a picture, or the cultivation of a garden, concentration and definition are essential. Desirables have to be arranged in order of importance, and not merely the undesirables, but the less desirables also, must be ruthlessly eliminated. In such practical work, no mental sophistry can conceal failures; the object itself stares one in the face—the severest and most candid of critics. And that is why a good craftsman is so rarely a confused thinker, though his verbal expressions may not always give this impression.

The great masters of the game of life have not attained their powerful position by habitually playing with weak opponents. The good chess player or the good tennis player would not improve his game, or derive appreciable pleasure, if he customarily selected as antagonists novices who offered him no unexpected problems to solve. A diet can be too saccharine as well as too bitter. Yet ease and avoidance of effort are commonly looked on as ends in themselves—as worthy human ideals. The weakening of religious faith, which has undoubtedly occurred in all civilized countries during the last century or two, has been accompanied by many associated results that seem to me regrettable.

It has, among other things, led to the very general implicit acceptance of a philosophy which assumes that the phenomenal incidents of the few years between the

cradle and the grave constitute the be-all and end-all of our existence. Whatever litany we still may verbally mutter, it is obviously the doctrine of "eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die"—however we may sublimate these symbols of the temporary—that determine for most of us our hopes, ambitions and activities. I believe this to be a very shallow philosophy. If it represented the truth, who could avoid pessimism?

In our revolt from sanctimoniousness and humbug, we have, in my view, reacted much too extremely. Over-reaction is, indeed, a general mark of humanity. We all know how the sailor, long buffeted by wind and rain, hankers after that snugness and security which, in their realization, often take the form of sheer fugginess. Just so does the suddenly enriched man, unaccustomed to material adequacy, commonly mishandle his unwonted wealth.

So, indeed, do most of us seek the solution of our difficulties in an avoidance of those things which make life not only desirable but also in the ultimate analysis possible. The religious doctrine that this earth is but man's testing-ground, and that the life lived thereon is of value only in so far as it develops his character and his vision, enabling him to see and desire ever nobler ideals, is not dependent for its truth on any theological dogma. Experience and philosophy afford it adequate foundation. And, therefore, they who say that we take life too seriously, and they who say we take it too lightly, are all utterers of half-truths.

It seems to me that we are inclined to treat the mystery and immensity of life with an indifference amounting

almost to stupidity ; whilst giving ridiculous overthought to evanescent things, whose effect on us, but for our egotistical contemplation, would be as fleeting as themselves.

The otherwise healthy man who avoids the stimulus of the cool air, by frowsting in his bed or by the fire-side, and he who seeks to avoid trouble, disappointment, and possible defeat, by declining to meet the circumstances of which those are the alternative fruits, are fundamental muffs in the game of living. Rarely, indeed, do such men attain even the negative euthanasia they seek. The mind, no less than the body, is not so easily subdued. Deprived of its natural food, its appetite remains ; and it seeks to satisfy that appetite with queer mental pabulum.

The only really satisfactory life is the life full of conscious aim and eagerness. Life without enthusiasm is, indeed, scarcely life at all, for the essential stimulus of all human activity is interest ; and enthusiasm is but healthy and vigorous interest. In its absence, not only does the mind stagnate, but even those bodily processes farthest removed from conscious control tend to slow down. This must be within the experience of everyone. Of course, the capacity for enthusiasm is, like most of our other capacities, dependent to some extent on our varying inheritance.

But not entirely so. It is capable of cultivation by conscious thought and effort. Knowledge helps ; and so, also, does a reasonable sense of proportion. Its allies are self-respect and a recognition both of human limitations and of the mystery that surrounds us. It is the

very opposite of grousing, self-pity, idle vanity, and self-conscious humility. It is no passive acceptance of the unnecessary that is advocated ; but rather of making the best of existing circumstances, whilst employing all reasonable means to improve those that are capable of human improvement.

It is a poor reply to injustice to do what one is called upon to do—or even unjustly compelled to do—as poorly as one can. That course leads merely to self-degradation. To the true artist, whether in life or in any of the several activities whose totality is life, there is in every task a potential joy which no man can take away. No part is so poor but that it may be acted well or ill.

THE DISEASE OF INDECISION

IN the face of danger, different animals have differing instinctive methods of reacting, in order to secure their preservation. Some pugnacious creatures fight the attacker ; others trust to their speed to secure safety in flight ; others again immediately assume immobility, in this way escaping notice. But a given animal may be endowed with more than one of these instincts. It may, for instance, have a primary instinct to flee until further flight is hopeless ; and the running-away impulse may then be replaced by the pugnacious one, as with the stag at bay ; or by the sudden arrest of all movement, as with the hare.

Now an important point in the adoption of these

THE DISEASE OF INDECISION

alternative instinctive reactions is that whichever is chosen shall be, for the time being, chosen wholeheartedly ; otherwise failure is certain. If the animal is running away, it must run with all its soul and with all its strength. If it continually stops enraged, and makes half-hearted attempts at a bite or a scratch, it is not likely to be very successful. If, again, it adopts the instinct of immobility, but is all the while half inclined to bolt, the immobility will be of that trembling order which gives the show away.

Among animals this hesitation is very rare. The hesitators have long since been weeded out, leaving no descendants with such half-baked instincts. Probably, primitive man was kept pretty sound in this matter by similar relentless forces. Under the conditions of civilization, however, these have long been ineffective as eliminators. And so we find everywhere to-day people hopelessly degenerate, confused and hesitating in their reactions, humming and hawing, being pulled equally or nearly equally in all sorts of directions ; taking every step in trepidation and doubt, and, as often as not, retracing it as soon as it is taken.

Every doctor's consulting-room is invaded by such victims. Anxious, vague, indefinite souls, devoid of self-confidence ; worried folk, seeking refuge from the realities which they are incompetent to face in a world of fancies and whimsies. Here we have one of the most fertile causes of unhappiness and ill-health, not of mind only but of body also. For, associated with every instinct is an emotion ; and to every emotion there is related an elaborate physical and chemical mechanism,

in the workings of which all our bodily processes are involved. In perfect health, a man or other animal responding emotionally and instinctively to an external circumstance experiences nothing but hygienic good. It is a very different thing when, through the unresolved conflict of instincts and consequently of emotions, neither of them take their normal course.

People who are the slaves of such unsatisfactory conflicts are like animals caught in a snare. They lose the power of action, or, at any rate, of coherent and satisfactory action ; and, nearly always, they lose also the power of coherent thought ; because the very essence of coherent thought is the exclusion of the irrelevant.

Nothing is more objectionable, or more destructive of peace of mind, than the habit of calculating the consequences before any word is spoken or any deed done. But the antithesis of this habit is little less disastrous.

Man's reason is among his principal possessions ; and it is clearly intended to be used. Most of the worries of the world are caused by people failing to make proper use, or disuse, of their reason. These are accustomed to act with insufficient thought, and then uselessly to exercise their reasoning powers when it is too late. Owing to the disorderly state of their minds, such people, when a word or a deed is called for, having no notion where to put their hand on what is wanted, give expression to the first thought that comes handy. Conflict is the invariable consequence.

If we are wise, we shall get ourselves quite clear as to the order of our desires. But this alone will not save us from possible worry. A little sound philosophy

THE DISEASE OF INDECISION

or common sense in our choosing is also needed. Circumstances, of course, limit us, but that again is in the nature of things. Life without limiting circumstances would be as uninteresting and meaningless as a game of cricket without rules.

The more we select as our prime aims in life things which are within our power, the more are we likely to succeed ; for, as Jeremy Taylor puts it : " He that suffers transporting passion concerning the things within the power of others, is free from sorrow and amazement no longer than his enemy shall give him leave ; and it is ten to one that he shall be smitten then and there where it shall most trouble him. . . . Prosperities can only be enjoyed by those who fear not at all to lose them, since the amazement and passion concerning the future takes off all the pleasure of the present possession ; therefore, if thou hast lost thy land, do not also lose thy constancy."

And, if we look into ourselves, we shall almost every one of us find, deeply but firmly rooted there, a desire stronger than any other that we ourselves be not transformed. We look enviously at the circumstances of another ; yet, truly, we do not wish to be that man. " Would any man be Dives to have his wealth, or Judas for his office, or Saul for his kingdom, or Absalom for his beauty, or Achitophel for his policy ? It is likely he would wish all these and yet he would be the same person still."

Of all material things, it is true that there is a practical minimum and a desirable adequacy. Beyond the latter point lies redundancy. But it is not only in such external

possessions that men commonly mistake superabundance for sufficiency. In matters of the mind and of the body, their innate qualities and their possible accomplishments, the same foolish disregard of limitations is general.

It has been so rubbed into us, in hundreds of improving works and by hundreds of platform exhorters, that we have but to will a thing to achieve it, that the wise humility of sound Christian doctrine has come to be looked upon either as antediluvian or as a silly pose. Yet, if we glance through the pages of history, we can but be struck by the comparative humility of the men and women who have contributed most to the storehouse of human knowledge or to the sum of human happiness.

By the very nature of man he can have no direct familiarity with the absolute. His knowledge, his standards, and his aims are perforce relative. Were all men alike and equal, they would have uniform knowledge and identical standards and aims. But men are not equal, nor are they even identical in kind. In so far as they are alike, their desires and capacities, bodily and mental, are alike. But, in so far as they differ, their desires and capacities vary. It is this variability which most of us are so slow in recognizing.

Instead of valuing, studying and increasing the peculiar talent which Providence has thought fit to bestow on him, man seems perversely intent on developing a fictitious or imaginary talent which he has observed in another.

Instead, for example, of accepting as universal qualitative standards of conduct and of thought as though

THE DISEASE OF INDECISION

there were but a limited number of forms of greatness and of goodness, we would do well to look within ourselves and examine well our armoury, noting such implements as are a common possession, and noting no less those peculiar to our individual selves.

These are the tools at our command ; it will be idle and worse to base our lives on the assumption that they are other than they are.

Men seek distinction, yet studiously avoid the cultivation of the means whereby every man may become distinguished. To know oneself is the beginning of wisdom ; to use this knowledge in the execution of the task of being oneself is the last word in practical philosophy.

It is true that most of us are surrounded by all sorts of artificial bars ; but these, by human effort, can be removed, and boundaries accordingly widened. When we contemplate the infinite universe, and the tiny field within which the lives of all men must be lived, and their activities manifested—even the lives and activities of the richest, wisest, and most powerful—the few additional restrictions of capacity, time, or space which confront the reputedly less fortunate seem trivial enough.

There is no sin more deadly than complacency over the hardships of others ; but, for ourselves, we may be well persuaded that our difficulties are but the rules of the game. Indeed, it would seem that difficulties offer the only alternative to vacuity.

Man cannot live in infinity, nor can he function without resistance. In the few decades which are the measure of this stage of our existence, it is but a small patch

that any man can hope to cultivate. And whether the walls that environ it extend a few yards more or less to the west or to the east is a matter of relatively small moment. Our happiness and our satisfaction will depend rather on the care we have bestowed on our garden, the spirit in which we have tended it, and the originality we have displayed in its ordering. By these, rather than by any mere vulgarity of size and garishness, shall we, when we come to look back, measure the success of our lives.

THE PROBLEM OF PAIN

TO the common man, pain has always seemed an evil to be overcome, or to be endured with such patience as may be. It consoles him little to be told, as Sir Charles Sherrington tells him, that "pain is a psychical adjunct to a protection reflex"; or, as another distinguished physiologist has said, that it is "a fundamental factor in human progress." It is true that pain, more often than any other symptom, drives a man to the physician or the surgeon for relief; and, if we might attribute to the force behind evolution full prescience of the technical resources of the twentieth century, it would, perhaps, be possible for a super-optimist to find beneficence—imperfectly synchronized—in the pain of an impacted gall-stone or renal calculus. With similar complacency, one might possibly find utilitarian justification in the value of localized pain to the modern diagnostician. It is the persistence, rather

than the acuteness, of pain which makes it difficult to accept this philosophy as adequate.

Paley was not the unimaginative ass that some people suppose. The protagonists of the purposiveness of Nature need no apology to-day. That pain, in the conditions of primitive life, often serves as a protective danger-signal is obvious. At the same time, it must be admitted that Nature has a nasty way of taking the long view—"So careful of the type she seems; so careless of the single life." If a thing serves her purpose—which, collectively, may be our purpose too—she is often indifferent as to how far it serves the individual purposes of Thomas Jackson and Hannah Brown.

It is an interesting fact that physiologically the immediate reaction to pain is nearly always substantially identical with the reaction to fear, to anger, and, indeed, to all other emotional excitements. To intelligent readers, unfamiliar with the facts—and, strangely enough, nearly everyone is unfamiliar with the facts—it would be difficult to recommend a more intellectually thrilling book than Professor Cannon's *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, a revised edition of which appeared a year or two ago. The physiologists and psychologists have generally hedged over the proper classification of pain. Is it a sensation or an emotion? Like sight and touch, it is directly dependent on the stimulation of afferent nerves, which can be located and, by artificial means, be put out of action or "anæsthetized." We have no special fear-nerves; no afferent nerves which, on stimulation, automatically lead to rage or joy. At the same time, there is no denying to pain an emotional

tone analogous to that of fear and anger, a tone altogether different from anything present in a mere visual or tactual "sensation." Moreover, as Professor Cannon and others have proved, pain brings about, through the selfsame mechanisms, that increased capacity for bodily resistance to primitive dangers which the other great primal emotions evoke. The constant and outstanding reaction is an increase in the activity of the adrenal glands, with a consequent increase of adrenalin in the circulating blood. The effect of this touch on the accelerator is to stimulate the whole sympathetic nervous system, with astoundingly adaptive results.

The total blood volume of the body being altogether less than the potential capacity of the fully dilated vessels, it is necessary for effective physical action, whether it takes the form of flight or of resistance, that the maximum of blood be made available for the great muscles of the limbs. Accordingly, there is a hurried closing-down of the blood-vessels of the skin ("pale with rage," or with fear, or with pain) and of the abdominal viscera, bringing digestion to a standstill, while coincidentally the heart beats more quickly and more vigorously; the liver unlocks its stores of sugar for distribution to the muscles which need it as fuel for energy—the blood sugar being often increased by as much as thirty per cent a few minutes after a brief emotional disturbance—and the breathing deepens, facilitating a more adequate oxygenation of the blood. All these obviously utilitarian reactions to pain, as to fear, take place without the intervention of our conscious will; and it would seem that the further back we go in our evolu-

THE PROBLEM OF PAIN

tionary history, the more generalized—that is to say, the less differentiated and localized—are the psychic impression and physical reaction to which pain gives rise. It is only in its highly developed differentiated forms that pain can justly be said, in Sir Edward Sharpey-Schafer's words, to be "not a primitive" experience.

The psychic manifestations of all the emotions, together with their varying outward expressions, as we know and show them to-day, are much more elaborate and subtle than anything known to the animal creation before the cerebral cortex took over the sorting of the relayed messages received from the optic thalamus—then the highest neural centre for emotional responses. We are apt to forget how very much older and how much more involved with the very roots of our being are our emotions than is our thinking and reasoning mind. We have only lately come to realize how large a part of our existence is harmoniously conducted, without any guidance from our conscious will, by the emotions, the sympathetic nervous system and the endocrine glands.

We know, for instance, how very intimate are the interrelations between our emotions and those as yet very little understood organs. It is they which respond in the first instance to such states as fear, anger, enthusiasm and joy. Their activities do not show themselves on the screen of our consciousness; but the results of these activities—that is, of the potent chemicals which they pour into the blood—are obvious in the furrowed brow, the facial pallor, the throbbing heart-beat, the taut muscle, and so on. It is some perversion of the emotions,

some misuse or unnatural restraint of their expression, to which a very large number of cases of insanity—not traceable to accident or physical disease—are probably due.

Mental unsoundness does occasionally result from crude injuries to the tissues of the brain, whether caused by physical forces from without or by poisons from within. But there remains an enormous proportion of our total insanity which cannot be thus accounted for. Even those temporary outbreaks of psychic unsoundness which we call epilepsy are unaccompanied by any structural changes in the brain distinguishable by our acutest pathologists; and it is usually impossible, by the examination of the brain, to decide whether its owner was a sane man or an insane man. It is, of course, conceivable that insanity, even though no changes can be detected in brain or nerve, may yet be marked by modifications of other structures of the body, or of their secretions.

All emotional experience has an impulsive as well as a sensory aspect. Originally, these "reactive patterns for emotional expression" were purely reflex, being localized in the optic thalamus—a region of the brain not associated with "cognitive consciousness." Nowadays, the automatic response is, so far as the voluntary muscles are concerned, normally restrained and modified by processes in the cerebral cortex. When, as in the first stage of anæsthesia, the higher neural centres are suppressed, and consciousness disappears, emotional expression still continues until the secondary centres are in turn put out of action.

FAITH AND THE DOCTOR

With the evolution of the higher mental faculties, an interesting new situation has been created. Through the instrumentality of the imagination, the mind is able to bring into existence, without any aid from external sensory stimulus, various emotional states, with all the psychic and physical processes ordinarily associated with them. Doctors have not, as yet, given much attention to the problems—physiologic as well as mental—which these psycho-genic states present; but it is becoming increasingly recognized that the mind—to quote from a stimulating book by Dr. George Draper of New York—“by reason of its imaginative faculty and the phantasy life, is capable of setting up a new and complete universe of its own, from which may flow menacing forces as potent as those which arise in the individual’s physical surroundings.”

FAITH AND THE DOCTOR

WHEN the present writer was a very small boy, he performed an experiment in order to test the efficacy of prayer. Having placed a watering-pot beneath the fully turned-on tap of an empty water-butt, he went away and prayed to God that in five minutes that pot might be full of water. The object of the experiment was scientific, yet faith exceeded scepticism, and the result was disappointing and unexpected. Of course, it may be argued that a greater measure of faith would have ensured the filling of the watering-pot, but observation of the experience of others

lends no support to this proposition. It is possible that faith can move mountains, in a literal as well as a figurative sense, but none of us sees it happening. In truth, to us ordinary people, faith would seem to have its limitations as well defined as those of will.

That faith and hope help us physically and mentally has been recognized throughout historic times ; and their therapeutic value has always been utilized by physicians. But the modern auto-suggestionists have gone further. They have argued that we, as individuals, have it in our power to inspire ourselves with confidence and with faith in a happy issue out of all our afflictions. Of the potency of faith, most of us have little doubt ; but of the possibility of deliberately filling our mind with faith to suit our convenience we cannot feel quite so assured. Millions of simple folks believe everything they are told by persons in authority ; and presumably such folks can often be trained to believe what they tell themselves ; but anyone in whom the scientific or critical faculty is at all developed finds it difficult, or even impossible, to maintain a sustained faith opposed to the evidence of his senses and of his reason. To such " facts " as a developing malignant tumour within him, or his best friend lying dead, or the congenital idiocy of his child, a man of this class finds himself unable to say that things grow every day, in every way, better and better. If he could bring himself to repeat the formula of the auto-suggestionist, it clearly would have no meaning for him.

Spiritual healing—associated to-day with auto-suggestion—is perhaps the most long-lived of all the hetero-

dox cults of medicine. People are again asking, as they have asked times out of number, whether there is anything in it.

A new fillip has undoubtedly been given to this hybrid of medicine and religion, both by the revolutionary developments of recent psychology and by the no less revolutionary discoveries of recent chemico-physiology. The vital part played in the human economy by those hitherto unknown, scarcely tangible, bodies, the vitamins ; the remarkable functions of the endocrine glands, and the significant interaction between the latter and emotional states, could not but shake the complacency of hygienists of the old, orthodox school. In the light of these newly discovered truths, it were folly to lay down limits to the phenomenally possible.

Whatever may be the realities behind those concepts which we term mind and body, there can now be no question as to their intimate connexion and capacity for mutual influence. The therapeutic efficacy of faith is, at any rate within certain limits, accepted by science because it has been demonstrated by methods on which science relies. Every doctor is aware that much of his success depends on his power of suggestion—on the measure of confidence with which he can inspire his patient. Nor are the effects of this “suggestion” or emotional influence limited to the subjective. Physical and chemical consequences, measurable by the observer, also result. Everybody has first-hand experience of physical phenomena directly following on, or accompanying, emotional states. The diminished digestive secretions in periods of anxiety ; the contraction of the

surface blood-vessels and the more vigorous beating of the heart consequent on fear or coincident with it ; the blush of self-consciousness ; these, and dozens of similar illustrations, prove how impossible it is in practice to draw the line which has often been attempted between the psychic and the " material." Indeed, on the basis of established fact, the most rationalistic of us can but set very wide limits to the theoretically possible effects of thought and emotion.

We know that the effect of emotion on our body's workings is profound and far-reaching. Without any conscious wariness on our part, and without any intervention of our will, the emotion of fear, or that of danger, leads to a physiological revolution which profoundly affects every part of us.

The blood is hurriedly driven from all our internal organs, except the heart, lungs and brain, and dispatched to the muscles of our limbs and trunk ; our stored-up reserves of starch are hurriedly converted into soluble sugar, with which the blood becomes charged ; the blood itself becomes curiously modified, so that it more readily clots ; the heart beats more quickly and strongly, and all feeling of fatigue disappears.

Where is the drug, or where the surgeon's tool, that can in a minute effect such a miracle as this ? The series of automatic and immediate adaptations is by no means purposeless. It is exactly calculated to make efficient the essential self-preservation response to the fear-provoking situation in the primitive environment in which this machinery developed. Whether flight or fight were expedient, it is in the muscles that the blood

would be needed ; and, for the work which they would be called upon to do, they would need all the fuel they could get. The advantage of the increased coagulability of the blood in case of physical injury is obvious.

All this takes place as a spontaneous consequence of an emotion. In the light of these facts, he would be rash who would set narrow limits to the possibilities of faith or any other emotion. The success of the old "charmers," who often caused such crude material objects as warts to disappear in a night, is a standing challenge to unimaginative "science." At the same time, all experience goes to suggest that there are limits to the capacity of the spontaneous and unconscious forces within us.

It is not a question of distinction between visible structural changes and what are called functional disturbances. Nothing could be more visible than a wart ; and those causes which can cause a rush of blood to the face when we blush, or to the muscles when we are afraid ; which can increase the beat of the heart or cause it to stop ; which can turn our hair white or produce baldness ; which can lead to enlargement or atrophy of important glands ; can obviously play a very important part in the restoring of health and the healing of wounds.

Most of the diseases which attack man are, not infrequently—perhaps generally—spontaneously recovered from without external medical aid. And it appears that the defensive activities on which such cure depends are for the most part regulated by what is known as the sympathetic nervous system ; which, in turn, is inti-

mately associated with the emotions. It is even so with the healing of wounds, and the joining of broken bones ; and there can be no doubt that what we call states of mind may have, and generally do have, a considerable influence on the vigour of the defence of the body against bacterial attack. The potency of auto- or hetero-suggestion, therefore, must be taken as proved. But, even here, so far as experience goes, there are limits ; and the empiric limits correspond fairly closely with those which our current theories would lead us to expect. There is nothing to make us believe that faith can restore to normality the degenerate granular kidney or the tubercle-destroyed or fibrosed lung.

So much for " suggestion "—for " faith," regardless of that which inspires it. The special claims of spiritual healing are fundamentally different ; though many of its adherents confuse the two methods. The essence of spiritual healing consists in the doctrine that its efficacy depends on the spiritual nature of the " healer." It asserts that its alleged cures are due to the direct intervention of God, which intervention would not have occurred but for the efforts of the " healer." In other words, a cure by spiritual healing is a miracle. Now, on the philosophical or theoretic side, both the arguments for and the arguments against such religious therapeutic are commonly based on a complete misapprehension of the principles of science and on a vague and woolly use of terms. A miracle has been defined as an interruption of natural law ; or, again, as a temporary replacement of the law of uniformity by a higher law. It is difficult for

FAITH AND THE DOCTOR

a scientific mind, with the best will in the world, to attach any meaning to such definitions.

The "laws of nature" which science establishes or discovers represent merely a summarized statement of observed relations between phenomena. Pressed to their ultimate significance, they are comparable with the laws of mathematics. They have nothing in common with the laws of a country, or with the laws laid down on Mount Sinai. There is no "must" or "must not" about them. There can be no such thing as "breaking" a law of nature; and, although the scientific mind refuses to admit even the possibility of a circle whose circumference is four times its diameter—the definitions involved being arbitrary and absolute—it readily admits the possibility of infinite phenomena utterly beyond and unrelated to any phenomena of which we have had experience. So far as possibilities go, therefore, even the most hard-headed physiologist is quite open-minded. Not unreasonably, however, seeing that the claims of those professing a social "gift of healing" by spiritual means are unsupported by his previous experience, he asks for evidence of the sort on which he is wont to rely. Nor, when it is remembered that, however spiritual and intangible may be the agents employed, the results claimed are identical with those which the orthodox physician is accustomed to observe and measure, can objection be made to his request. For it is argued, not merely, as Epictetus might contend, that by spiritual means a man may rise superior to pain, or be made indifferent or insensitive to it; or that he may truly come to realize that no physical defeat need touch his spirit

or disturb his soul ; but that such physical phenomena as cancer of the stomach, fibrosis of the kidney, or the nerve degeneration associated with established infantile paralysis, may be made to disappear as though they had not been.

What, then, is the kind of evidence on which an intelligent, open-minded person can be expected to admit the force of the spiritual healer's contention ? Results that are acknowledged to be possible as a consequence of the method of " suggestion " will in no way help his case ; for such results have been, and are being, obtained by doctors and by quacks of every description daily. There are few diseases from which spontaneous recovery—without medical or other outside assistance—is unknown. Even cancer does, very rarely, " cure itself." But from many such diseases, from very wide observation, the average percentage of recovery is known. If spiritual healing is what it claims to be, it should be able at least to increase this percentage many-fold. There are certain other diseases from which recovery is unknown. Such are atrophy of the optic nerve and advanced granular degeneration of the kidneys ; and these, especially the former, can be diagnosed with reasonable certainty. Can the spiritual healers produce one single cure for such a case previously authenticated by recognized diagnostic experts ? Such are the tests which a new drug or a new operative procedure has to satisfy. The believers in spiritual healing can easily obtain credence on the same terms.

For the intelligent man, is there, then, no effective

THE FACULTY OF SELF-DECEPTION

alternative to this creed which he finds himself unable to utilize? Such a man cannot convince himself that there is no tragic element in life, or that all is right with the world. Nor is it desirable that, in the face of tragedy and of evil, he shall merely repeat the parrot-cry, "It doesn't matter." Unless he is a man without sensitiveness, these things very much do matter. Not for him are the calm and complacency of the prophet.

On the other hand, he has at command an instrument far more reliable and, in the long run, far more effective than faith for enabling him to get the most he can out of life. By the wise use of cultivated reason, he can arrange things to some extent in the order of their importance, and can distinguish generally between those things that are within his power and those that are without. Whilst, by this means, we cannot hope to abolish worry and anxiety and pain in the wholesale way claimed by many of the therapeutic exploiters of the new psychology, we can, if we choose, by keeping our ambition within the attainable and by keeping before us our scale of values, save ourselves from the petty irritations and troubles that rob most people of their happiness and of much else that makes life fine and desirable.

THE FACULTY OF SELF- DECEPTION

OUR minds, like our bodies, are things of gradual growth—are, to use the scientific catchword, evolved, not ready-made, Therefore, again as with

our bodily structures, we are constantly in our minds coming across faculties and habits better adapted to earlier stages of our racial life than to modern life and modern conditions.

Relatively new in our evolution are those impersonal, psychic forces from which have proceeded science and philosophy. Far more deeply rooted in the recesses of the soul is that faculty of "special pleading" which is the essence of the barrister's art. No one who has had occasion or curiosity closely to study the expressions and acts of others, or to compare his own "opinion" with his doings, can have failed to be struck by the very small part that impersonal truth and the cool light of science and philosophy play in our judgments and our reflections. Nine times out of ten, what we call our opinions and our reasons are but the clothes with which we hide the nakedness of our impulses. We are inclined to make a virtue of our self-indulgent inclinations by falsifying their motivation, generally with a view to self-deception rather than to the deception of others.

Most of us do a lot of thinking, as well as talking, "through our hats." A good deal of our righteous indignation at the iniquities and solecisms of others has its root in moral obliquities or social deficiencies of our own, which we but dimly recognize and decline to admit to full consciousness. Personal hatreds, again, are far more often due to a sense of inferiority than to reasoned distaste and approval. Just as a bad workman is proverbially said to quarrel with the tools which he misuses, and as the cross child beats the chair into which it has bumped, so often do the inefficient, the indolent,

THE FACULTY OF SELF-DECEPTION

and the unsuccessful attribute their failure to the perfidy of their friends or the negligence of their parents. We easily understand the irritation provoked by people "who are always reminding us of what they have done for us." But there are plenty of mean souls who grow to hate their friends for no other reason than that they feel indebted to them, even though the latter may have acted solely from generous and affectionate impulses, with never a moment's subsequent thought or desire for recognition or return. As many friendships have been destroyed by "good turns" as by bad ones. It is along these lines that we may find the clue to a common trait of insane people who often turn most violently against those to whom they have hitherto seemed most attached.

Man is essentially a rationalizing animal. (He may also be a rational one; but that is not the present question.) By rationalizing is meant the furnishing of an act or an emotion with a plausible explanation which might, if true, account for the actual phenomenon. Sometimes, the rationalizing process manifests itself not so much in the region of thought as in that of action.

A common example of this is the kicking of a dog, or the cursing of a wife, in a fit of ill-temper, in the causation of which neither of these creatures could be legitimately charged with playing the slightest part. But it is not only in crude ways like this that most of us show our slavery to the rationalizing habit.

If we are honest, and reflect—rare coincidents—we shall find that few of our daily acts represent the final

product of a logical process of thought. Nearly always, native impulses and instinctive preferences are the true determinants. But we are so constituted that we cannot leave it at that. We are impelled, equally instinctively, at once to provide a more or less fictitious rational motive for our act, in accord with our notion of our character, or with our ideal of what we would desire that character to be. In all this there is no conscious deception. We deceive ourselves far more than we deceive others, and we are apt to regard the reflections and comments of our neighbours as unjustly cynical.

In politics and religion we are always encountering rationalizations—that is to say, fancy explanations—of our various prejudices and instinctive dislikes. The reasoned case for or against nearly every belief or line of action falls short of absoluteness. There is almost invariably something to be said on the other side. Generally the case for and the case against are not very unevenly balanced.

If we have an instinctive preference one way or the other, it therefore takes but a very little adjustment of the pros and cons to make reason seem to support our wish. By slightly emphasizing the importance of certain factors favourable to our case, and passing lightly over the obvious and even acknowledged objections, it is easy to cause the scale to descend as our prejudice dictates, without any apparent blinking of the facts.

One can easily see how, in the simpler and in many ways more savage, conditions of life under which our minds and bodies were mainly developed, this tendency to make facts fit with instinctive needs would often be of

THE FACULTY OF SELF-DECEPTION

practical service in making action definite instead of hesitating.

Conditions are now very different, and human reason and our social heritage of accumulated knowledge have both developed to a far higher level. Our instincts still remain our only motive forces. But we have altogether greater power of so delaying their action and modifying by imagination and memory the stimuli which called them into play, that our reasoning faculty should no longer be regarded as a mere emergency brake.

Civilization calls for a constant exercise of discrimination. Superficial resemblances between phenomena can no longer safely provoke in us similar responses. Fundamentally the realities may be as unlike as similar sounding words.

In medicine, to take but one example, all our recent progress has rested on a recognition of this principle. Yet popular notions of health and disease are still, for the most part, based on the old habit of rationalization. Evidently, man was an artist before he was a scientist ; and the novelist, the poet, and the painter differ from the rest of us only in having perfected a practice in which we all instinctively engage at nearly every moment of our lives.

There are two psychological phenomena about which endless discussion has taken place, phenomena which seem to me to have a very close relation to this tendency to rationalization. I refer to dreams and to artistic compositions ; and, associated with the latter, I might include some of the processes involved in scientific discovery.

The nature and causation of dreams are rightly regarded as very mysterious matters. The elaborate experiences and visions which, on waking, we remember having encountered during our hours of sleep often seem so remote from anything which we have experienced in our waking moments, and so apparently unrelated to anything we have ever thought, that all kinds of strange and unlikely theories have been advanced to account for them.

Some people have even gone so far as to explain our dreams as phenomenal representations or symbols of the thoughts we have not dared to think when awake. Personally, I am inclined to believe that there is no fundamental difference between our ordinary dreams, the angry man's kicking of his dog, and the plausible rationalizations on which we live all day long. Our emotions are much more primitive and profound than our thoughts. In the art of thinking, the wisest of us are but as little children, playing a game ; and the results are generally about as important.

In the matter of dreams, we shall generally find that what we may call the tone of the dreams corresponds very closely with our prevailing emotional state—fear, peaceful, thankfulness, despair, irritability, confusion, or what not. The emotion which our dream furnishes with material phenomena and incidents may be that which possessed us as we fell asleep ; or it may be one induced by disturbances in our physiological processes—which have so intimate a relation, causative and sequential, with our emotional life.

In my opinion, dreams throw no more light on our

THE FACULTY OF SELF-DECEPTION

wishes and our hopes, or on our repressions and suppressions, than is thrown by our daytime thoughts and our daytime speech. These thoughts and words are generally a little more sober and restrained because of the constant impact of sensory impressions made by contact with what we call reality.

The whole hope of the further development of mankind lies in our increasing discrimination between fancy and fiction on the one hand, and objective truth on the other. We can all do a good deal by courageously studying the true motives of our daily acts, and by refusing to deceive ourselves, however unpleasant and startling the truth may at first appear.

With the growing complexity of social life, habits of "rationalization" and "projection" becomes increasingly dangerous. They may prove more fatally corrupting to the mind than any hallucinations of sight or sound. Rationalization, indeed, is often the first stage of that psycho-pathological state which we call delusion. When a rationalization is used to conceal from ourselves the reality of some insistent impulse, or of some personal defect of mind or body, we are on the borderline of insanity—not far from the region of persecution mania, psychic dissociation, and their often terrible consequences.

It is a good hygienic practice occasionally to collate our outward acts and words with what we believe to be our opinions and sentiments. Particularly to be suspected are those opinions and those hatreds to which we hold most firmly—those which no arguments shake—which no experience destroys or modifies. Commonly, the exhortation "know thyself" is interpreted all too super-

MIND AND REASON

ficially. A sincere and courageous investigation of our motives, and the exposing of our soul, naked, to our critical gaze, though often disconcerting and humbling to false pride, is an essential prelude to real sanity, self-respect, and true charity.

EDUCATION AND THE CHILD

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

A WORD FOR MR. SQUEERS

MR. SQUEERS of Dotheboys Hall—so far as the educational side of his establishment was concerned—was undoubtedly ahead of his generation. Maligned by his contemporaries, as have been so many great men, his system contained the root of the matter. His, as he states, is “the practical mode of teaching, the regular education system. C-l-e-a-n, clean; verb active, to make bright, to scour. W-i-n, win, d-e-r, der, winder, a casement. When the boy knows this out of book, he goes and does it.”

Our national expenditure on education, even measured in money, absorbs so large a part of our national income that our indifference to the value of the results obtained would, to anyone ignorant of human nature, seem strange. I am referring not only to the publicly provided education, on which most of the population is fed, but also to the education in privately financed schools and universities, which cater for our richer half-million.

When education is discussed by politicians or by the newspapers, it is nearly always spoken of in terms of money cost. One political school argues that we should spend more; the other that we should spend less; and this is by many supposed to make up the whole issue. It is as though the agricultural problem, for

instance, were assumed to consist solely in the question of how much money ought to be spent on an acre of land each year, regardless of the differences between one acre and another, their differing needs and different potential reciprocities.

Now, whatever may be thought as to the proportion of our national income which we can afford to invest in the improvement of the personnel of the next generation, few people with opportunity of first-hand observation can for a moment believe that the average boy or girl of fourteen to-day—no matter what may have been the inherent or hereditary factors—is the fruit of eight or nine years of wise education. One is often inclined to think that a cat gives her kitten a better one. For the object of all rational education surely is to enable its subject to get the highest value out of life. And we shall most of us agree that this is normally to be attained by so developing mind and body that, so far as their individual potentialities go, their owners may, by a clear understanding of their limitations, harmonize with their environment and, in a sense, master it. If this aim be analysed, it will be found to contain, implicit in it, spiritual, no less than mental and physical, elements.

Now the thing that most forcibly strikes me, at any rate, about the average working boy and girl, just leaving school—and I see many hundreds of them at close quarters in the course of the year—is that, as a result of their eight or nine years' education, they have precious little to show in the shape of ideals of life, technical knowledge (kinetic or potential) of any kind, or intelligent understanding of literature or the use of books. They seem

to have acquired practically no knowledge of the facts, and as little of the principles, which would help them to play even a humble rational part as citizens of a democratic State.

Country boys, after leaving school, begin agricultural or garden work devoid of elementary relevant information, and, what is much more important, devoid of any acquaintance with the simplest of those scientific "laws" and facts which serve to illuminate and make interesting that craft. The same is true of nearly all girls in relation to the domestic arts, and of the boys of the towns in relation to the mechanical industries in which most of them will be engaged. Indeed, apart from reading, writing, and possibly the multiplication table—which surely ought to be acquirable even by the dullest in a couple of years—it is not easy to see what mental attainments have been furnished, or what mental cultivation has been effected, during all those potentially absorptive years. For it is not primarily to our schools that may justly be attributed the credit for the undoubtedly more active mentality of the young men and women of to-day, compared with those of previous generations. The free library, cheap books, the newspaper, popular lectures of all sorts, and latterly the cinema and the wireless, have done far more than have all the elementary schools to inform and to stimulate the imagination of the younger generation.

What conclusions, then, are we to draw? First and foremost, that two-thirds of the money and energy at present devoted to provided education—and probably to privately-paid-for education as well—is as good as

wasted. And, secondly, that it is not so much, in the superficial sense, the "methods" of teaching that need altering as the fundamental basis and working principles. Seeing that accepted knowledge and cultural traditions are now largely expressed and transmitted in the form of printed books, obviously the art of reading must remain the prime accomplishment of every child in the country. Writing and the rudimentary use of numbers must also retain their historic place among the elementary necessities. Given this, easy access to good literature of every class, coupled with a little intelligent and understanding help and advice, would do more to induce a love of beauty and wisdom than would any number of silly, wooden-headed, pseudo-pedantic "lessons," calculated only to induce an indifference to, or even a hatred of literature of every sort. But the root mistake goes even deeper.

Our whole system of national education has been based on the mediæval tradition which regarded "education" as synonymous with "learning." "Learning" was, in the Middle Ages, quite rightly held to be the province of a selected few, and the need for any general education—in the true sense of the word—was not realized as existing. The guilds and trading associations, by means of the elaborate system of apprenticeship, did truly educate a small number of persons, through the instrumentality of the crafts themselves, but this number was limited by the protective restrictions placed on the teaching of trades.

The great mass of the people were untouched by either learning or craft, and, as the guild system weakened and

died, only the abstract form of "learning" was left to stand in all men's eyes for any glimmering of a mental life above that of the domestic animals. Not that theoretical knowledge has not its place in any reasoned system of education, but it must for most of us be strictly related to practical work and actual experience if it is to be incorporated and enjoyed. We must get rid of the foolish old notion that education is something apart from real life, something to be acquired as a separate art—a mystery for the initiated. Education must be alive. Everything taught—or attempted to be taught—should be clearly related to practical things within the experience of the child. In almost all children there is a natural desire to do things, to see things, and to hear about those things. That merely theoretical knowledge, or, one fears, that even more common thing, the assumption of knowledge, which forms the stock-in-trade of most teachers, is largely responsible for the production of the unpractical, unthorough boys and girls whom we are turning out from our schools by the thousand a day.

There is a common suspicion that the "practicalizing" of education is advocated in order to make "wage-slaves" more profitable to their employers. The truth is, however, that it is only by associating theory with practice that the average mind and imagination can be developed. Thought and fancy are much more "physical" than is commonly supposed; and few realize how dependent they are on the development of our senses, both for their material and for the healthy organization and metabolism of that material. Classrooms should be the least conspicuous feature of a modern school,

EDUCATION AND THE CHILD

primary or secondary. Very few are the boys and girls who should be pressed or encouraged to spend more than an hour or two a day in these benevolent prisons. The school kitchen, workshops, laboratories, gardens and playgrounds are the quarters where five-sixths of the school-hours of most boys and girls should be spent. Only by "doing" can the average child learn to use not only its body but its mind also. In practical hand-work, as in games and sports, pretence and quackery expose themselves; and it is pretence, quackery, indifference and susceptibility to false flattery that constitute a far greater danger to our national stability and our national "character" than all the candle-lit turnips still so generally employed as effective diverters of popular "opinion."

PHYSICAL ILLITERACY

ONE needs to be of a complacent disposition to be satisfied with the results of our national system of education. Nearly every child in the country receives ten continuous years of schooling; the results are what we see. A former Senior Inspector of Elementary Schools said that "whatever else the current system of education may do to the child, there is one thing which it cannot fail to do to him—to blight his mental growth." However exaggerated may have been that verdict, quite a lot of competent and sympathetic observers have come to the conclusion that, so far as any cultural aim—individual or national, physical or mental—is concerned,

two-thirds of our present expenditure on elementary schooling is just thrown away. It is true that improvements are constantly being introduced into the school routine, and into the work of the Training Colleges, but few of those who are directly concerned with these matters ever seem to ask themselves whether, perchance, there may not be a flaw in the basic idea on which our publicly-provided education has been built.

"We have prided ourselves," said Sir George Newman, "on our sports and games ; and sometimes we must have appeared to others to assume that we are the best sportsmen on earth." But it is possible for a nation to be ninety per cent physically illiterate and yet be capable of producing and of worshipping a minority class of specialized athletes and men of outstanding courage and enterprise. Most of us show our sportsmanship only by joining the crowd at Wimbledon or Wembley, and by buying the earliest and latest editions of the evening papers.

In any case, it is no more with supremacy in competitive games than with supremacy in competitive examinations that education is, or should be, specially concerned.

"I would have," wrote Montaigne, "the exterior demeanour or decencie, and the disposition of his person, to be fashioned together with his mind ; for, it is not a mind, it is not a body, that we erect, but it is a man, and we must not make two parts of him." As was said many years ago, even if our present system of teaching developed the faculty of thinking—which it does not—in so far as it dissociates thinking from doing it would still be a worthless system for training the youth of the

nation. "The too exclusively intellectual scholasticism of the courses of teaching and examinations in schools and universities must be unfrozen," said Sir Michael Sadler, at a recent Public Health Congress. "From the earliest stage of nurture and training, throughout the whole educational process of childhood, adolescence and maturity, the development and exercise of the body should be integrated—scientifically, artistically and to the pupil acceptably—with the development and exercise of the reason and the memory."

The seat of intelligence is not the brain only ; nor is it possible usefully to treat as two separable things physical culture and mental culture. The reform that is wanted is not merely the provision of a few more gymnasia and gymnastic instructors—welcome additions though these would be. Physical culture is not just one more "subject," like algebra or French.

Dr. Linhard, Principal of the State's Gymnastic Institute at Copenhagen, writing of the Theory of Gymnastics, has expounded a basic idea in harmony with that of the Greeks, by whom psycho-physical perfection was treated as a natural aim as spontaneous as those dictated by primary appetites, ethical and æsthetic ideals ranking as equal in desirability with that of mere physical fitness.

Convenient and helpful in many ways as has been the artificial and abstract differentiation between mind and body, it has unfortunately led to a widespread notion that this division corresponds with reality. In every department of theory and of practice this misconception has proved disastrous. Thought and action, health and happiness, beauty and utility ; one has but to name these

things to realize how false and how confusing such pseudo-scientific divisions may be. The gymnastics of the Greeks seem to have corresponded more nearly with what we call athletics than with the formal exercises which we now associate with the former term.

Athletics—in their original form—attempted to strengthen the muscles of the body and develop such qualities as courage, power of ready action, resourcefulness, self-control, discipline, solidarity and a competitive spirit, by means of natural forms of exercise—such as have their origin directly in the individual's desire for movement—dancing, for instance, or such exercises as are employed in primitive communities in fighting or hunting. According to its origin, the individual exercise may have an independent value, for purely practical purposes, or as a source of enjoyment. On the other hand, athletics do not aim at imparting any definite shape to the body or at moulding it at all. The classical athlete's carriage is a by-product, gained as a result of the athletic life, not in consequence of practising special exercises for the carriage of the body.

It is to the æsthetic sense rather than to narrowly physiologic and hygienic knowledge that Dr. Lindhard would have us appeal for guidance. "With physiology and hygiene, gymnastics has as yet no connexion. Such a connexion should no doubt be aimed at, but, for the present, the work to be done in this respect belongs to the laboratory rather than the gymnasium." The exercises and forms of sport which he describes and illustrates have as their purpose the increased responsiveness of the mechanism of nervous co-ordination, the

development of courage and resourcefulness, the giving to the individual of a dignified expression of his personality, a reasonable pride, capacity for self-discipline, and an adequate control of the whole apparatus of motion. Quite apart from formal exercises and organized games, the free and spontaneous play activities of children take an important place in mental development.

Nearly all the theories of play that have from time to time been advanced by psychologists, teachers and philosophers, even when they have afforded adequate explanations of certain of childhood's spontaneous activities, have been of limited applicability. It was Froebel who first clearly pointed out that organized games form but a small part of the play activities of children ; and that play, so far from being a mere relaxation, is really " the free expression of what is in the child's soul." He held that " the trend of the whole future life of the child is revealed in his freely chosen play." Play certainly serves more than one purpose, and performs more than one part in the child's life and development. Dr. Margaret Lowenfeld, of the Institute of Child Psychology, has given us, in her book, *Play in Childhood*, the most complete and probably the truest account of the biological significance of children's play yet published.

Dr. Lowenfeld's summing-up should cause many an intelligent parent and many a professional teacher to reflect, and to question the validity of a number of too readily made assumptions. Her observations, which have been spread over many years, and have been made on a large number of children of all classes and of various

ages, have led her to the conclusions that play not only affords to the child relaxation and amusement, enjoyment and rest, but also represents "the externalized expression of his emotional life, and therefore serves for the child the function taken by art in adult life"; that it links up his consciousness with his emotional experience, and so "fulfils the rôle that conversation, introspection, philosophy and religion fill for the adult"; and that it acts as the child's instrument for making physical and psychical contact with his environment. The author believes that spontaneous play is an essential factor in the attainment of emotional maturity; and that those who have been deprived in childhood of opportunity for adequate play will inevitably "go on seeking them in the stuff of adult life." Unfortunately, such emotionally starved individuals rarely recognize the nature of what they are seeking, or the reason why "emotional satisfactions, which the mind has missed at the period to which they properly belong, do not present themselves later in the same form." Thus, she argues, may be explained many of those impulses among men and women—such as an inclination to anarchy and to war—that often seem to us inexplicable divagations from the general trend of the individual's character.

Contemplating the play of children, we can but see how fantastic is much of the content of their interior life. By play they give expression to these fantasies; and it is a poor sort of education that would treat play as irrelevant to its purpose—as a mere mid-morning or evening frivolity, allowing the brain to rest and recover its receptivity for the serious lessons imposed by adults. After

all, there is no reason for regarding the life and activities of a man or woman of forty as having more cosmic or spiritual significance than attaches to the life and spontaneous activities of a child. Spontaneous play, like voluntary work, has its goal ; and involves its sacrifices and hardships, its restraints and its rebuffs.

Although it still forms the basis of most school curricula, few of us any longer believe that the prime purpose of education is to fill a child's mind with a lot of stereotyped "knowledge," the memorizing of which can be tested by examinations. Knowledge and action are not really the dissociate things our educational system presupposes. Out of every hundred boys and girls, one, or possibly two, will respond readily enough to the essentially "booky" pabulum served out to them. Such exceptional children are the modern representatives of those studious boys whom the monks (from whom we derive our school system) picked out as worthy of scholastic education. But the remaining ninety-eight or ninety-nine do not respond in this way. Only by doing things can the minds—as well as the bodies—of most children be developed. Workshops, playing-fields and gymnasia are the places where at least three-quarters of the ordinary boy's or girl's school hours should be passed.

But these are the externals, the tangibles of the matter. It is a new pride, a new ideal—individual and national—that is called for. Fundamental principles of ethics and æsthetics, as well as of citizenship and of health, are involved. We would be wise impartially to contemplate the German Youth uprising ; the physical culture of

PHYSICAL ILLITERACY

Sweden ; and our own Boy Scout and Hiking movements. Music, dancing, gymnasia, craftsmanship, athletics, games ; these are all words suggestive of realities that are relevant to our problem.

The industrial and domestic conditions of our lives have, in the course of the last century, been so transformed that, whatever may once have been the case, it is no longer possible to leave to cultural *laissez-faire* the fostering of those qualities of "poise, balance, self-control, self-confidence and spontaneous discipline" which a truly integrated education should produce. If we take no steps to secure these things, there would seem to be before us no alternative to a social discipline similar to that now imposed on the peoples of various Continental countries. "Can it be," asks Dr. Jacks in the *Hibbert Journal*, "that the intelligent control of human conduct in general, implied in current demands of 'controlled society,' 'controlled economy' (to say nothing of birth-control), begins in the intelligent self-control of the human *body*, and cannot begin otherwise ? If the answer be in the affirmative—and how can it be in the negative ?—the need at once suggests itself for a body of men and women, a new profession, definitely trained for the purpose of developing the human values here involved and of preventing discoveries so promising from falling into the hands of the incompetent."

And this brings us to what is, perhaps, the most difficult task with which the education reformer is confronted. Teaching is not a mechanical process, in spite of the impression which an impartial inspection of some of our schools might produce. Where, at present, exist

in any but the smallest numbers the men and women temperamentally equipped and technically trained to put new life into the elementary schools of Great Britain? Colonel Loftus, the Headmaster of Barking Abbey School, said the other day that "until last year there was not a single physical training college for men in the country, and that which now exists gives a course lasting only one year."

We need more teachers who can do things as well as talk about them. It is only when things have to be done that quackery exposes itself. In craftsmanship, as in athletics, pretence and unreal "knowledge" are useless and unconvincing. Power of self-control and self-adjustment, self-reliance, courage, judgment, straight-thinking and love of truth—these are among the goals at which a well-conceived educational system would aim. A sudden revolution is obviously impossible. What is wanted is a clear recognition of our ideal, and of the obstacles, human and mechanical, that stand in the way of its realization; together with a really practical, business-like programme of action whereby each of these obstacles may in turn be overcome. Far better a little delay than an attempt to calm public disquiet by some plausible change in the old school syllabus—or the addition of a few hundred sergeant-majors to our school staffs.

Finally, let us not forget that the first step towards the physical uplifting of our people is to ensure for every child a home in which healthy physical development is possible, and food as abundant and as varied as is the food of the children of the well-to-do.

CHARACTER IN THE MAKING

ON the physical side, at all events, parents are altogether better-informed for the purpose of raising healthy children than were average parents in the days of Queen Victoria. We no longer see those handsome tombs, "to the memory of John and Jane Smith, and their seventeen children, dead in infancy," and there is already an antique tang about the old lady's boast that she ought to know how to look after children, "seeing that she'd buried fifteen of her own."

Are we justified in being so complacent on the mental and emotional side? Character-building is as important a function of family life as is the building of brawny muscles and of physical vigour generally; and there are still few parents who rise to their possibilities and opportunities.

We say of a boy that he inherits his father's bad temper, or of a girl that she was born with her mother's fundamental querulousness. Are we sure of our facts? Had these children been removed at birth from their parents' influence, and been exposed to a domestic atmosphere of generosity, affection and intelligence, is it not quite likely that their environment would have proved as potent as their inborn tendencies?

It is not a problem so relatively simple as that of breeding piebald ponies or squash-nosed Pekes. Many parents who do, to some extent, realize that procreation does not mark the end of their duties and that they have

a responsibility in this matter of character-building, have very uninformed and very unsound notions as to the sort of training that is helpful.

You don't make a child generous by forcibly compelling him, against his will, to give half his bar of chocolate to the little boy next door. And how often does one see a child repulsed or even scolded for "being in the way" when he is making his first tentative offer of friendly co-operation in sweeping the carpet or dusting the chairs?

Discipline and obedience, again, are among the most misunderstood of virtues. Any sort of order given by a parent to a child, however young, should be a reasonable and defensible one. In small things orders are best reduced to the minimum; in bigger matters, they should have for their aim, and obviously for their aim, either the well-being of the individual who is to obey or the harmony of the group of which he is a part; and an order once given should be insisted on with whatever degree of firmness may be necessary.

If the order isn't important enough to insist on, it isn't important enough to give. A child should not grow up with the notion that obedience and discipline are things to which a weak person has to submit, for fear of a box on the ear from a stronger person whose authority consists entirely in his superior strength. All through, reasonable confidence, self-respect, and self-assertion are essential ingredients of the soil in which ideals of fine, individual character may be sown. Unless a boy or a girl or a woman or a man has a measure of self-pride (very different from conceit) and some

CHARACTER IN THE MAKING

sense of proud dignity, it is useless to look for the finer manifestations of human character.

The doctrine of the clean slate at birth is, in the light of modern knowledge, an untenable one. Two children brought up by the same parents in, as near as may be, the same conditions, at every stage of their career, may yet differ almost to the point of grotesqueness. These differences are equally pronounced among a litter of puppies, where the uniformity of environment and training even more nearly approaches to identity, and so it is with nearly every species of animal.

When we contemplate the intimate relation which we now know to exist between mind and body—not only so far as intellectual capacity is concerned but also in matters of emotion and impulsive force—it is seen to be as absurd to argue that one can have the nature and character he chooses as that he can have the colour of hair or length of limb which seems to him desirable.

There are, for instance, fundamental and unalterable differences in impulse and, therefore, in character, between the man with a well-developed pituitary gland and the man with an ill-developed one; and the emotions and psychic needs of the woman with a normal thyroid gland differ from those of the hypothyroidic. It is untrue to speak of these individuals as being equally free to attain a common ideal of character.

At the same time, we must not, as is so often done, adopt a fatalistic attitude, and base our lives on the principle that what is is, and what will be will be.

Ultimate philosophic reflection lands us on the horns of strange dilemmas, on none of which we can rest. The normal mind of man is so constructed that it can realize neither finity nor infinity ; neither a beginning nor eternity. So with the ancient controversy between those who argue that the will of man is free and those who urge that no one can act other than in obedience to the pre-determination of fate. Excellent arguments can be produced by both ; but neither conclusion can be accepted without qualification.

Fortunately, our minds are such as to be amenable to the guidance not of reason alone ; faith and suggestion play a far larger part in determining the trend both of our thoughts and of our acts. If we attempt to analyse the nature of our reasoning faculty, of our logic, and of those fundamental postulates of all our thinking which we take for granted as necessarily and obviously true, we shall find that reason is by no means the supreme and ultimate arbiter that many complacent and reputed wise suppose it to be.

It has been said by one recognized even by the most sceptical as among the wisest of the sons of men that faith can move mountains. This may be the language of poetry, but essentially it is true. By the nature which is born in him, the capacity of every man is limited. But by faith, which is but another word for confidence, our potentialities may be multiplied a hundredfold.

It is not within our power to implant in our children faculties which they lack. The acorn will grow into the oak tree, and the apple pip into the apple tree ; but, by means of suitable soil and the provision for the

CHARACTER IN THE MAKING

seed of air and light and shelter, we can largely determine the degree of its development, and to some extent its form. So with the human child. Far too little thought is commonly given to the science and art of character-building.

One cannot, of course, disregard those primary and fundamental forces—egoism, sympathy, pity and imitativeness—which are born in us, with relative strengths varying from individual to individual. These form the raw materials of our character, the total propulsiveness of which depends not only on the strength of these forces, but also on our intellectual clarity and our physical energy. But by training and environment we can do much toward determining the lines along which these inherent characteristics may fulfil and satisfy themselves.

We cannot turn the natural egoist into a genuine altruist, or the congenital hard-of-heart into the embodiment of tenderness ; but the majority of acts customarily classified as vicious or anti-social do not in essence differ from those which we all agree to class as virtuous. Egoism may be the basis of a noble life, as well as of a most despicable one ; and even the absence of tenderness and pity may be made to serve a useful purpose in the commonwealth.

Parents and teachers normally pay but little consideration to this subject. When they do, all too commonly their efforts are directed to the impossible task of altering the unalterable—the native make-up of the child. The true artist or craftsman studies his material as well as pursues his abstract ideal. Much more is

this necessary with so superficially plastic, yet at bottom so resistant, a material as the living human being.

Although we universally recognize the necessity of parental intervention in the bringing up and training of boys and girls, no one seems to think that any special thought or knowledge is called for.

What percentage of parents, actual or potential, ever take the trouble to get even a general idea of child nature? Rarely indeed does a man bother to read a book summarizing the knowledge on the subject garnered by others, much less observe anything for himself. A few antiquated maxims, many of them of doubtful present-day applicability, satisfy his complacent mind as fitting him for fulfilling all the complicated duties of parenthood.

It is probable that nowadays a rough working knowledge of the main conditions of physical health is more widely diffused than even the most elementary knowledge of the fundamental conditions of a healthy and happy mental life. Yet so artificial is the customary environment in which children are necessarily brought up to-day—so far removed from the natural primitive conditions which afforded both a satisfactory outlet for, and an effective restraint on, the various impulses and their emotional accompaniments—that the psychological training of a child, especially of a sensitive child with mental capacities above the average, calls for sound knowledge and sound judgment.

The amount of so-called “nervous trouble”—really, for the most part, psychic trouble—in all civilized countries to-day offers a very serious comment on the

failure of parents to rise to the new duties which the very civilization they have created imposes on them.

We have the two extreme types of parent, the one who gives his children everything they ask for or have ever so temporary a hankering for ; and the other, who acts on the assumption that a child's natural inclinations are but manifestations of original sin, from which it is the duty of parents and others to purge him. "Go and see what Tommy's doing and tell him not to."

Between these two extremes every gradation is represented. But rare indeed is the parent who takes the trouble to study his child's words and deeds, his moods and expressions, and tries to understand what impulses lie behind them ; what are their dangers, if overdeveloped on the one hand, or suppressed on the other ; and what means may best be found for their expression and satisfaction.

Not one parent in a hundred has the competence, or takes any steps to acquire the competence, to deal, for example, with that very common type, the child with emotions of more than average activity—often spoken of as the "nervous" child.

Clearly the parents are here confronted with material of great interest and great potentialities. Yet, as a result of sheer stupidity, coupled either with the sentimentality which takes the form of selfish affection, or with that which assumes the shape of equally selfish brutality, on the part of the parents, one or both, how commonly are these exceptional children allowed to grow up into empty-headed masses of vanity, or into self-centred neurotics.

THE MIND OF THE CHILD

THE emotional impacts of a child during the first few years of his life are almost as important as—perhaps more important than—his inherited balance of impulses, in determining the character and the psychic trend of his whole later life. Yet the thoughts and questions of children are rarely interpreted with sympathetic understanding by their parents and teachers. Maternal “fondness” is often both foolish and selfish, inflicting little less emotional and moral damage than is caused by sternness or indifference.

In our reaction from the over-disciplinary conventions of the last century, there is a common tendency to assume that the adult has little part to play in the development of the child's mind beyond that of an admiring onlooker. Even puppies and kittens, however, need maternal education and correction—as those who have been given a kitten or puppy too early removed from its mother will know. Truer still is it of the human infant, who arrives in this world at an almost helpless stage of his development, furnished with needs and impulses, but equipped with few organized instincts directly applicable to the circumstances of the world in which he is destined to live. Moreover, man differs from most, if not all, other animals, in having a sense of values beyond crudely biological ones. In other words, he has ideals of individual, as distinct from species or even race life. These ideals are not inherited, but are conveyed from generation to generation by

THE MIND OF THE CHILD

contagious influence and by conscious education. They are part of our social, as distinct from our biological, heritage. If he is to be a civilized human being, and is to live a civilized life, the child cannot be left entirely to nature and to the instincts and influences born in him.

Parents who wish to do their best for the child for whose existence they are responsible obviously need to form some clear and accurate idea of the nature of the material with which they have to deal. Perhaps one of the first things to be realized is that a child is not merely an undeveloped adult. A tadpole is not just an immature frog, though it will eventually turn into one. Meanwhile, it has a life of its own, much of which is peculiar to its early self. Who shall say that the life and spontaneous activities of a child are of less consequence in the scheme of things than is the life of a business man or of the head of a family? But it is important to remember that children develop and change far more rapidly than most people imagine.

Many people seem to look upon the spontaneous impulses of a child as forces to be either fostered or suppressed, according to the way in which they manifest themselves. But these are the forces whereon the whole life of the individual depends. It is they which make up the substance of vital energy. Reason, intelligence, and even imagination, are but directing instruments—they have no motive power in themselves. Nothing can be more stupid or more harmful than such irritable and selfish outbursts as “Don’t keep on fidgeting,” “Don’t ask silly questions,” and so on. There are far too many “don’ts” introduced into the

training of children. Inquisitiveness is the very basis of intellectual growth ! it is a thing to be encouraged, not discouraged. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that parents who sincerely and sensibly responded to every question a child asked would, so far as intellectual education goes, have fulfilled nine-tenths of their responsibility. This applies strikingly to those questions the answers of which parents commonly evade. If a child, however young, asks "Where do babies come from?" a simple, straightforward and accurate answer should be given. The mere fact that the question has been asked is sufficient evidence of capacity to take in some part of the truth. The majority of a child's questions, however, relate to things and happenings less superficially mysterious than the origin of individual human life. In dealing with these, no conventions or customs stand in the way of veracity ; but it is not always wisest to answer by statements of fact unsupported by direct evidence. Often "Let's find out" is the best reply—followed, of course, by a practical investigation and demonstration. The best teacher of the young is far more often a demonstrator than a lecturer. Doing things *together*, making things *together*, "looking-up" references *together*, are very different from—and very much more useful than—mere elaborations of terms, or unillustrated verbal answers. A competent parent should be able to say, "Do it like this" : not only, "Don't do it like that." But, all the time, it should be borne in mind that steering, not attempting to supply the motive force, is the business of the adult who takes on himself, or on whom is imposed, the care

of children. To quote Mr. de la Mare : " To change, apart from inclining a child's individual nature, to graft faculties that are not innate, to instill what is alien to temperament and personality—all that lies beyond us. Train up a child in the way he should go, said the wisest of the wise ; some modern experts prefer to substitute *would* for ' should.' "

Two of the most powerful inherent psychic tendencies in all social or herd animals are the impulse to imitate and the impulse to respond to suggestion. It is on these native inclinations that the conscientious parent and educationist will, to a large extent, depend. Suggestibility belongs to the same category as faith ; and, notoriously, is far more potent than reason. Anyway, it is a much earlier development in the life of the human individual. The confidence of his or her child is, for the parent, one of the chief rewards of wisdom and honesty. Adults are all too ready to treat children as many people treat lunatics, by " humouring " them. That is all wrong. Every question that is asked by a child should be answered with the utmost honesty, candour, and completeness, so far as a young intelligence can follow the explanation. This applies, as has been said, to what are called the problems of sex and of birth, as to every other matter. Lack of candour in parents and teachers when dealing with the innocently inquisitive manifestations of the child's mind is responsible for three-quarters of the sex obsessions and sex perversions of adolescents and adults. There is nothing surprising in the fact that a child plays with its toes, or its sex organs ; they are the nearest objects within his reach ; nor is it

surprising if a little later the external differences between boys and girls are noticed and inquired about. Why shouldn't they be? To introduce an air of mystery into these things is to introduce the essence of obscenity into the child's mind. Hence obsessions and morbidities that may be lifelong.

It is doubtful if many parents realize the effect on their children of the inconsistent explanations and stories they offer to them. It is reasonable to attribute to this almost universal parental habit the rarity of individuals who are intellectually honest—that is, honest with themselves. What about the day-dreamer; the essential dramatist, who in everyday life endeavours to personify the hero of his half-formulated play? The answer is that, if this habit of self-deceptive fantasy is carried into adult life and persists, even when tested against reality and experience, a result not quite sane eventuates. But, on the other hand, it is both natural and desirable that children should live a large part of their lives in a world of dreams—of fairyland. Only thus is it possible for them ever to build up a true and just scale of values. Sober citizens are all too prone to assume that the phenomenal world is the whole world. Healthy children know better. Coleridge tells us that he found it quite easy, at the age of eight, to accept the idea of the interrelation of the stellar universe, “for,” he says, “from my early reading of fairy tales and genii, etc., my mind had been habituated to the *Vast*, and I never regarded my *senses* in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions, not by my *sight*, even at that age. Should children be

THE MIND OF THE CHILD

permitted to read romances, and relations of giants and magicians and genii? I know all that has been said against it; but I have formed my faith in the affirmative. I know of no other way of giving the mind a love of the Great and the Whole. Those who have been led to the same truths step by step, through the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess. They contemplate nothing but *parts*, and all *parts* are necessarily little, and the universe is to them but a mass of *little* things."

The very young child has an almost uncanny faculty of sensing emotional attitudes in others. Later, this "intuitive" capacity becomes confused by intellectual judgments based on inadequate premises. But, at this early stage, emotional attitudes are all-important. Action, not informed by genuine feeling, is to the young child unconvincing. Maternal solicitude, for instance, can be simulated; but such pretence rarely deceives this sensitive psychologic interpreter. Even the infant is capable of love, fear and hate; and it is the acts that it comes to associate with these several emotional reactions which largely determine its habits—its code of conduct. The child, even more than does the adult, illustrates the more elementary deductions of Pavlov—the cruder truths of "reflex conditioning." Pain and pleasure furnish for the child ultimate criteria. It has no imaginative view of the future, or of those abstract ideas which in later life play so big a part in shaping our conduct. Therefore, it is absurd to drag in notions of "justice" or of moral "rights" and "wrongs" in dealing with young children, if we wish

to do our best by them. That is why formal "punishment" is, at this stage, such a mistake ; creating as it does an instinctive antipathy to the punisher, and to all that he or she stands for. But this does not mean that even the infant is to be coddled and "spoilt," obliquely rewarded for being a public nuisance, and spared from the normal consequences of unsocial acts. All life in this world is conditioned life ; and it is mainly on the habits of body and of mind which have been built up in childhood that our relative happiness and our social usefulness depend. In dealing with children, we should arrange for natural penalties—in however attenuated a form—inevitably to follow undesirable activities.

Play is a far more important thing in a child's life than it is in the life of the adult—important though it is there also. It is the child's principal means of self-directed education, contributory to its healthy development. It is not a mere respite from work and serious activities ; but is itself a serious biological activity, to a large extent taking the place of adult work. Not only the physical, but the æsthetic, the intellectual, and even the spiritual impulses of the child thus find tentative means of expression. He is "finding out," establishing environmental contacts, and discovering the essential interaction of mind and matter, and the possibilities and the limitations of his sensory linkage with, and control over, the tangible and phenomenal world. In other words, it is by play that the child comes to realize the nature of the world in which he lives, and of his own place in that world.

CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

SCIENTIFIC discoveries, like money, have an unfortunate way of falling into the wrong hands, and consequently of being misused and misapplied. The latest illustration of this tendency is afforded by certain exploitations of the newer doctrines of psychology. The revelation of the magnitude and potency of our inborn tendencies and urges has led, in servile minds, to the enthronement and adoration of the so-called "unconscious"—"the unspoilt self." "Man is at heart good and kind and honest; culture introduces the serpent into man's Eden; the law makes the crime; discipline converts the child's natural love into hate, his goodness into evil. When cultural standards of behaviour are removed, bad boys become good boys." So writes one of the best-known and most vocal of our Liberty Hall schoolmasters. The fallacies of Rousseauism never die, and are always popping up, newly costumed, as novelties. Once more they have captured the enthusiasm of our intellectual elegants, by whom the teachings of Freud and of Rousseau are thought to be not only compatible but complementary.

Fallacious thinking is rarely innocuous. Sometimes the injury is to the thinker alone; but in this case defenceless children are largely victimized; and, unless the minds of highbrow parents clear, a not inappreciable fraction of the next generation will have been seriously handicapped in the none-too-easy race for which they have entered. For a child born and brought up in a

community, "self-development" in the sense in which the term is often used is quite impossible. In the first place, the human child is born physiologically immature, and is, for a considerable time, dependent even for its simplest organic needs on the benevolence of others. Inevitably it comes under the psychic as well as the physical influence of other human beings almost from its birth. Romuluses and Remuses are rare. The instincts and urges that are born in us are very crude, very elementary and unspecialized; and they may take any one of a thousand forms or modes of expression according to environmental circumstances. Heaven knows that our traditional method of educating the young is indefensible. It is marked by crudity of method and banality of aim; but we are apt to exaggerate its evil consequences. After all, it has certain advantages lacking in some more recent "schemes." It is a great thing to have been brought up in an environment of orderliness, even if many of the assumptions that our teachers and parents took for granted were such as provoked us to rebellion. The very provocants themselves served a good purpose in stimulating us to strike out a line for ourselves—to develop our own peculiarities if we had any worth developing. Still, I agree that the typical school of the Victorian period was about as stupid and narrow in aim as its critics allege. "*Obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent.*" But, to jump from this conclusion to the further one, that the mental environment of the child can be left to chance, implies an ignorance of the process of organic evolution as well as of the established facts

CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

of psychology. Not only our characters but also our mental health and happiness depend, however much we may loathe some of the associations of the words, on the ideals and on the suppressions which result from our education.

If an average child were deliberately left to build up its own reaction-habits—its own character—by crude “natural” experience, without any conscious influence from outside, it is true that a sort of responsibility sense would develop ; but it would be an entirely utilitarian one, with little of those qualities which even the most cynical of us admire and would wish our children to possess. Where self-preservative motives were inapplicable, an individual thus untrained would inevitably be the slave of caprice—that is, of transient characterless impulses subject to, and in harmony with, no master idea. This is no true freedom. “The wise are free, but fools are slaves.” The present-day adoration of those almost physiological reaction-habits which people the imaginary world of “the unconscious” strikes me as mere foolishness. Yet one of the leading apostles of the new “educational freedom” writes that “the only safe guide is instinct, which is divine . . . An aim of education should be to keep the child from thinking.”

It is surely the prime function of education to attach the strongest sentiments to certain ideas at the expense of others. We often forget that the child is still only part way along the evolutionary path of the human adult. A few short months before his birth he was at the amœba stage ; and, in the years of his childhood, he has to pass through a series of stages synopsizing the

history of the human species over thousands of years. The educational provocants responsible for human development during these æons are, in however modified and abbreviated a form, essential to the child's wholesome growth. The educational instruments appropriate to the development of the three-year-old have thus small resemblance to those suitable for the years approximate to adolescence. The pain and pleasure principle holds throughout ; but as soon as the imitative impulse shows itself an enormous influence on the child's future life is exercised by the individuals who have won his admiration, affection or respect. "Example teacheth ; Company comforteth ; Emulation quickeneth ; Glory raiseth." The child has passed from savagery to membership of a tribe. At this stage the emotions become attached not only to individual persons but also to individual things ; and as, at the same time, the faculty of memory is active and receptive, impressions now made tend to remain through life. It were criminal for any but the gloomiest of sceptics and pessimists to leave these impressions to chance.

Gradually the child grows self-conscious, and the impulse to assert or express himself becomes manifest. The object desired becomes a little further removed from the effort ; and, if strength of character is to result, the necessity for attention, persistence, restraint and the enduring of temporary discomfort must be understood. We have refined life by removing some of its husks and "offal" ; but contained in the "offal" are important vitamins essential to our spiritual and mental health. In some form or other these vitamins have to be restored

CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

to the child's psychic pabulum. Human character, individuality and definiteness of will are largely the fruit of discipline—not the discipline which is imposed on slaves by tyrants, but the kind that one has learned to impose on oneself. A well-disciplined mind is the surest weapon against difficulty, and it is one of the most valuable possessions that a man can have. But discipline is not one of those things which we automatically have. It is not one of the primary gifts contained in that lucky packet which we call the germ-plasm. It has to be learned, and it can only be learned through practical lessons of a more or less painful kind. A measure of externally imposed compulsion is here often necessary, or the more infantile "self-indulgent" impulses may conquer and give rise to an almost ineradicable inability to carry anything to a satisfactory completion.

A few years ago, Dr. James Kerr collected a mass of evidence bearing on the physical and mental development of the human child, on the part which education has played and may play in that development, and on the various pathological and other aberrations of mind and body that most strikingly manifest themselves in childhood; passed this evidence through the sorting-house of a keen, sensible, and scientific mind; brought it into relation with his own very extensive, first-hand experience; and presented the product in the form of a book, *The Fundamentals of School Health*.

The definition of healthy personality which he accepts implies on the psychic plane the possession of intelligence adequate to meet the demands of the individual's life; of ability to concentrate on the matter before him, and

to perceive the important elements of a situation with accuracy and alertness ; of interest in the world about him, and of curiosity to understand it ; and of developed faculties of responsibility, companionability, and social sportingness. The health which he contemplates implies, also, a preponderating happiness, cheerfulness and courageousness.

Needless to say, Dr. Kerr is somewhat contemptuous of those who, theoretically accepting such an ideal, expect it to be generally realized through a booky mediæval education such as is still almost universal in our schools of every class. He quotes with hearty approval the eleven-year-old boy who wrote : “ ‘ Keep off the grass,’ is used too many times. There is too much education going on nowadays, and the man who makes boys go to school till they are sixteen wants dealing with.” “The gradual failure of Renaissance education,” Dr. Kerr writes, “preserved the great Public Schools. It is said that arithmetic was only introduced at Eton in 1840. This neglect allowed games to grow up, so that an English Public Schoolboy is now educated in a more natural and healthy way than any other child.”

If our education is to be of any real value we must get an absolutely fresh basic principle. We must keep ever before us that the aim of education is to enable every child to reach the highest point of physical and mental development of which he or she is capable. As a result of his education a man should not only be efficient in his work, but should take a pleasure and an intelligent interest in it—and not only in his work, but

CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

in life. Judged by this standard, our educationists still have a good deal to learn.

Our elementary schools at present produce, in the great majority of cases, practically no educational results so far as intellectual development is concerned, so far as physical development is concerned, or so far as character is concerned. In the case of the minority, whose minds are of that type which responds to theoretical training, the utmost that it produces is a certain sharpness, and an unimaginative habit of substituting a wooden logic for reason. In either case the education given has practically no relation to life in general, or to the development or the life-work of the individual.

Our education will be worth very little until we have got rid of the notion that the way to educate children is to give them a series of formal lessons in certain specified subjects. The work of the teacher is not to force into the brains of the children a heterogeneous collection of doubtful facts ready to be produced on demand. To quote Epictetus, "The sheep are not to produce the grass which they have eaten, but wool and milk." What one wants to do in education is to pour what Mr. Benson calls a "stream of fertilizing influences" over the minds and souls of children. One desires to bring them into contact with noble examples of humanity and with lofty thoughts, to help the development of the imagination, to encourage the child's natural delight in creation, and to build up in its mind an association between healthy work and healthy life and real pleasure. Froebel pointed out that the growing mind, like every other growing thing, needs space and time and rest ;

and, at every stage, education should be adapted to the mental and physical stage of development.

Moreover, to be of any value, education must be interesting. Where there is no interest there can be no real result. Now, in the case, probably, of nine children out of every ten it is quite impossible for their interest to be aroused by anything in the way of theoretical teaching for more than about, in the aggregate, an hour a day. A lot of lip homage is paid to Froebel, but we have not begun to learn the meaning of his greatest rule, "Learn by doing." Only by doing can the normal average child learn to use not only its body, but its mind. And even in the case of those whose minds respond to the more theoretical form of teaching, at any rate a few hours every day should be spent in some form of productive manual or physical work. Anyone who has had any considerable experience of the products of our present elementary educational system, where the work of the schools has not been supplemented by good home training, must have been staggered by the utter inefficiency and helplessness of both boys and girls when they are turned out at fourteen with their so-called education completed. Fortunately even yet a large number of homes exist where the defects of the school education are to some extent made good so far as character is concerned.

In the case of a few of our "backward" children, special schools have been established in which manual occupations form the principal part of the curriculum. Smithing, carpentry, joinery, bootmaking, tailoring, and so on, providing that they are properly and sym-

CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

pathetically taught, produce in these children a stimulating and brightening effect which those accustomed to ordinary classroom teaching can scarcely credit. For no mistake could be greater than that of supposing that the chief value of educational handicraft consists in its mechanical training of the hand and eye. The mental effect is far greater and more valuable, and the effect on character is probably greater still. The adaptation of means to end, the act of creation itself, the relentless criticism which the object created offers, constitute an education by the side of which our traditional method of parcelling out bundles of unassorted "knowledge" stands out as cruel and futile.

Mr. Bernard Shaw has said that it is one of the things that will probably be regarded in more enlightened ages with a species of incredulous horror that we should herd children together in classrooms and beat or punish them for inattention to a teacher whose remarks would not be tolerated for five minutes in ordinary society. We all know the charlatanry which forms the stock-in-trade of ten teachers out of twelve—an assumption of knowledge which is not real—a dogmatic assertion of facts which the teacher has not begun himself to digest. All this helps to produce the unpractical, unthorough boys and girls whom we are turning out from our schools by the thousand a day.

In doing practical work, on the other hand, quackery exposes itself. In making a jug or a table pretence is useless. The youngest and dumbest child can see through it. Moreover, in the direct pleasure yielded, there can be no comparison between a system which shuts children

up for six or more hours a day in stifling classrooms, compelling them to direct their whole being to matters in which they normally take no interest, and a system which gives outlet to most of the natural instincts of childhood. Weaving, pottery, carpentry, hut-building, forging, making clothes, gardening, the care of animals, cookery, housewifery, baby-tending, dressmaking—these subjects, properly taught, would convert our schools into veritable paradises for children, real Child's Gardens. Not that intellectual and theoretical knowledge should be left out of account, but the essential interrelation of so-called brain work and so-called manual work should be kept in view all the time.

The meaning of education has been concisely summarized by Sir Michael Sadler. Our aim should be to get a power of self-adjustment, to keep alive the spirit of adventure, to inculcate readiness to do drudgery, and, above all things, to form judgment and character. We need an education which opens the mind and trains the practical aptitudes ; which inspires courage and fortitude while also imparting knowledge, and the scientific way of looking at things, and the scientific way of doing things ; which opens new opportunities and at the same time cultivates the intellect and moral powers by means of which alone these opportunities can be seen and seized.

SOCIOLOGY

STERILIZING THE INEFFECTIVE

IT may be taken as axiomatic that every deliberate interference with individual liberty needs justification. Each time we limit the range of personal initiative, and lessen the measure of personal responsibility, we do an injury to humanity ; and we may rightly be challenged to show that we are coincidentally removing evils or conferring benefits that outweigh our act of stultification. Many remedies for the economic anxieties of capitalism have been suggested. One that is popular at the moment is that which consists in the sterilization of the socially inefficient—that is, those who fail to contribute their part to the ever-fattening purse of the world's bond-holders. It seems to be assumed that social unadaptiveness and economic inadequacy are Mendelian unit-characteristics, transmitted in the germ-plasm according to the simple laws which determine tallness and shortness in garden peas. We all recognize the undesirability of poverty. So, the argument would seem to run, since poverty is a characteristic of poor people, what simpler method for its abolition could there be than the sterilization of those who carry this taint ?

From time to time, the idea of improving racial quality by selective breeding stirs the imagination of those to whom sociological abstractions are more interest-

ing than human idiosyncrasy. "It takes all sorts to make a world," rejoins the tolerant common man, who is for taking things as he finds them and making the best of them. People who think and talk like this are, in the experience of most of us, the very salt of the earth. They give expression to a philosophy in harmony with the impulses and aspirations of average humanity. These, however, are not the sort of individuals to whom we owe most of the outstanding features of our material civilization—though, in the capacity of hodmen, they have done much of the work essential to its building. It would appear that on the solid rock of a man of this type Christian ethics and philosophy, and, indeed, the whole edifice of ideal Christianity, were erected. The social and economic order of the modern world is, however, as eugenists are constantly reminding us, mainly the product of a relatively few superior persons with exceptional constructive capacity. The more of them we can breed the better for mankind.

"The sterilization of mental defectives" has effected an entrance into that strange enclosure known as the field of practical politics, and the sterilization of the socially inefficient is advocated from orthodox pulpit and orthodox platform. "While we continue to breed as the cave-man bred, automatically and instinctively," says one complacent expert, "our future outlook is appalling." "We excel in the scientific breeding of horses, cows, dogs, cats and rabbits; but the production of superior men and women we leave to chance." The problem is not to be stated in quite such simple terms. The dog-fancier, aiming at length of nose or hardness of

STERILIZING THE INEFFECTIVE

coat, is able to exploit the established laws of heredity. A race of blue-eyed men or fair-haired women could doubtless be built up by such means. But human excellence is a somewhat more complicated affair. In the first place, there is no general agreement as to its components, or as to their relative importance. Is business incapacity less desirable than cruelty? Is scholastic ability worthier than a kindly heart? Are physical or mental limitations of the greater moment? And, even if we all came to an agreement on these things, how much will our knowledge of embryology and of the laws of heredity help us to reach our goal? Professor Raymond Pearl recently reminded our eugenicist highbrows that "in preaching as they do that like produces like, and that therefore superior people will have superior children, and inferior people inferior children, they are going contrary to the best-established facts of genetical science." As Professor Jennings puts it, the old notion that the genes are static character-bearing entities will not hold water. They should rather be looked upon as packets of chemicals which interact among themselves, and so give rise to compounds phenomenally very unlike their constituent elements. It is these compounds which afford the characteristics of any given individual. In a very interesting book by Dr. Landman, of New York, published a year or so ago, various investigations into the life histories and ancestry of children—feeble-minded and other—are analysed. These findings convincingly demonstrate the inapplicability of the Mendelian law—narrowly interpreted as it usually is—to the inheritance of mental qualities. For

instance, it is often stated as an incontrovertible fact that all the children resulting from the union of two feeble-minded parents will also be feeble-minded. But Freeman and others, investigating the mental capacity of 671 foster-children, found that of 26 children each with both parents feeble-minded, only four had an intelligence quotient even slightly below seventy. Evidently, the environmental influence of the foster-parents played as big a part as blood-relationship.

Moral defectiveness proved to be altogether unrelated to heredity. A few years ago, Dr. Neil Dayton, of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Diseases, made an analysis of 3,553 backward public schoolchildren, seventy-two per cent of whom were classified as feeble-minded. He found that in only seven per cent was there any evidence of mental defect in *either* parent. In his report, he gives expression to his opinion that "it has always seemed that we are asking too much of heredity when we expect the transmission of the hodge-podge of characteristics which we now call feeble-mindedness."

It is doubtful if many of those who theorize about the cause and cure of mental defectiveness have any clear notion of its nature. To begin with, mental deficientes differ only in degree from the rest of us. The fully and perfectly developed mind is a figment. There is no natural line between those whom we classify as mental efficientes and those we choose to call deficientes. Such lines as are drawn are as artificial and arbitrary as is the line between poor and rich. Nor must mental deficiency be confused with those eccentric perversions of the mind which we call insanity. The characteristic

STERILIZING THE INEFFECTIVE

of mental deficiency is an incapacity, through incomplete development of mental or emotional faculty, for independent adaptation to ordinary social requirements, save under some abnormal degree of supervision or control. This arrested development may be due to inborn defect or to some accident or disease intervening before development is complete.

The extreme of mental deficiency is idiocy. Not far removed from it is imbecility, between the milder forms of which and the lower grades of feeble-mindedness the gap is often narrow ; and even the feeble-minded are but the tail of a long series of the dull and backward, between whom and their more adaptable and efficient neighbours no natural line of cleavage can be recognized. This vagueness and this overlapping of classification make diagnosis difficult. Ordinary school or educational tests are, of themselves, not very helpful ; though, so far as actual intelligence goes—a very different thing from social efficiency—reasonably effective tests have been devised. These tests enable skilled observers with fair accuracy to measure intelligence in terms of a mental age. In children, the ration is taken to be that of the mental age to the chronological age. Thus, a twelve-year-old child with a mental age of six is said to have a mental ratio of fifty per cent. The chronological age assumed in adults is, for purposes of assessment, taken as fourteen ; for it seems that the average mental level of the ordinary adult population corresponds very closely with that of the normal fourteen-year-old child. Evidently, for most of us, so far as development of potentiality goes, we have, by that age, reached our limit.

The greater ease of defining intellectual standards and of measuring intellectual capacity has led to their receiving more attention than has been given to the even more important emotional and instinctive aspects of mind and character. In this matter, Dr. Lewis, reporting the findings of the Committee on Mental Deficiency, is perfectly sound. He points out that, although precise standards have been formulated for the purposes of his mass inquiry, he has by no means relied on the mechanical application of formal tests. "It is essential," he says, "that the person who undertakes to diagnose mental deficiency shall have not only a knowledge of medicine, of psychology and of educational methods, but shall also be experienced in observing the physical, mental and social features of sub-normal persons ; and this knowledge and experience cannot be reduced to the tabloid form of standards." He points out that, if external circumstances are not markedly unfavourable, many adults, if they have no grave handicap of temperament or physique, "can manage to get along in a general community with a mental age so low as even eight years." Below this level, nearly all adults, whatever their physique, and however well-balanced their instincts and emotions, need, in a modern community, supervision, care, or control. But most of the difficult and troublesome feeble-minded persons have ages above eight. "We have evidence," writes Dr. Lewis, "that the majority of feeble-minded persons in the largest institutions for the mentally defective have mental ages of nine or ten, and a certain number have mental ages of even eleven or twelve." Their defects are evidently

of temperament and character rather than of intellect in the narrow sense.

The real problem of the adult defective is presented by his fundamental and irremediable incapacity for social adaptation. Plenty of people who are hopelessly befogged by the three R's prove themselves decent and self-supporting citizens, at any rate in the humbler walks of life. There is some deep-down truth, as well as ironic humour, in an observation of Dr. Reginald Worth: "If there were no mentally deficient, the world would be a pretty poor place; for its real drudgery is done by people who are slightly defective."

Segregation of the whole mentally defective population of the country, numbering at least a third of a million, is so impracticable as to be not worth talking about. Moreover, it would be as undesirable as it is impossible. The remedy for mental deficiency popular among those who pride themselves on their hard-headedness is the "sterilization of the unfit." Had we any assurance of its effectiveness and practicability, it would indeed be hard to raise conclusive opposition to sterilization by one or other of the comparatively safe and painless methods now available. At present sterilizing operations, unless performed for medical reasons, are illegal in this country; even when performed with the consent, or at the request, of the patient. A man may not legally maim himself, or employ another person to maim him. A year or two ago, Lord Atkin told the Medico-Legal Society that a surgeon who performed a maiming operation for merely economic reasons might find himself in very serious danger of a criminal prose-

cution. Yet, seeing that both the intent and the sole effect of the modern sterilizing operations are the prevention of the procreation or bearing of children, normal sexual impulses and activities being in no way affected, genuinely voluntary sterilization would seem to differ essentially only in its irrevocability from other contraceptive practices.

There is an idea abroad, though its foundations are doubtful, that the number of individuals who are adjudged mentally deficient and unable to take a normal independent part in contemporary social life is increasing at an alarming rate ; and it is popularly assumed, on the basis of a small number of notorious instances, that mental deficiency is a well-defined characteristic, transmitted by parents to their children from generation to generation. If steps were taken to prevent these individuals from becoming parents, it is plausibly inferred, this social burden could, in a short time, be got rid of, and the pockets of the rest of us would be better for the riddance. The issues raised are not, however, so simple as they may at first sight appear ; for considerations other and more profound than those of physiology and social convenience are involved. Recent examples have shown us how slippery is the path of a nation that ceases to regard the personality and liberty of the individual as having value or sacredness except in so far as they further the purposes, and harmonize with the ideals, of those at the moment dominant.

Very many serious sociologists have urged the legalizing of the operation of sterilization when voluntarily acquiesced in by individuals recognizable as mental

STERILIZING THE INEFFECTIVE

defectives, or as potential transmitters of psychic or physical deformities. Whatever our religious or ethical prejudices, most of us would welcome such legislation. If any appreciable number of mental defectives could be persuaded thus to make parenthood impossible, it would be all to the good ; for, apart altogether from questions of heredity, the feeble-minded can rarely be described as fitted for the care and training of young children.

Many of those who have publicly commented on the Committee's proposals have, however, attributed to them potential consequences out of all proportion to possibilities. If these recommendations are, as it may be hoped they will be, converted into law, they will not, however great their success in other directions, touch more than the fringe of the problem of mental deficiency. There are over a quarter of a million certified or certifiable mental defectives in this country ; and there are, in addition, many times that number of seemingly normal members of the community who carry in their germ-plasm as recessive elements essential factors of hereditary feeble-mindedness. For, although it has been shown that an abnormal proportion of the children of mentally defective parents are feeble-minded, yet, of the total certified mental defectives in the country, not much more than five per cent are the descendants of parents similarly afflicted. Popenoe estimated the total number of people in the U.S.A. with serious mental disease or defect as approximately ten millions ; and of these he considered that at least one and a quarter millions should be sterilized if the problem were to be effectively dealt with along these lines. Our knowledge either of the human

mind or of the principles of inheritance is not yet at a stage which could justify the boldest "reformer" in embarking on an enterprise of this magnitude.

Before we even contemplate racial intervention on such a scale, we must have learnt to distinguish between truly hereditary defect and mere genetic predisposition. Tuberculosis was once regarded as a heritable disease. We now know that some people are more susceptible to infection than others: but, by improving social conditions and raising the economic level of the poor, we have, in a comparatively few years, done more to stamp out consumption than we could have done by sterilization, voluntary or compulsory, in a decade of centuries. When we come to mental abnormalities or subnormalities, we are confronted with conditions with which environment, especially social environment, is intimately concerned. Professor Lancelot Hogben, in his book *Nature and Nurture*, has defined the issue between the so-called eugenicists and the environmentalists as by no means so simple or so clear-cut as used to be imagined. As he says, human society "is a biological phenomenon *sui generis*, with unique laws of development," and the problems presented cannot be solved by the same methods or by the same instruments as those which are apt when we are contemplating the development of most other living organisms—though, by the way, even that is a much more complex affair than we used to think in the (biologically) cock-a-hoop 'nineties.

As Professor Hogben points out, our parents do not endow us with characters. "They endow us with genes; and these genes cannot carry their cheque-

books into the next life." Whether or not a genetic difference will manifest itself and how it will manifest itself in a particular individual are largely matters of environment—pre- and post-natal, and "no statement about a genetic difference has any scientific meaning unless it includes a specification of the environment in which it manifests itself in a particular manner." This is a piece of scientific realism which some of our sublimated sadists who have taken up "mental defectiveness" as a hobby might study with advantage.

There are, of course, a few comparatively rare diseases and disfigurements, such as lobster-claw and brachydactyly, which, being dominant conditions, could be eliminated in half a century if all individuals suffering from them agreed not to reproduce—or were, by sterilization or other means, prevented from so doing. Also, it is true that sterilization of all individuals displaying sex-linked recessive diseases (such as hæmophilia) would, in every generation, halve the proportion of persons so affected; but, with our present elementary knowledge of genetics, we soon reach the limits of possible achievement by selective sterilization. However resolute we were, we should not, by this means, appreciably reduce in a thousand years the undesirable traits and weaknesses of human nature to which "hereditary" contributes—greed, stupidity, cruelty, weak-mindedness, complacency, conceit, apathy, and so on, according to the ethical and intellectual fashion of the moment. Mr. James Bridie recently referred to the "almost voluptuous insistence" by a large number of well-to-do "repressed unhappy people" on the desir-

ability of inflicting on others "a mutilating operation, before a full understanding of the disease has been reached."

We shall not know the essential facts about human inheritance until, much more nearly than we have yet done, we have equalized human environment. What should we think of the laboratory worker who kept one lot of rats in conditions representing the murine equivalent of our slums and another lot in conditions comparable with those of Hampstead, and then attributed differences in the mental and physical development of the two groups to genetic distinctions? Even when there is an hereditary factor, we have no right to assume that it is the only factor, or that the "defect" by which it manifests itself is irremediable. "The fact that heredity is the culprit in one framework of environment is fully consistent with the possibility of discovering a complete cure in another."

There is nothing to justify the assumption, made by many influential yet ill-informed persons, that the science of genetics is now sufficiently established to justify us in emasculating or otherwise cutting-about those of our neighbours who seem of no particular use to us. If, nevertheless, such sterilization came to be enforceable by law, we may be pretty sure that only those subnormals in intelligence who, in the circumstances of our industrial order, found themselves without visible means of subsistence would be subjected to it. It were fanciful to suppose that the feeble-minded recipient of an assured income, or the feeble-minded child of well-to-do parents, would be interfered with. There are some admirable arguments for wholesale sterilization. It

CONSTITUTION AND IDIOSYNCRASY

would, in many ways, be an excellent thing if the normal manifestations of love could be freed from all thought of consequences ; if the most satisfying of the adventures open to man could be looked upon as disinterestedly and unprudentially as poetry or as the contemplation of beauty itself. The propagation of the species might—once we had eliminated certain traits from our nature—be made the specialized duty of selected individuals, and human breeding be conducted with the same scientific efficiency as that—so admired by the eugenists—which characterizes the conduct of the stud-farm and the raising of pedigree pigs. But the notion that the sterilizing of a few thousand poor simpletons who are weak in their arithmetic or fail to recognize the orderly beauties of our industrial system is going appreciably to raise the intellectual standard of the nation is just a fairy-tale of old-wives' science.

CONSTITUTION AND IDIOSYNCRASY

(OR THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF INDIVIDUALITY)

“**M**AY I fill your glass ? ” I asked my host, who had placed a bottle of Bass before me. “ No, I’ll have a drop of stout. Dr. Chappell put me on to it. When I lived up North, stout used to upset me ; whereas a glass of beer nearly always made the wheels go round. Chappell explained to me that it was a matter of latitude. He said I should find that, whilst beer agreed with me, and stout disagreed, when north of the Thames, the

exact opposite would hold good south of that river ; and, by Jove, he was right. He must have formed a pretty good picture of my constitution." Chappell is an old friend of mine, so I said nothing that might betray scepticism as to the scientific foundation of this bit of benevolent bunk.

Medical "science" has for a long time been more concerned about the study of disease than about the relieving of sick individuals. This latter task has, for the most part, been left to the day-labourers of medicine. The discovery of the important part played by specific germs in the causation of a number of common disorders diverted interest from the reactions of the individual to external influences. "Diseases" once more came to be looked upon—much as primitive folk looked at them—as so many demoniac entities, to be excluded or exorcised.

The financial success of the old-time family doctor depended very largely on his capacity for convincing his patients that he understood their several constitutions. Is this belief in the variability of "constitution" a mere survival of mediæval superstition, or is it founded on demonstrable realities ? We know that our minds and our emotions differ enormously both in quantity and in kind. We know, also, that there are small but obvious physical differences between the thousand million of us, or whatever the number is, sufficient to enable each individual to be distinguished from all the others. *Prima facie*, it would seem likely that parallel microscopic and chemical differences exist among the physical infinitesimals of which our bodies are made up.

CONSTITUTION AND IDIOSYNCRASY

Biochemical research has proved the correctness of this pre-supposition ; and it seems clear that our chemical differences are as definite as are our differences of physiognomy and of emotion.

When St. Paul told the Corinthians that "all flesh is not the same flesh"—the flesh of men, the flesh of beasts, the flesh of fishes, and the flesh of birds being all different—he anticipated some of the latest researches into the nature of proteins. We have become so used to look upon the important factors of disease as external to ourselves that the contribution of the individual is apt to be underestimated. Much of the criticism levelled at orthodox medicine is thus explicable. Generalizations about man's reactions are as fallible in the world of physiology as in the worlds of morals and of æsthetics. A writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, over a century ago, referred to the fact that "among men of the same race and the same habits, one is poisoned by eggs, and the other by honey, almonds, or cheese ; another finds an antidote to dyspepsy in plum-pudding or mince-pie, and at the same time suffers from bread as from a poison." It was not a bad definition which Berkeley gave of the human constitution, when he described it as "something in the idiosyncrasy of the patient that puzzles the physician."

The few beautiful acres of the earth's surface of which a queer social convention enables me to call myself the freeholder, were bought by me from a distinguished and philosophic-minded surgeon, Mr. Jonathan Hutchinson. More than half a century ago, Hutchinson delivered, in the theatre of the Royal College of Surgeons, a course

of six lectures on "Temperament, Idiosyncrasy and Diathesis." He was a man with a "scientific imagination"—that is to say, he possessed the faculty of forming intelligible pictures incorporating the established facts of science. Uninterpreted facts seemed to Hutchinson as the mere bricks and nails of architecture. He expressed his contempt for physicians who had acquired "the easy-going habit of regarding all persons alike, and recognizing differences only in their diseases." He compared such practice with that of a farmer (and Hutchinson was a bit of a farmer himself) concerned only with the quality of his seed, taking no account of the peculiarities or the previous usage of his soil.

"It is much the same with us in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. In addition to the primary or exciting cause, which is of a paramount importance, we have various others which may perhaps be conveniently classed together under the term contributory, since they contribute to control and modify final results. Among these, temperament—the original vital endowment of the individual—is unquestionably a real force, and one which we would most gladly recognize and estimate if we could. Any scepticism which I have expressed applies not to the reality of the thing, but to our ability to discriminate it."

The theory of evolution depends on the assumption of individual differences of varying survival utility. The potentialities of no two individuals are identical. This is as true in disease as in health. As Sir Archibald Garrod put it, "The constitution of a patient plays a very important part in *shaping* the diseases from which he suffers."

CONSTITUTION AND IDIOSYNCRASY

The tubercle bacillus as found in one individual cannot, by the most expert microscopist, be distinguished from the tubercle bacillus found in another ; yet no two cases of tubercular infection are truly alike. The reaction of the individual is at least as important an element in the resultant phenomena of illness as is the nature of the hostile invader. A distinguished surgeon, addressing the British Medical Association on "Bad Surgical Risks," recently drew attention to many idiosyncrasies that at first sight might seem irrelevant to his subject : "It would be difficult," he said, "to controvert the accepted view that members of the Jewish faith are notoriously bad surgical risks ; and in the case of operations on Jews the simplest measures are to be preferred : safety must be put before thoroughness and the highest efficiency." The speaker went on to advise his hearers to refrain from any avoidable operation on those who require much persuasion or over-persuasion. "Beware of the apprehensive patient," he said ; "the man with the rapid pulse and the stack of French novels around him. An "eventful" recovery, or worse, may be confidently predicted for those who change their religion the night before an operation ; and for the politician or potentate who keeps the theatre waiting while the final lines of his autobiography are completed. . . . Clergymen, doctors, nurses, actors, and those of an artistic temperament are poor surgical risks ; and garrulous loquacity, pre-operative or post-operative, is a danger signal that should not pass unnoticed : it so often heralds surgical disaster." So closely interrelated are emotional states and biochemical processes.

SOCIOLOGY

In our complacency, we are inclined to dwell on the wonderful capacity that man has displayed in adapting himself and his bodily and mental organization to the circumstances which environ him. Have we fully realized the pace at which developments have been taking place in the environmental circumstances themselves? Human ingenuity has, in cruder matters—such as housing, heating, clothing and cooking—introduced “aids to living,” the importance of which is obvious. But, subtle and sinister rivals for world supremacy—the unicellular organisms—have also been changing to meet the new conditions. The race will be won by the species which is most swift in deliberate or spontaneous adaptation to the development of cosmic circumstances. The end of this race is not yet within the reach of confident prophecy.

THE AUTHOR AND SOCIETY

“**H**IGHER natures act; average natures react.” Like most generalizations, this aphorism embodies a working truth, not an absolute one. The moral implications are obvious; and don’t let us be afraid of this word moral. Morality is older than the Victorians, older than prudery; older, indeed, than recorded history. It is, in fact, of the very essence of human civilization. Morality, also, though in its substance constant, in its external form and expressions must move with the times and with the evolution of the human mind.

An essential ingredient of every community of herd

animals—if it is not to remain, like the bees, static through the ages—is a modicum of eccentrics, of pioneers, of adventurous heretics, who wander away from the herd, discovering new pastures and hitherto unexplored ways of life. Galton noted the phenomenon among the South African cattle; human history is, of course, heavily decorated with instances. It is thanks to these wanderers, adventurers, experimenters, prophets, philosophers, scientists and artists, these disregards of convention and tradition, from Cain to Columbus, from Jesus to Einstein, from Diogenes to Freud, from the author of Ecclesiastes to Karl Marx and Bernard Shaw, that our activities and our aspirations are no longer limited by our crude material needs. In science, in philosophy, in religion and in art, the innovator, as the word implies, is a disturber of contemporary society; and, nearly always, if the new idea is sufficiently revolutionary, sufficiently unconventional, society blindly attacks this ugly duckling.

If, then, we agree that both general morality (that is, zeal for individual and social perfection—as, in ratio to our imaginative capacities, we severally conceive it) and sporadic heresy are necessary for the healthy development of human communities, where are the boundary lines of these seemingly conflicting biologic tendencies to be drawn? In other words, is the innovator—the adventurer—to give full play to his heterodox impulses, or is he morally bound to take into account the rather blind susceptibility of the majority of his contemporaries? Is the artist or the philosopher to say what is in his mind, regardless of the reactions of the mass of

unreflective persons to whom, perforce, he addresses himself ?

I belong to a profession the members of which are in honour bound to take into account not only the abstract correctness of their intellectual decisions but also the likely reactions which their deeds or words will provoke. Truth cannot, by the conscientious doctor, be treated as an absolute. The ultimate well-being of his patient—or, if he takes the larger view, of society as a whole—defines a boundary beyond which his own pride of intellect or of craftsmanship must not trespass. Consideration for social welfare limits even the crude technique of the lawyer, if he would be regarded by his colleagues as a man of honour. So, in varying degrees, with almost every other profession or trade. Are the artist and the prophet free from such conditions and considerations ?

Most people will agree that, if society is to cohere—in other words, to exist at all—liberty of self-expression in *action* must be in some respects limited. Nearly all action has an idea behind it. Part of the instinctive outfit of man is susceptibility to suggestion. One often hears or reads about the elevating effects of fine literature ; presumably, therefore, literature affects the point of view and the ethical standards of readers ; and, if they are sincere and courageous persons, their acts. That being so, literature can also debase ; for we have appealed to standard, and *supra* and *infra* measurements come in. Iago produced a convincing work of art ; Othello was moved by it and acted accordingly. Othello is nearly every one of us, though we may not all be so courageously logical as he.

THE AUTHOR AND SOCIETY

In my profession we are constantly asked to devote ourselves to what is called preventiveness—to anticipating disease ; that is, to finding out the circumstances and conditions that predispose to physiological disorder. Does not the same principle of expediency apply in the world of social ethics ? It is an urgent question for the pundits of literature. Once we agree that some conduct is socially desirable and that other lines of conduct are socially disruptive, are we not bound, unless we think society ought to be disrupted, to take steps to make difficult the activities which tend to that result ? We are apt to assume that we live in an unconditioned world—that the True, the Good and the Beautiful are sufficient signposts for humanity. In fact, these are mere words, assumed to give finity to indefinite lumps of psychic chaos. There is no getting away from the fact that twentieth-century civilization, with certain modifications which would be quite easy to effect, suits most of us very well. The granting or exercising of complete personal liberty of action would, it must be admitted, make this or any other civilization impossible. There is, in every human herd, an appreciable minority of individuals who have no instinctive bias against murder, rape, kidnapping and banditry, however equalitarian the economic system and however Christian the prevalent convention.

This is one side of the question. Is there another side ? Socrates and Jesus Christ uttered doctrines which, not unreasonably, were thought by the responsible heads of their communities to tend towards social disruption. Not unreasonably, these revolutionists were officially

killed. Yet few people to-day would deny that both of them rendered great service to humanity. Though, at the moment, there is apparent in certain countries a tendency to revert to ancient practices, most of us have acquired by racial experience a knowledge of the social danger of undue intolerance. Unfortunately, art and prophecy have become lucrative occupations, adopted by individuals as a congenial alternative to cultivating the soil or making suits of clothes. These professions have, like commercial advertising and horse-coping, their own tricks of the trade. The libertarian issue is no longer whether a man shall be free to say what he believes to be true ; but whether he shall be free cleverly to imitate the manner of utterance of genuine artists and prophets. It will be seen that the question is not simply one of allowing everyone honestly to say what he believes, in the way in which he thinks it ought to be said, but of allowing a man to sell anything he likes to a lot of uninformed persons incapable of recognizing the poison which it may contain. Milton's *Areopagitica* avoids the real issue.

All of us are constantly engaged in quieting our consciences—in finding excuses or reasons for doing what we want to do. A writer who can present such reasons in a plausible and attractive form is pretty sure to find a market for his wares. Having discovered a drug that causes insensitiveness to moral pain, he proceeds commercially to exploit his discovery. That his drug is one of addiction, paralysing the conscience and destroying the moral will of his clients, is, he alleges, no concern of his. Money is clearly at the root of this, as of so many moral

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARCHITECTURE

and social evils. I believe that here is the crux of the whole matter. I believe, further, that it would be a splendid thing for art and for honesty if neither they nor their simulacra were marketable products. Such might be the state of affairs in a truly democratic communist state, but within our system it is impracticable. Nor is there any possible means whereby an outside authority can discriminate between the utterances of the honest and of the dishonest. Legal censorship inevitably suppresses disturbing novelty irrespective of its ultimate social value or wholesomeness. Censorship in practice has always proved thoroughly ineffective, and a debaser of the moral currency. The author himself, however, is not freed from responsibility. He cannot decently or with honour disregard the individual and social reactions which by publication he deliberately provokes. He must be his own censor. He must somehow harmonize honesty with morality.

“The community has no bribe that will tempt a wise man”—or an honest one; and it has no penalty that will prevent him from giving expression to the truth he honestly feels or the beauty he truly sees.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARCHITECTURE

NEARLY all of us call ourselves functionalists nowadays; but I often wonder if we are all quite clear as to the significance of that term, or as to the limitations of its applicability. In so far as a building

fails to fulfil its utilitarian purpose it falls by that much short of perfection. But, when we have created a building which adequately satisfies all "practical" demands, devoid of all hindrance or superfluity—in other words, is "functionally" perfect—have we necessarily achieved architectural success? I put this question to two highly intelligent modernists who recently honoured me by weekending at my house. One answered with a decisive "yes"; the other temporized. He admitted that, of two buildings equally fulfilling their utilitarian purpose, one might be much more architecturally satisfying than the other—which seemed to me to give away the whole case for "functionalist" absolutism.

It is that "something more" which intrigues me—a mere amateur in these matters. Even the crudest of theoretic functionalists fail to express their admiration of those rows of modern villa residences for artisans which border so many station roads in England. Yet many of these houses closely correspond with the ambitions, social notions, and domestic demands of ninety per cent of the people who occupy them. Hundreds of these humble villas are quite devoid of "useless ornament," of decoration added to meet conventional or traditional superstitions—in fact, of anything which is not strictly "functional." The bolder and more thorough-going of my guests, when I advanced this instance, stuck to his guns, arguing that if, as alleged, these buildings met the practical needs of their occupants, they were architecturally beyond criticism. My other guest agreed with me that they are hideous and ought

to be exploded by dynamite. The former, a hot Socialist, urged that, in any case, the look of a building was no business of the passer-by, that all this talk about beauty as distinct from utility was sheer bunk, and that the so-called æsthetic sense was "as purely a matter of local fashion and convention as are women's dress and religious ritual." I pointed out that it is a little difficult, if there is no such thing in animal nature as an æsthetic sense, to account for the springtime manifestations of the peacock's tail, the lapwing's crest, or the plumage of the pheasant. As I anticipated, my friend explained to me that these had obvious physiological or biological utility in that they suitably excited the emotions of the females of the several species concerned. When I rejoindered that this emotional stimulus seemed to imply the existence of something uncommonly like æsthetic sense in the ladies concerned, the discussion became the prey of red-herrings.

It is surely the experience of everyone with any degree of sensitiveness that of two objects equally fitted for their objective purpose one is more pleasant to look at, and usually at the same time more stimulating, than the other. This applies to the most varied things—jugs and tea-pots and chairs and rooms and houses and theatres. It is "this little something extra some others haven't got" that calls for consideration and analysis. The extreme "modernist" often argues, as my guest argued, that this supplemental element is the fruit of mere prejudice or faulty education—just a convention that needs correcting to meet new circumstances and new developments of the practicable. The conservative

prejudices of some of our architectural diehards, and the architectural affectations of our raw mediocracy, would seem to justify such a contention ; but a glance at the contents of the bookcases of the latter should give us pause. For there we find a corresponding insincerity, a corresponding affectation of taste. These books—like the meaningless gables or pillars of the houses which contain them—are but potentially beautiful objects out of place. The books were bought for the same reason as the gables and pillars were built ; because they have been praised by persons of acknowledged sensitiveness and discrimination. We do not condemn the works of Blake because they are to be found in the homes of many a sordid money-grabber or half-wit ; and argue that, because the stories of Gaboriau or of Edgar Wallace would most appropriately occupy those shelves, these should rightly be looked upon as the only honest embodiments of literature. Obvious inappropriateness and obvious insincerity are rightly regarded as contemptible ; but it is the shallowest logic that drives some people to infer therefrom that the things and tastes affected are themselves so much footle. New circumstances demand new forms, it is true ; and that to-day new circumstances exist is equally true. But, in its main manifestations, and in its psychic equipment, humanity is very much what it has been for many thousand years. The same stock of senses and emotions remain—though their most effective provocants may have changed. The discoveries of steam, of the internal-combustion engine, and of steel have indeed produced important revolutions in human environment, but they have only

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARCHITECTURE

in the smallest measure changed the spiritual and æsthetic nature of man.

If we are honest most of us will admit that we like a home to look homely ; a room to look lived in ; a cathedral to inspire awe and reverence ; a hall devoted to the arts to suggest our nobler dreams of human potentialities. Our whole mental and emotional life works with symbols and analogies. Any art which is to be more than sensual in its appeal—probably even the sensually appealing also—must be symbolic. There is prevalent, especially in intellectual circles, a notion that science represents the last word in human knowledge and intelligence. In truth, science is a mere tool, no more human, and of no more human relevance, than is the steam engine or the automobile. Its very in-humanity is one of its prime postulates and one of its proud boasts. Science is cold, humanity is warm. In so far as a building is utilitarian (in the crude sense), it is the business of the engineer and the builder, the scientist and the craftsman. In so far as it is to contribute to human happiness something over and above that which the strictly “scientific” building can offer, it is the business of the symbolist, the artist, the architect. Surely everybody now realizes that above the level of elementary sensation all is flux and interblending, every thought contains an element of emotion. This is mere commonplace. Yet plenty of persons with minds of good repute still argue that the æsthetic emotions (if their existence is allowed at all) are most pure when they are unstirred by thought, by memory, or by association. This passion for sterility is a new thing

in the world, and it manifests itself in unexpected places. The detachedness, orderliness and mathematical precision of the laboratory are taken as the indices of reality and of spiritual clarity. But life is not at all like that ; nor is beauty, nor is art. In all these is an ingredient not measurable by instruments of precision ; and it is that ingredient which gives the savour to our existence.

If the extreme functionalist position is accepted, architecture as a fine art disappears. Indeed, there is no longer room for the architect ; for the engineer and the technical builder can between them meet the whole of the difficulties. That a building, like a piece of literature, should serve the purposes for which it was intended, efficiently and, in the truest sense, economically, is, of course, beyond dispute ; but everything depends on the interpretation we give to that word " purpose." No man can see or feel beyond the range of his own mind ; and there are millions of people on this earth to whom Shakespeare's sonnets must appear a ridiculously affected way of conveying information. Yet in the ultimate analysis, such is the first and most important function of literature. But the information conveyed by the sonnets differs from that which the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Herald* so effectively present. Incidentally, it is probable that it could not be presented by words otherwise than as it is. Architecture is to be considered and criticized from much the same standpoint as is literature. Many people pay visits to cathedrals, derelict castles, and the like, simply because the guide-books tell them that they ought to. We may be pretty sure that every time they miss the architectural point. If

they are rich enough to build a new house for themselves they commonly have in mind something resembling, even on a miniature scale, the highly recommended buildings they have visited—hence the thousands of pseudo-Gothic and pseudo-Elizabethan villa residences all over the country. The reasons why the castles, or cathedrals, or cottages are (so they are told, and readily believe) admirable examples of applied art entirely escape them. The relativity of beauty is a notion foreign to them. Yet, when we see suburban villas, with their quaint apings of baronial grandeur (“bijou baronial halls,” as one enterprising agent describes them), it is not the buildings which merit our criticism so much as the inferiority complex of those whose minds and morals they embody. It is the unused “best parlour” over again—a terrible give-away, which should stir our pity rather than our scorn. If we look a little deeper we shall be driven to see that these æsthetic perversions, as they seem to us, are but inevitable fruits of our social system. It is as foolish and as heartless to denounce the taste of the *petit bourgeois* as to ridicule the poverty of the proletariat.

THE NOBLE SAVAGE

I AM getting a little tired of, and, I fancy, a little irritated by, the constant reiteration of the doctrine used by so many of our distinguished health missionaries as the fundamental basis of their teaching—the doctrine that the primitive times were the healthy times and that civilization is but another word for decadence.

I suppose that at some time in our lives most of the liveliest of us have been taken in by that ideal of the noble savage ; and the healthy savage seemed but his rightful heir. But the relevant thing about savages and primitive men, so far as they have lasted on into our own times, and thus become possible subjects of observation, is that, if the test of healthy living is to be longevity and freedom from disease, they can scarcely claim to serve as hygienic examples to the rest of us.

It is true that in an average tribe of uncivilized natives the number of men past middle-age suffering from disease is smaller, in proportion to the whole population, than in some civilized communities, but that is because a smaller proportion of them attain advanced middle-age. And if we talk about infant mortality—which has been held up as the best test of a nation's healthiness—few savage tribes or primitive races could hold the most feebly glimmering candle even to the slummiest of civilized slum-dwellers.

As for old people. Well, as a general rule, it is a delicate subject among savages. In truth, there is hardly a particle of evidence to support the theory that an unreflective life, "according to nature," is a healthy one, and that only the products of man's reason and intelligence are vile and unwholesome.

Of course, not every invention of man represents a true advance towards any goal that can be called desirable ; but only an unnatural hybrid of pessimist and cynic would argue that the average man or woman of our modern civilization shows no progress—in the sense that "progress" has for us—when compared with

the nearly simian hero of some of the new health apostles.

Everything which tended to take man away from those primal methods of satisfying the elemental hungers and lusts which distinguished our early ancestors has, of course, modified and made more subtle the hygienic problem.

The invention of fire ; the invention and development of language ; the origin and growth of the art of building ; the supplementing of nature's scanty covering with clothes ; all these, and every corresponding development, created new circumstances, demanding some measure of ingenuity to prevent or lessen the ill-effects which otherwise would have gone far to nullify the gains to health and life which they brought.

But the fact that the early days of radiography demanded the sacrifice of a few heroic martyrs in but small measure lessens the right of the discoverer of the X-rays to claim for his invention enormous gains to the health of humanity. Cooking has brought its evils, as well as its boons ; its evils we are learning to correct ; the boons will remain. But for houses, man could never have occupied more than a tenth of that area of the globe which he now enjoys. Still, we have much to learn about the proper method of building houses. So, with one thing after another.

Only a rash or a mentally-afflicted man would discard clothes because their shape displeased him ; or burn his house because of its minor defects. Tentativeness is the very essence of conscious human progress. Indeed, it would, so far as we can observe and judge, seem to characterize even the workings of the universal mind.

Much of the "back-to-nature" propaganda is the merest rubbish, for it is a great fallacy to identify primitive life with genuine simplicity. To possess few amenities merely because others are beyond one's reach is a very different thing from deliberately limiting one's possessions and cravings to things which one can use, appreciate, and enjoy. The latter is the only sort of simplification worth aiming at. "How many things there are in the world that I do not want to own," is the cry of cultivated philosophy. "How few things there are in the world that I can possess," is the cry of barbarism.

We hear a lot about the rush and the strenuousness of modern life, but that is merely to confuse alertness, eagerness, and interest with overstrain. For all its dullness, the life of primitive man was far more exhausting than that of the inhabitant of a twentieth-century city.

Where, after all, are the signs that modern men and women lead more strenuous or more strained lives than did their ancestors? How many of those who utter these lamentations have any even temporary experience of conditions remotely comparable with those of primitive or even mediæval times? The motor-car moves more quickly than did the stage coach, but it leaves its occupants, at the end of a hundred-mile journey, less exhausted, less nerve-racked, and fresher in every way.

Most of us probably touch life at more points in a day than our grandparents did in a week, but it has all been made so much easier for us.

I read the other day a pronouncement of one of our most distinguished physicians. This is what he said :

“In the sphere of the intellect, and especially of the emotions, we must preach moderation and simplicity. It is difficult for any clear-thinking doctor to avoid the conclusion that the hustle of modern life, the pace at which we go, the nerve-strain involved, and the expense of spirit entailed, have become a large factor in the incidence of disease.”

I walked along the Mile End Road, and later along Oxford Street, past Bourne and Hollingsworth's and Peter Robinson's, and through Piccadilly, gazing into the faces of my over-intellectualized fellows, and I reflected on my patients and their average mental activities and emotional life, and again meditated on that peroration. And I am afraid that I spiritually shrugged my shoulders. Where is this hustle of which Sir Thomas Horder and Lord Dawson speak? The electric train travels quickly, but modern man sits still in it, and smokes his pipe. It is true that a man cannot keep pace with the wireless; but I have visions of stout, well-fed gentlemen and comfortable, complacent ladies lying back in easy chairs each evening, listening to music, news as to the current value of the lira and the weather forecast, with the minimum manifestations of hustle or emotional disturbance. Working people who work shorter hours than they have ever worked before; whilst over a couple of million working-people—poor devils—do nothing, and have nothing to do, each day but stroll to the Labour Exchange and report themselves. The few people who are actively engaged in mental work, and those with active emotions, whether of enthusiasm or the more specific passions, are the rarest

of visitors to the physicians' consulting-room. Our leaders of thought and our great poets and dreamers are not usually a very lucrative part of the doctor's clientele. They are, in the popular phrase, too busy to be ill. Neurasthenics are not confined to places like London, where taxi-cabs and telephones are customary instruments of movement and communication. They are common in "quiet" villages, and their manifestations are portrayed even in the works of Jane Austen. There is, in fact, not one particle of evidence to justify the allegation of a casual connexion between modern mechanical invention and contemporary psychic trouble.

It strikes me as the merest journalistic clap-trap to bemoan on hygienic grounds inventions which, though in themselves complex, undoubtedly tend to simplification of life for the individual. The electric light is less "worrying" than the oil-lamp, and the electric train of the District Railway than the old smoky and dingy affair it replaced. The wireless is less calculated to "disturb" than squeezing into a concert-hall and more or less uncomfortably spending several hours in its doubtful atmosphere; and so with almost all the "improvements" of to-day.

Nearly all the increase of speed is in that of so-called inanimate objects—the motor-car, the telegraphic message, and so on—rather than in the men and women to whom they minister. Lightning is no modern invention; the turning of it to our purposes is what is modern. And it is an unanswerable fact that, so far from modern conditions cutting short our lives, we live far longer than did our forebears, both in the sense of living more

years and in the even more important sense of keeping young over a far greater number of them.

Surely, in so far as our age provides specific and peculiar causes of the minor psychoses, these causes do not consist in over-intellectual activity, or even over-emotional liveliness on the part of the average Englishman and Englishwoman, but in the increased uncertainty and inconstancy of circumstance which mark all periods of social transition. In the world of thought, including religion, intelligent man has, at the moment, but very insecure resting-places ; and conduct is accordingly random or haphazard, the rules of the game being very ill-defined. So, also, in the economic sphere, uncertainty and insecurity are general. We are, as it were, riding on a switchback. As a consequence, there is very widespread anxiety, which is but a pathological manifestation of conflicting fears. The old outlets for intellectual activity and the natural emotions have not yet, for the average person, been replaced by new ones. The work of the wage-earners tends to become less interesting, less mentally satisfying ; and their education is so futile and so unrelated to reality that it gives them no assistance in pleasurably and healthily spending their increased leisure time. The Edisons and the Bernard Shaws, the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges—the men who use their minds more, and more strenuously, than any average hundred of their contemporaries put together—maintain their balance and interest and reasonable health to what we may call the full potential span of human existence.

It is but necessary to compare the real age—measured

SOCIOLOGY

by the only relevant standards—of the average “educated” man or woman of forty or fifty to-day, with that of their parents and grandparents at the corresponding stage of life, to realize how shallow are the foundations on which these “authoritative” medical pronouncements rest. This idealization of the stagnant life is the purest rubbish. It is an increase of intellectual and emotional strenuousness, and the provision of conditions which will allow of its satisfactory expression, that we need; not for hedonistic reasons only, but also, if indeed they can be separated therefrom, in the interests of true health.

THE CURSE OF ADAM

I DOUBT if there is any subject which, in its discussion, becomes so bathed in cant and self-deception as that of the sacredness and pleasure of work.

As usual, this is made possible, and more or less plausible, by assuming an unreal universality of definition. There may be good reason for using one and the same term to cover the writing of the plays of Shakespeare and the labelling of jam. But no very subtle analysis is needed to demonstrate that there are differences between these two forms of work. Accordingly, conclusions rightly inferred about the one, may be utterly inaccurate if assumed about the other.

The conditions of modern industry made it almost impossible for an intelligent manual worker engaged therein to regard his or her work as anything but the

THE CURSE OF ADAM

regrettably necessary price of the subsequent play ; which latter, so far as the individual is concerned, rightly constitutes the main business of life.

My own occupation happens to be one that might reasonably constitute the major interest of a man's life. But I am perfectly sure that if Fate had given me as my unescapable job the washing of beer-bottles, or even the constant tending of one small piece of machinery, I should have considered that I was insulting Providence if I did not regard my roses or my Beethoven gramophone records as not only more important in my real life than my paid job, but as more worthy of my attention and enthusiasm. It is unreasonable to expect intelligent young men and young women of to-day to assume the ridiculous notion that the main purpose of life, so far as they individually are concerned, is the doing of the particular piece of work whereby they earn their weekly wages, or that the perfecting of this mechanical aptitude is the chief function of education.

To use the same little bit of mind again and again, in exactly the same way, hour after hour and day after day, is as exhausting and as injurious as would be a trivial physical impact, endlessly repeated at some point on our bodies.

Some of the historic Chinese tortures illustrate the possibilities along this line.

Increasing recognition of the disastrous effects of industrial monotony must make every doctor rejoice when he hears of any reduction in the hours of labour of people compelled to earn their bread by such soul-and-body killing work.

From a psychological and hygienic point of view, there is little to be said for uniformity in the hours of labour ; and those complacent folk who suggest that because an occupation is classed as unskilled it may, therefore, wisely be followed for ten or twelve hours a day, for fifty-two weeks a year, are quite at sea.

The truth lies in the very opposite direction. It would be wiser to say that such an occupation is so skilled, and therefore presumably has such potentialities of interest, that a man could quite well spend his entire day at it.

No employer should feel aggrieved when he observes that his men, who express themselves as unable or unwilling to devote more than eight hours a day to some relatively light but tedious occupation in his factory or workshop, are quite ready, after tea and a wash, to put in another four hours in the evening working hard in their own gardens or allotments. It is the element of interest that makes the difference. This cannot be measured in foot-pounds.

When I read in a leading article that " a man rests that he may labour, and deserves pity only when he is debarred by circumstances from giving to his labour all the strength at his command," I felt that either the journalist who wrote this sentence is unfamiliar with the life lived outside his own sphere, or that he is a slave to the process, so solacing to optimists, known as rationalization.

It is all very well to say that " the man of science, repeating the same calculation or experiment again and again, suffers no sense of drudgery or monotony, because his mind is drawn forward by the knowledge of the

significance of his labour," but only a sophist could come therefrom to the comfortable inference that "if it be true that many tasks in these days are monotonous and uninspiring, the conclusion to be drawn is not that the tasks themselves are at fault, but that those who perform them lack understanding."

One would like to know the kind and degree of "understanding" that would make the labelling of Seidlitz powders, for eight or ten hours a day, for six days a week, and fifty-two weeks a year, what one writer has called "a signal enterprise, endowing the hours of leisure with comfort and contentment."

It was a saying of Sir James Paget's that of all the causes of the transmission of disease, fatigue stands easily first. Apparently he was thinking of what is called muscular fatigue. Limited in that way, few would be found to agree with his axiom to-day. Mere tiredness of this sort, which leaves you perfectly happy when you are able to sit or lie down; ready, after a pause, to eat a good supper, have a pleasant chat, and end up with a sound and peaceful sleep, is, if not too habitual, an entirely desirable state.

Harmful fatigue is of quite another kind. In so far as mind and body can be separated, it is mental rather than physical in character. Nearly all the so-called industrial fatigue which sends people to the doctor is of this type.

The work may be as unintellectual as you like, and yet may lead to tiredness of brain, rather than of muscle. Indeed, it seems likely that genuine muscle fatigue is comparatively a rare phenomenon.

It is not so much the hardness of work, as the concentration on the one hand or the monotony on the other which lets us down. Modern industry is apt to be shockingly monotonous for most of those engaged in it, and it is curious how disproportionate seem the beneficial effects on the workers produced by the slightest element of variety.

I remember, years ago, a wise friend giving me a piece of advice on the choice of an occupation. "You must choose, in the first place," he said, "between work that you will thoroughly enjoy, regardless of its financial yield, and work which is likely to give you money and leisure to follow your own bent when the work is done. You can hardly expect to be highly paid for doing what, in any event, you would like to do for fun."

People sometimes refer to the fact, as though it were scandalous, that for writing *Paradise Lost* Milton was paid no more money than a modern dustman earns in two or three weeks. I have always failed to see the injustice of this. Few people would empty a city's dustbins other than as a penance or for a livelihood. Anyone who could write *Paradise Lost* would be willing to give nearly all he had to be allowed to do it. The absurdity of applying common adjectives to these two pieces of "work" is too obvious to need stressing.

This problem of the respective attractiveness of work of different kinds is worth explaining in considerable detail. It should be considered and studied, not only by men of science, psychologists and the like, but equally by organizers of industry and by all who aspire

to play a useful part in the world of politics. A number of facts will emerge, strange unlike preconceptions that have obtained wide acceptance.

A year after the Armistice in the course of a speech at Manchester, the late Mr. Clutton Brock said :

“ You will not have a happy society or happy individuals unless they are happy in their work. All happiness, of its very nature, is active. You must have people who know that their work means something and that it is worth doing, not only for earning wages, but in and for itself. When you have people who do work of that kind, I venture to say it won't be necessary for you to trouble yourselves so much about their amusements. They will learn to amuse themselves just as our poor, benighted ancestors in the Middle Ages did.”

And he went on to say :

“ There is no doubt that many people did positively welcome the war, because it seemed to give them reality instead of the unreality that they had been living in. But what a comment on our life it is, that war should be more real than peace. There is only one way finally of getting rid of war, and that is to make peace so well worth having that no one would think of ending it by war—to make a music of our whole lives, of our whole society, compared with which war would seem to be a horrible noise. If we do not do that, we shall not get rid of war.”

So much of the labour which most of us are compelled to perform in order to earn our daily bread belongs to the class named by William Morris mechanical toil,

that not one in fifty of us has the tiniest experience of the joy inherent in all intelligent work. "The mechanical workman who does not note the difference between bright and dull in his colours, but only knows them by numbers, is, while he is at work, no man, but a machine." The work of hired labourers, no matter what its nature, is nearly always wearisome and often soul-destroying. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, such labour is usually dictated by others, the end aimed at having no necessary connexion with the worker's interests or well-being. He is, in fact, a tool, not a human being confronting the difficulties and the problems directly set him by Nature. In the second place, such work is apt to be monotonous; for the economic advantages of specialism and of repetitiveness—even though the operation be of the simplest—have been fully realized and exploited by the organizers of industry. Almost alone among the major occupations of Western labouring man, agriculture still remains reasonably free from this ultra-specialism; with the result that, in spite of its long hours, its poor wages, and its many physical discomforts, it still attracts an enormous number of men and women, to whom the glamour of the town appeals in vain. To monotony, industry has now added uncertainty—an uncertainty by the side of which that imposed on the landworker by climate and other natural circumstances appears relatively inconsiderable.

It has been said that "intelligent work is the child of struggling, hopeful, progressive civilization." My dictionary tells me that to civilize is "to enlighten, to refine." Material progress does not in itself constitute civilization.

In so far as it aids spiritual, intellectual and emotional refinement, and the realization of a life more fully satisfactory to human instincts and nearer to man's ambitions and ideals, it is a gain to rejoice in. In so far as it hinders these things, it is to be ranked as a failure. Few of us with eyes and a functioning mind can possibly feel complacent about the drift of human society to-day. There are plenty of things to be thankful for—the greater ease with which we can obtain the material necessities of life, the greater leisure thereby made possible, with increased opportunities for carrying that process of “enlightenment and refinement” to a higher level—but possibilities have little value unless they are made use of. How many of our people to-day do, in fact, obtain the material necessities of life with greater ease—bodily and emotional—than did their forebears, before science had so greatly increased our mastery of natural difficulties? For ease, in the true sense, cannot be measured by the time involved. Eight hours' work in a factory is not comparable with eight hours' work in a garden; or, for those to whom such things appeal, with eight hours' saunter with a gun. Thousands of people free to choose between activity and idleness deliberately choose the two last-named forms of “work” as means of recreation; but I have yet to find the wealthy man or woman who seeks pleasure in the sweet-factory or the tailor's workshop. Unemployment is not the root evil of our industrialized society, it is one of its fruits. If every unemployed working man and woman in the country were to-morrow found a job similar to those allotted to their “luckier” fellows

a good deal of misery and anxiety would disappear ; but the main evil would still be there.

We have got into the way of looking at these problems of industry and finance too objectively, as though they were matters of mathematics. Doctors used to look at the problems of disease much in the same way ; but more and more they are coming to realize the importance of the human factor. They have learnt that it is man they are called upon to help and relieve, rather than a devil they are called upon to exorcise. The only industrial revolution worth talking about is that which makes man's daily work more pleasurable—that is, more satisfying to his emotions, ambitions and inherent impulses. The dream of freeing man from the necessity of performing his daily task has proved itself to be the nightmare it always was. To fight with problems and difficulties is one of the instinctive cravings of man ; and if he can find no satisfying task ready to his hand it is but natural for him to seek an outlet for his energy and ambition in attempts to overcome his fellow-men in commercial enterprise or in war. To quote Burton :

“The heavens themselves run continually round, the sun riseth and sets, the moon increaseth and decreaseth, stars and planets keep their constant motions, the air is still tossed by the winds, the waters ebb and flow to their conservation, no doubt to teach us that we should ever be in action.”

Since Burton's day his disease of “melancholy” has spread and the ideals which he denounces have won wide acceptance among the smaller as well as among the greater ones of the earth. By hundreds of thousands

THE CURSE OF ADAM

of men and women, "unemployment" has by habitude come to be taken as a normal condition, the material needs of existence being provided through some sort of national dividend, the creation of which is looked upon as a matter of no direct relevance. It might have been assumed that the invention of "labour-saving" mechanisms and the consequent increased "leisure" made possible would add to man's happiness and true well-being. Record world experience, however, has lent to both labour-saving and leisure a new significance, unexpectedly sinister. Never in the history of the world have the conditions of man's everyday life changed so rapidly as they have done during the past quarter of a century, and are still doing. To what extent has man himself changed? He has proved himself to be the most adaptable of all the animals; with remarkable ease supplementing each of his inventions by others purporting, often with success, to minimize the difficulties introduced by the previous ones. For half of our inventions are concerned with methods of neutralizing or lessening the evils consequent on another invention. Human character certainly changes; for it is largely built up of influences brought to bear on it after our birth—the conventions of our period, the teaching and unconscious influence of our parents, the attitudes and activities of our neighbours, and those embodiments of the thoughts and emotions of others which we know as books, pictures and music. This social heritage plays nearly as great a part in the formation of a man's tastes and inclinations as does the biological heritage with which he is born. We cannot,



SOCIOLOGY

therefore, truly say that human nature does not change. It does change, and has markedly changed, even within the memory of people now living. On the other hand, those inherent impulses and needs, the seeds of which are present in the germ-plasm from which we have developed, change very slowly. It is doubtful if in this year, 1936, they differ much from the inborn impulses of average man in the days of King Solomon. It is impossible to look at the world about us without suspecting that human ingenuity and love of novelty have outpaced man's capacity for adaptation.

The gains yielded by our civilization are obvious, and we are constantly reminded of them in our newspapers and by our public speakers. A reflective world-accountant would yet hesitate, in spite of the figures shown on the balance-sheet, to present, without qualification, an optimistic report. We are too ready to judge the situation in the light of wholesale statistics that omit most of the essential facts. We think too much in terms of nations and classes and industries, and too little in terms of men and women. A doctor has exceptional opportunities of observing the more intimate needs and reactions of individuals ; and much of what he observes is calculated to destroy complacency. He sees widespread dissatisfaction, stultification and fundamental unhappiness often cloaked by courage.

2





11 NOV 1938

