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AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES

By C. DELISLE BURNS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTION

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF LABOUR

DEMOCRACY: ITS DEFECTS AND ADVANTAGES

AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES

By C. DELISLE BURNS

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PREFACE

THIS introduction is not intended for children. It assumes an adult acquaintance with the social problems which are commonly discussed among educated men and women, although it presupposes no knowledge of the details of any one social science. Its purpose is to review the life of man in society, so that this subject-matter of many sciences may be seen to be one whole before any special study is begun. It is a review of the whole field covered by the social sciences, not as a summary nor as a substitute for elementary text-books, but for the use of those who have no time nor inclination for a detailed study of any one section of social science. But it is also for the use of the student of any one social science, lest he may specialize so much as to forget the importance of other social sciences.

It is felt by many teachers of economics, for example, that some of those who study economics do not see its problems in their setting. The isolation of one aspect of social life is necessary for exact study, just as it may be necessary to study the heart first and the lungs afterwards in arriving at a knowledge of the body. But it would be dangerous to imply that one could know much about the heart if nothing were ever said about the lungs, and still more dangerous if the whole body were never considered. Economics is misleading in isolation from the study of political organization and cultural tradition.

This introduction is "philosophical" in implying a comprehensive view of the factors in experience which are studied separately in different social sciences. But it is not merely an addition of one social science to

another. The life of man in society is best seen as a whole when we are aware of the assumptions underlying its division into different aspects; but the study of the underlying assumptions of the sciences is a part of philosophy, and therefore this introduction is "philosophical" in a deeper sense. In the end, any study of social life would give some understanding of the nature of man and of his relation to the universe in which his life occurs.

If there are certain aspects of the life of man that even a skilled student in economics or political science finds it difficult to understand, he may nevertheless find it useful to remember that he does not understand. The chief defect of the social sciences at present seems to be the absence of any sense of their inadequacy, in the accumulation of statistics or the classification of facts. But an introduction cannot do more than serve as an awful warning to those who already think they know, while it encourages those who confess their ignorance by indicating that even those who are authorities on the subject are only beginners.

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C. DELISLE BURNS

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

I

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

THE life of man in society provides the subject-matter for many different sciences. It is analysed usually by reference to the kind of relation which connects men; and so, if men buy or sell one from the other, economics gives an account of the factors in such a relation; if a policeman directs traffic and the citizen obeys, political science explains government. But clearly no one of these relations between men is altogether independent of the others. Social life is the whole complex of human relations, and there is no man at all who is not thoroughly social. The fundamental fact of mental life is not the atomic but the related individual. No mind exists which is not in contact with other minds; and there is no mind whose fundamental characteristics are not social. What infinite mind could possibly be, only heaven or Hegel knows, for to add the adjective "infinite" to mind is to square the circle. The nature of man, therefore, may be discovered partly by the analysis and criticism of social life; and this analysis and criticism, not of distinct aspects, but of such life taken as a whole, is a section of philosophy. The purpose of social philosophy is to "place" the life of man in society as one among the many real facts which are included in "the world" or "the universe".

But it is not necessary, for the more restricted purpose here in view, to go as far as metaphysics would require. The characteristics of social life may be viewed philosophically without immediate reference to the world of nature or number or other realities within which social life appears; and since progress has recently been made in the study of social life and many general conclusions have been made, it will not be necessary to deal with the more obscure sections of the problem, where disagreement exists among authorities. A general view of social life can now be had without the apparatus of learning and for use in the practical affairs of every day. That, and not any obscure commentary upon unintelligible "authorities", is the best introduction to the social sciences.

We live in the age of faith in physical science. Men swallow easily the most fantastic generalizations if they are labelled "scientific"; and the more resolute of the scientists who venture into philosophy give an impression of certainty which would make a mediæval theologian blush. It is therefore necessary to note that social life is not in all its aspects a "natural" fact, like a mountain or a thunderstorm. The forms of social life at present under our eyes are not the result of inevitable process, but, in great part at least, the result of definite acts of choice made by particular men and groups of men. A purely naturalistic description of social life is quite inadequate. States and trade unions and schools and city-areas and manners, good or bad, are not the results of "natural law" in the usual sense of that phrase; but at least in part they are the results of acts of choice which might have been other than they were. If that is denied, morality and art are

inexplicable; but it is not possible to argue the case here. What has been said is intended to act as a statement of the assumption upon which rests the analysis now to be attempted. In the language of the philosophers, not facts only but values also must provide the material from which we are to make our study of social life. But this, in the language of common men, indicates that, as the facts of social life are the results of past acts of will, so the social life of the present may be transformed by new acts of will. Social life is amenable to human control. Human character, emotion, and intelligence can be made by human acts different from what they now are. The indications by which we steer our course in such a control over institutions and personalities are called "values"; but that only means what the common man refers to as good and beautiful. The consciousness of such factors in experience as the good in a good act or the beauty in a beautiful face—this consciousness is essential for the adequate study of social life. One may count heads irrespective of their contents for the purposes of statistics; but in social life the dreams of a man are more important than his digestion.

We may begin our study of social life anywhere. If your relatives are a nuisance, begin by considering why some persons are so indicated as to imply that the relation is more important than its terms. If you are "in love", begin by considering why the metaphor seems to imply that you fell into a morass. If you regard your business as philosophically of the least interest to anyone but yourself, begin by considering why you do the strange things you do for such inadequate reasons. All men are parts of families; and

therefore social scientists often begin at what we are pleased to call the accident of birth. But here the beginning will be made with those larger relationships which seem to be more amenable to conscious control than the sexual and the paternal. Eventually, the family and the circle of friends will have to be discussed. The purpose, however, in the whole of the argument is to discover the most general characteristics of the life of man in society; and it is where change is occurring under the control of human will that the life of a society can best be felt. There also the characteristics of human as distinct from animal society can best be seen, in the form most significant for our purpose.

But even for this very general view of social life it will be necessary first to take separate aspects of the whole landscape. If we suppose ourselves to stand sufficiently high upon the mountain of experience in order to see the subject-matter of economics, politics, and educational theory, we may still find it convenient to see them one at a time. Imagine, therefore, that on the philosophical mountain we turn so as to be able to take three general views of the landscape which is social life: the first of these three views will be a view of political organization.

Society and the State

The most obvious facts in this section of social life for most men are policemen, postmen, and the relations they express and embody. The less obvious but no less poignant facts are taxes; and in the far distance, seen through the mythology of journalism, which gives them

the limelight, are politicians who are pleased to be called statesmen, as majors prefer to be called generals and lecturers professors. The whole of the relations between men in a certain group, expressed in such officials and representatives, and in the peculiar act of paying taxes—the whole is the State. There are many such groups of men in such relationships, and there have been many more. The customs and functions performed by certain men in any such group are ancient; and a mist of reverence and muddled beliefs adorns them. There are in existence kings and generals; and such relations as paying taxes have a long history in earlier forms, for example, in the payment of tribute. But we must regard the State here as an accomplished fact. Its forms differ in different countries even at present; but the more ancient forms, on which Plato and Aristotle based their analysis, were quite unlike anything in the present world.

The first general statement to be made is that the State is not the whole of organized social life. It has connections, clearly, with the rest of social life; but trade unions and scientific societies, for example, are not parts of the State, nor subordinate in importance to the State. The State is one among many different kinds of relation between men—that one, namely, in which order and liberty are the chief purposes of the actions organized. But the State neither drops from heaven ready-made nor does it continue to exist without effort on the part of men; that is to say, a State is an "artificial" product of the creative moral imagination of certain men at certain times in certain places. The peculiar relationships between men, which make a given State, may be said to be the results of a will

"for the State"; but in this region of experience the language of the older psychology is certainly inadequate. Such phrases as "the will of the people" or "public opinion" express the mythology of the last century. Some sort of impulse or desire or instinctive exploration finds its satisfaction in the settlement of the relations of men in a certain order; but it is not often a case of "will" or "opinion".

Modern psychology has provided us with many illuminating suggestions applicable to political organization. It would be impolite, no doubt, to say that we never understood politicians until the study of lunacy had progressed to its present point; but clearly, some of the attitudes and explosive emotions in the life of the State can best be explained by reference to abnormalities in mental activities. Thus the origin of the State and its fundamental characteristics to-day are not to be explained by reference to rational calculation or "will", but rather by reference to vague reverence for the products of the mythological imagination, to instinctive fear, to the flight towards a refuge or protection, to the "flair" for influencing other men, which comes out in leadership, and to other such factors in mental or psychical experience. Thus, by selection, out of the whole mass of social relationships a certain set of relationships are organized in the establishment of authority or government. In general the whole group of men in relation called a State includes some having authority, and others, subject to these, who may in some cases be called citizens. The situation is more or less permanent, so long as the burdens involved are not greater than the benefits; but this situation is never "willed" nor

consciously designed, except when for a moment in a crisis a few have power to influence the rest by their own clear ideas or definite desires. In normal times the State is an unconscious habit, and it may be a bad habit. A State is not necessarily good, although the best of intentions—the purpose to have law and liberty—may maintain it. Philosophers in the past have tended to confound the good intentions which explain *the* State with the very bad acts which are to be found in any given State. Thus State-worship succeeded king-worship; and in our days the divine right of committees seems to be as orthodox as the divine right of kings once was. But on the other hand, it is not true that *the* State is "a cold monster", although some States are monstrous, considering the small benefit and the large cost which their maintenance involves. It must not be thought, however, that the balance of cost and benefit under any government is ever consciously worked out. The so-called "contract" theory, which implied that men agreed to maintain a State, was false not only as history, for there never was any such agreement, but also as to contemporary experience, for very few ever think that the sort of relationship enforced by government can be easily changed. The great majority, even of those who derive little benefit from law and order, assume that the law and order to which they are accustomed is "the nature of things", like the climate. Thus political relationships are the breeding-place for mythology. Personifications abound: England, France, Germany—these are names not only for countries or peoples, but for States. They stand for certain kinds of organized relationship between certain men, women, and children; and when

such a relationship, supported by "complexes" and fears and vague affections, is personified, a passionate devotion is avowed for a form of government. Mythological figures such as Britannia, la France, or Deutschland are political facts which are more important for the understanding of social life than are the rules of the House of Commons or the practice of the ballot. What men passionately believe is the most powerful of political forces, even if they believe what is false.

Nationalism

In the modern world the State depends upon a general popular sentiment with regard to a tradition which is usually called national. Even where kingship survives, as in Afghanistan or Abyssinia, the political organization has been affected by that great movement of the human spirit which first showed itself in the French Revolution. There is a feeling in most parts of the world that the State and its institutions should reflect and embody a tradition which is to be found in a particular language or complex of customs. Persons who have the same language, who believe that their "blood" or physical descent is the same, and admire the same type of character or style of living, are called a nation. Thus in one sense a nation is a natural fact, which may be taken as a basis for political institutions; but the consciousness of such facts as are supposed to make a "nation" is generally overheated by rhetoric and a fantastic history. Nationalism is the result, and nationalism is by no means a natural fact. The popular conception of what makes this or that nation great

is formed by particular persons who in some cases have the very crudest moral ideas; and in actual experience those who have played most commonly upon the conceptions of nationality have been half-educated politicians and journalists. Thus nationalism, which has been used as the source of some new States and as the support of others, is in many cases an obstruction to civilized intercourse. But since it is not a natural fact, nationalism can be transformed by anyone who is skilful enough to use the simple affections of patriotism for the support of a more intelligent devotion to the community to which he belongs.

The Citizen and the State

The State being a psychical relationship between men, has within it certain differentiations. Subjects are those who have no direct power over the acts of government, and in most States most men are subjects. Thus within the British State about twenty-six millions have some power over the Government, and about four hundred millions, chiefly in India, are subjects whose calculation of their own benefits or costs is not allowed to affect the form of government. In the "Latin" countries women are subjects. In all dictatorship, veiled or professed, in Bolivia as well as in Italy, the State is a system by which the majority are ruled perhaps for their good, but without regard to their opinion of what is good. The so-called democratic State of theory hardly exists, except in traces in certain small countries. Those, however, who have some power over the acts of government in their group are called citizens, and in so far as they are conscious of what

is done in their name and for their sake, they may be regarded as morally responsible for the character and the acts of that government. In most modern States since 1918, except in the "Latin" and Eastern tradition, all men and women have citizenship. Citizens in modern States usually exercise their power through representatives, who are really agents intended to specialize in political thought and decisions.

It is commonly supposed that loyalty is morally due from the citizen or the subject to those who embody the organized system of government in their group; and with loyalty, which is an emotional "set", go also service or assistance in the maintenance of order, the payment of the cost of State services, and other such acts. All this is indeed morally due to the institution called a State, in so far as the State provides adequate benefits in order and liberty. But the service of the State is a moral duty only because of the moral quality of the acts performed in and through the State; and if a State is only a robber band, no service is morally due to it. The moral obligation towards any form of government must be discovered by a candid criticism of the ends actually achieved by that form of government. But always there remains the moral principle that almost any government is better than none at all. In that sense "the" State is good.

Authority and Service

A great change has come upon the State within the last century; but the older systems of organization in all States survive in the midst of the new growth. The older section of State life is authoritarian. In that

aspect the State-system is said to be "sovereign", as an ultimate court of appeal in all social disturbance; the State is embodied, in this aspect of the State-relation, in armed forces, police, and commanding persons. An early mythology led to the belief that all law was the command of a superior, although the Greeks never made that mistake. On this side, therefore, the State was in its essence a system for establishing authority and obedience. But without any perception of the change implied, the State during the past century has been used for the organization of social services, public health, roads, drainage, the post office, and education. For all these functions armed force and sovereign authority are irrelevant. The State itself became a social service; and it began to be perceived that law was an agreement, not a command. The assumption that the State-relationship must be of some "service" to men has affected even the position of those traditional habits—the bearing of arms or the catching of criminals—and it is now generally supposed that armies are public services for "defence". The mythology surviving in that conception will be noted when the relation between States is discussed.

In all States services are organized in grades of dependence. Some States are federal, having units within them almost entirely separate except for the common relation to a central system; all States have part of their organized relations in what are called "local authorities". These are, obviously, not "authorities" at all, but services. The adjustment of burdens and benefits in reference to local as contrasted with general State interests is always difficult, and in some States the power of the central organization of govern-

ment is supreme over the local. The test applied to local government, however, is the amount of benefit in order and liberty which it provides and the cost to the inhabitants of the locality of such services as are provided. But the application of this test is having its effect upon the attitude of common men towards the State itself and all the institutions included in it. Thus political realism is affecting the traditional mythology, and men ask what advantage they have from political institutions. It is not enough to say that the citizen should serve the State: the State is expected to serve the citizen.

Again, authority itself is changing its meaning. The authority of any official, king or policeman, is now seen to be simply the sphere of power allowed to him for the exercise of his function. And he is not himself the judge of the extent of the "authority" he requires for that purpose. But this, of course, occurs only in advanced and educated societies. In Spain or in Turkey the majority would still, no doubt, accept the official's view of his own importance, and that is the essential basis of all dictatorship. Even in States where the new conception of public service is dominant, there are survivals of authoritarian practice or ceremony.

The use of the State-relationship or of State-organization for public services has involved an increase in the contacts between the State and both (1) economic organization and (2) the educational or cultural systems in any community. Thus, although for centuries the State provided currency, it is not until recent times that the State has provided postal services or, in some countries, railway services. In all modern States economic organization depends for its existence

on the provision by the State of laws on banking, bankruptcy, companies, factories, and health. Again, in all modern States, since modern government is quite impossible without educated subjects or citizens, education is organized under the State. The modern State, therefore, is a central or co-ordinating institution in social life, not because it is "sovereign" or superior, but because it is a sort of official receiver for the bankruptcy of economic or cultural organizations. States run railways when those who otherwise would, show no intention of running them for the public good. States take over education, when Churches quarrel and universities go to sleep in corners.

Political Parties

In any State in which a great number of citizens have some power over government, the citizens are inevitably separated by differences of opinion as to how their power should be used. Small groups or a few leaders will attract a following, and thus some large associations may be founded, with funds and journalistic support for leaders or programmes. By means of the Parties so formed the political consciousness is kept sufficiently awake to control occasionally the direction taken by Governments; but since many remain always politically somnolent, Parties have a bad name among those who are confused by their cries. Parties are despised by those superior persons who, though cultured in irrelevant antiquities, have no understanding of political facts. In countries in which intellectual criticism is practised more vigorously than joint action, Parties tend to be very small groups with very detailed pro-

grammes or very rigid general principles. In other countries where education is superficial, Parties are organizations for the obtaining of votes in support of the interests of a small "caucus". And in all countries those who are politically conscious tend to "sublimate" their desire for action in a flow of words, for which Party controversies provide a useful outlet. But whatever the peculiarities of political Parties, the life of the State is to be found in their controversies, their contending influences, and their pressure in support of this or that public action. The character of Parties in any State depends upon the general level of education and the amount of political consciousness there. A gang of violent youths must not be mistaken for a political Party.

The State-System

The State-system is formed by the relation between peoples organized under different governments. That there are many States is obvious; but it has been difficult to persuade philosophers that the *relation between* States makes a significant difference to the character of all States, and therefore should be allowed for in the definition of "the" State. No State would be what it now is but for the effect upon it of the action of other States. It is perhaps better to say that actual men and women are in contact across frontiers; for to say that a State-system exists may involve us again in the old mythology, a personal England being given credit or blame in its dealings with a personal France. The unadorned fact of social life is that the citizen or subject in any modern State is affected by and also affects the citizens and subjects of other

States. The oldest aspect of this relationship is armed rivalry. States or those in control of them used to keep armed forces to obtain what they could of the available sources of wealth and power. At a later date, when the open use of force for obtaining wealth was abolished within civilized States, the armed forces were kept for the exercise of threats and only occasional use in compelling a recognition of "rights" or "claims" or "interests". Then, sentiment having become more civilized, it began to be believed that armed forces were for "defence" against other States or Governments, which *en hypothesi* were regarded as still retaining the older use of arms for predatory purposes. Fear and ignorance still keep the common men in every State in the "posture of gladiators". But even that posture affects their neighbours in other States, and armed forces embody the character of the State in its relation to other States. The profession of the citizens or subjects of each State that their armaments are only for defence is still assumed to be untrustworthy by the citizens of all other States, for otherwise armed forces could not be maintained. Psychologically, this is an instance of rationalization: armed forces are ancient habits which it is desired to maintain, and "defence" is a pseudo-reason to "moralize" a primitive device. Wars occasionally break out for similar causes, repressed complexes or primitive fears, for which noble names are found. But the elaborate organization of armed forces throughout the world to-day shows how primitive and mythological are the governing conceptions of men with regard to their political relations outside their own frontiers.

Long ago intellectual intercourse between the few

competent thinkers or artists in the different States increased our knowledge of the world and of man and our control over natural forces. And traders, who wished to buy and sell outside their own frontiers, built up an elaborate organization of transport, commerce, and finance, uniting economic enterprises in different nations or States. Last of all, in the middle nineteenth century, the States themselves, through their Governments, becoming services instead of sovereigns, assisted intellectual and economic intercourse; and the experience of inter-governmental co-operation before the war was carried into the new system of co-operation called the League of Nations. All this is described in political science; but for a philosophy of social life it is necessary to interpret the movement which appears to be gaining strength in the transformation of social life by the obsolescence of war. Contacts between citizens on subjects of many States, embodied in actual co-operation of their Governments for the sake of public health, better transport and communication, or a higher standard of life, may release many new forces of character and personality. The barriers of language and custom still remain; but much social life may be shared by peoples who are still separated by these barriers. Not only music by wireless, but also the organization of justice may spread. Frontiers may cease to be obstacles to trade or travel. Governments may become instruments by which peoples co-operate in the common tasks of civilization. But that cannot happen until war and the preparation for war are as obsolete as chattel slavery or cannibalism now are; and between that situation and our present experience lies the mythology of State-worship, of

national defence, and of "honour and vital interests". Mythology lives upon the unconscious; it expresses hidden complexes and abnormalities. For that reason it becomes more powerful politically when an emotional crisis spreads. When war or the danger of war or revolution is expected, almost anything can be believed by the majority of men. Abnormal psychology provides abundant suggestions for the explanation of the preparation for war, the excitability of simple minds in crowds, and the suspicion of "foreigners". And it is useful also to remember that the State itself may show its true character in a crisis more clearly than in the normal life when no one is thinking about it.

Moral Standards and Political Organization

Viewed as one whole, that section of social life which has been called political is seen to have in view orderly relations between men and an increase of the area within which a man may exercise his powers. These two ends are called order and liberty, and justice consists in a situation in which as much order and liberty as possible is available. But, of course, natural conditions and the actual ability of the men concerned delimit the possibilities. Not much liberty is possible in a boat escaping from a sinking ship: not because the liberty of each man in the boat is limited by his duty to help, but because the whole available time and energy must be absorbed in escaping. Similarly order is of many kinds. There is the order of a military parade, of a row of boots, of a flock of geese, of a group of dancers. The simplest order is homogeneous; a more civilized order demands independent judgment

by each individual with regard to the course he is to follow; but in a modern dance the intricate pattern is not without order.

An orderly and free society is well governed; but no such society can exist in which the cost and the benefit of government are unequally distributed among the governed. Injustice, by which all in fact are injured, is generally felt most by those who bear too great a proportion of the necessary burden of political society; but they may not recognize the disease from which they suffer. In simpler forms of government the majority suffer from the privileges of the few; and such political privileges—immunity from taxation or compulsory service, special consideration in law courts and the rest—are believed to have been destroyed in the more highly developed States. Those, however, who write books about political philosophy generally belong to the class which does not suffer from such privileges as survive; and one suspects that a different account of political equality would be given by poor men haled before judges or taxed on their food. It is true, nevertheless, that injustice in modern social life is more obvious in economic than in political affairs; and economic intercourse will be discussed later. Law and administration are the political means by which such political justice as is commonly understood is maintained; but it is obvious that the moral standard in any progressive society is always in advance of the law and administrative practice—for otherwise there would be no amendments of law or improved administrative methods. One of the most striking characteristics of modern political society is continuous legislation. In the old days laws were traditional and few. And

again, modern legislation is not in the main a command to do this or avoid that: penalties are of no great importance. Most of modern legislation is an agreement to set up new forms of administration, and the daily practice of administration is recognized to be an adjustment of social customs to meet new needs. Thus the registration of infectious disease and the planning of towns are parts of modern government. It follows that government enters more intimately into daily life than ever before; that it is more widespread in its functions; and, above all, that the co-operation of the individual citizen becomes more and more essential to the success of modern political organization. Just in this period in which the number of State officials is increasing, the old "caste" distinction between the official and the citizen is disappearing. We seem to be passing, in the increased sense of responsibility among the body of citizens, into a new and finer form of political society, which may be what is meant by "democracy".

For the understanding of the philosophy of social life it is essential to feel the life of a political community as a vivid and changing experience. Above all, this life is to be understood as passing through the forms to which we are accustomed towards other forms. But the new forms may not be better. If there is not among any group of men enough political consciousness or a clear enough moral standard directing their control of the situation, then the inevitable change which comes over a society, as growth affects a man, may produce a monstrosity. A government which works quite smoothly and is able to mobilize much power may nevertheless devitalize the governed. If,

however, a sufficient number of citizens know what forces in social life they can control and have a clear moral standard indicating the type of man and the type of intercourse between men which they can produce, then any State and the State-system itself may be improved and its products made more excellent than they now are. The philosophy of social life may have an effect upon character and conduct. It does not involve exhortations to virtue or social duty, for philosophy is not a rule of life, but a statement of facts; nevertheless, the perception of a wide landscape, viewed from the mountain of philosophic experience, may induce action.

II

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

ONLY one adult in a hundred gets his food and clothing without doing anything directly in exchange for them. The other ninety-nine form active parts of the system of relations in society which will be called, in what follows here, economic; and even the one in the hundred who does not give, takes something, as children and imbeciles take, out of the store of services which are economic life. Boots and bread are but the bridges over which one man is connected with another, through services exchanged. The study of social life, therefore, must "place" these economic relations in the whole complex unity of human experience. The science of economics analyses some of the aspects of the relations of men in exchanging services, and it provides a language which is already sufficiently current to be used here without full explanation of the terms. Therefore, without more ado, the wider aspects of the economic system may be considered in the terms of economic science, but outside the frontiers proper to that partial analysis.

The facts are the actual relations of men in a society in which each man does not grow his own food or make his own clothes. The attempt to explain these facts by reference to a supposed situation in which they did not exist—the Robinson Crusoe of economic mythology—is irrelevant, if not misleading; for to assume that men are essentially separate invalidates the explanation of the present relationship, even if the assumption, as in current psychology and in the traditional economic

science, is unconscious. There is no doubt at all that every man, woman, and child is now dependent for food, clothing, and other goods upon the activities of other men. In China and Kurdistan and Central Africa that is the situation, as it is in Western Civilization. But the particular form of the relations in exchange of goods and services which now dominates Western Civilization is called "industrial", which seems to mean that the relations are fundamentally affected by mechanization of human activities and large-scale social organization. What is economic, therefore, will be treated here as if it were pre-eminently industrial; for this is written to be read by Londoners and New Yorkers, not by Kurds.

If we ask, conversationally and without the strange appetite of philosophers for irrelevant information, what a man is, we generally receive an answer in terms of an occupation in economic activities. Such and such a man is a banker or a dustman; such and such a woman is a typist or a charwoman. He or she may also be said to be a mind and a body, but such a description is reasonably regarded as less informative. There are some philosophers who say that everything is mind; and other compliments are paid to triangles and tripe. But compliments to the world as it is generally end in words without meaning. At any rate, it is philosophically important that one man is a banker and another a dustman. Only the Absolute knows which the Absolute is or what other occupation it follows. Mind has a habit of banking or collecting refuse and doing many other things much more vigorous than thinking and certainly more important than existing; and not one of these things does any mind do without a body, or

separately from other minds and bodies. It does not explain these facts to omit to mention them in the explanation. The names for occupations, then, which are given as explanations of what men and women are, indicate the structure of social life in its economic aspects.

Economic Activities are Social

Social life in its economic aspects can be analysed by reference to the different kinds of relation between men in the exchange of their services. Exchange of services is the fundamental fact; but many services clearly are not exchanged, and some are regarded as not exchangeable. A mother feeds her infant without charge—at least usually, although parents used to claim credit for the results of what was called the accident of birth. Probably some husbands and wives are not parties to a financial contract, although many more are actually so than are aware of it. However, omitting some services, clearly bankers and dustmen, professors and postmen, grocers and professional singers, exchange their services. There are, therefore, in most of the social situations for all men some exchanged services of other men. A boot contains the blood and the bone of those who made it. Bread is not only a natural product but also some human labour. The movement of the train one sits in is quite different from the movements of the earth, because in it is the vigour of the builders and drivers of the engine, and supporting it are the intricate calculations of financiers and the watchfulness of signalmen. The fare one has paid is one's service in exchange —banking or collecting refuse—rendered in a common

unit of exchange, that is to say, money. A keen philosophical eye, therefore, ought to be able to see in boots and bread the human relations which make them available. But whereas in earlier times the man who wore the boots saw the man who made them, now we are distant and divided; for the person served is usually forgotten by those whose activities are for his service; and, worse still, those who derive benefit from the service generally ignore those who serve. True, we are served now through more tools or machinery, but within all machinery is the blood and bone of those who made it and those who use it. The range of our social insight has not kept pace with the increase in the scale of operations on which civilized life depends. Again, we do not see that great sections of modern service are essentially co-operative; that is to say, that neither railways nor ships are made by individuals working separately, but by closely knit groups interlocking their activities. A modern boot is much more of a social product than a mediæval boot, and it is quite fantastic to suppose that the part made by each worker, organizer, or owner of the machinery, can be distinguished exactly from the parts made by others. Service is not individually rendered, and therefore payment for service cannot justly be made to individuals taken separately. There is no means of desocializing the existing system of production.

The prevalent industrial system in Western Civilization is new, but it is already regarded by most Europeans and Americans as "the nature of things". In its present form it has lasted for about fifty years in the record of civilized life, which goes back at least eight thousand years, and will probably be continued for

more than another eight thousand. The industrial system is, therefore, much more experimental than our political or educational and religious systems. However, in its present stage it consists of three chief relationships between men: (1) ownership of the instruments of production, (2) use of these instruments, and (3) organization of this use.

Capital-Owners

Ownership, which is a political not an economic situation, is the right to control the use of instruments. It is, of course, derived from such primitive ownership as the control of one's own food and clothes; but for our present purpose what is important is that machinery or plant and land is "owned". The scale of the operations in contemporary production, however, has made it unusual for one man to own all of a plant, and therefore joint stock companies have become common. The persons who thus own some of the chief instruments of production are usually called shareholders, of whom there are many classes distinguished according to the extent of the power involved in owning. But in general they act together in groups for dividing the purchasing power obtained by the use of "plant" in rendering services. Thus in modern social life a shareholder's mind is formed; and all who have that type of mind, or whose behaviour is in accordance with such a mental "set", are in a peculiar social relationship with those (*a*) who use the instruments of production directly, and with those (*b*) who organize such use. The shareholders and their representatives generally extend ownership to include the right to what *they*

consider their share of the product. This understanding of ownership is maintained by the State, although certain obligations are enforced, since, for example, an owner of houses is not allowed to earn an income by their use as brothels nor an owner of cattle to sell diseased meat. There are limits to "what a man may do with his own". It is not even allowed in Western countries that an owner of machinery shall have it used by children of five, as the mill-owners of Lancashire did a century ago. The State compels those who use the economic system to consider other ends than their own advantage.

The relation, however, of shareholders to those who use their machinery or other "plant" is unconscious. Those who divide the proceeds of rubber plantations, for example, never hear of those who work on them; and at closer range, the owners of tobacco or shipping shares have no personal knowledge of the conditions under which tobacco-trade workers or seamen perform their services to the community. The human groups whose actions maintain the economic system are insulated one from another, and the owners of the tools seem to regard the tools chiefly as means for obtaining purchasing power for themselves and not as means by which other men are served. Capital-owners have very little conscious responsibility either to those who use their machinery or to those who need its products.

The "Manual" Workers

Secondly, the use of instruments in the industrial system involves continuous activity of many millions of men and women, working in close contact in mines

and factories. There are about sixteen million in Great Britain so occupied, as compared with twenty-six million who are citizens, having votes; and most of the ten million voters outside mines and factories are women in their homes working, as we say, with their hands. But of the persons available for such services over a million in Great Britain and about ten millions in Western Civilization as a whole are continuously unemployed—that is to say, not integrated into the system of exchanged services and, for this purpose, wasted. However, the rest are organized in distinguishable occupations.

Such occupations greatly affect the mental outlook or "set", since the carpenter, for example, tends to develop a technical language of his own and a special view of wood and its uses. An occupation moulds the character and tendency of a person's life; but this moulding is still more drastic when the occupation is followed by many in close contact. Thus a coal-miner works always among coal-miners, and a common mental "set" is thus formed, no less powerful than what is sometimes unwisely called the "group mind". There is obviously a "mind group" of coal-miners. The members of such a group are related more intimately than any one of the group is related to others outside the group. An occupational unit in social life is at least as important as the unit formed by neighbourhood. But clearly the result in a certain mental "set" or attitude towards life is not designed. It is the accidental result of large-scale operations in the modern system of economic services. Similarly large-scale machinery has brought together girls in carpet factories, men in engineering shops and shipyards, and the

rest. Their services are rendered in certain "cadres" or regiments or occupational groups, in which most of them spend most of their waking lives. The extent and importance of their services are immense. Civilized life would be quite impossible without such services, so organized and so endured. They are the substitutes in the modern world for the services in other civilizations of slaves or serfs; and the men and women who render such services are less rapidly exhausted than in earlier civilizations. But for this study of social life two aspects of their services are important: first, the old tradition continues to make it usual to speak of them as "manual" workers, as if the brute force they contributed were the most important aspect not only of their services but of their personalities; and, secondly, each receives in exchange for his or her service what is called a wage. The wages-system has great social effects. It involves generally a small payment made at short intervals and, in most industries, without any promise of security from month to month. Short views and uncertainty are, therefore, common among most industrial populations—which has important effects upon voting in politics and upon education. These characteristics of the so-called "manual" workers make it possible for the few who have security of tenure and long views to neglect not only the mental "set" but even the existence of their servants in industry. The antiquated social philosophy of Aristotle still survives. It is assumed that those whose opinions are in fact discounted have no opinions worth counting, as Aristotle assumed that those who happened to be slaves were naturally slavish. Indeed, the majority of treatises on "the general will" and "social purpose" still imply that

civilized life is mainly what occurs in drawing-rooms, in abstraction from kitchens and streets—not to speak of mines. But what occurs in mines is—thinking and feeling, as well as the movement of coal by muscle. Such thinking and feeling is not integrated into the dominant social consciousness of to-day, as the thinking and feeling of slaves or serfs was not integrated into the anæmic "good life" of Aristotle or the childish chivalry of mediæval courts.

Behind the shelters which protect superior persons from unpleasant sights are poverty and waste of human energy, the great evils of economic life, as war is the great evil of political life. And, like war, poverty is commonly regarded as regrettable but inevitable. As we prepare for war, so we "help" the poor—which helping, like the preparation for war, greatly increases the evil and prevents any drastic treatment of its causes. We are told on authority that we must give something to those who have too little, without asking why they have too little. Indeed, it would be regarded as improper if, even in this section of the study of social life, anything unparliamentary were said of the nature of complacency. Most analyses of social life are made by those who do not suffer from contemporary habits. It would, indeed, be a mistake to suppose that the majority of our servants in industry are the poor or the wasted: for poverty is the state of a person who has not even enough for normal human needs. But great numbers of workers are in this state, and many more are in constant danger of it.

The structure of social life, however, is already affected by consciously planned associations based upon the occupational mental "sets" already men-

tioned. These take two forms: Trade Unions and Consumers' Co-operative Societies. In Western Civilization generally, but chiefly in Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, organized groups of "manual workers" maintain their common outlooks and interests by trade unions. A trade union is a sphere of intense loyalty and original creative association between its members. The first attempts of the discounted to associate for their own ends were so vigorously opposed by all social forces then available that even now members of a trade union feel themselves to be living in a hostile world. But great associations such as the National Union of Railwaymen, with about 400,000 members, are much more important for civilized life than many small States. All powerful trade unions have an elaborate organization: a central executive, a local administration, and an easily roused membership. The opinions and mental "sets" developed in such an association are not confined to rates of wages, and are philosophically as important as the mental "set" of a group of "business men" or of university professors. Trade Unionism colours the situation within which the State operates in the chief Western countries. Social life in industrial civilization is unintelligible without continual reference to it; and it is, as an institution, very young. Probably the general character of trade unionism is already changing with the increase of education, the extension of the political franchise, and the determination of men conscious of the need for their services to be no longer discounted. The so-called manual worker thinks and feels, and is not inclined to accept other people's views of his position in the social structure. As the common soldier discovered in war that his work was

essential, so the electrical or railway worker knows his power and accepts his responsibilities, but not at the direction nor under the exhortation of those who regard him as an instrument of their will. Many strikes are not mere reactions due to grievances, but threats to tyranny; and they are directed not only against the owners of the instruments used in public service, but also against the complacent ignorance of the general public which uses services without regard to the conditions under which they are served.

Trade unionism, however, is not simply a defensive organization: it is a system of free association among equals, which may become the basis of progressive organization in the rendering of services. It should become, therefore, not weaker but stronger in proportion as the more obvious grievances of our servants in industry are redressed. Already it differs in character in different sections of industry. In some, as in railway services, it is constructive in policy; in others, as in the chaotic and slavish occupations of mining or textile production in the United States, it is bellicose. But in some parts of the United States trade unionism is opposed by armed forces and spies maintained by the capital-owners. In Germany, at the other extreme of civilized life, trade unions are represented as the central advisory body of the Reich for industrial policy; and in Great Britain powerful trade unions treat with bodies of organizers of industrial services.

Business Men

The third great group of activities in economic relationships is the organizing group. In simpler societies the

organizing of the use of instruments was done by the owners of the instruments, and in still simpler societies the owners were the users of the instruments. But now financiers, managing directors, and commercial agents for raw material or finished products make a class by themselves. They are not necessarily, and in most cases are not at all, owners in the industry in which they are employed. Their services are exchanged for salaries, which they usually derive from the resources of the capital-owners. Thus the human relations in the economic systems of to-day are dominated by the conception of ownership, through organizers conceived as agents for owners and not as servants of the community served by industry. But, of course, dominant conceptions do not necessarily arise from the most important factors of a situation. The economic system might be viewed as primarily an interchange of services. It might be viewed as a co-operative enterprise for maintaining and developing civilized life. It is actually viewed by most men as a battle-ground for a general scramble to get as much and give as little as possible. The organizers of industrial production have in their minds certain assumptions, more or less clearly conceived, which give direction to their devices; and these assumptions themselves rest on the generally accepted views of social forces which maintain the system. Business men, as financiers and industrial organizers are called, are generally quite unconscious of the assumptions on which their behaviour rests. Some of them appear to perceive at certain moments that they are in fact servants of the community served by industry and not of the owners of the instruments of production. But the majority act as if their occupation

were mainly a source of income for themselves. This is commonly assumed also by capital-owners and by manual workers: for all industry is regarded as a scramble by individuals making little piles for themselves. But it is most important when this assumption dominates the minds of those who are at the heart of all industrial policy, for then the system of organization itself is controlled with a view to improving the chances of a scramble, especially for the advantage of those who hold the key positions—the organizers of industry. In the political sphere this would mean that the executive and its chief administrators were "not in politics for their health", but were confessedly "on the make"; but even in the Middle Ages political and judicial administration was believed to be a form of public service. This is not yet commonly accepted in practice in economic life. The organizers of industrial services are not regarded as primarily servants of the community, and the occasional assertion that they are, serves to cover private raids upon the store available, excused by the distribution of what the successful raider can spare.

The Consumers

The great majority of persons served are themselves serving; but as persons served they are called consumers, users, or enjoyers. Their activities, such as they are, are called by the economists "effective demand". Needs are embodied roughly in wants. But wants are operative in the economic system only when expressed in terms of purchasing power, and therefore the want of boots in a poor child is irrelevant for the present economic system. Nevertheless, there is enough

monetarily expressed want to keep the system of production going. There are boots and houses used; there is food consumed; there are cinemas enjoyed. In order to study this part of the economic system, one should watch people eating or travelling in trams or looking on in cinemas. All this is called "consumption", and in many aspects it does indeed appear to be a disease. It is at any rate very unskilful. What a man eats, wears, or enjoys is traditional, and is largely dominated by what are called "herd" instincts. This is an advantage for large-scale production, for production would be much more difficult to organize if the organizer could not foresee whether men would wear trousers or togas next week. But it has the disadvantage that every man is disguised as the average man, and nobody seems to be anybody. Perhaps beneath the calm of innumerable bowler hats many different poetic souls are blossoming; but the evidence seems to point to the assimilation of souls through similar clothes. We have carried the village mind of neighbours frightened of one another's opinions into the vast world market. We live on a large scale with small ideas to guide us. We can move faster, but have not discovered any better reasons for moving at all. Most goods and services are used as savages, if not monkeys, would use them, for individuals nibbling in corners. But a large and increasing amount of goods and services are communal. Roads and drains, parks and libraries, and many other services are used in common by great numbers of people. The State has been used to provide economic services where traditional appetites could not be induced to provide them or where private groups were likely to victimize consumers. Similarly, the great Co-operative Societies

throughout Western Civilization have organized the supply of needs in the hands of consumers. There are therefore the beginnings of a new development in consuming.

All this is for the sake of a full and enjoyable vitality which is called "welfare". The relation of wealth to welfare is not carefully thought out, and the so-called standard of living differs in different social classes and in different nations. But the standard of life, or the moral ideal for a civilized human being, in civilized society affects the production and use of exchangeable goods and services; and therefore, if the cultural organizations, which are to be discussed later, develop a new conception of civilized life, the economic system would have to be changed. On the other hand, a society dominated by efforts to acquire wealth may not have intelligence to spare for the consideration of the purpose, the welfare, which the economic system should satisfy. And in a civilization in which producing is highly organized and consuming traditional or unskilful, ease and serenity, vigour and perceptiveness are likely to be deficient. But the most striking characteristic in all parts of the economic system is the general feeling that it must be what it is.

Government and Industry

Against the fatalism of habit, reformers have struggled for a century, and now the State assists in the organizing of production and consumption through company and factory laws, laws against adulteration, and for the support of the unemployed and those who are the "casualties" of the industrial services. In theory, the

economic system might have been organized in view of fundamental human needs; but in fact, at the time the new system grew up, the scientific mythology of natural law dominated even human relations. Nevertheless, regulations were made operative, and the State has civilized some parts of the industrial system; although the relation of government to the organization of production and consumption is still empirical and tentative. What used to be called State interference has, however, been shown by experience to be of great advantage to the economic system even for the limited purpose of producing more wealth and distributing it more equitably.

The general character of economic relations should now be apparent. As compared with the political, already discussed, or the cultural, to be discussed later, economic relations are primitive, and it is in this very field that power has been most rapidly increased in recent times. The elaborate mechanisms, trains and drains, aeroplanes and wireless, produced and used within the economic system, have misled the simple-minded into supposing that economic life has advanced beyond the Middle Ages. Indeed, the Middle Ages were bad enough; and where mediævalism survives in China and India, the economic relations of men—the scrambles for private wealth out of a small store—are very evil. It is fantastic to idealize the fourteenth century. But the habits and mental outlooks dominating production and consumption in modern industrial civilization are those of the Middle Ages. The State, as we have seen, has recently become a service rather than a power, and there are the beginnings of a State system or system of government uniting the whole world. But

economic organization, both in its consuming and in its producing, is still dominated by primitive appetites and the very simplest ideas; and, worst of all, the system which is hardly fifty years old is regarded as too sacred to be changed. The conception of an economic policy, that is to say, a deliberate control of production and consumption for the sake of a clearly conceived civilized life, is not yet common even among thinkers.

Economic "Laws"

The relations formed by traditional habits are affected by "natural" results which are not designed and are hardly at all controllable by human power. Thus, given the habit of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, certain "natural facts" occur, such as the so-called law of supply and demand, which can be studied without reference to human choice. The use of the word "law" to indicate general facts for scientific observation is misleading even in the physical sciences, as, for example, when the general fact in regard to the relation of masses is called the "law" of gravitation; for "law" implies either will or agreement and obligation of some kind. But it is quite absurd philosophically to imply that the Earth obeys a command or is obliged to go round the sun. The word "law" in the phrase "economic law" is still more misleading, because the general fact referred to is a fact about human acts, within which field real law is found. There is, of course, no command and no obligation about the relation of supply and demand or about diminishing returns; they are general facts in the same sense as gravitation is a general fact, in contrast with events such as a position

of the Earth or a given situation in the exchange of services. But because of the unfortunate use of the phrase "economic law", economists have been regarded as law-givers; and some of them have praised economic general facts, which is as absurd as if a physical scientist praised the Earth for going round. Ignorance of general facts is regrettable; a knowledge of general facts in regard to exchange is useful in devising a policy; but such general facts are only the necessary conditions, within which there is a large field for alternative policies in economic organization. And because economists are seldom psychologists, they do not know anything of the undeveloped abilities of common men. They study actual habits and are not aware of abilities for which the established system provides little or no scope. This is not a disadvantage to them as economists, if economics is a science of facts. But it makes them quite incompetent as judges of "values"; and values must be studied for the devising of economic policies and skill in the economic art.

The possible policies or suggested methods for reorganizing economic systems must have regard not so much to necessary conditions, studied in pure economics, as to psychological abilities which, in relation to economic activities, have hardly yet been studied. Existing practices must be studied psychologically. The peculiar habits of "business" men, their standards of morality, their interest in the work they do, the fantastic reasons they give for doing what they do—all this must be examined. Again, the different groups of manual or clerical workers have most interesting "behaviour systems", mental "sets" and outlooks. Finally, when men eat badly, or clothe

themselves hideously, or run in or out of their absurd houses, we may study the psychology of consuming or using goods and services. Almost all such acts are traditional; they are ingrained; they are firmly set below the level of conscious calculation. But if any change is proposed, for example, in the wearing of clothes or in the laying of bricks, the traditional "behaviour systems" may prove to be not flexible enough to produce or use goods under a new system. The strength of the undeveloped abilities in any man or group of men is in question, when it is doubted whether a new economic policy could be adopted in any one industry or country. The fundamental issue, however, is the desirability of change; and this can only be decided after weighing the benefits and losses to civilized life of the existing system. Clearly greater benefits and less cost would be desirable—more wealth, better used, with fewer victims in the service of men. The ideal of an economic system, however, is dependent upon the general ideal of civilized life, for the discovery and expression of which we look to "the spiritual power"—the organized religious and educational institutions.

III

CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS

POPPIES in a field of corn may annoy a farmer and rejoice an artist. Clearly they are not in their right place, if the standard of judgment be immediate utility; but it is better that they should be accidentally there than nowhere at all to be found. The political organization of social life and, still more obviously, the economic, does not promote devotion to other purposes than those which appear to be practical in the eyes of men who cannot see very well. To suppose, for example, that beauty or truth is not useful is the result of philosophical near-sightedness. But there are some men, women, and children who are moved deeply by beauty and the divine whose emotion is not easily understood in political terms and is altogether unintelligible in terms of exchange-value. Such men, women, and children react in intercourse, which is not either political or economic, which, for want of a better word, will be called here "cultural". There are institutions, associations, and organizations, resulting from such reactions in cultural intercourse, which in the present social system include schools, universities, churches, scientific and artistic societies, and clubs of various kinds. Thus both by reference to psychological "interests", and by reference to the institutional structure of society, it is necessary to make a third section in the study of social life. This section is called the cultural or developmental. The facts are those of social intercourse in the perception or creation of beauty and truth and goodness; and therefore the philosophy of values is most

important in this section of the present subject. But the general character of values and their relation to human action must be assumed to be sufficiently agreed upon, in order that here the embodiment or the expression of values in social organization may be discussed. It is sufficiently clear that some factor in our experience of the world and of man is referred to by the word "beauty", whatever its nature. In any case, men are actually thrilled by music and by sunsets; they seem to react to propositions called "true"; and they distinguish benevolence from murder by the use of the word "good". But in none of these cases do men act or feel alone. The style of music differs from age to age and from country to country, the acts regarded as good differ similarly; and even propositions called "true" are different propositions in different ages and races. This, of course, does not imply that all ages are wrong. It might just as well indicate that all ages are right, in so far as (1) each age or race sees or feels one and not another of the factors concerned, and in so far as (2) there is no finished or final and complete value, in the sense of the word "final", which implies that it is attainable. The ideal is real, not as a goal but as a mark of direction. All values are relative, but not in the sense that knowing them brings them into existence—only in the sense that they are qualities of a situation in the relation of men to men or to the world. The values appear in social intercourse of any kind—political, economic, or cultural: but there are different levels of intercourse. Casual meeting is at a lower level than intimate conversation. Accidental impact is at a lower level than continuous co-operation. But it has already been shown in former sections of this study

that co-operation, in its various stages, from communication in speech to interdependent actions, organized politically or in economic relations, has good and bad aspects in reference to a situation vaguely named "welfare". Thus political welfare—peace and liberty, and economic welfare—exchangeable or enjoyable wealth, form parts of a whole, of which another part is cultural. Associations of men in the enjoyment of beauty, or in the search for truth or in friendship or love, are all parts of the normal whole which we call social life; and in general it may be said truly that cultural association is intercourse at a level higher than the political or the economic. The character or conduct which is admirable is best described in cultural terms; and "civilization" is a word generally used to refer to a cultural rather than a political or economic situation. Minds in contact in intimate intercourse about factors in experience in which the values are prominent are therefore the facts to which reference must now be made in the study of social life. A very large number of such contacts are unorganized—that is to say, they do not form institutions; but such contacts, no doubt, are the most fundamental in all social life and the most pervasive. In the terms of common speech, a man's friends are of more importance in indicating his nature than are his fellow-citizens or his paymasters or his paid servants; although his friendships may arise out of political or economic co-operation. There is, however, a distinguishable class of institutions which are primarily cultural, namely, schools, churches, and the rest.

The Spiritual Power

All those relations between men in cultural intercourse, in so far as they are organized, have been well called the spiritual power. There is, indeed, a difficulty about the meaning of the word "spiritual", because it is used by some to imply a kind of reality in regard to which space-time is irrelevant; and, worse still, some appear to think that what is spiritual has no connection with "matter" as studied in the physical sciences. All these implications cannot be discussed here. They are a part of pure metaphysics, consciously or, in the majority of cases, unconsciously accepted. But it is enough to say that the use of the word "spiritual" here does not imply either the irrelevance of space-time or the disembodied ghosts of a mediæval mythology. What is spiritual is only what at any moment is emergent in what is material. It is the *nisus* which exists in any social development. The spiritual power is simply that force in the organization of social life which, while maintaining custom upon bases more deeply set in human life than law or utility, also expands or exalts the powers of men into other worlds than that of breakfast and dinner, in another air than that of street and counting-house. How much of that force is, in fact, socially organized in any given community of men it is difficult to estimate, especially because, although social theorists have spent much time on politics and economics, they have not attended to churches or schools as equally important institutions. But, organized or not, a force exists when a little phrase of some melody stirs the lover to see his beloved in a world adorned by new beauty; and a drawing-room

which presents that little phrase is a part of the spiritual power much more obviously than a chapel in which preachers soar only to the loftiest platitudes. In old days in Western civilization, the temple or the church building was the place in which men found not only what we now call religion but also the Fine Arts. The best available music, painting, sculpture, architecture, drama, and dancing would be in or around the house of the god. This seems to have continued in Europe until the fifteenth century, when beauty came to be regarded as dangerous: and the old simplicity of the spiritual power, uniting many interests with religion, still survives in corners of European civilization. In the East—that is to say, in China, and perhaps in parts of India—religion was never so departmentalized as in the Europe of the Reformation; and religion there seems still to imply a friendliness towards the beautiful. But in modern European social life the mediæval church or the Greek temple is now represented by many other buildings besides the local chapel, church, or cathedral. Beauty has found other homes, in theatres, picture-galleries, and concert halls; and men associate for many cultural purposes, which are not in our narrower sense of the world "religions". Therefore, the spiritual power in contemporary Western life must be taken to include all the organizations implied in the existence of buildings we call schools, universities, social clubs, picture-galleries, and theatres; and it also includes drawing-rooms, when they are used for social intercourse with regard to beauty, truth, or goodness. Any such apparatus may be used also for politics or for that economic purpose which is called "getting on"; but there may be civilized men in any corner. The colour or tone of

social life in any group is dependent less upon political or economic organization than upon the effectiveness of the spiritual power; and civilization is the name for a peculiar colour or tone to be found in the way in which men treat one another and are affected by the natural circumstances in which they live.

In intercourse of this kind and through institutions such as schools the standard of civilized life is maintained and developed. Here, therefore, is the growth-point in the always changing conception of "welfare" which has its effects in politics and in economic life. The spiritual power is the natural source of the ideal of life in any community.

All men form part of that spiritual power; but some few exceptional men are in position of authority within this field. Here, however, has taken place one of the greatest transformations of social life; for authority now means, at least in this field if not also in politics and economic activities, not the status of a person in an organization but the expertness of special ability. Thus the only man who has "authority" for other civilized men is an authority on his subject. The artist, the scientist, the explorer, or the speculative genius is tested by reference to his special ability in a field in which the common man has some competence to estimate ability. And, except in corners of surviving mediævalism, in religion, too, the authority of a man depends, not upon his "orders", but upon the quality of his religious insight. An analysis of contemporary culture would, no doubt, reveal great numbers of men and women who are still primitive or mediæval, taking great notoriety for greatness and priests for prophets. But a quantitative analysis may be unscientific. It is

the small number of those with a more intense modern grasp of real "authority" in the spiritual or cultural sphere which gives its character to our time and moulds the future.

The general body of those who share a form of culture, and the exceptional who direct its progress, consolidate tradition by appreciation of its distinctive qualities and also provide that restlessness which distinguishes human from animal society. There are, therefore, in general two functions which all cultural institutions should perform: one is transmitting and maintaining a tradition; the other is the discovery of new values or new areas of experience. All men need both factors in culture: and all teachers or researchers have the two functions to perform—preserving and amending tradition. At some stages in the history of a tradition the past controls the present; at others, discontent with established custom and inherited moral and æsthetic standards is prominent. In our own time the institutions of culture seem to be regressive and cultural genius is erratic.

The Educational System

The organization of schools and universities is much more extensive and effectual in Western civilization than it ever has been before or than it is elsewhere. The mere number of schools and scholars is significant; for that has immensely increased in most Western countries during the past fifty years. But much more significant is the recent change in methods. The schools are now affecting the new generation much more deeply than former generations were affected, by the intro-

duction of music and dancing, the obsolescence of punishment, and the variety of interests introduced. Indeed, we are hardly yet in a position to estimate the effects of a change of method and an extension of the system which took place in the "West" hardly a generation ago. By comparison with the so-called elementary schools, or at any rate with publicly organized education, most private schools are still backward and universities are still primitive or mediæval in their methods of instruction and in their systems of organization. The lecture, for example, as a method of instruction is probably obsolete: the examination system is more useful for discovering memory-fiends than for developing rational animals. But the new "tests", new analyses of adolescence, new free associations of students in universities, and the obsolescence of the old authoritarianism may be setting in operation abilities of men never hitherto operative.

All parts of the educational system are useful for fitting the new generation to take places in social life, for the fulfilment of certain social functions. The schools and universities have to provide as much competence as is required to "run" the political and economic system. Actual railwaymen, textile workers, clerks, bankers, and merchants have to be provided; and because the occupations by which such men and women obtain means for living are services rendered to the community, education is producing and should produce always better servants of the community. It seems possible that modifications of educational method or system may be required: for the traditional competition of individual against individual is hardly a training in social interdependence. Still more defective is the

division of schools and universities by reference to social castes or incomes so that the community of the next generation is already divided into upper and lower, rulers and governed, masters and their instruments. But in some countries, such as France, the school system is more homogeneous for all social classes and therefore tends to form a more united community, although in France particularly the bookish tradition still limits the opportunities of those who use, or will use in after-life, other instruments than books. The formation of a new community on a large scale with more varied elements, in the schools of the United States, is probably one of the best contributions of that country to civilization. In Germany the attempt to democratize the educational system has not so far succeeded: but in England, and in a smaller degree in Scotland, the old caste education is supported in the midst of the system provided through the State. This seems to be partly the result of snobbery and partly the result of the most peculiar "boarding" system, by which boys and girls of one social class are cut off during impressionable years from the normal contact with persons of the older generation, who are at work in the majority of the occupations of civilized life. The formation of a superior caste is regarded by many as desirable. This is important for the philosophy of social life in so far as the insulation of groups with a distinct, even if a superior, type of culture within a community obstructs the "circulation" of intercourse and puts obstacles in the way of free social contact of each with any other. The actual development of social life in any country can be seen in the schools of that country; and most of them are repressive of unusual abilities

and untried tendencies. Culture is likely, therefore to remain at the present semi-barbaric stage for some time.

Universities have partly the function of carrying forward the preparation begun in schools for the new generation to take the places in the social services: and in this function they are like technical schools for the professions, as those services are called which require a more lengthy training. An increasing number of physicians, chemists, teachers, and officials will naturally be needed in a more elaborately organized society; and therefore the universities may grow larger or may offer more varied types of training. But social life is not merely the maintenance of a traditional order; and universities, as parts of the spiritual power, have a more important function to perform. They are outlook-towers. They are research stations, not only in the sciences but in the humanities. The teacher in a university may be partly a transmitter of acquired knowledge or skill; but he is incapable of inciting to new life if he has nothing original to add in attitude or surmise, not to speak of new knowledge and hitherto unsuspected skill. Again, as for the student body in universities, probably the mere learner of a trade or method of gaining a livelihood is an obstruction to the scholar whose eye is upon beauty or truth, whatever its present uselessness. In social life the elements of speculation in the younger generation should be preserved and used in universities; but in actual experience the student groups in universities are generally conservative in outlook, reactionary in desire, and absurdly complacent in their childish air of superiority to the hewers of wood and drawers of water. The worship of books has perhaps

made the learned forget how much may be learnt from an axe or a bucket.

Scientific and Artistic Organizations

Some men and women, with special interests in the realization of what is still unachieved in the knowledge of truth or the revelation of beauty, are associated in voluntary groups of equals. An example is the French Academy or the British Royal Society or Royal Academy: smaller and less permanent organizations are always being formed in all civilized countries. And in all the higher types of these academies, intercourse between specialists occurs across the boundaries of nationality and language. Culture at this level is international: for no local group includes all the best minds of the age. Social life in these organizations is concerned chiefly with what may be called the frontiers of experience. These groups are not concerned with recording but with exploration. They are in general groups of persons on the same level of competence, whose association promotes the special ability of each; and the function of such associations in the whole of social life is like the function of the brain system in the human body, if the brain is not merely an organ of reflex action. These organizations form part of the spiritual power, extending the perceptiveness of the whole of society or, in the creation of new art-forms, deepening the effect of beauty. The men and women thus in intercourse about undiscovered values are, no doubt, what Plato called guardians. They are the growth-points of social life, the most sensitive parts of human society where it touches the greater world

of nature and whatever is beyond that which is commonly called nature, if nature does not include such realities as beauty. But as their position in social life is most exalted, so their defects are most disastrous: for they may lose themselves in clouds or be entirely cut off from the roots of all sane experience in common life. They may investigate the irrelevant and forget disease; and they may pay more attention to lunacy than to common sense. Thus sciences may leave social life unaffected. And in the arts, literary or plastic, small cliques may admire abnormalities and promote the production of absurdities in the effort to be original; or, on the other hand, old gentlemen may copy their grandfathers and call it architecture or painting or music, or even literature. Social life may derive much illumination from scientific and artistic groups: but in present experience the amount of illumination received from this source seems to be very small. If, however, all the cultural institutions so far considered be called educational, their relation to political and economic organizations is a problem like that of the relation of the Church to the State in the Middle Ages The study of this section of social life is thus a corrective of the abstractions resulting from the study of politics alone or economics alone; for the same man is at the same time a citizen or subject, an earner or spender, and a being holding intercourse with friends. It is discovered that certain forms of political organization, called democratic and regarded as desirable, are impossible unless education is more general. Also policy needs to be understood in order that men may be its instruments. But that is no proof that the school exists for the State. The school should form not citizens

merely but men and women. Again, in industry education "pays", and so does research. But that is no proof of the supremacy of economic purposes: for learning and exploration are needed by men not merely as producers or consumers but as inhabitants of a universe. Indeed, so far is it from the truth that education is subordinate to politics or industry—the opposite is true, all politics and all industry are excusable as forms of education. It is therefore an unhealthy sign in any society if schools, universities, or academies are dominated by political or economic organizations. The State or economic organizations may provide the shell—the building or the appliances; but politicians and industrialists should not control the teaching. That is the old theory of the superiority of the spiritual power: but, as in earlier times, its application requires a knowledge of detail and skill in adjusting different social tendencies.

The Press

An important link between the world of knowledge and the two other worlds of politics and economic life is now formed by newspapers; and to treat them as expressions of the spiritual power may indicate the level at which the modern spirit normally operates. It is, however, unwise to blame journalists. They are probably more beneficent, on the whole, than their predecessors—the heralds of Greece, the betting-touts of the gladiatorial combats in Rome, or the mediæval *jongleurs*. And they also fulfil some of those functions which the international connections of even village churches in the Middle Ages enabled the clergy to fulfil. To-day the minds of men are in contact through

news and opinions, selected by journalists or their masters. The world of news is wider than it ever was: that is to say, men live in a social culture which, however superficial, is world-wide. The Press, as the work of a few journalists is reverentially called, sets out what these few believe to be of interest generally; and this is sometimes called "public opinion". These journalists also attempt to influence readers by the expression of the opinions of the small "set" in which they live, which some of them quite seriously believe to be authoritative. Anonymity gives prestige both to narrow observation of reported events and to the opinions of the half-educated. But some men in this section of social life increase knowledge and improve wisdom. Culture, within the limits of a language or a transport radius, is maintained by the Press, and spread in a veneer which becomes thinner as it is spread.

Religious Institutions

The Churches and other associations for purposes usually now called in the West "religious" are in most cases survivals from earlier forms of civilization. Thus the Roman Catholic Church, the many different Churches classed as Protestant, the Islamic systems, Sunni and Sufi, the Hindu, Confucian, Buddhist, and Shinto groups, are all traditional in organization and in the attitude of their members, which they exist to preserve and develop. A few very new associations, on new bases or for the maintenance of comparatively new attitudes in this sphere, are to be found, chiefly in the West; but these are very exceptional, and their importance for the whole of

social life is still difficult to estimate. By far the greatest number of men belong to the oldest of the traditional religious associations; and the current traditionalism in what is called religion affects deeply both the political and the economic organizations of society. By religion is here meant, not theology or dogmas, but practice and the attitude implied in practice. The practice is partly a ritual or sacred traditional acts, partly moral behaviour. But, of course, most reasonable men require explanations of their behaviour or ritual; and these they find in dogmas or traditional doctrines as to the nature of man and of the universe. Most current religions imply beliefs in regard to a deity conceived in terms drawn from the experience of human personality. These beliefs appear to depend partly upon the insight of religious geniuses in former times, who naturally spoke in the terminology current in those days, and partly upon the shared experience of intercourse in communal prayer or ritual. The social sources of dogma have hardly been explored; since the common man is still conceived to provide merely a following, in spite of the obviously social character of ritual, prayer, and mythology. Probably we exaggerate the importance of prophets in the past. In any case, the group has some shared experience as a group, which forms ritual and dogma. Two quite different questions are (1) the actual place of religious associations or churches in contemporary life and (2) the function they might, or possibly should, perform. In contemporary life they are traditionalist. In theory, they might be revolutionary. Heretics and reformers have often tried to turn a tradition into the basis for a revolution by a skilful use of commentary. As it has

been well said—if men imprison the mind in a text, it escapes in the commentary. But every successful heresy soon becomes a new orthodoxy, and every popularized violation of convention establishes a new convention. However, the religious association *may* be a source of new insight and new attitudes towards life and the world: or new insight may establish other forms of religious association. Thus the spiritual power contains a force for the revelation of characteristics in reality which have been hitherto unsuspected.

Throughout recorded history the sense of what has been called the "numinous" has led men to ritual and belief connected with ritual. The earlier forms of perception seem to have revealed a characteristic which is somehow other than beauty, truth, or goodness: at any rate, it has been generally believed to be different and was called in the philosophical tradition of the Greeks "the divine". It has been found both in nature and in persons; and various traditions as to where it is to be found, by eyes turned that way, are preserved in religious associations. But there is no reason to suppose that all is discovered, in this sphere of experience, which there is to be discovered. Religion, if we mean by it "experience of the divine", is no more exhausted than is art or science. It follows that the traditional views of this characteristic are probably inadequate and that a religious association *may* be revolutionary in discovering or promoting new conceptions of the factors in experience connected with "the divine". But it must be confessed that this is unlikely, because "modernism", in Hinduism or Islam as in the various Christian traditions, seems to be more

concerned with finding new meanings of old words and new excuses for old habits than in free and bold exploration expressed in new terms and new customs. Science is no longer a commentary upon Aristotle; medicine is no longer a commentary upon Galen; but "religious" knowledge appears to be believed still to be a commentary upon sacred books or a repetition of primitive creeds. The effect of this in the other spheres of social life is that—(1) the religious associations maintain established political and economic practices. In the early nineteenth century, while poverty and war were being spread with new power, the churchmen were discussing virgin birth and a six-day creation. And (2) religious associations have become increasingly separate from other cultural advances in the sciences and the arts, so that a great scholar or a great artist is hardly now to be found among the teachers of the religious associations. The days of Fra Angelico and Thomas Aquinas are gone. The "ecclesia" no longer includes the "studium". One of the sources of illumination in regard to human welfare is thus damned up by traditionalism.

Thus as soon as one turns in the study of social life from analysis of the facts and generalizations based upon that analysis to the criticism of social life in view of values or standards, the cultural element in contemporary society seems to be defective. That is to say, men in society are not living at the height of which they seem, from certain indications, to be capable. In fact, we are uncivilized, and most of all in our blindness to our own barbarism in all that relates to beauty or the divine.

"Trahison des Clercs"

It was pointed out at the beginning of these studies of social life that a knowledge of the facts is only in part interpretation based upon analysis of current practice. Its other part is an indication of values, some of which are unrealized. Now, in the political sphere the great evil is war, though various other forms of evil—dictatorships, privilege, tyranny by majorities, and the rest—also exist. In the economic sphere poverty and the waste of human ability in the present system of production and consumption are the chief evils. But in all social life perhaps the evil of the cultural institutions is the most important. In one word, it is—complacency. The "superior" airs of the saved in a religious revival are as nothing if compared with the insolence of self-styled intellectuals and the quiet accumulation of private gains by those with exceptional abilities. Men of exceptional ability in art, science, or religion are, no doubt, very valuable to common men; but it is a pity that their value is assessed in terms of political power and economic wealth, for this in practice degrades the spiritual power. And yet some scientists are purchasable. Some teachers readily accept a political career. This is the reason why political and economic evils are not criticized with the precision and force which would reveal their character. This is why the associations which, as the spiritual power, might be the source of a finer civilization, are chiefly employed to cover with vague phrases and pretty decorations the brutal facts of contemporary barbarism. Science provides the instruments for war; art makes the shelters for hiding the victims from the beneficiaries

of the economic system; and organized religion produces the anæsthetics for oppression and ignorance. But science, art, and organized religion are abstract terms. Actual men and women are at fault. There is an actual betrayal of trust by those who have exceptional abilities and have been given exceptional opportunities. The spiritual power is ineffectual, because living men and women are incapable in this sphere of social life; and most of them are quite complacent, or troubled rather about subordinate defects in the political or the economic spheres than about this inmost emptiness in civilized life. But if politicians are criticized for not being statesmen, and business men or manual workers for serving themselves rather than the community, a counterblast against professors, scientists, artists, and religious leaders, in their social services might be still more biting. Such a judgment, indeed, implies an analysis of contemporary social life which is disputable; but even if it is not accepted, the assumption underlying it may be granted—namely, that from the spiritual power should come the force to change the character of acquired civilization into better forms, and most of all from those men and women who have exceptional ability in the discovery of truth or the creation of beauty.

Social life, however, has not ceased to develop. As in politics we devise new systems of government, as in industry we improve mechanisms and extend the scale of organization—so in culture we are producing some new music and painting, and some recent scientific generalizations point to a transformation of our view of the physical universe. The consciousness of change is common.

The New Spirit

Two characteristics of the present cultural situation, not only in the West but also in China, India, Turkey, and other places, are (1) the supersession of the old idealism in "living up" to an ideal by a new idealism in the search for an ideal worth living up to; and (2) the confidence that there are abilities in men not hitherto used by which social life can be transformed. These characteristics of our time are significantly different from those of the older cultures: for hitherto the spiritual power was chiefly concerned with inculcating what appeared to be an achieved or revealed standard of life; and besides, hitherto men disbelieved in duration or time and therefore assumed that the chief features of the social system to which they were accustomed were permanent. Not only Augustine and Aquinas, but even the much greater Plato and Aristotle, not to speak of Mahomed and Confucius, implied in their social idealism a morality in its main features already complete; and they believed that the social organization they knew had all the essential features of an ideal society. Very few have that sort of confidence now.

Those who deal with the art of life or morality, including in the widest sense of that word all the purposive activities of man, do not yet take seriously the conception of a progressive morality. They still conceive good action to be a conforming to a known "law". They under-estimate the importance of the "frontier" of experience in morality; and they seem to imply that we know in the main what is right with regard, for example, to the relation of the sexes or the

duties of a citizen to his State. Suppose, however, that we do not know more than the A B C of such sections in the art of living; in that case the chief task of the spiritual power is not exhortation but discovery. There may be more than youthful restlessness in the experimentalism of some of the younger generation. Mistakes may lead to destruction, but adventure sometimes leads to discovery; and it is mere dotage to imply that the young, in order to be better than they are, should become like the old. In social life at present there are many who do not in practice believe that a good man or woman would be anything like the models that earlier generations have accepted as their ideals. What is criticized now is not merely the failure to live up to a standard but the standard itself: and it is not yet possible to state clearly the characteristics of a new standard, for we are in a period of moral discovery. The conception of what a good man and a good society are is no longer believed to be found in any sacred tradition: and reinterpretation of old traditions to make them mean what they have never yet meant causes a certain impatience among the younger generation. It is difficult, indeed, to believe that one can discover what is good by any other means than that by which we discover what is true.

In the second place, cultural intercourse, in so far as it is not traditionalist, implies a confidence in the existence of unused abilities. That is why we do not now plan final or ideal commonwealths, except as humorous sketches. We do not know what the forces are with which social life will be sustained when men are freer in intelligence and when they feel more keenly or subtly. Social life in a primitive tribe brought

into play the tendencies to imitation and the ups and downs of the major crises in life—adolescence, disease, sexual intercourse, approaching death. Social life in later periods brought some individuality into play. In our own day social life brings into play some cunning and some useful competence: but men are still very unskilful in understanding other men, and most men are very inert emotionally. Social life, therefore, may contain new elements when intercourse on the cultural level is more skilful: that is to say, when the fine arts move men more powerfully, when the communication of mind with mind is quicker and more intimate. If that were possible in the arts, the sciences, and religion, then perhaps also political and economic relationships would be illuminated; and the spiritual power would become more effectual even in the street and the market-place.

Meantime, in the midst of the obvious world of social organizations and institutions, there is a company of men and women, most of whom are quite unknown, who bear the great tradition of serenity and depth in experience onwards to new achievements. Some of them are dustmen and textile workers; and there are moments in which some other men and women belong to that company, which is called in the Western tradition the City of God or the Communion of Saints. This is a very small element in social life. It is not noticed in the statistics, nor in the current text-books. But it may be the highest point at which men meet and therefore a philosophy of social life must give it due weight. Men in that company do not retire apart but plunge more deeply into human intercourse. The existence of exceptional men and women, of exceptional

experiences in human intercourse above the normal level, of exceptional moments in which even the common man may see farther or hear more keenly—this is the proof of possibilities in social life still unrealized. But for the present purpose it may be only an indication. The discussion of its meaning involves the more general problem of the relation of each man to the community of which he is said to form a part, including under the word "community" all those three sections of social life which have been so far considered.

IV

ORDER AND LIBERTY

In all three of the sections of social life so far discussed a distinction has been implied to exist between the relationship of men and the men who are related. John may be the father of James, but fatherhood remains distinct from both John and James. Some social relationships are momentary or accidental, as when two men collide in the dark; but such relationships as citizenship or industrial service are fixed by custom or habit. In such cases men do the same kind of acts many times and thus create an institution. But no institution is possible unless some acts which a man might do are made impossible: some acts are ruled out. Operative law and organization of some kind is essential to social life; and this is called Order. What, then, remains to the men who are so organized or governed? Under such conditions, is Liberty possible? Only if Liberty means something very different from what it has commonly been taken to mean.

The current conception of liberty is both negative and individualistic. It rests upon obsolete assumptions. Philosophers may be conscious of the defects of such assumptions, but even that is doubtful; and clearly the average journalist or politician is by no means aware of them, for the advocates of "liberty", in the old sense, have a very weak case, and its opponents attack it on the wrong grounds. The controversy in the lecture-room is not important. The quarrels of commentators are trivial. But there is a mortal conflict between the advocates and opponents of liberty in the

sphere of government, industrial organization, and education. In the policies of those who have social power the conflicting conceptions of liberty are operative; and the battle is still uncertain, because it is usually fought upon the basis of unexamined assumptions.

It is implied in the common arguments both for and against liberty that (1) the mere absence of restraint is good, which is as negative as most of the Ten Commandments, and that (2) the individual or the group, whose liberty is under discussion, is essentially a segregate atom in a social void. Such assumptions are inherited partly from the Renaissance, partly from the Enlightenment—an inheritance invested for compound interest by the Utilitarians. Such assumptions lie at the base of most current economic and political theory. They have been effectual in the formation of popular phrases such as "government interference"; and they are the unnoticed supports for fantastic contrasts between "law" and "liberty", "the individual" and "the state", "discipline" and "self-assertion". But that would not matter much, for it has long been obvious that in philosophic argument men "raise the dust and then complain they cannot see". What does matter is that in the daily practice of many powerful persons the same obsolete assumptions lead them to oppose "liberty" in the name of "national unity", or in the name of "the proletarian mind"; and this has grave consequences. These assumptions, therefore, may usefully be examined in order that the field may be cleared for a more consistent and more correct conception of the fact at which, it may be granted, both the old philosophers and we ourselves are looking. The question

is—what is that element or factor in experience which is called "liberty"?

In order to correct the current conception of liberty it may be restated in such terms that its defects are made clear, and this is not merely the setting up of a straw man to be devoured by a bonfire. The restatement is not necessarily a misrepresentation, as the more persuasive original statements of Mill and his followers were not deceptive, although they do imply the omission of objectionable characteristics in describing the object they are intended to explain. Since the underlying assumptions are in question, a restatement of the older conception, having in view quite other assumptions, may easily reveal, without unjustly falsifying the original doctrine, the defects of the foundation upon which the whole argument rested.

False Assumptions

First, liberty is described in terms of restraint removed; or worse still, the increase of liberty is described in two negatives as "the hindrance of hindrances". Clearly a man is not less free if he cannot, because of gravitation, leap over a mountain; but he is really less free if he is bound in chains so that he cannot walk. Restraint is not merely limitation, for there are obviously quite natural limits to any man's powers; and the same holds good of groups of men such as nations, for one nation may not have the ability to organize its members effectually for industry or government or religion. It would be well, therefore, to avoid the words "limit" and "limitation" in speaking of liberty, and use only the word "restraint". There are, properly speaking, no

"limits" to liberty, for liberty is what can occur within natural limits; and whatever obstructs that which can occur within such limits is restraint. The current conception, however, even when it avoids confusing restraint with limitation, rests nevertheless upon the assumption that removal and avoidance are the characteristics of what is free, as the ancient morality rested on the assumption that a good man was simply a man who dodged temptation.

But, secondly, the restraint must be *felt* restraint, or restraint consciously perceived by the person or group lacking liberty. It was agreed by the older exponents of liberty that, although a man might be said to be unfree, even if he had never had any experience of being unchained, and therefore did not feel the chains, yet he was not in the full sense unfree unless he felt himself to be unfree. Thus a slave might not know he was a slave, and he might, speaking loosely, be said to lack liberty; but when a slave felt himself to be a slave, then indeed his liberty was most truly restricted. This explained the apparent paradox that a man or a group might be quite happy without being free, as a cow may be happy in a field of pasture. If happiness was the end, the advocacy of liberty seemed irrelevant; and yet the early utilitarians were libertarian in their prejudices and did not feel inclined to leave men in slavish happiness. The reference to the feeling of restraint, however, does not adequately explain the paradox, although it lessens its destructive force. The further explanation will be attempted below.

For the present it is sufficient to note that consciousness is an essential ingredient in what we call liberty; and the increase of consciousness is obviously good,

even if it leads to a perception that one's liberty is not so great as it seemed to be at first. If we look at actual experience in order to distinguish the free man from the unfree, we agree with the older theorists that the free man is without the restraints unconsciously or consciously present in the case of the unfree. This is not false, but it is hopelessly inadequate to explain why men die for their own liberty or fear it in others. Such are the negative elements in the current conception of liberty: the individualistic elements must now be considered.

Clearly the conception of liberty refers to relationships between human beings. A man or group was conceived to be unfree if obstructed by "the will", as it was called, of another man or group of men. The fantastic psychology of "will" in political philosophy, where the "general will" or "the will of the people" play mythical parts, may be omitted from the discussion here. Perhaps "the will" which obstructed liberty was a complex of actually exerted power, conscious direction and impulsive desire. Now in explaining liberty, any man or group was assumed to be *over against* some other men or group; and liberty consisted in a sort of removal to a distance or elimination of one of the terms in the relation. Thus liberty came to be a conception of social dissolution; and this is pure individualism or, in the case of groups of men, crude nationalism. It is significant of the crudity of current political conceptions that the Fascists who oppose liberty, in the old sense, on the ground that it is a dissolution of the community, advocate this very same antique conception of liberty in regard to Italy as a whole. They see the relations of men within a nation

but not beyond a nation. But nationalism of that kind is only individualism *plus* the mythology which implies that a nation is a person.

Removal of "the other" is the essential characteristic of liberty as conceived within the assumptions of early individualism; for the individual or the group is assumed to be an atomic unit with a whole life of his own or its own. The assumption is worked up into a fantastic psychology of associationism, sense-data, and the rest; and the social elements of all human life are quietly omitted until they are bowed to in a closing chapter or in a footnote. The farther away individuals are from one another, in this conception, the freer each is likely to be; for it is assumed that it is almost an "interference" for any individual or group, if any other individual or group exists in the same universe. Some might note regretfully with Matthew Arnold how—

> God between them bade to be
> The unplumbed, salt estranging sea;

for they did not notice that the sea was an open road, but all assumed that men were in their essence divided.

Society, on this assumption, is a necessary evil; although why it is necessary the individualists could never explain, if individuals are essentially atomic. Liberty, on this assumption, is what we all must "limit" in order to live the only life which has ever been known. The perfect man, as the economists cheerfully assumed, was a Robinson Crusoe without parents or memory on an island in the void of space: and with such an assumption, fantastically misrepresenting the basic facts of all experience, it was possible to reach the conclusions of individualism that the less government

the better, and that all regulation was interference.[1] The original assumption, that the individual is essentially atomic, works havoc with the theory and practice of moral responsibility; and the advocates of "the state" or "the community", similarly assuming that individuals are atoms, dissolve personality into "hot air" and "uplift" about the state or the community. They oppose liberty because liberty, on the old assumptions, is clearly impossible if government is to exist.

Finally, the individualistic assumptions led to identifying liberty with what was called independence—a tell-tale word. The free man was simply not dependent. He was a sturdy ruffian, no doubt, but somewhat exclusive, since theoretically he ought not to have "depended" upon a shoemaker for his shoes or upon a tailor for his clothes or upon an individualist philosopher for his ideas. Thus if one helped him, one might destroy "parental responsibility" or initiate "paternal government"—and either way no help was possible, because parents were conceived to be at once worthy atoms and meddlesome interlopers. Similarly in regard to a group of men, it was conceived to be free when it was not "dependent" upon any other group; and therefore it could be shown that if the foreigner sold you his pottery, he was corrupting your "independence". True the advocates of liberty in the nineteenth century were usually Cobdenites, who desired that "the angel of

[1] It should be noted that an assumption, and not a premise in an argument, is in question. The conscious premises of the economist may be correct, and yet the whole of his argument may be futile in reference to real life because of the unnoticed assumptions upon which the argument rests or within which alone it moves.

peace should descend, clothed in untaxed calico"; but free trade was really not a correct conclusion within the assumptions of a policy of non-interference. If you take non-interference seriously, you must stop trading, just as if you take Bentham's or Herbert Spencer's conception of liberty seriously, you should stop governing. Indeed, it is not certain that you should talk to any other individual, if you are to respect his Spencerian liberty.

The conception of the liberty of nations in the nineteenth century, resting on an individualistic assumption, left the "free" nations without any vital relationship between them. In Canning's words, it was "Every nation for itself and God for us all", and he quite clearly assumed that what was left to God was no business of his. This operated in actual practice in the dissolution of tendencies towards co-operation between governments. A band of robbers was clearly a bad instance of co-operation; and if States were robbers, it was clearly better for their subjects that governments should not co-operate. So in the "New World", where still survive the most obsolete of European conceptions, "no entangling alliances" was seriously advocated as a reasonable policy. And similarly within each State the valid conclusion, within the accepted assumptions, was pure anarchism; but philosophers wriggled out of that conclusion, and political rulers, using the premises of anarchism, urged its suppression.

Liberty and Life

It is time now to look at the facts again and to ask what is meant by liberty in our present experience.

Both those who love their own liberty and those who hate the liberty of others are really thinking of the same factors in life which the older philosophers discussed; but they see these factors in a new light. A new conception of liberty is not to be worked out in a day. Its meaning is to be found not between the covers of a book, but in politics and industry and the religious consciousness, in art and in science. Already the new assumptions which have displaced those of individualism are causing a revision of the current *practice* of government, industrial organization, and cultural movements, especially education. But the practice of men often runs ahead of their theories, as in the case of the Utilitarians. The conceptions of liberty which at that time should have dissolved society actually accompanied an extension of social legislation. In Dicey's description of the change of mind in England during the nineteenth century, the actual transformation appears to be mysterious: for clearly the arguments of individualism were not refuted when what Dicey calls "socialistic" tendencies began to operate. What actually happened? The underlying assumptions were changed and the unrefuted arguments, which had rested on the obsolete assumptions, were left high and dry in the textbooks of economics. The new assumptions, then beginning to operate, are now more easily seen.

It is not possible to analyse fully these assumptions. Some of them, no doubt, cannot be made conscious to us who breathe them. Some are obscurely distinguishable; but they need not be set out in the light here. An indication of their character may, however, be given. It is assumed that human life is essentially, down to its depths and in all its heights, social. Psychology no

longer begins with sense-perception, but with instinct, with what we share rather than what distinguishes us, each from the other. Puritanism and asceticism have given place to good company as an ideal. Governments can rely on an appeal to "the community", whatever that means! Even business men claim to render "service", and professors condescend to be intelligible. In that mass of experience are the new assumptions: but here their effects upon the conception of liberty must be described.

First, if restraint is bad, why is it bad? We can answer such a question more adequately than our predecessors. We have Freud and Jung to help us in theory, and the results of social legislation in practice. Restraint is bad because there is in each man or group of men an inner force which grows upward to a natural height if obstructions are absent. This inner force is the fundamental fact which explains liberty. Liberty is the natural growth of this force. Liberty is one of the aspects of life, in so far as life is an effort. But "effort" is perhaps a misleading word, since in a devitalized population effort seems to be "cost" or objectionable expenditure of energy against a resisting medium: and that is not what is meant by effort here. The enjoyable effort in a game should be the basis of our conception. In any case, if liberty is conceived positively, and not merely by reference to restraint, it is seen to be the enjoyable expansion of personality or activity which is characteristic of every normal individual or group of men. Let us not, therefore, say that liberty is the absence of restraint, but that liberty is the presence of expanding force. Thus the complaint of Matthew Arnold that liberty was only a means falls to the

ground, for life is clearly not a means but an end. The growth element in life is the factor to which the admirers of liberty look, which the opponents of liberty fear. Liberty is the use of the sphere of growth. Such a revision will indicate why the *feeling* of restraint is common in men denied liberty; for this feeling is the result of the growth-force pushing its way upward, and where there is slavishness there is no such force. Perhaps Aristotle was right in saying that some men are born slaves, although he was clearly wrong in implying that the particular men who were treated as slaves in his world were these naturally slavish men. What is slavery for one man *may* be freedom for another, if this other has no inner force to grow beyond his circumstances; but we cannot assume this in any actual case, because the growth-force can be so easily driven under by education or physical starvation. That forces exist within even the contented slave has been revealed by the psycho-analysts. No doubt even in the freest nation there are thousands who are less contented than they appear to be. Acquiescence is not freedom; nor is it a passable substitute for freedom, as dictators argue. The mere absence of restraint or a feeling of restraint is not the fundamental characteristic of liberty, but rather the presence of either an inoperative or an actually energizing force of growth in personality or group-life.

Liberty Needs Order

To pass now to the revision of the old individualistic assumptions, assuming rather that man is fundamentally social, liberty is seen to involve a closer and more continuous contact between persons. What

is obstructive in the conflict of wills, such as the old reformers found in tyranny, is the congealing or constrictive effect of *force* applied by one man or group of men to another. If the only form of contact between persons is similar to that of material objects in contact, that is to say external pressure or friction, then clearly the farther apart individuals or groups are the freer each will be. But because there is a contact of "interpenetration" or the "transfer of meaning" between persons, the materialistic metaphor of individualism must be avoided. Liberty, which is the use of all the natural force in a man, includes the use of such force as he has in his communication with others. A man who can make himself intelligible spreads his personality, as it were, over the frontiers of another personality, and is freer in proportion as the flow of his personality into another is operative. Thus freedom is increased by personal contacts. For not only is the outward flow of persuasiveness an aspect of freedom, but the return from the other personality thus in contact increases the growth-power of the first. Thus a man grows in his unique individuality not by isolation, but by contact with others, so long, of course, as this contact is not merely external. Personalities may not be in mental or emotional contact in a closely locked conflict, for between them lies the insulation of external force.

On this ground it may be shown that "labour laws", for example, not only increase the liberty of the workers, but by improving the quality of their contact with the employers, actually increase the liberty of employers also, because they increase the amount which, as employers, they can "get" out of the whole organization. This is not paradox. Clearly it is, in a

sense, a restriction of the power of the employer, if he is prevented from starving or injuring the worker: the point is that to dam up that outlet of force is really to release much more force even in the "bad" employer. The total of liberty which results from "labour laws" is much greater than existed before, even for employers. The conception that "interference" is opposed to liberty can be accepted only on the assumption that regulation is always and in the end restrictive; but all good regulation releases new forces of contact between persons. If, however, liberty involves not a decrease but an increase of contacts between persons, "independence" or not being dependent upon others is no ideal at all. Indeed, it is an absurdity. The free nation, then, is not one with no "dependence" upon other nations, but precisely the contrary. The freer a nation is, the more varied and intimate its relationships will be with other nations. Again, this is not paradox; nor is it simply accepting an ideal and using the old word "liberty" to give it colour. In actual experience the most highly developed nations—those with the most distinguishable characteristics—are not the nations which have been isolated; they are those that have received the greatest variety of "foreign" influences. France was the centre of European civilization in the eighteenth century because France had been the meeting-place of many nations in scholarship and government during the centuries before; and the prestige of French civilization to-day, for example, in Eastern Europe and in South America is due to the intelligibility for other peoples of French learning and culture. Similar conclusions might be drawn from the position of England in the nineteenth century. And

what we find in both cases is liberty in the contact of nations.

Nations are but groups of persons, differing among themselves in outlook, temper, and intelligence, who are intimately in contact through sharing the same language and tradition. And nations are not atomic, as individuals are not, for their influences interpenetrate. Now the use of the force of genius or ability within any nation is made more possible by the more varied contact which communication across frontiers may give. The genius of a nation as a whole is developed by the more intimate contact with another nation, as in the case of individuals in a community; and the sort of contact which takes place in war or the preparation for war is restrictive of liberty because it insulates the national spirit and does not allow the ebb and flow of ideas or other activities across frontiers. Thus interdependence in regard to food-stuffs or finance does not diminish but increases the liberty of the parties concerned, except in so far as it diminishes the liberty to go to war! But the position of a nation no longer able to go to war is like that of the employer whose "liberty" is "restricted" when he is prevented from injuring the workers. The nation's power to go to war is "restricted" only in as much as real liberty is not consonant with that licence. Whatever restricts contact of mind and emotion prevents liberty: and that which now most restricts such contact is war and the preparation for war.

Clearly the only policy consistent with this conception of the liberty of nations is closer co-operation. Non-interference, as it was shown above, left the units unrelated. It is obsolete. No nation in the modern

world can avoid affecting in some way the lives of others; and to attempt to reduce the world of States to entirely separable solar systems, as if each State could revolve about its capital city without "gravitation" from outside, is to misread the facts of political astronomy. There is no help for it. Either the influences affecting nations from outside must be left to chance or they may be directed. We cannot abolish them. But the attempt to introduce a new order into the relation of States should not be conceived as a restriction of their liberties. Such an order does not diminish, it actually increases the available force for wealth or life in each nation. Its most obvious effect would be to reduce the friction or external pressure of fear and suspicion which now freezes into immobility the adventurousness of men: for war is not adventurous, it is deadening dullness with spasms of insane excitement. The non-individualistic conception of liberty is the true basis for an increase in social organization both within and beyond the frontiers of any State.

Social Liberty

The chief results of conceiving liberty outside the field of negative and individualistic assumptions would be to destroy the supposed conflict between law and liberty or between discipline and self-realization. In the positive sense of the word "liberty" and in its social implications, law is always and in every way an extension of liberty. Clearly there may be bad laws, which do in fact restrict liberty; just as there may be "government interference" if the acts of government are ineffectual for the purposes of

government. But there is nothing in the nature of law or government which should make us desire to diminish them in the interests of liberty. Law is the sphere of existing liberties, and new laws, if they are good laws, extend that sphere. All good government assists and does not interfere, and in such an assertion it is implied that it assists more and more as civilization becomes more intricate. Similarly discipline is the ordering of the increase of available forces, and there is no excuse for a discipline which utilizes only existing force and gives no place for more. The whole purpose, indeed, of law, government, discipline, and order is nothing but liberty. This liberty, however, is neither a mere removal of restraint nor an isolation.

Obviously this liberty is not the self-assertion of a truculent atom in a social void nor the barbaric segregation of a nation. It is thoroughly social. Indeed, if liberty is essentially an individualistic and negative factor in life, the sooner we abolish liberty the better. But perhaps even the Utilitarians were thinking of something greater than their descriptions imply. They saw the real thing but not enough of it. And if it gives satisfaction to any reader to believe that the conception of liberty explained above is only a development of the old conception, he is welcome to such belief. Undoubtedly Mill, for example, at the end of his life saw the social implications of liberty. But most commentary upon dead philosophers is waste of time. The important issue at present is the prevalence of an appeal against the inner force of men in behalf of an external framework of government or order. This inner force of common men is difficult to govern by persuasion, for the skill to persuade is rare; and those who lack ability

to persuade the members of the group in which they live, fly to the crude control by external pressure "for the good of the governed"—a parody of government. Tyranny is always a proof of the incompetence of the tyrant, just as a blow is a proof of incompetence in argument. Intellectuals self-styled, when they cannot make themselves intelligible, complain of the dullness of common men.

In order to understand the inner force, essentially social, which runs through the life of common men, it would be necessary to analyse psychologically the experience of governing and being governed, of organizing production and consumption, and, above all, the experience of teaching and being taught. Only after such psychological analysis, by the modern methods of experiment and by such methods as are used in "abnormal" psychology, can the nature of liberty be understood. Some of the defects of the older assumptions, which obstruct our practice in government, industry, and education, are defects of crude metaphysics; but most of the defects are due to a faulty psychology. The common man simply does not behave as most of the theorists of government believe; nor are "the leaders" or the intellectuals half so "original" as they themselves believe. But the fundamental fact is this. In persons or groups of persons there is a sort of "inner" force which can be brought into operation by intellectual and emotional communication. It is, no doubt, a metaphor to speak of "inner" and "outer" in this connection; but there is a real distinction between persuading a man and pushing him. He can be pushed, of course, and pushing is easier than persuading. To move another person physically is often easier than to

induce him to move by his own force. But the second method alone is government.

Even on the assumption, however, that it is better to persuade than to push, some doubt may be felt in regard to the abilities of common men or primitive groups. The liberty which is admittedly admirable for us may seem to be undesirable for less excellent persons; and so democracies become tyrannous in colonial dependencies, just as the leaders of "industrial democracies" may practise dictatorship. The ostensible reason is usually the inability of common men, the lack among them of that inner force which seems to the tyrant or the dictator so obviously to be possessed by himself. Similarly self-styled "upper" classes are in grave doubt of the possibility of liberty for the rest of the community. These superior persons do not find that others value them as highly as, in their surely competent opinion, they should be valued. What appears to be lacking in common men is precisely that inner force of intelligence or emotion upon which the new conception of liberty rests.

This difficulty, however, is met by reference to "abnormal" psychology. Contemporary social life is largely abnormal. Repressions and pernicious "complexes" are common. Convention and traditional beliefs hold men enthralled so completely that probably not half of the abilities of common men are "in play" in the ordinary conduct of life. The admiration for riches in domestic affairs and the fear of foreign bogies in foreign relations dominate the situation into which each generation is born. In this sense, indeed, Rousseau was right in saying that "men are born free and everywhere they are in chains"; but it is not social life nor civiliza-

tion which enchains them. The "instinct" of admiration or of fear may be natural; but what to admire or to fear has to be learnt, and, as most of us have learnt from our grandmothers, most of us are wrong. The abilities of common men are much greater than the existing circumstances allow them to seem to be; stores of intelligence and emotion lie under the incrustations of the past, reinforced as they are by many of the practices of government, industrial organization, and education. To release these forces in common men is to give them liberty.

But can the existence of such forces be proved? Or is the belief in their existence a blind, if noble, faith? The indications of something more in common men and in ordinary social life than meets the eye can be found in somewhat the same way as the medical practitioner diagnoses mental disorder. There are traces of forces not operative in ordinary life which come to the surface in crises, for example, devotion to public service in war. And again, modifications in government have actually brought into play abilities hitherto unsuspected. The conclusion from much evidence of this character is that the available supply of personality and social intercourse is much greater than the amount we already use, and that infinitely more can be made available. But perhaps some of the chief obstacles to liberty are psychological, "within" the minds of persons, if one may use that metaphor. Men are in reality freer than they think they are, but in thinking themselves unfree they enchain themselves. Many a nation complaining against oppression would be enfranchised if complaint gave place to laughter at the bogies that keep them quiet.

This clearly does not imply that "outer" circumstances are irrelevant, for it is pure sentimentalism to say that a man starving to death can have a "free" mind. The refusal of political or economic liberty on the ground that the inner life is untouched by such refusal is a well-known psychological "cover fantasy" of conservatism. Every evil can be excused on the ground that there is "a soul of good" in it. The abilities of a subject who is not a citizen, of a worker who is underfed, of a child who is drilled, are not "in play"—neither the spiritual, nor the intellectual, nor the emotional abilities. But, on the other hand, the force which is personality or community is not a force acting by external pressure or material position: it is a force of a unique character whose growth depends upon the intensity of experience and its communicability. The nature of that force is inadequately studied and not very clearly conceived even by those who have worked upon social psychology. But here lies the issue of the immediate future both in theory and in practice. Here lies the answer to the problems of liberty.

V

MAN AND SOCIETY

PHILOSOPHERS less subtle than those of the Middle Ages feel no difficulty about such words as "and" or such phrases as "member of"; but even to write "man and society" has committed us to an assumption which may not be justifiable, and to say that men are "members" of a community or of a trade union is so alarming a metaphor that it would startle Duns Scotus. It is unwise, however, to ask scientists what they mean when they feel very passionately about what they say, for the confusion becomes even greater than it was if passion gets into explanation. It is supposed to be obvious that men exist *and* that States and Trade Unions and Churches exist; and who would be so foolish as to raise difficulties about the difference between existence and essence? Many who claim to be scientists with regard to politics or economics suppose it to be obvious that there is an "essence" called "public opinion" or "the will of the people" or "utility"; and what Occamite would now dare to say that entities are not to be multiplied?

We should know more about the nature of social life if we did not unconsciously assume that we already know more than we do. The fundamental issues of the philosophy of social life, therefore, are not the conclusions, nor even the premises, which have been so far analysed, but the assumptions on which both premises and conclusions rest. And it is difficult to dig down to those assumptions, because the only words available are the results of those very assumptions.

If one asks what is meant by "social", the word social itself prevents one finding an answer underneath it. So much psychology is now known that psychologists become quite angry if they are asked what psychology is. So much "truth" is "useful" that it makes even philosophers with a taste for social reform become abusive if one asks whether it is "useful" to regard the two as identical. The truth is—but it may not be useful—that the frontier of knowledge and what lies outside it may be more important for our understanding of social life than the whole of what is now contained within it. One of the difficulties in the philosophy of social life is that the assumptions implied in political science and economics are not recognized as assumptions, and to examine their value may require an expedition beyond their frontiers.

We face the frontier, however, from within it. The aspects of social life which, in general, seem to be pervasive can be classified as subject-matter either for psychology or for metaphysics, that is to say, "first philosophy". This classification, then, will be adopted in what follows, although the psychological aspects of the problem seems to be of no importance for our purpose here except in providing a new language for the statement of assumptions. It is not a philosophical explanation of beauty, for example, to say that it is an "adjective" of the motor-affective relation; but such a statement may be a better instrument for the discovery of what beauty is than earlier and simpler statements. The only trouble at present seems to be that even philosophers seem to believe that they have found an answer when they have found a new word in which to ask the question.

Language

The psychological aspects of all social life, stated in modern terms, no longer seem to involve atomic individualism. Fortunately, it is no longer necessary to argue that "men" are not atoms in a container called society. There is a mind-group consisting of or formed by—but both phrases are metaphorical—the members of the group. The psychological structure of the group embodies or expresses or *is* the form of communication present; and the most interesting and important form of communication, for our present purpose, is language. All language is communication, in the sense that there is no word whose "meaning" does not express a *social* relation. The word "red", for example, means much more fundamentally a relation between you and me than a sense-datum—whatever that may be! Clearly the word "red" does not mean only a relation between you and me, but it means that first and foremost. When I say "red" or you say "red", both of us look in the same direction; and it is much more important that we look in the same direction than that our sensations are similar. No language at all would exist if mental process occurred in a mind taken singly; and it seems unlikely that any thinking, in the usual sense of the word, ever exists or has existed which is not a reference by two or more minds, in which each mind refers to the other at the same time as it refers to the so-called object of thought. Similarly, "meaning" is reference which a word or a phrase has for more than one mind. It is not necessary to suppose that what I "mean" by a word is any more than whatever you can get at by looking in the direction

in which my word points for you. All languages, therefore, consist of "pointers" for use in co-operation. What I mean by "dog" depends, as we say, on the universe of discourse; and this universe is the social experience within which the communication takes place. But the words which indicate to you what I am interested in, selected from the vast number of factors impinging upon us—that is, what are called nouns and adjectives—are probably not so fundamental as verbs. Psychologically, a verb is, more definitely than a noun or an adjective, a reference to a social relation. It is more "subjective" in the old bad language. And one of the tragedies of logic is the turning of a perfectly good verb into a mere composite of a noun and an adjective, as when the textbook says that "I hit you" is the same as "I (subject) am—hitting you (adjective of me!)". But this over-simplifies the variety of meanings in language. Again, psychologically, language is passionate. That is to say, it has reference to my "motor-affective interest" in you and in the direction in which we are both looking. The pure scientist, if there is such a person, tries even in philosophy to extract and throw away the passion in language; and so we read about $x\,y\,z$ and R^2 instead of about chairs and tables and relations. But the assumption implied in the belief that "facts" can be best viewed by philosophers through formulæ is at least doubtful. The by-products of the meaning of words may be more valuable than the raw material extracted in the making of a formula. One may have left out just what matters in philosophy when one has left out all that cannot be put into a colourless symbol. The so-called "inexactness" of language is not a dis-

advantage for understanding a very "inexact" universe; and why should we assume that the universe is as tidy as an algebra? But if language is allowed its full weight as an expression of passionate appreciation, then the tertiary qualities—beauty and the rest—are given a more fundamental place in philosophy, and their discovery is seen to come through personal communication.

Finally, language is not merely a collection of words. It is more exact to speak of *a* language as a whole in which the interplay of all the members of a group, dead and living, is expressed. Every language is traditional. The forms of meaning which are available for an English-speaking group are not the same as those available for a Chinese group. Translation is never a complete substitution, although it seems possible for a man to enter into a language-universe other than that in which his earliest experience occurred. But further, not only is every word and phrase a part in the whole which is *a* language, this or that language as a whole is itself a part in a whole structure of behaviour-patterns which are the customs of a group. Each "member" of the group does what he does in reference to what each other is doing at the same time. What is called my action is only part of a "curve", of which the other parts are the actions of others in my group; and thus communication is the characteristic of the mental or psychical. Custom in a group is mental structure. My act is not completed and then added to yours, for each act of each one in a group is modified in its formation by reference to expectation or insight in reference to the acts of others in the group. Social life is not a whole of parts, nor even an organism

of organic parts, but in another metaphor may be understood as a compound of elements in "organic" chemistry. The elements are "minds" or individuals, and no one can precipitate an individual even by the experiments of religious individualism.

That sympathy or emotional continuity, which is implied in communication through language, is a psychological factor, fundamental in all social life. The names for the relations of the individuals in any such life are attachment, affection, and other such terms. On such relationships are built the various forms of co-operation, which are either transient or customary or institutional; and within this whole psychological structure there are some forms of co-operation which are consciously purposive. But if the forms which are purposive are those explained by such words as "will", then probably neither the State nor the Church nor even most economic institutions can be explained by use of the word "will". Psychologically, it seems likely that the State is not *for* the good life, but *is* the good life; association of that kind is not for a further purpose, but is "its own reward". Even the "will for" the State seems too definite a phrase to represent the psychological factors to which the phrase refers. But clearly we suffer from a lack of words and phrases to explain social experience, for what is not "purposive" is commonly regarded as "determined" or as "accidental". And yet the way in which mental process forms the structures called institutions is probably not either "purposive" or "determined" or "accidental". Indeed, the same kind of process seems to occur as in the painting of a picture or the composition of a piece of music. The State and other such institutions

are psychologically "works of art", and works of art are not designed for a purpose.

Unconscious Grouping

Allowance must therefore be made for co-operation in fact, which is not designed and not even present to the minds of men assisting one another, after they have had it pointed out. For example, the man who grows the cotton for manufacture co-operates with the Chinaman who wears the cotton clothing made by Lancashire operatives out of the raw cotton; but the co-operation is not conscious, and can hardly be made so, even if it is mental. It seems unlikely that the cotton-picker "ought" to feel his co-operation with the Chinaman, for a vague cosmopolitanism of that kind destroys the structure of immediate contacts and "individualizes" the relations of persons who are parts of the structure of distinct mind-groups. That is to say, the way for any member of a group to the members of other groups is through the whole groups. Psychologically, that seems to be the only possibility, except for intellectuals or "schizophrenic" persons. That is to say, although there may be some contact between an Englishman and a Chinaman, nevertheless the more important relation is one between England and China —which are, of course, not mythical entities, but mind-groups, sometimes denoted mythologically. Britannia and Liberty are not indeed young ladies in pseudo-classical costumes; but the figures of myth stand for real factors in experience, which are perhaps better rendered in mythology than in statistical or geographical terms. There are wholes which are groups, national or of other kinds; but no group is impermeable or

"without windows". The contact between groups in very barbaric circumstances is quite external. Each has a protective shell. But as civilization develops, groups tend to interpenetration, which promotes vitality in each.

These psychological factors in social life are most obvious in close associations such as the family or the groups of friends. Good company is the highest ideal of social life; a man who is *déraciné* is in hell. But the unit-groups which underlie such complicated mental structures as nations, states, trade unions, and the rest, differ in the intensity of the life they embody and express. Casual acquaintance in a community which has a place for social skill is the first step in a voyage of discovery. The discovery of personality is the cure of nostalgia from which subtle minds suffer; but one dare not in the present banality of social sciences introduce a commentary upon Dante's *Vita Nuova*, for it must be confessed that there are no statistics of passionate personal love. It is understood, however, that in such a situation the whole of experience takes on a new colour, and even chairs and tables seem different from what they seemed to be before. It would be entertaining to hear a symbolic logician render in a formula the statement: "Take, O! take those eyes away . . . lights that do mislead the morn." At another level occurs what is called friendship. This is another kind of discovery of personality, which is essential to the good life; and perhaps all political, economic, and cultural organization is maintained by and exists in the friendship of distinct groups. Obviously it is a more important experience that a man should find friends in his occupation through his trade union

than that he should continue to raise his wages through it. But in thus comparing a man's different experiences, the test of importance is philosophical, in the sense that one experience more than another illuminates for a man the nature of the world he lives in and strengthens his ability to live in it.

The position of any "man" with respect to any other is always changing; and what is meant by the "same man" in the different stages of the change is probably different. We say that a new person communicating or a new situation "brings out" new characteristics in any man. In some extreme cases a man appears to be "out of himself", either in anger or fear or ecstasy of joy; and always there is more in a man than what happens to be "in play" in any given situation. Again, in dreams or in abnormal states, new characteristics of tendency or of structure seem to be revealed in any man. Indeed, it is believed by some psychologists that sleep is a relief, partly because of the strain involved in waking life in being a member of a society. A man, as it were, can go to pieces safely in sleep, but in waking life he has to hold together and to hold in place the abilities or characteristics useful in his position in the social whole. Thus each man, the so-called "member" of a group, *is* society: he is all the parts he plays, and he plays every part in the group to which he belongs in so far as he puts himself into the position of "the other fellow" in discovering what he himself is. Psychologically, I see myself as you see me when I respond to your co-operation with what I am about to do. The self is a discovery made in communication, but it is not a creation of that communication such that a higher unit or group-mind can be said to exist. Mind-

groups are not group-minds, in the old "substance" sense of group-mind, for individuals or "percipient events" are real. The relation of the individual to the group is, however, best seen in the case of the great artist.

The fine arts, or rather the actual "works of art" in painting, music, architecture, and poetry, tell us more both about the nature of mind and about social life than do the puzzles for rats analysed by traditional psychology. That is to say, mind or mental process is what results in Michelangelo's "David" and Beethoven's "Fifth Symphony". Social life is expressed in these, but not any one is a Michelangelo or a Beethoven. The peculiar fact, however, for the present argument is that only when social life is vigorous does great art appear. At the beginning of the industrial era the old forms of society were dissolved and each so-called "individual" became an atom in the void; more exactly one may say that the relations of men became superficial. A pervasive ugliness is the characteristic of a superficial society, and perhaps the ugliness exists not only in dress and houses, but also in the shapes of human bodies and the expressions in human faces. Psychologically, the contact of minds in such a situation is the barest impact of one against another. Intimacy disappears. But by contrast with such a barbarism, the Middle Ages show an intimacy and intensity of human intercourse, resulting in the cathedral of Chartres; and in the Renaissance in Italy the mind-group makes Michelangelo's work possible. A very large field for psychological analysis, therefore, may be found in the conditions of artistic creation. But enough has now been said in reference to the psychological factors, the description of which involves making

those assumptions which imply our metaphysics or first philosophy.

The question then arises as to the nature of that reality called man or "mind in society" by comparison with other realities, whether "matter" or triangles or the law of contradiction. This, however, is a metaphysical problem which need not be considered by the political scientist or the economist. When the question is asked, "What is social life?" or "What is price?" the answers may be, and generally are, descriptions of certain restricted areas of the actual or the possible; and that is enough for most men to-day, because these are the ages of faith—faith, that is to say, in scientific assumptions. But the question "What is social life?" may mean, "How does that factor in experience appear to be related to stones and stars and triangles and logical contradiction?" And, as was confessed above, we have probably not yet enough evidence for an answer, although some more evidence has become available than earlier philosophers had.

Social Life and Science

First, social life is the pervasive or inclusive factor in all the processes by which stones and stars and triangles are in contact with us. It is impossible to dissolve away tradition, as Descartes thought he could. But when in any scientific experiment it is impossible to eliminate a certain factor—say, gravitation—it is usual to vary the position of the object affected in order that what cannot be eliminated may be distinguished from the factors being studied in the experiment. So, although we cannot eliminate the social factor in experience, we may allow for it and distinguish

it, over against other data. If we do not allow for it, we tend to read as data what are really effects of the process of observing them.

The social aspect of the data of experience has not been sufficiently studied in philosophy. Quite obviously the poetry or painting or music of one age is not that of another, and these are the records of what was experienced—these rather than the pale ghosts of mathematical calculation. The language of one group or period is not the same as that of others, and each language is the instrument through which men perceive and feel the facts. It is not accident and not unimportant that Aristotle thinks in Greek and Kant in German. The tragedy of the categories is a perpetual reminder of that. No one who knows any philosophy seems to be able nowadays to think in mediæval Latin, and so the mediæval philosophy appears to be a senseless gabbling. We look through works of art—including, of course, language in its finished forms in poetry—to see the only things we can see; and not all the strength of a Leibniz can reduce such passionate words as "harmony" to the colourless ghostliness of a scientific formula. Every philosophy is the philosophy of a particular social group, and the philosophy of social life, therefore, is not irrelevant nor unimportant for "first philosophy". To erect a metaphysical system out of the child's building-blocks of contemporary mathematical symbols is childish, unless we allow for the Arabs who worked at the symbolizing of numbers. We see only what we are able to see, and what we are able to see depends upon the social group to which we belong.

But clearly we see what is there to be seen. If Occam saw one thing and I see another, that *may* not prove

either of us mistaken. Error and illusion occur, but the data of experience are sufficiently numerous for each of many social groups to "get at" real data without actually getting at the same data. In a Kantian sense, perhaps the understanding makes Nature, if that means that we can see only what we are able to see; but the understanding does not create its object, since what we see is there to be seen. The point, however, for our argument here is in the word "we". The things seen are seen by a group. The understanding is social; and here perhaps is the ground for some moderate forms of Pragmatism. Why we see one thing and not another is probably because of the direction in which we are looking, that is to say, our common "purpose". The sort of truth that matters to us is the truth that is useful—to us; but, of course, the fact that it is useful to us, and that another truth is not useful to us, does not show that truth is utility, since what is not useful to us may be very useful to some other group.

Now the general character of the factors that are not mental should be rendered in such a way that their impinging upon a whole group experience is made obvious. A certain unity of stones and stars and triangles is indicated in that they are all found together. They are related: that is to say, relation is pervasive. But so also is distinction of one from the other; and although some factors are derivative from others, as green from blue and yellow, there are many factors which cannot be assumed to be more or less fundamental to the structure of the real world than others. The danger for a philosopher lies in the attractiveness, for his type of mental process, of certain kinds of factor. Thus triangles may have a superior attractiveness.

But it is dangerous to begin philosophy with statements about such pervasive characteristics as space-time, because these statements seem to omit reference to the emotional or motor-affective, and also to the social aspects of all experience, whether that of immediate or that of very abstract perception. The measurement and duration of "things" is not more fundamental than their beauty or goodness. The so-called values or tertiary qualities are not derivative; nor can they be "explained" as emergent from space-time, any more than the effectiveness of a Beethoven melody can be "explained" by analysing the vibrations of air which it causes. The "red patch"—presumably an English letter-box, which the philosophers of sense-data adore—has motor-affective aspects much more important than its intellectual effects. Beauty is not a subordinate characteristic of "things", but is probably more significant of their nature than is extension or duration. Similarly, Hegel's Being and Becoming are too intellectualist.

There is some connection between being beautiful and being round or long-lasting, and one *may* emerge from the other; but "emergence" is a new word which is sometimes used, not to explain but to hide the fact that no explanation has been found. And therefore it is dangerous to be satisfied with a conjuring trick by which everything appears to come out of everything else, like rabbits emergent from a hat or baggage from a "little Austin". There is always a suspicion that the rabbit emerges which the conjuror had previously inserted. And so Deity emerges. The larger problems of metaphysics, however, cannot be discussed here; it is enough to point out that the data of experience

are not quite so unexciting as mathematical and physical theories seem to imply.

We must, however, begin somewhere, and there is no objection to beginning with mathematical or physical concepts, if it be understood that we could equally well show how space-time is emergent from beauty. The connection of realities is not a one-way route. But there are two quite distinct factors involved in the connection between the "factors of fact": one is the relation of the data of experience, in which clearly the beauty coexists with the size of an object presented; the other is time or duration. And it may seem that the relation of events in time or duration *is* a one-way route. It cannot be denied that history is a reasonable study, but history is not metaphysics. The conception of emergence which attempts to derive the "values" from the "facts" seems to read history into metaphysics; that is to say, it seems to imply that a factor is more fundamental which occurs *before* another factor. What is more fundamental may be taken to mean more "real"; and it is to be feared that some modern philosophers have not escaped from the old error of taking "real" for an adjective and assuming grades of reality. On the other hand, what is maintained here implies that, even if "mind" appeared later in history than "matter", it does not follow that the *metaphysical* explanation of mind can be derived from its relation to matter any more than the metaphysical explanation of matter can be derived from its relation to mind. Similarly with beauty or deity in relation to space-time. There is no one-way route for metaphysics.

The Nature of Mind

A second section of philosophy which may be influenced by the philosophical study of social life is that which is concerned with "mental process". This is assumed here to include thinking, seeing, feeling, and the rest of that group of factors. Now, many of the difficulties of explaining mental process arise from the assumption that there is an obvious two-term relation, subject-object, thinker-thing. Thinking and the rest are assumed to be names for such relations; and whenever a philosopher has started upon an expedition to discover either one of the two terms, he has come back with the story that there is nothing there! Hegel said the "object" was a ghost, and Holt said the "subject" was. But why should we assume that thinking is a relation, and, above all, a two-term relation? Largely, of course, because of our language and its structure, as affected by mediæval metaphysics; but to explain a bad habit is not to excuse it. The best of modern philosophers find it hard to escape from the mediæval theory that there is "something which thinks", and it must not be *assumed* that there is not. But perhaps thinking, in so far as it is a relation, is a relation of minds within a group. Even seeing or other sense-perception appears to be so different in a dog and a man, and, in fine art, so different in a European and a Chinaman that seeing also may be what it is in each man because of the group to which he belongs. It is assumed in this, however, that seeing is *not* the "bodily" reflection of an object in an eye, which clearly is not a group phenomenon. Seeing is a form of thinking, no less but no more "bodily" than thinking. But one

should refrain from further speculation in this region, for it seems to enrage philosophers if it is implied that the nature of mental process is not obvious.

Suppose that "seeing a tree" is, in a sense, "being a tree",[1] and that feeling a hard book is "being a hard book", then mental process is a form of "being real", not derivative from terms in a relation. To ask "How knowledge is possible" implies "How, with these assumptions (a mind and an object), can this situation (an object in a mind) be possible?" And in spite of Kant's effort, he does not seem to have proved that *with his assumptions* his theory of knowledge *is* possible. But there was no reason to ask "How is knowledge possible?" any more than to ask "How is a tree possible?" Trees, indeed, are most unlikely, if no "events" have any character; but trees exist. The assumptions implied in the old epistemology were wrong. Similarly, if we *assume* that seeing is *not* thinking, it is impossible to close the gap between them. But "seeing a tree" may be "being there or thus", and in two ways, namely, from inside (empathy) and from outside, if the spatial metaphor may be excused. Now all "there" or "thus" is relative. No absolute "there" exists. Class names (universals, etc.) are delimitations of each "there" or "thus" in relation to one "field" or another. "Tree" is the name for the *locus* of a changing particular in a changing relation, and most, if not all, class names are *loci* in reference to a social structure. That is to say, universals are

[1] There is no objection to the phrase "seeing a red patch", if the "red patch" has emotional characteristics; but no one ever sees a pure "sense-datum" if a "sense-datum" is a symbol in a formula. We see red books, not red patches.

mental perspectives, objects perhaps, but by no means "eternal", whose "ingression into events" is the social perspective. Perhaps the relations of each event to other events are infinite in number; but in any case the particular groups of relations which are the characteristics named in the definition of it are those which appear in the adjustments to it of groups of minds. I "place" an object by acting so that my relation to it is a function of my relation to you and others. The justification for such an hypothesis requires much more argument; but for the present purpose it is enough to suggest that social philosophy may be important for the metaphysics of "mind" or "thought".

There are treatises on mind which never even refer to social experience, and there are speculations about mind which depend upon ghost-hunting or table-rapping, and not upon the unexplored regions of ordinary language and ordinary affection. Why should it be more "psychical" if a table enunciates a platitude than if a dustman empties a dustbin? Presumably because "mind" is still assumed to be a sort of "geni" in a bottle, called a body. Even "social" psychologists seem not yet to have discovered social life, for they manœuvre in the mists of instinct when they might consider language. They seem still to believe that "social" means what is common to particulars called "minds", whereas in fact it means the structure "between" minds.

Short of a new theory of mind, which might be the result of a study of the philosophy of social life, there may be new theories of art and of science, in so far as science is a "work of art". And these would probably affect our ethics or theory of morality, for we have suffered too long from the conception of morality as

adherence to a law. The conception of purpose as the conscious approach to the preconceived end of a process probably needs correction; but at any rate, with regard to "the good life", as it is called, a closer study of social life would show that (1) what is sometimes conceived by philosophers to be a means is in practice an end, as when men join an army for good fellowship; and that (2) there is no preconceived plan or end in the best and finest lives, just as there is no fixed idea in the mind of a great artist when he composes a symphony.

With the conception of a "moral law" goes the conception of obligation and command, mainly negative command as to avoidances. But all such conceptions belong to a state of social life which is primitive. Kant is as obsolete as Moses, for morality is an art; and a fine quality of character or personality is like a work in one of the fine arts. Perhaps there is some sense in the old phrases, for the "moral law" may be to morality as the laws of perspective are to painting, and what a barbarian calls "obligation" may be what a civilized man calls attractiveness. But without an interpretation so drastic as almost to reduce the ancient phrases to ghosts in a graveyard, it is impossible to use, as explanations of the ideal, the taboos of an earlier age. To a civilized man murder is not attractive, and he feels no obligation or categorical imperative preventing him from committing murder. The whole flow or energy of social experience is misrepresented by the metaphors drawn from law in primitive communities. Even the metaphors of social authority drawn from "will" originate in obsolete autocracies.

But if the arts as creative and works of art as the best expressions of creation may be our guides in

understanding moral experience, then perhaps "good" is a subordinate and somewhat misleading form of beauty. The ideal should be rendered in terms of the beautiful, whether we discuss social situations or moral character or conduct. It would then be obvious in ethical theory, as it certainly is in practice, that there is no excuse for being a "good" man who is utterly unattractive! And as a serious result for general philosophy, the finest social products which are works of art would be understood to be revelations of the characteristics of the world. Certainly more can be learnt about the world from the "David" of Michelangelo or the "Fifth Symphony" of Beethoven than can be learnt from any scientific formula. Art is not a substitute for philosophy; nor will poetry excuse bad reasoning; nor is philosophy a Pasteurized form of religion. But if there is such a thing as religious consciousness or æsthetic appreciation, it may provide material from which philosophy can arrive at conclusions. What the material is cannot be discussed here, but we cannot obtain it except through social life. The philosophy of social life, therefore, besides correcting the specialisms of economics and political science, besides discovering principles which hold with regard to all the relations of a man to other men, may also be useful in illuminating certain dark corners in the experience all men have of the world of stars and triangles. But the philosophy of social life requires an examination of all those inherited assumptions about thought and mind and society which imply that we know more than we actually do. Progress in thought, as in experience generally, consists not in rearranging acquired possessions, but in advancing beyond present frontiers.



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