

Sketches of intellectual and moral relations / By Daniel Pring.

Contributors

Pring, Daniel, 1789-1859.

Publication/Creation

London : Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1829.

Persistent URL

<https://wellcomecollection.org/works/kfvevgqh>


License and attribution


This work has been identified as being free of known restrictions under copyright law, including all related and neighbouring rights and is being made available under the Creative Commons, Public Domain Mark.

You can copy, modify, distribute and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, without asking permission.



Wellcome Collection
183 Euston Road
London NW1 2BE UK
T +44 (0)20 7611 8722
E library@wellcomecollection.org
<https://wellcomecollection.org>





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2018 with funding from
Wellcome Library

<https://archive.org/details/b29292979>

SKETCHES
OF
INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL
RELATIONS.

BY
DANIEL PRING, M.D.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, LONDON.

LONDON :
LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN.

1829.

BATH :

PRINTED BY GEORGE WOOD,
UNION STREET.



PREFACE.

THE Reader having just finished a critical perusal of my title-page, his curiosity, or, perhaps, some motive even less complimentary, may put him upon inquiring what one, whose business it is to repair the body, has got to do with the mind? or how one, whose profession is at least in part mechanical, and altogether, as it may appear, averse to speculation, could presume to interfere with a department so much above his proper sphere? It must be allowed that there is some reason in these exceptions; but I will reply to them by claiming an apology from the customary practice of men, which is, first, to project and to execute their designs, and afterwards inquire how far they were qualified for the undertaking. To some such inversion of the appropriate

order, these Sketches may trace their origin. An early propensity to speculation led to desultory readings upon speculative topics ; and the result of a confused information, and a hasty judgment, was a vivid apprehension that the state of opinion upon the subjects which most concerned us, was that of a perfect chaos—a conflict of assumptions, and conjectures ; of truths, errors, and deceptions ; sophisms, prejudices, and contradictions ; from amidst which it was impossible to choose a creed, upon which the mind might repose with satisfaction.

Upon this conviction was founded the chivalrous design of making for myself an analysis of relations, both in the physical and moral departments ; and with no better, or more systematic preparation than that just confessed, this task was commenced ; and has since been pursued, if not always with energy, at least with no very considerable interruption, except from more imperative duties. The proposed order of this enterprise was, first, an analysis of the laws of the organic life ; and, as a sequel to it, one of intellectual, and moral relations. The first was prosecuted with all the advantages of a professional pursuit, which derived aid from habitual practice and reflection, and with the

confidence also of a first ardour, and of unbroken energies : the second has been proceeded in with the hesitation, diffidence, and apathy of one, who is not sure of his footing—who is sensible of his temerity in mingling his poor reflections with those of the greatest geniuses, and who has, moreover, lived long enough to suffer a considerable abatement of that enthusiasm, which is only in full vigour, before experience of life has dissipated its illusions.

It has been the custom of Authors to make some sort of propitiatory invocation to the reader—deprecating his severity by the epithets, gentle, courteous, liberal, indulgent reader ! For my own part, I do not think readers are often very gentle, or even merciful : but although I have no very great faith in these qualities, I am sensible that the following performance will stand in need of them in a more than common degree. In apology, therefore, for the numerous defects which I cannot but anticipate, I will beg the reader to remember that I profess only to make partial sketches ; that there is no attempt at laboured classifications ; that the customary classifications are either neglected, or not known ; and that the discussion of no single topic is assumed to be

complete. If it should be inquired why, confessing these imperfections, I hazard the publication of my remarks? my answer is, That I believe they will contribute something to a more comprehensive analysis of human nature than could have been attempted by a mere scholar, or metaphysician, without some such aid. It may be doubted whether mankind are sufficiently alive to the importance of this design. They cannot, however, have failed to remark the prevalent inconsistency of principles—how greatly practice is at variance with rules, and how little, in an ill-digested mass of contrivances, is contributed towards human happiness. The source of the failure I believe to be that men have either not sought truth honestly, or else have thought it incumbent upon them to disguise it, in order that opinions may be perverted to an accommodation with existing institutes. This, however, is an erroneous order: legislation should follow truth, upon which, of whatever kind, it ought to be founded; and instead of throwing obstacles in the way of its discovery, the cause of humanity requires that it should be promoted by every species of encouragement.

It was originally intended to connect this attempt at an analysis of intellectual relations,

with the "Indications on Organic Life," and to publish both under one title. It was accordingly finished in conformity with this design; and, in this shape, embraced extensively the discussion of a moral system, which, partly to avoid offence even to the most fastidious, and partly from an ignorance how far the liberty of inquiry was permitted, has, at no trifling increase of labour, been entirely omitted. Owing to this omission, to say nothing of other defects, the proposed second part has been rendered incomplete; and an additional reason for abandoning the design of uniting this to the former publication is, that one is addressed to the medical profession, and the other to the public; and therefore, in connection, the entire work would have been appropriate to neither.

BATH, *November 19th, 1829.*

CONTENTS.

PART I.

ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL HISTORY AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

	PAGE
CHAP. 1. Origin of the Mind	3
CHAP. 2. Relation of Sensibility with the Causes of Sensation	21
CHAP. 3. Relation of the Mind with the Organic Life,	30
CHAP. 4. Relations of the Mind with the Structures,	40
CHAP. 5. General Account of the Constitution, Phenomena, and Maintenance of the Human Mind	140

PART II.

MORAL RELATIONS.

CHAP. 1. Summary of the Moral Constitution . . .	231
CHAP. 2. On the Influence of Moral Beauty . . .	248
CHAP. 3. On the Nature and Influence of the Moral Sense	301
CHAP. 4. On the Nature and Obligation of a Sense of Honour	317
CHAP. 5. On the Influence of Political Expediency .	341
CHAP. 6. General Comparison of Moral Principles and Obligations	347
CHAP. 7. On the Principles and Institutes of Moral Government	385

PART I.

ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL HISTORY
AND CONNECTIONS OF THE
HUMAN MIND.

OF THE THEORY OF THE
ARTS
PART I
ON THE THEORETICAL HISTORY
AND CONNECTIONS OF THE
HUMAN MIND

PART I.

ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL HISTORY AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE MIND.

1§. THERE is nothing in the mode of the origin of the mind, which is not common to the other properties of life, of which the structures are possessed: like them, it is derived from parents; it is developed by the changes of the constituents of the ovum; it is matured by the processes of growth, by which the foetal state is perfected; it is, like the other properties of life, allied with its appropriate organization; and, like them, it displays, subsequently, the phenomena which result from its own nature, and the agency of related causes.

2§. If a view of the origin of the mind, which is so agreeable with common sense and received opinion, require the formality of proofs, there is no difficulty in finding them. It is alone sufficient to establish

the derivation of the mind from parents, that the being who exhibits the possession of it, is a production from parents; that he is so endowed by an internal formation, the materials of which are furnished obviously from a parental source. We observe, also, that the being thus formed, is not cotemporary with parents, but is a production peculiar to a more or less advanced period of their existence. There are no ova in the early stages of life; or if it should be objected that, from their minuteness, they are not objects of the senses, the same objection does not apply to the endowments of the fœtus, conferred by the male progenitor—these are incident to a certain age; they inhere with an habitual secretion, and are formed in connection with a process of this kind: this secretion is frequently expended, and as often renewed, by the repetition of the same functional processes.

3§. The peculiar features, also, of the mind in the offspring, are sometimes found to resemble conspicuous ones which belonged to the parents; or, like the hereditary peculiarities remarked in the structures, the mental characteristics of parents are not manifested in the succeeding generation, but remain latent, and are displayed by the one which follows. Thus insanity is as conspicuously transmitted from parents to the offspring, in certain families, as any one of the hereditary corporeal diseases.

4§. The resemblance of the characteristics of *mind*, is, however, perhaps more rarely traced in the offspring, than that of peculiarities of structure, organic disposition, colour, or physiognomy: and this defect of resemblance must necessarily follow from the nature of the mind, which has innumerable external relations, by which an original bias may be repressed or encouraged; by which the weaker powers may be stimulated into habitual activity, while the stronger ones are but rarely

exercised—from the influence of these external relations, the modifications of character will be as diversified as the circumstances of situation, intercourse, &c., to which individuals might be exposed.

5§. The case is different with the corporeal characteristics: if these become active or efficient by the processes of growth, they are exhibited in phenomena, which are, in many instances, permanent. Whether a person lives in the town, or in the country; whether he associates much, or little, with the good, or the bad, with the well-informed, or the vulgar; whether he is familiarized with scenes, or sentiments, which captivate the imagination, or with topics that exercise his reason, or confined to a sphere, in which his impressions and exercises are little more varied than those of a horse in a mill—the shape of his nose will be pretty much the same; the colour of his skin, hair, eyes, the peculiarities of the internal organization, which he might derive unmixed from either parent, will be but little affected; while every one of these diversities will have its effect upon the character of the mind, and will concur, with previous relations of growth, to disguise its resemblance to the original from whence it proceeded.

6§. But, without looking for resemblance of characteristic traits, which, in this department of the mind, owing chiefly to the causes just enumerated, will very frequently fail, it is sufficient to establish the derivation of mind from parents, that such is *its obvious source*, or the only one which can be assigned. If any other mode of formation were supposed, it can have no weight superior to that of unfounded conjecture, or pure imagination; and there seems no more reason to seek for it in an inquiry concerning the origin of the mind, than in one relating to the principle which presides in the *organic* department, and determines its phenomena.

7§. Supposing it to be conceded, that the mind, like the vital properties which subserve organic purposes, is derived from parents; in the case of the maternal ovum, to which our considerations are now chiefly confined, the following modes may be suggested by which the intellectual principle is possessed by this rudiment: either, first, the ovum is endowed with mind by a local function of the ovarium, in which it is produced; or, second, this seat (the ovarium) is a centre, to which the maternal properties tend, whether those of the intellectual, or of the organic system.

8§. Without discussing these alternatives at any great length, it may be observed, that if the formation of the ovum were the result merely of a local function of the ovarium, there is no reason why peculiarities of parents, possessed by distant seats, should be perpetuated in the offspring; and the participation of the offspring in such peculiarities, seems a sufficient proof, that the endowments of the ovum are not merely from properties of the ovarium, but that they are communicated from all parts of the parent; and that the ovum is a miniature representation of the properties both of the organic, animal, and intellectual systems, which occupy respectively the structures of the parent.

9§. If this conclusion may be deduced from the observation of direct facts, it acquires additional weight from the more distant ones of analogy. Some such intercourse as is here supposed, is perpetually exhibited between parts, apparently no otherwise connected than by a mere continuity of the textures: these instances are furnished by the immense variety of the sympathies.

10§. But more to our present purpose, the brain affords a striking example of a centre of communication between distant seats. The natural function of this viscus subjects it to the influence of sensations from

the whole nervous system; and it participates also, very generally, in the diseases of distant parts, which affect chiefly the organic system.

11§. The difference between the brain and the ovarium, as centres, to which the properties or affections of distant parts are communicated, seems to be that the former obtains, as a result of natural function, only the animal properties of the structures—at least, thus much only can be remarked distinctly; while the ovarium is a centre to which not only the animal and intellectual properties of remote seats are communicated, but those also, with equal uniformity, of the organic life.

12§. Presuming that the formation of the ovum is not the result of an exclusive, or independent function of the ovarium, but rather that it is endowed by a contribution from all parts of the mother, and thus possesses the properties of every seat, it is next to be inquired, further, concerning the mode, and period, of this endowment. On these points, two alternatives may be proposed: first, that the mind, (confining ourselves to the present subject,) which is possessed by the fœtus, is conferred on the ovum by the *habitual* intercourse of the ovarium with the properties of distant seats, of which it is the centre; as if by a natural, spontaneous tendency of properties towards this part: secondly, that the ovum obtains the properties of mind, as well as those of life, which afterwards distinguish it by a determination from all parts of the maternal system, *sub coitû*.

13§. We shall scarcely decide between these alternatives with much certainty. It is presumed that we have, in regard to the formation of the human ovum, no direct testimony of experience; and with respect to analogy, we observe, in favour of the first alternative, or of the spontaneous tendency of the properties of

distant seats to the ovarium, that the ova of fishes are produced and fecundated without sexual connection; and the offspring furnish, by a resemblance to their progenitors, the evidence of a derivation from all their parts.

14§. But, although the endowments of the ova appear, in these examples, to be conferred by a spontaneous tendency of the diffused maternal properties to the ovarium, it is contrary to general experience, that the act by which any species is multiplied should be unattended with the sensation of pleasure. It therefore appears not improbable, (whether dependent on a turgescence of vessels, which progressively attains a certain degree, or on any unknown laws peculiar to the economy of these animals,) that the generative processes in fishes are the result of a *spontaneous* excitement, similar in character and effect to that which, in other animals, occurs *sub coitû*. Hence, the testimony derived from this source of analogy must appear of doubtful importance.

15§. On the other hand, confining our observation to the laws of sympathy, and of intercourse between the properties of distant seats, in the human species, a general disposition may be remarked in the vital properties of seats to preserve their place in these seats, unless the relations by which they were assumed are disturbed by change, whether for the purposes of a function, or for the occurrence of disease. Thus all the parts which are subjected to the influence of the brain, are free from this influence as long as this viscus is at rest; and the brain is not impressed by sensations from the distant systems with which it is connected, as long as these systems are undisturbed by preternatural agency. In disease, also, if a metastasis occur, it is perhaps most generally from an excitement in the seat to which disease, before occupying a distant one, is derived.

16§. Hence, of these two alternatives, it appears most probable that the ovum acquires the properties which it afterwards manifests, and which include those of the mind, by a general determination or derivation of the properties of every maternal seat towards the ovarium; that the mode by which this universal derivation is produced, is that of a local excitement, incident to the act of generation; and all that is required of the previous constitution of the ovum, is a disposition to imbibe or adopt the properties which are at this time conferred upon it, and which are afterwards displayed in complicated relations.

17§. Without insisting upon the truth of this account, which is always unbecoming where alternatives may be proposed, to the decision of which the evidence we possess is inadequate, it may be remarked of the mode, whatever it is by which the maternal ovum obtains the characteristic properties both of the species and of the individual, that a similar one may be inferred with regard to the contribution of the male; the act of procreation being the same in character, and the resemblance of the offspring to both progenitors, being equally manifest.

18§. It is observed of the properties which govern the organic system, that those of the progenitors are *generally possessed* by the offspring; that some of them are so related as to modify each other; and that others, derived from either parent, produce their characteristic effects without suffering any change.

19§. These results do not occur with regularity, even in the same structures, but are occasionally intermixed, or separate. Thus the exterior of the offspring sometimes resembles that of neither parent, but exhibits the mixed character of both. The colour of the skin, in the offspring of black and white parents, shews a mixed

resemblance, or is neither black nor white ; and in other instances, perfect black, and perfect white, at different places. The same is remarked of other dispositions in the organic department: propensities to disease, or peculiarities of growth, belonging to either parent, are counteracted, or are continued, in the offspring, according to the relations of parental properties with each other. The most regular example of the distinct and exclusive prevalence in the offspring of the organic properties of either parent, is that of sexual resemblance: and even in this instance, the relation by which a peculiarity of either parent is modified by the influence of the other, is sometimes, though very rarely, displayed.

20§. The same general tendencies may be remarked of the mind, which is conferred on the offspring by either parent, as those which have just been traced in the life of the organic system.

21§. Without attempting a vain inquiry concerning the laws on which the separate or mixed efficacy of the properties of either parent depends, or without attempting an arrangement of examples under either head, since we see that the phenomena are capriciously irregular, it is sufficient to observe, that the two dispositions of the *mental endowments* of the parents respectively, to a separate or mixed efficacy in the offspring, are also exhibited: and thus conspicuous traits of mind or character, belonging to either parent, are sometimes preserved, sometimes counteracted, moderated, or augmented, in their degree; according to the absence of relation, or the nature of the relation, subsisting between the properties of mind conferred respectively by parents upon their offspring. But owing to causes before enumerated, which are comprised chiefly in the diversity of circumstances to which the mind is exposed, and by all of which it is liable to be more or less in-

fluenced, the resemblance of traits in the offspring to those of the parents is rarely preserved; and the endowments of mind or character which may be supposed to be derived from either parent, whether illustrating a distinct or a mixed efficacy, are less clearly marked in this, than in the organic department; the original tendencies in which are less likely to be modified or counteracted, because its relations are more simple.

22§. The mental qualities which are conferred by parents on the offspring, are those only of *disposition*. However copiously the minds of parents may be furnished with ideas, these are not communicated to the ovum: the disposition alone is bestowed, by which similar or other mental stores may be accumulated, by subsequent exposure to the same, or other causes, which are the sources or means of information. To quote a trite illustration: if a child, whose intellectual *disposition* was of the highest order, were shut up for the first twenty years of his life in a dark room, never suffered to hear an articulate sound, or to exercise the other senses upon any objects, except those to which, in his confined situation, he was inevitably exposed, a being so circumstanced would have no language, no ideas, save those of the walls and furniture of his room. It would appear from this fact alone, that a mental disposition only is transmitted from parents to their offspring.

23§. At the same time, we observe that properties are conferred by parents on their offspring which remain latent; and the proof of their possessing these properties is, that a conspicuous characteristic of one generation is frequently retained, although passive, in the succeeding one, and does not declare itself by its effects until a third or a fourth generation. But the proof that such characteristic is possessed, though not declared, rests upon the circumstance, that in a future,

and no very distant generation, it is manifested ; which proof, in regard to *the ideas* possessed by progenitors, it may be presumed, would not be afforded : if the race of human beings who were never presented with appropriate objects of the senses, were to be perpetuated by procreation ad infinitum, the knowledge of language, of historical events, of laws, of physical relations, &c., would never be manifested by any generation of such a race.

24§. Hence, as this indication of analogy, drawn from the latent preservation of characteristics, chiefly perceived in the organic system, seems defective, inasmuch as the proofs which establish the preservation of such characteristics in the one instance would fail in the other, we have no grounds for proceeding beyond our experience ; which is, that the mental endowment of the offspring is confined to a *disposition*, by which information also, with the aid of externals, may afterwards be obtained.

25§. If any exception may be proposed to the truth of the remark, that the *ideas* which are possessed by parents are not communicated to the offspring, it is that the knowledge which is called instinctive (and *if knowledge*, it must, at least in the *first instance*, have been prior to any possible experience,) may, in the perpetuation of the respective species, be conferred on the ovum *in the same manner* as the mental disposition is conferred. This exception suggests, that as much information of the mind of parents is bestowed upon the offspring, as is necessary to his preservation.

26§. This degree of information, however obtained, is commonly allowed to the offspring of every species ; for, it may be alleged, unless a young animal were acquainted with the existence of the teat, for example, it would no more seek for this instrument of nutrition,

than it would seek for a teapot, or any thing else, of which it was not informed: and, being instructed of the existence and use of the teat, if it were not also acquainted with its situation, it would be as likely to seek for it at the mouth or fore-legs of the mother, as at the place where it is found: and if, further, the young animal were not acquainted with the figure, properties, &c., of the teat, it would be very likely to mistake the part, and to suck the tail or the nose of the mother, and to arrive rather by accident, than by foreknowledge, at the source from whence it is to derive nourishment; to which, however, it is guided with great certainty, even if its pursuit should not be aided by the sense of vision, as in animals which are born blind.

27§. It may be objected, that the search for nourishment is prompted by the spontaneous sensation of want, or by appetite; but this suggestion is not enough: the sensation of hunger may prompt the search after food, but it does not arise in other instances, merely out of this sensation, that the information is obtained of the place and mode by which this want is to be supplied.

28§. But, although we should concede to our young animal this degree of instruction, namely, the possession of instinctive ideas, our concession must stop here: all other information is the result of the exposure of the mental disposition to the influence of appropriate causes, by which knowledge is obtained; and though the new being from his birth should manifest the possession of instinctive ideas, yet if he were afterwards precluded totally the exercise of his senses, he would exhibit no others of which the minds of his progenitors were possessed.*

* These remarks are, in great measure, conformable with prevalent opinion: it may, however, be suggested, that *all* the actions of instinct may be produced in the same manner, by *experience*, as different sensations, ideas, or affections, are otherwise produced

29§. It appears, agreeably with these facts, that the instinctive propensities result from natural wants, which relate chiefly to nutrition, the causes of which are communicated from parents to the offspring of every species; that the *actions* of instinct are directed by ideas, which may be conferred on the offspring in the same way; and that to this extent, if the customary relation of causes with modified sentient principles should be thought inapplicable, the possession of innate ideas may be allowed. To me, however, it appears that *all the actions of instinct* may be explained by supposing, as in subsequent periods of life, that certain objects related with the senses produce *certain affections*; to which succeed *actions in conformity* with them—these actions being produced by excited affection or propensity rather than directed by a fore-knowledge of final purposes.

30§. The question may arise on the origin of the intellectual characteristics of the fœtus, as on the formation of the structures, whether the properties conferred by the parent on the ovum, and afterwards manifested by their effects, are identical, or predisponent? Whether the properties which form a muscle, or the desire for food, and the knowledge of the mode in which this desire is to be gratified, are conferred identically by parents, or arise out of the processes and relations of growth, to which the properties identically bestowed by parents on the ovum, were only determinate or predisponent? On this question it is not here necessary to remark further, than that the *possession* of the identical properties of the parents, by the offspring, has been elsewhere* considered a proof of their being identically

by the same causes; viz., by relation of these causes with *different sentient predispositions*; a mode which supposes that the first, or the instinctive actions, are excited by appropriate objects, in relation with peculiar sensibilities.

* Indications on Org. Life : Book II., Chap. 2.

conferred, chiefly because no other mode of their origin can be proposed; and because also the processes of growth, the formation of the textures, the peculiarities of character, &c., exemplify, in respective stages, corresponding changes in the *combinations* only of the properties which were derived by the ovum from parents.

31§. With the possible exception of the instinctive ideas, it appears that the foetal mind is a disposition of properties, by which, in relation with other causes, the information is attained which afterwards distinguishes it. It remains to inquire concerning the nature of this disposition, which seems to be the ground-work of so stupendous a superstructure.

32§. The only physical proofs of the nature of the mind, are those which are furnished by its phenomena: these phenomena are common, or particular; the general nature of the mind is deduced from the former, and the varieties of the latter afford the distinctions of individual character.

33§. All the phenomena of the mind, which are within the scope of our experience, agree in being only varieties of consciousness; and this consciousness, although in terms it is generally distinguished from sensation, appears to be essentially the same. The most that can be said of a sensation is, that it is a particular kind, or individual instance, of consciousness; and the most that can be said of an idea is, that it is one variety of sensation.* If a person receives a wound, his con-

* That all our ideas, whether of perception or reflection, are essentially sensations, is admitted by Mr. Locke, who proposes to call the ideas of reflection, those of "the internal sense."—(On the Human Understanding. 1700. p. 42, 321, &c.) He, however, suggests a *convenience* in the customary distinction of terms, which does not facilitate a *physiological inquiry*. I shall therefore illustrate, so far as may be required by our future argument, the identity of every form of consciousness with that which we call sensation.

sciousness is that of pain; if he is not *conscious* of pain, he does not *feel* any: if a person has the idea of a substance, possessing certain physical properties, or if the idea of an historical fact is present to his mind, he is *sensible* of this idea; and if the proof of his having it does not consist in the sensation of it, it would be difficult to say on what other testimony it rests.

34§. Insisting upon a distinction between sensation and consciousness, it may be urged that we are *conscious* of *ideas*, but do not *feel* them: it is however obvious that the distinction is attempted by the use merely of synonymous words; for if an idea is not a sensation, in what does our *consciousness* of it consist? It must be replied, in our not being sensible of it, or in a *conviction*, which is not felt: which is an absurdity.

35§. But not to evade the argument, however it may be disposed; what is meant by *sensation*, in any example? It is the consciousness of a particular state, or the consciousness of a particular form of existence, which, as acknowledged instances of sensation, we may call either pain or pleasure. And what is consciousness in other examples, but the same sense of the existence of a particular state, which, though neither the feeling of pain, nor of pleasure, may be that of a property, a form, or substance, belonging to the external world? The terms may be transposed without any violation of their meaning; and we may say indifferently we are *conscious* of pain or pleasure, or that we *feel* the existence of an external object, which latter is otherwise expressed, by saying we have the idea of such external object.

36§. Thus it appears that the *disposition* of mind chiefly consists in a *sensibility*; and that all the information which it may obtain in the progress of life consists of a succession of sensations, which are produced

principally by the relation subsisting between this sensibility and certain causes, which we denominate the objects of the external world.

37§. The principal source of sensations is external; it is not however the only one: sensations are excited by internal states, which produce the feeling of desire, as in the examples in which this feeling is subservient to nutrition, and many other animal purposes: the internal origin of sensation is also illustrated by the various degrees and modifications of pain, incident to spontaneous disease.

38§. But we observe a difference in the character of sensations; and agreeably with this difference of character, sensations are divided, and arranged. The circumstance in which they all agree is, that they are all sensations; and the common disposition to which they owe their origin is a sensibility. As the sensibility is modified, the phenomena of sensibility, or sensations, exhibit a corresponding variety.

39§. The general division of sensations is into

- (1.) Those of mere existence; and
- (2.) Those of pleasure and pain.

40§. The first respect *truth*, and are denominated ideas: to these, the appellation of intellectual sensations is generally confined: the sensations of pleasure and of pain, those of the second class, are designated as animal sensations.*

41§. But the latter term of distinction does not appear correct, if it is intended to *limit the intellectual sensations to man*, or to concede to other animals only

* If these terms should appear exceptionable, it will, nevertheless, be understood in what sense they are employed.

the sensations of pleasure, pain, and their modifications, love, hatred, anger, &c. That ideas of mere existence, or those which respect truth, are possessed by animals, is as clear, from their actions, as if they were capable of imparting to us this information by language. The perceptions which constitute the ideas of the human mind are, to a certain extent, common also to brutes; and these perceptions are retained also by them, and recur by that which is termed memory. A dog knows his master's house from another; he distinguishes persons; he remembers persons or places of which he has no present perception; all his movements are premeditated, or have reference to a known object: if a stick is shown to him, he *associates* with the *perception* the *recollection* of a beating, &c. Any additional proofs are here unnecessary of the familiar observation, that animals possess, in common with man, both the sensations which are called intellectual, or ideas, as well as those which have been distinguished as animal: but of the former, those which are preserved by memory are less numerous in brutes than in men, and therefore their relations are less complicated, and their *combinations*, of course, fewer.* This intellectual deficiency in brutes is probably compensated by their comparative exemption from the *evils*, which greatly exceed the *pleasures*, both of retrospect and of anticipation; as well as by the unmixed and more perfect enjoyment which they experience in the gratification of their animal desires.

42§. If it is allowed, as appears sufficiently obvious from these examples alone, to which many others may be added, that brutes have those perceptions of mere existence which are denominated ideas; that their

* The chief difference between brutes and men, according to Mr. Locke, is, that the former do not abstract, or have no general ideas: this, however, it may be difficult to prove.—On the Understanding. 1700. p. 76, &c.

actions give unequivocal proofs of memory; and that they are capable of associating ideas, whether in succession, or in combination: it will be difficult to adduce any phenomena of the mind of man, which exemplify the possession of faculties *in addition* to these; the chief difference will be found in the degree in which these faculties are respectively possessed, and in the objects upon which they are engaged.

43§. It appears, therefore, that the terms of the division of sensations into intellectual, and animal, or sensations of mere existence, and sensations of pleasure and pain, together with the passions, are not wholly unobjectionable; inasmuch as the implication, that the latter only are possessed by brutes, seems to be erroneous. As, however, the purposes of distinction may be answered as well by these terms as by any others, intellectual sensation may be said in general to be the consciousness of external existence; as of a sound, a figure, a man, a king, a watch, a coat, &c.: and animal sensations may be defined to be those of internal states, or affections; as of pleasure, pain, joy, anger, love, aversion, &c. According to these definitions, the terms will be hereafter employed, if a recurrence to them should be occasionally required.

44§. The mental disposition of the fœtus, then, may be said to consist chiefly of a sensibility—the phenomena of this sensibility are sensations, which are produced by internal or external causes which are related with it; of which causes, the external are the most numerous. Sensations are intellectual, or animal; the former are those of existence which is independent of, or external to, the mind itself; the latter are sensations of its own states, with which is usually conjoined the additional consciousness of the existence of the external or separate objects, by which these states are excited.

45§. This division of sensations may possibly suggest, that the *sensibility* which constitutes the mental disposition is also intellectual, and animal: the former affording the consciousness of an existence which is separate from, or independent of, the consciousness itself; the latter subserving the mere consciousness of affection. In one case, the sensation is that of an object which would exist, whether the mind were conscious of it or not; in the other, the sensation is that of a condition of the mind, to which an apprehension of the cause which produces it is not always necessary; as, for example, in the pain produced by some internal spontaneous diseases.

46§. How far the *sensibility* is *distinct*, by which these sensations are produced, or how far the history of these sensations respectively is so different as may at first sight appear, will be hereafter considered. In this place it is necessary only to remark, that different sensations ensue either from a different *sensibility* in relation with the same causes, or from the same *sensibility* in relation with different causes.

47§. In speaking of the mental disposition before it is instructed, as one of *sensibility*, it is not intended that all the predisponent properties of the mind, or those which subserve all its phenomena, are necessarily comprised in this principle. The sensations which are excited by the presence of their objects cease, and recur, by reminiscence, perhaps at a distant period: the mind, therefore, has a physiology which respects the cessation, preservation, and recurrence, as well as the origin, of sensations. This distinction will be remarked upon in a future part of our subject. In the mean time, the foetal disposition to mind may be represented by the term *sensibility*, whenever the relation with externals is spoken of by which sensations *originate*.

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF SENSIBILITY WITH THE CAUSES OF SENSATION.

48§. THE origin of the intellectual disposition has been found to be by a derivation from parents: it has been said to consist principally of a sensibility, and its phenomena of sensations. Sensations have been divided into those which respect exclusively the states of sensibility, and those which respect the existence of objects which are independent of, or external to, the mind itself: the former are the animal; the latter, intellectual sensations.

49§. The testimony of *the reality of both* these classes of sensations is the same. If we assert that, under the infliction of an injury, we feel pain, or that, under other circumstances, we feel desire or hatred; the only testimony that we really feel pain, desire, hatred, &c., is, that we have these sensations, or we are conscious of these states. If we assert that we see a man, a house, a tree, or any other object which exists in the external world independently of our sensation, the testimony of the reality of such existence is the same as that of the animal sensation; namely, that we feel, or are conscious of, the existence of these external objects, and that they would exist as they appear, whether we were conscious of their existence or not.

50§. The testimony of the existence of the external world is then the same as that of the reality of our own

sensations ; namely, it consists of a consciousness, in the one instance, of internal, and, in the other, of external, existence ; which consciousness constitutes belief, or establishes *the truth* of the existence in either example. It is therefore no less *true* that an external object exists, than that we are conscious of its existence ; for of the *truth* or reality of *our consciousness* we have no proof, but consciousness itself ; and the consciousness of the existence of an external object, is the *particular example* of consciousness, or is merely a definition of it.*

51§. But it sometimes happens, as in dreams, delirium, and not unfrequently in the perfect possession of our faculties, that we have an unequivocal consciousness or conviction of the existence of an external at one time, and at another, we have a conviction, equally strong, that no such external existed. This is the opposition of equal testimony : it is one conviction, opposed to another. There is a third conviction, which is not less decided than either of the others, namely, that the convictions that a thing does, and does not exist, cannot both be true ; yet we can cite no testimony for truth or fallacy, but our consciousness that a thing does, or does not exist.

52§. As then we are liable to opposite convictions with respect to the same object, and have a third conviction that both cannot be true ; and as the testimony for the existence, or non-existence of an external, as well as the testimony that the external cannot both be, and not be, is precisely the same, we are forced upon the conclusions that truth and fallacy are both sensations ; that the former is the sensation that a thing exists, the latter the sensation that it does not exist ; that the existence of an external is true, as long as we have the sen-

* See Indic. on Org. Life, Chap. 1, &c.

sation, conviction, or belief, of its existence, and false when we have the sensation or conviction that it does not exist.

53§. Hence, in asserting truth or falsehood relatively to any proposition, we assert only varieties of sensation. When we say of a thing it is, or it is not, we assert one of two opposite convictions; a third conviction is, that the thing remains *the same*, whatever *our opinion* may be, with respect to it. The testimony of the first is, that the thing exists, because we are conscious of it; the testimony of the second is, that the thing does not exist, because such is our conviction; the testimony of the third is, that the thing cannot both be and not be, because *this also* is our consciousness or conviction. It is evident, therefore, that whatever we assert as true, is only our conviction or sensation; for this is the proof of what is, of what is not, and that the object concerning which the assertion is made, cannot both be and not be, at the same time.

54§. The history of truth and fallacy is included in that of our sensations, of which we speak on subjects with regard to which, the question of true, or false, may be proposed: and in treating of the phenomena of the mind, as of those of other departments, we make the appeal of our own consciousness to the credibility, of others; and our statement is accepted as true, or rejected as false, as the consciousness, sensation, or conviction, of others agrees, or disagrees, with our own.

55 §. Sensation is *the result* of a relation which subsists between sensibility and other forms of existence, which are denominated causes. Sensibility is a disposition to sensation. The *origin* of sensibility has been said to be by derivation from parents; but this is only an epoch in its history, from whence it is convenient to date.

56§. As sensibility is a form of existence, (or else it is nothing,) so its production affords only one particular example of the universal mode of the creation of forms. Presuming the truth of the axiom, that nothing can exist without a cause, (or that existence cannot arise out of nothing,) it follows that every form of existence is made by the combination of other forms; for if it consists only of one form, the cause is the effect, concerning which, the inquiry is made; and its *origin* still remains to be explained, or rather it has arisen, contrary to our axiom, from nothing. Every example, with which our experience furnishes us, of the *origin* of existence, shews that one form is produced by the union of others which pre-existed; that existence is supplied by existence, and that creation ends where existence ceases to be supplied.

57§. If then existence cannot arise from nothing, one cause or form of existence can produce nothing additional to itself, or nothing different from that which before existed; for if it did, that in which the difference consists, would originate from nothing. Hence the condition of the existence of every form is, that it must be produced by the union of other forms; and by this union the effect differs from the causes, only in being the united, instead of the separate, existence of different forms; as the number *four* differs from the numbers *two* and *two*, by being the aggregate instead of the parts.

58§. It follows from this view of the terms of the origin of forms, that the constitution of every thing is infinite; that every form is the effect of its causes; that no cause can supply more than its own existence; and that effects are according to the forms of existence, or the causes which they comprise.* If the universal

* For an explanation of the difficulties and apparent inconsistencies which may attach to these conclusions, see Indic. on Org. Life. Ch. 2 and 3.

terms of existence are thus truly stated, although the apparent *origin* of sensibility is by a derivation from parents, yet its *complete history* is that of the forms of existence by which it is constituted; and these, in this particular instance, as in all other examples, must be infinite.

59§. The sensibility, which is the basis of the understanding, or from which all the phenomena of it result of which we are capable of an experience, is a predisposition to the sensations which constitute these phenomena. These sensations are produced by the union of other forms of existence with sensibility. The forms of existence which thus produce sensations, are said to be *related* with sensibility.

60§. By the term *relation* is implied that there are, in some forms of existence, causes which dispose them to an union, or connection, more or less intimate; and, according to the presence or absence of these causes, forms of existence either combine, or remain separate. When we say one thing is related with another, we mean there is a capability in such things to unite, or co-operate for the production of an effect. When we say that such causes produce a given effect, we designate the particular result of their relation, or that certain causes are so related, as to produce a certain effect. Physical inquiry, therefore, concerning causation, has for its object the knowledge of causes which are related with each other, and of the results of relation in respective examples.

61§. All our sensations are produced by the influence of causes which are related with sensibility: the sources then of every sensation of which we are capable, are sensibility, and certain causes related with it, to the influence of which, this sensibility is exposed. Our sensations are dependent upon these sources: and what-

ever the quality of these sensations may be, they are thus produced.

62§. As sensations are the results of sensibility, and of certain other causes; as these two constitute the parts of the relation by which sensations are produced, so sensations are varied agreeably with the varieties of sensibility, and of the related causes by which it is influenced. The same causes will produce the same sensations in relation with the same sensibility; or the same causes will produce different sensations in relation with a different sensibility; or different causes will produce different sensations in relation with the same sensibility: if the parts of this relation are the same, sensations will be the same; as either of these parts is varied, sensations will be modified.

63§. The causes which, in relation with sensibility, produce sensations (exclusive of the instinctive sensations before mentioned, which are thought, though perhaps erroneously, to be possessed previously to the influence of external corresponding objects), are internal, and external. The sensations excited by internal causes, are those which arise from the connection of sensibility with its alliances, chiefly or entirely, in the organic department: thus the sense of hunger is produced by inanition; the sense of pain, by spontaneous inflammation; certain other animal sensations, probably by the presence of blood, or the turgescence of vessels in particular seats, &c. But this source of sensations is comparatively insignificant, and it has little more than an indirect relation with the *intellectual* phenomena: these latter are produced by the relation between sensibility and the external causes, to which our present considerations are chiefly limited.

64§. The sensations of external existence (or ideas) are produced by causes which act upon the senses, and consist in the ideas of vision, hearing, taste, smell, and

touch. The causes which produce these sensations, are related with properties of the seats of these senses.

65§. Relying upon the conviction which is produced by the influence of externals, it appears that *the seats of sensations, are in the organs of the senses*. Thus, the *seat* of vision appears to be in the eyes; that of taste, in the tongue; touch, in the skin; &c. If a person were asked *where* he felt pain, or perceived a pungent odour, he would reply, from his consciousness, in the hand, arm, foot, (indifferently,) or in the nose. The degree of credit to which this testimony of consciousness is entitled, in opposition to facts which appear to have suggested a different conclusion, will be spoken of in considering the relation between the mind and the structures.

66§. The following account then appears to comprise the *general* history of the mind, so far as we have hitherto traced it :

1. Among other properties, conferred by parents on the fecundated ovum, are those which constitute a sensibility, or capacity for sensation.

2. Some *sensations*, which have been remarked upon as instinctive, are also either identically conferred by parents on the offspring, or are developed in them by spontaneous changes; or else are produced by the excitation of a predisposition, which has a parental source: these generally are subservient to the nutrition of the new being.

3. The properties conferred on the ovum, which constitute sensibility, are identically derived from parents; but in the early periods of the ovum, like those of the organic life, they are disguised in successive combinations, and they assume, finally, the state of sensibility, which is capable of displaying its characteristic phenomena by the processes of growth; which are those of a progressive causation among the constituents of the

ovum, with the aid of a material of nutrition, with which it continues to be supplied.

4. This sensibility is only a disposition to intellectual phenomena.

5. These phenomena are produced by internal influence, as that incident to states of the organic constitution, or by external causes.

6. The effects of the relation of these causes with sensibility are sensations, which are comprised in those of pain, pleasure, &c., and in those of mere existence: the former are denominated animal sensations; the latter, ideas: the former respect our own state; the latter, truth, or the reality of external beings.

7. Ideas of external existence are produced by the influence of external causes upon sensibility, *in the same way* as all other effects are produced, namely, by the combination of causes, or by the union of different forms of existence.

8. The sensibility which subserves the phenomena of intellect, is so affected by other forms of existence, that these phenomena are produced through the medium of the senses.

9. All the ideas which the mind obtains, are those which it acquires through the medium of the senses, with the exception, possibly, of the instinctive ones before named; to which may be added the sense of our own corporeal being, with which the sentient faculty is almost every where allied.

10. The intellectual phenomena (or ideas) being the results of a relation which subsists between sensibility and external causes, as either of the parts of the relation is varied, these results of it, or ideas, are diversified.

67§. Our history has hitherto referred to the origin of the mind, and the origin of its sensible phenomena. The disposition to mind has been regarded as a form of sensibility, by the relations of which with externals, sensations are produced. We have *no experience* of

any phenomenon of the mind which is not a sensation ; but an *inferred analysis* will instruct us that there are properties in the mind which subserve other processes, by which sensations are disposed of, or are renewed. The development of these relations will be attempted when our business is to examine the processes in which these properties are engaged.

CHAPTER III.

RELATION OF THE MIND WITH THE ORGANIC LIFE.

68§. By the *organic* life is meant that principle, (or aggregate of properties,) the chief characteristic of which is, that it resists the chemical tendency of the structures to decomposition. It is also instrumental to other phenomena; as those of circulation, secretion, calorification, &c.

69§. The topics of this relation are comprised in the following questions; first, whether the mind is to be considered as a part of the principle which produces the phenomena of organic life? second, whether either can exist without the other? third, whether changes in the one might influence the condition of the other? and, what are the results, if any, of changes in the one, on the condition of the other?

(1) 70§. The phenomena of the mind, and those of the organic life, exhibit so obvious a difference of character, that, although the contrary opinion has not been without its advocates, there has been little hesitation in assigning an absolute distinction, or independence, of the principles by which these phenomena are produced.

71§. But if this distinction is proved by the *diversity* of phenomena, the several processes of organic life may also be attributed to the exertion of distinct principles. We refer digestion, chylication, the immense variety

of the secretions, assimilation, the aggregation of the components of the several structures, absorption, &c., to the agency of the organic life ; yet there is scarcely more difference of character between the digestion of food and a perception of the mind, than between the digestion of food, and the formation of bone, cartilage, or muscle.

72§. It will be observed, the inference of the unity or integrity of the *organic* principle, is deduced rather from the *concurrence* of its processes *to an end*, namely, that of constituting an organized being, than from a resemblance between the particular acts which subserve this end.

73§. But this ground of distinction also appears to be imperfect ; for if the end characterizes the principle, and this end is said to be *the preservation* of an organized being, the destruction of this being by disease, or a derangement of the processes which tend to his support, must be referred to the operation of a different principle. Besides which, granting that so much is to be imputed to an organic principle *as subserves the maintenance* of an organized being, the understanding itself is pretty generally impressed into this service : all the arts of life are plyed with reference to this object ; and the means by which food is obtained, may be said to be no less necessary to the support of the animal, than the digestion, or the assimilation of food. This concurrence is not peculiarly true of man : even among the inferior animals an intelligence of some sort exemplifies a similar co-operation.

74§. Will it be said, the unity or integrity of the organic life is to be inferred from the similitude of its phenomena in men, to those of other organized beings, which display *only this form* of life ? The distinction will fail also upon this ground ; for there is scarcely a greater difference between the intellect of a worm, and

of a man, than between the number and character of their organic peculiarities.

75 §. The organic life in man exhibits many different agencies, from whence result the corresponding diversities of phenomena : if these agencies ensue from *varieties only* of the same principle, as they are presumed to do, we can scarcely say, upon any argument of analogy, where variety only of the principle ends, and where the agency of a different one begins.

76 §. Consulting our experience, we find that the phenomena of the organic and intellectual principles are displayed in the same structures ; that there is a difference in the character of these phenomena, as there is of those which are attributed respectively to either principle ; that as the phenomena are displayed at the same time, and in the same seats, the principles co-exist, and are allied with a common fabric ; and an entire separation of them is not to be presumed upon the obvious, or first-sight grounds of distinction just enumerated, but must be sought after by a minuter analysis of their connection.

(2) 77 §. The question whether the mind and the organic life are so entirely independent that one might exist without the other, comprises the most important objects of this examination.

78 §. It is observed that the organic life may be maintained without evidence of intellectual existence ; but we never discover indications of mind where the organic life has ceased. The organic life is perfect in the brains of brutes, who display but a very limited intelligence : the organic life may also be perfect in the brains of idiots ; and all its phenomena are continued in persons labouring under apoplexy, from pressure on

the brain by depressed bone (or any other cause), in whom the intellectual functions have ceased, and whose animal sensibility is also extinct. In addition, we find that, in the local death of structures, by sloughing, gangrene, &c., the sensibility never survives the organic life; that the sensibility of a limb ceases by intercepting the supply of blood which maintains its organic life; and, on the other hand, that the instances are numerous in which the organic life, in seats almost indifferently, survives the sensibility of such seats.

79§. These facts indicate the conclusions, first, that the organic life is independent of sensibility, and of the intellectual functions; and, second, that the existence of sensibility, and the exercise of the intellectual functions, are dependent upon the organic life.

80§. (1.) Many who have taken views of this subject unfavourable to the existence of the mind independently of its organic alliances, have contented themselves with the citation of these facts, or with reasoning to this extent; but this statement, as we shall presently see, is not perfectly conclusive against the existence of the mind independently of the organic life.

81§. Although in brutes the intellectual phenomena may be extremely simple, while the organic life might appear perfect, it does not follow that the perfection of the latter is independent of the influence of the intellectual constitution. Although in idiots no traces, or but very faint ones, of mind may be exhibited, it does not follow that the mind, such as it is, is not essential to the organic life, which in them also may appear perfect; for properties *are possessed*, as is proved by every stage of growth, as *constituent parts* of a principle, which properties are *not displayed* until subsequent stages of foetal development. Such properties are, in

this state, latent; or their efficacy is that only of constituting a disposition; and their existence is subsequently manifested upon exposure only to agents which are related with them. Although, then, the sensibility subserving the purposes of intellect, which is in general shown to be possessed by certain structures (as by the nerves, and, as is commonly presumed, by the brain), should not be manifested, it no more follows that it does not exist, than that the properties which make some parts of the skin black, in the offspring of parents of different colour, are wanting, because such properties do not display themselves in the earliest periods of the ovum. Properties may be possessed which are essential constituents of a principle (or aggregate of properties); but if they are disguised by combination, or not subjected to the influence of appropriate related causes, they will produce no effects by which their existence may be inferred.

82§. Hence, because the traces of intellect which may be remarked in idiots and brutes are faint, it is not proved that the intellectual constitution is not in them essential to the organic life; for it would not follow, if there were even *no signs* of intelligence, that therefore the mind does not exist in the state of latent combination, in which many other properties are proved by their subsequent agency to be possessed. The import of the mental constitution, or, as it may be termed, of the intellectual sensibility, to the organic life, whether as an essential constituent, both in its latent and active states, or as an association only, remains therefore to be inquired after on other grounds than those here stated, by which it has been presumed that this argument has been in some measure settled.

83§. (2.) The dependence of the sensibility which subserves the intellectual phenomena upon the organic

life, can be proved only by the analytic and synthetic tests of causation—by ascertaining whether, by the abstraction of the principle of organic life, that of sensibility ceases; or whether, upon the restoration of the principle of organic life, that of sensibility is produced. It is obvious that the inquiry cannot be made in this experimental way, because the principle of organic life cannot be withdrawn; and if rendered extinct, dependent functions cease, which may be necessary to the display of sensibility, as to that of a principle which is allied with organic life, and dependent for its manifestation upon the functions which result from it. Still less practicable is the synthetic experiment, of restoring this organic principle in the expectation of a renewal of the sensibility which has been suspended during its abstraction. As we cannot, on this subject, avail ourselves experimentally of the tests of dependence, we must examine the force of circumstances which are analogous to these modes.

84§. The causes which make the organic life cease, produce also the cessation of sensibility. This mutual cessation of phenomena, in either department, may prove either a dependence upon common causes, or an indivisible principle: it may happen, either because the contribution of one is essential to the existence of the other, or because the agents which are so related with, as to impair, suspend, or destroy the one, might impair, suspend, or destroy the other.

85§. Our experience furnishes us with no circumstances analogous to the synthetic proof of the relation between the mind and the organic life. We have evidence that the organic life may continue after the intellectual phenomena have ceased; but when the organic life has ceased, and intellectual phenomena are no longer exhibited, we cannot say, in the first place, that the

change which has occurred in the mind is owing to the cessation of the organic life ; or that, if the organic life were restored, the former state of the mind would be renewed.

(3) 86 §. If there is difficulty in helping out our experience by inferences on the questions which relate to the dependence of the intellectual and organic principles upon each other, this difficulty will still prevail, though perhaps not in equal degree, in assigning the instances of re-agency between the intellectual and the organic principles.

87 §. We have apparent examples both that changes in the state of the organic life may produce corresponding effects upon the state of the mind ; and more obviously, that states of the mind may influence the condition of the organic life.

88 §. Examples of the secondary affection of the mind, from change originating in the organic system, are furnished by disease : thus fever, excited, perhaps, by exposure to cold, produces delirium ; and chronic spontaneous disease, originating by influences which have relation only with the corporeal functions, may depress the energy of the mind, or suspend the habits of its action.

89 §. But the effects of this relation are not clearly to be imputed to an abstract, or exclusive connection between the organic, and intellectual principles ; since the operation on the mind, which succeeds to a primary change in the organic principle (expressed by variety of its phenomena), is complicated with changes in its material alliances: these changes, affecting the condition of the structures, and of the circulation, may have a considerable, if not in some instances an exclusive efficacy, in

disordering the state of the mind, independently of any direct relation of the disordered state of the organic *principle*, with that which the mind assumes in consequence.

90 §. But the *direct* relation between the mind, and the organic life, is less equivocal in the disorders of the latter, which succeed to changes in the former, than in the preceding instances. Thus the power which moves the heart belongs to the system of organic life, and an influence on the mind, which will raise the action of the heart from eighty to a hundred-and-twenty strokes in a minute, produces this effect by a *direct* relation between the *principles*; at least we can assign no intermediate agency. The same is to be remarked of the examples of disordered organic function, induced by habitual impressions on the mind; as in those corporeal derangements, produced by the habitual prevalence of a passion, or by the moral influence of the fatigue, and harassing vicissitudes, incident to some occupations.

91 §. It appears from this view that our means of analysis of the dependence of the principles (or rather of the properties, as the term “principles” seems to imply a separation, which is not apparent) which preside in the organic and intellectual departments, on each other, are very imperfect; we can therefore do little more than define our experience of the relation. The principal facts and conclusions, comprised in this experience, or immediately suggested by it, are—

92 §. 1st. That the intellectual and organic principles, in health, co-exist in alliance with an organization which is common to both;

2nd. That the phenomena of the intellectual principle may cease, while those of the organic principle are continued;

3rd. That the phenomena of the intellectual principle are never displayed after those of the organic life have ceased ;

4th. That the causes which make the organic phenomena cease, produce also the cessation of the intellectual phenomena ;

5th. That causes will produce the cessation of the intellectual phenomena, which do not prevent those of the organic life ; hence,

6th. That, if the cessation of intellectual phenomena, by causes which destroy the organic life, prove community of relation, the continuance of the organic life, under the influence of causes which make the intellectual phenomena cease, proves that these principles are liable to be separately affected, and that the properties of the one, however intimately connected, are not identified with those essential to the other ;

7th. That the community of relation on the one hand, and the independence of affection on the other, just remarked, may obtain, whether the intellectual and organic principles are wholly distinct, or whether the former is constituted by properties superadded to the latter ;

8th. That changes which occur in the organic department (referring principally to those of disease), may produce corresponding changes in the intellectual department : such changes, however, in the organic life, do not necessarily produce corresponding intellectual changes by *direct* relation of the principles or properties of the two departments ; but more frequently, change in the organic, appears to influence the intellectual department, by intermediate organic relations, connected with the structure, and with the circulation ;

9th. That change, originating from causes related with the intellectual principle, may produce corresponding change in the organic department by direct relation between the principles, or properties, which preside respectively in these departments.

The evidence which has hitherto been adduced, appears to justify the conclusions only which are here stated. As our analysis proceeds, we shall find the principal topics of this relation intimately connected with other parts of the subject; and some views which are here hazarded only as suggestions, will probably be confirmed by collateral testimonies.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIONS OF THE MIND WITH THE STRUCTURES.

93§. THE first topic to be discussed in examining these relations is, concerning the seat of sensibility generally; the second is, of the seat of the mind; the third, of the connection or dependence subsisting between the mind and the organized fabric.

(1.) 94§. It is a common assertion, that the seat of sensation is in the brain. The fact on which this inference is chiefly founded is, that sensation, in an extremity, which otherwise appears to be the seat of it, is not excitable, if the communication of such seat with the brain is prevented by a division of its nerves; that sensation is excitable so far as the continuity of nerves with the brain is preserved, but ceases beyond the place where this continuity is interrupted.

95§. It is inferred from this fact, that sensation is dependent upon the brain: but this proof of dependence relates to what might be termed *personal* sensation, and does not limit the seat of *sensation* to this viscus; since, compatibly with this dependence, sensation may be either in the seat in which it appears to be excited, or in the brain, or both.

96§. The possible modes of the dependence of sensation, in distant seats, upon nervous communication

with the brain, are either, first, that continuity of nerves between seats of sensation and the brain is required, because such seats obtain properties from the brain which are necessary to sensation; or, second, that the continuity of nerves is necessary merely to convey a change which occurs in a distant seat to the brain. In the former case, the seat of sensation may be the place which is acted on by the exciting cause; in the latter, a sensation may be produced in the brain by an influence upon a distant part, which sensation comprises that of a locality, agreeing with the seat on which the cause acts, by which, thus intermediately, sensation is excited.

97§. (1.) There is *no proof derived from experiment*, that the seats of sensation are endowed with sensibility by a diffusion of this principle from the brain, or any other nervous centre. Our experience acquaints us only, that sensation is excited by the employment of certain agents on these seats; and *the mode* by which sensation is produced, is liable to the alternatives first stated. The appeal to experiment, for a decision between these alternatives, fails totally: the proofs of experiment are conclusive only on a dependence of some kind, of sensation in distant seats, on their connection with the brain; or they prove that a sensibility, capable, in relation with externals, of producing *personal* sensation, does not reside in the apparent seats of sensation.

98§. If the evidence of experiment is, on this point, insufficient, no other source of testimony occurs to me than that of our own consciousness: and it must be confessed, that the proof derived from this source is upon an equality with that by which *truth* is in general established. In order to ascertain the conclusion to which this evidence tends, we must examine the nature

of our consciousness, or conviction, under an experience which relates to this question.

99§. We cannot always assert the *precise locality* of faint sensations, more especially if they are internal: but suppose a severe wound to be inflicted, or that a person suffers amputation, as of the leg; this injury is productive of the greatest pain, or of the highest degree of sensation. Is our *consciousness of the seat of this sensation* at all doubtful? It must be replied, we feel the pain where the wound is inflicted: and pursuing its consequences, the brain is the seat of the consciousness of a pain which *occurs* in the distant part; and in turn, perhaps, communicates an influence to the organs of voice, or other voluntary muscles.

100§. If our consciousness be scrutinized, we have a similar impression from the effects of agents which are related with the senses: thus we feel the figure, solidity, &c., of substances in the seat of the organs of touch; and we see, taste, smell, and hear, in the organs which are appropriate to these faculties. This evidence appears unequivocal: yet there are circumstances which appear, at first sight, opposed to the conclusion which this testimony inculcates.

101§. (2.) In favour of the opinion,^f that the seat of sensation is in the brain; it may be observed, that sensations are repeated, when their existence in their supposed original seat is precluded: thus persons have the sensations of vision, hearing, &c., in their sleep, when these senses are not only indisposed to be acted upon by the related causes which otherwise excite them, but when also the objects represented by these sensations are either at a distance, or do not exist at all: thus, also, the sense of pain in *the toes* occurs after the *amputation* of the limb to which they belong: thus, also, the sen-

sation of *the presence* of the objects of vision, occurs in the dreams of those who have been many years totally blind from gutta serena.

102§. In these instances it is obvious that the seat of sensation is in the brain: it is not apparently the mere remembrance of sensations which have been before admitted by their appropriate organs, but a consciousness of the present existence of objects, without the aid of organs distant from the brain, which otherwise appear to be the seats of the sensations excited by them.

103§. But, although these examples appear to indicate, not only that the brain is the seat of sensation in general, but that it is capable of *originating* sensations independently of the senses, or even of the existence of their organs, yet these instances will be found, upon examination, to be not incompatible with the locality of sensation in the seats on which the causes act, which in general excite it.

104§. In every known example of sensation, it must be admitted, although the primary seat of it is the part on which the related cause acts which produces it, that the brain *participates* in this sensation, or that this sensation is communicated from such seat to the brain. The brain, therefore, *is possessed* of the sensation of the existence of a given object, so long as this object remains to excite it. As soon as the cause which produced it has ceased to act, the brain is no longer conscious of the sensation of a present existence; but this sensation, being once *possessed* by the brain, may recur, as an act of memory. When the cause which produces the sensation of a present existence ceases to act, this consciousness gives place to some other, and is either entirely obliterated, or is modified by association: if it afterwards recurs, as by memory, it is not, except in

dreams and insanity, revived separately, or with the distinctness which obtained while the impress of the cause which produced it lasted, but it recurs associated with other sensations ; and, owing to this association, it is not revived as the sensation of that *which is*, but of that which *has been*.

105§. That the perception, as it is termed, of the brain, is only an extension to this part of the sensation which appears to be first produced in the organ of sense, seems to be proved by the facts, first, that there is no difference between the sensation of the organ of sense, and the perception: the consciousness in the brain would be expressed as “*I see a certain object ;*” and the medium, or instrument, would be declared to be, “*with my eyes ;*” that is, I see, or my sensorium is conscious of, that which is seen by my eyes: the sensation is evinced by this fact alone, I think unequivocally, to be the same in the brain as in the organ of sense, or to be an extension of sensation from the latter to the former ;—second, that not only this sensation may be revived in the brain, as a recollection, but the sensation itself may, under certain circumstances, be revived. These facts, in conjunction, prove that no new or different sensation is produced in the brain by the influence of an object upon a sense ; but merely that the sensation excited by the object, in the organ of sense, is communicated to the brain.

106§. The sensation of which the brain participates, is, in general, lost, or ceases when the cause which excited it is removed: our analytic method would suggest the questions, why is this sensation lost? and, as it afterwards recurs by memory, and is liable to be revived as the sensation of a present existence, why does the sensation recur? To discuss these questions fully, would be to anticipate a future part of our subject ; they can-

not, however, be wholly dismissed without remark in this place.

107§. A sensation of existence, as of an external, is, like all other things, an effect: the law with respect to the continuance of effects is, that nothing but existence can produce change; and, consequently, every effect which is once produced, must remain, unless changed by some other form of existence, which latter is expressed as a related cause. Hence, a sensation which is once produced in the brain, as of the existence of an external, would continue, unless this sensation was made to cease, or assumed another state, by a related influence. We find that, upon the removal of the external cause, the sensation of its presence ceases, the destruction or suspension of which sensation must happen from the relation which it holds with the other properties, or forms of being, to which it is exposed or allied. If the sensation in the brain is so made to cease, it must be by entering into combination with the other properties of this seat, with which it is related; if the sensation is revived, as by memory, in which case it consists of a recollection of a former presence of its object, it is by a cessation of the combination by which this sensation was before lost, or disguised, and by a partial renewal of its former state; that is, it does not, in general, by memory, recur as the sensation of the presence of its object, but is modified by other sensations, as those which have subsequently been produced by the presence of their objects, marking the period at which it was produced, or the interval which has since elapsed.

108§. The renewal, therefore, of a sensation by memory, is that of a mixed sensation: not of the presence of its object merely, but of the sense produced by this object, together with other connected sensations; the result of which is, that instead of saying, upon the

recurrence of a sensation by memory, "I see," we should say, "I have seen." But if, on the *cessation* of the combination by which the sensation of an external presence is lost upon the removal of its object, this sensation should be revived unmixed, unmodified by other sensations, in its original state of separation, or individuality, then reminiscence, instead of producing the consciousness of that which has been, would furnish the sensation of that which is, even although the object which originally produced it should be far removed, should have ceased to exist, or if the organ of sense through which it was admitted, should be impaired or lost.

109§. The phenomena of the mind, therefore, which appear to constitute so distinct a class, are found to agree with, or to exemplify, the universal laws of causation. An external form of existence is so related with sensibility, as to produce a corresponding sensation, which is that of the presence of this form of existence. The testimony that a sensation is so produced, is our own consciousness, or the sensation itself. And an equal, or similar testimony is afforded, that the locality of this sensation is in the organ, which is related with the cause which excites it. By the same testimony it is proved that a sensation which is produced in an organ of sense, by relation with externals, is *extended to the brain*. Thus far, we have traced merely the causation of an effect, which effect is the sensation, or idea, of an external presence. This effect being constituted, should continue to have its existence *preserved* by the causes which identify it: but we find that this sensation of an external presence, lasts no longer, in general, than the object is present; hence, as the effect of the influence of such external ceases, or changes its form, as soon as it is produced, this can happen only by an extension, or change of its relations; and as the sensa-

tion was produced originally by the relation between sensibility and an external presence, this sensation is afterwards modified, suspended, or lost, by a relation between it, *and other properties of the brain.*

110§. According to this latter relation, are the future phenomena of an effect, originally produced by relation between sensibility and an external presence: these phenomena are, that an individual sensation gives place to another sensation, when the external cause which produced it is removed; or this particular sensation is revived by memory, in relation with other sensations which modify it, and instead of a sensation of that which is, make it the sensation of that which has been; or the sensation is restored, as in dreams, delirium, &c., in the same state as when it was first produced by the external presence, and an object is believed to be present, although it may long since have been removed; or, the sensation produced by the presence of an external, related with sensibility, may cease upon the removal of the external, and may never be revived. These phenomena—the future fate of a sensation once produced—depend upon relations with other forms of being, agents, or causes, consisting chiefly of sensations which once acknowledged a similar mode of origin, and have their seat afterwards in the brain.

111§. Hence it appears, that the sensations which are revived by memory, or which occur without the presence of their objects, are those which have been produced by the relation of sensibility in the organs of sense with externals; and the proof that these are not instances of sensation produced in any other than the common mode, namely, by the relation of sensibility with an external, is, that the sensations which were excited in any one organ of sense, would not originate in the brain, if this sense had been absent from the birth

of the individual. The phenomena, therefore, of the mind may be said briefly to consist of sensations produced by the presence of their objects, and of sensations revived, preserving their individuality, or variously mixed, according to the relations subsisting between them.

112§. The renewal of sensations by memory, then, appears to be no proof that the seat of sensation is in the brain exclusively, and not in distant nerves. On the contrary, we are assured by the testimony of consciousness (which is that of *truth* in any instance), that the seat of sensation is in the organ, or part, with which the external is related which produces the sensation; that this sensation is communicated to the brain, where it is retained or lost, is revived, mixed, or otherwise, or never recurs, according to relations which this sensation has with the properties, or forms of being, possessed by the brain; that, as the sensation produced in a distant organ of sense never recurs in it, when the immediate effect of the cause which excited it has ceased,* so, although distant nerves are the seats of sensation, there is no reason to presume that sensations find in them any relations by which they are retained; and consequently the operations of memory, &c. are confined to the brain. It remains that we should connect this account of the phenomena of sensibility with the material fabric in which they are displayed.

* The visions of delirium or insanity may perhaps be regarded as exceptions to the truth of this remark; but although in these affections the eyes may appear intensely to regard some object, the false perception may nevertheless be produced in the brain, rather than from a disordered action of the optic nerve. I clearly remember that, under the delirium of fever, when I was tired of looking at spectra in the room, I used to shut my eyes, and cover my head with the bed-clothes; yet I continued to see spectra, though perhaps the objects were changed. This fact is not, however, conclusive.

113§. It is proved by the results of the division of nerves, that the system to which these organs belong is the seat of sensation; but sensation in nerves is not known to occur, either under certain injuries of the brain, or if the communication of nerves with the brain (or other nervous centre) is intercepted. Hence, although under ordinary circumstances, as those of health, the seat of sensation seems to be generally in the nervous system, yet the sentient faculty in the nerves appears to acknowledge a dependence upon the brain.

114§. The dependence of the faculty of sensation upon the connection of nerves with the brain, admits the proposition of two modes, or alternatives: the first, that the continuity of nerves with the brain is necessary, in order that the impressions of external agents may be transmitted to the brain; the second is, that the continuity of nerves with the brain is necessary, in order that nerves may be endowed with properties which are communicated to them from the brain, and constitute their sensibility, by relation of which, with externals, sensations are produced.

115§. (1.) According to the first alternative, sensation would be confined to the brain; which is contrary to our experience, which consists of sensation, or consciousness. To recur to a former example; if a man suffered amputation of the thigh, he would have the *same testimony* that *he felt* pain in *his thigh*, as that *he felt* pain *at all*. This is our general experience. If a person feels pain in the toes of a limb that has been amputated, or if he sees in a dream a person who has been some years dead, these are only revived, perhaps modified, sensations, to which the organs or parts which were their first seats are not necessarily instrumental; because the sensation which first occurred in them has been transmitted to the brain, is retained

there, and may be revived, mixed or unmixed, by relations which it finds in this viscus. But neither would pain be felt in the toes of an amputated limb, nor would the sense of the presence of a person who has been some years dead *occur*, if the first sensation in the distant part or organ had been precluded; as if the subject suffered amputation of a limb which was *deficient in toes* from his *birth*, or as if he had been born blind.

116§. This proposition, therefore, of the mode of the dependence of sensation upon the integrity of the nerves, seems to be at variance with testimony of the highest credit. The proposition has been made as the false inference from a fact: it is, that, as sensation does not occur in distant nerves, the communication of which with the brain is intercepted, *therefore the seat* of sensation is exclusively in the brain; which, though I once acquiesced in it without consideration, seems, upon reflection, as gross an assumption as ever disgraced human genius.

117§. (2.) Presuming, then, that the seat of sensation generally is in the nervous system, the dependence of this phenomenon in distant nerves upon their communication with the brain, must be one, or both, of the two kinds before stated: either continuity is necessary to communicate a sensation to the brain, which is produced by externals in relation with an inherent sensibility belonging to the nerves; or continuity of nerves with the brain is necessary for the communication of properties from the brain to the nerves, which constitute the sensibility of the latter. The first mode supposes that the nerves possess sensibility in their own structures, which is generally presumed not to be the case, for the reason that, if their communication with the brain is intercepted, sensation in them, it is pre-

sumed, cannot be excited. It appears, therefore, to follow, from these premises, that the brain diffuses sensibility through the nervous system; which sensibility is excited by appropriate causes in the seats of the nerves, constituting, as the result of this relation, sensations, which are in turn communicated to the brain.

118§. The relation then between the brain and nerves, comprising the dependence of sensation, may be said to be that the brain imparts sensibility to the nerves, and the nerves communicate sensations to the brain. The relation is thus stated *in conformity with received opinion*, or as the suggestion of the evidence hitherto exposed: but the truth of this hypothesis will hereafter appear liable to the doubt of another alternative, which I believe to be more strictly agreeable with our experience.

119§ Assuming for the present, chiefly with a view to some additional indications, that the relations between the brain and nerves are thus truly stated; the following questions arise with respect to the laws of their intercourse. First, of the sensibility; does the brain diffuse sensibility *habitually* throughout the nervous system, which may be excited to sensation in its several seats? or does the brain impart sensibility to the nerves occasionally, or under the influence only which produces sensation? The former is a question of whether sensibility is regularly diffused from the brain, as a result of its undisturbed function; the latter, whether sensibility, not residing habitually in the nerves, is excited in, or derived to these organs, only under the influence of occasional causes.

120§. Upon the reply to these questions will depend, in some measure, that to the questions which might be proposed with regard to the communication of sensations, from the nerves to the brain. These questions

are, does a sensation return to the brain as a result of a distinct relation between this sensation and the brain? or is there an habitual diffusion of sensibility from the nervous centres, through the nervous system, which *is returned* from the nervous system again to its centres, together with any changes which it might have sustained by related agents, (as those which produce sensation,) in its course?

121§. The theory of a spontaneous and habitual diffusion of sensibility throughout the nervous system, supposes that sensibility pervades this system, and is returned to the brain—that sensibility may be excited in every part of this course; and thus excited, or modified, is converted into sensation, which is returned to the brain as a result of the laws by which unexcited sensibility would otherwise have been returned. In order to be consistent with phenomena, it would be required that this diffusion and return of central influence should be performed with a celerity, of which the movements of the grosser fluids furnish no parallel.

122§. This theory of an habitual communication of sensibility from a nervous centre throughout the distribution of the nerves, and of its return to this centre, is suggested analogically by the sanguineous circulation, which proceeds from, and returns to, a centre. The seats of this circulation of nervous influence will be assigned generally to be in the nerves; but, subservient to the sanguineous circulation, we distinguish two sets of vessels (arteries and veins). It is an additional suggestion which belongs to the theory, whether the same nerve conveys and returns central influence, or whether certain nerves convey or diffuse this influence, which are joined with others, constituting a returning system?

123§. It may be remarked on this theory, that it is weakly supported by a distant analogy, and that it offers an explanation, perhaps, of the principal phenomena of the sentient system. But a conclusion is not to be adopted on the evidence of a distant analogy; nor is it a sufficient testimony of truth, that phenomena might be explained by a conjecture indifferently supported.

124§. The appeal to fact would at first sight suggest that, if the remote nerves are the seats of sensation, a division of those nerves which convey sensibility should deprive such nerves of the faculty of sensation; while the division of other nerves, those of the returning system, should not prevent the conversion into sensation, by exciting causes, of a diffused sensibility in the nerves which possess it, but should merely prevent the participation of the brain in such sensation. If *sensibility* is diffused from the brain throughout the nervous system, the nerves, however remote, must then be *the seats* of sensation: but if properties only which dispose ultimately to sensation are communicated from the brain to the nerves, then the brain may be exclusively the seat of sensation; and a division of nerves would prevent sensation, whether by intercepting the communication of properties from the brain to remote nerves, or from remote nerves to the brain.

125§. Thus it appears, agreeably with this theory, that if the seat of sensation is in the nerves, *sensation* would be prevented by a division only of nerves which convey sensibility; if in the brain, by a division indifferently of those which convey or return the influence by which sensation occurs in this viscus.

126§. It was formerly supposed, and the theory has

been revived on the credit of recent experiments, that sensation, in remote nerves, depends upon the communication only of one set of nerves with a nervous centre, and that muscular motion depends upon the communication of another set of nerves with such nervous centre. This arrangement, at first sight, appears to favour the conclusion that sensation occurs in the nerves, and that it is prevented only by a division of those which convey sensibility. But this arrangement, in reality, if it were confirmed, would afford no support to the theory of a circulation of nervous influence; for we can have no actual example of sensation which is not participated by the brain; and if the division of a returning nerve does not prevent this participation, the distinction of conveying and returning nerves is superfluous, since the same nerve must be competent to both offices.

127§. It has been affirmed, in a former part of our inquiry, upon the testimony of an unequivocal consciousness or conviction, than which no higher can be proposed, that the seat of sensation is in the nerves, or in the parts to which, generally, the causes are applied which excite it. And as sensation does not occur in such seats after a division of their nerves, it has been by some inferred that *sensibility*, or the sentient faculty, is *derived* from the brain, or is conveyed from this viscus to such seats through the nerves. It was hinted that this conclusion, plain as it appears, is liable to the doubt which must be cast upon it by another alternative, which is at least equally agreeable with facts. This other alternative which militates against *a dependence of any kind upon the brain*, of the production or origin of sensation, is so at variance with received opinion, that although its claims to credibility are by no means slight, the proposition of it will, perhaps, be considered as that only of a sceptical doubt. To state this doubt:

128§. Suppose the nerves of the axillary plexus to be divided, the arm is apparently rendered insensible: hence it is inferred that its sensibility was obtained from the brain.* But this is not our experience: suppose an arm thus circumstanced to be wounded, as with a knife, we say *it* does not feel; by which we mean only that the brain, or a supposed common sensorium, is not conscious that the arm feels. But if the *seat* of sensation is in every portion of the nervous system, *sensation may be produced* in any given portion, of *which the brain would not participate*, if the nerves of communication were divided.

129§. It would appear, therefore, that the absence of consciousness in the brain of a distant sensation, is no proof that the nerves do not possess an inherent sensibility, or that they may not, *beyond the place of their division*, suffer painful sensations, under the infliction of injuries: just as *two individuals* may each suffer painful sensations, of which the other does not participate, *for the reason* that the seats of pain in each are respectively *unconnected with the sensorium of the other*. The *phenomena of intercourse only*, would be prevented by such division of nerves, of which the consciousness that *the arm feels* is one.

130§. If then it is asked, does a part *feel*, under the infliction of an injury, beyond the place of the division of its nerves; or under a state of paralysis from mere incapacity of the brain? It must be replied, *we* (meaning our common sensorium) are not conscious of such sensation. Are there, it will be inquired, any effects resulting from a sensation confined to its apparent

* The brain is spoken of on this, and many other occasions, chiefly because the reference to it is familiar; the term "nervous centre," for such general reference, would, perhaps, be more correct.

seat, which are remarked either to cease, or to continue, under a division of the nerves of such seat?

131§. We observe that pain will originate an action of the voluntary muscles; as if a sharp instrument were slowly pushed through an arm, possessed as we say of sensibility, the muscles of the arm would act to withdraw it from this cause of injury. But volition, we have reason to think, proceeds from the brain; and the consequent action of the muscles, being dependent upon communication with this viscus, would not take place, under circumstances by which this communication was prevented: hence, it is no proof that *pain* is not *felt in the arm*, supposing its nerves to be divided, that effects do not take place which occur only by an influence on the brain, requiring the uninterrupted continuity of the nerves communicating with the seat of injury.

132§. In a healthy state of the retina, the stimulus of light produces a contraction of the pupil, which is supposed to be the effect of sensation: under paralysis from pressure on the brain, light occasions no contraction of the pupil; it would hence appear that, under paralysis, no sensation is produced in the retina by the stimulus of light, since the effect of this sensation, namely, the contraction of the pupil, does not take place.* But it remains to be decided, whether, in the healthy state of the organ, the contraction of the pupil is the immediate effect of *the sensation of the retina*, or whether it is the effect of the participation of *the brain* in this sensation: if the former, the dilatation of the pupil under pressure on the brain, would prove that

* I am acquainted with a lady who has been many years blind from gutta serena, in whom exposure to a very strong light makes the tears flow copiously.

the sensation of a distant seat is not independent of the brain, or that the *sensation* from light does not occur: if the latter, the retina might feel the presence of light of which the brain is unconscious; and from which therefore the usual consequence, namely, the contraction of the pupil, does not ensue. The difficulty of this discrimination will, I apprehend, prevent its being satisfactorily made; and, in all other instances, this criterion would be found to fail, owing to the liability of the dependence of the alleged effects, rather upon the participation *of the brain in a sensation*, than upon the *sensation itself*.

133§. The possession of a principle of sensibility by the nerves, is not always thought necessary by those who consider the brain to be the exclusive seat of sensation. It may, perhaps, be stated, as the prevalent hypothesis on this subject, that an *impression* is made by an external object on an organ of sense; that this impression is communicated to the brain, where it produces *perception*; that a healthy condition of the organ of sense, as well as the continuity of its nerves with the brain, are required for the purpose only of receiving and transmitting this impression; that the exclusive seat of the perception, or sensation, is in the brain; that this structure is the seat of sensibility—is a common sensorium; and consequently, as sensations are produced here, and no where else, that a sensibility in *the nerves themselves* is *superfluous*.

134§. This account, the inferences in which are at once so bold and convenient, is deduced chiefly from the facts, 1st, that we do not feel in a nerve, if its communication with the brain is intercepted; from whence the *locality of sensation* is concluded to be in the brain; and, 2nd, that if an organ of sense is lost, as by disease or injury, the brain afterwards shews the

possession of *the perceptions* which were before produced in it by the impressions on this sense. Thus much for prevalent opinion. And now to state, and in part to recapitulate, the opposite view.

135§. We have a consciousness of the sensation, in the organ of sense; we have a consciousness of pain, at the place where an injury is inflicted: this consciousness would be admitted a sufficient proof that such place is the seat of the sensation, if there were *no presumed testimony* which indicated the seat of it to be elsewhere. But there is, in reality, *no sufficient evidence of this sort*; for the absence of the perception when the nerve communicating with the brain is intercepted, proves, *not that there is no sensation in the place of injury*, but that *we* are not conscious of it; or that the sensation which, on the testimony of consciousness, under the integrity of the organs we conclude to be in this place, is *not transmitted* to the brain. This, of course, we should naturally expect: we should no more expect *a sensation*, if it were excited in *a sense*, to be conveyed to a part, *the communication with which was prevented*, than to one with which it had never been connected. And with regard to the second fact, namely, the recurrence of a former perception, when the organ of sense is impaired or lost; this proves only that a sensation which occurred in a distant nerve was communicated to the brain, and retained there; and consequently may be renewed, by relations in this viscus. But because the brain retains a sensation, it does not follow that it originated there, or that it was not communicated from a distant part: on the contrary, the testimony of our consciousness is, that the sensation did occur in a distant part and was communicated to the brain; and as the evidence against this testimony of consciousness acquires its chief weight from the circumstance that there appears only one mode or process with

which it is compatible, so if another alternative is proposed, with which this evidence is equally compatible, the force of it must be equal with regard to them both. We have afterwards to decide, if certain facts are equally agreeable with two explanations, *on other* testimony, *which* of these explanations *is true*; and recurring to the only other testimony which can be quoted, or against which none other equally forcible can be opposed, it appears from our consciousness of the place where a sensation occurs, *that this place is* that of the injury, or that which suffers the immediate agency of the cause by which sensation is excited.

136§. If this view of the subject, in opposition to the prevalent theory, were admitted, it would lead to an explanation of many phenomena, no less opposite to that which is generally received. To trace the admissions which must follow, from regarding the nervous system generally as the seat of sensation, rather than of mere impressions.

137§. If sensations are produced where the influence is applied which excites them, that is, in the organs of sense, and in the nerves generally; if these sensations are transmitted to the brain; if the only phenomena of the brain (or its only sensations) are those which it obtains from the organs of sense; if these phenomena consist of the acquisition of sensations, or perceptions, (for in this view they cannot be distinguished,) obtained from these sources, of the recurrence and combination of these sensations by association, reasoning, and all those which are enumerated as operations of the mind, which seems to be only a definition of our experience, or consciousness: then, so far from the brain being *the source of sensibility*, it is not necessary that it should even possess sensibility; for, if all the ideas which are possessed by the brain are formed in the

senses, communicated to the brain, are retained there, and produce all the phenomena of the mind, a sensibility in the brain itself is superfluous, seeing that *all its sensations are produced* by the sensibility of other seats, in relation with externals, and *conferred upon it*.

138§. This account would scarcely be disputed if it were clear that the mind manifested no other sensations than those which are communicated to the brain from the senses, together with the products of these, in their relations with each other. That these sensations would comprise all the phenomena which are regarded as purely intellectual, as those of memory, reasoning, &c., there is no doubt; but there are other sensations which have their seat in the brain, which appear, at least at first sight, to be distinct from those which are imparted by the senses, or additional to them. The sensations alluded to are the appetites, the passions, volition, &c. To make a full analysis of these, would be to anticipate a future part of our subject: it may, however, be briefly inquired whether, taking a specimen of the feelings alluded to, the examination is likely to furnish us with proofs of the residence of a sentient principle in the brain.

139§. Say, for example, that one man tells another he is a thief, and the passion of anger is in consequence excited; the share which the auditory nerves have in this process is that of originating the sensation produced by these words, and of conveying it to the brain; this sensation may consist merely of a certain modification of sound: in the brain, this sensation is related, perhaps, with a past experience, which would show that such a charge was not deserved, or was untrue, or it might be related with what is called a principle of honour; the first of these relations would produce a conviction that the charge was unjust, or supposing the

charge to be either just or unjust, the accusation might excite anger, because it is related with all that information which the mind has acquired by early education that there is disgrace in being a thief; *and hence the disposition to resent* such an accusation. The *proof* that this sensation of anger is owing to a relation of the accusation with sensations which had been previously obtained through the senses, as by education, &c., is that *if the education had been a different one*, by which theft was inculcated as a virtue, or regarded only as a mark of superior ability, as among some nations, the accusation of being a thief *would produce a feeling* of triumph or of self-congratulation, *instead of* one of anger.

140§. Thus far our passion has arisen from sensations communicated to the brain through the senses: and the order of the processes is this—1st, a perception, or the sensation, conveyed from the auditory sense, and produced in it by the accusation; 2nd, this sensation, related with a principle of honour, which is the effect of previous experience, as of the advantages of this principle to society, of preceptive recommendations in its favour, consequent admiration, &c., of all which the senses were the media; 3rd, the conviction that the charge was *untrue*, is another result of the relation of the sensation produced in the auditory nerves, by the accusation of theft, *with former experience*; 4th, in relation with other former experiences, the conviction would be felt that the charge was *unjust*; 5th, this sensation, transmitted from the auditory nerves, is related with the knowledge, obtained also through the senses, that there is disgrace in being a thief; and the disposition to resent such an accusation, is the result of these various contributions.

141§. In this stage of the history, the decision of our question rests upon the choice of one of two alterna-

tives: 1st, is the feeling of *anger compounded* of these sensations which have originated in the senses, in the same manner as other sensations, such as inferences, principles, &c., are made by the combinations of the perceptions, perhaps of different senses? or, 2nd, is *another sensibility* required in the brain, with which the charge of being a thief, the conviction that it is untrue, the consciousness of a principle of honour, and the knowledge that there is disgrace in being a thief, are all related, *exciting this sensibility to the sensation of anger*? In reply to these questions, I should be disposed to say, the preceding account of the relation by which this feeling is produced comprises all *the causes* of it which can be traced or recognized; and it is therefore probable that the feeling is produced by a present perception, in relation with many complex sensations which have before been communicated to the brain from the senses.

142§. Or, to try an illustration of a more simple kind—liking, or aversion. We like some objects, and dislike others. We do this, in some instances, because the sensation which an object produces on a sense is agreeable or disagreeable: in other instances, the sense of liking, or disliking, arises from a relation between a perception and the brain; and the part of this relation which the brain furnishes may be, supposing for instance the object of liking or aversion is a man, a *recollection* that this man once conferred on us a benefit, or inflicted an injury; both experiences of the senses, *or former sensations*.

143§. When treating hereafter more particularly of the affections, it may perhaps appear more certain that the sensations of pleasure, pain, liking, aversion, hatred, jealousy, volition, &c., are either directly produced by relations between externals and the senses; or else are

compounded of the sensations, animal or intellectual, which originated in the senses, and were conveyed from thence to the brain. But, as some degree of uncertainty must in candour be allowed to rest on this point, we are justified at present only in pursuing the conclusions which are forced upon us, by an *assumption merely* of the truth of our sceptical doubt.

144§. According to it; (1.) sensibility would exist as the inherent property of every structure in which sensations might be excited by certain related influences; (2.) the brain would be a mere receptacle of the sensations communicated to it through the nerves from distant seats; (3.) these sensations would be retained in the brain, from relations subsisting between them, and the life of this seat, and this life would possess the distinguishing properties which furnish one part of the relation, by which sensations were preserved, and in which, as well as in the power of originating volition, the nerves themselves are deficient, or of which they at least afford no signs; (4.) the phenomena of the brain (assuming this viscus to be the seat of the mind) would then be comprised in receiving, retaining, reviving, and combining, so as to produce all the modifications of thought and feeling, the sensations communicated to it from the nerves; (5.) every structure which displayed sensibility during the integrity of the organs, would be capable of feeling, although the communication of its nerves with the brain should be intercepted; (6.) but as a sensation can be felt only where it exists, so it may be felt in a structure, the nerves of which are intercepted, and not in the brain, because it is excited in this structure, while its communication to the brain is prevented; it is for this reason that one man does not feel the injury inflicted upon another; the sense of this injury being confined to the subject on whom it is inflicted: and two persons, one of whom receives an injury, exemplify a

parallel case to that of the individual who suffers pain, of which the brain is not conscious, in a structure, the nerves of which are divided; in whom the connection, necessary for communicating this sensation to the brain, has ceased; thus making, so far as sensation is concerned, two persons in one man.

145§. Having stated thus freely our sceptical doubt, by which the brain would be excluded the possession of sensibility, whether for its own, or for the phenomena of any portion of the nervous system, it seems proper to remark that this view is at least opposed by common sense, if not by a sort of intuition, which would induce the belief that some of our sensations, chiefly those of the animal kind, *originate* in the brain, their origin from external impressions not being, at first sight, very obvious. How far this common sense, or this intuitive feeling, might have arisen from defect of attention, or from a loose analysis, I will not now attempt to determine: the more particularly, as in a future examination which will respect these phenomena of the mind, we shall have occasion to recur to the topics of this discussion. It is however to be observed, that if the common sense of mankind is in favour of an origin of some of our sensations in the brain, it is a departure from common sense to suppose that the seat of sensation, as of pain for example, is in the brain, and not in the part which sustains an injury. In this stage of our information, the results of former investigations will perhaps be most advantageously discussed, by pursuing our analysis in conformity with received opinion.

146§. If it should be true that the brain is entirely deficient in the principle of sensibility, something equivalent to it may be produced by the sensations communicated to this viscus, which may *constitute* a sentient principle, peculiar to the brain, to some extent

agreeing with Mr. Locke's suggestion of an "internal sense." The term sensibility, would not, perhaps, in this signification be strictly correct, because the principle, if it may be so called, would consist of sensations; but it may be admitted as a figurative expression, which represents one part of a sentient relation. In speaking of a sensibility of the brain, it will be understood that the alleged proofs of this sensibility are very questionable; as possibly those are also which would confine an inherent sensibility to the nerves. The term sensibility will therefore be used as liable to these alternatives, which may at present be regarded as unsettled, namely, that the sentient principle of the brain consists either wholly of past sensations, or of an inherent sensibility, in addition to these sensations.

147§. Although it appears, from preceding views, that our experience is defective, or that we are not furnished with an *experience* that the occurrence of sensation is dependent upon the brain, yet it is not scrupled in general to conclude as much in the way of inference. As the brain is not conscious of a sensation in a distant seat, to which, under a division of its nerves, the causes of pain might be applied, it is concluded, on this account, that such seat is *insensible*.

148§. This inference is founded upon the presumption, that *that is not*, of which there are no manifestations. This presumption is one of apparent propriety, since belief respects existence; and that cannot become an object of belief, of the existence of which there is no evidence. If this rule were not observed, there is no absurdity which may not be believed; since, of the greatest absurdities which the imagination can devise, it may, otherwise, be said, "We have no proofs that such things are; but they ought nevertheless to be believed, because there are no proofs that they are not."

149§. This is not precisely the predicament of our sceptical doubt; but, agreeably with *prevalent opinion*, and without losing sight of that testimony of conviction which has been in some measure opposed to it, it appears, 1st, That the seat of sensation is that where our consciousness assures us it takes place, or on which the exciting cause of sensation acts; 2nd, That such part would have no sensibility, but for its communication with the brain; and, 3rd, That it obtains sensibility from the brain by this communication.

150§. It has been said, conformably with this hypothesis, that the diffusion of sensibility from the nervous centres is either habitual or occasional: in the former case, the nerves always possess sensibility; in the latter, they obtain it only under the excitation of a stimulus, or cause of sensation, applied to a distant seat. We can do little more than suggest these modes as alternatives. We can have no experience that *sensibility* is habitually possessed by nerves, since the only proof of the possession of such sensibility is *sensation*. According, then, to our experience, the sensibility which is already diffused through the nerves may be excited by the causes of sensation; or the influence of these causes may be to derive sensibility (and in relation with it, to produce sensation) to the parts on which causes act. It will perhaps be remarked, in favour of the constant presence of sensibility in the nerves, that there is no interval of time, between the application of a cause, and the excitation of this principle: but it may be as justly said, that we are conscious of a sensation without a communication of it to the brain, since the perception is simultaneous with the application of its cause. Indeed, no degree of celerity of communication in this system seems greater than may be presumed from its phenomena.

151§. If our *experience* on this point fails, the evi-

dence of analogy will also be found not satisfactory. Certain secretions, which are unremitting, are supposed to depend upon an influence from some nervous centre; certain actions, as those of the heart, diaphragm, perhaps the peristaltic movements of the intestines, &c. which are unremitting, are also supposed to depend upon an habitual supply of properties from the origin of nerves. On the other hand, in the metastasis of disease, a cause of irritation which acts upon a secondary seat, will *derive* from a primary one; as in the instances of counter-irritation; in some of the sympathies, in the translation of gout from the head to the feet, under the application of mustard cataplasms to the latter parts: and in physiology, the organs of generation, in both sexes, under some circumstances, exemplify the derivation of properties to a seat, by an occasional cause of excitement, affecting such seat. As experience upon this point is necessarily defective, and as the testimonies of analogy appear to be pretty equally opposed, these alternatives must remain, with many others, to be settled by new facts which are to be hoped for in the progress of investigation.

152§. It appears then, on the first topic of this section, which respects the seat of sensibility generally, (1.) that all those parts possess it which are capable of sensation, the only proof of the locality of which, is consciousness: (2.) that such parts possess sensibility, either independently of any other seats, with which however they entertain functional intercourse, or they obtain it from the centres of nerves: the latter has for the present been presumed; (3.) that if sensibility is communicated to the nerves from their centres, the modes of its diffusion are either, 1st, that central influence is distributed through the nervous system, returning to its source in a manner which is, in effect, analogous to the sanguineous circulation: or, 2nd, that an habitual

influence is communicated merely, from the nervous centres to the nerves, by which the latter are constantly possessed of sensibility; (this mode may suggest an enquiry concerning the laws by which the quantity of sensibility produced in the brain, and communicated to the nervous system, is regulated, so as to prevent, or compensate the tendencies of accumulation and waste :) or, 3rd, that central influence is obtained by nerves, by a derivation of such influence produced by an occasional cause of local excitement.

153§. The testimonies we possess appear inadequate to a decision between these modes of the communication of central influence to remote nerves. We can therefore do little more than define our experience, which is, that sentient structures are possessed of a sensibility by which they are, during health, and in the waking state, in constant relation with certain causes which, becoming influential, produce sensation as a result of this relation. This experience, presuming the theory that the brain is a source of sensibility, comes nearest the conclusion that there is an habitual or constant diffusion of sensibility from a nervous centre; or this conclusion presumes less beyond our experience than either of the others.

(2.) 154§. We have seen that the seat of sensibility generally is in the nervous system; the particular *seat of the mind* is assigned by common, or perhaps universal consent, to be in the brain.

155§. The degree of credit which is to be attached to general consent in this instance is greater than in some others: in matters of inference, general consent is many times changed, on the same questions, in the lapse of ages; and therefore, being thus fallible, can be permitted only the authority of prevalent opinion, which

may be either true or false. But that the seat of the mind is in the brain, rests upon a somewhat similar testimony to that of the locality of the senses of vision, touch, smell, &c. ; that is, the brain is felt to be the seat of the operations of the mind, as all those have experienced who, under an intense exertion of the mind, whether habitual or occasional, have remarked the place where it occurs.

156§. In addition to this evidence of a prevalent consciousness, the seat of the mind might be traced experimentally to the brain. The communication of this viscus with the rest of the body, is by the nerves which proceed from it; and the division of any of these nerves, which can be made compatibly with the continuance of life, is found to render remote parts, to which these nerves are distributed, insensible, or at least incapable of expressing sensation; but the operations of the mind, the functions of the brain, are still continued with little or no interruption. A violent scepticism may, I am aware, quarrel with this experimental proof: it may urge, supposing all the nerves which proceed from the brain to be divided near their origin, and that the operations of the understanding are continued, *the seat of these operations* may be either above or below the place of such division. But to advance seriously this objection, would argue a degree of scepticism which no one will be disposed to indulge; the more particularly as the seat of the mind would be decided to be, under such circumstances, in the brain, rather than in remote structures to which the nerves are distributed, as well by the consciousness before spoken of, as by the additional evidence that the mind is not sensibly impaired by *the removal* of as many parts as can be *separated* from the rest of the body without destroying life.

157§. That the seat of the mind is in the brain, is

also deduced from the injuries and diseases which are suffered by this viscus; by the different forms or grades of which, the mind is disturbed, impaired, or its phenomena cease altogether. But our determined scepticism may remark on this argument, that the preternatural influence, whether by injury or disease, to which one part of the body is subjected, frequently disturbs or destroys *the function of another part*, as in the instances of the sympathies, and in all those numerous examples which display a relation between seats: and hence an injury of the brain may impair or suspend the operations of the mind, by the relation of this viscus with a distant structure, which constitutes *its seat*. Thus we find that life may *be destroyed* by injury of a part of the brain, which in another case may be actually lost, as by hernia cerebri, without this effect; or life may be destroyed by a ligature close to the spine, upon a sciatic *nerve*. Yet that the nerve, or this portion of it, is *the seat of life*, or the source from whence it is distributed, is not, *on this account*, inferred.

158§. But, although these arguments individually are liable to the doubts of a scepticism which is prepared to dispute even the testimony of the senses, if such testimony stood in its way, collectively, they must nevertheless be admitted to prove that the seat of the mind is in the brain; at least, one might believe so much without manifesting a pitiable degree of credulity. Whether we can still more minutely assign the locality of the mind, than by saying generally its seat is in the brain, remains to be considered.

159§. This has, in fact, been attempted. The seat of the mind has been fixed in an insignificant portion of the brain (in the Pineal Gland); and it has been fixed in the brain generally, while the several faculties and propensities belonging to it have been supposed to

reside in respective portions of this viscus. To consider these theories briefly :

160§. If the proofs of the locality of the mind *in the brain* are not so unexceptionable as to be beyond the reach of scepticism, we shall find the conjecture that the seat of the mind is not only in the brain, but in some specified part of this viscus, to be still more indifferently supported. The strongest evidence, perhaps, of the locality of the mind in the brain, is our own consciousness that this is the seat of its operations ; yet this consciousness is not on all occasions very distinct : the next proof is, that the operations of the mind are suspended or impaired by injuries of the brain.

161§. If we apply *these tests* of locality to any particular portion of the brain, we shall find them to fail of confirming such portion to be the seat of the understanding. In the perceptions of sounds, of the objects of vision, of touch, of smell, &c., we have no consciousness that the seat of these perceptions is in the front, in the back, the right, or the left, the superior, the inferior, or the middle portions of the brain—and in the operations of the mind, whether those of association or induction, whether engaged in the study of music, of languages, of mathematics—and of propensities, whether we are animated by the passion of love, jealousy, revenge, anger, &c.; we have in neither of these instances a consciousness of the locality of these sensations, which will enable us to assign it to one part of the brain rather than another, or to distinguish even, that the seat of these respective sensations is individually different.

162§. Then for the proofs of locality afforded by disease or injury : we find that extravasations of blood, as in apoplexy, however trifling, will suspend the phenomena of the mind, or make them, together with life,

cease, in whatever part of the brain they might occur. Whether extravasation takes place in the cortical, or in the medullary, the lateral, the anterior, or posterior, superior, or inferior, portions of the brain; whether fluid is effused from the membranes of the brain upon its surface, or poured into its cavities; or even without the occurrence of effusion, in whatever part congestion may be remarked; and in some instances of fatal cerebral disease, which does not obviously affect one part rather than another; in injuries also, as by wounds of the brain, by concussion, by pressure from depressed bone; in the sympathies of the brain with distant injuries, as in the phrenitis succeeding to a severe compound fracture, &c.: in all these varieties of the seat of the influence of the palpable cause, and in those instances in which no particular seat can be assigned, there is in general this common result, that *all* the phenomena of the mind are modified, are suspended, or cease *together*. Or if, under certain injuries or diseases, some faculties or propensities survive, while others are lost, this occurs in connection with injury or disease of any *given portion* of the brain with so little regularity, that either consequence can never be predicted from an influence of either kind, which is exerted upon one portion, rather than another.

163§. It appears then that *the proofs* that the *brain* is the seat of *the mind*, do not support the conjecture that its seat, or that of any faculty or propensity belonging to it, is limited to any peculiar sphere in the structure of this viscus. It remains that we should examine what other proofs have been quoted on behalf of this conjecture, remarking at the same time what kind of testimony would be required in order to establish its truth.

164§. Of the two suppositions, that the seat of the

mind is in one part of the brain, and that its *several faculties* have their *respective seats*, it is scarcely necessary to say more of the first, than that it is one of those conceits which are every now and then proposed from the imagination, and being supported by no testimony, can be addressed only to the credulity, and not to the judgment of mankind. The second conjecture, namely, that the several faculties of the mind, and the propensities which help to make up character, have their seats in respective portions of the brain, from its being proposed with some colour of argument, as well as from the number of its advocates, requires to be more fully considered. To state this doctrine, which will be recognised as that of Doctors Gall and Spurzheim :

165§. (1.) The faculties of the human understanding are enumerated, together with the passions and propensities which are remarked in greater or less degree, in different individuals. (2.) The phenomena of the mind are imputed to so many distinct faculties as are specified, which, together with the passions and propensities, exist respectively, in different degrees, in the same, or in different individuals. It is said further (3.) that these faculties, &c. have their respective seats *in particular portions of the brain*; (4.) that these portions of the brain are the organs of such faculties; (5.) that the strength of each faculty is in proportion to the size of its organ; (6.) that these organs are situated in the superficial parts of the brain; (7.) that in proportion to their size, will be the protuberance of the skull, in the situation of them; (8.) that therefore, by an examination of these protuberances, the size of the organs, and consequently the strength of the respective faculties, may be estimated; (9.) that faculties may, by education, be developed or restrained; (10.) that the preponderance of one faculty may be repressed by the cultivation of another, &c. Lastly, (11.) that the authors

have been so fortunate as to discover *in what parts* of the brain, (these parts being conveniently situated for the purpose,) the faculties of the mind, as well as the passions, reside.

166§. The doctrine, according to this statement of it, must at first sight appear a hypothetical one, of the most visionary character. But evidence has been cited in its behalf, which may be briefly considered in connection with the several particulars just stated.*

167§. The enumeration of the faculties, &c. appears to be generally correct, because it is only a specification of those operations of the mind which take place in relation to the principal objects upon which it might be employed. It is a comprehensive account of what the mind does, or of its actions; and that which it

* In apology for a notice at this time, of the doctrines of Messrs. Gall and Spurzheim, the Author thinks it necessary to observe, that some years have elapsed since the manuscript of *this part* of the work was written. The general line of argument more recently pursued in the excellent refutation of these doctrines, contained in the 88th Number of the Edinburgh Review, might justly have superseded the Author's remarks. He trusts, however, that he might be excused their insertion, if only for the sake of making a more complete exhibition of his subject, notwithstanding he has, in the article alluded to, been to some extent anticipated.

On a *re-perusal* of this part of his volume, the Author confesses that it falls very much below what might be expected from one who has only assertion, or the assumptions of expediency, to contend with; and nothing but a feeling of insuperable aversion or disgust, would prevent his breaking up the arrangement of the work, in order to bestow upon the subject a much closer examination. He may, however, be excused from taking this trouble, by the conviction that he has already bestowed upon it sufficient notice to demonstrate its absurdity; and therefore quite as much attention as it deserves. The secret of the manufacture of this craniologico-phrenologico-physiognomical system is this: that comparing the mind to a musical instrument, *others* have been content to reckon and arrange its notes, while our philosophers have wisely and profoundly reflected, that every note ought to have a *separate* string.

does, of course it possesses a faculty or ability of doing—not that all, or half of its acts, or abilities, are comprised in this enumeration. For instance, the mechanical genius which displays itself only by making mouse-traps, is not distinguished; or the musical one, which enables a person to excel at the jew's-harp, but is positively obtuse with respect to all other instruments; such geniuses are by no means uncommon. And among propensities, there are enumerated, it is true, those to murder, theft, &c.; but nothing is said of a predilection for wigs or tails, of which some men are so enamoured, that the happiness of their lives seems to depend upon one particular cut, size, or length of these fascinating objects. And of the propensity to *destructiveness*: some men are disposed to destroy *each other*; some to kill hares; others foxes; and others rats: some to *pull down moral edifices*, and allow *old houses to stand*; to pull down *castles*, and to *build up* modern mansions; some, as conquerors, to *pull down* kings, and perhaps also to *make* kings: some manifest nothing but benevolence towards others, but are bent upon destroying themselves. These varieties are mentioned merely to shew that a person both has, and has not, an organ for a particular genius, for doing, and undoing, &c.; and that, elaborate as the distinctions are already, they might be made much more numerous. But it is rather an object in philosophy to simplify, than to make useless distinctions; whether this object has been kept in view, and with what success, in the doctrines we are considering, will hereafter appear.

168§. (2.) “The phenomena of the mind are imputed to so many *distinct faculties*, having separate habitations, as are enumerated; which, together with the passions and propensities, exist respectively in different degrees, in the same, or in different individuals.” By which is meant, among other things, that a person may

have a particular talent, or genius, for any one department of information. But the independence, or distinctness of such faculty, does not therefore follow. On the contrary, however one particular talent may prevail, the other faculties are found to subserve it. Thus, if there is a genius for calculation, this faculty must be supplied with its objects by the senses of vision, hearing, touch, &c. : as also calculation proceeds by inference, so the faculty of *reasoning* is exerted in the processes of calculation ; and as calculation may respect real or imaginary numbers, or as it may respect real or imaginary quantities, a perceptible or an imaginary divisibility, &c., so the faculty of calculation is exercised by the aid of *imagination* : and as calculations are made in language, or may respect languages, or may respect historical events, &c., so the faculties of the mind which subserve these latter objects, are also contributory to the faculty of calculation. The same may be observed with respect to the other faculties, that each participates in the operations, and exercises itself upon the objects of the rest.

*168§. In *what organ* then shall we say that any particular class of ideas are produced, when the ideas of this class are *compounded of others*, which ought to be produced in *several organs*? Do the ideas of the several classes quit their respective spheres, to make a mixed idea of another class *in its appropriate organ*? or do the contributions of all the organs concerned meet half way, which seems to be the fairest arrangement, in order to compound an idea of another class, with the assistance of an ambassador from the department of this class? Whichever alternative is preferred, seeing that so many organs contribute to one mixed idea, it may perhaps be difficult to settle *the right to it* of either one of them. In addition, we have *experience* that *the will*, if so disposed, has the power of calling into action, under some or other modification, any

faculty, or passion. Confessing, then, the general experience, that the faculties and passions are, *to this extent*, under the controul of the will; let us exert a strenuous volition, in order to bring *all the faculties and passions* into action *at the same time*, which we certainly could do, if the will is, as is proved, their common stimulus, and if the faculties and passions were *so many distinct subjects*, existing in their respective spheres, and requiring only volition to render them active. What *ought to be* the consequence of this *comprehensive desire*? Certainly, that we should have a consciousness *of some sort*, of ideas and sensations *of every class*, or of every faculty, or passion. But *what is* the consequence of such a volition? Simply, that instead of a mind at once teeming under this prevalent volition with a diversity of reflections and sensations, corresponding with all the faculties and passions, we have but *one idea*, which apparently possesses *one mind*; and this idea, instead of a vast and motley display of several faculties and passions, is merely the conviction that we are making a vain attempt. Will it be said that the will *can only go to one organ at a time*; perhaps for the reason that its energy can only flow *in one stream*, or that *all other avenues are closed*? (for those who maintain absurdities *will assume* any thing.) How then happens it, under so rigorous an exclusion, that ideas may be collected by volition from the several classes of perceptions or sensations (organs as they call them) to make up a mixed idea, beyond the *appropriate seat* of which, the will should have *no efficacy*, if it is incapable of diffusing its influence?

169 §. We cannot, then, say that one faculty is independent of the others, if the terms upon which it is exercised (or if it otherwise wants the *ability* of exercising itself) are, that the other faculties should co-operate with it. But that persons may have talents for parti-

cular pursuits, or that they have certain propensities in a greater degree than others, is a truth of which we do not require to be instructed, since the remark must have been almost coeval with the creation of man. If we were to express this observation, confining ourselves to little more than our experience, we should say that there is a stronger, or a more favourable disposition in some minds to certain operations, (those agreeing perhaps with the enumeration of the faculties) than in others; and that the respective passions or propensities are also stronger in some individuals than in others. But that the existence of any one faculty is independent of all the rest, or requires to be spoken of as more than a disposition of that which is expressed in the gross as the mind, cannot be inferred, 1st, Because the disposition which makes the faculty related with its objects, has the character of a common principle (at least we have no means of analysis to shew that the sensibility subserving the phenomena of the mind is a separable principle); 2nd, Because the objects of a given faculty are presented to it through media (the senses) which are common to all the other faculties; and, 3rd, Because one ability is not perfect, or in reality *does not exist* without the concurrence, more or less extensive, of others. In truth there seems little more reason for supposing that the different phenomena of the mind are produced by distinct faculties, than that it requires *different hands* to play different tunes upon a musical instrument; or that to turn a wheel, to lift a weight, to fire a musket, to build a house, or to make a watch, are so many exertions of *separate muscular powers*. If this were admitted, it is obvious that the sensibilities of the nerves, and the powers of the muscles, are very imperfectly enumerated; since by *such reasoning*, these structures must possess *faculties* which are *equal in number to their sensations or their actions*; and these would correspond with the several causes by which they

are excited, or with the several subjects upon which their powers are exercised. So far, indeed, from there being a distinct sensibility for every sensation, the question may be suggested whether sensibility is not *always alike*; the diversities of sensation, being produced by different objects, in relation with the same sensibility, and the *organs* of the senses serving only the purpose of *bringing different objects into relation* with the *same principle* of sensibility? As, however, there is a convenience in supposing the sensibility, at least of the respective senses, to be a modified principle in each, which is true virtually, if not in reality, such modification of it may perhaps be advantageously assumed.

170§. (3.) “These faculties of the mind have their seats in respective portions of the brain.” As it appears from the preceding considerations, that the faculties of the mind are not themselves distinct, so it seems superfluous to inquire whether they have respective or appropriate seats in the brain; which would almost amount to a confession of that distinctness which we have seen to be entirely chimerical.

171§. It is evident that the appropriation of certain faculties, to certain portions of the brain, is not confirmed by experience, or is no part of our experience. In all other instances, in which we fix the locality of faculties or functions in certain organs, we make this appropriation upon the experience that the phenomena of such functions or faculties are found to take place in, or to be produced by, such organs. Thus if a person were informed that food is somewhere digested, and if his instruction went no farther, he would not, upon a mere exposure of the abdominal viscera in the dead subject, be able to pronounce that the stomach was the organ of digestion; but he would attain the knowledge of this fact, by witnessing that *this was the organ in*

which the changes of food, characteristic of digestion, occurred: if this testimony were wanting, while the fact of a digestion somewhere was confirmed by other proofs, he would be unable to assign the seat of this function. Thus also, upon a similar evidence, the seat of the function which separates bile, is proved to be in the liver; of that which separates urine, in the kidneys; of certain muscular actions, in certain muscles, &c.

172§. But although it may be concluded from evidence, the sufficiency of which will scarcely be questioned, that the seat of the mind is in *the brain*, our consciousness of its phenomena does not instruct us of their precise seats: we are on this account deficient in the testimony of experience; and are therefore left to conjecture, with the aid only of the most questionable data, in what particular part of the brain the faculty resides which produces phenomena of any particular kind, or whether in the brain generally; whether these phenomena are results or modifications of a common principle, or whether of several faculties existing in respective spheres, united only by a free intercourse with each other.

173§. If we inquire on this subject, as a methodical design would suggest, our proofs, whether experimental, or analogical, must be according to the modes of analysis, or synthesis.

174§. The analytical proof that a certain faculty resided in a certain portion of the brain, would be the separation of this portion, and the consequent cessation of the faculty. It is obvious that this test is generally inapplicable, because such a separation cannot be made compatibly with the continuance of life; and if its evidence were taken, we should have as much reason to

conclude that *all* the faculties of the mind, as that *one faculty* resided in this separated portion, for they would all cease or be suspended together; and this, it is presumed from the effects of injuries, would happen, whatever portion of the brain may be selected as the suspected seat of a particular faculty.—The synthetical proof of a strictly experimental kind, would be afforded by the recurrence of the faculty upon the restoration, or re-production of a portion of the brain, in which it was conjectured to reside, and the phenomena of which ceased upon its removal. It need not be said, we are precluded the acquisition of a proof of this kind.

175§. But the subject is treated of more loosely. It is observed, elsewhere, in the systems of animals, that when different faculties are displayed, they are found to be connected with different structures. In order that this argument should have any weight, it is necessary first to shew that the faculties of the mind *are* different, or are not modifications of one common principle. It will be remarked, as apposite to the question, that the nervous system itself, in its various distributions, displays the possession of different faculties, although the structure of nerves is generally alike. But this, again, is an assumption: the several *seats to which nerves are distributed*, may display a diversity of function; but, as the properties of life (to say nothing of the influence of connected organization) resident in such seats are respectively different, as is proved by the difference of the structures they produce, so different results may ensue from nervous influence in different seats, not because the *nervous* influence is not *the same*, but because the properties with which it is related, and with which it produces effects in conjunction, are different.

176§. It will be urged, there is another analogical

ground for supposing the different parts of the brain to be the seats of respective faculties, namely, that although the structure of this viscus bears throughout a general similitude, yet more or less of diversity of appearance is exhibited by its parts—thus we have in the brain, cortical and medullary portions, cavities, eminences, alleged varieties of fibrous arrangement, different degrees of vascularity in the membranes contiguous to certain parts, &c.

177§. But, after the most elaborate enumeration of differences, it must still be confessed that the respective portions of the brain are little more than varieties of figure of a similar composition, united in one viscus. This appeal would therefore dispose us to the conclusion, that if the brain is the seat of the mind, this principle occupies it generally; and is, at most, modified in its operations in those few places only, where the difference of substance or arrangement is the least equivocal.

178§. The conclusion of a distinct locality in the brain of the respective faculties of the mind would not follow, though all the differences of structure in the parts of this viscus, which have ever been remarked or fancied, should be freely conceded; for we observe in other instances, that different properties, or properties even from very distant seats, unite for the formation or perfection of a function—as, for example, the resident properties of muscles, or of the stomach, and those derived from nervous centres, for the function of muscular action, or of digestion, &c. Hence, although different structures of the brain may be, agreeably with analogy, the seats of different allied properties, yet these properties may not be even any one faculty of the mind, but may all contribute to the constitution of this principle; which, to pursue alternatives, may be identi-

fied only in one particular part of the brain, or from community of intercourse among these constituent properties may be equally perfect in every portion of its structure.

179§. But if it were granted, that wherever diversities of structure (which, in this instance, are those of arrangement, rather than of substance) were manifested, different faculties may be inferred to reside, as these varieties are the most numerous in the internal parts of the brain, so it is evident that we are furnished, according *to this rule*, with few or no external signs, by which certain faculties may be appropriated to certain structures, or by which either the degree of the faculty, or the development of its imputed organ, may be estimated.

180§. Among proofs of the particular localities of the several functions of the brain, it will be remarked, that disease or injury, occurring in certain situations, is found regularly to destroy certain functions: thus effusion of blood, or lesion of any kind, happening about the origin of certain nerves, produces paralysis of such nerves, as of the optic, auditory, olfactory nerves, &c., occasioning loss of vision, deafness, &c. These instances do not, however, exemplify the residence of a faculty of the mind, but of a sense, in a particular portion of the brain—or perhaps not even the *locality of a sense*, but merely *the course* of the propagation of influences from its external organ; in which latter view, the function of a sense would be impaired or suspended, by disease or injury at the origin of its nerve, *only because the transmission* of its sensations to the common sensorium *is impeded*. Pressure, from effusion, or any other cause, on one hemisphere of the brain, is found to paralyse that side of the body, the nerves of which are derived, or supposed to be derived,

from this hemisphere. But the faculties of the mind survive this injury, although perhaps their powers are weakened. It might be concluded from this fact, that nerves derive their powers from that side of the brain in which they originate; while the faculties of the mind are possessed by the whole brain, and are diminished in degree by an influence which incapacitates a portion of this viscus. Yet this argument is liable to the doubts before expressed, which were suggested by the necessity of discriminating when effects happen from the operation of a cause on the seat to which it is applied, and when from the relations of this cause with a distant one, of which the seat of its application becomes only the medium. It remains also to be explained, how, without a tendency to a common centre, or without community of intercourse, the powers of one side of the brain (supposing them, agreeably with a symmetrical structure, to be the same on both) should be reciprocally auxiliary to those of the other.

181§. But the fact that a sense may be lost, as that of vision, or of hearing, by pressure on the origin of the nerves which subserve it, to say nothing of other explanations to which this fact is liable, is not so strong a proof as at first sight it appears, that the brain possesses different faculties of *any kind*, in different seats—for it is to be observed, that these nerves of the senses have relation with different structures; and we cannot say whether either of these nerves would, or would not, give the perceptions of *another sense*, if it were transposed, or distributed in an appropriate organ. In other words, a common sensibility, as formerly hinted, may be communicated to the optic, auditory, olfactory nerves, &c.; which sensibility may furnish different perceptions, because, in its extreme distribution, it is related with a different structure, possessing both different properties of life, and a different composition and arrangement of

organic materials. Hence it appears that the experience which should instruct us of the particular localities of certain faculties in certain portions of the brain, is either very defective or entirely wanting; and that the proofs of a looser kind, being liable to different explanations, for the truth of which testimonies are divided, are equally inadequate.

182§. (4.) “The portions of the brain in which faculties reside, are respectively *the organs* of these faculties.” If it cannot be proved, in the first place, that the faculties of the mind are distinct, and, in the second, that they reside severally in different portions of the brain, it seems superfluous to inquire whether each faculty has its appropriate organ. In this instance, even admitting such a separation of the faculties of the mind that they may occupy different spheres in the brain, the designation of such seats by the term *organs* does not appear very intelligible.

183§. When we call other parts of the material fabric “organs,” as the thoracic, and abdominal viscera, the glands, &c., we mean that these parts are the material agents of functions, whose results or phenomena take place by their instrumentality—thus the stomach is the organ of digestion, because by it, in connection with its life, digestion is performed; the same of the liver, kidneys, &c., which are the organs of their respective secretions: but in this phrenological appropriation, to urge a popular objection, it is not remarkably obvious how a flight of imagination, a philosophical reflection, a cautious action, or an arithmetical calculation, is to be produced by one arrangement of the substance of the brain, rather than another; to say nothing of the additional disadvantage, that some of the *alleged differences* of arrangement *are perceptible only* to a few of the phrenologists.

184§. (5.) "The strength of the faculty is in proportion to the size of the organ," &c. This is an *assumption*, founded on the former *assumptions*, that faculties are distinct, and have appropriate organs: but if faculties are neither proved to be distinct, nor to have organs, it is presumed that the size of any portion of the brain which may be called an organ, cannot be a criterion by which the strength of a faculty may be estimated. It is indeed, in some instances, a physiological truth, that the power of an organ is in proportion to its size: we find that this is the case with respect to the muscles, but not uniformly in this system; for muscular strength is by no means invariably in a ratio to the bulk of the muscles, either in men or in other animals. It is true also, generally, in the nervous system, that the largest nerves appear to communicate the greatest degree of the muscular power dependent upon them. But there are phenomena which are *not to be estimated by degree*, and those of the mind are among the number, at least to a great extent: this, however, is a topic, the discussion of which is not required in this place.

185§. But to consider, in connection with our phrenological discovery, one or two palpable examples: Sensibility is a property possessed by nerves. Is the *sensibility* of the sciatic nerve, which is a large one, more exquisite than the sensibility of the optic, auditory, or olfactory nerves, which are comparatively small ones? or is the sensibility of a nervous trunk more acute than that of its branches? It would be difficult, I apprehend, to prove the affirmative in all instances, if in any. And, in other examples, we do not find that a large eye, or a large nose, is capable of a longer-continued exercise of its faculty than a small one, or that the excellence of its faculty is in proportion to its size; and even in the organic system, digestion is not perfect in proportion *to the size* of the stomach; nor is a large

heart, or a large liver, a more successful agent of the circulation, or of secretion, than a small one. Thus on this point of doctrine it may be remarked, that it is an assumption founded on two other assumptions; and requires for its convenience the additional assumption, of a ratio between the function and the size of the organ in a particular instance; which ratio, in analogous examples, is found to obtain only very rarely, or sometimes. If the operations of the mind were purely *mechanical*, the strength of faculties may possibly be in proportion to the size of the mechanical powers; but *because* a *club* is stronger than a *switch*, it does not appear to follow that *therefore* the strength of an intellectual faculty will be *in proportion* to *the number of cerebral particles* accumulated in any given spot. But it is said that animals are wise, or docile, or something, *in proportion to the size of their brains*—this, however, is obviously false; for a little dog is as docile, and perhaps a flea is as wise, as an elephant: but then it is added, *wise* according to the size of their brains, relatively to that of their bodies—an evasion which amounts to the confession, that wisdom, or docility, *at least is not in proportion* to the *number of cerebral particles*.

186§. (6.) “The organs of faculties are situated on the external parts of the brain,” &c. In praise of this situation for the organs, it may be observed that no other would have suited the exhibitions of craniology, which may have been almost a sufficient reason for the selection. With respect to the assertion, it is merely an assumption, resting upon four or five other assumptions, which have scarcely the merit of being rational. To treat it, however, with becoming gravity: It has been remarked that the principal analogical testimony in favour of the residence of individual faculties in respective portions of the brain is, that the structure or arrangement of this viscus manifests some diversity

in its several parts, by which a corresponding diversity of function is indicated, agreeably with the difference of function which different structures elsewhere manifest. This testimony of analogy has been found to be very weak, and opposed by considerations which render it altogether inconclusive. But this evidence, if insisted upon, does not favour the doctrine; for if the proof of local diversity of function is alleged to be the local diversity of structure, this diversity obtains more frequently, and is more conspicuous, in the internal than in the external parts of the brain—these latter are *composed* of the same substance; the convoluted arrangement of this substance, its investments, and its vascularity, are also generally *alike*; yet the portions of this *similar* substance are said to possess *different* faculties! The proof of several faculties, derived from difference of structure, is more equivocal in the external part of the brain than in its internal portions; and if this testimony has been excepted against, where difference of substance and of arrangement is conspicuous, it will not be admitted where difference in these respects can scarcely be said to exist.

187§. But the principal argument by which it has been attempted to prove that the external parts of the brain are the organs, or seats of faculties, is that the assumed development of these parts, in the places of an external protuberance of the skull, is affirmed to indicate the degree in which these faculties severally are possessed: hence it is pretended that character may be ascertained by an examination of the external signs of these portions of the brain. Supposing even this to be true; supposing it conceded that a certain configuration and development of the brain, or of certain parts of it, indicate faculties, propensities, or what is called character; it does not *on this account* follow that these portions of the brain are the seats of such

faculties, or propensities, or even that they are seats of the mind. *The configuration of the whole brain* may be modified by any given variety in the shape of the cranium, *at any one place*; and therefore, *supposing* it to be an *invariable fact* that the same protuberance in the skull were accompanied by the same peculiarity of character, it *would not follow* that the place of this protuberance is the seat, or organ, however named, of the mental peculiarity; since this may be owing, as probably, to the adaptation of the whole brain, *to a cranium of a given shape*, if properties, in the mental department, are liable to be influenced by the configuration of the substance with which they are allied. Character is also *indicated* by a conformation of *the face*, by lines of the face, by the expression of the eyes, &c., with much more regularity than by any assigned configuration of the brain. Yet we do not say, because a man has a thinking countenance, that his face is the seat, still less the organ, of thought; or if he appears revengeful, that his face is the seat of revenge; or, if his eye expresses anger, love, &c., that his eye is the seat of these passions. So far, indeed, are the affections of organs from proving a separate or exclusive locality of function, that there is scarcely in the whole system an organ or part which may not owe its phenomena, however peculiar, in greater or less degree to an influence which originates elsewhere, or is derived from a related seat. The examples which illustrate this remark are so numerous, that it will be superfluous to specify them: they may be adverted to generally in physiology, as all those instances in which the phenomena of one seat are dependent upon the influence derived from another; and under disease, as all those which exhibit relations between seats.

188§. If therefore we would render the conclusion, that those which are called “organs” in the brain are the seats of the faculties &c. which make character, a

legitimate one, we must seek for better proofs than that such a state of the brain is *sometimes associated* with such a mental disposition, or is the indication of it.—We must seek for proofs which will enable us to discriminate whether such portions of the brain owe their development and configuration to faculties of the mind which inhere with these seats; whether peculiar faculties of the mind are dependent upon a *local* development, or a *general* configuration of the brain; whether these modifications of the structures are dependent upon an influence derived from related seats, &c.—distinctions, for the making of which, it is presumed, our facts are rather deficient.

189§. (7.) “In proportion to the size of the organ, will be the protuberance of the skull,” &c. This assumption arises out of the preceding assumptions, and like them is equally convenient, and equally unfounded. It implies these additions to all former assumptions, namely, that the cranium is moulded by its contents; and that the inequalities of its surface indicate corresponding inequalities of the brain.

190§. That the internal surface of the cranium is marked by the convoluted arrangement of the brain, is sufficiently obvious: it is also marked by the blood vessels which are contiguous to this surface; but these parts, together with the cranium, were simultaneous formations in the fœtus, and the surface of the cranium was thus impressed, whilst the bones were soft. Supposing it, however, to be conceded, not only that the soft parts contiguous to the internal surface of the skull were capable of marking it, before the bones had acquired firmness, agreeably with their own configuration, but also, that during the whole period of growth, from infancy to manhood, the lines, depressions, &c. of the cranium were extended in proportion as the soft

parts were enlarged (which appears to be the fact), it does not therefore follow that the effect of the pressure of the soft parts upon the bone, in their respective situations, should go beyond that table of the skull with which they are in contact. Supposing the formation of the brain, and that of the skull, to be antagonist growths (which seems to be confirmed by the great development of the skull in extreme cases of mollities ossium), the former tending to augment the projection of the latter, and the latter tending to limit or compress the volume of the former, it seems more probable that the brain, which offers the less, should conform to the growth of the skull, which offers the greater resistance, than that the skull should adapt itself to the brain. This probability seems to be the greater, as the skull in the fœtus is formed of larger dimensions than are necessary for the purpose of containing the brain, as is proved by the reduced bulk of the head, the over-lapping of the bones, &c. which takes place during parturition, and more strikingly, by the reduction of which the head is susceptible by the compression of the forceps.

191§. But without laying much stress upon this argument, concerning which opposing facts may be quoted at some length, we find that there are protuberances in the skull, where there are, underneath, no corresponding processes of the brain; and that the skull is moulded *internally* by irregular developments of the convoluted portions of the brain, where *externally* there are no projections of the skull, which correspond with the concavities of its internal surface. This fact, so familiarly quoted, and first opposed to these doctrines, I believe, by the late Dr. Barclay, agrees well with the supposition just expressed, that although the internal surface of the cranium may be marked by the soft substances in contact with it, the influence of these

substances does not extend always to the configuration of the diploe, and with still less regularity to the external table of the skull. On the other hand, if the growth of the skull were altogether independent of the influence of its contents, and if its projections, with corresponding internal concavities, were irregular at different places, it appears probable that these concavities would be filled by the brain, or that the development of this viscus by growth would be greatest where there was the least resistance; thus rendering the projections of the surface of the brain dependent rather upon the formation of the skull, than the latter dependent upon the growth of the brain.

192§. But it is a part of the doctrine which has been already in some measure discussed, that the size of the organ is in proportion to the strength of the faculty—it is confessed that a faculty, not naturally very predominant, may be greatly strengthened by education, or habitual exercise; and we find that this happens, although the education should be commenced, or the faculty habituated to exercise, at a late period of life; or at least in adult age. Would, it may be asked, the projection of the skull increase,* *in proportion* as the faculty acquired strength? If it did not, which is assuredly the fact, it would follow that the faculty gained strength, while the organ preserved its former bulk (which would prove *the ratio* between it and the size of the organ to be *unnecessary*); or else that the projection of *the skull* was not in a ratio to the development of *the organ*.

* This doubt has suggested itself to the phrenologists; some of whom have not scrupled to assert, that the size of the external protuberance may be *a little* increased by a vigorous and constant exercise of its corresponding faculty.

193§. (8.) "The strength of the faculties may be estimated by an examination of the projections of the skull," &c. Without discussing this matter at greater length, it may be sufficient to say, recurring to a former remark, that the concavities of the internal surface of the cranium are not denoted by corresponding external projections; or, if there is a correspondence in this respect, it is without regularity; and that the external protuberances do not justify the inference of corresponding internal cavities. Where there is a concavity on the internal surface of the skull, the bone is generally thinner than in other places, and there is frequently no external indication of an increased development of the brain in such situation; and where there is an external protuberance, the skull is commonly thicker than in other places, frequently without a corresponding internal cavity. Hence, if a faculty of the mind is possessed in peculiar vigour wherever there is a protuberance of the cranium, the seats of the strongest faculties are the *thickest parts of the skull*; which cannot fail to be excellent guides for education; in confiding to which it may sometimes happen that the genius of a thickened portion of bone will be most assiduously cultivated.

194§. (9.) "Faculties or propensities may, by education, be developed or restrained," &c. It seems scarcely necessary to discuss so trite an observation. The increase of strength, or power, by exercise, is sufficiently obvious in the *muscular* system: but it may be doubted whether an analogy may be presumed between the effects of exercise in the mental, and muscular systems, or whether these effects may be correctly expressed by the same terms. Certain muscles, as is commonly observed, acquire a preponderating strength, by certain habits of labour, which call these muscles into action. This increase of muscular strength appears to

be produced by a preternatural or an excessive stimulation of these structures, by which probably both nervous energy and blood are derived to them in more than ordinary proportion; as a somewhat similar derivation is produced by local irritation in disease; or for the contrary reason, that the structures of a paralytic limb are diminished.

195§. This increase of strength, as a result of the exercise of a faculty, is however not certain in all instances, or is true only with limitation: thus that of vision is more frequently impaired than strengthened, by excessive use. The same is to be said, generally, of organs which are the seats of preternatural derivation, from habitual excitement; and the remark may be extended to the faculties of the mind. It appears, therefore, that although by exercise a structure may obtain a preternatural quantity of energy, this energy, if passing beyond certain bounds, loses its character; and instead of being a high state of vigour, the faculty belonging to such structure is impaired or lost, either by the state of excitement running into one of disease, or by the organic derangement produced by excessive or long-continued irritation.

196§. But the cases of the increase of muscular strength, and the apparent increase of that of a mental faculty, by exercise, are not precisely analogous. It is not a mere increase of degree in the latter instance, but in proportion as a faculty is worked, it makes acquisitions of ideas; and the facility of its action afterwards may be imputed rather to the additional light which is shed upon the subjects of its operation, than to any increase of degree of the faculty itself. How far this mode is universally true, is perhaps not to be satisfactorily determined.

197§. By whatever mode faculties acquire facility of action, by exercise, to a certain extent, the fact is sufficiently ascertained ; and therefore the benefits of education (if they are benefits), in multiplying the supposed advantages which we derive from the possession of such faculties, are equally certain.

198§. It is commonly remarked also of the propensities, of the passions, &c. that they acquire strength in proportion as they are indulged : but this also is true only to a certain extent, or this effect is irregular. A passion which in the earlier periods of its gratification was vehement, might give place, after continued indulgence, to an apathy with respect to the same objects ; and in other instances, the excessive indulgence of almost any passion or propensity may, through the medium of disease, lead to its imbecility or extinction.

199§. (10.) “ The predominance of one passion or faculty, may be restrained by the cultivation of another.” Thus a revengeful disposition may be counteracted by encouraging benevolence ; selfish propensities, by those to liberality ; cruelty, by pity ; &c. Thus also, among intellectual faculties, imagination may be repressed, by constantly exercising the judgment, and the contrary. The antitheses are, however, among these faculties, fewer, and less marked, than among the passions and propensities. There is nothing very new or erudite in this observation of the phrenologists ; it is both old, and vulgar ; the latter in so great a degree, that common sense is found to suggest a proceeding upon some such direction among the most barbarous and uneducated people.

200§. If it be enquired upon what law this relation depends ? this enquiry may perhaps involve some little intricacy, and is therefore, of course, one upon which the authors of the craniological system have but

imperfectly instructed us. If they were called upon for an explanation of this law, they would say perhaps, recurring to their assumptions, that the propensities and faculties have their seats in respective organs, that the energy of one organ is increased by its exercise, while that of a *related* one is, as a consequence, proportionally diminished.

201§. But this explanation, however agreeable it might be with experience in other functions, does not appear true in the present application of it. It is rather true, relatively to the passions, &c., that *one set of sentiments* are obtained by education, which repress, or *are incompatible* with opposite sentiments: and relatively to the intellectual faculties, that opinions are formed by the cultivation of one faculty, which are unfavourable to the employment of another, than that the educated faculty is increased in vigour, and the neglected one, as a consequence, rendered feeble.

202§. But if by the exercise of one faculty, or the indulgence of one propensity, the capability of others should actually be diminished, this might naturally happen from the influence of opinions and sentiments on the mind, which are opposed to its more natural dispositions; that is, these dispositions may be subverted by the constant influence of sentiments, which are inimical to them. It is not however always, if ever, true that *a capability*, or the force of a propensity, is diminished, while by a countervailing education, its tendency is repressed—for, if imagination prevails at the age of eighteen, its exercises may lead to speculative difficulties which, for two or three years, will dispose the mind to habits of closer thinking, perhaps confine it to a rigid induction: during this period, imagination may be silent—certain principles having been established by the most *scrupulous reasoning*, imagination may

resume its empire, even with increased force. Thus also, a disposition to cruelty may be repressed for many years by a cultivation of the sentiments and habits of benevolence, &c.: these sentiments and these habits may prevail until the age of thirty, when, from injurious treatment, or unfavourable observations on human nature, it may be suggested that mankind are altogether unworthy objects; that they merit hatred, rather than love; that, instead of the kinder offices, no species of cruelty is too bad for them. The original propensity would then be resumed, perhaps even in the greater force, from the contrasted sentiments which had been previously entertained; or for having been so long repressed. The same is true of all the other supposed relations between the faculties of the mind and the capabilities of the passions; and in this light they equally concur in the testimony that the relation is not one between *separate capacities*, but between the different *sentiments* resulting from the exercise of these capacities, which might at different times be entertained.

203§. (11). “Not only have faculties their respective seats in appropriate organs, but the place of these organs in the brain is respectively assigned,” &c. This proposition is founded upon the preceding ones, which, however well adapted to the cause of craniology, can scarcely boast the recommendation of truth. Before it can be allowed that *the seats of faculties*, &c. are correctly assigned, which would indeed be a rare instance of good fortune, it must be shewn that faculties are, in the first place, distinct; and in the second, that they occupy severally appropriate spheres of the structurē, of corresponding distinctness. Both these propositions we have seen reason to doubt; or rather, from defect, or opposition of testimony, to reject.

204§. But the appropriation of faculties to seats in

the brain, is made upon the credit of an alleged experience; and instead of being deduced from an *à priori* conclusion of distinct faculties, the proposed evidence tends to inculcate this conclusion. It is asserted that those who have certain faculties, passions, &c. in a great degree, have certain protuberances on the skull, by which these faculties are denoted: these protuberances are therefore affirmed to be the external signs of the cerebral organs, and a just measure of intellectual qualifications. This assertion, we are informed, is supported chiefly by the examination of numerous crania of persons who had certain faculties, or certain propensities, in an unusual degree; and the result of this examination *is said to be*, that those who were remarkable for the same passion, or the same faculty, had a protuberance, or *bump* in craniological language, in the same part of the skull.

205§. But this alleged fact is far from being one: it has been found that persons who are not peculiarly favoured by education, display faculties or propensities in a great degree, without corresponding protuberances of the cranium; that persons, between whose crania there is no discoverable difference of projection at one particular part, have the faculty which should be attached to this part in very different degrees; that persons who have a protuberance in the alleged seat of a faculty, may evince rather a deficiency of this faculty; and that others, who have no external indication of the faculty, may possess it in rather more than the common degree; and that in the same individual, under the influence of circumstances and education by no means peculiar, the propensity of a little bump, will keep that of a great one in habitual subjection. All these discrepancies it is attempted to reconcile, by saying, that where there is the organ without the faculty, its exercise is restrained by education, or by the preponderance of

a faculty of an opposite kind; and where there is the faculty without the organ, we are not precisely informed how this deficiency is made amends for; but it may be said that the duties of such faculty are then performed by some other, which perhaps remains to be discovered.*

206§. This argument is an appeal to facts; and the facts are at variance, according to the reports of different examiners. The appeal, in this instance, is a tolerably safe one; for, in the first place, the habit of observation is not likely to become general, since few persons will take the trouble to remember the several localities of the organs; and, in the second, the physiognomical sign is often so equivocal, that where there ought to be the indication of an organ, because the possession of the faculty is ascertained, some would say there is a protuberance of the skull, and others that there is none; some, that the protuberance is considerable, others, that it is so trifling as scarcely to be perceived. It is a truth, of which the craniologists cannot be ignorant, that examples may be furnished by daily observation of persons who *exercise* a faculty, of which *this* is the only, and it must be allowed the best, indication, with more acumen than some others, in whom there may be a perceptible prominence, in the alleged seat of the organ appropriate to such faculty.† And

* The craniologists are not without a resource, I am informed, for this dilemma: they say, that where *great* effects proceed from *a very little organ*, the organ, though a very little one, and if there were none at all it would perhaps make no difference, must *have been extremely active*.

† I am acquainted with an elderly lady, who has never been thought deficient in any intellectual quality, who has always had in the place for "individuality," a *depression* in the cranium which would perhaps contain a dram of water.

owing to the caprice with which the existence of prominences is liable to be decided, the doctrine will rarely want the support of affirmative *assertion* on the one side, or the opposition of negative *assertion* on the other. It may be easily believed that when a character is otherwise known to a craniologist, he may pronounce upon it with the confidence of an oracle—or if his judgment, from a first craniological survey, should prove to be erroneous, he may doubtless, in a second, find an appropriate bump, by which it would be corrected: thus also a facial physiognomist, who should affirm a person to be of an open, honest character, from this expression of his countenance, *upon being told* that his life was a system of cunning and deception, may wonder, upon a second inspection, at his having overlooked a trifling cast of the eye, or a twist of the mouth, which effectually invalidated the testimony of the general expression.

207§. But, granting that there is some regularity in the connection between character and bumps, which is far from being the case, it does not then follow that corresponding portions of the brain are *the organs* of the faculties or passions: certainly this does not follow with any more propriety than that countenances which indicate philanthropy, irritability, discontent, hatred, &c., should be the *organs* of these dispositions.

208§. The credit which is to be attached to the philosophy of bumps, as to facial physiognomy, will be estimated by the frequency with which certain signs are found associated with certain faculties and propensities, *compared* with that, with which the signs exist without the faculties, and the faculties without the signs. And it may be presumed that our experience in this matter will be so little uniform, or rather so confusedly contradictory, that craniological evidence will

rarely be permitted to suggest an indication on which any reliance might be placed.

209§. How, it has been asked, should the authors of these doctrines have been able to make those discriminations of character for which they have obtained credit (not always deserved), if their professed mode of information were entitled to no reliance? In reply to this question, it has been frequently objected, that the examinations were not fairly made: they were not confined to the cranium, but the expression of the countenance, and the manners of the individuals, were at the same time submitted to observation. It need not be told, that if the mental character were a marked one, it would be indicated by a corresponding facial expression; and that, from this hint alone, a trait, or character, may be assigned to an individual, while the *ostensible* examination is that of the cranium. A very good guess may, in general, be formed of *some disposition* of the mind, from a view of the exterior of the person: the vulgar are all physiognomists; and it is a common remark, with those of less sagacity than our craniologists, that such a person looks like a thief, another like an assassin; one man has a thinking, another a benevolent, countenance; another looks like an enthusiast; &c. It is very much to be suspected that those persons whose countenances are so devoid of expression as to indicate no peculiar or predominant traits of character, would generally be pronounced rather deficient in organs. But the expression of the exterior is not confined wholly to the countenance: I have read or heard of a person, no doubt of nice tact in these matters, who professed to judge of a man's character merely by his manner of entering a room.

210§. It is also an additional imperfection in this argument, that an *erroneous* affirmation of character is

likely oftentimes to be admitted as true, *by the individual* whom the affirmation concerns. This happens from the circumstance that the propensities and faculties of individuals, are in a greater or less degree *common* to the whole species; so that if a person who is even deficient in a passion or faculty, were told that such passion or faculty was *naturally* a ruling one in his character, he would, from recollecting some occasion in his life, in which it was called forcibly into action, be disposed to admit the truth of the remark; more especially if a compliment were implied by it. Socrates is said to have admitted that he was naturally inclined to debauchery, from recollecting perhaps, that he once possessed the passions and propensities which were incident to his time of life; but these, inasmuch as they were sooner repressed, did not exist probably in so great a degree in him, as in others, by whom they were for a longer time indulged (perhaps with a moderation which did not subject them to remark), notwithstanding the checks of experience, and the avocations of business, the practical influence of which in restraining the passions, will generally exceed that of speculative principles, which, having all the uncertainty of opinion, are frequently made to sanction our inclinations, are laid aside and resumed, at our pleasure or convenience. Perhaps also the reformation, or habitual sobriety of Socrates, which philosophers and moralists are so fond of quoting, might have been a little owing to the influence of his wife, and not entirely to the suggestions of his philosophy.

211 §. If these helps from facial expression, and from manner, were precluded, as by introducing our cranio-logist blindfolded, to a person whom he never saw, (an expedient not unfrequently recommended, though rarely or never adopted) and he pronounced truly upon his character, with such correspondence between the assigned,

and the known characteristics of the individual, that the account required *no equivocation* to show this agreement; and if this conformity were proved to be not accidental, by its obtaining in a sufficient number of instances; we might then yield a credit to craniological signs, little short of that which has been demanded in their favour. But even if such examples were said to be furnished, many persons would rather suspect a *collusion*, than concede a knowledge, the foundation of which appears so very slight; preferring on this, as on other occasions, if either must be adopted, to accept the lesser improbability, rather than the greater.

212§. With respect then to *the second topic* of our section, namely, of the *seat of the mind*, we possess an evidence of this locality which is satisfactory only to an inconsiderable extent. It appears that the brain generally is the seat of the mind and passions; the faculties and tendencies of which, are manifested in different degrees, in different individuals—that a more precise locality than this cannot be assigned—that if certain protuberances of the cranium were uniformly found to be associated with a peculiar energy of certain faculties, even then the parts of the brain which correspond with these protuberances could not be inferred to be the peculiar seats or organs of such faculties, but may be regarded as indications of them—that from the irregularity of such association, a bump in the skull is rarely, if ever to be considered the proof of a corresponding strength of the faculty it should indicate, or the absence of the bump a proof of its deficiency. The discrimination also remains to be made between cerebral bumps, and osseous bumps: and for this purpose, before, in virtue of a given bump, either talent could be inferred, or a course of education prescribed, it would be necessary to bore a hole in the skull, in order to know whether the bump consisted of bone or brain. It is a

prevalent admission among physiologists, that the powers of the mind are in proportion to the *size of the brain* ; this opinion may be discussed at some length, on grounds which have never been adverted to, but the result would in all probability be unsatisfactory. It is also supposed that the development of the brain has been increased by education, and that this peculiarity being hereditary, like other modes of organization, is transmitted from parents to offspring, giving rise to distinctions of race, founded in a comparative civilization. This hypothesis, if even partially true, is obviously so only to a very limited extent ; for if the size of the brain were augmented, even in the most trifling *ratio*, to the results, or attainments of education, the brain of a schoolboy of this generation, should be five, or ten times as large as that of any one of our ancestors, who lived before the invention of letters.

213§. It must be confessed that this craniological doctrine, amidst its manifold errors and gross assumptions, may boast a sort of ingenuity ; and the habit of observation which it inculcates may be for the present perhaps pursued with advantage, either as a harmless amusement, or with the view of ascertaining, by additional examinations, whether, as the appropriation of particular functions to particular structures is true, to some extent, in other examples, a *very limited* credit may not be conceded to the association which has been proposed in this. It is however to be feared that a just analysis of the physiological connections of the mind, cannot be thus successfully attempted—different faculties are attributed to portions of a very similar structure : our argument of *analogy* leads us to expect different functions, in alliance only with different structures ; and it would perhaps, on this ground, be as reasonable to presume a *different power* in the different portions of the same muscle, or of the same stomach, or a different

sensibility in different portions of the same nerve, as any considerable diversity of faculties in the different portions of the same brain; the more particularly, as these faculties are so united, that *several faculties* are necessary to the existence and operations of *one faculty*, or, no one faculty is complete without the contributions of others; and therefore, by parity of reasoning, the *organ* of this one faculty must be composed of *all those other organs* essential to the faculty, by which it is regularly or occasionally subserved.

(3.) 214§. It has been common with those who have reasoned against the possibility of a separate existence of the mind from the body, to quote the general agreement of the state of the mind, with that of the organization with which it is allied. Thus the mind is observed to sympathize or correspond with the condition of the corporeal organs, in the several stages of life; to be weak in infancy, vigorous in manhood, and imbecile in old age, &c. And the changes of the structure of the brain which are produced by disease or injury, are found to modify, suspend, or as it is said destroy the intellectual functions.

215§. These facts will not be disputed: and if the inference they have given rise to, were a legitimate one, we should have no occasion to seek further for proofs that a relation of dependence subsisted between the existence of the intellectual functions, and a given state of the brain.

216§. With respect to the first class of facts, namely, those which show a correspondence of vigour at different periods of life, between the mind and the corporeal functions, it is to be observed that the changes in these departments severally, although to some extent simultaneous, are not so universally: the faculties of the mind

are sometimes entire at advanced periods of life, and amidst a general decay of the structures.

217§. But without giving any weight to this objection, it is also to be observed, that although the progress of the mind from infancy to old age, from its first demonstration to its second state of imbecility, is in general agreement with corporeal strength, yet it does not *on this account follow* that the changes of the mind *are dependent* upon those of the organic department. The organized system itself affords examples of a *simultaneous progress* without dependence : thus all the textures are developed, increase in bulk, and decay, almost in the same periods ; but the legs do not increase in bulk, or waste, *because* the arms increase or waste. If a dependence of these phenomena upon other functions or other structures is asserted, it requires to be demonstrated by other proofs than those *merely of simultaneous change*.

218§. The second class of facts, namely, those which exhibit a modification or suspension of the intellectual functions, in consequence of a change of the structure of the brain from disease or injury, have been commonly regarded as very conclusive proofs of the dependence of the mind upon the integrity of the structure with which it is allied. And this argument has been extended with the design of shewing that the mind, the existence of which is dependent upon a certain arrangement of structure, can exist no longer when this fabric is dissolved.

219§. On this testimony it is to be remarked, that there are *two sorts of dependence* : one is the dependence of a thing upon its own causes, without which it cannot exist ; the other is a dependence upon a foreign influence, *which is not necessary to the existence of*

that which suffers a change from such influence : thus, the movements of a clock, are *dependent* upon the parts composing its mechanism, as upon essential causes : these movements would cease if a wheel, or if the pendulum were removed, because the wheel and the pendulum are necessary to their occurrence : these movements would *also cease*, if any part of the machinery were impeded by a *foreign substance*, or if the pendulum were kept stationary *by the hand* ; but these movements *might be resumed upon withdrawing such foreign influence*. In the former case, the movements of the clock would cease for the reason that a cause was abstracted upon which their occurrence necessarily depended ; in the latter case, not because they were dependent for their occurrence or production upon a foreign influence, but because by such foreign influence *they were prevented*.

220§. This latter case (a copious illustration of which is furnished in the phenomena of the corporeal functions) may be parallel to that of the relation between the mind and the brain, under conditions of disease or injury of the latter. The exercise of the intellectual functions may be dependent upon causes which are allied with the brain : and the exercise of the faculties of the mind may be modified or suspended in consequence of injury of the brain, not because the integrity of the brain *produced* the intellectual functions, but because the exercise of these functions is prevented by the foreign influence of a preternatural state of the organ with which they are allied. The arguments which have been proposed on this subject, have not, to my knowledge, taken this distinction into the account, and consequently it remains to be discriminated.

221§. In sensible examples, the dependence of an effect upon a supposed cause is ascertained by the ana-

lytic method, or by subtracting this cause, and observing whether the effect ceases in consequence: or if an effect ceases in consequence of a related change, it is to be ascertained whether causes *are removed* upon which the effect essentially depended, or whether causes *are added* which change its form, or make it another identity, only by a knowledge of the causes which produce this change, or upon which this change depends.

222§. This distinction is easily made in those physical changes, the agents of which are perceptible by the senses; as, recurring to our former example, the different dependence of the cessation of the movements of a clock, on the one hand, on the constituents of its mechanism, and on the other upon a foreign or preternatural influence, is readily perceived: but in the present instance, in the case of disease, or injury of the brain, followed by suspension of the functions of the mind, we do not know the agents, or the mode by which such suspension is produced. We perceive a change in the condition of the structure; but whether the action of the mind ceases because a material arrangement is disturbed, upon the precise state of which the action of the mind depended, as upon an essential cause; or whether this action ceases because it is impeded by the foreign or preternatural influence of a fabric with which it is allied; we are precluded the discrimination of experience. Yet the alternatives have this important difference, that in the former case, the intellectual function cannot exist without a precise arrangement of a material structure; in the latter, the intellectual function may exist independently of such organization; and although it is liable to be disturbed, or suspended by change of organization, in the same manner as any other effect may cease under a foreign influence, yet its exercise may be resumed when this influence is withdrawn.

223 §. To make this distinction in the present case would require, considering the mind as an effect, that we should know whether the suspension of its exercise occurred owing to causes added to, or abstracted from, its natural constitution : and this is a minuteness of analysis which at present can scarcely be attempted experimentally. As on other occasions, in which the appeal to experience fails, so on this, we must resort to the next best testimony, which is that of analogy.

224 §. It is suspected that the mind depends upon the organization, or would not exist without it : it seems an obvious mode of analytic proof to remove the structure, and see whether the mind continues to exist. There is no great difficulty in guessing the result of such an experiment ; it will not be doubted, if any portion of the brain were removed, but that the function of this portion, of whatever kind, would no longer be manifested.

225 §. But this proof, although apparently one of a direct analytic sort, is not conclusive on the question of the dependence of an intellectual function upon the structure—it may prove *either* a dependence of the function upon the structure, or merely *an alliance* of the properties which constitute the function, with the structure ; an alliance of such a sort, that the properties of the function are attached to the material structure, and reside with it, whether this structure retain its natural place, or is removed ; in which latter case, the function, or so much of it as belongs to this seat, would exist although it may want the connections necessary to its manifestations.

226 §. It seems necessary, upon this argument, to admit either a dependence of the function upon the mechanism of the structure, or this alliance, subject to which bond, the properties of the function will continue

to be attached to the structure. Either of these concessions is an important one; for in the former case the intellectual function would cease with the dissolution of the structure; and in the latter, related properties, which may be necessary to the integrity of the understanding, if allied with different portions of the structure, are liable to be removed from each other as far as the portions of structure may be removed, to which they are attached.

227§. Hence the import of the alliance just suggested, so far as concerns the future destiny of the understanding, rests chiefly upon a question, the topics of which have been before remarked upon, namely, whether the mind is constituted by properties of function which have their seats in respective portions of the brain, or whether it is an undivided principle, or a constitution of a similar nature, which pervades every portion of the structure with which it inheres. In the former case, supposing respective properties, which are collectively necessary to constitute the intellectual function, to reside in particular portions of the brain, the separation of these portions would separate also the properties, the union of which is necessary to constitute the mind; and therefore, supposing these properties to be *allied* by affinity with the structure, although capable of existing independently of it, the *mind* would not exist, but only certain constituents of it, in separate forms, after the dissolution of the structure with which these constituents were allied: in the latter case, namely, if the mind is an undivided principle, or a similar constitution which is allied with every portion of the brain, then the removal of as many sections of the structure as can be made, would only multiply the places in which the same intellectual formation resides, as well before, as after the cessation of this alliance, by the dissolution of the material fabric.

228§. It appears, then, that this direct analytic proof is conclusive only on the alternatives, that the function, before connected with a given portion of structure, ceases upon its removal, either, 1st, because the function is entirely a product of a certain organization, or depends for its existence upon a given organized state; or, 2nd, because the properties constituting an intellectual function are so allied with the structures as to follow its fate, or to be removed along with it. If, then, the presumed analytic proof is equal in regard to two alternatives, is there any other evidence by which we might decide between them?

229§. Here, again, in the examples in which the agents are objects of the senses, there is in general no great difficulty in the discrimination. Mere alliances with substances are distinguished from the effects of the constituents of such substances by being separable from them, while the identity both of the allied existences, and of the substances with which they were allied, is preserved. But, if the properties of function connected with the structures are merely allied with them, and capable of an independent existence, we possess no artificial means of separating them: and if we did possess the means of divorcing this alliance, we should then be no more capable of ascertaining this effect, or of recognizing the existence of such properties of function, than if the separation were made naturally by the spontaneous dissolution of the structures.

230 §. In the living system, we have certainly no example of the continuance of a function in the sphere of a detached structure: and if we pursue the inquiry after this separate existence beyond the living state, we also have no example in which the properties which constituted the functional life of a structure, produce effects,

independently of the structure with which they were allied, or in a separate state.

231 §. The only examples in which the existence of these properties after death, may be in any degree traced, are those of their translation into other forms of animate being. Thus it may be inferred that the functional properties of animals, which are produced, maintained, and renewed, from dead organic substances, would not be renewed unless *the constituents* of life, or the *properties* of functions, continued *to exist* in such substances after death. But in these examples, the functional properties are still found, so far as an imperfect observation may be depended upon, in alliance with the remains of their organization; they do not confer, or maintain life, except in connection with the matter with which they were allied, during their own possession of a living form.

232 §. The dependence of the function upon the organization, or arrangement of the brain, if said to be equivocally shewn by organic lesions which may suspend the function by a preternatural influence, is, it will be urged, more forcibly inculcated by the facts that if the brain is compressed, the intellectual functions will be suspended; the pressure being removed, and the structure assuming its natural state, the intellectual functions will also be resumed. To state this order of succession more concisely: the structure of the brain is natural, and the intellectual functions are exercised; the brain is compressed, the intellectual functions are suspended; the natural state of the brain is restored, and the intellectual functions are resumed.

233 §. This argument would, at first sight, appear to establish clearly the dependence we are considering, of

the function upon the structure. But the admission of it must still rest upon the settlement of a doubt before stated; for compression of the brain, like the organic injuries before noticed, may impair, or suspend the intellectual function, whether this function is a result of a certain state of organization, or whether, being otherwise constituted, the function is impeded by the foreign influence incident to a derangement of the material fabric.

234 §. The argument then, for the settlement of this relation between the function and the structure, so far as it has been hitherto stated, appears to be defective. It may at least be safely asserted that disorder or suspension of the function of the brain, from disease or injury of this viscus, occasioning organic change, is no proof that the function is necessarily an effect, or product of the organization.

235 §. In favour of the belief that the function is independent of the organization, or is a result of properties superadded to it, it may be observed, in the first place, that the function of the whole brain will cease in consequence of an organic change which has occurred in a particular, or very limited portion of it: if the function were the result of the organization, there seems no reason why it should not still be produced, wherever the organization is perfect. This argument is perhaps not wholly beyond the reach of the doubt already expressed, concerning the prevention of a function by the communication of a foreign influence. More conclusively, it may be observed, in the second place, that the properties of function, or the materials of life, are yielded from *inorganic* substances, as from the earth, &c.; and these properties are also yielded from dead structures, which are broken down, or the *arrangement* of which, as by artificial preparation, is ever so

completely destroyed. This latter proof appears as certain an evidence as we need seek for, that *the properties* of life do not result from material arrangement, but exist only in alliance with such arrangement. If properties of life in living animals are undergoing a perpetual consumption, and are renewed from inorganic substances, as from their elementary sources, it will scarcely be doubted, in the first place, that such substances contain the constituent properties of life, and in the second, that such properties *exist* in them independently of *organization*.

236§. The state of the properties of life in inorganic substances appears to be an informal, or, as it is termed, an elementary one. The proofs of this informal state of life are, 1st, that none of the phenomena of the living state are displayed in those substances from which formal life is produced, or renovated; and, 2nd, that if the life of a living animal were not constantly becoming informal, it would not require, in order to be maintained, a perpetual renovation. The first of these proofs may be objected to on the ground that substances may contain life, in its formal state, the evidences of which are not afforded by phenomena, for the reason that these phenomena require the concurrence or instrumentality of an organization which was never produced, or else has been impaired or destroyed. These proofs, however, in conjunction, appear as satisfactory as we can reasonably expect, on a matter so far removed from the cognizance of the senses.

237§. If, then, the state of the properties of life in inorganic substances, is truly described as an informal one, it will be deduced, from the terms upon which these properties are converted into the formal one of life, that this conversion is performed by the relation of the living state with its own elementary properties

contained in inorganic substances. This relation, as elsewhere described,* is one of assimilation, or is one of affinity, by which a living principle adopts, or unites its own constituents, or separates them from a material containing elementary life; and thus renovating itself, perpetuates its form, as long as its own identity is preserved, and as long as its elements are submitted to it.

238§. Although this account may be satisfactory with respect to the independence of the properties of the organic life on the structures, it will be inquired how far the same view may be applicable to our present topic, which respects the intellectual functions. It will be asked, although it may be true that inorganic substances contain informally the principle of life, as well as the materials of the structures, because this principle, and these structures, are perpetually renewed from them, does it therefore follow that the mind has a similar independence on organization, or that the intellectual principle is also renewed from elementary properties, contained in inorganic substances? The full discussion of this question will fall under the next title, and would in this place be premature. But not to dismiss it thus briefly, we may stipulate in favour of the applicability of the preceding view to the present question, that an argument of analogy may be founded on it, with which we might be satisfied in the absence of opposing proofs of any sort.

239§. We observe of functions generally, that they are results of life in conjunction with structure; that the function of every organ, is dependent upon the continuance of its life; that functional life is not produced

* See Indic. on the Org. Life, chap. "On the Mode by which Life is maintained."

by the organization, for, like the diffused life of the structures in general, it is perpetually dying, or changing its form, while the organization with which it is allied, is unimpaired; that its maintenance depends upon its own existence, and its renovation from elementary constituents contained in inorganic substances. Hence, as this is the general dependence of function in all the organs, upon the argument of analogy, a similar one might be inferred, so far as this testimony is to be admitted, with respect to the brain, the function of which has been said to be chiefly intellectual.

240 §. If then the conclusion, that the mind is not a result of mere structural arrangement, is deducible from satisfactory testimonies, it remains to inquire still further for the relation subsisting between the intellectual principle, and the material fabric with which it is connected. A perfect account of this relation would comprise a statement, 1st, of the causes upon which *the existence* of the intellectual principle depends; 2nd, of the mode of its connection with the material fabric; 3rd, of the mode by which changes or conditions of the intellectual function, and of the organization, affect each other. As such an account is scarcely to be hoped for, we must be content merely to consider these topics in their order, under all the disadvantages of an imperfect experience.

241 §. (1.) The formation of the mind has been already considered in speaking of the relation of sensibility with externals, and an inquiry concerning its formation, is of course one which respects the causes upon which its existence depends. It has been shown that the *general history* of the *mind*, is *that of effects of every description*; in which quality all things are liable to be regarded. Descending to its particular history, which has for its end the statement of particular

causes, it has been shown that *a sensibility* is derived from parents ; that it is formed or developed during foetal existence, like other products from similar sources, by the processes incident to growth ; that its phenomena are produced principally by relations subsisting between it and external beings ; that these phenomena are sensations, which are transmitted to the brain, and there disposed of according to their relations with the other properties, which help to compose the intellectual principle. And, apposite to our present topic, it has just been shown that the connection between the mind and its material organ is one of alliance, and not of dependence ; or of dependence, only so far as the structure may be required as a medium between the mind and external objects, or may concur for its support or phenomena. An additional stage of analysis, which would aspire to a knowledge of the constitution of that which we now call collectively a principle of sensibility, can scarcely at this time be more than suggested.

242 §. (2.) The bond by which certain properties are allied to appropriate substances, is in general described as one of affinity. We can, in other instances, do little more than express the effect : we cannot say *why* certain properties are, in any case, attached to certain substances ; but we perpetually experience this connection, and we designate it as a relation of affinity.

243 §. If it were inquired generally, *why* an affinity between a property and a substance subsisted ? we must reply, for the same reason as an effect of any kind is produced, namely, that such is the result of a relation between forms of existence, or causes ; or we might reply, for the same reason as two and two make four, namely, that two and two *are* four. We cannot expect that our inquiry after a more satisfactory knowledge of the production of effects, among which affinities are to

be reckoned, will meet with any extraordinary facilities in our present example.

244 §. We have seen that, although the intellectual principle is in alliance with a peculiar structure, *its existence* is not dependent upon any given organic arrangement. Our analysis has however hitherto detected only the independence of the constituent, or elementary properties of functions, on the organs to which they belong: it has discovered only the independence of informal life, on the organized fabric. How far the arrangement of the matter with which elementary life is allied is necessary, in order that elementary should become the formal life, which is capable of characteristic phenomena, is an additional subject of inquiry.

245 §. (3.) The principal facts relating to the influence which the condition of the structures is capable of exerting upon that of the functions connected with them, are, 1st, if the structure is deranged by external injury, as by puncture, or laceration, the function which is attached to such structure suffers a corresponding derangement; 2nd, if a portion of structure is removed, the allied functional properties are removed along with it, or are not displayed in the sphere which this structure occupied.

246 §. It appears from these facts, that function is liable to be disturbed, or in some instances is made to cease, by a mechanical change in the organ with which it is allied: thus, if a nerve is punctured, an immediate disorder of the function of this nerve succeeds to the mechanical injury; or if an instrument, of any kind, were passed through the centre of the brain, there is little doubt but the entire function of this viscus would immediately cease. Agreeably with what law of connection, it is to be inquired, does this mechanical

change produce a corresponding one in a function, which we have seen good reason for believing to be no result of mechanism? or at least to be capable of an elementary existence, independently of mechanism?

247§. It would appear on this topic, if properties of function are merely attached to the matter of the structure, that, upon a displacement of the latter, the former would suffer no other change but that of circumstances, namely, they would exist in one place, instead of another.

248§. But not only is the function impaired, which belongs to the displaced structure, but that also of contiguous or distant spheres is deranged. If a function is disturbed, or ceases, from an injury of the structure, this happens either from a direct, or an indirect dependence of the function upon the organized fabric: in the former case, the function depends upon the structure, as upon a true or constituent cause; in the latter, the dependence of the function upon the place of the structure is through the medium of the properties of life, which are attached to such structure, and the efficacy of which is dependent upon a relation with properties, concurring to a result, the natural intercourse of which is prevented by a change of their relative place.

249§. Supposing, for example, an inch of the spinal marrow to be compressed in as great a degree as is compatible with the preservation of its texture; the effect of the compression on the life, or functional properties of this portion of the spinal marrow, would be merely a change of place, corresponding with that of the particles to which these properties are attached: yet, as a result of this compression, the function of distant parts of the nervous system may be impaired, or suspended: thus also from an injury of one, perhaps

of an inconsiderable portion of the brain, the function of the whole viscus, in parts where the structure is not displaced, may cease.

250§. These facts prove that function may be the result of a relation, which requires a certain union of the constituents of the organ in which it resides; and this necessity of an union, proving a relation of place, shews a dependence of function either upon the material fabric which is displaced, or upon the allied vital properties, which are displaced along with it. The examples are very numerous in which function ceases in one part, the integrity of which is perfectly preserved, from mechanical change in another. Now as such mechanical change can influence only mechanically such distant part, and as this is found, in these examples, not to be the case, for the integrity of the part which is the seat of consecutive loss of function is perfect, so it appears that the dependence of function upon connected spheres of organization, is not upon the mechanism, but upon the allied properties of such organization.

251§. It may be objected in the cases just adverted to, that although the structure which is the seat of consecutive loss of function is not changed, yet may such loss of function not be produced by relation between functional properties, but rather from disturbance of the circulation, succeeding to a mechanical injury in another seat.

252§. This objection would no doubt be applicable to many instances, in which the causation which produces secondary disease, is not direct, as by relations between properties of life, but indirect, as through the medium of the circulation. But in the cases from which our conclusions are drawn, of the dependence of function, upon relations between properties of life, this

objection does not apply; for the consecutive loss of function in a secondary, from injury in a primary seat, may be instantaneous; and if the primary injury is one which tends to produce effects through the medium of the circulation, the consecutive effects which we have remarked, are not those of any state of the circulation, which may be adduced as a consequence of such primary injury.

253§. It is proved by the fact that the functional properties of a structure are removed along with it, that these properties are so allied with the materials of the structure, that the sphere of the former, corresponds with the place of the latter. Hence, if a structure is deranged, the sphere of its life, or of its functional properties, suffers a corresponding change, and the results of this change in the sphere of the life of such structure will be, 1st, that the function will be modified, or will cease, if it depended upon properties communicated from a near, or distant seat, which communication is prevented by a removal of properties which made one part of the relation, from their natural sphere; or, 2nd, that the function of such deranged structure will cease, or will be modified, (if the constituent properties of the function which are attached to the molecules of the structure, reciprocally act upon each other,) in consequence of a confusion of molecules, by which the spheres of properties, from their attachment to such molecules, suffer a corresponding disturbance; or, 3rd, the function of contiguous or distant seats will be modified, or will cease, from such primary derangement of structure, by prevention of a communication of properties from a primary, to a secondary seat, which communication was necessary to the function of the secondary seat, and dependent upon a relation of place, between the properties of the two seats; or, 4th, the function of contiguous or distant seats will be modified,

or will cease, from such primary derangement of structure, if a new relation of place is opened by it, by which preternatural properties are communicated from the primary to the secondary seat.

254§. With respect to the mode by which functional properties of one seat communicate with, or subserve the function of another; this, I presume, is not ascertained, or it may even be presumed that facts have scarcely been examined, with reference to such a question. To take an example: Supposing properties *to originate* in a seat, which properties are communicated to another seat, *why* are properties communicated to such other seats in particular, rather than to others which may be also connected with that from whence the properties originate? As in the brain, for instance; why does an energy of volition, a property of sensibility, or any other, if such there be, take its course through a nerve which is attached to the seat of its origin, rather than in other directions, through structures which are equally continuous?

255§. In answer to this question, two modes are suggested by analogy by which such particular communication, or transmission of influence, may be made: the first is, that if an energy originates (or properties are produced) in a defined portion of the brain, such energy takes its course through one continuous structure (as through a nerve), rather than another, because this direction is given to it *by an impulse* at the place of its origin; the second mode is, not that a particular direction is given to an influence at the place of its origin, but that this direction is owing to an affinity between it and the structure, the course of which it pervades.

256§. There do not appear to be any facts sufficiently conclusive, to decide between these alternatives. It

may however be remarked, that when an influence originates from primary change or affection of its seat, the fact proves *no agency* except in this seat; as when volition originates from a thought, and sets particular muscles in action; and, on the other hand, *a derivation* of energy appears to be produced by an influence, as one of irritation, occasioning a primary change in the seat *which obtains* the influence from a distant one. The order of change, in the examples of the former mode, indicates the direction of an influence from an impulse at its source; in those of the latter, an affinity in a remote seat, for an influence which originates elsewhere.

257§. But, if the former explanation were conceded in any case, there is still a relation to be developed between the influence which originates in the brain, and the nerves by which it is distributed. We find that *any* medium of continuity will not suffice for this communication, but it must be a nervous continuity; and it will remain to be examined whether the necessity for this precise continuity arises out of a relation of the influence which originates in the brain, with *the structure*, or with the *allied properties* of nerves—in either case an affinity must be supposed; since the effect does not take place by the continuity of a different substance, occupying any portion of the same course.

258 §. The alternatives then on this topic may be resolved into the following: 1st, that the nerves only, rather than other structures of similar contiguity, entertain such an affinity for influence originating in the brain, as to convey it in the course of their distribution by an impulse given at the place of its origin; 2nd, that the affinity between the cerebral influence and the nerves is not merely one by which they, rather than other structures, are disposed to convey an influence

which is propagated by an influence at its origin, but is rather one by which the nerves themselves are rendered *active* in the propagation of this influence; as if they exercised a power of attraction for it, which, at their origin, derived it from the brain, and being exerted throughout the course of the nerves, compelled its distribution agreeably with their own. These questions have been elsewhere* in part discussed, and will probably in another place be resumed—they are not here so intimately connected with our present topic, as to compensate for the digression, to which a fuller consideration of them would lead. It may however be remarked, that the phenomena can scarcely be adequately explained, unless we suppose that the brain is capable, not only of giving an impulse to the influence it originates, but of directing and limiting its precise course and extent; for we find by volition, although many muscles should be supplied by the same nerve, we put those only in action which are instrumental to the end of the volition; or, the volition goes beyond some muscles without affecting them, or stops short with others, leaving those more remote quiescent—such a power in the brain, connected with the production of nervous influence in this viscus, would require, on the part of the nerves, no derivative power of attraction, but merely so much affinity as would prevent the diffusion of this influence among the mixed structures, or confine it to a precise course.

259§. The only connections which we have hitherto discovered between the function and the structure of the brain are, that the properties of the former are allied with the materials of the latter; that, by this

* Exposition of the Principles of Pathology, &c.; chap. on Relations of Disease.

union, the spheres of the properties of functions are preserved; that these properties are related, and reciprocally act upon, or modify, each other; that function is a result of this relation; that this relation between properties of respective spheres, is one dependent upon place: and hence variations in the place of component molecules, produce one of, or all, the effects which have been ascribed to such variations, by modifying or destroying the relation which naturally subsisted between the properties of respective spheres, which relation was essential to the existence of the function.

260 §. It would appear from this view, that changes of the structure, have no other efficacy in producing changes of function, than that of interrupting the continuity of related allied properties, by breach or interposition. This conclusion, indeed, independently of facts, which show that the phenomena of function are produced by relation between the allied, or vital properties of the structure, would be deduced from the *à priori* consideration that mechanical change, relates chiefly to variety of place, and has rarely the power of altering the peculiar *nature* or properties of substances, or of producing directly any effects, except such as ensue from the common properties of matter.

261 §. Hence the alliance between properties of function, and organic molecules, is one which serves to preserve the spheres of the former; and therefore concurs to the function which results from their relations with each other; and the phenomena of function are also extended by this alliance, since the material fabric is mechanically related with matter, whether external, or in connection with the circulation, and changes of function are liable to be produced in consequence of primary change among the organic molecules, to which functional properties are attached.

262 §. Hitherto we have considered the relation between the function and the structure, chiefly with respect to the dependence of the former upon the latter. But if the structure, by this indirect mode which we have described, is essential to the perfection of the function, a function which ensues from the properties of life, is no less, and probably more, essential to the existence of the structure. This latter relation has been elsewhere freely considered ;* and avoiding a repetition of the detail, a few results only of the discussion alluded to may here be remarked.

263 §. We observe that if life is never manifested, except in connection with the structures, the structures are neither formed, nor being formed, are capable of existing, without the concurrence of life. Life therefore, is necessary to the formation and support of the structures. We have elsewhere seen reason to believe that this relation, in which organization is regarded as dependent upon life, is one of the following kind. Properties of life, by the affinity just spoken of, ally themselves to certain molecules, which they separate from a common material ; and these properties, agreeably with their own continuity, form a continuous aggregation of molecules ; which constitute similar structures, where similar properties exist, augment these structures by growth, where similar properties are augmented, or produce other textures, where different forms of these properties are separated by processes of causation, arising out of the relations between properties of life, and the material which renews them, and upon which they act.

264 §. A subtle objection will probably be urged to this part of our history. It will be remarked that, ac-

* Indic. on the Organic Life, &c.

cording to this account, there is a reciprocal dependence of the connexion of life, and of the structures, upon each other: continuous organization follows spiritual continuity, and the alliance of spiritual properties with organic molecules, prevents the dissipation of these properties. How happens it, then, it may be inquired, that in an example of a new growth, proceeding from a root or centre, the life which precedes the organization preserves its sphere before the organization exists, by which it should be fixed?

265§. This objection suggests the following alternatives: 1st, that properties of life being extended from a centre, have still an affinity for the life from which they are developed, by which their connexion with this life is preserved; and this spiritual affinity may subsequently operate in part, or wholly, to preserve the continuity of the organic molecules with which it becomes allied; or, 2nd, properties of life proceeding from a centre may have no affinity with the life of such centre, and would then be dissipated, if their place were not preserved by a simultaneous alliance with molecules, which become joined to the original fabric, and being held together by a power of material aggregation, preserve also a corresponding connection of the properties of life. In the former case, the affinity of life in connected spheres, helps to maintain the continuity of the structures; in the latter case, life does not maintain the integrity of the structures by an affinity subsisting between its own properties, but this integrity, together with the continuity of life, is maintained by the force of a material cohesion, and the efficacy of life is then that only of resisting chemical decomposition, to which material cohesion yields, this influence of life being withdrawn.

266§. It is presumed that we cannot make a perfectly satisfactory decision between these alternatives; but it

may be observed of the first, that if properties of life were held together by an affinity between themselves, this affinity cannot *be manifested*, since the properties are not recognized except in their alliance with matter. It may be observed further, that if such affinity subsists, it is weaker than that between properties of life and the structure, since if the latter is detached, the former are separated along with it; and therefore that the affinity of life with itself, is unnecessary to preserve the cohesion of organic molecules. On the second alternative, it is to be remarked, that even though an affinity should subsist between the properties of life, tending to maintain them in a state of union, yet this affinity does not preserve the place of organic particles, or is at least superfluous for this end; since their place is maintained after death, until the material cohesion is dissolved by chemical decomposition. Of the first alternative, therefore, we may say, in favour of a *limited efficacy* of life, in preserving the cohesion of organic particles, that we have only a conjectural testimony, supported by a few distant analogies which it is unnecessary to quote; and of the second alternative, it may be said that, without being incompatible with the first, it is confirmed by experience.

267§. But the dependence of the formation of the structures, and of their resistance to chemical tendencies, appears to be upon the agency of a principle which belongs *to every seat*, and is to be distinguished from those varieties which subserve the other phenomena *of function*. The formation and support of the structures, have no direct dependence upon the functions which are constituted by the vital properties *of related seats*; since we find that such functions may cease, but life being continued, the structures with which they were allied are still preserved. This dependence of the structures on one agency of life, and their independence

on functions which are relative to other seats, and to other phenomena, have given rise to the familiar division of life into the organic, which is the inherent life of every seat, and the animal life, the functions of which, in the organs in which it is displayed, are dependent upon an influence obtained from other seats. This distinction is not unexceptionable. The chief difference between these forms of life, is this—that as every property of life must be renewed by assimilation, so the life which is maintained in every seat independently of other seats, is assimilated wherever it exists; and this appears to be true generally of the organic life, by which the structures are produced; whereas the animal life, or that which performs the *relative* functions of organs, appears generally to be dependent upon an intercourse with other seats; and hence this life is *not assimilated* in the organ, the function of which it subserves (by which it would be rendered independent of other seats), but is assimilated elsewhere, and communicated to such organ.

268§. The principal relations then, of mutual dependence between life and organization, may be thus described: 1. The sphere of the properties of organic life, is dependent upon the alliance of these properties with the material fabric, and the condition of the organic life, of course, is liable to be impaired by disturbance of the spheres of organic particles, to which its properties are attached. 2. The functional properties, or those of *animal* life, acknowledge an equal dependence upon the material fabric, and by a similar mode—by change of the place of the organic molecules—the communication of properties which are relative to function in other seats, is prevented; or preternatural properties which are foreign to those constituting function, are imparted. 3. The formation and maintenance of the organized fabric are directly dependent upon the life

which assimilates in every seat; and are indirectly dependent upon the animal functions, or those made by the related properties of different seats, only so far as these animal functions are necessary to the formation, or circulation of the blood.

269§. The dependence is of course reciprocal between life, and the organs subserving the purposes of the circulation: the formation of these organs is first dependent upon life, by which they are modified during processes of foetal growth, until a perfect state of them is attained; life afterwards, not only maintains their fabric against chemical tendencies, but confers upon them an activity, the result of which is the distribution of the blood, or of a nutrient fluid, throughout the whole organized system, by which, in turn, life is supplied with its materials, and renovated in its minutest spheres.

270§. Having seen how this alliance between the structure and the function operates in the natural and modified states of either, it remains to consider what consequences are likely to ensue upon the cessation of this alliance, by the decomposition of the structures.

271§. It has been seen that as long as the materials of the structures are preserved, although their organization should be broken down, properties of life still continue to reside with these materials. It has been seen that the alliance of these properties with the materials of the structures is one of affinity; that although properties of life may continue in connection with these materials, as long as their molecules are preserved, whatever may be their arrangement, the phenomena otherwise resulting from these properties, are modified, or do not occur, when the natural arrangement of component molecules is disturbed. It has been seen that

the animal functions, so far as their dependence can be traced by analytic means which do not also destroy the organic life, are dependent for their origin and continuance upon properties communicated from other seats; that this communication is dependent upon the integrity of the structure; and that hence, impairment, or a more considerable disorganization of the structure, will modify the phenomena of such functions, or altogether prevent them.

272 §. The dependence of the *organic* life upon the arrangement of the structure, is more doubtful, or is less intimate. We see the dependent *animal* functions cease almost immediately, by intercepting communications with other seats, or by injuries of the seats from whence their communicated properties are distributed. But if a structure, exhibiting only organic life, upon which no animal function depends, is disorganized or crushed, the phenomena of this life are still continued, though perhaps modified, for a time, or if they cease, it is by a mechanical hindrance to the circulation; but having totally ceased, as from temporary impediment to the circulation, this life cannot be resumed; which proves that the life of such part is dependent upon itself, as well as upon the supply of blood, and that in dying, it changes its form.

273 §. As the animal functions acknowledge this intimate dependence upon the arrangement of organic molecules, as during life, these functions cease under a disturbance of such arrangement; so the existence of these functions, except in the elementary state of properties, or in an informal state, of course cannot occur, or must cease under that complete disorganization which precedes the dissipation of the structures, or in the last stages of chemical decomposition. This, it is observed, is true of the animal functions generally; and that it is

true also of the mind, is suggested, 1st, by the general analogy of the intellectual, to the animal functions; 2nd, by the fact that the exercise of the mind is that of a *function* which is attached to the brain, as that of digestion is attached to the stomach, &c. ; 3rd, and chiefly, because the facts which have been quoted to prove the general dependence of function upon the integrity of the fabric, and consequent intercourse of properties essential to the function, is peculiarly true of this intellectual one of the brain, from which indeed our principal illustration has been taken. But it by no means follows, from these considerations, that a perfect intellectual principle may not be resumed at some period after death.

274 §. It has been observed that the alliance between spiritual properties and the textures, is of the former, to the components of the latter ; and therefore that the phenomena which ensue from this alliance, are chiefly dependent upon a relation of place. This relation is prevented by the changes of the structures consequent on death, as it is, in many instances, by those which happen during life ; but the question which relates to the resumption of functions, and a renewal of as many phenomena as do not depend upon their material connections, is this—seeing that the communication of properties which constitute function is prevented, under a disturbance of the arrangement of molecules, for the reason that these properties are allied to these molecules ; whether, if this alliance were divorced by the total dissolution of the textures, an affinity would afterwards prevail among *spiritual properties*, by which that state may be resumed which renders them capable of as many relations, and as many consequent phenomena, as do not depend upon their connection with an organized fabric?

275 §. The physical inquiry which this question suggests, may be comprised in the following topics: 1st, does the chemical decomposition of the structures involve that of *the nature* of the spirit? or, 2nd, is the spirit, preserving still its nature, dissipated in alliance with the chemical constituents of the textures, which latter are dissipated in consequence of decomposition? or, is the alliance between the spirit and the structure dissolved by the decomposition of the latter? And if such separation does take place between the properties of the spirit and the materials of the structure, 3rd, is there *a tendency* among spiritual properties to *a re-union*, by which a functional state of the spirit might be restored?

276 §. (1.) The decomposition of one thing, involves necessarily that of another, only in cases which exemplify a mutual dependence upon the same causes. If one thing *cannot exist* without another, the decomposition of the latter ensures that of the former; but if one thing is *merely allied* to another, the decomposition of the latter may occur without that of the former; although the decomposition of the former may ensue in consequence, if, although not dependent upon the latter, it is liable to change by relations with it. We can only remark on this question, that the known chemical constituents of animal substances may exist, without any recognized spiritual ones in connection with them: which seems to indicate that the spiritual properties are *allied only* to the chemical substances of the animal fabric, or are superadded to these substances.

277 §. (2.) We have certainly no experience that the spiritual properties preserve their identity, and remain united after the dissipation of the chemical ones with which, previous to decomposition, they were connected. Some *such experience* has, indeed, been asserted by those who have been favoured with a sight of the spirits, pre-

serving the corporeal figure, of persons long since dead, whose remains are mouldering perhaps at the distance of some hundreds of miles. But these are idle stories, which the brain, in some of its states, has a great facility in fabricating : mere dreams by day, or by night, produced by a state of mind, somewhat similar to that occasioned by laudanum, habitual dram-drinking, &c. Yet the reality of these spectra has been confidently affirmed, and that with a circumstantiality so imposing as to have obtained extensive belief. It may, however, be presumed that as these ghosts are *mere spirits*, so in this quality, they are not to be perceived with ordinary faculties ; and if we suppose extraordinary ones, it is, perhaps, as well to consider these appearances altogether, rather as products of the mind, than as the external beings which they represent, the more particularly, as we have abundant experience that in this supposition we impute no more to extraordinary faculties, or to extraordinary states of the natural faculties, than we know them to be capable of producing.* If this is the best alleged testimony of *experience*, we shall not perhaps concede to it any great weight.

278§. We have seen reason to think that the spiritual properties are in alliance only with the chemical ones, or *associated* with them. If the chemical constitution of the fabric is decomposed, the spiritual one must suffer a corresponding decomposition, supposing the

* If the reality of apparitions were to be made *a question*, the strongest argument in favour of this reality would be, that, although in the natural state of our faculties these spectra are not objects of experience, it does not follow but they might be perceptible under *modified states of these faculties*, which would have then nearly *the efficacy of an additional sense*—just as the *existence* of many odours is proved by their being perceptible to dogs, and other animals, of which, trusting to the sufficiency of our own senses, we should otherwise have no evidence.

alliance between them to be continued—appealing to the general laws of alliance between properties, we find them to be these; that if properties are united, this union continues until it is dissolved by internal change, or by external agents; that the proof of the continuance of the union is either a sensible recognition of both sets of properties, or the occurrence of phenomena, which are peculiar to each; that the proof of the separation of these allied properties, is the recognition of them *in separate places*, or the production, in separate places, of their respective phenomena.

279§. Applying these laws to our present example: After the decomposition of an animal fabric, we cannot recognize sensibly chemical and spiritual properties in a state of union, but we can trace the chemical properties, into which the textures are resolved; and these being subservient to other forms of life, we may conclude that the spiritual properties which they supply, are those which were previously in alliance with them. Thus much in favour of the continuance of an union between chemical and spiritual properties, after the decomposition of the structures. In addition, we are not capable, after the decomposition of the structures, of a recognition of the two sets of properties in separate places; nor do we ever witness phenomena which may be imputed to spiritual properties, *except in connection* with chemical ones.

280§. Hence, it must be confessed upon very slender testimony, it would appear that an alliance between spiritual and chemical properties which subsists during life, is continued after death, and is even preserved when the structures are, by decomposition, become elementary, or at least when they are no longer objects of the senses, and are to be traced only by their phenomena—when they may mix with the atmosphere, and

be dissipated, and play some unknown part wherever they find relations.

281§. (3.) It seems superfluous to consider, whether there is a tendency among spiritual properties which were in alliance with the textures, to an union after this alliance is dissolved—this seems unnecessary, since we have seen no reason to presume that the alliance is made to cease by any processes which succeed to death—it would be sufficient to quote, in favour of its continuance, the total absence of proof that such dissolution occurs; but there appears something like an indicative testimony, it must be allowed of rather a questionable kind, that the alliance between spiritual properties and the components of the textures, is indefinitely continued; that their union is preserved amidst the stages of decomposition; that both are dissipated together, and are to be traced in phenomena, by which their existence is mutually indicated, in conjunction.

282§. The supposition, perhaps the fancy of poets and visionaries, is not uncommon, that the mind works the more freely when separated by death from the gross material organs; that it then holds communication with pure intelligences of the same kind, &c. This, indeed, may be perfectly possible, if the decompositions which succeed to death involve no change in the condition of the mind, by which its previous faculties may be impaired, or destroyed; or *if the separation* which this theory presumes, could be proved to take place. But it has appeared, so far as the history of the connection may be traced by facts or analogy, that the mind exists only in connection, or alliance, with material organs; and that the alliance of constituent properties, under an informal condition both of life and of the structures, is preserved amidst the decomposition of these organs; each set of properties suffering changes both of place

and combination in the remoter stages of their history, and extending their relations in conjunction. It has been presumed that the perfection of the intellectual function results from a relation between the properties of different seats; hence, that if the alliance of constituent properties with seats is preserved after death, and the distinction of seats afterwards lost, and the spheres of properties before related, indefinitely removed—the intellectual function can be no longer exercised, when the terms of its exercise are thus effectually violated, and the circumstances upon which it depended no longer obtain.

283§. If, upon a matter so remote from our experience, and consequently one upon which we are so little likely to arrive at any certain conclusions, it were desirable to extend our discussion, it may be observed that the proofs which have been cited of the dependence of the intellectual function upon an intercourse of properties, which are attached to respective spheres of the structure, are liable to the objection that effects cease, either from privation of essential causes, or from the communication of preternatural influence. Thus, recurring to the best among these proofs, a displacement or removal of a part of the brain would suspend or destroy the intellectual function; that is to say, the intellectual function would not be exercised by the principal part of the brain, the organization of which may be uninjured; from whence it would at first sight be concluded, that the intellectual function acknowledged a dependence on the properties of the portion of the brain which is injured or removed. But such injury or removal of a portion of the brain, cannot be made without some disturbance of the surface which belongs to the unimpaired portion of this viscus; and the function of such portion might cease, by a consequent communication of preternatural influence from such surface,

rather than from privation of the properties resident in the portion, which has been disorganized or removed.

284§. Under a division of nerves, the function of their lower portion ceases, while that of the superior portion is still exercised. A dependence of the function of the lower portion, upon properties communicated from the superior portion, is hence commonly inferred: the case is nearly parallel to the cessation of the intellectual function, from a removal of a portion of the brain; and the conclusion indicated is the same, namely, it would be inferred if any portion of the brain were removed, and the intellectual function were not exercised by the remainder, that the function was not complete in such remaining portion, but required for its perfection the communication of properties which, under this experiment, would no longer take place.

285§. If this doubt should be admitted any weight, the remaining alternative would be, that the intellectual function was alike perfect in every part of the brain; that intellect was one homogeneous principle, which pervaded every part of the brain, the changes of which equally prevailed in its respective spheres; that injury or removal of any portion caused the function of this portion to cease by a preternatural influence; and that if this alliance of a principle to component molecules were continued after death, however the organization may be broken down, a perfect intellectual principle would still be in connexion with the molecules of the structures, or with their constituents, supposing the alliance to be indefinitely continued. Whether under these circumstances the intellectual principle would be one of intelligence, or, whether its state would be informal, from changes in the combination of its constituents, it is presumed we have no facts to determine. But supposing the principle to remain one of intelli-

gence, as the connection would be dissolved between its spheres, and those of the sensibility attached to the organs of sense, its operations could be those only of association of past sensations; or, according to our present knowledge of the relation between the understanding and the senses, it could obtain no new experiences.

286§. Thus much for *physical testimony*, on the relation subsisting between the mind and the structures; the imperfection of which is so obvious as, in candour, to compel the acknowledgment, that on this subject, our faculties are not competent to any satisfactory conclusions. How far that revelation which takes up vaguely the history of man after death may be rationally confided in, it is no part of our present business to examine. It is asserted by this revelation that the union which subsisted between properties, and classes of properties, during life, is resumed after death; that for a time, something like an elementary condition of these properties succeeds to death; that at a future period they are re-combined—from an informal, they are restored to a formal condition; and the functions of their combined state of course resumed, with modifications, not clearly designated.

287§. Of the agreement, in this instance, between revealed instruction and physical testimony, it is to be remarked that there is no suggestion of the latter which is absolutely incompatible with the doctrines of revelation: the chief difference between them is, that revelation asserts, upon its own peculiar authority, more than can be satisfactorily deduced from mere physical analysis.

CHAPTER V.

GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTION, PHENOMENA, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MIND.

288 §. It has been shown in the preceding Chapters, that the mind, before it is instructed, consists chiefly of *a disposition* to the formation, retention, and perhaps to the recurrence and combination of sensations, which ensue from relations subsisting between this disposition and certain agents, the most numerous of which belong to the external world. The mind, in this primitive state, has been spoken of comprehensively as one kind or form of sensibility;* the condition of which prior to experience, is similar to that of the sensibility which pervades the structures generally, when it is not under the influence of the causes of sensation.

289 §. The mind, in this original condition, has been called a *tabula rasa*, &c. : but this is an imperfect account of it. If the mind resembled a sheet of blank paper, the impressions would be the same, and the same consequences would ensue in the minds of different per-

* Throughout this Chapter, the question with respect to the seat of *inherent sensibility* formerly suggested, is to be remembered. Agreeably with the alternatives which were left for future decision, the phenomena of the brain consist wholly of former sensations, conveyed to it from the senses; or it possesses a sensibility, by which sensations *may be originated in itself*. Our present discussion will perhaps enable us to choose between these alternatives.

sons, from exposure to the same related causes—that is, the same figures would be formed upon the same paper, by the same stamps; all these figures would equally remain, and would all preserve their primitive individuality. But we find that, although circumstances of birth, education, &c. may be the same with respect to different persons, their minds assume very different characters, and display the predominance of very different faculties and affections. From whence it is to be inferred that, although the sensibility of individuals which disposes to experience, may be *generally* so far alike that similar sensations may be produced by similar related causes, yet the properties allied with this sensibility, and disposing to the retention and combination of sensations, must acknowledge a diversity corresponding to a great extent with that of character in respective instances. And as the same objects have not in all conditions and stages of life the same appearance, whether because a sense is modified by disease, or that these objects, owing to organic change, are viewed through different media, it is further to be concluded that sensations, instead of being the mere figures of the objects they represent, are *the effects of a causation* between sensibility and related agents; and that sensation is, that which it is made, *or constituted*, by these parts of the relation.

290§. Sensibility has been divided into that which takes account of mere existence, or which respects ideas, and that which relates to pleasure and pain. This division of sensibility is made rather in reference to its phenomena, than from any ascertained difference of the sensibility itself: this may be common to both these classes of results; which may owe their distinction entirely to the diversity of agents, by which a common sensibility is affected.

291§. By this remark, it is not intended to affirm that there is only one form of sensibility; this is, *perhaps*, contrary to experience, as we find that the sensibility of the same seats is different, at different times, and that the sensibility of different seats manifests a considerable variety. It is meant only that the same seat does not possess two different sensibilities at the same time, one which takes account of mere existence, and another in which consists the susceptibility of pleasure and pain. This seems to be shewn by the fact that a mere sensation of existence, may, by an increased exertion of the cause which produces it, or may, under the operation of the same cause, upon a higher degree of sensibility, become one of pleasure or of pain: thus a degree of *pressure* of an ounce weight, would be merely felt; its effect would exemplify knowledge, but neither pleasure nor pain: while the pressure of an hundred weight, would, in relation with the same sensibility, be productive of pain; or in relation with a higher degree of sensibility, a weight which, under the natural sensibility, would produce only a sense of the existence of pressure, would produce that of pain, &c.

292§. The phenomena which ensue from sensibility, are familiarly quoted as forming the chief distinction between men and animals. It is said, as a comprehensive account of living forms, that vegetables have only organic life; animals, sensations, the passions, and the power of voluntary motion, superadded to the organic life; and man, the intellectual functions superadded to the characteristics of mere animal life. It is presumed, *perhaps*, generally, though a contrary opinion has not been without its advocates, that these distinguishing phenomena result from the operation of separate principles. The conclusion is, however, more agreeable with our experience, that all these phenomena ensue from a modification of a similar principle in respective

examples. We find the forms of organic existence, the general character, and peculiarities, of the structures, varying, as the organic life differs, in the several instances; all the varieties of structure and conformation in the several specimens, are declaratory only of so many modifications of life; and these superadded phenomena, the characteristic ones of animal and intellectual being, are so inseparably connected with the common principle of organic life, that they are never known to exist without it; and the laws of their continuance *are the same*, as of its support.

293§. But it will be urged, if we have no experience of animal or intellectual phenomena, except in connection with organic life, the operations of organic life may be continued with little or no interruption, when the animal and intellectual phenomena are no longer displayed. But this argument proves nothing against the conclusion that organic, animal, and intellectual phenomena, are all results of one common principle, modified in the different specimens of life, or in the different seats of the principle in the same individual; for under disease, phenomena of the organic life itself are sometimes multiplied, and sometimes cease partially: by which it appears that, under changes of this principle, *some agencies of it may be continued, others impaired or suspended*: and hence the continuance of phenomena in some cases, sufficient to characterize the organic life, while the evidences of animal and intellectual being cease to be afforded.

294§. Of the sameness of those which are generally regarded as separate principles, we also have proofs in the community of affection from the same causes—thus preternatural agents influence mutually the causes of the three sets of phenomena; this influence is expressed in either department by effects which vary both in

degree and in kind ; but agree in exhibiting *a common relation*, from whence a common change ensues, the consequences of which are remarked in either department. The stimulus which increases the action of the heart gives additional intensity to the operations of the mind, or additional force to the passions ; the sedative which depresses the organic functions, and causes them finally to cease, depresses also, suspends, or destroys the animal and intellectual functions : the mechanical or chemical agent, which inflames a structure, excites pain, may produce spasmodic muscular action, or prevent in the structure so affected the controul of the will. Thus also in disease the cure of a cutaneous one, chiefly engaging the organic life, might be followed by insanity ; the formation of an abscess, or the accumulation of fat, might cure insanity ; and pregnancy, by curing it also, shows the same relation with the intellectual system, as by curing, or preventing consumption, it manifests with a particular condition of the organic life.

295 §. Should it be inquired, do these facts in logical strictness prove the identity of the principle, to which the phenomena of the organic, animal, and intellectual departments are to be attributed ? it must be replied, they prove only a relation between the animal, intellectual, and organic departments, together with a community of relations with preternatural agents. This last agreement is however equivocal ; since a community of affection by the same substances, might happen from a specific relation of the properties of the respective departments with others of their own kind, which are among the constituents of such substances.

296 §. But if these facts are short of affording logical proof of that inseparable union between the causes which preside in these departments, which would entitle

them to be regarded as the properties of one principle, they may be allowed at least to suggest, that the results which appear to be peculiar to these departments, are those only of modified states of a common principle.

297 §. Admitting the supposition of a common principle to this extent, as there is a difference in the phenomena of these departments, a corresponding difference must be inferred of the principle which produces them; and this difference requires that the laws of each class of examples should be traced in some measure separately.

298 §. There is a general agreement in the sensibility which subserves the phenomena, which are arranged as several classes of sensations. Thus the sensibility in man, which gives origin to sensations of existence, or to ideas, is a disposition to feel, as a consequence of a relation with certain objects; the sensibility to pleasure or pain, is a disposition to feel, in relation with certain other causes of these excitations; the sensibility of the senses respectively, is a disposition to feel, in relation with appropriate causes—and a sensibility, to this extent analogous, is generally possessed by animals. A considerable variety may however be remarked in the degree, and apparently in the kind of sensibility subserving characteristic phenomena, whether the comparison is made between that of different men, or between that of men and animals.

299 §. If therefore it cannot be said that the form of sensibility which originates the different sensations is the same, it appears that the sensibility subserving these phenomena is a modification only of a common principle; so far common, that in each example it consists of the *disposition to feel*; and from this *general analogy* in the nature of sensibility, a general one is to be presumed of its laws.

300§. It has been seen that the origin of sensibility, at the earliest epoch to which we have presumed to trace it, is from parents. That, like all other properties which display themselves by effects in subsequent life, it is conferred on the ovum either as an aggregate of informal constituents, or else as a disposition to its perfect state, which it attains during growth by a progressive causation, engaging both the properties derived by the ovum from parents, and the influence of the materials of nutrition. Recurring to this remote stage of our history, no difference can be defined between the *mode of the origin* of the sensibility, which furnishes the characteristic sensations peculiar to the several organs. It remains to consider, 1st, the general dependence of sensibility, or the general mode of its maintenance; and, 2nd, the particular dependence of the mind, or of that constitution from which the intellectual phenomena and the passions ensue.

(1.) 301§. The quantum of sensibility possessed by the adult, was either possessed by the embryo, or has been accumulated in the stages of growth. In the former case, a fixed sum of sensibility is conferred by parents upon the offspring; in the latter case, every animal has within himself *a source of sensibility*.

302§. According to our first alternative, the ovum is endowed with a sensibility which is capable of an expansion commensurate with the extent of the structures, which subsequently manifest the possession of it. There appears, however, no more reason why the *sensibility* contained in so small a substance as the ovum, should be developed to the entire sum of the principle possessed by the adult, than why the material aggregation of the adult state should be an expansion only of that of the ovum. Setting aside the manifest improbability of this conjecture, it must at least be admitted, according to

the theory, that the quantum of sensibility conferred on the ovum, is *a part only* of that possessed by *the parents*; and that this quantum is *therefore finite*. Not only then, according to the first alternative, is it necessary that the sensibility of the ovum should be expanded into that of the adult, but the ovum of the second generation must have contained a sum of sensibility which has been sufficient to furnish this principle to the whole human race; to all who have existed from the second generation of man, and to all who may exist, so long as this unlucky race is perpetuated.

303 §. It is needless to say, that a proposition so strikingly absurd, is conformable with no part of our experience; or that the whole of our experience is against it. It appears, therefore, that there must be in every animal *a source* of sensibility, from whence the original quantum of the embryo, is augmented to that of the adult; and according to which there may be variations of the quantum of sensibility; which may be increased or diminished at different periods of life.

304 §. But if it appears necessary, from the absurdity of the converse, that animals should possess *a source of sensibility*, the proposition is also, in other respects, agreeable with experience, and supported by analogy. We find that sensibility, in quality of patient, is perpetually undergoing the change which converts it into sensation; sensation originates volition, volition excites muscular motion; hence, sensibility plays, in turn, the part of agent. It is deducible from the whole of our experience, that where properties of any kind are constantly producing phenomena, or passing into other forms of being, the sum of these properties undergoes a proportionate diminution, and is finally exhausted, unless renewed from a source; and that a fixed quantum

cannot be maintained under these circumstances, unless renovation is equal to exhaustion.

305§. In addition to this testimony, from which alone it seems impossible to withhold the concession of a source of sensibility, it is to be remarked that the continuance of sensibility, like that of the organic life, is dependent upon nutrition; from whence, by parity of reasoning, it is to be concluded, that sensibility, as well as every other principle, or property of an animal, is undergoing a perpetual waste, and would fail, but for an equally unremitting renovation from its appropriate source.

306§. This latter reflection not only confirms the dependence we are considering, but *indicates the particular source* from whence sensibility is renovated. If, as appears little less than demonstrated, sensibility is augmented during growth, is undergoing constant exhaustion, is as perpetually renewed, and acknowledges a dependence upon nutrition, the source of it must be the blood; which is the common one of all the animal properties and structures, which are suffering a similar waste.

307§. This inference, which arises almost necessarily out of the facts enumerated, is also confirmed by direct experiment. We find that the continuance of sensibility in the different structures, is dependent both upon the integrity of their nerves, and upon the supply of arterial blood. If the abdominal aorta is tied, the inferior extremities, it is said, are paralysed; and, applying this remark to the brain itself, we find that sensibility ceases if the supply of blood to this viscus is deficient, as in the cases of *syncope* from hemorrhage, or any other cause, during which state the quantity of blood which

the brain obtains is inadequate to the support of a degree, or quantum of sensibility, which will render it capable of its customary phenomena.*

308§. It appears then, that the relation subsisting between sensibility and blood, is, that the former is a principle which is produced from the latter, or sensibility acknowledges a dependence upon blood, as the source from whence it is augmented or renewed.

(2.) 309§. The facts which indicate a general dependence of sensibility upon blood, prove also the particular dependence of the sensibility which subserves the intellectual functions to be of the same kind. Thus we find that sensibility is conferred by parents on the offspring; and if not renewed, and augmented from a source, the identical quantum bestowed upon the ova of the second generation, must have furnished the entire sum of this principle which has since been possessed by the whole human race: thus the sum of this principle possessed by the structures of the embryo in its earliest period, must, if there were no source of its production, be expanded, without increase, to that which is possessed by the structures of the adult: thus, as this intellectual sensibility, as is remarked of sensibility generally, (if indeed the principle itself is not always alike, liable only to be modified in its phenomena by its connections in different seats) is alternately in the condition of patient and agent, in which latter quality, it is perpetually imparting properties, the principle would be undergoing

* This fact is liable to the explanation either that the phenomena fail from deficiency of sensibility, or that properties, the customary state of which depends upon the quantity of the *nutrient* material, have become informal. That the elements of the principle are still preserved in connection with a formal state of life, is proved by the fact, that the sensibility is restored, as soon as the natural circulation is resumed.

constant waste, still preserving its quantum, or even perhaps augmenting it, as during growth, without any confessed source of its renovation : thus also, this sensibility, whether peculiar or common, acknowledges a dependence upon nutrition, or is suspended, or ceases, if the supply of blood to its seat is diminished, or if this fluid is abstracted. Hence it appears that sensibility, however diversified the sensations it originates, acknowledges, whatever might be its seat, one common dependence for its support upon the blood.

310§. Recurring to a subject of former consideration, we have remarked an intimate relation between the organic life and the intellectual principle ; a community of affection which suggested the inference, that the intellectual function consists only of a modification of the organic life. This analogy has also been just found to obtain in the common dependence which the properties, subserving both classes of phenomena, acknowledge upon blood. The identity of these principles, or rather that one is only a particular form of the other, will further appear from a consideration of the mode by which their existence is perpetuated.

311§. The sensibility which is proper to every animal, is maintained during the life of such animal, and is perpetuated in his race ; in the human subject, the sensibility of every seat is maintained during his life, and perpetuated in his race, liable of course to varieties, from disease or accident. Hence, *the sensibility* which we have proved to be renewed from a source *is assimilated* ; or sensibility is produced from such source, similar to that which is expended in its phenomena, renewed, and at some periods augmented.

312§. The only ascertained conditions upon which sensibility is maintained, are those also of the mainte-

nance of the organic life, namely, the existence of life, in the seat of sensibility, and the adequate supply of arterial blood. It appears, therefore, that the production of sensibility is a result of the relation between the organic life of its seat, and arterial blood. If this dependence is allowed, it must also be admitted that the organic life, in producing itself from blood, produces also sensibility. From whence it follows, further, that the assimilation of sensibility is comprised in the assimilation of the organic life.

313§. There are only two other possible modes by which sensibility may be renewed: one is by supposing this principle to be distinct from the organic life, and that it is capable, like the organic life, of *renewing itself* from its elements in arterial blood, by uniting them; the other mode is, that sensibility does not subserve its own renewal, but is produced either spontaneously from blood, or by a relation between blood and the structures.

314§. (1.) In order to establish the first proposition, namely, that sensibility distinctly assimilates itself from blood, it is necessary to adduce some instances in which this principle or faculty displays such a power, independently of the organic life. There is no such instance. Sensibility exists nowhere without the organic life; and it ceases when the organic life ceases, or rather its cessation frequently precedes that of the organic life. As there is no example of this separate assimilation by a distinct relation between sensibility and blood, we have no right to assume it. On the other hand, as it is invariably produced, when it exists at all, as a result of the relation between organic life and blood, so there is this testimony, which is not a weak one, against the supposition of a separate power of assimilation: the testimony is of this kind—that as sensibility is never maintained without organic life, as it is maintained where there is orga-

nic life (unless this principle is changed by disease), and an adequate supply of arterial blood, so it is presumed that it does not maintain itself, but that its renewal is involved in that of the organic life, being, to this extent, dependent upon it.

315 §. (2.) Of the second mode, namely, that sensibility is produced without being instrumental to its own renewal, either spontaneously from blood, or by a relation between blood and the organized structure, it may be sufficient to remark, that either conjecture is wholly unsupported by any example. The only known spontaneous products of blood (in addition to its preparatory separations) are those gaseous ones which are disengaged in the stages of its decomposition, among which a principle of sensibility has certainly never been discovered: and to attribute the production of sensibility to a relation between blood and organization, would be to regard it as a result of mechanism; a supposition which, being opposed both by experience and analogy, seems scarcely deserving of consideration.

316 §. If, however, sensibility were produced merely by the relation subsisting between blood and the structures, its production would be independent of organic life, and it might be renewed where life had become extinct, if the structure was unimpaired, merely by supplying this structure with blood, as by transfusion; an experiment, the failure of which might be anticipated with some certainty.

317 §. In this respect also, the conjecture is contrary to our experience, namely, that the terms on which sensibility is maintained are, that the organic life, and arterial blood, should be possessed by its seat; and a mode of the production of this principle which dispenses with *one of the conditions* of its existence, is contrary

to our experience of the only terms upon which it can exist.

318§. But it may be urged, if sensibility is the result of a relation between the organic life and arterial blood, or if its maintenance is involved in that of the organic life, how happens it that sensibility becomes extinct, in structures, where the organic life is still maintained? In reply to this question, it is to be observed, that the state of the organic life, under which sensibility is not produced, is a state which is capable of assimilation from arterial blood; that therefore one condition of the organic life is maintained, instead of another; and that under this state, the organic life still continues to evince itself by characteristic actions, although other phenomena of it have ceased, which were dependent upon its former state.

319§. The examples in which sensibility becomes extinct, in a structure which before possessed it, while the organic life is continued, are those of disease, as of apoplexy, amaurosis, &c.; and confining our observations to the organic life itself, there are very few instances of disease under which this principle is not maintained as a new state of it; and in this state its former agencies are partially impaired, or suspended; or else, by additional agencies, it displays additional properties, and produces preternatural phenomena. Thus, in the inflammation of a gland, or of a secreting surface, the organic life of this seat is maintained, although one result of it, namely, secretion, is perhaps suspended; and if the continuance of the same disease were compatible with life, this characteristic agency of the organic life might never again be exhibited, while its other phenomena are not interrupted: thus also, in conversions which structures undergo in disease, the organic life is still maintained in their seat, while almost every property which

distinguished the life of this particular seat, has ceased to display itself; and the existence of the principle in this seat is perhaps manifested by its producing altogether a preternatural structure, or by its merely preserving, in opposition to chemical tendencies, a structure of some sort.

320§. It appears, then, agreeably with the strongest testimonies which can be quoted on this subject, that sensibility is a part of the organic life, or that there is a state of organic life which comprises sensibility, which may therefore be regarded as one of its properties; that this state of organic life, like every other condition of it which admits its continuance by renovation, is one which assimilates itself from arterial blood; that this state of organic life, in which it assimilates sensibility together with its other properties, is liable to change, from disease or accident, and that it might, under such change, no longer produce sensibility, or it may produce a modified or a heightened sensibility, or it may be defective in some other properties in its own department, or it may produce new or preternatural phenomena; that there is, according to our experience, the same connection between sensibility and the organic life, as between this principle and the faculty of secretion, or that by which it selects from a material the molecules of the structures, or any other faculty; and that, therefore, there is no more reason to consider sensibility as distinct from that which is collectively called the principle of life, than any other of its properties; or to suppose that this, rather than any other of its properties, is capable of maintaining itself separately.

321§. The result, then, of our analysis to this extent is, that properties, by their union, constitute that which is collectively called a principle of life; these properties are constantly engaged in actions, and require to be

renewed from a source: as they are renewed from a source, the process is one of assimilation, or one by which (as the existence of these properties is essential to the process) they withdraw their similitudes from blood, or a common material. This principle manifests the possession of different properties in different structures; but in all it is maintained in the same way, except on occasions when it is modified by receiving properties which are assimilated in other seats: this principle in all its seats is liable to various states, in which its former phenomena are changed; they may cease partially, or new ones may be produced, or both, at the same time; the continuance of the same principle, in every seat, is by assimilation; if it undergoes a change, but is still one form of a living principle, which is capable of assimilation, its former phenomena cease, or others are produced, according to the nature of the change which the principle has sustained.

322§. The most simple condition of this principle, under which it is capable of living, is that in which it merely maintains the cohesion of homogeneous animal substance, as in polypi, &c.; the most complex, that in which it maintains diversified structures, forms various arrangements of molecules, produces various secretions, and exhibits, in addition, the properties which subserve the animal and intellectual departments. In the declension of disease in the human subject, or in the more complex animals, the principle can never attain the simplicity which has been regarded as the first grade of a living principle, because in these its existence is dependent upon the relations of functions; and if the form of life ceases which comprises the faculty of any one of these functions, the dependent life of other seats, whether the dependence is direct or indirect, ceases also.

323§. To bestow a few more words upon this principle of life: We do not find that any one property of it can be singly maintained—we therefor infer, that the union of its properties is necessary to make up a form of life, or an assimilating principle. We observe that some of its properties might cease under disease, and that life is still continued: we may therefore conclude, that *all* the properties which a form of life comprises, are not necessary to the existence of a *living principle*. What those properties are, which are essential to an assimilating form of life, we are but imperfectly informed. Two properties of it, or properties which subserve two purposes, appear to be necessary in every instance: these are inferred from the two results, which are common to all living forms, namely, circulation, or the distribution of a nutrient material, and the formation (which possibly includes also the preservation) of a material fabric.

324§. Considering the life which displays only these characteristics as the most simple state of it, it would appear that the other phenomena which might be imputed to it, ensue from properties which are superadded to these, combined in one principle, which is rendered peculiar in the several examples, by the possession of these superadded properties.

325§. Although, from the difficulty of the analysis, we cannot pronounce what those properties are which make a living principle, yet in every instance the properties which a principle displays, are to be regarded as its constituents. Thus, in every seat in which the phenomena of the principle are different under community of relations, its constituent properties are different: if any one of these properties were abstracted, or rendered inefficient, the phenomena, and therefore the form of life, in this seat, would be changed.

326§. The properties, therefore, which we can enumerate from their effects, constitute the principle ; but our analysis does not extend to the development of the constituents of those which, owing to this defect of analysis, we must still term properties. Thus, considering the life of any seat, as of the brain for example, we should enumerate its acts, and infer the possession of corresponding properties. We should say of it, it derives blood ; it assimilates itself from blood ; it aggregates the molecules of the structure ; it perhaps preserves their cohesion ; it produces their absorption ; it is presumed also to manifest a sensibility, chiefly relative to the phenomena of the mind. If the properties subserving any of these purposes were to cease, the principle of life occupying the structure of the brain would no longer be the same ; or if others were adopted, or added, its identity would be one of corresponding difference from its former state ; and by either change it may be continued as a modified principle, or else it may become extinct. But, although we have enumerated that of assimilation as one of its properties, because this result is one of its phenomena, our analysis does not instruct us of what properties the faculty of assimilation, so characteristic of the living principle, is composed. If it be asked what is the proof that these properties constitute the principle ? I would reply, because they are necessary to its existence : make a supposititious decomposition of this principle, abstract all these properties which we have inferred from their effects, and what remains ?

327§. In reply to this question, it would have been argued by the late Dr. Barclay, after these properties are abstracted, there remains *a substance*. But independently of there being no manifestation in this principle of any thing which answers to the definition of a substance, there is nothing gained by supposing it. The

argument in favour of such a substance is stated to be this ; that we have no experience of properties, except they are united to a substance. It would be sufficient, for the discussion of this argument, to say that our experience of the properties in question, is in connection with the animal fabric, which is quite substantial enough to render the supposition of any other substance with which they might be allied, superfluous.

328 §. But the argument is founded upon an erroneous principle—it assumes that there are no agents (or properties) which are not allied with substances ; while it must be confessed, that *substances* are made *by properties*. We should say the properties of weight, extension, and their modifications, resistance, figure, by which substance is brought into relation with some or other sense, and thereby rendered an object of experience, are necessary to its existence—it is otherwise not distinguished from those properties which are inferred only from their effects. Say, however, merely expressing the common apprehension of the meaning of the term, that substance is some form or extension of matter—and why does matter exist ? either from nothing, or from something. It is needless to repeat proofs, which are elsewhere enumerated, that it does not proceed from nothing—it is then made to exist by something. Now if this something is not different from matter, is not immaterial, then matter has originated from nothing ; for to say it is made by matter, is to leave *the origin* or *formation* of matter *unexplained*—it is to quote *the effect*, when our inquiry respects the cause, the laws, or the mode by which that effect *came to be*. As nothing can produce itself, so every thing must be produced by something different from itself : and as nothing *can do more* than supply its own existence, so effects, or productions of every kind, must result from, or consist in the union of different forms of existence. Hence, not only is matter

made by other forms of existence, but *individual properties* are also liable to an inferential analysis, which is infinite.

329 §. If it be granted that substances are made up, or consist of properties, substances themselves furnish a sufficient proof of the efficacy of properties which are not allied to substance; for *by this efficacy* substances are produced; and of course its exertion precedes the existence of *that* which results from it.

330 §. On the supposition of that infinite constitution of every form of existence by other forms, which has been just insisted upon, and which is deduced from the whole of our experience without a possible exception, not only are those properties efficient which make substances, independently of any alliance with substance, but the same efficacy belongs to the causes of properties, which are supposed single, or elementary, only because they are not analysed.

331 §. If then a property is produced by the union of other properties, properties, although they display themselves to our perception only in relation with substances, are capable of uniting, and of making other properties; which become agents with respect to those things with which they are related, independently of matter, or of any but perhaps a remote or indirect assistance from the substances with which we find them in alliance.

332 §. As properties are formed by the union of other properties (or forms of existence), *principles, also*, may be formed in the same way; for all that is stipulated in favour of a principle, of life, for example, is that it is made up of the union of many properties; the difference between a principle which displays many properties,

and a single property, is, that the properties of the former, are analysed by their relations, or are severally manifested, while those of the latter are not individually displayed, because they find no relation by which constituent properties may be inferred from separate effects.

333§. We should therefore say of the principle of life, agreeably with this view, that it is made up of properties, some of which are essential to the characteristics of a principle of life, and others superadded to these; that its phenomena are according to the properties which compose it, and to those with which it is brought into relation; that this union of properties no more requires the bond of an uniting substance, than any single property, which, being separate from substance, is also made up of constituent properties; that we have no experience of this principle, or of its component properties, but we infer the existence of the principle, meaning thereby the aggregate of vital properties, as well as the individual properties, by their effects upon matter, through which medium alone, or by their operation upon which, they have a perceptive relation with our faculties; that the *union* of these vital properties in that which is termed a vital principle, is inferred from phenomena which are conjointly produced by them, or from phenomena, meaning the characteristics of life, which cannot take place by the separate agency of these properties, or without the co-operation of those which have been said to be essential, to which others are superadded.

334§. Returning from this digression: we have seen that the mind before it is instructed consists chiefly of a disposition to sensations; that this sensibility is undergoing the waste of action; that it is transmitted from parents, to offspring through all generations; that it is renovated, or produced from a source; that as the same

sensibility is renewed, the process is one of assimilation ; that its renovation depends upon the presence of an organic principle of life ; that being inseparable from this principle, its assimilation or production is comprised in that of this principle ; that the source from whence sensibility is renovated, is the common one of life, namely, arterial blood ; that the process is of this kind—blood, or a material containing infinite properties, pervades the seat of life, which is rendered, in this instance, a peculiar form of life, by having sensibility superadded to the mere characteristic properties of a living principle ; the principle of life, thus formed, lives, renews itself, and passes away, or changes its form ; and in this process of renovation it derives its constituents, which are latent in blood ; it unites them ; and from being latent, they become formal. Thus much for *the sensibility* which is the basis of the instructed mind. We are next to consider, 1st, the modes of its affection or change ; 2nd, the laws of the presence, recurrence, and cessation, of its different states.

(1.) 335§. The modes by which sensibility is affected, are the common ones by which all effects are produced ; it is changed by the addition of other properties (or by uniting with other forms of being), or by the abstraction of any of its own constituents, which latter mode is by a decomposition, more or less complete. It may be the effect of agency, by either of these modes, to change the phenomena of this sensibility, or to destroy it. But the agencies by which this sensibility may be impaired or destroyed, belong to the subject of disease, or death. Our present business is to trace the history of the mind through those stages by which it attains that which may be considered, in some sort, as its most perfect state.

336§. The first relation which this sensibility obvi-

ously displays, is with the objects of the external world ; and the mode of affection by these objects generally, may be represented by confining our examination to one.

337§. Sensibility is one form of existence ; an external object, as a spherical substance, for example, is another. The result of the relation subsisting between these two parts of it is, that, by the influence of the spherical substance upon sensibility, sensibility is converted into sensation. This is an effect, agreeing in character with every possible effect : causes which are related unite, and produce by their union another form of existence, which is different from the causes individually, but is their united existence, and is called their effect : this effect is according to the causes which produce it ; as these vary, the effect is different. Hence the effect of sensibility and a spherical substance, is according to these causes ; and it consists of a sensation, which is that particular sensation, for the same reason that two and two are four. If the object were a different one, or if the sensibility were not the same, the effect would be different ; as if the parts of the relation, instead of being two and two making four, when united, were two and three making five, or four and two making six.

338§. This, it will be observed, is but an imperfect account of the origin of a sensation : according to it, pursuing the objection, the spherical substance is the cause of the sensation, and as causes exist in their effects, the substance should, according to this representation, exist in the mind. The common explanation on this point will suffice in this place ; the more particularly, as the present topic of our history will be hereafter resumed. It is not that a spherical substance, or any other external *object*, is the *efficient* cause of the sensation ; but that it produces a modification of light, agreeing with its figure, &c., which modification of light,

communicated to the retina, is so related with its sensibility, as to produce the sensation which we call the perception of a spherical figure.

339§. Through the medium of whatever sense an idea is acquired, this mode is common to each, namely, that an influence is communicated to the seat of such sense, by which its sensibility is excited to a sensation, agreeing with the relation between it and the influence which occasions it; and this influence, originating from external objects, is either mediate or direct: the former, as by the modification of light in the examples of vision, the undulation or vibration of the air, in those of sound; the latter, by the emission of properties, as those of odour; and by the contact of substances which act upon a related sensibility, as in the examples of taste and touch. These explanations are given agreeably with received theories; and it is not here worth while to question them.

340§. Thus a sensation is produced by a relation subsisting between sensibility and an external influence; this sensation is a change of sensibility, or one of its affections; a new state, or modification of it.

(2.) 341§. The sensation thus produced, continues as long as the object continues, and the sensibility is exposed to it; upon the removal of the object, or from a change of place by which sensibility can no longer communicate with it, the sensation is no longer present. As this sensation is a positive production, why does it cease upon the removal of the object, or what becomes of it?

342§. This phenomenon appears to be in perfect agreement with that constant renovation of sensibility which forms so important a postulatium in our doctrine:

it may perhaps be said to reflect additional proof upon the process of renovation which has been supposed. The retina possesses sensibility, which, like all the other properties of life, assimilates itself from the blood, either in this or in another seat, from whence it is communicated : it is produced, and changes its form or dies ; the same process is repeated with regard to fresh quantities of the principle contained in blood ; and thus the presence of a sensibility, consisting of successive quantities, is perpetuated. If then sensibility is related with an external, by which it suffers a change, this state of sensibility is an affection of it, and obeys the laws of the continuance of sensibility itself ; that is, the sensibility so affected passes away, and is succeeded by another quantity of the same principle. Hence sensibility is impressed with, or assumes the sense of, an object, as long as this object is present ; this sensibility passing off, the renovated sensibility, or successive quantity of it, is not subjected to this relation unless the object is present ; and therefore an object which is seen while it is present, is, upon its removal, seen no longer.

343 §. But although this seems a simple and easy explanation of the cessation of a perception, upon the removal of its object, yet it does not appear to comprise all the relations which are engaged in connection with this circumstance. If the condition of the sensorium, under the existence of a perception, is a state capable of assimilation, there seems no reason why the presence of the perception should not, in this way, be maintained, independently of that of its object. It appears, therefore, when a sensation is produced by an external, in relation with sensibility, that the state of the mind, excited by its presence, ceases upon its removal owing to some additional relations which remain to be traced.

344 §. These relations can be developed only by the

general inquiry, why does any present state of the mind cease, or any present consciousness cease, and give place to another? We can answer this question only by saying that the constituents, or properties of the mind, are so related with each other, that certain ones combine with others; and that, as these relations prevail, *combinations* between the constituents of the mind are diversified, giving rise to the phenomena of a successive causation.

345 §. If then a sensation ceases upon the removal of its external object, it happens because this sensation finds relations among the other constituents of the mind, by which it is lost as a perception, but becomes perhaps a superadded property to the general constitution of the mind. If this sensation is revived, it is in its former state as a perception, which is a result of dreaming or disease, as of insanity; as a recollection, in which state it is combined merely with ideas, which give the consciousness of an object that has been, rather than of one that is; or it is associated with a present perception, or with former sensations, and helps to make a more complex idea; as if from the perception, or recollection of a polished sphere, the idea of a *steel* globe were formed by a combination with this perception, or recollection, of all the former sensations incident to an experience of the properties by which steel is characterised.

346 §. Connecting our present topic with former discussions, it will be inquired whether the processes of the origin, recurrence, or cessation of a sensation, do not comprise the different phenomena of different seats? To this question it must be replied, the origin of an idea appears to be from a community of state between an organ of sensation, as the eye for example, and the brain—thus by saying, *I see* a spherical substance, is meant that a sensation is extended or communicated from the eye,

with which I see it, to the brain, which thus partakes of the same sensation. If the sensation ceases in the brain, when the object is removed, this is from relation which it has with the properties of the mind, which have their seat in the brain; the proof of which is, that this sensation may be revived as a recollection by association, if the function of the organ of vision were to cease as soon as this perception has taken place.

347§. Hence it appears that the organ of sense possesses a sensibility which might be converted into sensation by an external related object; that the sensation so produced, is imparted, to the brain, where it is disposed of, according to other relations, which it has with the mind; here it might remain latent, or it may be renewed as a recollection, or as a perception, leaving, *except* in the last case, which is sometimes exemplified in dreams and insanity,* the organ of sense in possession only of a renovated sensibility, which is free for a repetition of similar results, in relation with externals. And in this way is that which, in the fœtus, was only an intellectual disposition, formed, by a gradual growth, into the most perfect, or rather unnatural state of the human understanding.

348§. We have seen in our former examinations that the sensibility, which has so considerable a share in intellectual phenomena, is so allied with the organic life as to be inseparable from it by any known means of analysis—that it may be considered a part of this

* In dreaming, the functions of the organs of sense appear to be merely suspended: but in some forms of insanity, it seems as if the usual relations between the brain, and an organ of sense, were inverted: as if the perception which was originally communicated from the organ of sense, to the brain, were then extended from the brain, to the organ of sense, to the exclusion, more or less complete, of customary impressions.

principle, or a modification of it, in a particular seat. We have just seen that this sensibility is so related with external influences, as to suffer changes from exposure to them; which changes comprise all the varieties of sensations. It has been observed of the sensibility, that it is renovated together with the properties subserving the organic life, by a process of assimilation: it remains that we should trace the results of the relation of this sensibility with the external world; and consider whether *the sensations* which ensue from this relation, are also maintained in the same way.

349§. To continue then the history of our sensation: It ceases upon the removal of the object: but it is as much an effect, or positive production, as if, instead of being a sensation, it had been a bone. It is revived as a recollection; and it is therefore united either to the properties which constitute the mind, or to the material fabric, with which these properties are allied: in the former case, it recurs by relations, originating change, subsisting between the properties of the mind; in the latter case, it recurs by relations subsisting between these properties, and those of the structures.

350§. As the existence of this sensation is afterwards manifested only in connection with the processes of the mind, and as the phenomena of it are wholly intellectual, so there is this testimony that the alliance of it is with the intellectual properties. We may, therefore, adopt this alternative without any scruples; the more especially, as we are acquainted with no facts which shew that this sensation allies itself with the structures, or becomes in any way merely a related agent with the properties of the mind, without forming a part of the intellectual principle.

351§. But it will be asked, if the sensation produced

by an external becomes a part of the mind, how happens it that sensibility only is communicated from parents to their offspring? how happens it that the affections of the mind, are not also transmitted in the same way? These questions have not much to do with the argument. But it may be answered, if we suppose the sensation to ally itself with the *structure*, as the disposition to this is transmitted to the offspring, as well as that to the formation of the mind, the question, why is not the sensation also transmitted with the disposition, is equally applicable. It is to be presumed that this question cannot be satisfactorily answered in any case. We can only observe with respect to it, that there are many peculiarities both in the physical and mental systems, which are neither communicated identically to the offspring, nor to which any disposition is afterwards manifested, in the constitution of the offspring. We can therefore approach no nearer to a solution of the question, why some properties of parents are transmitted to the offspring, and others not? than by quoting general relations between these properties and the generative function; and the particular relations upon which phenomena depend, must be sought after when we have obtained a more intimate acquaintance with the properties engaged in them.

352§. The sensation produced by the mode which has been described, is allied with the mind, and becomes a part of it. Sensibility is one part of the relation by which this sensation is excited, or is one of its causes; an external influence, is the other. As this change of the state of sensibility, this conversion of it into sensation, is permanent, which is proved by the recurrence of the sensation at very distant periods, it is next to be examined how this sensation is preserved in the mind? The alternatives upon this point are, either, 1st, that this identical sensation remains, and allies itself with

successive quantities of all those properties of the mind which are renewed by assimilation; or, 2nd, that this sensation is itself produced by the same process of assimilation.

353§. (1.) As experience will serve us but to a trifling extent in tracing the farther history of a sensation, our appeal, on these alternatives, must be chiefly to the testimony of analogy. A sensation, produced by an external, may, without another exposure of sensibility to this influence, originate voluntary actions every day for years; as if a person under some authority received an order to attend every day at a certain place, and at a certain hour. The process is of this kind: A sensation excites volition; volition is imparted to the muscles, and produces in them corresponding actions. Supposing the distance to be walked every day, is a mile; this sensation, produced by an order from a superior authority, is a cause of the volition which is imparted to the muscles, and its influence is reiterated, producing in one day some hundreds of muscular actions; and these actions, this number, might be repeated every day for years, by a single change of sensibility, namely, that, in which consisted the original sensation, excited by once seeing, or hearing, an order for such regular attendance.

354§. Now if this sensation were retained identically in the mind, it seems impossible that it should be a cause of some millions, perhaps, of muscular actions. It is engaged as a cause in producing volition, and is communicated in this quality to muscles, in every action of them. We might as reasonably suppose that the influence of volition, or that muscular power, is equally capable of an infinite series of transactions without renovation—a supposition which will scarcely

be admitted with respect to a finite quantity, of which perhaps a single sensation will be considered an instance.

355§. It may probably be urged, in objection to this argument, the instances are numerous and familiar in which a cause which is not renovated, may produce an indefinite repetition of the same effects. To quote such a cause, without departing from our present example: It may be remarked, the written order for a regular attendance at a certain place and time, produces, in relation with sensibility, the sensation from whence ensues this series of voluntary actions: this order, this writing, is not renewed; yet it may, for a hundred years, communicate the same influence to a sensibility. Such an objection to our argument, would be founded in a mistake, as to the *cause* of the sensation—this cause is not the writing, but a modification of light; and the repetition of *this influence* would require a corresponding succession of fresh quantities of light, which is equivalent to a renovation of the influence, in agreement with the frequency of its action.

356§. It may still be urged, this is rather removing the difficulty, than explaining it—for if the same writing does not produce repeated effects on sensibility, it does on light. But the effect which the writing, or any other substance, produces on light, is by no act of causation on the part of such substance, by which an influence is imparted from it to light: the substance is passive; it only offers an impediment to the passage of light; the line of which may, in this way, be modified according to all the variety of surfaces. There are, indeed, innumerable examples in which effects are apparently produced by causes which remain the same; but in these examples the efficient causes are mistaken; the effect is produced by constituents independently of

them, and a relation of place only is exhibited by such supposed causes. Thus, if a cylindrical piece of iron were placed on an anvil, and *struck flat* by a blow from a hammer, the anvil is not the *cause* of this effect: the anvil only opposes its place, solidity, &c. to an impulse, or to a power of motion; and *the cause* which flattens the iron, is that momentum, the *active power* of which must be *re-produced* as often as it is exerted. The causation in this instance is, that the constituents of the anvil make a substance which will not yield to the force of the blow which flattens the iron: hence, this force is concentrated, or expended upon the iron.

357§. But recurring to the modification of light, which is one cause of vision: If the writing (or a substance of any kind) imparted properties from itself to light, which helped to constitute this modification of it, then this writing, or substance, would be capable of a repetition of its effects only so long as the quantum of such properties was not exhausted, or so long only as they were renovated. Now we have to discriminate, if we can, in this example of a sensation, originating volition, volition, originating muscular action, whether the succession of these phenomena is owing *to a communication* in this order of *efficient causes*, or whether those which stand in the order of causes are merely necessary connections, without which the ultimate effect would not perhaps occur, although having occurred, it *may exist*, independently of them. Whatever apparent contradictions may present themselves, owing to our imperfect knowledge of the constituent causes by which effects are produced, the principle, it may be presumed, will not be disputed, that if properties are communicated from one substance to another, the substance to which they are communicated acquires properties, as that which communicates, loses them—that this com-

munication can last no longer than these properties are possessed, whether as a fixed sum, or by renovation.

358§. This principle, so generally confirmed by our experience, will not be disputed, the more especially as the apparent exceptions to it have been formerly traced to the mistake of ascribing effects to associations, rather than causes ;* or of supposing effects to be produced by agents, with which the real causes of such effects have perhaps even no relation, or at most only one of place. It may be anticipated that, at a future time, when the scrutiny of modes of causation shall have become more familiar, many current doctrines will appear erroneous, and many processes, now grossly described, will be more minutely understood. Without prosecuting further a digression which would be here misplaced, and which, to be complete, must be very elaborate, it is sufficient for our present purposes to quote the general admission, that properties can be communicated no longer than they are possessed.

359§. Now in order to be satisfied, so far as testimony can be adduced upon the point, that our sensation produces the voluntary actions which succeed to it in the relation of a true or efficient cause, it may be almost sufficient to quote *the order* of occurrence. The series of actions which have been described, *is commenced* by this sensation : it is not, that this cause holds some equivocal place in a circle of connections ; but the sensation *originates* the volition, which is its immediate consequence, and the imputed effect ; and the volition, thus produced, is extended from the brain to the muscular system. This piece of causation is repeated many times every day ; and its reiteration may be continued

* Indic. on Organic Life ; chap. on Causation, &c.

as long as life lasts, or so long as the other concurrent powers do not fail.

360§. The conclusion, therefore, is founded upon as strong a testimony of analogy as can be adduced, on a point so far removed from actual observation that this sensation does not remain in the mind, identically, the sensation which was produced by the first influence of an external object; but that it is renewed, at least in a ratio to the frequency with which it acts; and probably, as we shall find reason to believe, more frequently, as a result of a general law, or as a part of a process in which this renovation is comprehended.

361§. Independently of this proof, with which, in the absence of opposing testimony, we ought to be satisfied, there is a difficulty in conceiving the permanence of any *identical property* or substance, in alliance with any order of the constituents of an animal body, seeing that they are all undergoing constantly the processes of waste and repair. If any influence is communicated, no matter with what department of the animal it is related, it remains only for a time, unless it is assimilated; then, indeed, it may be perpetuated indefinitely.

362§. This law is exemplified by all those preternatural agents which increase or diminish excitement, or which produce the phenomena of disease. The effects which result from some of these agents continue only for a time, and their quantum being consumed, the former state is restored—other preternatural agents produce a state which remains, because it is an assimilating one; as the properties of some infectious diseases, which so permanently affect the subject who receives them, that he is for the remainder of his life *indisposed* to a similar state, from exposure to the same influence.

363 §. We have also experimental proof that substances which are allied with the organized fabric, the processes of waste and renovation in which are slow, continue only so long as the substances remain with which they are allied. Thus, to quote a familiar example, the bones may be died red by a feeding on madder; if this feeding is discontinued, they again become white in a few hours, or days, or weeks, for experimentalists are agreed rather on the fact, than on the time in which it occurs. This experiment, although, as formerly remarked, not conclusive on the period of the absorption of solids, in connection with other proofs, may suffice to show that the identical substances which are united to an animal fabric can only endure in this connection for a time.

364 §. Indeed it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive how properties or substances, united with other properties or substances, which are undergoing a perpetual decomposition or waste, should remain, when the substances with which they were united have disappeared. If one were to task one's *imagination* for a mode by which this phenomenon, so contrary to our general experience, might occur, it is not impossible but some very sufficient process, just within the limits of possibility, may be suggested. But as even imagination at present is silent upon the point, and as we have a general experience against the supposition, we appear justified in the conclusion that the sensation produced by an external influence, in relation with sensibility, although it may be possessed by the mind for an indefinite period, is not preserved in it identically.

365 §. (2.) If then, as it appears, from the preceding account, it is true, not only that sensibility, but the sensation also, the permanence of which is proved by its recurrence, is renewed, it remains that we should

inquire by what mode it is renewed ; agreeably with what general laws ; and from whence.

366 §. It is needless to be very elaborate in our examination of the mode of this renovation. It is obvious, if the same sensation is renewed, that the mode of its renewal is a process of assimilation. But of this process of assimilation, two modes* may be suggested. The first is, that a certain property, of a principle for example, is permanent, and holds a relation with the source from whence the principle is renewed, by which relation certain properties from this source ally themselves with it, and constitute the entire principle, which, by a repetition of this act, is perpetuated. The other mode is, that the entire principle, substance, form of being, (or however else denominated) to be renewed, holds a relation with its elements contained in a source, by which it derives these elements, or separates them from their previous combination.

367 §. The former of these modes may perhaps be regarded as impossible ; since it supposes a permanent property, which commences and continues an action, and entertains a relation with an endless succession of other properties or substances, producing effects in conjunction with them, while it is confessed of itself, that it has no source of re-production. In addition, it may be remarked, that there is only one process of assimilation from

* It has not been thought necessary to remark the familiar mode of the production of similitudes, by constitution, as by the addition of a similar cause, to a similar predisposition : the kind of assimilation both here and elsewhere intended, is relative to the production or renovation of a similitude from a source, by the instrumentality of the principle or substance which is in this way maintained ; and in this sense it differs from every other application of the term, whether relative to the physical or moral department.

a source, which may be in some sort considered a matter of experience; and the assimilative process in this instance, to which model all other examples of the same kind should conform, is that the entire form of being assimilated, is perpetuated, as long as the assimilating principle is unchanged, and as long as its elements are duly exposed to its influence: thus fire, as a palpable instance, is maintained as long as it is not, by some foreign influence, extinguished, and as long as its elements, in the two sources air and fuel, are exposed to it; each quantity of fire is no sooner produced than it is dissipated, or changes its form; and combustion would cease if, before each quantum of fire had changed its form, it had not assimilated, and united into the same form, its elements contained in fuel and air. Hence, a process of assimilation differs from one of common causation in this respect, that instead of being a result of the union of causes which are brought together by other relations, it is instrumental to its own production; or is the cause, which is so related with its elements, as to separate them from their previous combinations, and thus perpetuate its own form.

368§. It has many times been shewn that no one property of life is capable of maintaining itself separately; some properties are not essential to an assimilating principle; these properties, allied with those which are essential, modify only the assimilating principle, without depriving it of this character; and in this combination with an assimilating principle, they also, if they are permanent, are renovated. But the properties which appear to be essential to a living principle, because on them depend the characteristics of life, ceasing, the superadded properties, or those which modify an assimilating principle, to some extent common, cannot maintain themselves by an assimilating process.

369 §. Hence it appears true of sensations, as of sensibility, that their renovation is not a separate act, but that it is comprised in the renovation of the mind ; as the mind, together with all the spiritual properties of an animal which are wasted, repaired, exhausted, accumulated—are produced by their collective union in one assimilating principle of life, which is common, or peculiar, in respective seats, according to the properties which help to constitute it.

370 §. From this view it appears that the phenomena of the mind are its several states ; that these phenomena originate by a relation subsisting between that which was only an uninstructed disposition to mind, and the external world : the mode of these effects is the common one of causation—the mind is disposed to a particular state or affection, under the operation of an external influence ; this state consists in a particular sensation, or consciousness ; and this state of the mind, spontaneously, or by another external influence, gives place to another condition of it, and the former sensation ceases, is dissipated, and never recurs, or combines with the properties of the mind, and is renewed, either unmixed or in combination with other ideas, as a perception, or as a recollection.

371 §. If a sensation is produced, and is dissipated by the incessant change of form incident to a living principle, and is not perpetuated in the mind, this happens because the sensation is not assimilated ; if a sensation is excited, becomes latent, or recurs as by memory, this sensation is preserved in the mind by being a part of an assimilating principle.

372 §. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish those specimens of sensation which are not

adopted, and renewed by assimilation. It would appear that this assimilative relation does not obtain in all the examples of perception, the objects of which pass immediately from our consciousness, and are forgotten. But as we find from the recurrence of a perception at a very distant period by association, perhaps from the influence of an external, as well as from the temporary oblivion into which most of our sensations pass until they are renewed by memory, that sensations may become latent, and still make a part of the mind, so we can scarcely pronounce in these instances of the apparent cessation of sensations, whether their total dissipation succeeds quickly to their production, or whether they are perpetuated in the mind in a latent form by assimilation.

373 §. We find in the organic system, availing ourselves of the nearest analogy which we can quote, that some of its affections are temporary, or endure no longer than the identical causes to which they might be imputed, as in the affections excited by those which are called stimuli, as well as by other causes which produce only temporary effects; that others are permanent, as in the examples of diseases which preserve their character for a very long time, without any repetition of the external causes by which they were produced. From a considerable weight of testimony of this kind, it is inferred that some of the affections of the organic life are temporary, for the reason that they do not consist of a state of the principle which is capable of assimilation: that others endure, because they admit of being maintained by a process of this kind. But this distinction can be perhaps but dubiously made in the several examples, even in the organic system; and the difficulty seems still greater in the intellectual department, owing to the experience, just remarked, that sensations which

appear to have ceased, or to make no part of the mind, are sometimes revived by association, at very distant intervals.

374 §. But if there is difficulty in pronouncing *what sensations* are latent, in an assimilable state of the mind, and what not, (seeing that an idea may be assimilated, and owing to internal relations, or from defects of externals to excite it, may never recur) the inference has been shown to rest upon adequate proofs that no sensation or idea can recur, unless it makes a part of a principle which is renewed by assimilation.

375 §. To recapitulate briefly some former results of our analysis, for the purpose of connecting them with our present subject.

1. A disposition of the mind which, in regard to its future acquirements, may be said to consist chiefly of a form of sensibility, is conferred by parents on the offspring.

2. Sensibility is possessed by every part of the nervous system.

3. Either the principle of sensibility itself is different, or the same principle is modified in its relations by its alliances in different parts of the nervous system.

4. Sensibility in all its seats is maintained by assimilation.

5. Sensibility is related with the objects of the external world—the common result of this relation is sensation; the particular results of this relation are characteristic sensations of respective seats. The general result, or sensation, occurs from an agreement of the principle of every seat, in being one of sensibility; the particular results correspond with the modifications of sensibility in respective structures, and with the variety of objects by which it is excited.

6. The places of the occurrence of sensation, are the

seats of sensibility ; and these seats are those on which the causes act, by which sensations are produced.

7. From these seats sensations are extended or communicated to the brain ; which is therefore described as their common centre.

8. The brain participates in the sensations which are communicated from distant seats of sensibility ; but in the brain, these sensations become related with properties which are not displayed in other parts of the system ; these properties are not necessary to a principle of sensibility, the possession of which by the brain, although this viscus is commonly regarded as the source of it, has been thought superfluous. Hence the instructed mind is constituted by the sensations communicated from distant seats of sensibility, and certain properties in the brain, with which these sensations are related.

9. The results of this participation of the brain in the sensations of distant seats, are, 1st, that the sensation merely affects the mind (or quantum of its properties) which then exists, and being dissipated with the quantum of mind which changes its form, the sensation ceases, or has no farther place in the history of the phenomena of the mind, because it is no longer possessed by it ; 2nd, this sensation ceases for the present, but instead of producing a mere affection of the mind, which lasts no longer than the quantum of properties which it affects, it is combined with the properties of the mind, is preserved in a latent state, is renewed by assimilation together with the other properties of the mind, is revived by association, or by the influence of an external, as a sensation ; and in this quality, mixed or unmixed, as a recollection, or as a perception ; and continues to be possessed by the mind, only so long as it is disposed by internal relations for assimilation : these relations ceasing by spontaneous change, the sensation exists there no longer, and the object of course is totally forgotten.

376§. Some additional explanation will perhaps be required of the relations between a sensation and the mind. It will be asked, how happens it that a sensation can exist in the mind, of which we are not conscious? The first influence of an external, imparted to the brain, in connection with the sensibility of a distant seat, is to produce a given state of the mind, which is recognized as a certain consciousness; this consciousness would continue, if there were no related causes which made it cease; as it does cease, there are related causes equal to this effect; and these related causes are internal, or external; those existing in the mind itself, or in the external world. We find that a present consciousness may be made to cease, as a past one may be revived, by either of these sets of causes—thus if a certain sensation is produced by the presence of its object, without the instrumentality of another perception, this certain sensation may give place to a different consciousness; or a certain consciousness being produced by the presence of an external object, this consciousness may be superseded by a different *perception*—and in the recurrence of a sensation, a former one may be revived by spontaneous association, or it may be revived by the association which succeeds to the presence of a certain external.

377§. Hence it appears, if a certain consciousness is produced by the influence of an external, communicated to the brain through the medium of a sense, that this is one state of the mind; that if this ceases without external influence, it does so from a catenated causation, proceeding among the constituents of the mind, by which different states of it are produced; which states, or consequences, of this causation, are recognized as varieties of consciousness: if a present sensation passes away, or ceases to be a part of the mind, it is because it is so related with the constituents

of the mind ; if it is retained, it is for the reason that such are its relations with the constituents of the mind : it becomes latent, and is revived, for the same reason ; and for the same reason, it is capable of assimilation so long as such relations obtain ; by which process it is preserved, with those other constituents of the mind, which are maintained in the same way.

378§. The present stage of our analysis concerning the formation, preservation, and phenomena of the mind, may be thus generally stated. A sensation is produced by the relation of sensibility with an external, or other influence : this sensibility is inherent in the seats in which sensations originate, which are those of the application of the influences by which they are produced. A sensation thus formed in one of these seats (as in that of vision, taste, smell, &c.) is communicated through its nerves to the brain : if it is preserved in the brain, it is by allying itself with some of its properties. All the properties of the brain are undergoing unremittingly the processes of waste and repair ; hence this sensation either allies itself with successive quantities of related properties, or it is renovated, together with the properties with which it is allied : the latter has been inferred from the subsequent agencies of this sensation, or the subsequent transactions in which it is engaged. The alliance of this sensation, is either with the structure of the brain, or with its life : as it is not manifested except during life, as its capacity for an union with the organic life is exemplified in their reciprocal modifications ; as it is assimilated, which must either be in conjunction with organic life, or as a consequence of organic life, in which latter case it might have been produced by it, without ever occurring in a sense (or its own instrumentality would be superfluous, if the organic life alone were competent to produce it)—for these, and

other reasons, formerly stated, it is to be concluded that the alliance of a sensation is with the properties of life belonging to the brain. In the same manner as one sensation is produced in a sense, and retained in the brain, others are produced, and retained. The effect of the alliance of these sensations to the life of the brain is to modify this principle; and the phenomena of the mind are to be regarded as the phenomena of a principle of life, to which sensations, or certain affections of distant seats, are superadded. According to the relations subsisting between these sensations and the life of the brain, and according to the relations of sensations with each other, sensations cease altogether, or become latent, are retained and revived. The phenomena of the mind, which consist chiefly of sensations, may be considered as different states of the principle of life belonging to the brain; and these states succeed each other in great measure, or wholly, in conformity with the relations which subsist between sensations, whether those already possessed by the mind, or additional perceptions; so that if the idea of a man is now present, this is one state of the cerebral principle; and this idea being related with other past sensations, it may revive, from a latent form, the idea of a coat, and become itself latent; or both may combine, if such is their affinity, give the consciousness of the man, and his coat, and be succeeded by other ideas, or past sensations which are, by this consciousness, revived, or restored from a latent to a sensible form. All the phenomena of the mind consist in the reception, cessation, preservation, recurrence, and combination of sensations, communicated to the brain from distant seats of sensibility:* for if we have no sensations, which

* It will be perceived that a sensibility of the brain, which has been sometimes spoken of, chiefly for the sake of embracing the investigations which have been made on this subject, is here, as elsewhere, considered superfluous.

may perhaps be admitted, but those which are formed in the organs of the senses, a sensibility in the brain is both inexperienced and unnecessary, since no sensations result from it. These phenomena of the mind are those which ensue from certain properties of a principle, the whole constitution of which is maintained, or renewed by assimilation; as the respective phenomena of the organic department, are other results, of other constituent properties, of the same principle.

379§. If the truth of this account is equal to its simplicity, the history of the human mind will scarcely furnish a problem of any great difficulty; unless, indeed, not content with general laws, we aspire to a knowledge of all those constituent properties which have been faintly traced in their relations with external objects. It is obvious that, until we are supplied with an additional sense, by which these properties may be perceived, our analysis of their relations and phenomena must be inferential; but it may nevertheless be to a great extent satisfactory, provided it proceeds only upon just analogies.

380§. The conformity of these deductions with our experience, will be best shown by connecting them with some actual examples, which may serve to represent all others. To re-state as many of these deductions as require to be illustrated in this place—1st, All the phenomena of the mind, which we are capable of knowing, are sensations; knowledge and sensation being essentially synonymous: 2nd, Sensations originate chiefly from a relation between externals and a sensibility belonging to the seat on which the influence of externals is exerted: sensations are the effects of this relation, for the same reason as two and two make four; that is, because the united existence of causes is the existence of the effect, or more familiarly, because sen-

sation is *constituted* by an external influence, and by sensibility : 3rd, Sensations are communicated from the seats of their origin to the brain, to the life of which they are an addition ; and that life, which before produced phenomena agreeably with a constitution disposing it to little more than organic processes, produces afterwards phenomena agreeably with the properties, or sensations, which are superadded to it : 4th, Sensations cease, if they are not assimilated, because they are dissipated with the quantum of life with which they are allied : they are preserved as a part of the principle, if they assimilate with it ; this is determined by relations subsisting between the sensations, and the properties of the brain : 5th, All the spontaneous phenomena of consciousness are constituted by the sensations communicated from distant seats of sensibility, and retained in the mind. Now to exemplify this abstract—

381 §. I see an object ; for example, the table on which I write ; by which is meant, 1st, I have this sensation, or I designate, in expressing this instance of vision, one particular consciousness ; 2nd, My eyes are the seat of this sensation, the testimony of which *is the same* as that I have a consciousness of the existence of the table, namely, that I am conscious of seeing it with these organs, which are therefore the seats of the sensibility with which the external object is related ; the sensation is the result of this relation, or is the effect of the union of an external influence with sensibility : 3rd, This sensation is communicated to the brain, and allies itself with its life ; the proofs of which have been just stated, and therefore need not be repeated in this place : 4th, If this sensation ceases, it is because, like the other temporary affections of life, as by wine, opium, &c., only a quantum of this principle corresponding with that of the foreign influence, is affected by it ; if this sensation continues, it is because, like the permanent affections of

life, manifested both in physiology and disease, the state of life comprising this additional property, or sensation, is renewed by assimilation: 5th, The spontaneous phenomena of consciousness are constituted by the sensations which have before been transmitted from distant seats of sensibility to the brain. This principle, which has before been partly considered, will require in this place a short discussion in connection with some additional examples.

382§. Not to trouble ourselves with minute subdivisions, every state of consciousness of which we are susceptible may be said to be comprised in the sensations, 1st, of existence; 2nd, of pleasure and pain, in their several grades; 3rd, of desire and aversion, and their several degrees and modifications; 4th, of volition. It is to be examined whether all these states of consciousness, which comprehend the whole of our experience of the phenomena of the mind, are constituted by former sensations, or whether any of them might be imputed *to a sensibility of the brain*, in addition to these sensations.

383§. (1.) It is generally confessed of *ideas*, or sensations of existence, that we derive them all through the media of the senses, that there is no idea in the mind which has not previously existed in the senses. For this reason, experience is made the basis of all the operations of the understanding. It seems superfluous to bestow more words in establishing a truth which is generally admitted. It is sufficient, in support of it, to make a general appeal to experience, which consists chiefly in the knowledge of the objects of the external world. No idea can be proposed which does not refer to some object of past experience. In the essays of imagination, the mind seems to originate a creation of its own; but if the images, which in these

operations are presented to us, are analysed, however fanciful and remote from reality these fictions might be, they will be found to consist of former perceptions of the senses, variously associated or combined. In these instances, the materials are those with which past experience has furnished us; the objects are the former ones of the senses, and their results are various, like the words formed by the letters of the alphabet, or the tunes by the elementary notes of the gamut, as they are differently grouped. As all these sensations, which are comprised under the general term experience, were first formed in the organs of the senses, and from thence transmitted to the brain by a relation subsisting between the sensibility of these organs and externals, so a sensibility in the brain itself, is superfluous for *this class* of sensations; seeing that they are produced by the sensibility of other seats.

384§. (2.) That the sensations of pleasure and pain, are originally produced in the organs of sense, is proved by that testimony of consciousness, or unequivocal conviction, from which there is no appeal, or which is indeed synonymous with truth. All our sensations are excited by external, or by internal, causes—the external are those which are related with the senses, and with that diffused sensibility, pervading the sentient structures, which is liable to be influenced by the operation of externals. The external causes of the sensations of pleasure and pain are mechanical, chemical, or peculiar; the latter, belonging, probably neither to the department of chemistry, nor of mechanism, as those of taste, smell, perhaps vision, and hearing. Of the internal causes of pleasure and pain, very few of the former can be enumerated; but it may be observed, if any such produce sensation, this sensation has its origin in the seat where such causes act. This is palpably the case with the internal causes pro-

ductive of pain, which are more numerous and familiar than those of the same kind productive of pleasure—the origin of the sensation of pain by internal causes, is exemplified in almost every instance of spontaneous disease: and even in the sympathies, although the causation of pain might proceed from another seat, the operation of the cause by which pain is produced must be on that secondary one, perhaps of disease, in which the sensation is felt, or for the locality of which we have that unequivocal testimony of consciousness, before spoken of.

385§. But, it may be inquired, although it should be conceded that pain and pleasure are in general results of the sensibility which occupies structures, remote from the brain, what shall we say of the sense of uneasiness which, on some occasions, seems to arise spontaneously and in the absence of any exciting cause? What, for example, shall we say of the origin of the sense of hunger, which might be painful in an animal who has never been fed, and can therefore acquire this sensation neither by the operation of a cause upon a remote organ, nor as the recollection of a sensation before produced? But this mode of stating the question, comprehends something more than the difficulty; it is not only stating a question, but giving an answer to it at the same time; the question is properly urged, but we may perhaps take exception at the answer.

386§. It is an assumption that the cause of hunger, whatever it may be, does not exert its primary influence upon organs remote from the brain. We cannot indeed say with *strict limitation*, where we feel the sensation of hunger, or of thirst, both of which might become painful; but there is sufficient reason for believing, although the brain may be conscious of, by participating in these sensations, that their origin con-

cerns rather a remote sensibility than a principle of this sort belonging to the brain—our consciousness serves us rather less dubiously in fixing the seat of the origin of thirst, than of hunger. We are aware of a state of the tongue, throat, fauces, &c. which is a painful one, of these parts, and for the relief of which drink is required; this consciousness, in this example, is, perhaps, without the aid of experiment, sufficient to fix the locality of the origin of this sensation; and so far as experience serves us, every example concurs in the same testimony. In extreme cases of hunger, the uneasiness is in the stomach; and this is not the only instance, when appetite, from its degree, becomes painful, in which the sense of uneasiness is in the organs subservient to the function with which this appetite is connected.

387 §. In addition to this general agreement of consciousness, by which the seat of these sensations is indicated to be in structures remote from the brain, there is the farther testimony that these sensations are allayed by causes, whose first relation is with the sensibility of the organs which subserve the functional purposes of the sensations in question; and this is true equally, whatever appetite prevails.

388 §. It appears from this view of evidence, to which much of the same import might be added if it did not seem superfluous, that the sensations of pleasure and pain originate by relation of their causes with the sensibility of structures, which are remote from the brain.

389 §. If it is true that the origin of the sensations of pleasure and pain is in the seats of a diffused sensibility, it is equally so that the brain participates in these sensations. The laws of this intercourse are the same as those which obtain with respect to the objects which

produce ideas, or sensations of mere existence. The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, is excited in a remote structure, and communicated to the brain—this sensation ceases in the structure in which it originates, or exists there only so long as the cause continues to be supplied by which it is excited. The operation of this cause is to convert a present quantum of sensibility into sensation: this latter is communicated to the brain; and successive quantities of sensibility which are assimilated in the seat of the origin, are not subjected to the influence of this cause, of sensation.

390 §. The proofs of the participation of the brain, in the sensations of pleasure and pain, are, that they become related with past perceptions, or with ideas, and associate with them at the time of their occurrence; or are revived at distant periods, as recollections, by association; or are revived at future periods as perceptions, or as the original sensations, both in dreams and insanity; and this recurrence of the sensations of pleasure and of pain may take place even though the function of the sense, in which they were originally excited, shall have ceased, or if the structure in which they first occurred is removed. No additional proof will be required of *the participation* of the brain in the sensations of pleasure and pain, which originate in other seats.

391 §. The further history of these sensations is the common one of all perceptions: they are communicated to the brain, and are dissipated; or they become latent, are preserved by assimilation, and recur at periods and in forms, which are determined by relations subsisting between properties of the brain, which consist chiefly of past perceptions, so related as to combine with each other, or to form trains of successive consciousness.

392§. It appears true, then, that the sensations of pleasure and pain are results of the diffused sensibility ; and we may safely make the appeal to experience in favour of the proposition, that the sensations which are produced originally in seats distant from the brain, are the only ones which the brain, in any exercise of the mind, shews the possession of. It will readily be conceded, with respect to pleasure and pain, that we have no sensation of either sort, as we have no idea of an external existence, which has not been previously experienced or formed in the way described, in distant organs of sense. But it will be observed, these sensations of pleasure and pain, which are thus experienced, appear to originate sometimes also in the brain sensations of pleasure and pain, of a different description from those which occurred in the organs of sense.

393§. Thus, for example, we derive pleasure from the acquisition of *the means* only by which the sensation of pleasure is to be renewed ; and we are afflicted by circumstances which have no other importance than that *they tend* to produce a pain which we have previously felt. This apparent exception is intimately connected with the general nature of good and evil ; upon which it is necessary to bestow a brief consideration, in order that the exception may be justly appreciated.

394§. Although the terms good and evil, seem to imply something different from those of pleasure and pain, yet in fact they are essentially synonymous : the terms pleasure and pain, express well-known sensations, which become the measure of good and evil ; either term may also be extended to *the means* by which these sensations are produced : thus we say of these means, they are pleasant, or unpleasant, good, or bad. If it be asked why a thing is good, or bad ? it must be answered,

because it produces pleasure, or pain, or agreeable, or disagreeable sensation. As the terms good and evil, are relative to, or synonymous with, pleasure and pain; and as we have no pleasure or pain which does not originate in some seat of the diffused sensibility; so it is obvious that the ideas of good and evil, like the sensations which these terms serve to express, originate in seats remote from the brain, to which organ they are communicated; and *for their* occurrence, a sensibility in the brain itself is, on this account, *superfluous*.

395 §. It will perhaps be thought that this statement of the nature of good and evil, is more brief than correct: it may be objected, that things which afford pleasure, are sometimes bad; and those which produce pain, sometimes good. This observation is the common one of moralists: but it is founded in this mistake, that the *consequences* of those things which produce pleasure, are, on the occasions alluded to, productive of a degree of pain, which is perhaps not compensated by this pleasure. It is not that every thing which produces pleasure, or agreeable sensation, is not *good*; since pleasure and good are so strictly identified, that one implies the other; but that, from indulgence in certain pleasures, consequences ensue which are evil, *because* they are productive of pain.

396 §. Our experience, unluckily, furnishes an abundant commentary on this apothegm of the moralists; for our relations with circumstances, whether those which are imposed upon us, or those which we seek, are such, that every pleasure has its price; or there are attendant circumstances on the causes of pleasure, which are productive of pain. And there is scarcely any occupation in which the understanding is more frequently engaged, than in calculating the preponderance of pleasure or pain, of good or evil, which is likely

to result from any action or course of life. But because pleasure and pain are so allied as to be almost inseparable companions, good and evil are not on this account to be confounded, or the relation of these terms to pleasure and pain to be questioned. These sensations are produced not by the same, but by different causes ; to which the terms good and bad, will be respectively appropriate, whether *causes of pain* should, or should not *succeed to those* which are productive of *pleasure*.

397 §. Every day of our lives affords us examples of this distinction, if indeed so trite an observation stands in need of additional examples. A pleasure of any kind, which might be ardently desired, is enjoyed, and the infliction of some severe punishment follows. The moralists, at least those of the politic sect, would say, that this *pleasure* was *bad*, for the reason that it was productive of a greater degree of subsequent pain—but it is not that the pleasure is bad, or that the means which produce it are bad, but that the consequent pain is bad ; and of course *the means* by which this pain is occasioned, are of the same character. Thus, also, a person proposes to himself some felicity, for the attainment of which he is under the necessity of suffering many hardships, and of undergoing for years great toil. This practice would perhaps be said to exemplify the virtues endurance, courage, patience, industry, &c. ; and it would be called a *good* practice, inasmuch as it tends to a laudable end—laudable, because it proposes the attainment of some good, or the possession of the means of happiness. In this case, too, the term good is misapplied : that which is painful, or produces suffering, must be bad ; *the end*, the possession of the object desired, is *the good*, for the acquisition of which much evil is sustained—and in such instances, men incur an evil to attain a good, as in other cases they enjoy a pleasure, which, in its consequences, is productive of pain,

according to their estimate of the probable degree of these opposed sensations; and according to this estimate, which will be made with a different result on the same questions, by persons of different temperaments, education, taste, or character, actions are deemed eligible, or otherwise. So customary is it for good to be succeeded even by a *preponderating degree* of evil, that we may almost refine upon the supreme felicity of Epicurus, which was said to consist in “tranquillity of mind, and indolence of body,” by affirming that a human being who could sleep from the time of his birth to that of his death, would be, of all others, the most to be envied. The freedom from care, so highly esteemed by the Epicureans, would no doubt be greatly to be coveted, if the absence of excitement were not itself an evil; so great a one indeed, that people often seek voluntarily *painful* emotions, in order to be relieved from the tedium of a mere sense of uninterested existence.

398 §. It must suffice in this place to remark further, on the subject of good and evil, that these qualities are public and private; that the terms in either case designate pleasure and pain, happiness and misery—that those obligations which are called social duties have reference to the public good, or to the happiness of a community: but as nothing is good which does not afford pleasure, so public and private good are compatible only when that which is good for a community is good also for the individual: and the relations of society are such, that that which does not tend to promote general good, is most commonly an evil in itself, or in its consequences, to the individual.

399 §. The general obligation of men to concur in a scheme which promotes public welfare, is founded on their individual interest, which is the only and necessary basis of a conduct which is either good or bad rela-

tively to themselves; since every thing must be bad for an individual which gives pain, and every thing good which gives pleasure. Hence men concur in a scheme of general good, because punishment of some kind follows a departure from this scheme; or they do it for the sake of a reward; or because it is agreeable, as when, by a natural or acquired taste, they are gratified by contributing to the happiness of others. Such a state of the affections has been the favourite recommendation both of Divines and Moralists; and if they have not succeeded very generally in inspiring this humane disposition, so conducive to public good, and also to individual tranquillity, it is that the attainment of it is rendered a little impracticable by the conflict between human passions, and the circumstances by which they are assailed.

400 §. Returning from this digression; it appears that we have no sensation of pleasure or of pain, and consequently no idea of good or evil, which is not communicated to the brain by relation of the objects which excite these sensations, with the sensibility of the organs of sense; and that therefore, for the production of these sensations, a sensibility possessed by the brain itself is superfluous.

401 §. (3.) Desire and aversion appear to be sensations which *originate* in the brain: for these, therefore, a sensibility belonging to this viscus would be indispensable, if this apparent origin were true. But if desire and aversion, like good and evil, are synonymous with pleasure and pain, or are inseparable from these sensations, their origin in distant seats of sensibility is otherwise accounted for.

402 §. What do we mean by saying "we desire a thing," but that it is agreeable to us, or that it gives us

pleasure? and what is signified by dislike or aversion to a thing, but that such thing is disagreeable, or causes us one modification of pain?*

If then, by desire or aversion, we imply agreeable or disagreeable sensation, and if the origin of such sensation is in the distant organs of sense, the production of desire and aversion is comprised in that of pleasure and pain, for the purposes of which a sensibility belonging to the brain itself is superfluous.

403§. If farther proof were required of this origin of desire and aversion in the distant organs of sense, it may be observed, that these feelings are generally entertained only with respect to objects of which we have had experience; which experience, as is generally confessed, is a result of the relation subsisting between influences, chiefly external, and the diffused sensibility.

404§. But it will perhaps be insisted upon, that desire and aversion are separable from pleasure and pain: it may be said, we desire things which do not give us pleasure, *until* they are attained; and that therefore desire and pleasure are not the same. It may just as reasonably be objected, that the idea of an external object originates in the brain, because we have this idea of that which we do not actually see, until the object is again presented to us. The sensations of pleasure and pain, the former good, the latter bad, the former desired, the latter disliked—all of which are only different terms expressive of agreeable, or disagreeable, sensation—are, like the origin of the ideas of existence, first produced as perceptions, by the presence of the objects which excite them; they are communicated to the brain, and afterwards also, like the ideas of exist-

* The difference between inclination, or desire, and *volition*, will be hereafter spoken of.

ence, recur as recollections, except in dreams and insanity, when they might be revived as sensations immediately excited by their appropriate causes, although no such causes should be present.

405§. (4.) Volition also appears to *originate* in the brain—thus, for a purpose which is conceived in the brain, we will to perform an action, or a series of actions. To trace the origin of this volition :

406§. It is to be inquired *why* we will a certain action? It must be replied, because something is desired. It is next to be asked, do we desire any thing of which we have not had experience? or the *constituent sensations* of which, supposing the desire to be even a fanciful one, were not, as we have remarked of the other productions of the imagination, experienced in the senses, before the mind could have formed the conception? It must be replied, we can have no desire for any thing which has not first occupied the organs of sense. From this account, then, it is obvious that volition is produced by an experience of something which is desired, or is a result (alluding now to the instinctive wants, and even these, whether excited by internal or external relations, *may be suggested by the common mode of experience*) of the sensibility of remote seats, in quality either of a perception or of a recollection. It is to be examined whether volition is, in fact, separable from this desire, by which its *production* is confessed.

407§. A person wills a gratification, indifferently, of any sort : and what is meant by saying that he wills, but that he desires this gratification ; and what by his desiring it, but that it is agreeable, or pleasant? or, he wills to avoid an evil, which means that he is averse to such evil ; that it is disagreeable, or painful, to

him. Then it appears that volition is only liking or aversion; and liking and aversion are comprised in the sensations of pleasure and pain, or in those called agreeable and disagreeable. Now as we have no pleasure or pain which does not originate by relation of the sensibility of the organs of sense with certain exciting influences, so it is evident that volition, which expresses desire and aversion, is comprised in the sensations which were originally produced in these organs.

408§. Our analysis has conducted us to a result, which is perhaps too much at variance with prevalent opinion to be readily admitted. It would be argued against this explanation, that volition and desire are not the same; still less, that volition is comprised in the sensations of pleasure and pain. It will be said, *we desire* things, of which we do not will the attainment. Nothing apparently is more common than the wish for possessions which we make no attempt to obtain; and in other instances, we actually *do voluntarily* that which we know will be productive of *pain*. On these accounts, the difference between volition, and desire and aversion, would at first sight appear striking. But a stricter scrutiny will perhaps shew us that there is some deception in this matter.

409§. Suppose a person wishes to enrich himself fraudulently, or at another's expense: say that he attempts this robbery; *why* does he attempt it? because he *desires* the possession of another's wealth, and desires also, in consequence, to accomplish all that may be requisite to obtain it. Say that he *desires* this possession, and *does not* attempt it; why does he not endeavour to obtain it? because he is withheld by principle, or fears punishment. In the former case, he wills, because he desires; in the latter, he does not will the attempt at this possession, because he does not desire it

on the terms upon which it is to be obtained: in the former case, the attempt is agreeable to him, and he wills it; in the latter case, the attempt is not agreeable to him, because he had rather not hazard the consequent punishment. It appears, therefore, that desire is volition; but desire, and therefore volition, *may be counteracted* by the conviction, that though pleasure may be enjoyed by a possession, yet it is not desirable, and therefore is not willed, to make the attempt at obtaining it. This predicament exemplifies a desire, which would lead to an act of volition, opposed by aversion; of course, both these feelings cannot prevail; and doing, or refraining, or the volition by which we are actuated, is in this case, *according to the prevalence* of desire, or aversion.

410§. The relation of desire with the voluntary muscles is such, as to produce in them corresponding actions, which have for their end the attainment of an object from which gratification is expected. But this relation obtains only when desire is not counteracted by knowledge, or rather by a different affection, under which the opposite feeling of aversion may predominate. So that *volition* may be said to be unmixed desire; or else the preponderating desire, when inclinations are opposed; to either of which succeeds a corresponding state of the muscles.

411§. But this identity of these sensations, is not necessary to our present argument; the object of which is to shew that there are no sensations in the brain, which did not previously occur in some other seat: and although it should be disputed that volition is included in the sensation of pleasure, or pain, comprising the disposition to seek, or to avoid, to do, or to refrain, yet it will be allowed that we *never will* but for a purpose which is made by recollections of past sensations, or

else by a present perception. Thus, recurring to an instance which is not favourable to our argument, a person engages in laborious pursuits, or sustains privations, fatigue, and danger, for the sake of applause, or from what is called a motive of ambition. The applause is what he seeks; but he would have had no idea of this applause, if his senses had not experienced the expressions of it; and in them, these expressions produced agreeable sensations which were transmitted to the brain, (or formed there, by relations with previous perceptions), and like that of other agreeable sensations, the repetition of them is desired, when these sensations recur to the mind; and sought for, if related affections permit *their prevalence*.

412§. By those who are unwilling to admit that volition is identically pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, it will at least be conceded that it is produced by these sensations. We will to attain a good, or to avoid an evil—to attain a present or future good, or to avoid a present or future evil. In this sense, all mankind act upon the same motive, namely, they do that which is most agreeable: and that which is preferred, or that which governs volition, is dependent upon the relations between sensibility and externals, and upon those subsisting between sensations which are the consequences of these relations. As the sensibility is modified, or as externals are varied, so different sensations will be produced, and as these are retained and associated, will be the recollections, opinions, and affections of individuals—such being the sources of intellectual phenomena, according to the varieties in them, will be those of individual character. That which is good to a mind of a certain constitution, is bad to another, of a different constitution; or that, proverbially, which is agreeable to one, is painful to another—each does that which is most agreeable to himself; and thus

far, all mankind act upon the same motive, that is, to please themselves, so far as they can. The designs which have this common end are infinitely various; and in these are found the different shades of moral excellence or depravity—but that which every individual does, for whatever reason, is that which he likes, or thinks best; hence every thing that is done, is *relatively good* (or agreeable) to the individual, though perhaps not to society.

413§. The freedom, as it is called, of the will, has been a subject of much controversy. Without entering at length into this discussion, the relations in which the will is engaged may be thus briefly described. We act from volition; we will from desire, or aversion. Volition is therefore governed by desire or aversion, the predominance of either of which, when they are opposed, or when there is a choice of actions, is called preference; and desire, or aversion, is produced chiefly by the influence of externals upon our sensibility. We appear to have a freedom of election in doing, or in refraining; yet whether we decide upon doing, or refraining, *our decision is necessary*; since there would be no decision, if causes did not operate which produce or determine it; *and these causes operating, it cannot be otherwise*. Thus, I may either write more, on this subject, or not, just as I please; but if I do, it must be from the force of causes, which compel me; if I do not, it is from the absence of causes which would compel, or from the influence of others which prevent, me; *in either case the decision is equally necessary*. It may be truly said that the will, in health, governs the muscles, or at least one system of them; but something also produces the will; and the will, being such as *it is made*, of course is no party, in any given instance, to its own making, which would be to suppose that it acted before it existed. As a general account, it may be said that

we act from volition ; that we will from affection ; that affection is owing primarily to a relation between sensibility and external influences, and is modified, as these parts of the relation are varied. If it were asked what it is *in the power of the will* to accomplish ? the answer is, any thing which is an *object of preference*, and within the ability of the muscles ; these being the *only conditions of its efficacy*.

414§. But while we remark a general agreement in the laws of action, we must also acknowledge a difference in the qualities of actions, corresponding with all the variety of motive by which volition is impelled. This consideration belongs to the subject of right and wrong, virtue and vice ; with which I have no business at present ; and shall therefore remark only that these qualities are defined commonly in agreement with an arbitrary rule, which has for its most obvious end the good of a community ; that every thing is considered right for an individual which promotes the welfare of society, or is not incompatible with it ; that every thing is considered wrong in an individual, the practice of which is prejudicial to others, or which would be injurious to society, if such practice were to become prevalent.

415§. As volition always results from preference, and as preference must always refer to individual pleasure, or gratification, *so it is impossible* that there should be *any* voluntary action which does not arise from self-love, or which has not for its object the gratification of the individual who performs it. This necessary propensity in individuals would induce them to pursue their own interests to the prejudice of others : and hence it becomes requisite to make it their interest to respect the welfare of others, or not to pursue their own advantage at the expense of others. This is done by reward or punishment : the former induces men to abstain from

the gratification of their passions, or to suffer a present evil, for the sake of a future benefit; the latter restrains the propensities of self-love by the infliction of pain, which is not compensated by the indulgence of these propensities. Thus Governments provide for public welfare, *by prescribing the terms of individual interest.*

416§. In addition to the apprehension of personal injury which may ensue from a certain action, or course of life, there are three checks proposed for restraining the propensities of individuals to their own gratification, when the indulgence of these propensities may be pernicious to society; and these are, the religious (or moral), the civil, and the social checks. The first is capable of rendering the other two superfluous; the second prevents crime by penal laws, and is designed for the restraint of those who are not influenced by either of the other checks; the third is the check of public opinion, expressed by the censure of society, or perhaps by the exclusion from society of the individual who violates its laws. Those who are governed by the first, ought to be the best characters in society, because the scheme of religion inculcates the preference of general to individual good; but there is perhaps not one in a thousand of those who confess a religious government, but, by mistaking a mere acquiescence for a belief, or, by an undefined mixture, or alternation of motives, either deceives himself, or deceives others—or both.

417§. This first restraint of religion failing, the social check, or regard to reputation, may make good members of society, or what is called honourable characters of a second-rate kind; but it is, for the purposes of social welfare, inferior to religious restraint, which imposes a tie of conscience, and prevents *secret* crimes

or immoralities, to which the censure of society cannot reach, for this is applicable only to that which is, or may be known. The restraint of the laws, or penal enactment, prevents the commission of crimes, but is applicable, like the censure of society, only to that which is, or may be discovered, and operates chiefly with the worst part of mankind—with those who neither acknowledge the control of religion, nor any respect for society, whose rules, and whose censure they alike disregard or despise. Those who are absolved from the restraints of religion and of society, in general acknowledge no law but their own inclination, so far as the laws of their country will allow it to be indulged with impunity. It is one of the well-known consequences of public censure, to make persons feel that they are no longer members of society, which may have the effect of freeing them completely from its restraints, if not of stimulating them to a return of hostility. This condemnation is indeed, for social welfare, oftentimes necessary, and is the only punishment which society can inflict; but it is frequently observed to be productive of individual and of general evil, if it is made wantonly or injudiciously; and more especially, if it is made *unjustly*. This last check of the civil laws failing, men are left to the dominion of their evil Genius, who, by indulging their predilections, not unfrequently terminates their career by a kind of elevation which excites no envy. Such seems to be the general predicament of society, according to its present institutions.

418§. Thus it appears that men act for the purpose of obtaining a present gratification, or a future good; or to avoid a present pain, or a future evil—the end of individual volition, therefore, on one or other of these accounts, is individual advantage; and if men

are withheld by artificial restraints, from actions or pursuits from which they would otherwise derive pleasure, it is by the desire of religious or social reward, or the fear of religious, civil, or social punishment. This analysis, applied to individual instances of conduct, exposes very freely the principles of our nature; and shews that, however complicated men's motives may appear by their mixture, their alternation, or the rapidity of their succession, their elements are very few.

419§. The social law, so far as it concurs with morality, is in general satisfied, if men are negatively good; but the *principle of ethics*, of which religion is a prevalent system, goes farther; it not only imposes restraints upon indulgences which may be prejudicial to a community, but inculcates the benevolence by which others are to be served, in preference to ourselves. This moral recommendation, in the system of Christianity, is enforced by the promise of reward, and by the threat of punishment; and such incentives, as human beings are constituted, are well adapted to the end, at least with all those whose belief of this system has in it no shadow of doubt.

420 §. The same *practice* is also suggested by a scheme of morality much less perfect. Men are recommended to practise virtue, benevolence, honour, &c. because there is a *beauty* in these qualities. But it is obvious that there can be no beauty in any thing except to those who have the taste to perceive it: and it is to be feared that the great bulk of mankind would fail in the taste to appreciate this moral beauty. But say that the taste may be *acquired*—if this were attempted, the success would perhaps be very doubtful, or would be possible only with those whose dispositions enabled them to derive pleasure from the possession and exercise of the benevolent affections. But *what incentive*

does the scheme propose, in order to induce men to make the attempt? None, but that they may possibly *enjoy a pleasure* of philanthropy; which the ingratitude, duplicity, and baseness of mankind would generally keep at a very reduced degree. And for this equivocal pleasure, *this chance* of a partial success, they are to sacrifice all other enjoyments, to which, whether naturally, or by education, they are more forcibly impelled.

421 §. This system is obviously deficient *in incentive*, inasmuch as it proposes a practice on the ground of pleasure arising from it, to those alike who have, or have not, the taste which will enable them to derive pleasure from such a source; and to those to whom it recommends the acquirement of this taste, it proposes, at best, but an exchange of enjoyments which have been experienced, for a gratification which is problematical; and which, it may be anticipated, even in the successful instances, would be one of a weaker kind. As human nature is constituted, some superior inducement must be proposed, before *the acquisition* of this *moral taste* will be generally *attempted*; or, being acquired, before it will supersede the inclination for popular goods, or the more natural propensities, the strongest, at least the *most prevalent* of which, amidst all the refinements of education, are still those of the animal kind.

422 §. But notwithstanding these objections to the *general efficacy* of a precept, which has no other recommendation than the gratification of a taste, it must be confessed that there are in the world occasional instances of its prevalence, when not powerfully opposed by the more natural passions. Those who have attained this taste, or even, it may be said, those who make pretensions to it, have few interests in common with those who are wholly destitute of it; who could not derive plea-

sure from a good action, independently of any expectation of reward, whether from the applause of men, or by a reciprocation of service.

* 422 §. A better security for benevolent practice, and yet one of no great steadiness, is found in the sympathies of human nature; by which men *participate* in each other's afflictions, and share also in the happiness which is conferred by relief from the immediate pressure of misfortune. It may be remarked of these sympathies, that we are indebted to nature for the disposition by which we participate in, or are affected by the feelings of others, whether those of grief or joy. We find some persons incapable of these sympathies, although their education might have been favourable to their indulgence; and others, in whom they are remarkably powerful, whose education and habits of life have a natural tendency to repress them. We may say, therefore, that this disposition, so creditable to humanity, so beneficial to society, is conferred originally upon our nature, or that the rudiments of it belong to our sentient constitution, and that it may be encouraged, or repressed, both by precept and practice.†

423 §. All this complicated machinery of the human mind (the chief springs of which only have been remarked) is produced by the relation of a principle of sensibility with certain influences, which, with the exception of those which occasion the animal desires, and pain, as in local diseases, may probably be said to be external; and the origin of these last, is not so exclusive but that externals may also excite them. The

† The moral systems are here merely touched upon, for the purpose of exhibiting them in connection with the more immediate topics of our analysis: they will hereafter be more fully considered under their separate titles.

effect of every influence which is related with this sensibility, is to produce sensation; and hence we have a variety of sensations which corresponds with the variety of influences by which they are excited. These sensations have been before classed as those merely of existence, which are familiarly recognized under the term "ideas," and those of pleasure and pain.

424§. The former, or ideas, constitute information, or knowledge, and as the several objects of knowledge are more or less intimately allied, so the sensations produced by them are divided into classes, agreeably with the similitude, or connection of their objects. Information on any one subject, must be in a general proportion to the number, and to the quality, of the sensations produced by the objects which this subject comprehends: but *the results* of a similar instruction, the first effect of which is to produce nearly similar sensations, are very different, in different individuals; which must be imputed chiefly, or entirely, to those qualities of the mind by which a different disposition is made of the perceptions, furnished by a common sensibility. The mind may be disposed, by affection, towards the sensations produced by one class of objects, rather than another. *In this union* of affection, taste, or propensity, with the faculties of preserving, and combining, certain sensations, seems to consist what is called *a genius* for any particular pursuit. Affection for the objects of any department, is perhaps not so *necessary* to genius, as those other qualities of the mind with which it should be allied: but although such other qualities, upon which depend the phenomena of memory, and combination, may be possessed by the mind, they are rarely very productive, unless taste, affection, or propensity, stimulates their exercise, and helps to furnish them, by an appropriate choice of occupation, with an adequate supply of objects. The

dependence then of information upon any subject, is, 1st, upon the relation subsisting between sensibility and external influences, the immediate results of which are perhaps both knowledge, and affection; 2nd, upon the relations of sensations with those properties of a principle residing in the brain, by which they are retained; and 3rd, upon relations subsisting apparently between sensations themselves, by which they are associated, or combined.

425 §. The other class of sensations, namely, those of pleasure and pain, of that which is agreeable or disagreeable, of that which is to be desired, or willed, whether to avoid an evil, or to attain a good—these sensations constitute the passions and propensities, which are so many modifications and degrees of liking and aversion.

426 §. Both these classes of sensations, namely, those of simple existence, and those of pleasure and pain, originate in the seats of a diffused sensibility, from whence they are communicated to the brain. They are related with the life of this viscus, unite with, form a part of, or modify it; every sensation being an addition to a principle which was originally unintelligent, but which, in this way, becomes the instructed mind.

427 §. These sensations are not only related with the life of the brain, as a consequence of which they become latent, and are retained in this form, but they are related with each other; and the phenomena of this last relation are, that these sensations are revived from their latent form, and may recur, as they were originally produced, that is, as if the objects which excited them were still present; but more commonly they recur as recollections, that is, in connection with other ideas, which modify them, and which make them respectively

the sensation of that which has been, rather than of that which is.

428§. The phenomena of the relations between sensations, are those wholly of association: one consciousness precedes, and produces another; and the only difference in the results of association is, that former sensations are revived separately, or in combination, producing in the former case a successive, and in the latter a combined consciousness, of past sensations: in the former case, sensations preserve in some degree, though not altogether, their original simplicity; in the latter, a new idea is produced, as in reasoning, by the combination of other sensations; and this idea is according to the sensations which *are its constituents*. Every spontaneous phenomenon of the mind, of which we are conscious, is a result of one, or other, or most commonly of both, these modes of association; and consequently all the sensible operations of the instructed mind ensue from this disposition, or from this relation, between sensations, by which they revive, or combine with, each other: and excepting the capacities of perception, and memory, and perhaps that to originate a recollection after sleep, the mind has apparently no other faculty.

429§. Not only are ideas, or sensations of mere existence, thus related with each other, but those of pleasure and pain, are capable also of a similar association. The sensations of either class, may also associate those of the other—thus a perception of mere existence, may revive a sensation either of pleasure or of pain, which was formerly experienced in connection with the object of such perception: and thus a sensation of pleasure or of pain, may bring to the mind the recollection of some object, with which it was formerly in connection, but which had no share in the production of either of these

sensations: the instances of both are numerous, and familiar. Hence it appears, from this exemplification of our abstract, that all the phenomena of the mind consist in the reception, cessation, preservation, recurrence, and combination, of sensations, communicated to the brain, from distant seats of sensibility.

430 §. If it were inquired *why* one sensation, or idea, of which we have a consciousness, revives another, which was before latent, we can do no more than say, such is the relation between them. We cannot assign in this, rather than in any other instance, a reason for such relation. We can no more say why an external should produce a sensation, than why one consciousness should produce another: in the former case, we can offer no other explanation than that the sensation is the result of the relation subsisting between sensibility and an external; and in the latter case, we say such is the relation subsisting between a present, and a past sensation.

431 §. Of the *order* of association, it may be remarked generally, that it seems to be in agreement with *analogy* between sensations, as when one sensation associates a resembling one, or another of the same kind; and from *experience* of a former *connection*, as if a man, from seeing water, should be reminded of a ship, to which the waters bear no analogy, and then perhaps of a particular flavour of some article of diet, of which he once partook during a voyage. It is probable that there are many sensations, the association of which will not appear to observe the order either of analogy, or of experienced connection—that ideas are so capriciously related, as to defy every attempt to confine their association within any rules: whether this difficulty is so great as it appears, can be settled only by

a more elaborate consideration of examples than is here proposed.

432§. But although in general, in this business of reviving sensations, a present, appears to be the cause of a past sensation, because when we are awake our consciousness is uninterrupted, and therefore every sensation has necessarily a precursor, yet it appears that sensations may also be revived without *any connection* founded either in analogy or experience; as if a phenomenon, resulting from a latent causation among the constituents of the mind. Thus we may fall asleep thinking of a fish, or this was our *last* consciousness; we may awake, six hours afterwards, and our *first idea* may be that of a field of hay—there is, or may be, neither analogical, nor experienced connection in this instance, between the antecedent, and the consequent idea; and of course the occurrence of the consequent idea must be independent of association on either of these grounds; since whatever might be passing in the mind during sleep, whatever internal causation may be going on, we are not conscious of sensations; and therefore these latent processes might originate a recollection, as well as any present sensation, by which it might otherwise be associated. Will it be said that ideas are present in the mind during sleep, to which our first waking thought succeeds in the accustomed order of association, but that these ideas, or these links of the chain as they are called, are *not recollected*? Thus, it may be urged, we have a perception, *during sleep*, of the noise of the waves at sea, which is proved, *it is said*, by our waking, if the sea should suddenly become calm. To this objection, I reply, this is an assertion, contrary to our experience: in all other instances, if ideas or perceptions are present to the mind, we can recollect that a continued consciousness, *at least with respect to some objects*, has obtained,

although the particular images with which the mind has been occupied, or some of them, might have been forgotten. It is a more correct conclusion, that latent processes, of which of course we are not conscious, may proceed during sleep, or that an action of the mind may be resumed on our waking, independently of any associating *sensations*, of which our first waking thought is a result; and that a cause of perception, as, for example, the noise of the waves, during which we fall asleep, may, or may not, under this state, exert an influence upon the mind by which, not a perception, but an unknown state of it, is produced, upon the cessation of which the waking condition is resumed. This is little more than definition of the fact—we sleep during a noise, and wake upon the cessation of the noise, yet *we were not conscious* during our sleep of any noise. To suppose that we had, during the time of our sleep, *a perception of the noise*, would be to assume a *continued consciousness of some hours' duration*, of which consciousness, our memory fails totally to inform us on the very instant at which we awake, which is the *succeeding instant* to the existence of *the assumed perception*. If, during sleep, the mind were under *a perception* of the noise of the waves, there seems no reason why the memory should *always* fail to assure us of this perception, as clearly, as if, instead of being asleep, we had perceived the noise of the waves an equal number of hours, whilst we were awake. It may just as sensibly be affirmed that a person who should sleep soundly during a thunder-storm, of three hours' continuance, on awaking would be entirely ignorant of the circumstance, *merely because he had forgotten it*. The metaphysicians, when they have attempted a refinement, or assumed a discovery, which is opposed to common sense, have most frequently written nonsense.

433 §. Neither is the idea which first occurs after

sleep, always that of a sensation which has been recently impressed with *the greatest degree of force, or vivacity* : for when a very disagreeable, or a very interesting circumstance has occurred the preceding day, this circumstance is not always the first which presents itself to us on waking ; on the contrary, we may think of fifty indifferent things, in the first five minutes that we are awake, and then the circumstance which the day before had powerfully agitated us, may flash painfully upon our minds. If then, it is asked, by what law our first waking thought occurs ? it may be presumed that it arises out of the change of the mind from the sleeping to the waking state ; but why this change happens, in what it consists, or what preparatory processes may be going on during sleep, by which one recollection is revived on our waking, rather than another, we cannot assert, without a knowledge of all those properties of the mind, of their relations with each other, and of the results of these relations, which our analyses have not declared.

434§. In addition to former proofs that a sensibility of the brain itself is superfluous for the origin of our ideas, it is observed that this viscus does not afford evidence of the possession of the sensibility which is *common* to all the other structures. The brain *is said* not to feel any mechanical injury ; and from my own observation, I can assert that a portion of the brain which protrudes through a fracture of the skull, may, in a subject, otherwise sensible, be removed by scissars without occasioning any pain. This fact furnishes little more than an instance of agreement with the supposed insensibility of the brain on all other occasions : but as we know that this principle of sensibility may, in effect, be so diversified (as in the organs of the senses) as to be excitable only by peculiar or appropriate causes, so it does not follow that the brain, being insensible to mechanical agencies, is also, on this account, insensible

to those more subtle influences which are concerned in the phenomena of intellect.

435 §. Agreeably with the examples which have been quoted, as well as from a collective regard of our *à priori* reasoning, it appears that a principle of sensibility in the brain itself is superfluous—it appears that this viscus possesses a principle of life, which performs all the functions common to an organic life in every seat ; that this principle possesses other properties in addition to those of the organic life of other seats, or in a modified organic life, by which it is related with sensations in the manner described ; that all the variety of sensations indicate different states of the principle ; which states occur, or succeed each other, either by relations of the principle with externals, or by internal causation among its own constituents ; that the organic life of other seats is liable also to a diversity of states from internal and external relations ; but that these states do not exemplify the phenomena of intellect, because the principle which displays them does not resemble that of the brain, which is a modified form of organic life, and therefore entertains peculiar relations. That no state of this principle endures longer than the constituents of it preserve a present form, or relative condition ; that it is undergoing perpetual changes, both from external influences, and by internal progressive causation. That its spontaneous changes, comprising all the varieties of consciousness, are results of its constituent properties. That all the properties of the principle are liable to be engaged in actions, by which every quantum passes into new combinations ; that the principle may therefore be said to be perpetually dying—but as amidst these changes it is still maintained, or its identity is still preserved, so all those properties of it which continue to exist after their present quantum has passed

into other forms, are renewed by assimilation. In this manner, personal identity is preserved through life, namely, *by the renovation* of the same principle, together with the properties or sensations *which have been united to it by experience*.*

436 §. The life of the brain, then, like that of other seats, in all its diversity of states, suffers the changes incident to a principle which is unremittingly consumed, and renovated. From the immense variety of our sensations, it appears that these states of the principle possessed by the brain, must be incalculably numerous: but we know, from the diversity of its phenomena, that the states of the principle occupying other textures must also be very numerous; probably its changes are equal to those of the principle which subserves intellectual purposes, only they are not recognized, because the conditions of the common organic life, though occasionally inferred from effects, do not, like those of the brain, consist chiefly in sensations—the states of the intellectual principle are generally *varieties of consciousness*, and therefore almost every state is known to us; the changes of the organic life elsewhere, are not phenomena of consciousness, and we can therefore infer them only when their effects are displayed to us. In fever, the condition of the organic life is changed, and it renews a modified principle, as long as this condition of it lasts; if the intellectual principle, or the life to which properties subserving intellect are superadded, were affected in a similar manner, it also would assimilate its modified condition, and as the change in this department would probably be one of consciousness, we

* Mr. Locke makes personal identity to consist in a continuous vital principle, which, remaining itself *always the same*, is united to a perpetual succession of particles, forming the bodies both of animals and plants.—On the Understanding, 1700, p. 181.

might be enabled to say *in what the difference consisted* between its present or changed, and its previous or natural state.

437§. We have then, through an intricate analysis, arrived at the conclusion, that the life of the brain, to which the properties subserving intellectual phenomena are united, is, together with these properties which belong to it, renovated from *some source*. The necessity of a source for the renovation of all those properties belonging to an animal which, in performing functions, are constantly suffering waste, has been deduced from much *à priori* reasoning, and supported by the citation of facts: it remains to inquire from *what source* the various agents of these functions are supplied.

438§. We observe of the vital properties of functions, as well as of the materials of which the structures are composed, a general dependence upon arterial blood. This dependence appears from the loose and general experience, that if this common material fails, the functions become debilitated, and the structures waste; that if the supply of blood is locally prevented, the functions of parts suffering this privation cease altogether, and the structures, subjected to the laws of chemical decomposition, fall to decay. From this general experience, the general dependence of the properties of function, and of the structures, upon blood, has been deduced.

439§. This general testimony of dependence may be extended, without exception, to every particular function, or to every particular structure subserving the animal and organic life. Our business is to examine whether these common proofs of dependence upon the blood, are furnished by the particular function which has been imputed to the brain.

440§. Agreeably with a division which, though perhaps convenient, is in great measure artificial, the functions of the brain are said to be animal and intellectual: the characteristics of the first are sensations and voluntary motions; those of the second, all those phenomena of memory, association, &c. which are attributed to peculiar faculties of the mind.

441§. In proportion as nutrition is defective, the powers of *voluntary motion* are diminished; but it will be observed *sensibility* does not appear to be diminished in the same ratio. This objection is however inconclusive; since we find that functions elsewhere are increased, or the phenomena resulting from them are multiplied, in proportion to defective nutrition: thus the irritability of the heart is apparently increased by extreme depletion, by fever, &c. attended with a diminished quantity of the common material of nutrition; and sensibility to the objects which usually excite it, in its several seats, appears sometimes to be increased in the last stages of protracted disease, while the powers of the mind are enfeebled. At the same time it is confessed that the principle of irritability, which seems oftentimes to be increased under extreme chronic depletion, is dependent, as upon a source, upon the blood. The want of agreement, therefore, in these instances, may be attributed to complex relations, involving the distinction between effects dependent upon degree, and upon the operation of new, or extraneous properties. These relations it is scarcely worth while to analyse; more especially as, if the alleged disagreement is opposed to the dependence of sensibility upon blood, it is equally so to that of irritability in the organic department, the renovation of which from this fluid is confessed.

442§. But to quote facts from which a dependence, of some kind, of sensibility and of the power of volun-

tary motion upon blood, is familiarly inferred. We find that a limb is paralysed by a deprivation of its blood: the inferior extremities have neither sense nor motion, it is said, under the action of a ligature upon the abdominal aorta. It will scarcely be supposed that this dependence is merely hydraulical, or that filling the vessels of the lower extremities with any other fluid, of the same consistence as blood, would either maintain or restore these faculties. In syncope, during which there is a diminished quantity of blood in the brain, sensibility and the powers of voluntary motion both fail, or their characteristics cease under fatal hemorrhages, together with all those other functions which acknowledge a dependence upon the same source.

443§. The same facts are exhibited in the *intellectual department*. The partial deprivation of blood which the brain suffers in syncope is followed by a suspension of all the characteristics of mind; this privation being complete, the intellectual functions, together with the organic life, with which they were allied, are not merely suspended, as the life in both departments is in asphyxia, but become apparently extinct, or are not resumed. This agreement in the suspension and cessation of the functional and organic life in the seats of both, though not quite perfect, is sufficient to prove a common dependence; and the obvious circumstance in which they differ is, that the intellectual and animal functions, from this deprivation of blood, fail first.

444§. In addition to these particular proofs of the dependence of the mind upon blood, there is the general one of analogy. Life, in all its seats, is supported by arterial blood; every function is exercised only so long as its powers can be renewed from this source: and it is agreeable with the whole of our experience relatively to the function of the brain, that this furnishes no

exception to that general dependence upon the blood, which prevails elsewhere.

445§. From our former examinations, it appeared that *some* source of all the properties of an animal was necessary, from whence these properties might be renewed: it appeared, also, that *the mind* was no exception to this general law; on the contrary, that its subserviency to it, as well as that of all other functions, was established *by parity of proofs*; that the mind was a constituent part of the vital principle of the brain, which was originally a modification only of the common principle of life; to this principle sensations are afterwards superadded, and by relation with its peculiar properties are preserved, in union with it. From our present inquiry, with a view to particularize this source, no other has suggested itself than the common one of life, and of the structures, namely, arterial blood: and the facts which prove this fluid to be the source of nutrition and renovation in all other instances, obtain equally with respect to the functions of the brain.

446§. We are accustomed to regard *the mind* as constituting some very remarkable exception to the general character of natural productions. We *compliment ourselves* by supposing that the Deity consists of some such trash as our heads are filled with—for my own part, I see nothing at all extraordinary in it. I can as readily conceive that a sensation, as that a table, or a candle, may be made by its appropriate causes—all that I should be disposed to remark is, that the causes are not the same in these examples; and therefore very naturally the effects are different; or different results are produced by the union of different forms of existence, which are their causes.

447§. Men seem to have taken great pride in this

same possession of intellect, though it may be doubted whether, instead of a benefit, it is not the curse of their existence—it imposes upon them some thousands of cares and anxieties, from which animals are in great measure, or altogether exempt; and suggests factitious wants, which, when supplied, afford but little pleasure, and are immediately succeeded by others: it makes the existence of man a restless, painful, and dissatisfied condition; one of fears, desires, labour, and disappointment. It is generally true, that infelicity is in a ratio to intellectual cultivation; a principal reason perhaps of which is, that education, which is to the intellectual, what the causes of disease are to the organic principle, in effect, increases sensibility; that, of the inevitable circumstances which are related with sensibility, there are ten which produce pain, to one which produces pleasure; and consequently the less sensibility we have, the less we are likely to suffer. It is true, by intellectual cultivation (from whence result the arts) the number of persons is increased who are enabled to exist upon the same extent of soil: but the advantage of enabling a crowd of miserable beings to exist, for little else than to jostle and contend with each other through life, instead of a few comparatively happy ones, seems rather problematical. Hence, for the purpose of reconciling the preponderance of evil which obtains, and is generally confessed, under every condition, with a scheme of universal benevolence, it is thought necessary that the infelicity of our present, should be compensated by the happiness of a future, state.

448§. The process by which all the constituents of an animal are renovated, has been said to be one of assimilation. The mode and order of this assimilation has been described as follows: Blood, or a material of nutrition, pervades every part of the textures; this

nutrient fluid contains in an elementary, or informal, state, all the properties or constituents which are possessed by an animal; the terms of the continued possession of these properties or constituents, or the terms of their maintenance, are, that life should exist formally in the structures, and that the material containing its elements should be adequately supplied—if life ceases, blood alone, with the instrumentality of the structure, will not maintain, or renew it; if the supply of blood is prevented, life ceases; life then, comprising all the properties by which the functions are performed, is no fixed or permanent sum, but it passes into another form as soon as it is produced—the result, or a result of this relation between life and blood, is, that life is maintained; and as the successive quantities of this principle preserve the same character, it is maintained by assimilating itself from blood, or by withdrawing its elementary constituents from blood, combining them, and thus rendering them formal, or thus identifying the living principle. This account is deduced from an extensive regard of phenomena, which have before been considered in detail. An animal may be affected by various agents, from his relations with externals; but no influence or property thus acquired, is maintained, unless this property finds its resemblance, by which it may be renewed, in arterial blood.

449 §. By this process of assimilation, we have supposed the life of the brain to be renewed and perpetuated, involving the intellectual properties which are united to it, and which make this a principle peculiar to the brain, as the properties which separate bile, make the life, with which they are allied, peculiar to the liver.* As by this process the mind is perpetually

* Some sort of dependence of character upon blood, has been a popular notion in all ages. It is not, however, that *the character*

renovated, so also, as a part of this process, it is perpetually throwing off, or dissipating its present state; whether these copies *preserve their character*, or become *informal*, is an additional topic of inquiry.

450§. What ! it will be exclaimed, ideas in blood ! yes, ideas in blood : and why not ? Of those who would make this exclamation I would ask, is it not true, agreeably with all doctrines and all confessions, that the blood is *the source* of life ; or that life, in proportion as it is exhausted, is renovated from blood ? And what do we know of *life*, that we should suppose *its* source too vulgar to be that also of ideas ? It is granted of *sensibility*, that this principle is renovated from the blood, or rather, it is confessed to be in some way dependent upon it : *and what are ideas but a modification of sensibility ?* and if *one form of sensibility* may be produced *from blood*, there seems no good reason why another may not also be obtained from the same source.

451§. But it may be objected, rather obeying the impulse of a startled understanding, than engaging it in a cool consideration, we never perceive anything like ideas in blood ; we know their origin, they are produced by external objects, &c. And pray do we see horns, hoofs, hair, skin, bones, &c. in blood ? Yet we know from the history of animals, from their increase from the foetal to the adult age, that all these things, and many more, are contained in blood. Then for the origin of these same ideas ; they are produced, it is said,

is according to *the blood* ; for this is many times changed, in the course of a man's life : but that the vital principle, upon which character is ingrafted, *renews itself*, together with its superadded qualities, from blood, as from an elementary source ; and provided it contained no foreign influences, the blood of a pig would contribute as much *to the character* of a gentleman, as the gentleman's own blood.

by external objects, and therefore cannot exist in blood—this is but indifferent reasoning. In reply, however, it may be observed, so miasmata produce diseases, engaging a modified condition of the organic life, which endures for days, weeks, or months; so the inoculated morbid poisons are introduced from without, and assimilate the same qualities from blood, which, as is well known, are increased by this assimilation a thousand fold. It is not that *the objects* which excite ideas, such as glasses and candlesticks, are produced from blood; but a *modified sensibility*, which is a result of the influence of these objects. The sensations are *only conditions of the vital properties* of an animal, which find their similitude in blood; from which source, in common with all the other constituents of an animal, they are produced.

452§. The principle, that a strictly elementary substance, or a simple form of being, is impossible, has elsewhere been shown to be founded upon the whole of our experience. It follows that the constituents of every form of being, are infinite, and the reason why simple substances are supposed is, that we have no means of analysis, by which their composition may be shown, or that they are presented to us only as effects, the separate causes of which are not perceived in their united existence.

453§. But limited as are our artificial means of analysis, it is singular that those which are manifested in natural phenomena, should be so generally overlooked. It was called a discovery when it was found that water was not a simple, or elementary substance; but an animal body possesses more agents of analysis than are to be found in the laboratories of the chemists. I have known a newt kept for some time in a glass jar, which contained besides only water: this newt increased considerably in size, and more than a third part of one of

his legs, which had been amputated, was re-produced. From this increase of his structures, to say nothing about the renovation of particles, which are undergoing constant waste, it appears that water contains not only oxygen and hydrogen, but the constituents of skin, bone, flesh, fat, &c.

454§. The history of nutrition furnishes many striking examples of the variety of constituents contained in substances apparently of a homogeneous, or simple kind. Thus, however little complimentary it may be to us intellectual bipeds, it is nevertheless true, that, without the formality of a Metempsychosis, there is a man in the meanest vegetable. A child of seven or eight years of age, may weigh forty pounds; this child may live wholly on potatoes until he becomes a man, when he might weigh one hundred and sixty pounds; from whence it follows that he has produced from the potatoes one hundred and twenty pounds of muscle, bone, fat, skin, brain, nerves, &c. The difference between the man in the vegetable, and the living man, is, that in the vegetable, *he was informal*: or *his constituents* were disguised *by a state of combination*, in which our faculties were not capable of their recognition;* just as the component properties of a chemical substance are not known, until they are declared by analysis.

455§. Not only does it appear that that which we call mind, is contained in blood, but many substances display so close a relationship with it, that it will be difficult to account for their phenomena without sup-

* See Indic. on Org. Life, ch. on the Mode by which Life is Maintained, on Death, &c.

posing that they become a part of it. It will scarcely be disputed, that one thing cannot change the identity of another, unless it combines with it ; and if the character of that which is subjected to this influence is still preserved, the form must nevertheless be modified. Wine, brandy, æther, ammonia, laudanum, &c., are all capable of influencing the state of the mind ; they may add to the rapidity of its associations, they may increase the range of its associations, they may also stupify or depress its energies. It may be presumed that different phenomena of the mind result from different conditions of it ; and that that which constitutes a condition of intellect, or which makes one form or state of an intellectual nature, must itself be intellectual. Objections will readily suggest themselves to this argument ; but if it were worth while to anticipate, there would be no great difficulty in answering, them. Thus also the mind is furnished by the external influences which are related with sensibility ; all our ideas are derived from such sources ; these influences are *necessary to the existence* of our ideas, and if ideas are a part of the mind, which will not be disputed, those influences which excite, or help to constitute ideas, can scarcely be less so.

456 §. But to say that intellect, and all those mysterious properties which are called spiritual, constituting, in common estimation, an order superior to that of all other forms of being, are produced from the most contemptible substances, will, by the ignorant, the stupid, or the malicious, be accounted, at least, a very gross doctrine of materialism. To persons of this description, I would not willingly address myself. For their satisfaction, however, it may be remarked, that properties which do not answer the definition of matter, are found to be possessed by material substances. Thus, spiritual properties are *not identified*, but *allied*, with matter ; a possi-

bility which will readily be admitted by those who reflect that their own vital and intellectual principle, is in alliance with a material fabric.

457 §. Thus we have traced faintly a general history of intellectual being ; we have considered its origin by derivation from parents ; we have hinted at the laws of its development during foetal growth ; we have perceived the basis of it to be a sensibility which, by its relations, chiefly with externals, supplies the materials of the instructed mind ; we have considered its relations with its alliances—with the organic life, of which it appears to be a modification in a particular seat, and with the structures, with which it holds complex relations, originating the effects of a reciprocal influence, both direct and indirect. We have considered the general laws of sensations, of their production, their localities ; of their retention, their preservation, and of their association. We have seen that the maintenance of this intellectual possession, which gives man so distinguished, though perhaps so unenviable a supremacy in the creation, is ensured by the concurrence of all those means which tend to the general support of life. It remains only, in order to complete a system of Psychology, to the extent which is permitted by our imperfect faculties, that the principles suggested in this condensed view, should be stated under separate titles ; should be more elaborately discussed ; and that the instances of relations, the classes only of which are here alluded to, for purposes of illustration, should be more particularly remarked. Our analysis has been confined principally to this present state of existence : and here our history ends.

458 §. It is however deducible from this analysis, that the history of intellectual being, *does not terminate* in this stage of existence : thus much is demonstrable.

But to this stage of existence our experience is confined : and if we reason of a future state upon physical testimonies, it must be upon analogies and presumptions, which will be productive of but little satisfaction. It may be said that physical analysis is capable of demonstrating a future existence of some sort ; but it does not instruct us *of the form of this existence*, or of *the relations* in which it is liable to be engaged.

PART II.

MORAL RELATIONS.

PART II.

MORAL RELATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY OF THE MORAL CONSTITUTION.

459§. IT was the object of our former analysis, to deduce chiefly from the phenomena of the human mind, a general account of its origin, formation, and maintenance. It is intended here, before entering upon a consideration of the Ethical systems, to recapitulate so many results of this inquiry as may serve as an introductory account of *our moral nature*.

460§. The common predisposition of mind, has been shewn to consist chiefly in a form of sensibility. This sensibility is brought into relation with the external world. The effects of this communication are according to the form of sensibility, and according to the external objects by which it is influenced—different objects producing different effects upon the same sensibility; and the same objects producing different effects upon different forms of sensibility.

461§. The several effects of the relation of sensibility with externals, agree in one common character ; that is, they are all sensations, or modifications of consciousness. These sensations are chiefly arranged under three classes, which are variously combined, and interchanged ; namely, ideas, sensations of pleasure, and sensations of pain.

462§. The first class of sensations, or ideas, relate merely to existence, and are otherwise called knowledge ; these vary in their nature comparatively with each other, agreeably with the diversities of their sources, or elements ; and they vary also in the degree of conviction, or belief, with which they are entertained—this latter variety is dependent upon the different grades of testimony, by which corresponding degrees of conviction, or belief, are produced. The second and third classes of sensations, or those of pleasure, and of pain, comprise in their modifications the passions ; the sense of agreeable, and disagreeable, of desire, and aversion, together with volition. The sensations belonging to the latter classes are *thus named* in correspondence with their diversities of degree, rather than of nature ; although they are by this, in respective examples, distinguished from each other. Thus we have the *passions* of love, hatred, revenge, &c. on some occasions ; and on others, the common character of these feelings is preserved, while their degrees only are distinguished by the terms inclination, dislike, retaliation, &c.

463§. It is not intended that the desire of an object, and the pleasure it confers, are identically the same sensations. Mr. Locke, so far from thinking desire and pleasure analogous, calls desire “an uneasiness,” and supposes this sense of uneasiness to be the entire,

or principal spring of volition.* His analysis, however, of the nature of these feelings does not appear to be unexceptionable: it is not always true, that desire, relating to an object of enjoyment, is a painful sensation; since it is by no means uncommon for persons to seek, both at expence and trouble, the means of stimulating desires, as if for the mere *pleasure* of experiencing *them*, which they do not propose to gratify.† It may be said of pleasure and pain, that they are, in their recollections, desire and aversion, provided with these recollections of pleasure or pain from a given object, there are no combined influences, whether furnished by the mind itself, or by external circumstances, by which the recollection of a pleasure, for example, is prevented becoming a desire; or by which this recollection is so modified as to be something else than desire, perhaps mere knowledge, if indifference is the result; or else, according to the nature of the associated influence, perhaps even aversion. Pleasure and pain being the necessary constituents of desire and aversion, are also of volition: the difference between which and desire is, that, as counteracting influences are sometimes mixed with recollected pleasure to prevent desire, so counteracting influences may be mixed with desire, to prevent volition.

464 §. These three sets of sensations, namely, those of knowledge, of pain, and pleasure, together with their modifications, are variously disposed towards each

* On the Human Understanding, 1700. p. 134, &c.

† With a remarkable contrast, Shaftesbury, so far from supposing that desire implies uneasiness, proposes to make happiness, like virtue, to consist not merely in the *gratification* of certain affections (or desires), *but in the possession of them*—a possibility, the terms of which we shall hereafter consider. See *Characteristicks*, 1727. vol. 3, p. 198, &c.

other, in different examples. It may be sufficient to remark here this general connection between them ; that the sensations of pleasure and pain, however diversified, always include the sensations of existence, or ideas ; but the sensations of existence have not always the additional modification of sensibility, which consists in the consciousness of pleasure or pain ; our habitual perceptions being, as we say, indifferent to us, while the occasional ones exemplify the common consciousness of the existence of objects, which, in addition to this knowledge, are either agreeable or otherwise.

465 §. It has been elsewhere demonstrated* that the instruction or formation of the mind, proceeds upon the universal principle of causation ; which may be thus stated :—*every form of existence is the effect of the union of other forms which compose it ; hence, the efficacy of a cause is merely to supply its own form of existence.* The sensations of each class acknowledge also this common, or universal mode of origin. The sensibility which belongs to the predisposition of the mind, is one part of a relation ; external influences form the other. The results of this relation are such as they are constituted by the parts of it : different causes, in other instances, produce different effects ; and in this, different external influences produce different sensations, alike for the same reason, namely, that different causes are different forms of existence ; and therefore constitute, when united, other forms of existence, of corresponding diversity.

466 §. The sensations of each class are related with properties of the mind, which *are not* objects of its consciousness ; as these properties therefore cannot be

* On the Org. Life ; chap. Truth, Causation, &c.

known, their agency is only inferred. The sensations of each class, are also related with each other. By a mixture of these two relations sensations are preserved informally, revived, associated, &c.

467§. We have hitherto considered sensibility in its quality of subject, or patient. We have described generally the mode of the formation of the mind; the process of which is continued, producing an infinity of results, or changes, through all the stages of life. During the state of infancy this sensibility is exposed to the influence of certain externals; their *common* effect is a knowledge, or consciousness, of these externals; the additional effect of some of them, to gratify, or displease: hence we have, with respect to these objects, *the ideas* they are calculated to produce; and also the passions of love, hatred, fear, &c. The same course of mental formation is pursued during the progress of education: new objects are brought into relation with a form of sensibility, and their results are knowledge, pleasure, or pain, according to the form of existence which is produced by the union of these elements. A history of the mind, the same in character, but diversified by additional objects, or new relations, is exemplified throughout the period of maturity.

468§. By this progressive instruction, the mind *acquires* its sensations. From the multitude of objects by which our sensibility is influenced, it would appear that there was no need of additional complication. But of this varied instruction, some sensations are lost, some retained, preserving an assimilating form, by which they are renewed, for longer, or shorter, duration. Those which are thus retained, are extensively connected with each other; so that, in addition to the sensations produced by the presence of their objects, an endless variety of them is afterwards revived by relations among

themselves; and by these relations the sensations of each class, furnished by objects from every department of experience, perhaps separately acquired, without limitation of time, associate or combine with each other.

469§. The state, then, of the mind, at any period of its formation, is this:—A multitude of sensations have been produced by the relation subsisting between an inherent sensibility, and a corresponding number of external objects. The difference between the mind in this educated state, and in its primordial one, is that it has got an accession of properties, which are related with each other; so that whereas the original disposition, our mere sensibility, would, in the absence of related influences, remain for ever the same, the sensations acquired by the educated mind are producing perpetual changes in it, according to relations subsisting among themselves. And the difference between our primordial sensibility, and the educated mind, *with respect to externals*, is this: that the relation between an external object, and this sensibility, was simple; that is, it produced a consciousness, dependent only upon its own nature, and the form of sensibility; but with the educated mind, the relations of an external object are more complex: not only is it related with a principle of sensibility, but likewise with sensations, or adventitious properties, ingrafted on this sensibility by a progressive experience.

470§. The phenomena of the mind, then, so far as it is necessary here to remark their origin, are such as are produced by relations of its acquired properties or sensations with each other, and by external influences, in relation with them. Hence, those spontaneous phenomena which appear to ensue from what are called mental powers, from the exercise of faculties, &c. are merely

the successive results of sensations, which are related with each other in a natural order ; and according chiefly to the number, qualities, and relations of these sensations, will be *the disposition* of the mind to additional phenomena, from the influence of externals. This *disposition* of mind is in a state of *progressive change* through life ; as well from internal relations among its constituent properties, as because this disposition is dependent also upon its acquisitions from the external world, which are perpetually fluctuating, some being lost, and others added.

471 §. This disposition of mind, the *necessary origin* of which has been demonstrated, is otherwise called character, which is various, as its sources, or causes, are individually different ; though their modes of efficacy are the same, and equally simple. Two children of the same family, may be brought up amidst the same external circumstances ; they may go through the same course of education, by the same masters ; yet at the age of twenty, their characters may be in many respects strikingly contrasted. Our analysis readily explains this difference : the form of *sensibility*, relatively in great measure, or wholly, to the capacity for pain or pleasure, with which externals were related, if the externals were the same, was different ; hence, different sensations were produced, because the elements, or parts of the relation, were not the same. Those other properties of the mind, before adverted to, concerned in preserving sensations, may also have been different ; hence many perceptions in common are lost, or preserved, irregularly, in either example. Although externals may be the same, there is then *a different disposition*, dependent perhaps upon both the original sensibility, and upon the acquired properties or sensations, which remain to form this disposition, through all

the stages of experience, or education. Very naturally, in every stage, the same externals produce different effects, in relation with different dispositions. And, therefore, the difference of character in our two individuals, supposing the externals to be throughout the same (which, however, cannot be strictly the case), is precisely in ratio to the differences of disposition, dependent upon these sources, with which such externals have been related.

472§. The *common results* of this intellectual progress are ideas, or knowledge of external forms of existence; or pleasure, and pain, with their modifications or consequences, desire and aversion. These common results may be still more simplified: the diversities which ensue, whether from the influence of externals upon sensibility, whether from the associations and combinations of the acquired sensations with each other, or with new ones—are all, only so many modifications of consciousness, existing in successive times.

473§. The *particular results* of this intellectual formation, are according, 1st, to the particular form, or constitution of the primordial sensibility; 2nd, according to the particular external influences which affect it; 3rd, according to relations of the sensations which are preserved in the mind informally with each other, by which relations these sensations are associated, and combined, producing their particular phenomena; and, 4th, according to the relations subsisting between these acquired sensations, and new ones, from additional experience.

474§. Amidst the various sensations which are thus produced, and accumulated, during the formation of the mind, man seems to be disposed as a re-agent on the external world chiefly by those which exemplify some

degree, or modification, of pleasure and pain. From these sensations, originate desire, and aversion.

475§. The sensations of desire and aversion are, indeed, almost identified with those of pleasure and pain. Desire and aversion, respect ultimately the sensations of pleasure and pain; but they respect also mediately, not only the objects by which these sensations are produced, but also as many as are necessary, or conducive to them. Thus a person may desire the possession of wealth, without reference to any additional purpose, if *he is gratified* merely by the possession of it; and he will also desire those innumerable means which, in themselves, afford no pleasure, on the contrary, which are pursued with pain and difficulty, but which *are necessary to the acquisition* from which he proposes to *derive his enjoyment*. The objects of aversion are also direct, and mediate: the former respect pain; the latter, all those agents or means by which it may be inflicted.

476§. This desire of pleasure, or aversion to pain, which may be otherwise expressed as the desire of good, or the aversion to evil, is, when not counteracted, *a volition*, which proposes for its end the attainment, or evasion of any particular good, or evil.

477§. Although pleasure and pain are different, apparently contrasted, sensations, they are both capable of originating *desire*. The object of this desire, in one case, is to possess; in the other, to avoid. And the desire which entertains either one of these ends, frequently induces the desire which respects the objects of the other. Thus we propose to ourselves some *final good*, to be attained perhaps at a period, many years distant: the medium of the attainment of this good, may involve a series of evils; not only may the mind be

harassed by perpetual anxiety and labour, but bodily suffering may, also, in consequence, be superadded. Yet the desire of the final good induces a *keen pursuit of evils*, which, if not instrumental to a future possession, would be sedulously avoided.

478 §. Although then, the sensations of pleasure and pain are, in themselves, different, they are either productive of desire, as their common result, or else have this sensation in common. Desire is otherwise called volition, the objects of which, are the attainment of some degree, or modification of pleasure, or the avoidance of some evil; and in the pursuit of these objects, desire is interchanged with respect to them, or affects successively, or alternately, good, or evil. Every desire is not volition; but volition is always desire: and the reason why desire is not always volition is, that desire may be *modified* or *counteracted*, as by other opposing inclinations—the desire *which prevails*, or has the greater force, in these instances, is distinguished by the term volition, to which, or to the more powerful inclination, succeeds a corresponding action of the muscles.

479 §. We hear those who are advocates for disinterested conduct, sometimes maintain that persons incur *voluntarily* great evils, without proposing to themselves any ultimate good. That *evils* are every day *voluntarily* incurred by individuals, we have sufficient and a painful experience: but I can conceive no instance of this in which a preponderating good, or the avoidance of still greater evil, is not the object. To take an extreme case, in illustration of a disinterested action, or of an evil incurred without apparent benefit:—Say a person suffers the loss of a leg, or cuts it off himself, without any expectation of consequent advantage. *Why*, then, does he suffer so fruitless an injury? The reason, or an adequate one, does not appear very obvious; yet an

adequate one there must be; and that founded in desire, or in the preference of a good, even at the expense of so great an evil. Say the motive of the individual is merely to shew that he is capable of suffering, or of inflicting upon himself, so much pain—what is this, but a *preference* of the reputation for courage, or fortitude, which outweighs the evil through which it is acquired? But say that our individual was not stimulated by the love of reputation; say that the injury was so privately inflicted that the manner, or circumstances of it, were not even known to his friends—what *good* could he then intend? The answer is, the *voluntary* action was still founded in some object of preference, or was still with the view to *some* good—he wished *to convince himself* of the extent of his fortitude, or of the strength of his resolution—a motive, it must be confessed, which would so generally be esteemed inadequate, that the infrequency of the example is in this way explained. It is, however, only necessary that a good, whether common or uncommon, should be more highly appreciated by an individual than the evil, through the medium of which it is attained, in order that the volition, which impels to such evil, should be founded in some form of self-love, or some desire of gratification. The soldier who is trained to the love of glory, would think honour cheaply purchased by the loss of a limb, or even perhaps of life; though, with this last, *his consciousness would cease of the reputation he has gained!* We can generally understand or appreciate the good which is, in this case, sought at the expense of an evil; but if a different education, or other sentiments, were prevalent in the world, we should think this motive as idle, or insufficient, as that of one who should cut off his leg, to try his resolution or to gratify his curiosity. Nay, with other sentiments, *the former kind of self-gratification* might be an incentive as powerful as the desire of popular applause: thus, Cato's daughter

is said to have inflicted upon herself a deep wound, merely to be satisfied of her own resolution. Perhaps the self-imposed penalties of the Stoics were generally intended as public exhibitions; and sometimes, for the private gratification of their vanity. But whether the good proposed is the vulgar one of pecuniary acquisition, of reputation with the public, under whatever form it may be sought, or the object of a private motive, which has sprung from the sentiments, the refinement, or the sophistication of the mind, the law is the same, and universal—that no human being ever performs, or can perform, a voluntary action which is not founded in self-interest, or in the desire of the attainment of a good, or of the evasion of an evil, or these mixed; and for this reason, whatever a man does voluntarily, he does to please himself, or *from preference*, however embarrassing may be the dilemma under which he acts, or however unwise this preference may be proved by subsequent events.

480 §. The belief that mankind act generally upon interested motives, is a very prevalent one, more especially among those whose experience has inclined them to think unfavourably of human nature—it is the maxim of politicians; it is confessed in the treaties and alliances between states; and is often implied, or defined, in the connections subsisting between parties, and individuals. But those who are readiest to support this opinion, use the term most frequently in a confined sense, meaning, by self-interest, pecuniary aggrandizement, obvious services, or sensual gratification. They admit that there *may be* actions, contrasted in their nature to their conception, of those which are founded in self-interest; but are generally sceptical with regard to them, or are disposed to seek for some solution of *apparently* disinterested actions, in *their own scale of self-interest*. This, however, is an erroneous or partial

view of the subject: the person who ruins himself to serve a friend or a stranger, or who sacrifices his own life to preserve that of another, in effect acts as truly upon a principle of self-interest, as he who robs another to benefit himself. In the former case, from some sentiment or motive, which has sprung conjointly from his nature and education, he gratifies an inclination or a taste, or he desires a reward, or applause, which is to be obtained only at such an expense; in the latter, he seeks pecuniary possession, perhaps at the expense of reputation, or at the hazard of his life. Both act with the same view; that is, to please themselves: *and the quality or nature of their actions is different*, as the individuals themselves are differently disposed *in their estimate of good and evil*.

481 §. It appears then that our second and third classes of sensations, or those of pleasure and pain, of agreeable and disagreeable, produce, or comprise desire, or a volition which, with respect to the objects of the former, is to possess, and with respect to those of the latter, to avoid; and that the desire which affects either of these objects is liable to be mixed, or alternate, with that which affects those of the other class. So close is the connections between these sensations, that the pursuit suggested by one, not only involves the pursuit of the objects of the other, but the same object apparently sometimes produces both sensations. This, however, is a deception which originates in a defective analysis: if the same event produces both joy and sorrow, an *apparent* fact too common to require a particular illustration, it is that different elements concur to these sensations respectively, or the event itself is of a mixed character, or its consequences are mixed; for which reason, both sensations are produced, as results of their appropriate causes.

482§. But not only is there this intimate connection between the objects respectively of these sensations, but the sensations themselves are so related, that in their union they sometimes modify each other. Thus the regret for a loss, the evil of which is unmixed, would be more poignant than if the loss were in some measure compensated by present, or prospective benefits. It is true, on these latter occasions, the mind frequently yields *in succession* to the sense of good, or evil: but, in their prevalence respectively, it can scarcely be doubted but the quality or intensity of either feeling, is modified or diminished, by the influence of the other; and, according to the prevalence, the succession, or the reciprocal influence of these sensations on each other, are the desires or the volitions which ensue from the event by which they were produced.

483§. The sensations of pleasure and pain, are not only related with each other, but with those of the first class, or with ideas of mere existence. In this place, it may be sufficient to remark two sets of examples which display the chief efficacy of *ideas*, in this relation. The first are those in which *a sensation of pleasure or pain*, with perhaps the consequent desire or volition, is suggested by association with either a recollection, or perception, of a mere form of existence; the second are those in which the sensation of pleasure or of pain associates the ideas of mere existence, which perhaps subserve the desire to possess or to avoid, in the pursuit of their respective objects. Thus the sight of an individual who is indifferent to us, may bring to our recollection some former occasion of a pleasure enjoyed, or of a benefit received; and under certain circumstances, may originate a train of volitions for the renewal of pleasure, or by other ramifications of design, for the increase of benefits, in the pursuit of which, knowledge *suberves*,

or plays its part, by instructing us in the means by which our wishes may be accomplished.

484§. This condensed view exhibits an outline of the *moral constitution* of man; whose principal relations, whether in his quality of effect, or cause, may, for the purposes of connection with the ensuing topics, be thus separately stated :

1. The original state of the mind is a pre-disposition to future effects, and consists chiefly in a form of sensibility.

2. These effects comprise the phenomena of sensation.

3. The sensations of the mind are produced chiefly as the consequences of a relation subsisting between the mental predisposition, and external influences.

4. These sensations, are according to the nature of the sensibility, conjointly with that of the externals by which it is influenced.

5. The production of every individual sensation, is an inevitable result ; since the circumstances or causes subsist, by which its existence is made : if these circumstances or causes were otherwise, the sensation would of course not be ; except, perhaps, in its elementary sources.

6. The sensations thus produced, are chiefly of three kinds ; those of existence, of pleasure, and of pain.

7. Of these sensations, some are preserved informally in the mind, by laws of assimilation, or renovation, formerly declared ; and others are lost : the former are liable to be revived from their latent state, apparently by a spontaneous act of the mind, as when the succeeding idea is not obviously excited by its immediate precursor, or by relations subsisting among themselves ; the latter have the common fate, whatever it is, of the mind, which is perpetually dying.

8. The sensations of each class are related with those of their own, and of the other classes ; and all

are related with external influences, or with additional perceptions.

9. By these relations, the instructed mind is formed ; and is therefore to be regarded merely as an effect, produced like every other effect in nature, by the union of its causes, or elements.

10. This effect, like every other, is liable, in another relation, to become a cause, and in this quality, *it does that which it is constituted to do*, by the elements which compose it.

11. By this constitution, the mind acquires a disposition as fluctuating as the relations of causes in perpetual progress, whether from internal, or external sources, can make it.

12. This *disposition* of the mind, with an exception* which need not be enlarged upon, in its quality of agent, is otherwise expressed as desire, or aversion.

13. Desires and aversions are such as they are made, by a similar process of constitution : old ones are revived, or new ones produced ; and either are modified by existing relations, or according to the prevalence of different causes, at different times.

14. The inevitable disposition of the mind is to the renewal, or attainment, of sensations which are agreeable to it ; or, to the prevention, or evasion of those which are disagreeable : but owing to the common relations of things, the former can rarely be pursued without interruption ; they are, therefore, most commonly mixed.

15. The desire of every individual is for that which is agreeable ; and the dependence of that which is

* Perhaps that to trains of thinking which we desire to repress ; which seems characteristic of two dispositions of the mind, which may be distinguished as voluntary, and spontaneous : either might prevail, in succession.

agreeable, is upon a relation subsisting between objects, and the mental constitution.

16. Consistently with this disposition, we abstain from the lesser good, in order to avoid the greater evil; or we incur the lesser evil, in order to obtain the greater good.

17. The disposition of the mind is such as it is made by an universal mode of constitution; and according to its disposition, are the voluntary actions which subserve its desires.

18. As every individual necessarily desires, and pursues his own good, although he is sometimes severely punished for his mistakes, *it is the object of morals, and of legislation, so to form, to regulate, or counteract this disposition*, that public welfare may be protected against it; *or rather, that private interest may be made subservient to the public good.* This latter is the chief aim of Ethics; how far the systems which have been inculcated with this end, are calculated to ensure it, it is proposed briefly to examine.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF MORAL BEAUTY.

485§. It has been attempted to found a system of Ethics, not indeed without aid from more familiar motives, upon the perception of *a moral beauty*. Before discussing the probable efficacy of this peculiar *form* of beauty, so elegantly described and recommended by Shaftesbury, it may not be amiss to bestow a few words upon beauty in general.

486§. It appears that the nature of beauty is not to be defined by any one criterion. In the several specimens, if the question were asked of each, *why* is it beautiful? a different reason would frequently be assigned. In painting, setting aside propriety in the selection of the subject, beauty seems to consist in *the truth of the imitation*. This character of beauty is not absolutely confined to painting, sculpture, &c., but is extensively the ground of admiration in many of the productions of the coarser arts, in which the appearances of the rarer, or more costly, materials, are successfully *imitated* by those which are more common. In representations on the stage, also, the measure of beauty seems to be the truth of *an imitation*. Yet this is so little an essential requisite *to the quality*, that, on other occasions, in the common intercourse of the world, *imitations* of every description, whether of sentiments, manners, passions, or habits, are generally felt to be disgusting.

487§. In some of the mechanical arts, the beauty seems to consist in combination or adaptation, or these together. In the former, we admire the concurrence of powers, the complexity of principal and subordinate agents, composing a piece of mechanism, and subservient to one, or several purposes—this kind of beauty is chiefly striking in the contrivances productive of great powers, and executed on a large, or coarse scale. The more delicate constructions exhibit the beauty both of an ingenious combination of means, and of an exquisite nicety in their adaptation. But here, again, if in some of these instances there is a beauty in the *complexity* of the agents, there is, in others, an equal beauty in the *simplicity* of the means by which a purpose is accomplished. Both these kinds of beauty may be respectively admired. I once heard a gentleman bestow some eloquence in praise of the structures of the human body; alleging chiefly as the theme of his admiration, the myriads of vessels, nerves, and fibres, which compose it! To which I answered, this same complexity which you admire, is the source of all the diseases with which our unlucky carcasses are liable to be visited: it would, I added, in my opinion, be a much more beautiful piece of mechanism, if all its functions were performed by a single screw.

488§. In music, the beauty is somewhat analogous to that of mechanical construction; that is, it seems to consist in combination and adaptation; of which, sounds are the materials.

489§. There is also a beauty of *proportion*, the rule or measure of which, is perhaps not to be defined. This kind of beauty is sometimes perceived, or avowed, *because* it is subservient to usefulness; and sometimes it is equally confessed where, if usefulness had been consulted, the proportion would have been different.

So remote are we from any positive criterion of this kind of beauty, that the decision concerning it is little better than capricious: hence we see a various, or contrasted estimate of the beauty of proportion, prevailing in different nations with respect to the same subjects; and the course of nature is, in consequence, diverted or restrained, and her accommodation forced to a fanciful standard.

490§. There is a beauty in *order*, and a beauty in *confusion*: neither of these, therefore, furnishes our single characteristic. There is a beauty in uniformity, and a beauty in repose—*contrasted* with these, if a grove of majestic trees of the same kind is beautiful in summer, from the deep, unmingled green of their foliage; the *diversity* of the tints of a mixed foliage in the autumn, is not less admired: and if the *stillness* of the ocean, in the tranquillity of nature, may suggest the consciousness of a beauty, one of a different origin, though perhaps much more impressive, is perceived in the raging of the storm—in the conflict of the elements, and in the foam and uproar of the waters.

491§. It not only appears, from this illustration, that the *nature* of beauty is not to be defined *by any single criterion*, but that the qualities in which it seems to consist are, in different instances, quite opposite. Yet the term “beauty,” which we apply alike to the several specimens, seems to imply that, amidst all this diversity, there is some *general analogy*.

492§. Thus of the modifications of pleasure and pain, we find the sources or causes of these sensations to be almost infinite, but there is, as in the different examples of beauty, a general analogy of result; this general analogy is, that they are all productive of pleasure, or of pain; but these sensations, similar only to this ex-

tent, are *modified* agreeably with their respective causes. So also of beauty ; the perceptions of which, confessing some general resemblance, are modified in the several examples agreeably with the differences belonging to the objects by which they are produced.

493. To connect this exposition with our present design, it is to be enquired concerning *any one* of those specimens which we have enumerated, *why* it is beautiful? I apprehend we can assign no better reason, than that this sensation, or perception of beauty, is produced as the effect of a relation subsisting between our sensibility and an external object. From whence it appears that the origin and laws of beauty, are much the same as those of all other *sensations* ; the general conditions of which we have seen to be, that causes are forms of existence, which, when united, produce other forms of existence, for the same reason as two are different from one. Agreeably with this universal order, in our present example, the result of the influence of certain externals upon a sentient principle, is the perception of a beauty : in what this quality of an external consists, we cannot define ; but, as many externals produce this sensation in common, we may conclude that they have also some quality in common, which is modified by other causes or associations, agreeably with the different perceptions of beauty which ensue from them. Hence, as the perception of beauty, of every description, is the result of a relation of this kind, it follows that the same external will produce the same sensation only in connection with a similar sensibility ; that the same external will produce a different perception, in relation with a different sensibility ;* that a different external will pro-

* The expression, "sentient principle," would *perhaps* be more appropriate ; since the dependence of the modifications of taste seems to be rather upon relations with former sensations *in the*

duce a different perception, in relation with the same sensibility.

494§. The *sensibility* which is related with the objects of *beauty* is usually called *taste*. If the specimens of beauty are so diversified that we have been able to deduce from them no uniform standard, the differences of taste, by which beauties of the several kinds are apprehended, are not less numerous. In proportion generally as a taste is refined, or as the sensibility is acute, its perceptions are lively, and a warm enthusiasm is kindled in favour of its objects; while, with a duller groundwork of this sort of apprehension, a beauty may be faintly perceived, confessed, and then give place to the superior interest excited by the meanest incident.

495§. If a miserably executed painting, full of glaring colours, without one real excellence of the art, were exhibited to a connoisseur, he would feel only contempt for the performance, and perhaps turn away from it with disgust. Would *such* a painting be beautiful? certainly not, to our connoisseur; who would be impressed only with a sense of its deformity. If the *same* painting were shown to a child, to a boor, or a savage, either of them would be greatly captivated by its gaudy colours; with them, it would have the force of a master-piece, and they would covet its possession: is this same picture, then, *not* beautiful? To those, it must be replied, to whom it imparts *the perception* of a beauty, it must be confessed to be beautiful. Here, then, is a predicament! This *same painting* both is, and is not, beautiful! To solve the paradox, we need

brain, than upon any difference of sensibility in the nerves. The term "sensibility," qualified by this doubt, may however be retained.

only inquire *why* it gives the perception of a beauty to the child, the rustic, or the savage? The answer is, that it is *so related* with *their* taste, *as to produce* the sense of beauty: and why *not* beautiful; rather, why a deformity, to our connoisseur? Because it is *related* with a *different taste*. Hence, then, it appears, as all other examples agree in testimony with this, that all beauty is relative: that the same object is beautiful or not, nay, beautiful or repulsive, according to the taste with which it is brought into relation; and therefore, where there is no taste, there is no beauty.

496§. Having said thus much, we are prepared to consider the nature and obligation of that *moral beauty*, which has been thought a basis sufficiently solid to sustain the weight of an ethical system.

497§. The notion of this moral beauty, seems to have been suggested by the contemplation of a general harmony, or fitness, which prevails in the natural world. It is remarked that the world is *a whole*, containing many systems; that these systems mutually subserve each other. Not only is there an agreement in those grander divisions which are regarded as separate systems, but a similar harmony is discovered among the particular parts, down to the minutest subdivisions of which they are respectively composed. This natural harmony or adaptation, is thought to be one *specimen of beauty*; and it is argued, *a similar concurrence* in the moral department—in that theatre where man presides, would illustrate *a beauty* of the same kind.

498§. It is, in the first place, to be inquired whether this same beauty may be recognized by any *certain* character; or, in our analytic way, *why* is this harmony (to reduce our scale) of the parts of any one system, *beautiful*? Because, it will be answered, they mutually

subserve each other. Is this *the whole* of our experience? For what object, or to what extent, is there this mutual subserviency? Shall we state the *preservation* of respective forms, as its final purpose? There would, doubtless, be an extensive harmony in the concurrence of so vast a number of agents, for this general end—but preservation is not the only end which we remark in the order of Nature, neither is it the only illustration of the harmony she exhibits. There is the same subserviency of parts to an end in *the production*, as in the preservation, of forms; and this obliges us to take also *destruction* into our reckoning of the harmonies; for it is by the destruction of existing forms, that new ones *are produced*.

499 §. It appears, then, that, in this scheme of Nature, there are three results of that co-operation, or subserviency of parts to an end, in which her eulogised harmony is said to consist. New forms are *produced* by the concurrence or subserviency of their parts respectively, to this end; existing forms are *preserved*, for the same reason; and existing forms are *destroyed* by the co-operation of causes which, through the medium of this catastrophe, *become subservient* to new productions, and of course to their preservation.

500 §. Now as these different or contrasted results alike illustrate the harmony of Nature, should we not be *equally imitators* of the *natural beauty*, whether we selected *one*, or the *other end*? There is subserviency, agreement, or adaptation in the production of forms, in the preservation, and in the destruction, of forms. Whether then we emulated one, or other, of these ends, we should *still exemplify* that *harmony*, in which this sort of beauty is said to consist.

501 §. By carrying our analysis a very little farther,

we shall perceive that actions of every character must *necessarily* exhibit that *harmony*, which is proposed as a model for moral beauty. Concurrence, or subserviency of parts to an end, is the reason, or ground, of this beauty : and what can possibly take place, *productive of consequences*, in which the causes *are not* subservient *to the end* ? Assuredly, there is the very same *co-operation* of causes for effects of every description, however contrasted, however admired, or however to be deprecated—a common relation between causes and effects, which will permit any sort of licence in conduct, still under the assurance, that we concur in the harmony exhibited by Nature, or that we are *imitators of a natural beauty*.

502 §. This being the dilemma, it is necessary to desert the liberal example which Nature sets us, and decide *arbitrarily* upon a *particular end*, the subserviency to which will constitute *moral beauty*.

503 §. Let the feelings of mankind decide in favour of this arbitrary end. *Happiness* is agreeable to them, let it be said, and *misery* repugnant ; further, let it be said, there is harmony or agreement *in the one*, and discord, because aversion, with respect to it, *in the other*—not indeed a positive harmony, or discord ; if harmony is defined to be concurrence, or adaptation, to an end ; but a comparative harmony or discord ; that is, agreement or disagreement, *with a given end*. Say then that the moral beauty consists in general happiness, or in the public welfare ; and that the measure of the beauty of a sentiment, or of an action, is its coincidence with this settled purpose, or its subserviency to public happiness.

504 §. The *recommendation* then to the sentiments and practice by which general happiness is promoted

is, that there is a beauty in whatever contributes to this end. Thus *the incentive* to virtue, by which is meant that regulation of character and conduct which is most consistent with, or best promotes public good, *is the gratification of a taste.*

505 §. It is in the first place to be remarked of this, as of all the other instances of beauty, that it is not in itself beautiful, but relatively so; and the other part of the relation being a particular taste, where there is not this taste there is no beauty. In the second place, it is obvious that this recommendation is not to one exclusive practice, but to many, which may be more or less inconsistent with each other. Nothing can be more capricious than the perception of beauty: one may have a taste for virtue, from a sense of the *moral beauty*; another for order, in the less ethereal specimens; and another for disorder of every description. In the practice of virtue upon the moral taste, there may be a quiet, perhaps a weak gratification; but in the work of destruction, which seems to be more congenial with our original nature, the impulse of all ordinary degrees of beauty may be exceeded, and the contemplation of havoc and desolation may, without any very laborious cultivation, be ecstatic, thrilling, or sublime. To say nothing of other tastes for coats, caps, ribands, &c. which, if *taste* is to be indulged, may sometimes be too powerful for the love of the moral beauty—if the *ground of practice* is the gratification of a taste, why then whatever that taste might happen to be, whether to the harmony or discord of mankind, the practice suggested by it would have precisely the *same recommendation*. And in favour of either course may still be pleaded the *common* ground of beauty; that, whether the course is good, or bad, productive of happiness, or of misery, our harmony, or subserviency of means to an end, is still preserved. Nay, so great a

licence would be permitted by this kind of precept, that thieves, pick-pockets, and assassins, may plead the excuse that *they* are *amateurs* in these occupations respectively ; that *they* can perceive a *beauty* in a dexterous accomplishment, which would furnish the same recommendation, and place *their practice* upon a *moral equality*, with that of virtue.

506 §. In addition, suppose the improbability that mankind should be brought to be almost unanimous in their predilection for moral beauty, or that this taste, which affects the good of a community, should become general ; still *the practice*, upon this *same* impulse or design, might be varied or contrasted, according to the diversity or opposition of the views entertained by individuals of *the best mode* of ensuring the welfare of mankind. Nay, the views of the same persons may fluctuate with their experience of their effects : those who began by thinking that the best way to promote human happiness was for each to supply the wants of another, may find that the balance was not even ; that many, by being served, were disqualified for serving others, or even themselves ; and that the consequences of so fruitless an attempt, which could at best succeed but partially, were the oppression of some, the encouragement of idleness and vice in others, or a listlessness and satiety which would be even worse than the fermentation of conflicting passions. Hence, an experience in philanthropy, or virtue itself, in its ordinary forms, may lead to an agreement with those of contrasted views ; who think human nature altogether made of such incorrigible stuff, that the most effectual way of serving mankind would be to exterminate the whole race. This conclusion seems a little at variance with virtue, or with the moral beauty ; yet, in fact, it is only *the same principle*, the *same design* of benefiting

mankind, pursuing one, among an infinite variety of courses.

507 §. To continue our argument after a less desultory fashion, we will suppose it demonstrated that there is a moral beauty, which agrees with our notions of virtue; that a practice in conformity with it, would have for its object the *gratification of a taste*—it is to be inquired what is the probable efficacy of a precept founded in taste?

508 §. This discussion should be preceded by a settlement, if we can obtain it, of what is meant by *taste*; which perhaps does not admit a very clear, or exclusive definition. It may be said, taste is the capacity for *one kind* of gratification, from objects of a *certain class*. It remains, to complete our definition, and is perhaps the only difficult part of it, to say *what* is the kind of gratification, and *what* this particular class of objects.

509 §. The capacity in question may be translated in terms, but, I apprehend, not described. It may be said that taste is allied to, or is a capacity for admiration—and what is admiration? The feeling, it must be replied, produced by the gratification of a taste. To seek then among *the objects* of taste for a criterion by which it may be distinguished.

510 §. These are generally thought to exemplify some form of beauty—and *is this beauty better defined than taste itself?* We have been able to discover no single characteristic of it. One may say, it consists in order; another, in disorder; another, in sounds; another, in colours; or in all these, in many more, or in none of them. What then is meant by beauty? That which

gratifies a taste. And what is the gratification of a taste? a particular form, or mode of agreeable sensation, not to be described. Thus, then, taste is a capacity for a gratification, not to be described; and beauty is that which gratifies this taste! which seems a remarkably happy definition.

511 §. On this, as on other occasions, we must cut the knot which we cannot untie. We will not engage in this impracticable work of distinguishing perceptions by definition (as who can *define* the difference of sensation in the smell of camphor, and of musk?); and in the absence of definition, we will trust the apprehension of our terms to usage, and common sense.

512 §. Conceding all that can be required, we will suppose that there is a beauty in virtue, no matter of what sort, and even that the taste is a prevalent one, which is susceptible of this beauty—what kind, or *degree of obligation*, is imposed by the suggestions of a taste? To take an example or two—a person may have a taste for painting, for poetry, or music; by which is meant that he is gratified by what are called specimens of excellence, in either of these arts. What then? A picture, a poem, a piece of music, may be agreeable to a taste—but even where this susceptibility is most vehemently professed, it neither makes painters, poets, nor musicians; at least, the taste may, and frequently does exist with only this degree of influence, that people are content to admire the productions of others, but do not therefore become artists themselves, or *contribute* to the multiplication, or variety of objects from which, confessedly, they derive pleasure.

513 §. Why then is it that taste, for the productions of these arts, does not induce those who possess it, to become artists? Perhaps they have no farther wish

than *to admire* the productions of others : this seems to be the most simple end of taste—if they become artists themselves, there is generally some motive superadded to the taste, which the taste, or capacity for this kind of gratification, does not necessarily imply. The mere taste may rest satisfied with contemplation : if those who have it become practitioners in the art, it is because they are ambitious in some or other sense, or they resort to it as the means of subsistence ; or they please themselves with thinking it would be a pretty accomplishment, or that it may serve to kill time, &c. Say, however, that they have the taste, and are not without an inclination to become artists themselves. Notwithstanding this favourable disposition, they might never make the attempt, *because* they are deterred by the anticipation of much labour ; or, in spite of their taste for the specimens of the art, they had *rather* be employed about many other things, than in the acquisition of a practical skill.

514§. Not only does the existence of a taste fail to ensure this sort of contribution to its objects, but the indulgence of it, which imposes no laborious pursuit, may, on innumerable occasions, be most easily restrained. A person may have a taste for the drama, and yet never visit the theatre ; perhaps *because* he is afraid of taking cold, or his wife had rather that he would stay at home : or he may have a taste for painting, yet not possess a single picture ; *because* he has got but five hundred a year, and cannot afford to spend *any of it in this way*. In these cases, the *taste*, though professed, and we have no reason to doubt its existence, is no such powerful *incentive to action*, but that it may be put aside by a hundred more imperative claims, or by as many frivolous excuses.

515§. Then, too, it is the nature of *taste* to be pro-

gressive: it seldom stops with admiration of any one sort, or degree of beauty: it begins with relishing common performances; it next requires to be fed by those of greater excellence; at length it becomes fastidious, yawns in the midst of the most exquisite performances, or perhaps falls in love with deformity—as the gourmand proceeds from plain fare to culinary delicacies, and tiring of these, ends perhaps by a predilection for putrid venison, and assafoetida.

516§. Thus also, with respect to the taste for moral beauty—it may, with numerous individuals, be a very pretty, enthusiastic sort of a taste, and yet leave others to furnish the objects of it; or, if the taste is subservient to ambition, or interest of any kind, with this additional impulse, it may occasionally shew itself in a more practical manner; or, with taste for the beauty, and inclination for the practice, the disposition may nevertheless be checked by some anticipated inconvenience, or by the necessity of doing something still more agreeable.

517§. If we find that such is the uncertain influence of *taste* in the specimens of art, in favour of which there is a sensible beauty, and a confessed admiration; if even a practice here, in virtue of this taste, requires additional motive, or is effectually restrained by idleness, or slight inconvenience, or thwarted by a stronger disposition to numerous other pursuits: what can we expect of the efficacy of taste for a metaphysical beauty—for one, the nature of which is not defined, which may be thought to consist in opposite qualities; of which very few have any sort of apprehension; and still fewer, a clear, and vivid perception?

518§. But we will suppose that the degree of affec-

tion for the moral beauty may even exceed the limits of taste—we will suppose that it amounts to a *love* for this sort of beauty—we will go farther, and admit a contribution from sources, to which mere taste is not necessarily indebted, in order to constitute a *love of virtue*. There may enter into the formation of this love, not merely the perception of an agreeable harmony in the practice it suggests, but also a favourable temper, which is perhaps more essential, towards mankind; whose happiness it is the object of this affection to promote. We will admit the existence of this effectual love, or of an inclination so prevailing, that those who possess it find a pleasure in virtue from which they cannot refrain, and to obtain which they are perpetually seeking opportunities.

519§. *What part* then of mankind will be incited to virtue, by this powerful inclination towards it? In reply, it may be said, all those who possess it. But if those who possess this affection should form only a very small portion of mankind, (a truth I will not stop to demonstrate,) what, upon this ground, is the recommendation to virtue with that larger portion, who have no such violent inclination for it? It must be answered, the inducement to virtue, *on the ground* that an affection is gratified by the practice, can *relate only* to those by whom this affection is entertained; to those who have it not, of course its gratification cannot be proposed.

520§. This then is the dilemma—a practice of virtue *is founded* on the inclination for it; this inclination is rare, and therefore the practice, on this recommendation, must be proportionally limited. The doctrine must go one step farther, of which, indeed, it makes some faint profession, if it is to be productive of general benefit—it must teach us how this love may be

created ; the objects of it will then be sought for without admonition. And *can this love be produced*, in those whose affections are otherwise engrossed ?

521 §. This question leads up to a difficult, an important, but perhaps an unsatisfactory discussion, which will respect the laws of the dependence, government, and change of the affections—of the subjection of such as were formerly entertained ; and of the production of new ones ; the facility of which has been occasionally *assumed* from time immemorial ; has been inculcated without the requisite analysis ; and therefore, by rather a fruitless expenditure of wisdom and precepts. The inquiry, however discouraging the prospect, must nevertheless be attempted. For this purpose, as is our occasional practice, we will take the benefit of a supposititious example.

522 §. We will say that a person has no perception of a moral beauty, and that ill treatment from the world, or an original nature, has made him misanthropical ; that he is pained, rather than gratified by a contemplation of the happiness or prosperity of others ; and so far from deriving pleasure from an *active contribution* to the welfare of mankind, his chief delight is in rendering their misfortunes more poignant, or in the success of his own schemes for the infliction of injuries. Such characters there are ; and the instances are perhaps the most numerous in those classes of society who pretend to the greatest refinement. All classes, however, have their share of them.

523 §. Now we will suppose it is proposed to our individual of this unlucky species, *to cease to feel pleasure* in the misfortunes of mankind, and *to derive gratification* from their welfare—to subdue a former disposition, and to acquire a new one. The imperfect control

of the will over our inclinations is tritely remarked. Thus, to quote a familiar experience, suppose an individual to be the subject of any propensity, the indulgence of which is constantly followed by severe moral or physical suffering: suppose the individual to be himself conscious of his infirmity, and *desirous* to be released from it (and in the moments of repentance at least, neither the sincerity, nor the ardour of this desire will be doubted): what is the efficacy of this strenuous volition to escape from the thralldom of so pernicious an inclination? Simply, that when the sense of punishment has abated, the inclination most commonly returns in its former force; indulgence and repentance again succeed each other, confirming, by reiterated experience, the inefficacy of the will* to extinguish an inclination.

524§. And with respect to *acquiring* an inclination; suppose there to be any one affection, the indulgence of which is followed by *no punishment*; which is a source of great enjoyment; and the opportunities of which are so frequent, as to admit of its being almost uninterrupted;—if the existence of this affection, and these effects of it, were demonstrated to an individual suffering, by turns, the prevalence of all the perturbing interests and passions of human nature, it can scarcely be imagined that he would not gladly renounce them, in favour of an inclination productive only of *unmixed happiness*. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, this affection to consist in philanthropy (a feeling, perhaps,

* The terms “will, and volition,” are familiar in this application. Whenever a *desire prevails*, in spite of an *opposing one*, the former, on all such occasions, illustrates volition; which has been said to be either unmixed desire, or the *predominant one*, ending in voluntary actions, when desires are opposed. It is necessary, in this discussion, that the volition relatively to an *affection*, should not be confounded with that relatively to the *objects* of a taste or passion.

in reality, deserving only a more qualified praise); *it is clearly for the interest* of him who is perpetually exposed to toils, anxieties, and shipwreck, amidst the gales and hurricanes of human passions, to renounce his subjection *to them*, in favour of a *single affection*, which ministers constantly to his tranquillity and enjoyment. Who, with an apprehension of this difference, would not desire a release from the dominion of his former unhappy nature, and the substitution of a ruling inclination so powerfully recommended? Say, then, in virtue of this conviction, our individual *desires* an affection or a passion, the gratification of which will consist in a contribution to the welfare of others. This new affection he desires to take up, in exchange for some contrasted one—*will the desire* of this inclination *produce* it? No: there is a relation between his existing nature and externals; or there is a relation between the component parts of his character, by which *other* feelings are produced, and therefore cannot choose but be; *while the relation of causes by which alone* our philanthropic feeling *can be produced* does not obtain. Yet it is customary with the vulgar, as well as with the educated, to suppose *some sort of voluntary power* by which our affections may be ruled: they allege excellent reasons in favour of this, that, or the other taste, or inclination; and are occasionally surprised at the ill success of their precepts.

525 §. It appears then, refining a little upon the vulgar remark, that the will, *however powerfully incited* by a prospect of advantage, or by a motive of any kind, has no *direct* power of subverting a *former inclination*, or of producing a *new one*. It is to be inquired whether, *by any indirect mode*, the desire of these objects may ensure their attainment?

526 §. This question can scarcely be answered, without

a knowledge of the dependence of affections of every sort: the laws of this dependence being first defined, we may, agreeably with them, prescribe the terms upon which our inclination may be controled, in particular instances. The general nature of this dependence has been sketched in our introductory chapter: the subject here requires a more minute analysis.

527§. It has already been shown that desire and aversion are feelings produced by a relation of certain objects with the sentient principle, or with that which has been called a mental predisposition—it has been shown that this principle is perpetually changing, in our course through life, owing to the additional ideas, or sensations, which the mind is constantly acquiring, and the complex relations of which have been adverted to; so that the objects which are most agreeable to us at one period of life, are indifferent, or repulsive, at another, &c. But amidst all the fluctuations of our disposition, with respect to particular objects, one law is still remarked, namely, that we desire, or not, according to the nature of the mental constitution, and its relation with a given object—if this constitution so disposes us, we desire a particular object; under a different mental constitution, the desire of the same object is modified, or does not exist, or other desires are produced, for objects perhaps of a contrasted kind.

528§. Now say that the mind is instructed, by observation, that one source of gratification is productive of more happiness than another; either because the enjoyment from this source is one of a higher degree, or because it involves no evil consequences. But in order to be capable of this enjoyment ourselves, which we contemplate in others, it is necessary that we should have *the same disposition*; by which the relation

between our minds and certain objects would be such, that we, should be as capable as others, of the same gratification, from the same sources. Say then we have not this disposition, affection, or taste, however named; but are induced, by the observation of its effects on the happiness of others, *to desire it*. It is necessary that the desire which respects the acquisition *of the affection*, should not be confounded with that for its objects. We may desire the taste, or inclination for objects, but not the objects themselves; *for the reason*, that we *have not* the taste, or inclination, for them. This difference leads to a corresponding one of results —if our desire respects certain objects, because *we have* the inclination by which we derive gratification from them, if this desire is not counteracted, we seek these objects *by a volition*; but if our desire respects only the acquisition of the taste, we do not seek the objects of this inclination, or perhaps even the inclination itself, if either we are uninstructed of the mode in which the latter may be obtained, or else are averse to the conditions. Thus it appears that the desire of *an affection*, may have the same recommendation, at least, as the desire of *the objects* of this affection, supposing it to exist: that is, in the one case, an inclination would be gratified by possessing an affection; and in the other, an inclination would be gratified by the possession of its objects.

529 §. It seems requisite, then, in order to a change of affection, or we will say, to avoid confusion, in order to the acquirement of an affection, 1st, that we should have the desire for it; 2nd, that we should have a knowledge of the means, or mode, by which it may be attained; and, 3rd, that we should have an inclination to employ these means; or that the desire for the taste, or affection, should not be counteracted by our repugnance to the means.

530§ 1. We will suppose a person with a certain taste, to derive a given sum of pleasure or happiness from a certain source ; we will suppose there to be a different source of enjoyment, from which, with a different taste, or affection, a greater sum of happiness may be derived. Now if the individual were asked which of these tastes or inclinations he preferred, or which he would have, if he were free to choose either, he would naturally desire the one productive of the greater, rather than of the lesser, sum of enjoyment. Thus then we admit that the desire for a change of affection, may be produced by a demonstration, or rather by a conviction of the superiority of one source of enjoyment, to another. Thus much for the first part of this dependence.

531§. This general concession, that the desire to exchange an affection may be in this way produced, cannot, however, be suffered to pass without a remark on the general inefficacy of a rational demonstration to produce *the conviction of the superiority* of one inclination to another. A philanthropist may recommend his taste and practice to a sensualist, alleging, that his enjoyment is the more exquisite, and less alloyed ; but even if this were the fact, the absence of the philanthropic affection in our sensualist, would be an impediment *to the conviction*. On making the comparison of his actual inclination with the one recommended to him, he would say, I have no experience of the pleasures of philanthropy, and can credit their reality only on the evidence of observation, or authority : but of the pleasures of sense, I have an ample experience : and therefore it can scarcely be expected that I should desire to yield up a taste productive of enjoyments with which I am familiar, in favour of one, the pleasures of which I have never felt, and can therefore but faintly apprehend.

532 §. Nevertheless, we will suppose it to be proved, in spite of this deficiency of experience, that a greater sum of enjoyment may be derived from one set of affections than from the other. The *signs* of superior enjoyment in our philanthropist, in addition to his assurances, may be so unequivocal, that the conviction of this superiority may not be resisted : the experience, also, of the sensualist, may suggest to him that his own enjoyments are rather occasional, than constant ; that he must wait the returns of appetite ; and then, that his mortification, or his sufferings at other times, amount to a price almost equivalent to his pleasures. In some such collateral way, by dint of observation and comparison, he is forced to admit the conviction that the taste or inclination in which he is deficient, may, although the quality or nature of the enjoyment is not known to him by experience, be productive of a greater sum of happiness than that which he possesses. Hence *he may be desirous* to exchange it.

533 § 2. The question is, *how* this may be accomplished ? or upon what does the possibility of his taking up a new affection, agreeably with a desire of this sort, *depend* ?

It has been shown that the desire alone of a proposed inclination, is not sufficient to ensure the possession of it. It may also be added, though it is perhaps superfluous, that the attainment does not necessarily follow from the clearest demonstration of self-interest. If our inclinations were at once obedient to our desires, or may be taken up from motives of *interest*, we have only to consider *what practice* is most within our power, which may therefore be the most *constantly enjoyed*, and which involves the *fewest evils* in its consequences, *in order* at once to assume the inclination which is gratified by this practice, and enter upon a course of uninterrupted happiness. Now it may be

demonstrated by an advocate of this simple philosophy, that no source of enjoyment is more completely in our power, may be pursued with less interruption, or is productive of less evil, than that of sucking our thumbs, or reflecting constantly on the fact, that our shoulders are above our elbows—if it were in our power to *assume any inclination we pleased*, the inclination which is gratified by this amusement, or by this reflection, may *be assumed as well as another*; and it would have the advantages over most others, that the gratification afforded by it may be as frequent as we please, would be free from consequent pain, and may be reckoned upon, as an amusement for life. Yet, I apprehend, notwithstanding the clear demonstration of these advantages, of this agreeableness with our best interests, a person would find it very difficult, *from these inducements*, to create an inclination which would render sucking his thumbs, or thinking of his shoulders, a source of perpetual delight.

534 §. As then no obvious recipe has suggested itself by which we may *assume any inclination*, from the mere demonstration that it is desirable, we must take a lesson from Nature in her spontaneous course; and consult our experience of the methods she employs in the origin, and growth of taste, or affection.

535 §. It seems that we have some inclinations, which are thought to be prior to experience, and are therefore called instinctive. Our present business is with the *acquired* tastes or inclinations, which result from experience; and which are connected with our original nature so far only, as consequences are dependent upon a remote predisposition. We have supposed sensations in general to be according to the nature of the sensibility, and of the externals with which it is brought into relation. This sensibility, when subjected to the influ-

ences of experience and education, has been called the "mental disposition," the origin or constitution of which has been formerly exhibited.

536 §. We will take a given *disposition*, at any period of life—it may be in childhood. This disposition is brought into relation with an external; the result, dependent upon these elements, is pleasure or pain, in some form or grade: *if we are pleased* with this external, *an inclination* for it is created; if we are neither pleased nor pained by it, the external is an object of indifference to us; if we are pained by such external, our feeling towards it is that of aversion. Hence, *the dependence* of an inclination for any given object or pursuit, is according to the relation subsisting between it and our disposition, or sentient principle: the inclination is produced, or exists, if we are gratified by this object; and is not produced, or does not exist, if we are not gratified by this object or pursuit. Gratification, then, either experienced, or perhaps anticipated by analogy, setting aside the instinctive desires, is the ground or dependence of inclination.*

537 §. Now we will say it is proposed that we should derive enjoyment from a certain class of objects, or from a given pursuit: in order to do this, it is necessary that we should possess the disposition which is gratified by these objects, or this pursuit. We will suppose it unknown whether we have this disposition, or not; but, from example or precept, we are induced to ascertain this, by an appropriate experiment upon our sensi-

* Both here and elsewhere, the word "inclination" is used in the vulgar sense, meaning a disposition to that which is pleasant, or agreeable. Volition is also a form of inclination; but so little synonymous with the common acceptation of the word, that it is frequent, in speaking of *voluntary actions*, to say, "I did so and so, *against* my inclination."

bility. Upon such recommendation we may be persuaded to make trial of these alleged sources of pleasure: if their effect should be the reverse of agreeable, it is ascertained that we have no inclination for them. Our present question is, whether the inclination may be produced, or by what mode?

538§. Say it is proposed to an individual who, though poor, is extremely indolent, to walk ten miles a day for a twelvemonth: he is persuaded once to perform this feat, finds the exertion very irksome and fatiguing, and has no inclination whatever to repeat it. But let this individual be assured, that if, for one twelvemonth, he walks ten miles a day, he shall have afterwards, for his life, a thousand a year, which he will forfeit, if he omits to perform this task only one day—what *then is his inclination* towards that to which he was previously so averse? In reply: he has an inclination for the thousand a year, for the reason which we have assigned, namely, that this sum will afford him experienced gratification, or else gratification apprehended by analogy—his disposition, so far as the daily exertion is concerned, is perhaps the same; that is, he has no inclination for *this fatigue*; but he has an inclination for the reward, and *therefore* incurs the fatigue. Hence we see that evil may be incurred for the sake of future advantage, for which latter we have the inclination, because from it, whether by experience or analogy, we have assurance of *gratification*—this illustrates a mere government or direction of the will, which is determined by the sense of the greater good, though at the expense of voluntary suffering. But although the will may determine, upon such inducement, to this course of action, the mere force of the will cannot *render it agreeable*, if to our disposition, or sensibility, it is irksome.

539 §. We may justly presume one of three results of this practice with respect *to our inclination*; all of which are in analogy with our experience—1st, the certainty or hope of the reward, of which this daily exertion is the medium, makes us set about it with alacrity, subdues the propensity to indolence, and renders that which was before tiresome, *agreeable*: an inclination is thus produced, in exchange for aversion: 2nd, after walking ten miles a day, to which, in the commencement, we felt so reluctant that nothing but a great reward would induce us to undertake it, for three months, we take a pleasure in the exercise, independently of the reward, which so increases with practice, that at the end of the year we may continue the exercise from choice, though no longer stimulated to it by the promise of reward: or, 3rd, the longer we continue our pedestrianism, the more tiresome it becomes; so that, instead of being *more favourably* disposed towards it, we are sometimes upon the point of indulging our favourite indolence, renouncing the fatigue, and the reward together, thinking the latter an insufficient compensation for the former.

540 §. Without confining ourselves entirely to this example, it may be observed, that the instances are numerous in which an object, or a pursuit, to which we were originally averse, becomes agreeable by familiarity. Thus a person who begins and prosecutes an anxious, or fatiguing business, from the desire of gain, may gradually become attached to the occupation—thus an object, perhaps an individual, whom at first we dislike, may, in the progress of acquaintance, become agreeable to us; and inclination for the society of such individual may take the place of aversion. Our explanation should comprise all these instances.

541 §. If that to which we are at one time averse, is

at another time agreeable to us, it follows from the laws of causation, that one part or other of the relation has suffered some change—that either our own disposition is altered, or else that the object itself is modified, relatively to our disposition.

542 §. Say then, recurring to our examples, that a practice is disagreeable without an incentive, and is rendered agreeable when productive of reward: in this case, the practice, and the reward, form perhaps an united influence; or the practice is modified, by being associated with the reward, relatively to our disposition; the result of which modification is pleasure instead of pain, inclination instead of aversion. Say that a practice, at first irksome, becomes agreeable, independently of the reward; what makes it so? Either our disposition is modified by other sentiments, or combinations of feelings, or else influences, *connected* with this practice, are brought into relation with our disposition; and the practice and these influences *being united*, a disagreeable pursuit is converted into an agreeable one. But say that neither the expectation of reward, nor additional influences in connection with our practice, will render a pursuit agreeable to which we were originally averse; why then, our disposition remains the same with respect to it, and the quality or nature of the pursuit is also not changed: hence, its first effect is continued in spite of familiarity; or aversion might be increased by an unfavourable change in our own disposition, or by additional influences to this end, occurring in the course of the pursuit. The same is to be remarked, and indeed the observation is sufficiently common, of the changes of affection in regard to individuals. The society of a person, say one of the other sex, may be at first disagreeable to us, and if we were not in some measure compelled to endure this society, we should perhaps take pains, on all occasions, to avoid it. In the

progress of acquaintance, the society of this individual may become agreeable to us in an uncommon degree. One of two things, therefore, must have happened; either our own disposition has undergone a change, or else additional qualities, belonging to this person, are brought into relation with it. With respect to the first mode, the individual may be very superior, or very inferior, to ourselves; and this disparity may be a source of repugnance: if our own sentiments undergo a change, whether they rise or fall, to the same level, or are by any mode assimilated, the society of this individual may be as diligently sought, as it would before have been avoided, notwithstanding the character of the individual remains the same. Or, with respect to the second mode of this change of affection; our own disposition may remain the same, but traits, sentiments, or beauties, are developed in our individual, with which we were not originally acquainted; and the result may be regard, in place of aversion. Or, to reconcile this example, with which all others should conform, to our last alternative, the first impression of dislike *may be increased* by acquaintance, if our own disposition undergoes a change which renders it still more unfavourable to the individual, or if traits or qualities are developed in the individual, which heighten aversion into disgust or hatred.

543§. By this illustration, *the general law of the dependence* of a change of affection, or of the production of inclination, in place of indifference, or aversion, appears to be confirmed. The law may be thus defined. We feel an inclination towards that which is agreeable, and an aversion to that which is disagreeable, as indeed is implied by the terms, which are nearly synonymous. If a thing which is *disagreeable* becomes *agreeable*, either our disposition with respect to it has

undergone a change, or the thing itself is modified in its nature, by addition or privation of qualities, relatively to our disposition. As long as the result of the relation between an object and our disposition is any form of pain, we are averse to it ; if this relation is altered by a change of its constituents, and if the result is pleasure, or gratification, whether experienced or inferred, unless the tendency of such change is counteracted, an inclination is produced for it. Hence, inclination and aversion are dependent upon some or other modification of pleasure, or of pain, from a given object.

544 §. This conclusion, which is merely a definition of common sense, tends rather to facilitate our discussion ; the topic of which will be, how we might render that agreeable which was disagreeable, whether by a change in our own disposition, or by modifying the object which respects the sensation.

545 §. It is customary with wise people of every description, more especially with the Divines and Novelists, to give excellent reasons, cogent motives, founded in common sense, religion, interest, &c., for controlling our desires, or subduing our feelings. If a person is addicted to any vice, they reason with his inclination on the disgrace, the moral impropriety, on the absurdity, or ill consequences of such addiction. If a person is suffering intense grief for the loss of a beloved friend or relative, they point out that it is of *no use* to grieve ; that trouble themselves as much as they will, they cannot recal the object whose loss they deplore ; and finally, they suggest that their friend is surely in Heaven, and therefore they *ought* to *rejoice*, rather than *regret* his departure from a miserable world, a vale of sorrow, &c. All this they gravely inculcate ; and in general the tears

fall faster, in proportion as they deal out their wisdom upon their unhappy patient. It is a wonder with these sage preachers, that people should be so obdurate ! That their feelings, instead of proving so refractory to grave counsel, should not be precisely what they recommend ! Our analysis may serve to explain this common failure. By it, we are instructed that a rational demonstration of advantage may direct our volition to a course of action which is disagreeable to us ; but if we are to derive pleasure from such course of action, or to have an inclination towards it, it is not that aversion is to be subdued by the mere wish, or desire to this end ; but that our temper, or disposition, or else the quality or circumstances of the course of action, must be changed, in order that *the results of these constituents of a relation*, may be *pleasure* instead of *pain*. How far this may be done, we shall hereafter examine.

546 §. 3. We have supposed it necessary, in order to a voluntary change of inclination, with respect to a particular object, or pursuit, first, that we should desire this change, and second, that we should be informed of the mode by which it may be accomplished. But supposing all the difficulties of these terms to be surmounted, it is still requisite that we should have an inclination *for the means*, or that the desire for the end, should prevail over an aversion to the means.

547 §. Let it be proposed to an individual, a sensualist, for the sake of illustration, *to acquire* a taste for moral beauty : we will suppose this taste to be recommended by every thing which can render it desirable : we will suppose a glowing picture to be drawn, with the force of demonstration, of the *superior enjoyment* which would ensue from the possession of this taste : we will suppose this eloquence to be not altogether in vain ;

which is more than can be said for eloquence in general—that our sensualist is convinced of the *superior enjoyment* afforded by the taste for moral beauty, and he *desires* accordingly to possess it. The next lesson instructs him of *the terms* of this possession: a discipline is prescribed for him, consisting of some preparatory courses of study: he must *familiarize* his mind with *certain sentiments*; he must repress other sentiments, or subdue every recurrence of them by forcing his attention into a prescribed channel; and, in addition to all this, he must modify his practice, and abstain from all those sensualities which are inimical to the growth of a taste for the moral beauty. Here, then, our success is tolerably complete: we have attained two requisites out of three, to a voluntary change of taste or affection—will our individual then renounce his sensualities, and fall in love with the moral beauty? It is to be feared that he would be rather startled *at the recipe*—he would perhaps say, “the taste for moral beauty may be very well for those who have it, and they may even think themselves in more than common luck: now, for certain, I think very favourably of this same taste; but if I can obtain it *only by the prescribed course of discipline*, by a forced and persevering direction of my thoughts, and at the expense of all those luxuries for which I have so keen a relish, why e’en let others enjoy the moral beauty, while I content myself with pleasures of an inferior kind; for although I am willing to allow all that can be said by the worshipers of this Beauty in her praise, *my aversion to the means* by which the taste is to be acquired, is infinitely *more powerful than the desire* to possess it.” Here then the prescription would fail; and it is to be feared that the failure, at this stage, or in this last condition, would be common, even among those less unfavourably disposed than our sensualist.

548§. Our advocate for the moral beauty is not, however, so easily defeated—What, he would demand, is the ground of your failure? You desire a change of taste, but are *averse to the means*—it remains then that you should acquire *an inclination for the means*, or else that the inducement for a recurrence to them, in spite of your aversion, should be rendered more powerful. If our advocate has already exhausted his eloquence in the recommendation of this taste, we may presume there is no more to be urged on this *latter ground*—that if the recommendation was not powerful enough to win the consent to one course of discipline, for the purpose of acquiring an inclination, it would be a still less adequate incentive to another course of discipline, which has for its object to produce an inclination *for the means*, which are to produce *an inclination for the end*.

549§. This result, however, it must be confessed, is by no means necessarily an universal one—we have supposed the projected substitution of taste or affection to fail, for the reason that the aversion to the means is more powerful than the desire for the end. Hence, if the desire for the end were more powerful, or the inducement so preponderating that the aversion is not to be put in competition with it, the taste, to say nothing of slight changes of sentiments or habits by which the force of *the aversion* may be diminished, would, by this mode, be acquired. That the *inducements* offered by *Christianity* are sufficient to compel us to almost any course of thought or action within the power of the will, or of the strongest desire, cannot be doubted; that the change of affections inculcated by this scheme would more frequently, by some such process, be attained, there can also be no doubt, if the proposed inducements did not fail of this effect, owing to

an imperfect apprehension of their nature, and a prevalent doubt of their reality.*

550§. To pursue this discussion in general terms, only a short extent further: We have supposed three conditions necessary to a voluntary change of feeling or affection with respect to a given object—1st, that we should desire this change; 2nd, that we should have a knowledge of the means by which it may be accomplished; and, 3rd, that we should have the will for the employment of these means.

551§. (1.) The desire for this change, may be produced by a rational conviction of its superior advantage, which may ensue from experience, observation, or precept.

552§. (2.) As every feeling is the result of a relation, most commonly between our sentient disposition, and externals; so, if a disagreeable, is to be exchanged for an agreeable sensation, from the same object, or from an influence in which this object is retained, it must be by a corresponding change in the constituent parts of the relation: that is, our disposition must be changed relatively to the same external, or the external must be modified relatively to our disposition.

553§. (3.) If our aversion to the means, is stronger than our inclination to the end, the employment of the means may still be ensured, either by adding to the inducements to the end, or by a change of our disposi-

* I have heard the voluntary change of the affections *asserted* to be a matter of great facility, as if by a *direct control* of the will over our *inclinations*: of which power, I have never myself had any experience.

tion relatively *to the means*, or by a modification of the means, relatively to our disposition.

554§. Now with respect to each of these conditions, there is, to this extent, a common agreement of purpose; that is, a *change* is to be produced either in our disposition, or in the external, the object of which is to render that agreeable, or sometimes we aspire no higher than to render that indifferent, which was before disagreeable to us. Of the general modes of accomplishing a proposed change in either part of our relation, I shall only say a few words for the purpose of additional illustration.

555§. Let it be proposed to an individual *to acquire an inclination* to blow out his own brains: an effort, to which, perhaps, there is a very general repugnance. Suppose that his life is one of more than common enjoyment, and that he *is desirous* rather to extend, than to abridge the term of it. Let it, however, be said, *in recommendation* of this catastrophe, “if you blow out your brains, you will no more feel hunger, or thirst, or cold, or heat, or fatigue, or envy, or regret—the shafts of calumny, pecuniary want, will never reach you; and you will escape from the thousand curses of a connection with the world.” These appear to be weighty reasons. But in answer to them—“when I am hungry, it is a *pleasure* to eat; when thirsty, to drink; when cold, to warm myself; when hot, to cool myself: as for envy, or regret, I do not feel either of them above once in seven or eight years: with respect to calumny, I fear it not, for it is a bubble which must burst sooner or later: pecuniary wants are not in my way, and if they were, I could be content to reduce my diet; and for the curses of a connection with the world, they do not trouble one who has the sense to laugh at it.” It is plain, with such a subject, the motives would fail even for the action,

and are still less likely to *inspire an inclination* for it, by any dubious or complex processes.

556§. To try the case in another view:—let our individual, who barely passes his time upon the whole agreeably, and not without occasional feelings of an opposite kind, be assured *and convinced* that if he will only blow his brains out, he will enjoy for ever afterwards an exquisite and uninterrupted felicity. This motive would undoubtedly be sufficient to ensure *the action* in most instances; but even if the action is performed, it may only be upon this strong inducement; and repugnance, instead of inclination, or liking, may still be felt *for the action itself*. To this extent, the inducement has produced *the volition* necessary to an act, but not the inclination or liking for it: *this inducement*, then, does not establish *the relation* between the action and our sentient principle, of which *an inclination is the result*.

557§. But say, in place of a tolerably happy condition, that our individual has sustained much injury from the world, incredible hardship, much suffering from disease, and finally is in a prison, from whence he expects to be released only to die by the slow torture of some barbarous execution—say that *to such a one* it was proposed to blow out his brains: even in these wretched circumstances he may be averse to suicide, *owing* to the prevalence of sentiments, or of a disposition, formed by some moral influence of religion; or he may reject the proposal from an expectation of consequent punishment hereafter. Now say, with such a one, it is intended to produce this tragical *inclination*; his aversion *is owing* to a sense of religion, or to the fear of punishment: suppose then his understanding to be convinced that the religion which influenced him was an absurdity, and that the fears he entertained

of a subsequent punishment were entirely groundless ; he would then snatch *with avidity* at the means of terminating a miserable existence, of avoiding a public exhibition, and a death of agony. In this case, the relation is produced by the conjoined influence of external circumstances, and of a change of sentiments, *affecting the disposition*, by which an action is recurred to with eagerness, or a strong feeling of satisfaction, rather than regarded with aversion or horror.

558§. To take, for general purposes, one illustration more of a coarser kind, which, it is expected, will prove the same in nature as those moral instances to which our speculations chiefly relate : Borrowing a hint from the gastric Idolaters ; let us take for example some production of the culinary art. I am scarcely enough versed in such matters to select a favourable specimen ; but any one which answers to our supposition will serve. Say that the taste of a certain dish is *disagreeable* ; hence it is an object of *dislike*. It is proposed to acquire a relish for this preparation. Our first inquiry is concerning *the reason, or cause*, of our dislike to it ? There is perhaps an acidity in it, which renders it unpleasant. Now either our aversion will continue, or else one of two things must take place—either our taste must be altered relatively to the composition, or the latter must be modified relatively to our taste. If we know in what respect our taste is at fault, this knowledge will assist us in correcting it : but say we are ignorant of the influence upon which this peculiarity, perhaps, of taste, depends ; or of any other influence by which it may be corrected—it remains then that we should try our ingenuity upon the preparation itself : We have discovered that the flavour is disagreeable, from the presence of acid : the remedy is, to omit this ingredient in a future preparation ; or, if this is objectionable on other accounts, to correct it by some other

flavour, or by increasing the proportion of the other ingredients. But, if the cause of the aversion *in the disposition* is not known, or if known, cannot, from existing relations, be *subtracted*; or if, in this predicament, the cause necessarily remaining, the influence is not known by which it may be *corrected*; and if the cause of a disagreeable flavour *in our culinary specimen* is not known, or being known, cannot be omitted, or being necessarily retained, cannot be corrected, either because the corrective is not known, or cannot be employed—*then*, the parts of the relation remaining the same, the result will also be the same; that is, our aversion to this culinary preparation will continue.

559§. This familiar example concurs in illustration of the general *conditions* of a change of taste, or inclination, which may be thus briefly enumerated:

1. If the disposition, with respect to a given object or pursuit, is one of *aversion*, the cause of this aversion, whether discovered to be in the disposition, or in the object, must be either removed, or counteracted.

2. If there is *indifference* with respect to an object or pursuit, a cause must be supplied, or abstracted, which will either constitute, or admit, the necessary disposition; or which will modify the object, or pursuit, so as to render it agreeable to the existing disposition.

3. If the cause of the aversion can neither be withdrawn nor counteracted, the aversion will remain.

4. If the cause which will admit, or produce, the inclination is not known, the indifference will remain.

5. If the cause of the aversion is known, and if *the inducement* is not sufficient for an employment of the means by which it may be removed or counteracted, either the weight of the inducement must be increased, or the disposition must be modified relatively *to the means*, or the means relatively to the disposition; or else the aversion will remain.

6. If the cause which will produce the inclination is known, but the aversion to the means by which it might be rendered efficient is greater than the desire of the end, the inclination will not be produced, unless the incentives to the end are adequately augmented.

7. The cause which will produce the necessary change either in the disposition, or in the pursuit or object, must be specifically relative to every given example, or is applicable only to analogous instances—that is, the sentiment which, with one mind, will produce a favourable disposition towards a pursuit or object, will fail with another; and the same of a modification of an object, or pursuit.

8. The general conditions of a change of affections, whether the substitution of desire for aversion, or the contrary, with respect to a given object, are, that the disposition must be modified, as by other sentiments, relatively to the object; or the object to the existing disposition, by an association with other influences; the efficacy of which may be through the medium of the same, or of another affection. These dependences illustrate the universal law, that the same effects can ensue only from the same causes—thus, supposing the requisite disposition to be represented as 6., and of two dispositions to be converted, one is 4., and the other 7., the conversion will require, in the one case, that two should be added, and in the other, that one should be taken away.

560§. Returning more especially to our subject; it remains that we should examine how far the taste for *moral beauty* is likely to be a prevalent acquisition; whether as a result of early education, or from the recommendations in its favour, which may be addressed to those of maturer understandings and adopted habits.

561 (1.) §. We will presume the nature of virtue to

be absolutely fixed (which is more than can be said with truth); we will suppose the plan of it to be very simple, liable to no fluctuations from opinion, or relative circumstances, and the actions comprised in it so few and obvious, that they may be easily enumerated and apprehended. In order still more to simplify our view, we will let the whole system of virtuous actions be represented by two general purposes, from whence they obtain their character—one, that we should abstain from gratifying an inclination, the indulgence of which, if prevalent, is inimical to the welfare of society; and the other, that we should promote the welfare of others, in opposition to our own interests, or inclinations, in other respects.

562§. In the first place, it may be inquired, what is *the incentive* to a practice of this sort? It must be replied, the gratification of a taste. This incentive must fail with two classes of persons; namely, with those who do not possess the taste, and with those in whom it is weaker than the other inclinations, to which it is opposed. Hence this taste *must be acquired*; and to be efficient, it must preponderate over every other inclination.

563§. We will suppose a child to be trained to the actions of disinterestedness, or benevolence, by dint of parental authority, or any other influence, from his earliest years; and this, with a view *to dispose* him favourably to those sentiments, and that discipline, which are hereafter to produce not only moral actions, but the love of moral beauty, from which it is intended that these actions should spring. This seems to be thought generally a very proper beginning: but the success even of this preparatory scheme is not quite certain. That which a child desires possession of, it is commonly unwilling to part with, until tired of the

possession: when the possession becomes a matter of indifference, it may then be readily yielded to another, though it is perhaps more frequently retained, if for the reason only, that another shall not have it. To part with a possession which has become *indifferent*, does not, however, illustrate our argument: the preparatory *practice* requires that the child should give, readily or habitually, that, the possession of which is still an object of desire. Now suppose this to be done: what is the cause of an action of this sort—why does the child part with that, which it desires to keep? Either because it has a *greater affection* for the person to whom the gift is made, than for the thing itself; or else, in obedience to parental, or other authority. We will set the former reason aside, because the action from this motive is rare; and when it occurs, only illustrates a particular affection towards individuals, the sacrifices to which are frequent, with all tempers, in after life. We suppose the philanthropic disposition to be not yet attained; but preparatory to the influence of sentiments to be subsequently apprehended, a practice of this kind is enforced, to which the natural disposition is averse. In obedience then to parental authority, perhaps from fear of punishment, the child is accustomed to give to others, that which it still desires to possess. Would *this practice certainly dispose* the child to a more favourable reception of the sentiments which are to inspire the taste for benevolence, or moral beauty? It must be replied, such a result is by no means certain. In some instances, perhaps generally, the practice of giving to others that which we desire ourselves, would be facilitated by this early habit; in others, the aversion may be increased: the ingenuity may be exercised to avoid these harsh injunctions; and *the man* may rejoice finally, in an escape from authority, which during childhood rendered life miserable, by requiring perpetual sacrifices; and for these sacrifices, he would

perhaps indemnify himself by an exclusive system of self-gratification. The consequences of this pre-disposing practice to the moral taste, would be various in different examples: upon the whole, however, under judicious direction, the preparation may be favourable to the end.

564§. With all the advantages of a previous training, we will suppose our pupil, though familiarised, upon the indirect motives of fear, love, or applause, with *the actions* of virtue, still to have no inclination towards the practice, for its own sake: that is, remove these indirect inducements, and the actions would cease; because there is not the inclination towards them, which it is now intended to create.

565§. At this early period of intelligence, we will suppose a preceptor to bestow upon his pupil a comprehensive principle of this sort—"Your desire for the happiness of mankind should be stronger than your inclination for any other object in life;" or, qualifying a little this sweeping recommendation, "should be stronger than for any thing which *is opposed* to the happiness of mankind." Thus much for the recommendation; but will the feeling *therefore* ensue? No more than if the *recommendation* had been *to feel an exquisite pleasure* from resting one's chin upon one's hand. The case is even stronger than is thus represented: the subject of our experiment is not only without the taste for moral beauty, or the philanthropic affection, but he has a thousand ardent desires for other objects, or pursuits; all of which it is intended to supersede, or render secondary to this inclination, which yet remains to be produced.

566§. The mere recommendation, it seems, has failed of its effect: the elements, or constituents, of the

inclination, are yet to be furnished—and what are they? Proceeding to inspire this taste, our preceptor may try the common resources. It is *right*, he may enforce upon his pupil, that you should have this moral inclination. Will he therefore have it, *because it is affirmed to be right*? Why, it must be replied, it may be *as easily affirmed* that any thing else is *right*—as, for example, that we should desire to be suspended every day for half an hour by the thumbs: but *the precept* would scarcely make the practice *agreeable*. To give *a reason*, then, for its being right—because, our preceptor continues, the taste for a benevolent practice conduces to the happiness of mankind.

567§. Will the inclination be produced by this cogent argument? If it is, it will exemplify a very rare accident: in the first place, we may have no violent inclination for the happiness of mankind, for the reason that we do not experience *that pleasure* from their happiness, from whence *the inclination* must spring: and even allowing that we are favourably disposed towards *the end*, it does not follow that we should have an inclination for the benevolent *practice* by which it is produced—this practice may be troublesome, or expensive, and we may prefer our repose, or our money, to the happiness of mankind; so that we may refuse to engage ourselves even *in the practice*: and if the end is not desirable enough to produce *the volition*, we can scarcely expect from it *a liking* to that which is otherwise disagreeable; seeing that the most desirable ends which we can propose to ourselves, and which we pursue strenuously, do not always render us insensible of the disagreeableness of the medium, through which they are to be attained.

568§. To proceed then with the other customary

resources :—“ If you cultivate and acquire the benevolent affections, (of those which subserve the scheme of moral beauty,) you will enjoy the pleasure of self-approbation, or esteem.” Now, suppose our pupil to try the practice upon this recommendation, by which he will engage in a dubious contest with many other inclinations—say that, resolute, for a time, in his desire of self-approbation, he continues forcibly to make sacrifices of all sorts. May we not at least doubt whether the pleasure of self-esteem would be produced? And if it were, is it not improbable that *the degree of it* would supersede all opposing inclinations? Self-applause or approbation must be founded on some quality which is an object of affection, or from the possession of which we derive pleasure: we cannot feel a gratification of this sort from *any source*, from whence we propose to derive it. Now say that the benevolent practice is disagreeable to our pupil; but that, in defiance of all opposing desires, he still pursues it *for self-applause*: *why* would he applaud himself? For doing that which *is disagreeable* to himself, *for a purpose* which perhaps affords him *no pleasure*! This would not even be a motive *for action* with the Stoics, who are stimulated to their self-inflictions, assuredly not *by a love of pain* of any sort, but for *the gratification* of a vanity, more powerful than dislike, or apprehension: with them, the desire of self-applause, or the force of a vanity of any kind, is by no means a certain recipe for a pleasure *in the terms* on which its gratification is purchased; and an incentive of the same kind seems still less likely to succeed with our pupil, whose more natural inclinations are ardent, and as yet unsophisticated by long habits of social intercourse—by experience, reflection, injury, or disappointment. If the insufficiency of this recommendation should still be doubted, let school-boys be left entirely to the operation of this motive, and see how many of them would forego the pleasures of the

play-ground, in favour of Latin and Greek, however liberal might be the promised reward of *self-approbation*, which they will derive from the sacrifice of their other inclinations.

569 §. To consider briefly the efficacy of more powerful motives: Recurring to the doctrines of *Christianity* which are rather relative to the general argument, than to our immediate topic—suppose our pupil to be told that the possession or supremacy of benevolent affection, will, as is said, ensure his eternal happiness; that his punishment, on the other hand, will be eternal, if he is deficient in this virtue; and that the authority, moreover, or evidence, upon which this assurance is made, is of an unequivocal kind. This motive should indeed be sufficient for almost *any course of action*, however disagreeable; but such is the stubborn nature of our affections, or so fixed their laws, that if we really feel dislike to any object or practice, although a strong motive may reconcile us to the endurance of it, I apprehend that the certainty of being damned would not make it otherwise *agreeable*, than as the necessary medium of a desirable end; which of course exemplifies an inclination for the end, but a volition only for the means.

570 §. If we find that all these higher inducements may fail to create the inclination for a benevolent practice, what shall we say of a recommendation, founded merely on *a taste for moral beauty*? The harmony and subservience, which has been thought the principal ground of this beauty, may be forcibly displayed: but if our pupil should be less captivated by this abstract beauty, than by that in the more material forms, it is to be presumed that his pursuit of beauty would be by no means confined to the moral Phantom; more especially as harmony, or subservience to an end, is

common to actions and pursuits of every kind, rather than peculiar to this form of beauty.

571§. But even granting that rare disposition in our pupil by which he is susceptible of *pleasure*, from the contemplation of a moral beauty, in sufficient degree to constitute a taste, it has been shewn, in our inquiry concerning the general efficacy of this taste, that its influence is by no means to be depended upon; and that uniformity in moral practice can scarcely be expected to ensue from an inclination of the weaker sort, which is opposed by passions and propensities innumerable, of a more powerful kind.

572§. In order that every advantage may be afforded to the cultivation of the taste for moral beauty, we will suppose the existence of this quality to have been among the earliest perceptions; that the excellence of it has been the subject of daily panegyric; that every deviation from the rule of this beauty, admits of being clearly perceived, and the deformity of an action inconsistent with it, to have been eloquently described. The practice then, which this instruction recommends, is *beautiful because* it subserves the happiness of mankind—what would be the probable force of an impulse, proceeding from this admission? The happiness of mankind—this is the end, would it not be necessary that we should at least *desire* the happiness of mankind, *before* we should be very strenuous in promoting it, from the mere perception of one specimen of harmony? Say that experience has shewn general happiness, to be opposed to that of the individual—before the practice which has for its end general happiness, would be engaged in, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of an undeniable harmony, the affection must be possessed, which would enable us to feel more pleasure in the happiness of others, than in our own individual gratifi-

cation. Hence, the beauty of virtue, the daily theme of eulogium, may be freely confessed ; but to inspire an inclination for the practice, the preparatory discipline must be directed to a much more difficult purpose—to produce a preference of the happiness of others, to our own exclusive gratification—a disposition which can never be expected from the taste for moral beauty, so long as there exist in the world objects of more powerful affection, which can be pursued or attained only by a deviation from the rule of this beauty.

573§. As neither description, nor precept, founded in prospective good, nor daily panegyric, will necessarily produce even the conviction of a *higher beauty in virtue* than in those other practices which *equally* illustrate harmony and subservience ; as the conviction, or admission of a beauty in virtue, *if produced*, may fail, whether from deficient incentive, or the opposition of more powerful interests, to ensure a corresponding practice ; and as the practice, if engaged in, from the force or promise of connected or prospective good, may fail also, though aided by precept and eulogium, of producing the inclination from whence the practice would ensue, independently of all other inducements—on these accounts, the success of a training to moral conduct, from a mere sense of the beauty of virtue, is not to be anticipated with confidence. As then, without an entire change of nature, the recipe for which remains to be furnished, the taste for moral beauty could never, during the periods of education, become a preponderating love, let us examine briefly whether it is likely to be accepted in the *way of exchange*, by those whose habits have been long adopted, and whose prevailing passions and inclinations are already in great measure fixed.

(2.) 574§. Let it be proposed, by way of illustration, to one who has hitherto been ardent in the pursuit

of wealth, to exchange a powerful desire of this possession, for a taste for moral beauty. We will suppose he is made to comprehend the nature of *this beauty*; and is disposed thus far to admit its claims. Why, he would ask, am I to relinquish one inclination in favour of another? The most I apprehend that can be urged by way of recommendation, in reply to this question, would be an assurance that the new taste would be productive of more present enjoyment, or of greater future good, or of fewer present or future evils, than the old inclination. To examine the alleged fact; and then its probable success, if true, in producing this substitution of taste.

575§. First, for the present enjoyment—by possessing the taste for moral beauty, we may perpetually gratify ourselves by a concurrence in its scheme; we may occupy ourselves constantly in ministering to the wants of others; and by this contribution to the harmony of a moral system, attain *the regular enjoyment of a gratified taste*. This is doubtless something in its favour. To try then, by the same measure, the worth of the pecuniary taste; an advocate for which, may urge, in the way of parallel—by possessing an inclination for money, we may occupy ourselves constantly in the acquisition of wealth, and by this practice obtain *the regular enjoyment of a gratified taste*.

576§. It seems then, so far as the practice in either case conduces to present enjoyment, that the mode is very similar—the moral taste is good, because the practice it suggests, or rather the end, the contribution towards a moral beauty, is agreeable: and the pecuniary taste is also good, because the practice it suggests, or the end, pecuniary possession, is also agreeable.—The *superiority* of either of these tastes remains to be decided perhaps by the degree, respectively, with

which either might be entertained ; according to which will be, *cæteris paribus*, the degree of gratification.

577§. We might suspect, from our general experience, that the pecuniary taste or inclination is calculated to be a more powerful interest, than that for moral beauty—the prevalence of this pecuniary taste, and the infrequency of the other, might suggest that it is better adapted to the constitution of human nature. At all events, conceding more than is true, in favour of the moral taste, supposing the degree of these inclinations *to be equal*, there is, on the score of present enjoyment, no reason why our individual with the pecuniary inclination, should set about acquiring the moral one ; for a high degree of which, he perhaps has less capacity, and the gratification of which therefore promises *less* enjoyment. This sketch may fairly represent the tendency of the argument.

578§. I cannot refrain, however, from adding to the promise of present enjoyment, some motives of a loftier kind. How elegant, how liberal, how refined, how much above the vulgar level of sentiment, is this love of moral beauty ! How mean, how sordid, how contemptible is the desire of wealth ; how closely allied is this groveling appetite with all that is coarse, and base, in human nature ! Such may be the exclamation of an enthusiast in this moral scheme. Without stopping to inquire how far it is *rational* that we should be greatly moved by these terms of praise, or of abuse, I will merely observe that they may have an influence, perhaps a powerful one, upon the sentiments of persons, who do not reflect deeply upon their true import, or signification. Briefly, it may be asked *why* is elegance good ? *why* refinement ? or *why* is that bad which is sordid, mean, contemptible, coarse, base, &c. ? *Some form* of

pleasure, or of agreeable sensation, seems to be *the measure of what is good*: if then the pecuniary inclination is a source of more gratification than the moral taste, and if each is truly described by these rhetorical terms, why then in fact the sordid, mean, base, coarse, inclination for money, is a better inclination than the elegant, liberal, refined one, for moral beauty. Yet it must be confessed, however *good* this pecuniary predilection may be, *relatively* to the individual who entertains it, his character must be one with which few persons of any cultivation can have any sympathies.

579§. To examine the other grounds of recommendation:—What *future* good is promised by the *moral taste*? Self-satisfaction, it may be replied, and the constant contemplation of that system of moral beauty which it has helped to form. What, then, is the source of this self-satisfaction? Merely the assurance, if it originates with the taste, of possessing the capacity for this kind of enjoyment; and if with the practice, of having contributed to the perfection of a system, which we contemplate with pleasure. And, to continue the parallel, what *future* good may be proposed from the pecuniary inclination? The assurance, if it originates with the taste, of possessing an inclination for this sort of enjoyment; and if with the practice, of having acquired that which we contemplate with pleasure. Say, in addition, that the moral taste, or its consequent practice, ensures us hereafter the happiness of Heaven, and that the pecuniary one consigns us to Hell: then, indeed, the recommendations are not equal. But say this is either not true, or is not *believed*; then, with respect to the promise of *future* good, *the terms* of recommendation in favour of each may be nearly the same: and the superiority, in the estimate of individuals, will be assigned to that inclination which might be entertained by them

respectively, in the greatest degree, because, *cæteris paribus*, the degree of gratification will be in proportion to it.

580§. With respect to present or future *evils*, connected with either inclination, each pursuit might be laborious; in each, we may be disappointed. But, in a general way, it may be observed, supposing other disadvantages to be nearly equal, that, as the moral taste proposes its gratification from one object only, namely, the beauty of the moral system, and as the pecuniary one proposes not only an agreeable possession, but the means of much other enjoyment, so *the evils* of the moral taste may comprise not only *the loss* of the pecuniary possession, but all the inconveniences of pecuniary want; while the pecuniary taste involves only the loss of the enjoyment, derivable from the system of moral beauty.

581§. It appears from this exposition, that the only ground *of the superiority of an inclination* is, that directly, or indirectly, whether present, or prospective, the enjoyment derived from it is greater, or the evil connected with it is less, than that which may ensue from any other, with which it may be compared. Hence, if any one taste or inclination is proposed in substitution of another, there will not be even a motive for attempting the exchange, unless it is first shewn, that the happiness of the individual will be enhanced by it.

582§. The capacity for enjoyment from any given pursuit has been shewn to be, *cæteris paribus*, in proportion to the force of the inclination entertained for it; the inclination itself, for any object or pursuit, being in proportion to *the gratification* derived, or anticipated from it.

583§. It has been shewn of taste in general, though it

must be allowed, with occasional exceptions, that it is among the weaker grades of desire ; and therefore that a system of practice on the impulse of this *taste*, which is constantly liable to the opposition of *the passions*, and of a thousand more powerful inclinations, is not likely to be pursued with much regularity. It is, however, designed to kindle a warmer affection for the moral beauty, than is implied by this inferior grade of inclination. For this purpose the advantages of this moral taste have been displayed—but as in our examination of these advantages, we have found that a just parallel may be made with those which belong to inclinations of the meaner sort, more easily acquired, so, supposing the moral taste to be attained, it would have no superior recommendation to those more vulgar inclinations with which it might be compared. Nay, it has been seen that the tastes and inclinations which are the most prevalent among men, are calculated to exist in greater force than this love of abstract beauty ; and therefore, as circumstances, in other respects, are much the same, that motive, or inducement, is rather in favour of retaining the tastes we have, than of the acquisition of another in exchange, which may be but a source of inferior enjoyment.

584§. Although the terms of praise, by which the moral taste is recommended, sound very lofty, it may be doubted whether they are not rather fitted to captivate the ear, than to have any great weight with the understanding. The moral taste, upon which these fine epithets are bestowed, *is good*—essentially ; *why* is it good ? Because a source of *enjoyment*, to be estimated in proportion *to its degree*. The pecuniary taste, or any one of those stigmatized as the baser inclinations, is also a *source of enjoyment* ; and therefore, if the degree of enjoyment, *which is our criterion of its value*, is equal, is just as good as the moral taste, and precisely for the

same reason. It is one of the consequences of a factitious state of society, of a desertion of nature, that mere words, often absurdly applied, should have the currency among those upon whom they are palmed, of principles or laws. Mankind may accept these counterfeits in ignorant ages; or that portion of mankind, by far the largest, who are born to be deluded, may accept them in a more enlightened age: but as knowledge becomes more general, and the habit of reasoning more prevalent, some better security must be found for a just distinction of the various shades of right, and wrong, than these vaunting epithets, the influence of which would generally be rejected with contempt, if their true import were understood.

585§. In pursuing this argument, we have thrown many inducements into the scale, which scarcely belong to the recommendation of a taste for moral beauty. In strictness, the only inducement to a *moral practice* upon *this* ground, is the perception of a beauty which would impel us constantly to seek gratification from this source. But if this beauty is not perceived, or if perceived, is not regarded with enthusiasm, or with the force of a ruling passion, it may not, in opposition to more decided tastes and propensities, have the slightest influence upon our conduct and pursuits. It may be *confessed* that a flower is beautiful, or that a painting is beautiful; but who, in admiration of beauty, even in this palpable form, could contemplate *constantly* either specimen with satisfaction, or be insensible to numerous other objects, which would at least divide our affections, if, in spite of the *acknowledged beauty* of our specimens, they did not altogether engross them?

586§. At least, if this taste is to exist in a force which would render it practical, the inducements must be increased. All the motives which can be deduced

from the nature of philanthropy, and even the reward of Heaven, and the terrors of Hell, would perhaps be necessary to recommend this taste sufficiently to our attention. But with respect to the preparatory training in philanthropy, its success must be in most instances at least doubtful, while men, though united in gross confederacies, must inevitably be opposed to each other in detail ; and while, from this necessary opposition, this conflict of interest, the causes of mutual hatred are, in many conditions, so much more numerous than those of mutual love. However this may be, granting that under another state of things the feeling of philanthropy may cease to be a rare exception in human nature, and that the promise of Heaven, or the threat of Hell, may not be deprived of its force, by a scepticism which some think just, even then, although these powerful influences may be sufficient to produce the volition, to which would succeed an uniform practice of virtue, they may nevertheless fail of producing the *inclination*, which, separated from connected advantages, would render this practice agreeable.

*586§. From this analysis it appears that, in order to a change of affection with respect to a given object, either a new and more powerful affection must be produced in its favour, *with which the prevalence, if not the existence, of the former one is incompatible* ; or the agreeableness of this object *with an existing affection* must be demonstrated—as if a thing were liked or disliked from an error of opinion with respect to its nature or quality, which being corrected, it is differently regarded, without a change of affection ; or else the object itself must be appropriately modified by association, relatively to affections which suffer no change.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE NATURE AND INFLUENCE OF THE MORAL SENSE.

587§. SOME men, if not all, are agreed, to a certain extent, to call some things right, and others wrong. Right and wrong, are said by some to be perceived by a moral faculty; and by others, by a moral sense—the nature of right and wrong is said by some to be immutable; by others, relative, &c. We will attempt briefly, and perhaps unsuccessfully, a settlement of these points, by an exposition of some principal facts which relate to them.

588§. Suppose a child to be whelped, like a wild beast, in the woods; to be deserted by its mother, to be suckled by a bear, or a monkey, and afterwards to have no human intercourse—it will be granted that such a one would be a tolerably fair specimen of man, *in a state of nature*, or destitute of the instruction which might be afforded *by any grade of education*.

589§. Having attained years of maturity, if not of discretion, we will suppose our natural man, hitherto a Peripatetic in his native woods, to have strayed into cultivated grounds, into some vineyard perchance, where he is tempted, irresistibly, to banquet on the luxuries which Nature seems to have prepared for him.

Would he be *restrained* from the indulgence of his appetite by *a sense* of the moral turpitude of theft? It must be answered, he would scarcely be restrained by that, of which he has no apprehension. Yet it cannot be denied that it is *wrong* for one person to take, without permission, that which belongs to another. But our natural man has no idea of exclusive property; and, therefore of course, in this instance at least, can have no idea of right and wrong; distinctions, *founded* upon this previous knowledge.

590§. Now say that another human being taken from the civilized hordes, and it must be by no means a bad specimen, finds himself in a somewhat similar situation: he has strayed into a vineyard which does not belong to him; and though tempted by heat, and thirst, to allay a craving desire by partaking of its produce, he nevertheless *abstains* from this gratification *because* it would be a theft, and *theft* is *wrong*. To what, in our two individuals, is to be imputed this difference of conduct, under an impulse, to some extent the same? Our natural man *gratifies* his appetite, because he is withheld by no sense of right and wrong: our civilized man *abstains* from this gratification, because he has the sense of this distinction. And *how came he* to differ, in this respect, from his brother of the woods? First, he has *been taught the nature of exclusive property*; and then he has been *taught* that it is *right* to respect this property, and *wrong* to infringe it: not only must he have attained this *knowledge*, but *the disposition* to obedience, whether from inclination or fear, must have been produced in him: and lastly, he must have the additional instruction which, by certain signs, as by those of artificial labour, would enable him *to distinguish* that this vineyard was private property; *of all of which* our *natural man* is totally ignorant.

591§. It is plain, then, that the *knowledge* of right and wrong, if other examples agree with this, as I believe they do, is a consequence, or effect of *education*.

592§. The terms right and wrong are applied in several relations, which may be arranged appropriately under corresponding titles. But these terms generally, relate to sentiments, or conduct: and although in particular instances the sentiment, or the practice, which is right or wrong, is liable to diversity of opinion among individuals, yet there is this common coincidence, that, in every example, the definition of right or wrong is the statement of a rule, or standard, according to the agreement, or disagreement with which, a sentiment, or an action, is either right or wrong.

593§. The sentiments, or actions, which are designated as right, or wrong, not only differ in the estimation of different individuals, but whole communities differ also, in this respect, with each other. Thus that very instance of theft, which we have chosen as an example of moral delinquency, would, agreeably with the education and consequent moral sense of a Circassian, be deemed a virtue. For the present, however, before inquiring into the nature of the obligation implied by these terms, it may be sufficient to remark, that sentiments or actions are decided to be right or wrong by the consent of mankind, or of communities, or portions of communities, who have agreed to arrange them severally under these denominations. How *far consent* in this matter, furnishes only an artificial standard, we shall hereafter inquire.

594§. Recurring to our illustration; the difference between the civilized and the natural man is this: the former has been *taught* what those sentiments and actions are, which are expressed by the terms right and

wrong; while the latter, *not being instructed* of this distinction, is therefore ignorant of it.

595 §. Thus far we have traced only one, though an essential stage, in the growth of the moral character. An acquaintance with the several specimens or examples which men have, to some extent, agreed to call right and wrong, *is the knowledge* of the conformity, or disagreement, of things with these terms—the moral training does not stop with merely instructing individuals in the external relations of right and wrong; but *their obedience* to the recommendations, founded on this distinction, is also inculcated. This obedience is only an extended illustration of right—men are taught *what* is right; and then that *it is right to think, and act*, conformably with a rule, on respective occasions. I shall not at present inquire concerning the grounds of this injunction—nor dwell longer upon the various instances to which the terms right and wrong are applied. I will merely repeat, that both the knowledge of right and wrong, and the precept of obedience to the rules of the former, are taught by education; and proceed to inquire whether this kind of knowledge requires *any faculty, or sense*, peculiarly appropriated to the purposes of its acquisition.

596 §. Extending a little our argument; it is said that honesty is right, and theft wrong; the same of truth and falsehood, benevolence and malignity, &c. What have we here more than the *designation* of a thing or quality by its proper term? The question is, whether, as some have supposed, a distinct or peculiar sense or faculty is required *either* for the purpose of apprehending the thing, or distinguishing it by a term?

597 §. What is meant by honesty or theft? We will say the notion of either is founded upon the pre-

vious knowledge of the nature of property. To begin, then, with property. The pen I write with is mine. What is meant by saying *it is mine*? Merely that I have the privilege of disposing of it as I like; and that no other person has the same liberty. And what gives me this exclusive privilege? We will say the pen was purchased by me, or given to me, by one who before possessed the same exclusive privilege of disposing of it: and by *what efficacy* does purchase, or gift, invest me with this exclusive right? Again, it must be said, by the consent of mankind, or of a community, who have agreed that a person shall possess exclusively that which he has paid for; or, that, *on certain conditions*, an individual has the right to that which he possesses. Thus far the apprehension of a right, or of the nature of property, seems to require no sense, or faculty, *in addition* to those which we employ for general purposes. The grounds of a title are defined: the instances which exemplify it are recognized, and distinguished by a term, or sign, by which mankind have agreed that it shall be represented. Now take any other example, and see whether the process, *mutatis mutandis*, is not the same: two and two, make four; by which is meant, that when a single unit, and a single unit, are combined, mankind *have agreed* that this combination shall be represented by the term *two*; and that when this combination is doubled, the *result* shall be *called four*; that is, as in the former case, a certain set of circumstances form a recognizable example—this example is expressed by a term, and the agreement with any example to which it may be applied, is according to the coincidence or difference of the conditions, or circumstances, which men have agreed to distinguish by such term.

598§. Thus, by the *common mode of experience*, we gain the knowledge of the conditions, or circumstances,

which men *have agreed* shall confer exclusive right ; or *in this way* we understand what is meant by the terms “exclusive property.” By the term theft, we distinguish an infringement of exclusive right, or a possession of property *on other* conditions than those which constitute a right ; and this recognizable example, the knowledge of which is also attained in the common way of experience, is designated as “wrong ;” a term which, as in the other instances, merely expresses a predicament, or case, which is constituted by certain circumstances, or conditions.

599 §. When, therefore, it is said that we have *the sense*, or the apprehension, of *right and wrong*, how much is implied by this qualification ? Merely that we distinguish by the common mode of experience—that of taking account of existences, and of their relations with each other, by means of our senses—the similitude, or difference of any proposed examples, when compared with the instances which men have agreed to designate by the terms right, and wrong. Thus, honesty is right, and theft wrong. Say, for the sake of illustration, that honesty consists in paying for that of which we assume the exclusive possession, and theft the assumption of an exclusive possession, without fulfilling the conditions of its purchase. In the former case, our sense of right, amounts to no more than a perception of the circumstances or conditions which men have agreed to distinguish by this term ; and in the latter, we recognise an instance which is denoted by the term “wrong.” In either case, our sense, or apprehension, is no more than a perception of the agreement or difference of an alleged example with the term by which such example is expressed. Just as, in the numerical illustration, we should perceive that a single unit was not an example of the combination which we call “two ;” that a combination of either three, or five units, could not pro-

perly be expressed as “four,” which is the term agreed upon to denote a different number.

600§. To favour the views of the advocates for the *moral sense*, let their argument be thus stated: When we perform a good action, *we feel* that we are doing right; and wrong, when we are doing a bad one: thus, also, in the way of parallel, if it is a question whether we should read, or write, whether we prefer one, or the other, *we feel* that we are either *reading*, or *writing*. If a good action is right, and a bad one wrong, supposing the qualities *to be defined* which constitute good or bad, *we cannot choose but feel* when we are doing right, or wrong; since we cannot *but be conscious* under what term our conduct falls in a particular instance; or under what signification, if the term itself should be forgotten, supposing every mode of conduct to be known by an appropriate definition.

601§. But it will be said, there is something more in this matter than has hitherto been exhibited. Our advocate for the *moral sense*, may be willing to grant that the *knowledge* of right and wrong exemplifies no more than the *common mode* by which, in all other instances, we apprehend resemblance or difference between things, or agreement or disagreement of things, with terms, the application of which is founded in common consent. That, it may be continued, which gives to this discrimination of right and wrong the efficacy of a *peculiar sense*, is not merely the consciousness of the different qualities of the actions thus designated, but that *we feel we ought to prefer* one course of action to the other—that we have the *approbation* or *reproach* of our *conscience*, in proportion as our conduct is agreeable, or otherwise, with the observance of moral right.

602§. It may be presumed, by all this variety of

expression is intended only, that we feel conscious of *some sort of obligation* to make our practice, and if we can, our inclinations, conform with a certain rule. Hence, when we deviate from this rule, of which we are informed by that common mode of *knowledge* confessed in other instances, we have the reproach, or the additional consciousness, of having violated a moral obligation. It seems then that we have no need of a peculiar or separate sense *to know* good from evil, right from wrong, &c. ; but this peculiar sense, if at all necessary, is required for the purpose of apprehending *the obligation* imposed by these distinctions. The nature of this obligation then is next to be examined.

603 §. It is inculcated by our earliest lessons in morals, that truth is right, falsehood wrong ; honesty right, theft wrong, &c. *If this were the whole extent of the instruction*, would a child *therefore* feel any greater obligation to speak the truth, to be honest, to be guilty neither of falsehood nor theft, than if he had been told that truth was green, falsehood sky-blue, honesty pink, theft yellow ? *This degree of instruction* would acquaint him only *with a fact or relation*, and of the *term* by which it is expressed ; but *the sense of obligation* to a particular conduct in respective instances, would not ensue from this *knowledge*. How then is the *sense of obligation created* ?

604 §. In connection with the definition of the examples of right and wrong, there is also an injunction to a compliance with a proposed rule of conduct ; and this injunction is founded *upon some affection*, illustrating merely the desire of some modification of pleasure, or aversion to some form of pain. Obedience to this injunction is enforced on many grounds—together with the information that an action is wrong, there is an emphatic *direction to abstain from it* ; the first obligation of this sort that is felt, is produced by the influence

of parental authority, the efficacy of which is chiefly through the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward. Afterwards, as the understanding is prepared by cultivation for the comprehension of other motives, the moral obligation is enforced through the desire of Heaven, or the terror of Hell, illustrating the *common motive*, founded in the desire of happiness, and the aversion to punishment, into which the influence of God and the Devil, at least in early life, may be resolved. Or other motives are ingrafted upon this distinction of right and wrong, arising out of the systems of honour, political expediency, philanthropy, moral beauty, &c.

605 §. But from whatever system the obligation to moral conduct is derived, the whole apprehension of it amounts only to this—that there are different modes of conduct relatively to the same circumstances, or occasions; an understanding of these is a common illustration of knowledge: that there are motives for *a compliance* with moral precepts, derived from one or other of the ethical systems, which motives are founded in a conviction of *superior good*, or in what consists our true interest. This obligation, or these motives, are the inducements to *a certain line of conduct* in respective examples, the definition of which becomes a rule of what is called duty. Hence, when we deviate from a moral rule, *our consciousness* of the deviation *is an ordinary specimen of knowledge*: and if our conscience, as it is called, reproaches us with a violation of a duty, it is that we have the sense of having acted in opposition to our true interests, or to a previous conviction of superior good.

606 §. Such is the constitution of the moral sense: and any other sense, moral or immoral, is formed by very much the same process, and will exhibit in every

respect a just analogy. To try this parallel: If we commit a bad action, it is perceived by the moral sense, and we are reproached with the conviction of having violated a duty—the meaning of which, according to our analysis, is this—A certain action is called *bad*: the agreement between the thing and the term, is recognised, just as that of a colour, with the word by which it is denoted. We *ought* not to have committed this action, because by it we offend God, forfeit heaven, incur the danger of eternal punishment; or, because it is opposed to a system, whether of philanthropy, or taste, which is most agreeable with our real interest. Now, then, what is the whole amount of the dilemma? Simply this: we have preferred the lesser, to the greater good! or possibly that which is injurious, to that which is advantageous—being aware of the qualities of actions, we make this distinction, or thus we are informed of what we have done; and, in some degree or other, we regret it accordingly—which seems to express both the recognition of a duty, and the reproach of our conscience for the breach of it; and therefore all that is intended by “the moral sense.”

607§. An *immoral* sense is produced much in the same way. A smuggler may have information to impart to a colleague, upon which may depend the safety of a cargo: but our smuggler is comfortably seated in a public-house, smoking his pipe—he reflects, perhaps, that some other person may communicate this information to his colleague—at all events, for his own part, he is very comfortable; 'tis a wet night; and, *preferring his present enjoyment*, to a disagreeable action, with a view to what *he confesses to be a superior good*, he trusts to chance, or fortune, for a favourable issue. In consequence of this neglect, the cargo is lost. Would not *the self-reproach* of our smuggler, though engaged in a *nefarious pursuit*, be very similar to that

which "the moral sense" gains credit for, under the violation of a duty? What is there, in either instance, more than *knowledge* of certain relations; and *preference* of the lesser, to the greater good?

608§. A sense, the same in character, or in the mode of its formation, may be exemplified in every other department in which we first gain the knowledge of certain distinctions, and then, being called upon to act in this department, prefer the lesser, to the greater good—or at least prefer, commonly, a present enjoyment; and repent having incurred the consequent evil. Thus, if a distinct sense, a peculiar, or separate faculty, is required for moral apprehension and observances, by parity of reasoning, there should be a smuggling sense, a fighting sense, a judicial sense, a medical sense, a chemical sense, a shoe-making sense, &c.—for in all these branches respectively, there may be knowledge, conviction of superior good, and opposed desire of present gratification: if this latter is overcome, the instance *is the same in kind*, as that of a duty performed; if indulged, as that of a moral duty neglected.

609§. Admitting then the existence of a moral sense, of the kind just displayed—a sense founded in a knowledge of right and wrong, and in a conviction of superior good—let us next examine how far this sense may be trusted for imposing moral obligation.

610§. It is superfluous to seek for any *incentive* in mere knowledge. Actions of a certain description may be termed right, and those of another description, wrong: these actions may be recognised, and expressed by their respective terms; but there is no virtue in these terms, or in this information, which will impel to any particular line of conduct; and therefore *the know-*

ledge of what is called right and wrong, furnishes no practical obligation.

611§. But, in connection with this knowledge, there is an appeal to our affections: it is another item in the ethical systems, of each of which *the knowledge* of right and wrong forms so principal a part, that a practice which is agreeable with moral precepts, is the most conducive to happiness, or is the best security against evil. All systems agree in a promise of this kind, though the proposed allurements are not precisely alike. The incentives offered by the scheme of Christianity, are by far the most powerful—in this scheme, there is first a definition (not always consistent) of what is right; and *the obligation to obedience* to the moral rule, is founded upon the hope of reward, or the fear of punishment; or, with some, upon the gratification to be derived from a participation in the Divine nature. Thus, also in the other systems of ethics, there is instruction in certain relations, from whence are deduced rules of right and wrong; and in these, also, the obligation to a practice, agreeable with the former, *is founded upon* the proposition of superior good—whether this good is said to consist in the gratification of taste, in the pleasure of benevolence, in the consciousness of an honourable character, or in an exalted sense of the pleasure, pride, or dignity, of patriotism. Analogous to these, ambition, or the love of applause, may, on public occasions, *furnish the incentive* which helps to form the moral sense, and pride, or vanity, so frequently said to be the basis of the virtues and self-denials of the Stoics, may also impose, with some minds, a powerful obligation on conduct, whether the occasions are public or private.

612§. Thus, then, whatever may be the elements of a moral sense, however varied the distinctions of right

and wrong, and however diversified the incentives, to which the obligation is confided, in these systems respectively, there is, among them, this common agreement—that they all propose rules of conduct; and a compliance with these rules is recommended by the promise of *superior good*.

613 §. Such is the construction of the moral sense. Now say of any one of these systems from whence this sense originates, that its doctrines are not believed, or that the incentive proposed by it is not acknowledged to be a superior good; where, then, is the moral sense? or, if it ever existed, what becomes of it, in this predicament of belief, or affection? To illustrate briefly—

614 §. The scheme of Christianity distinguishes the examples of right and wrong—to ensure obedience to a certain rule, it proposes the obligation of reward and punishment. Now say that *the application of the terms* right and wrong to respective examples is not excepted against: *what obligation* of any kind would there be to the observance of a moral rule, *if the doctrines* were disbelieved, by which alone the expectation of reward or punishment can be entertained? And without this obligation, founded on the confession of a superior good, what is the state of the moral sense which might spring from Christianity? Merely that the terms right and wrong are allowed to designate certain relations, or certain actions; but impose no more restraint upon our conduct, than any other terms, which express qualities that are indifferent to us.

615 §. But, it will be said, *there is a reason why* one course of action is right, and another wrong, independently of the proposed reward or punishment. There is an obligation to that *which is right*, and therefore a moral sense, founded on the good of society. This

reply brings us only to another application of the argument. Virtue, to represent the rule and practice of morality by a term, is right : so let it be : and a violet is blue : and what then? Why as virtue *is right*, we ought to be virtuous. *Why*, we would enquire of our advocate ; why should we be virtuous? Why, because it is right ! The question then seems to be, *why* we should do that which is *right* ? Our system of benevolence says, because it is for the advantage of society. But suppose we happen to feel no interest in the welfare of society—what obligation is there then, on this ground, to do that which is right ?

616 §. Or, to connect our argument with the taste for moral beauty. Virtue is right, because it is beautiful—and why should we do a thing for the reason that *it is beautiful* ? There will be no obligation on this score, unless it should be an admitted belief that an action which concurs with a system of beauty, is recommended by the certainty, or promise of superior good. Then, indeed, something like a moral sense might spring from this, or either of the other systems—that is, we recognize an action which promises superior good ; if we perform a contrary action, by which the moral rule is violated, we are conscious of having forfeited our claim to the superior good ; and this is otherwise expressed by saying, the moral sense informs us, or our conscience reproaches us, when our conduct is opposed to virtue.

617 §. With respect then to these three topics, which have engaged our consideration, namely, of the nature of the moral sense ; of the origin of the moral sense ; and of the dependence to be placed on the influence of the moral sense ; thus much, in the way of summary, may be remarked.

1. By a moral sense is implied a knowledge of the

meaning of the words right and wrong; and a disposition to practise agreeably with the rules of the former, from a conviction that such conduct is productive of some kind of superior good: as a conduct of an opposite kind, is believed to be productive of some present, or future evil.

2. Concerning *the origin* of this moral sense; the *knowledge* of right and wrong seems to be attained in the same way, and apprehended by the same faculties, as all those other qualities and distinctions with which the mind is acquainted through the medium of the senses; and with respect *to the disposition* to comply with a moral rule, this means no more than that we are inclined to attain that which we believe to be good, and to avoid that which is bad. The origin, therefore, of this sense appears to be the same as that of an apprehension, of which affection makes a part, in any other department: that is, we know from experience, or else infer from analogy, that which is most advantageous to us, and this is to be ensured only by conformity with a rule: when we obey this rule, we are conscious of having acted as is prescribed for the attainment of a superior good; and on the other hand, that we have forfeited our claims to such benefit, when we violate the rule which is prescribed for the possession of it. So also in all other instances—in which we first know what is the most desirable; then the mode of attaining it; and lastly, whether we have employed, or neglected the means of this attainment.

3. *The influence* of a moral sense upon the conduct of men, will be precisely in a ratio to the degree in which the good it proposes is desired, and to the degree of the desires which are opposed to it, in respective instances. Every ethical system furnishes rules of conduct; and the obligation to a practice, agreeable with these rules, is founded in the promise of present, or future good. If this good is promised only upon the

authority of speculative doctrines, if these doctrines are believed, the obligation will be in proportion to the ardour with which the good promised by them is desired; if these speculative doctrines are not believed, there will be no obligation to a compliance with the rule of this ethical system, and consequently this system will furnish no moral sense: if these doctrines are neither positively believed nor rejected, the influence of the ethical recommendation, or of the moral sense, will be always vacillating; sometimes weak, and sometimes powerful; according to the desire of the proposed good, the fluctuations of opinion, and the desires, in respective instances, by which the moral recommendation is opposed. If the promise of this good is not founded upon the truth of speculative doctrines, but is recommended on the ground of present enjoyment, the obligation suggested by the moral sense which might spring from a system of this kind, will be according to the taste or disposition of the individual, or according to his capacity of enjoyment from this source, compared with his capacity for enjoyment from sources which are opposed to it. If a moral rule is recommended on the ground of the enjoyment which results from it, if this enjoyment is considerable, the influence of the moral sense created by this system, will be in proportion to it; if it is trifling, the impulses of this sense will be proportionally weak, and will admit the habitual prevalence of pursuits, the objects of which are desired with greater force: if no enjoyment at all is experienced from a compliance with the rule of such ethical system, it cannot, by any direct mode, and will not, by any indirect one, inspire in any degree a moral sense; and consequently, under this predicament, the definition of the moral rule, and the obligation proposed for ensuring obedience to it, will have no influence at all on the characters or conduct of men.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE NATURE AND OBLIGATION OF A SENSE OF HONOUR.

618§. THE sense of honour, in its most favourable construction, seems to consist in the adoption of a principle of conduct, which ensures obedience to *certain* moral rules, without any other expectation of present or future reward, than the feeling of self-approbation or applause, which results from a compliance with this principle of action.

619§. It may be thought, possibly, that there is a little too much latitude in this definition ; it will be remarked that we do not attribute *moral* actions in general, to a mere sense of honour, but to some motive connected with religion, or at least, with one or other of the systems of ethics. But, in reply to this objection, it may be remarked, that honour, though commonly regarded as auxiliary only to the principles of morals, derived from other sources, is capable of becoming, to some extent, their substitute. Whether or not the principle of honour will apply to all the instances which are comprehended in ethics, I will not positively assert ; but I believe there are very few of them in which the sense of honour would not dictate a conduct, similar to that suggested by the moral rule, among those very few

individuals in the world, who entertain this sense with great sincerity and refinement.

620 §. If, indeed, honour were not capable of becoming the substitute of moral principles, say for example of those derived from religion, of what use would it be? If the religion is really believed, the principle of honour must be superfluous, at least as a moral guide; for every instance of conduct to which the rules of honour can justly apply, are comprehended in those which are founded in religion. If then the sense of honour is useful, it must be from the *inadequacy* of a moral recommendation on other grounds; and therefore, of course, in any given instance of this kind, the sense of honour will stand in the place of a moral obligation, the defect of which is, in such instance, supplied by it.

621 §. It is certainly possible (and perhaps common, so far as anything genuine is common) that a moral principle from some other source, and that of honour, may be confessed in the sentiments and practice of the same individual. But still it is true, that if the moral principle is efficient, that of honour, so far as it is agreeable with it, is superfluous; and if that of honour furnishes an obligation where the other fails, it must be allowed, unless there is some sort of connection of dependence between them, which will be presently seen, that a motive which is more powerful than a moral influence, is itself sufficient to ensure the conduct which may be otherwise produced by the moral injunction.

622 §. To illustrate the common tendency of these principles of action, and to show how far they are capable respectively a common result; first, with respect to morals: in our intercourse with mankind, what recommendation of honour, so far as it is agreeable with mo-

ality, is not comprised in the ethical rule of "doing to others as we would be done by?" The chief difference is perhaps, that this rule goes farther than the principle of honour; and seems open to the just objection that it is a little too extensive, or unqualified. The criterion, it must be allowed, is a vague one, and much too dependent upon the different degrees in which the propensities, of what is called self-love, are indulged by different individuals. Do to others, as we would be done by! why, some men would have all that their neighbours possess, and perhaps their lives, bodies, and souls, into the bargain: it can scarcely be the intention of a *moral rule* that a person should give *all* he possesses to his neighbour; yet this would follow, if an individual were to realize in *his* actions towards *others*, the *desire* he might entertain of their prodigality towards himself. As, then, this moral rule, of the two, seems, with a similar tendency, in some respects more extensive than that suggested by the sense of honour, it appears that something more than the applications of the latter, are comprised in the former. Now let us see what moral injunctions may be substituted by the sense of honour.

623§. The ethical rule recommends truth, sincerity, forbearance, candour, the liberal sacrifice of one's own interest on all proper, or even improper occasions, respect of all obligations, expressed or implied, charity, benevolence, &c. The obligation of the sense of honour in a common, or even a favourable apprehension, appears chiefly calculated to ensure truth, sincerity, candour, good faith, the liberal sacrifice of one's own interest; whether or not the virtues, charity and benevolence, may be added to these, must depend in great measure upon the source from whence the sense of honour is derived, or the principles by which it is sustained. There are, in addition, some impulses of honour connected with the

qualities, courage, pride of family, personal endowments, &c., the affinity of which with moral precepts, is not, on all occasions, very obvious.

624§. From this view, it appears that the principle of honour, if not so extensive in its application as the rules of ethics, or capable of substituting them in every instance, is at least to a great extent powerfully auxiliary to these rules. Before inquiring into the origin, or ground of this principle of action, it may not be amiss to ascertain how far the rational intentions of this scheme, are embraced by *the prevalent notions* of the nature, and extent of its obligations, entertained by those who profess it.

625§. Nothing is more common than the occasional influence of honour, in some or other of its shapes, upon the conduct of mankind; so general indeed is this influence, that there are few men who do not acknowledge it in some modification or degree. But this influence, perhaps *in its perversions*, is so far from holding any near alliance with morality, that it is often the bond of union between those whose practice is an habitual violation of all moral rules.

626§. Instead of accepting the term "honour" in its rational, or better construction; instead of adopting that notion of it which would render it the ally of religion or virtue, in all instances, or its substitute where other motives failed; every individual thinks himself at liberty to make a code of his own, or to construe its meaning after a fashion which is best suited to his own taste, propensities, or convenience. It is this departure from the best intentions of a principle of honour, which permits the luxurious growth of all the vice and folly which claim, from their connection with it, excuse, or praise.

627§. Yet such is the inconsistency, that though men, from a *partial adoption* of the principle of honour, infringe it with great licence, they nevertheless *lay claim to all* its virtues ; and would feel their *honour* hurt if it were questioned in *any one* of those particulars, in which they have not thought proper *to possess it*. From whence it would appear, that *their honour*, to a great extent, *consists* in maintaining a lie, or in asserting their pretensions to that which *they know they have not*, and dispense with habitually in their practice. Thus, contradictory as it may appear, *dishonour* is one, and a *prevalent, form of honour*.

628§. We have remarked to how great an extent the principle of honour, when it emulates truth, good faith, liberality, &c., may be auxiliary to the general purposes of virtue. We cannot dismiss, however, the consideration of its tendency, without illustrating some effects *of its perversions*.

629§. That vice may be promoted by a partial adoption of the principle of honour, is matter of every-day experience. Nothing is more common than for men to confederate in the most vicious, or base designs. Those who form such associations, rarely confess any obligation from religion, or ethics ; yet, for the most nefarious purposes, they pledge *their words* to each other ; and to keep faith, perhaps in this instance only, is with them the sole obligation of honour. Thus honour militates *against morality*, or promotes vice ; and may be even so far inconsistent with itself, as to permit perhaps a repeated breach, on other occasions, of *that veracity* which is respected only in the single example, in which it is the bond of a confederacy inimical to virtue.

630§. There is another misapprehension of the na-

ture of honour, which is still more prevalent, and perhaps equally mischievous. A very large class of mankind think that all those recommendations of honour, such as truth, sincerity, &c., by which it is rendered conducive to the welfare of society, may be dispensed with: at the same time, they profess subserviency to the rules of honour, which, according to their interpretation, seems to consist, *not in the possession of its qualities*, but in a readiness to assert their pretensions to them, even when they violate honour by making this assertion falsely.

631 §. It is much to be lamented that this construction of honour, so extensively pervades society. It is in the security afforded by this prevalent apprehension, that any scoundrel, who is willing to hazard a worthless life in defence of his claims to qualities of which he knows himself entirely destitute, and of which his whole life is a contradiction, may still calculate upon a favourable reception by three-fourths of the higher classes of society. A man may be a liar—he may have seduced the wife of a friend from whom he has received nothing but kindness—he may betray confidences solemnly reposed in him—he may be a fabricator of calumnies, and a cheat—yet with all his depravity, if, when charged with dishonourable conduct, he will, by denying it, add another lie to the catalogue of his delinquencies, and support this lie by the hazard of a life of which profligacy has rendered him reckless, he may still pass for an honourable man, and is still a privileged companion among those who *assume* the highest rank! On the other hand, if a person *is habitually actuated by the nicest sense of honour*, and illustrates in his practice all those qualities which are comprised in the better conception of this principle; if, perhaps in the cause of honour itself, he refuses to hazard a life which may be

agreeable to himself, or useful to others; he, forsooth, *has thus forfeited* his title to the character of a man of honour.

632§. In this view of the matter, it seems requisite only that a man should acquire the temper of a duellist, in order, with none but the qualities perhaps of a scoundrel, a ruffian, or a beast, to be an assured man of honour under all circumstances!* What may have been the origin of this mode of vindicating a claim, false, or true, to honour, it may be difficult to say with certainty. It is easy to understand that men, inveterately disposed towards each other, whether from reiterated injuries, or sudden provocation, may be actuated by a resentment so strong that nothing but the sacrifice of the life of an enemy may be sufficient to allay it. This may perhaps be considered the natural origin of single combats, resembling in this origin, to some extent, the more general warfares which arise between tribes, and nations: ingrafted upon this natural origin, it is probable that a prescribed institution of this sort arose *out of the defects of legislation*, and the superstition of mankind.

633§. Cases must have occurred in all periods of society, as none have been exempt from falsehood, in which the testimonies of individuals, whether relating to private or public interests, were opposed; and without aid from religion, it was not an unlikely mode of settling an equal dispute, where all other arguments were

* It is by no means intended to deny that the practice upon which these reflections are offered, is not sometimes, or even frequently, associated with the highest principle, or the noblest sentiments which can adorn human nature; but, in the most favourable examples, it may be doubted whether it does not spring from a blind, or irrational concurrence in a social error, the nature and extent of which, it is here designed to expose.

exhausted or had failed, by a defiance, which would afford something like a presumptive proof at least of the sincerity both of him who gave, and of him who accepted it. In after-times, strange as the anomaly may appear, Religion lent her expressed sanction, in cases of a similar nature, to the trial by combat, under the presumption that God would decide for the right. In modern times, this expectation has been abandoned ; and though it is now believed that such disputes are commonly decided in favour of him who has the truest eye and the steadiest hand, or rather, who best knows how to use them, still this method of settling *questions of truth* is frequently appealed to.

634§. Thus, to connect the modern practice with our view of the prevalent construction of the nature of honour : One man accuses another of falsehood ; upon which a challenge ensues from him whose honour is thus impeached. Now whether the charge is just, or unjust, how can this be proved *by the event* of the duel, supposing the old expectation, that God would decide for the right, to be abandoned ? The man who is *justly* accused of falsehood, may kill his opponent ; the man who is *unjustly* accused of falsehood, or any thing else, may be killed by his opponent. Why, then, seeing that the result of a duel is *no evidence whatever* that a person is either innocent or guilty, should this method be resorted to for a decision *between true, and false* ? It is obvious that *the force of an imputation cannot be weakened* by any result of a duel ; since this result can furnish *no evidence* by which the imputation may be either confirmed, or refuted.

635§. But then, it will be asked, is it not some proof of innocence, that a man is willing to hazard his life, in defence of his reputation ? To this question it must be answered, *assuredly not* ; for *each* opponent is ready to

abide this issue; yet *both* cannot be right—his doing so, only proves that he considers the hazard of his life, a less evil than perhaps the loss of his reputation; but by no means that his reputation is not brought justly under suspicion. This practice is, with some, induced by so many baits, or is so congenial with their temper, that they rather seek than avoid occasions of thus distinguishing themselves. With this disposition, a man may think himself entitled to discard all *the encumbrances* of honour, and sustain his reputation, not by any great sacrifices which might afford a presumption of his sincerity, but by an action congenial to his temper, or which promises an increase of the reputation which is most to his taste. Or even supposing the hazard of his life to be felt as a severe evil, a man whose honour is *justly* impeached, might nevertheless incur the risk of this evil, rather than the still greater one which he would suffer in the injury of his reputation, or in the loss of the place he desires to hold in society. Thus, there is no point of view in which this practice can be contemplated, in which it must not appear at least altogether inconclusive; since the *disposition* to rest a difference on this issue, is no proof that the cause is good, this disposition perhaps being the most *common*, among those whose cause *is the most likely to be bad*; and the *result*, depending rather upon practice and skill, than upon *justice*, is no proof that he is guilty to whom this result is adverse, or that he is innocent to whom it is favourable. It is not always even a proof of *superior courage*; for it may be generally said that he who refuses a challenge, *fears* a bullet, more than he fears society; and that he who accepts it, *fears* society, more than a bullet.

636 §. In favour, however, of this custom, oftentimes so completely at variance with that honour from which it professes to spring, it is observed that it has a bene-

ficial influence upon the manners of men ; that, but for this check, human intercourse would be intolerable ; the grossest insults may pass current without restraint, the most base assertions may be made, the most scandalous calumnies fabricated, with impunity. This argument, I admit, has considerable weight in favour of the practice ; at the same time, in this point of view, duelling becomes rather *a punishment*, by which the manners and conversations of men are confined within certain limits, than a rational method either of refuting, or confirmig an imputation—indeed, in point of *evidence*, it has about the same efficacy in the just settlement of a dispute, as if, under similar circumstances, the parties were to toss up, which should have his ears cut off.

637 §. But even this benefit, so commonly alleged in favour of duelling, is not without its counterpoise ; for, if a powerful check is imposed by it upon insult, falsehood, and calumny, on the other hand, it is equally a restraint upon the just exposure of character ; and gives protection against injuries of the deepest kind, only at the expense of *an additional evil*.

638 §. Are there then no occasions, on which this practice may be sanctioned by reason ? We will state the predicament to be this—a man suffers an injury by a false assertion, affecting in some or other way his interest, or his reputation. Now say that he challenges the person who does him this wrong—if he kills his opponent, or is killed himself, or neither—one, of two consequences, must be attached to either result : either it must *be admitted* that by this proceeding *he has refuted* the charge ; or else, notwithstanding he has resorted to it, the charge remains the same as before. It has just been shown that the truth, or falsehood, of a charge cannot be proved either by any result of a duel, or by the readiness with which it is risked : it follows,

therefore, that notwithstanding this evil has been freely incurred, the force of the imputation, under any result of it, *is not diminished*.

639 §. It only remains then to justify this practice upon the ground that a man, being conscious that he has suffered injury or injustice, *is desirous to avenge it*. Upon this ground, also, to say nothing of the immorality of the motive, the practice is equally *irrational*; for the person who has sustained an injury, proposes by this mode to punish him who has inflicted it, *by punishing himself* in an *equal degree*—thus, perhaps, adding physical, to moral injury; and instead of punishing, perhaps rewards the author of it for his baseness, by the eclat of an action of which there are many admirers.

640 §. From this exhibition of the argument, and I believe it is pretty nearly the popular view of it, it appears that only one of two purposes can be proposed by the practice of duelling, namely, to refute a slander, or to avenge an injury. We have seen that for the first of these purposes, it is totally inadequate; and for the second, absurd. Yet as it is productive of the good conceded to it, namely, that of confining within certain bounds the evil passions and propensities of men, and of improving, perhaps, the general tone of society, all the mischief and folly incident to it, are tolerated on this recommendation.

641 §. Whether or not the same effects, or much better effects, may not be ensured to society, by means which involve neither the evils, nor the absurdities of this practice, is for the consideration of Governments; who *should be* at least as much interested in *the welfare* of mankind, as in petty schemes of policy or aggrandizement, in which the welfare of mankind is not always

consulted. Some such design has been tried in another country, though I am ignorant under what regulations, or with what success. But to me it appears that every occasion, however trifling, which, as society is now constituted, may originate a duel, may be comprised in the jurisdiction of a court of honour; and that the proceedings may be conducted in nearly the same manner as in other cases of libel.

642§. An institution of this sort, would be founded *in the principle*, that *disgrace consists*, not in being called a liar, or a thief, but in *actually being* either a liar, or a thief. If a man *is not* a liar, there is just the same absurdity in his being called one, and about as much insult, as if he were called a camel, or a tree. Admitting then that disgrace *consists* in the *possession*, or *indulgence* of an imputed quality, or propensity, rather than *in the imputation*: the question, whether disgrace is really incurred? must be decided *by the proofs* of the possession of this quality, or of the operation of it, in a given instance: these proofs, although not always logical, would be precisely *of the same kind* as those which are otherwise admitted in law, for the decision of cases affecting either property, or life. Supposing then, with a resource of this nature, that an individual wished to exonerate himself from an unjust accusation of any kind; this may be done more effectually by challenging an opponent before a proper tribunal, either to establish the imputation by proof, or release him from it by a public failure in this respect, than by merely exposing himself to the additional injury of having his own brains blown out. A jurisdiction of this kind, sufficiently extensive to meet every occasion, and supported by adequate punishment, whether corporeal, pecuniary, or social, would at once protect character from calumny, regulate the tone of con-

versation and manners, restore the reputation which had been unjustly impugned, and put the stamp of delinquency upon those who deserve it.

643§. I am not prepared to assert that this relic of barbarism, so long as our Legislature do not think it worth while to make any provision for the evils it so imperfectly obviates, can be altogether abolished. But that a much more rational and effectual jurisdiction may be substituted; so arranged as to meet every difficulty, and to reconcile every material objection; I believe to be a matter of no great difficulty. There are some other topics of this subject, which have here scarcely been adverted to: it might be considered relatively to the different sources of honour; to the different stations, or occupations of men; and also in regard to its influence upon national character. I will not, however, digress into these particulars, but having premised these general reflections *upon the vulgar notions of honour*, will next inquire concerning its origin, with a view to aid our conclusions on the moral, or other obligations, it is calculated to impose.

644§. Recurring to our definition of the better apprehension of the principle of honour, it must be inquired if this sense would arise spontaneously; or without education? We have supposed, in our definition, that the purest form of honour, is that which consists of *a disposition*, preponderating over all other incitements, to an honourable practice on all occasions; the reward of which is to arise from self-approbation, or the consciousness of a conduct agreeable with an adopted principle of action. We have then, to consider the origin of this disposition.

645§. The necessity of an adherence to some sort of honour, is perhaps one of the earliest lessons, taught in

the most uncivilized stages of society. If only a dozen savages formed a community, they would soon find some of the virtues of honour, as truth, fidelity, at least towards each other, respect of person and property, to be essential to its interests, or existence. But, by a man in a state still more perfectly natural, as a mere insulated being, who has not received this early lesson of experience—who, never having lived in a community, and ignorant of the conditions of its subsistence, or of the necessities by which these conditions were suggested, these qualities of honour could not be known; because the experience which furnishes the lesson, must at least precede the deduction from it. It seems then that the notion of honour, like the moral sense, is a result of some, or other, grade of education.

646§. Quitting our reflections upon the honour of savages, which, though not very comprehensive in its objects, is perhaps less frequently violated than that of the great mass of civilized beings; let us trace the history of this sense in our more favourable specimens.

647§. We will suppose it intended, whether in aid of other principles of morals, or in place of them, to create in a child this sense of honour, in order that his future life may be regulated by it. What sort of proceeding would be required for the accomplishment of this design? In the first place, (as in the case of moral beauty, &c.) he must be taught in what honour consists: its objects must be represented to him, its rules defined, and its applications described. We may suppose all this to be settled; and for the sake of simplicity, we will suppose the general criterion of honour to be the welfare of society, in all our intercourse with it. Thus much for the instruction, by which our pupil is taught in what honour consists.

648§. It may be presumed that the mere display of the nature, or objects of this principle, will not ensure its adoption: if an action, agreeable with a rule of honour, is opposed to an affection, to an object of desire or aversion, the mere information that the former is *honourable*, will no more ensure its performance, than if it were said to be white, or black. In order that honour should be capable of opposing an inclination for other objects, an equal, or a more powerful inclination, must be produced in favour of honour. To the injunction then of a preference of honour to other objects, or pursuits actually desired, would succeed, on the part of our pupil, an inquiry concerning *the grounds* of this preference—one is agreeable to him, the other disagreeable. What then are the terms of recommendation, by which it is intended to create a different disposition?

649 §. For this purpose, it may be urged by a preceptor, perhaps an enthusiast in the scheme, “the principle of honour furnishes a rule of conduct on every occasion in life; it conduces to the happiness of mankind; is an essential quality in those innumerable transactions which grow out of the relations of society; its adoption is that of a superior impulse, which distinguishes the gentleman from the vulgar, the noble from the base; it raises its possessor to the highest grade in the scale of humanity, and ensures the approbation, and applause of mankind.” This, it must be allowed, is a very imposing panygeric: let us, however, analyse it.

650 §. Setting aside *the convenience* of a rule of action of some kind or other, which will apply to all occasions, the adoption of this principle of honour seems to be recommended on two grounds, philanthropy and pride—the latter may be subdivided, as the pride of attainment, or that which is gratified *by the posses-*

sion of a quality; and the pride of reputation, which is mean enough to be satisfied *with the credit* of it—these are most commonly, in some proportion, mixed.

651§. To compare this division, which suffices for our present purpose, with the terms of the panegyric: The principle of honour furnishes a proper rule of action on all occasions, and thereby conduces to the happiness of mankind. This recommendation falls within the systems before considered, which have philanthropy for their basis—the object proposed by the adoption of the principle, is the welfare of mankind: but before this incentive can have any weight, as was formerly demonstrated, *the love* of mankind must exist; and if not a natural disposition, must be produced by cultivation, in sufficient degree, to make the affection for public welfare, prevail over that for every private interest, to which it may be opposed. If accepted on this ground, the sense of honour will differ but little from the *moral sense*, or rather will become identical with it; because the rules of honour will be extended, abridged, or modified, to a conformity with those moral rules, by which the happiness of mankind is thought to be most effectually consulted.

652§. Then comes the recommendation which is best suited to a *prevalent* efficacy—"The adoption of the principle of honour, is that of a superior impulse: it *raises its possessor* in the scale of humanity; it *distinguishes* the noble, from the base; and ensures the *applause* and *admiration* of mankind." Now supposing the sense of honour to be produced by this latter recommendation, what is the nature of the bait? what the disposition to which it may be successfully addressed? and what the character of the impulse which is likely to originate from these sources?

653§. All these terms of praise have this common agreement, that they give *a promise of superiority* to the person, by whom this principle of honour may be adopted—"The possession of it distinguishes the noble, from the base, ensures the applause and admiration of mankind, &c." The chief incentive, then, in this splendid eulogium, consists in the promise of superiority; and is of course addressed to *a love of superiority*, presuming that this is a common ingredient in human nature—or at least has a place in the composition of the pupil, on whom this lesson is inculcated.

654§. We will suppose our pupil, captivated by this description, to accept the principle in its better form: he is told, by the adoption of such a principle of action he will be distinguished from a very large proportion of mankind, exalted in the scale of humanity, &c.: he accepts it, therefore, *because he desires* this superiority; and he entertains the principle, *because* he is gratified by the possession of that by which his title to superiority is authenticated. The *incentive* to the system of honour, *is a promise* of superiority; *the disposition* by which it is favourably received, is one of love, or desire for this kind of superiority; the entertainment of the principle, and its influence upon conduct, are founded in the gratification derived from a consciousness of the superiority its possessor has attained. Hence, the principle of honour may be said *to be adopted* from pride, or from a love of superiority; and *to be maintained* by the gratification of this pride, or love of superiority.

655§. It is certainly possible that, in the adoption of the principle of honour, pride, and philanthropy, may be mixed; at least, it might, with some, be an additional inducement, if this code were thought beneficial to society. So much may indeed be pleaded in its

justification ; but I believe there are very few occasions, on which honour derives much assistance from a genuine philanthropy.

656§. We have supposed an argument addressed to the pride of our pupil, or to his love of superiority, to have succeeded in producing *the adoption of a principle*, by which his pride may be gratified. Now *what are the terms of this success?* Merely that the love of the kind of superiority promised, should exist in sufficient degree. Say that the same argument is addressed to another, and does *not* succeed—what is the reason of this failure? Simply, that he has not the same love of this kind of distinction, or there is a predominance of other tastes. Is he then destitute of pride? Most likely not; but *his pride* may be gratified by wrestling, boxing, taking birds' nests, &c. when a boy; and by shooting, fishing, hunting, drinking, or picking pockets, when he becomes a man.

657§. From this view, it appears that the success of a recommendation of the principle of honour, is dependent upon the disposition to which it is addressed. The chief ground of this recommendation, is distinction, or pre-eminence: if its rules are complied with from a sense of duty, it will then be more properly examined in connection with one or other of the avowed systems of ethics. If then the question is concerning *the extent* to which the adoption of the principle of honour may be reckoned upon? the answer is, To the extent to which the disposition prevails, which can derive more gratification from a consciousness of the possession of this principle, than from the numerous attractions to which it is opposed.

658§. As the necessity of a code of honour is pretty generally felt in society, respect for its obligations is to

some extent maintained by the influence of social reward and punishment: the person whose conduct is honourable on all occasions, is gratified by the approbation or applause of society; and a deficiency in this respect, or a violation of the rules of this system, is followed by public censure, or exclusion from society. If we were to consult our experience respecting the extent to which the love of honour, *for the sake of its possession*, is a prevalent affection? the examination would perhaps not incline us to think it very general. *The profession* of honour is, indeed, sufficiently common; but the sense which accompanies this profession, is not that which *proposes its gratification* from the possession of a principle, or *from its practical exercise*, but is rather a sense of *the expediency of the semblance* of honour, founded in the dispensation just remarked, of reward and penalties, respectively attached to the observance, or breach, of its laws.

659 §. This latter kind of honour, if it may be so called, though it furnishes no motive of private conduct, to a great extent ensures a compliance with the intentions of the principle, *on most public occasions*. It is, however, sometimes a mixed impulse, and its effects are greatly dependent upon circumstances: on some private occasions, when weakly opposed by other interests, it suggests the line of conduct from a faint regard for it, independently of the censure of society; and it fails *on some public ones*, where the interests opposed to it are more powerful than either the desire of applause, or the apprehension of disgrace.

660 §. From this appeal to experience, it appears that the disposition is rare, which will accept the principle of honour, in virtue of those terms by which it has been recommended. Agreeably with the prevalent dispositions of men, they are gratified by numerous acquire-

ments and pursuits, in a greater degree than by the possession of a principle of action, commonly opposed to their stronger propensities, which will only raise their *self-esteem*. Nay, it may be doubted whether the disposition is not rare, which is susceptible of self-esteem from this influence. Although ambition of some sort is diffused through all classes of men, yet the desire of distinction from a *private conviction* is rare, as the desire is common, for the distinctions conferred by society. A man may derive gratification from the assurance that he possesses a quality, of which the world is ignorant: but such quality, in general, is not itself an object of ambition, but is esteemed only for the reason that it subserves a desired purpose, whether of a public, or private nature.

661 §. We have, however, supposed that pride may be gratified by the mere possession of a quality, which, in a suitable disposition, is capable of raising the sense of superiority. But the most common form of pride, is that which ensues from *public* distinction, or the public confession of superiority, the desire or pursuit of which, may be called ambition. The objects of this ambition are as diversified as the original dispositions, the education, and circumstances of men. To a great extent, the ambition of individuals, is observed to display itself in a desire to excel in the different departments of literature, in the sciences, or arts, in which they have been more especially educated. This may perhaps be in great measure owing to the associations which necessarily take place among those of the same pursuits; a common interest in these pursuits, subsists between the individuals engaged in them; degrees of excellence are defined in the qualifications of those by whom they are cultivated; and the love of superiority, thus excited, seeks the gratification of pre-eminence in a single department, which, with those who are fascinated with it,

may almost furnish a general criterion of the merits of men. One who had satisfied his ambition with the attainments of a first-rate scholar, would think but little of a mere mathematician; an accomplished statesman would have no great reverence for a mere scholar; a man who could trace his pedigree so far back as the eleventh century, would think statesman, scholar, and mathematician, very much beneath him, more especially if their grandfathers happened to be tailors; a Newmarket jockey would pity a Lord Chancellor, if he neither knew the breed of a horse, the value of a horse, nor how to ride a horse; a hard drinker would despise the head that was upset by a weak potation; and a painter, or a fiddler, may look with contempt upon the attainments of the scholar, the statesman, the lawyer, the mathematician—or even upon the exquisite endowments of him, whose honours are derived from distant generations.

662 §. Education, however, in any one particular art or science, by no means renders a person always insensible of merit in other departments, or confines his ambition to this; on the contrary, the desire of pre-eminence in a professional attainment, sometimes, scarcely displays itself; while ambition may burn with great ardour in favour of some other mode of distinction, to which the habits and education of the individual may have been averse. The effect of a training in any occupation or pursuit, so far as this is calculated to produce a desire of distinction in this particular way, seems to depend, 1st, upon the degree of interest with which the subject is regarded; 2nd, upon a disposition, which would be gratified by that real, or reputed, excellence, which is in others admired, or envied; and, 3rd, upon some real, or presumed qualifications in the individual himself, for attaining the same distinction.

663 §. The chances of rendering, by education, the principle of ambition, or indeed any other, permanent and uniform, are perhaps most to be depended upon in the most uncivilized stages of society ; for in these, there is less likelihood of destroying the influence of early precepts, by reasoning, or sophistry ; and as the habits of men, their occupations and pursuits, are simple, *the modes of distinction* presented to their tempers or their tastes, are extremely few. The grounds of distinction, at least in some illustrations of savage life, are almost confined to the chace, to war, the endurance of pain, and contempt of death. Here the prevalent confession of superiority respects so few objects, that precepts inculcating excellence in one, or in all, are likely to be adopted, and preserved, with the force of instruction which has never been questioned, or, in opposition to which, *no choice is presented*. But as communities are enlarged, wants are multiplied ; arts, sciences, and pursuits are diversified, competitions are lighted up ; sentiments, and opinions, of all kinds, are arrayed in perpetual conflict : hence there is *a mode of distinction* suited to every disposition ; a party, with whom ambition may display itself, seeking applause, even from the boldness of its hostility to the general principles of honour or virtue. Amidst such a confusion of heterogeneous materials, the only wonder is, that the checks imposed by society are so extensively respected ; and that there is, among mankind, so much agreement or stability.

664 §. To connect this digression with our more immediate subject—it has been shewn that there are four forms of that which passes for the principle of honour ; or, that it may be accepted or assumed on four grounds : 1st, from an impulse of philanthropy, to the interests of which this system may be thought essentially conducive ;

2nd, from a sense of the elevation attained by the adoption of that which is esteemed a superior principle of action ; 3rd, from a desire of the reputation for honour, without much regard for the principle itself ; 4th, from a sense of the expediency of honourable conduct, founded on the dispensations of society. These forms of honour are single, or blended in various proportions, in the characters of individuals. Whether there may be an abstract love of honour, or a natural bias in favour of its rules, independently of the sources enumerated, may be suggested ; but an analysis of a presumed example would not perhaps tend to confirm the supposition.

665 §. It has been seen that, except in its connection with a motive of philanthropy, or of political expediency, the principle of honour is adopted from pride, or ambition ; either seeking gratification from the *conviction*, or else from the *credit* of superiority. But whatever may be its recommendation, the acceptance of it illustrates only the common result of a preference, for that which holds a suitable relation with a taste, or disposition. If philanthropy is the basis of a sense of honour, why a person indulges his inclination, by adopting it, just as if horse-racing, cock-fighting, or pugilism, were his prevalent addiction ; the objects only are changed, agreeably with the diversity of that mental constitution which has been before traced, and the result of which has been generally expressed by the word “disposition.” If the pride of *superior attainment* furnishes the impulse of a sense of honour, why *then the gratification* of this propensity, is *preferred* to that of any other which may not be agreeable with it. The same of the desire of a mere reputation for honour ; and the same also of its observance from expediency ; that is, the disposition is so constituted as to be susceptible of a preference of the objects respectively, to which it tends.

666 §. But although *the mode* of the production of a sense of honour, is common to every example of preference, whatever may be its object, and indeed only illustrates the universal relation of cause and effect, it may be inquired, is not the preference of this principle *more commendable* than that of any other which, in its nature or consequences, may be contrasted with it? The discussion of this question has been occasionally touched upon, and will hereafter be further pursued. At present it may be answered by remarking, that a principle which more effectually subserves the welfare of society than another, *is better* than such other *for society*: but whether it is better *for the individual*, remains to be considered, in connection with the coincidence between public, and individual, good.

667 §. The existence, then, of the sense of honour, in its better forms, seems to depend upon a disposition in the individual to a preference of its rules, whether from pride, or philanthropy, or these mixed, sufficiently powerful to oppose all other temptations. Its influence on character, where the principle is not thus adopted, depends either upon the desire of applause, or the fear of disgrace. Among those who are susceptible of its recommendations, a corresponding obligation, both in degree, and in kind, may be calculated upon: but with those who have no disposition to accept it either from pride, philanthropy, or taste; and who are so far alienated from all regard to society as neither to fear its censure, nor desire its applause; with all such, the recommendations on behalf of a principle of honour, furnish no obligation.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY.

668 §. IT has been formerly shewn to be an *inevitable result* of the constitution of human nature, that all men *must act, on all occasions*, from a motive of self-interest. This proposition is, at first sight, not perfectly agreeable with the whole of our experience: hence, although its truth is to a great extent a matter of common observation, it seems, in rare examples, so flatly contradicted by what is called liberality, generosity, *disinterestedness*, that, as an axiom, it is scarcely thought to be without exceptions, even by those who are accustomed to look for a motive of this sort, under the most specious appearances. The instances in apparent opposition to this law, have been before examined: I will here merely repeat, by way of defining the sense in which the proposition is to be understood, that the actions of a man are according to his volition; that his volition is dependent upon, or synonymous with preference; the object of which, however embarrassing the choice may be rendered by circumstances, is that which is most agreeable to him. It need not be added that *self-gratification*—the attainment of a good, or the avoidance of an evil, is *the common end* of every action or pursuit, suggested by that which is called self-interest.

669 §. From the *similarity of nature* which prevails among men, notwithstanding its infinite shades of modi-

fication, there is, to a great extent, community of desires ; hence, agreeably with the propensity just remarked, that which is possessed by one individual, must frequently be coveted by another. In a state of *nature*, supposing that one man desires that which another possesses, and is able to obtain it by force or stratagem, what is there to hinder him ? It must be answered, “ nothing,” before the checks imposed by civil, religious, or social laws, are instituted for this purpose.

670 §. In a state of society in which men are at liberty to act without restraint, upon motives of individual interest, the weak must frequently become the prey of the strong ; the unsuspecting, of the crafty ; and therefore laws are enacted to restrain this tendency to private benefit, and render the actions of individuals, agreeable with the welfare of a community.

671 §. By such laws, the principle of self-interest is rather directed, than subdued ; it is the basis of legislation, rather than the object of legislation to dispense with it : by these laws *the interests* of individuals are prescribed, *or changed* ; for whereas, *before* their institution, it may be the interest of one man to rob another, so *afterwards* it is rather his *interest to be honest*, than to hazard the punishment, of whatever kind, for theft. The same may be remarked of perhaps all the other virtues, which have for their end the welfare of society ; and which are protected by some or other imposition, which makes it the interest of individuals to observe them—of these virtues, honesty may, if requisite, stand as the representative.

672 §. It appears, then, that the benefits of this arrangement must still *be partial* ; for if the weak are protected, the gratifications of the powerful are abridged. But the entire case is not yet exhibited—

although, previously to the institutions of society, the strong may indulge their inclinations at the expense of the weak, the weak, in turn, by stratagem or confederacy, would retaliate upon the strong. The fluctuations of *interest* then, in *this state of things*, would be according to the fluctuations of success, or of possession. Meantime, the evils of perpetual warfare are incurred; a general insecurity of possession prevails; the benefits of co-operation are precluded: and hence, the forbearance, or the restraints which are found to promote the welfare of a community, are also confessed to be the most conducive to individual advantage. This experience produces the sense of political expediency; and the ground of its recommendation to individuals is this—that *it is the interest of individuals* to observe in their conduct, the rules which are essential to the welfare of a community.*

673 §. The obligation then to a concurrence on the part of individuals, in a system of general expediency, is founded upon the *coincidence* between *general*, and *individual* expediency. Hence, after experience has suggested the rules adapted to general welfare, and legislation has ensured respect of them as far as may be, *the motive* of a conduct, in conformity with these rules, is precisely that which prevailed before their institution; that is, in each case individuals pursue their own interest, with this difference, that their interest, which, before the social compact, was opposed to the general good, is afterwards conducive to it.

674 §. But the interests of individuals are, in this stage of the argument, but partially represented. It

* See this doctrine inculcated by Shaftesbury, in his "Inquiry concerning Virtue," with his accustomed elegance of manner, and depth of reflection.

is shown that the conduct which is most agreeable with general expediency, is more conducive to individual advantage, than if each person pursued his own desires, without any regard to the welfare of others. But there is a sort of under-plot, which is the source of all the discrepancies remarked between the actions of individuals, and the general good. Although it is confessed that a *general observance* of the social rules is better suited to individual interest, than if such rules were commonly violated; yet it often happens that individual interest, is opposed to general expediency, under circumstances, by which the evils of a *prevalent pursuit* of individual interest, are not incurred; and therefore, although it is *the general* interest of individuals to acquiesce in a scheme of *general* expediency, it may become the *particular interest* of individuals, to act in opposition to this scheme. Thus, supposing it recommended to a person to abstain from a theft, by which he may be enriched for life, on the ground that respect for the rights of others, is most conducive to the welfare of individuals, and therefore to his own; he would perhaps confess the truth of the principle to some extent, but in this particular instance he would run no hazard from its violation, for the theft may perhaps be committed without danger of punishment or retaliation; and therefore, by committing it, he would, when *opposing* the scheme of *general* expediency, act upon precisely *the motive* which is urged in recommendation of a *concurrence* in it—namely, upon the motive of *individual* interest.

675§. This, more especially in the more complex forms of society, is a frequent predicament. The *individual* recommendation to concur in the scheme of general expediency, being *individual* good, this obligation *would cease*, whenever public and private interests were opposed: if, therefore, a person could profit him-

self by an action inimical to the interest of a community, without fear of punishment, there would still be *the same reason* for thus consulting his private advantage, as for an opposite conduct on another occasion, where it appears his interest to co-operate for the general good. Hence *private advantage would be pursued, whenever the individual gain, from a proposed acquisition, was greater than the individual injury, consequent upon the violation of the rules of general expediency.*

676§. Supposing it then to be proposed, that an individual should concur in this scheme of general expediency, *because it is his interest*; for *the same reason* he may act in opposition to general expediency, when this latter happens not to be his interest. This defect, arising necessarily out of the constitution of human nature, has been at all times felt: and the mere demonstration of a connection or coincidence between general, and individual good, having an influence upon conduct to the extent only *of their agreement*, and therefore a very partial one, it has been attempted to ensure a practice conformable with *public good*, on occasions where this, and private interest, are opposed, by *other* incentives and restraints—hence the institution of the *civil laws*; hence the *rules of society*, which descend to those minor instances which the laws do not embrace; hence the political uses of the ethics of Christianity; of the precepts of philanthropy; the code of honour; the exhibition of the beauty of virtue—all of which agree in the design, whether by creating affections, or controlling them, of producing an agreement between individual interest, and public welfare.

677§. In the operation of these systems, auxiliary to the recommendations of political expediency, it has formerly been shewn that a community of motive may be traced

in all those examples by which they are respectively illustrated. In reverting to these systems, I will merely remark of any one of them, that if a concurrence in the scheme of social welfare is founded on the dispensation of reward and punishment, or upon any ground of affection or taste, such recommendation will influence those only who are disposed to admit the reality and importance of such dispensation; or whose tempers incline them to embrace the taste or affection proposed to them, rather than any other which might be opposed to it. Say then that a person, whether from the expectation of reward, or fear of punishment, from a love of mankind, from a sense of honour, or a taste for moral beauty, concurs, on all occasions, in the scheme of general expediency, he does this because his individual interest is to obtain a reward, or avoid a punishment; or else because he *indulges an inclination compatible* with general good, in *preference* to any other he may happen to entertain—and to this extent the spring of his conduct is the same as that of one who, before the nature of general expediency was understood, pursued exclusively his private advantage; that is, each would act under the impulse of *a prevalent affection*, entertaining only different objects, agreeably with the diversity of the dispositions with which they are related.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL COMPARISON OF MORAL PRINCIPLES AND OBLIGATIONS.

678 §. WE have many times had occasion to connect with the topics of our discussion, a statement of the general end, or intention of morality. In our inquiry concerning the moral sense, it has been demonstrated that our notions of morals are obtained by education, in a way *which is common* to every other department of information. It has been shown also, that the general intention of morality is, by a principle of conduct, to impose a restraint upon those propensities of self-love, the indulgence of which would, in proportion as it was prevalent, be prejudicial to the welfare of others. Hence morality has been formerly considered as auxiliary to the civil laws; tending at once to supply their deficiencies, and to give an additional motive for their observance.

679 §. If then the end of morality may be stated to be the welfare of a community, this object must furnish *a criterion*, by conformity, or disagreement, with which, an action may be decided to be moral, or otherwise. But before defining the welfare of a community as the criterion of morality, it should be settled in what the welfare of a community consists? It must be replied, in as much individual gratification, as can be enjoyed without injury to others. But by this answer our for-

mer criterion of morality, namely, the welfare of a community, seems to be in some measure deserted: if the object of morality is the welfare of a community, a conduct which has this object in view *should contribute* something towards the happiness of others; and this is the general construction of the design of morality: but if the welfare of a community is said to consist in the gratification of individuals, then the object of morals, instead of a contribution to the happiness of others, would be as much individual enjoyment as could be obtained without injury to others. Is then individual happiness still to be alleged as the criterion of the welfare of a community?

680§. To commence our analysis a little higher: It is to be inquired what is meant, in its application to human beings, by the term "welfare"? It must be replied, Happiness, or some or other grade, or modification, of pleasure. What then is meant by the welfare of a community? It must be answered, The happiness of a community. And of what does a community consist? It must be replied, Of individuals. After all, then, the welfare of a community means the happiness, or gratification of individuals—the end of morality is the welfare of a community, and the welfare of a community is the happiness of individuals: yet morality proposes, on the part of individuals, an active co-operation for the happiness of others, rather than a pursuit of individual gratification.

681§. The argument can be rescued from this dilemma, only by rendering our definition of morality a little more comprehensive—instead of saying, the end of morality is the welfare of a community, we must propose, as its object, the happiness of individuals: if this happiness is promoted, as is confessed, on grounds formerly stated, by a compliance

with moral injunctions, not only must morality prescribe rules of conduct, but a just definition of it would include a given state of the affections; for without this, there would be, on the part of individuals, either no contribution to the happiness of others, or this contribution would be made at the expense of the happiness of individuals. Let us then try another definition of morality: let it be said to consist of a disposition, or predominant affection, among individuals, which is gratified by a compliance with all those rules of action which tend to the welfare of others. According to this definition, the end of morality corresponds equally with public welfare, and with the individual happiness in which it is said to consist.

682§. Independently of a state of the affections which would render moral practice a source of gratification, it is customary to allege that the happiness of individuals is promoted by the *mutual* contribution of benefits, in *a greater degree* than by a selfish and exclusive pursuit of individual advantage. It has however been formerly shewn that this incentive is not alone to be trusted; since, upon a similar ground of self-interest, immoral actions may be committed by individuals, whenever a more considerable benefit may be obtained by the violation, than by the observance of moral rules. This recommendation to morality would dispose men readily enough *to accept* benefits from others; but, unless they derived pleasure from the practice on other accounts, it would incline them to contribute none in return, except on occasions when the exchange may be in their favour.

683§. Confining ourselves, however, to the present question: It is sufficient in this place to state generally, that the end of morality is the welfare of a community. According to this test, whatever promotes the happi-

ness of others, *is agreeable with the intention* of morality ; whatever is injurious to others, is opposed to the intention of morality : and as communities are composed of individuals, whatever confers, or promotes, individual happiness, is agreeable with the intentions of morality, provided such individual happiness is attained without injury to others. Hence it may be said, that those are *moral affections, which dispose men to receive gratification* from a practice which is beneficial to others ; those are *moral actions*, which promote the welfare of others, or which concur in a scheme of public welfare : and affections and actions which are injurious to others, or inimical to public welfare, are not conformable with the intention, or principle, of morality.

684§. The *intention* of morality being thus simple, it would at first sight appear that the conduct which conforms to it must be, on all occasions, perfectly obvious. Yet, owing to the complexity of human affairs, and chiefly owing to the conflicting interests of men, either the rule, or the action, which may be agreeable *with the principle* of morality, is frequently liable also to be opposed to it. To illustrate generally this truth, it may be observed that *opposite views* prevail in every community, with respect either to the opinions, the sentiments, or the conduct which would be most agreeable with its welfare. Hence many parties are formed, all of whom, acting in conformity with the principle of morals, that is, in a manner which appears the most conducive to public welfare, violate, on the other hand, the principle of morals, by perpetual enmities, and contentions. And in the minor details of relations between individuals, it frequently happens that the services which, on the moral principle, are rendered to one, are injurious to another : if also the preference of public good is to be a predominant passion, there is no limit to the sacri-

fices which should be made by an individual in compliance with its impulse, by which also, the welfare, or even support of those dependent upon him, may be compromised : and if the love of public welfare is not a predominant passion, why then the moral practice will be but imperfectly secured ; for this love will, on many occasions, be too weak effectually to resist the temptations of interest which are opposed to it.

685§. However simple therefore may be *the intention* of ethics, there is room for great diversity of opinion concerning the system, or mode, by which its objects may be most effectually ensured ; so that *the end* of morality is rarely proposed as the guide for conduct, but is most commonly abandoned in favour of rules ; which are thought to promise as many advantages as can be obtained from a principle of morals, without, at the same time, incurring its inconsistencies.

686§. In what then, it may be asked, to take all these jarring elements into the account, does morality consist ? The Chinese might reply, in an observance of the laws of Confucius ; the Hindoos, in respect for the institutes of Menu ; the Turks, in obedience to the laws of Mahomet. Without, however, travelling beyond the civilized world, or our own times—to the question, in what does morality consist ? our religionists will agree generally, in a conformity with the precepts of Christ. But then what are these precepts, or how far are those agreed upon, which are relative to moral practice ? It might appear, from an examination of the ethics of Christianity, that the answer to this question may be sufficiently diversified. To quote one illustration : The Protestants belonging to the English Church, admit the competency of the civil Government to dictate the tenets of their religion, and to prescribe the mode of

worship: this is *a coincidence* with the civil Government—the Dissenters deny the authority of the civil Government, either for the decision of religious tenets, or for the dictation of a mode of worship: the Dissenters therefore do not acquiesce in the authority assumed by the civil Government. The Catholics agree with the Dissenters in this respect, but at the same time stipulate for the supremacy of the Pope: the Dissenters, and the Church Protestants, agree in renouncing the authority of the Pope; but the former, instead of accepting the religion, “by law established,” assume the right, in religious affairs, of being judges and arbitrators for themselves. Thus, the religionists are opposed either to their Government, or to each other, or both: and the consequence must be, either that the civil legislature remits its authority, or, compliances are yielded by sects and parties, in obedience to it, which are at variance with their principles. So long as there is no equality of power, these compliances may, to some extent, be successfully exacted; but each party is engaged in constant efforts to augment its strength; and no sooner is there such an approach to equality, as to afford a chance of success in a struggle for supremacy, than rebellious principles, lead to rebellious actions; or, as a result of these conflicting creeds, men fall to cutting each other’s throats—proposing to themselves, in a practice of this sort, merely the fulfilment of *a religious duty*, upon which *is founded their sense of moral obligation*.

687 §. In addition to the confession of some classes of the Religionists, that their morality is an obedience to the laws of God, or to the precepts of Christ, there are others with whom morality is not derived from religion, but is founded either upon a vague perception of expediency, or else, like honour, is thought to be a mere social convention, imposing no very strict obliga-

tion, except perhaps to external decency of conduct. If the question, in what does morality consist? were addressed to those who do not connect it intimately with a religious government, some would reply, in obedience to the civil laws; others, in obedience to the laws of society, or of particular associations, or parties in a community; others, in a concurrence in the scheme of social harmony; others, in a *benevolent* practice, which has for its end a contribution to the happiness of mankind: some, and this is the most important division, believe morality to consist in obedience *to rules*, from whatever system derived; others, in the conformity of sentiments and actions, with the *principle*, or *intention* of morality.

688 §. As, then, our question is so variously answered by respective parties, it may be properly asked, Does morality consist *in any one given system*, to the exclusion of every other? Let such a system be assumed, with a view to the discovery of some criterion, by which this doubt may be decided. Say that the moral laws, supplied by Christianity, are consistent, and so clearly delivered as not to admit, in any one instance, of two constructions. This, it may be affirmed, is the true, or best system of morality, and every other is false, or pernicious. Thus much our advocate. What, then, is the fact? or how much is proved by this assurance, in favour of this exclusive system? Merely that, by our advocate, this system *is believed* to be the true one, and every other false. Take, on the other hand, the testimony of a Turk, and he is ready to affirm the true system of morality to be comprised in the laws of Mahomet; or of an infidel, perhaps some kind of philosopher, and he affirms his conviction that *no rule* of morality can be at all times adhered to, without compromising *the principle*; and therefore that morality, making

its end the test of the distinction, consists in any practice which is calculated to promote the interests of mankind.

689 §. To the question, then, in what does morality consist? no more can be said in favour of *any one reply*, than that such is the belief of him who makes it: and as much may be said in favour of any other system which is professed with equal sincerity. It has been shown, in our chapter on this subject, that *all truth* is relative; quoting an example of knowledge, or of a perception which is justly thought to be the least equivocal specimen of reality, it has been asked, what is meant by saying, I see the candle which burns before me? to which it has been replied, merely that I have *this conviction*, or *consciousness*. It has been further asked, *why* it is *true* that such an object *exists*? The answer is, because I see it; which is another mode of expressing my consciousness, or conviction, to be a test of truth. If the same inquiry is made concerning any other object, whether one of perception, or of speculation, we can cite no higher proof in favour of its truth, than that we believe it; intending that *our conviction is that of a truth*, or reality.* Thus, also, in morals; whichever of the systems of morals is *believed* to be the *true* one, or the *best*, is so, relatively to him who entertains this conviction.

690 §. In objection to this conclusion, it may perhaps be urged by a disputant, there is something in proof of a given system, of which our disputant is the advocate, besides a mere belief in it; are there not *excellent rea-*

* See, for an explanation of some apparent inconsistencies on this subject, chap. i. of Indic. on Org. Life.

sons (which we will suppose to have been stated) for its being true? Admitting the excellence of these reasons, (to which we are disposed rather by courtesy, than by general experience) in what manner, or to what extent, do they prove the truth which they are intended to establish? Merely by producing a belief of it, or a *conviction* that it is so, in virtue of which it is asserted.

691§. But because any given system of morality is true relatively to him who believes it, it does not follow but that, in virtue perhaps of those same excellent reasons just spoken of, his belief of it may give place to a conviction in favour of some other system. We will suppose an ingenuous person, at one period of his life, to have drawn his notions of morals from some scheme of philosophy, rejecting the religion which is otherwise proposed as their proper source: we will suppose him at another period, whether from a light shed accidentally upon his mind, or from maturer reflection, to perceive the fallacy of his former views—to reject his philosophy in favour of religion, and to accept the morality it offers as the only true or rational system. What can he say more in favour of the *new system* which he has embraced, than that he believes it? and would he formerly have said less, or must he not have said the same, in behalf of the old one which he has rejected? The religionists will all agree that, in his *new* profession, he is perfectly correct; that, in complying with the recommendations of *his reformed* morality, he is acting upon *true principles*. But what makes these principles true either to our corrected moralist, or to those who sanction so liberally his reformation? Simply, on the part of our moralist, that he believes one system instead of another; and on the part of those who commend him, that they entertain a similar belief. If an action upon one principle is just, *because* this principle is believed, is

not an action upon another principle, *which is also believed, equally just?*

692§. Although then our question, in what does morality consist? admits so many different or contradictory replies, we perceive that there is *a general, or inclusive principle*, which extends the sanction of morality to all those by whom any one of its particular systems may be sincerely professed. There is this common agreement; that the Turk, the Jew, the Christian, and the Philosopher, *each believes* his adopted morality *to be true*. As truth and belief are synonymous, *belief* in either system of morality makes this *a true system relatively* to him who believes it. The Turk's morality is true, for this reason; and the Christian, for the truth of his morality, must urge the same reason, or *can* quote no higher testimony. So long as belief in a moral system is entertained, this system is a true one *relatively to him who believes it*, and no more; be the system what it might, it is as false, relatively to those who disbelieve it, as that in which *they* believe, might be relatively to those by whom it is rejected.

693§. Hence morality may be stated by different individuals, to consist in the adoption of very different sentiments, principles, or rules. The belief of each, in the system he professes, makes this to him, as a different one, for the same reason, is to others, *a true system of morality*: in other words, every system is true relatively to him who believes it; and every one is false, relatively to him by whom it is rejected. Morality, therefore, does not consist of any one system, since all the different systems may have an equal recommendation, or one common testimony for their truth. That then is a true system of morality, which is believed to be such; and therefore all those are moral sentiments,

or moral actions, which are in conformity with it. If different sentiments, or actions, proceeding from a moral design, were not reconciled by *the general principle*, that that is moral, which is believed to be so, the most conscientious men, whose views of things are liable to change, as their experience is diversified, or enlarged, may, upon every such fluctuation of opinion, have to reproach themselves with a whole previous life of immorality; and the more scrupulous was their moral sense, the more severe and constant would be this reproach. But as, in adopting a new system, or view of morality, they can urge no more in proof of its being right, than might before have been offered in favour of that which they have abandoned, so, upon this inclusive principle of morals, they have *precisely the same reason* to be satisfied with the actions which were in conformity with the rejected system, as they might have with those which are to follow from the creed, to which it has given place.

694§. Having thus arrived at some sort of settlement of the general nature of morality, it remains that we should consider *its obligations*. Recurring to the particular systems, before stated, morality is said to consist,

(1.) — In obedience to the will of God, or to the precepts of Christ; and *why* is the will of God, or why are the precepts of Christ obeyed? The answer must be, either from the desire of future reward, or from the fear of future punishment; or else from some impulse of love, or veneration, by which the practice of obedience is agreeable with a predominant affection.

(2.) — In obedience to the civil laws—and *why* are the civil laws obeyed? Either from the fear of incurring the punishment attached to a breach of them, or else from a respect for the civil laws, which is one form of affection, which renders obedience to them *agreeable*.

(3.) — In obedience to the laws of society, or of

particular associations, or parties, in a community—and why are the laws of society, or of any particular portion of it, obeyed? Either from the fear of disgrace, or diminished reputation, attached to their violation; or else from some motive of pride, or ambition, by which an observance of them is rendered necessary, or agreeable to a passion, or affection, founded in self-love.

(4.) — In a concurrence in the scheme of social harmony—and why this concurrence? According to our former exposition, for the gratification of a taste for moral beauty.

(5.) — In obedience *to rules*, from whatever system derived, or in a conformity of actions with the principle, *or intention* of morality, which has been said to be the good of a community—and why are rules, of whatever kind, obeyed? Either from the desire of reward, or the fear of punishment, or from an abstract affection for the rules themselves, or from a desire of their end—and why a conformity with the intention of morals? why a contribution to the happiness of others? Either from a feeling of philanthropy, which is gratified by the happiness of others, or from a sense of duty, founded in some motive of preference, whether relative to the end, or to self-approbation.

695§. The practical obligation then of morality, is either the desire of future reward, the fear of future punishment, or a love, or veneration of God, which seeks its gratification in an obedience to his commands; or else a respect for the civil laws, or a fear of the punishment attached to their violation; or a fear of social disgrace; or a desire of self-approbation, or applause, which is dependent upon the conformity of actions with adopted principles; or the gratification of a taste, or a benevolent affection, which delights in a contribution to the happiness of others.

696 §. We perceive from this exposition, that the *particular obligations to morality*, may be at least as *diversified as those particular systems* in which, by respective advocates, it may be said to consist. But amidst all this variety of motives, we may observe this common agreement—that they all propose the attainment of some modification of pleasure, or escape from some modification of pain. Hence, as it has been said of moral tenets, that although there are *particular systems*, there is one general principle of morality, which is common to, or includes them all ; so, although, agreeing with each system, there are many *particular obligations*, there is also a *general one*, founded in that *community of motive* which has just been remarked.

697 §. Every system of morality proposes rules of conduct, and morality is sometimes thought to be comprised in these rules ; but the proposition of rules would of course have no practical influence, unless a motive of obedience was connected with them, which is relative to some human affection. *Obedience*, therefore, to the precepts of morality, is *dependent* upon the force of the obligation : and this *will be relative* to the affections of individuals. If the affection is a predominant one, to which a moral obligation is addressed, conduct will therefore be in conformity with the moral rule ; if the affection is weak, or only prevails occasionally, the moral rule will be sometimes observed, but will be more frequently set aside. In proportion to the strength of the affection interested in the moral obligation, will be the adherence to the moral rule ; and this adherence will prevail extensively, or with limitation, among individuals, in proportion as the affection is, in this degree, rare or common. But although morality, in familiar construction, implies obligation, (and rules of morality would be idle without it) the important question remains to be discussed, whether the *moral obligation* is *above every other*.

698 §. Before entering upon this comparison, it seems necessary to understand what is intended by the word "obligation." In its customary sense, all penal enactments, and all proposed rewards, are termed the obligations either to forbearance from actions prohibited, or to the performance of actions which are recommended. In this sense I have commonly employed the term—but we propose here a brief analysis by which its true, or philosophic meaning may be ascertained.

699 §. Let it be proposed to an individual to pay a just debt—so far the rule, or precept—but our individual may perhaps reply to this recommendation, "*Why* should I pay it?" Because, if you don't, you will be sent to prison. Imprisonment then, in this case, is the alleged obligation to an act of honesty. But our individual perhaps says, in answer to this announcement, "I do not fear the penalty, for the debt cannot be proved; or if it were proved, *I had rather* incur the penalty, than pay the debt. Is then the threat of imprisonment *an obligation* to a moral action in this instance? In reality, it is only the proposal of an inadequate motive: can a person be said *to be obliged* to do, that which he *does not*? It would appear, however peremptory the mandate, or however formidable the denunciation, that if a person *does not* perform a given action, *he is not obliged* to perform it. Let us reverse the case we have supposed—let the payment of a debt be proposed to an individual of other sentiments, or affections—to the question, *why* he should pay it? because, it may be answered, it is just; because it is inculcated by religion, and enforced by the promise of future reward, or the threat of future punishment; because imprisonment will be the consequence of refusal, &c. If, in agreement with whatever mode of self-love, an individual acknowledges the sufficiency of a demonstration of justice to impose a conduct in conformity

with it, he will comply with the claim *on this ground*, and therefore *to him*, justice *has the force of an obligation*: if this motive of justice should fail to induce the action it recommends, justice is with him *no obligation*. Upon a religious motive, however, the action may be performed: then, although an abstract or philosophic proposal of justice, as an end, is to our individual no obligation, religion is: or both these motives failing, from the absence both of morality and religion, the fear of imprisonment may induce the payment of the debt; the latter incentive would then have the force of an obligation, while the proposal of the two former would be that, not of obligations, but of inadequate, or rather, perhaps, of inapplicable motives.

700 §. Two conclusions appear to follow from this statement of the argument: the first, that *the test* of obligation *is obedience*; and the second, that all obligation is relative. But is obedience, it may be inquired, the test of *the highest* obligation? for, it may be continued, a corollary of this admission must be, that *whatever action is performed*, whether good or bad, it is the result of *the highest obligation*. Say that a choice of two actions, one good and the other bad, is proposed to a person: the alleged motive for the one, is the expectation of future reward; that of the other, a present gratification. Say that our individual complies with the former inducement, *and performs* the good action; which alleged motive then imposes the *highest* obligation? It must be replied, that which is founded in the expectation of future reward: and what proves this to be the *highest* obligation? Simply, that it is followed by obedience—and what shall we say of the proposed motive which is not followed by obedience? That, for this reason, it imposes *no obligation*—unless that can be obligatory, which I presume means *compulsive*, which is not obeyed. Thus, then, the *moral* act is recommended

by the highest obligation: but say that the individual, to whom this choice is submitted, either does not believe in the future reward, or from a predominant inclination prefers the present gratification—to which action is there *then* the *highest obligation*? Assuredly to the immoral one, if this is performed; for to that which is rejected, the proposed inducement is inadequate, and therefore does not amount to an obligation. Whether then an obligation may be called the highest, or the lowest, whether moral, or immoral, obedience still is the test of obligation; of which, in reality, there are no degrees, since that which is obeyed is merely an obligation; no obedience can prove more than an adequate obligation, and that is no obligation which is not *characterised* by this consequence.

701 §. But the question concerning the *highest* obligation, is perhaps less relative to fact, than to propriety; instead of the inquiry what is the highest obligation, the question may be disposed more agreeably with customary intention, by asking *what ought* to be the highest obligation? Before this question can be answered, it must be known how much is meant by this word “ought,” which seems to imply some pre-eminent authority.

702 §. We will take, by way of example, any acknowledged instance of duty, as obedience to God, or obedience to the civil laws: Why *ought* God, or why *ought* the civil laws, to be obeyed? We will not say, in reply, because obedience *is prescribed*; because as much may be said for a direction of any other kind. It may however be answered, by one who thinks a substitution of terms sufficient, “God ought to be obeyed, because it is a duty.” What then is meant by a duty? A rule, which ought to be obeyed. And why ought a rule, which is termed one of duty, to be

obeyed? Because, it may be replied, it is agreeable to God, or beneficial to mankind. And why should we do that which is agreeable to God, or beneficial to mankind? Because, it must be answered, on some or other account, it is agreeable, or advantageous to ourselves. If God is obeyed, as has been formerly shewn, it is from a sense of veneration, or respect, which makes obedience agreeable to us, or from an expectation of reward, or a fear of punishment, which makes obedience advantageous. If the welfare of others is promoted, it is from a feeling of philanthropy, which renders it pleasant, from the expectation of reciprocal service, or from some motive drawn from one or other of the moral systems, which renders it a source of immediate, or future gratification.

703§. The reason, then, why an action *ought* to be performed, or the ground of obedience to a rule of duty, is the common one of obligation, namely, preference, or predominant affection. If the action inculcated by the rule, is not one of preference, or agreeable to predominant affection, it is no duty, unless a duty is that which imposes no obligation. Hence the ground *of the efficacy* of a rule of duty, is precisely that of every other obligation, and may be tried by the same test—a rule of duty is followed *by obedience*, when it imposes an obligation; when *it is not* followed by obedience, it merely exemplifies a precept which imposes no obligation.

704§. It must be confessed, that the end of the performance of a duty, of whatever kind, is some sort of good or advantage to him who performs it. But it seems to be implied, and in this sense it is merely the statement of a proposition which may be believed or not, that those actions are the most advantageous to individuals, which are conformable with the rules

of duty. Hence it may be said (and we will not quarrel with the terms, lest we should have none left), that although many motives have, in reality, the force of obligations, that only should impose an obligation, or should be obeyed, which has for its end the *greatest sum of good*. This recommendation supposes that there is a choice of actions upon different motives: although perhaps one motive only which may be compared with another, furnishes an obligation of any kind, we will allow, for the sake of convenience, that which it is said *ought* to be the predominant one, to be called *the highest obligation*.

705§. The proposition of a moralist, then, may be thus represented:—Morality should impose *the highest obligation to conduct, because* a practice in conformity with moral rules, is productive of a greater sum of good, or averts more evils (and hence becomes a duty), than obedience to motives furnished from any other source. Thus much for the proposition; the truth of which our moralist next proceeds to demonstrate—"A moral conduct is sanctioned by the approbation of God: it is a compliance with the terms of future reward; it obtains the respect, perhaps the applause, of mankind; it promotes social welfare, and offers to self-love the gratifying sense of a superior character, founded in the adoption of superior motives of action—hence, it may be continued, on some, or all of these accounts, nothing can be more obvious than that morality must be productive of the highest degree of happiness, and therefore supplies *an obligation which should be superior to every other*." It must be acknowledged that this recommendation is entitled to no inconsiderable respect; but it is possible that there may be those who have so far taken leave of all opinion and affection, which it is the common object of education to teach or inspire, that not one of these terms of praise will find a hold

upon their refractory natures ; and therefore all of them will fail of imposing an obligation. Suppose our moralist to have addressed his panegyric to one of this unlucky caste ; he might reply, in an orderly manner, to its several advantages, “ I am not sufficiently acquainted with God, to know whether morality is agreeable to him, or not, and still less do I know enough of his intentions, to be assured that he will reward it in a future state : as for the respect, or applause, of mankind, I should not feel honoured by the applause of those whom I despise ; on the contrary, the farther I am removed from their approbation, the greater is the distinction I prefer. Entertaining then no very favourable opinion of mankind, and feeling towards them, if not dislike, at least no regard, their welfare must of course be to me a matter of indifference ; and for the persuasion of a *superior character*, young gentlemen and ladies are taught that their pride may be flattered by the adoption of the moral views, and old gentlemen and ladies, from having, as they think, preserved in a jarring world some moral pretensions, do assuredly, on this account, think very highly of themselves : but for my own part, I can see in their virtue nothing more than the gratification of a taste or inclination ; and if they happen to have one taste, and I another, I am not sure that by pursuing the objects of mine, I do not display as much virtue, and may therefore feel as much pride, as they who act merely from other predilections.”

706 §. It must be confessed that, to an *unlucky individual* of this description, who has so far deserted humanity, morality imposes no obligation. But if it should still be inquired, *ought* it not to impose an obligation ? The answer is, it has been demonstrated that *the reason* why one obligation ought to be higher than another is, that it is productive of more pleasure, or advantage, than another. Now if an object which is

proposed to an individual, from peculiarity of opinion, or affection, can afford *no* pleasure, or advantage, it cannot be said, according to our definition, that such object *ought*, relatively *to him*, to impose the highest obligation.

707§. Not only has our rebellious subject ceased to feel interested by all common, or virtuous inducements, but his most powerful inclinations are perhaps opposed to morality. What then, to him, *ought* to be the highest obligation? Let us take the argument upon moral grounds. *Why ought* the obligation to virtue to be the highest? Because, in relation with certain affections, it is productive of the greatest happiness. But our individual has *other* affections, which disqualify him for any happiness from virtue, while the greatest, or the only pleasure of which he is susceptible, is derived from immoral pursuits—has he not, in favour of these immoral pursuits, precisely *the same claim* to a conduct in conformity with that which *ought to be* the highest obligation, as one whose practice, upon a construction of duty, is agreeable with the dictates of morality?

708§. What then shall we say of the general nature of obligation? Simply that it is, in every instance, relative to affection; that a proposed motive for action becomes an obligation, when, being related with a predominant affection, the object proposed by it is preferred to any other with which it might be compared. And of particular obligations; it may be observed that they are as diversified as the particular actions which are suggested by different grounds of choice.

709§. *The relation* which has just been remarked of obligation in general, is equally true of *any kind, or class* of obligations, which may be distinguished by a

term. Thus of *moral* obligation, the ground of its efficacy with one, may be the desire of future reward ; with another, the fear of future punishment : with one, pride in the possession of moral excellence ; with another, philanthropy, &c. And with respect to the *highest* obligation, with those even who confess it to be of a moral kind, it may suggest very different actions, or lead to the most opposite results, according to the *different constructions* of that conduct which is most agreeable with morals on different occasions.

710 §. It would appear from this latter view, as if obligation were not entirely relative to affection ; but acknowledged some kind of dependence also upon opinion. The connection between obligation, affection, and reason or opinion, seems to be this—that the obligation to an action is imposed by the relation of its end with affection, by which this action becomes one of preference, on some or other ground of self-love ; while the principal efficacy of *reason or opinion* is either to instruct us of the reality or comparative worth of a proposed object, or to direct or modify our actions in its pursuit : hence we have a vast diversity of actions, as various or fluctuating as the shades of opinion, performed by individuals who propose to themselves a similar end, or nearly the same mode of gratification. Thus the moralists, from whatever system they derive their chief design, all agree in pursuing a conduct which is conformable with their notions of morality : the Turk, the Jew, the Christian, and the Philosopher, all act from a moral impulse ; to this extent, the obligation and the end are the same ; but as the individuals of either class entertain different, or opposite opinions as to that in which morality consists, their conduct, on respective occasions, may be strikingly contrasted. Such modifications of conduct, under similar affection, from difference

of opinion as to the reality of an end, or concerning the best, or most successful method of obtaining it, are familiar in our daily experience: but although knowledge or opinion, as remarked in speaking of the moral sense, must always have a share in the direction of conduct, knowledge never produces actions, unless related with some predominant affection, by which these actions, rather than any others, are preferred.

711§. In order then to include in our account *of obligation* the efficacy of opinion or knowledge—instead of saying *that obligation ought to be the highest*, obedience to which is productive of the most gratification, we will say that obligation ought to be the highest, obedience to which *is believed* to be productive of the greatest good. The moralists agree in this foundation, for every specimen of conduct which boasts the recommendation of a duty; and the foundation being the same for other actions which may not be conformable with any given system of morals, the recommendation of duty may be equally pleaded in their favour.

712§. The meaning of the terms right and wrong still remains to be considered, in connection with the other topics of our analysis. In order to understand how much may be justly intended by the use of these terms, it is to be inquired, 1st, do the terms right and wrong imply the highest *moral* obligation to action or forbearance; or, 2nd, the highest obligation merely, *of whatever sort*? In examining these questions, it must be remembered that there is no absolute criterion of the highest moral obligation, but that this is relative to the belief of individuals, none of whom can say more in behalf of the morality they have adopted, than that they believe it; and none, it may be presumed, if their profession is sincere, would be inclined to say less.

713§. Recurring to example: We will select some acknowledged specimen of conduct which may be termed *right*. As one, of all others, the least liable to be questioned, we will say, it *is right* for a witness to speak the truth. *Why* is this *right*? or what do we intend by saying, it is right? Let it be replied, Because to bear testimony to the truth is a moral obligation. This answer brings us back to the question, whether a *moral* obligation is the *highest*? We have seen, in fact, that it is not, according to the test of obedience; because it may be set aside in favour of other obligations, which have no moral tendency. If then an action is right, because it is recommended by a moral obligation, it having been shewn that a moral obligation is not necessarily the highest, it follows that there may, in physical truth, be an obligation superior to that which is right.

714§. We have, then, to choose between two alternatives: either that which is right, being dependent upon *moral* obligation, is not the *highest* obligation; or that which is the *highest* obligation is *right*, although it should not be agreeable with morality. Appealing to customary application, which is sometimes the best criterion of the meaning of terms, it appears to be implied, when it is urged, in favour of a given action, that such action is right, that it is recommended by that which ought, on moral grounds, to be the highest obligation. Let us then inquire, *why* an action is performed in compliance with the highest *moral* obligation? Simply for the reason that this action, relatively to him who confesses the obligation, is thought to be the best; which means, productive of the greatest good. Then an action *is right*, that is, conformable with the highest alleged moral obligation, because it is productive of *most good*. We have seen, however, that this result, proving so rare a felicity of choice, is relative

to *certain* affections : if therefore the action is proposed to those of *other* affections, it cannot be *right* for *the same* reason ; on the contrary, a different or contrasted action will, with them, have precisely *the same reason* for being *right*, as the moral one with those who adopt it ; namely, that it, relatively to their affections, is productive of the greatest sum of good.

715§. Let there then be proposed to two individuals of different affections, and entertaining therefore different estimates of advantage, a choice between two actions, one moral, and the other immoral. We will suppose, by one of our individuals, the moral action to be preferred ; and he alleges, as a reason of his preference, that this action *is right*. If it is asked why it is right ? he may reply, Because it is agreeable with morals : and if he is asked why a conduct agreeable with morals is right ? he will reply, Because, in his estimate, that is, relatively to his affections and opinions, it is *the highest* obligation. Our other individual alleges that, according to his estimate, or relatively to his affections and opinions, the immoral obligation *is the highest*—may he not *therefore* say, the immoral action *is right* ? It must be answered, If the *moral* obligation *is right*, *because* by one person it is considered the highest ; any other obligation which may, by another, be considered *the highest*, must also, the reason being the same, be *equally* right.

716§. But, supposing the terms right and wrong to be confined in their use to actions which are either moral, or immoral (and this decision is rather arbitrary, than agreeable with the principles of obligation), still it is absolutely unsettled in what right and wrong consist ; for morality itself is variously interpreted. The highest *moral* obligation has been shewn to be that which is believed to be such : hence, upon the *moral*

ground, the terms right and wrong will be relative, not to any fixed or determinate conduct, but to all the varieties of moral apprehension.

717§. That then is agreeable with the construction of right, founded in community of obligation, which is believed *to be productive of the greatest good*; and therefore *ought*, thus becoming a duty, to impose the *highest* obligation. Right, therefore, will consist in no one principle, or system of morals; but, being relative to the belief of individuals concerning the highest good, will be exemplified in every action which is conformable with this belief. Hence it would follow, by antithesis, that every action is wrong, which is believed to be incompatible with the acquisition of the greatest good, or inconsistent with the pursuit of it.

718§. As, then, happiness, or some form or degree of pleasure, is the object or end of that which is right, and misery, or pain of some kind, the presumed consequence of that which is wrong; are we to propose happiness and misery, pleasure and pain, as the measure of right and wrong? Such a standard would be rather perplexing to our reflections on this subject; and is not agreeable with our definition. It frequently happens that an action which is considered right, or most obligatory, is productive of much misery; and, on the other hand, one that was considered wrong, turns out better than was expected, and produces the most fortunate consequences. But these unexpected results would not render the action wrong, which was believed to be right, nor that right, which was believed to be wrong; since, if right means that which ought to be most obligatory, and wrong, that which should be least so, the terms of the definition of right and wrong must be relative, not to *the results* of actions, but to *the belief* which imposes the obligation to them. Such unex-

pected results may prove an error of calculation ; but they cannot change the nature of right and wrong, which is dependent upon the quality of a choice, or action, *by which these results were preceded.*

719§. On what occasion, then, in agreement with this view of the argument, may a person be said to act right, or wrong? If that is *right* which is conformable with a sense of superior obligation, *founded in a belief of the greatest good*, every action which illustrates this coincidence must be right ; and that conduct only will answer to our definition of *wrong*, in which a temporary or inferior gratification is preferred at the expense of that which is believed to be the greater good. It is the licence afforded by this interpretation, which, in the daily practice of the world, gives the sanction of *right* to actions of a very equivocal kind. The soldier applies without scruple the term *right* to all the practices of war, by which pain, ruin, and death, are inflicted upon thousands of unoffending individuals: the statesman, for a mere bubble of some sort, thinks it *right* to originate and sustain this work of devastation ; or, for contemptible ends of policy, to make his whole life little better than a lie, a system of deception in his foreign and domestic relations—and for private ends of individual advantage, men, without any very elaborate reasoning, are seldom at a loss for an argument, by which the sanction of *right* may be compelled into the service of their inclinations. On these occasions, *a moral* plea is sometimes adduced ; but more frequently morality is not consulted : it is sufficient to understand that which promises the most advantage, and is therefore thought to be the most obligatory, in order to have a very satisfactory conviction of its being *right*.

720§. We have seen that the ground of a *moral*

obligation is a belief of the superior good : on the other hand, it has appeared that an *immoral* obligation may have a similar origin, or may plead the sanction of a similar belief. We have seen that the term *right* may be applied to moral actions, and that, for the same reason as these are right, there may be an equal obligation to immoral ones. Hence, it appears, after all, that the question of *duty* relates to the highest *rational* obligation; intending *that* to a conduct which is accepted by the understanding as the best, or productive of the greatest sum of good. If, however, a distinction of terms should be insisted upon, by which the application of the term *right* is confined to the *moral* practice, it must at least be conceded that the *moral* obligation does not become *the highest*, unless it is accepted as the highest *rational* obligation, which is invariably the case with those with whom a moral design is a governing principle of conduct.

721 §. In a former part of our discussion, it was remarked that there were many particular systems of morality, each of which, by respective advocates, might *be affirmed* to be the *true* one. But it was observed also, that *the truth* of a moral system acknowledged the *general dependence* of truth, namely, that it was true relatively to him who believed it. As this is as much as can be said by any advocate in favour of the particular system he has embraced, so a general, or inclusive principle of morality was said to be furnished by this coincidence, which principle was stated to be, that every action, suggested by any system of morality, which *is believed* to be the true one, is moral. Hence the same action may be right or wrong, relatively to the same individual, at different periods of his life, provided, at these periods, he entertains a different belief concerning that in which morality consists. And an action undertaken upon a new construction of morality, would be no better than an oppo-

site one which proceeded from that interpretation of morality which has been superseded ; for, in favour of each, no more, and no less, can be said, than that it is, or was *believed* to be, the true one, or the best.

722 §. But it is a question which has been slightly touched upon, how far an action might be rendered right, or wrong, by unforeseen circumstances? To examine this question, first, on the moral ground. Say, a person accepts the system of morality which makes *the end*, or the welfare or happiness of others, its criterion, and ground of obligation. We will suppose him to have a perception of some considerable benefit which may be conferred on a community by the execution of a given design. Actuated perhaps by a genuine philanthropy, our moralist incurs expense, labour, and many privations, in order that he might extend to society the benefit of his design. We will suppose it is successfully accomplished. Its first effects are productive of all the good that was intended : but its relations are more extensive than was apprehended ; and in some of these, instead of proving a benefit, it turns out to be a curse ; or, although not without some claim to the advantages proposed from it, the unforeseen evils are incalculably greater. The predicament of our moralist is this, that instead of a contribution to the happiness of others, he has been instrumental to a very superfluous augmentation of their misery. According to his system, the *welfare* of others is the *criterion* of that which is moral ; but the action, or conduct, we are supposing, has been productive of injury rather than benefit. Is this conduct therefore *not immoral*? The answer is, upon that particular system, which makes the effects of an action upon the happiness of others *the standard* of morality, such an action, not agreeing with this criterion, must be immoral. But the general or inclusive principle of morality, would authorize a different reply ; for although the

action has failed of its end, or although its effects are the reverse of those which were proposed from it, it was nevertheless the result of that which *was believed* to be the true system of morality; than which a higher sanction cannot be quoted in favour of an action performed by the same, or by another individual, in conformity with any other system.

723 §. Thus also, if a person changes his *moral creed*, an action performed at the suggestion of a former one, may be *wrong, relatively* to the *new one* which he has adopted; but right, upon the inclusive principle, which gives to the conduct which may be agreeable with either, an equal sanction.

724 §. But shifting the argument from the moral ground, we will suppose *right* to consist in the highest *rational* obligation, which means *that* to a conduct or design of any sort, productive of the greatest sum of good—how far, then, is the character of an action affected on this ground, by unforeseen relations or effects? In answer, it is to be observed, that if the comparative good or evil from an action, to him who performs it, is the criterion of *right*, an action which, in its consequences, produces more pain than pleasure, must be wrong. But here again, on this construction of right, there is the particular, and the general, or inclusive principle: for although an action which produces more pain than pleasure would not correspond with a definition of *right*, which makes it consist in a coincidence with the greatest good, or in a conformity with the highest rational obligation, yet if this action were *believed* to conform with such a standard, it is as much as can be said in favour of a different one, which may be suggested by an improved view, or with the benefit of an experience of the consequences of that which was performed under an erroneous calculation. If right is *characterized* by agreement with the highest

rational obligation, whatever may be the consequences of an action, the action itself, and one action as well as another, must be right, *provided* the performance of it was believed to be the highest rational obligation. And this must be true, whether the unforeseen consequences are relative to the affections which existed at the time the action was performed, or whether, from change of affection, the action which at one time appeared agreeable with the highest obligation, should at another be considered ineligible, or wrong. Hence, according to the highest rational obligation, the same action may be right, or wrong, relatively either to different individuals of different sentiments ; or relatively to the same individuals at different times, under the prevalence of different affections.

725§. To exhibit then the various predicaments of our moralists, and the grounds of their pardon, without the encumbrance of illustration.

1. If a system of morality is, at one period of life, believed, and if belief in this system is, at a different period, superseded by belief in another, the former is, equally with the latter, justified on the ground of *truth* : for, of the latter, no more can be said in proof of its truth, than that it is believed ; and of the former, no less could be said, so long as this conviction was entertained.

2. So, with respect to different individuals ; if different systems of morality are respectively believed, neither individual can say more in favour of the system he has embraced, than the other, namely, that relatively to him this system is true, because by him it is believed.

3. The term *right* implies either the highest moral obligation, or the highest obligation, founded in the expectation of superior good, whether moral or otherwise : to him who believes the term *right* to signify the highest rational obligation, an action, conformable with

that which is thought to be an obligation of this kind, will be right, although it should be contrary to morals.

4. Whether morality imposes the highest rational obligation, or whether there may be an obligation above that of morality, *depends* upon opinion and affection. Thus, two persons of the same opinion, say concerning religion, for example, with *different affections*, may entertain different convictions of the highest obligation, each of which will be founded in an apprehension of superior good; and two persons of the same affections, but of different opinions, may entertain different convictions of the highest obligation, not because an end is not equally agreeable with their affections, but because their opinions are at variance on the mode, or practicability, of its attainment. Hence, from difference of affection, one object is conformable with the sense of the highest obligation rather than another; and from difference of opinion, an object which, under other circumstances, may create the sense of the highest obligation, may impose no obligation at all.

5. If an obligation is thought by one individual to be the highest, and a different obligation is thought to be the highest by another individual; or if the same individual, at one period of his life, thinks one obligation to be the highest, and at a different period, another; there is, for the conduct which would ensue from either variety, precisely the same foundation, namely, that this conduct is in conformity with that which is believed to be the highest obligation.

6. If an action which is conformable with the sense of the highest moral obligation, produces unforeseen consequences which are opposed to the ground of the obligation, the action is nevertheless moral, since it has the common recommendation, or is agreeable with the necessary definition of every moral action, namely, that it is *believed* to be such.

7. If that is right, which is believed to be the highest

obligation, although an action in conformity with the sense of the highest obligation should produce unexpected effects, which are contrasted with the ground of the obligation, such action, agreeing with the definition, must nevertheless be right.

8. If an action is right because agreeable with the highest rational obligation, the quality of such action is not altered *by a change of affection*, which makes another believed to be the highest obligation; because an action, proceeding from the former construction, would have precisely the same foundation as one proceeding from the latter, namely, that it is believed to be the highest rational obligation.

726 §. Hence, whether morality is believed to consist in one system, or another, an action conformable with either belief, must be equally moral. Whether that is believed to *be right*, which is conformable with morality, or with the highest obligation, founded in the expectation of superior good, an action performed upon either construction must be equally right: if morality is thought to impose the highest rational obligation, or if it is thought that there is an obligation of this kind above morality, an action proceeding from either construction would be either equally right, or else there is an obligation to that which is wrong, which is above the moral obligation; but if the moral obligation is said to be *right, because* it is believed to be the highest, so any other obligation, which is believed to be the highest, will, for the same reason, *be right*: and as right and wrong, applied to actions, are dependent upon the belief of different individuals, or of the same individual at different times, so an action may be either right or wrong which is believed to be so, whether upon moral grounds, or those of the highest rational obligation, although its unforeseen consequences should be opposed to the ground of the obligation by relation with existing affections, or

although the action should be opposed to the sense of obligation which succeeds to a change, whether of opinion, or affection, or both.

727§. We have seen then that an action which is conformable with any accepted system of ethics is moral, and that as the moral obligation is said to be right because, being productive of the most good, it is believed to be the highest, so any other obligation, which is believed to be the highest, must be right, for the same reason. Notwithstanding an action, either on the moral ground, or proceeding from a conviction of the highest obligation, may have the sanction of reason, or principle, such action may afterwards become a subject of self-reproach, or of repentance. This repentance may be produced either, 1. by a change of belief, relatively to the principles of morality; 2. by change of belief, concerning the highest rational obligation; 3. by the consequences of an action relatively to existing affections; 4. by relations either of the action, or of its consequences, with a change of affections; or, 5. by these mixed. To examine briefly these grounds of reproach in their order:

(1.) A person may believe a given system of ethics, at one time, to be true, and at another, false. Under the latter conviction, it may be a matter of reproach with him that he ever entertained the former. This reproach, however, it has been seen, cannot have the sanction of reason; because the highest possible moral obligation is that which is believed to be such; and the rejected system must be entitled to this apology. If, then, the former belief of the rejected system continues to be deplored, this must be from its relation with an existing affection, to which reason, or principle, is no party.

(2.) The same is to be observed of change of belief respecting the highest rational obligation: if a former

one is lamented, having the same sanction in favour of its truth, as any other by which it may be superseded, the feeling of self-reproach must be produced by its relation with an affection which prevails in opposition to a rational conclusion.

(3.) The most common ground of repentance of an action, is that which arises out of its unforeseen consequences. Although an action proceeding either from a conviction of moral, or of the highest rational, obligation, may have all the authority of reason, principle, or right, its consequences may, on some occasions, be fatal to the peace of him by whom such an action is performed. On the ground of principle, such action may be reconciled to what is called conscience; but its effects may nevertheless be productive of the most extreme wretchedness, whether from relation with affections which reason approves, or with affections which reason is inadequate to subdue.

(4.) Or, from *change* of affections, an action may be detested which was once approved; and such abhorrence of the action may be a ground of self-reproach. But this predicament would merely illustrate a change of supposed highest rational obligation, founded in a change of taste or affection. On the ground of principle, or conformity with the highest existing obligation, the action may be reconciled: if it is opposed subsequently to a contrasted affection, this disagreement no more furnishes a just reason of reproach, than any other change of taste—than, as if a *man* should be averse to the luxuries or amusements which gratified him when a *child*. But although the action itself may be thus reconciled with principle or conscience, its consequences, whether foreseen or otherwise, in relation with other affections than those which existed at the time of its performance, when it was esteemed the highest obligation, may be productive of great misery.

(5.) But it sometimes happens that a single action

may involve all those separate grounds of repentance by which, individually, the peace of an unlucky specimen of humanity may be sufficiently disturbed. Thus an action performed at one period of life, may, at another, be regarded at once as opposed to morality, as contrary to the highest rational obligation founded in a calculation of the greatest good; its unforeseen consequences may be productive of misery in relation with a continuance of the same affections, and its consequences, whether foreseen or otherwise, may be productive of misery in relation with affections subsequently acquired. A dilemma so complete, seems to furnish little better than a subject of hopeless contemplation. To consider, however, the just amount of the predicament. If the action in question was at the time of its performance believed to be moral, however opinion may afterwards be changed respecting morality, the action was, upon our former demonstrations, a moral one: if the action at the time of its performance was believed to be conformable with the highest rational obligation, the action, supposing *right* to imply an obligation of this kind, notwithstanding the subsequent prevalence of a different sense of obligation, must be admitted to be right: if the action was both *contrary* to the existing moral belief, and contrary to the sense of the *highest rational obligation*, such action was both *immoral* and *wrong*, and admits of no plea by which it may be reconciled to the conscience, unless an adequate excuse is thought to be furnished by that doctrine of *necessity*, which seems to level all moral distinctions, by making human beings instruments only in the hands of destiny, or effects, acknowledging the same dependence as the vilest matter, upon their causes: if the unforeseen consequences of the action should be opposed to existing affections, or consequences, whether foreseen or otherwise, should be opposed to newly acquired affections, although the action may be reconciled on moral grounds, or those of the highest obligation, its

consequences, from inevitable relation with affections, may be productive of great wretchedness. In this latter view, the individual has incurred misfortune; but, relatively to the action from whence the misfortune has proceeded, cannot charge himself with a fault, or at most, but with an error of calculation. If his affections are trained on principle, the conformity of the action with the principle, or the construction of duty, will in great measure reconcile him to the discrepancy between its consequences and his affections: but if this recipe should fail of giving all the peace that may be desired, as it most commonly would, it remains for him only to take up the modelling of his affections, the principles of which were formerly shown, and, if he cannot avert, or modify the consequences of the action, so as to render them agreeable with his affections, to discipline his affections into an agreement with these consequences.

728 §. A more particular consideration of the comparative worth of the different moral systems, may seem an appropriate conclusion to these remarks. I leave, however, such an undertaking to those who are inclined to pursue the subject in detail. In order to show successfully that one moral system *ought* to be accepted rather than another, it would be necessary to begin by waging war with many conflicting creeds, each of which, if one had the misfortune to be engaged with bigoted, interested, or ignorant advocates, may furnish matter of disputation for a man's life.

729 §. I shall merely therefore observe, in addition, that the choice of morality appears to lie between that which consists of *rules* of some or other description, and that which makes *the end*, which has been said to be human happiness, or the welfare of others, the criterion of morality. In an election between these, it is sufficient,

for my present purposes, to express my unqualified coincidence with those who make moral conduct to consist in a conformity with *rules*, rather than with *the end*, or that which has been alleged to be *the principle* of morality. Although, however, I am not prepared to say that occasional departures from *the rules* of morality may not be beneficial to mankind, (for otherwise the morality of the most barbarous ages would have descended to our own times) yet, even with men of the best intentions, from their necessary ignorance of consequences, in relations which cannot be calculated, or from their short-sightedness, the avowed concession of judicial power, in matters of right and wrong, would be extremely unsafe.

730 §. It is no doubt true that, on many occasions, a conformity with *a rule* of morality, would be at the expense of *the principle*: but the question is, not what would be most conducive to public advantage on *certain* occasions, and in the hands of certain persons, but concerning that system, the *general adherence* to which promises more advantage to a community than may be rationally expected from any other. If it is proved that a conformity of the conduct of individuals with certain rules, *on all occasions*, is more advantageous to a community, than an occasional, or discretionary departure from them, *the principle of morality is best represented by its rules*; for the principle, or end, being the welfare of a community, that only can *be agreeable with the principle*, which is adapted to the end.

731 §. In digesting a code of ethics, these appear to be the principal objects: 1st, to define clearly as many rules of conduct which, without being numerous, may apply to almost every occasion in life, as are thought to be most conducive to public welfare; and in order to avert the plea of public, or individual expediency,

for a departure from such rules, the exceptions to their observance, which can be advantageously permitted, should be enumerated among the rules: 2nd, to impose such obligations to obedience to these rules, as may ensure this end by relation with affections which are common to all mankind. Such a system, which is perfectly within the scope of legislation, admitting a rational demonstration of its usefulness or necessity, would be readily accepted *by the understandings* of men; and it would furnish a model on which their affections may be trained by methods and on principles which will presently be considered—not indeed with the presumptuous hope of *deciding* upon such intricate questions, but with the more humble design of offering merely a few indications which may engage in this cause the reflections of those who possess more suitable qualifications.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

732 §. It has been shown to be a common tendency in human nature, that each individual pursues the objects of his own inclination or preference, even on those occasions when his actions have a seeming reference exclusively to the advantage of others. The *general intention* of Government is to restrain, or direct this tendency, with a view to prevent the violation of mutual rights; the intention of moral Government comprises this protection of rights, and has also for its object to ensure a conformity of sentiments and actions with rules which tend to the welfare of society, in examples which scarcely fall within the jurisdiction of the civil laws. Hence it may be said that the *common end* of government is the welfare of a community.

733 §. And what, it has been asked, is *the criterion* of the good of a community? Our answer has been, *individual happiness*—for if this is not conferred, or permitted, so far from the good of *a community* being ensured, there will be no good at all.

734 §. The inquiry here suggests itself, agreeably with the order of the subject, concerning *the best mode* of promoting the happiness of mankind? The wisest men have perplexed themselves in vain on this question.

To me it appears that, from the constitution of human nature, there will necessarily be about as much happiness in the life of a man, as there is of sun-shine in November ; or rather less. Our happiness, such as it is, ensues from the gratification of desire, of some kind or other. Yet such is the perverse composition of the subject, that if a dispenser of happiness intended to confer it by giving to a man every thing he could possibly desire, though he were allowed six months to ascertain what this might be, he would in less than a fortnight, after all the wants he could enumerate were supplied, be as discontented as he was before. Nay, it is almost a matter of daily experience, that men can scarcely be more effectually cursed, than by granting to them what they most desire. This is certainly true, to a great extent, in the pursuits of ambition, wealth, love, &c. as well as in many minor instances, though perhaps in none without occasional exceptions. There is nearly the same restlessness, or inherent source of dissatisfaction, in all the animal creation. I will defy the ingenuity of man to make even a dog happy with much permanence or uniformity, though his capacity for it, owing to a greater simplicity of mechanism in the moral department, is much more favourable. I will not here consider how *men* may be made *happy*: the chief objects of legislation, their happiness being *partly* abandoned from its hopelessness, are, to prevent their taking what does not belong to them ; to put a sufficient restraint upon their teeth and claws ; or to check their propensity to cutting each other's throats, which they are ready enough to indulge when the law is silent, or the customs of society will afford them a frivolous excuse.

735 §. Bad, however, as the condition of human nature must necessarily be, it may be worse under some circumstances than others ; at least, such is the popular view of it—and it will therefore be an object with those

who, from whatever motive, have at least good intentions towards this unlucky species, composed of all that is admirable, of all that is contemptible, of all that is good, bad, and indifferent, in the creation, to make the best of their unpromising materials.

736 §. Without permitting myself the freedom of a doubt on the subject, I will presume that one state of society may be better than another ; and I will presume further, that that state of society is the best, in which there is the most general obedience to the rules of morality. Mankind can scarcely be so generally mistaken in this object—all think morality conducive to social welfare ; and their ingenuity has been racked to find some sort of hold upon human nature, by which moral obligation may be imposed. Let us briefly *recapitulate* what their ingenuity has accomplished ; and then see whether a more effectual bit may not be contrived.

737 §. Amidst all the differences of intellect, taste, and temper, the object has been to ensure conformity among human beings in those particulars which concern their common welfare. The most simple scheme for this purpose, must have consisted in a few deductions, suggested by the experience of a family, or of a small community, concerning the conduct, on certain occasions, which would promote their mutual benefit ; and these deductions, being assented to, were afterwards inculcated and observed as rules of duty, founded upon expediency. But as it was found that, under a conflict of interests, the sense of expediency was no match for the inclinations opposed to it, the rules of duty were supported by the decrees, whether civil, or social, of reward and punishment : and superstition, to which men in barbarous ages are so especially prone, also furnished

some additional incentives in aid of the obligations imposed by society.

738 §. Although it is argued that the tendency to a belief in a creative power, a presiding Deity of some sort, prevails throughout human nature, (which is not literally true) mankind seem to have been rather unlucky in their conjectures concerning him. Opinions, so absurd, and inconsistent with each other, have, at various times, been held by different nations, that if there is in human beings a tendency to believe in some sort of Deity, these differences, or failures, prove that the capacity for *a satisfactory knowledge* concerning him is generally withheld from us: and therefore, so far as the deductions from a nature of which we are essentially ignorant are of any value, the propensity to speculate on the subject, which is at least presumptuous if not impious, might perhaps as well have been spared us. In former times, cruelty was the favourite attribute of this Deity, and thousands of victims were immolated to gratify this passion; of late, mercy, love, justice, &c. have been imputed to him *theoretically*, while injustice, revenge, and cruelty, have been taught to be his familiar practice; so that, in times not very remote, religious men, interpreting, as is sometimes their custom, the pleasure of the Deity by their own, have thought a few burnings and massacres not altogether unacceptable to him.

739 §. Without troubling ourselves to remark upon the mythologies which prevailed in the earlier ages—what tricks they suggested; by what imposture they were maintained; or how, by the increase of intellectual light, these clouds of the understanding were gradually dissipated—confining ourselves more strictly to the subject, we will consider briefly *the dependences* of the obligations imposed by the moral systems.

740 §. By the scheme of Christianity, a model is proposed for imitation, both in affection and practice; and precepts for moral conduct are inculcated—not however with so much consistency or precision, but that men make opposite constructions of duty on the same occasions, and perhaps from the very same text. These moral recommendations are enforced by the promise of future happiness, and by the threat of future punishment, accordingly as they are either observed, or otherwise. The truth, or reality, of this dispensation, rests upon the authority of certain alleged facts and doctrines: if this authority is excepted against, if these facts and doctrines are thought to be incredible—by *all persons so regarding them* (which, if practice is a test of belief, we may suppose to comprise at least nine-tenths of the Christian world), *this system imposes no real obligation to morality*. I will by no means deny to this system the efficacy of a *partial* obligation; but it is in general extremely weak: in other instances, it is not acknowledged in any degree—and perhaps even this partial efficacy, chiefly arising from fear and diffidence, will decline, as the customs, opinions, or prejudices, drawn from the dark abyss of antiquity, are unsettled by the augmenting impulse of the human mind.

741 §. The defects of this scheme having been by some long perceived, or fancied, other systems of a more flimsy construction, though not entirely without their attractions, have been proposed as a foundation for morals. The beauty of virtue, or the beauty of a concurrence in a design of general good, has been eloquently described, and the ground of moral conduct stated to consist in the gratification of a taste. But with all those who are not naturally disposed to gratification from this source, or in whom the description of this sort of beauty fails to inspire a taste in its favour, its

objects will afford no gratification; and to such, the terms of its recommendation not being applicable, *it will suggest no moral obligation*. We are justified by experience in the belief, that few are qualified *for a perception* of this beauty in any degree; and that the taste is still more rarely possessed in a degree which will ensure a compliance with moral rules, on occasions when these are opposed to other inclinations. In addition, the principal ground of this beauty is thought to consist in harmony, or in the concurrence of parts to a common end: and as the same may be said of dispositions and conduct of every kind, so an indulgence of propensities, contrasted with the objects of morals, would still illustrate a harmony or concurrence, similar in kind, though tending to a different purpose, to that which has for its end the welfare of society. If every pursuit of taste or inclination is still a concurrence to an end, which has been shewn to be the case with actions or processes of every kind, even amidst the most disorderly operations, both in the moral and natural departments;* individuals may follow their respective desires, alike upon the recommendation of a harmony or beauty, *which is common to them all*, rather than peculiar to the intentions of morality. Hence this system is calculated to have an influence

* This general tendency to an ultimate good, in the midst of physical confusion, has been remarked by Shaftesbury as one illustration of an harmonious *design*: but the moral deduction, that if order and disorder, creation and destruction, virtue and vice, all work together for a final good, an imitator in either mode, would equally concur in the scheme of virtue, seems to have been overlooked. The immorality of Mandeville, founded in a demonstration, that private injuries are public benefits, may claim a somewhat similar apology; and the principles of those who deny the existence of evil, alleging that *every thing* is for the best, are equally defective, for the reason that, if all is good, or if every thing is an essential contribution *to the best*, nothing can be bad—and consequently there can be no distinction between virtue, and vice.

of any kind only upon a very few: to these it suggests no particular line of conduct, secure of being within the terms of its recommendation, whatever impulses are indulged; and to all, it proposes only the gratification of a taste, and therefore offers only the same inducement to moral practice, as may be proposed in favour of a practice of any other kind, for which there happens to be an equal taste.

742§. It has been discovered by some others, as if for the purpose of obviating all these difficulties and uncertainties, that men have *a sense* peculiarly appropriate to *morality*, and that therefore all the purposes of ethics may be confided to this sense, provided only that it is judiciously managed, or some such thing. But it has been formerly shewn, that *the sense* for morality is very much the same as the sense for theft; that is, each exemplifies only a variety of knowledge and affection. That we have a sense, or sensibility, for the notion of morals, is very certain, if only for the reason, that we are capable of an apprehension of this kind. In the same manner, we have a sense for law, physic, divinity, for the mechanical arts; and each of these, to one instructed in these departments, and whose affection was also in any degree engaged in their behalf, would, *mutatis mutandis*, be precisely the same as the moral sense—that is, there would be the knowledge in what the specimens of either kind consist, an inclination for the corresponding pursuit, and self-reproach, if this pursuit were interrupted, or its designs frustrated, by the occasional indulgence of an inclination which is regarded as an inferior source of good, and therefore esteemed as one *that should have been subordinate*. It has been customary to prove this moral sense not inherent, by shewing the dependence of it upon education; and that so entirely, that opposite systems of morals are found to prevail in

different communities. But this demonstration has been regarded as unsatisfactory, by some who have had obscure and dismal glimmerings of *a something* in the moral sense, in addition to a mere conformity of sentiments or actions, with rules; and, for no better reason than that they had a faint vision of something which they could not cleverly define, they have concluded the moral sense to be innate. In our analysis of this subject, it has been shown that there are two conditions necessary to this moral sense: one, that those by whom it is entertained should be instructed in what its objects consist; and the other, that an affection should be kindled in favour of them by some appropriate recommendations, the most familiar of which are founded in religion or philanthropy. The first of these conditions is easily fulfilled: men may be taught readily enough in what right and wrong consist, provided the consent of society is the criterion of the distinction; but the moral sense is most commonly defective, *for the reason* that those terms which recommend its objects *to the affections* of individuals, *most frequently fail*. Virtue is right, vice is wrong: this lesson may be understood by any capacity, although the specimens are ever so contradictory, provided only it is agreed thus to express the distinction: but it is *a duty* to do that which is right. This recommendation then, *why* is it *a duty*? because it is inculcated by some obligation, as by that of religion for example. As the dispensation of future reward and punishment is dependent upon the observance or breach of the rules of morality, and as the importance of this dispensation furnishes a motive for the observance of moral rules, which should be more powerful than any other inclination—for these reasons, the obligation thus imposed to a conformity with moral rules, is expressed as *a sense of duty*; and if the rules are ever violated by a preference of other objects, there follows what is called *the reproach*

of conscience, for the breach of a duty; which means merely, the consciousness of having forfeited or endangered the greater, by a weak or culpable preference, of the lesser, good. So also of the recommendations of philanthropy, patriotism, &c., which, together with the requisite knowledge of examples, may make a moral sense, provided these recommendations produce the conviction that an adherence to rules, adapted to the welfare of society, is on all occasions the superior good. How far then, agreeably with this account, may the intention of ethics be entrusted to this moral sense? It must be answered, so far as the recommendations in favour of the moral rules will impose an obligation, founded upon the belief of superior good. Say then, that these recommendations are furnished by religion, or are inculcated on the ground of philanthropy, patriotism, &c.; if the *religion*, from doubt, or infidelity, *has little or no weight*; if *philanthropy*, or *patriotism*, are feelings which *are not entertained*, and cannot, amidst the conflicting interests of the world, be excited—*with all those who fail in these respects, there will be no moral sense*; or, if the failure is something short of being complete, with all such the moral sense will be extremely weak. As this last, at least, is a very common predicament, the moral sense, when opposed by passion, or interest, is less to be trusted than was perhaps imagined by those who were so ingenious as to discover it.

743§. The inducements of religion, the attractions of the moral beauty, and the influence of the moral sense, all failing; individual expediency being also preferred to general expediency, even on the peculiar recommendation of the latter, when they happen to be in opposition to each other; society have attempted an additional hold on human nature by a legislation of its own, comprised in the system of honour. We have

seen that the adoption of the better sense of honour, which nevertheless has in general, if ever, no better foundation than pride, is liable to all the uncertainty of taste, or affection. It has been formerly observed, that the sense of honour is, to a considerable extent, capable of ensuring a practice which is agreeable with the welfare of society. This sense is entertained by individuals in one of the following modifications, or in these mixed: 1st, as an abstract love of that which is called honour, independently of the obligation imposed by any other motive or consideration; 2nd, from a gratified consciousness *of the distinction* attained by *the possession* of that which is thought a superior principle of action; 3rd, as a desire of the distinction, or applause of society; 4th, as a result of the penalties attached to a breach of the rules of honour. The first mode of honour would, with an adequate degree of affection to counteract all other inclinations, ensure a compliance with the intentions of ethics so far as there is coincidence between them, and the rules of honour. But we are justified by experience in believing the disposition so rare to an adoption of honour on this ground, that its reality, in any instance, may be almost questioned. The second form of honour may also be trusted on private, as well as on public occasions, provided there is a greater reluctance to abandoning a favourite principle of distinction, than to forego the gratification of propensities with which it is inconsistent. The third form of honour, may ensure a compliance with its rules on public occasions, and stimulate to the most heroic achievement; but on private occasions it imposes no obligation. The same also may be remarked of our fourth modification, or of the lowest grade of honour, with this addition, that its rules are obeyed only from a motive of expediency, and will therefore be respected or violated, as the censure of society, or the privation of a good, is regarded as the greater evil.

The restraints of honour then, according to this account, would *fail entirely* with those who have no love for it on something like the ground of beauty; who are indifferent to the distinction conferred by its mere possession; who are not ambitious of the distinctions, or applause of society; and who, from contempt of society, or loss of character, are insensible to disgrace. Of these forms of honour, the first is the most rare; the second, is sometimes entertained, though a little sophistry will commonly silence it, when it happens to stand in the way of powerful interests; the third, is common when directed partially to a certain pursuit, or mode of distinction, though it may not be a general principle of action; and the fourth, or the honour of expediency, is that, perhaps, of nine-tenths of mankind, whom vice or disgrace has not already placed beyond the jurisdiction of the social laws.

744 §. Not to notice inferior projects: Although the necessity of an adherence to moral rules is generally confessed, *provided an individual* neither believes in the dispensations of religion, nor has a relish for the beauty of virtue, nor entertains the moral sense, whatever might be its source, nor acknowledges the influence of honour, in any of its forms—such individual is emancipated from all moral restraint; and may either prefer his own individual good to that of the community on all occasions, or may even act with systematic hostility to the welfare of society. There is in this diversity of means, to a common end, the advantage that the chances of imposing something like moral obligation are multiplied, though not in ratio to the variety of character. But if all these restraints should fail, there remains the more certain dependence upon the civil laws, to which all this hypothetical instruction is subsidiary.

745 §. Recurring, then, to the general principles of

legislation: It has been formerly stated that the proper design of a Government is to ensure as much *individual happiness* as is compatible with *public welfare*. This double intention is however but rarely, or at least imperfectly contemplated by Governments: it being customary, though not without a few exceptions, for the rulers of nations to legislate chiefly for the protection, or welfare of *the public*; while the conformity of the affections, with the practice which is thus compelled, and therefore to a great extent the happiness of individuals, is left to Divines and Moralists. Indeed, it may be almost doubted whether the precepts of the moralists are not in general regarded by the civil legislature rather as mere auxiliaries to the laws, intended for public benefit, than as any source of individual happiness.

746 §. It has been shewn that mankind are naturally disposed to pursue their own individual desires; and the interests of men, in their respective associations, being frequently opposed, in order to restrain this propensity, or for the purpose of preventing mutual injuries, and the evils of perpetual strife, individual rights are defined and protected by laws, founded in the consent of the societies for whose benefit they are intended. *If these laws* extended to every instance of conduct which could be in any ways injurious in the relations of men with each other, so far as *public welfare* is concerned, there would be very little occasion for the interference of the moralists: but in general the laws relate to the protection of persons, the protection and disposal of property; and they leave individuals free to be extremely bad members of society, without however falling under their jurisdiction.

747 §. It appears, then, agreeably with this view, that the intentions of a Government can be perfectly accomplished only, 1st, by such institutes, as are best calcu-

lated to promote the happiness of individuals, by rendering the practice, to which they are compelled, a source of the highest gratification; and, 2nd, by a legislation which will impose adequate obligation to a conduct agreeable with public welfare.

748§. Owing to the necessary diversity of the conditions and occupations of men, it is less the object of moral institutes to produce entire uniformity of taste, than to produce uniformity of disposition *in those respects* which concern the good of a community. Provided there is resemblance of affection to this extent, the greatest benefit which a Government can contemplate will be attained: a moral disposition will be produced, and a moral practice will of course follow, agreeably with its suggestions; beyond this, the more numerous perhaps the ramifications of taste, the more agreeable with the multiplicity of objects, and the varieties of pursuits, which claim the attention of individuals, and conduce also to the public good.

749§. As the interests of communities differ considerably, owing generally to differences of political relations, of national character, and of civilization, the affections which would be most favourable to the welfare of one community, may not, in all respects, be best suited to that of another. Hence, although there are some leading rules, the observance of which would be beneficial under any state of society, a code of morality, in order to be appropriate, should of course be modified relatively to the circumstances, or peculiarities, of respective communities.

750§. To continue the argument upon a supposititious case; we will assume that, owing to a general failure of religious influence, a moral government upon other principles is thought desirable, whether for the purpose of

substituting religion with those who, from indifference or infidelity, are not sensible to its influence, or *as an additional obligation in aid of it*, with those who acknowledge its control. Or rather, in order to avoid confusion of precepts, and discipline, we will suppose the experiment of a religious government to have been fairly tried; and from whatever cause, to have failed so completely that the expectation of a security for morals from this source has been entirely abandoned. By what proceeding, then, would a general conformity of disposition, with a moral practice, be most effectually promoted, or ensured?

751§. As the natural propensities of men would incline them to a conduct on most occasions which is opposed to public welfare, it is obvious that the substitution of a moral, for this immoral disposition, must be produced *by education*, or not at all. What then are the institutes best adapted to this end? and upon what grounds, and by what processes, may this object be most rationally attempted?

752§. It will be attempted with very little chance of success, so long as the direction of the human mind is left to any pretenders who may find it convenient to set up a school. It has been stated that a Government fulfils its intentions but *partially*, so long as it legislates only for conduct, the disposal of property, &c. : by this legislation, mutual injuries are perhaps prevented; but the philanthropic or social disposition, which, if produced in individuals, would almost supersede the necessity of laws of protection, is neglected, or left to a cultivation by any sort of teachers, with the aid of precepts founded in incomprehensible or in shallow doctrines, which rarely have a steady influence upon character, and to a very great extent, no influence at all. As then *the formation* of character is properly no less an object

of Government than the protection of persons, or property, it seems but right that the *entire business of education*, to which the formation of character must be confided, should also fall within the province of the Legislature.

753§. Preparatory to any inquiry concerning the principles, and mode of that moral cultivation here alluded to, and the want of which is so generally felt, it may be proper first to ascertain *the practicability, under any circumstances*, of a system of *National education*, directed in conformity with the best intentions of a Government. I cannot but suppose that a better scheme of this sort than I am capable of suggesting, if indeed not already extant, would be a matter of facility with some of our numerous projectors of colleges, schools, institutions, and clubs. But as their ingenuity has not, to my knowledge, been hitherto exerted with precisely our present views, we may be allowed at least to support our argument *by an illustration* of the design, although its own merits should entitle it to no respect.

754§. Supposing, then, a Government were called upon to legislate with that double view, with less than which its objects must be but partially contemplated; in the first place, what would be required in order to settle a system of national education, agreeably with this comprehensive design? What the most eligible plan may be, I will not pretend to anticipate; but it seems not improbable that a design, which may be thus loosely sketched, may be *progressively* accomplished.

755§. The objects of education may be said to be, 1st, the formation, or direction of tastes or affections; 2nd, the communication of knowledge; and, 3rd, perhaps the improvement of physical constitution. The first, should be *common* to every member of a community,

since all are equally interested in possessing the affections which are most agreeable with the public good, and in acquiring a disposition which will establish a conformity between their conduct, and their inclinations. The second, or instruction, may be of three kinds, adapted respectively to the principal divisions of society : 1st, the instruction which may be thought appropriate to the poor, and labouring classes ; 2nd, that of a superior kind, which may be either appropriate to those who live without occupation, or preparatory to a training in any particular branch of knowledge ; and, 3rd, the instruction which is proper for the respective professions. The third object of scholastic discipline, or the improvement of the physical constitution, is as common to each of these classes, as the attainment of the character best suited at once to individual happiness, and to public welfare.

756§. It seems then that three establishments would be required, agreeably with this division : 1st, schools, for instruction in reading, writing, &c., or for instruction of that kind which may be thought most appropriate to the poor ; 2nd, colleges, the objects of which, in addition to those which are said to be common, would be to communicate the best possible information on the principles of science, in mathematics, classical literature, history, rhetoric, composition, &c., or as many of these as may be thought requisite to complete the qualifications of a mere gentleman, or of one whose mind it is intended only *to prepare* for an additional course of instruction ; 3rd, colleges for the respective professions. These last would relate chiefly to those who were intended for the profession of arms, law, physic, &c. ; and, *more especially*, for the benefit of those who were designed *for any share in the Legislature*; by which the monstrous incongruity would be guarded against, of allowing the most ignorant

men in society, or the most contemptible tricksters, for no better reason than that they have either money or friends, to be eligible to the most important offices in the State.

757§. In the execution of a project of this sort, there are two principal matters for consideration : one relates to the erection of such buildings as may be required ; and the other, to the appointment of masters, and professors. With respect to the first, as the object is the education of the whole community, there should be a college in every district containing a given population ; and schools also, the number and localities of which would be according to the population of the divisions, and sub-divisions, of districts. The first expense of these buildings may be loosely estimated at ten millions ; and the annual expense of teachers, &c. in every branch of education, may, perhaps, be over-rated at one million. The public would be free to send their children to these colleges or schools, or not, just as may be most agreeable to themselves ; but, as it should be an immutable principle of Government that there should be no education at all, except by persons properly qualified, and regularly authorized (unless, indeed, parents chose themselves to undertake this duty), so, if the prescribed and appropriate education open to all classes of the community were rejected, there should remain only the alternative of dispensing altogether with its benefits. As education at the colleges would be intended only for those classes who aspire, or are entitled to the highest attainments, so a moderate re-imbursement may be expected from such as receive the advantages of these institutions. The education of those whose circumstances do not enable them to pay for it, should be gratuitous, and *such as is adapted to their station in society.*

758 §. The election of masters, and professors, may be made in this way: A National Senatus Academicus, consisting, perhaps, of thirteen members, should be appointed by Government; *not* by interest, or favour, or by polling, or balloting, BUT BY LOT; *any candidate being eligible who could produce appropriate testimonials both of character and attainments*; the terms of which might require that they should be, for every department, more especially in the superior branches of education, of the very highest quality. Every vacancy in this National Senatus may be filled up *by the same mode of election*: to this Senatus should be confided the general jurisdiction of seminaries, the appointment of all professors and masters of colleges, *by the same mode of election*; and perhaps the appointment of masters to schools, *by the same method*, may be entrusted to the professors, or masters of colleges.

759 §. To perfect the model of such a design, would perhaps be the work of a century. How it may be best executed, or arranged, in all its parts, it is impossible to say; an outline of a plan may be easily sketched, and is sufficient for a beginning; but the arrangements, in detail, can be properly suggested only by expediency, and brought to perfection by a progressive improvement. Supposing, however, such a plan to be successfully executed, which would be a matter of no difficulty whatever, provided it were set about in earnest, and steadily pursued by those who commanded the means of accomplishing it, there would be a college, and schools, on an appropriate scale, in almost every town, and a school in almost every village. The disposition, and the understanding, of every individual in the community would be cultivated *at once in the manner best suited to his own happiness, to his excellence in any*

particular pursuit, and to the general welfare of society.

760§. There is, however, much less difficulty in projecting *an apparatus for instruction*, than in conferring the benefit of it upon impracticable human nature. The acquisition of knowledge, to those who possess only common abilities, is a mechanical process, dependent chiefly upon industry, or application, which may be compelled by adequate incentives, and the success of which is tolerably certain. The most difficult purpose of education is that which emulates the creation, or direction, of taste, or affection, which is usually found not only beyond the control of preceptors, but even refractory to the most zealous wishes and efforts of the individual. Our present considerations relate chiefly *to the principles* of success, or failure, in this moral design of so forming the dispositions of individuals, that, by a conduct agreeable with the welfare of the public, they should pursue the gratification of their own desires.

761§. We have formerly supposed a preparatory training *in the practice* of morality, to favour the future adoption of its principles. We will say, then, that this practice has been compelled by ordinary methods, up to the age, when it is intended to produce *the love* of morality. We will suppose it to be first demonstrated in what moral excellence consists; comprising an enumeration of all the virtues, as of truth, honesty, candour, liberality, charity, patience, fortitude, courage, &c. which are thought conducive to the welfare of a community; and as all these qualities agree in this common end, we will allow the acquisition of this taste to be expressed by the single word, “philanthropy.”

762§. The love of mankind we will suppose to be

proposed; but is not *therefore* excited: our pupil understands that this disposition is recommended to him, and perhaps his own reason acquiesces to some extent in the propriety, or justness, of its purposes. Nevertheless he does not love mankind: he may even be so favourably disposed as to admit that he ought to love them; but has still to regret, that he does not possess this temper.

763 §. In this predicament, it has formerly been shown that one of two things must happen in order that this desired taste may be attained: either the disposition must be modified relatively to the objects, or the objects relatively to the disposition.

764 §. It has been seen that the common ground of love is experienced gratification from the object, towards which we therefore feel an affection. Hence the failure of this philanthropic taste, on the part of our pupil, should be for the reason that he has not derived pleasure from those human beings with whom his disposition has been brought into relation. In order, therefore, to accomplish the proposed change, his disposition must be adapted to the present state of men; or the state of these latter must be adapted to his existing disposition. How then, to simplify our argument, may the disposition be produced from whence *pleasure will preponderate*, in our intercourse with human beings? or how may the character of mankind be so adapted to our disposition, as to produce a similar result?

765 §. The answer to these questions may be premised by consulting our experience of the familiar instances, in which this love subsists. We find it more or less among the individuals of the same family; we find it faintly exhibited even in narrow circles of connections;

we find it in the friendships between individuals of the same sex ; and in a still greater degree, in the relation between individuals of different sexes. In all these cases, the source of love is obvious : it is from the preponderance of gratification in personal intercourse. Yet this love, however effectually kindled, burns with so little steadiness or certainty, that a single impression of a disagreeable kind, a contrasted sense of injury on one single occasion, is often sufficient to extinguish it ; or to make that hatred prevail, the source of which, in opposition to that of love, is experienced pain in some or other modification.

766§. Recurring to our questions : By what method may it be attempted to produce a disposition which will receive *habitual* or *preponderating gratification* from an intercourse with human beings ; a result which we have seen to be necessary to a steady philanthropy ? From our former exposition of the moral systems, it appears that each of them has aspired, more or less directly, to encourage, or create, this disposition. Christianity tells men to regard each other as brothers : it inculcates, on all occasions, *mutual love* ; and sustains these recommendations by threats of punishment, and promises of reward. This scheme, it must be confessed, is powerfully recommended : *failing, however, most commonly in its object*, whether from its own constitution or that of human nature, it must therefore be regarded, on some or other account, as essentially defective. The end is otherwise attempted by the system of moral beauty, which does not suggest a course of action from philanthropy, but proposes the gratification of a taste, of which the objects can be illustrated, only by a moral practice. The design does not inculcate *the pleasure* of serving those whom *we love* ; but supposes the affection to be placed on a certain scheme of harmony, by

our concurrence in which, the benefit of mankind is rather an accident, than a principal end.

767§. But without a tedious enumeration of all the methods by which it has been attempted to produce the philanthropic disposition, it may be remarked that they all concur in furnishing precepts for the attainment of this temper: it is recommended on grounds of virtue, expediency, ambition, pride, and sympathy: it is said to be good, to be proper, to be noble, exalted, or humane: but if the relation between these terms of recommendation, and the disposition to which they are addressed, is not such that the love inculcated may spring from it, the only effects of such an address are, that the ears will receive, and the understanding will apprehend it; but the love of mankind will not be produced, because these recommendations do not fulfil the conditions of the affection, or commute indifference, or the sense perhaps produced by injuries, deprivations, and conflicting interests, into one of experienced, and preponderating gratification.

768§. It has been remarked that Christianity offers some incentives to philanthropy, in addition to the gratification of the taste its precepts are designed to inspire. A state of eternal happiness, though its sources are not declared, is promised to those who adopt this affection. But even this inducement is not always, if indeed ever, equal to the end. In our analysis of *the dependence* of a change of affection, we have seen that reward, although it may compel volition, will not always render *the medium agreeable* through which the recompence is obtained. Thus the promise of heaven may be a sufficient inducement to *a moral practice*, but it may fail of rendering this practice *agreeable*, on *any account*; and is still less equal to this effect, with any certainty, by *first*

producing a love for those to whose benefit it relates. It has been shewn to be very doubtful whether we acquire a taste for a *mere medium* of reward, even when this reward is of an experienced, and assured kind ; how much less certain, then, of this end must that inducement be, *the reality* of which is open to a prevalent rejection, which is mixed with more or less of doubt with those who approach nearest to a belief of the system in which it is comprised ; and which, in addition, is not a matter of experienced gratification, or even a promise of gratification from specified sources, with which we are acquainted, either by experience, or analogy ? There are those who will say that we have only to gain the benevolent taste, and the practice will give us *experience of the nature* of the proposed felicity ; but this recipe supposes *the taste to be possessed*, the *effects* of which are *the proposed means* of its acquisition ; which is a little unreasonable.

769 §. Can there then be suggested any *direct mode* of influence, by which the disposition may be so trained or altered, that a steady philanthropy may be maintained under all circumstances of intercourse, or collision, with men ? I know of none—unless one could be brought to regard the whole human species with an unalterable feeling of *pity* ; which is perhaps not quite impossible. If however this feeling of pity were to be analysed, we should find that love, in some form or other, our expedients for which are so little to be boasted of, must *precede* it, in order that it might contribute an element to its origin.

770 §. Since then all those projects for changing the dispositions of men to a philanthropic temper, upon which the ingenuity of Poets, Philosophers, and Divines, has been expended in so many centuries, have all failed, or are calculated only for a partial, or accidental success,

it is next to be enquired whether *human nature*, the other part of our relation, may be so adapted to a natural or inevitable disposition, as, by exciting none but agreeable sensations, to ensure that affection which usually springs from them? This also has been attempted; and with very little better effect than to add one more illustration to the catalogue of human vanities. The proposition is this—if men did nothing else but please each other, men would be very naturally inclined to love each other. Doubtless, there is some truth in the conjecture; but so long as the individuals of a society have only a few interests in common, while their particular, and more powerful interests are necessarily opposed, it would perhaps require at least as alluring a rhetoric to persuade men to be on all occasions *agreeable* to each other, as to entertain none but philanthropic dispositions, without this previous inducement. But say, what, indeed, for reasons formerly stated, cannot be true, that all mankind on all occasions endeavoured to serve and please each other, and that they were uniformly successful in this design; would the philanthropy of individuals then be as comprehensive, as the practice of mutual service was general? Even this expedient, if the habit of mutual gratification were universal, would fail perhaps of inspiring *love for the species*; for as we can be *gratified* only by those individuals within our own circle, our love is likely to be confined to them; while our disposition towards the rest of mankind, as is the case with respect to persons existing in distant parts or the world, from whom we have neither received pleasure nor pain, would be one of perfect indifference. No wonder, with such subjects, our Philosophers and Moralists have made so dismal a progress.

771 §. Recurring to the principle of the general dependence of affection—that the will has *no direct control* over our inclinations, if not always expressed with

this qualification, is a common remark. On the other hand, nothing is more common than for persons to urge certain reasons for liking this, or disliking that ; as if, in reality, the will held that power over our inclinations which is otherwise denied ; or as if a corresponding inclination would follow a conviction of the understanding. I am not aware that a satisfactory explanation of these contradictory presumptions, each apparently founded in our experience, has ever been proposed, and the impracticability of the subject may perhaps furnish a just apology for the omission. To connect, however, a few additional considerations with this topic.

772 §. Confessing the fact, so commonly alleged, that the will has no immediate control over the affections, the question is, whether they might be directed, or changed, by any indirect method ? We have seen that the conditions of this change require either that the disposition, or the object, should be modified. We will suppose then that a person is the subject of any given addiction, say to gambling, theft, drinking, or debauchery of any kind—it is intended to subdue this inclination ; and in what manner, recurring to our experience, may this triumph be accomplished ? The ruinous consequences of its indulgence, are perhaps pointed out ; and if the addiction is only a moderate one, this single argument *may* be sufficient *to control the volition*, and prevent the *practice*, although it may *not subdue the inclination*. Say, however, that the individual is not restrained in the practice by this admonition, but, under an irresistible infatuation, pursues it, until, by some unlucky stroke, he is reduced to beggary, and beholds a family, who are to him objects of the utmost regard and solicitude, suffering under the severest inflictions of poverty. What then would be his *inclination* towards gambling, for example ? We are justified by observation in believing that all that apparatus, which was once

so fascinating, would be execrated ; that he would avoid the scenes in which he formerly delighted, with the deepest abhorrence. Here then is a specimen of one change of affection ; it is the substitution of aversion, for inclination ; and how has it been produced ? *By connecting with the practice more pain, than gratification.*

773 §. To try the antithesis to this substitution : We will suppose an individual to entertain a decided *aversion* with respect to any given pursuit ; to war, to study—we will take the former, the aversion to which may be enhanced by its coincidence with a passion purely natural. Whether from authority or an inconsiderate choice, we will suppose our individual to be engaged in the profession of arms : we will suppose, on entering upon his first campaign, the utmost aversion to danger which can result from fear ; nevertheless, his volition is compelled, by adequate authority, to incur all the hazards of a battle, from whence he escapes without loss of honour. Courage is made the daily theme of conversation among those by whom he is surrounded ; till at length it acquires, in his estimation, the rank of a criterion of human excellence—he is again engaged in battle ; his inclination is perhaps not yet *quite favourable* to danger, but his volition induces him, against every opposing impulse, to signalize himself by some heroic action : for this, praises are lavished on him ; he gains promotion ; his nature is flattered ; his ambition is fairly kindled ; and, in place of timidity and aversion to danger, he burns impatiently for new opportunities of acquiring additional honours. What is *the ground* of this substitution of inclination, for aversion ? Simply, that the practice to which it relates, though not relished for itself, is, in additional connections, and with *a modified disposition*, productive of more gratification than pain. And every other ex-

ample, so far as I can perceive, would concur in a similar illustration.

774 §. We have however seen, in a former and more strict analysis of this subject, that there is no universal recipe for a substitution of this sort. Of course, the substitution would *not occur* where the terms of it were not fulfilled, or where its influences did not apply. Thus in the former instance; say that our gambler was of a reckless temper, and not accessible to pain through the medium of *other affections*: although he might have lost his last farthing, his inclination for gambling would most probably remain, with a force but little diminished; he would regret the loss of fortune only so far as it restricted him in the indulgence of a favourite propensity: and if by any accident he again became possessed of the means of gratifying a taste, suppressed only by inevitable circumstances, he would resume the habit with increased eagerness, perhaps schooling himself effectually into a total disregard of consequences, whether in their anticipation, or under their occurrence. So also with our practitioner in chivalry: if, when he heard others talk of glory, he thought of a quiet habitation and regular meals; if, when they displayed ardour to encounter difficulties, privations, and danger, he thought only of a comfortable fire-side, a good bed, and an agreeable consignment to repose, in the full sense of security—with such a one, the trade of campaigning would not be very likely to improve on acquaintance.

775 §. Assuming that these familiar specimens might justly illustrate the respective classes of examples, we may define *the dependence* of inclination, in any given instance, to be upon the preponderance of gratification; that of aversion, upon the preponderance of pain, in some or other modification. Hence it follows, that if

we intend, in any given case, to produce an inclination, we must make that to which it relates a source of preponderating gratification; or, if we wish to diminish affection, or to substitute aversion in its place, we must first render the object or pursuit to which it relates a source of vexation, disappointment, shame, regret, or some or other feeling, in a preponderating degree, which belongs to the class of painful sensations. Indeed, so closely allied are pleasure and pain with inclination and aversion, that we have formerly thought the difference between them to be little more than in terms.

776§. It is by this mode, though rarely, if ever, with the benefit of a definition, that philosophy attempts the government of the affections. If anger is to be subdued, or fear, philosophy represents, first, perhaps, the immorality of the former passion, then the absurdity: it shews that nothing is gained by it; on the contrary, that it disarms the judgment, that the evil is confined to him who feels it, or, if it leads to an expression of resentment, that it most probably brings additional calamity, and is followed by repentance. Then with respect to fear: philosophy first calls it a base passion; and, if this should not be sufficient, it asks why we should fear any evil, seeing that, by fearing, we cannot perhaps avert it; or why we should even fear to incur it, when all human concerns are of so vain and transitory a nature? In addition, it suggests that good comes out of evil, and indicates some course, or circumstances, by which that which is regarded with apprehension, may be converted into a benefit. Thus, also, if any object is passionately *desired*, and pursued with ardour, in many respects at the expense of happiness, philosophy attempts to moderate this tone of affection, by connecting with it all the evils to which it is allied—by a collective exhibition of all the circumstances, either of present accompaniment, or of future oc-

currence, by which the object, or pursuit, if not proved to be productive of more pain than pleasure, is at least shown to be no source of unqualified gratification, and therefore not worthy of so enthusiastic a desire. Hence, as the principle of a change of affection with respect to a given object, is the substitution of pleasure in place of pain, or pain in place of pleasure, so the *indirect mode by which the will* attempts the control of affection, is by associating in the regard of an object, if one unwisely *desired*, all the evils, and if one unwisely *disliked*, all the benefits connected with it, either immediate or consequential. In this way, reason, or invention, by combining or arraying against each other the affections, may sometimes render philosophy a practical benefit.*

* For the purposes of this discipline, affections may be arranged as natural, or spontaneous; and as artificial, or voluntary. These may be subdivided into (1.) affections which relate to prospective goods. (2.) Affections which relate to goods possessed. (3.) Affections which relate to prospective evils. (4.) Affections which relate to evils incurred. One rule for all these, which has both precept and common sense to recommend it, may be defined, namely, that those affections, relatively to either class of objects, *are the best*, which are the most agreeable with happiness. Let a person, in any given case, consider what those affections may be which, *if he had them*, would be most agreeable with happiness. This done, reason has pointed out the best affections: but if from the inevitable laws of dependence, formerly exposed, the affections should not follow the demonstration of reason, he must create them, or modify existing ones, by some association; as if pride were brought in aid of the rational demonstration, in this way—"the best affections, or it may be said the best possessions, because the most agreeable with happiness, are demonstrated: these then, *proving real excellence, are the true grounds of self-exaltation or compliment*;" and to one disposed to like, or dislike, according as his pride is flattered, or otherwise, things *may be agreeable to him in virtue of this auxiliary passion*, which would be otherwise, under a mere abstract demonstration of self-interest—and perhaps justly so; because they may not be conformable with self-interest, until the affection is subdued which is opposed to them.

777 §. There are perhaps but few passions or inclinations which do not admit of being moderated, if not entirely subdued, as is occasionally illustrated by those who maintain a perpetual self-discipline, by an habitual practice of this sort; since there are few objects or pursuits in which, either at the present or a future time, good and evil are not mixed in almost equal proportions. If, therefore, a person accustomed himself to look for both these qualities (which I am free to acknowledge is in itself a very troublesome habit, and by no means suited to all minds), his affections would most commonly be moderated; but if a natural bias were likely to prevail under this equal contemplation, the will is capable, if so disposed, of the additional efficacy of fixing the attention chiefly upon those circumstances which are most likely to counteract the prevalent inclination. But it commonly happens, more especially if an affection has been long indulged, that there is a stronger propensity to obviate or resist a connected evil, which is sometimes attempted even at the hazard of life, than to acquire an indifference with respect to the object of such affection. Another resource of no mean efficacy, and more frequently attempted than the methodical discipline here suggested, is, under an inevitable disappointment, or privation, sustained through the medium of one affection, to supersede the hold which this has upon the mind by the cultivation of another, with all the aids of practice, precept, and example.

778 §. Although these expedients of philosophy for combating the affections are sometimes successful, it must be acknowledged that the success is often only partial, and that on many occasions they fail altogether. The common ground of the failure is this: if an object is desired, although its circumstances may not be exclusively those which are agreeable,

its preponderating influence is to afford either present, or anticipated gratification, in some or other degree, in proportion to which it is desired: and the same, *mutatis mutandis*, may be remarked with respect to aversion. As therefore, in spite of *existing* influences, this object is either desired or disliked, either of these feelings can, on many occasions, be counteracted, or diminished, only by looking for *future* circumstances in connection, which would tend to the prevalence of the opposite feeling: but these consequences of an action have frequently less claim upon our affection than the present inducements, because the pleasure they are calculated to afford, or the misery they are likely to produce, is anticipated, but not actually felt; and hence there is *no immediate sense* of gratification or pain, from whence might spring inclination, or aversion.

779§. It is, however, by no means impossible that a present desire should be effectually counteracted by the anticipation of consequent evil; or that the mere promise of future good should substitute desire for aversion. But it is generally true that all the objections which the mind can associate with an action, or pursuit, to which we are impelled by a present inclination, have no better success than to control the volition, while the inclination is still retained; and the same with respect to aversion. While, on the other hand, if influences, productive of pain, or pleasure, by their relation with a more powerful affection, are inevitably associated with an action otherwise desired, or disliked, these contrasted agencies being mixed in actual experience, desire, with respect to such action, would very generally be converted into aversion, and the contrary. This result is not, however, to be expected with uniformity; for it has been formerly shown that the relation of things *necessarily associated in our experience*, may be such with the affections, that *each preserves its separate agency*: so

that although the pursuit of an object intensely desired may be productive of more pain than pleasure, the desire for it is not, on this account, subdued: the evils connected with it are deplored, but affection for the proposed good is not counteracted, though it can scarcely fail of being mitigated by them.

780 §. To define, then, in aid of our present views, a general rule, agreeably with these modes, for directing the affections, so far as it is practicable, it may be said, if we wish to substitute aversion for inclination towards any particular object or pursuit, we must connect with such object or pursuit more evil than good, or more pain than pleasure; and if we would substitute desire for aversion, we must connect with the object more good than evil, or the influences productive of more pleasure than pain. If this association is made only by the mind, it will commonly fail of changing, in any great degree, the affection, although the conviction with which the mind is impressed of that which is most conducive to our real interests, will often decide the will to incur a present evil, or forego a present enjoyment; and may even reverse the nature of our feelings, on rare occasions, with respect to the object, *if the associated good or evil is related with affections more powerful*. But if good, or evil, in a preponderating degree, is mixed in actual experience with that which would be otherwise avoided or desired, this modification will very generally render us desirous to attain, or to avoid, that which we should otherwise have been solicitous to avoid, or possess. We see here only another example of that common law of causation, which teaches that, if effects are to be changed, the causes must be appropriately modified.

781 §. Having thus sketched the principles of the general dependence of the origin and change of the

affections, recurring to our more immediate design, it is to be inquired by what modes, or institutes, a *moral taste* may be inspired?

782 §. From this exposition it appears that there are two modes of moderating, subduing, enhancing, or creating an affection, with respect to a given object or pursuit. One of these modes may be called preceptive, and the other experimental: the former is a doctrinal representation, or a mental association of connected circumstances which tend to repress, or encourage an inclination by a countervailing relation with other affections, which should be of a more powerful kind; the latter is the actual, and necessary experience of such contrasted influences in regular connection with the pursuit, or object. Of these two, both of which may fail in some instances, the first is the least to be depended upon.

783 §. The preceptive mode is chiefly appropriate to Divines and Moralists, and is that also which Philosophers, and even the vulgar less systematically, employ, in regulating the affections of others, or their own. By this method, the evils or the benefits of a course of action which it is intended to correct, or inculcate, are pointed out: it is perhaps clearly shown that that to which we are most strongly inclined, is, in reality, the most inimical to our true interests; and that to which we are averse, in the greatest degree conducive to our welfare. By this sort of demonstration, as before remarked, our actions may be controled to some extent, because volition is often a preference, or the prevalence of one desire over another, rather than an unmixed affection: by it also, the force of a given feeling may be moderated, if not entirely subdued. In this way, it is common for men to reconcile themselves to present, or anticipated evil, by finding out some qualifying circumstances which will have the effect of showing that the evil is not exclusive, or

their case so desperate as, at first sight, it appeared : and it must be acknowledged that our peace of mind may, on many occasions, be preserved, or our anticipations relieved, by just looking the evil steadily in the face, and tracing its consequences, or considering its associations, until we find one upon which we might repose with something like consolation. But the simple interrogatory "what then?" by which a train of consequences may be pursued, has perhaps had a demoralizing influence, little inferior to the expression "I don't care," so intimately allied with it, and so generally reprobated by parents and preceptors. The *success* of this method *depends* upon whether there is, in the train of consequences, a circumstance or event which is adequately related with a more powerful affection than that, the excitation of which we are desirous to counteract. It is however perhaps true that there is no possible affection of human nature, more especially if it is entertained with any intensity, which is not either directly, or in its connections, a source of greater pain than enjoyment. This conviction might effectually recommend a philosophy of indifference, which would render some men less vulnerable by evils than others ; but still, in this respect, which has been thought by the Stoics to be the height of human attainment, *inferior* to trees or stones.

784 §. Thus far, or in the exercise of this preceptive mode of controlling the affections, the efficacy of the will may be trusted with those who are disposed habitually to exert it ; but although the experimental mode is entitled to much more dependence, it is scarcely to be expected from individuals themselves, or from mere teachers. It therefore belongs chiefly to governments, or to those endowed with competent authority, to attempt the subversion of tastes and propensities by a *necessary* and immediate association of such influences with the objects of moral, or immoral desires, as would substitute

inclination for aversion with respect to the former, or render the latter sources of much greater pain, than gratification : which, of course must be accomplished by the relation of these associated influences with affections more powerful than the aversion to be overcome, or the inclination to be counteracted.

785 §. In the common methods of education, it is perhaps *intended* that the preceptive and experimental modes of inspiring a taste for moral practice, should be mixed. A presumption of this sort would however be little better than a mistake ; and it is perhaps owing to this mistake that the failure in this end is almost universal. Education, in these respects, only imitates the systems of ethics : they are all liberal in preceptive recommendation, and they agree in attaching rewards and penalties to virtue and vice—but this connection is rather prospective than immediate ; hence the object of desire or aversion not being made, by adequate association, a source of experienced pain or pleasure, the disposition with respect to it, with exceptions and dependences before expressed, remains the same ; and the pursuit of it in the former case, will be indulged, either if the punishment might be evaded, or if the pleasure is more desired, than the punishment is apprehended ; or the aversion, in the latter, will prevail if the pleasure of the reward is more lightly appreciated, than the evil through which it is to be obtained. Hence, although reward and punishment may certainly come to have a practical influence of some sort, the promise of the one, or the denunciation of the other, amounts only to a preceptive recommendation, founded in views of self-interest, rather than an experimental mode of creating or subverting a taste, by uniting with a given object or pursuit those influences which will render it agreeable, or otherwise.

786§. Thus much concerning *the principles* of this moral design. With respect to the details by which it may be best accomplished, a matter of so much importance, and it may be added of so much difficulty, may properly form a subject of distinct consideration. It may, however, be assumed that the taste for a moral practice is one to which we are not, or with but few exceptions, naturally disposed ; and therefore any incentives which may be proposed generally with a view to its cultivation, must be addressed to an affection of some other kind, which should be more powerful than the aversion to the objects of morals. If such influences are connected with moral practice by a necessary and constant association, it is probable, with the aid also of mere preceptive recommendation, which might acquire a hold on some minds, at least that the aversion to moral habits will be diminished, if a positive inclination for them is not inspired.

787§. The first question suggested by this design is, through the medium of what capacity of affection, may the objects of morals be most effectually recommended? To settle this question, we have only to recur to our experience, in order to ascertain what affection is *at once* the most powerful, and the most prevalent ; for these requisites constitute the chief grounds of recommendation in a popular design.

788§. Without making a tedious and perhaps unsatisfactory comparison of the force of different affections, it may be sufficient to remark, in favour of the love of reputation, or of distinction, that there is no passion more general, and none so effectual, not merely in overcoming weak objections, or slight difficulties, but in controlling the instinctive dispositions, or counteracting the most powerful, of our natural propensities. What prin-

ciple suggested the ancient maxim that a king should kill his brother, or his father, if necessary to the security of his throne? What has been the spring of the martyrdoms, and persecutions, voluntarily incurred, in all ages? What the motive to the dangers, and hardships which men have at all times courted with the cheerful sacrifice of every other good in life, or even of life itself? What the incentive of soldiers, of every rank; of gladiators; pugilists; horse-racers; sportsmen of every denomination; of competitors in all the sciences, and every art? What the inducement to Governments, who make war upon a point of honour, or at the instigation of pride, and lavish the blood of their subjects as freely as if it were water? What the passion which sustains the Indian in the steady chant of his death-song, under every infliction of ingenious torture? Reputation, it must be replied; ambition, in some or other shape; the over-ruling force of a love of distinction, the gratification of which is clung to with greater tenacity than even life itself; the desire of which impels men to forfeit their hopes of heaven, and embrace the conditions of eternal punishment:—reputation; which gives to society the security of a sustained character among individuals, and is seldom lost but with a feeling of abandonment, which disposes men for an acquaintance with the hangman and the gallows.

789§. It is already customary in the business of education to take this passion, the efficacy of which is so generally acknowledged, and has been so variously described, into the account. But the question is, seeing that all the systems of morals are so defective, seeing also that ambition, it must be confessed *of a mean kind*, may now be pursued in actual opposition to their injunctions; whether the services of this powerful principle may not be regularly engaged on the side of morality, so as to give additional security to its pur-

poses, and ensure a more prevalent respect of its obligations? This possibility has by no means escaped the observation of the Moralists, as we have seen by the terms of their panegyric upon virtue: but the principal difficulty appears to be, by *what method* its services, as an instrument in the moral design, may be rendered effectual?

790 §. To this end, it is necessary in the first place that the general objects of morality should be *defined*; and then every particular rule which will apply respectively to all practical occasions. The common end of morality is the welfare of a community; and agreeably with this criterion, the sentiments and actions which are most conducive to the public good, should be enumerated in the code of ethics. Thus, every case which concerns the interests of society, would have its appropriate rule; and the laws of morals would be at least as well defined, if not as powerfully enforced, as those in the civil department. In this scheme all obscurities, and all contradictory injunctions should be avoided; it is necessary to consider only what course of action in the several classes of examples is most conducive to the public welfare, in order to make *the love of the prescribed practice*, on respective occasions, *the standard of moral affection*.

791 §. We will suppose all the virtues, and vices, to be enumerated, which can be exemplified in practice; we will suppose them to be arranged under those gross divisions as of truth, honesty, charity, patience, courage, &c., and their opposites, which are now, as choice directs, the themes of the Moralists. We will suppose it a result of moral instruction, of a systematic kind, that even in the earlier stages of education the knowledge of these distinctions is attained, together with that of their several applications in practice. We will sup-

pose it to be stated fairly, seeking no protection, or aid, from mystery or deceit, that *the end* of the practice, recommended to the liking of individuals, *is the welfare of a community*. Our former exposition has shown that, as the case stands, private interests, commonly of a more powerful kind, are frequently opposed to the public good. The object, then, is to identify the choice of action, subservient to public welfare, with the private interests of individuals.

792§. The rule for attempting so desirable a purpose, is to associate with the moral practice, on its respective occasions, such circumstances, or inducements, as will create in its favour an inclination, more powerful than that for the objects, or pursuits, by which it may be opposed. If the avowed *object of morals*, the benefit of mankind, should be a matter of indifference, and if a philanthropic disposition is not to be inspired by any known expedient, an inclination for moral practice can be produced only through the medium of another affection, which will have the effect of counteracting other propensities on all those occasions, on which the affection, engaged on the side of morals, is more powerful than the propensity opposed to it. If then it is true, as it certainly is to a great extent, though not universally, that there is no love at once more powerful, and more general, than that of distinction, or reputation, and no aversion, in spite of apparent examples to the contrary, more prevalent than that to disgrace, it follows, if the *gratification* of this love, or the infliction of *this punishment* were *regularly associated* with the practice of virtue, and of vice, that the affection for the one, and the aversion to the other, would prevail over all addictions of inferior force, with which they may be contrasted; which would be, if our premises are true, *over affections of every kind, provided the terms* of the gratification of this love deducted nothing from its force.

793 §. The question then, in this stage of our exposition, seems to be, by what method, through the medium of the love for reputation, or the aversion to disgrace, the practice of virtue may be rendered at all times a means of gratification, and the indulgence of vice, an immediate source of some or other modification of pain?

794 §. Agreeably with this view, it should, in the first place, be taught that morality, *or the possession of the virtues it comprises*, is the *highest of all human distinctions*, or the chief standard of human excellence; as vice, is the immediate ground of *the lowest degradation*. This sentiment of the *pre-eminence of the moral over all other qualities*, having a rational foundation in the common interests of society,* would ensure, to a great extent, an acceptance of the precepts of moral instruction which should form a regular branch of scholastic teaching. If it were not sufficient *to inculcate by education* the pre-eminence of morality *above all other human qualifications*, in connection with this theoretical recommendation, honorary distinctions may be conferred for moral excellence of every kind; and disgrace may be attached to any sufficient infringement of the moral rules. Thus morality would be enforced by precepts addressed to the understanding; the moral restraint imposed by public opinion would be rendered more severe; ambition of moral excellence would be kindled by the rank conceded to it, and gratified, if requisite, by the honours, and distinctions it obtained. In addition to those incentives which are calculated to stimulate ambition in behalf of morals, some public

* This is for the present assumed: it may, however, be doubted whether society, in its existing state, can afford to lose the benefits which ensue from making talent the principal, rather than a secondary, ground of distinction.

evidence might be required of every one, that *a certain moral character is regularly sustained*; or that their title to respect, on this account, has not been forfeited.

795 §. Such are the objects, and such the modes, by which they may be most rationally attempted. With respect to the means, or apparatus, I leave them to better projectors. It may, however, be suggested, *for mere purposes of illustration*, that the interests of morality would require a separate jurisdiction in two stages of life, one of which would be appropriate to the periods of education, and the other, to those of maturity—the latter, subject only to a few modifications, and perhaps to a different tribunal, would be very little more than a continuation of the former.

796 §. The principal ends of a moral jurisdiction, may be stated as, (1.) the encouragement of an ambition, which entertains moral excellence for its end; (2.) the repression of vice; (3.) the preservation, and assurance of a moral character. Agreeably with these objects, it may be suggested that all those classes who, during the period of education, were instructed in the principles and practice of morality, should receive some testimonial, as a medal, for example, to be worn publicly, of title to a moral character: the permission to retain which, may be renewed at a prescribed interval. If the moral rules had, during this interval, been infringed, this testimonial of character may be withdrawn, or suspended for a time, or a badge of disgrace imposed in its place, as may be required. In addition to these testimonials of the mere preservation of character, honorary medals should be awarded, upon severe terms, for moral excellence in any one of the qualities in which it may be displayed, which may be publicly worn in addition to the mere testimonials of character; and either of them withdrawn permanently, or for an interval, or the

badge of disgrace substituted in its place. In order additionally to ensure respect for these distinctions, which should hold a *rank above those of every other kind*, they might be sustained by other collateral means of reward and punishment, which need not here be particularly adverted to. When the courses of education were finished, a testimonial, to be worn publicly *through life*, should be given of the manner in which the moral character had during this period been sustained; of what honours had been awarded, and what disgrace incurred.

797§. The objects being the same in our second epoch, or during the periods of maturity, the methods of attaining them would be much the same. With the aid of our schools and colleges, a system of preceptive instruction in morals may be steadily maintained. Regular courts of morals may be appointed in districts respectively, and their influence and jurisdiction may be extended, by means of commissioners, delegates, or teachers, to the most insignificant subdivisions of a community. To these courts may be referred every question of what is now called honour, the instances of which, involving chiefly the questions of truth or falsehood, of course belong to the department of morals. Every individual may be required to obtain from one of these courts a testimonial of character, to be renewed periodically, which may be reclaimed on proof of infringement of the moral rules, and restored upon prescribed conditions, or one of disgrace substituted in its place; and honorary medals may be adjudged for any species of moral excellence, as during the periods of education, with, however, this difference, that an honorary distinction, or a badge of disgrace, should, during the more responsible periods of manhood, be exhibited through life; while a subsequent deterioration, or improvement, of character, may be announced by the absence, or the

accompaniment of the *common* testimonial of *moral character*. These incitements failing, in any given case, to ensure the intended respect for morality, the individual by whom its rules are repeatedly infringed, or over whom neither honours, nor disgrace, held any control, should be turned over to the civil authorities, and fined or imprisoned, or sent to some other country, where he might labour in degradation for political uses—where his rebellion against the institutes of society could do no harm, and where his depravities could corrupt only wild beasts.

798 §. What then would be the sources of failure, or what the probable success of the scheme of education, and moral government, thus loosely sketched? The collective objects of this system are, 1. the improvement of health, and of physical strength; 2. the attainment of knowledge, in the highest degree, appropriate to every condition in life; 3. excellence in any particular art or science; 4. the increase of happiness, by *such an indulgence* of every taste or propensity incident to human nature, *as is compatible with the public good*; 5. a preference of moral practice, on all occasions, to a practice of any other kind, which may be in opposition to it. We will suppose a system of regulations, in whatever it might consist, best adapted to these purposes; under which (1.) the means of promoting health, or physical strength, would fail with those few who could not bear an appropriate discipline, or with those by whom these means were counteracted by other influences, whether accidental, or habitual; (2.) the means of instruction would fail only with those who could not learn; (3.) the means of ensuring excellence in any particular branch of science or learning, would fail with those who attempted it without sufficient ability, and with those in whom aversion to the practice, or other tastes, pre-

vailed over the inducements to persevere in it; (4.) the permission to indulge the more natural tastes and inclinations, under prescribed regulations, would fail of increasing the enjoyment only of those who did not entertain these tastes or propensities, or had not the means of indulging them; (5.) and the choice of a moral practice, on those occasions on which it might be opposed to any other, would fail with all those who preferred other things to honour, or who feared other things more than disgrace—or whose addictions, inimical to public welfare, were so inveterate as not to be controlled either by the desire of honour, the fear of disgrace, fine, imprisonment, banishment, or death.

799§. Upon the whole, if we may be permitted to conjecture on a question so extensive, and in an affair dependent upon elements so numerous and discordant, it seems probable that the success of a system of this kind would be very general; the instances of a partial failure would be very frequent; and those of a total failure, exceptions of rare occurrence. A community with whom these objects could be realized, would be hardy, strong, familiarized with all manly exercises, perfect in the use of arms, courageous, well informed, masters in every kind of intellectual qualification—with a subjection of all these qualities and attainments to a preponderating regard for the rules and institutes, which subserve the public good.

800§. Upon a general observation of human conduct, we find the most powerful efforts, both of the mind and body, are made systematically through life, in order to attain, or preserve, some or other rank or distinction. In this struggle, perhaps at the present time, the efforts are the most strenuous which emulate pre-eminence in the intellectual department—and why is pre-eminence of this sort so sedulously attempted? For no other

reason than that, at this time, intellectual character, though often little better than a curse to the possessor, (and therefore, in reality, more deserving of pity than applause,) in public opinion, ranks the highest. In a community of merchants, the objects of ambition would be knowledge of trade, and the possession of wealth; because, in such a community, these would be the most highly appreciated: in the fashionable world, dress, equipage, household finery, arrogance, affectation, and grimace, are the standards of human excellence; because such are, in this circle, the means of the highest distinction: in remoter ages, physical strength, and skill in arms, were the sources of gratification to a similar form of self-love; for no other reasons than that learning was despised, (though eventually found to be more powerful than the sword,) and the arts, including commerce, left to a race who were thought to have no title to the warlike, and higher qualities of men. And thus, in every interest or pursuit which can engage human beings, when they cease to labour merely to supply the natural wants, the love of distinction, in some or other form, with comparatively few exceptions, stimulates their energies, and sustains their career. And what, in the midst of this general and diversified competition, is the fate of morals? The protection, or advancement of morality, is ostensibly left with the Divines—but as the system upon which they recommend it appears to have but a weak, or partial influence, either upon the affections, because the reward is prospective, and not associated with a moral practice; or upon conduct, because even the promise of this reward is seldom entirely confided in; the little morality which may be observed in the world, is *chiefly* the effect of public opinion, or social rules, or else of the coincidence between the moral and the civil laws.

801§. Thus much for a scheme by which it has been proposed to ensure the *political benefits* of morality, and at the same time to promote individual happiness, by rendering the prescribed practice of men agreeable with a predominant affection. As, however, our present object is *to expose relations*, rather than to recommend projects, more especially such as must be at this time impracticable, we may bestow with advantage some additional reflection upon the probable success of a principle which emulates this double design.

802§. It has been remarked of the civil laws, and of the customary apprehension of those of honour, that their efficacy extends only to public occasions. Punishment for the breach of the civil laws is *dependent* upon conviction ; and provided this is not feared, they impose no restraint : the love of honour is most commonly only a desire for the reputation of it—hence, when reputation is not to be obtained by an honourable action, or disgrace incurred by a dishonourable one, *this* sense of honour furnishes no obligation. So also with *ambition* in any other department, if, by ambition is meant the desire of reputation, or of public applause, in contradistinction to *pride*, which is satisfied *with the possession* of a quality or attainment, with little or no care for the reputation of it. If such is the nature of ambition, as it is commonly, if not essentially, why then the ambition of moral character may be satisfied with the public display of morality, or may even gain many of its distinctions, while the principle, which should render it useful on private occasions, which are those for which it is most difficult to supply an adequate control, may be entirely wanting.

803§. Then, with respect to the other design, that of promoting individual happiness, by the coincidence

between a prescribed practice and a predominant affection—it may happen that the ambition for moral distinctions, as for any others, conferred by society, may be ardent, while the moral practice itself may continue to be disagreeable, either directly, or from its opposition to other interests. Nevertheless, the practice of morality may be pursued, but the recipe for making it agreeable, by association with another mode of gratification, may fail; and the observance of its rules would be ensured on this ground, only so far as public distinction may be attained by it, which would be but to a very limited extent.

804 §. But the ambition for moral distinction, so far as individual welfare is concerned, is open to the trite and *general objection* that ambition, at least in its vulgar forms, is totally incompatible with human happiness. Whatever species of distinction is desired, its attainment is doubtful, its possession insecure; and supposing it to be attained, and that no apprehension was felt for its security, it would then cease to be valued; or a higher degree of it would be desired; and the same discontent which marked the commencement of the career, would stimulate to a restless pursuit of additional acquisitions, until the mind, as distant as ever from satisfaction or repose, worn out by its efforts, sinks into peevish imbecility, and presents only a warning to mankind.

805 §. Suppose the objects of ambition to be fully attained, and suppose the uncommon circumstance that the person whom fortune has *thus favoured*, as it is thought, can propose no higher distinction than that which he possesses, would he then be happy, or would he be the happier for this rare success? No: if his success has been great, he has met with some failures; and these, however trifling, from the propensity of men to think

more of a single evil in their destiny, than of a thousand benefits, would be productive of greater regret than his acquisition is of pleasure—or he would be cursed with jealousy, lest the star of some hated rival should shine brighter than his own. Or, if none of this happens, what is to ensure him against *a change of affection?* by which, his former objects of ambition may be held in contempt; and the same passion, perhaps, displaying itself in another direction, may overwhelm him with mortification, that although he has been flattered by the applause of some, he has built for himself only a monument of disgrace, as lasting as his own name, in the estimation of others, whose opinion, under this change of affection, he more highly values. This indeed is the most common ending of ambition, when it does terminate, except in death—a change of affection, under which the proposed goods, when attained, are, by our candidate for distinctions, neglected as worthless, if evils are not deplored: society has the benefit of his past existence, if calculated to be beneficial, and he the curse, for his own private edification, or amusement.

806 §. For political uses then, the incentive of *ambition* to a moral practice, seems defective; and for private happiness, it is a result of insane teaching; since if the value of an affection is to be measured by the comparative happiness which ensues from it, this is the worst that a human being can entertain. Hence, in our scholastic discipline, if this incentive is retained, it must be as an avowed evil; the only recommendation of which is, that it is capable of being made a powerful instrument for political purposes, and the only apology, that society requires in some measure the sacrifice of private happiness, for public good.

807 §. In place of *ambition*, the objects of which are public distinctions, how far may the allied principle of

pride, as an auxiliary to morals, be substituted with advantage, in the double relation to public benefit, and individual happiness? Supposing it to be inculcated that the *highest* human distinction is the possession of a moral character, rather than the reputation for it; in its public relation, if this lesson were accepted, it would supply that governing principle of conduct, without which no moral restraint can be effectual; it would furnish a directing influence, which would descend to the most minute and private transactions of a man's life. And in its relation with individual happiness, the sense of this sort of distinction is infinitely above that dependent upon *popular applause*; inasmuch as if this possession is regarded as a summum bonum, it is the inalienable property of him who holds it; it may afford a perpetual consolation amidst the various sufferings and vicissitudes of life, and has this supreme advantage, in which ambition is so eminently deficient, that a person's happiness, so far as it may be ensured by a ruling passion, is in his own hands, rather than at the mercy of the multitude, or of any knave, or fool, who may choose to assail it.

808§. It seems not improbable but this impulse to virtue may be rendered very prevalent, though by no means universal. The feeling of *pride* is one to which human nature is very generally predisposed, and this so effectually, that we often find it in the highest degree, where the basis of it is some accident, such as birth, or some corporeal distinction, or quality, which may be equally possessed in common by the vulgar. But although the pride of moral worth is one which reason may thus far sanction, that this species of excellence is a real distinction, or property of him who has attained it, which neither *opinion*, *injustice*, nor *calumny*, can alter or abate, yet it would perhaps have been no ground of self-esteem, if the consent of mankind had not

fixed its value. It is most commonly for this reason that human excellence of every sort is esteemed by its possessor; not for any intrinsic worth, or because one thing is really better than another, but because it is so relatively; and thence obtains the character of a good, and is esteemed accordingly. In order, then, to render pride auxiliary to morals, it is necessary that mankind should concede *to the possession of morality* the highest distinction: if this kind of honour were supported by general consent, and inculcated invariably by education, there seems no reason why it may not be accepted generally as a superior good, upon which the mind might rest with satisfaction, so long as it is possessed, as well as those accidents, or more worthless, if only because more uncertain qualities, just adverted to, which are the common grounds of self-exaltation. For this purpose, or as the mere sign of its currency, all that apparatus may be advantageously employed which in our scholastic discipline was directed for the encouragement of ambition; under this employment, however, of our apparatus, in stimulating the taste for *the possession* of the moral character, rather than for *the reputation* of it, care must be taken that the shadow does not become an object of worship, rather than the substance. It is probable that mere precept may be sufficient to produce a feeling which too frequently springs up, when it is useless, in spite of all the obstacles which can be thrown in its way. Doubtless the pride of moral excellence may be excited very generally, and it may produce many of the benefits just ascribed to it. If reason should ever unluckily inquire the foundation of it, the reply may not be very satisfactory. Nevertheless, like other feelings, congenial with self-love, when fairly kindled, it may maintain itself on a very slender diet, *in spite of reason*.

809 §. These advantages of pride, as an incentive to

morality, belong equally to *philanthropy*, which differs both from pride, and ambition, in this respect, that these latter may suggest a practice of morality from an exclusive self-love, while philanthropy proposes self-gratification through the medium of a love for mankind. Philanthropy is thought to be the purer, or the better principle, and perhaps it is: but considering those conflicting relations between human beings, formerly described, it is by far the most difficult to inspire or sustain.

810 §. The pursuits of the Alchymists after the Philosopher's Stone, have not been more vain, than the inquiries of Moralists and Philosophers, after some universal summum bonum, or panacea for human happiness. On so trite a subject, it may be sufficient to observe, that with all the helps of education, a different estimate of the greatest good, will, to a great extent, prevail among individuals: but that seems to promise the greatest felicity, which is farthest beyond the reach of accident; and hence the wisdom of those among the Ancients, who placed it in *some governing principle*, or in some property, which an individual may possess so long as he lives, without fear of deprivation from any changes of fortune. Perhaps there is no good which absolutely deserves this panegyric: and if such a one were discovered, as has been remarked of ambition, although it may be secure against external assaults, it is liable to be weakened, or dissipated by change, whether of belief or affection.

811 §. After all, so far as human happiness is concerned, the question is less whether a given taste may be inspired by precept or discipline, than whether any one taste can be proposed, which may become *an engrossing affection*? For my own part, I believe, in common with many who have scrutinized the

conditions of humanity, that an intense, or engrossing interest *of any kind*, from some or other inevitable connections, must be productive of infinitely more misery, than enjoyment—that the suffering necessarily attendant upon such interest, will not be confined to the moral department, but, as is familiarly exemplified, that it will be extended to the corporeal system ; and if long continued, or without adequate interruptions, will produce disease and death. This is true of love, whether sexual or parental ; it is true of the pecuniary addiction ; it is true of religion, which, between doubts on points of belief, doubts of grace, and fears for moral delinquencies, when this subject is one of intense affection, is a perpetual source of anxiety ; and if it does not lead to insanity, at least keeps the mind incessantly divided between hopes and fears : it is true also pre-eminently of ambition, perhaps because in favour of its objects, this passion is calculated to be at once the most enduring, and the most engrossing ; it is true also of the love of life, owing to which people consume their existence in the constant fear of death. In this latter instance, this morbid feeling is termed *hypochondriasis* ; but the disease *is the same*, the feeling is *equally morbid*, whatever may be the mode of affection, when it becomes exclusive or intense.

812 §. The most that has been urged in favour of one predominating affection, whatever may be the object, is, that it renders him who entertains it insensible to all the minor, or even the more considerable, evils of life—this is certainly an advantage—but, on the other hand, it renders him negligent of all common enjoyments. Social pleasures, the indulgence of harmless tastes, all customary recreations, are to him nothing : the beauty of Nature has no power to please, and the sun shines in vain for him whose soul is the prey of one devouring fire. But say, what indeed never can be true, that an

object may be proposed which *might*, under circumstances which remain to be discovered, be a source of unmixed enjoyment, and therefore worthy that ardent love which has just been described : even then, the certainty of a deprivation of it by death, would render the possession of it, like that of most other things which people labour to attain, no better than an evil. The religionists will suggest an object of the kind just spoken of, in favour of which a boundless enthusiasm may be indulged, in spite of the certainty of death—or rather, the degree of enjoyment, from the contemplation of this object, may be heightened by the expectation of death. But the defects of the summum bonum which religion offers, have just been remarked. It would be no difficult matter for the understanding to propose an object, or pursuit, which would ensure any degree of felicity, *provided* an adequate affection towards it *would follow the rational demonstration*, which is that of a benefit, *only* on this condition ; but rational and animal, or involuntary good, are most frequently opposed—that is, the object or pursuit which may be approved by the understanding, *fails to be a good*, because affection towards it is wanting ; and the object or pursuit which is a good, so far as it is related with affection, is an evil in the decision of the understanding, for the reason that *its conditions* are those of more misery, than enjoyment. If a *coincidence* could be produced between the highest rational good, and a predominant affection, human happiness would scarcely be allayed by any consideration short of the necessity of death.

813 §. By these reflections we are forced upon the conclusion, that if every thing becomes an evil, *if much desired*, there is nothing that is *much worth* desiring. If a thing is much desired, or intensely valued when possessed, *it is an evil* ; if it is not much desired, or much valued, *it is no good*, or but a moderate one.

What then shall we say of the pursuits of ambition? What, of all those whose names are recorded in history; and whose exploits are transmitted to us through a long succession of ages, as those of the great, and the illustrious? With very few exceptions, that these, great and illustrious, pursued that which was a source rather of misery than of happiness; and that they attained that which they had better have been without—that, as happiness should be the measure of wisdom, these same great and illustrious men were, in reality, greater fools than the meanest, and most obscure; who, entertaining more moderate affections, derived enjoyment from humble sources, and transferred their regard easily to other objects, when these failed, or gratified no longer. But then the difference in the result! *Posterity* thinks these great men, whose names, as they say, have adorned the page of history, *illustrious!* True; *but this anticipation was no good to them*, while they lived, (and *the reality is certainly none* after they are dead; *at which period*, the reputation of a beggar, *without any trouble on his part*, so far as it is a good, *will be equal* to that of the most illustrious) because the pursuit of their object, being one of intense interest, and therefore of anxiety, was productive of more misery than enjoyment: *to them* ambition was *an evil*; and to those more humble individuals *who were not possessed by a similar desire*, the imposing distinction of a name in the page of history, was *no good*—the former therefore gained nothing by having it, but the misery which *they had better have been without*; and the latter lost nothing, by the deficiency *of that which they did not desire*. By such bubbles men are induced to sacrifice their peace: and well it is if, in return for this splendid folly, this self-imposed individual injury, society is benefited. I am much deceived if the dogs which are halloo'd on by men, and thus encouraged either to fight, or to hunt down their game, do not receive *the same kind of com-*

pliment, as society bestows upon its Heroes, Statesmen, Philosophers, and Poets.*

* The defects of ambition, are of a more radical kind than is here stated. It may be justly doubted whether honour, and disgrace, have any real dependence upon public opinion; since either the quality of an action, or the character of a man, remains *just the same, being neither better, nor worse, under any variety of public estimation.* The ground of honour, if any, from public applause, should be that *some sort of excellence is implied by it.* And if an excellence is implied by it, the honour will consist only in an inferior species of confirmation, of that which was otherwise better assured. If a quality is in itself a good, it is so, without the reputation for it: if it is not a good in itself, the reputation for it can be no compliment. Two conditions are necessary, in order that reputation should be a compliment, *on the ground that it implies excellence*: 1st, that the quality is justly imputed; and 2nd, that *it is good to possess it*, or that it is one by which a person's happiness is enhanced: and the same, *mutatis mutandis*, are the conditions of disgrace, from public censure. But it most commonly happens that persons desire reputation for qualities which *they had better be without*, because they are inimical to happiness: and they do this, not only though the quality is a bad one, but the reputation for it may also be a greater plague than profit. An affection of this kind, is founded in a double mistake: and if the judgment lends a sanction to the pursuit of its objects, it is owing to the misapprehension that *that is best, which is the most desired*; a conclusion which is true only when there are no detracting, or opposing circumstances, which either diminish the quality of the desired possession as a good, or convert it into an evil. If reason were called upon to say *what form of reputation is the best*, supposing any to be desired? the answer would be, That which is the most agreeable with happiness: and this application of a common rule, would give a very different estimate of the comparative value of reputations, from the customary one—it would be, that *any reputation is the best*, because the most agreeable with happiness, which follows from the pursuit of the greatest good; or, according to our former definition, which ensues, whether in general or particular instances, *from the conduct which is right.* If, however, it is necessary for the interests of society that men should be encouraged in inflicting upon themselves all sorts of miseries, which they would scarcely do if they entertained the philosophic, rather than the vulgar estimate of the value of reputation, there is, nevertheless, no fear but there will be enough to think themselves honoured by public distinctions, either supposing honour to consist in these distinctions, or else for the sake of their indirect, or consequential advantages; for though moral, or other excellence, like gold, can derive from an impress which is the sign of its nominal value, no real improvement in its quality, yet to this impress it is indebted for its currency.

814 §. So far as individual happiness is concerned, it may be safely said that moderate affections, of various sorts, are better than one engrossing one, whatever may be its object. But owing to the increase of population, great exertions, the results of solitary and intense interests, have been demanded, in order that the resources of art may supply the deficiencies of nature, and keep pace with the necessary multiplication of modes of subsistence. The increase of population is an evil to be deplored for more reasons than are commonly alleged: it would have been better if the population of countries and districts could, from the beginning, have been limited to as many inhabitants as the earth could have fed with little or no cultivation: men would then have been troubled only by natural wants, which are the most easily borne, and supplied; and, besides the prevalent curse of prosperity, which leaves people nothing to do but to torment themselves, they would have escaped the necessity of providing for one evil, by incurring another in addition to it.

815 §. What might have been the state, and what the success of Moral Institutes at the present time, if for the last three hundred years no other basis had been proposed for morality than its importance to public welfare, it may be difficult to conjecture. But even now, without the aid of that cumbersome apparatus, which has been introduced chiefly to illustrate the laws of the affections, if it were thought desirable *to support the ethics* founded in religion by a better defined system of education, it appears not improbable but much, perhaps all that the good of society requires, may be gained by the appointment of a board of education, and a court of morals; from *each of which* a licence may be obtained, upon high testimonials of character and ability, together with such instructions as are best adapted to the public welfare, by every person who proposed to assume the

important duties of education. By such a jurisdiction, supported by the civil or penal laws, the interests of society could not fail to be essentially promoted; and the establishment of a systematic government in these two departments of knowledge and morality, could be engrafted upon existing institutions without expense or difficulty.

816§. What the effects of an additional progress in civilization may be *upon the happiness* of mankind, we seem to be in a very fair way of knowing. Regarding education rather physiologically, than politically, it appears to me to have much the same sort of relation with the intellectual, as cold, miasmata, poisons, medicines, &c. have with the organic principle; that is, disease, or a preternatural state, of which, in the intellectual department, every idea is an additional property, is their common result.* If, however, the whole course of civilization, or the departure from the state of mere animal life, is to be regarded as a disease, a

* A conspicuous difference in the two departments is, that the organic principle, not being one of sensibility, it is not known in what its changes consist; while the cause of every change of a principle of sensibility is recognized, *provided* the agency of the cause is upon some or other sense, and also, that the cause itself is of a kind to constitute sensation in relation with sensibility. But the sensibility of the senses is not capable of sensation from *every agent, or property*, which is brought into connection with it. As, for example, water, containing arsenic, at a temperature of 130° would be felt only to be water of this temperature, and the presence of the arsenic would not be recognized, because it is not so related with sensibility, as to constitute a sensation. And the principle of consciousness belonging to the brain, is so far from holding a relation with all sorts of properties by which their nature or presence may be perceived, that the mind is ignorant of its own vital and material alliances. If, indeed, it were *otherwise*, or if the brain possessed a principle of sensibility which was liable to be thus affected, the perceptions which are accumulated in the mind itself by experience, could never pass into that temporary oblivion, from whence they are revived by reminiscence.

sophistication, or perhaps an evil, the apology neither has been, nor will be, wanting, that it is a necessary one. At a period, how distant I will not venture to predict, prevalent intellect will have attained a higher level than the present, and the result will be, either suddenly or progressively, such a change in political institutions, that they will exhibit but a very partial resemblance to those with which we are acquainted. The career of civilization will afterwards proceed for a time, with all the energies of human intelligence; and then, unless an increase of happiness should follow by the discovery of new modes and principles from the increase of intelligence, either as a refinement upon the highest pitch of civilization, or from disgust or dissatisfaction at its results, men will court barbarism, or a return to the animal state, with more enthusiasm than they ever departed from it. Yet in this last resource they will be disappointed: the state of population will always impose the necessity for some kind of civilization, the form of which will serve probably but to illustrate some new specimen of corruption.

THE END.

INDEX.

A

- ACTION, voluntary, proceeds from self-love, and is regulated by reward and punishment, *section 415, page 202.*
- Action, voluntary, analysis of motives of, *s. 418, p. 204.*
- Affection, the continuance of any to which an animal is liable, dependent upon its capability to assimilate, *s. 362, p. 173.*
- Affections, laws of continuance of those in the spiritual department, *s. 363, p. 174.*
- Affections, government of, *s. 521, p. 263.*
- Affections, change of, *s. 522, p. 263.*
- Affections, acquirement of, *s. 524, p. 264.*
- Ibid, s. 525, p. 265.*
- Affections, analysis of general dependence of, *s. 526, p. 265.*
- Ibid, s. 527, p. 266.*
- Ibid, s. 528, p. 266.*
- Affections, change of, conditions of, *s. 529, p. 267.*
- Ibid, s. 530, p. 268.*
- Ibid, s. 531, p. 268.*
- Ibid, s. 532, p. 169.*
- Ibid, s. 533, p. 269.*
- Affections, spontaneous change of, *s. 534, p. 270.*
- Ibid, s. 535, p. 270.*
- Ibid, s. 536, p. 271.*
- Affection, dependence of change of, *s. 537, p. 271.*
- Ibid, s. 538, p. 272.*
- Ibid, s. 539, p. 273.*
- Ibid, s. 540, p. 273.*
- Ibid, s. 541, p. 273.*
- Ibid, s. 542, p. 274.*
- Affection, general law, of dependence of, *s. 543, p. 275.*
- Affection, application of dependence, to change, of, *s. 544, p. 278.*
- Ibid, s. 545, p. 276.*
- Ibid, s. 546, p. 277.*
- Ibid, s. 547, p. 277.*
- Ibid, s. 548, p. 279.*
- Ibid, s. 549, p. 279.*

- Affection, additional illustration of modes of change of, *s.* 550, *p.* 280.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 551, *p.* 280.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 552, *p.* 280.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 553, *p.* 280.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 554, *p.* 281.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 555, *p.* 281.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 556, *p.* 282.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 557, *p.* 282.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 558, *p.* 283.
- Affection, summary of modes of change of, *s.* 559, *p.* 284.
- Affection, grounds for desiring change of, *s.* 581, *p.* 297.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 582, *p.* 297.
- Affections, general conditions of change of, *s.* *586, *p.* 300.
- Affection, dependence of, *s.* 775, *p.* 411.
- Affections, how philosophy attempts the government of, *s.* 776, *p.* 412.
- Affections, most, may be influenced in some degree by habitual discipline, *s.* 777, *p.* 414.
- Affections, expedients of philosophy for controlling, success, and failure, of, *s.* 778, *p.* 414.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 779, *p.* 415.
- Affections, general rule for the direction of, *s.* 780, *p.* 416.
- Affections, preceptive, and experimental modes of influencing the, *s.* 782, *p.* 417.
- Affections, efficacy of the preceptive mode of influencing, *s.* 783, *p.* 417.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 784, *p.* 418.
- Affections, relations of reward and punishment with, *s.* 785, *p.* 419.
- Affection, moral, indirect proceeding to create, *s.* 786, *p.* 420.
- Affection, moral, to be produced through the medium of the most powerful and prevalent propensity, *s.* 787, *p.* 420.
- Affection, moral, how far capable, of being a prevailing mode of ambition, *s.* 789, *p.* 421.
- Affection, moral, criterion of, *s.* 790, *p.* 422.
- Affection, an engrossing one, incompatible with happiness, *s.* 811, *p.* 435.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 812, *p.* 436.
- Affections, best state of, *s.* 814, *p.* 440.
- Affinity, exemplifies common relation of cause and effect, *s.* 243, *p.* 117.
- Ambition, prevalent efficacy of, *s.* 800, *p.* 428.
- Ambition, whether a desirable incentive to morals, *s.* 801, *p.* 430.
- Ambition, defect of, as an incentive to morals, *s.* 802, *p.* 430.
- Ambition, failure of, in rendering the moral practice agreeable, *s.* 803, *p.* 430.
- Ambition incompatible with happiness, *s.* 804, *p.* 431.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 805, *p.* 431.
- Ambition, relatively to political uses, and private happiness, *s.* 806, *p.* 432.
- Appetites, origin of, in organs distant from the brain, *s.* 387, *p.* 189.

Assimilation, relations engaged in the support of life by, *s.* 484, *p.* 221.

Association, comprises the relations of sensations with each other, *s.* 428, *p.* 210.

Association, order of, agreeable with analogy between sensations, or founded on experienced connection, *s.* 431, *p.* 211.

B

Being, intellectual, general history of, *s.* 457, *p.* 227.

Being, intellectual, precise condition of, after death, not deducible from experience, *s.* 458, *p.* 227.

Beauty, moral, a foundation for ethics, *s.* 485, *p.* 248.

Beauty, whether any single criterion of, *s.* 486 *p.* 248.

Beauty, general analogy of the various characters of, *s.* 491, *p.* 250.

Ibid., *s.* 492, *p.* 250.

Beauty, dependence of perception of, *s.* 493, *p.* 251.

Beauty all, relative, *s.* 495, *p.* 252.

Beauty, moral, origin of the notion of, *s.* 497, *p.* 253.

Beauty, moral, suggested by a partial observation of the scheme of nature, *s.* 498, *p.* 253.

Ibid., *s.* 499, *p.* 254.

Ibid., *s.* 500, *p.* 254.

Ibid., *s.* 501, *p.* 254.

Beauty, moral, may be assumed from a limited analogy, *s.* 502, *p.* 255.

Beauty, moral, an arbitrary rule of, assumed, *s.* 503, *p.* 255.

Beauty, moral, taste for, whether calculated to be prevalent, *s.* 560, *p.* 685.

Beauty, moral, probable results of education, in producing the love of, *s.* 563, *p.* 286.

Ibid., *s.* 564, *p.* 288.

Ibid., *s.* 565, *p.* 281.

Ibid., *s.* 566, *p.* 288.

Ibid., *s.* 567, *p.* 289.

Ibid., *s.* 568, *p.* 289.

Ibid., *s.* 569, *p.* 291.

Beauty, moral, general ground of the failure of obligation of, *s.* 572, *p.* 292.

Beauty, moral, system of, not to be acquired during the periods of education, *s.* 573, *p.* 293.

Beauty, love of moral, whether likely to supersede adopted tastes, or fixed habits, *s.* 574, *p.* 293.

Ibid., *s.* 575, *p.* 294.

Ibid., *s.* 576, *p.* 294.

Ibid., *s.* 577, *p.* 295.

Beauty, moral, efficacy of terms, in the recommendation of, *s.* 578, *p.* 295.

Beauty, moral, taste for, compared with other tastes, *s.* 579, *p.* 296.

Ibid., *s.* 580, *p.* 297.

Beauty, moral, value of taste for, *s.* 583, *p.* 297.

Ibid., *s.* 584, *p.* 298.

- Beauty, moral, as a foundation for ethics, not to be depended on
s. 585, p. 299.
- Ibid, s. 586, p. 299.
- Blood, dependence of sensibility and voluntary power on, s. 441,
p. 218.
- Ibid, s. 442, p. 218.
- Ibid, s. 443, p. 219.
- Bodies, animal, agents of analysis contained in, s. 453, p. 224.
- Brain, the supposed seat of sensation, s. 101, p. 42.
- Brain, sensations exist in the, s. 102, p. 43.
- Brain, sensations of, may exist also elsewhere, s. 103, p. 43.
- Brain, participates in sensations produced in the nerves, s. 104,
p. 43.
- Brain, question concerning its relations as a centre, s. 120, p. 51.
- Ibid, s. 121, p. 52.
- Brain, absence of consciousness in, of injuries below intercepted
nerves, no proof that these parts do not possess sensibility,
s. 129, p. 55.
- Brain, and nerves, hypothesis of relations between, s. 133, p. 57.
- Ibid, s. 134, p. 57.
- Brain, and nerves, hypothesis of relations between, not proved by
facts, s. 135, p. 58.
- Brain, not only not a source of sensibility, but probably does not
possess it, s. 137, p. 59.
- Ibid, s. 138, p. 60.
- Brain, a sensibility of, superfluous, whether for the phenomena
of the passions, or of the understanding, s. 142, p. 62.
- Ibid, s. 143, p. 62.
- Brain, and nerves, investigation concerning, pursued according
to prevalent hypothesis of relation between, s. 145, p. 64.
- Ibid, s. 146, p. 64.
- Brain, opinions concerning relations of, with the nerves, s. 149,
p. 66.
- Brain, and nerves, defect of experience with respect to relations
between, s. 150, p. 66.
- Brain, and nerves, analogy inconclusive on the relations between,
s. 151, p. 66.
- Brain, no proofs that the mind resides in one particular part of,
s. 163, p. 72.
- Ibid, s. 164, p. 72.
- Brain, variety of structure, in different parts of, s. 176, p. 81.
- Brain, exhibits no great diversity of structure, s. 177, p. 82.
- Brain, diversity of structure in the internal parts of, s. 179, p. 83.
- Brain, residence of mental faculties in external parts of, not to be
deduced from anatomical circumstances, s. 186, p. 87.
- Brain, conformation of to the skull, more probable than the con-
trary, s. 190, p. 90.
- Brain, effects of compression of, on the mind, s. 232, p. 112.
- Brain, sensations preserved in, independently of the organ of
sense from whence it is communicated, s. 346, p. 165.
- Brain, living principle of, renovates sensibility, s. 348, p. 166.

- Brain, proofs of participation of, in the sensations of pleasure and pain, *s.* 390, *p.* 190.
 Brain, insensibility of, to mechanical injuries, *s.* 434, *p.* 214.
 Brain, characteristics of function of, *s.* 440, *p.* 218.
 Brutes manifest the same intellectual faculties as men, *s.* 42, *p.* 18.

C

- Causation, laws of, illustrated by the phenomena of sensation, *s.* 109, *p.* 46.
 Causes, essential, are sought for to prove dependence, in sensible examples, *s.* 221, *p.* 107.
 Cause, every, constitutes a part of its true effect, *s.* 357, *p.* 171.
 Causes, confusion arising from associated, *s.* 358, *p.* 172.
 Character, why an erroneous affirmation of, is likely to be believed by the individual whom it concerns, *s.* 210, *p.* 100.
 Character, discovery of, by examination of the cranium, less probable than collusion, or imposture, *s.* 211, *p.* 102.
 Character, sources of every variety of, *s.* 423, *p.* 207.
 Christianity, how subservient to morals, *s.* 419, *p.* 205.
 Civilization, future progress of, *s.* 816, *p.* 441.
 Combats, single, origin of, *s.* 632, *p.* 323.
 Combats, single, absurdities of, *s.* 633, *p.* 323.
 Ibid, *s.* 634, *p.* 324.
 Ibid, *s.* 635, *p.* 324.
 Ibid, *s.* 636, *p.* 325.
 Ibid, *s.* 637, *p.* 326.
 Ibid, *s.* 638, *p.* 326.
 Ibid, *s.* 639, *p.* 327.
 Connection, intimate, between properties of the organic, and intellectual departments, *s.* 76, *p.* 32.
 Conscience, what, *s.* 601, *p.* 307.
 Consciousness, the only testimony of reality, *s.* 50, *p.* 21.
 Consciousness, sometimes contradictory with respect to the same objects, *s.* 51, *p.* 22.
 Consciousness, the proof alike of what is, of what is not, and that a thing cannot both be, and not be, at the same time, *s.* 53, *p.* 23.
 Consciousness, how far a proof of the absence of sensation, *s.* 147, *p.* 65.
 Ibid, *s.* 148, *p.* 65.
 Consciousness, classification of the states of, *s.* 382, *p.* 186.
 Craniology, doctrines of, visionary, *s.* 166, *p.* 74.
 Craniology, is proposed on the ground of observation, *s.* 204, *p.* 97.
 Craniology, results of observation with respect to truth of, contradictory, *s.* 205, *p.* 98.
 Craniology, general truth of, not proved by correspondence of faculties with signs, *s.* 207, *p.* 100.
 Ibid, *s.* 208, *p.* 100.
 Craniologists, examinations of, should preclude other information of character, *s.* 209, *p.* 101.
 Craniology, summary of remarks on, *s.* 212, *p.* 103.

Chraniology, summary of remarks on, *s.* 213, *p.* 104.

Cranium, protuberances of, indications of character, a gross assumption, *s.* 189, *p.* 90.

D

Death, processes which succeed to, not agreeable with the terms upon which the intellectual functions are exercised during life, *s.* 282, *p.* 136.

Ibid., *s.* 283, *p.* 137.

Ibid., *s.* 284, *p.* 138.

Dependence, of two kinds, *s.* 219, *p.* 106.

Desire, and aversion, origin of the sensations of, *s.* 401, *p.* 195.

Desire, and aversion, dependence of, *s.* 402, *p.* 195.

Desire and aversion commonly respect objects of which we have had experience, *s.* 403, *p.* 196.

Desire and aversion, origin of in seats distant from the brain, *s.* 404, *p.* 196.

Dishonour, one form of honour, *s.* 627, *p.* 321.

Disposition, moral, institutes and modes of producing, *s.* 751, *p.* 398.

Disposition, moral, formation of, *s.* 752, *p.* 398.

Disposition, how modified relatively to society, *s.* 766, *p.* 405.

Disposition, philanthropic, efficacy of the will in producing, *s.* 771, *p.* 408.

Disposition, indirect modes of the formation of, *s.* 772, *p.* 409.

Ibid., *s.* 773, *p.* 410.

Distinction, love of, the most powerful and general affection, *s.* 788, *p.* 420.

Doctrines, abstract of, proposed for exemplification, *s.* 380, *p.* 184.

Doctrines, abstract of, connected with an example, *s.* 381, *p.* 185.

Doubt, a sceptical one, opposed to the prevalent hypothesis of the relation between the brain, and nerves, *s.* 144, *p.* 63.

Duelling, how far beneficial to society, *s.* 640, *p.* 327.

Duty, ground of, *s.* 701, *p.* 362.

Ibid., *s.* 702, *p.* 362.

Ibid., *s.* 703, *p.* 363.

Ibid., *s.* 704, *p.* 363.

Duty, defective obligation of rules of, *s.* 705, *p.* 364.

Ibid., *s.* 706, *p.* 365.

Ibid., *s.* 707, *p.* 366.

Duty, obligation to, not confined to morals, *s.* 711, *p.* 368.

E

Education, national, practicability of, *s.* 753, *p.* 399.

Education, national, may be progressively accomplished, *s.* 754, *p.* 399.

Education, national, sketch of plan of, *s.* 755, *p.* 399.

Ibid., *s.* 756, *p.* 400.

Ibid., *s.* 757, *p.* 401.

Ibid., *s.* 758, *p.* 402.

Education, national, effects of, *s.* 759, *p.* 402.

- Education, the direction of taste the most difficult part of,
s. 760, *p.* 403.
- Ethics, foundation of, in moral beauty, *s.* 496, *p.* 253.
- Ethics, founded on moral beauty, obligation of, *s.* 504, *p.* 255.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 505, *p.* 256.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 506, *p.* 257.
- Ethics, principle, or intention of, practical defects of, *s.* 684, *p.* 350.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 685, *p.* 351.
- Ethics, institutes in support of, *s.* 815, *p.* 440.
- Existence, every form of, produced by other forms, *s.* 56, *p.* 24.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 57, *p.* 24.
- Expediency, political, connection of self-interest with, *s.* 668, *p.* 341.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 669, *p.* 341.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 670, *p.* 342.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 671, *p.* 342.
- Expediency, political, grounds of, *s.* 672, *p.* 342.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 673, *p.* 343.
- Expediency, general and individual, when opposed, *s.* 674, *p.* 343.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 675, *p.* 344.
- Expediency, political, defective obligation of, *s.* 676, *p.* 345.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 677, *p.* 345.

F

- Faculties, phenomena imputed to distinct, ensue from different
dispositions of the mind, *s.* 169, *p.* 77.
- Faculties of the mind, not proved to be distinct, therefore super-
fluous to look for their respective seats, *s.* 170, *p.* 79.
- Faculties, distinctness of, not a matter of experience, *s.* 171, *p.* 78.
- Faculties, consciousness does not inform us of a precise locality
of, *s.* 172, *p.* 80.
- Faculties, seats of, how to be investigated methodically, *s.* 173,
p. 80.
- Faculties, particular seats of, not to be shewn experimentally,
s. 174, *p.* 80.
- Faculties, particular seats of, not to be proved by analogy,
s. 175, *p.* 81.
- Faculties, distinctness of, not to be inferred from difference of
structure, *s.* 178, *p.* 82.
- Faculties, energies of, not always in a ratio to the bulk of the
structures, *s.* 185, *p.* 86.
- Faculties, strength of, increased by education, but not the ex-
ternal projections of the skull, *s.* 192, *p.* 92.
- Faculties, strongest, according to craniology, reside in the thickest
parts of the skull, *s.* 193, *p.* 93.
- Faculties of mind, results of, multiplied by education, *s.* 197, *p.* 95.
- Faculties and propensities, opposed rather by sentiments, than
powers, *s.* 201, *p.* 96.
- Faculties, seats of, how assumed, *s.* 203, *p.* 97.
- Faculties, possessed without indications of organs, and the con-
trary, *s.* 206, *p.* 99.

- Faculty, strength of, in proportion to an assumed organ, is an assumption, founded on an assumption, *s. 184, p. 86.*
- Fœtus, parental properties in, related, and produce separate, or mixed effects, *s. 18, p. 9.*
- Fœtus, separate, or mixed agency of parental properties in, not regular in the same structure, *s. 19, p. 9.*
- Fœtus, properties displayed by effects in, identically derived from parents, *s. 30, p. 14.*
- Forms, living, classes of, not produced by principles wholly different, *s. 292, p. 142.*
- Function, cessation of, by removal of structure, might occur by two modes, *s. 225, p. 109.*
- Function, the cessation of, by removal of structure, proves either dependence or alliance, *s. 226, p. 109.*
- Function, evidence of cessation of, by removal of structure, *s. 228, p. 111.*
- Function, no experimental mode of deciding whether properties of, are allied with, or dependent on the structure, *s. 229, p. 111.*
- Function, no example of, except in connection with the structures, *s. 230, p. 111.*
- Function, suspension of, by organic change, no proof of dependence, *s. 234, p. 113.*
- Functions, produced by properties which are not results of organization, *s. 235, p. 113.*
- Functions, properties of, allied to the structures by affinity, *s. 242, p. 117.*
- Function, properties of, or informal life, not dependent on organization, *s. 244, p. 118.*
- Function, principal facts concerning relation of, with structure, *s. 245, p. 118.*
- Function, derangement of, how produced by change of structure, *s. 246, p. 118.*
- Function, direct result of mechanical changes on properties of, *s. 247, p. 119.*
- Function, modes of derangement of, by change of structure, *s. 248, p. 119.*
- Function, change of, extends beyond derangement of structure, *s. 249, p. 119.*
- Function of one sphere of organization, dependent upon functional properties of another, *s. 250, p. 120.*
- Function, loss of, from injury in distant seats, through the medium of the circulation, *s. 251, p. 120.*
- Ibid*, *s. 252, p. 120.*
- Function, properties of, two modes of communication of, in a particular course, *s. 255, p. 122.*
- Function, direction of the energies of, *s. 257, p. 123.*
- Function, general constitution of, *s. 259, p. 124.*
- Function, effects of breach, or interposition of structures, with respect to, *s. 260, p. 125.*
- Function, relations of, extended by the alliance of properties with the materials of the structures, *s. 261, p. 125.*

- Function, summary of relations of properties of, with the materials of the structure, *s.* 268, *p.* 129.
- Functions, all, dependent upon arrangement, must cease upon a dissolution of the structures, *s.* 273, *p.* 131.
- Functions, whether resumed after decomposition of the textures, with which their properties were allied, *s.* 274, *p.* 132.
- Function, results of dissolution of material alliances with, *s.* 275, *p.* 133.
- Function, and structure, mutual decomposition of, when necessary, *s.* 276, *p.* 133.
- Function, properties of, proofs of alliance, or separation of, *s.* 278, *p.* 134.
- Functions, general dependence of the properties of, upon arterial blood, *s.* 438, *p.* 217.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 439, *p.* 217.
- Functions, intellectual, support of, by the blood, agreeable with general analogy, and proved by particular facts, *s.* 444, *p.* 219.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 445, *p.* 220.

G

- Gall, doctrines of, *s.* 165, *p.* 73.
- Good and evil, *s.* 393, *p.* 191.
- Good and evil, ideas of, have a common origin with the sensations of pleasure and pain, *s.* 394, *p.* 191.
- Good, and evil, have been supposed different from pleasure and pain, by confounding the consequences of these sensations with the sensations themselves, *s.* 395, *p.* 192.
- Good and evil, the nature of, not correctly discriminated, owing to a frequent misapplication of the terms, *s.* 397, *p.* 193.
- Good and evil, public and private, *s.* 398, *p.* 194.
- Good, public, obligation of individuals to concur in scheme of, *s.* 399, *p.* 194.
- Good, public, criterion of, *s.* 733, *p.* 385.
- Government, general, and moral, intentions of, *s.* 732, *p.* 385.
- Government, how the intentions of, may be perfectly accomplished, *s.* 747, *p.* 396.

H

- Happiness of mankind, very improbable, *s.* 734, *p.* 385.
- Happiness, morality thought conducive to, *s.* 736, *p.* 387.
- Happiness, uncertainty of, *s.* 810, *p.* 435.
- Honour, what, *s.* 618, *p.* 317.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 619, *p.* 317.
- Honour, connection of, with morals, *s.* 620, *p.* 318.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 621, *p.* 318.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 622, *p.* 318.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 623, *p.* 319.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 624, *p.* 320.
- Honour, popular construction of, *s.* 625, *p.* 329.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 626, *p.* 320.
- Honour, effects of the perversions of, *s.* 628, *p.* 321.

- Honour, effects of the perversions of, *s.* 629, *p.* 321.
 Ibid, *s.* 630, *p.* 321.
 Ibid, *s.* 631, *p.* 322.
 Honour, court of, *s.* 641, *p.* 327.
 Ibid, *s.* 642, *p.* 328.
 Ibid, *s.* 643, *p.* 329.
 Honour, origin of, *s.* 644, *p.* 329.
 Ibid, *s.* 645, *p.* 329.
 Ibid, *s.* 446, *p.* 330.
 Honour, how far to be produced by education, *s.* 647, *p.* 330.
 Ibid, *s.* 648, *p.* 331.
 Honour, grounds of recommendation of, *s.* 649, *p.* 331.
 Ibid, *s.* 650, *p.* 331.
 Ibid, *s.* 651, *p.* 332.
 Ibid, *s.* 652, *p.* 332.
 Ibid, *s.* 653, *p.* 333.
 Honour, on what grounds adopted, *s.* 654, *p.* 333.
 Ibid, *s.* 655, *p.* 333.
 Ibid, *s.* 656, *p.* 334.
 Honour, how far likely to prevail, *s.* 657, *p.* 334.
 Ibid, *s.* 658, *p.* 334.
 Honour, common efficacy of, *s.* 659, *p.* 335.
 Ibid, *s.* 660, *p.* 335.
 Honour, prevalent grounds of desire of, *s.* 661, *p.* 336.
 Honour, dependences of education in producing sense of, *s.* 662, *p.* 337.
 Ibid, *s.* 663, *p.* 338.
 Honour, forms of, *s.* 664, *p.* 338.
 Honour, general nature of, *s.* 665, *p.* 339.
 Ibid, *s.* 666, *p.* 340.
 Honour, grounds of failure of, *s.* 667, *p.* 340.

I

- Idea, renovation of, that only of a form of sensibility, *s.* 451, *p.* 223.
 Ideas, no proof of their being communicated to offspring, and retained as latent properties, *s.* 23, *p.* 11.
 Ideas, instinctive, possibly conferred by parents on offspring, *s.* 25, *p.* 12.
 Ideas, not conferred by parents on the offspring, *s.* 28, *p.* 13.
 Ibid, *s.* 29, *p.* 14.
 Ideas, relations engaged in the cessation and recurrence of, *s.* 370, *p.* 177.
 Ideas, why lost, or preserved, in the mind, *s.* 371, *p.* 177.
 Inclination, general dependence of substitutions of, *s.* 774, *p.* 411.
 Information, general dependence of, on subjects respectively, *s.* 424, *p.* 208.
 Intellect, whether an advantageous possession, *s.* 447, *p.* 220.
 Intellect, primary change of, influences secondarily the organic life by direct relation, *s.* 90, *p.* 37.
 Intellect, division of relations of, with the structures, *s.* 240, *p.* 116,

Instinct, actions of, may ensue from innate ideas, *s.* 26, *p.* 12.

Ibid., *s.* 27, *p.* 13.

Institutes, moral, must be adapted to respective communities, *s.* 749, *p.* 397.

L

Legislation, in general, adapted to public safety, rather than to individual happiness, *s.* 745, *p.* 395.

Legislation, so far as public welfare is concerned, may supersede the designs of the moralists, *s.* 746, *p.* 396.

Life, organic, characteristics of, *s.* 68, *p.* 30.

Life, organic, character of, very different in respective examples, *s.* 71, *p.* 30.

Life, organic, unity of the principle of, suggested by co-operation to an end, *s.* 72, *p.* 31.

Life, organic, unity of the principle of, not to be inferred from general resemblance of its properties, *s.* 74, *p.* 31.

Life, organic, operations of, the effects either of the same, or of a separate principle, *s.* 75, *p.* 32.

Life, not supported by detached properties of function, *s.* 231, *p.* 112.

Life, state of, in inorganic substances, informal, *s.* 236, *p.* 114.

Life, informal, converted into formal, by a peculiar mode of assimilation, *s.* 237, *p.* 114.

Life, relation of, with elementary properties in inorganic substances, extended by analogy to the intellectual function, *s.* 238, *p.* 115.

Life, properties of, and structure, mutually necessary to each other, *s.* 262, *p.* 126.

Life, alliance of, with organic molecules, *s.* 264, *p.* 126.

Ibid., *s.* 265, *p.* 127.

Life, preserves its connection during growth, by alliance with the particles of the structures, *s.* 266, *p.* 127.

Ibid., *s.* 267, *p.* 128.

Life, and organization, relative effects of connection between, *s.* 269, *p.* 130.

Life, phenomena of cessation of alliance of, with the structure, *s.* 270, *p.* 130.

Life, organic, existence of, less dependent upon arrangement, than function, *s.* 272, *p.* 131.

Life, partial cessation of, no proof of a different principle in the seat of, *s.* 293, *p.* 143.

Life, proofs of the community of the principle of, in the several classes of phenomena, *s.* 294, *p.* 143.

Ibid., *s.* 295, *p.* 144.

Ibid., *s.* 296, *p.* 144.

Life, classes of the phenomena of, admit a separate investigation, *s.* 297, *p.* 145.

Life, comparison of the intellectual, with the organic, *s.* 436, *p.* 216.

Life, organic, connection of, with the intellectual principle, *s.* 310, *p.* 150.

- Life, organic, why displayed where sensibility has ceased, *s.* 318, *p.* 153.
 Life, organic, certain properties of, cease under disease, *s.* 319, *p.* 153.
 Life, form of, determined by properties added to a mere assimilating principle, *s.* 324, *p.* 157.
 Life, no manifestation of a substance serving as a bond of union between properties of, *s.* 327, *p.* 158.
 Life, uniting substance of properties of, supposed on erroneous grounds, *s.* 328, *p.* 158.
 Life, phenomena of, according to the constitution of the principle and related agents, *s.* 333, *p.* 160.

M

- Man, all the constituents of, contained in the meanest vegetable, *s.* 454, *p.* 225.
 Man, in a state of nature, *s.* 588, *p.* 301.
 Men, common principle of action, among, *s.* 412, *p.* 200.
 Men, act upon a common principle, with infinite variety of motive, *s.* 414, *p.* 202.
 Men, perhaps less unhappy under some circumstances, than others, *s.* 735, *p.* 386.
 MIND, mode of origin of, common also to the properties of the organic life, *s.* 1, *p.* 3.
 Mind, proofs of derivation of, from parents, *s.* 2, *p.* 3.
 Mind, characteristic traits of, belonging to parents, preserved in the offspring, *s.* 3, *p.* 4.
 Mind, peculiarities of, in parents, why sometimes not displayed in the offspring, *s.* 4, *p.* 4.
 Mind, parental peculiarities of, why less frequently displayed in the offspring, than those of the organic life, *s.* 5, *p.* 5.
 Mind, exhibition of parental peculiarities of, in the offspring, not necessary to prove an origin by derivation, *s.* 6, *p.* 5.
 Mind, communicated to the ovum either from distant seats, or as a function of the ovarium, *s.* 7, *p.* 6.
 Mind, proofs of communication of, from distant seats, *s.* 8, *p.* 6.
 Ibid, *s.* 9, *p.* 6.
 Ibid, *s.* 10, *p.* 6.
 Mind, tendency to separate, or mixed agency, of parental properties in, as in the organic life, *s.* 20, *p.* 10.
 Mind, effects of related properties in, less obvious than in the organic system, *s.* 21, *p.* 10.
 Mind, disposition to only, conferred by parents on the offspring, *s.* 22, *p.* 11.
 Mind, disposition to, only, in the fœtus, agreeable with experience, *s.* 24, *p.* 12.
 Mind, informed by relation of intellectual disposition with other causes, *s.* 31, *p.* 15.
 Mind, nature of, to be deduced from phenomena, *s.* 32, *p.* 15.
 Mind, principal varieties of, those of consciousness, *s.* 33, *p.* 15.
 Mind, fœtal disposition to, consists chiefly of a sensibility, *s.* 36, *p.* 16.

- Mind, properties additional to mere sensibility, comprised in the disposition to, of the fœtus, *s.* 47, *p.* 20.
- Mind, properties of, which relate to the retention, recurrence, &c. of sensations, *s.* 67, *p.* 28.
- Mind, general division of relations of, with the organic life, *s.* 69, *p.* 30.
- Mind, distinction between, and the organic life, not proved by the concurrence of processes to the support of an organized being, *s.* 73, *p.* 31.
- Mind, examples of secondary affection of, from change originating in the organic system, *s.* 88, *p.* 36.
- Mind, affection of, by change originating in the organic system, either by direct or mediate relation, *s.* 89, *p.* 36.
- Mind, and organic life, summary of facts and conclusions concerning relations between, *s.* 92, *p.* 37.
- Mind, relation of, with the structure, general division of the topics of, *s.* 93, *p.* 40.
- Mind, seat of, assigned by common consent, to the brain, *s.* 154, *p.* 68.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 155, *p.* 68.
- Mind, experimental testimony concerning seat of, *s.* 156, *p.* 68.
- Mind, seat of, in the brain, supported by concurrent testimony afforded by the phenomena of disease, *s.* 157, *p.* 69.
- Mind, seat of, in the brain, may be questioned by a violent scepticism, *s.* 158, *p.* 70.
- Mind, seat of, has been assigned to some portion of the brain, *s.* 159, *p.* 70.
- Mind, admitted proofs of locality of, *s.* 160, *p.* 71.
- Mind, failure of proofs to establish the locality of, in a particular portion of the brain, *s.* 161, *p.* 71.
- Mind, a connection of, with all parts of the brain, indicated by the phenomena of disease and injury, *s.* 162, *p.* 71.
- Mind, distinct faculties of, not proved by the predominance of any one, *s.* 167, *p.* 74.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 168, *p.* 75.
- Mind, particular localities of faculties of, in the brain, proved neither by experience nor analogy, *s.* 181, *p.* 84.
- Mind and body, sympathies between, supposed proofs of dependence, *s.* 214, *p.* 105.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 215, *p.* 105.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 216, *p.* 105.
- Mind and body, sympathies between, do not prove dependence, *s.* 217, *p.* 106.
- Mind, dependence of, on organization, has been inferred from the effects of injuries and disease, *s.* 218, *p.* 106.
- Mind, phenomena of, may be made to cease under derangements of the structure by foreign influence, *s.* 220, *p.* 107.
- Mind, dependence of, on structures, not susceptible of experimental analysis, *s.* 222, *p.* 108.
- Mind, dependence of, to be inquired into by analogy, *s.* 223, *p.* 109.
- Mind, suspended functions of, by pressure on the brain, liable to alternatives, *s.* 233, *p.* 112.

- Mind, general analogy of, to function, in other departments, *s.* 239, *p.* 115.
- Mind, general history of the formation of, *s.* 241, *p.* 116.
- Mind, and organization, defects of physical testimony, on the relations between, *s.* 286, *p.* 139.
- Mind, disposition to, general resemblance of, to a common sensibility, *s.* 288, *p.* 140.
- Mind, disposition to, not a tabula rasa, *s.* 289, *p.* 140.
- Mind, renovation of, from the blood, *s.* 309, *p.* 149.
- Mind, present states of, cease by successive causation, whether spontaneous among its own properties, or by the influence of externals, *s.* 344, *p.* 164.
- Mind, results of the relations of a sensation with, *s.* 345, *p.* 165.
- Mind, does not retain identical sensations, *s.* 364, *p.* 174.
- Mind, mode by which a sensation is perpetuated in, *s.* 365, *p.* 178.
- Mind, constituents of, related with the preservation, recurrence, &c. of sensations, *s.* 377, *p.* 181.
- Mind, instructed, summary of the formation, preservation, and phenomena of, *s.* 378, *p.* 182.
- Mind, properties of, may be reasoned upon from phenomena, although we cannot designate them as known substances, *s.* 379, *p.* 184.
- Mind, in what all the phenomena of, consist, *s.* 429, *p.* 210.
- Mind, capable of originating a recollection independently of association, *s.* 432, *p.* 212.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 433, *p.* 213.
- Mind, no exception to the general character of natural productions, *s.* 446, *p.* 220.
- Mind, relations of, with the constituents of substances, *s.* 455, *p.* 225.
- Mind, production of, from substances, not a doctrine of materialism, *s.* 456, *p.* 226.
- Moral sense, origin of, *s.* 596, *p.* 304.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 597, *p.* 304.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 598, *p.* 305.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 599, *p.* 306.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 600, *p.* 307.
- Moral sense, what, *s.* 602, *p.* 307.
- Morals, knowledge of, does not imply obligation, *s.* 603, *p.* 308.
- Morals, obligation of, *s.* 604, *p.* 308.
- Morals, general end of, *s.* 678, *p.* 347.
- Morals, principles and mode of engaging ambition in behalf of, *s.* 791, *p.* 422.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 792, *p.* 423.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 793, *p.* 424.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 794, *p.* 424.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 795, *p.* 425.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 796, *p.* 425.
- Morals, resources under failure of kindling affection for, *s.* 797, *p.* 426.
- Morals, probable extent of success and failure of plan for inspiring love of, *s.* 798, *p.* 427.

- Morals, love of, may be ensured to a considerable extent, *s.* 799, *p.* 428.
- Moral system, which to be preferred, *s.* 728, *p.* 382.
- Moral system, grounds of preference of, *s.* 729, *p.* 382.
- Morality, connection between the principle and rules of, *s.* 730, *p.* 383.
- Moral system, general objects of, *s.* 731, *p.* 383.
- Morality, incentives to, *s.* 611, *p.* 312.
- Morality, general agreement of incentives to, *s.* 612, *p.* 312.
- Morality, definition of, *s.* 681, *p.* 348.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 682, *p.* 349.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 683, *p.* 349.
- Morality, conflicting opinions concerning, *s.* 686, *p.* 351.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 687, *p.* 352.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 688, *p.* 353.
- Morality, relative to belief, *s.* 689, *p.* 354.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 690, *p.* 354.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 691, *p.* 355.
- Morality, general, or inclusive principle of, *s.* 692, *p.* 356.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 693, *p.* 356.
- Morality, abstract of particular obligations to, *s.* 694, *p.* 357.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 695, *p.* 358.
- Morality, general obligation to, *s.* 696, *p.* 359.
- Morality, dependence of obedience to rules of, *s.* 697, *p.* 359.

N

- Nature, human, summary of the moral constitution of, *s.* 459, *p.* 231.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 460, *p.* 231.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 461, *p.* 232.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 462, *p.* 232.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 463, *p.* 232.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 464, *p.* 233.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 465, *p.* 234.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 466, *p.* 234.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 467, *p.* 235.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 468, *p.* 235.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 469, *p.* 236.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 470, *p.* 236.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 471, *p.* 237.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 472, *p.* 238.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 473, *p.* 238.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 474, *p.* 238.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 475, *p.* 239.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 476, *p.* 239.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 477, *p.* 239.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 478, *p.* 240.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 479, *p.* 240.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 480, *p.* 242.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 481, *p.* 243.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 482, *p.* 244.

- Nature, human, summary of the moral constitution of, *s.* 483, *p.* 244.
 Ibid, *s.* 484, *p.* 245.
 Ibid, *s.* 487, *p.* 249.
 Ibid, *s.* 488, *p.* 249.
 Ibid, *s.* 489, *p.* 249.
 Ibid, *s.* 490, *p.* 250.
 Nerves, sensation in, dependence of, upon the brain, *s.* 113, *p.* 49.
 Nerves, two modes of the dependence of sensation in, *s.* 114, *p.* 49.
 Ibid, *s.* 115, *p.* 49.
 Ibid, *s.* 116, *p.* 50.
 Ibid, *s.* 117, *p.* 50.
 Ibid, *s.* 118, *p.* 51.
 Ibid, *s.* 119, *p.* 51.
 Nerve, whether the same conveys and returns central influences, *s.* 122, *p.* 52.
 Ibid, *s.* 123, *p.* 53.
 Ibid, *s.* 124, *p.* 53.
 Ibid, *s.* 125, *p.* 53.
 Nerves, alleged distinction of, *s.* 126, *p.* 53.
 Nerves, division of, prevents only phenomena of intercourse, *s.* 128, *p.* 55.
 Nerves, whether capable of sensation, which is not communicated to the brain, *s.* 130, *p.* 55.
 Ibid, *s.* 131, *p.* 56.
 Ibid, *s.* 132, *p.* 56.

O

- Objects, external, not efficient causes of sensation, *s.* 338, *p.* 162.
 Obligation, what, *s.* 698, *p.* 360.
 Ibid, *s.* 699, *p.* 360.
 Obligation, highest, proof of, *s.* 700, *p.* 361.
 Obligation, dependence of, upon the affections, *s.* 708, *p.* 366.
 Obligation, moral, relative to affection, *s.* 709, *p.* 366.
 Obligation, connection of affection and opinion with, *s.* 710, *p.* 367.
 Obligation moral, general efficacy of plans for imposing, *s.* 737, *p.* 387.
 Ibid, *s.* 738, *p.* 388.
 Ibid, *s.* 739, *p.* 388.
 Ibid, *s.* 740, *p.* 389.
 Ibid, *s.* 741, *p.* 389.
 Ibid, *s.* 742, *p.* 391.
 Ibid, *s.* 743, *p.* 393.
 Obligation, moral, effects of general failure of plans for imposing, *s.* 744, *p.* 395.
 Organs, cerebral, mutual dependence of faculties of, *s.* *168, *p.* 76.
 Organs, separate in the brain, superfluous to seek for, *s.* 182, *p.* 85.
 Organs of the brain, existence of, very doubtful, *s.* 183, *p.* 85.
 Organs of brain, if character were indicated by, not therefore proved to be the seats of faculties, *s.* 187, *p.* 88.
 Ibid, *s.* 188, *p.* 89.

- Ovarium, difference between, and the brain, as a centre, *s.* 11, *p.* 7.
 Ovum, period of acquiring its living principle, *s.* 12, *p.* 7.
Ibid., *s.* 13, *p.* 7.
Ibid., *s.* 14, *p.* 8.
Ibid., *s.* 15, *p.* 8.
 Ovum, the alternative that properties are conferred on, *sub coitâ* preferred, *s.* 16, *p.* 9.
 Ovum, mode of contribution of properties to the formation of, the same in both sexes, *s.* 17, *p.* 9.

P

- Pain, causes of, most commonly succeed those of pleasure, *s.* 396, *p.* 192.
 Passions and propensities strengthened to some extent, by indulgence, *s.* 198, *p.* 95.
 Passions and propensities sometimes restrained by prevalence of contrasted ones, *s.* 199, *p.* 95.
 Passions and propensities, *how* repressed by the cultivation of others, *s.* 200, *p.* 95.
 Passions, connection of, with pleasure and pain, *s.* 425, *p.* 209.
 Perception in the brain, only an extension of sensation from another seat, *s.* 105, *p.* 44.
 Perception ceases upon the removal of the object, *s.* 341, *p.* 163.
 Perception, relations engaged in cessation of, agreeable with the theory of renovation, *s.* 342, *p.* 163.
 Perception, mode of cessation of, *s.* 343, *p.* 164.
 Perceptions, present, or past, furnish the objects of volition, *s.* 411, *p.* 199.
 Philanthropy, modes of inspiring, *s.* 761, *p.* 403.
Ibid., *s.* 762, *p.* 403.
Ibid., *s.* 763, *p.* 404.
 Philanthropy, ground of failure of, *s.* 764, *p.* 404.
 Philanthropy, illustrations of dependence of, *s.* 765, *p.* 404.
 Philanthropy, inadequacy of the customary recommendations to inspire, *s.* 767, *p.* 406.
Ibid., *s.* 768, *p.* 406.
 Philanthropy, whether any direct mode of producing, *s.* 769, *p.* 407.
Ibid., *s.* 770, *p.* 407.
 Philanthropy, advantages of, in common with pride, or any other principle of action, *s.* 809, *p.* 434.
 Pleasure, and pain, origin of, in seats remote from the brain, *s.* 384, *p.* 187.
 Pleasure, and pain, apparent exceptions to an origin of, in parts remote from the brain, *s.* 385, *p.* 188.
Ibid., *s.* 386, *p.* 188.
 Pleasure, and pain, do not originate in the brain, *s.* 388, *p.* 189.
 Pleasure, and pain, participation of the brain in the sensations of, *s.* 389, *p.* 189.
 Pleasure and pain, history of, the common one of perceptions, *s.* 391, *p.* 190.
 Pleasure and pain appear to originate other sensations in the brain, *s.* 392, *p.* 191.

- Powers, animal, increased generally by exercise, *s.* 194, *p.* 93.
- Powers, animal, sometimes diminished, or lost, by exercise, *s.* 195, *p.* 94.
- Power, increase of muscular and mental, by exercise, not by the same mode, *s.* 196, *p.* 94.
- Practice, moral, how may uniformity of disposition be ensured with respect to? *s.* 750, *p.* 397.
- Pride, superiority of, to ambition, *s.* 807, *p.* 432.
- Pride, efficacy and advantages of, relatively to public benefit, and private happiness, *s.* 808, *p.* 433.
- Principles, organic and intellectual, difference of suggested by their phenomena, *s.* 70, *p.* 30.
- Principles, organic, and intellectual, whether essential to the existence of each other, *s.* 77, *p.* 32.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 78, *p.* 32.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 79, *p.* 33.
- Principle, intellectual, dependence of, upon the organic life, *s.* 80, *p.* 33.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 81, *p.* 33.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 82, *p.* 34.
- Principles, organic, and intellectual, analytic, and synthetic tests, with respect to connection between, *s.* 83, *p.* 34.
- Principles, organic, and intellectual, community of influence on, by the same causes, liable to different explanations, *s.* 84, *p.* 35.
- Principles, organic and intellectual, analogies to the analytic and synthetic tests, with respect to the, *s.* 85, *p.* 35.
- Principles, organic and intellectual, difficulty of assigning the instances of re-agency between, *s.* 86, *p.* 36.
- Principles, organic and intellectual, apparent re-agencies between, *s.* 87, *p.* 36.
- Principles, organic, and intellectual, means of analysis of relations between, defective, *s.* 91, *p.* 37.
- Principle, intellectual, if preserved after death, the phenomena, of, are those of memory, *s.* 285, *p.* 138.
- Principle, living, most simple form of, not attainable in complex animals, *s.* 322, *p.* 155.
- Principle, renovating, union of properties necessary to form, *s.* 323, *p.* 156.
- Principle, living, properties displayed by, to be regarded as its constituents, *s.* 325, *p.* 156.
- Principle of life, analysis of, limited to the properties displayed by effects, *s.* 326, *p.* 157.
- Principle of life, all the properties of, alike renewed by assimilation, *s.* 367, *p.* 175.
- Principle, all the properties displayed by, not necessary to constitute a renovating one, *s.* 368, *p.* 176.
- Principle, affections of in the organic department how maintained, *s.* 373, *p.* 178.
- Principle, all the properties of the intellectual, renewed from a source, *s.* 437, *p.* 217.
- Principle, intellectual, how renewed, *s.* 449, *p.* 222.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 450, *p.* 223.

- Properties, functional, question respecting removal of, *s.* 227, *p.* 110.
 Properties, functional, communication of, in a particular course,
 by impulse at their origin, illustrated, *s.* 256, *p.* 122.
 Properties, nervous, modes of propagation of, through nerves,
s. 258, *p.* 123.
 Properties, spiritual, and chemical alliance of, after death, *s.* 279,
p. 135.
Ibid, *s.* 280, *p.* 135.
 Properties, re-union of, after death, how far prevented by chemical
 alliances, *s.* 281, *p.* 136.
 Properties themselves formed by others, *s.* 330, *p.* 159.
 Properties, related agents, independently of an alliance with
 matter, *s.* 331, *p.* 159.
 Properties of life, relations between, general account of, *s.* 334,
p. 160.
 Property, different from a principle only inasmuch as its consti-
 tuents are not analysed by relations, *s.* 332, *p.* 159.
 Property, difficulty of conceiving any permanent one, in alliance
 with any given order of the animal constitution, *s.* 361,
p. 173.

R

- Recollection, the recurrence of combined sensations; spectra,
 dreams, &c. the recurrence of unmixed sensations, *s.* 108,
p. 45.
 Recollections, confined to the brain, *s.* 112, *p.* 48.
 Relations of things, dependent upon the causes they comprise,
s. 60, *p.* 25.
 Relations, abstract of intellectual, amidst which personal identity
 is preserved, *s.* 435, *p.* 215.
 Repentance, modes of, *s.* 727, *p.* 379.
 Reputation, popular errors concerning the advantages of, *s.* 813,
p. 437.
 Right and wrong, origin of notions of, *s.* 589, *p.* 301.
Ibid, *s.* 590, *p.* 302.
Ibid, *s.* 591, *p.* 303.
Ibid, *s.* 592, *p.* 303.
 Right and wrong, different opinions concerning, *s.* 593, *p.* 303.
 Right and wrong, knowledge of, *s.* 594, *p.* 303.
Ibid, *s.* 595, *p.* 304.
 Right and wrong, whether the highest obligation is implied by
 these terms, *s.* 712, *p.* 368.
Ibid, *s.* 713, *p.* 369.
Ibid, *s.* 714, *p.* 370.
Ibid, *s.* 715, *p.* 370.
 Right and wrong, general nature of, *s.* 716, *p.* 370.
 Right, dependence of, *s.* 717, *p.* 371.
 Right and wrong, criterion of, *s.* 718, *p.* 371.
Ibid, *s.* 719, *p.* 372.
 Right, connection of with the highest rational obligation, *s.* 720,
p. 372.

- Right and wrong, may vary at different periods of life, *s.* 721, *p.* 373.
 Right and wrong, how far affected by unforeseen consequences of actions, *s.* 722, *p.* 374.
Ibid., *s.* 723, *p.* 375.
Ibid., *s.* 724, *p.* 375.
 Right and wrong, summary of relations of, with obligations and belief, *s.* 725, *p.* 376.
Ibid., *s.* 726, *p.* 378.

S

- Self-love, propensities of, restrained chiefly by three checks, *s.* 416, *p.* 203.
 Self-love, occasions on which the restraints on, operate, *s.* 417, *p.* 203.
 Sensation, and consciousness, the same, *s.* 34, *p.* 16.
 Sensation, and consciousness, instances of, may be designated by the same terms, *s.* 35, *p.* 16.
 Sensations, principal sources of, external, *s.* 37, *p.* 17.
 Sensations, difference in the character of, *s.* 38, *p.* 17.
 Sensations, division of, *s.* 39, *p.* 17.
 Sensations of existence, or ideas, and animal sensations, *s.* 40, *p.* 17.
 Sensations, animals possess those of each class, *s.* 41, *p.* 17.
 Sensations, animal, and intellectual, how to be understood, *s.* 43, *p.* 19.
Ibid., *s.* 44, *p.* 19.
 Sensations, varieties of, result either from different sensibilities, or different related causes, *s.* 46, *p.* 20.
 Sensations distinguished, *s.* 48, *p.* 21.
 Sensations, testimony of the reality of, the same with respect to each class, *s.* 49, *p.* 21.
 Sensations, produced by the union of other forms of existence with sensibility, *s.* 59, *p.* 25.
 Sensations differ, as the parts of the relation are modified, *s.* 62, *p.* 26.
 Senses, properties of, related with external causes of sensations, *s.* 64, *p.* 26.
 Senses, organs of, are the seats of sensation, *s.* 65, *p.* 27.
 Sensation, seat of, thought to be in the brain, *s.* 94, *p.* 40.
 Sensation, personal, only, proved to be dependent on the brain, *s.* 95, *p.* 40.
 Sensation, two modes of dependence of, upon the brain suggested, *s.* 96, *p.* 40.
 Sensation, consciousness best proof of locality of, *s.* 98, *p.* 41.
 Sensation, proved by consciousness, to be in the seat, acted on by exciting causes, *s.* 99, *p.* 42.
 Senses, organs of, the seats of sensation, *s.* 100, *p.* 42.
 Sensations, communicated to the brain, cease, and are renewed, *s.* 106, *p.* 44.
 Sensations, dependence of cessation and recurrence of, *s.* 107, *p.* 45.
 Sensation, results of, in its relation with the properties of the brain, *s.* 110, *p.* 47.

- Sensations which first existed in the senses, are revived as recollections, *s.* 111, *p.* 47.
- Sensation, mode of its occurrence altogether independent of the brain, *s.* 127, *p.* 54.
- System, nervous, phenomena of, on the presumption that the nerves possess sensibility, independently of the brain, *s.* 136, *p.* 59.
- Sensations, none in the brain, which do not originate in the nerves, exhibited by the analysis of one passion, *s.* 139, *p.* 60.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 140, *p.* 61.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 141, *p.* 61.
- Substances are formed by properties, and illustrate the efficacy of properties which are not united to substances, *s.* 329, *p.* 159.
- Sensation, an affection or form of sensibility, *s.* 340, *p.* 163.
- Sensations, preserved by alliance either with the mind, or with the structure, *s.* 349, *p.* 167.
- Sensation, alliance of, is with intellectual properties, *s.* 350, *p.* 167.
- Sensations, not communicated to offspring, no proof that their alliance is not with the mind, *s.* 351, *p.* 167.
- Sensations, alternatives respecting the preservation of, *s.* 352, *p.* 168.
- Sensation, not renewed by the object, may operate for years in a series of actions, *s.* 353, *p.* 169.
- Sensation, not identically the cause of a series of actions, *s.* 354, *p.* 169.
- Sensation, as a cause, why apparently identical in a series of actions, *s.* 355, *p.* 170.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 356, *p.* 170.
- Sensation, originating volition, and producing a series of muscular actions, an instance of causation by communicated properties, *s.* 359, *p.* 172.
- Sensations, once admitted into the mind, though latent, if liable to be revived, are renovated, *s.* 360, *p.* 173.
- Sensation, two modes of *renewal* of, by assimilation, *s.* 366, *p.* 175.
- Sensations, not renovated separately, *s.* 369, *p.* 177.
- Sensations, difficulty of knowing those which are, or are not, preserved in the mind, *s.* 372, *p.* 177.
- Sensations, import of the difficulty of distinguishing between those which are, and are not, renewed, *s.* 374, *p.* 179.
- Sensations, relation of, recapitulated, *s.* 375, *p.* 179.
- Sensations, mode by which those exist in the mind, of which we are not conscious, *s.* 376, *p.* 181.
- Sensations, origin of both classes of, in the seats of a diffused sensibility, *s.* 426, *p.* 209.
- Sensations, phenomena of, in relation with the life of the brain, and with each other, *s.* 427, *p.* 209.
- Sensation, no reason to be assigned why one should associate with another, *s.* 430, *p.* 211.
- Sense, moral, *s.* 587, *p.* 301.
- Sense, moral, constitution of, *s.* 605, *p.* 309.
- Ibid.*, *s.* 606, *p.* 309.

- Sense, immoral, produced in the same way, as the moral sense, *s.* 607, *p.* 310.
- Ibid, *s.* 608, *p.* 311.
- Sense, moral, how far to be trusted, *s.* 609, *p.* 311.
- Ibid, *s.* 610, *p.* 311.
- Sense, moral, dependence of, *s.* 613, *p.* 313.
- Ibid, *s.* 614, *p.* 313.
- Sense, moral, grounds of failure of, *s.* 615, *p.* 313.
- Ibid, *s.* 616, *p.* 314.
- Sense, moral, summary concerning, *s.* 617, *p.* 314.
- Senses, locality of organs of, in the brain, *s.* 180, *p.* 83.
- Sensibility, classed as animal, and intellectual, *s.* 45, *p.* 20.
- Sensibility, has a history antecedent to its derivation from parents, *s.* 55, *p.* 23.
- Sensibility, causes of, as of all other things, infinite, *s.* 58, *p.* 24.
- Sensibility, and the related causes, the sources of all our sensations, *s.* 61, *p.* 25.
- Sensibility, causes related with, *s.* 63, *p.* 26.
- Sensibility, and sensations, general history of, *s.* 66, *p.* 27.
- Sensibility, experiments afford no proof of diffusion of, from the brain, *s.* 97, *p.* 41.
- Sensibility, summary of discussion respecting seats of, *s.* 152, *p.* 67.
- Sensibility, definition of experience concerning, *s.* 153, *p.* 68.
- Sensibility, animal, and intellectual, may be one principle, *s.* 290, *p.* 141.
- Ibid, *s.* 291, *p.* 142.
- Sensibility, agreement and modification of the principle of, in different examples, *s.* 298, *p.* 145.
- Sensibility, general analogy of the laws of, *s.* 299, *p.* 145.
- Sensibility, common origin of, *s.* 300, *p.* 146.
- Sensibility, quantum of, in the adult either conferred on the ovum, or acquired subsequently, *s.* 301, *p.* 146.
- Sensibility of the adult, not possessed by the ovum, *s.* 302, *p.* 146.
- Sensibility, a source of, in every animal, *s.* 303, *p.* 147.
- Sensibility, source of, deduced from its conditions of agent and patient, *s.* 304, *p.* 147.
- Sensibility, source of, shewn from dependence on nutrition, *s.* 305, *p.* 148.
- Sensibility, renovated from the blood, *s.* 306, *p.* 148.
- Sensibility, source of, indicated by the effects of hemorrhage and syncope, *s.* 307, *p.* 148.
- Sensibility, relation of to the blood, that of a principle with its source, *s.* 308, *p.* 149.
- Sensibility, renewed by a mode of assimilation, *s.* 311, *p.* 150.
- Sensibility, the result of a relation between the organic life, and arterial blood, *s.* 312, *p.* 150.
- Sensibility, possible modes of renewal of, *s.* 313, *p.* 151.
- Sensibility, does not maintain itself by a separate assimilation, *s.* 314, *p.* 151.
- Sensibility, not produced by a relation between blood, and the structures, *s.* 315, *p.* 152.

- Sensibility, production of, by a relation between blood and the structures, would render it independent of the organic life, *s.* 316, *p.* 152.
- Sensibility, independence of, on organic life, not agreeable with experience, *s.* 317, *p.* 152.
- Sensibility, no more reason for thinking it distinct from the organic life, than any other recognized property of the latter, *s.* 320, *p.* 154.
- Sensibility, organic life, and the material of renovation, summary of relations between, *s.* 321, *p.* 154.
- Sensibility, modes of affection of, *s.* 335, *p.* 161.
- Sensibility, first relation of with the objects of the external world, *s.* 336, *p.* 161.
- Sensibility, affection of, a common process of causation, *s.* 337, *p.* 162.
- Sensibility, acted on by substances, by two modes, *s.* 339, *p.* 163.
- Sensibility, not necessary in the brain, for the origin and continuance of ideas, *s.* 383, *p.* 186.
- Sensibility superfluous in the brain for the sensations of pleasure and pain, good and evil, *s.* 400, *p.* 195.
- Sentiments, opposition of, illustrated, *s.* 202, *p.* 96.
- Skull, nature of the external protuberances of, *s.* 191, *p.* 91.
- Spirit, a visible separation of, from the structures, asserted, *s.* 277, *p.* 133.
- State, future, physical testimony not incompatible with, *s.* 287, *p.* 139.
- Structure, function of a removed portion of, ceases, *s.* 224, *p.* 109.
- Structure, consequences of derangements of, with respect to the relations of the properties of function, *s.* 253, *p.* 121.
- Structures, properties of, laws of communication between, *s.* 254, *p.* 122.
- Structures, mode of formation of, by properties of life, *s.* 263, *p.* 126.
- Structure, why any change of, must modify or prevent the phenomena of life, *s.* 271, *p.* 130.
- Substance, none elementary, *s.* 452, *p.* 224.
- Sympathies, capable of originating benevolence, *s.* *422, *p.* 207.

T

- Taste, what, *s.* 494, *p.* 252.
- Taste, whether to be defined, *s.* 507, *p.* 258.
- Ibid, *s.* 508, *p.* 258.
- Ibid, *s.* 509, *p.* 258.
- Ibid, *s.* 510, *p.* 258.
- Ibid, *s.* 511, *p.* 259.
- Taste, efficacy of, in practice, *s.* 512, *p.* 259.
- Ibid, *s.* 513, *p.* 259.
- Ibid, *s.* 514, *p.* 260.
- Ibid, *s.* 515, *p.* 260.
- Ibid, *s.* 516, *p.* 261.
- Ibid, *s.* 517, *p.* 261.

- Taste, moral, by what mode to be inspired, *s.* 781, *p.* 416.
 True and false, sensations which may prevail in succession with respect to the same objects, *s.* 52, *p.* 22.
 True and false, history of, included in that of sensations, *s.* 54, *p.* 23.

U

- Understanding, formed by the relations of sensibility with externals, and of sensations with the mind, *s.* 347, *p.* 166.

V

- Virtue, defects of a scheme of, founded upon moral beauty, *s.* 420, *p.* 205.
 Ibid, *s.* 421, *p.* 206.
 Ibid, *s.* 422, *p.* 206.
 Virtue, love of, efficacy of, *s.* 518, *p.* 261.
 Ibid, *s.* 519, *p.* 262.
 Virtue, love of, whether to be created, *s.* 520, *p.* 252.
 Ibid, *s.* 523, *p.* 263.
 Virtue, objects of, *s.* 561, *p.* 285.
 Virtue, incentive to, *s.* 562, *p.* 286.
 Virtue, practice of, on the ground of beauty, a weak incentive, *s.* 570, *p.* 291.
 Ibid, *s.* 571, *p.* 292.
 Volition appears to originate in the brain, *s.* 405, *p.* 197.
 Volition, objects of, have first been related with the senses, *s.* 406, *p.* 197.
 Volition comprised in the sensations of desire and aversion, *s.* 407, *p.* 197.
 Volition, apparent difference between, and desire and aversion, *s.* 408, *p.* 198.
 Ibid, *s.* 409, *p.* 198.
 Volition, identity of, with desire and aversion, agreeable with the phenomena of muscular action, *s.* 410, *p.* 199.
 Volition, an effect, like every other, compelled by adequate causes, *s.* 413, *p.* 201.

W

- Welfare, public, criterion of, *s.* 679, *p.* 347.
 Ibid, *s.* 680, *p.* 348.
 Welfare, public, requires uniformity of affection, only in a few particulars, *s.* 748, *p.* 397.

ERRATA.

- P. 51, line 11, after "with," add "a."
- P. 74, line 10, after 167 §. add (1.)
- P. 124, line 1, for "influence," read "impulse."
- P. 179, line 7, for "defects," read "defect."
- P. 210, line 23, after "recollection," read "as for example."
- P. 215, line 10, for "in," read "is."
- P. 216, line 19, for "brain, read "mind."
- P. 223, line 14, dele "rather."
- P. 243, line 24, for "connections," read "connection."
- P. 305, line 30, for "the," read "its."
- P. 305, line 32, after "of," read "such example with."
- P. 309, line 6, after "illustrating," dele "the."
- P. 323, 1st line of note, dele "to deny."
- P. 326, line 9, for "conversations," read "conversation."
- P. 331, line 21, read "it" is, &c.
- P. 399, line 6, for "any," read "an."
- P. 421, line 3, read the "true" spring," &c.

Works by the same Author.

An ESSAY on the ABSORBENTS: comprising some Observations upon the Relative Pathology and Functions of the Absorbent and Secreting Systems. *Callow*, 1813.

A VIEW of the RELATIONS of the NERVOUS SYSTEM in Health and in Disease: containing Selections from the Dissertation to which was adjudged the Jacksonian Prize for the Year 1813. With additional Illustrations and Remarks. *Callow*, 1815.

GENERAL INDICATIONS which relate to the LAWS of the ORGANIC LIFE. *Callow*, 1819.

An EXPOSITION of the PRINCIPLES of PATHOLOGY, and of the TREATMENT of DISEASES. *Underwoods*, 1823.

