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INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY PAMPHLETS

No. 10

Individual Psychology
and
Nietzsche

F. G. Crookshank, M.D., F.R.C.P.



"Know Thyself"

LONDON: THE C. W. DANIEL COMPANY
Forty-six Bernard Street, W.C.1

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY PAMPHLETS

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AND
NIETZSCHE

F. G. Crookshank, M.D., F.R.C.P.

October, 1933



“KNOW THYSELF”

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No. 10

Regular issues of Individual Psychology Pamphlets will appear in future quarterly. Copies will be supplied, without charge, to all Members and Associates of the Medical Society of Individual Psychology, but will be obtainable by others through the usual booksellers.

These regular issues will constitute the Journal of the Society, and will be prepared in collaboration with American and other groups of Individual Psychologists. Each issue will be denoted by an arabic numeral, thus: 3. Other pamphlets, dealing with special subjects, will appear from time to time, but will not be distributed by the Society to Members and Associates. Such supplementary pamphlets will be distinguished by the addition of a roman letter to the arabic numeral denoting the quarterly issues with which they are linked, thus: 3a.

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NOTES AND NEWS

THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the MEDICAL SOCIETY OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY was held during July, according to precedent, following an informal dinner at the Florence Restaurant. The Report of the Honorary Secretary declared the growth of the membership of the SOCIETY from eight or ten in 1930 to one hundred and fifteen in 1933, and the Statement of the Honorary Treasurer showed a balance in hand with all liabilities met and almost every subscription paid. A slight alteration was made in the Rules of the SOCIETY, enabling a full complement of Members of Committee to be elected in the event of any Officer holding more than one office at a time.

The Meeting then proceeded to the election of the Officers and Committee for the Session 1933-34, as set out on page 77 of the present PAMPHLET. In the regretted absence of Mr. C. W. Daniel, through illness from which he has made a good recovery, a statement was read by the Honorary Editor indicating the progress made in sales of the PAMPHLETS during the year, and calling upon Members and Associates for yet stronger support of what is a considerable burden carried by only a few. It is felt that much could be done to increase the remunerative sales of the PAMPHLETS most suitable for placing in the hands of patients, and relatives of patients, as well as of the many non-medical adherents of INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Much propaganda work, too, remains to be done among members of the medical profession whose acquaintance with practical psychology is of the sketchiest description. And yet, unless doctors do come to realize that medicine without psychology is but as the stirring of dry bones, the next few years are bound to witness an acceleration of the declining prestige of the general practitioner in the eyes of the public! The judicious gift of an appropriate PAMPHLET may sometimes drive home the lesson that should be learned by consultation with a psychologically-minded physician!

Perhaps a few words of explanation, if not of defence, for the make-up of the present PAMPHLET are here required. Although the PAMPHLETS do constitute the Journal of the SOCIETY, the support given by the SOCIETY to the Publishers is not sufficient to obviate financial loss. The occasional devotion of a PAMPHLET to a single essay by one writer may, it is felt, be more profitable from the sales point of view, than a rigid adherence to the magazine style of production. And, as a matter of fact, the next PAMPHLET (No. 11), which should appear early in January 1934, will be from the pen of Dr. J. C. Young, who will present therein the paper read by him in May last (*The Sterility of Modern Psychiatry*) as well as the address dealing with *Psychology and Holistic Medicine* with which he will open the new session.

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It may be that, by the time these lines are being read, DR. ADLER himself will have been among us on his way to America. But in any case—however greatly we shall miss the genial presidency of Professor Langdon-Brown—the new session will start confidently, knowing that, by Dr. Young, it will be guided in full loyalty to INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY, yet with wide recognition of all trends of psychological thought and practice and in constant relation to general medicine in the broadest sense.

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The list of promised papers, duly set out on the session-card now circulated, is sufficient earnest of the activities of the SOCIETY. Is it too much to hope that, before another year has gone round, the list of Members and Associates will be within measurable distance of its *second* century? With a membership of two hundred or so, further developments may be expected. The need for a CLINIC at which Individual Psychology Treatment is given is becoming urgent, and nowhere is this more acutely felt than at the INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY CLUB—open to lay men and women as well as doctors—which is rapidly expanding its work at 62 Torrington Square, W.C.1. Clearly, during the coming months, due thought must be given to the correlation and co-ordination of three organizations: the MEDICAL SOCIETY, the CLUB, and the CLINIC.

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND NIETZSCHE*

F. G. CROOKSHANK, M.D., F.R.C.P.

For here lay the excellent wisdom of him that built Mansoul, that the walls could never be broken down nor hurt by the most mighty adverse potentate unless the townsmen gave consent thereto.

JOHN BUNYAN: *The Holy War.*

NIETZSCHE replaced the scholastic duality of *cause* and *effect* by the *continuum* (X, 158, *et infra*, p. 34).

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the *continuum* for Individual Psychology and the work of Nietzsche himself: a *continuum* as evident in the differences as in the likenesses and parallels. My bench-mark is this: that while neither Nietzsche nor Adler declares, with Descartes, I THINK, THEREFORE I AM, both affirm, as first postulate of human action and responsibility, I AM, THEREFORE I WILL.

.

Before, however, commencing the task proper, a few words must be said by way of clearing the ground. Even to-day in England, amongst doctors at least, when Nietzsche is spoken of the reply is: "Oh, yes! The Will to Power, and the Superman, and all that! Or was it Bernard Shaw? But wasn't Nietzsche re-

* Read, in abstract, on June 8th, 1933, before the *Medical Society of Individual Psychology*, London.

References throughout are to the complete English edition of Nietzsche, published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., and to the same publishers' pocket edition of *Zarathustra* and *Ecce Homo*. Roman figures indicate the volume, and arabic numerals the pages.

F. G. C.

sponsible for the War? He wrote the *Hymn of Hate*, didn't he? And died mad, in an asylum, surely! After all, he was really a poet and not a philosopher at all!" And so, as a rule, the conversation flags. But the attention of the Englishman-in-the-street may well be directed to some words that have recently fallen from the pen of M. Charensol. This writer, who takes as his text a passage from the French version of *Ecce Homo* ("Un jour viendra où le souvenir d'un événement formidable s'attachera à mon nom; le souvenir d'une crise unique dans l'histoire de la terre. Je ne suis pas un homme, je suis une dynamite"), goes on to say that "à l'époque où Nietzsche . . . écrivait ces lignes, elles pouvaient être interprétées comme un phénomène de mégalomanie, comme un signe de cette folie qui, bientôt, allait s'emparer de lui. Pourtant, le jour qu'il annonçait est venu: la philosophie de Nietzsche est peut-être, dans le domaine des idées, l'événement le plus important du xix^e siècle, et le rôle qu'a joué dans l'évolution des esprits contemporains, un livre comme *Par delà le bien et le mal* ne peut guère être mesuré" (*Le Matin*, 8.1.1933).

If it be asked: What has this to do with Individual Psychology? I reply: Everything.

For I would state it as beyond dispute that, as Prinzhorn has seen (and McDougall too), the great psychological movement of the last thirty or forty years has had its source in the Nietzschean revolt against the whole artificial structure of categories, classes, causes, and concepts, set up in the nineteenth century on a basis of mediævalism. The nineteenth century marks a stage in the corruption of humanity signalised by the neglect, on the one hand, of individual differences and, on the other, of Society *as a whole*, and by an appalling lust for class-differentiation between man and woman, sheep and goats, good and bad, right and wrong, species and species, shared alike by modern Christianity and that Darwinian

brand of science which really contributed nothing to the *freedom* of human thought and has but set up a new ritual in which a new jargon is mumbled in the old way. Now, if the old psychology of the nineteenth century (like the old religion, the old science, the old politics, and the old economics) was based upon the insistent separation of human beings one from another in terms of *differences*, the new psychology and the new social movement of the twentieth and—in Mr. Baldwin's phrase—the present twenty-first century, are based on recognition of what we have in common with each other as Human—all *too* Human—Men and Women in the World.

This we owe to Nietzsche. To use his own nomenclature, the old psychology (like the academic medicine of the nineteenth century, and so much else in which so many of us were brought up) was Apollonian: Nietzsche was the great modern Dionysian. Perhaps, on another occasion, we may wish to debate the significance of this great antinomy: just now it must suffice to say that Freud and Jung, as well as Adler, are cognizable as Dionysian psychologists. (McDougall, *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, July 1930.) Though this is so, to my mind the bond between Adler and Nietzsche is far closer than that between Nietzsche and Jung, even if some of Jung's principal tenets, as we shall see, were anticipated by Nietzsche. And, in spite of what the Freudians may say—they are notoriously hard to please—Adler is infinitely closer to Nietzsche than is Freud.

For Freud, whatever he may have derived from Nietzsche—and it must have been hard for any German-speaking thinker, in the last decade of the last century and the first of this, not to have been influenced by Nietzsche—is one who has really manufactured his metaphysics and his philosophy as he has gone along his self-appointed way, owing at least as much to the French academic school of

Charcot—scholastic realists and formalists to the backbone—as to his Teutonic and Semitic origins of place and race. I regard Freud much as I do Darwin: as one revolting, not against system, ritual, formality, and intolerance *as such*, but against particular manifestations of these crippling agencies. In a word, Freud and Darwin are alike as those casting out devils in the name of Beelzebub and, in the name of Liberty, substituting for one horrid tyranny another even more horrid by reason of its masquerade.

What, now, is there in common—negatively and positively—between Nietzsche and Alfred Adler?

To adopt a superficial and journalistic method of expression, we may say that Nietzsche carried his individualism—his revolt of the individual against system and against social co-ordination—to such a pitch that he, the super-individual, became mad by virtue of his self-isolation from society. No less superficially, we may say that Adler has sought to reconcile the Nietzschean *ressentiment* by a due subordination of individual rights to social rights, recognising that the essence of insanity lies in the isolation of the individual from the community, and that the strong man, who uses his strength to help others, thereby gains greater strength for himself.

We can *say* all this. But we must admit a tendency for Individual Psychology sometimes to slip further into the preachment of what Nietzsche would have called a slave-morality, a *ghettoism* (as Mr. Ludovici has said), a kind of sentimental and christianic Socialism which, if divine rather than human, is hardly manly, and one against which there is now an almost inevitable counter-reaction in progress to-day.

Indeed, quite an interesting series of parallels may be drawn between the midnight gatherings of the Christians in the Roman catacombs, the slinking and

secret congregations of oppressed Jews during the Middle Ages, the swamp revival meetings of American Negroes in the Southern States a hundred years ago, and the less desirable group-manifestations of some pseudo-psychological cliques to-day, to say nothing of their Buchmanite analogues! All these have had, and have in common, an obvious sense of inferiority, an ostentatious and exaggerated self-abasement, and a lively and fantastic confidence in a day when retribution will overtake the present Lords of the Earth, and Power and Glory will be the reward of the chosen few. In no obscure sense these group-phenomena, which are sometimes treated as if working models of Individual Psychology in practice, are better understood as demonstrations of that very reaction to difficulty which Individual Psychology deprecates and considers to be neurotic.

On the other hand, we must be careful not to overlook Nietzsche's very definite recognition of the social task, as exhibited in the following passage:

Similar manifestations of pleasure awaken the idea of the same sensations, the feeling of being like something: a like effect is produced by common sufferings, the same bad weather, dangers, enemies. Upon this foundation is based the oldest alliance, the object of which is the mutual obviating and averting of a threatening danger for the benefit of each individual. And thus the social instinct grows out of pleasure (vi, 97).

How does this differ, save verbally, from Adler's account of the origin of the social or community-feeling in those who are socially adjusted? I say "save verbally," for while Adler would declare social feeling to grow out of the common *happiness* in security gained, Nietzsche uses a word—pleasure—which, at first blush, seems to express a more hedonistic outlook.

I say, too, "in those who are socially adjusted," for those, ill-adjusted, who are denied community-feeling, neither anticipate happiness nor seek security with those in whose presence they feel inferiority and *ressentiment*.

But, so far as I know, this alliance in thought has not been formally acknowledged by Adler himself.

The truth is, indeed, that, as Allers says (in his recent remarkable little book *The New Psychologies*), two separate but tremendous psychological movements began when, in 1894, Breuer and Freud read their first paper at Vienna and Dilthey made, at Berlin, his declaration that, while science explains for us natural phenomena, psychology makes us *understand* the mind. Since then two ever-broadening streams of psychological thought have never ceased to gain momentum and, while it remains true that Individual Psychology is naturally related to Dilthey and his *Understanding-Psychology* rather than to Freud and his system, Nietzsche stands for the common source of both these great streams of dynamic psychology.

I am more than conscious that a far deeper and more critical study than any I can give would be required, were an adequate survey of my whole subject to be attempted, but I am not sure that the easiest method is not in all the circumstances the best that I can adopt. I therefore propose to follow the plan of my *Preface* to Adler's *Problems of Neurosis*, and will take the works of Nietzsche in the natural chronological order of the English edition, selecting for comment such passages as seem to me germane to the matter.

I do not suggest that the development of I.P. has been influenced by the Nietzschean teaching *in this order*, but I do think it is of importance to trace, throughout the Nietzschean *corpus*, the continuity of what I may call the golden thread of Individual Psychology.

I will first draw your attention, however, to some passages in *Who is to be Master of the World?* that reprint of Mr. Ludovici's brilliant lectures, introductory to a study of Nietzsche, which rightly forms a volume prefatory to the English edition of his works.

So far as I know, Mr. Ludovici, when he delivered these lectures in 1908, had but little, if any, interest in the New Psychology of that moment, and he is, therefore, at most an involuntary bearer of testimony on my side. Obviously, too, the passages which I am about to quote as illustrating salient points in Nietzsche's philosophy were written by Mr. Ludovici without any thought of the use to which I am about to put them.

The first *point de repère* made by Mr. Ludovici is the specific statement that, not the Darwinian struggle for life, and not Schopenhauer's will to live, but *Will to Power* is the motive force beyond all living phenomena. This statement, to which I will presently recur (*vide infra*, pp. 39, 53) is, of course, fundamental to I.P.

Psychologists should bethink themselves, before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength. Life itself is *Will to Power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results* thereof (xii, 20).

Now upon this base, says Mr. Ludovici, Nietzsche constructs a philosophy which . . . says "Yea" to life and blesses it. But "Nietzsche is not blind to the suffering in this world; on the contrary, he sees even more deeply into it than his predecessors . . . for, in pain, he sees the greatest educating and ennobling force of Nature."

The discipline of suffering, of great suffering, know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto? (xii, 171).

Here, of course, is the germ of Adler's doctrine of the overcoming of weakness by courageous effort.

Obviously we must not join hands with certain religious teachers, and insist that there is virtue in the suffering itself: we remember Adler's basic aphorism

that what matters is *not* the trauma, but the *courage* with which it is met!

But it is with almost a shock that we meet, in the following lines, Mr. Ludovici's unwitting recognition in Nietzsche of the very prototype of Adler's "teacher as benevolent comrade":

The nearer we get to the heart of Nietzsche's teaching, the more honestly convinced we become that he is rather a friend walking at our elbow, in the open, suggesting, insinuating, exhorting and chaffing, than a herdsman looking for a herd which he may lead and squeeze into a pen (p. 157).

We read on, remembering how we have all heard Adler himself say: "I do not like very much classes."

This, in fact, is the test underlying Nietzscheism. If we are of the herd, we naturally sniff around for our fold, for our rules, and formulae, for our restrictions, and our constraints; we have learned to love these things, and we cry aloud, when they are not to be found: "Behold our leader has no system! He is but a bungler who has no business with herds!"

Now, just as (in Mr. Ludovici's words) nothing may sound more incredible than the statement that Nietzsche's philosophy actually constitutes one regularly organized whole, so nothing (I declare) is more frequent than the accusation that Individual Psychology has no system. Yet I will affirm that I.P., properly viewed, constitutes a definite *corpus* no less than do the Nietzschean sentences, in Mr. Ludovici's judgment.

To understand the Nietzschean philosophy, *au fond*, and the Adlerian as well, it would be necessary to know fully the lives—the young lives—of the two great men who have propounded them. But in spite of the recent flood of Nietzschean *ana* which has deluged the reading public, it may, I think, be said that Nietzsche's life has not yet been fully discussed from the point of view of the Individual Psychologist. However, not a few details may be gleaned from the

Introduction (by Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche) to *The Birth of Tragedy* (I).

Nietzsche, as we know, was born in October, 1844. In 1849 his father died and in 1850 his mother withdrew, with her children, to Naumburg where, says Frau Förster-Nietzsche, "she brought us up with Spartan severity and simplicity which, besides being typical of the period, was quite *de rigueur* in her family." Later, in 1858, when fourteen years of age, Nietzsche entered the famous Pforta school where, also, "very severe discipline prevailed and much was exacted from the pupils, with the view of inuring them to great mental and physical exertions." In such circumstances, we can well understand the importance, in moulding Nietzsche's life-style, of the definite organ-inferiority which is best described in his sister's own words:

In him it might . . . be said, Nature had produced a being who in body and spirit was a harmonious whole: his unusual intellect was fully in keeping with his uncommon bodily strength.

The only abnormal thing about him, and something which we both inherited from our father, was shortsightedness, and this was very much aggravated in my brother's case, even in his earliest schooldays, owing to that indescribable anxiety to learn which always characterised him.

This coincidence of a severely strict discipline, exercised by a woman on a little chap, deprived of a father but encouraged by an elder male relative, handicapped by extreme myopia, and urged by a developing thirst for knowledge and study, reminds me irresistibly of Kipling's tale *Baa, Baa, Black Sheep*, in which, as is commonly asserted, the author has described incidents of his own early life. The elderly and affectionate "Uncle Harry" in the story seems to have played much the same part as did Grandfather Oehler in young Nietzsche's life. Students of physiognomy will not think me fanciful if I point out the

quite remarkable facial resemblances between Kipling and Nietzsche. We note the same strongly-marked supraciliary ridges, bushy eyebrows, deep-set eyes, heavily-moustached upper lip, and extraordinarily massive jaw.

(I)

From our present point of view *The Birth of Tragedy* is chiefly of interest by reason of its curious anticipation of the Jungian doctrines. Two passages may be quoted: the first is echoed in the concluding lines of *Psychological Types*; the second goes to the very heart of Jung's theory of neurosis.

And science itself, our science—ay, viewed as a symptom of life, what really signifies all science? Whither, worse still, *whence*—all science? Well? Is scientism perhaps only fear and evasion of pessimism? A subtle defence against—*truth*? Morally speaking, something like falsehood and cowardice? And, unmorally speaking, an artifice? (p. 3).

It is not necessary to follow Jung in order to recognise the essentially neurotic artifice that underlies so much modern scientific thought. However:

And what, then, physiologically speaking, is the meaning of that madness, out of which comic as well as tragic art has grown, the Dionysian madness? What? perhaps madness is not necessarily the symptom of degeneration, of decline, of belated culture? Perhaps there are—a question for alienists—neuroses of health? Of folk-youth and youthfulness? (p. 7).

In the *Appendix* to (I) there are a few notes concerning the antinomy between the Apollonian and Dionysian points of view (pp. 191, 192) which should not escape attention. But as they are there inserted outside their right chronological order, I will not now discuss them.

(II)

In *Early Greek Philosophy* we meet, at the very outset, in the *Preface* (p. 73), with the excellent aphorism that "Philosophical systems are absolutely true only to their founders, to all later philosophers they are usually *one* big mistake, and to feebler minds a sum of mistakes and truths"—an aphorism with which Individual Psychologists at least will not quarrel. Nor will any Individual Psychologist disagree with the development of this notion in the *Later Preface* (p. 75).

But the chief interest of this volume lies in its setting out (pp. 92-114) of the *second* great antinomy which interests Individual Psychologists and Nietzscheans alike. This is that between Being and Becoming. (The *first* of course is that of Apollo *v.* Dionysus.)

The pith and marrow of what Nietzsche has to say concerning Heraclitus, the first and greatest Voice of the Becoming, is contained in two sentences (p. 98). Heraclitus, he declares, "no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical, a realm of definite qualities from a realm of indefinable indefiniteness."

We should be hard put to it to express the ultimate fundamentals of Individual Psychology in fewer words than these! But Nietzsche continues:

Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: "I see nothing but Becoming. Be not deceived! It is the fault of your limited outlook and not the fault of the essence of things if you believe that you see firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names for things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one which you entered before."*

It is impossible here to develop further the Heraclitean element in Individual Psychology, but we may

*cf. *Problems of Neurosis*, p. viii.

at least observe that the proposition, "everything has always its opposite within itself" (II, 98), has its complement in Adler's dictum that what we most desire we fear and what we most fear we most greatly desire, and it is worth notice, in passing, that Richard Aldington, in his brilliant foreword to D. H. Lawrence's *Last Poems*, claims that, in some sense Nietzschean, and certainly tragic, thinker as a true Heraclitean and apostle of Becoming. We shall find later passages in Nietzsche which are strangely echoed by some of these *Last Poems* of Lawrence.

(III, IV, AND V)

On the Future of our Educational Institutions (III) need not detain us, but the first volume of *Thoughts out of Season* (IV) is remarkable for the attack made by Nietzsche on the sincerity of the man of science. Underlying this onslaught is the clear idea, which Individual Psychology must share, that the attitude of the man of science towards his science, and towards general culture, is one largely dictated by the neurotic desire to escape the pressure exercised by Life upon him.

Now, Pascal suggests that men only endeavour to work hard at their business and sciences with the view of escaping those questions of greatest import which every moment of loneliness or leisure presses upon them—the questions relating to the *wherefore*, the *whence*, and the *whither* of life (p. 60).

In succeeding pages Nietzsche develops these ideas, his intensity of feeling culminating in a truly Lawrentian passage which deserves quotation for its insistence on *loneliness* as a basic component of neurosis.

. . . . Alone with oneself! —this thought terrifies the modern soul; it is his one anxiety, his one ghastly fear.

When I watch the throngs that move and linger about the streets of a very populous town, and notice no other expression

in their faces than one of hunted stupor, I can never help commenting to myself upon the misery of their condition. For them all, art exists only that they may be still more wretched, torpid, insensible, or even more flurried and covetous. For *incorrect feeling* governs and drills them unremittingly, and does not even give them time to become aware of their misery. Should they wish to speak, convention whispers their cue to them, and this makes them forget what they originally intended to say; should they desire to understand one another, their comprehension is maimed as though by a spell: they declare that to be their joy which in reality is but their doom, and they proceed to collaborate in wilfully bringing about their own damnation. Thus they have become transformed into perfectly and absolutely different creatures, and reduced to the state of abject slaves of incorrect feeling (p. 141).

In the second volume of *Thoughts out of Season* (V) the second essay—that on Schopenhauer as educator—is perhaps the most important to us, but its message is almost entirely confined to a few lines:

. . . physicians are most in danger themselves in times when they are most needed and many men are sick. For where are our modern physicians who are strong and sure-footed enough to hold up another or lead him by the hand? (p. 113).

(VI)

So far, we have been dealing only with chips from the workshop of Nietzsche the "philologist." With the publication of the first volume of *Human, All-too-Human* we make acquaintance with Nietzsche the psychologist; one whose psychology is directly derived from contact with Men and Women in the World, and is in the truest sense an understanding of human nature.

The disjointed, aphoristic style of the work lends itself readily to citation, and we are, almost at once, struck by what Nietzsche has to say concerning "the harmlessness of Metaphysics in the future":

. . . With religion, art, and morals we do not touch the "essence of the world in itself"; we are in the domain of representation . . . (p. 21).

A page or two later we have the acute anticipation of another of Jung's cardinal principles:

I hold, that as man now still reasons in dreams, so men reasoned also *when awake* through thousands of years; the first *causa* which occurred to the mind to explain anything that required an explanation, was sufficient and stood for truth. (Thus, according to travellers' tales, savages still do to this very day.) This ancient element in human nature still manifests itself in our dreams, for it is the foundation upon which the higher reason has developed and still develops in every individual; the dream carries us back into remote conditions of human culture, and provides a ready means of understanding them better (p. 25).

Afterwards, in a series of miniature essays, Nietzsche sets out, with the utmost lucidity and force, what I will call the attitude of Individual Psychology towards Metaphysics in general. One rises from their perusal more than ever convinced that Allers is right when he declares, in *The New Psychologies* (p. 77), that a metaphysical conflict is at the bottom of all neurosis.

The young man values metaphysical explanations, because they show him something highly significant in things which he found unpleasant or despicable, and if he is dissatisfied with himself, the feeling becomes lighter when he recognises the innermost world-puzzle or world-misery in that which he so strongly disapproves of in himself. To feel himself less responsible and at the same time to find things more interesting—that seems to him a double benefit for which he has to thank metaphysics. Later on, certainly, he gets distrustful of the whole metaphysical method of explanation; then perhaps it grows clear to him that those results can be obtained equally well and more scientifically in another way: that physical and historical explanations produce the feeling of personal relief to at least the same extent, and that the interest in life and its problems is perhaps still more aroused thereby.

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But inasmuch as all metaphysics has concerned itself chiefly with substance and the freedom of will, it may be designated as the science which treats of the fundamental errors of mankind, but treats of them as if they were fundamental truths. (pp. 31-33).

Later, the neurotic aspect of what is too often called morality is exposed as devastatingly as it has been by Adler himself but, I should imagine, to the discontent of Allers:

A good author, who really has his heart in his work, wishes that some one could come and annihilate him by representing the same thing in a clearer way and answering without much ado the problems therein proposed. The loving girl wishes she could prove the self-sacrificing faithfulness of her love by the unfaithfulness of her beloved. The soldier hopes to die on the field of battle for his victorious fatherland; for his loftiest desires triumph in the victory of his country. The mother gives to the child that of which she deprives herself—sleep, the best food, sometimes her health and fortune. But are all these unegoistic conditions? . . . Is it not clear that in all four cases the individual loves *something of himself*, a thought, a desire, a production, better than *anything else of himself*; . . . Is it something *entirely* different when an obstinate man says, "I would rather be shot than move a step out of my way for this man"? The *desire for something* (wish, inclination, longing) is present in all the instances mentioned; to give way to it, with all its consequences, is certainly not "un-egoistic" (p. 75).

After this Nietzsche puts with admirable terseness a notion which is familiar to us all:

ST. LUKE XVIII. 14, IMPROVED.—He that humbleth himself wishes to be exalted (p. 88).

It is impossible not to correlate with this passage a most penetrating remark made by Oscar Wilde in his *De Profundis* (p. 110):

A man's very highest moment is, I have no doubt at all, when he kneels in the dust, and beats his breast, and tells all the sins of his life.

On page 97 we have the clearest adumbration, already quoted (*vide supra*, p. 11) of the basal doctrine of Individual Psychology: that the communal feeling has arisen from the need of seeking security in the face of danger, given the sense of individual helplessness.

ness when confronted with the apparent irresponsibilities of nature.

In a good discussion of "The Religious Life" in the third division of the first volume of *Human, All-too-Human*, the link between religious ritual and compulsive neurosis is made clear to us at the same time that the nature of the latter is elucidated in Adler's fashion.

In many respects the ascetic seeks to make life easy for himself, usually by complete subordination to a strange will or a comprehensive law and ritual; something like the way a Brahmin leaves nothing whatever to his own decision but refers every moment to holy precepts.

. . . in self-contempt, which is one of the signs of holiness, and likewise in the deeds of self-torture, a means by which those natures fight against the general weariness of their life-will; they employ the most painful irritants and cruelties in order to emerge for a time from that dullness and boredom into which they so frequently sink through their great mental indolence (pp. 142-3).

In succeeding passages, after the acutest analysis of the mediæval theory of the sexual life as intrinsically sinful—"as evil in itself"—and of the hypostasis of sensual desires, in actual terms of demonology, we come to a statement of the origin of so much neurotic fear and guilt sense:

Everything natural with which man has connected the idea of evil and sin (as, for instance, he is still accustomed to do with regard to the erotic) troubles and clouds the imagination, causes a frightened glance, makes man quarrel with himself and uncertain and distrustful of himself. Even his dreams have the flavour of a restless conscience. And yet in the reality of things this suffering from what is natural is entirely without foundation, it is only the consequence of opinion *about things* (p. 145-6).

But presently we find the first foreshadowing of Adler's doctrine of compensation:

. . . some one who has completely lost his *way* in a wood, but who with unusual energy strives to reach the open in one direction or another, will sometimes discover a new path which nobody knew previously,—thus arise geniuses, who are credited with originality. It has already been said that mutilation, crippling, or the loss of some important organ, is frequently the cause of the unusual development of another organ, because this one has failed to fulfil its own and also another function (p. 215).

He who could attain to a comprehension of the production of genius, and desires to carry out practically the manner in which Nature usually goes to work, would have to be just as evil and regardless as Nature itself (p. 216).

In "The Future of the Physician" (pp. 225-6), what we may call the fictive ideal that should be ever-present to the mind of the psychologist is admirably set out in phrases which deserve close study:

There is now no profession which would admit of such an enhancement as that of the physician. . . The highest mental development of a physician has not yet been reached . . . he must possess . . . a manliness, the sight of which alone drives away all despondency . . . in short, a good physician now has need of all the artifices and artistic privileges of every other professional class. Thus equipped . . . from a "medicine man" he becomes a saviour and yet need work no miracle, neither is he obliged to let himself be crucified.

There is hardly any page of this, as of certain other of Nietzsche's volumes, which is not of interest to the Individual Psychologist. Adler's explanation of the homosexuality of classic Greece is given in a few lines:

A MALE CULTURE.—The Greek culture of the classic age is a male culture. As far as women are concerned, Pericles expresses everything in the funeral speech: "They are best when they are as little spoken of as possible amongst men." The erotic relation of men to youths was the necessary and sole preparation, to a degree unattainable to our comprehension, of all manly education (pretty much as for a long time all higher education of women was only attainable through love and marriage). All idealism of the strength of the Greek nature threw itself into that relation, and it is probable that

never since have young men been treated so attentively, so lovingly, so entirely with a view to their welfare (*virtus*) as in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C.—according to the beautiful saying of Hölderlin: “For it is when loving that mortal man gives of his best.” The higher the light in which this relation was regarded, the lower sank intercourse with women; nothing else was taken into consideration than the production of children and lust; there was no intellectual intercourse, not even real love-making (pp. 237-8).

In a word, the Greeks feared women, as the Trojans Greeks; not understanding them, *et dona ferentes*.

Almost the whole of the sixth division of this volume of *Human, All-too-Human* (VI), which deals with “Man in Society,” repays our examination. Here is an aphorism which might have been written by La Rochefoucauld:

ADVISERS OF THE SICK.—Whoever gives advice to a sick person acquires a feeling of superiority over him, whether the advice be accepted or rejected. Hence proud and sensitive sick persons hate advisers more than their sickness (p. 268).

And again:

THE EMBARRASSED.—People who do not feel sure of themselves in society seize every opportunity of publicly showing their superiority to close friends, for instance by teasing them (p. 274).

We all know the contentment of the neurotic with “the semblance of things.” And so:

TOO LITTLE HONOURED.—Very conceited persons, who have received less consideration than they expected, attempt for a long time to deceive themselves and others with regard to it, and become subtle psychologists in order to make out that they have been amply honoured. Should they not attain their aim, should the veil of deception be torn, they give way to all the greater fury (p. 277).

And of “Disappointment in Society”:

One man wishes to be interesting for his opinions, another for his likes and dislikes, a third for his acquaintances, and a fourth for his solitariness—and they all meet with disappointment. For he before whom the play is performed thinks himself the only play that is to be taken into account (p. 284).

The discussion in the seventh division of "Wife and Child" is indeed a string of aphoristic jewels, some of which are very precious to Individual Psychologists.

The first of these must be specially mentioned as picturing for us Nietzsche's true notion of womanhood.

THE PERFECT WOMAN.—The perfect woman is a higher type of humanity than the perfect man, and also something much rarer. The natural history of animals furnishes grounds in support of this theory (p. 295).

And then comes this sequence:

FRIENDSHIP AND MARRIAGE.—The best friend will probably get the best wife, because a good marriage is based on talent for friendship.

THE SURVIVAL OF THE PARENTS.—The undissolved dissonances in the relation of the character and sentiments of the parents survive in the nature of the child and make up the history of its inner sufferings.

FATHERS AND SONS.—Fathers have much to do to make amends for having sons.

A MALE DISEASE.—The surest remedy for the male disease of self-contempt is to be loved by a sensible woman.

MATERNAL EXCELLENCE.—Some mothers need happy and honoured children, some need unhappy ones—otherwise they cannot exhibit their maternal excellence (pp. 295-7).

The discussion of "The Feminine Intellect" (p. 302) is not perhaps strictly relevant to the purpose of this study: nevertheless, it should not escape the attention of those who accept the Individual Psychologist's teaching of woman's equality in status with man.

And, in the paragraph on "Authority and Freedom" the Individual Psychologist's interpretation of woman's apparent acquiescence in subordination is clearly set out:

However highly women may honour their husbands, they honour still more the powers and ideas recognised by society; they have been accustomed for millennia to go along with their hands folded on their breasts and their heads bent before everything dominant, disapproving of all resistance to public authority (p. 315).

I close my series of excerpts from this wonderful volume with a few lines that are a marvel of compression:

EACH SUPERIOR IN ONE THING.—In civilised intercourse every one feels himself superior to all others in at least one thing: kindly feelings generally are based thereon, inasmuch as every one can, in certain circumstances, render help, and is therefore entitled to accept help without shame (p. 360).

Could there be a finer, more human recognition than this, of the real social value that may attach itself to the oft-contemned "superiority feeling"?

(VII)

In the second volume of *Human, All-too-Human*, Nietzsche develops, in a series of disconnected aphorisms, epigrams, maxims, and *obiter dicta*, the human—if that can be distinguished from the psychological—side of his thought and (on pp. 136-140) discusses the intellect and character of women in a fashion that once more belies the popular appreciation—or, rather, depreciation—of his teaching in this respect; once more showing how much there is in common between Individual Psychology and himself.

But in "The Wanderer and his Shadow" Nietzsche plumbs the very depths of psychological truth, and in the section on the "Use of Words and Reality" he strips away determinedly the mask of verbal inter-

pretations which hides from us the significance of what happens. Thus:

For instance, we say "we only eat to live"—an abominable *lie*, like that which speaks of the procreation of children as the real purpose of all sexual pleasure. Conversely, the reverence for "the most important things" is hardly ever quite genuine (p. 185).

Nietzsche develops his contempt for the misuse, or misleading use of words, in subsequent sentences, finally flaming out against "that fundamentally superfluous dependence upon physicians, teachers and clergymen, whose dead weight still lies heavy upon the whole of society." ". . . everyday matters," he declares, "are very imperfectly seen and rarely observed by the majority . . . from this defect are derived *nearly all the bodily and spiritual infirmities of the individual*" (p. 186).

This discussion leads on to consideration of the "Freedom of the Will and the Isolation of Facts" (p. 191) and to the anticipation of Relativity in Psychology contained in the aphorism on "Repetition" (p. 193):

It is an excellent thing to express a thing consecutively in two ways, and thus provide it with a right and a left foot. Truth can stand indeed on one leg, but with two she will walk and complete her journey.

A shrewd commentary on the abuse of the notion of social equality is found in the sections on "Vanity as an Anti-Social Aftergrowth" and "Equity" (pp. 210-211):

As men, for the sake of security, have made themselves equal in order to found communities, but as also this conception is imposed by a sort of constraint, and is entirely opposed to the instincts of the individual, so, the more universal security is guaranteed, the more do new offshoots of the old instinct for

predominance appear. Such offshoots appear in the setting-up of class distinctions . . . So soon as danger to the community is apparent, the majority, who were unable to assert their preponderance in a time of universal peace, once more bring about the condition of equality, and for the time being the absurd privileges and vanities disappear . . . Neither a natural justice nor a natural injustice exists . . . Equity is a development of justice and arises among such as do not come into conflict with the communal equality.

In "The Wanderer and his Shadow" ("The Belief in Disease *qua* Disease"), Nietzsche stumbles upon the great truth, common to Individual Psychology and all other developments of Hippocratic medicine, that *disease* is no entity. "Christianity," he says, "first painted the devil on the wall of the world."

Christianity first brought the idea of sin into the world. The belief in the remedies, which is offered as an antidote, has gradually been shaken to its very foundations. But the belief in the disease, which Christianity has taught and propagated, still exists (p. 237).

It is not an exaggeration to say that the academic teaching of clinical medicine in terms of disease entities (which still persists) is a logical and metaphysical derivative from the mediæval teaching in respect of Sins.

The notion is followed up in the commentary on "Saviour and Physician" (pp. 239-40) where Nietzsche insists that he who follows the advice "If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out," and so thinks he has killed his sensuality, is wrong, "for his sensuality still lives in an uncanny vampire form, and torments him in hideous disguises."

In the cliché of the consulting-room, a "present problem" has perhaps been dramatically settled, but the style of life remains unchanged!

(VIII)

The Case of Wagner is, to the Individual Psychologist, of hardly greater value than a sojourn in Iceland to an ophiologist. However, on page 92, Nietzsche, in declaring that Wagner "has the mind of the ordinary man who prefers to trace things to one cause," opens for the first time, so far as I am aware, that attack upon the nineteenth century notions of causality that Individual Psychology, alone amongst medical psychologies, has sustained and still sustains.

(IX)

With *The Dawn of Day* Nietzsche expresses clamantly the need, not for the clichés of the consulting-room but for "the New Physicians of the Soul." It is thus that he sets out the case for the psychologist:

. . . the worst disease of mankind has arisen from the struggle against diseases, and apparent remedies have in the long run brought about worse conditions than those which it was intended to remove by their use. Men, in their ignorance, used to believe that the stupefying and intoxicating means, which appeared to act immediately, the so-called "consolations," were the true healing powers: they even failed to observe that they had often to pay for their immediate relief by a general and profound deterioration in health, that the sick ones had to suffer from the after-effects of the intoxication, then from the absence of the intoxication, and, later on, from a feeling of disquietude, depression, nervous starts, and ill-health. Again, men whose illness had advanced to a certain extent never recovered from it—those physicians of the soul, universally believed in and worshipped as they were, took care of that.

It has been justly said of Schopenhauer that he was one who again took the sufferings of humanity seriously: where is the man who will at length take the antidotes against these sufferings seriously, and who will pillory the unheard-of quackery with which men, even up to our own age, and in the

most sublime nomenclature, have been wont to treat the illnesses of their souls?

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And now do ye understand our task? (pp. 56-7).

In "If you think it Evil you make it Evil" Nietzsche exclaims, apropos of what he calls the transformation by Christianity of Eros and Aphrodite into hellish genii and phantom goblins: Is it not a dreadful thing to transform necessary and regular sensations into a source of inward misery, and thus arbitrarily to render interior misery necessary and regular *in the case of every man!* (p. 77).

I cannot refrain from making one citation in this place which, although little relevant to Individual Psychology itself, is yet of tremendous anthropological importance. On page 253 Nietzsche says that it is probable that there are no pure races, but only races which have become purified, and even these are extremely rare.

We more often meet with crossed races, among whom, together with the defects in the harmony of the bodily forms (for example when the eyes do not accord with the mouth) we necessarily always find defects of harmony in habits and appreciations. . . . Crossed races are always at the same time crossed cultures and crossed moralities: they are, as a rule, more evil, cruel, and restless.

At first sight such a statement as this appears not merely irrelevant to, but actually inconsistent with, Individual Psychology. It certainly trenches upon the debatable and disputed question of the significance to the individual of the "original outfit" as from birth. But deeper reflection, I think, may help us to an appreciation of what truth there is in this dictum of Nietzsche, and to a solution of the controversy that has so vexed and still does vex Individual Psychologists. I have elsewhere (*The Mongol in Our Midst*, 1931, pp. 202-4, 363-4, 441) attempted to explain the characters of imbecile mongoloids as the expression

of conflict between ancestral strains in the developing embryo. It is AS IF the neurotic character, the indecision and weak compromise of neurosis, was sometimes displayed even in the womb by the developing foetus! So in the "facts" thrown at us by the ethnologists in agreement with Nietzsche, we find, not a rebuttal of the thesis of Individual Psychology, but a province for observation which is illuminated when the range of applicability of these theses is extended from the child's first year or two of life to his pre-natal circumstances and conditions.

However this may be, in "The Pastime of the Psychologist" Nietzsche hits those of us engaged in practice rather shrewdly:

He thinks he knows me, and fancies himself to be subtle and important when he has any kind of relations with me; and I take care not to undeceive him. For in such a case I should suffer for it, while now he wishes me well because I arouse in him a feeling of conscious superiority. There is another, who fears that I think I know him, and feels a sense of inferiority at this. As a result he behaves in a timid and vacillating manner, in my presence, and endeavours to mislead me in regard to himself so that he may regain an ascendancy over me (p. 265).

There is tremendous practical wisdom as well as profound spiritual insight in what Nietzsche says concerning "Slow Cures" in a little homily, which puts me in mind of what Mr. St. John Brodrick, of Merton, once wrote concerning the therapeutic methods of Sir Andrew Clark. Mr. Brodrick said that nothing had struck him so much as the importance which Sir Andrew attached to the persistent attention to small details and the continued operation of gentle remedies, in chronic diseases, throughout lengthy periods of time. Nietzsche deals with body and soul, or rather with the psycho-somatic unity, in the same way.

Chronic illnesses of the soul, like those of the body, are very rarely due to one gross offence against physical and mental

reason, but as a general rule they arise from innumerable and petty negligences of a minor order. A man, for example, whose breathing becomes a trifle weaker every day and whose lungs, by inhaling too little air, are deprived of their proper amount of exercise, will end by being struck down by some chronic disease of the lungs. The only remedy for cases like these is a countless number of minor exercises of a contrary tendency—making it a rule, for example, to take a long and deep breath every quarter of an hour, lying flat on the ground if possible. For this purpose a clock which strikes the quarters should be chosen as a lifelong companion.

All these remedies are slow and trifling, but yet the man who wishes to cure his soul will carefully consider a change, even in his least important habits. Many a man will utter a cold and angry word to his surroundings ten times a day without thinking about it, and he will forget that after a few years it will have become a regular habit with him to put his surroundings out of temper ten times a day. But he can also acquire the habit of doing good to them ten times (p. 329).

After this, our examination of *The Dawn of Day* may fitly conclude with the citation of an aphorism or epigram which will appeal with peculiar force to those who remember the literal translation of the three names: Freud, Jung, and Adler!

NEVER FORGET!—The higher we soar the smaller we appear to those who cannot fly (p. 394).

(X)

The Joyful Wisdom which, as the editor says, "is rightly judged to be one of Nietzsche's best books," is not one that I have found so useful as are some others. But the excursus "On Female Chastity" bears significance in every line for the Individual Psychologist who would thoroughly understand the origins of het masculine protest:

There is something quite astonishing and extraordinary in the education of women of the higher class; indeed, there is perhaps nothing more paradoxical. All the world is agreed to

educate them with as much ignorance as possible *in eroticis*, and to inspire their soul with a profound shame of such things, and the extremest impatience and horror at the suggestion of them. . . . But here they are, intended to remain ignorant to the very backbone:—they are intended to have neither eyes, ears, words, nor thoughts for this, their “wickedness”; indeed knowledge here is already evil. And then! To be hurled as with an awful thunderbolt into reality and knowledge with marriage—and indeed by him whom they most love and esteem : to have to encounter love and shame in contradiction, yes, to have to feel rapture, abandonment, duty, sympathy, and fright at the unexpected proximity of God and animal, and whatever else besides! All at once!—There, in fact, a psychic entanglement has been effected which is quite unequalled! Even the sympathetic curiosity of the wisest discerner of men does not suffice to divine how this or that woman gets along with the solution of this enigma and the enigma of this solution; what dreadful, far-reaching suspicions must awaken thereby in the poor unhinged soul; and forsooth, how the ultimate philosophy and scepticism of the woman casts anchor at this point!—Afterwards the same profound silence as before; and often even a silence to herself, a shutting of her eyes to herself. . . . Wives easily feel their husbands as a question mark to their honour, and their children as an apology or atonement. . . . In short, one cannot be gentle enough towards women (p. 104).

We think of D. H. Lawrence’s *Last Poems*, p. 140, “Men and Women”:

All this talk of equality between the sexes is merely an expression of sex hate;

Men and women should learn tenderness to each other and to leave one another alone.

Later in the book (pp. 157-9) Nietzsche recurs to the topic of “Cause and Effect,” in respect of which, as we have seen, he was beginning to have doubts and difficulties.

We say it is “explanation”; but it is only in “description” that we are in advance of the older stages of knowledge and science. We describe better—we explain just as little as our predecessors. We have discovered a manifold succession where the naïve man and investigator of older cultures saw only two things,

“cause” and “effect” as it was said; we have perfected the conception of becoming, but have not got a knowledge of what is above and behind the conception.

It is sufficient to regard science as the exactest humanising of things that is possible; we always learn to describe ourselves more accurately by describing things and their successions. Cause and effect: there is probably never any such duality; in fact there is a *continuum* before us, from which we isolate a few portions:

An intellect which could see cause and effect as a *continuum*, which could see the flux of events not according to our mode of perception, as things arbitrarily separated and broken—would throw aside the conception of cause and effect, and would deny all conditionality.

(XI)

Thus Spake Zarathustra is doubtless, so far as English readers are concerned, vastly the most popular of Nietzsche's writings. I have no intention whatsoever of embarking upon a criticism, far less a valuation, of this book, but I confess that it seems to me that such psychological value as *Zarathustra* possesses is by virtue of its subjective revelation of the poet's soul rather than its objective validity as a criticism, account, or analysis of life. However, *Zarathustra* must be read, inasmuch as we find therein the first clear statement of one of the three ideas of greatest importance to psychology in general if not to Individual Psychology in particular. These, set out by Frau Förster-Nietzsche in her admirable *Introduction* (XI, ix-xxvi), are the *Superman*, the *Will to Power*, and the *Transvaluation of all Values*. The *Will to Power*, of course, is best dealt with in relation to the two volumes bearing that name, and the *Transvaluation of all Values* is discussed in the first of these. But although, as Frau Förster-Nietzsche says truly enough, the ideal of the Superman is put forth quite clearly in all

Nietzsche's writings during the years 1873-75 (thus, in *We Philologists* (VIII) he says: Even among the Greeks, it was the individuals that counted), it is to *Zarathustra* we must turn for Nietzsche's completest setting out thereof.

This is no place in which to discuss the doctrine of the Superman and I am far from suggesting that there is anything common in substance, so to speak, between Nietzsche's Superman and the ideal of the Individual Psychologist, or even the ideal Individual Psychologist himself! Nevertheless, it does seem to me that there is some analogy between the part played by Nietzsche's Superman in the Nietzschean *corpus*, on the one hand, and the rôle of the fictive normal in Individual Psychology on the other. For neither the Nietzschean Superman nor the fictive normal of the Individual Psychologist is to be looked at in the same way as physicians regard what they call "a typical case." Rather, it seems to me, are the Superman of Nietzsche and the human ideal of the Individual Psychologist to be considered, ontologically, or metaphysically, in the same category as the "ideal" or "typical" horse or dog present to the mind of a judge in the show-ring. Each of us may say of his own "fictive ideal," as Jaques said of his melancholy: It is . . . of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects: and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps me in a most humorous sadness.

Nietzsche's Superman and the Fictive Normal of the Individual Psychologist are, in fact, impersonal projections from experience and contemplation.

Another intensely Nietzschean idea which is perhaps best, if not exclusively, developed in *Zarathustra* and which, moreover, has an almost paradoxical interest for the psychologist, is that of the Eternal Recurrence. It is not, I think, for one moment far-fetched to declare that Thomas Sydenham, the first great

English epidemiologist, had the idea of the Eternal Recurrence in mind when he adumbrated his great theory of the repetition of epidemic constitution-sequences, in the course of "the mysterious successions of Time" (*Med. Obs.*, I, ii). Now the link between Sydenham's epidemiology and Nietzsche's psychology is by way of Charles Creighton, the greatest and most neglected British thinker in Medicine during the nineteenth century. For, as Hans Prinzhorn has shown in his *Psychotherapy*, and as I have ventured to reaffirm in a paper on "Organ-Jargon" (*Brit. Journ. Med. Psych.*, X, iv, 1930, pp. 295-312) it was Charles Creighton who, in his *Unconscious Memory in Disease* (1886) laid the foundations of the New Psychology by showing how neurosis develops by use and wont out of functional errors, by foreshadowing the theory of conditioned reflexes, and by demonstrating in what fashion disturbances of somatic function are conditioned by such influences as "the unexpressed emotion of anxiety, worry, and paralysing misfortune, the grief unrelieved by tears, the load of care borne without help, the mind turned for ever inwards upon itself and checked in its active outgoings, even curtailed opportunities and soured ambitions."

Some of Zarathustra's utterances must not escape our notice. Has anything finer in its way been said than these sentences on "Chastity"?

Do I counsel you to slay your instincts? I counsel you to innocence in your instincts.

Do I counsel you to chastity? Chastity is a virtue with some, but with many almost a vice.

These are continent to be sure: but doggish lust looketh enviously out of all that they do (p. 61).

On page 68 we find, I think for the first time in Nietzsche, the word *goal*, so necessary to Individual Psychologists.

A thousand goals have there been hitherto, for a thousand peoples have there been. Only the fetter for the thousand necks is still lacking; there is lacking the one goal. As yet humanity hath not a goal.

But pray tell me, my brethren, if the goal of humanity be still lacking, is there not also still lacking—humanity itself?

We shall meet with this word, in more appropriate contexts hereafter, but pause to find a new application of an ancient reproach, on page 89:

Physician, heal thyself: then wilt thou also heal thy patient. Let it be his best cure to see with his eyes him who maketh himself whole.

There is bitter psychological truth in this flash of insight:

What the father hath hid cometh out in the son; and oft have I found the son the father's revealed secret (p. 117).

These sentences, too, are pregnant (p. 136):

Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master.

.

And as the lesser surrendereth himself to the greater that he may have delight and power over the least of all, so doth even the greatest surrender himself, and staketh—life, for the sake of power.

.

And where there is sacrifice and service and love-glances, there also is the will to be master.

.

And this secret spake Life unto me. "Behold," she said, "I am *that which must ever surpass itself.*"

To be sure, ye call it will to procreation, or impulse towards a goal, towards the higher, remoter, more manifold: but all that is one and the same secret.

Zarathustra speaks (p. 205) with scorn of the small people given to much lying, of whom some *will* but most are willed:

Some of them are genuine, but most of them are bad actors . . .
 . . . therefore do their women masculinise themselves. For only he who is man enough, will—*save the woman* in woman.

Adler has told us that the sexual problem in life only seems the most important because it is the least understood. Thus spake Zarathustra (p. 230):

. . . . who hath fully understood *how unknown* to each other are man and woman!

In "The Shadow" (pp. 335-336) the notion of the goal again comes before us:

Have I—still a goal? A haven towards which my sail is set?

.

Thou hast lost thy goal. Alas, how wilt thou forgo and forget that loss? Thereby—hast thou also lost thy way!

(XII)

Beyond Good and Evil—which Mr. Common declares to be, in spite of its name, one of the most serious, profound, and original philosophical works—offers, not merely to the "morally and intellectually fastidious"—as Mr. Common says—but to every Individual Psychologist, a feast of good things which it would take long to exhaust.

On page 10 Nietzsche enunciates what I may call the thesis of Individual Psychology concerning Philosophy:

It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography.

Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is the father of Philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument.

On page 20 he gives us the great statement, already mentioned (*vide supra*, p. 13) of which the echoes reverberate throughout Adler's early writings:

Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength—life itself is *Will to Power*.

However, we are bound to remark, in the next sentence, the commencement of divergence between Adler and Nietzsche, in respect of the former's recognition of Purpose:

In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of *superfluous* teleological principles!

I have already referred (*vide supra*, pp. 30, 31) to Nietzsche's remarks on racial purity, and have attempted to reconcile them with the position taken up by Individual Psychology. The following paragraph appears to me of considerable importance in the same relation, and I quote it the more willingly, inasmuch as I had already developed the same idea (*The Mongol in Our Midst*, pp. 119, 164) in complete ignorance of what Nietzsche had written. (See also my *Introduction* to Masson-Oursel's *Comparative Philosophy*, pp. 9-10.)

It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altai languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans; the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of *physiological* valuations and racial conditions (p. 29).

In the next section (p. 30) Nietzsche boldly affirms the purely conceptional nature of "Cause" and "Effect":

One should not wrongly *materialise* "cause" and "effect" as the natural philosophers do . . . according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure *conceptions*, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding—not for explanation. . . . It is *we* alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose.

From this exordium Nietzsche proceeds to a really magnificent, rhapsodical outburst on the future and scope of Psychology, from which I take a few passages:

All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths . . . it seems as if nobody had yet harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and *Development-doctrine of the Will to Power*, as I conceive of it. . . . A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator. . . .

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Never yet did a *profounder* world of insight reveal itself to daring travellers and adventurers, and the psychologist who thus "makes a sacrifice"—it is *not* the *sacrificio dell' intelletto*, on the contrary!—will at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognised as the queen of the sciences for whose service and equipment the other sciences exist. For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems (pp. 33-4).

A particularly interesting speculation is put forward in pages 46-7. Nietzsche says :

Throughout the longest period of human history—one calls it the prehistoric period—the value or non-value of an action was inferred from its *consequences*; Let us call this period the *pre-moral* period of mankind. . . .

It is, of course, hardly inaccurate to say that Individual Psychologists infer the value or non-value of an action from its social consequences: in the same way, too, the *purpose* is inferred. But Nietzsche goes on to suggest "that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds with regard to . . . values, owing to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man," and even that it is possible that we may be standing on the threshold of a new period "which to begin with, would be distinguished negatively as *ultra-moral*."

But to pursue the implications of this suggestion from our point of view would lead us too far.

The third chapter of this book, on "The Religious Mood," opens with a passage that at once arrests us:

The human soul and its limits, the range of man's inner experiences hitherto attained, the heights, depths, and distances of these experiences, the entire history of the soul *up to the present time*, and its still unexhausted possibilities: this is the preordained hunting-domain for a born psychologist and lover of a "big hunt" (p. 63).

What could be more valuable to the psychologist than recognition of what Nietzsche goes on to say?

Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared on the earth so far, we find it connected with three dangerous prescriptions as to regimen: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence—but without it being possible to determine with certainty which is cause and which is effect, or *if* any relation at all of cause and effect exists there (p. 66).

Of "the passion for God" Nietzsche declares that:

. . . in many cases it appears, curiously enough, as the disguise of a girl's or youth's puberty; here and there even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her last ambition. The Church has frequently canonised the woman, in such a case (p. 70).

An aphorism of tremendous importance is given on page 82, where Nietzsche declares that man is "the

animal not yet properly adapted to his environment": no less pointed is the declaration, on page 86, that "If a man has character, he has also his typical experience, which always recurs." Is not this the doctrine of the life-style?

The fourth chapter, of Apophthegms and Interludes, from which this last citation is made, is again a string of psychological gems from which only a few may here be chosen.

The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play.

"You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him."

When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature.

Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.

One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never confess to the individual.

One does not hate so long as one disesteems but only when one esteems equal or superior.

One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired.

"I dislike him." Why?—"I am not a match for him."—Did any one ever answer so?

The irrelevancy of a remark in "The Natural History of Morals"—irrelevancy, that is, so far as the present discussion is concerned—must be excused by virtue of its truthful wittiness:

Industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle: it was a master stroke of *English* instinct to hallow and begloom Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week- and work-day again (p. 109).

The devastating remark on page 146—how true only we to-day can realize!—that "the time for petty

politics is past; the next century will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world—the *compulsion* to great politics,” prefaces an appreciation of the fashion in which Frederick became the Great in reaction to the education he suffered at the hands of his “problematic, crazy father.” It may perhaps fitly close my excerpts from this volume:

That unscrupulous enthusiast for big, handsome grenadiers . . . had on one point the very knack and lucky grasp of the genius: he knew what was then lacking in Germany, the want of which was a hundred times more alarming and serious than any lack of culture and social form—his ill-will to the young Frederick resulted from the anxiety of a profound instinct. *Men were lacking*; and he suspected, to his bitterest regret, that his own son was not man enough. There, however, he deceived himself; but who would not have deceived himself in his place? . . . Meanwhile, however, there grew up in his son that new kind of harder and more dangerous scepticism—who knows *to what extent* it was encouraged just by his father’s hatred and the icy melancholy of a will condemned to solitude?—the scepticism of daring manliness, which is closely related to the genius for war and conquest.

Could such a father-son relationship be presented with greater point and objectivity?

(XIII)

The Genealogy of Morals is very fairly described by Dr. Oscar Levy (the Editor of the English Edition) as perhaps the least aphoristic, in form, of all Nietzsche’s productions. But he very truly says that, for analytical power, it is unequalled by any other of his works and, in the light which it throws upon the attitude of the ecclesiast to the man of resentment and misfortune, is one of the most valuable contributions to sacerdotal psychology. In submission to this judgment, *The Genealogy of Morals* should be studied by the Individual Psychologist. While the Preface is

important enough, our attention is, as Englishmen, at once arrested by the opening sentences of the body of the work:

Those English psychologists, who up to the present are the only philosophers who are to be thanked for any endeavour to get as far as a history of the origin of morality—these men, I say, offer us in their own personalities no paltry problem; they even have, if I am to be quite frank about it, in their capacity of living riddles, an advantage over their books—*they themselves are interesting!* These English psychologists—what do they really mean?

Leaving, however, Nietzsche's answer to his riddle to be read at length, we are struck by his response, on pages 65 and 66, to another self-imposed question:

“How is a memory to be made for the man-animal? How is an impression to be so deeply fixed upon this ephemeral understanding, half dense, and half silly, upon this incarnate forgetfulness, that it will be permanently present?”

Nietzsche replies:

Perhaps there is nothing more awful and more sinister in the early history of man than his *system of mnemonics*. “Something is burnt in so as to remain in his memory: only that which never stops *hurting* remains in his memory.”

The transition from this axiom, of what Nietzsche calls the oldest psychology in the world, to a study of the *ressentiment* of the German text, is obvious and easy.

A deprecatory word here against the attempts, that have lately been made, to find the origin of justice on quite another basis—namely, on that of *resentment*. Let me whisper a word in the ear of the psychologists, if they would fain study revenge itself at close quarters: this plant blooms its prettiest at present among Anarchists and anti-Semites, a hidden flower, as it has ever been, like the violet, though, forsooth, with another perfume. And as like must necessarily emanate from like, it will not be a matter for surprise that it is just in such circles that we see the birth of endeavours to sanctify revenge

under the name of *justice* (as though Justice were at bottom merely a development of the consciousness of injury) and thus with the rehabilitation of revenge to reinstate generally and collectively all the *reactive* emotions (p. 84).

Perhaps the most important of the three Essays of which this book (XIII) is made up is the third and last: "What is the meaning of Ascetic Ideals?" From a curiously interesting discussion of philosophers as shuddering mortally at *marriage* (p. 135) we pass to the analysis of a typically astounding Nietzschean aphorism:

The ascetic ideal springs from the prophylactic and self-preservative instincts which mark a decadent life, which seeks by every means in its power to maintain its position and fight for its existence; . . . the ascetic ideal is a dodge for the preservation of life.

Criticism of these sentences, to be adequate, would itself require volumes and a Nietzschean intellect. But Nietzsche goes on:

An important fact is brought out in the extent to which, as history teaches, this ideal could rule and exercise power over man, especially in all those places where the civilisation and taming of man was completed . . . the diseased state of man up to the present, at any rate of the man who has been tamed. . . .

The ascetic priest is the incarnate wish for an existence of another kind, an existence on another plane . . . but it is the very *power* of this wish which is the fetter that binds him here; . . . it is with this very *power* that he keeps the whole herd of failures, distortions, abortions, unfortunates, *sufferers from themselves* of every kind, fast to existence, while he as the herdsman goes instinctively on in front (pp. 154-5).

It is the truth and cogency inherent in this analysis that makes me distrust so profoundly the attempts of Catholic dialecticians to comprise Individual Psychology within the ambit of their own philosophies. It seems, indeed, as if the herdsman, having found that the flock is deserting him for another leader, bustles

about telling those anxious to say "Yea" to Life, that he, Codlin, is the friend and *not* Short!

And now Nietzsche bursts into his bitter diatribe against "sickliness in man," declaring that "the higher honour should be paid to the rare cases of psychical and physical powerfulness, the *windfalls* of humanity."

For, "the sick are the greatest danger to the healthy; it is not from the strongest that harm comes to the strong, but from the weakest" (p. 156).

Nietzsche continues to harp on the notion that the *sick* are the great danger of man, *not* the evil, *not* the "beasts of prey," but proceeds now in terms which will command the assent of the Individual Psychologist.

The sick man's will to represent *some* form or other of superiority, his instinct for crooked paths, which lead to a tyranny over the healthy—where can it not be found, this will to power of the very weakest? The sick woman especially: no one surpasses her in refinements for ruling, oppressing, tyrannising. The sick woman, moreover, spares nothing living, nothing dead; she grubs up again the most buried things. Look into the background of every family, of everybody, of every community; everywhere the fight of the sick against the healthy.

But Nietzsche does not reserve the vials of his wrath merely for the sick tyrant of every family. He has much to say that is not without topical application concerning the "men of resentment" who, in the Germany of *his* day, he found to be "physiological distortions and worm-riddled objects, a whole quivering kingdom of burrowing revenge indefatigable and insatiable in its outbursts against the happy, and equally so in disguises for revenge, in pretexts for revenge . . ." (p. 160).

If, says Nietzsche, we have understood in all their depths the reasons for the impossibility of its being the business of the healthy to nurse the sick, to make the

sick healthy, it follows that we have grasped this further necessity—the necessity for doctors and nurses *who themselves are sick*.

And now we have and hold with both our hands the essence of the ascetic priest . . . the *lordship over sufferers* is his kingdom, to that points his instinct, in that he finds his own special art, his master-skill, his kind of happiness. . . . If you wish to comprise in the shortest formula the value of the priestly life, it would be correct to say that the priest is the *diverter of the course of resentment*.

Surely New Psychologist is, in this sense, but Old Priest writ large! But again:

Every sufferer, in fact, searches instinctively for a cause of his suffering . . . something living, on which . . . he can on any pretext vent his emotions. For the venting of emotions is the sufferer's . . . mechanically desired narcotic against pain of any kind. It is in this phenomenon alone that is found . . . the real physiological cause of resentment, revenge, and their family . . . that is, in a demand for the *deadening of pain through emotion*: this cause is . . . very erroneously, looked for in . . . a "reflex movement" in the case of any sudden hurt and danger . . . but the difference is fundamental.

It is not necessary to insist that here Nietzsche underlines the difference between the old mechanistic psychology and that New Psychology which finds the mainspring of action in *Purpose*. He continues:

"It must be somebody's fault that I feel bad"—this kind of reasoning is peculiar to all invalids and is but the more pronounced, the more ignorant they remain of the real cause of their feeling bad, the physiological cause (the cause may lie in a disease of the *nervus sympathicus*, or in an excessive secretion of bile, or in a want of sulphate and phosphate of potash in the blood, or in pressure in the bowels which stops the circulation of the blood, or in degeneration of the ovaries, and so forth). All sufferers have an awful resourcefulness and ingenuity in finding excuses for painful emotions; they even enjoy their jealousy, their broodings over base actions and apparent injuries, they burrow through the intestines of their past and present in their search for obscure mysteries, wherein they

will be at liberty to wallow in a torturing suspicion and get drunk on the venom of their own malice—they tear open the oldest wounds, they make themselves bleed from the scars which have long been healed, they make evil-doers out of friends, wife, child, and everything which is nearest to them. “I suffer: it must be somebody’s fault”—so thinks every sick sheep. But his herdsman, the ascetic priest, says to him, “Quite so, my sheep, it must be the fault of someone; but thou thyself art that someone, it is all the fault of thyself alone—it is the fault of thyself alone against thyself”: that is bold enough, false enough, but one thing is at least attained; thereby, as I have said, the course of resentment is—*diverted* (pp. 164-5).

In succeeding passages Nietzsche develops what he calls “an hypothesis which . . . does not require to be proved”—so far, he says, as such readers as he wants are concerned. This is:

. . . the hypothesis that “sinfulness” in man is not an actual fact, but rather merely the interpretation of a fact, of a physiological discomfort—a discomfort seen through a moral religious perspective which is no longer binding upon us. The fact, therefore, that any one feels “guilty,” “sinful,” is certainly not yet any proof that he is right in feeling so, any more than any one is healthy simply because he feels healthy (pp. 166-67).

Few Individual Psychologists, I fancy, will quarrel with this manner of dealing with the so troublesome “sense of guilt.” But it brings us abruptly in conflict with what Allers (*The New Psychologies*, p. 76) has to say in his effort to wrest Individual Psychology to the service of his Church! To continue:

I do not for a minute accept the very “pain in the soul” as a real fact, but only as an explanation (a casual explanation) of facts that could not hitherto be precisely formulated; I regard it therefore as something as yet absolutely in the air and devoid of scientific cogency—just a nice fat word in the place of a lean note of interrogation. When any one fails to get rid of his “pain in the soul,” the cause is, speaking crudely, to be found *not* in his “soul” but more probably in his stomach (speaking crudely, I repeat, but by no means wishing thereby that you should listen to me or understand me in a crude spirit). A strong well-constituted man digests his experiences

(deeds and misdeeds all included) just as he digests his meats, even when he has some tough morsels to swallow. If he fails to "relieve himself" of an experience, this kind of indigestion is quite as much physiological as the other indigestion—and indeed, in more ways than one, simply one of the results of the other. You can adopt such a theory, and yet *entre nous* be nevertheless the strongest opponent of all materialism (p. 167).

Surely we find here, though set out in the Nietzschean manner, many of the considerations most relevant to the twin-doctrines of the psychosomatic unity and of organ-jargon.

On page 169, Nietzsche poses the question, whether this ascetic priest of whom he has spoken is really a *physician*, declaring that our most radical objection to "priestly medication" derives from the fact that the priest combats only the actual suffering or discomfort of the sufferer and not either its cause or the actual state of sickness. In other words—and we shall not disagree—the psychologist *as priest* treats merely symptoms: as physician, he must be concerned with origins.

Elaborating the notion that a *sense of physiological depression* such as prevails from time to time among large masses of the population can only be understood and relieved through the medium of psychology, Nietzsche recurs to the suggestion that very much of psychological and anthropological importance is to be explained in terms of the "crossing of two heterogeneous races."

Of tremendous importance to the Individual Psychologist is what Nietzsche says on pages 174 to 177. He declares that a suffering existence can be considerably alleviated by what is called to-day the "blessing of work"—a title which, oddly enough, he stigmatises as "somewhat ignoble."

An even more popular means of fighting depression is the ordaining of a *little joy*. . . . The most frequent form in which joy is prescribed as a cure is the joy in *producing* joy (such as

doing good, giving presents, alleviating, helping, exhorting, comforting, praising, treating with distinction); together with the prescription of "love your neighbour." The ascetic priest prescribes, though in the most cautious doses, what is practically a stimulation of the strongest and most life-assertive impulse—the Will for Power. The happiness involved in the "smallest superiority" which is the concomitant of all benefiting, helping, extolling, making oneself useful, is the most ample consolation of which, if they are well advised, physiological distortions avail themselves: in other cases they hurt each other and naturally in obedience to the same radical instinct. An investigation of the origin of Christianity in the Roman world shows that co-operative unions for poverty, sickness and burial sprang up in the lowest stratum of contemporary society, amid which the chief antidote against depression, the little joy experienced in mutual benefits was deliberately fostered. . . . This conjuring up of the will for co-operation, family organisation, for commercial life, for "*Coenacula*," necessarily brought the Will for Power, which had been already infinitesimally stimulated to a new and much fuller manifestation. The herd organisation is a genuine advance and triumph in the fight with depression. With the growth of the community there matures even to individuals a new interest, which often enough takes him out of the more personal element in his discontent, his aversion to himself, the "*despectus sui*" of Geulincx.

All sick and diseased people strive instinctively after a herd-organisation, out of a desire to shake off their sense of oppressive discomfort and weakness . . . by an equally natural necessity the strong strive as much for *isolation* as the weak for *union*: when the former bind themselves it is only with a view to . . . joint satisfaction of their Will for Power, much against the wishes of their individual consciences. . . . There is always lurking beneath every oligarchy . . . the desire for tyranny. Every oligarchy is continually quivering with the tension of the effort required by each individual to keep mastering this desire.

The last sentence seems to me to reveal, in terms of Individual Psychology, a profound comprehension of and sympathy for those with whom Christianity always, and Individual Psychology very frequently, fails to display much charity—the strong and powerful.

But, while Nietzsche is undoubtedly sincere in

recommending the priestly building-up of the herd-organisation as a counter to herd-depression, he reserves his scathing denunciation for what he calls the "priestly medicine-mongering" in the service of projected emotional excess, unless this remedy is applied with a *good conscience*. The exploitation of the feeling of "*guilt*" and "*sin*" he compares to the application by mad doctors of penance-torture, contrition, and salvation-ecstasies.

In every body politic where the ascetic priest has established this treatment of the sick, disease has on every occasion spread with sinister speed throughout its length and breadth. What was always the "result"? A shattered nervous system, in addition to the existing malady, and this in the greatest as in the smallest, in the individuals, as in masses. Speaking generally, the ascetic ideal and its sublime-moral cult, this most ingenious, reckless, and perilous systematisation of all methods of emotional excess, is writ large in a dreadful and unforgettable fashion on the whole history of man, and unfortunately not only on history (pp. 185-6).

(XIV)

In the first volume of *The Will to Power* we have, says Mr. Ludovici, the first two books of what was to be Nietzsche's greatest theoretical and philosophical prose work. Undoubtedly, although *Zarathustra* is probably his most popular composition, *The Will to Power* is that by which he is chiefly characterised—I had almost said, stigmatised. I am, for the moment, not concerned with the second of the volumes bearing this title, which is, I think, in some respects more important than the first. This, indeed, seems to me, in not a few respects, unsatisfactory, and Mr. Ludovici himself, I fancy, realises its defects or limitations. Nevertheless, it is not without interest to us as Individual Psychologists, for, although the popular interpretation would assign it values which are antipathetic to Individual Psychology, I am convinced that

adequate critical investigation would show how much there is in common between Nietzsche's teaching, as therein set out, and the stronger tones of Adler's message.

However, to justify this judgment would require a patient and prolonged examination for which the present is no occasion. I therefore confine myself to the indication of certain passages which will prove interesting to Individual Psychologists even though at first sight they appear refractory to some of our conclusions.

An important point of view with which we will not disagree is set out on pages 38 and 39: the first paragraph thereof contains *in petto* the doctrine of organ-inferiorities:

That which is inherited is not illness, but a *predisposition* to illness; a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external influences, etc., etc., broken powers of resistance; expressed morally; resignation and humility in the presence of the enemy.

So Nietzsche proceeds:

I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the highest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which have been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the *insane* and the *neurasthenic*: in a milder form, they present the same evils.

Health and *illness* are not essentially different, as the ancient doctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe to-day. They cannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight for the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense and mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of fact, there is only a difference of degree between these two living conditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the normal phenomena, constitute the morbid state.

After this much space is taken up with a dithyrambic glorification of *strength* and the exercise of the Will to

Power. Reconciliation of this with the Adlerian teachings, as I have hinted, is at first blush difficult. But the *continuum* between Adler and Nietzsche seems reaffirmed when we treat the sense of inferiority that Adler finds present, even to the newly-born babe, as a recognition of obstruction, hindrance, to that "discharge" of energy which (*vide supra*, p. 13) Nietzsche puts *before* "self-preservation," "as the cardinal instinct of an organic being." If we all agree that the inferiority feeling arises from obstruction to the expression in action of the Will to Power, we are able to see the more clearly where Adler and Nietzsche differ as well as agree. Nietzsche, on the one hand, cries for a stronger and ever-stronger exercise by the individual of his Will to Power: Adler counsels, not so much social activity as a canalization of this Will to Power, but social co-operation as a source of that feeling of security put in peril by its frustration. I often think that we, as Individual Psychologists, might do well if, whilst always encouraging the weak to gain this security, we more boldly counselled the strong to aid the weak by the exercise, in the social interests, of their own frustrated strength. It seems to me that if, as I have elsewhere said, Greek and Roman society lost much—perhaps everything—through ignorance of the social value indwelling in the weak and imperfect, there is no reason why we, in following the Christian path and encouraging the despised and rejected, should at the same time deprive society of the social advantages to be gained by the right exercise of strength by the strong.

In this connection the "signs of increasing strength" (pp. 91 *et seq.*) are interesting. Thus, Nietzsche declares, in a phrase which seems to foreshadow the Adlerian "responses to trauma":

The same causes which tend to promote the belittling of men, also force the stronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness.

But Adler would not speak of the stronger and rarer individuals being forced upwards to greatness: he would say that those achieve greatness who make the stronger and more courageous response to injury or defect.

In "A Criticism of the Highest Values that have prevailed hitherto," the second book of this volume, almost at the outset, Nietzsche recurs to the absurdity of regarding mediæval "entities," in words which may be commended to barristers who defend shop-lifters as victims of "attack" by proclivities to appropriate other people's property!

Just as the illiterate man of to-day believes that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his mind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of his feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities are still unthinkingly postulated as causes; so, in a still more primitive age, the same phenomena were interpreted by man by means of personal entities (p. 113).

No psychologist has yet done so much as Adler—who, we know, does not "very much like causes"—to free medicine in general, and psychology in particular, from the mediæval belief in demonological or fictional entities *as causes*, which still persists, so strongly, amongst the upholders of ids, egos, super-egos, censors, Oedipus complexes, and the like. *Anything* for these psychologists save the imputation of personal responsibility to the individual!

We all know Adler's penetrating diagnosis of the criminal as not essentially a non-social individual but rather one who, having a "private" form of personal life, participates with others of the same predicament in a "private" social life, having its own rules, conventions, and loyalties. It is, therefore, intensely interesting to find that Nietzsche makes a similar diagnosis—in form, that is—of the Christian whose "kingdom is not of this world":

Christianity is possible as the *most private* form of life; it presupposes the existence of a narrow, isolated, and absolutely unpolitical society (p. 175).

In recognising, as I think we must, the analogy—or rather, perhaps, the general, as opposed to the special, identity in diagnosis—involved in the comparison between Adler's statement of the private life of the criminal and Nietzsche's statement of the private life of the Christian, no moral or ethical judgment is, of course, intended; but it should be made clear that when Nietzsche speaks of Christianity, he implies the pure teaching of Christ and His immediate disciples—in this context, at least. Thus, he is logical when he says that:

. . . a "Christian *state*," "Christian politics," are pieces of downright impudence; they are lies like, for instance, a Christian leadership of an army, which in the end regards "the God of hosts" as chief of the staff.

The fact is that, whether we like it or not, acceptance of the Christianity of Jesus Christ *is* incompatible with co-operation in the affairs of this world. It is, therefore, just as truly a private form of life, a retreat from co-operation in organised society, as according to Dr. Crichton Miller, is suicide "Man's retreat from life."! But whether or not it should therefore be considered a neurosis, is a topic on which I will not enlarge at this moment. It is, however, an interesting observation that we can trace instructive parallels between forms of religion (or, of religious observance) and forms of psychosis. Ritual, for example, has its "pathological double" in compulsive neurosis, while the devout schizoid finds his appropriate conventicle amongst those of the more fissiparous and solipsistic sects.

A few pages later, Nietzsche has much to say concerning "remorse and its purely psychical treatment." But, when he speaks of the purely psychical

treatment of remorse, he has in mind, as he says, "the purely psychological and religious practices, which have existed hitherto," and which "only led to an *alteration in the symptoms*": it is fair to say that he had no inkling of psychotherapy in the modern, or, at any rate, Individual Psychological sense. However:

The whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a physiological basis: the "sting of conscience" as such is an obstacle in the way of recovery—as soon as possible the attempt must be made to counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there may be an escape from the morbidity of *self-torture*. . . . The purely psychical practices of the Church and of the various sects should be decried as dangerous to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers or by the exorcising of evil spirits: the states of "repose" which follow upon such methods of treatment, by no means inspire confidence, in the psychological sense. . . . (p. 191).

An interesting point—not without bearing on such speculations as have been made by Wexberg and others concerning the social and political organisation or *symbiosis*, likely to emerge when Individual Psychology in its sociological aspects becomes widely diffused—is made in the following passage:

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious nature and then begins to feel at ease (p. 236).

The answer which, as Individual Psychologist, I would make to the implications contained in these

words, is: Granted that difficulty, inferiority, and "disadvantage" are the forcing-bed of genius, it will nevertheless be long before the variations in humanity due to the operation of biological factors will be so flattened out as to reduce mankind to the dead level of comfortable mediocrity postulated by Nietzsche. Before ever that desirable or undesirable consummation be reached, we will have to reckon with the incalculable and catastrophic interventions of Nature which will either *prevent* its attainment or destroy it *if* attained!

On the other hand, what could be less compatible with the popular notion of Nietzsche's sociology and what more gratifying to the Individual Psychologist than the considerations involved in what Nietzsche now says (p. 323) concerning what might happen were the *strong* "masters in all respects"?

. . . let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! *Self-contempt on the part of the weak* would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be *desirable?*—should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the plasticity—in fact, the whole influence of the weak—was lacking? . . .

Mr. Ludovici comments on this, in a footnote, that Nietzsche did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. "What he wished to resist and to overthrow *was their supremacy, their excessive power.*" Perhaps we may say that Individual Psychology seeks to overthrow the tyranny and excessive power of the weak by converting their activities to social rather than personal ends, and so destroying their *neurosis*.

The volume virtually closes with a few words of advice to psychologists and philosophers:

Concerning the psychology of *philosophers*. They should be psychologists—this was possible only from the nineteenth

century onwards—and no longer Little Jack Horners, who see three or four feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on self-contemplation . . . we are instruments of knowledge . . . we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their own navels (p. 344).

Do not the psychologists who—whether Individual Psychologists or not—continuously “contemplate their own navels,” all end by producing a psychology which may *explain*, but is calculated to *excuse*, their own aloofness from worthier objects of contemplation?

(XV)

In the second volume of *The Will to Power*, as Mr. Ludovici says, Nietzsche boldly carries his principle still further into the various departments of human life, and does not shrink from showing its application even to science, to art, and to metaphysics, going to great pains to impress upon us that science is as arbitrary as art in its procedure, and that the knowledge of the scientist is but the outcome of his inexorable Will to Power interpreting facts in terms of the self-preservative conditions of the order of human beings to which he belongs. Mr. Ludovici adds that, in aphorisms 515 and 516 (pp. 29-33) which are typical of almost all the thought expressed in Part I, Nietzsche says distinctly: “The object is not ‘to know’, but to schematise—to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require.” He further stresses Nietzsche’s frank declaration that the criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power (p. 49), and quotes with approval Nietzsche’s views concerning the belief in “cause and effect” (pp. vii-xix).

“The so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar.”

I have already referred to Nietzsche's foreshadowings, in *The Genealogy of Morals* and elsewhere, of his developed views in this respect, but shall have more to say about them hereafter. As may be gathered from what has been just said, this volume (XV) is, to all who are Individual Psychologists, of cardinal importance, particularly in so far as the destruction of metaphysical fictions is concerned. Thus:

Causality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal relation between thoughts, as logic does, is the result of the coarsest and most clumsy observation (p. 7).

This aphorism must be read in connection with the series directed "Against Causality" on pages 53 to 62, already referred to, but from which further citation must be made.

We have absolutely no experience concerning *cause*; viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept from the subjective conviction, that *we* ourselves are causes—that is to say, that the arm moves. . . . *But that is an error.* . . . What have we done? . . . In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and our design to do an action: *causa efficiens* and *causa finalis* are fundamentally one.

But this *is* our thesis: that the *causa finalis* and that alone is the *causa efficiens*. To read on:

There is no such thing as *a sense of causality*, as Kant would have us believe . . . the so-called instinct of causality . . . is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.

Returning to page 11, we find wonderful discrimination between the two great fashions of regarding disease: (i) the oriental (and Adlerian), which regards illness as a falling away, a declension of or subtraction from the individual, for which the individual is responsible; and (ii) the occidental, and more popular (so far as this country is concerned)

which sees in disease an "attack" by a demonological or nosological "entity":

For instance, "I feel unwell"—a judgment of this sort presupposes a *very great and recent neutrality on the part of the observer*: the simple man always says, "This and that make me feel unwell."

Nietzsche proceeds with his onslaught against fictive entities:

There are no such things as "mind," reason, thought, consciousness, soul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no purpose.

But perhaps Nietzsche here goes farther than Individual Psychologists can follow him. Vaihinger and others, since the time of Jeremy Bentham—as Mr. C. K. Ogden has shown us—have amply demonstrated the value of fictions, provided that they remain our instruments and do not master us.

I have often thought how delightful it would be to listen to Dr. Adler's exposition of a very remarkable passage written, it is true, with reference not to human beings but to "subjects" in thought, Nietzsche declaring that the assumption of a *single subject* is perhaps not necessary and that it may be permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our consciousness in general:

A sort of *aristocracy* of "cells" in which the ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are accustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command? (p. 18).

We all know well Adler's aphorism that the neurotic is content with the *semblance* of things, but Prinzhorn's declaration, that psychopathics are those to whom error is a necessity of life, is less well known. Both seem to me to have been anticipated by Nietzsche:

Truth is that kind of error without which a certain species of living being cannot exist. The value for Life is ultimately decisive (p. 20).

But Nietzsche's statement conveys the truth inversely, of course.

A primary proposition of Individual Psychology is implicit in Nietzsche's affirmation (p. 28) that "logic is bound up with the proviso: granted *that identical cases exist.*"

That is our case for speaking of Individual Psychology and discarding Logic! Identical cases do *not* exist, save fictively!

The discussion of "Consciousness" (pp. 20-24 and 38-43) is full of interest:

There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "*Substance*" is utterly useless as a means of explanation.

It is essential that we should not mistake the part that "consciousness" plays: it is our *relation to the outer world; it was the outer world that developed it.*

We say, of course, that the prototype begins its formation from the moment that conscious choice develops. But conscious choice develops *pari passu* with the recognition by the child of the distinction between himself and the world around him—a process which does not, if ever, attain completion until after puberty and the achievement of adult biological independence.

A great deal that is in common with Individual Psychology and the views of Blondel, is well set out in this passage:

On the other hand, the *direction*—that is to say, the care and cautiousness which is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does *not* enter into our consciousness any more than does the *storing activity* of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling force at work in these things cannot be

doubted—a sort of directing committee, in which the various *leading desires* make their votes and their power felt. “Pleasure” and “pain” are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are also *acts of will* and *ideas* (p. 39).

And again:

Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions—that is to say, they consist of assimilation, rejection, growth, etc.

The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the general clue (p. 47).

But these are the conclusions arrived at by, and the method adopted in, the study of Organ-Jargon!

On page 114, Nietzsche returns to the subject of causality in a phrase which we will accept implicitly:

. . . the psychological necessity of believing in causality lies in the impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose. . . . The belief in *causae* collapses with the belief in *τέλη* (against Spinoza and his causationism).

This, too, is important:

What is ultimately “useful”? It is necessary to ask, “Useful for what?”

For instance, that which promotes the *lasting powers* of the individual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable throughout development. On the other hand, a *deficiency*, a state of *degeneration*, may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a *state of need* may be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual to that modicum of means which, though it *keeps him together*, does not allow him to squander his strength. The individual himself is the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development involves the *triumph*, the *predominance*, of isolated parts; the *wasting away*, or the “development into organs,” of other parts.

The influence of “environment” is nonsensically *overrated* in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely *uses, exploits* “environment.”

The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not exist long *without* becoming related to some kind of semi-utility and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly (pp. 126-7).

The approximation to Lamarckism is here obvious enough, and the importance of these sentences to the understanding of *Organ Inferiority and its Psychological Compensation* cannot be ignored.

On page 128, Nietzsche repeats with little variation the aphorism already referred to (*vide supra*, p. 39) as given in *Beyond Good and Evil* (XII, 20), saying, in this place, that "self-preservation" is only one of the results of the desire of the living thing to discharge its strength. A few pages further on, he criticises *Will* itself, asking if it is not an illusion to regard that which enters consciousness as will-power as a cause, and proceeds to develop this view in a discussion of free will, terminating by the dictum that the "objective value" is measured according to the quantity of *increased and more organised power* alone (p. 146). This dictum, it seems to me, calls for our very careful consideration. The phrase "objective value" here refers to the *value* of existence. If we interpret Will to Power as Will to Do, and not as Will to Dominate—a suggestion which we owe to Mr. W. T. Symons—we may, I think, find it not unacceptable (*Purpose*, IV, 4, p. 148).

We now come to two very important pronouncements of extreme pedagogic and sociological importance, to which I fancy all Individual Psychologists will assent:

The effect of prohibition.—Every power which forbids and which knows how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience. (That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the danger of gratifying it, and is consequently forced to be secretive, underhand, and cautious.) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the character of those who do not willingly submit themselves to it, but are constrained thereto.

"Punishment and reward."—These two things stand or fall together. Nowadays no one will accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority should have the power to punish. We have a desire: it meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most easily obtain it by coming to some agreement—by drawing up a contract. In modern society where every one has given his assent to a certain contract, the criminal is a man who breaks that contract. . . . Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system (pp. 196-7).

But when we read what Nietzsche has to say concerning "The Morphology of the Feelings of Self," it is less easy for the Individual Psychologist to follow him. Thus, Nietzsche asks:

To what extent are *sympathy* or *communal feelings*, the lower or preparatory states, at a time when personal self-esteem and initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals, are not yet possible? (p. 217).

Nietzsche does not, I think, categorically answer this question in the affirmative but, so far as he does by implication, it must be admitted that Individual Psychology departs from the path he makes. True, in succeeding paragraphs he gives an admirable analysis of "disguised forms of Will to Power" which we may accept, but in the second of them at least there seems to me to be concealed a disguised distrust of any alleged sincerity in the exercise of communal feeling. The three "disguised forms of Will to Power" with which Nietzsche so deals are thus set out by him:

(1) *The desire for freedom*, for independence, for equilibrium, for peace, for *co-ordination*. Also that of the anchorite, the "Free Spirit." In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs—the instinct of self-preservation.

(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of a whole community; submissiveness, the making of one's self indispensable and useful to him who has the power; love, a secret path to the heart of the powerful, in order to become his master.

(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary comfort of belonging to a higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power; the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even the more powerful; self-depreciation; the discovery of new *codes of morality* (of which the Jews are a classical example) (pp. 218-9).

And again, "Concerning the Machiavellism of Power":

The will to power appears:

(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will to "*freedom*": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to be an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc., etc.).

(b) In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the "will to justice"—that is to say, to the will to the same measure of rights as the ruling caste possesses.

(c) In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the people," of the "gospel," of "truth," of "God," of "pity," of "self-sacrifice," etc., etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts to give a direction; the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category; it will overpower something, possess it utterly, and it looks like self-abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's instrument, of one's "horse"—the conviction that things belong to one because one is in a position to use them.)

"Freedom," "Justice," "Love"! ! ! (pp. 220-21).

The idea of health as the active functional unity of the organism, is hardly concealed in Nietzsche's note on the *dominating passion* which, he says:

. . . may even bring the supremest form of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal system and its functions to perform one task is best attained—but this is almost a definition of health (p. 222).

Two very pointed shafts are these:

The individual is an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its high degree of its susceptibility to pain, demands that everyone should be made equal; that the individual should only stand *inter pares* (p. 225).

People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is obtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for it), then "justice," i.e. "equality of power" becomes the object of desire (p. 229).

In "The Will to Power in Art," we find, on page 250, an aphorism which Nietzsche has repeated in several forms:

Has a beautiful woman, who knew she was well-dressed, ever caught cold? Never yet on this earth! I even suppose a case in which she has scarcely a rag on her.

Much in the later portion of this volume (XV) falls, I think, below the level of earlier chapters, but one or two flashes of insight attract our attention. Thus:

. . . the value of man *can only be measured with regard to other men.* (p. 315).

And on page 339 we are given the "masculine ideal" in a nutshell:

A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous?"—but he immediately becomes eager if he be asked: "Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?"

In this we have, indeed, the very kernel of the Will to Power, to which the second section of the Fourth Book—"Dionysus"—appears a little unrelated, though full of interest as Nietzsche's amplest exposition of the Dionysian outlook (pp. 388-421).

But the Book concludes with a brief essay on the

“Eternal Recurrence” from which I take only the last sentences:

This world is the Will to Power—and nothing else! And even ye yourselves are this will to power—and nothing besides!

Nevertheless, Individual Psychology has something more to say!

(XVI)

The Twilight of the Idols (as this volume is known) is made up for the greater part of two separate works; one, eponymous, consisting of disconnected aphorisms and short statements; while the second—“The Antichrist”—is, as all the world knows, in effect Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity. But there are two appendices. In the first of these—“The Eternal Recurrence”—Nietzsche, as he says, expounds and substantiates this doctrine in notes which, according to Frau Förster-Nietzsche, were the first which he ever wrote on this subject. The second appendix is composed of explanatory notes to *Zarathustra*. With these appendices we have nothing here to do, nor need “The Antichrist” concern us greatly. But some of the Maxims and Missiles with which *The Twilight of the Idols* itself opens are worth notice. Number 25, on page 3, is a variation on the theme that “Contentment preserves one even from catching cold” (*vide supra* p. 65). Number 26, I fancy, cannot be wholly displeasing to Dr. Adler:

I distrust all systematisers, and avoid them. The will to a system shows a lack of honesty (p. 5).

Perhaps Nietzsche’s real views concerning women, in despite of popular judgment, are well shown by Numbers 27 and 28:

Man thinks woman profound—why? Because he can never fathom her depths. Woman is not even shallow.

When woman possesses masculine virtues, she is enough to make you run away. When she possesses no masculine virtues she herself runs away.

But the last Maxim of all—Number 44—brings us to the definite assertion of the life-line, in these words:

The formula of my happiness: A Yea, a Nay, a straight line, a *goal* . . .

In "The Four Great Errors" (pp. 33-43), Nietzsche returns, with sharpened blade, to the error of False Causality:

In all ages men have believed that they knew what a cause was: but whence did we derive this knowledge, or more accurately, this faith in the fact that we know? . . . We believed ourselves to be causes even in the action of the will; we thought that in this matter at least we caught causality red-handed. . . . To trace something unfamiliar back to something familiar, is at once a relief, a comfort, and a satisfaction, whilst it also produces a feeling of power.

Wherever men try to trace responsibility home to anyone it is the instinct of punishment and of the desire to judge which is active. . . .

In "Skirmishes in a War with the Age" (pp. 94-6) Nietzsche elaborates his concept of freedom in relation to Will in a fashion that I think we must accept. He says:

What in sooth is freedom? Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves.

And he goes on, in words which are not without relevance to-day:

The nations which were worth anything, which *got to be* worth anything, never attained to that condition under liberal institutions: *great danger* made out of them something which

deserves reverence, that danger which alone can make us aware of our resources, our virtues, our means of defence, our weapons, our *genius*—which *compels* us to be strong. *First principle*: A man must need to be strong, otherwise he will never attain it.

Concerning “The criminal and his like” we read, in this connection, on page 103:

The criminal type is the type of the strong man amid unfavourable conditions, a strong man made sick. . . . Society puts a ban upon his virtues. . . .

We remember Adler’s insistent claim for the criminal, as a not asocial individual but one who has a private code and respects a private society!

(XVII)

Ecce Homo is the last prose work that Nietzsche wrote. Herein, says Mr. Ludovici, he bids his friends farewell, as if half-conscious of his approaching spiritual end, just in the manner in which, in *The Twilight of the Idols*, he declares that everyone should take leave when his time seems to have come—that is to say, while he is still himself. But Mr. Ludovici’s *Introduction* should be read in full by those who wish to understand “the form and content of this wonderful work.” For truly it is a wonderful work, the meaning of which completely evades those who only see in it the foreshadowing of the megalomania of dementia paralytica.

In his *Preface* Nietzsche speaks with pride of his life work, declaring that in it *Zarathustra* holds a place apart, and that in this book it is no “prophet” who speaks, not one of “those gruesome hybrids of sickness and Will to Power, whom men call founders of religions.”

But, for us, the greatest interest lies in a relatively small number of passages of enormous significance

Thus, in a few lines in "Why I am so Wise," we have the gist of the Individual Psychologist's teaching on certain points.

Now, by what signs are nature's lucky strokes recognised among men? They are recognised by the fact that any such lucky stroke gladdens our senses; that he is carved from one integral block, which is hard, sweet, and fragrant as well. He enjoys that only which is good for him; his pleasure, his desire, ceases when the limits of that which is good for him are overstepped. He divines remedies for injuries; he knows how to turn serious accidents to his own advantage; that which does not kill him makes him stronger.

As I was born on the 15th of October . . . I naturally received the Hohenzollern names of Frederick William. There was at all events one advantage in the choice of this day: my birthday throughout the whole of my childhood was a day of public rejoicing (pp. 13, 15).

(The Frederick William here mentioned was the Prussian King Frederick William the Fourth, from whom Nietzsche's father obtained his living at Röcken. Nietzsche says, concerning his father: I regard it as a great privilege to have had such a father; it even seems to me that this embraces all that I can claim in the matter of privileges—life, the great Yea to life excepted.)

The relation between emotional feeling—and resentment in particular—and physical ill-health is admirably indicated in a few crisp lines:

Those who keep silent are almost always lacking in subtlety and refinement of heart; silence is an objection, to swallow a grievance must necessarily produce a bad temper—it even upsets the stomach. All silent people are dyspeptic. . . . Freedom from resentment and the understanding of the nature of resentment—who knows how very much after all I am indebted to my long illness for these two things? . . . To be ill is a sort of resentment in itself. . . . And nothing on earth consumes a man more quickly than the passion of resentment. . . . It involves a rapid wasting away of nervous energy, an abnormal increase of detrimental secretions, as,

for instance, that of bile into the stomach. To the sick man resentment ought to be more strictly forbidden than anything else—it is *his* special danger: unfortunately, however, it is also his most natural propensity. This was fully grasped by that profound physiologist Buddha. “Not through hostility is hostility put to flight; through friendship does hostility end”; this stands at the beginning of Buddha’s teaching—this is not a precept of morality, but of physiology (pp. 19-21).

Here are a few more indications as to my morality. A heavy meal is digested more easily than an adequate one. The first principle of a good digestion is that the stomach should become active as a whole. A man ought, therefore, to know the size of his stomach. . . . All prejudices take their origin in the intestines. A sedentary life . . . is the real sin against the Holy Spirit (p. 32).

On page 65, Nietzsche deals with the psychology of the “eternally feminine”:

Woman is incalculably more wicked than man, she is also cleverer. Goodness in a woman is already a sign of *degeneration*. All cases of “beautiful souls” in women may be traced to a faulty physiological condition—but I go no further, lest I become medicynical. The struggle for equal rights is even a symptom of disease; every doctor knows this. The more womanly a woman is, the more she fights tooth and nail against rights in general: the natural order of things, the eternal war between the sexes, assigns to her by far the foremost rank. Have people had ears to hear my definition of love? It is the only definition worthy of a philosopher. Love, in its means, is war; in its foundation it is the mortal hatred of the sexes (p. 65).

In these words we have perhaps the germ of an idea expressed by D. H. Lawrence in lines which I have already quoted (*vide supra*, p. 33).

On the succeeding page Nietzsche reveals, as he says, one more clause out of his moral code against vice; by the word “vice” intending every kind of opposition to Nature:

The clause reads: “Preaching of chastity is a public incitement to unnatural practices. All depreciation of the sexual

life, all the sullyng of it by means of the concept 'impure,' is the essential crime against life. . . ."

This passage is to be collated with another on page 140, where Nietzsche again denounces those whose aim seems to be:

To teach the contempt of all the principal instincts of life; to posit falsely the existence of a "soul," of a "spirit," in order to be able to defy the body; to spread the feeling that there is something impure in the very first pre-requisite of life—in sex. . . .

If *Ecce Homo* be held to contain, as I think it does, the quintessence, not only of Nietzsche's teaching but of all psychology, we cannot deny supreme significance to the sentences with which Nietzsche opens his last and terrible chapter: "Why I am a Fatality."

I know my destiny. There will come a day when my name will recall the memory of something formidable, a crisis the like of which has never been known on earth, the memory of the most profound clash of consciences, and the passing of a sentence upon all that which theretofore had been believed, exacted, and hallowed. I am not a man, I am dynamite (p. 131).

This, to-day, even in popular esteem, is far less extravagant than it seemed to all but very few when written forty-five years ago. Nietzsche *was* dynamite: he thunderously broke down the glacial barriers to the free flow of human thought and vital activity that had so long been unassailed and deemed unassailable. So great an upheaval could not be without reverberations and even catastrophe. But the barriers *have* broken down, and Individual Psychology is, to humanity, not the least important of the many fertilising streams that have been released. Can any answer but an affirmation be given to the magnificent claim which Nietzsche makes before he lays down his pen?

Was a single one of the philosophers who preceded me a psychologist at all, and not the very reverse of a psychologist—that is to say, a “superior swindler,” an “Idealist”? Before my time there was no psychology.

True, *we say*, Nietzsche failed in his own life, as that comparable figure, D. H. Lawrence, failed in his. But if Prometheus, bringing fire from heaven, were not chained to the rock, and no eagle daily devoured his liver, he would be, not Prometheus, but a mere lamplighter.

So far I have strung hard, brilliant crystals of Nietzsche's thought on my tenuous thread: I make no pretence to have given an analysis of his psychology; but I do claim to have demonstrated the debt of Individual Psychology to Nietzsche, or, at least, that there is such a debt. I am far from suggesting that all Individual Psychology is to be found, even in embryo, in Nietzsche's writings; and in them we miss very much which we rightly claim as Adler's positive contribution to world-thought. Nor do I suggest that the debt of Individual Psychology to Nietzsche is one that has been in any sense consciously incurred. To impute this would be to betray our own conceptions!

No; Adler and Nietzsche constitute a sequence in becoming, even as dawn follows night, and day dawn, a sequence in the phantasmagoria of life. We recognize a *continuum*, profound though be the differences between the Nietzschean and the Adlerian Messages. A mountain range is none the less one by reason of the bottomless chasms that divide the several peaks!

It is said that Einstein has declared Adler to play the rôle of Sancho Panza to Freud's Don Quixote:

we forgive the apparent flippancy for the sake of the truth that the epigram conveys, for in Adler we see the commonsense philosopher with warm social feeling, who makes the world a not altogether unfriendly place even for schizoid tilters-at-windmills who have windmills in their heads!

But there is possibly another lesson to be learned from the relation in difference between Adler and Nietzsche. I have so far purposely avoided discussion of the Nietzschean *crux*, summarised in what is actually the last line of the last chapter of Nietzsche's last book: *Ecce Homo*. It is this:

Have you understood me? *Dionysus versus Christ*.

Now there are some—indeed, many—who see in Individual Psychology what I can only call, in the American manner, a kind of “debunked” Christianity, and I have heard thoughtful people say that the world has waited nearly two thousand years to learn from a Viennese Jew what Christ really wished to teach. I will not say whether or not I am prepared—or even willing—to give assent to this, but much in Nietzsche is recalled by the very remarkable poem, *For Herod feared John*, dedicated by Mr. Evan Morgan to Cardinal Gasquet:

A cry went forth through the Desert,
A cry like a sword of flame!
And wild and rugged and terrible the sun-scorched prophet
came;
Wild and rugged and hungry, he strode through the sand
and the sage,
Whilst his lips foamed white with fervour and his eyes burnt
black with rage;
His hair swung dank and matted as he reeled from famine
and prayer,
One gaunt arm raised in warning, one stretched out in
despair.

Straight as a withered palm-tree, as a giant against the
sky,

He roared to mankind of Repentance, crying the CHRIST was nigh!

But the CHRIST Nietzsche prophesied was the Superman, not the Individual Psychologist; and, in ZARATHUSTRA'S words:

THE MAN WHO REMAINETH A PUPIL REQUITETH HIS TEACHER
BUT ILL.

We may perhaps say that if Nietzsche glorified the strong for reasons of their strength, and despised the weak for their weaknesses, Roman Christianity inclined towards condemnation of the strong *because* of their strength and to exaltation of the weak *because* of their very weakness. Do we not sometimes see, in some Individual Psychologists, that the swing away from Nietzsche has gone far—perhaps too far? Do they not sometimes, in showing encouragement to the weak, actually *discourage* the exercise of the nobler qualities of mankind? The *leit-motif* of Individual Psychology is encouragement: but it seems to me that this finds its best expression in encouraging the weak, not merely because they are weak but because, in being weak, they have the opportunity to become strong. We need to encourage the strong in their strength, for the same reason that we would encourage the weak to gain strength: that is to say, that the strength gained may be used for the encouragement and strengthening of others.

This is the paradox (if it be a paradox) with which I would end—for I believe that there is no truth save in paradox and that *that* paradox is the greatest truth and paradox of all. Individual Psychology is paradoxical from beginning to end but, most of all, in its relation to Nietzsche! Called Individual Psychology—and rightly—it is nevertheless the first and best, if not the only, *social* psychology. Unsystematic, yet a system, and, because unsystematic, the only

system of psychology that will survive, it will, I believe, survive without recognition of its survival. Indeed, the extent to which it has already permeated contemporary thought is incredible to those who know it best, for they believe that its voice is even now as the voice of one crying in the wilderness.

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
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