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THE KAISER
by
MORTON PRINCE

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
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER

A STUDY OF HIS SENTIMENTS
AND HIS OBSESSIONS

BY
MORTON PRINCE, LL.D.

AUTHOR OF "THE DISSOCIATION OF A
PERSONALITY," &C.

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I

THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY

IN the psychology of the Kaiser there is nothing that is more dominant than his increasing and virulent antipathy to a great body of citizens, constituting no less than one-third of his Empire—the Social Democrats. We have all read of his hatred of this party. We have read the epithets which he has constantly hurled at them, and of his antipathy to their creeds. “Traitors,” “a plague that must be exterminated,” “a horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans,” “foes to the country and empire,” “people without a country and enemies of religion,” he has called them.

To a delegation of striking miners he said, “for me every Social Democrat is synonymous with an enemy of the Empire and

Fatherland. If, therefore, I believe that there are any Socialist tendencies in the movement [the strike of 100,000 men], stirring up to unlawful resistance, I shall act with merciless rigour, and bring to bear all the power at my disposal—which is great.” Again : “. . . the doctrines of the Social Democrats are not only opposed to the commandments of God and Christian morality, but are also altogether unpractical, being equally injurious to the individuals and the whole community.” So violent was the hatred of the Kaiser towards this party that he even thought it might come to suppressing it by the army. “For you,” he said to the young soldiers at Potsdam, “there is only one foe, and that is my foe. In view of our present Socialist troubles, it may come to this, that I command you to shoot down your own relatives, brothers, and even parents, in the streets, which God forbid : but then you must obey my orders without a murmur.”

Why so much feeling ? Why such outbursts of anger and hatred against a political party which in numbers was twice

as large as any other single party in the Empire, a party which in 1912 cast 4,250,000 votes, and which was represented in the German Parliament in 1912 by 110 members—the representatives of over 21,000,000 people, nearly one-third of the total population.

These are strong words. They are not mere invectives uttered during the heat of a political campaign. They are not to be classed with those emotional castigations with which political speech orators working themselves up to a state of passionate indignation flay their adversaries, and which are promptly forgotten as soon as the campaign is ended, albeit the Kaiser is essentially a stump-speech orator. We have all learned not to take seriously the ephemeral indignation of the political orator. But the Kaiser's denunciation of the Social Democrats is the expression of an antipathy which is fixed, deep-rooted, persistent, and is a part of his personality, for it has manifested itself in the form of recurrent attacks of anger and dread ever since he came to the throne, twenty-seven years ago. It is like

unto an obsessing idea, common enough, which fixed deep down in the mind, rises in consciousness whenever its object presents itself.

Fixed antipathies are always, for the psychologist, objects of interesting study, but for others, even in an Emperor, they are little more than matters of intellectual curiosity unless the antipathy is one of practical political import, one that affects the policies of government and the course of history. If the antipathy of the Kaiser were only of that trivial kind, common to many people, which is manifested as a dread of snakes, or of death, or other banal object, its study would be of little practical interest excepting for its victim William II himself, although the revelation of its origin and meaning would be given an insight into one component, however unimportant, of an exalted personality. The periodical recurrence of the antipathy and the psychological reactions to which it gave rise would probably affect the happiness of no one but himself and his family who would have to bear the brunt of it. No one

is interested in other people's symptoms. But it is different when such an antipathy is of a political nature. Then by a study of the underlying causes of this obsessing idea we not only can obtain an insight into important components of the psychology of a great historical character, but we should expect to find the true motives which have determined those policies of government, and the course of history, which have been the direct result of the antipathy. The Kaiser's dread of the Social Democrats has had momentous practical consequences. It is safe to say that it has been more than any other single factor the motive which has determined him to maintain, against the progressive spirit of modern civilization, the present autocratic system of government, to resist all liberal attempts to change the constitution so as to give responsible representative government to the people, and to defend what he claims as his prerogatives.

It has determined tyrannous measures which have suppressed freedom of speech and of the press, and banefully oppressed

the liberty of the German people. I refer to the laws of *lèse-majesté*.

This law, a return to the feudalism of the Middle Ages, is the means the Kaiser employs to punish those who talk back. He may insult his subjects, call then all manner of names, misrepresent their principles, their purposes and ideals, excite animosity against them "as enemies to the country and religion," but if they answer back they are met by the law of *lèse-majesté*; and this law is enforced, as every one knows, with merciless severity to suppress political opponents. Against the Democrats the law has been used as a weapon of suppression, though without success. Under this law statistics showed that up to 1898, during only the first decade of William II's reign, more than 1000 years of imprisonment had to be inflicted upon offenders. A recent responsible writer asserts that up to 1914 the sentences had reached 30,000 years, but I do not know upon what authority these figures are based.

It is not surprising that editors of Social Democratic newspapers, many political

leaders of the party and writers for the democratic press have been amongst those who have served terms in prison for *lèse-majesté*, or offence against the press law. There have been times when scarcely a week passed without three or four trials. But against the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag when making use of their prerogatives as elected representatives of the people, this law has not been sufficient to satisfy the Kaiser's animosity. So on one occasion when they refused to rise and cheer him, in response to a demand, the Kaiser had introduced, through his chancellor, a bill to permit the criminal prosecution of these delegates. To its credit, be it said, the majority refused to permit this encroachment upon its rights.

It is safe to say that such a criminal law and its abuse for political purposes in England would cost the King his crown.

To this antipathy of the Kaiser may also be traced in large part responsibility for the consolidation of the autocratic and military party in Germany. For by suppressing the political power of the only militant party

that has opposed this autocracy, the Kaiser has been enabled to solidify his power and entrench himself with his army as the dominating political force which has determined the foreign policies of the Empire. It is safe to say that if the democracy had been in power, or if the constitutional system of government had been such that the Social Democratic party in and out of the Reichstag could have made its influence felt, the foreign and military policies and methods of the Government would have been far different and there would have been no war. More than this, it is impossible, I believe, for any one to study the internal politics of Germany without arriving at the firm conviction that the elimination of German militarism, for which the war is being waged, and therefore the hope of permanent world's peace, must rest upon the German Democratic party. From this viewpoint the study of the Kaiser's antipathy for the Social Democratic party offers a most fruitful psychological study.

Why then, I repeat, so much feeling when the Kaiser thinks of the Social Democratic

party? Why such dread of it, why such anger? Why such a personal attitude? To explain it on the ground of differences in political principles, as a political antipathy intensely expressed in terms of an intense emotional personality is a superficial and inadequate psychological explanation, although it is commonly satisfying as a political explanation. The two are not synonymous. I will presently give the reasons for this disturbance.

If the party represented only a small band of criminal agitators, of militant anarchists, let us say, who sought by assassination and terrorism to destroy the existing Government, such an attitude of mind would be easily comprehensible and would need no analysis. But the Social Democratic party in 1888, on the accession of William II, on the basis of one voter in every five of the population, represented less than four million subjects, and in 1912, over twenty-one million, a third of the total population. It is therefore representative of a large part of the public opinion of the Empire and above all of

the working classes. Indeed it is the largest political party in the Empire. Criminal agitation is, therefore, out of the question.

In other countries political feeling in times of crises often runs high, and at times statesmen, rulers, leaders of political parties generally, have strong political bias and feel intensely hostile to their political opponents ; but they do not regard them as foes of their country and God and religion, to be crushed by every force in the power of the Government ; and they rarely carry their hostility and anger and hatred into social and industrial life, as has been the case with the German Emperor. Furthermore, the persistency of the Emperor's antipathy is remarkable. It is like an obsession. He has retained, undiminished, his hatred of the Social Democrats from his accession to the outbreak of the war, and has never ceased to angrily stigmatize them with such emotional epithets as I have cited.

Now it is probable, owing to a psychological law, that when strong emotion, out

of all apparent proportion to the cause, is excited by some object, that object has struck some sentiment, a "complex" of ideas and emotions deeply rooted in the personality, but not squarely admitted and faced by consciousness. Examples of this we see every day. A strong protectionist inveighs with intense anger against the principle of free trade and the political party that advocates this principle in its platform. The reason he consciously gives is the economic disadvantage which, he apprehends, will result to the country at large. But though this may be a reason, or rather one reason, for his political opinion, it is not the real reason for his emotion—his anger and his invectives. These are due to the fact that the free-trade doctrine strikes a chord within him which resonates with selfish fear for his own business interests, and the reaction of this chord is anger. In other words, to use a homely phrase, while apparently speaking from the viewpoint of political principles, he is really "talking out of his pocket." But he does not squarely face

and perhaps is only half conscious or entirely unconscious of this fact. This selfish viewpoint is his "unconscious attitude of mind."

Now is the Kaiser's antipathy to the Social Democrats merely the expression of an academic disbelief in Marxian principles of Socialism and a disbelief in the practicability of such principles if applied by the State to political government? Or are these only ostensible reasons for his antipathy? If the latter, a study of the Kaiser's mind ought to reveal deep-rooted sentiments of another kind which will explain his emotional reaction. But in that case, for a complete explanation, we must inquire what there is that is peculiar in the political tenets of the Social Democracy that touches these sentiments and excites the reaction. In other words it is a question of the Why.

These questions rise above a banal curiosity to inquire into a peculiar personal dislike of an Emperor, however that might be justified by the exalted world-position

which he occupies. They are important in that, if pursued, they may lead to a deeper understanding of his personality, and they may unfold both his viewpoint of government as exemplified by the German system, and the antagonistic viewpoint of the German Democracy, which for many years has been striving against the power of the Emperor to force its ideals and aspirations upon the autocracy that rules Germany.

All these questions are involved in the psychology of the personality of the Kaiser. The political questions are involved, for no personality can be understood apart from its environment to which it reacts, and which is largely responsible for the formation of "sentiments." The sentiments are of prime and fundamental importance in the formation of a personality. I use the term "sentiments" in a psychological sense and not in accordance with the popular restricted usage. I shall have occasion later to explain how sentiments are formed, after we have become acquainted with some of the Kaiser's mental

attitudes. Meanwhile I would simply explain in justification of this inquiry, that character depends upon the psycho-physiological organization of ideas, derived in the broadest sense from life's experiences, with the innate primitive instinctive dispositions to behave or react to given situations (*i.e.* to react to the environment). Thus on the one hand sentiments are formed which characterize our attitude towards life, including therein our personal, social, political and industrial relations to the world about us, and on the other the inborn natural instincts of man are harnessed, controlled and repressed, or cultivated and given free rein. Upon the development of sentiments, therefore, not only the behaviour of the individual depends, but the whole social organization. Of course in a brief article of this kind we shall be obliged to limit ourselves to a few of the sentiments involved in the questions placed before us and therefore to a very limited study of the Kaiser's personality.

II

THE KAISER'S PREROGATIVES

LET us go back to the year 1888, when the Kaiser came to the throne. In his very first speech to the Prussian Diet he proclaimed with noticeable emphasis that he was "firmly resolved to maintain intact and guard from all encroachment the chartered prerogatives of the Crown."* It was noticed that he laid marked stress on these words so that it was publicly commented upon by those who heard him. This intention to defend his prerogatives the Kaiser has consistently maintained ever since, and more than once has proclaimed. What are the prerogatives about which the Kaiser took the very first opportunity to warn Germany and about which

* "The Kaiser," edited by Asa Don Dickinson, p. 113.

he has been so tenacious ever since? They can be briefly stated.

In the first place, we must know, it is the Kaiser's prerogative *not* to be responsible to the people or to parliament, but only to himself. He does not derive his power from either, but he reigns by his own right. This is his prerogative. Furthermore he not only reigns, but it is his prerogative to govern. The King of England reigns, but as has so often been said, he does not govern. In England the responsibility for governing rests entirely with the ministry, which in principle is only a select committee of Parliament. It is the English Parliament therefore and, practically, the elected House of Commons that governs.

In the second place, it is the Kaiser's prerogative to appoint a Chancellor to help him govern. He has no cabinet nor board of advisors. The Chancellor is responsible only to the Emperor. Parliament may be entirely opposed to him, but in such case he does not necessarily resign as with the British Prime Minister, nor is it the

customary usage. He may not have been a member of Parliament when appointed. The Kaiser alone may dismiss him, as he dismissed Bismarck. The Emperor may disregard him and his advice, if he likes ; so that in practice he may be his own chancellor, as it is commonly said in Germany he has been ever since Bismarck's dismissal, and as Bismarck foretold would be the case.

A third prerogative is to appoint the ministers, the heads of the great departments—Navy, Foreign Affairs, Colonies, etc.—who are under the Chancellor. Thus all executive power resides in the Kaiser. Parliament has none. We may say it is the Kaiser's prerogative to be the administration.

A fourth prerogative is to be Commander-in-Chief of the army and to have absolute authority over the forces of the army both in peace and in war. (Art. 63 of the Constitution.) It is his prerogative to "determine the numerical strength, the organization, and the divisional contingents of the imperial army" ; also to appoint

all superior officers (Art. 64). That the Kaiser regards this as one of his most cherished prerogatives the world well knows.

A fifth and exceedingly powerful prerogative is to appoint and control seventeen members of the Upper House—the Bundesrat or Federal Council—the most powerful Upper House in the world. The Kaiser thus has the votes—only fourteen being required—to defeat any amendment to the constitution, and in practice he has always controlled a majority of the Council which has been the creature of the Kaiser throughout its history. With the consent of the Council he can declare war, but as the Council is a lady of easy consent this limitation need not bear hardly and the wooing need be but short and light.

A sixth prerogative is to initiate all legislation, although indirectly, through his controlled Federal Council of which the Chancellor is president. The Lower House, the Reichstag, elected by the people, cannot initiate legislation, so well did Bismarck fix the constitution for the benefit

of Prussia and the Kaiser. All measures must originate in the Upper House, which can also veto them when amended in the Reichstag, and can dissolve the latter (with the Kaiser's consent) if it doesn't like its ways. (Think of the House of Lords dissolving the Commons!) The Kaiser has thus very great power in controlling legislation. (With almost innumerable parties, none of which has a majority, in the House, log-rolling under an astute Chancellor has been raised to a fine art which would make an American state legislature blush like a neophyte). The Reichstag, however, can refuse to vote supplies and to pass measures favoured by the Kaiser. The elected representatives of the people can thus talk, resolve, and criticize, and refuse to follow the Kaiser, and thus create a public opinion which he may or may not dare to oppose, but they can do little more.

III

THE DIVINE RIGHT DELUSION

FINALLY, the Kaiser claims that his prerogative to govern is derived from God, granted by the Almighty to his House, the House of Hohenzollern. This is far from being meant as a figure of speech or mere rhetoric, or an allegorical expression of religious responsibility for duties to be performed. It is a deep, all-abiding belief and principle of action. It is difficult for us Americans of the twentieth century fully to grasp this belief in a present-day man of boasted culture, from whom we expect common sense. We may laugh at it, but in its practical consequences it is no laughing matter. It is fundamental to the Kaiser's viewpoint and to an understanding of his attitude towards his subjects and the world. Another sovereign derives his

right to reign, if not to govern, from the constitution of his country, which means in the last analysis by contract with his people. But the German Emperor refuses to acknowledge any responsibility to the people, or any dependence upon the people or the constitution or contract for his right to govern. He derives this right directly from God. Whatever rights and powers the people possess descend from the Kaiser, who grants them through the constitution : the rights and powers of the Kaiser do not ascend from the people, as in a democracy. The concentration of irresponsible hereditary power in one man and those appointed by him is plainly an autocracy. "The Divine Right of Kings to rule" is a doctrine dating back to the Middle Ages and is by Americans naïvely supposed to have ended with the dissolution of the "Holy Alliance," whose designs upon South America gave rise to our Monroe Doctrine in 1823.

This doctrine of Divine Right, then, is one of the prerogatives, if not in his mind the great prerogative, which the Kaiser announced he was resolved to defend. And

it does not belong to the present Kaiser alone, but was possessed, as he claims, by his long line of ancestors of the House of Hohenzollern, and will descend to his successors of this House. It is the prerogative of his House. "It is the tradition of our House," he announced, "that we, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern and to lead the people whom it is given us to rule, for their well-being and the advancement of their material and intellectual interests." And again: "I look upon the people and nation handed on to me as a responsibility conferred upon me by God: and that it is, as is written in the Bible, my duty to *increase this heritage*, for which one day I shall be called upon to give an account; those who try to interfere with my task I shall crush." And again: "I regard my whole position as given to me direct from Heaven, and that I have been called by the Highest to do His work, by One to whom I must one day render an account."

This claim as German Emperor, or as King of Prussia, has been announced again

and again by the Kaiser, and his words have been quoted by the press, by magazine writers, and pamphleteers and book-makers unto weariness of the reader.

The prerogatives we have briefly summarized are imperial, but be it noted they are double-headed, in that—*mutatis mutandis*—they also belong to William II as King of Prussia so far as the constitutional relations of the Kingdom to the Empire make them applicable.

The odd notion of Divine Right the Kaiser picked up from his grandfather, William I, who, to show he was above the constitution which his predecessor had granted the people when he was crowned King of Prussia at Koenigsberg, raised with his own hands the crown from the altar, “set it on his own head and announced in a loud voice, ‘I receive the crown from God’s Hand and from none other’”; and referring to this historical incident the present Kaiser, William II, in a speech, now historic, at the same place said, “And here my grandfather, again, by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his

head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone and not by parliament or by any assemblage of the people or by popular vote, and that he thus looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign."

From a psychological point of view it does not matter—any more than it signified anything to the Kaiser and his grandfather—that as a matter of fact the first ruling Hohenzollern of Brandenburg, Frederick I, acquired his title to "the crown" by taking and foreclosing a mortgage on the Province—and a rather poor title at that, as there was already a mortgage on the property which it was convenient to repudiate. Perhaps royal second mortgages—like marriages—are made in Heaven, and thus they become "divine rights." What does psychologically matter is that the present Kaiser has persuaded himself, forgetting all about the business transaction, that the early Hohenzollern Shylock (in foreclosing the mortgage) "felt within himself

the call to journey to this land " of Brandenburg—plainly a divine call—and " was convinced that the task [of governing] was given him from above." (Kaiser's speech, February 3, 1899.) What counts psychologically is that the Kaiser believes that a divine right to rule is his prerogative.

How, in this age, a man who has shown such marked ability in certain directions can be such a fool—I mean psychologically, of course—as to persuade himself to believe such stuff is another story that would make an interesting psychological study in itself, and in the last analysis could probably be traced to subconscious wishes or dreads which have produced this conscious delusion, just as such subconscious processes determine the delusions of insane people. Our conscious thoughts are much more determined by subconscious processes, of which we are unaware, than we realize. One great popular delusion is that our minds are more exact logical instruments than they really are, and we stand in awe of the minds of great men, thinking that because they are superior in certain directions, therefore

they are superior in all other directions of their activities, where they claim superiority. Whereas, as a matter of fact, a man may be eminently superior in certain fields of mental activity and psychologically a perfect fool-thinker and fool-performer in other fields. Helmholtz said of the eye that it was such an imperfect optical instrument that if an instrument-maker should send him an optical instrument so badly made, he would refuse to accept it and return it forthwith. He might have said the same thing of the human mind. It is a very imperfect instrument of thought. All we can say of it is, that though a poor thing it is the best we can get. The deeper insight we get into the mechanism of the human mind, the poorer thing it appears as an instrument of precision.

The most curious part of this whole divine-right business is that in Germany, with all its "kultur," there has been scarcely one single voice amongst all the people of Germany to publicly deny this claim, excepting the voice of the Social Democracy; or if there has, it has been

like a voice crying in the wilderness—or perhaps from behind prison bars where such rashness brought the prisoner condemned under the feudal law of *lèse-majesté*. We shall presently see what the German democracy thinks about it.

IV

THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND THE ARMY

THE practical upshot of this whole German system of government, in which Imperial Prerogatives and an impotent Opéra Bouffe Reichstag are essential ingredients, is that the Kaiser with his Chancellor and the Ministers of the several departments (Foreign Affairs, Navy, Post Offices, etc.), a bureaucracy responsible only to the Kaiser, constitute an autocracy independent of Parliament and the voters. Consequently the government is intended to be and is for the State, by the State, not of the people, by the people. The Kaiser's point of view of his own place in the State is shown by some of his sayings : " There is only one master in this country—I am he and I will not tolerate another." " There

is no law but my law ; there is no will but my will," he told his soldiers, and "The King's will is the highest law," he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich. And so, as a German professor, Ludwig Gurlitt, has said, "He regards his people, the masses, as children not yet of age, and thinks the Government competent to prescribe the course of their social and cultural development—a profound and fatal mistake . . . a mediæval idea ! ”

Autocracy makes for efficiency, but it also makes for the suppression of the aspirations of the people and the self-government of democracy.

But if the Kaiser, the bureaucracy and an emasculated Parliament were the whole system of government, autocracy would be incomplete. The system would crumble away as by an earthquake when democracy became successful at the polls. The system, therefore, must be supported by power of some kind. Without power behind the throne, or behind any Government, autocratic, monarchical, or republican, that Government would fall at the first shock

of internal conflict. In a real republic that power is the will of the people—commonly called Public Opinion. But we have seen that the German system does not rest upon public opinion. Upon what then? William II, indeed, as the “instrument of the Lord” has flaunted his own defiance of public sentiment. “Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way,” said William II, at Koenigsberg, five years ago. Behind the German autocracy is the army, under the absolute control of the Kaiser. Upon the army the Kaiser depends for the security of his rule. The army is the power behind the throne. As one writer remarks: “The army is the foundation of the social structure of the Empire.”* “With grave anxiety,” the Kaiser declared, “I placed the crown upon my head. Everywhere I met doubt, and the whole world misjudged me. But one had confidence in me; but one believed in me—that was the army. And relying

* “The Kaiser,” p. 51. Edited by Asa Don Dickinson.

upon the army, and trusting in God, I began my reign, knowing well that the army is the main tower of strength for my country, the main pillar supporting the Prussian throne, to which God in His wisdom had called me."

"The soldier and the army," he said in 1891, "not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army—as my grandfather said at Coblenz: 'These are the gentlemen on whom I can rely.'"

And again, asserting his belief in military force as the means upon which the Empire must rely to accomplish its ends at home and abroad, he quoted the saying of Frederick I: "If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword."

In his first official act as Emperor (June 15, 1888), he declared "The absolutely inviolable dependence upon the War Lord (Kriegsherr) is in the army, the inheritance which descends from father to son, from generation to generation. . . .

So we are bound together, I and the army. Thus we are born for one another, and thus we will hold together in an indissoluble bond, in peace or storm, as God wills."

This close connexion between the army and the Prussian Kings, as Professor Gauss points out, is a tradition which William II has sedulously maintained, just as we have seen he has maintained the traditions of a divine right to rule.

V

THE KAISER'S SENTIMENTS

WITH the meaning of all these prerogatives in mind, let us look a bit more closely into the psychology of the Kaiser. In doing so let us bear in mind that in the doctrine of divine right we see developed in the Kaiser a strong sentiment of the most personal kind, of birth-right, of self-interest. And besides this, in all the other prerogatives which the Kaiser has so defiantly resolved to defend against all encroachments, we also have sentiments of self-interest—sentiments of possession of rights pertaining to self. All these sentiments are bound up with a consciousness of his own personality (a “self-regarding” sentiment) with his Ego. And there is a great deal of Ego, of consciousness in his Ego, in his personality. Perhaps his enemies would

say, as was said of the great orang-outang, Bimi, in Kipling's tale—Bimi, who also wished to crush his enemies in furious outbursts of jealous rage—"there is too much Ego in his Cosmos."

Now, as a matter of psychology, "sentiments" are of tremendous importance as factors in personality and as forces which determine attitudes of mind, reactions of the personality to the environment and conduct.

Upon the formation of "sentiments" the character of a person and his social behaviour fundamentally depend. And by the formation of sentiments in the course of the individual's mental development, the primitive innate instincts of human nature are harnessed and brought under control, and their impulses given proper direction. Thus their primitive impulses are repressed or cultivated according to the ideals of society. Otherwise, driven by the impulses of our innate instincts, we should all run amuck through society.

We must understand then a little more precisely what, psychologically and techni-

cally speaking, a sentiment is. I am not using the word in the popular sense. Without going into the psychology deeply, we may say that a sentiment is an idea of something, as its object, organized or associated with one or more instinctive emotions which give the idea impulsive force.

In the personality of every human being—and the same is true of animals—there are a number of emotional instincts. These instincts are characterized by a particular emotion which each possesses, and may be named indifferently, for our present purposes, either after the emotion itself, or after the biological aim which the instinct serves. Every person, for instance, possesses a pugnacity instinct of which the emotion is anger. Other such instincts are fear, parental feeling, disgust, curiosity, self-assertion, self-abasement, reproduction, and so on. All such instincts have a biological function in that they serve either to protect, like anger and fear, the individual (and the species) from danger against its enemies and prevent its extinction, or, like the

parental and reproduction instincts, serve to perpetuate the species, or like the curiosity instinct, to acquire knowledge and thereby experience, and so on. Emotion, as the very word itself indicates, moves us, *i.e.* it is a force that impels towards some end, and the emotion of each instinct carries it to fulfilment.

When an emotion (*i.e.* instinct) has been excited by some object, whether it be a material thing like a snake, or another person, or something mental—an idea of a material object or a thought as of a possible danger to the individual, or of a political principle—the emotion may become so associated with and bound to the object that whenever the object is presented in consciousness the emotion is excited. This particularly happens when the emotion has been frequently excited by the same object. Thus a person may acquire a persistent fear of snakes, or thunder-storms, or hatred of a person. Two or more emotional instincts may be thus associated with a given idea as their object.

Now, when an idea always excites one or

more emotions, so that the idea is always accompanied by the same emotional reaction, the whole is called a sentiment. Thus we have the sentiment of love of a mother for her child, of hatred of a tyrant, of disgust for a vicious person, of pride of self, and so on. Practically psychological analysis shows that the organization of a sentiment is more complicated than such a simple association would make it, and that the sentiment is deeply and widely rooted in a number of ramifying, previous mental experiences of an emotional kind. This is expressed by popular language when we say a given sentiment is deeply rooted in a person's personality. The mechanism, as I have stated it, however, is sufficiently accurate for our purpose. The emotions serve to give their ideas great intensity and driving force for action.

With these general principles in mind, one has only to read the Kaiser's speeches to recognize that his ideas of himself and of his prerogatives, which he jealously defends, are organized with instinctive emotions of great intensity—emotions belonging

to greed of possession, and pride, and self-assertion (or self display), and pugnacity, and vengeful emotion, and jealousy. These ideas are therefore sentiments deeply fixed and organized in his personality, and given great driving force by their emotions, which tend to carry them to activity and fruition. Hence it is that the Kaiser's sentiments of himself and his prerogatives exhibit great intensity of feeling and determine his conduct to assert his rights and to exercise and enjoy them by being his own chancellor and ruling the army and Empire, and, if need be, to defend them most vigorously.

VI

THE KAISER'S SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENT

BUT we must leave these traits of the Kaiser's personality for the immediate issue of our study. One sentiment, however, ought to be considered more intimately if certain of his most notorious peculiarities are to be understood. I refer to what has been called the "self-regarding" sentiment. Every person possesses such a sentiment, although it varies according to the ingredients that enter into it. Professor William McDougall, one of the most eminent of contemporary psychologists, has analysed the sentiment and attributes it to the biological instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement compounded in varying proportions with the idea of self. (These instincts are common to animals as well as

men and have a biological end.) We thus get different types. When the first instinct of self-assertion—also called self-display—with its emotion of positive self-feeling is the chief instinct, then we have a type in which *pride* is the main characteristic of the idea of self. When the second instinct (with the emotion of negative self-feeling) is happily blended in the sentiment, we have a type of self-respect. To illustrate the former type, Professor McDougall (Social Psychology) draws the character of an imaginary prince in whom the first instinct is the dominating one. It is interesting to see how perfectly his picture perfectly represents the Kaiser.

“Imagine the son of a powerful and foolish prince to be endowed with great capacities, and to have in great strength the instinct of self-display with its emotion of positive self-feeling. Suppose that he is never checked, or corrected, or criticized, but is allowed to lord it over all his fellow-creatures without restraint. The self-regarding sentiment of such a child would almost necessarily take the form of an

unshakable pride, a pride constantly gratified by the attitudes of deference, gratitude, and admiration, of his social environment ; the only dispositions that would become organized in this sentiment of pride would be those of positive self-feeling or elation and of anger (for his anger would be invariably excited when any one failed to assume towards him the attitude of subjection or deference). His self-consciousness might be intense and very prominent, but it would remain poor in content ; for he could make little progress in self-knowledge ; he would have little occasion to hear, or to be interested in, the judgments of others upon himself ; and he would seldom be led to reflect upon his own character and conduct. The only influences that could moralize a man so endowed and so brought up would be either religious teaching, which might give him the sense of a power greater than himself to whom he was accountable, or a very strong natural endowment of the tender emotion and its altruistic impulse, or a conjunction of these two influences.

“ A man whom the self-regarding senti-

ment had assumed this form would be incapable of being humbled—his pride could only be mortified ; that is to say, any display of his own shortcomings or any demonstration of the superiority of another to himself could cause a painful check to his positive self-feeling and a consequent anger, but could give rise neither to shame nor to humiliation, nor to any affective state, such as admiration, gratitude, or reverence, in which negative self-feeling plays a part. And he would be indifferent to moral praise or blame ; for the disposition of negative self-feeling would have no place in his self-regarding sentiment ; and negative self-feeling, which renders us observant of the attitudes of others towards ourselves and receptive towards their opinions, is one of the essential conditions of the influence of praise and blame upon us."

The inordinate cultivation in the Kaiser of the self-regarding sentiment with the unalloyed instinct of self-display, also explains, psychologically, the manifestations of certain traits which have amazed the world. I mean his colossal vanity as

manifested by his fondness for dressing himself up in all sorts of uniforms, and constantly changing his costumes—on occasions as often as five or six times in a single day—and even during the course of a court reception—his fondness for having himself photographed or painted, or his portrait made as busts, lithographs, medals, bas-reliefs, always posing in heroic attitudes* for the purpose (there are thousands of photographs of him), and not only as himself but in the character of a Roman Emperor mounted on a charger, and again in imitation of the Emperor Charlemagne. It explains his self-assumption to be an artist—a painter, a musician, a composer, an architect, an art critic, a preacher, and heaven knows what else. It also gives a psychological explanation of his inability to stand personal criticism, and for his vain obtuseness in not being able to understand how anyone should not look upon him excepting with reverent awe.

One of his subjects had been sentenced

* It is interesting to compare the snap-shots of the Kaiser with the posed photographs.

to prison for hinting something disrespectful about his sovereign. "William was genuinely amazed that such an unnatural crime could ever have been committed. He 'read and re-read the papers in the case with the closest attention': and finally said to the waiting official; 'It would seem that this man hitherto has not been a criminal—son of respectable parents, himself in a respectable walk of life, with a good education. And yet—how do you explain this?—this insult to the Anointed of the Lord? Strange! Strange!" On another occasion: "After reading a speech of the Socialist leader Bebel, containing some animadversions upon himself, he turned to the officer in attendance with clouded brow and flashing eye, and remarked in a voice trembling with passion: 'And all this to *me*! To *me*! What is the country coming to?' " (The Kaiser).

Such and other manifestations of the Kaiser's self-regarding sentiment, due to the impulsive force of its highly developed instinct of self-display (self-assertion), would make this element of his personality

an interesting psychological study by itself. I merely wish now to point out that it is the extreme type of this sentiment that is responsible for many of his extravagances of speech and action, and that it plays a part, as we shall see, in his reactions to democracy.

Now let us return to the Kaiser's hatred of democracy. This also is a sentiment organized with several emotional instincts, etc., which we need not bother about here. That he has a hatred of democracy is obvious.

But why ?

To know that he has a hatred is not enough. We want it explained—to know why. It is not a sufficient explanation to say that he disbelieves in the principles of democracy. That would not be sufficient to account for the development of the sentiment of hatred and for the reaction of anger which democracy excites. What created the hatred ? For so much emotion there must be a deeper lying cause—some hidden sentiment which, we may suspect,

conflicts with the sentiments of his cherished prerogatives and his self-regarding sentiment.

We want to know the Why. With this object let us consider the object of the hatred—the aims of the party of democracy, one of the great political forces in Prussia and the Empire, one with which, as we have seen, the Emperor has been passionately in conflict since his accession to the throne. We cannot understand the psychological reaction of the Emperor without understanding the aims and the potential power of this political force. For this purpose we shall have to ask the reader to bear for a moment with a slight digression, keeping in mind what has been said about the Kaiser's sentiments until we return to our main theme.

VII

AIMS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRACY

WHAT does the Social Democratic party stand for and in what respect are its aims antagonistic to the Emperor's prerogatives and the German system of government? The party is widely regarded in the United States, I am constrained to believe, as the party of Socialism. But this idea needs considerable modification. Indeed, so much so, that the party would, if its aims were understood, receive the moral support of Americans.

Socialism has an ominous sound to American ears. The word has a stigma for many and is calculated to repel. At one time in its early history Marxian Socialism, formulated by Marx himself as "the social ownership of the means of

production and distribution," was the dominating aim of the German Socialist party. But times have changed. The aims of the party have undergone various metamorphoses as the result of conflicts of factions within, fusions, and political evolution. Since the Kaiser came to the throne in 1888 a revolution has taken place in the aims, methods, tactics, and programs of the party. In accordance with this change, in 1890 the name was changed to the Social Democratic party. Socialism has been relegated to the background and democracy has become the paramount aim and issue. In other words, the principles of the Socialist, Marx, have given place to those of the brilliant democratic leader, Lassalle. Both men are dead, but democracy survives. As one authority (S. P. Orth) puts it, "Marx is a tradition, democracy is an issue."

"To-day one hears very little of Marx and a great deal of legislation"—based on democratic principles. "The last election [1912], with its brilliant victory for Social Democracy was not won on the

general issues of the Erfurter program, but on the particular issue of the arrogance of the bureaucracy, and ballot reform." Marxian propagandism has been sloughed off. But even if the democratic party still stood for Socialism as its paramount aim, this fact would not necessarily make it antagonistic to the Emperor's prerogatives or the German system of government. The State might become engaged in all sorts of individual enterprises without the fundamental structure of government becoming altered. As a matter of fact Germany is to-day the most socialized nation in the world.

The State owns railway, canal, river transportation, telegraph and telephone systems, harbour and parcel-post. It conducts banks, insurance, savings banks and pawnshops. It administers sick and accident insurance and old age pensions. The municipalities own public utilities of all kinds, theatres, markets and warehouses. The State, or municipality, obviously might go further and administer iron, coal, and manufacturing enterprises, it might under-

take all sorts of socialistic functions without altering one whit the prerogatives of the Crown, or of Parliament, or of the relations of the Government to the people. Governmental autocracy would still exist and very likely would administer these industrial enterprises with the same satisfying efficiency with which it administers everything else it has taken hold of.

The intense anger and hatred with which the Emperor reacts to the Social Democrats cannot therefore be explained by the principles of Socialism *per se*, although he may disbelieve in extreme Marxian Socialism. Even if these were still the aim of the party, there must be some other explanation that a Social Democrat should be stigmatized as an enemy of the Empire, of religion and of God, to be shot down by the army if his party became too strong.

Let us examine then the demands as given in the latest program (1912) of the Social Democrats and some of the legislation for which they have fought. The demands are given in fourteen articles. *Number one* demands equal opportunities

for all, special privileges to none—good American doctrine. *Number two* relates to reform of the ballot laws and has been the main immediate issue. “Universal, direct, equal, secret ballot” is demanded—also American doctrine. Owing to the present inequality of the ballot the democrats have been badly handicapped in that they cannot elect their proportionate number of representatives. *Number three* relates to the existing system of government. A true parliamentary government is demanded, and a ministry like that of England responsible to Parliament instead of the present autocratic system by which the ministry is responsible only to the Emperor. Also it is demanded that “the power to declare war or maintain peace” be given to the Lower House (Reichstag). Consent of the Reichstag to all State appropriations (as with the House of Commons and the American Congress). *Numbers four and five* relate respectively to the organization of the army, and reform of administrative justice, abolishing class privilege, etc. *Number six* demands the

“right to combine, meet and organize.” *Number seven* relates to the establishment of a national department of Labour, factory inspection, and a legalized universal eight-hour day, etc. *Number eight* relates to reform of the industrial insurance laws, and lowering the age of old age pensions from seventy to sixty-five, etc. *Number nine* : complete religious freedom. Separation of church and state. No support of any kind for religious purposes from public funds — good American doctrine again. *Number ten* demands universal free schools. *Number eleven* relates to reform of taxation demanding abolition of indirect taxes and taxes on necessities of life and reduction of tariff on those schedules which encourage trusts. *Number twelve* supports “measures that tend to develop commerce and trade.” *Number thirteen* : “A graduated income, property and inheritance tax” in order to dampen “the ardour of the rich for a constantly increasing army and navy.” *Number fourteen* : “Internal improvements and colonization” ; but the “cessation of foreign colonization now done for the

purpose of exploiting foreign peoples for the sake of gain."

The first thing that will strike the reader is the absence of anything essentially Socialistic in the principles formulated in this program. They are rather what we in this country would call republican, "progressive" and democratic. They are not nearly as socialistic as many of the functions now undertaken by the German State. With the exception of those articles that relate exclusively to German conditions (such as numbers four and eight), and the abolition of indirect taxation, they express good American doctrine and are for the most part axiomatic in this country. No American and no Englishman would see anything in them to get excited about, although he might hold a different opinion about the expediency of one or the other demand. Undoubtedly the spirit of German democracy goes farther than the program, especially in particular parts of Germany, nevertheless this program formulates the demands of the national party.

Between the American Republic and

German Democracy there is, or should be, a bond of common sympathy, a bond of common political ideals and common purpose—the love of political and religious liberty ; freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of the press without fear of imprisonment or punishment under *lèse-majesté* or any power of the State ; the emancipation of mankind from the tyranny of autocracy ; the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” according to the dictates of the individual conscience ; the rule of the people and not of an autocracy ; the subordination of the State to the will of the people ; and to this end government based, not upon an army, but upon public opinion as expressed by the votes of the people. When these ideals and purposes of the German democracy are realized in the United States, American public opinion will have the strongest ties of sympathy with the great masses of Germany, struggling for these ends against an entrenched “State.”

Between German democracy and Ameri-

can public sentiment there can be no conflict. It is only with the autocratic classes that there can be antagonism ; but the autocratic classes mean the State as an artificially created entity isolated from and distinct from the masses of the people.

Why then does the Emperor almost alone, even amongst Germans, react to them with such passion, such anger, and such dread ? On psychological grounds we can anticipate that such emotion must be for personal reasons, and because they strike some intense emotional sentiment.

We find the key to the puzzle when we come to examine articles three and four. Number three has been the paramount issue of the democracy—it is its foundation-stone. Number two, the reform of the ballot, while the main political issue of the day, is only a means to this end. The fundamental issue is (1) A true parliamentary Government with parliamentary power in conformity with modern democratic ideas such as obtains in England ; and (2) the abolition of a chancellor and

ministry appointed by the Kaiser and responsible only to the Kaiser, and the substitution of a Government responsible to Parliament. Thus the Government and the army would be responsible to the people and rest upon public opinion.

This democratic principle seems to our ideas not only harmless enough, but a matter of course and only the expression of the age we live in. But to the Kaiser it means a personal cataclysm. It means the abolition of the greatest of the Kaiser's prerogatives, it means the denial of the divine right of kings ; it means the downfall of the House of Hohenzollern, in that it means the reduction of the prerogatives of the House to reigning without governing. He could be no longer his own chancellor, as he is recognized generally to be to-day in fact. His wings would be clipped. He would be shorn of autocratic power. He could no longer dictate policies of government. The will of the people would rule. What would be the use of a "divine right" to sit as a social ornament upon a throne and watch the people rule? Furthermore,

his "self-regarding sentiment" characterized by the instinct of self-assertion and the emotion of pride, would receive an unbearable rebuff. He would no longer be the central figure in Europe, overlording all other rulers by his personality, his autocratic power, and his prerogatives. The conflict between the Kaiser and the democracy thus becomes a personal conflict on his part.

VIII

THE KAISER'S OBSESSION A SUB-CONSCIOUS PHOBIA

GATHERING together the facts which we have collated, we have found in the Kaiser intensely strong sentiments of his prerogatives, an almost abnormal self-regarding sentiment, and a powerful political party acting in antagonism to those sentiments and threatening in case of success to rob him of his prerogatives.

Now, with these facts in mind, let us analyse the antecedent contents of the Kaiser's mind a little more intimately. If he has been a thinking being at all, we know, in view of the political and historical facts we have studied—any assertion to the contrary would meet with incredulous scepticism—there have been thoughts, however fleeting, of what would happen to

himself and his House if the democratic reforms should prevail : thoughts of being robbed of his prerogatives, robbed of his power to rule the Kingdom of Prussia, to rule the Imperial Bundesrat by his power as King of Prussia, to rule the Reichstag through the Bundesrat ; thoughts of being robbed of his prerogatives to be his own chancellor, to appoint his own ministry, to control the army, to be independent of Parliament and public opinion and the public will—in short, to be an autocratic ruler of the Kingdom of Prussia and the German Empire by divine right.

And there has been a full realization of the increasing power of democracy, steadily growing in numbers, and rising, swelling, year by year, like a great irresistible tidal wave, threatening sooner or later to carry all before it and overwhelm the system of autocracy. And against this growing avalanche of ballots of the democracy he sees no defence for himself save the army, and so he calls upon his soldiers to be prepared to “shoot down your own relatives, brothers and even parents, in the

streets," when he shall give the word of command.

Such thoughts and such realizations of future danger could not but excite the biological defensive instinct of fear. And this instinct being associated with its object, the idea of democracy forms a sentiment, the fear of democracy. This sentiment is further associated with or crystallized about other egoistic sentiments of Self and his House, and his prerogatives. Hence it may be described as *a fear of democracy because of the danger to himself and his House of Hohenzollern*, a fear of being deprived by the hands of the democracy of his prerogative to be an autocrat. It is a fear of democracy, not for Germany but *for himself*. He fears for his own life, so to speak, for if you rob him of his prerogative do you not take away that which to him is his life ?

This does not mean that he is aware of this very personal egoistic or ego-centric fear-sentiment. He undoubtedly would not admit it to others, nor is it likely that he could, even if he would, admit it to

himself, because it has not been squarely faced, but has been thrust aside, repressed by the pride of his self-regarding sentiment and not allowed to come to the full light of consciousness. Though not recognized by himself it is there all the same, repressed into the subconscious or, if you prefer, in the background of the mind (which, after all, is a part of the subconscious).

Repressed into the subconscious, it is there necessarily intimately systematized with, and has deep roots in, the many associated antecedent thoughts that, as we have seen, gave rise to it. So long as these so-called psycho-genetic thoughts are there unmodified—conserved also, like a phonographic record, in the subconscious—he could not get rid of his fixed fear of the democracy if he would.

In this light his famous declaration of his prerogative: “I am the Supreme War Lord,” receives deeper meaning when at the same time we remember he is at the head of that autocracy that wields the power. We can see into the background of his mind. He sees the danger, we see

the fear. We see, too, in the background of his mind a realization of a growing democracy, and we find thereupon what method he relies if the German democracy should win at the polls and change the constitution. To oppose the will of the people he has the army. And we see into his inner consciousness when he prepared (as already quoted) the minds of his young soldiers for "the day."

IX

THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY A DEFENCE REACTION

Now let us go one step further. Although this ego-centric sentiment of fear for himself and his dynasty is repressed into the subconscious, it is not for that reason inert and incapable of affecting his conscious processes. On the contrary, as we are forced to believe from the result of psychological investigations into such conditions of personality, it determines many of his conscious processes of thought, of his political principles, and his activities against his most dangerous political enemy. In the first place it induces a *defence reaction* of an intensely emotional character which aims to direct his activities in a direction that will protect him against the dangers

of democracy. This *defence reaction* is anger and the sentiment of hatred.

It should be explained that psychological analysis of the emotions goes to show that the sentiment of hatred is made up of several emotions associated with the object, at least fear and anger and vengeful emotions, which last also includes anger besides that most conspicuous trait of the Kaiser—the self-regarding sentiment. The way the *defence reaction* comes into play is this: The instinctive emotions and their sentiments are awakened and recur from time to time whenever the subconscious egoistic sentiment, or any of its associated psychogenetic thoughts—those of his possible fall from power—is touched. The sentiments of fear he will not admit to himself and they are repressed as such; but the fear emotion *appears in consciousness disguised as hatred* of which it is a component. Anger against and hatred of democracy he is prepared to admit. They rise into the full light of consciousness although their real underlying cause is hidden.

Such an intensely fixed emotional idea (hatred), recurring whenever its object is presented to consciousness is, in principle, an obsession, although it may not be so beyond control as to be pathological. But, as in the Kaiser's case, it may be only the apparent obsession, *i.e.* a defence reaction to the real obsession hidden in the subconscious. The Kaiser's real obsession is a *subconscious phobia*, a fear of democracy for himself and his House.

It is interesting to notice in this connexion how the national hatred of one nation for another is recognized by popular language as a phobia or fear. We speak of an Anglo-phobia, of a Russo-phobia, to describe the hatred of, let us say, Germany for England and Russia respectively. Though neither nation would admit being afraid, nevertheless, by the very term employed, it is popularly recognized that the hatred is really, though unconsciously, the expression of a fear.


In the case of the Kaiser's phobia of Democracy, the impulsive force of the biological instincts of pugnacity (anger),

fear, self assertion, etc. provide the energy of the fighting spirit and carry to fruition his political ideas aimed at repressing the Social Democrats. This is exemplified by the Kaiser's exhortations, threats, and epithets hurled in his speeches at these alone of his political enemies, and by the laws enacted and the use of the *lèse majesté* to suppress them. By suppressing the Social Democracy he is defended from his peril. Hence, as I have said, anger and hatred is a defence reaction.

There are other ways in which the Kaiser's subconscious phobia unconsciously determines his mental behaviour, by this I mean his modes of reasoning, his political principles and activities. As is well recognized, not only by psychologists but by popular notions, such a repressed, unadmitted sentiment becomes a motivating force, a subconscious motive that directs our conscious reasonings. Thus the Kaiser rationalizes, as psychologists say, his political objections to Democracy ; that is, unwilling to admit his real objections, he finds and formulates logical reasons why Democracy is wrong

and why his own opinions are right, really believing in them, perhaps, as God-given. Saving the introduction of the deity, this is nothing more than what every one does who is unconsciously influenced by subconscious motives of which he is unaware.

When we say that a person is unconsciously influenced by this or that, unconsciously governed by a prejudice, or sentiment, like jealousy or fear or ambition or what not, we mean that he is governed by a motive which is subconscious, which he will not admit to himself, and of which he is therefore unaware. It determines his thoughts just as the hidden works of a clock determine the movements of the hands and chimes.






THE MORAL

WHAT is the moral of all this ? Surely the insight into the Kaiser's mind which a study of his sentiments and his phobia has given us reveals something more important than the mere personality of an exalted personage—exalted in the eyes of the world. It gives us an insight into the political forces which are wrestling within the German Empire for those ideals for which humanity has been striving through all the ages. And it reveals the forces upon which the world must count to overthrow Germanism.

If the Powers of Europe want lasting peace through the overthrow of Autocracy and Militarism, *i.e.* Germanism, the obsession of the Kaiser points the way—Look to the Democracy of Germany !



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