

The Cratylus, Phaedo, Parmenides, and Timaeus ... / Translated ... by Thomas Taylor.

Contributors

Plato.

Taylor, Thomas, 1758-1835.

Publication/Creation

London : B. & J. White, 1793.

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
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



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THE
 CRATYLUS, PHÆDO,
 PARMENIDES AND TIMÆUS
 OF
 PLATO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY

THOMAS TAYLOR.

WITH NOTES ON THE CRATYLUS,
 AND AN EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION TO EACH DIALOGUE.

Κλαυτα τε και κωκυσα, ιδων ασυνηθεα χωρον.

EMPEDOCLES.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR BENJAMIN AND JOHN WHITE,
 FLEET-STREET.

M.DCC.XCIII.

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P R E F A C E.

THE Dialogues of Plato are such rare and admirable pieces of composition, that it is alike impossible to explain the beauty of their construction to such as are ignorant of the Greek tongue, or translate them into any other language without at least frequently losing something of their native elegance and grace. Plato's style indeed has been justly celebrated in the warmest terms by the literati of every age. Aristotle, from considering its animated, vehement, and luminous nature, places it as a medium between poetry and prose; and Ammianus, from regarding as we may suppose its elevation and majesty, asserts, that if Jupiter were to speak in the Attic tongue, he would use the diction of Plato. But his language principally demands our admiration, when we attend to the abstruse meaning of his sentences in conjunction with the beauty of their composition. For then we shall find that Plato possessed the happy art of uniting the blossoms of elocution with the utmost gravity

of sentiment; the precision of demonstration with the marvellous of mystic fables; the venerable and simple dignity of *scientific* dialectic with the enchanting graces of poetical imagery; and in short, that he every where mingles rhetorical ornament with the most astonishing profundity of conception. Such indeed is the unparalleled excellence of Plato's composition, that notwithstanding all the artifice of the style, almost every word has a peculiar signification, and contains some latent philosophical truth; so that at the same time it both gives elegance to the structure, and becomes necessary to the full meaning of the sentence with which it is connected. He who desires to be convinced of the truth of this observation, need only consult any one of the invaluable commentaries of the latter Platonists on Plato's dialogues; and if he has a genius for such speculations, he will perceive with astonishment that Plato is as close in his reasoning, as skilful in *vulgar* dialectic, and as prolific in his conceptions, as the Stagirite himself; at the same time that his language is incomparably more magnificent, and his doctrine in some particulars infinitely more sublime.

Thus much I thought it necessary to premise, as an apology for the literal exactness of the following translations. Had I indeed been anxious to gratify the false taste of the moderns with respect to
compo,

composition, I should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original, have omitted almost all connective particles, have divided long periods into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong, deep, and rapid river of Plato's language, into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams. But as the present volume was composed with an eye to the commentaries of the latter Platonists, and with the hope of obtaining the approbation of more equitable posterity, and benefiting *men of elevated souls*, I have endeavoured not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. How well I have succeeded, cannot I fear be justly determined by any writer of the present period. For as unfortunately there does not appear to be any living author besides myself who has made the acquisition of the Platonic philosophy the great business of his life, without regarding the honours of the multitude, or paying the smallest attention to the accumulation of wealth;—as this is the case, who of the present day can equitably decide the merit of the ensuing work? Surely no one can be so ignorant, as to think that a bare knowledge of the Greek tongue, such as is acquired at universities, can be a sufficient qualification for appreciating his labours who has studied

the Greek philosophy *, or for passing judgment on a translation from a species of Greek so different from that which is generally known. Philosophy indeed in any language must vindicate to itself a number of peculiar terms ; but this is so remarkably the case with the philosophy of Plato in the original, that he who should attempt to translate any one of his dialogues without understanding his se-

* To convince the reader that I have at least been in earnest in my pursuit of the Platonic philosophy, I think it necessary to inform him that I have in my possession the following Platonic manuscripts : The seven books of Proclus on the Parmenides—The Scholia of Olympiodorus on the Phædo, and large extracts from his Scholia on the Gorgias—The Commentary of Proclus on the first Alcibiades, and his Scholia on the Cratylus ; for which last I am indebted to the kindness of a gentleman, with whom I am perfectly unacquainted, and whose liberality I have mentioned in the additional notes to the following translation of the Cratylus, not in such terms indeed as it deserves, yet in such as the warmest gratitude could inspire. All these manuscripts are copies taken with my own hand ; and some of them I have read through twice, and the rest once. I have likewise read through Proclus on the Timæus thrice ; and on Plato's Theology five times at least. And surely after all this I may be supposed, without any vanity, to know more of Platonism than those men who never consult such authors, but to gratify an indolent curiosity, to find out some new phrase, or to exercise their critical acumen in verbal emendation. I omit mentioning other Platonic authors which I have diligently studied, because these are the most voluminous, the most difficult, and the least generally known.

cret doctrine, would produce nothing but a heap of absurdities, would only abuse the credulity of the simple reader, and would himself in the end sink into silent contempt. Let the reader, if he has any knowledge of Platonism, compare the following version of the Phædo with that of Dacier; and then, from the difference in point of meaning between the two, let him either subscribe to the truth of my assertion, or prove that my translation is false.

I take this opportunity therefore of publicly declaring, that during the course of my translating all the remaining dialogues of Plato, which have not been attempted by Mr. Sydenham, I shall pay no attention whatever to the criticisms of any writer who has not legitimately studied the philosophy of Plato, unless it shall appear that his criticisms are not only dictated by ignorance, but are the result of malevolent design. For in this case, merely from regard to the philosophy which I am so anxious to propagate, and not from any resentment for the personal injuries which I may sustain, I shall not fail to expose the infamy of such conduct with all the ability I am capable of exerting.

But here it is necessary to observe, that by a legitimate student of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who both from nature and education is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking.

That is, one who possesses a naturally good disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; has diligently studied the whole or at least the greater part of Aristotle's works, as a preparative for the more profound speculations of Plato; and who, after this gradual and scientific progression, has for many years with unabated ardour strenuously laboured through the works of Plato and his disciples; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skilfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;—in short, who has never considered *wisdom* as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that for which every thing is to be endured, and for which every thing is to be sacrificed; which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and whose intrinsic worth surpasses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. To the judgment of such a character as this I cheerfully and joyfully submit my past, present, and future productions. The censure of such a one I should reverence; his approbation, should

should I be fortunate enough to obtain it, I shall receive with transport; and his friendship would be a felicity which language is unable to describe.

As an apology for the boldness with which I have censured certain modern opinions, it may be sufficient to observe, that to reprobate foolish and impious notions when there is nothing personal in the censure, is certainly the duty of every honest and liberal mind. Indeed such a conduct can never be objected to by any, but either those who embrace such opinions and are secretly conscious of their baseness, or those who cannot *rationaly* defend their belief; or, lastly, those whose souls, as Plato beautifully observes, are *crushed* and *bruised* by servile employments. I have always indeed found that men of this last description are particularly averse to the honesty of attacking tenets which are generally received; and this for a very natural reason—the danger of suffering by such a conduct in their worldly concerns. For with these, so powerful is the influence of corporeal good, which they feelingly call their *dearest interest*, that rather than diminish the wealth which they are yearly amassing, they would leave the man of whom they ridiculously call themselves the friends to perish through extremity of want. It is however no uncommon thing at present, to find men with such degraded souls deciding on the most abstruse subjects, with
much

much greater confidence than the profoundest philosopher of antiquity ever employed on such an occasion. But the absurdity and arrogance of this conduct may be easily pardoned, when we consider that such men are perfectly ignorant that *magnificence of thought* and *a contempt of wealth* are essential characteristics of the philosophic genius; that to toil in the same dull round from year to year, merely to acquire a fortune, can be borne by none but *slaves*; and that the interrogation of the poet in the following lines is no less pertinent, than the answer which they contain is indisputably true:

What can ennoble fots, or SLAVES, or cowards?

Alas! not all the blood of all the Howards.

I only add, that as the present volume was principally designed for the mere English reader, I have not filled my pages with verbal criticisms *;

* From some emendations which I have given in the Introduction to the Parmenides of a part of the Excerpta from Damascius *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, by Wolfius, the reader may see the ignorance of verbal critics, as to philosophical matters at least, fully displayed. For Wolfius ranks high in this *most trifling* profession, and had I doubt not arrived at that most enviable degree of perfection in a knowledge of the Greek tongue, by which a man finds that *he can do nothing without accents, and that Homer is principally to be read with a view to the quantity of his syllables!* And yet, notwithstanding all this, there are many gross verbal mistakes in his edition of these Excerpta, some of which I have noticed; and the extreme erroneousness of the pointing surpasses any thing that I have ever met with in print.

though in the course of the translations I frequently found a necessity of differing from Ficinus, and might have displayed a variety of readings from the MS. commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides. But as I profess myself a lover of *things*, and not *words*, my attention has been wholly directed to the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and not to *pedantic* emendations of his text; my efforts have been exerted to disseminate real wisdom, and not to amuse the inanities of folly; and my hopes of approbation rest on the judgment of the thinking and liberal few, and not on the criticisms of the superficial emendator, who is so much in the habit of substituting one word for another, that at last he thinks a *strange error* has crept into *the book of knowledge*, and that in every page of it we should read *words* instead of *things* *.

* Sic Critici ferè omnes, sed malè.

THE
CRATYLUS OF PLATO:
A DIALOGUE
ON THE RECTITUDE OF NAMES.

THE
CRATYLUS OF PLATO

A DIALOGUE
ON THE RECTITUDE OF NAMES

INTRODUCTION.

THE ensuing dialogue, which disputes whether names have been assigned to things from nature or position, and whether some at least are not derived from a more divine origin than that of human invention, has been highly censured by modern critics for its etymologies, which they have with *great sagacity* discovered to be for the most part false. The extreme ignorance indeed of these verbalists, with respect to all real knowledge, I have elsewhere frequently exposed; but their criticisms on the present dialogue display this predominant feature of their character in a manner so conspicuous, that it cannot fail of striking the most illiterate, and producing contempt in the most phlegmatic observer. For, in the first place, the intention of Plato in this disputation is to investigate names philosophically, and not grammatically; and this was obvious to the philologist Selden, as may be seen in his treatise on the Syrian gods:—and in the next place, Plato mingles in his investigation the serious with the jocular: so that in the first part of the dialogue, when he investigates the names of the gods, he is perfectly in earnest, as is highly proper on such an occasion; and in the middle part he facetiously ridicules the followers of Heraclitus, who considered all things as perpetually flowing, without admitting any periods

riods of repose. Hence, in order to explode this opinion, which is erroneous in the extreme, when extended to intelligible as well as sensible natures, he proves that by an abuse of etymologies, all names may be shewn to have been established, as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation. The truth of this account will be evident to every ingenuous mind, from barely reading the dialogue with attention; but is not even suspected by the verbal critic *, who as usual dogmatically decides on writings, which he is so far from having studied, that he has not even read them like a rational being; but, totally neglecting the design and sense of the author, has confined himself solely to the pursuit of new words and phrases, different readings, and omissions of accent! Such as these however are the men who are *ignorantly* called men of learning, who are celebrated as prodigies of genius, who form the literary taste of the present generation; and who, like Homer's mice, impiously *nibble* the veil of *Wisdom*, and would willingly destroy the work of her celestial hands!

With respect to the subject matter of this logical dialogue, which is the invention and as it were generation of names, it is necessary to observe, that there were two opinions of the ancients on this particular; one of Heraclitus and his followers, among whom Cratylus held a considerable rank; the other of certain Parmenidæans, among

* How contemptible Daniel Heinsius considered men of this description, the following passage abundantly evinces: "Nam quod hic et ibi de syllabæ alicujus tempore nugantur Grammatici, quis hoc invidet illis? qui hac sorte nati sunt, ut literas venentur, sicut mendici in sole pedunculos suos." Prolegom. in Hesiodum.

whom

whom Hermogenes was no ignoble advocate. Of the former of these, Cratylus, it is reported that Plato was an auditor; and he is said to have been under the tuition of the latter in theological concerns. And the Heraclitics indeed asserted that names consist from nature alone, and that the consent of men contributed nothing to their formation or invention. But the Parmenidæans affirmed, that names were not the productions of nature, but received their conformation from the arbitrary decision of men, by whom they were assigned and imposed upon things. The more early Academics or disciples of Plato embraced the opinion of the Heraclitics; and the more early Peripatetics that of Hermogenes: while in the mean time each sect endeavoured to bring over its leader to the doctrine which it embraced; though, as we shall now shew from Ammonius *, the sentiments of Plato and Aristotle on this subject differed only in words, and not in reality.

In order therefore to be convinced of this, it is necessary to observe, that the dogma of those who considered names as consisting from nature, and not from the will of men, received a two-fold distribution. Hence one part, as the Heraclitics, were of opinion that names were natural, because they are the productions and works of nature. For (say they) proper and peculiar names are prepared and assigned from the nature of things, no otherwise than proper or secret senses are attributed from the same cause to every thing. For that which is visible is judged to be different from that which is tangible, because it is perceived by a different sense. But names are similar to natural resemblances; *i. e.* to such as are beheld in mirrors or in water,

* In Aristot. de Interpretatione.

and not to such as are the productions of art. And indeed those are to be considered as denominating things, who produce true and solid names of this kind : but those who act in a different manner, do not properly denominate, but only emit a sound or voice. But it is the business of a prudent, learned, and truly philosophic man, always to investigate names, which are peculiarly constituted and assigned to each particular from the nature of things ; just as it is the province of one who possesses an acute sight, to know and judge rightly the proper similitudes of every visible object.

But the other class of those who defended this opinion, asserted that names consisted from nature, because they corresponded to the nature of the denominated particulars. For (say they) names ought to be illustrious and significant, that they may express things with perspicuity and precision. As if (for instance) any one should be born with a disposition admirably adapted to imperial command, such a one may with great propriety be called *Agefilaus* or *Archidamus*. And that on this account such names are natural, because they significantly accord with the things which such names imply. For the person just adduced may be elegantly called *Archidamus*, because he is able to rule over the people ; and *Agefilaus*, because he is the leader of the people. They add besides, that names are indeed similar to images ; but to those only which do not consist from nature, but which are the offspring of human art, such as pictures and statues, in which we evidently perceive that various similitudes of resemblances correspond to the various exemplars of things ; and that these render more, but those less express effigies of things, according as the skill of the artificer by employing the dexterity of art is able

to fashion them in a more or less convenient manner. But the truth of this (say they) may be clearly evinced from hence, that we often investigate the natures of things by an analysis of names; and, after a process of this kind, demonstrate that names are assigned adapted to the things which they express.

In like manner, the dogma of those who ascribed names to the consent of men received a twofold division. And one part indeed defended such a position of names, as the Parmenidæan Hermogenes in the present dialogue, *viz.* that names might be formed according to every one's arbitrary determination, though this should take place without any rational cause: so that if a man should call any thing by just whatever name he pleased, the name in this case would be proper, and accommodated to the thing denominated. But the other part, such as the more ancient Peripatetics, asserted that names ought not to be formed and assigned by men rashly, according to the opinion of Hermogenes, but with deliberation and design. And that the artificer of names ought to be a person endued with universal science, in order that he may be able to fabricate proper and becoming names for all the variety of things. Hence they assert that names consist from the determinations of men, and not from nature, because they are the inventions of the reasoning soul, and are properly accommodated from hence to things themselves. For those ancient founders of names did not rashly and without design denominate marshes of the female genus, but rivers of the male (not to mention the various tribes of animals), but they characterized the former by the feminine genus, because like the soul they are certain receptacles; and called the latter by a masculine appellation, on account of their en-

tering into and mingling themselves with the former. In like manner they assigned the masculine genus to intellect, and marked soul with a feminine appellation; because intellect diffuses its light upon soul, which, in consequence of receiving it from thence in her inmost penetralia, is most truly said to be filled and illuminated by intellect. They likewise very properly employed an equal analogy in the sun and moon, on account of the abundant emanation of light from the former, and the reception of the prolific rays by the latter. But with respect to the neuter and common genus, as they judged that these were constituted and composed from the mixture or separation of the masculine and feminine genus, hence they significantly assigned them to certain things in a congruous proportion of nature.

Hence it appears that Aristotle and the Peripatetics differ only in words from Plato and the Academics: since the latter assert that names consist from nature, because they signify particulars in a manner accommodated to the nature of things; but the former contend that names are the offspring of human invention, because they have been sagaciously assigned by a most skilful architect as it were of speaking, and this according to the exigency of nature. But the present dialogue sufficiently proves that this is a true interpretation of Plato's opinion on this interesting subject; since Socrates here establishes himself as a medium between Hermogenes and Cratylus, and remarkably reprehends each by a multitude of very conclusive reasons. For he plainly demonstrates that names cannot alone consist from the arbitrary determination of men, as Hermogenes seemed to assert, on account of the universal genera of things, and immutable and eternal natures to which a stable and right reason of names may be well ascribed,
both

both because they are perpetual and constant, and known to all men from the beginning, and because they are allotted a nature definite and immovable. And again, he shews that neither can names consist from nature in the manner which the Heraclitics endeavour to support, on account of the gliding and fluxible nature of individuals, to which names can neither be conveniently assigned nor well adapted for any considerable period of time.

But that the reader may see the progression of names from their sources which are the gods, let him attend to the following beautiful passage from Proclus on the Theology of Plato *. “The first, most principal, and truly divine names must be considered as established in the gods themselves. But those of the second order, and which are the resemblances of these, subsisting in an intellectual manner, must be said to be of a dæmoniacal condition. And those in the third rank, emanating indeed from truth, but fashioned logically, and receiving the last representation of divine concerns, make their appearance from scientific men, who at one time energize according to a divine afflatus, and at another time intellectually, generating images in motion of the inward spectacles of their souls. For as the demiurgic intellect establishes about matter representations of the first forms subsisting in his essence, temporal resemblances of things eternal, divisible of such as are indivisible, and produces as it were shadowy images of true beings; in the same manner, as it appears to me, the science which we possess, fashioning an intellectual production, fabricates resemblances both of other things and of the gods themselves. Hence it assimilates through composition that which in the gods is incomposite; that

* Lib. i. cap. 29.

which

which is simple in them through variety, and that which is united through multitude. And thus forming names it manifests images of divine concerns, according to their last subsistence : for it generates each name as if it was a statue of the gods. And as the Theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the unenvying goodness of the gods, into an illumination of the artificial statues; in the same manner, the intellectual science of divine concerns, through compositions and divisions of sounds, exhibits the occult essence of the gods. With great propriety therefore does Socrates in the Philebus assert—that *he proceeds with the greatest dread in that which respects the names of the gods, on account of the caution which should be employed in their investigation.* For it is necessary to venerate the last resounding echoes as it were of the gods; and in consequence of this reverence to establish them in their first exemplars *.”

Thus

* Agreeable to this, likewise, Proclus in the fourth book of his Commentary on the Parmenides, which is justly called by Damascius *υπεραιρουσα εξηγησις, a transcendent exposition*, observes as follows: *πολλαι ταξεις εστι κ' των ον. ατων, ωσπερ δη κ' των γνωσεων κ' τα μεν αυτων θεια λεγεται, δι ων οι καταδεικτροι θεοι τους προ αυτων ονομαζουσι· τα δε αγγελικα, δι ων οι αγγελοι εαυτους τε κ' τους θεους· τα δε δαιμονια, τα δε ανθρωπινα. κ' τα μεν εφ' ημιν κ' ημιν, τα δε αρρητα. κ' ολας ωσπερ ημας ο Κρα-υλος αναδιδασκει, κ' προ τουτου η ενθεος παραδωσι, και γνωσι, κ' ονομασια διαφορος εστι.—i. e. “ There are many orders of names, as well as of cognitions; and some of these are called divine, through which subordinate gods denominate such as are prior to them; but others are angelic, through which angels denominate themselves and the gods; and others are dæmoniacal, and others again human. And some are effable by us,*
but

Thus far the truly divine Proclus; from which admirable passage the Platonic reader will find all his doubts on this intricate subject fully solved, if he only bestows on it that attention which it so well deserves. I only add, that every ingenuous mind may be convinced from the etymologies of divine names in this dialogue, that the latter Platonists were not perverters of their master's theology, as is ignorantly asserted by verbal critics and *modern* theologists. This indeed will be so apparent from the ensuing notes, that no greater proof can be desired of the dreadful mental darkness in which such men are involved, notwithstanding the *great acumen* of the former, and the much-boasted but *delusive light* of the latter.

but others are ineffable. And universally as the Cratylus informs us, and prior to this the divine tradition (*i. e.* the Zoroastrian oracles), there is a difference in nomination as well as in knowledge."

INTRODUCTION

It is the duty of the author to state briefly the object of this work, and to explain the reasons which have induced him to undertake it. The object of this work is to present a concise and accurate statement of the principles of the theory of the mind, and to show how these principles are applied in the various branches of human knowledge. The reasons which have induced the author to undertake this work are, first, the desire to see the principles of the theory of the mind clearly and distinctly stated, and secondly, the desire to see how these principles are applied in the various branches of human knowledge.

The author has endeavored to do this in a manner which is both concise and accurate, and which is also such as to be easily understood by the reader. He has also endeavored to show how the principles of the theory of the mind are applied in the various branches of human knowledge, and to show how these principles are applied in the various branches of human knowledge.

THE
CRATYLUS

OF

PLATO.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

HERM. ARE you willing, then, that we should communicate this discourse to Socrates?

CRAT. If you think proper.

HERM. Cratylus here, Socrates, says, that there is a rectitude of name naturally subsisting in every thing; and that this is not a name which certain persons pronounce from custom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; but that there is a certain rectitude of names, which is naturally the same both among Greeks and Barbarians. I ask him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. I then enquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In all other particulars, therefore, I say, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, says he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men should agree in calling you so. And upon my eagerly desiring to know the meaning of what he says, he does not declare any thing, but uses dissimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about something on this subject, which if he should be willing to relate clearly, he

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would

would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to say the same as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this oracle of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I should much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.

Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, according to the ancient proverb, *beautiful things are difficult to be understood*; and the discipline respecting names is no small affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonstration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which instructed the hearer in this very particular, as he himself says, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth, respecting the rectitude of names: but I never have heard it; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumstance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth respecting these particulars; but am nevertheless prepared to investigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he derides you: for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and, at the same time, have not obtained your desire. But, as I just now said, the knowledge of these matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to consider, whether the truth is on your side, or on that of Cratylus.

HERM. But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently disputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot persuade myself, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what custom and mutual consent have established. For to me it appears, that the name which any one assigns to a thing, is a proper name; and that, if he
should

should even change it for another, this name will be no less right than the first; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants. For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in any thing, but subsists only from the law and habit of those by whom it is instituted and called. But, if the case is otherwise, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

Soc. Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us consider therefore. Is that by which any one calls any thing, the name of that thing?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. And this, whether a private person calls it, or a city?

HERM. I think so.

Soc. What, then, if I should call any thing in such a manner, as to denominate that an horse which we now call a man, and that a man which we now call a horse; would not the name man remain the same publicly, but the name horse privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horse? Would you not speak in this manner?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me, then, do you call it any thing, to speak true and false?

HERM. I do.

Soc. Therefore, one thing will be a true discourse, but another a false one. Will it not?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not that discourse then, which speaks of things as they are, be a true discourse; but that which speaks of them different from what they are, a false one?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Is not this, therefore, to speak of things which are, and which are not, by discourse?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But, with respect to a discourse which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?

HERM. The parts, also, are no otherwise than true.

Soc. But whether are the large parts true, and the small ones not? or, are all the parts true?

HERM. I think that all the parts are true.

Soc. Is there any part of what you say, smaller than a name?

HERM. There is not. But this is the smallest of all.

Soc. And does not this name belong to a true discourse?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And this, you say, is true.

HERM. I do.

Soc. But is not the part of a false discourse, false?

HERM. I say it is.

Soc. It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and false, since we can call a discourse so.

HERM. How should it not be so?

Soc. Is that therefore, which each person says the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any person assigns it; and at that time when he assigns them?

HERM. I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this; that I may call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I see that in cities,

cities, the same things are assigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.

Soc. Let us see, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to subsist in such a manner, with respect to the peculiar essence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who said that man was the measure of all things; so that things are, with respect to me, such as they appear to me; and that they are such to you, as they appear to you: or do some of these appear to you to possess a certain stability of essence?

HERM. Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

Soc. But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no such thing as a man perfectly evil?

HERM. Never, by Jupiter! But I have often been disposed to think, that there are some men profoundly wicked, and that the number of these is great.

Soc. But have you never yet seen men perfectly good?

HERM. Very few, indeed.

Soc. You have seen such then?

HERM. I have.

Soc. How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus: That those who are completely good, are completely prudent; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, for every thing to be such as it appears to every one, can some of us be prudent, and some of us imprudent?

HERM. By no means.

Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since there is such a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirely speak the truth; for one person will not in reality be more prudent than another, if that which appears to every one, is to every one true.

HERM. It is so.

Soc. But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that all things subsist together with all, in a similar manner, and always; for thus some things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always, and in a similar manner, inherent in all things.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. If, therefore, neither all things subsist together similarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each person, it is evident that there are certain things which possess a stability of essence, and this not from us, nor in consequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which subsist from themselves, according to the essence which naturally belongs to them.

HERM. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

Soc. Will, therefore, the things themselves naturally subsist in this manner, but their actions not so? or, are their actions, in like manner, one certain species of things?

HERM. They are perfectly so.

Soc. Actions therefore, also, are performed according to the nature which they possess, and not according to our opinion. As for instance, if we should attempt to cut any thing, shall we say that each particular can be divided just as we please, and with what we please? or rather, shall

we not say, that if we desire to cut any thing according to its natural capacity of receiving section, and likewise with that instrument which is natural for the purpose, we shall divide properly, effect something satisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary to nature, we shall wander from the purpose, and perform nothing?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. If therefore we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which any thing is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with those materials which are proper on the occasion.

HERM. It is so.

Soc. Must we not, therefore, proceed with other things after the same manner?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not to speak, therefore, one particular operation?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does he speak rightly, who speaks just as he thinks fit; or he, who speaks in such a manner as the nature of things requires him to speak, and themselves to be spoken of; and who thinks, that if he speaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he shall effect something by speaking; but that, if he acts otherwise, he shall wander from the truth, and accomplish nothing to the purpose?

HERM. It appears to me, it will be just as you say.

Soc. Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of speaking? For those who denominate things, deliver after a manner discourses.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action; since to speak is a certain action about things?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But it has appeared that actions do not subsist with respect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.

HERM. It has so.

Soc. It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted. And thus we shall act and nominate in a satisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. Come then, answer me. Must we not say, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with something?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And that the thread, which ought to be separated in weaving, ought to be separated with something? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to be perforated with something?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with something?

HERM. It ought.

Soc. But with what are the threads separated in weaving?

HERM. With the shuttle.

Soc.

Soc. And what is that with which a thing is denominated?

HERM. A name.

Soc. You speak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, I should enquire what sort of an instrument a shuttle is, would you not answer, that it is an instrument with which we separate the threads in weaving?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not separate the woof and the threads, which are confused together?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not answer in the same manner, concerning perforating, and other particulars?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilst we denominate any thing with a name, which is a certain instrument?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Do we teach one another any thing, and distinguish things according to their mode of subsistence?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the shuttle textorial?

HERM. How should it not?

Soc.

Soc. The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns the art of weaving : but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Through whose operation is it, that the weaver acts properly, when he uses the shuttle ?

HERM. The carpenter's.

Soc. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. And whose work does the piercer properly use, when he uses the augur ?

HERM. The coppersmith's.

Soc. Is every one therefore a coppersmith, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. But whose work does the teacher use, when he employs a name ?

HERM. I cannot tell.

Soc. Nor can you tell, who delivered to us the names which we use ?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Does it not appear to you, that the law delivered these ?

HERM. It does.

Soc. He who teaches, therefore, uses the work of the legislator, when he uses a name.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But does every man appear to you to be a legislator, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it appears, is a legislator, who is the most rare of artificers among men.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But come, consider what it is which the legislator beholds, when he establishes names; and make your survey, from the instances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is naturally adapted to the purposes of weaving?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But if the shuttle should break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather, would he not look to that form, agreeable to which he endeavoured to make the broken shuttle?

HERM. It appears to me, that he would look to this, in his fabrication.

Soc. Do we not, therefore, most justly call this form, the shuttle itself?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. When, therefore, it is requisite to make shuttles, adapted for the purpose of weaving a slender garment, or one of a closer texture, or of thread, or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is necessary that all of them should possess the form of the shuttle; but that each should be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the most becoming manner.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And the same reasoning takes place with respect to other instruments. For an instrument must be found
out

out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a substance must be assigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce just what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument with which he operates. For it is necessary to know, as it appears, that an augur ought to be composed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And that a shuttle should, for this purpose, be made of wood.

HERM. It is so.

Soc. For every shuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every species of weaving; and other things in a similar manner.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. It is necessary therefore, excellent man, that the legislator should know how to place a name naturally, with respect to sounds and syllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he should frame and establish all names, if he is desirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compose every name from the same syllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every coppersmith use the same iron, when he fabricates the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but that the instrument is properly composed, so long as they fabricate it according to the same idea, though from different sorts of iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians,

rians, assigns a form of name accommodated to each, in any kind of syllables, that while this is the case, the founder of names here will not be worse than the founder in any other place?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Who therefore is likely to know, whether a convenient form of the shuttle is situated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artificer of the shuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is used?

HERM. It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the shuttle is used.

SOC. Who is it, then, that uses the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to instruct the artificer of it in the best manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made, or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But who is this?

HERM. The harper.

SOC. And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?

HERM. The pilot.

SOC. And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not, and who is able to judge concerning it, when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Must it not be the person who uses this work?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And likewise to answer?

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer, any thing else, than one who is skilled in dialectic*?

HERM. I should not.

Soc. It is the business therefore of the shipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. And the legislator, as it seems, ought, in the establishing of names, to consult a man skilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.

HERM. He ought.

Soc. It appears therefore, O Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is no despicable affair, as you think it is, nor the business of depraved men, or of any that may

* The dialectic of Plato is very different from that dialectic which is produced by the cogitative power of the soul converting itself to opinion, and deriving the principles of its reasoning from thence; and which is the subject of Aristotle's *Topics*. For the Platonic dialectic employs divisions and resolutions, as primary sciences, and as imitating the progression of beings from *the one*, and their conversion to it again, as their original cause. It sometimes likewise uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and still prior to this last the divisive art. But vulgar dialectic is entirely destitute of irrefragable demonstrations, on account of its being solely derived from opinion.—For a more ample account of this wonderful science, which is the summit of the mathematical science, and is entirely unknown to men of the present day, we must refer the reader to our Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

occur.

occur. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature, and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to any thing, and who is able to insert this form of a name in letters and syllables.

HERM. I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you say. And, perhaps, it is not easy to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think that I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could shew me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.

SOC. As to myself, O blessed Hermogenes, I say nothing; but I even almost forget what I said a short time since, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would investigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in consequence of our mutual survey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name possesses some natural rectitude; and that every man does not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. After this, therefore, it is necessary to enquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you desire to know this.

HERM. But I do desire to know it.

SOC. Consider then.

HERM. But in what manner is it proper to consider?

SOC. The most proper mode of enquiry, my friend, must be obtained from those endued with science, offering them money for this purpose, and loading them with thanks: and these are the sophists, through whom your
brother

brother Callias, in consequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wise man. But, since you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to supplicate your brother, and entreat him to shew you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

HERM. But this request of mine, Socrates, would be absurd, if, notwithstanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I should be pleased with assertions resulting from this truth, as things of any worth.

Soc. But if this does not please you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.

HERM. And what does Homer say, Socrates, concerning names; and where?

Soc. Every where. But those are the greatest and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names which are assigned to the same things by men, and those which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he speaks something in these, great and wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

HERM. I well know, that if the gods denominate any thing, they properly denominate it. But what are the passages you speak of?

Soc. Do you not know, that speaking of the Trojan river, which contested in a singular manner with Vulcan, he says,

Xanthus its name with those of heav'nly birth,
But call'd *Scamander* by the sons of earth *?

HERM. I do.

* *Iliad* 20.

Soc.

Soc. But what then, do you not think that this is something venerable, to know in what respect it is more proper to call that river Xanthus, than Scamander? Likewise, if you are so disposed, take notice that he says*, the same bird is called Chalcis by the gods, but Cymindis by men. And do you think this is a despicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrines than Batica; and so in many other instances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But these things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human sagacity; and it may easily be seen, what kind of rectitude there is in these names, which, according to Homer, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses in which these names are contained.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Which therefore of these names do you think Homer considered as more properly adapted to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?

HERM. I cannot tell.

Soc. But consider the affair in this manner: if any one should ask you, which you thought would denominate things in the most proper manner, the more wise, or the more unwise?

HERM. It is manifest that I should answer, the more wise.

Soc. Which therefore appears to you to be the more wise in cities, the women or the men, that I may speak of the whole genus?

* Iliad 14.

HERM. The men.

SOC. Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the son of Hector was called, by the men of Troy, Astyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?

HERM. It appears that it was so.

SOC. Do you not think that Homer considered the Trojan men as wiser than the Trojan women?

HERM. I think he did.

SOC. He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. But let us consider the reason which he assigns for this denomination: for, says he,

Astyanax the Trojans call'd the boy,
From his great father, the defence of Troy*.

On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the son of the saviour of his country *Astyanax*, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confess I am ignorant of the reason of this. Do you understand it?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. But, excellent man, Homer also gave to Hector his name.

HERM. But why?

SOC. Because it appears to me that this name is something similar to Astyanax, and that these names were considered by the Greeks as having the same meaning;

* Iliad 6,

for *king* and *Hector* nearly signify the same, since both these names are royal. For whoever is a *king*, is also doubtless a *Hector*; since such a one evidently *rules over*, *possesses*, and *has*, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but deceive myself, in thinking, as through certain vestiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer respecting the rectitude of names?

HERM. By no means, by Jupiter! But perhaps you in some degree apprehend his meaning.

SOC. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not say, that this ought to be the case when something monstrous is produced from a horse, and which is different from a horse; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox should generate a horse, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horse, contrary to nature, should generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf*.] And again, if from a
man

* A great part of this sentence within the crotchets is omitted in the Greek text of all the printed editions of Plato; and a great part likewise of the preceding sentence is wanting: though Ficinus, as is evident from his version, found the whole complete in the manuscript, from which he made his translation. In the Greek, there is nothing more than, *εαν βιος εκγονον φυσει ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκημοσχον, ε' πωλον κλητειν, αλλα μοσχον*. Instead of which we ought to read, *εαν βιος εκγονον φυσει ιππον τεκη ε' μοσχον κλητειν, αλλα πωλον, και εαν ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκημοσχον, ε' πωλον κλητειν, αλλα μοσχον*. But though, without this emendation, the passage is perfect nonsense, yet this has not been discovered by

man an offspring not human should be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the same reasoning must take place respecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear so to you?

HERM. It does.

Soc. You speak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the same reason, therefore, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no consequence, though the same thing should be expressed in different syllables, or a letter should be added or taken away, as long as the essence of the thing possesses dominion, and manifests itself in the name.

HERM. What is this which you say?

Soc. Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, four alone excepted, viz. ϵ & υ , and δ & ω : and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we insert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the

any of the verbalists; a plain proof this, that either they have no understanding, or that they never read this dialogue with a view to understand it. Or, perhaps, they considered an emendation of this kind beneath their notice; for doubtless it is not to be compared with the remarks with which their works abound! Such as, for instance, the following observation in Fischer's edition of this dialogue, p. 2, in which we are informed that, instead of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\tilde{\nu}$, "the Basil edition has $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\tilde{\nu}$, and this not badly:" "Ald. Bas. 1. 2. $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\tilde{\nu}$, non male." And this author's edition is replete with remarks no less curious, acute, and important!

name

name that which is manifested to us by the element. As is evident, for instance, in the letter $\beta\eta\tau\alpha$: for here you see that the addition of the β , and the η , and the τ , and the α , does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeable to the intention of its founder; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

HERM. You appear to me to speak the truth.

Soc. Will not, therefore, the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, *good* from *good*, and *beauty* from *beauty*; and in the same manner with relation to every thing else, from every genus a progeny of the same kind will be produced, unless something monstrous is generated; and will be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary these names in such a manner by syllables, that, to ignorant men, the very same appellations will appear to be different from each other. Just as the medicines of physicians, when varied with colours or smells, appear to us to be different, though they are still the same; but to the physician, as one who considers the power of the medicines, they appear to be the same, nor is he at all astonished by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names speculates their power, and is not astonished, if at any time a letter should be added, or changed, or taken away; or that, in other all-various letters, the same power of name should be found. As in the names Aftyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of, they do not possess any thing of the same letters, except the *t*, and yet, at the same time, they signify the same thing. So likewise with respect to the name $\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$, or a *ruler of a city*, what communication has it in letters with the two

preceding names? and yet it has the same signification. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; many which signify nothing else than the leader of an army, as ἄγης, πολέμαρχος, εὐπόλεμος; and likewise many which imply a professor of medicine, as ἰατροκλῆς, and ἀκεσιμβροτος. And perhaps many other may be found, disagreeing indeed in syllables and letters, but in power vocally emitting the same signification. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And that to things which subsist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

HERM. Perfectly so.

Soc. But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offspring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; just as we said before, that if a horse should generate the progeny of an ox, the offspring ought not to be called a horse, but an ox?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs must be assigned him.

HERM. It must so.

Soc. Such a son, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or any thing of this kind: but he should be called by that which signifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to possess any thing of rectitude.

HERM. This ought to be the case more than any thing, Socrates.

Soc.

Soc. Just, Hermogenes, as the name Orestes appears to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune assigned him this name, or some poet, evincing by this appellation his rustic nature, correspondent to an inhabitant of mountains.

HERM. So it appears, Socrates.

Soc. It appears also, that the name of his father subsists according to nature.

HERM. It does so.

Soc. For it seems that Agamemnon was one who considered that he ought to labour and patiently endure hardships, and obtain the end of his designs through virtue. But his stay before Troy, with so great an army, evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with respect to perseverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps also Atreus is a proper denomination: for his slaughter of Chrysippus, and the cruelty which he exercised towards Thyestes, evince that he was *pernicious* and *noxious*. His surname, therefore, suffers a small degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; so that the nature of the man is not evident to every one: but to those who are skilful in names, the signification of Atreus is sufficiently manifest. For his name properly subsists throughout, according to the *intrepid*, *inexorable*, and *noxious*.—It appears also to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly assigned: for this name signifies one who sees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of such a denomination.

HERM. But how?

Soc. Because it is reported of this man, that in the slaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for any thing,

nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be subject to from this circumstance; but he only regarded that which was just before him, and which then subsisted, that is, what was πέλας, or *near*; and this when he desired, by all possible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from πέλας *near*, and ὄψις *sight*. Every one also must think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally assigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.

HERM. But what is that relation?

SOC. That, while he was yet living, many unfortunate and dire circumstances happened to him, and at last the whole of his country was subverted; and that, when he was dead, a stone was suspended over his head in Hades, these particulars, as it appears, corresponding with his name in a wonderful and artless manner: for it is just as if any one should be willing to call him τάλαντατον, i. e. *most miserable*, but, at the same time, desirous to conceal this circumstance, should call him Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the fortune of rumour caused him to receive this appellation.—But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is composed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means easy to be understood: for in reality the name of Jupiter is, as it were, a discourse; but dividing it into two parts, some of us use one part, and some another, for some call him ζῆα, and some δῖα. And these parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought to effect: *For there is no one who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing*

thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all things *. It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is present with all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, viz. into *δία* and *ζῆνα*. But he who suddenly hears that this god is the son of Saturn, may per-

* It is evident from hence, that Jupiter, according to Plato, is the Demiurgus, or artificer of the universe: for no one can be more the cause of living to all things, than he by whom the world was produced. But if this be the case, the artificer of the world is not, according to the Platonic theology, the first cause: for there are other gods superior to Jupiter, whose names Plato, as we shall shortly see, etymologizes agreeable to the Orphic theology. Indeed, his etymology of Jupiter is evidently derived from the following Orphic verses, which are cited by Joannes Diac. Allegor. ad Hesiodi Theog. p. 278.

Εἰν δὲ παντῶν ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς. Ζεὺς γὰρ ἔδωκε,
Ζωὰ τ' ἐγέννησεν * καὶ Ζῆν αὐτὸν καλεῖσσι,
Καὶ Δία τ' ἡδ, ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἀπάντα τέλειται.
Εἰς δὲ παῖρ ἕλος πάντων, θνητῶν τε βροτῶν τε.

i. e. " Jupiter is the principle of all things. For Jupiter is the cause of the generation of animals; and they call him Ζην, and Δία also, because all things were fabricated *through* him; and he is the one father of all things, of beasts and men." Here too you may observe that he is called *fabricator* and *father*, which are the very epithets given to the Demiurgus of the world by Plato, in the *Timæus*. In short, Jupiter, the artificer of the world, subsists at the extremity of that order of gods which is called *νοῦτος*, *intellectual*, as is copiously and beautifully proved by Proclus, in *Plat. Theol.* lib. 5. And he is likewise celebrated by the Chaldaic Theology, as we are informed by Damascius and Psellus, under two names, *δις ὑπερβαλον*, *twice beyond*,

haps

haps think it a reproachful assertion : for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain mighty cogitation ; for, when Saturn is called *κόρος*, it does not signify a boy, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect *. But, according to report, Saturn is the son of Heaven : and sight directed to things above is called by this name, *ὀρανία* †, from beholding things situated on high.

* Saturn therefore, according to Plato, is *pure intellect*, viz. the first intellectual intellect : for the intellects of all the gods are pure in the most transcendent degree ; and therefore purity here must be characteristic of supremacy. Hence Saturn subsists at the summit of the intellectual order of gods, from whence he is received into all the subsequent divine orders, and into every part of the world. But from this definition of Saturn we may see the extreme beauty of that divine fable, in which he is said to devour his children : for this signifies nothing more than the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself ; and consequently its offspring, which are intellectual conceptions, are, as it were, absorbed in itself.

† *Heaven*, which is here characterized by *sight*, is the *heaven* which Plato so much celebrates in the *Phædrus*, and composes that order of gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles *νοητός* καὶ *νοήτος*, i. e. *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*. This will be evident from considering that Plato, in what follows, admits with *Hesiod*, that there are gods superior to *heaven*, such as *night*, *chance*, &c. But as *sight* corresponds to *intelligence*, and this is the same with that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* ; and as Saturn is the summit of the *intellectual* order, it is evident that *heaven* must compose the middle order of gods characterized by *intelligence*, and that the order above this must be entirely *intelligible*. In consequence of all this, what must we think of their system, who suppose Heaven, Saturn and Jupiter, and indeed

high. From whence, O Hermogenes, those who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that he is very properly denominated Heaven. Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Hesiod, and the yet superior progenitors of these which he speaks of, I should not desist from shewing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wisdom, whether it produces any thing of consequence, or not; and whether those explanations which I have just now so suddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective, or true.

HERM. Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a sudden, like those who are agitated by some inspiring god.

Soc. And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wisdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphron, the son of Pantius: for I was with him in the morning, and listened to him with great attention. It seems therefore, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but that he has also arrested my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in such a manner as to make use of this wisdom to-day, and contemplate what yet remains

deed all the gods of the ancients, to have been nothing more than dead men deified, notwithstanding the above etymologies, and the express testimony of Plato to the contrary in the *Timæus*, who represents the Demiurgus commanding the subordinate gods, after he had produced them, to fabricate men and other animals? For my own part, I know not which to admire most, the ignorance, the impudence, or the impiety of such assertions. All that can be said is, that such opinions are truly *barbaric*, *modern* and *Galilean*!

concerning the rectitude of names. But to-morrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aside, and purify ourselves from it, finding out for this purpose one who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is some one of the priests, or the sophists.

HERM. I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion concerning names.

SOC. It is necessary to act in this manner. From whence then are you willing we should begin our speculation, since we have insisted upon a certain formula of operation; that we may know whether names themselves will testify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of construction? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us: for many of these subsist according to the surnames of their ancestors, and sometimes have no correspondence with the persons, as we observed in the beginning of this disputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, such as *the prosperous*, *the saviour*, *the friend of divinity*, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the discussion of these: but it is probable that we shall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings; for it is most becoming to study the position of names in these. But, perhaps, some of these are established by a power more divine than that of men.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak excellently well.

SOC. Will it not therefore be just, to begin from the gods, considering the reason why they are properly denominated gods?

HERM. It will be proper,

SOC.

Soc. I therefore conjecture as follows :—It appears to me, that the most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians ; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these *running* round in a perpetual course, from this nature of *running* they called them gods ; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name. Has what I say any similitude to truth, or not ?

HERM. It possesses a perfect similitude.

Soc. What then shall we consider after this ?

HERM. It is evident that we ought to speculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.

Soc. Concerning dæmons ? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to understand by the name dæmon ? See whether I say any thing to the purpose.

HERM. Only relate what it is.

Soc. Do you not know who those dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of ?

HERM. I do not.

Soc. And are you ignorant that he says, the golden race of men was first generated* ?

HERM.

* The different ages of men which are celebrated by Hesiod, in his *works* and *days*, are not to be understood literally, as if they once really subsisted, but only as signifying, in beautiful poetical images, the mutations of human lives from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue. For earth was never peopled with men either wholly virtuous or vicious ; since the good and the bad

HERM. This I know.

Soc. He says therefore, concerning this, "that, after
this

bad have always subsisted together on its surface, and always will subsist. However, in consequence of the different circulations of the heavens, there are periods of fertility and sterility, not only with respect to men, but likewise to brutes and plants. Hence places naturally adapted to the nurture of the philosophical genius, such as Athens and Egypt, will, in periods productive of a fertility of souls, such as was formerly the case, abound with divine men: but in periods such as the present, in which there is every where a dreadful sterility of souls, through the general prevalence of a certain *most irrational and gigantic impiety*, *αδολγιστος και γιγαντικη ανοσιουργια*, as Proclus elegantly calls the established religion of his time, in Plat. Polit. p. 369—at such periods as these, Athens and Egypt will no longer be the seminaries of divine souls, but will be filled with degraded and barbarous inhabitants. And such, according to the arcana of ancient philosophy, is the reason of the present general degradation of mankind. Not that formerly there were no such characters as now abound, for this would be absurd, since mankind always have been, and always will be, upon earth, a mixture of good and bad, in which the latter will predominate; but that during the fertile circulations of the heavens, in consequence of there being a greater number of men than when a contrary circulation takes place, men will abound who adorn human nature, and who indeed descend for the benevolent purpose of leading back apostate souls to the principles from which they fell. As the different ages therefore of Hesiod signify nothing more than the different lives which each individual of the human species passes through; hence an intellectual life is implied by the golden age. For such a life is pure, and free from sorrow and passion; and of this impassivity gold is an image, through its never being subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is with great propriety

this race was concealed by fate, it produced dæmons* denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men."

HERM. But what then?

SOC. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally composed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. Do you not therefore think, that, if any one of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say, he belonged to the golden race?

HERM. It is probable he would.

SOC. But are the good any other than such as are prudent?

HERM. They are the prudent.

SOC. On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other, he calls them dæmons, because they were *prudent* and *learned* (δάνυμοις). And, in our ancient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence

propriety said to be under Saturn, because Saturn, as we have a little before observed, is *pure intellect*.—But for a larger account of this interesting particular, and of the allegorical meaning of the different ages celebrated by Hesiod, see Proclus upon Hesiod, p. 39, &c.

* By dæmons, here, must not be understood those who are *essentially* such, and perpetually subsist as mediums between gods and men, but those only who are such *κατὰ ἔξιν*, or *according to habitude*; or, in other words, the souls of truly worthy men, after their departure from the present life: for such, till they descend again upon earth, are the benevolent guardians of mankind, in conjunction with those who are *essentially* dæmons.

both

both he, and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a *dæmon*, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man is *learned* and *skilful*; that he is *dæmoni*acal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a *dæmon*.

HERM. And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name Hero* signify?

Soc.

* Heroes form the last order of souls which are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and are characterized by a venerable and elevated magnanimity; and, as they are wholly of a reductorial nature, they are the progeny of Love, through whom they revolve about the first beauty in harmonic measures, and with ineffable delight. Men, likewise, who in the present life knew the particular deity from whom they descended, and who lived in a manner agreeable to the idiom of their presiding and parent divinity, were called by the ancients, *sons of the gods*, *demigods*, and *heroes*: i. e. they were *essentially* men, but *according to habitude*, *κατὰ ἔξιν*, *heroes*. But such as these were divided into two classes; into those who lived according to *intellectual*, and those who lived according to *practical* virtue: and the first sort were said to have a god for their father, and a woman for their mother; but the second sort, a goddess for their mother, and a man for their father. Not that this was literally the case; but nothing more was meant by such an assertion, than that those who lived according to a reductorial or intellectual life, descended from a deity of the male order, whose illuminations they copiously participated; and that those who lived according to practical virtue, descended from a female divinity, such a species of life being more imbecile and passive than the former. But
the

Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.

HERM. How is this?

Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

HERM. What then?

Soc. All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the ancient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation: for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name: or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wise and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in

the masculine genus, in the gods, implies the cause of stable power, being identity and conversion; and the feminine, that which generates from itself all-various progressions, divisions, measures of life, and prolific powers. I only add, that as the names of the gods were not only attributed by the ancients to *essential* dæmons and heroes, but to men who were such according to *habitude*, on account of their similitude to a divine nature; we may from hence perceive the true origin of that most stupid and dire of all modern opinions, that the gods of the ancients were nothing but dead men, ignorantly deified by the objects of their adoration. Such an opinion indeed, exclusive of its other pernicious qualities, is so great an outrage to the common sense of the ancients, that it would be disgraceful even to mention the names of its authors. For,

O'er such as these, a race of nameless things,
Oblivion scornful spreads her dusky wings.

D

dialectic,

dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating; for εἰπεῖν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists is, in consequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men is obscure, I mean, why they were called ἄνδρωποι, men. Can you tell the reason?

HERM. From whence, my worthy friend, should I be able? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this discovery, I should not exert myself for this purpose, because I think you will more easily discover it than I shall.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphron.

HERM. Evidently so.

Soc. And your confidence is proper: for I now seem to myself to understand in a knowing and elegant manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I shall become to-day wiser than I ought. But consider what I say. For this, in the first place, ought to be understood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compose names, just as we please; and, besides this, often change the acute syllables. As when we say Δὴ φίλος, *a friend to Jove*: for, in order that this name may become instead of a verb to us, we take away the other ἰώλᾱ, and, instead of an acute middle syllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we insert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc.

Soc. This therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name *man* : for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, *α*, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

HERM. How do you mean ?

Soc. Thus. This name *man* signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate ; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon that which he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated *ἀνδρωπός*, viz. *contemplating what he beholds**. But what shall we investigate after this ? Shall it be that, the enquiry into which will be very pleasing to me ?

HERM. By all means.

Soc. It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to investigate concerning soul and body ; for we call the composition of soul and body, man.

HERM. Without doubt.

Soc. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these, in the same manner as the former subjects of our speculation. Will you not therefore say, that we should first of all consider the rectitude of this name *soul*, and afterwards of the name *body* ?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. That I may speak, then, what appears to me on a sudden, I think that those who assigned this name *soul*, understood some such thing as this, that whenever this nature is present with the body, it is the cause of its life,

* For every thing receives its definition from its *hyparsis*, or summit, which in man is *intellectual reason* ; and this is entirely of a contemplative nature.

extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of respiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceases, the body at the same time is dissolved and perishes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$). But, if you please, stop a little; for I seem to myself to perceive something more capable of producing persuasion than this, among the followers of Euthyphron: for, as it appears to me, they would despise this etymology, and consider it as absurd. But consider whether the following explanation will please you.

HERM. Only say what it is.

Soc. What other nature, except the soul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?

HERM. No other.

Soc. But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul distribute into order, and contain the nature of every thing else?

HERM. I do.

Soc. It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which *carries* and *contains* nature, $\phi\upsilon\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\nu$: but it may more elegantly be called $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

HERM. For it certainly is so.

Soc. But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its composition.

HERM. But what shall we next consider after this?

Soc. Shall we speak concerning body?

HERM. By all means.

Soc. But this name appears to me to deviate in a cer-

tain small degree from its original: for, according to some, it is the *sepulchre* of the soul, which they consider as buried at present; and because whatever the soul signifies, it signifies by the body; so that on this account it is properly called *σημα*, a sepulchre. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have established this name, principally because the soul suffers in body the punishment of its guilt, and is surrounded with this inclosure that it may preserve the image of a prison*. They are of opinion,

* With this doctrine, that the body is the sepulchre of the soul, and that the soul suffers the punishment of her guilt in body, as in a prison, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans perfectly agree. Thus Heraclitus, speaking of unembodied souls: Ζωμεν τον εκεινων θανατον, τεθνηκαμεν δε τον εκεινων βιον, i. e. "We live their death, and we die their life." And Empedocles, blaming generation, beautifully says of her:

Εκ μεν γαρ ζων ειδεις νεκρα, ειδεις αμειβων.

"The species changing with destruction dread,
She makes the *living* pass into the *dead*."

And again, lamenting his connection with this corporeal world, he pathetically exclaims:

Κλαυστα τε και κωκυστα, ιδων ασυνηθεα χωρον.

"For this I weep, for this indulge my woe,
That e'er my soul such novel realms should know."

Thus too the celebrated Pythagorean Philolaus, in the following remarkable passage in the Doric dialect, preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromat. lib. 3, p. 403. Μαριτυριονται δε και οι παλαιοι θεολογοι τε και μανεις, ως δια τινος τιμωριας, α ψυχα τω σωματι συνιζεινται, και καθαπερ εν σωματι τουτω τεταπται, i. e. "The

opinion, therefore, that the body should retain this appellation, *σῶμα*, till the soul has absolved the punishment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.

HERM. But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been said concerning these particulars. But do you think

ancient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment ; and that it is buried in body, as in a sepulchre." And lastly, Pythagoras himself confirms the above doctrine, when he beautifully observes, according to Clemens in the same book : *Θάνατος ἐστὶν οὐκ οὐα ἐγχεσθῆναι ὁρρομεν οὐκ οὐα δὲ εὐδοκίης ὑπνοῦ*, i. e. " Whatever we see when awake is death, and when asleep a dream." Hence, as I have shewn in my Treatise on the Eleusinian Mysteries, the ancients by Hades signified nothing more than the profound union of the soul with the present body ; and consequently, that till the soul separated herself by philosophy from such a ruinous conjunction, she subsisted in Hades even in the present life ; her punishment hereafter being nothing more than a continuation of her state upon earth, and a transmigration, as it were, from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream : and this, too, was occultly signified by the shews of the lesser mysteries. Indeed, any one whose intellectual eye is not perfectly buried in the gloom of sense, must be convinced of this from the passages already adduced. And if this be the case, as it most assuredly is, how barbarous and irrational is the doctrine, which asserts that the soul shall subsist hereafter in a state of bliss, connected with the present body ! A man might as well think of going to heaven, invested with his ordinary clothing. And as to their system, who talk of the same body being glorified, it puts one in mind of some simple but wealthy cit, who should hope in a future state to wear garments embroidered with gold ; or, in other words, never to wear any thing but Sunday clothes !

we

we can speak about the names of the gods, in the same manner as we considered the name of Jupiter, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?

Soc. By Jupiter, Hermogenes, if we are endued with intellect, we shall confess that the most beautiful mode of conduct, on this occasion, is to *acknowledge* that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themselves*: for it is evident that they call themselves by true appellations. But the second mode of rectitude consists, I think, in calling the gods by those names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice

* A modern reader will doubtless imagine, from this passage, that Plato denied in reality the possibility of knowing any thing concerning divine natures, and particularly if he should recollect the celebrated saying of Socrates, "This one thing I *know*, that I know nothing." But, as Proclus beautifully observes, in his book on providence, Socrates, by such an assertion, meant to insinuate nothing more than the middle kind of condition of human knowledge, which subsists between intellect and sense; the former possessing a total knowledge of things, because it immediately knows the essence of being, and the reality of being; and the latter neither totally knowing truth, because it is ignorant of essence, nor even the nature of sensible things, a knowledge of which is feigned to have a subsistence. So that the Oracle might well call Socrates the wisest of men, because he knew himself to be not truly wise. But who, except a wise man, can possess such a knowledge? For a fool is ignorant that he is ignorant; and no one can truly know the imperfection of human knowledge, but he who has arrived at the summit of human wisdom. And after this manner the present assertion of Plato must be understood.

to hear; and that we should act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully established. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this speculation, previously, as it were, declaring to the gods that we speculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourselves equal to such an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by those men who first fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak modestly: let us therefore act in this manner.

Soc. Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Vesta, according to law?

HERM. It is just that we should.

Soc. What then shall we say is to be understood by this name *Ἑστία*?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not think it is easy to discover this.

Soc. It appears indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.

HERM. But what then?

Soc. It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And indeed, if any one considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call *οὐσία*, *essence*, there are some who call it *ἰσία*, and others again *ᾠσία*. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things *Ἑστία*, according to one of these names, *ἰσία*: and because we denominate that which parti-
cipates

cipates of essence *Ἔσῑα*, *essence*, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called *Ἔσῑα**: for our ancestors were accustomed to call *οὐσία*, essence, *ἔσῑα*. Besides, if any one considers the business of sacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of those by whom sacrifices were ordained. For it was proper, that those who denominated the essence of all things *Ἔσῑα* (Vesta), should sacrifice to Vesta, before all the gods. But those who called *essence* *ὥσία*, these nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, considered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent subsistence. The cause therefore, and leader of things, with them, is *impulsion*:

* The goddess *Vesta* has a manifest agreement with *essence*, because she preserves the being of things in a state of purity, and contains the summits of the wholes from which the universe consists. For *being* is the most ancient of all things, after the first cause, who is truly superessential; and Earth, which among mundane divinities is Vesta, is said by Plato, in the *Timæus*, to be the most ancient of all the gods in the heavens. This goddess first subsists among the *liberated* ἀπολύτοι, gods, of whom we have already given an account in our notes on the *Phædrus*, and from thence affords to the mundane gods an unpolluted establishment in themselves. Hence every thing which is stable, immutable, and which always subsists in the same manner, descends to all mundane natures from this supercelestial Vesta. So that, from the stable illuminations which she perpetually imparts, the poles themselves, and the axis about which the spheres revolve, obtain and preserve their immovable position; and the earth itself stably abides in the middle. For that this is really the case with the earth, notwithstanding the much celebrated but false astronomical system of the moderns, we shall demonstratively prove in our *Introduction to the Timæus*.

and

and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cause *ὥστ' α*. And thus much concerning the opinion of those who may be considered as knowing nothing. But, after Vesta, it is just to speculate concerning Rhea and Saturn, though we have discussed the name of Saturn already. But perhaps I say nothing to the purpose.

HERM. Why so, Socrates?

Soc. O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wisdom.

HERM. But of what kind is it?

Soc. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.

HERM. What probability is this?

Soc. I seem to myself, to behold Heraclitus formerly asserting something wisely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himself also asserts.

HERM. Explain your meaning.

Soc. Heraclitus then says, that all things subsist in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and assimilating things to the flowing of a river, he says, that you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.

HERM. He does so.

Soc. Does he therefore appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus assigned both of them, by chance, the names of streams of water? As therefore Homer * calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says,

* Iliad 9.

In beauteous-flowing marriage first combin'd
Ocean, who mingling with his sister Tethys join'd*.

Behold, therefore, how all these consent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!

HERM.

* Ocean, according to Proclus, in Tim. lib. 4, is the cause to all secondary natures, of all motion, whether intellectual, animastic (*ψυχική*) or natural. But Tethys is the cause of all the distinction and separation of the streams proceeding from the Ocean; conferring on each its proper purity, in the exercise of its natural motion. Ocean therefore may with great propriety be called the generation of the gods, as it is the cause of their progressions into the universe, from their occult subsistence in the intelligible order. But it is necessary to observe, that this mutual communication of energies among the gods was called by ancient theologists *προς γαμος*, a *sacred marriage*; concerning which Proclus, in the second book of his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides, admirably remarks as follows: Ταύτην δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν, πότε μὲν ἐν τοῖς συζυγοῖς ὀρῶσι θεοῖς (οἱ διολογοῖ) καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Ἡρᾶς καὶ Διός, Οὐρανίου καὶ Γῆς, Κρόνου καὶ Ρεᾶς· πότε δὲ τῶν καλλιδειξερῶν πρὸς τὰ κρείττω, καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Διὸς καὶ Δημήτρας· πότε δὲ καὶ ἐμπαιλῶν τῶν κρείττων πρὸς τὰ υφειμένα, καὶ λεγούσι Διὸς καὶ Κόρης γάμον. Ἐπειδὴ τὰ θεῶν ἀλλὰ μὲν εἰσὶν α. πρὸς τὰ συζυγὰ κοινωνοῖαι, ἀλλὰ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τὰ προαύτῳ· ἀλλὰ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τὰ μέλα ταύτα. Καὶ οὖν τὴν ἐκαστῆς ἰδιότητα καλῶναι καὶ μίλῳσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδη τὴν τοιαύτην διαπλοκὴν: i. e. “Theologists at one time considered this communion of the gods, in divinities co-ordinate with each other; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, of Heaven and Earth, of Saturn and Rhea. But at another time they considered it as subsisting between subordinate and superior divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Ceres.

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose ; but I do not understand what the name Tethys implies.

Soc. But this nearly implies the same, and signifies that it is the occult name of a fountain ; for *leaping forth*, and *straining through*, represent the image of a fountain. But from both these names the name Tethys is composed.

HERM. This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.

Ceres. But at another time, on the contrary, they beheld it as subsisting between superior and subordinate divinities ; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Proserpine. For, in the gods, there is one kind of communion, between such as are of a co-ordinate nature ; another, between the subordinate and supreme ; and another again, between the supreme and subordinate. And it is necessary to understand the idiom of each, and to transfer a conjunction of this kind from the gods, to the communion of ideas with each other." And in lib. I, in Tim. p. 16, he observes : *Και το την αυτην (supple θεαν) ελεους, η τον αυτον διον πλειοσι συζευγυσθαι, λαβοις αν εκ των μυστικων λογων, και των εν απορητοις λεγομενων Ιερων Γαμων :* i. e. " And that the same goddess is conjoined with other gods, or the same god with many goddesses, may be collected from the *mystic discourses*, and those marriages which are called, in *the mysteries*, *Sacred Marriages*." Thus far the divine Proclus ; from the first of which admirable passages the reader may perceive how adultery and rapes are to be understood, when applied to the gods ; and that they mean nothing more than a communication of divine energies, either between a superior and subordinate, or a subordinate and superior divinity. For none, but a person of the most simple understanding, would ever suppose that the ancient theological poets believed there was any such thing as marriage or adultery among the gods, according to the literal meaning of the words.

Soc.

Soc. What then shall we next consider? Jupiter we have already spoken of.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Let us therefore speak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.

HERM. By all means.

Soc. He, therefore, who first called Neptune ποσειδῶν, appears to me to have given him this name from the nature of the sea, restraining his course when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any farther, as if it became a bond to his feet. He therefore denominated the ruler of this power ποσειδῶν, as ποσίδεσμον ὄντα, viz. *having a fettered foot**. But the ε perhaps was added for the sake of elegance.

* The first subsistence of Neptune is in the supermundane order of gods, and in the centre of the demiurgic triad of that order. Hence, from his central subsistence, and which consequently is wholly of a vital nature, he may be considered as not only unfolding all life, and calling it into progression, but as likewise perpetually connecting it in union and consent. From this divinity therefore, containing in himself the cause by which all things are bound and connected, he may be symbolically said *to be fettered*; which implies nothing more than a comprehension of those demiurgic reasons which are the causes of union to all generated natures. As the foot, too, is a very proper symbol of progression, and progression of life, there is a remarkable beauty and propriety in representing this god as having a *fettered foot*.—But, according to the arcana of the ancient theology, this divinity governs the whole planetary system, gives perfection to its revolving orbs, and fills them with vigorous, various, and divine motions. He likewise presides over the middle elements; and, throughout the whole of generation, irriguous caves, earthquakes, and hollow places, are subject to his imperial sway.

Hence

elegance. But perhaps this was not the meaning of its founder, but two $\lambda\lambda$ were originally placed instead of σ ; signifying

Hence souls living in generation are said to be under the dominion of this god; and hence the reason why Ulysses is represented by Homer as continually pursued by the anger of Neptune. As life too corresponds to intelligence, for all life is knowledge, hence the propriety of describing him as *knowing a multitude of things*.—But farther, according to Proclus on the *Timæus*, Justice was said, by ancient theologists, to be diffused through, and rule over all things, from the middle throne of the Sun. And the same author informs us, that Justice presides over the planetary spheres, and consequently is the same with Neptune. Hence, since all the deities of the planets subsist in the Sun, and proceed from him, through the vivific power supplied by Neptune, we shall see the reason why the planets are described, by Martianus Capella, as so many rivers of different colours; and why he gives the following representation of the Sun: “*Ibi quendam navim, totius naturæ cursibus diversa cupiditate moderantem, cunctaque flammæ congestionem plenissimam, beatissimam circumactam mercibus conspicatur. Cui nautæ septem germani, tamen suique consimiles præsidebant. In prora, felix forma depicta leonis in arbore, crocodili in extimo videbatur. In eadem vero rate fons quidam lucis æthereæ, archanisque fluoribus manans, in totius mundi lumina fundebatur.*” For here the Ship represents the Sun, considered as supermundane: for, according to this characteristic, the Sun contains in his essence all the mundane gods. But the seven kindred sailors represent the seven planets, among which the Sun, considered as mundane, must be ranked: and the fountain of æthereal light in the ship may be considered as the same with Neptune, as the preceding observations evince. Hence too we may collect the reason why the Egyptians represented the river Nile by the image of a sun, with water flowing from its mouth: for the seven streams of this river have an evident

signifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And perhaps likewise he was denominated *σειών*, i. e. shaking, from *σειειν*, to shake, to which π and δ were added. But Pluto was so called from the donation of *πλούτος*, wealth, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation *αἰδής*, the multitude appear to me to conceive the same as *ἀειδής*, i. e. obscure and dark; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

HERM. But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?

Soc. It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occasion: for their fear arises from hence; because, when any one of us dies, he abides for ever in Hades; and because the soul departs to this god, divested

of its agreement with the seven planetary spheres, the former proceeding from the Nile in a manner perfectly analogous to the defluxions of the planets from the sun. And lastly, this explains why Apollo, in the Orphic hymns, is called *Μεμφίτης*, or *Memphian*, from *Memphis*, the old capital city of Egypt; for it is a compound of the Hebrew* words *Maïm*, or *Mem*, *Phe Esb*, which mean *the visage of fire and waters*, that is, *of waters issuing from the visage of the Sun*.—From the preceding observations, the reason is obvious why *Justice* was celebrated, by a certain ancient poet, as having a *golden eye*, *χρυσέον ὄμμα*, according to the information of Athenæus (*Deipno.* lib. 14); and why, according to the same author (lib. 8), *Nemesis* was fabled, by a Cyprian poet, to be changed into a fish.

* It must ever be remembered, by the Platonic reader, that the Hebrew dialect is the same with the Phœnician, as is proved by Selden (in *Syntag. de Diis*). And the Phœnicians, according to Julian, were well skilled in divine concerns.

of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular respecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the same thing.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Answer me, therefore, Which of these is the stronger bond to an animal, so as to cause its detention, necessity, or desire?

HERM. Desire, Socrates, is by far the most prevalent.

SOC. Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who dwell there by the strongest bond?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them therefore, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Are there not, therefore, many desires?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, with the greatest of all desires, if it binds them with the greatest of bonds.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is there then any greater desire, than that which is produced when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through his means, he shall become a better man?

HERM. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is not any.

SOC. On this account, Hermogenes, we should say, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful discourses of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect sophist; that

that he greatly benefits those who dwell with him; and that he possesses such great affluence as enables him to supply us with those mighty advantages which we enjoy: and from hence he is called Pluto. But does he not also appear to you to be a philosopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and design, from his being unwilling to associate with men invested with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converse with him, when their souls are purified from all the evils and desires which subsist about the body? For this divinity considered, that he should be able to detain souls, if he bound them with the desire belonging to virtue; but that, while they possess the consternation and furious insanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he is said to be bound.

HERM. You seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

Soc. We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate αἰδῆς from ἀσίδῆς, dark and invisible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things*: and
from

* The first subsistence of Pluto, as well as that of Neptune, is among the supermundane gods, and in the demiurgic triad, of which he is the extremity. But his first allotment and distribution is according to the whole universe; in which distribution he perpetually administers the divisions of all mundane forms, and converts all things to himself. But his second distribution is into the parts of the universe; and in this he governs the sublunary region, and perfects intellectually the terrestrial world. His third progression is into that which is generated; and in this he administers, by his providence, the earth, and all which it contains, and is on this account called *terrestrial Jupiter*. But his fourth distribution is into places under the earth, which,
E together

from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names
αἰδης.

HERM. Be it so, But what shall we say concerning the names Ceres, Juno, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and those of the other gods?

Soc. It appears that Ceres was so called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, *διδούσα μήνη*, or *a bestowing mother**. But Juno, from being *lovely*, on account of the love which Jupiter is said to have entertained for her†. Perhaps also the founder of this name, speculating

together with the various streams of water which they contain, Tartarus, and the places in which souls are judged, are subject to his providential command. Hence souls, which after generation are purified and punished, and either wander under the earth for a thousand years, or again return to their principle, are said to live under Pluto. And lastly, his fifth distribution is into the western centre of the universe, since the west is allied to earth, on account of its being nocturnal, and the cause of obscurity and darkness. Hence, from the preceding account of Pluto, since he bounds the supermundane demiurgic triad, and is therefore intellectual, the reason is obvious why Plato characterizes him according to *a knowledge of all beautiful things*; for the beautiful first subsists in intellect.

* The first subsistence of Ceres is among the intellectual gods, where, considered as united with Saturn, she was called by ancient theologists Rhea, and as producing Jupiter, Ceres. She is therefore of a vivific nature, and consequently produces and *distributes*. But the character of distribution particularly belongs to her, according to her mundane subsistence; since she is the divinity of the planet Saturn, and it is the province of Saturn to *distribute* all things intellectually.

† Juno, so far as she is filled with the whole of Venus, contains in herself a power of illuminating all intellectual life with the splendour

speculating things on high, denominated the air ἥρα; and, for the sake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Juno. With respect to the names *φεῖρέφαττα*, or Proserpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unskilfulness as it appears in the rectitude of names. And indeed, changing the first of these names, they consider *φερσεφόνη*; and this appears to them as something terrible and dire. But the other name, *φεῖρέφαττα*, signifies that this goddess is wise: for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and pursue things which are borne along, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may, with great propriety, be named *φερέπαφα*, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along*: and hence

splendour of beauty. And hence, from her intimate communion with that goddess, she is very properly characterized by Plato as *lovely*. But her agreement with Venus is sufficiently evident, from her being celebrated as the goddess who presides over marriage; which employment was likewise ascribed by the ancients to Venus.

* Proserpine first subsists in the middle of the vivific supermundane triad, which consists of Diana, Proserpine, and Minerva. Hence, considered according to her supermundane establishment, she subsists together with Jupiter, and in conjunction with him produces Bacchus, the artificer of divisible natures. But, considered according to her mundane subsistence, she is said (on account of her procession to the last of things) to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities of the universe, these being subject to the empire of Pluto. “But Proserpine (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 371) is conjoined paternally with Jupiter prior to the world, and with Pluto in the world, accord-

hence the wife αἰδώς, or Pluto, associates with her, because of these characteristics of her nature. But men of the present times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her φερρέφαια. In like manner with respect to Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the case?

HERM. I am not; and you speak the truth.

SOC. But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully established, with respect to the power of the god.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will endeavour to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, because it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain respect, his *harmonic, prophetic, medicinal, and arrow-darting skill*.*

HERM.

ing to the beneficent will of her father. And she is at one time said to have been incestuously violated by Jupiter, and at another to have been ravished by Pluto, that first and last fabrications may participate of vivific procreation." According to the same author too, in the same admirable work, p. 373, the epithet of wisdom assigned to this goddess by Plato, in the present place, evinces her agreement with Minerva: and this correspondence is likewise shewn by her contact of things in progression; since nothing but wisdom can arrest their flowing nature, and subject it to order and bound. But her name being terrible and dire to the multitude, is a symbol of the power which she contains, exempt from the universality of things, and which, on this account, is to the many unapparent and unknown.

* For a full and beautiful account of these four powers of the sun, and his nature in general, let the Platonic reader attend to the
the

HERM. Tell me, then ; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something prodigious.

Soc.

the following observations, extracted from Proclus, on Plato's theology, and on the *Timæus* ; and from the emperor Julian's oration to this glorious luminary of the world. To a truly modern reader, indeed, it will doubtless appear absurd in the extreme, to call the sun a god ; for such regard only his visible orb, which is nothing more than the vehicle (deified as much as is possible to body) of an intellectual and divine nature. One should think, however, that reasoning from analogy might convince even a careless observer, that a body so transcendently glorious and beneficent, must be something superior to a mere inanimate mass of matter. For if such vile bodies, as are daily seen moving on the surface of the earth, are endued with life, (bodies whose utility to the universe is so comparatively small), what ought we to think of the body of the sun ! Surely, that its life is infinitely superior, not only to that of brutes, but even to that of man : for unless we allow, that as body is to body, so is soul to soul, we destroy all the order of things, and must suppose that the artificer of the world acted unwisely, and even absurdly, in its fabrication. And from hence the reader may perceive how necessarily impiety is connected with unbelief in ancient theology. But to begin with our account of the powers and properties of this mighty ruler of the world :—

The fontal sun subsists in Jupiter, the perfect artificer of the world, who produced the hypostasis of the sun from his own essence. Through the solar fountain contained in his essence, the Demiurgus generates solar powers in the principles of the universe, and a triad of solar gods, through which all things are unfolded into light, and are perfected and replenished with intellectual goods ; through the first of these solar monads participating unpolluted light and intelligible harmony ; but from the other two, efficacious power, vigour, and demiurgic perfection. The sun

Soc. This name then is well harmonized as to its composition, as belonging to an harmonical god : for, in the first

subsists in the most beautiful proportion to *the good*: for as the splendour proceeding from *the good* is the light of intelligible natures ; so that proceeding from Apollo is the light of the intellectual world ; and that which emanates from the apparent sun is the light of the sensible world. And both the sun and Apollo are analogous to *the good* ; but sensible light and intellectual truth are analogous to superessential light. But though Apollo and the sun subsist in wonderful union with each other, yet they likewise inherit a proper distinction and diversity of nature. Hence, by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes of the two are celebrated, and the fountains are distinguished from which their hypostasis is derived. At the same time they are described as closely united with each other, and are celebrated with each other's mutual appellations : for the sun vehemently rejoices to be celebrated as Apollo ; and Apollo, when he is invoked as the sun, benignantly imparts the splendid light of truth. It is the illustrious property of Apollo to collect multitude into one, to comprehend number in one, and from one to produce many natures ; to convolve in himself, through intellectual simplicity, all the variety of secondary natures ; and, through one hyparxis, to collect into one multiform essences and powers. This god, through a simplicity exempt from multitude, imparts to secondary natures *prophetic truth* ; for that which is simple is the same with that which is true : but through his liberated essence he imparts a *purifying, unpolluted, and preserving power* : and *his emission of arrows* is the symbol of his destroying every thing inordinate, wandering, and immoderate in the world. But *his revolution* is the symbol of the harmonic motion of the universe, collecting all things into union and consent. And these four powers of the god may be accommodated to the three solar monads, which he contains. The first monad,

first place, do not purgations and purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewise the operations

monad *, therefore, of this god is enunciative of truth, and of the intellectual light which subsists occultly in the gods. But the second † is destructive of every thing wandering and confused: but the third ‡ causes all things to subsist in symmetry and familiarity with each other, through harmonic reasons. And the unpolluted and most pure cause, which he comprehends in himself, obtains the principality, illuminating all things with perfection and power, according to nature, and banishing every thing contrary to these.

Hence, of the solar triad, the first monad unfolds intellectual light, enunciates it to all secondary natures, fills all things with universal truth, and converts them to the intellect of the gods; which employment is ascribed to the prophetic power of Apollo, who produces into light the truth contained in divine natures, and perfects that which is unknown in the secondary orders of things. But the second and third monads are the causes of efficacious vigour, demiurgic effect in the universe, and perfect energy, according to which these monads adorn every sensible nature, and exterminate every thing indefinite and inordinate in the world.

And one monad is analogous to musical fabrication, and to the harmonic providence of natures which are moved. But the second is analagous to that which is destructive of all confusion, and of that perturbation which is contrary to form, and the orderly disposition of the universe. But the third monad, which supplies all things with an abundant communion of beauty, and extends true beatitude to all things, bounds the solar principles, and guards its triple progression. In a similar manner, likewise, it illuminates progressions with a perfect and intellectual measure

* *i. e.* Mercury. † Venus. ‡ Apollo.

rations of pharmacy, and the lustrations, washings and sprinklings employed by the divining art, all tend to this one

of a blessed life, by those purifying and pæonian powers of the king Apollo, which obtain an analogous principality in the sun. —The sun is allotted a supermundane order in the world, an unbegotten supremacy among generated forms, and an intellectual dignity among sensible natures. Hence he has a twofold progression, one in conjunction with the other mundane gods, but the other exempt from them, supernatural and unknown. For the Demiurgus, according to Plato in the *Timæus*, enkindled in the solar sphere a light unlike the splendour of the other planets, producing it from his own essence, extending to mundane natures, as it were from certain secret recesses, a symbol of intellectual essences, and exhibiting to the universe the arcane nature of the supermundane gods. Hence, when the sun first arose, he astonished the mundane gods, all of whom were desirous of dancing round him, and being replenished with his light. The sun, too, governs the twofold co-ordinations of the world, which co-ordinations are denominated hands, by those who are skilled in divine concerns, because they are effective, motive, and demiurgic of the universe. But they are considered as twofold; one the right hand, but the other the left.

As the sun, by his corporeal heat, draws all corporeal natures upwards from the earth, raising them, and causing them to vegetate by his admirable warmth; so, by a secret, incorporeal, and divine nature resident in his rays, he much more attracts and elevates fortunate souls to his divinity. He was called by the Chaldæans, *the seven-rayed god*: and light, of which he is the fountain, is nothing more than the sincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure, illuminating in its proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and incorruptible light.

The

one point, *viz.* the rendering man pure, both in body and soul?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc.

The sun is said to be the progeny of Hyperion and Thea; signifying by this that he is the legitimate progeny of the supereminent god, and that he is of a nature truly divine. This god comprehends, in limited measures, the regions of generation, and confers perpetuity on its nature. Hence, exciting a nature of this kind with a sure and measured motion, he raises and invigorates it as he approaches, and diminishes and destroys it as he recedes: or rather, he vivifies it by his progress, moving, and pouring into generation the rivers of life. The sun is the unifying medium of the apparent and mundane gods, and of the intelligible gods who surround *the good*. So far as the sun contains in himself the principles of the most beautiful intellectual temperament, he becomes Apollo, the leader of the Muses; but so far as he accomplishes the elegant order of the whole of life, he generates Esculapius in the world, whom at the same time he comprehended in himself prior to the world: and he generates Bacchus, through his containing the cause of a partial essence and divisible energy. The sun, too, is the cause of that better condition of being belonging to angels, dæmons, heroes, and partial divine souls, who perpetually abide in the reason of their exemplar and idea, without merging themselves in the darkness of body. As the sun quadruply divides the three worlds, *viz.* the empyrean, the æthereal, and the material, on account of the communion of the zodiac with each; so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of gods, and each of these into three others: so that thirty-six are produced in the whole. Hence a triple benefit of the Graces is conferred on us from those circles, which the god quadruply dividing, produces, through this division, a quadripartite beauty and elegance of seasons and times. Monimus and Azizus, *viz.* Mercury and Mars,

Soc. Will not then the purifying god, who *washes* and *frees* us from evils of this kind, be *Apollo*?

HERM. Perfectly so.

Soc.

Mars, are the attendants of the sun, in conjunction with whom they diffuse a variety of goods on the earth. The sun loosens souls from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtle and firm texture of divine splendour, as a vehicle in which they may safely descend to the realms of generation. And lastly, the sun being supermundane, emits the fountains of light; for, among supermundane natures, there is a solar world, and total light: and this light is a monad prior to the empyrean, æthereal, and material worlds.

I only add, that it appears, from the last chapter of the 4th book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, that the celebrated seven worlds of the Chaldeans are to be distributed as follows: One empyrean; three æthereal, situated above the inerratic sphere; and three material, consisting of the inerratic sphere, the seven planets, and the sublunary region. For, after observing, that of the comprehending triad of gods, one is fiery or empyrean, another æthereal, and another material, he enquires why the gods called Teletarchs, or sources of initiation, are distributed together with the comprehending gods? To which he replies, "Because the first, on account of his possessing the extremities, governs, like a charioteer, the wing of fire. But the second, comprehending the beginning, middle and end, perfects æther, which is itself triple. And the third, comprehending, according to one union, a round, right-lined and mixed figure, perfects unfigured and formless matter: by a round figure, forming that which is inerratic, and the first matter: but, by a mixed figure, that which is erratic, and the second matter; for there (that is, among the planets) circumvolution subsists: and by a right-lined figure, a nature under the moon, and ultimate matter." From
this

Soc. According, therefore, to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called ἀπολυων, or *the liberator*; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called ἀπλόν, or *simple*, as he is denominated by the Thessalians; since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god *the simple*. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called αἰεὶ βέλλον, that is, *perpetually darting*. But with respect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that α often signifies the same as *together*, as in the words ἀκόλουθος, *a follower*,

this passage, it is evident that both Patricius and Stanley were mistaken, in conceiving the meaning of the account given by Psellus (in his summary exposition of the Assyrian Dogmata) of these seven worlds; which, when properly understood, perfectly corresponds with that of Proclus, as the following citation evinces: Ἑπτὰ δὲ φασὶ κοσμοὺς σωματικούς. Ἐμπύρεον ἓνα καὶ πρῶτον. καὶ τρεῖς μετ' αὐτὸν αἰθερίους: ἐπειδὴ τρεῖς υλαιοὺς, τὸ ἀπλανές, τὸ πλανώμενον, καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ σελήνην. viz. "They assert that there are seven corporeal worlds; one empyrean, and the first; after this, three æthereal worlds; and last of all, three material, the inerratic sphere, the planetary system, and the sublunary region." But Patricius and Stanley conceived the passage, as if the three æthereal and three material worlds were distributed by the Assyrians into the inerratic sphere, the planets, and the sublunary world. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the Assyrians, as we are informed by Julian in his Hymn to the Sun, considered that luminary as moving beyond the inerratic sphere, in the middle of these seven worlds; so that the sun, in consequence of this dogma, must revolve in the last of the æthereal worlds.

and

and ἄκοιλις, *a wife*. So likewise in the name of this god, α and πόλῃσις signify the revolution *subsisting together with, and about the heavens*, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony *subsisting in song*, which they call symphony. Because all these, according to the assertions of those who are skilled in music and astronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god presides over harmony, ὁμοπολῶν, i. e. *converting all these together*, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call ὁμοκέλευθος and ὁμόκοιλις, i. e. *going together, and lying together*, ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιλις, changing ο into α, so likewise we denominate Apollo as ὁμοπολῶν, inserting at the same time another λ; because otherwise it would have been synonymous with a difficult name. And this many of the present time suspecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it signified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we just now observed, is so composed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his *simplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature*.—But the name of the Muses, and universally that of Music, was derived, as it seems, from μῶσθαι, to enquire, and from investigation and philosophy. But ληθῶ, i. e. Latona, was derived from the mildness of this goddess, because she is ἐτελήμων, viz. *willing to comply with the requests of her suppliants*. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a stranger; for many call her ληθῶ: and this name ληθῶ they seem to have assigned her, because her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But ἄρτεμις, i. e. Diana, appears to signify integrity and modesty, through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name

so called her, as being skilful in virtue*. And it is not likewise improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through some one, or all of these, the institutor of her name thus denominated the goddess.

HERM. But what will you say concerning Dionysius and Venus?

Soc. You enquire about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to these divinities, is both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others, about the serious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose: for these deities are lovers of joking and sport. Dionysius, therefore, is *the giver of wine*, and may be jocosely called *διδούσιος*. But *οἶνος*, wine, may be most justly denominated *οἰόνους*, because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before †. But, with respect to Venus, it is not proper to

* We have before observed, that Diana first subsists in the supermundane vivific triad: and her being characterized according to *virtue*, in this place, evidently shews her agreement with Minerva, the third monad of that triad, who is the first producing cause of all virtues. This goddess, according to her mundane subsistence, is, as is well known, the divinity of the moon; from whence, says Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353), she benignantly leads into light the reasons of nature, and is on this account called *Phosphor*, or *light-bearer*. He adds, that the moon was called by the Thracians, *Bendis*.

† Dionysius, or Bacchus, is the mundane intellect, and the monad of the Titans, or mundane gods. This deity is said, in divine fables, to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, because the mundane soul, which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the mundane gods,

to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was
called

and through them distributed into every part of the universe. But the following beautiful account of this deity by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo, will, I doubt not, be highly acceptable to the Platonic reader: *Σπαράττεται δὲ το καθόλου εἶδος ἐν τῇ γενέσει, μονὰς δὲ τίτλων ὁ Διόνυσος.*—Κατ' ἐπιβουλὴν δὲ τῆς Ἥρας, διότι κινήσεως ἐφορὸς ἡ θύοις καὶ προσδοῦ· διὸ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι ἐξαιετῶσιν αὐτὴ, καὶ διεγερεῖ τὸν Δία εἰς προνοίαν τῶν δευτέρων· καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλῶς ἐφορὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Διόνυσος, διότι καὶ ζῶσις καὶ τελευτῆς. ζῶσις μὲν γὰρ ἐφορὸς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, τελευτῆς δὲ διότι ἐνδουσιασὶς ὁ εἶνος ποιεῖ. καὶ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν δὲ ἐνδουσιαστικῶς γινώμεθα, ὡς ἄλλοι ὁ παρ' Ὀμηρῷ Προκλός, μυστικῶς γεγονώς περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν. καὶ τὴν τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὴν κωμῶδιαν ἀναισθῆσαι φασὶ τῷ Διόνυσῳ. τὴν μὲν κωμῶδιαν παιγνίον οὖσαν τοῦ βίου· τὴν δὲ τραγωδίαν διὰ τὰ πάθη, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν. ἐκ ἀρα καλῶς οἱ κωμικοὶ τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐγκαλῶσιν, ὡς μὴ διονυσιακοὶ εὐσιν, λεγόντες ὅτι ἔθεν ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. κεραῖνοι δὲ τοῦτοις ὁ Ζεὺς, τοῦ κεραίνου δηλοῦντος τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν. πυρ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνω κινούμενα. ἐπιστρέφει οὖν αὐτοὺς πρὸς αὐτόν. i. e. “The form of that which is universal is plucked off, torn in pieces, and scattered into generation: and Dionysus is the monad of the Titans. But his laceration is said to take place through the stratagems of Juno, because this goddess is the inspective guardian of motion and progression: and, on this account, in the Iliad she perpetually rouses and excites Jupiter to providential energies about secondary concerns. And, in another respect, Dionysus is the inspective guardian of generation, because he presides over life and death: for he is the guardian of life because of generation; but of death, because wine produces an enthusiastic energy. And we become more enthusiastic at the period of dissolution, as Proclus evinces agreeable to Homer; for he became prophetic at the time of his death. They likewise assert, that tragedy and comedy are referred to Dionysus; comedy, indeed, as being the play or joke of life; but tragedy, on account of the passions and death,

called ἀφροδίτη, through her generation from ἀφρός, foam*.

HERM. But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the investigation of Minerva, Vulcan and Mars.

death, which it represents. Comedians, therefore, do not properly denominate tragedians, as if they were not Dionysiacal, asserting at the same time that nothing tragical belongs to Dionysius. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans; the thunder signifying a conversion on high: for fire naturally ascends. And hence Jupiter by this means converts the Titans to himself."—Thus far the excellent Olympiodorus; from which admirable passage the reader may see the reason of Plato's asserting, that *the mode of nomination belonging to this divinity is both serious and jocose*.

* As Venus first subsists in the reductorial triad of the supermundane gods, her production from the foam of the genitals of heaven may occultly signify her proceeding into apparent subsistence from that order of gods, which we have before mentioned, and which is called νοητός καὶ νοερός, *intelligible, and at the same time intellectual*; and likewise from the prolific and splendid power of this order, which the *foam* secretly implies. But, according to the fable, Venus rose from this foam while it was floating on the sea; and this doubtless implies her progression from Neptune, the centre of the demiurgic triad of this order. The nomination too, of Venus, may be said to be *serious*, considered according to her supermundane subsistence; and she may be said *to be a lover of joking and sport*, considered according to her mundane establishment; for to all sensible natures she communicates an exuberant energy, and eminently contains in herself the cause of the gladness, and, as it were, mirth of all mundane concerns, through the illuminations of beauty which she perpetually pours into every part of the universe.

Soc.

Soc. For such a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.

HERM. Certainly not.

Soc. One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.

HERM. Which do you mean?

Soc. Do we not call her Pallas?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. This name, therefore, we must consider as derived from leaping in armour; and in so doing, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneself, or something else, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us *to vibrate* and *be vibrated*, and *to dance* and *be made to dance*.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. The goddess, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.

HERM. And very properly so. But how will you explain her other name?

Soc. Do you mean that of Athena?

HERM. I do.

Soc. This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the ancients appear to have considered Athena in the same manner as those of the present day, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of these explain the poet as signifying, by Athena, *intellect* and *cogitation*. And he who instituted names seems to have understood some such thing as this about the goddess, or rather something yet greater, expressing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddess, as if he had said that she is *θεονόν*, or *deific intelligence*, employing after a foreign mode α instead of η , and taking away ι and σ . Though perhaps
this

this was not the case, but he called her *θεονόν*, as understanding divine concerns in a manner superior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpose to say that he was willing to call her *ἡδονόν*, as being intelligence in manners*. But either the original founder of this name,

* This whole account of Minerva is perfectly agreeable to the most mystic theology concerning this goddess, as will be evident from the following observations. In the first place, one of her names, *Pallas*, signifying to *vibrate* and *dance*, evidently alludes to her agreement with the Curetes, of the progressions of which order she is the monad, or proximately exempt producing cause. For the Curetes, as is well known, are represented as dancing in armour; the *armour* being a symbol of guardian power, through which, says Proclus, the Curetes contain the wholes of the universe, guard them so as to be exempt from secondary natures, and defend them established in themselves; but the *dancing*, signifying their perpetually preserving the whole progressions of a divine life, according to one divine bound, and sustaining them exempt from the incursions of matter. But the first subsistence of Minerva, considered as the summit, or, as it were, flower of the Curetes, is in the intellectual order of gods, of which Jupiter, the artificer of the world, is the extremity; and, in this order, she is celebrated as the divinely pure heptad. But as Proclus, in *Tim.* p. 51 and 52, beautifully unfolds the nature of this goddess, and this in perfect agreement with the present account of Plato, I shall present the following translation of it to the reader.

“ In the father and demiurgus of the world many orders of unical gods appear; such as guardian, demiurgic, reductorial, connective, and perfective of works. But the one pure and untamed deity of the first intellectual unities in the demiurgus, according to which he abides in an uninclining and immutable

name, or certain persons who came after him, by producing it into something which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.

HERM.

state, through which all things proceeding from him participate of immutable power, and by which he understands all things, and has a subsistence separate and solitary from wholes ;—this divinity all theologists have denominated Minerva : for she was, indeed, produced from the summit of her father, and abiding in him, becomes a separate and immaterial demiurgic intelligence. Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as *θεογονη*, or *knowing divine concerns*. But this goddess, when considered as elevating all things, in conjunction with other divinities, to one demiurgus, and ordering and disposing the universe together with her father ;—according to the former of these employments, she is called *the philosophic goddess* ; but, according to the latter, *philopolemic*, or *a lover of contention*. For, considered as unifically connecting all paternal wisdom, she is *philosophic* ; but, considered as uniformly administering all contrariety, she is very properly called *philopolemic*. Hence Orpheus, speaking concerning her generation, says “ that Jupiter produced her from his head, shining with armour similar to a brazen flower.” But, since it is requisite that she should proceed into the second and third orders, hence in the Coric order (that is, among the first Curetes) she appears according to the unpolluted heptad ; but she generates from herself every virtue and all reductorial powers, and illuminates secondary natures with intellect and an unpolluted life : and hence she is called *κορη τριλογυνης*, or *a virgin born from the head of Jupiter*. But she is allotted this virgin-like and pure nature from her Minerval idiom. Add too, that she appears among the *liberated* gods with intellectual and demiurgic light, uniting the lunar order, and causing it to be pure with respect to generation. Besides this, she appears both
in

HERM. But what will you say concerning Vulcan?

Soc. Do you enquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?

HERM. So it appears.

Soc. This divinity, therefore, being φαῖρος, luminous, and attracting to himself ἦ, is called ἡφαίστος, or *the arbiter of light**.

HERM.

in the heavens and in the sublunary region, and every where extends this her twofold power; or, rather, she distributes a cause to both, according to the united benefit which she imparts. For sometimes the severity of her nature is intellectual, and her separate wisdom pure and unmixed with respect to secondary natures; and the one idiom of her Minerval providence extends to the lowest orders: for where there is a similitude among partial souls to her divinity, she imparts an admirable wisdom, and exhibits an invincible strength. But why should I speak concerning her Curetic, dæmoniacal, or divine orders, together with such as are mundane, liberated, and ruling? For all things receive the twofold idioms of this goddesses as from a fountain. And lastly, this goddess extends to souls, Olympian and reductorial benefits, exterminates gigantic and generation-producing phantasms, excites in us pure and unperturbed conceptions concerning all the gods, and diffuses a divine light from the recesses of her nature."

* Light, according to Proclus, and I think according to truth, is an immaterial body, viz. a body consisting of matter so refined, that, when compared with terrene matter, it may be justly called immaterial: and Vulcan is the artificer of every thing sensible and corporeal. Hence this deity, when considered as the fabricator of light, may with great propriety be called *the arbiter of light*. For, since he is the producing cause of all body, and light is the first and most exalted body, the definition

HERM. It appears so, unless you think it requires some other explanation.

Soc. But, that it may not appear otherwise to me, enquire concerning Mars.

HERM. I enquire then.

Soc. If you please, then, the name of Mars shall be derived from *το ἄρρεν masculine*, and *το ἀνδρεῖον bold*. But if you are willing that he should be called Mars, from his *hard* and *inconvertible* nature*, the whole of which is deno-

of his nature ought to take place from the most illustrious of his works. But this deity first subsists in the demiurgic triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds to the extremity of things. He is fabled to be lame, because (says Proclus, in Tim. p. 44) he is the artificer of things last in the progressions of being, for such are bodies; and because these are unable to proceed into any other order. He is likewise said to have been hurled from heaven to earth, because he extends his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. And he is represented as fabricating from brass, because he is the artificer of resisting solids. Hence he prepares for the gods their apparent receptacles, fills all his fabrications with corporeal life, and adorns and comprehends the resisting and sluggish nature of matter with the supervening irradiations of forms; but, in order to accomplish this, he requires the assistance of Venus, who illuminates all things with harmony and union.

* The character of *hard* and *resisting*, which is here given to Mars, is symbolical of his nature, which (says Proclus, in Plat. Repub. p. 388) perpetually separates and nourishes, and constantly excites the contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. But this deity requires the assistance of Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and discordant. He first subsists

denominated ἀρπάζων, this also will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Let us therefore dismiss our investigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to discourse about them. But urge me to any thing else you please, that you may see the quality of the horses of Euthyphron.

HERM. I will consent to what you say, if you will only suffer me to ask you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.

SOC. This name seems to pertain to discourse, and to imply that this god is *an interpreter and a messenger, one who steals, and is fraudulent in discourse, and who meddles with merchandise**: and the whole of this subsists about the power of discourse. As, therefore, we said before, τὸ εἰπεῖν is the use of speech: and of this Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο, i. e. *he deliberated about it*. This name, therefore, is composed both from *to speak* and *to deliberate*; just as if the institutor of the name had authoritatively addressed us as follows: "It is just, O men, that you should call that divinity, who makes speech the object of his care and deliberation, Εἰρέμης." But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμῆς *Hermes*. But Iris likewise is so called, from τὸ εἰπεῖν *to speak*, because she is a messenger.

in the *defensive* triad of the *liberated gods*, and from thence proceeds into different parts of the world.

* For an account of Hermes, see my Notes to the *Phædrus*.

HERM. By Jupiter, then, Cratylus appears to me to have spoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; because I am by no means an excellent artist of discourse.

Soc. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the bipartite son of Hermes.

HERM. But why?

Soc. You know that speech signifies *the all*; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is twofold, true and false.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that which is true in speech, smooth and divine, and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is false, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the multitude of mankind, and, besides this, rough and tragic? For in speech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falsities about a tragic life, subsist.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates every thing, and perpetually rolls, is *πᾶν αἰπόλος*, the bi-form son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us leave these investigations of the gods.

HERM. Gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates, we will omit*; but what should hinder you from discussing the

* It is plain, from this passage, that Plato acknowledged gods superior to those of a mundane idiom; for that he is serious in the present instance, must be evident to the most careless observer.

the names of such divinities as the sun and moon, stars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the seasons and the year?

Soc. You assign me an arduous task; yet at the same time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.

HERM. It will so, indeed.

Soc. What therefore do you wish we should first investigate? Or shall we, agreeable to the order in which you mentioned these, begin with the sun?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. It seems, then, that this would become more manifest, if any one should use the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the sun *ἥλιον*. He will therefore be *ἥλιος*, from his collecting men into one, when he rises; and likewise, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, because he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But *τὸ ποικίλειν*, and *αἰολεῖν*, have one and the same meaning.

HERM. But what will you say of *σελήνη*, or the moon?

Soc. This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.

HERM. Why?

Soc. Because it seems to manifest something of a more

observer, from his etymologies being every where agreeable to the Orphic theology, which was the established religion of his country. And, if he had not been a believer in this theology, why should he etymologize in agreement with it, and at the same time profess to be filled with religious dread on the occasion? Similar to this, he observes, in the *Philebus*, "that the fear which he possesses concerning the proper names of the gods, surpasses the greatest dread to which the soul is on any occasion subject."

ancient date, which he lately revived, when he said that the moon derives her light from the sun.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Σέλας is the same with φῶς, *light*.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But this light about the moon is perpetually νέον and ἔννον, *new* and *old*, if what the Anaxagorics say is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But many call the moon σελανάιας.

HERM. They do so.

SOC. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called σελαεννεοάεια; but it is now concisely denominated σελαναία.

HERM. This name, Socrates, is Dithyrambic. But what will you say of month and the stars?

SOC. Μείης, or month, may be properly so called, from μειῦσθαι, *to be diminished*; but the stars appear to derive their appellation from ἀστραπή, *corruscation*. But ἀστραπή is denominated from ὥπας ἀνατρέφει, i. e. *converting to itself the sight*; but now, for the sake of elegance, it is called ἀστραπή.

HERM. But what is your opinion concerning fire and water?

SOC. I am in doubt with respect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphron deserts me, or that this word is most extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all such things as cause me to doubt.

HERM. What is it?

SOC.

Soc. I will tell you. Answer me, therefore: Do you know on what account $\pi\upsilon\rho$, fire, is so called?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

Soc. But consider what I suspect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

HERM. But what then?

Soc. If any one, therefore, should investigate the propriety of these names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.

HERM. It is likely he would.

Soc. Consider, then, whether this name, $\pi\upsilon\rho$, is not of Barbaric origin: for it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifest that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewise that $\iota\delta\omega\rho$ water, $\kappa\upsilon\iota\delta\alpha\varsigma$ dogs, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.

HERM. They are so.

Soc. It is not proper, therefore, to use violence with these words, since no one can say any thing to the purpose about them. On this account, therefore, I shall reject the explanation of $\pi\upsilon\rho$ fire, and $\iota\delta\omega\rho$ water. But air, O Hermogenes! is so called, because it elevates things from the earth; or because it always flows; or because, from its flowing, spirit is produced: for the poets call spirits $\alpha\eta\rho\alpha\iota$ winds. Perhaps, therefore, it is called $\alpha\eta\rho$, as if implying a *flowing spirit*, or a *flowing blast of wind*. But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from *always running in a flowing progression, about the air*; and on this account it may be called $\alpha\epsilon\theta\epsilon\rho$. But $\gamma\eta$, or earth, will

more plainly signify its meaning, if any one denominates it γαῖα. For γαῖα may be properly called γεννήτειρα, *the producer*, as Homer says; for he calls γεγάασι, γεγενησθαι, *or that which is produced in itself*.

HERM. Let it be so.

Soc. What then remains for us to investigate after this?

HERM. The seasons, Socrates, and the year.

Soc. But ὥραι, that is, the hours, must be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more ancient, if you wish to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are ὥραι, on account of their bounding the winter and summer, as likewise winds and proper occasions subservient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, because they bound, ὀρίζουσαι, they are most justly called ὥραι. But ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος, the year, appear to be one and the same: for that which, at stated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itself, is *the year*. And as in the foregoing part of our discourse we gave a twofold distribution to the name of Jupiter, and asserted that he was by some called ζῆνα, and by others δία; so likewise, with respect to *the year*, it is called by some ἐνιαυτός, because *it explores in itself*; but ἔτος, because *it explores*. But the entire reason of its denomination is because it explores things in itself; so that two names are generated, ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος, from one reason.

HERM. But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.

Soc. I seem, indeed, to have pursued wisdom to a considerable distance.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Perhaps you will urge me still further.

HERM.

HERM. But, after this species of enquiry, I would most gladly contemplate the rectitude of those beautiful names concerning virtue, such as *φρόνσις* *prudence*, *σύνεσις* *cogitation*, *δικαιοσύνη* *equity*, and all the rest of this kind.

Soc. You raise up, my friend, no despicable genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to investigate prudence and intelligence, consideration and science, and all the other beautiful names which you speak of.

HERM. We ought by no means to desist till this is accomplished.

Soc. And indeed, by the dog, I seem to myself not to prophesy badly, about what I understand at present, that those ancient men who established names, experienced that which happens to many wise men of the present times; for, by their intense investigation concerning the manner in which things subsist, they became giddy, far beyond the rest of mankind, and, afterwards, things themselves appeared to them to stagger and fluctuate. But they did not consider their inward giddiness as the cause of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they imagined that nothing was stable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I speak this, as what I conceive respecting the names which we have just now mentioned.

HERM. How is this, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps you have not perceived that these names were established as belonging to things born along, flowing, and in continual generation.

HERM. I do not entirely perceive this.

Soc. And, in the first place, the first name which

we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind.

HERM. Which is that?

SOC. Prudence, or *φρόνησις*: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that it is plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, *γνώμη*, or consideration, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for *τὸ νομᾶν* is the same as *τὸ σκοπεῖν*, to speculate. Again, *νόησις*, or intelligence, if you please, is *τῷ νέῳ ἔστις*, or the desire of that which is new: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name *νέεσις*: for it was not at first called *νόησις*, but two *εἴ* ought to be substituted instead of *ῆ*, so as to produce *νέεσις*. But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which account, by inserting *ἑ*, it ought to be called *ἐπιστημένης*. But *σύνεσις* appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. But when *συνιέναι* is said to take place, the same thing happens, in every respect, as when any one is said *ἐπίσασθαι*, to know: for *συνιέναι* asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obscure and foreign from us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express any thing which accedes on a sudden, they say *ἔσσυθι*, it rushed forth: and the name of a certain illustrious Lacedemonian was *Σοῦς*, i. e. one who

who rushes forward; for thus the Lacedemonians denominate a *swift impulse*. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But τὸ ἀγαθόν, the good, signifies *that which excites admiration*, in the nature of every thing: for, since all things subsist in continual progression, in some swiftness, and in others slowness, prevails. Every thing, therefore, is not swift, but there is something in every thing which is *admirable*. Hence the name ταγαθόν is the same with τὸ ἀγαθόν, *the admirable*. —But, with respect to the name *equity*, we may easily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is just: but the signification of the *just itself*, is difficult to determine; for it appears that the multitude agree thus far to what we have said, but that what follows is a subject of doubt. For, indeed, such as think that the universe subsists in progression, consider the greatest part of it to be of such a nature that it does nothing else than yield to impulsion; that, on this account, something pervades through every thing, from which all generated natures are produced; and that this pervading nature is the swiftest and most attenuated of all things: for it would not be able to pass through every thing, unless it was the most attenuated, so that nothing can stop its progression; and the swiftest, so that it may use other things as if in an abiding condition with respect to itself. Because, therefore, it governs all other things διαῖον, i. e. by pervading through them, it is properly called δίκαιον, receiving the power of the $\bar{\alpha}$ for the sake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of το δίκαιον, *the just*. But I, O Hermogenes! as being assiduous in my enquiries about this affair,

affair, have investigated all these particulars, and have discovered in the *απορρητα*, or sacred mysteries, that *the just* is the same with *cause*. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cause of that thing: and a certain person said, that it was on this account properly denominated *το δίκαιον*. But, notwithstanding this information, I do not the less cease to enquire, O best of men! what *the just* is, if it is the same with *cause*. I seem, therefore, now to enquire farther than is becoming, and to pass, as it is said, beyond the trench; for they will say that I have sufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavour, through being desirous to satisfy me, to give different solutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. For a certain person says that the sun is *the just*, because the sun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to a certain person, as if I had heard something beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and asked me, if I thought that there was no longer any thing just in men after sun-set? Upon my enquiring, therefore, what *the just* was, according to him, he said it was fire. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person said, it was not fire, but the heat which subsisted in fire. Another again said, that all these opinions were ridiculous, but that *the just* was that intellect which Anaxagoras speaks of; for he said that this was an unrestrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in these explanations, my friend, I find myself exposed to greater doubts than before I endeavoured to learn what justice is. But, that we may return to that for the sake of
of

of which we entered on this disputation, this name appears to be attributed to *equity*, for the reasons which we have assigned.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these particulars somewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourself.

SOC. But what do you say respecting my other explanations?

HERM. That this is not entirely the case with them.

SOC. Attentively hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by speaking as if I had not heard.—What then remains for us, after equity? I think we have not yet discussed fortitude: for injustice is evidently a real hindrance to the pervading power; but fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than a contrary fluxion. If any one, therefore, takes away the δ from this name $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\iota\alpha$ fortitude, the name $\alpha\nu\rho\iota\alpha$, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the just*; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner $\tau\omicron\ \alpha\rho\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, that is, the male nature, and $\alpha\grave{\nu}\eta\rho$ man, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from $\alpha\nu\omega\ \rho\acute{o}\eta$, or *a flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes! seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.

HERM. It appears so, Socrates.

SOC. But the word $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$, to flourish, appears to me

to

to represent the increase of youth, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who composed it from *θεῖν* to run, and *ἄλλεσθαι* to leap. But do you not perceive that I am born, as it were, beyond my course, since I have met with words plain and easy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of investigation.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. And one of these is, that we should consider the meaning of the word *art*.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Does not this word τέχνη, then, signify ἐχονόη, or the habit of intellect, taking away for this purpose τ, and inserting ο between χ and ν, and between ν and η?

HERM. And this in a very far-fetched manner, Socrates.

Soc. But do you not know, blessed man! that such names as were first established, are now overwhelmed through the studious of tragic discourse; who, for the sake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For, in the word κατοπτρῷ a mirror, does not the addition of the ρω appear to you absurd? But such alterations as these are, I think, made by those who care nothing for truth, but are solicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: so that these men, having added many things to the first names, at length rendered it impossible for any one to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name Sphynx, which they call σφίγγξ instead of σφίγξ, and so in many others.

HERM. This is indeed the case, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed, if it should be allowed for every one to add

add to, and take away from names, just as he pleased, this would certainly be a great licence; and any one might adapt every name to every thing.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. The truth indeed. But I think that you, who are a wise president, ought to preserve and guard the moderate and the probable.

HERM. I wish I could.

SOC. And I also, O Hermogenes, with the same in conjunction with you. But you should not, O demoniacal man, demand a discussion vehemently exact, lest you perfectly exhaust my force: for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after *art*, I have considered *artifice* or *skill*. For *μνηστική*, or *artifice*, seems to me to signify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is composed therefore from *μήκος*, length, and *αἰετις*, to finish a thing completely. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse, and to enquire the signification of the names virtue and vice.—One of these, therefore, I have not yet discovered; but the other appears to me to be manifest, for it harmonizes with all that has been said before: for, in consequence of every thing subsisting in progression, whatever passes on badly will be *depravity*; but this, when it subsists in the soul, badly acceding to her concerns, then most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progression is manifest in *timidity*, which we have not yet discussed; though it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have omitted many other names. *Timidity* therefore signifies, that the bond of the soul is strong: for the word *vehement* implies a certain strength.

And hence the most vehement and greatest bond of the soul, will be timidity : just as *want* is *an evil* ; and every thing as it appears, which is an impediment to passing on and progression. *Passing on badly*, therefore, seems to evince a detention and hindrance of progression : and when the soul is thus affected, she then becomes full of evil. But if the name *vice* is applicable to such things as these, the contrary of this will be *virtue* ; signifying, in the first place, facility of progression ; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good soul ought to be perpetually loosened and free. And hence, that which always flows unrestrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, ἀειρήνη. Perhaps also, some one may call it αἰρετή, because this habit is the most eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will say that I feign ; but I assert, that if the preceding name *vice* is properly established, the same may be said of the name *virtue*.

HERM. But what is the meaning of το κακόν, *evil*, through which you explained many things in the word *depravity* ?

SOC. It appears to me, by Jupiter, to imply something prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this also the artifice mentioned above.

HERM. What is that ?

SOC. To assert that this name is something Barbaric.

HERM. And, in so doing, you appear to me to speak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit these, and endeavour to consider the rectitude of composition in the names, *the beautiful*, and *the base*.

SOC. *The base*, then, seems to me to evince its signification plainly, and to correspond with the preceding explanations :

nations: for he who established names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now assigned the name *ἄεισχορόον* to that which always detains a flowing progression. But, at present, they call it collectively *αἰσχροῖον*.

HERM. But what will you say concerning *the beautiful*?

SOC. This is more difficult to understand, though they say that the *α*, in this word, is produced only for the sake of harmony and length.

HERM. But how?

SOC. It appears that this appellation is the surname of *cogitation*.

HERM. How do you prove this?

SOC. What do you think is the cause of the denomination of every thing? Is it not that which establishes names?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Will not this cause, then, be the cogitation either of gods, or men, or of both?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. To call things therefore, and *the beautiful*, are the same with *cogitation*.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Are not, therefore, the operations of *intellect* and *cogitation* laudable; but such things as are not the result of their energies, blameable?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works; and that which belongs to the carpenter's art, carpentry works: or what is your opinion on the subject?

HERM. The same as yours.

SOC. Does not, therefore, *the beautiful* produce things beautiful?

HERM. It is necessary that it should.

SOC. But this, as we have said, is cogitation.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. To καλόν, therefore, or *the beautiful*, will be properly the surname of *prudence*, which produces such things as, in consequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.

HERM. It appears to be so.

SOC. What then remains for us to investigate, of such-like names?

HERM. Whatever belongs to *the good* and *the beautiful*; such as the names signifying *things contributive, useful, profitable, lucrative*, and the contraries of these.

SOC. You may find then what το συμφέρον, or *the contributive*, is, from our foregoing speculations; for it appears to be a certain brother of science. For it evinces nothing else than the local motion of the soul, in conjunction with things; and that things resulting from hence should be called συμφέροντά and σύμφορα, i. e. contributive, from συμπεριφέρεσθαι, or *being born along in conjunction*.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. But the name *lucrative* (κερδαλέον) is derived from κέρδος, *gain*. And if any one inserts a ν instead of a δ in this name, it will manifest its meaning: for it will thus, after another manner, become the name for *good*; since he who assigned it this name intended to express that power which it possesses, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things. And thus, by placing δ instead of ν, he pronounced it κέρδος.

HERM.

HERM. But what will you say concerning λυσιτελοῦν, or *the useful*?

SOC. It appears, O Hermogenes! that this name was not established according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, *because it frees from expence*; but because it is the swiftest of being, and in consequence of this, does not suffer things to stand still, nor *lacion*, by receiving an end of being born along, to stop, and rest from its progression: but, on the contrary, it always departs from *lacion*, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceasing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελοῦν was called *the good*; for that which *dissolves the end* of *lacion* was called λυσιτελοῦν. But ὠφέλιμον, or *the profitable*, is a foreign name; and Homer himself often uses τῷ ὠφέλλειν. But this is the surname of *increasing and making*.

HERM. But what shall we say respecting the contraries of these?

SOC. There is no occasion, as it appears to me, to evolve such as are the negations of these.

HERM. But what are they?

SOC. The *non-contributive, useless, unprofitable, and the non-lucrative*.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. But may we not enquire concerning βλαβερὸν and ζημιώδης, the *noxious and pernicious*?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And το βλαβερὸν, indeed, or *the noxious*, says that it is βλάπτειν τὸν ῥοῦν. But βλάπτειν signifies *that which wishes to bind*; and ἄπτειν, *to bind*, is the same as δεῖν: but this it blames in every respect. He, therefore, who wishes ἄπτειν ῥοῦν, i. e. *to bind that which flows*, will be most pro-

perly called βουλαπτεροῦν; but it appears to me, that, for the sake of elegance, it was denominated βλαβερόν.

HERM. A variety of names, Socrates, presents itself for your consideration; and you just now appeared to me to have sounded a prelude on your pipe*, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name βουλαπτεροῦν.

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but he who founded the name.

HERM. You speak the truth: but what will you say about ζημιῶδες, *the pernicious*?

* The following remarkable passage, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the first Alcibiades, sufficiently proves that the ancients as much excelled the moderns in the practical part of music, as they did in philosophy, poetry, and sculpture. Αἱ οὐθαι πολίτεια τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἀπετραφίσαν. Οὐκ οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ Πλάτων αὐτὴν παραδεχίται. Τὸ δὲ αἶσιον, ἡ ποικιλία τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ὄργανου τοῦ αὐλοῦ λεγῶν, ὁ καὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν χρωματικὴν αὐτῶ ἀπεφθνε Φευκίον. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ παναρμοῖα, καὶ ἡ πολυχχορδία, μιμήσθαι τὰν αὐλῶν ἐστίν. Ἐκαστος γὰρ τρυπηματῶν αὐλῶν τριφθογγούς, ὡς φασι, τὴν ἐλαχίστου ἀφίστην. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ παστρυπηματῶν αὐλῶν ἀνοιχθεῖη, πλείους. i. e. "Well-instituted politics reject the melody of the pipe; and, on this account, Plato does not admit it in his republic. But the reason of this is the variety of this instrument the pipe, which evinces that the art employing it ought to be avoided. For instruments producing every kind of harmony, and that which consists of many chords, are imitations of pipes; for every hole of the pipe emits (as they say) three sounds at least; but if the cavity above the holes of the pipe should be opened, then each hole would send forth more than three sounds."—In this extraordinary passage, it is worth observing, that the art of constructing these pipes was entirely lost at the time in which Proclus lived, or the 5th century; as may be inferred from his using the expression φασι, *they say*.

Soc.

Soc. I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word; and do you behold how truly I shall explain it, by asserting that men, through adding and taking away letters, vehemently vary the meaning of names, so that sometimes a very small alteration causes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As for instance, in the word $\tau\omicron\delta\epsilon\omicron\nu$, the becoming: for I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this beautiful word $\delta\epsilon\omicron\nu$ is new to us, and induces us to enunciate $\tau\omicron\delta\epsilon\omicron\nu$ and $\zeta\eta\mu\iota\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obscure their signification: but the ancient name evinces the sense of both these words.

HERM. How is this?

Soc. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors very frequently used the τ and δ , and that this was not less the case with such women as particularly preserved the ancient tongue. But now, instead of the τ , they perversely use either $\bar{\tau}$ or η , and $\bar{\zeta}$ instead of δ , as being more magnificent.

HERM. But how?

Soc. Just as, for instance, the most ancient men called *day* $\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$, and some of them $\bar{\iota}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$; but those of the present times $\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$.

HERM. This is indeed the case.

Soc. You know, therefore, that this ancient name only manifests the conceptions of its founder: for, because light emerges from darkness, and shines upon men rejoicing in and desiring its beams, they called *day* $\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But, as it is now celebrated in tragical performances, you can by no means understand what $\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$ means;

though some are of opinion that day is called ἡμέρα, because it renders things ἡμερα, *placid and gentle*.

HERM. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewise know that the ancients called ζυγον, *a beam*, δυογον.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And ζυγον, indeed, manifests nothing: but that which subsists for the sake of bringing two things together, so that they may be bound, is very justly named δυογον. But it is now called ζυγον; and this is the case with a great variety of other particulars.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Hence then, the word δέον, when it is thus pronounced, signifies the contrary to all the names which belong to *the good*. For this name, being a species of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαβερὸν the noxious.

HERM. And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. But this will not be the case if you use the ancient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the present name. But you will agree with those ancient good men, if you substitute ἰ for ε; for διον, and not δέον, will signify that good which is celebrated by the institutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself, but the names δέον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον, αγαθον, συμφερον, ευπορον, or *proceeding with facility*, will all of them appear to have the same meaning; for he meant to signify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the universe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιῶδες,

if, according to the ancient tongue, you substitute δ for ξ , it will appear to you that this name was composed from $\delta\omicron\upsilon\nu\eta$ τὸ $\iota\omicron\nu$, or binding that which is in progression, and was called $\delta\eta\mu\iota\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$.

HERM. But what will you say concerning pleasure, pain, desire, and such-like names?

Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for *pleasure* seems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the δ was added, that it might be called $\eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta$, instead of $\eta\omicron\nu\eta$. But *pain* seems to have derived its appellation from the dissolution of the body, which the body experiences in this passion: and the name *sorrow* was so called from impeding the motion of progression; but the name $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\gamma\eta\delta\omicron\nu$, i. e. *torment*, appears to me to be foreign, and to be so called from $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$, *troublesome*. $\text{Ὀ}\delta\upsilon\nu\eta$, i. e. *anxiety*, was denominated from the ingresses of pain.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But $\acute{\alpha}\chi\theta\eta\delta\omicron\nu$, grief, clearly signifies that it is a name assimilated to the slowness of lation: for $\acute{\alpha}\chi\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is a burthen, and $\iota\omicron\nu$ any thing in progression. Joy seems to have received its appellation from the diffusion and easy progression of the flowing of the soul; but $\tau\epsilon\rho\psi\iota\varsigma$ delight, was derived from $\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\nu\omicron\varsigma$ the pleasant. But $\tau\omicron$ $\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\nu\omicron\nu$ was so called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through the soul: it was therefore justly called $\epsilon\grave{\epsilon}\rho\pi\nu\omicron\nu$, i. e. *inspiring*; but, in the course of time, it came to be denominated $\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\nu\omicron\nu$. But, with respect to $\epsilon\upsilon\phi\rho\omicron\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta$, or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain *the why* of its denomination; for it is obvious to every one, that it was so called from $\epsilon\upsilon$ and $\sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, that is, from the soul's being well born along in conjunction with things. Hence
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it ought, in justice, to be denominated *εὐφροσύνη*; but, notwithstanding this, we call it *εὐφροσύνη*. But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of *ἐπιθυμία*, *desire*: for it evinces a power proceeding to *θυμός*, *anger*. But *θυμός*, *anger*, derives its appellation from *θύσεως* and *ζέσεως*, *raging* and *ardour*. And again, *ἡμερος*, *amatorial desire*, was so called from *ῥῶ*, or a *flowing which vehemently attracts the soul*; for because it flows excited, and desiring the possession of things, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called *ἡμερος*. But *πόθος*, *desire*, was so called, from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, and its effluxive streams, like *ἡμερος*, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But *ἔρως*, *love*, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors *ἔσρος*, from *ἔσρῆν*, *to flow inwardly*. But at present it is called *ἔρως*, through the insertion of *ω* instead of *ο*. But what shall we consider after this?

HERM. What *opinion*, and such-like names, appear to you to signify.

Soc. *Opinion*, *δόξα*, was denominated from the *pursuing* which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from *the darting of an arrow*; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence *οἴσις*, *opinion*, harmonizes with *δόξα*; for it signifies the *οἶσις*, or ingress of the soul, in considering the *οἶον*, or quality of a thing. Just as *βουλή*, counsel or deliberation, is so called from *βολή*, *hurling forth*: and *βούλεσθαι*, *to be willing*, signifies *τὸ ἐφίεσθαι*, *to desire*, and *βουλένεσθαι*,

βουλευεσθαι, *to consult*. For all these following δόξα, *opinion*, appear to be certain resemblances of βολή, *hurling forth*; just as the contrary of this ἀβουλία, or *a want of counsel*, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleasing to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of *necessity*, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

Soc. Τὸ ἐκούσιον, therefore, or *the voluntary*, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say εἰκον τῷ ἰόντι, *yields to that which is in progression*; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to βούλησις, *the will*. But τὸ ἀναγκάσιον and ἀντίτυπον, i. e. *the necessary and the resisting*, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about *guilt and ignorance*. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, *necessity* was denominated from an assimilation to a progression through a valley. But as long as our strength remains, we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.

HERM. I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, viz. *truth, falsehood, and being*; and why *name*, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?

Soc. What therefore do you call μέγεθος?

HERM.

HERM. I call it ζητεῖν, *to inquire*.

Soc. It appears then that this word ὄνομα, *a name*, was composed from that discourse which asserts that ὄν, *being*, is that about which name enquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call ὀνομαστόν, or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that *name is an enquiry about being*. With respect to ἀλήθεια, *truth*, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is θεία ἄλη, *a divine wandering*. But ψεῦδος, *falsehood*, signifies the contrary to lation. For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels any thing to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the ψ conceals its meaning. But ὄν, *being*, and οὐσία, *essence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an ἰ; for then they will signify ἰόν, or that which is in progression. And again, τὸ οὐκ ὄν, or *non-being*, is by some denominated οὐκ ἰόν; that is, *not proceeding*.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discussed these particulars in a very strenuous manner. But if any one should ask you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words ἰόν, *proceeding*, ῥέον, *flowing*, and δοῦν, *binding*, would you be able to answer him or not?

Soc. I should perfectly so. And something just now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to say something to the purpose.

HERM. What is it?

Soc. That, if we are ignorant of any thing, we should say, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the case with some names; and others are, perhaps, inscrutable

scrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being every where wrested from their proper construction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the ancient tongue, when compared with the present, is in no respect different from a Barbaric language.

HERM. And, indeed, you say nothing foreign from the purpose.

SOC. I say that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of an excuse. Let us, however, endeavour to consider this affair, and make our enquiry, as follows: If any one should always investigate those words through which a name derives its subsistence, and again those words through which words are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, would not he who answers such a one at length fail in his replies?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. When, therefore, will he who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they have an elementary subsistence, can no longer be justly said to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that τὸ ἀγαθόν was composed from ἀγατός, *admirable*, and θεός, *swift*. But θεός, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

HERM. You seem to me to speak properly.

SOC. Are not the names, then, which are the subject of
your

your present enquiry, elements? And is it not necessary that the rectitude of their formation should be considered in a manner different from that of others?

HERM. It is probable.

Soc. It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must be reduced to these: and if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again along with me, lest I should act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the first names ought to be.

HERM. Only do but speak; and I will endeavour to the utmost of my ability to speculate in conjunction with you.

Soc. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is first, as of that which is last; and that none of these differ from one another, so far as they are names.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But the rectitude of those names which we have just now discussed, consists in evincing the quality of every thing.

HERM. How should it be otherwise?

Soc. This property, then, ought no less to belong to prior than posterior names, if they have the proper requisites of names.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But posterior names, as it appears, produce this through such as are prior.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Be it so then. But after what manner can first names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as possible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But answer me this question:

question: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to manifest things to one another, should we not, like those which are at present mute, endeavour to signify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?

HERM. How could it be otherwise, Socrates?

Soc. I think, therefore, that if we wished to signify that which is upwards and light, we should raise our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itself; but that if we wished to indicate things downwards and heavy, we should point with our hands to the earth. And again, if we were desirous of signifying a running horse, or any other animal, you know, that we should fashion the gestures and figures of our bodies, as near as possible, to a similitude of these things.

HERM. It appears to me, that it would necessarily be as you say.

Soc. In this manner then, I think, the manifestations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it appears, that which it wishes to render apparent.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But since we wish to manifest a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifestation of every thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing subsists through these?

HERM. It appears to me, that it must be necessarily so.

Soc. A name then, as it seems, is an imitation of voice, by which every one who imitates any thing, imitates and nominates through voice.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

HERM.

HERM. Why?

Soc. Because we must be compelled to confess, that those who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. But do you think this is becoming?

HERM. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?

Soc. In the first place, as it appears to me, it will not be such an intimation as that which takes place through music, although this imitation should be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we should imitate the same things as music imitates, yet we should not appear to me to denominate things. But I reason thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and colour, in many things?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. It appears, therefore, that though any one should imitate these, yet the denominating art would not be conversant with these imitations: for these are partly musical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the case?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But what will you say to this? Do you not think that there is an essence belonging to every thing, as well as colour, and such things as we just now mentioned? And, in the first place, is there not an essence belonging to colour, and voice, and to every thing else, which is considered as deserving the appellation of being?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But what then? If any one is able to imitate the essence of every thing, by letters and syllables, must he not evince what every thing is?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc.

Soc. And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with respect to the former characters, one you called musical, and the other conversant with painting. But how will you call this character?

HERM. This person, Socrates, appears to me to be that institutor of names which we formerly sought after.

Soc. If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us consider about those names which are the subjects of your inquiry, i. e. *ῥον*, *flowing*, *ιεναι*, *to go*, *σχέσις*, *habitude*, whether, in the letters and syllables from which they are composed, they really imitate essence, or not.

HERM. By all means.

Soc. Come then, let us see whether these alone belong to the first names, or many others besides these.

HERM. I think that this is the case with many others besides these.

Soc. And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of division be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of essence subsists through letters and syllables, will it not be most proper to distribute in the first place the elements? just as those who are conversant with rhythms, in the first place, distribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables; and thus at length begin to speculate the rhythms themselves, but never till this is accomplished.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. In like manner, therefore, ought not we first of all to divide the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both mutes and semivowels? For this is the language of those who are skilled in these matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide such as are capable of being sounded indeed, yet are not semivowels, and consider the different species of vowels, with reference to

one another? And after we have properly distributed all these, it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which all may be referred as elements; and from which both these may be known; and whether species are contained in them after the same manner as in the elements. But all these particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to induce each according to similitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: just as painters, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes only introduce a purple colour, and sometimes any other paint: and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they make preparations for the purpose of producing the likeness of a man, or any thing else of this kind; and this in such a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colours which it requires. In the same manner we should accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be necessary, and should fabricate symbols, which they call syllables. And again, combining these syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed, we should again from these nouns and verbs compose something beautiful and entire; that what the animal described by the painter's art was in the above instance, discourse may be in this; whether constructed by the onomastic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be *our* employment, since we have already surpassed the bounds of our discourse; for, if this is the proper mode of composition, it was adopted by the ancients. But if we mean to speculate artificially, it is proper that, distinguishing all these, we should consider whether or not first and last names are established in a proper

per manner ; for to connect them without adopting such a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.

HERM. Perhaps so indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. What then ? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner ? for I cannot.

HERM. There is much greater reason, then, that I should not be able to do this.

Soc. Let us give up the attempt then : or are you willing that we should undertake it to the best of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning such particulars ? But as we said before respecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmata of men concerning them ; so now, with regard to the present subject, we may proceed in its investigation, declaring that, if these particulars have been properly distributed, either by us or by any other, they ought doubtless to have been so divided. Now therefore, as it is said, it is requisite that we should treat concerning them in the best manner we are able. Or, what is your opinion on the subject ?

HERM. Perfectly agreeable to what you say.

Soc. It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things should become manifest through imitation produced by letters and syllables : and yet it is necessary ; for we have not any thing better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the first names ; unless, perhaps, as the composers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarrassment : so we shall be liberated from our perplexity, by asserting that the gods established the first names, and that

on this account they are properly instituted. Will not such an assertion be our strongest defence? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians? For the Barbarians are more ancient than us. Or shall we say, that, through antiquity, it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with Barbaric names? But all these solutions will only be so many plunderings, and very elegant evasions, of those who are not willing to render a proper reason concerning the right imposition of the first names; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper establishment of first names cannot possibly know such as are posterior; for the evidence of the latter must necessarily be derived from the former; and with these he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who professes a skill in posterior names ought to be able to explain such as are first, in the most eminent and pure manner; or, if this is not the case, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of posterior names. Or does it appear otherwise to you?

HERM. No otherwise, Socrates.

SOC. My conceptions, therefore, about the first names appear to me very insolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have any thing better to offer, impart it to me.

HERM. I will do so; but speak confidently.

SOC. In the first place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called $\kappaίνησις$. But it is evident that it implies $\ῥέσις$, *going*; for η was not formerly used, but ϵ . But its origin is from $\κίειν$, *to go*, which is a foreign name, and signifies $\ἰέναι$. If therefore any one could find out

out its ancient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ἴσις. But now from the foreign name κίειν, and the change of the η , together with the interposition of the ν , it is called κίνησις. It ought however to be called κείνσις, or εἴσις. But στάσις, or *abiding*, is the negation of ἵεναι, *to go*; and for the sake of ornament is called στάσις. The element therefore ρ , as I said, appeared to the institutor of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to lation; and hence he every where employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words ῥεῖν and ῥοή, that is, *to flow*, and *flowing*, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this resemblance is found, in the next place, in the words τρόμος and τραχὺς, i. e. *trembling*, and *rough*; also, in words of this kind, κρούειν, *to strike*; ῥαδύνειν, *to wound*; ῥυκεῖν, *to draw*; θρύπτειν, *to break*; κερματίζειν, *to cut into small pieces*; and ῥέμχειν, *to roll round*. For all these very much represent motion through the ρ . Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the least space of time possible, and is agitated in the most eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in these words. But the institutor of names used the τ for the purpose of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words ἵεναι and ἵεσθαι, *to go*, and *to proceed*, through the τ : just as through ϕ , ψ , σ , and ξ , because these letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all such things as ψυχρὸν, *the cold*; ζέον, *the fervid*; σεισθαι, *to be shaken*; and universally σεισμός, *concussion*. And when he wished to imitate any thing very much inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have intro-

duced such-like letters. But he seems to have thought that the power of compressing $\bar{\delta}$ and $\bar{\tau}$, and the tongue's action in leaning, were useful for the purpose of imitating the words *δεσμος*, a bond, and *στάσις*, abiding. And because the tongue remarkably slides in pronouncing λ , the institutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an assimilative way, he established the names *λεία*, smooth; *ὀλισθαίνειν*, to slip; *λιπαρόν*, unctuous; *κολλῶδες*, liquid; and all other such-like words. But in consequence of the tongue sliding through λ , he employed the power of the γ , and thus imitated *γλίσχρον*, the slippery; *γλυκὺ*, the sweet; and *γλοιῶδες*, the viscous. Perceiving likewise that the sound of the ν was inward, he denominated *τὸ ἔνδον*, the inward, and *τὰ ἐντὸς*, things inward, that he might assimilate words to letters. But he assigned α to *μέγαν*, the great, and η to *μήκος*, length, because these letters are great. But in the construction of *τρογγύλον*, round, which requires the letter δ , he mingled δ abundantly. And in the same manner the legislator appears to have accommodated other letters and syllables to every thing which exists, fabricating a signature and name; and from these, in an assimilative manner, to have composed the other species of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.

HERM. And indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me sufficient employment, as I said in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obscure in his assertions. Now therefore, Cratylus, speak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleased with what Socrates has said respecting names, or whether you have
any

any thing to say on the subject more excellent ; and if you have, disclose it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.

CRAT. But what, Hermogenes ! Does it appear to you to be an easy matter to perceive and teach *any thing* so suddenly, and much more that which seems to be the greatest, among things which are the greatest ?

HERM. To me, by Jupiter, it does not ; but that assertion of Hesiod * appears to me very beautiful, “ that it is worth while to add a little to a little.” If therefore you are able to accomplish any thing, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.

Soc. And indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate any thing which I have above asserted ; but I have considered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth : so that on this account speak boldly, if you have any thing better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor shall I be surprised if you produce something more beautiful on this subject ; for you appear to me to have employed yourself in speculations of this kind, and to have been instructed in them by others. If therefore you shall assert any thing more excellent, you may set me down as one of your disciples about the rectitude of names.

CRAT. But indeed, Socrates, as you say, I have made this the subject of my meditations, and perhaps I shall bring you over to be one of my disciples : and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place : for, in a certain respect, I ought to say to you what Achilles said to Ajax † upon the occasion of his embassy ; but he thus

* Opera et Dies, lib. 1. † Iliad 9, v. 640.

speaks: "O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have spoken all things agreeable to my opinion." In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have prophesied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphron, or whether some muse, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inspiring influence.

Soc. O worthy Cratylus, I myself have some time since wondered at my wisdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have said: for to be deceived by oneself is the most dangerous of all things; for since the deceiver is not for the least moment of time absent, but is always present, how can it be otherwise than a dreadful circumstance? But it is necessary, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to the consideration of what we have before said, and to endeavour, according to the poet *, "to look at the same time both before and behind." And let us at present take a view of what we said. We said then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this definition is sufficient for the purpose?

CRAT. To me, Socrates, it appears to be vehemently so.

Soc. Names, then, are employed in discourse for the sake of teaching?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. Shall we not therefore say, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?

CRAT. Perfectly so.

Soc. But who are they?

CRAT. Those legislators, or authors of names, which you spoke of at first.

* Iliad 1, v. 341; and Iliad 3, v. 109.

Soc. Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not some painters more excellent than others?

CRAT. Entirely so. Will not such as are more excellent produce more beautiful works, i. e. the representations of animals; but such as are inferior the contrary? And will not this also be the case with builders, that some will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houses?

CRAT. It will.

Soc. And with respect to legislators, will not some produce works more beautiful than others?

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they will.

Soc. It does not therefore appear to you, that some laws are better, and others worse?

CRAT. It certainly does not.

Soc. One name therefore does not seem to you to be better assigned than another?

CRAT. It does not.

Soc. All names therefore are properly established?

CRAT. Such indeed as are names.

Soc. But what then shall we say to this name of Hermogenes, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly assigned him, unless something *ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως*, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was indeed assigned him, but improperly?

CRAT. It does not seem to me, Socrates, to have been assigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of some other person, who is endued with a nature correspondent to the name.

Soc. Will not he then be deceived, who says that he is

Her-

Hermogenes? for he will no longer be the person whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.

CRAT. What is this which you say?

Soc. Is the efficacy of your discourse founded in the opinion, that it is impossible to speak any thing which is false? for this has been asserted, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at present.

CRAT. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not to speak of non-being, to speak of things which are false?

Soc. This discourse, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the same time inform me, whether it appears to you impossible to discourse about that which is false, but possible to pronounce it?

CRAT. It appears to me impossible even to pronounce it.

Soc. And are you of opinion likewise, that it is impossible to denominate it? As if, for instance, any one, on meeting you, should in an hospitable manner take you by the hand, and say, I am glad to see you, O Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, would he not some way or other, by means of voice, express these words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or else no one?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate these words in vain.

Soc. Let it be so. But whether would he who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would some of these words be true, and some false? for this last supposition will be sufficient.

CRAT. I should say, that he founded these words,
moving

moving himself in vain, just as if any one should move brass by striking on it.

SOC. Come then, see, Cratylus, whether we agree in any respect. Do you not say that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?

CRAT. I do.

SOC. And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?

CRAT. I acknowledge this the most of all things.

SOC. And will you not therefore confess that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But come, for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you say, though you perhaps speak properly. Can we distribute and introduce both these imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impossible?

CRAT. It is possible.

SOC. But consider this in the first place. Can any one attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. And is it possible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

CRAT. This also is possible.

SOC. Are both these distributions therefore proper; or only one of them?

CRAT. Only one of them.

SOC. And this I think must be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the similar?

CRAT. It appears so to me.

SOC.

Soc. Left therefore you and I, who are friends, should fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I say ; for I, my friend, call such a distribution in both imitations (i. e. in the pictures and names) right ; and in names not only right, but true : but I call the other attribution and introduction of the dissimilar, not right ; and when it takes place in names, false.

CRAT. But consider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper distribution may take place, but not in names ; but that these must always be necessarily right.

Soc. What do you say ? What does this differ from that ? May not some one, on meeting a man, say to him, This is your picture, and shew him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman ? But I mean by *shewing*, placing it before his eyes.

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, This is your name ? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting. But my meaning is this : May he not therefore say, This is your name ? And after this, may he not present to his sense of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which asserts that he is a man ; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human species, and which asserts that he is a woman ? Does it not appear to you, that this may be some time or other possible ?

CRAT. I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be so.

Soc. You do well, my friend, if the thing subsists in this manner ; for neither is it proper at present to contest much about it. If therefore there is a distribution of this kind

kind in names, we must confess that one of these wishes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falsely. And if this is the case, and it is possible to distribute names erroneously, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will also be possible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus established, this must likewise necessarily be the case with discourses; for discourses are, I think, the composition of these. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?

CRAT. The same as yours; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

SOC. If therefore we assimilate first names to letters, the same things will take place as in pictures, in which it is possible to attribute all convenient colours and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave some and add others, and this according to the more and the less. Will not this be the case?

CRAT. It will.

SOC. He then who attributes every thing proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but such as are defective?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But will not he who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters, according to the same reasoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes every thing in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if any one fails in the least circumstance, or sometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will indeed produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And so that some of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?

CRAT. Perhaps so.

SOC. Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But was not the name which we assigned to this character that of legislator?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. Perhaps therefore, by Jupiter, as in other arts, one legislator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before asserted?

CRAT. It will be so. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters α and β , and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is described for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means described, but becomes immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind?

SOC. Let us thus consider this affair, Cratylus, lest we should not contemplate it in a becoming manner.

CRAT. But how?

SOC. Perhaps such things as ought necessarily either to be composed or not from a certain number, are subject to the passion which you speak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add any thing, immediately become some other number. But perhaps there is not the same rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it necessary to attribute to an image every thing belonging to that which it represents, in order to its becoming an image. But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would then these be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only assimilate your
colour

colour and figure, after the manner of painters, but should produce all such inward parts as you contain, and attribute the same softness and heat, the same motion, soul, and wisdom, as you possess; and, in one word, should fashion every thing else similar to the parts which you contain; whether in consequence of such a composition would one of these be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluses?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. Do you see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another rectitude of an image than that which we just now spoke of; and that it does not necessarily follow, that if any thing is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to possess the same things as their exemplars?

CRAT. I do.

Soc. Those particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be ascertained.

CRAT. You speak the truth.

Soc. You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that some names are properly composed, and others not so; nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly such as that of which it is the name: but you will sometimes suffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewise permit an unadapted name in a discourse; and if a name, you will suffer a discourse unadapted to things to
be

be introduced in a discourse; and will at the same time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheless be denominated and spoken of, as long as the name or discourse contains the effigies of the thing which is the subject of discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

CRAT. I do remember.

SOC. It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though every thing properly adapted may not be present, yet the representation may be said to subsist as it ought. But let us now, blessed man! cease our disputation, that we may not be exposed to danger, like those who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a similar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other rectitude of name, and do not confess that a manifestation produced by letters and syllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

CRAT. But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a very becoming manner, and I lay down the position which you mention.

SOC. Since therefore we thus far agree, let us consider what remains. We say then, that in order to the beautiful position of a name, it ought to possess convenient letters?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But it is proper that it should contain such as are similar to things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Such then as are beautifully composed will be composed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly composed,

composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of convenient and similar letters, since it is an image; but it will possess something unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully established. Shall we speak in this manner, or otherwise?

CRAT. There is no occasion, I think, Socrates, of contesting; though it does not please me to say, that a name has a subsistence, and yet is not beautifully composed.

SOC. Is this also unpleasing to you, that a name is the manifestation of a thing?

CRAT. It is not.

SOC. But do you think it is not beautifully said, that some names are composed from such as are first, and that others are themselves first names?

CRAT. I think, it is well said.

SOC. But if first names ought to be manifestations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accomplishing this, than their being so formed as to become in the most eminent degree, such as the things which they render manifest? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of, please you better, that names are signatures, that they manifest by signatures, and that they are prescient of things? And, besides this, that rectitude of name subsists by compact; and that it is of no consequence whether any one composes them as they are at present composed, or the contrary; calling, for instance, that which is considered at present as small δ , great, and ω , σ ? Which of these modes is most agreeable to you?

CRAT. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to evince by similitude that which any one wishes to evince, than by any other method.

Soc. You speak well. If, therefore, a name is similar to a thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which first names are composed should be naturally similar to things themselves? But my meaning is this: Could any one produce a picture, which we have just now said is the similitude of some particular thing, unless the colours from which the picture is composed were naturally similar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwise impossible?

CRAT. Impossible.

Soc. In a similar manner, therefore, names can never become similar to any thing, unless the things from which names are composed possess, in the first place, some similitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. You therefore now participate of the discourse which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter $\bar{\rho}$ is similar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardness?

CRAT. In a becoming manner, in my opinion.

Soc. But the letter $\bar{\lambda}$ to the smooth and soft, and other things which we mentioned?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. Do you know therefore that the same word, i. e. *hardness*, is called by us *σκληρότης*, but by the Eretrians *σκληροτήρ*?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do both the $\bar{\rho}$ and the $\bar{\sigma}$ appear similar to the same thing; and does the termination of the $\bar{\rho}$ manifest the same thing to them, as the termination

tion of the $\bar{\sigma}$ to us: or is nothing manifested by letters different from ours?

CRAT. The word evinces its meaning by both letters.

SOC. Is this accomplished, so far as $\bar{\rho}$ and $\bar{\sigma}$ are similars, or so far as they are not?

CRAT. So far as they are similars.

SOC. Are they, therefore, in every respect, similars?

CRAT. Perhaps they are so, for the purpose of manifesting lation.

SOC. But why does not the insertion of $\bar{\lambda}$ signify the contrary of hardness?

CRAT. Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inserted, just as in the names which you lately discussed with Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, $\bar{\rho}$ ought to be inserted instead of $\bar{\lambda}$.

SOC. You speak well. Do we, therefore, according to our present manner of speaking, mutually understand nothing when any one pronounces the word *σκληρόν*? And do you not understand what I now say?

CRAT. I do, my friend, through custom.

SOC. But when you say through custom, what else do you think you imply by this word, except *compact*? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, and understand by it *hardness*, you also know that this is what I understand. Is not this what you mean?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, something becomes manifest to you through me.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But what I understand, I enunciate from that

which is dissimilar; since λ is dissimilar to the σκληρότης, which you pronounce. But, if this is the case, what else can be the consequence, but that you accustom yourself to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; since both similar and dissimilar letters manifest the same thing to you, through custom and compact? But if custom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to say that similitude is a manifestation, but this ought to be asserted of custom: for this, as it appears, manifests both from the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of these things (for I consider your silence as a signal of assent), it is necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the manifestation of what we understand and enunciate. For if, O best of men! you are willing to pass on to the consideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit your consent and compact to possess some authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleases me, which asserts that names should be as much as possible similar to things. But yet I am afraid, lest perhaps, as Hermogenes said, the attraction of this similitude should be very precarious, and we should be obliged, in this troublesome affair, to make use of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: since, perhaps, we shall then speak as much as possible in the most beautiful manner, when our speech is composed either entirely, or for the most part, from similars, that is, from things convenient; but in the most base manner, when the contrary takes place. But still farther inform me, what power names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect we must assert they are able to produce.

CRAT. Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is simply true, that he who knows names, knows also things.

Soc. Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this: that when any one knows the quality of a name (and it is of the same quality as a thing), he then also knows a thing, since it is similar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he who knows names, knows also things.

CRAT. You speak most truly.

Soc. But come, let us see what this mode of teaching things is, which you now speak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the same time being the best; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?

CRAT. That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the best.

Soc. But whether do you think that the invention of things is the same as the invention of names, and the same as the discovery of those things, of which names are at present significant? Or do you think that it is necessary to seek and find according to another method, and that this should be learned?

CRAT. I think that we ought, above all things, to seek after and discover these things according to this method.

Soc. But let us consider, Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, speculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no small danger of his being deceived?

CRAT. How?

Soc. Because, evidently, he who first established names
I 3 fashioned

fashioned them such as he thought things themselves were. Is it not so?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but fashioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him? Can it be any thing else, than that they must be deceived?

CRAT. But this is not the case, Socrates: but it is necessary that he who composed names must have known how to compose them; for otherwise, as I have before observed, names would never have existed. But you may derive the greatest conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by considering that, if he had conceived erroneously, all things would not have thus corresponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive this, when you were saying that all names were composed according to the same conceptions, and tended to the same thing?

SOC. But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight: for if the founder of names was deceived in the first instance, but compelled other things to this his first conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it; just as in diagrams, in which sometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, consent notwithstanding with each other: if this be the case, every one ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much discussion and diligent consideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly established, or not; for this being sufficiently examined, what remains will appear consequent to the principle. And yet I should wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us
again

again consider what we discussed before ; in the course of which we asserted, that, in consequence of every thing proceeding, hurrying along, and flowing, names signified to us *essence*. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not ?

CRAT. Very much so, and that they properly signify this.

SOC. Let us consider, then, repeating some of these. In the first place, then, this name ἐπισήμη, *science*, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (ἵστησι) our soul at certain things, than that it is born along with them ; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of εἰ, πισημη, and to insert an ι instead of εἰ. In the next place, το βέβαιον, *the firm*, is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain *basis* and *abiding*, but not of *lotion*. Again, ἱστορία, *history*, signifies that it stops the flowing of things ; and πιστόν, *the credible*, implies that which produces *perfect stability*. Likewise μνήμη, or *memory*, entirely indicates a *quiet abiding in the soul*, and not *local motion*. And, if you will, ἀμαρτία, *guilt*, and συμφορὰ, *that which is casual*, when these names are attentively considered, will appear to be the same with σύνεσις, *intelligence*, and ἐπισήμη, *science*, and all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But still farther, ἀμαθία and ἀκολασία, that is, *ignorance* and *intemperance*, will appear to be similar to these : for *ignorance* will signify the progression of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity ; but *intemperance* will appear to be a perfect pursuit of things. And thus, those names which we consider as belonging to the basest of things, will appear to be most similar to the names of the most beautiful things. And I think that any one may discover many others of this

kind, if he applies himself to the investigation; from which he may be led to think, that the institutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and born along, but such as stably abide.

CRAT. And yet you see, Socrates, that he signified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.

Soc. What then shall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like suffrages? And does their rectitude consist in the same thing being signified by the most names?

CRAT. This is by no means proper.

Soc. Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting these particulars, let us consider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that those who instituted names in the several cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legislators, and that the art, which is capable of accomplishing this, is legislative?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me now, then, whether those who founded the first names knew the things to which they assigned names, or were ignorant of them?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.

Soc. For, friend Cratylus, they could not accomplish this, while ignorant of things.

CRAT. It does not appear to me they could.

Soc. Let us then return again from whence we have digressed: for you lately said, if you recollect, that he who established names must have previously known the things to which he assigned names. Are you therefore of this opinion at present, or not?

CRAT.

CRAT. I am.

SOC. Will you say, that he who established first names, established them in consequence of possessing knowledge?

CRAT. Yes.

SOC. From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, since first names were not yet established? But have we not said, that it is impossible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

CRAT. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

SOC. After what manner, then, shall we say that they possessing knowledge established names? Shall we say, that founders of names existed prior to the establishment of names, and that they then possessed a knowledge of names, since it is impossible to learn things otherwise than by names?

CRAT. I think, Socrates, that the opinion about these particulars is most true, which asserts that a power greater than the human assigned the first names to things; in consequence of which they must of necessity be rightly established.

SOC. Do you think that he who established names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would establish things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

CRAT. But the other sort of these were not names.

SOC. Which sort do you mean, best of men! those which lead to abiding, or those which lead to lation? For, as we just now said, this cannot be determined by their multitude.

CRAT. Your observation is indeed just, Socrates.

SOC.

Soc. Since names then contest with each other, and, as well these as those, assert that they are similar to the truth, how shall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where shall we turn ourselves? For we cannot have recourse to other names different from these; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which may shew us, without names, which of these are true; pointing out for this purpose the truth of things.

CRAT. It appears so to me.

Soc. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, as it seems, to learn things without names, if what we have just now asserted is true.

CRAT. It appears so.

Soc. Through what else, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be through any thing else than that which is proper and most just, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any respect mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For that which is different, and foreign from these, will signify something else, and not these.

CRAT. You appear to me to speak the truth.

Soc. But tell me, by Jupiter, have we not often confessed that names, which are properly established, are similar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. If then it is possible, in the most eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the most excellent and the clearest discipline? Will it be possible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it should be beautifully assimilated,
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and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, shall we be able from truth to obtain truth itself, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?

CRAT. It appears to me, that this must necessarily be obtained from truth.

Soc. After what manner, therefore, it is necessary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and discovered from themselves.

CRAT. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. But still farther, let us consider, lest this multitude of names tending to the same thing should deceive us, if, in reality, those by whom they were established considered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But should this be the case, their opinion is however erroneous: for these men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themselves confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the same whirlpool. For consider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we should say that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself, and the good, and so of every thing else.

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.

Soc. Let us therefore consider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or any thing of this kind, is beautiful; for all these appear to flow: but we ask, whether the beautiful itself does not always remain such as it is?

CRAT. It is necessary that it should.

Soc. Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always secretly flying away? And can it, in the first place,
be

be said that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of such a particular nature? Or is it not necessary, in this case, that, while we are speaking about it, it should immediately become something else, secretly withdraw itself, nor be any longer such as it was?

CRAT. It is necessary.

Soc. How, then, can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner? For if, at any time, it should subsist in a similar manner, in that time in which it is thus similarly effected, it is evident that it would suffer no mutation: but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it suffer mutation, or be moved, since it never departs from its idea?

CRAT. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one; for, as soon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes something different and various, so that it cannot be known what quality it possesses, or how it subsists: for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of subsistence.

CRAT. It is as you say.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, can there be any such thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itself does not fall from a subsistence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge: but if the form itself of knowledge glides away, it will at the same time glide into something different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge; but if it always glides away, it will always be something different from knowledge: and from hence it follows, that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge,

ledge, will have any subsistence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a subsistence, together with the beautiful, the good, and every thing else which we are now speaking of; and none of these, as it appears to me, will be similar either to that which flows, or is born along. But whether things of this kind subsist in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, it is by no means easy to perceive: nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, believing in their reality, and confiding in their author, as one endued with knowledge: and thus, in consequence of possessing no sound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themselves, considering all things as flowing like earthen vessels, and viewing them similar to men diseased with a rheum, as if every thing subsisted according to flowing and distillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to consider this affair in a very strenuous and diligent manner, since it is by no means easy to apprehend the truth: for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigour of your age; and if you should discover any thing in the course of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.

CRAT. I shall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at present without consideration; but, in consequence of speculating this affair, the truth seems to me to be much more on your side, than on that of Heraclitus.

Soc. Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, instruct me: but now, agreeable to your deter-

determination, proceed to the field ; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

CRAT. Be it so, Socrates : and do you also endeavour to think upon these things.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

TO THE

CRATYLUS.

SINCE my writing the above, and indeed after the whole was sent to the press, I have been favoured with the perusal of the MS. Commentary, or rather Scholia, of Proclus, on this dialogue, through the kindness of a Gentleman perfectly unknown to me; and whose liberality therefore, in this particular, demands no common gratitude on my part, and from the literary world in general no small tribute of applause. From this prodigious treasure, therefore, of theological information, I shall select a few passages for the reader's benefit, and as a specimen of the inestimable value of the whole.

In the first place, then, he observes that the Cratylus is a logical and dialectical dialogue; but that it is not dialectical in the Peripatetic sense of the word, but according to the most scientific dialectic of the great Plato, which is adapted to those only whose cogitative power is perfectly pure, who have been well instructed in previous disciplines, and who have purified the juvenile disposition of their manners through the virtues; and, in short, that it belongs only to those who legitimately philosophize. He further adds, that intellect is the author of this first of sciences, producing the whole of it from the whole of itself; —that, according to the progression of all things from *the one*, it establishes the *divisive* art; but, according to the collection of every characteristic into one comprehension, the *definitive*: That again, according to the presence of forms or ideas with each other, through which every thing is what it is, and participates
of

of other forms, it produces the *demonstrative* art; but, according to the conversion of all things to *the one*, and to their proper principles, the *analytic* method.

In the next place, he observes, that the present dialogue causes us to have a scientific knowledge of the rectitude of names; and that he who desires to be skilled in dialectic, ought to begin from this speculation: That, as in the *Parmenides*, where the whole of the dialectic art is delivered, the unfolding of it is mingled with the speculation of beings; so, in this dialogue, the rectitude of names is united with the science of things.

Again, that the persons of the dialogue are Cratylus, the disciple of Heraclitus, and of whom Plato was an auditor; and, according to him, all names subsist from nature, or otherwise they would not be names. But, after him, Hermogenes succeeds, who asserted just the contrary, that a name had no subsistence from nature, but that all names subsisted from position. And the third person is Socrates, who, acting the part of a judge, evinces that some are established from nature, and some from position, and that these last have a casual subsistence: for the names belonging to eternal natures have more of a natural, but those which are assigned to corruptible particulars have more of a casual subsistence. And further still, that since names possess both form and matter, according to form they participate more of a natural establishment, but, according to matter, more of a subsistence from position. Hence Socrates, addressing himself to Hermogenes, separates such names as are immutably established in the gods, such as *μῦρρον* and the like, from other names, and such as are established in souls, such as *βελία*. But directing his discourse to Cratylus, he shews, from the relation of names to things, that there is much of the accidental in names, and at the same time evinces that all things are not in motion. That Cratylus, being scientific and concise in his discourse, which last was peculiar to the Heraclitics, from their conviction that words were unable to keep pace with the
unstable

unstable nature of things, and at the same time wishing to apprehend their fleeting essence, is represented, throughout the dialogue, answering from the shortest syllables and words; and hence the most imitative Plato, in the very beginning of the dialogue, represents him as beginning his interrogation with the word βουλει, *are you willing?* But Hermogenes, who was full of opinion, and considered names as subsisting from position, answers Cratylus, *ναι σοι δοκει, if it is agreeable to you:* for *δοκησις*, *opinion or conjecture*, often takes place about such things as we are willing, and likewise about such things as we are unwilling, should happen; but *βουλησις*, *the will*, is directed to things good alone. That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus respecting names, but Democritus and Aristotle of that of Hermogenes. Hence Pythagoras, being asked what was the wisest of things, answered, Number: but, being again asked what was the next to this in wisdom, answered, He who gave names to things. But he obscurely signified, by Number, the intelligible order, which comprehends in itself the multitude of intellectual forms; for there the first and principal number subsists, after the supereffential one, and supplies measures of essence to every being; and which contains likewise true wisdom, and knowledge subsisting from itself, returning to itself, and causing its own perfection. And as intelligible, intellect, and intelligence are there the same, so likewise number is there the same with wisdom. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which subsists indeed from intellect, and is not things themselves, as intellect is in a primary manner, but contains the images of things, and essential reasons subsisting according to a transitive energy. All things therefore derive their being from intellect, which knows itself, and is wise; but names are derived from soul, which imitates intellect.

He further observes, that the name of Cratylus seems to have been derived from his *obtaining possession, in a proper manner, of the dogmata of Heraclitus* (*παρὰ τῷ περικρατῆσαι ἀκριβῶς τῶν Ἡρακλείων δόγματων*);

λογμῶν); and that, on this account, he despised flowing natures, as things which are not properly beings. But Socrates seems to have been so called, from *his being the saviour of the strength of his soul* (παρα το σωθῆναι τινι του κρατους της ψυχης); that is, of his reason; and from his not being drawn down under the power of his senses. And that the name of Hermogenes was assigned to him from *a Mercurial property becoming his gain* (παρα το ερμαϊκον το κερδαλειον γινεσθαι αυτω); or we should rather say, that Hermes is a god prolific of gain, and that Hermogenes was fortunate in lucrative affairs.

Again, he adds, that a name is neither a symbol, nor the result of casual position, but is allied and adapted by nature to things themselves; for every instrument (and a name is an instrument) is co-ordinated to its proper work, and cannot be harmonized to any thing else than that with a view to which it was produced. So that a name, from its being an instrument, possesses a certain power connate and adapted to the things which it signifies: and hence, as didactic, it possesses an order representative of conceptions; and, as endued with a separating power, it enables us to acquire a knowledge of the essence of things. Οτι ουκ εστι το ονομα συμβολον, ουδε θεσειως εργον της τυχουσης, αλλα συγγενεις τοις πραγμασι και φυσει οικειον. Παν γαρ οργανον, προς το οικειον εργον συνεσταλκει, και ουκ αν αλλο τιη αρμοσειεν η εκεινω προς ο γενηται. Ως τε και το ονομα ατε ον οργανον, εχει τινα συμφυα δυναμειν και τοις σημαιομενοις συμμοσμενην. Και διδασκαλικον ον εμφανιστικην εχει ταξιν των νοημάτων. Και διακριτικον ον, της ουσιας γνωσιν ημιν εμποικει των πραγμάτων.

NOTE to page 16, l. 12.

Should it be asked why Plato ejects from his Republic the Homeric poets as imitators, but now as divine persons introduces them as leaders in assigning the rectitude of names, Proclus well observes, that in a Republic, such as Plato's, the variety of

imitation is unadapted to simple and unperverted manners: but in the establishment of names, the deific intellect of these poets every where deserves our warmest assent. Δια τι ο Πλάτων τους περι Ομηρον ποιητας ως μιμητας εκδωλλων της εαυτου πολιτεας, νυν ως ε-διδους αυτους ισταγει καθηγεμενους των ονοματων της ορθοτης; η εκει μεν αποικειον ην το ποικιλιν της μιμησεως ηδισιν απλοις και αδιαφοροις· Επιδωδα δε και πανταχου το ειδουν αυτων αγαπα και ασπάζεταιται.

NOTE to page 17, l. 3, &c.

Proclus here beautifully observes, that names of a divine origin are smooth, well-sounding, and of fewer syllables than those which are invented by men, as Xanthus than Scamander, Chalcis than Cymindis, and Myrine than Batiia. He adds, that the first of these names seems to evince how the gods both previously comprehend and denominate, according to a definite cause, every flowing essence; that the second shews how they bound, in intellectual measures, the life which is born along in generation; and the third, how the gods separate and govern, in a separate manner, that life which is exempt from the fluctuating empire of generation. Οτι τα μεν διοκλητα ονοματα και λεια εισι και ευηχη και ολιγοσυλλαβωτερα ηπερ τα παρ' ανθρωποις· Οιν ο Ξανθος του Σκαμανδρου, και η Χαλκις της Κυμινδιος, και η Μυρινη της Βαλεις. Και εοικε το μεν πρωτον δηλουν οπως οι θεοι πασαν την ρευστην ουσιαν κατ' αλφαιαν ωρισμενην και προειληφασι και ονομαζουσ. Το δε δευτερον οπως την εν τη γενεσει φερομενην ζων ον θεοι τοις νοεροις μετροις αφοριζουσι. Το δε τελον, οπως την χωριστην απο της γενεσεως ζων χωριστως οι θεοι και χωριζουσι και επιρριπτουσι.

But, in order to understand this passage, it must be observed, that these divine names were produced by scientific men energizing according to a divine afflatus, and that they are symbols of those ineffable signatures, συνθηματα, which subsist in the gods. And with respect to χαλκις chalcis, *the owl*, this name, as Proclus observes, is derived from χαλκος *brass*, in consequence of

the sonorous screaming of the owl, resembling the sharp sound of brass: but brass, from its resisting nature, is an apt emblem of body, and consequently of the realms of generation, in which body predominates; and as the owl is sacred to Minerva, who fills all things with intellectual light, we may see the truth of what Proclus observes concerning Chalcis, or the divine name of the owl.

But with respect to Myrine, as this name has an evident agreement with Myrinus, or the male lamprey, it is necessary to observe that the teeth of this fish are said to stand out of its mouth; and teeth are symbols of the divisible nature of a partial life, from their office of dividing our food: but a fish, from its residence in the sea, represents a life merged in generation. And hence, from the teeth of the lamprey standing out of its mouth, we may see the beauty of what Proclus says, that this name shews how the gods separate and govern, in a separate manner, a life exempt from generation.

NOTE to page 61, l. 13.

Proclus observes, that Bacchus is often denominated, by theologists, *wine*, from the last of his gifts, and that this name evinces all the powers of the god: that, as in the Phædrus Socrates calls *love* in common *mighty*, both that *love* which is divine and that which is a lover of body, in like manner, by this epithet *wine*, we must understand that the characteristic of a partial intellect is in common presented to our view; for the word *wine*, such as, is nothing else than an intellectual form distributed from a total intellect, and, in consequence of this becoming participated, *particular* and *one alone*: for an *all-perfect* intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things in a similar manner; but a partial and participated intellect is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is

suspended

suspended from the Dionysiacal monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect *, many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper totalities; on this account theologists call both this god and all his fabrications *wine*: for all these are the progeny of intellect; and some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. *Wine* therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them: in body, indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication; since, in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the heart of the god is said to have alone remained undistributed, *i. e.* the indivisible essence of intellect. Οτι τον δεσποῦν ἡμῶν Διονυσον, οι θεολογοι πολλακις, κη απο των τελευταιων αυτων δαρων οινον κολουσιν.—Οστις ως ειρηται πασῶν εστι δηλωτικος των του θεου δυναμειν. Ωσπερ κη εν παιδρω τον μεγαλν ερτα κοινω λεγει, τον τε θεον, κη τον φιλοσωματον. Ο ουν οινος κυλος κοινω εξακουμενος, την ιδοτητα του μερικου του παριστησιν ημιν. Το γαρ οινου, ουκ αλλο τε εστι η το διηρημενον απο του ολου, και μελεχομενον ηδη νοερον ειδος, και οινον, και μονον γινομενον. Ο μεν γαρ πανιλης τους παντοῖ (lege παντα) εστι και ενεργει καλα παντα ωσαυτως. Ο δε μερικος και μελεχομενος παντα μεν, αλλα καθ' εν ειδος, οινον το ηλιακον, η το σεληνιακον, η το ερμαϊκον. Επειδη τοιουν η μεριστη δημιουργια πασα της διονυσιακης εξηρηται μοναδος, διαιρουσα τους μεν μεδικλους εντω κοσμω ντας απο του ολου του, τας δε πολλας ψυχας, απο της μιας, τα δ' ειδη τα αισθητα παντα απο των οικειων ολοτητων, δια δη τουτο κη αυτον τον θεον οινον προειρηκασιν οι θεολογοι, αυτον τε, και παντα τα δημιουργηματα αυτου. Παντα γαρ εγγονα του του. Και τα μεν πορρωτερον, τα δ' εγγυτερον μελεχει της μεριστης του του διανομης. Αναλογως ουν εν τοις ουσιν ο οινος εγγινομενος ενεργει. Εν μεν τω σωματι ειδωλικω;

* With respect to intellect, it is necessary to inform the reader, that one kind is imparticipable and total, such as all intellects unconnected with soul; but another participable indeed, but essentially so, such as the mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane gods and beneficent dæmons; but a third is participable, and subsists as a *habit*; and to this class our intellects belong.

καὶ αἰσιν, καὶ φανταστικῶν ψευδῶν. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοετοῖς τὸ καλὸν νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ δημιουργεῖν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ διασπαραξίῃ τῶν τιτάνων μόνη ἡ καρδία ἀνδρείος μείναι λεγέται. Τούτεστιν ἡ ἀμείνων τοῦ νοῦ οὐσία.

I shall only add farther, from Proclus, that, as a discourse concerning the gods is triple, viz. phantastic, like that of Euthyphron*, who irrationally imagined battles and stratagems among the gods; scientific, like that of Socrates; and opinionative, which subsists between these, and which, from the opinion of the founder of names, scientifically rises to the essences of the gods:—hence Socrates, perceiving that the conceptions of the multitude about the gods were equally depraved with those of Euthyphron, descends from a scientific energy to inferior concerns, but at the same time elevates those who are detained by phantasy to a middle habit of apprehension concerning the gods. Hence, he ascribes the cause of this descent in speculation to Euthyphron; not considering him as the leader of this knowledge, but as one who, through the phantastically prodigious nature of his discourse, excites the scientific to the investigation of truth.

* For the character of Euthyphron, consult Plato's Dialogue on *Holiness*, which bears the name of Euthyphron.

INTRODUCTION

THE
PHÆDO OF PLATO:

A DIALOGUE ON THE
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

PHEDO OF PLATO

A DIALOGUE ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

INTRODUCTION.

THE ensuing dialogue is no less remarkable for the masterly manner of its composition, than for the different effects which the perusal of it is related to have formerly produced. For the arguments which it contains for the immortality of the soul, are said to have incited Cleombrotus to suicide, and to have dissuaded Olympiodorus, a Platonic philosopher, from its perpetration. Indeed it is by no means wonderful, that a person like Cleombrotus, ignorant (as his conduct evinces) that the death so much inculcated in this dialogue is a philosophic, and not a natural death, should be led to the perpetration of a crime which is *in most cases* so enormous: but this ignorance is not peculiar to Cleombrotus, since I am afraid there are scarcely any of the present day who know that it is one thing for the soul to be separated from the body, and another for the body to be separated from the soul, and that the former is by no means a necessary consequence of the latter.

But as this philosophic death, or separation of soul from body, forms one of the most leading particulars of the dialogue, and is no other than the exercise of the cathartic virtues, the following observations are necessary in order to a perception of its origin and meaning. Accord-

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ing to the Orphic mythology * therefore, the traditions of which are every where followed by Plato in this dialogue, there are four governments, viz. consisting of *Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus*. And these four governments obscurely signify the different gradations of virtues according to which our soul contains the symbols of all the virtues, both *theoretical* and *cathartical*, *political* and *ethical*: for the soul either energizes according to the *theoretic* virtues, the paradigm of which is the government of *Heaven*, and on this account Heaven receives its denomination *παρὰ τοῦ ἰσᾶντος ὧρα*, *from beholding the things above*: or it lives *cathartically*, the exemplar of which is the *Saturnian kingdom*, and on this account Saturn is denominated *from being a pure intellect*, through a survey of himself; and hence he is said to devour his own offspring, signifying the conversion of himself to himself: or it energizes according to the *politic* virtues, the symbol of which is the government of *Jupiter*; and hence Jupiter is the Demiurgus, so called *from operating about secondary natures*: or the soul energizes according to both the *ethical* and *physical* virtues, the symbol of which is *the kingdom of Bacchus*, and on this account he is fabled to be torn in pieces by the Titans, because the virtues do not follow, but are separated from each other †.

But when Socrates, in the course of the dialogue, expresses his hope of departing to other good men, and other beneficent gods, by *other gods* can only be understood such as are supermundane, or of a superior order to the ruling

* Vid. Olympiodori MS. Comment. in Phædonem.

† See more concerning the virtues in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries,

divinities of the world; and this very particular is sufficient to convince the intelligent reader, that the theology unfolded by Proclus is not, as has been ignorantly asserted, a fiction of the latter Platonists, and a corruption of the genuine doctrine of Plato. In proving the immortality of the soul, Socrates founds his first demonstration on the generation of contraries from each other; from whence he concludes, that as the dead are generated from the living, so also the living from the dead. In the second place he discusses the doctrine of reminiscence, and proves that the soul lived prior, and will subsist posterior to the body. But he demonstrates that knowledge is reminiscence: first, because we often answer properly to questions which we have never studied; and secondly, because from a knowledge of sensible particulars, we suddenly ascend to the knowledge of ideas, as from a perception of things sensibly equal to a knowledge of equality itself.

After this our divine philosopher informs us, that the pure soul will after death return to pure and eternal natures; but that the impure soul, in consequence of being imbued with terrene affections, will be drawn down to a kindred nature, and be invested with a gross vehicle capable of being seen by the corporeal eye. For while a propensity to body remains in the soul, it causes her to attract a certain vehicle to herself, either of an aerial nature, or composed from the spirit and vapours of her terrestrial body, or which is recently collected from surrounding air: for according to the arcana of the Platonic philosophy, between an ethereal body, which is simple and immaterial, and is the eternal connate vehicle of the soul, and a terrene body, which is material and composite, and of short duration, there is an aerial body, which is material indeed, but

but simple and of a more extended duration : and in this body the unpurified soul dwells for a long time after its exit from hence, till this pneumatic vehicle being dissolved, it is again invested with a composite body ; while on the contrary the purified soul immediately ascends into the celestial regions with its ethereal vehicle alone.

After this follows the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls into brutes, which is not to be understood as if our souls became the animating principles of brutal bodies, but that for the sake of purgation they are bound as it were to the imagination of a brute, in the same manner as impure dæmons are said to be often mingled with the phantasy of mad men.

Observe too, that the soul carries with her into a future state the affections and habits both of her intellect and will, whether good or bad. Likewise that the orb of the earth is far different from what it is generally supposed to be ; that its summit is ethereal, and reaches as far as to the moon ; that it is every where perforated with holes ; and that we reside at the bottom of certain of these hollows, while at the same time we vainly imagine that we dwell on the summit of the earth. This indeed is an Egyptian tradition ; from which it follows, that the gross surface of the earth on which we reside is of a much greater extent than mathematicians conceive it to be, and this without being repugnant to modern circumnavigation. For if we only suppose the earth to be cavernous like a pumice stone, and that we dwell at the centre of a mighty orb which every way reaches to the heavens, and at the bottom of four of these perforations, it is easy to conceive that we may sail round these four hollows without knowing any thing of those other numerous cavities which the earth contains.

Lastly, the rivers under the earth, which are destined to the punishment of guilty souls, must be understood as follows: that Acheron is a purgatorial place, pertaining to care and sorrow, and which also corresponds to air and the meridional part of the world. That Phlegethon is analogous to fire and to the eastern centre, and is destined to the purgation of anger and desire; that Styx and Cocytus correspond to earth and the western centre, and punish hatred through lamentations and grief; and lastly, that Tartarus is the place destined for the punishment of incurable crimes, which, as it is situated at the extremity of things, is very properly assigned to the most atrocious guilt. Nor must we suppose that these infernal rivers and subterranean tribunals, which are described both by Homer and Plato, are nothing more than vain imaginations and monstrous fables; but, as it is well observed by Proclus on Plato's Republic, it is proper to believe, that for those who require chastisement and purification subterranean places are prepared, which, from their receiving the various defluxions of the elements above the earth, are called rivers by mythologists, and are filled with dæmons who preside over souls, and who are of an avenging, punishing, purifying, and judicial characteristic. Hence, says he, the poetry of Homer is not to be condemned, when it calls the infernal region a place

“ Horrid and dark, and odious to the gods.”

For the variety and imagination of the presiding dæmons excite all this obscurity and horror. Let the reader remember too, that crimes which admit of an easy cure are such as are not yet changed into habit; that those

are

are difficult to be cured which are become habitual, but yet are committed with a certain repugnance of the rational faculty, and produce repentance in the offending soul ; but that those are perfectly incurable, the habits of which are neither attended with repugnance nor penitence. The first of these are purified in Acheron ; the second, if they verge to the first, in Phlegethon ; but if to the third, in Styx and Cocytus ; and those of the third description are punished in Tartarus, from whence, says Plato, they are never dismissed. But let not the reader imagine, that by the word *never* an eternal duration is implied ; for divinity does not punish the soul as if influenced by anger, but, like a good physician, for the sake of healing the maladies which she has contracted through guilt. We must say therefore, as Olympiodorus well observes, that the incurable soul is punished *eternally*, calling eternity her life and the partial period of her existence. "For, in reality (says he), souls which have offended in the highest degree cannot be sufficiently purified in one period, but are *continually* in life, as it were, in Tartarus ; and this period is called by Plato eternity."

And thus much may suffice for a summary of the principal parts of this most important dialogue : for as it is my intention to publish, as soon as possible, a copious commentary on every part of it, from the invaluable manuscript commentary of Olympiodorus, and which will of itself make a large volume, it would be superfluous to make any further discussion at present.

THE
P H Æ D O

OF

PLATO.

ECHECRATES AND PHÆDO.

ECHEC. **W**ERE you present, Phædo, with Socrates that day when he drank the poison in prison; or did you hear an account of it from any other?

PHÆD. I myself, Echeocrates, was present.

ECHEC. What then was his discourse previous to his death; and how did he die? for I should be very glad to hear the account: for scarcely does any one of the Phlians now visit Athens; and it is some time since any stranger has arrived from thence who might afford us some clear information about these particulars: for all that we heard was, that he died through drinking the poison; but he who acquainted us with this, had nothing farther to say about other particulars of his death.

PHÆD. What! did you not hear the manner in which he was arraigned?

ECHEC. Yes; a certain person related this to us; and we wondered, as his sentence was passed so long ago, that he should not die till a considerable time after. What then, Phædo, was the reason of this?

PHÆD.

PHÆD. This happened to him, Echecrates, by chance : for, the day before his trial, the stern of that ship was crowned, which the Athenians send every year to Delos.

ECHEC. But what is the meaning of this ?

PHÆD. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly carried the twice seven young children to Crete, and preserved both them and himself. The Athenians therefore, as it is reported, then vowed to Apollo, that if the children were preserved, they would lead every year a sacred spectacle to Delos ; which, from that time, they regularly send every year to the god. As soon, therefore, as the sacred spectacles make their appearance, the law orders that the city shall be purified, and that no one shall be put to death by a public decree, till the ship has arrived at Delos, and again returned to Athens. But this sometimes takes a long time in accomplishing, when the winds impede their passage ; but the festival itself commences when the priest of Apollo has crowned the stern of the ship. Now this, as I told you, took place the day preceding the trial ; and, on this account, that length of time happened to Socrates in prison, between his sentence and his death.

ECHEC. And what, Phædo, were the circumstances respecting his death ? what were his sayings and actions ? and who of his familiars were present with him ? or would not the magistrates suffer that any should be admitted to him, so that he died deprived of the presence of his friends ?

PHÆD. By no means ; but some, and indeed many, were present with him.

ECHEC. Endeavour to relate all these particulars to us in the clearest manner, unless you have some business which may prevent you.

PHÆD.

PHÆD. But I am at leisure, and will endeavour to gratify your request: for, indeed, to call to mind, Socrates, whether I myself speak, or hear others, is to me always the most pleasant of all things.

ECHEC. Truly, Phædo, others who hear you will be affected in the same manner: but endeavour, as much as you are able, to narrate every circumstance in the most accurate manner.

PHÆD. And, indeed, I myself, who was present, was wonderfully affected; for I was not influenced with pity, like one present at the death of a familiar: for this man, O Echecrates! appeared to me to be blessed, when I considered his manner and discourses, and his intrepid and generous death. Hence it appeared to me, that he did not descend to Hades without a divine lot, but that there also he would be in a happy condition, if this can ever be asserted of any one. On this account I was entirely uninfluenced with pity, though apparently I ought not to have been, on so mournful an occasion; nor yet, again, was I influenced by pleasure through philosophical converse, as I used to be; for our discourses were of this kind. But, to speak ingenuously, a certain wonderful passion, and an unusual mixture of pleasure and grief, was present with me, produced by considering that he must in a very short time die. And, indeed, all of us who were present were nearly affected in the same manner, at one time exhibiting tokens of great delight, and at another bursting into tears: but this was eminently the case with one of us, Apollodorus; for you know the man, and his manner of behaviour.

ECHEC. How is it possible that I should not?

PHÆD. He therefore was remarkably affected in this
L manner;

manner; and I myself, and others, experienced great trouble and confusion.

ECHEC. Who then, Phædo, happened to be present?

PHÆD. Of the natives, Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, were present; likewise Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, and Antisthenes. And besides these, Ctesippus the Pœanian, Menexemus, and some other Athenians, were present: but Plato, I think, was sick.

ECHEC. Were there no strangers?

PHÆD. Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes, and Phædonides; and, among the Megarensians, Euclid and Terpsion.

ECHEC. But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆD. By no means: for they were said to be at Ægina.

ECHEC. Was any other person present?

PHÆD. I think those I have mentioned were nearly all.

ECHEC. Will you now, then, relate what were his discourses?

PHÆD. I will endeavour to relate the whole to you, from the beginning. For we were always accustomed to visit Socrates, myself and others meeting in the morning at the place where he was tried, for it was very near to the prison. Here we waited every day till the prison was opened, discoursing among ourselves, for it was not opened very early in the morning; but, as soon as we could be admitted, we went to Socrates, and generally spent the whole day with him. And then, indeed, we met together sooner than usual; for the day before, when we left the prison, we heard that the ship from Delos was returned. We determined, therefore, among ourselves,

to come very early in the morning to the usual place; and we met together accordingly: but when we arrived, the gaoler, who used to attend upon us, told us to wait, and not enter till he called us. For, says he, the eleven magistrates are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he must die to-day. But not long after this he returned, and ordered us to enter. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his fetters, but Xantippe (you know her) holding one of his children, and sitting by him. As soon, therefore, as Xantippe saw us, she began to lament in a most violent manner, and said such things as are usual with women in affliction; and among the rest, Socrates (says she), this is the last time your friends will speak to you, or you to them. But Socrates looking upon Crito, Crito (says he), let some one take her home. Upon which some of Crito's domestics led her away, beating herself, and weeping bitterly. But Socrates, sitting upright on the bed, drew up his leg, and, stroking it with his hand, said at the same time, What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call *the pleasant and agreeable*! and how admirably is it affected by nature towards that which appears to be its contrary, *the painful*! for they are unwilling to be present with us both together; and yet, if any person pursues and receives the one, he is almost always under a necessity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended from one summit. And it seems to me (says he), that if Æsop had perceived this, he would have composed a fable from it, and would have informed us that divinity, being willing to reconcile contending natures, but not being able to accomplish this design, conjoined their summits in a nature one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass,

that whoever partakes of the one, is soon after connected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at present; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the bond, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation.

But here Cebes replying, said, By Jupiter, Socrates, you have very opportunely caused me to recollect: for certain persons have asked me concerning those poems which you composed, *viz.* the Fables of Æsop which you versified, and your Exordium to Apollo, and other pieces of composition; and, among the rest, Evenus lately inquired with what design you did this after coming here, when before you have never attempted any thing of the kind. If, therefore, you have any desire that I may have an answer ready for Evenus, when he again interrogates me on this occasion (and I am certain that he will do so), tell me what I must say to him. You may truly inform him (says he), Cebes, that I did not compose these verses with any design of rivalling him, or his poems (for I knew that this would be no easy matter); but that I might try to explore the meaning of certain dreams, and that I might make a proper expiation, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to exercise. For in the past part of my life the same dream has often occurred to me, exhibiting at different times a different appearance, yet always advising me the same thing; for it said, Socrates, produce and exercise music. And indeed, in the former part of my life, I considered that this dream persuaded and exhorted me respecting what I should do, in the same manner as those in the Races are exhorted: for, by persuading me to exercise music, it signified that I should labour in philosophy, which is the greatest music. But now, since my
sentence

sentence has taken place, and the festival of the god has retarded my death, it appeared to me to be necessary, that if the music which the dream has so often exhorted me to undertake, should happen to be of the popular sort, I should by no means resist its persuasions, but comply with the exhortation : for I considered that it would be more safe for me not to depart from hence before I had made an expiation by composing verses, and obeying the dream. Thus, in the first place, I composed some verses in honour of the god to whom the festival belonged ; but after the god, considering it necessary that he who designs to be a poet should make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I myself was not a mythologist, on these accounts I versified the Fables of Æsop, which were at hand, and were known to me ; and began with those first, that first presented themselves to my view.

Give this answer, Cebes, to Evenus : at the same time bid him farewell for me ; and tell him, if he is wise he will follow me. But I shall depart, as it seems, to-day ; for such are the orders of the Athenians.—Upon this, Simmias replied, What is this, Socrates, which you command me to tell Evenus ? for I often meet with him ; and, from what I know of him, I am certain that he will never willingly comply with your request.—What, then (says Socrates), is not Evenus a philosopher ?—To me he appears to be so (says Simmias).—Both Evenus, therefore, will be willing to follow me, and every one who is worthy to partake of philosophy ; not perhaps, indeed, by violently depriving himself of life, for this they say is unlawful. And at the same time, as he thus spoke, he withdrew his leg from the bed, and placed it on the ground ; and afterwards continued to discourse with us, in a sitting posture, the

remaining part of the time. Cebes therefore inquired of him, How is this to be understood, Socrates, that it is not lawful to commit suicide, and yet that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is about to die?—What (says he), Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard your familiar Philolaus discourse concerning things of this kind?—We have not, Socrates, heard any thing clearly on this subject.—But I (says Socrates) speak in consequence of having heard; and what I have heard, I will not enviously conceal from you. And perhaps it is becoming, in the most eminent degree, that he who is about to depart thither, should consider and mythologize about this departure: I mean, what sort of a thing we should think it to be. For what else can such a one be more properly employed about, till the setting of the sun?

On what account then, Socrates, do they say, that it is unlawful for a man to kill himself? for I myself have some time since heard from Philolaus, when he resided with us, and from some others, that it was not proper to commit such an action; but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one.—Prepare yourself, then (says Socrates), for perhaps you may be satisfied in this particular: and perhaps it may appear to you wonderful, if this alone, of every thing else, is something simple, and by no means happens to a man like other events, but still remains the same, even with respect to those to whom it is better to die than to live; though, perhaps, it may seem wonderful to you, that it should be better for those men to die, in whom it would be unholy to benefit themselves by suicide, and who ought to expect some other, as a benefactor on this occasion.—Then Cebes, gently laughing, Jupiter knows that (says he,
speaking

speaking in his own tongue).—For this, indeed (says Socrates), appears to be irrational ; and yet, perhaps, it is not so, but has a certain reason on its side. For the discourse which is delivered about these particulars, in the arcana of the mysteries, *that we are placed as in a certain prison secured by a guard, and that it is not proper for any one to free himself from this confinement, and make his escape*, appears to me to be an assertion of great moment, and not easy to be understood. But this appears to me, O Cebes ! to be well said, that the gods take care of us, and that we, who are men, are one of the possessions belonging to the gods. Or does not this appear to you to be the case ?—It does to me (says Cebes).—Would not you, therefore, if any one of your servants should destroy himself, when at the same time you did not signify that you was willing he should die, would you not be angry with him ; and if you had any punishment, would you not chastise him ?—Entirely so (says he).—*Perhaps*, therefore, it is not irrational to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself, before divinity lays him under a certain necessity of doing so, such as I am subject to at present.

This, indeed (says Cebes), appears to be reasonable. But that which you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers would very readily be willing to die, appears to be absurd, if what we have asserted is agreeable to reason, that divinity takes care of us, and that we are one of his possessions ; for it is irrational to suppose that the most prudent men should not be grieved, when departing from that servitude in which they are taken care of by the gods, who are the best of governors. For such a one will by no means think that he shall be better taken care of when he becomes free : but some one who is deprived of intellect may

perhaps think that he should fly from his master, and will not consider that he ought not to fly from a good master, but that he should by all means abide in his service. Hence he will depart from him in a most irrational manner: but he who is endowed with intellect will desire to live perpetually with one who is better than himself. And thus, Socrates, it is reasonable that the contrary of what you just now said should take place: for it is proper that the prudent, when about to die, should be sorrowful, but that the foolish should rejoice.—Socrates therefore, upon hearing this, seemed to me to be pleased with the reasoning of Cebes; and looking upon us, Cebes (says he) never suffers any thing to pass without investigation, and is by no means willing to admit immediately the truth of an assertion.—But indeed (says Simmias), Cebes, O Socrates! appears to me to say something now to the purpose. For with what design can men, truly wise, fly from masters who are better than themselves, and, without any reluctance, free themselves from their servitude? And Cebes appears to me to direct his discourse to you, because you so easily endure to leave us, and those beneficent rulers the gods, as you yourself confess.—You speak justly (says Socrates); for I think you mean that I ought to make my defence, as if I was upon my trial.—By all means, says Simmias.

Be it so then (says Socrates): and I shall endeavour that this my apology may appear more reasonable to you than it did to my judges. For with respect to myself (says he), O Simmias and Cebes! unless I thought that I should depart, in the first place to other gods who are wise and good, and in the next place to men who have migrated from the present life, and are better than any among us, it would be unjust

unjust not to be troubled at death : but now believe for certain, that I hope to dwell with good men ; though this, indeed, I will not confidently assert : but that I shall go to gods who are perfectly good rulers, you may consider as an assertion which, if any thing of the kind is so, will be strenuously affirmed by me. So that, on this account, I shall not be afflicted at dying, but shall entertain a good hope, that something remains for the dead ; and, as it was formerly said, that it will be much better, hereafter, for the good than the evil.—What then, Socrates (says Simmias), would you have departed with such a conception in your intellect, without communicating it to us ? Or will you not render us, also, partakers of it ? For it appears to me, that this will be a common good ; and, at the same time, it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say.—I will endeavour to do so (says he). But let us first consider what that is, which it appears to me Crito some time since was desirous of saying. What else (says Crito) should it be, Socrates, except what he who is to give you the poison has long ago told me, that you ought to speak as little as possible ? For he says that those who dispute become too much heated, and that nothing of this kind ought to be introduced with the poison, since those who do not observe this caution are sometimes obliged to drink the poison twice or thrice.—Let him (says Socrates) only take care of his proper employment, as one who must administer the poison twice ; and even if occasion requires, thrice. I was almost certain (says Crito) that this would be your answer ; but he enjoined me to do this, as I said, some time since. Permit him to do so (says Socrates) ; but I am desirous of rendering to you, as my judges, the reason, as it appears to me, why a man, who

has truly passed his life in the exercise of philosophy, should with great propriety be confident when about to die, and should possess good hopes of obtaining the greatest advantages after death; and in what manner this takes place I will endeavour, Simmias and Cebes, to explain:

Those who are conversant with philosophy in a proper manner, seem to conceal from others that the whole of their study is nothing else than how to die and be dead. If this then is true, it would certainly be absurd, that those who have made this alone their study through the whole of life, should when it arrives be afflicted at a circumstance upon which they have before bestowed all their attention and labour. But here, Simmias, laughing, By Jupiter (says he), Socrates, you cause me to laugh, though I am very far from desiring to do so at present: for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would consider it as well said respecting philosophers; and that men of the present day would perfectly agree with you, that philosophers should in reality desire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that men of this description deserve to suffer death. And indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting that they are not ignorant of it: for both the manner in which true philosophers desire to die, and how they are worthy of death, is concealed from them. But let us bid farewell to such as these (says he), and discourse among ourselves: and to begin, Do you think that death is any thing? Simmias replied, Entirely so. Is it any thing else than a liberation of soul from body? and is not this to die, for the body to be liberated from the soul, and to subsist apart by itself? and likewise for the soul to be liberated from the body, and to be essentially separate? Is death any thing else but this? It is no other
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(says Simmias). Consider then, excellent man, whether the same things appear to you as to me; for from hence I think we shall understand better the subjects of our investigation. Does it appear to you that the philosopher is a man who is anxiously concerned about things which are called pleasures, such as meats and drinks? In the smallest degree, Socrates (says Simmias). But what, is he sedulously employed in venereal concerns? By no means. Or does such a man appear to you to esteem other particulars which regard the observance of the body, such as the acquisition of excellent garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body? whether does he appear to you to esteem or despise such particulars, employing them only so far as an abundant necessity requires? A true philosopher (says Simmias) appears to me to be one who will despise every thing of this kind. Does it therefore appear to you (says Socrates), that the whole employment of such a one will not consist in things which regard the body, but in separating himself from the body as much as possible, and in converting himself to his soul? It does appear so to me. Is it not therefore, first of all, evident, in things of this kind, that a philosopher, in a manner far surpassing other men, separates his soul in the highest degree from communion with the body? It appears so. And to *the many*, O Simmias! it appears that he who accounts nothing of this kind pleasant, and who does not partake of them, is not worthy to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who is not concerned about the pleasures which subsist through the body. You entirely speak the truth.

But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? is the body an impediment or not, if any one associates it in the investigation of wisdom? What I mean is this: Have fight
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and hearing in men any truth? or is the case such as the poets perpetually sing, that

“ We nothing accurate or see or hear?”

And if these corporeal senses are neither accurate nor clear, by no means can the rest be so: for all the others are in a certain respect more depraved than these. Or does it not appear so to you? Entirely so, says he. When then does the soul touch upon the truth? for when it endeavours to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is evidently then deceived by the body. You speak the truth. Must not therefore something of reality become manifest to the soul, in the energy of reasoning, if this is ever the case? It must. But the soul then reasons in the most beautiful manner, when it is disturbed by nothing belonging to the body, neither by hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor any pleasure, but subsists in the most eminent degree, itself by itself, bidding farewell to the body, and, as much as possible, neither communicating nor being in contact with it, extends itself towards real being. These things are so. Does not the soul of a philosopher therefore, in these employments, despise the body in the most eminent degree, and, flying from it, seek to become essentially subsisting by itself? It appears so. But what shall we say, Simmias, about such things as the following? Do we say that the *just itself* is something or nothing? By Jupiter, we say it is something. And do we not also say, that the *beautiful* and the *good* are each of them something? How is it possible we should not? But did you ever at any time behold any one of these with your eyes. By no means, says he. But did you ever touch

touch upon these with any other corporeal sense? (but I speak concerning all of them; as, for instance, about magnitude, health, strength, and, in one word, about the essence of all the rest, and which each truly possesses.) Is then the most true nature of these perceived through the ministry of the body? or rather shall we not say, that whoever among us prepares himself to cogitate in the most eminent and accurate manner about each particular object of his speculation, such a one will accede the nearest possible to the knowledge of each? Entirely so. Will not he therefore accomplish this, in the most pure manner, who in the highest degree betakes himself to each through his cogitative power, neither employing sight in conjunction with the energy of cogitation, nor attracting any other sense, together with his reasoning; but who, exercising a cogitation by itself sincere, at the same time endeavours to investigate every thing which has true being subsisting by itself separate and pure; and who, in the most eminent degree, is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in short from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, by its conjunction? Will not such a man, Simmias, procure for himself real being, if this can ever be asserted of any one? You speak the truth, Socrates (says Simmias), in a transcendant manner.

Is it not necessary, therefore (says Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind should be present with genuine philosophers in such a manner, that they will speak among themselves as follows: In the consideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reason from the vulgar track, that as long as we are connected with a body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never sufficiently obtain

obtain the object of our desire; and this object we have asserted to be truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable occupations through necessary aliment, and fills us with love, desire, fear, all various images, and a multitude of trifling concerns; not to mention that if we are invaded by certain diseases, we are hindered by them in our hunting after real being; so that, as it is said, *we can never truly, and in reality, acquire wisdom through the body.* For nothing else but the body and its desires cause wars, seditions, and contests, of every kind: for all wars arise through the possession of wealth; and we are compelled to acquire riches through the body, becoming subservient to its cultivation; so that on all these accounts we have no leisure for the exercise of philosophy. But this is the extremity of all evils, that if at any time we are at leisure from its attendance, and betake ourselves to the speculation of any thing, then invading us on all sides, in our investigations, it causes agitations and tumults, and so vehemently impels us, that we are not able through its presence to perceive the truth; but it is in reality demonstrated to us, that if we are designed to know any thing purely, we must be liberated from the body, and behold things with the soul itself. And then, as it appears, we shall obtain the object of our desire, and of which we profess ourselves lovers, viz. wisdom when we are dead, as our discourse evinces; but by no means while we are alive: for if we can know nothing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two consequences must ensue, either that we can never possess knowledge, or that we must obtain it after death; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but never before this takes place; and while we live in the body, as it appears, we shall approach

approach in the nearest manner possible to knowledge, if in the most eminent degree we have no association with the body, nor any communication with it (except what the greatest necessity requires), nor are filled with its nature, but purify ourselves from its defiling connection, till divinity itself dissolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madness of body, it is proper to believe that we shall then associate with others who are similarly pure, and shall through ourselves know every thing genuine and sincere : and this perhaps is the truth itself ; for it is by no means lawful that the pure should be touched by that which is impure. And such, O Simmias ! in my opinion, ought to be the discourse and sentiments of all such as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not seem so to you ? It does, Socrates, more so than any thing.

If all this then (says Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he shall there, if ever any where, sufficiently obtain that, for the sake of which we take so much pains in the present life : so that the journey which is now assigned me will be accompanied with good hope ; as will likewise be the case with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his cogitative part in such a manner that it may become as it were pure. Entirely so (says Simmias). But does not purification consist in this, as we formerly asserted in our discourse ; I mean, in separating the soul from the body in the most eminent degree, and in accustoming it to call together and collect itself essentially on all sides from the body, and to dwell as much as possible, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, becoming by this means liberated from the body as from detaining bonds ? Entirely so (says he). Is not death called

called a solution and separation of the soul from body? Perfectly so (says he). But those alone who philosophize rightly, as we have said, perpetually study in the most eminent degree to liberate the soul: and this is the meditation of philosophers, a solution and separation of the soul from the body; or do you not think so? I do. Would it not, therefore, as I said at first, be ridiculous for a man who has so prepared himself in the present life as to approach very near to death, to live indeed in the manner we have described, and yet, when death arrives, be afflicted? would not this be ridiculous? How indeed should it not? In reality therefore (says he), O Simmias! those who philosophize rightly will meditate how to *die*; and *to be dead* will be to them of all men a thing the least terrible. But from hence consider as follows: for if they are on all sides enemies to the body, but desire to possess the soul subsisting by itself, would it not be very irrational for them to be terrified and troubled when death approaches, and to be unwilling to depart to that place, where, when they have arrived, they may hope to enjoy that which they were lovers of in the present life (but they were lovers of wisdom), and to be liberated from the association of that nature to which they were always inimical? Or do you think it possible, that many should be willing, of their own accord, to descend into Hades, allured by the hope of seeing and conversing with departed beautiful youths, wives and children, whom they have loved; and that the true lover of wisdom, who has vehemently nourished this hope, that he shall never possess wisdom as he ought anywhere but in Hades, should be afflicted when dying, and should not depart thither with readiness and delight? For it is necessary, my friend, to think in this manner of one who

who is a true philosopher; since such a one is vehemently of opinion, that he shall never any where, but in that place, acquire the possession of wisdom with purity; and if this is the case, would it not be very irrational, as we just now said, for a man of this kind to be terrified at death? Very much so, by Jupiter, says he.

This then will be an argument sufficient to convince you, that he whom you behold afflicted, when about to die, is not a philosopher, but a lover of body; and this same person is a lover of riches and honours, either desiring the possession of one of these, or of both. The case is entirely so (says he) as you represent it. Does not then, O Simmias! that which is called fortitude eminently belong to such as are thus disposed? Entirely so, says he. Does not temperance also, which even the multitude thus denominate as a virtue, through which we are not agitated by desires, but regard them with moderation and contempt; does it not, I say, belong to those only who despise the body in the most eminent degree, and live in the exercise of philosophy? It is necessary, says he. For if you are willing (says Socrates) to consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurdities. But how, Socrates? You know (says he) that all others look upon death as the greatest of evils. In the highest degree so, says he. Those who are bold therefore among these sustain death, when they do sustain it, through the dread of greater evils. They do so. All men therefore, except philosophers, are bold through fearing and dread, though it is absurd that any one should be bold through fear or cowardice. Entirely so. But what, are not the moderate among these affected in the same manner? and are they not temperate by a certain intemperance?

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Though this is in a certain respect impossible, yet a passion similar to this happens to them with respect to this foolish temperance: for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures which at the same time they desire, they abstain from others, by others being vanquished. And though they call intemperance a subjection to pleasures; yet at the same time it happens to them, that being vanquished by certain pleasures, they rule over others; and this is similar to what I just now said, that after a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.—It seems so indeed. But, O blessed Simmias! this is by no means the right road to virtue, to change pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money: but that alone is the proper coin, I mean wisdom, for which all these ought to be changed. And indeed, for the sake of this, and with this every thing must in reality be bought and sold, both fortitude and temperance, justice, and, in one word, true virtue, which subsists with wisdom, whether pleasures and pains, and every thing else of this kind, are present or absent: but if these are separated from wisdom, and changed from one another, such virtue does not merit to be called even a shadowy description, but is in reality servile, and possesses nothing salutary and true. But that which is in reality true virtue, is a purification from every thing of this kind; and temperance and justice, fortitude and prudence itself, are each of them a certain purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us, appear to have been by no means contemptible persons, but to have really signified formerly, in an obscure manner, *that, whoever descended into Hades uninitiated, and without being a partaker of the mysteries, should be plunged into mire;*
but

but that whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, should dwell with the gods. For, as it is said by those who write about the mysteries,

“The thyrsus-bearers numerous are seen,

“But few the Bacchuses have always been.”

But these few are, in my opinion, no other than those who philosophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of these, I shall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myself in all possible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I shall accomplish any thing when I arrive thither, I shall clearly know, very shortly, if divinity pleases, as it appears to me. And this (says he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology, why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the present life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, since I am persuaded that I shall there meet with masters and companions not less good than such as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology shall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

But when Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes renewing the discourse said, Other things, Socrates, appear to me to be well spoken; but what you have asserted about the soul will produce in men much incredulity, who think, when it is liberated from the body, that it is no longer any where, but that, on that very day in which a man dies, it is corrupted and perishes, and this immediately as it is freed from the body; and besides this, that on its departure it becomes dissipated like wind or smoke, makes its escape, and flies away, and is no longer any where: for if it re-

maintained any where, essentially collected in itself, and liberated from those evils which you have now enumerated, there would be an abundant and fair hope, Socrates, that what you have asserted is true. But it will perhaps require no small allurements and faith, in order to be persuaded that the soul remains, though the man dies, and that it possesses a certain power and prudence.—You speak the truth, Cebes (says Socrates); but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should discourse about these particulars, whether it is proper that this should be the case with the soul, or not?—Indeed (says Cebes), I shall hear with great pleasure your opinion on this subject.—For I do not think (answered Socrates) that any one who should hear this discussion, even though he should be a comic poet, could say that I trifled, and discoursed about things not accommodated to my condition. If it is agreeable to you therefore, and it is requisite to investigate these particulars, let us consider whether the souls of dead men survive in Hades, or not.

The assertion indeed, which we now call to mind, is an ancient one, I mean that souls departing from hence exist in Hades, and that they again return hither, and are generated from the dead. And if the case is such, that living natures are again generated from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for they could not be again generated if they had no subsistence; and this will be a sufficient argument that these things are so, if it is really evident that the living cannot be generated from any thing else than the dead. But if this is not the case, it will be necessary to adduce some other reason.—Entirely so (says Cebes). You should not therefore (says he) consider this assertion with respect to men alone,

alone, if you wish to learn with facility; but we should survey it as connected with all animals and plants, and, in one word, with every thing which is endued with generation. Are not all things therefore so generated, that they are produced no otherwise than contraries from contraries, I mean those to which any thing of this kind happens? as the beautiful is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust; and a thousand other particulars subsist in the same manner. We should consider therefore whether it is necessary, respecting every thing which has a contrary, that this contrary should be generated from nothing else than that which is its contrary. As for instance, is it not necessary, that when any thing becomes greater, it should become so from being before this smaller?—It is so, says he.—And is not the weaker generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?—Entirely so.—But what if any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from the better? and if more just, must it not be generated from the more unjust? How should it not?—We have then (says he) sufficiently determined this, that every thing is thus generated, viz. contraries from contraries. Entirely so. But what, is there any thing among these which has a middle subsistence between both (since all contraries are two), so as to cause two generations from this to that, and from that again to this? for between a greater and a lesser thing there is increase and diminution; and hence we say, that the one is increased, but the other diminished. It is so (says he). And must not to be separated and mingled, to be cooled and heated, and every thing in the same manner, though sometimes we do not distinguish the several particulars by names, must they not in reality be every where thus circumstanced,

be generated from each other, and be subject to a mutual generation of each into one another? Entirely so (says he).

What then (says Socrates), is there any thing contrary to the being alive, as sleeping is contrary to waking? Entirely so (says he). But what is this contrary? To be dead. Are not these therefore generated from each other, since they are contraries? and since they are two, are there not two generations between them? How should there not? I will therefore (says Socrates) tell you what one of these conjunctions is which I have just now spoken of, and what its generations are; do you tell me what the other is. But I say, that the one of these is *to sleep*, but the other *to awake*; and from sleeping awaking is generated, and from awaking sleeping; and the generations of these are on the one hand to be laid asleep, and on the other to be roused. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not? Perfectly so. Do you therefore (says he) inform me, in a similar manner, concerning life and death. Do you not say, that *living* is the contrary of *to be dead*? I do. And that they are generated from each other? Certainly. What then is generated from that which is alive? That which is dead, says he. But what (says Socrates) is generated from *the dead*? It is necessary to confess (says he) that this must be *the living*. From the dead therefore (says he), O Cebes! living things, and men who are alive, are generated. It appears so, says he. Our souls therefore (says Socrates) subsist in Hades. So it seems. Is not therefore one of the generations subsisting about these manifest? for *to die* is, I think, sufficiently clear; is it not? Entirely so, says he. What then shall we do? shall we not render back a contrary generation in its turn, but say that nature is defective and lame

in this particular? Or is it necessary to assign a certain contrary generation *to the being dead*? Entirely so, says he. But what is this? To be restored back again to life. But (says Socrates), if there is such a thing as to revive again, will not this reviving be a generation from the dead to the living? Perfectly so. This then is agreed upon by us, that the living are generated from the dead no less than the dead from the living: but this being the case, it is a sufficient argument to prove that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they may again be generated. It appears to me (says he), Socrates, that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted.

Take notice then (says he), O Cebes! that we have not unjustly made these concessions, as it appears to me: for if other things, when generated, were not always restored in the place of others, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation subsisted according to a right line, proceeding from one thing alone into its opposite, without recurring again to the other, and making an inflexion, you know that all things would at length possess the same form, would be affected with the same passion, and would cease to be generated. How do you say? says he. It is by no means difficult (replies Socrates) to understand what I assert; but just as if there should be such a thing as falling asleep without recurring again to a vigilant state, generated from a sleepy condition, you know that all things would at length exhibit the delusions of Endymion, and would nowhere present themselves to the view, because every thing else would suffer the same as happened to him, viz. would be laid asleep. And if all things were mingled together, without ever being separated, the doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified; for all things would be at

collected in a heap. In the same manner, my dear Simmias, if all such things as participate of life should die, and after they are dead should abide in that lifeless form, and not revive again, would there not be a great necessity that all things should at length die, and that nothing should live? for if living beings are generated from other things, and living beings die, how can it be otherwise, but that all things must be extinguished through being dead? It appears to me, Socrates (says Cebes), that it cannot be otherwise; and in my opinion you perfectly speak the truth: for to me, Cebes (says Socrates), it seems to be so more than any thing, and that we have not assented to this through deception; but that there is such a thing in reality as reviving again; that the living are generated from the dead; that the souls of the dead have a subsistence; and that the condition of the good after this life will be better than at present, but of the evil worse.

But (says Cebes, interrupting him), according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently accustomed to employ (if it is true), that learning with respect to us is nothing else than reminiscence; according to this, it is necessary that we must have learned the things which we now call to mind in some former period of time. But this is impossible, unless our soul subsisted somewhere before it took up its residence in this human form; so that from hence the soul will appear to be a certain immortal nature. But, Cebes (says Simmias, interrupting him), recall into my memory what demonstrations there are of these particulars; for I do not very much remember them at present. The truth of this (says Cebes) is evinced by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when interrogated, if they are but interrogated properly, will speak about every thing just as it

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is. At the same time they could never do this, unless science and right reason resided in their natures. And in the second place, if any one leads them to diagrams, or any thing of this kind, he will in these most clearly discover that this is really the case. But if you are not persuaded from this, Simmias (says Socrates), see if, from considering the subject in this manner, you will perceive as we do. For you do not believe how that which is called learning is reminiscence. I do not disbelieve it (says Simmias); but I desire to be informed concerning this, which is the subject of our discourse, I mean reminiscence; and indeed, from what Cebes has endeavoured to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded: but nevertheless I would at present hear how you attempt to support this opinion. We defend it then (says Socrates) as follows: we confess without doubt, that if any one calls any thing to mind, it is necessary that at some time or other he should have previously known this. Entirely so (says he). Shall we not confess this also (says Socrates), that when science is produced in us, after some particular manner, it is reminiscence? But I mean by a particular manner, thus: If any one, upon seeing or hearing any thing, or apprehending it through the medium of any other sense, should not only know it, but should also think upon something else, of which there is not the same, but a different science, should we not justly say, that he recollects or remembers the particular, of which he receives a mental conception? How do you mean? Thus (says Socrates): In a certain respect the science of a man is different from that of a lyre. How should it not? Do you not therefore know, that lovers, when they see a lyre, or a vestment, or any thing else which the objects of their affection were accustomed to use, no sooner know
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the lyre, than they immediately receive in their cogitative part the form of the beloved person to whom the lyre belonged? But this is no other than reminiscence: just as any one, upon seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes; and in a certain respect an infinite number of such particulars continually occur. An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter (says Simmias). Is not then (says Socrates) something of this kind a certain reminiscence; and then especially so, when any one experiences this affection about things, which, through time, and ceasing to consider them, he has now forgotten? Entirely so (says Simmias). But what (says Socrates), does it happen, that when any one sees a painted horse and a painted lyre, he calls to mind a man; and that when he beholds a picture of Simmias, he recollects Cebes? Entirely so. And will it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias, he will recollect Simmias himself? It certainly will happen so (says he).

Does it not therefore follow, that in all these instances reminiscence partly takes place from things similar, and partly from such as are dissimilar? It does. But when any one recollects any thing from similars, must it not also happen to him, that he must know whether this similitude is deficient in any respect, as to likeness, from that particular of which he has the remembrance? It is necessary (says he). Consider then (says Socrates) if the following particulars are thus circumstanced. Do we say that any thing is in a certain respect equal? I do not say one piece of wood to another, nor one stone to another, nor any thing else of this kind; but do we say that equal itself, which is something different from all these, is something or nothing? We say it is something different, by Jupiter, So-

Socrates (says Simmias), and that in a wonderful manner. Have we also a scientific knowledge of that which is equal itself? Entirely so (says he). But from whence do we receive the science of it? Is it not from the particulars we have just now spoken of, viz. On seeing wood, stones, or other things of this kind, which are equals, do we not form a conception of that which is different from these? But consider the affair in this manner: Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, which sometimes remain the same, at one time appear equal, and at another not? Entirely so. But what, can *equals themselves* ever appear to you unequal? or can equality seem to be inequality? By no means, Socrates. These equals therefore are not the same with equal itself. By no means, Socrates, as it appears to me. But from these equals (says he), which are different from equal itself, you at the same time understand and receive the science of *equal itself*. You speak most true (says he). Is it not therefore either similar to these or dissimilar? Entirely so. But indeed (says Socrates) this is of no consequence: for while, in consequence of seeing one thing, you understand another, from the view of this, whether it is dissimilar or similar, it is necessary that this conception of another thing should be reminiscence. Entirely so. But what will you determine concerning this (says Socrates)? Do we suffer any thing of this kind respecting the equality in pieces of wood, and other such equals as we have just now spoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as equal itself? and is something or nothing wanting, through which they are less equal than equal itself? There is much wanting (says he). Must we not therefore confess, that when any one, on beholding some particular thing, understands that he wishes this
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which I now perceive to be such as something else is, but that it is deficient, and falls short of its perfection; must we not confess that he who understands this, necessarily had a previous knowledge of that to which he asserts this to be similar, but in a defective degree? It is necessary. What then, do we suffer something of this kind or not about equals and equal itself? Perfectly so. It is necessary therefore that we must have previously known *equal itself* before that time, in which, from first seeing equal things, we understood that we desired all these to be such as *equal itself*, but that they had a defective subsistence. It is so. But this also we must confess, that we neither understood this, nor are able to understand it by any other means, than either by the sight, or the touch, or some other of the senses. I speak in the same manner about all these. For they are the same, Socrates, with respect to that which your discourse wishes to evince. But indeed, from the senses, it is necessary to understand that all equals in sensible objects aspire after *equal itself*, and are deficient from its perfection. Or how shall we say? In this manner: Before, therefore, we began to see, or hear, and to perceive other things, it necessarily follows, that we must in a certain respect have received the science of *equal itself*, so as to know what it is, or else we could never refer the equals among sensibles to *equal itself*, and be convinced that all these desire to become such as *equal itself*, but fall short of its perfection. This, Socrates, is necessary, from what has been previously said. But do we not, as soon as we are born, see and hear, and possess the other senses? Entirely so. But we have said it is necessary that prior to these we should have received the science of *equal itself*. Certainly, We must necessarily

farily therefore, as it appears, have received it before we were born. It appears so.

If therefore, receiving this before we were born, we were born possessing it; we both knew prior to our birth, and as soon as we were born, not only *the equal, the greater, and the lesser*, but every thing of this kind: for our discourse at present is not more concerning *the equal* than *the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy*, and in one word, about every thing which we mark with the signature of *that which is*, both in our interrogations when we interrogate, and in our answers when we reply: so that it is necessary we should have received the science of all these before we were born. All this is true. And if, since we receive these sciences, we did not forget each of them, we should always be born knowing, and should always know them, through the whole course of our life: for to know is nothing else than this, to retain the science which we have received, and not to lose it. Or do we not call oblivion the loss of science? Entirely so (says he), Socrates. But if, receiving science before we were born, we lose it at the time of our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these particulars, receive back again those sciences which we once before possessed, will not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own proper science? and shall we not speak rightly when we call this a certain reminiscence? Entirely so. For this appears to be possible, that when any one perceives any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, he may at the same time know something different from this, which he had forgot, and to which this approaches, whether it is dissimilar or similar. So that, as I said, one of these two things must be the consequence: either that we were

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born knowing these, and possess a knowledge of all of them, through the whole of our life; or that we only remember what we are said to learn afterwards; and thus learning will be reminiscence. The case is perfectly so, Socrates.

Which therefore will you choose, Simmias: that we are born knowing, or that we afterwards remember the particulars of which we formerly received the science? At present, Socrates, I have no choice. But what will be your choice in the following instance, and what will be your opinion about it? Can a man, who possesses science, render a reason concerning the objects of his knowledge, or not? There is a great necessity, says he, Socrates, that he should. And does it also appear to you, that all men can render a reason of the particulars concerning which we have just now spoken?—I wish they could, says Simmias; but I am much more afraid, that to-morrow there will no longer be any one here who can accomplish this in a becoming manner. You do not therefore think, Simmias, that all men know these particulars. By no means. They remember, therefore, the things which they have once learned. It is necessary. But when did our souls receive this science? for they did not receive them from those from whom we are born men. Certainly not. Before this period, therefore. Certainly. Our souls therefore, Simmias, had a subsistence before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed prudence. Unless, Socrates, we received these sciences while we were making our entrance into the present life; for that space of time is yet left for us. Let it be so, my friend. But in what other time did we lose these? for we were not born possessing them, as we have
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just now acknowledged. Did we lose them at the very time in which we received them? Or can you mention any other time? By no means, Socrates: but I was ignorant that I spoke nothing to the purpose.

Will then the case remain thus for us, Simmias? For if those things have a subsistence which we perpetually proclaim, viz. a certain something beautiful and good, and every such essence; and if we refer to this all sensible objects, as finding it to have a prior subsistence, and to be ours, and assimilate these to it, as images to their exemplar; it is necessary that, as these have a subsistence, so likewise that our soul should have subsisted before we were born: but if these are not, this discourse will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these should have a subsistence, and that our souls should have had a being before we were born, and that the one cannot be without the other?—The same necessity, Socrates (says Simmias), appears to me to take place in a most transcendent manner; and the discourse flies to a beautiful circumstance, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born, in a manner similar to that essence which you now speak of. For I possess nothing which is so clear to me as this, that all such things as the beautiful and the good subsist, in the most eminent degree, together with every thing else which you now mention; and, with respect to myself, it is sufficiently demonstrated. But how does it appear to Cebes? says Socrates: for it is necessary that Cebes also should be persuaded. In my opinion he is sufficiently so (says Simmias), although he is the most resolute of all men in not assenting to what is said. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded that our soul had a subsistence before we were born. But whether or not
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the soul remains after death, does not appear to me, Socrates (says he), to be yet demonstrated; but that doubt of the multitude, which Cebes mentioned, still presses hard upon me, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dissipated, and this is the end of its existence. For what hinders but that it may be born, and may have had a subsistence elsewhere, and this before it came into a human body; and yet, after it departs, and is liberated from this body, may then die, and be corrupted? You speak well, Simmias (says Cebes); for it appears that the half only of what was necessary has been demonstrated, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born: but it is necessary that you should demonstrate, besides this, that it no less subsists after we are dead, than it did before we were born, in order that the demonstration may be complete. This, Simmias and Cebes (says Socrates), is even now demonstrated, if you are only willing to connect into one and the same the present discourse and that which we before assented to; I mean that every vital nature is generated from that which is dead. For if the soul had a prior subsistence, and it is necessary that when it proceeds into the present life, and is generated man, that it should be generated from nothing else than death, and to be dead; how is it not necessary that it should also subsist after death, since it is requisite that it should be generated again? Its existence therefore after death is even now, as I said, demonstrated. But you and Simmias appear to me still more earnestly to discuss this assertion in a very pleasant manner, and to be afraid, like boys, lest on the soul's departure from the body the winds should tear it in pieces, and widely disperse it, especially if any one should die during a stormy blast, and not when the heavens are serene.

serene. Upon this Cebes laughing, Endeavour (says he), O Socrates! to persuade us of the contrary, as if we were afraid, or rather as if we were not afraid; though, perhaps, there is some boy among us, by whom circumstances of this kind may be dreaded: him, therefore, we should endeavour to persuade not to be terrified at death, as if it was some dreadful spectre. But it is necessary (says Socrates) to charm him every day till he becomes well. But from whence (says he), O Socrates! can a man acquire skill in such enchantment, since you are about to leave us? Greece (says he), Cebes, is very spacious, in some part of which good men may be found: and there are many barbarous nations, all which must be wandered over, inquiring after an enchanter of this kind, without sparing either riches or labour, as there is nothing for which wealth can be more seasonably bestowed. But it is necessary that you should inquire among yourselves; for perhaps you will not easily find any one who is more able to accomplish this than yourselves. Let these things be so (says Cebes): but, if you please, let us return from whence we made this digression. It will be agreeable to me (says Socrates): for how should it not be so? You speak well, says Cebes.

Some such thing, therefore (says Socrates), we ought to inquire of ourselves, viz. to what being the passion of becoming dissipated belongs; and respecting what we ought to fear, lest this should take place; and to whom a fear of this kind is proper: and after this, we should consider whether it is soul or not; and, as the result of these speculations, should either be confident or fearful concerning our soul. You speak true, says he. Is it not, therefore, a passion natural to that

which is collected together, and a composite, that it should be dissolved so far as it is a composite ; and that, if there is any thing without composition, to this alone, if to any other, it belongs not to suffer affections of this kind ? This (says Cebes) appears to me to be the case. But does it not follow, that things which always subsist according to the same, and in a similar manner, are, in the most eminent degree, in-composites ; but that such things as subsist differently at different times, and never according to the same, are composites ? To me it appears so. Let us return, therefore (says he), to the particulars of our former discourse : Whether is *essence itself* (which both in our inquiries and answers we established as having a being) that which always subsists similarly, and according to the same, or that which subsists differently at different times ? And does *the equal itself, the beautiful itself*, and every thing which truly is, ever receive any kind of mutation ? Or does not every thing which always truly is, and has a uniform subsistence, essentially abide in a similar manner according to the same, and never in any respect receive any mutation ? It is necessary, Socrates (says Cebes), that it should subsist similarly, and according to the same. But what shall we say concerning many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of this kind, which are either equal, or beautiful ; and of all such as are synonymous to these ? Do these also subsist according to the same, or rather are they not entirely contrary to those, so that they neither subsist similarly according to the same, either with respect to themselves or to one another, or, in one word, in any manner whatever ? These (says Cebes) never subsist in a similar condition. These, therefore, may be touched, may be seen and perceived by the
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other senses ; but those natures which always subsist according to the same, cannot be apprehended by any other means than the discursive energy of cogitation. But things of this kind are invisible, and cannot be seen. Are you willing, therefore (says he), that we should establish two species of beings, the one visible, and the other invisible ? Let us establish them, says he. And that the invisible subsists always according to the same, but the visible never according to the same. And this also (says he) we will establish. Come then (says Socrates), is there any thing else belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other soul ? Nothing else, says he. To which species, therefore, shall we say the body is more similar and allied ? It is manifest to every one (says he), that it is allied to the visible species. But what shall we say of the soul ? Is it visible, or invisible ? It is certainly not visible to men, Socrates, says he. But we speak of things which are visible or not so, with respect to the nature of men. Or do you think we speak of things visible to any other nature ? Of those which regard the nature of men. What then shall we say respecting the soul, that it is visible, or cannot be seen ? That it cannot be seen. The soul, therefore, is more similar to the invisible species than the body, but the body is more similar to the visible. It is perfectly necessary it should be so, Socrates.

And have we not also formerly asserted this, that the soul, when it employs the body in the speculation of any thing, either through sight, or hearing, or some other sense (for to speculate through sense, is to speculate through body), then, indeed, it is drawn by the body to things which never subsist according to the same, wanders and is agitated, and staggers like one in-

toxicated, through passing into contact with things of this kind? Entirely so. But when it speculates any thing, itself subsisting by itself, then it departs to that which is pure, eternal, and immortal, and which possesses a sameness of subsistence: and, as being allied to such a nature, it perpetually becomes united with it, when it subsists alone by itself, and as often as it is lawful for it to obtain such a conjunction: and then, too, it rests from its wanderings, and perpetually subsists similarly according to the same, about such natures, as passing into contact with them; and this passion of the soul is denominated prudence. You speak (says he), Socrates, in every respect beautifully and true. To which species, therefore, of things formerly and now spoken of, does the soul appear to you to be more similar and allied? It appears to me, Socrates (says he), that every one, and even the most indocile, must admit, in consequence of this method of reasoning, that the soul is both totally and universally more similar to that which subsists perpetually the same, than to that which does not so. But to which is the body most similar? To the other species.

But consider also as follows: that, since soul and body subsist together, nature commands that the one should be subservient and obey, but that the other should rule and possess dominion. And in consequence of this, which again of these appears to you to be similar to a divine nature, and which to the mortal nature? Or does it not appear to you that the divine nature is essentially adapted to govern and rule, but the mortal to be governed and be subservient? To me it does so. To which, therefore, is the soul similar? It is manifest, Socrates, that the soul is similar to the divine, but the body to the mortal nature.

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But consider (says he), Cebes, whether, from all that has been said, these conclusions will result to us, that the soul is most similar to the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform and indissoluble nature, and which always subsists similarly according to the same; but that the body is most similar to the nature which is human, mortal, void of intellect, multiform, dissoluble, and which never subsists according to the same. Can we, my dear Cebes, produce any arguments to shew that this is not the case? We cannot.

What then, in consequence of all this, must it not be the property of the body, to be swiftly dissolved; but of the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or something bordering on such an affection? How should it not? Do you conceive therefore (says he), that when a man dies, the visible part of him, or the body, which is situated in a visible region (and which we call a dead body subject to dissolution, ruin, and dissipation), does not immediately suffer any of these affections, but remains for a considerable space of time; and if any one dies possessing a graceful body, that it very much retains its elegant form? for when the body is bound and buried, according to the manner in which the Egyptians bury their dead, it remains almost entire for an incredible space of time; and though some parts of the body may become rotten, yet the bones and nerves, and every thing of this kind, are preserved as one may say immortal. Is it not so? Certainly. Can the soul therefore, which is invisible, and which departs into another place of this kind, a place noble, pure, and invisible, viz. into Hades, to a beneficent and prudent god (at which place, if divinity is willing, my soul will shortly arrive); can the soul, I say, since it is naturally of this

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kind, be immediately dissipated and perish on its being liberated from the body, as is asserted by the many? This is certainly, my dear Cebes and Simmias, far from being the case. But this will much more abundantly take place, if it is liberated in a pure condition, attracting to itself nothing of the body, as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but fled from it and collected itself into itself; an employment of this kind having been the subject of its perpetual meditation. But this is nothing else than to philosophize rightly, and to meditate with facility, *how to be dead in reality*. Or will not this be a meditation of death? Entirely so. Will not the soul therefore, when in this condition, depart to that which is similar to itself, a divine nature, and which is likewise immortal and prudent? and when it arrives thither, will it not become happy, being liberated from wandering and ignorance, terror and insane love, and from all other evils belonging to the human nature; and so, as it is said of the initiated, will in reality pass the rest of its time in the society of the gods? Shall we speak in this manner, Cebes, or otherwise? In this manner, by Jupiter (says Cebes).

But I think that if the soul departs polluted and impure from the body, as having always been its associate, attending upon and loving the body, and becoming enchanted by it, through its desires and pleasures, in such a manner, as to think that nothing really is, except what is corporeal, which can be touched and seen, eat and drunk, and employed for the purposes of venereal occupations, and at the same time is accustomed to hate, dread and avoid, that which is dark and invisible to the eye of sense, which is intelligible and apprehended by philosophy; do you think

think that a soul thus affected can be liberated from the body, so as to subsist sincerely by itself? By no means (says he). But I think that it will be contaminated by a corporeal nature, to which its converse and familiarity with the body, through perpetual association and abundant meditation, have rendered it similar and allied. Entirely so. But it is proper, my dear Cebes, to think that such a nature is ponderous and heavy, terrestrial and visible; and that a soul of this kind, through being connected with such a nature, is rendered heavy, and drawn down again into the visible region from its dread of that which is invisible and Hades, and, as it is said, wanders about monuments and tombs; about which indeed certain shadowy phantoms of souls appear, being the images produced by such souls as have not been purely liberated from the body, but which participate of the visible nature; and on this account they become visible. It is very reasonable to suppose so, Socrates. It is reasonable indeed, Cebes: and likewise that these are not the souls of the worthy, but of the depraved, who are compelled to wander about such places; by this means suffering the punishment of their former conduct, which was evil; and they are compelled thus to wander till, through the desire of a corporeal nature, which attends them, they are again bound to a body.

But they are bound, as it is proper they should be, to such manners as they have exercised in the present life. But what do you say these manners are, Socrates? As for example, that such as are addicted to gluttony, arrogant injuries, and drinking, and this without any fear of consequences, shall enter into the tribes of asses and brutes of this kind. Or do you not think it proper that they should? You speak in a manner perfectly becoming. But shall we not

say, that such as held, in the highest estimation, injustice, tyranny, and rapine, shall enter into the tribes of wolves, hawks, and kites? Or where else can we say such souls depart? Into tribes of this kind, certainly (says Cebes). It will therefore be manifest concerning the rest into what nature each departs, according to the similitudes of manners which they have exercised. It is manifest (says he); for how should it not be so? Are not therefore (says he) those among these the most happy, and such as depart into the best place, who have made popular and political virtue their study, which they call indeed temperance and justice, and which is produced from custom and exercise, without philosophy and intellect? But how are these the most happy? Because it is fit that these should again migrate into a political and mild tribe of this kind; such as bees, wasps, or ants, or into the same human tribe again, and from these become moderate men. It is fit.

But it is not lawful for any to pass into the genus of gods, except such as, through a love of learning, have philosophized, and departed from hence perfectly pure. But for the sake of this, my dear Simmias and Cebes, those who have philosophized rightly abstain from all desires belonging to the body, and strenuously persevere in this abstinence, without giving themselves up to their dominion; nor is it because they dread the ruin of their families and poverty, like the multitude of the lovers of wealth; nor yet because they are afraid of ignominy and the infamy of improbity, like those who are lovers of dominion and honours, that they abstain from these desires. For it would not, Socrates, become them so to do (says Cebes). It would not, by Jupiter (says he). Hence those (says he), O Cebes! who take care of their soul, and do not live in
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a state of subserviency to their bodies, bidding farewell to all such characters as we have mentioned above, do not proceed in the same path with these during the journey of life, because such characters are ignorant how they should direct their course; but considering that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, and to its solution and purification, they give themselves up to its direction, and follow wherever it leads. In what manner, Socrates? I will tell you (says he).

The lovers of learning well know, that when philosophy receives their soul into her protection (and when she does so, she finds it vehemently bound and agglutinated to the body, and compelled to speculate things through this, as through a place of confinement, instead of beholding herself through herself; and besides this, rolled in every kind of ignorance: philosophy likewise beholds the dire nature of the confinement, that it arises through desire; so that he who is bound in an eminent degree assists in binding himself); the lovers of learning therefore, I say, know that philosophy, receiving their soul in this condition, endeavours gently to exhort it, and dissolve its bonds; and this she attempts to accomplish, by shewing that the inspection of things through the eyes is full of deception, and that this is likewise the case with perception through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy too persuades the soul to depart from all these fallacious informations, and to employ them no farther than necessity requires; and exhorts her to call together and collect herself into one. And besides this, to believe in no other than herself, with respect to what she understands, herself subsisting by herself, of that which has likewise a real subsistence by itself; and not to consider that as having a true being which she speculates

lates through others, and which has its subsistence in others. And lastly, that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible; but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of a true philosopher therefore, thinking that he ought not to oppose this solution, abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when any one is vehemently delighted or terrified, afflicted or desirous, he does not suffer any such mighty evil from these as some one may perhaps conceive, I mean such as disease and a consumption of wealth, through indulging his desires; but that he suffers that which is the greatest, and the extremity of all evils, and this without apprehending that he does so. But what is this evil, Socrates (says Cebes)? That the soul of every man is compelled at the same time to be either vehemently delighted or afflicted about some particular thing, and to consider that about which it is thus eminently passive, as having a most evident and true subsistence, though this is by no means the case; and that these are most especially visible objects. Is it not so? Entirely. In this passion, therefore, is not the soul in the highest degree bound to the body? In what manner? Because every pleasure and pain, as if armed with a nail, fastens and rivets the soul to the body, causes it to become corporeal, and fills it with an opinion, that whatever the body asserts is true. For in consequence of the soul forming the same opinions with the body, and being delighted with the same objects, it appears to me that it is compelled to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished, and to become so affected, that it can never pass into Hades in a pure condition; but always departs full of a corporeal nature; and thus swiftly falls again into another body, and becoming as
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it were sown, is engendered ; and lastly, that from these it becomes destitute of a divine, pure, and uniform association. You speak most true, Socrates (says Cebes).

For the sake of these therefore, O Cebes ! those who are justly lovers of learning are moderate and brave, and not for the sake of such things as the multitude assert. Or do you think it is ? By no means ; for it cannot be. But the soul of a philosopher reasons in this manner ; and does not think that philosophy ought to free him from the body, but that when he is freed he may give himself up to pleasures and pains, by which he will again be bound to the body, and will undertake a work which it is impossible to finish, unweaving as it were the web of Penelope. But procuring tranquillity with respect to these, and following the guidance of the reasoning power, and being always conversant with this, contemplating at the same time that which is true, divine, and not the subject of opinion, and being likewise nourished by such an object of contemplation, he will think that he ought to live in this manner while he lives, and that when he dies he shall depart to a kindred essence, and an essence of this kind, being liberated from the maladies of the human nature. But from a nutriment of this kind the soul has no occasion to fear (while it makes these, O Simmias and Cebes ! its study) lest, in its liberation from the body, it should be lacerated, and, being blown about and dissipated by the winds, should vanish, and no longer have anywhere a subsistence.

When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued ; and Socrates seemed to revolve with himself what had been said ; as likewise did the greatest part of us : but Cebes and Simmias discoursed a little with each other. And Socrates at length looking upon them, What (says he), do our
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assertions appear to you to have been not sufficiently demonstrated? for many doubts and suspicions yet remain, if any one undertakes to investigate them sufficiently. If therefore you are considering something else among yourselves, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about those particulars which we have just now made the subject of our discourse, do not be remiss in speaking about and running over what has been said, if it appears to you in any respect, that we might have spoken better; and receive me again as your associate, if you think that you can be any ways benefited by my assistance. Upon this Simmias said, Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for some time since each of us being agitated with doubts, we impelled and exhorted one another to interrogate you, through our desire of hearing them solved; but we were afraid of causing a debate, lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances. But Socrates, upon hearing this, gently laughed, and said, This is strange indeed, Simmias; for I shall with difficulty be able to persuade other men, that I do not consider the present fortune as a calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than I was prior to the present event. And as it seems I appear to you to be more despicable than swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that it is necessary for them to die, sing not only as usual, but then more than ever; rejoicing that they are about to depart to that deity in whose service they are engaged. But men, because they themselves are afraid of death, falsely accuse the swans, and assert that, in consequence of their being afflicted at death, their song is the result of grief. Nor do they consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted

afflicted with any other malady; neither the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the lapwing, all which they say sing lamenting through distress. But neither do these birds, as it appears to me, sing through sorrow, nor yet the swans; but in my opinion these last are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo; and in consequence of foreseeing the good which Hades contains, they sing and rejoice at that period more remarkably than at any preceding time. But I consider myself as a fellow servant of the swans, and sacred to the same divinity. I possess a divining power from our common master no less than they; nor shall I be more afflicted than the swan in being liberated from the present life. Hence it is proper that you should both speak and inquire about whatever you please, as long as the eleven magistrates will permit. You speak excellently well (says Simmias); and as you give me permission, I will both tell you what are my doubts, and how far Cebes does not admit what has been said. For, as to myself, Socrates, I am perhaps of the same opinion about these particulars as yourself; that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been said in every possible way, and to desist before by an arduous investigation on all sides weariness is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is necessary, in things of this kind, either to learn or to find out the manner of their subsistence; or if both these are impossible, then, by receiving the best of human reasons, and that which is the most difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and sail in it through the ocean of life, unless some one should be able to be carried more safely, and with less danger, by means of a
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firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reason* *. I shall not therefore now be ashamed to interrogate, in consequence of

* This passage has given the modern, and no doubt most of the ancient Christians, occasion to suppose, that Plato, by a *more safe and firm divine reason*, insinuates a divine revelation: but this supposition, as Olympiodorus well observes, is absurd; since a divine tradition affords no higher evidence than that of opinion. He adds, that we must understand by this *θεῖος λόγος*, or *divine reason*, *self-beholding intellect*, which, agreeable to Plato's description of it in the Phædrus, associates with deity itself. *Τίς ὁ ἀσφαλιστέρος, καὶ ἀκινδυνότερος, καὶ βεβαιότερος, καὶ θεῖος λόγος; ἢ ἤτοι ὡς φασι ὁ θεὸς ἐκδοθεὶς, δοξαστικός γὰρ ὁ γέ τοιούτος. Ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ εἰρημικὸς αὐτοπτικός νους, ὁ θεὸς τῷ ὅλῳ συνῶν, ὡς ἐν Φαιδρῳ.* But in order to understand what Olympiodorus means by *self-beholding intellect*, it is necessary to observe that there are four modes of knowledge, which we are able to acquire in the present life. The first of these results from opinion, by which we learn *that* a thing is, without knowing *the why*: and this constitutes that part of knowledge, which was called by Aristotle and Plato *παιδεία*, or erudition; and which consists in moral instructions, for the purpose of purifying ourselves from immoderate passions. But the second is produced by the sciences; in which, from establishing certain principles as hypotheses, we educe necessary conclusions, and arrive at the knowledge of *the why* (as in the mathematical sciences); but at the same time we are ignorant with respect to the principles of these conclusions, because they are merely hypothetical. The third species of knowledge is that which results from Plato's dialectic; in which, by a progression through all ideas, we arrive at the first principle of things, and at that which is no longer hypothetical; and this by dividing some things and analyzing others, by producing many things from one thing, and one thing from many.

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of the confession which you have made ; nor shall I blame myself hereafter, that I have not spoken what appears to me at present : for upon considering what has been said, both with myself and together with Cebes, your doctrine did not seem to be sufficiently confirmed.

And perhaps, my friend (says Socrates), you have the truth on your side ; but inform me in what respect it did

But the fourth species is still more simple than this ; because it no longer uses analyzations or compositions, definitions or demonstrations, but by a simple and self-visive energy of intellect, speculates things themselves, and by intuition and contact becomes one with the object of its perception ; and this energy is the *divine reason*, which Plato speaks of in the present passage, and which far transcends the evidence of the most divine revelation ; since this last is at best but founded in opinion, while the former surpasses even the indubitable certainty of science.

I only add, that those expressions of doubt and uncertainty concerning the immortality of the soul, which occur in the course of this dialogue, are to be considered as arising from a deep conviction in Socrates, that this sublime truth could not be fully comprehended by his auditors, who were very far from being masters in philosophy, and that this must be the case with the *multitude* in general. For that Socrates, and consequently Plato, firmly believed in this most important truth, is evident from the *Phædrus* and the tenth book of the *Republic*, and from Plato's seventh *Epistle*, which contains the following remarkable passage: *πειθεσθαι δε ουτως αι χρηταις παλαιαις τε και νεοις λογοις η δε μηνουσιν ημιν αθανατον ψυχην ειναι, δικαστας τε ιχθιν, και τινειν τας μεγαλας τιμωριας, οταν τις απαλλαχθῃ του σωματος.* i. e. "It is proper indeed always to believe in *ancient and sacred discourses*, which announce to us that the soul is immortal, and that it has judges of its conduct, and suffers the greatest punishments when it is liberated from the body."

not seem to be sufficiently confirmed? In this (says he); because any one may assert the same about harmony, and a lyre, and its chords; that, for instance, harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, all-beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of a corporeal nature; that they are composites and terrestrial, and allied to that which is mortal. When any one therefore shall either have broke the lyre, or cut and burst the chords, some person may contend from the same reasoning as yours, that it is necessary the harmony should yet remain, and not be destroyed (for it cannot in any respect be possible that the lyre should subsist when the chords are burst, and the chords themselves are of a mortal nature; but the harmony, which is connate and allied to that which is divine and immortal, will become extinct, and perish prior to the mortal nature itself); because it is necessary that harmony should be somewhere, and that the wood and chords must suffer putrefaction, before this can be subject to any passion. For I think, Socrates, that you yourself have also perceived this, that we consider the soul in the most eminent degree, as something of such a kind as to become the temperament of hot and cold, moist and dry, and such-like affections, for the reception of which our body is extended, and by which it is contained: and that the soul is the harmony of all these, when they are beautifully and moderately tempered with each other. If therefore the soul is a certain harmony, it is evident that when our body suffers either intension or remission, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must from necessity immediately perish, though of the most divine nature (in the same manner as other harmonies perish, which either subsist in sounds, or in the works of
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artificers); but the remaining parts of the body of each person must subsist for a long time, till they are either burnt or become rotten. Consider then what we shall say to this discourse, if any one should think, since the soul is the temperament of things subsisting in the body, that it perishes the first, in that which is called death.

Socrates therefore beholding us and laughing, as he was accustomed to do very often, Simmias (says he) speaks justly. If any one of you therefore is more prompt than myself, why does he not reply to these objections? for he seems not to have handled this affair badly. But it appears to me, that before we make our reply, we should first hear Cebes, and know what it is which he objects to our discourse; that in consequence of some time intervening, we may deliberate what we shall say; and that afterwards, upon hearing the objections, we may either assent to them, if they appear to assert any thing becoming; or if they do not, that we may defend the discourse we have already delivered. But (says he) tell me, Cebes, what it is which so disturbs you, as to cause your unbelief. I will tell you (says Cebes): your discourse seems to me to be yet in the same state, and to be liable to the same accusation as we mentioned before. For that our soul had a subsistence before it came into the present form is an assertion I will not deny of a very elegant kind, and (if it is not too much to say) sufficiently demonstrated: but that it still remains when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I assent to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for it appears to me to be much more excellent than all these. Why then, says reason, do you yet disbelieve? for since you see, that when a man dies, that

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which is more imbecil still remains, does it not appear to you to be necessary, that the more lasting nature should be preserved during this period of time? Consider therefore whether I shall say any thing to the purpose in reply. For I, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of a certain similitude: for to me these things appear to be asserted in the same manner, as if any one should say concerning an aged dead weaver, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps still survives somewhere; and should exhibit as an argument in proof of this assertion a vestment woven by himself, which he wore, and which is yet safe and entire. And if some one not crediting his assertion, he should ask him which is the more lasting, the genus of man or of a garment, whose subsistence consists in its use and in being worn; then should it be replied, that the genus of man is much more lasting, he might think it demonstrated, that the man is by a much stronger reason preserved, since that which is of a shorter duration has not yet perished. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case. For consider with yourself what I say: since every person must apprehend, that he who asserts this speaks foolishly. For this weaver having worn and woven many such vestments, died *after* them being many, but I think *before* the last; and yet it cannot be any thing the more inferred on this account, that the man is viler or more imbecil than a vestment. And I think that the soul, with respect to the body, will receive the same similitude; and he who shall assert the same concerning these, will appear to me to speak in a very equable manner; I mean that the soul is of a lasting nature, but the body more debile and less durable. But I should say that each soul wears many bodies, especially if it lives many years: for
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if the body glides away like a stream, and is dissolved while the man yet lives, but the soul perpetually re-weaves that which is worn and consumed, it will be necessary indeed, that when the soul is destroyed, it should then be clothed with the last vestment, and should perish prior to this alone. But the soul having perished, then the body will evince the nature of its imbecility, and, becoming rapidly rotten, will be perfectly dissolved: so that, in consequence of this reasoning, it is not yet proper that we should be persuaded to believe with confidence, that our soul subsists somewhere after we are dead. For if any one should assent to him who asserts even more than you have done, and should grant that not only our soul had an existence before we were born into the present life, but that nothing hinders us from admitting that certain souls after death may still have a subsistence, exist in some future period, and often be born, and again perish (for so naturally strong is the soul, that it will preserve itself through frequent births); but **this** being granted, it may still follow, that it will not only labour in those many generations, but that finishing its course, in some one of these deaths, it will entirely perish. But no one should say that this death and dissolution of the body, which also introduces destruction to the soul, can be known: for it is impossible that it can be perceived by any one of us. But if this be the case, it will not follow that he who possesses the confidence of good hope concerning death, is not foolishly confident, unless he can demonstrate that the soul is perfectly immortal and undecaying: for otherwise it will be necessary, that he who is about to die should always fear for his soul, lest in the death, which is at hand, he should entirely perish through the separation of his body.

When we heard them therefore speak in this manner, we were all of us very disagreeably affected, as we afterwards declared to each other; because, as we were in the highest degree persuaded by the former discourse, they again seemed to disturb us and to cast us into unbelief; and this in such a manner, as not only to cause us to deny our assent to the arguments which had been already adduced, but to such as might afterwards be asserted, fearing lest either we should not be proper judges of any thing, or that the things themselves should be unworthy of belief.

ECHEC. By the gods, Phædo, I can easily pardon you: for while I am now hearing you, I cannot refrain from saying to myself, In what arguments can we any longer believe? For the discourse of Socrates, which a little before was vehemently credible, is now fallen into unbelief. For the assertion, that our soul is a certain harmony, gained my assent both now and always, in a wonderful manner; and now it is mentioned, it recalls as it were into my memory a knowledge that I formerly was of the same opinion. And thus I am perfectly indigent again of some other reason, as if from the very beginning, which may persuade me that the soul of a dead man does not die together with the body. Tell me therefore, by Jupiter, how Socrates pursued the discourse; and whether he, as you confess was the case with yourself, seemed troubled at these objections; or, on the contrary, answered them with facility; and whether he defended his doctrine sufficiently, or in a defective manner. Relate all these particulars to us as accurately as you can.

PHÆD. Indeed, Echecrates, I have often admired Socrates; but never more so than at that time. That he should be able indeed to say something in reply, is perhaps
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not wonderful ; but I especially admired, in the first place, this in him, that he received the discourse of the young men in such a pleasant, benevolent, and wonderful manner ; and in the next place, that he so acutely perceived how we were affected by their objections ; and lastly, that he so well cured our disturbance, recalled us, as if flying and vanquished, and caused us, in conjunction with himself, to pursue and consider the discourse.

ECHEC. But how did he do this ?

PHÆD. I will tell you : I happened at that time to sit at his right hand, upon a low seat, near his bed ; but he himself sat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head therefore, and compressing the hair which hung on my neck (for he used sometimes to play with my hairs), Tomorrow (says he), Phædo, you will perhaps cut off these beautiful locks. It seems so indeed (says I), Socrates. But you will not (says he), if you will be persuaded by me. But why not (says I) ? For both you and I (says he) ought to cut off our hair to-day, if our discourse must die, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I indeed, if I was you, and I found that discourse fled from me, I would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never suffer my hair to grow, till, by contesting in disputation, I had vanquished the objections of Simmias and Cebes. But (says I) Hercules is reported not to have been sufficient against two, Call upon me therefore (says he) as your Iolaus while the light yet lasts. I call then (says I), not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules. It is of no consequence (says he).

But, in the first place, we must be careful that we are not influenced by a certain passion. What passion (says I) ? That we do not become (says he) haters of reason, in

the same manner as some become haters of men. For no greater evil can happen to any one than to be a hater of reasons. But a hatred of reason and a hatred of mankind are both produced in the same manner. For misanthropy is produced in us through vehemently believing without art in some particular person, and considering him as a man true, sincere, and faithful, whom, in the course of a short acquaintance, we find to be depraved and unfaithful; and that this is the case again with another. And when any one often suffers this disappointment, and especially from those whom he considered as his most intimate familiars and friends, at length, through finding himself thus frequently hurt, he hates all men, and thinks that there is nothing in any respect sincere in any one. Or have you never perceived that this is the case? Entirely so (says I). But is not this base (says he)? and is it not evident that such a one attempts to make use of men, without possessing the art which respects human affairs? For if, in a certain respect, he employed them with art, he would think, as the case really is, that men vehemently good, or vehemently bad, are but few in number; and that the greater part of mankind are those which subsist between these. How do you mean (says I)? In the same manner (says he) as about things very small and very great. Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or any thing else; and again any thing excessively swift or slow, beautiful or base, white or black? Or do you not perceive that the summits of the extremes of all these are rare and few, but that things subsisting between these are copious and many? Entirely so (says I). Do you not therefore think (says he) that if a contest of improbity should be proposed, those
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who hold the first rank among the base would be found to be but few ? It is agreeable to reason to think so (says I). It is so indeed (says he); but in this respect reasons are not similar to men (for I shall now follow you as the leader); but in this they are similar, when any one, for instance, without possessing the art belonging to discourse, believes that a certain discourse is true, and shortly after it appears to him to be false, as it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other, and the same thing happens to him about different discourses. And this is particularly the case with those who are familiar with contradictory arguments; for these you know think that they at length become most wise, and alone perceive that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasons; but that every thing is whirled upwards and downwards, as if existing in the river Euripus, and does not abide in any one condition for any portion of time whatever. You speak perfectly true (says I). Would it not then (says he), Phædo, be a passion worthy of commiseration, if when a certain reason is true and firm, and is capable of being understood, yet some one falling from this should be involved in doubt, because he has heard reasons, which, though remaining the same, yet have at one time appeared to be true, and at another false; and should not accuse himself and his own want of skill, but at length through grief should transfer all the blame from himself to the reasons; and thus should pass the remainder of his life, hating and slandering reasons, and deprived of the truth and science of things? By Jupiter (says I), such a one would be miserable indeed.

In the first place therefore (says he) we should be very careful against admitting an opinion, that no reasoning

appears to be valid ; but we should much rather think that we are not yet in a healthy condition, and that we ought vigorously and cheerfully to study how to be well. And this indeed ought to be the case with you and others, for the sake of the whole remainder of your life, but with me, for the sake of death itself ; as there is danger at the present time, lest I should not behave philosophically, but, like those who are perfectly unskilled, contentiously. For such as these, when they controvert any particular, are not at all concerned how that subsists about which they dispute ; but are alone anxious, that what they have established may appear to the persons present to be true. And I appear to myself at present to differ alone in this respect from such as these : for I am not solicitous that my discourse may appear true to those who are present (except just as it may happen in passing), but that it may appear to be so in the most eminent degree to me myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend (and see in how fraudulent a manner), that if my assertions are true, it will be a beautiful circumstance to be persuaded of their truth ; but that if nothing remains for the dead, I shall at least have the advantage of being less afflicted with my present condition than others. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long (for it would be bad if it should), but shortly after this will be dissolved ; and being thus prepared (says he), Simmias and Cebes, I shall now return to the discourse. But that you may be persuaded by me, pay no attention to the person of Socrates, but be much more solicitous in assenting to the truth, if I should appear to you to assert any thing true ; but if this should not be the case, oppose me with all your might, and beware lest, through too much ardour, I should deceive both myself and you, and, acting
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in this respect like bees, should depart from you, leaving my sting behind.

But to begin (says he): In the first place remind me of what you have said, if it should appear that I have forgot it. For Simmias, I think, distrusted, and was afraid lest the soul, though it is at the same time more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as subsisting in the form of harmony. But Cebes appears to me to have admitted this, that the soul is more lasting than the body; but yet that it is perfectly uncertain, whether after the soul has worn out many bodies, and this often, it may not at length, leaving body behind, itself also perish; so that this will be death itself, I mean the destruction of the soul, since the body perpetually perishes without ceasing. Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we ought to consider? They both confessed that the particulars were these. Whether therefore (says he) do you reject the whole of our former discourse, or do you reject some things and not others? They replied, We admit some things, and not others. What then (says he) do you say about that discourse, in which we asserted that learning is reminiscence; and that this being the case, our soul must necessarily have subsisted somewhere before it was bound in the body? I indeed (says Cebes) was both then wonderfully persuaded by that discourse, and now firmly abide in the same opinion. And I also (says Simmias) am affected in the same manner; and I should very much wonder should I ever conceive otherwise about this particular. But (says Socrates) it is necessary, my Theban guest, that it should appear otherwise to you, if you still continue of the opinion, that harmony is something composite, and that the soul is a certain harmony,

composed from things extended through the body. For you will never assent to yourself asserting, that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it ought to be composed; or do you think you can? By no means (says he), Socrates. Do you perceive therefore (says he) that you will not be consistent in your assertions, when you say that the soul had a subsistence before it came into a human form and into body, but that at the same time it was composed from things which then had not a being? For neither is harmony such as that to which you assimilate it; but the lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, have a prior existence; but harmony is composed the last of all, and is the first dissolved. How therefore can this discourse be consonant with that? In no respect (says Simmias). But it certainly is proper (says he) that a discourse about harmony should be consonant, if this can ever be asserted of any other. It is proper indeed (says Simmias). But this discourse of yours is not consonant. Consider therefore which of these assertions you will choose, that learning is reminiscence, or that the soul is harmony. I prefer the former, Socrates, by much; for the latter gained my assent without a demonstration, through nothing more than a certain probability and specious appearance; from whence also it appears evident to the multitude of mankind. But I well know that the discourses which frame their demonstrations, from assimilative reasons only, are nothing more than empty boastings; and unless a man defends himself against them, they will very much deceive him, both in geometry and all other speculations. But the discourse about reminiscence and learning was delivered through an hypothesis highly worthy of reception. For in this it was said that our soul had a subsistence

sistence somewhere before it came into the present body, as it is an essence possessing the appellation of that which truly is. But, as I persuade myself, I assent to this doctrine in a manner sufficient and proper ; and hence it is necessary, as it appears to me, that I should neither assent to myself, nor to any other asserting that the soul is harmony.

But what (says he), Simmias ? Does it appear to you that it can either belong to this harmony, or to any composition, to subsist differently from the things from which it is composed ? By no means. And indeed, as it appears to me, it can neither perform or suffer any thing else, besides what these perform and suffer. He agreed it could not. It does not therefore belong to harmony to be the leader of the materials from which it is composed, but to follow them. This also he granted. It is far therefore from being the case, that harmony will either be moved or sound contrary, or in any other respect be adverse to its parts. Very far indeed (says he). But what, does not every harmony naturally subsist in such a manner as to be harmony, so far as it receives a congruous temperament ? I do not understand you. But (says he) if it were possible that it could be congruously tempered with still greater vehemence, and more in quantity, would it not be more vehemently harmony and more in quantity ; but if less vehemently and less in quantity, just the contrary ? Entirely so. But can it be said of the soul, that, even in the smallest circumstance, one soul is more vehemently and more in quantity, or less vehemently and less in quantity, soul, than another ? By no means (says he). Consider then (says he), by Jupiter, is it truly said, that one soul possesses intellect and virtue, and is good ; but that another is foolish and vicious, and is bad ? It is truly said. Among those

those therefore who establish the soul as harmony, what can any one call virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call the one harmony, and the other discord? And that the one, that is to say the good soul, is harmonized; and as it is harmony possesses another harmony in itself; but that the other is discord, and does not contain in itself another harmony? I know not what to reply (says Simmias); but it is manifest, that he who establishes this would make some such reply. But it has been granted (says he) that one soul is not more or less soul than another; and this is no other than to confess, that one harmony is not more vehemently and more in quantity, nor less vehemently and less in quantity, harmony, than another: is it not so? Entirely so. But that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized: is it not so? It is. But can that which is neither more nor less harmonized participate more or less of harmony? or does it equally participate? Equally. The soul therefore, since it is not more or less soul than another, is not more or less harmonized. It is not. But since it is thus affected, it will neither participate more of discord, nor of harmony. By no means. And again, in consequence of this passion, can one soul participate more of vice or virtue than another, since vice is discord, but virtue harmony? It cannot. But rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will participate of vice, since it is harmony: for doubtless the harmony, which is perfectly such, can never participate of discord. It certainly cannot. Neither therefore can the soul, which is perfectly soul, participate of vice: for how can it, in consequence of what has been said? In consequence of this reasoning, therefore, the souls of all animals will be similarly good;

good ; since they are naturally similarly souls, with respect to the essence of soul. To me it appears so, Socrates (says he). If the hypothesis therefore was right, would it appear to you to be beautifully said, and that this consequence ensued, that the soul is harmony ? By no means (says he).

But what (says Socrates), among all the things which are inherent in man, would you say that any thing else governed except soul, if he be a prudent man ? I should not. But whether does the soul govern, by assenting to the passions belonging to the body, or by opposing them ? My meaning is this, that when heat and thirst are present, the soul, if it governs, will frequently draw the body to the contrary, i. e. not to drink ; and hunger being present, that it shall not eat ; and in a thousand other instances we may behold the soul opposing the desires of the body : may we not ? Entirely so. Have we not above confessed, that if the soul was harmony, it would never sound contrary to the intensions, remissions, or vibrations, or any other passion belonging to its component parts, but that it would follow, and never rule over them ? We have granted this (says he) ; for how could we do otherwise ? But what, does not the soul now appear to act just the contrary to this, ruling over all those particulars, from which it may be said it subsists, nearly opposing all of them through the whole of life, and exercising absolute dominion over them all manner of ways, punishing some of these indeed with greater difficulty, and accompanied with pain ; some through gymnastic and medicine, and some by milder methods, and some again by threats, and others by admonishing desire, anger, and fear ; addressing that which it opposes,

opposes, as being itself of a different nature? just as Homer does in the *Odyssæy* *, where he says of Ulysses:

“ His breast he struck, and cry’d, My heart, sustain
 “ This ill ! for thou hast borne far greater pain.”

Do you think that Homer devised this in consequence of thinking that the soul is harmony, and of such a kind as to be led by the passions of the body, and not such as is naturally adapted to lead and govern, and which is something much more divine than harmony? By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that he did. By no means therefore, most excellent man, shall we do well, in asserting that the soul is a certain harmony: for by thus asserting, as it appears, we shall neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor be consistent with ourselves. It is so indeed (says he).

Let it then be so (says Socrates); and thus, as it appears, we have sufficiently appeased the patrons of the Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what discourse shall we appease the patrons of Cadmus? You appear to me (says Cebes) to be likely to find out a way: for you have delivered this discourse against harmony in a wonderful manner, and beyond what I expected. For while Simmias related his doubts, I thought it would be a most admirable thing, should any one be able to reply to his discourse. He therefore appears to me, in a manner perfectly extraordinary, not to have sustained the very first assault of your discourse. I should not therefore be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate. My good friend (says Socrates), don’t speak so magnificently, lest a certain envy should subvert our future discourse.

* Lib. 19, v. 15.

These things indeed will be taken care of by divinity. But we approaching near in an Homeric manner, will try whether you say any thing to the purpose. This then is the sum of what you enquire: you think it proper to demonstrate that our soul is without decay and immortal; that a philosopher who is about to die with all the confidence of hope, and who thinks that after death he shall be far more happy than in the present life, may not indulge a stupid and foolish confidence. But you say, though it should be shewn, that the soul is something robust and deform, and that it subsisted before we were born, yet nothing hinders, but that all these arguments may not evince its immortality, but only that the soul is more lasting than the body, that it formerly existed somewhere for an immense period of time, and that it knew and performed a multitude of things. But that, for all this, it will be nothing the more immortal; but that entering into the body of a man, it will be the principle of destruction to itself, as if connected with a disease: so that it will both lead a miserable life in the body, and at last will perish in that which is called death. But you say it is of no consequence whether it comes into body once or often, with respect to our occasion of fear: for it is very proper that he who neither knows, nor is able to render a reason why the soul is immortal, should be afraid of death, unless he is deprived of intellect. This, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I have repeated it often, that nothing may escape our observation; and that, if you are willing, you may either add or take away from our statement of the objections. But Cebes replied, I have nothing at present either to add or take away; but these are the objections which I make.

Socrates

Socrates therefore, after he had been silent for a long time, and considering something by himself, said, You require, Cebes, a thing of no small importance : for it is perfectly necessary to treat concerning the cause of generation and corruption. If you are willing, therefore, I will relate to you what happened to me in this investigation ; and afterwards, if any thing which I shall say shall appear to you useful, with respect to persuading you in the present enquiry, employ it for this purpose. But I am most assuredly willing (says Cebes). Hear then my narration : When I was a young man, Cebes, I was in a wonderful manner desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature : for it appeared to me to be a very superb affair to know the causes of each particular, on what account each is generated, why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself as it were upwards and downwards ; considering, in the first place, whether after that which is hot and cold has received a certain rottenness, as some say, then animals are nourished ; and whether the blood is that through which we become prudent, or air, or fire ; or whether none of these, but the brain, is that which affords the senses of hearing, seeing, and smelling ; so that memory and opinion are generated from these, and that from memory and opinion obtaining tranquillity, science is accordingly produced ? And again considering the corruptions of these, and the passions which take place about the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskilful in the speculation of these, as to receive no advantage from my enquiries. But I will give you a sufficient proof of the truth of this : for I then became so vehemently blind, with respect to things which I knew before very clearly (as it appeared both to myself and others) through this specu-

speculation, as to want instruction both in many particulars, which I thought I had known before, and in this, why a man is increased. For I thought it was evident to every one that this took place through eating and drinking : for when, from the aliment, flesh accedes to flesh, bone to bone, and every where kindred to kindred parts, then the bulk which was small becomes afterwards great ; and thus a little man becomes a large one. Such was then my opinion ; does it appear to you a becoming one ? To me indeed it does (says Cebes). But still further, consider as follows : for I thought that I seemed to myself sufficiently right in my opinion, when on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head ; and in like manner one horse than another : and still more evident than these, ten things appeared to me to be more than eight, because two is added to them, and that a bicubital is greater than a cubital magnitude, through its surpassing it by the half. But now (says Cebes) what appears to you respecting these ? By Jupiter (says he), I am so far from thinking that I know the cause of these, that I cannot even persuade myself, when any person adds one to one, that then the one to which the addition was made becomes two ; or that the added one, and that to which it is added, become two, through the addition of the one to the other. For I should wonder, since each of these, when separate from one another, was one, and not then two ; if, after they have approached nearer to each other, this should be the cause of their becoming two, *viz.* the association through which they are placed nearer to each other. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to persuade myself that this division is the cause of its becoming two. For that former cause of two being produced is contrary

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to this. For then this took place, because they were collected near to each other, and the one was applied to the other; but now, because the one is removed and separated from the other. Nor do I any longer persuade myself, that I know why one is produced; nor, in one word, why any thing else is either generated or corrupted, or is, according to this method of proceeding: but, in order to obtain this knowledge, I venture to mingle another method of my own, by no means admitting this which I have mentioned.

But having once heard a person reading from a certain book, composed, as he said, by Anaxagoras—when he came to that part, in which he says, that intellect orders and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and thought that, in a certain respect, it was an excellent thing for intellect to be the cause of all; and I considered that, if this was the case, disposing intellect would adorn all things, and place every thing in that situation in which it would subsist in the best manner. If any one therefore should be willing to discover the cause through which every thing is generated, or corrupted, or is, he ought to discover how it may subsist in the best manner, or suffer, or perform any thing else. In consequence of this, therefore, it is proper that a man should consider nothing else, either about himself or about others, except that which is the most excellent and the best: but it is necessary that he who knows this, should also know that which is subordinate, since there is one and the same science of both. But thus reasoning with myself, I rejoiced, thinking that I had found a preceptor in Anaxagoras, who would instruct me in the causes of things agreeable to my own conceptions; and that he would inform me, in the first place, whether the earth is flat or round; and afterwards explain the cause
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and necessity of its being so, adducing for this purpose that which is better, and shewing that it is better for the earth to exist in this manner. And if he should say it is situated in the middle, that he would, besides this, shew that it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he should render all this apparent to me, I was so disposed as not to require any other species of cause. I had likewise prepared myself in a similar manner for an inquiry respecting the sun, and moon, and the other stars, their velocities and revolutions about each other, and all their other passions; so as to be able to know why it is better for each to operate in a certain manner, and to suffer that which it suffers. For I by no means thought, after he had said that all these were orderly disposed by intellect, he would introduce any other cause of their subsistence, except that which shews that it is best for them to exist as they do. Hence I thought that in rendering the cause common to each particular, and to all things, he would explain that which is best for each, and is the common good of all. And indeed I would not have exchanged these hopes for a mighty gain! but having obtained his books with prodigious eagerness, I read them with great celerity, that I might with great celerity know that which is the best, and that which is base.

But from this admirable hope, my friend, I was forced away, when, in the course of my reading, I saw him make no use of intellect, nor employ certain causes, for the purpose of orderly disposing particulars, but assign air, æther, and water, and many other things, equally absurd as the causes of things. And he appeared to me to be affected in a manner similar to him who should assert, that all the actions of Socrates are produced by intellect; and afterwards, endeavouring to relate the causes of each particular action,

should say, that, in the first place, I now sit here because my body is composed from bones and nerves, and that the bones are solid, and are separated by intervals from each other; but that the nerves, which are of a nature capable of intension and remission, cover the bones together with the flesh and skin by which they are contained. The bones therefore being suspended from their joints, the nerves, by straining and relaxing them, enable me to bend my limbs as at present; and through this cause I here sit in an inflected position—And again, should assign other such-like causes of my conversation with you, *viz.* voice, and air, and hearing, and a thousand other such particulars, neglecting to adduce the true cause, that since it appeared to the Athenians better to condemn me, on this account, it also appeared to me to be better and more just to sit here, and, thus abiding, sustain the punishment which they have ordained me. For otherwise, by the dog, as it appears to me, these nerves and bones would have been carried long ago either into Megara or Bæotia, through an opinion of that which is best, if I had not thought it more just and becoming to sustain the punishment ordered by my country, whatever it might be, than to withdraw myself and run away. But to call things of this kind causes is extremely absurd. Indeed, if any one should say that without possessing such things as bones and nerves, and other particulars which belong to me, I could not act in the manner I appear to do, he would speak the truth: but to assert that I act as I do at present through these, and that I operate with this intellect, and not from the choice of that which is best, would be an assertion full of extreme negligence and sloth. For this would be the consequence of not being able to collect by division, that the true cause
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of a thing is very different from that without which a cause would not be a cause. And this indeed appears to me to be the case with the multitude of mankind, who, handling things as it were in darkness, call them by names foreign from the truth, and thus denominate things causes which are not so. Hence one placing round the earth a certain vortex, produced by the celestial motion, renders by this means the earth fixt in the centre; but another places air under it, as if it was a basis to a broad trough. But they neither investigate that power, through which things are now disposed in the best manner possible, nor do they think that it is endued with any demoniacal strength: but they fancy they have found a certain Atlas, more strong and immortal than such a strength, and far more sustaining all things; and they think that the good and the becoming do not in reality connect and sustain any thing. With respect to myself indeed, I would most willingly become the disciple of any one; so that I might perceive in what manner a cause of this kind subsists. But since I am deprived of this advantage, and have neither been able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from another, are you willing, Cebes, that I should shew you the manner in which I made a prosperous voyage to discover the cause of things? I am willing (says he) in a most transcendent degree.

It appeared to me therefore (says Socrates) afterwards, when I was wearied with such speculations, that I ought to take care lest I should be affected in the same manner as those are, who attentively behold the sun in an eclipse: for some would be deprived of their sight, unless they beheld its image in water, or in a similar medium. And something of this kind I perceived with respect to myself, and

was afraid lest my soul should be perfectly blinded through beholding things with the eyes of my body, and through endeavouring to apprehend them by means of the several senses. Hence I considered that I ought to fly to reasons, and in them survey the truth of things. Perhaps indeed this similitude of mine may not in a certain respect be proper: for I do not entirely admit that he who contemplates things in reasons, surveys them in images, more than he who contemplates them in external effects. This method therefore I have adopted; and always establishing that reason as an hypothesis, which I judge to be the most valid, whatever appears to me to be consonant to this, I fix upon as true, both concerning the cause of things and every thing else; but such as are not consonant I consider as not true. But I wish to explain to you what I say in a clearer manner: for I think that you do not at present understand me. Not very much, by Jupiter, says Cebes.

But (says he) I now assert nothing new, but what I have always asserted at other times, and in the preceding disputation. For I shall now attempt to demonstrate to you that species of cause which I have been discoursing about, and shall return again to those particulars which are so much celebrated; beginning from these, and laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain something beautiful, itself subsisting by itself; and a certain something good and great, and so of all the rest; which if you permit me to do, and allow that such things have a subsistence, I hope that I shall be able from these to demonstrate this cause to you, and discover that the soul is immortal. But (says Cebes) in consequence of having granted you this already, you cannot be hindered from drawing such a conclusion. But consider (says he) the things consequent to these,

these, and see whether you will then likewise agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be any thing else beautiful, besides the beautiful itself, it cannot be beautiful on any other account, than because it participates of the beautiful itself; and I should speak in the same manner of all things. Do you admit such a cause? I admit it (says he). I do not therefore (says Socrates) any longer perceive, nor am I able to understand those other *wise* causes; but if any one tells me why a certain thing is beautiful, and assigns as a reason, either its possessing a florid colour, or figure, or something else of this kind, I bid farewell to other hypotheses (for in all others I find myself disturbed); but this I retain with myself, simply, unartificially, and perhaps foolishly, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, than either the presence, or communion, or in whatever manner the operations may take place, of the beautiful itself. For I cannot yet affirm how this takes place; but only this, that all beautiful things become such through the beautiful itself. For it appears to me most safe thus to answer both myself and others; and adhering to this, I think that I can never fall, but that I shall be secure in answering, that all beautiful things are beautiful through the beautiful itself. Does it not also appear so to you? It does. And that great things therefore are great, and things greater, greater through magnitude itself; and things lesser, lesser through smallness itself? Certainly. Neither therefore would you assent, if it should be said that some one is larger than another by the head, and that he who is lesser is lesser by the very same thing, *i. e.* the head: but you would testify that you said nothing else than that, with respect to every thing great, one thing is greater than another, by nothing else than magnitude, and that through

this it is greater, *i. e.* through magnitude; and that the lesser is lesser through nothing else than smallness, and that through this it is lesser, *i. e.* through smallness. For you would be afraid, I think, lest, if you should say that any one is greater and lesser by the head, you should contradict yourself: first, in asserting that the greater is greater, and the lesser lesser by the very same thing; and afterwards, that the greater is greater by the head, which is a small thing; and that it is monstrous to suppose, that any thing which is great can become so through something which is small. Would you not be afraid of all this? Indeed I should (says Cebes, laughing). Would you not also (says he) be afraid to say, that ten things are more than eight by two, and that through this cause ten transcends eight, and not by multitude and through multitude? And in like manner, that a thing which is two cubits in length is greater than that which is but one cubit, by the half, and not by magnitude? for the dread is indeed the same. Entirely so (says he). But what, one being added to one, will the addition be the cause of their becoming two? or if one is divided, and two produced, would you not be afraid to assign division as the cause? Indeed you would cry with a loud voice, that you know no other way by which any thing subsists, than by participating the proper essence of every thing which it participates; and that in these you can assign no other cause of their becoming two, than the participation of the duad; and that it is proper all such things as are about to become two, should participate of this, and of unity, whatever is about to become one. But you would bid farewell to these divisions and additions, and other subtilties of this kind, and would leave them to be employed in answering, by those who are
wiser

wiser than yourself. And fearing, as it is said, your own shadow, and your own unskilfulness, you would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer in the manner I have described. But if any one should adhere to this hypothesis, you would refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from thence, and whether they were consonant or dissonant to one another. But when it is necessary for you to assign a reason for your belief in this hypothesis, you will assign it in a similar manner, laying down again another hypothesis, which shall appear to be the best among supernal natures, till you arrive at something sufficient. At the same time you will by no means confound things by mingling them together, after the manner of the contentious, when you discourse concerning the principle and the consequences arising from thence, if you are willing to discover any thing of true beings. For by such as these perhaps no attention is paid to this. For these, through their wisdom, are sufficiently able to mingle all things together, and at the same time please themselves. But you, if you rank among the philosophers, will act, I think, in the manner I have described. Both Simmias and Cebes said, You speak most truly.

ECHEC. By Jupiter, Phædo, they assented with great propriety: for he appears to me to have asserted this in a manner wonderfully clear; and this even to one endued with the smallest degree of intellect.

PHÆD. And so indeed, Echecrates, it appeared in every respect to all who were present.

ECHEC. And well it might: for it appears so to us, now we hear it, who were not present. But what was the discourse after this?

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If I remember right, after they had granted all this, and had confessed that each of the several species was something, and that others participating of these received the same denomination, he afterwards interrogated them as follows: If then you allow that these things are so, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do you not then assert, that both magnitude and parvitude are inherent in Simmias? I do. And yet (says he) you must confess that this circumstance of Simmias surpassing Socrates, does not truly subsist in the manner which the words seem to imply. For Simmias is not naturally adapted to surpass Socrates; so far as he is Simmias, but by the magnitude which he possesses; nor again does he surpass Socrates so far as Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses parvitude, with respect to his magnitude. True. Nor again is Simmias surpassed by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo possesses magnitude with respect to the parvitude of Simmias. It is so. Simmias therefore is allotted the appellation of both small and great, being situated in the middle of both, exhibiting his smallness to be surpassed by the greatness of the one, and his greatness to the other's smallness, which it surpasses. And at the same time, gently laughing, I seem (says he) to have spoken with all the precision of an historian; but notwithstanding this, it is as I say. He allowed it. But I have mentioned these things, in order that you may be of the same opinion as myself. For to me it appears, not only that magnitude is never willing to be at the same time both great and small, but that the magnitude which we contain never desires to receive that which is small, nor be surpassed; but that it is willing to do one of these two things,

things, either to fly away, and gradually withdraw itself, when its contrary the small approaches to it, or to perish when it arrives; but that it is unwilling, by sustaining and receiving parvitude, to be different from what it was. In the same manner as I myself receiving and sustaining parvitude, and still remaining that which I am, am nevertheless small. But that being great dares not to be small. And in like manner *the small*, which resides in us, is not willing at any time *to subsist in becoming to be great, or to be great*: nor does any thing else among contraries, while it remains that which it was, wish at the same time *to subsist in becoming to be, and to be*, its contrary; but it either departs or perishes in consequence of this passion. It appears so to me (says Cebes) in every respect.

But a certain person, who was present, upon hearing this (I don't clearly remember who it was), By the gods (says he), was not the very contrary of what you now assert admitted by you in the former part of your discourse, *viz.* that the greater was generated from the less, and the less from the greater; and that generation, among contraries, plainly took place from contraries? But now you appear to me to say, that this can never be the case. Upon this Socrates, after he had extended his head a little farther, and had listened to his discourse, said, You very manfully put me in mind; yet you do not understand the difference between what is now, and what was then asserted. For then it was said, that a contrary thing was generated from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that contrary which subsists in us, nor that which subsists in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke concerning things which possess contraries, calling the contraries by the appellation of the things in which they

they reside; but now we speak of things which receive their denomination from the contraries residing in them. And we should never be willing to assert that these contraries receive a generation from one another. And at the same time, beholding Cebes, he said, Did any thing which has been said by this person disturb you also? Indeed (says Cebes) it did not; and at such a time as this there are not many things which can disturb me. We ingenuously therefore (says he) assent to this, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself. Entirely so (says Cebes).

But still farther (says he) consider whether you agree with me in this also. Do you call *the hot* and *the cold* any thing? I do. Are they the same with snow and fire? They are not, by Jupiter. *The hot* therefore is something different from *fire*, and *the cold* from *snow*. Certainly. But this also is, I think, apparent to you, that snow, as long as it is such, can never, by receiving heat, remain what it was before, *viz.* snow, and at the same time become hot; but, on the accession of heat, must either withdraw itself from it, or perish. Entirely so. And again, that fire, when cold approaches to it, must either depart or perish; but that it will never dare, by receiving coldness, still to remain what it was, *i. e.* fire, and yet be at the same time cold. You speak truly (says he). But (says Socrates) it happens to some of these, that not only the species itself is always thought worthy of the same appellation, but likewise something else, which is not indeed that species, but which perpetually possesses the form of it, as long as it exists. But in the following instances my meaning will perhaps be more apparent: for the odd number ought always to possess that name, by which we now call it: should it not? Entirely so. But is this the case

case with the odd number alone (for this is what I inquire)? or is there any thing else which is not indeed the same with the odd, but yet which ought always to be called odd, together with its own proper name, because it naturally subsists in such a manner, that it can never desert the form of the odd? But this is no other than what happens to the number three, and many other things. For consider, does not the number three appear to you to be always called by its proper name, and at the same time by the name of the odd, though *the odd* is not the same as *the triad*? Yet both the triad, and the pentad, and the entire half of number, naturally subsist in such a manner, that though they are not the same as *the odd*, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other order of number, though they are not the same as the *even*, yet each of them is always even: do you admit this or not? How should I not (says he)? See then (says Socrates) what I wish to evince. But it is as follows: It has appeared, not only that contraries do not receive one another, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea which they contain; but that on its approach they either perish or depart. Shall we not therefore say, that three things would first perish, and endure any thing whatever, sooner than sustain to be three things, and at the same time to be even? Entirely so (says Cebes). And yet (says Socrates) the duad is not contrary to the triad. Certainly not. Not only therefore do contrary species never sustain the approach of each other, but certain other things likewise cannot sustain the accession of contraries. You speak most true (says he).

Are you willing therefore (says he) that, if we are able,

we should define what kind of things these are? Entirely so. Will they not then, Cebes (says he), be such things as compel whatever they occupy, not only to retain their idea, but likewise not to receive a contrary to it? How do you mean? Exactly as we just now said. For you know it is necessary, that whatever things the idea of three occupies, should not only be three, but likewise odd. Entirely so. To a thing of this kind therefore we assert, that an idea contrary to that form, through which it becomes what it is, will never approach. It cannot. But it becomes what it is through the odd: does it not? Certainly. But is not the contrary to this the idea of the even? It is. The idea of the even therefore will never accede to three things. Never. Are not three things therefore destitute of the even? Destitute. The triad therefore is an odd number. It is. The things which I mentioned then are defined, *viz.* such things, which, though they are not contrary to some particular nature, yet do not at the same time receive that which is contrary; just as the triad in the present instance, though it is not contrary to the even, yet does not any thing more receive it on this account: for it always brings with it that which is contrary to the even; and in like manner the duad to the odd, and fire to cold, and an abundant multitude of other particulars. But see whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not receive a contrary, but likewise that the nature which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never receive the contrariety of that which it introduces. But recollect again, for it will not be useless to hear it repeated often. Five things will not receive the form of the even; neither will ten things, which are the double of five, receive the form of the odd. This therefore, though it is itself contrary to something else,

else, yet will not receive the form of the odd; nor will the sesquialter, nor other things of this kind, such as the half and the third part, ever receive the form of the whole, if you pursue and assent to these consequences. I most vehemently (says he) pursue and assent to them.

Again therefore (says Socrates) speak to me from the beginning; and this not by answering to what I enquire, but in a different manner, imitating me. For I say this, in consequence of perceiving another mode of answering, arising from what has now been said, no less secure than that which was established at first. For if you should ask me what that is, which, when inherent in any body, causes the body to be hot, I should not give you that cautious and unskilful answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant deduced from what we have just now said; I mean, that it is fire. Nor, if you should ask me what that is, which, when inherent in a certain body, the body is diseased, I should not say that it is disease, but a fever. Nor, if you should ask what that is, which, when inherent in a number, the number will be odd, I should not say that it is imparity, but unity, and in similar manner in other particulars. But see whether you sufficiently understand my meaning. Perfectly so (says he). Answer me then (says Socrates) what that is, which, when inherent in the body, the body will be alive? Soul (says he). Is this then always the case? How should it not (says he)? Will soul therefore always introduce life to that which it occupies? It will truly (says he). But is there any thing contrary to life or not? There is. But what? Death. The soul therefore will never receive the contrary to that which it introduces, in consequence of what has been already admitted; and this most vehemently so (says Cebes).

But

But what, how do we denominate that which does not receive the idea of the even? Odd (says he). And how do we call that which does not receive justice, and that which does not receive music? We call (says he) the one unjust, and the other unmusical. Be it so. But what do we call that which does not receive death? Immortal (says he). The soul does not receive death? It does not. The soul therefore is immortal. Immortal. Let it be so (says he). And shall we say that this is now demonstrated? Or how does it appear to you? It appears to me, Socrates, to be most sufficiently demonstrated. What then (says he), Cebes, if it were necessary to *the odd* that it should be free from destruction, would not three things be indestructible? How should they not? If therefore it was also necessary that a thing void of heat should be indestructible, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unliquified? For it would not perish; nor yet, abiding, would it receive the heat. You speak the truth (says he). In like manner, I think if that which is void of cold was indestructible, that when any thing cold approached to fire, the fire would neither be extinguished nor destroyed, but would depart free from damage. It is necessary (says he). Hence (says Socrates) it is necessary to speak in this manner concerning that which is immortal: for if that which is immortal is indestructible, it is impossible that the soul, when death approaches to it, should perish. For it follows, from what has been said, that it does not receive death, and of course it will never be dead. Just as we said, that three things will never be even, nor will this ever be the case with that which is odd: nor will fire ever be cold, nor yet the heat which is inherent in fire. But some one may say, What hinders but that the odd may never become

become the even, through the accession of the even, as we have confessed; and yet, when the odd is destroyed, the even may succeed instead of it? We cannot contend with him who makes this objection, that it is not destroyed: for the odd is not free from destruction; since, if this was granted to us, we might easily oppose the objection, and obtain this concession, that the odd and three things would depart, on the approach of the even; and we might contend in the same manner about fire and heat, and other particulars: might we not? Entirely so. And now, therefore, since we have confessed respecting that which is immortal, that it is indestructible, it must follow that the soul is, together with being immortal, likewise indestructible: but if this be not admitted, other arguments will be necessary for our conviction. But there is no occasion for this (says he). For it is scarcely possible that any thing else should be void of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is subject to dissolution.

But I think (says Socrates) that divinity, and the form itself of life, and if any thing else besides this is immortal, must be confessed by all beings to be entirely free from dissolution. All men, indeed (says he), by Jupiter, must acknowledge this; and much more, as it appears to me, must it be admitted by the gods. Since, therefore, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, will not the soul, since it is immortal, be indestructible? It is perfectly necessary. When, therefore, death invades a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies; but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, and withdraws itself from death. It appears so. The soul, therefore (says he), O Cebes, will, more than any thing, be immortal and indestructible; and our souls will in reality subsist in Hades. And therefore (says
Q he),

he), Socrates, I have nothing further to object to these arguments, nor any reason why I should disbelieve their reality : but if either Simmias, or any person present, has any thing to say, he will do well not to be silent : for I know not what other opportunity he can have, besides the present, if he wishes either to speak or hear about things of this kind. But indeed (says Simmias) I have nothing which can hinder my belief in what has been said. But yet on account of the magnitude of the things about which we have discoursed, and through my despising human imbecility, I am compelled to retain with myself an unbelief about what has been asserted. Indeed, Simmias (says Socrates), you not only speak well in the present instance, but it is necessary that even those first hypotheses which we established, and which are believed by us, should at the same time be more clearly considered : and if you sufficiently investigate them, you will follow reason, as it appears to me, in as great a degree as is possible to man. And if this becomes manifest, you will no longer make any further enquiry. You speak true (says he).

But it is just, my friends (says he), to think that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care and attention, not only for the present time, in which we say it lives, but likewise with a view to the whole of time : and it will now appear, that he who neglects it must subject himself to a most dreadful danger. For if death were the liberation of the whole man, it would be an unexpected gain to the wicked to be liberated at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with their soul : but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, no other flight from evils, and no other safety remains for it, than in becoming the best and most prudent possible. For when the soul arrives

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at Hades, it will possess nothing but discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, in the very beginning of their progression thither. For thus it is said: that the dæmon of each person, which was allotted to him while living, undertakes to lead each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them being collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time. The journey, therefore, is not such as Telephus asserts it to be in Eschylus. For he says that a simple path leads to Hades: but it appears to me that the path is neither simple nor one. For there would be no occasion of leaders, nor could any one ever wander from the right road, if there was but one way. But now it appears to have many divisions and dubious turnings: and this I conjecture from our holy and legal rites. The soul, therefore, which is properly adorned with virtue, and which possesses prudence, willingly follows its leader, and is not ignorant of its present condition: but the soul which still adheres to body through desire (as I said before), being for a long space of time terrified about it, and struggling and suffering abundantly about the visible place, is with violence and great difficulty led away by its presiding dæmon. But when it arrives at that place where other souls are assembled, all the rest fly from and avoid this unpurified soul, and which has been guilty either of unjust slaughter, or has perpetrated such deeds as are allied to this, and are the works of kindred souls; nor is any one willing to become either its companion or leader. But such a soul

wanders about, oppressed with every kind of anxiety and trouble, till certain periods of time are accomplished : and these being completed, it is driven by necessity to an abode accommodated to its nature. But the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation, obtaining the gods for its companions and leaders, will reside in a place adapted to its purified condition.

There are indeed many and admirable places belonging to the earth ; and the earth itself is neither of such a kind, nor of such a magnitude, as those who are accustomed to speak about it imagine, as I am persuaded from a certain person's account. How is this, Socrates (says Simmias) ? For I myself also have heard many things about the earth ; and yet perhaps not these particulars which have obtained your belief. I should therefore be glad to hear you relate them. Indeed, Simmias (says he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be necessary, in order to relate these particulars ; but to evince their truth, seems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accomplish. Besides, I myself perhaps am not able to accomplish this ; and even though I should know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, seems by no means sufficient for the length of such a discourse. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am persuaded is the truth, respecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains. And this information (says Simmias) will be sufficient. I am persuaded, therefore (says he), in the first place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical figure, it has no occasion of air, nor of any other such-like necessity, to prevent it from falling : but that the perfect similitude of the heavens to themselves, and the equilibrium of the earth, are sufficient causes
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of its support. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a similar nature, cannot tend more or less to one part than another ; but subsisting on all sides similarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the first thing of which I am persuaded. And very properly so (says Cebes). But yet further (says he), that the earth is prodigiously great; that we who dwell in places extending from Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, inhabit only a certain small portion of it, about the mediterranean sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others elsewhere, who dwell in many such-like places. For I am persuaded, that there are every where about the earth many hollow places of all various forms and magnitudes; into which there is a confluence of water, mists and air: but that the earth itself, which is of a pure nature, is situated in the pure heavens, in which the stars are contained, and which most of those who are accustomed to speak about such particulars denominate æther. But the places which we inhabit are nothing more than the dregs of this pure earth, or cavities into which its dregs continually flow. We are ignorant, therefore, that we dwell in the cavities of this earth, and imagine that we inhabit its upper parts. Just as if some one dwelling in the middle bottom of the sea, should think that he resided on its surface, and beholding the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the sea is the heavens; but through sloth and imbecility having never ascended to the top of the sea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other, who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very same manner are we affected: for,

dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reside on its surface; and we call the air heaven, as if the stars passed through this, as through the heavens themselves. And this, likewise, in the same manner as in the above instance, happens to us through our imbecility and sloth, which renders us incapable of ascending to the summit of the air. For otherwise, if any one could arrive at its summit, or becoming winged could fly thither, he would be seen emerging from hence; and just as fishes, emerging hither from the sea, perceive what our region contains, in the same manner would he behold the several particulars belonging to the summit of the earth. And besides this, if his nature was sufficient for such an elevated survey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the stones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, just as things in the sea are corroded by the salt: for nothing worthy of estimation grows in the sea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and sand, and immense quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But those upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than these which we inhabit. For if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places those are on the upper earth, situated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (says he), in the first place, that this earth, if any one surveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve skins, various, and distinguished

guished with colours ; a pattern of which are the colours found among us, and which our painters use. But there the whole earth is composed from materials of this kind, and such as are much more splendid and pure than our region contains : for they are partly indeed purple, and endued with a wonderful beauty ; partly of a golden colour ; and partly more white than plaster or snow, and are composed from other colours in a similar manner, and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. For the hollow parts of this pure earth being filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of colour, shining among the variety of other colours in such a manner, that one particular various form of the earth continually presents itself to the view. Hence whatever grows in this earth grows analogous to its nature, such as trees and flowers and fruits : and again, its mountains and stones possess a similar perfection and transparency, and are rendered beautiful through various colours ; of which the stones so much honoured by us in this place of our abode are but small parts, such as sardin stones, jaspers and emeralds, and all of this kind. But there nothing subsists which is not of such a nature as I have described ; and there are other things far more beautiful than even these. But the reason of this is because the stones there are pure, and not consumed and corrupted, like ours, through rottenness and salt, from a conflux of various particulars, which in our places of abode cause filthiness and disease to the stones and earth, animals and plants, which are found among us. But this pure earth is adorned with all these, and with gold and silver, and other things of a similar nature : for all these are naturally apparent, since they are both numerous and large, and are diffused every where throughout the

earth; so that to behold it is the spectacle of blessed spectators. This earth too contains many other animals and men, some of whom inhabit its middle parts; others dwell about the air, as we do about the sea; and others reside in islands which the air flows round, and which are situated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the sea are to us, with respect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the seasons there are endued with such an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never molested with disease, and live for a much longer time than those who dwell in our regions; and they surpass us in sight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And besides this, they have groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods dwell in reality; and likewise oracles and divinations, and sensible perceptions of the gods, and such-like associations with them. The sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are; and in every other respect their felicity is of a correspondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally subsists, and the parts which are situated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; some of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit; but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a less chasm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are less profound, but broader than ours. But all these are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have passages of communication through which a great quantity of
water

water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and besides this, there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewise a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moist mire, some of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a stream of fire, which is itself a flaming torrent. And from these the several places are filled, into which each flows at particular times. But all these are moved upwards and downwards, like a hanging vessel, situated in the earth. But this hanging vessel, through a certain nature of this kind, is one of the chasms of the earth; and this too the greatest, and totally perforated through the whole earth. And of this Homer * thus speaks:

Far, very far, where under earth is found
A gulf, of every depth, the most profound:

Which he elsewhere, and many other poets, denominate Tartarus. For into this chasm there is a conflux of all rivers, from which they again flow upwards. But each derives its quality from the earth through which it flows. And the reason why they all flow into, and again out of this chasm, is because this moisture cannot find either a bottom or a basis. Hence it becomes elevated, and fluctuates upwards and downwards: and this too is the case with the air and spirit which are situated about it. For they follow this moisture, both when they are impelled to more remote places of the earth, and when to the places of our abode. And as in respiration the flowing breath is perpetually expired and inspired, so there the spirit, which is elevated together with the moisture, causes certain vehement and im-

* Iliad, lib. 8.

menſe winds during its ingreſs and departure. When the water therefore being impelled flows into that place which we call downwards, then the rivers flow through the earth into different channels, and fill them; juſt as thoſe who pour into another veſſel the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and theſe, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have ſeverally paſſed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce ſeas, lakes, rivers and fountains. But flowing back again from hence under the earth, and ſome of them ſtreaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round ſuch as are ſhorter and leſs numerous, they again hurl themſelves into Tartarus; and ſome indeed much more profoundly, but others leſs ſo, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of ſome are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the ſame part. There are ſome again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themſelves like ſnakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as poſſible, they are again hurled forth on each ſide till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes ſteep to both theſe ſtreams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain ſtreams, four in number, of which the greateſt, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermoſt of all, is called the ocean. But that which flows oppoſite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other ſolitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the
Acheruſian

Acherusian marsh, into which many souls of the dead pass; and abiding there for certain destined spaces of time, some of which are more and others less extended, they are again sent into the generations of animals. The third river of these hurls itself forth in the middle, and near its source falls into a mighty place, burning with abundance of fire, and produces a lake greater than our sea, and hot with water and mud. But it proceeds from hence in a circle, turbulent and miry, and, surrounding the earth, arrives both elsewhere and at the extremities of the Acherusian marsh, with the water of which it does not become mingled; but often revolving itself under the earth, flows into the more downward parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they still denominate Pyriphlegethon; the streams of which send forth dissevered rivers to various parts of the earth. But the fourth river, which is opposite to this, first falls as it is said into a place dreadful and wild, and wholly tinged with an azure colour, which they denominate Styx: and the influxive streams of this river form the Stygian marsh. But falling into this, and receiving vehement powers in its water, it hides itself under the earth, and, rolling round, proceeds contrary to Pyriphlegethon, and meets with it in the Acherusian marsh, in a contrary direction. Nor is the water of this river mingled with any thing, but, revolving in a circle, it hurls itself into Tartarus, in a course opposite to Pyriphlegethon. But its name, according to the poets, is Cocytus.

But these being thus naturally constituted, when the dead arrive at that place into which the dæmon leads each, in the first place they are judged, as well those who have lived in a becoming manner, and piously, and justly, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a

middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and ascending the vehicles prepared for them, arrive in these at the Acherusian lake, and dwell there; till being purified, and having suffered punishment for any injuries they may have committed, they are enlarged; and each receives the reward of his beneficence, according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, because they have perpetrated either many and great sacrileges, or many unjust slaughters, and such as are contrary to law, or other things of this kind—these, a destiny adapted to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which they will never be discharged. But those who are found to have committed curable, but yet mighty crimes, such as those who have been guilty through anger of any violence against their father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their lives penitent for the offence, or who have become homicides in any other similar manner; with respect to these, it is necessary that they should fall into Tartarus; but after they have fallen, and have dwelt there for a year, the waves hurl them out of Tartarus; and the homicides indeed into Cocytus, but the violators of fathers and mothers into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along by these rivers, they arrive at the Acherusian marsh, they here bellow and invoke one part those whom they have slaughtered, and another part those whom they have injured. But invoking these, they suppliantly intreat that they would suffer them to enter into the lake, and forgive them. And if they persuade them to do this, they depart, and find an end to their maladies: but if they are unable to accomplish this, they are carried back again into Tartarus, and from thence again into the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this, till they have per-
suaded

suaded those they have injured to forgiveness. For this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But those who shall appear to have lived most egregiously, with respect to piety—these are they, who, being liberated and dismissed from these places in the earth, as from the abodes of a prison, shall arrive at the pure habitation on high, and dwell on the ætherial earth. But among these, those who are sufficiently purified by philosophy shall live without bodies, through the whole of the succeeding time, and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor is the present time sufficient for such an undertaking.

But for the sake of these particulars which we have related, we should undertake every thing, Simmias, that we may participate of virtue and prudence in the present life. For the reward is beautiful, and the hope mighty. To affirm, indeed, that these things subsist exactly as I have described them, is not the province of a man endued with intellect. But to assert that either these or certain particulars of this kind take place, with respect to our souls and their habitations—since our soul appears to be immortal, this is, I think, both becoming, and deserves to be hazarded by him who believes in its reality. For the danger is beautiful; and it is necessary to allure ourselves with things of this kind, as with enchantments: and, on this account, I produced the fable which you have just now heard me relate. But for the sake of these, it is proper that the man should be confident about his soul, who in the present life bidding farewell to those pleasures which regard the body and its ornaments as things foreign from his nature, has earnestly applied himself to disciplines, as things of far greater consequence; and who, having adorned his soul not
with

with a foreign but its own proper ornament, *viz.* with temperance and justice, fortitude, liberty and truth, expects a migration to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever he shall be called upon by fate. You, therefore (says he), Simmias and Cebes, and the rest who are here assembled, will each depart in some period of time posterior to the present; but,

Me now calling, fate demands:

(as some tragic poet would say) and it is almost time that I should betake myself to the bath. For it appears to me better to wash myself before I drink the poison, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body.

When therefore he had thus spoken, Be it so, Socrates (says Crito): but what orders do you leave to these who are present, or to myself, or respecting your children, or any thing else in the execution of which we can particularly oblige you? None such as are new (says he), Crito, but that which I have always said to you; that if you take care of yourselves, you will always perform in whatever you do that which is acceptable to myself, to my family, and to your own selves, though you should not promise me any thing at present. But if you neglect yourselves, and are unwilling to live according to what has been now and formerly said, as vestiges of direction in your course, you will accomplish nothing, though you should now promise many things, and in a very vehement manner. We shall take care, therefore (says Crito), to act as you desire. But how would you be buried? Just as you please (says he), if you can but catch me, and I don't elude your pursuit. And at the same time gently laughing, and addressing himself to us, I cannot persuade Crito (says he), my friends, that I am
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that Socrates who now disputes with you, and methodises every part of the discourse ; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how I ought to be buried. But all that long discourse which some time since I addressed to you, in which I asserted that after I had drank the poison I should no longer remain with you, but should depart to certain felicities of the blessed, this I seem to have declared to him in vain, though it was undertaken to console both you and myself. Promise, therefore (says he), for me to Crito, just the contrary of what he promised to my judges. For he promised that I should not run away ; but do you engage that when I die I shall not stay with you, but shall depart and entirely leave you ; that Crito may more easily bear this separation, and may not be afflicted when he sees my body either burnt or buried, as if I suffered some dreadful misfortune ; and that he may not say at my interment, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured of this (says he), excellent Crito, that when we do not speak in a becoming manner, we are not only culpable with respect to our speech, but likewise affect our souls with a certain evil. But it is proper to be confident, and to say that my body will be buried, and in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and which you think is most agreeable to our laws.

When he had thus spoke he rose, and went into a certain room, that he might wash himself, and Crito followed him : but he ordered us to wait for him. We waited therefore accordingly, discoursing over and reviewing among ourselves what had been said ; and sometimes speaking about his death, how great a calamity it would be to us ; and sincerely thinking that we, like those who are deprived of their father, should pass the
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rest of our life in the condition of orphans. But when he had washed himself, his sons were brought to him (for he had two little ones, and one considerably advanced in age); and the women belonging to his family likewise came in to him: but when he had spoken to them before Critó, and had left them such injunctions as he thought proper, he ordered the boys and women to depart; and he himself returned to us. And it was now near the setting of the sun: for he had been absent for a long time in the bathing-room. But when he came in from washing, he sat down; and did not speak much afterwards. For then the servant of the eleven magistrates came in, and standing near him, I do not perceive that in you, Socrates, says he, which I have taken notice of in others; I mean that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, being compelled by the magistrates, I announce to them that they must drink the poison. But, on the contrary, I have found you at the present time to be the most generous, mild, and best of all the men who ever came into this place: and therefore I am now well convinced that you are not angry with me, but with the authors of your present condition. You know those whom I allude to. Now therefore (for you know what I came to tell you) farewell, and endeavour to bear this necessity as easily as possible. And at the same time bursting into tears, and turning himself away, he departed. But Socrates looking after him, And thou too (says he), farewell; and we shall take care to act as you advise. And at the same time turning to us, How courteous (says he) is the behaviour of that man! During the whole time of my abode here, he has visited and often conversed with me, and proved himself to be the best of men; and now how generously he weeps on my account! But let us obey him,
Crito,

Crito, and let some one bring the poison, if it is bruised; but if not, let the man whose business it is bruise it himself. But, Socrates (says Crito), I think that the sun still hangs over the mountains, and is not yet set. And at the same time I have known others who have drank the poison very late, after it was announced to them; who have supped and drank abundantly; and who have enjoyed the objects of their love. Therefore don't be in such haste; for there is yet time enough. But upon this Socrates replied, Such men, Crito, act with great propriety in the manner you have described (for they think to derive some advantage by so doing), and I also with great propriety shall not act in this manner. For I do not think I shall gain any thing by drinking it later, except becoming ridiculous to myself through desiring to live, and being sparing of life when nothing of it any longer remains. Go then (says he), be persuaded, and comply with my request.

Then Crito hearing this gave the sign to the boy that stood near him. And the boy departing, and having staid for some time, came, bringing with him the person that was to administer the poison, and who brought it properly prepared in a cup. But Socrates, beholding the man—It's well, my friend (says he); but what is proper to do with it? for you are knowing in these affairs. You have nothing else to do (says he), but when you have drank it to walk about, till a heaviness takes place in your legs; and afterwards lie down: this is the manner in which you should act. And at the same time he extended the cup to Socrates. But Socrates received it from him—and indeed, Echecrates, with great cheerfulness; neither trembling nor suffering any alteration for the worse in his colour or countenance, but as he was accustomed to do, be-

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holding the man with a bull-like aspect, What say you (says he) respecting this potion? Is it lawful to make a libation of it, or not? We only bruise (says he), Socrates, as much as we think sufficient for the purpose. I understand you (says he): but it is certainly both lawful and proper to pray to the gods, that my departure from hence thither may be attended with prosperous fortune; which I entreat them to grant may be the case. And at the same time ending his discourse, he drank the poison with exceeding facility and alacrity. And thus far, indeed, the greater part of us were tolerably well able to refrain from weeping: but when we saw him drinking, and that he had drank it, we could no longer restrain our tears. But from me, indeed, notwithstanding the violence which I employed in checking them, they flowed abundantly; so that, covering myself with my mantle, I deplored my misfortune. I did not indeed weep for him, but for my own fortune; considering what an associate I should be deprived of. But Crito, who was not able to restrain his tears, was compelled to rise before me. And Apollodorus, who during the whole time prior to this had not ceased from weeping, then wept aloud and with great bitterness; so that he infected all who were present, except Socrates. But Socrates, upon seeing this, exclaimed—What are you doing, excellent men? For indeed I principally sent away the women, lest they should produce a disturbance of this kind. For I have heard that it is proper to die attended with propitious omens. Be quiet, therefore, and summon fortitude to your assistance. But when we heard this we blushed, and restrained our tears. But he, when he found during his walking that his legs felt heavy, and had told us so, laid himself down in a supine position. For the man had
ordered

ordered him to do so. And at the same time he who gave him the poison touching him at intervals, considered his feet and legs. And after he had vehemently pressed his foot, he asked him if he felt it. But Socrates answered he did not. And after this he again pressed his thighs: and thus ascending with his hand, he shewed us that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates also touched himself, and said that when the poison reached his heart he should then leave us. But now his lower belly was almost cold; when uncovering himself (for he was covered) he said (which were his last words), Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius. Discharge this debt therefore for me, and don't neglect it. It shall be done (says Crito): but consider whether you have any other commands. To this enquiry of Crito he made no reply; but shortly after moved himself, and the man covered him. And Socrates fixed his eyes. Which when Crito perceived, he closed his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end of our associate; a man, as it appears to me, the best of those whom we were acquainted with at that time, and besides this the most prudent and just.

coloured him to do so. And at the same time he who gave
him the position regarding him as a man who conducted his
last and best. And after he had been so long, he called him
good, he asked him if he had any more to say. And he
he did not. And then this happened to him. And his right
that attending with his hand he turned to him. And he
said and this. And then he who was his friend and his
that when the police reached his house he should then leave
and then now he found that he was almost dead. And he
covering himself up he was covered in his bed. And he
his last words. And then we saw a great deal of his
regarding the death of the man for me, and I was saying to
that he had done it. And then he who was his friend
not other company. And then this friend of his he was
he reply; but he who was covered in his bed. And he
covered him. And then he who was his friend and his
Cato perceived. And then he who was his friend and his
his friend was the end of his life. And then he who
a man in his life. And then he who was his friend and his
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THE
PARMENIDES OF PLATO:

A DIALOGUE
ON THE GODS,

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INTRODUCTION.

IT was the custom of Pythagoras and his followers, amongst whom Plato holds the most distinguished rank, to conceal divine mysteries under the veil of symbols and figures, to dissemble their wisdom against the arrogant boastings of the Sophists; to joke seriously, and sport in earnest. Hence, in the following most important dialogue, under the appearance of a certain dialectic sport, and as it were logical discussion, Plato has delivered a complete system of the profound and beautiful theology of the Greeks. For it is not to be supposed that he, who in all his other dialogues introduces discussions adapted to the character of the principal speaker, should in this dialogue deviate from his general plan, and exhibit Parmenides, a venerable and aged philosopher, engaged in the puerile exercise of a merely logical disputation. Besides, it was usual with the Pythagoreans and Plato to form an harmonious conjunction of many materials in one subject, partly in imitation of nature, and partly for the sake of elegance and grace. Thus in the *Phædrus*, Plato mingles oratory with theology; in the *Timæus*, mathematics with physics; and in the present dialogue, dialectic with divine speculations.

But the reader must not suppose that the dialectic of Plato is the same with vulgar dialectic, which is conver-

fant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in Aristotle's topics: for the business of this first of sciences, which at present is utterly unknown, is to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progressions of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. "But there are three energies," says Proclus, "of this most scientific method: the first of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect, which is as it were in a dormant state; for it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth through opposite positions the essential impression of reasons which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established upon a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analysing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search: and you may say that what is delivered in the Phædrus and Sophista

Sophista is the employment of this energy, giving a two-fold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art; and on this account it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is exhibitivæ according to truth, purifies from two-fold ignorance when its reasons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the Sophista." So that the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood.

And the first of these energies is accurately exhibited in the first part of this dialogue, in which Parmenides perfects the conceptions of Socrates about ideas. For, as Proclus well observes, the mode of discourse is every where obfetric, but does not confute; and is explorative, but not defensive. But it differs considered as sometimes proceeding from on high to such things as are last, and sometimes ascending from sensible particulars to such reasons as are accommodated to divine causes; but, according to each of these, it elevates Socrates, calls forth his native conceptions concerning ideas, and causes them to possess an expanded distinction. And in this respect, says Proclus, Parmenides truly imitates the paternal cause of the universality of things, who from the supreme hypostasis of all beings, preserves and perfects all things, and draws them upwards by his unknown and ineffable powers. But the second of these dialectic energies is no less accurately exhibited in the second part of the dialogue, which contains the mystic speculation of the unities of beings.

With respect to the dramatic apparatus of this dialogue, it is necessary to observe that the Athenians had two festivals

vals in honour of Minerva; the former of which, on account of the greater preparation required in its celebration, was called *the greater Panathenaia*; and the latter, on account of its requiring a less apparatus, was denominated *the lesser Panathenaia*. The celebration of them likewise was distinguished by longer and shorter periods of time. In consequence therefore of the greater festival taking place, sacred to Minerva, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides being the master and Zeno his disciple; but both of them Eleans—and not only this, says Proclus, but partakers of the Pythagoric doctrine, according to the relation of Callimachus the historian. Parmenides and Zeno therefore, in a place called the Ceramicus, beyond the walls of the city, and which was sacred to the statues of the gods, met with one Pythodorus together with Socrates and many other Athenians, who came thither for the purpose of hearing the writings of Zeno. The ensuing dialogue, which was the consequence of Zeno's discourse, was afterwards related by Pythodorus to one Antiphon, the brother on the mother's side of Adimantus and Glaucus, who were the brothers of Plato, both from the same father and mother; and the dialogue is supposed to be again related by Antiphon to Cephalus and his companions, in consequence of their soliciting Adimantus and Glaucus to request Antiphon for the narration.

Zeno therefore having read to the audience a book, in which he endeavoured to exhibit the difficulties attending the doctrine which asserts the existence of *the many*, and this in order to defend the favourite dogma of Parmenides, who called *being, the one*; Socrates by no means opposes his arguments, but readily admits the errors which must ensue from supposing multitude to exist, without participating

ticipating *the one*. However, Socrates does not rest here, but urges Zeno to a speculation of *the one* and the *unities* which subsist in intelligible natures, not enduring to dwell on the contemplation of the one which sensibles contain: and this leads him to the investigation of ideas, in which the unities of things reside. After this Parmenides, not in the least contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpose four questions concerning them: whether they have a subsistence; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they possess; and how they are participated by subordinate natures. And this being discussed, Parmenides ascends from hence to *the one* which subsists above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheses concerning it; five supposing *the one* to have a subsistence, and four supposing it not to subsist; accurately investigating at the same time the consequences resulting from these hypotheses. But of this more hereafter.

With respect to ideas, I shall briefly observe at present, that though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their existence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perspicuity and strength. Diversity of powers always indicates diversity of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of sense; that which is sensible therefore is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is superior to sense, so is intelligible more excellent than that which is sensible. But that which is sensible has an existence; and by a much greater reason, therefore, that which is intelligible must have a real subsistence. But intelligible is a certain universal species; for universal rea-
son

son is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are such things as intelligible and common species of things, which we call ideas.

Again, all corporeal natures subsist in time; but whatever subsists in time is measured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present, and future. And if we conceive that any one of these periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time, therefore, is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being such as it is depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident, therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential, must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing. As we cannot therefore affirm with propriety of any part of time that it *is*, since even before we can form the assertion the present time is no more, so with respect to all corporeal natures (from their subsistence in time), before we can say that they exist, they lose all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is said to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable: for, if any one should assert that truth is not, he asserts this either truly or falsely; but if falsely, there is such a thing as truth; and if truly, then it is true that there is no such thing as truth. But if it is truly asserted, it can only be true through truth; and consequently there is such a thing as truth, which must also be eternal and immutable. Hence truth cannot subsist in any thing mutable; for that which is situated in a mutable nature, is also changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures

tures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true existence. If therefore the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the first forms; for whatever ranks as first is perfect and entire, since the whole reason of every nature is established in that which is first. There are therefore certain forms above these, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a subject.

But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms subsist? Shall we say nowhere? But in this case falsehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former possessed and the latter had no subsistence. But this is impossible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth; since, unless it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is said to be. But indeed, without the presence of truth, the forms which are said to be false could not subsist; for they would no longer be what they are, unless it was true that they are false. True species therefore have a subsistence somewhere. But does not our soul possess truer species than those which are the objects of sensible inspection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and understands how far they depart from, and in what respect they agree with, such forms as are true? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a comparison between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the soul indeed corrects the visible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only; approves or condemns every artificial structure and musical modulation; and judges concerning the goodness or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in nature. The soul therefore pos-
sesses

esses truer forms, by which she judges of corporeal natures. But neither are these forms in the soul first forms, for they are moveable; and though not subsisting in place, yet they have a discursive procession through the intervals of time. Nor do they always exist in energy; for the soul does not always energize through them. Nor do they subsist in a total but in a partial intellect. For as the soul is not total intellect on account of its self-motive nature, so the intellect which is in soul is not a total and first intellect, but suffers a remission of intellectual union, from its connection with the discursive energies of soul. There is, therefore, above soul, and that intellect which is a part of soul, a certain first intellect, in itself entire and perfectly complete, in which the first and most true species of all things are contained, and which have a subsistence independent of time, place, and motion. And this first intellect is no other than that vital nature *αὐτοζών*, or *animal itself*, in which Plato in the *Timæus* represents the artificer of the universe contemplating the ideas of things, and fabricating the machine of the world according to this all-beautiful exemplar.

Again, the artificer of the universe must be a god. Every god operates essentially, or produces from his essence that which he produces, because this is the most perfect mode of production. Every thing which operates essentially produces an image of itself. He, therefore, who fabricated the universe, fabricated it an image of himself. But if this be the case, he contains in himself paradigmatically the causes of the universe: and these causes are ideas. To which we may add, that the perfect must necessarily antecede the imperfect; unity, multitude; the indivisible, the divisible; and that which abides perpetually the same, that which
subsists

subsists in unceasing mutation. From all which it follows, that things do not originate from baser natures, but that they end in these; and that they commence from natures the most perfect, the most beautiful, and the best. For it is not possible that our intellect should be able to apprehend things properly equal, similar, and the like, and that the intellect of the artificer of the universe should not contain in itself the essentially equal, just, beautiful and good, and in short every thing which has a universal and perfect subsistence, and which, from its residence in deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of substances, to which we very properly give the appellation of ideas.

With respect to *what things there are ideas of, and what not*, I shall summarily observe, that there are ideas only of universal and perfect substances, and of whatever contributes to the perfection of these, as for instance of man, and whatever is perfective of man, such as wisdom and virtue; and consequently matter, particulars, parts, things artificial, evil and sordid natures, are excluded from the region of ideas.

To the question *what kind of beings ideas are*, we may answer with Zenocrates, according to the relation of Proclus, that they are *the exemplary causes of things, which perpetually subsist according to nature*. They are exemplars indeed, because the final cause, or *the good*, is superior to these, and that which is properly the efficient cause, or the demiurgic intellect, is of an inferior ordination. But they are the exemplars of things *according to nature*, because there are no ideas of things unnatural or artificial: and of such natural things as are *perpetual*, because there are no ideas of mutable particulars.

Lastly, *ideas are participated by material natures*, similar to
 5 the

the impressions in wax of a seal, to images appearing in water or a mirror, and to pictures. For material species, on account of their union with matter, are analogous to the impressions of a seal; but on account of their apparently real, but at the same time delusive subsistence in its dark receptacle, they are similar to images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream; and they resemble pictures on account of their similitude, though very remote and obscure, to first ideas themselves. We may add too, as Proclus beautifully observes, that they derive their subsistence as *impressions*, from the *mundane* gods; their *apparent* existence from the *liberated* gods; and their *similitude* to supernal forms from the *supermundane* or *assimilative* gods. And thus much for the first part of the dialogue, or the doctrine of ideas *.

But in order to a summary view of the inimitably profound and sublime discussion which the second part contains concerning *the one*, it is necessary to observe that by *the one itself* the Pythagoreans and Plato signified the first cause, which they very properly considered as perfectly *superessential*, ineffable and unknown. For it is necessary that multitude should be posterior to unity: but it is impossible to conceive *being* without multitude, and consequently the cause of all beings must be void of multitude and superessential. And that this was really the opinion of the most ancient Pythagoreans, from whom Plato derived his philosophy, the following citations will abundantly evince.

And in the first place this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most ancient Pythagorean, on the principles of things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82, and in

* See more concerning ideas in the first dissertation prefixed to my translation of Proclus on Euclid.

which

which the following extraordinary passage occurs: *ὡς ἀναγκα τρεῖς εἰμεν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τὰν τε εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κινητικὸν καὶ ἀορατὸν δύναμει· τὸ δὲ τοῖστων οὐ οὐ μόνον * εἰμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῶν τι κρεσσον· νῶν δὲ κρεσσον ἐστὶ, ὅπερ ὀνομαζόμεν θεὸν φανερόν.*—i. c.

“So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; *that which is the subject of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power.* With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, *but that it should be something better than intellect.* But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate god.” It must here however be observed, that by the word *god* we are not only to understand the first cause, but every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeable to the above passage is that also of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause *νῆ παντός καὶ ὅσας δύναμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερ-σχεῖ*---“surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and antiquity.” Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed “that the Pythagoreans called god *the one*, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound.” *Τῶν θεῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν μὲν λεγούτων τὸν θεὸν ὡς ἐνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἰτίον, καὶ*

* Instead of *ὅν οὐ μόνον*, which is evidently the true reading, *ὁμόμον μόνον* is erroneously printed in Stobæus.

πάντος τε οὐτός, και πάσης ζωής, και νῦν τε πάντεσσιν ἐπέκεινται. μέρος
 δὲ τῶν πάντων ὡς πᾶσι τὴν οὐσίαν, και τὸ τέλος ἐπιλαμβάνοντα, και ὡς
 πάντα περιέχοντα, και ὀριζόντα ταῖς ἀφράστοις αὐτῶν, και πάντος ὑπερ-
 ἡπλωμέναις περὶ ὅσων ὑπεροχαῖς. And again, this is confirmed
 by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104,
 in which place *praclari* is erroneously substituted for *Clinii*.
 "That which is *the one*, and *the measure of all things* (says
 he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane
 concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since
 he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of in-
 telligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), possessing
 absolute dominion (κυριώδης), and himself manifesting him-
 self (αὐτοῖο εαυτοῖο δὴλον)." This fine passage I have translated
 agreeable to the manuscript corrections of the learned
 Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this
 we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, as
 Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is su-
 perior to the two first elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*.
 For (says he) "Philolaus asserts that the deity established
bound and *infinite*: by bound indeed exhibiting every co-or-
 dination, which is more allied to *the one*; but by infinity a
 nature subjected (υφειμένην) to *bound*. And prior to these
 two principles he places one, and a singular cause, sepa-
 rated from the universality of things, which Archainetus
 (Ἀρχαίνετος) denominates a cause prior to cause; but
 which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all
 things." To all these respectable authorities for the super-
 essential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony
 of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the
 Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us "that the Pytha-
 goreans placed *the one* as transcending the genus of things
 which are essentially understood." και δὴ τῶν μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ

ροσλαμβανων γένος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ως επαναθεστικος το εν. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning *the one*, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: such as *αλαμπια*, *σκοτωδια*, *αμιξία*, *βαραθρον υποχθονιον*, *Απολλων*, &c. viz. *obscurity*, or *without illumination*, *darkness*, *without mixture*; *a subterranean profundity*, *Apollo*, &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called *obscurity*, *darkness*, and *a subterranean profundity*: but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated *without mixture*, and *Apollo*; since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. "For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first god *Apollo*, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many." Ennead. 5, lib. 5. To which we may add, that the epithets *darkness* and *obscurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of *a thrice unknown darkness*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius *, in their most mystical invocations of the first god; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his *Theogony* he says:

πτοι μιν πρώτιστα Χaos γίγνεται, —

* πρὸς ἀρχάς.

That is, "*Chaos was the first thing which was generated*"—and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such however is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod *γενετο* is translated *was*, as if the poet had said that *Chaos was the first of all things*; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, *γενετο* was considered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was* simply. And in the first place this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cœlo. "There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are *generated*.—And this is especially the case with the followers of Hesiod."

ΕΙΣΙ ΓΑΡ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΟΣ ΦΑΣΙΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΓΕΓΝΗΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ.

—ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΗΣΙΟΔΟΝ. And again by Sextus Empiricus in his treatise *Adversus Mathematic.* p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. "For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod,

Chaos of all things was the first produc'd,

from what Chaos was *generated*, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers—To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth of things."

κομίδη γὰρ μείρακιςκος ὦν, ἤρετο τὸν ἐπαναγινώσκοντα αὐτῷ Γραμματιστὴν (ἢ τοι μὲν πρῶτισα Χάος γένετ')

γενετ') ἐκ τίνος τὸ χάος ἐγενετο, εἴπερ πρῶτον ἐγενετο. τούτου δὲ
 εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἐργὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλου-
 μένων φιλοσόφων· τοίνυν ἐφῆσεν ὁ Ἐπικύρη, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδίσσον
 εἶναι, εἴπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀληθεῖαν ἴσασιν.

Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: "Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first *generated*. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert *that all things are generated, except the first*. It is however evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the procession of things from their causes; on which account *all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten*. For Hesiod also, when he says that *Chaos was first generated*, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation." (De Cælo, p. 147.)

But these divine men not only called the first cause *the one* on account of his transcendent simplicity, but likewise *the good* on account of the superlative excellency of his nature; by the former of these appellations considering him as that principle from which all things flow, and by the latter as that supreme object of desire to which all things ultimately tend. And hence Plato, in his Republic, asserts that *the good* is superessential; and Aristotle, in lib. 14,

Metaphys. cap. 4, alluding to Plato and the Pythagoreans, says, "that according to some, *the one* is the same with the good." *οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ εἶν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι.*

With great beauty therefore does Proclus*, with his usual magnificence of expression, assert of this incomprehensible cause, "that he is the god of all gods, the unity of unities, and above the first adyta†; that he is more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence; that he is holy among the holies, and is concealed among the intelligible gods."

Plato too in the Republic, that we may be enabled to gain a glimpse from analogy of this transcendent nature, compares him to the sun. For as the sun by his light not only confers the power of being seen on visible objects, but is likewise the cause of their generation, nutriment and increase; so *the good*, through superessential light, imparts being and the power of being known to every thing which is the object of knowledge. Hence, says Damascius‡, "this highest god is seen afar off as it were obscurely; and if you approach nearer, he is beheld still more obscurely; and lastly, he takes away the ability of perceiving other objects. He is therefore truly an incomprehensible and inaccessible light, and is profoundly compared to the sun: upon which the more attentively you look, the more you will be darkened and blinded; and will only bring back with you eyes stupefied with excess of light."

And such is the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans concerning the highest principle of things. But, according to the same divine men, the immediate progeny of this

* In Plat. Theol. p. 110.

† *αδυταται* is erroneously printed for *αδυται*.

‡ *περὶ ἀρχῶν*.

ineffable cause must be gods; and as such must have a superessential subsistence. For what else prior to unities is it lawful to conjoin with *the one*, or what is more conjoined with a god subsisting according to unity, than the multitude of gods? Besides, progressions are every where perfected through similitude to their principles. For both nature herself, intellect and every generative cause, leads and conjoins to itself similar natures, prior to such as are dissimilar. For as there can be no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude. Hence every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic to its progeny, and before it generates that which is hypostatic of progressions far distant and separate from its nature, must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and conjoined with it through similitude. As nature therefore generates a natural number, soul one that is animal, and intellect an intellectual number, it is necessary that the first unity should produce from itself, prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterised by unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause. And hence the fountain of universal good must produce and establish in beings *goodnesses* naturally conjoined with himself; and these exalted natures can be no other than gods.

But if these divine natures are alone superessential, they will in no respect differ from the highest god. They must therefore be participated by beings; that is, each must have some particular being consubstantial with its nature, but yet so as not to lose its superessential characteristic. And hence every unity may be considered as the lucid blossom or centre of the being by which it is participated;

absorbing as it were in superessential light, and thus deifying the essence with which it is connected.

Nor let the reader imagine that this sublime theory is nothing more than the fanatic jargon of the latter Platonists, as is rashly and ignorantly asserted by Cudworth; for it is a doctrine as old at least as Timæus the Locrian. For in his book *On the Soul of the World*, after asserting that there are two causes of all things, intellect of such as are produced according to reason, but necessity of such as are produced by force, according to the powers of bodies, he adds—"that the former of these, that is intellect, is a cause of the nature of *the good*, and is called god, and is the principle of such things as are best." *ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΔΕ, ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΤΑΣ ΤΑ-ΥΑΘΩ ΦΥΣΙΟΣ ΕΙΜΕΝ, ΘΕΟΝ ΤΕ ΟΝΥΜΑΖΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΝ ΤΕ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΙΣΤΩΝ.* But according to the Pythagoreans, as we have abundantly proved, *the good* or *the one* is above essence and intellect; and consequently by intellect here we must not understand the first cause, but a deity subordinate to the first. Intellect however is (says he) of the nature of *the good*; but *the good* is superessential, and consequently intellect participates of a superessential nature. And when he adds that intellect is called god, he plainly intimates that every god (the first being excepted) partakes of a superessential nature.

But to return to our inimitable dialogue: This second part consists of nine hypotheses; five of which consider the consequences which result from admitting the subsistence of *the one*, and the other four what must be the consequences if it were taken away from the nature of things. But as Plato in these hypotheses delivers the Eleatic method of reasoning, it is necessary to inform the reader, that, according to Proclus *, it was as follows: Two hypotheses

* In lib. 5, MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of these may be tripled, by considering in each *what happens*, *what does not happen*, *what happens and at the same time does not happen*; so that six cases will be the result. But since *if a thing is* we may consider either itself with respect to itself, or itself with respect to others; or we may consider others themselves with respect to themselves, or others with respect to that thing itself, and so likewise if a thing is not: hence, the whole of this process will consist of eight triads, which are as follows. 1. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to itself, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 2. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 3. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to themselves, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 4. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis *that a thing is not*, are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those we have just enumerated. Such (says Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific; and under which those four powers, the *definitive* and *divisive*, the *demonstrative* and *analytic*, receive their consummate perfection.

In the first hypothesis, therefore, Plato considers *what does not follow to the one*, considered with respect to itself and to others. *In the second*, *what does follow*. *In the third*, *what follows, and at the same time does not follow*. And this forms the first hexad. But *in the fourth hypothesis* he considers *what follows*

follows to others with respect to themselves, and what does not follow, what follows and at the same time does not follow. In the fifth, what follows to others with respect to the subject of the hypothesis, what does not follow, what follows and at the same time does not follow. And so two hexads, or four triads, are by this means produced from the five hypotheses, if the one is. And the reader will easily perceive how each of the other four, which suppose the one is not, may form a triad: so that these four triads, in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete.

It is likewise necessary to observe, that these hypotheses are derived from the triple division of *the one*, and the two-fold division of *non-being*. For *the one* is either *above being*, or *in being*, or *posterior to being*. But *non-being* is either *that which in no respect is*, or *that which is considered as partly having a subsistence, and partly not*. This being premised, let the reader attend to the following beautiful account of these hypotheses from Proclus on Plato's Theology, and from his admirable commentary on this dialogue.

The first hypothesis demonstrates by negations the ineffable supereminence of the first principle of things; and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge. But the second unfolds the whole order of the gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essential idiom of the gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis, through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other *one* can that be which is participated by *being*, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the *imparticipable one*? For as bodies through their *life* are conjoined with *soul*, and as *souls* through their *intellective part* tend to *universal intellect* and the *first intelligence*, in like manner

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true beings, through the one which they contain, are reduced to a separate union, and are conjoined with the first cause of all.

But because this hypothesis commences from that which is *one being*, and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after *the one*, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is necessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various conclusions the whole multitude of particular souls, and the diversities which they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis extends.

But after this follows *that nature which is divisible about bodies and inseparable from matter*, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally depending from the gods. And the last hypostasis is the procession of matter, whether considered as *one* or as *various*, which the fifth hypothesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude to *the first*. But sometimes indeed the negations are privations, and sometimes the separate causes of all productions. And that which is most wonderful of all, the highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to subjection. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other iconically, or according to similitude. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul: for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations similar to affirmations. And since it is alone multiplied, as consisting from wholes, it possesses an adventitious *one*. And this *one* which it contains, though truly one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is as it were

absorbed by essence. And such are the hypotheses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes of the universe, as well exempt as subsisting in things themselves, according to the hyparxis of *the one*.

But there are four hypotheses besides these, which by taking away *the one* entirely subvert all things, both such as truly are, and such as subsist in generation, and shew that no being can any longer exist. *The one* therefore being admitted, all things subsist, even to the last hypostasis; and this being taken away, essence itself is immediately destroyed.

The preceding mode of exposition (except in the second hypothesis) agrees with that of the great Plutarch, preserved by Proclus in his commentary on this dialogue, and which is as follows :

The first hypothesis discourses concerning the first god. The second, concerning the first intellect, and an order entirely intellectual. The third, of the soul. The fourth, of material species. And the fifth, of formless matter. For these are the five principles of things. Parmenides in the mean time, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls every separate substance, on account of its simplicity, by the common appellation of *one*. But he denominates matter and corporeal form *different*, on account of their flowing nature and far distant diversity from divine essences : especially since these two do not so much subsist by themselves as through others, and are not so much causes as concauses, as it is asserted in the *Timæus* and *Phædo*. With great propriety therefore the three first hypotheses, which enquire how *the one* is related to itself and to others, are considered as treating of principal causes. But the other two, which investigate how other things are related to each other

other and to *the one*, are considered as representing form and matter. In these five hypotheses therefore these principles, together with what they contain or subsists about them, are confirmed from the position of *one*: of *one*, I say, *above* being, *in* being, and *posterior* to being. The remaining four hypotheses demonstrate how many absurdities follow from taking away *that one* which beings contain, that we may understand how much greater absurdities must ensue from denying the subsistence of that which is *simply one*. The sixth hypothesis therefore proves, that if there is not *that which is one* in beings, *i. e.* if intelligible has no real subsistence, but partly possesses and is partly destitute of being, that which is sensible would alone exist in the order of things. For if intelligible is taken away, that which is sensible must alone remain; and there can be no knowledge beyond sense. And this the sixth hypothesis demonstrates to be absurd. But the seventh hypothesis proves, that if *the one which beings contain* has no kind of subsistence, there can be no knowledge, nor any thing which is the object of knowledge, which this seventh hypothesis shews is foolish to assert. And again, *if this one partly subsists, and is partly without subsistence*, as the sixth hypothesis feigns, other things will be similar to shadows and dreams, which the eighth hypothesis confutes as absurd. But *if this one has no kind of subsistence*, other things will be less than shadows or a dream, that is, nothing; which the ninth hypothesis represents as a monstrous assertion. Hence the first hypothesis has the same relation to those which remain, as the principle of the universe to the universality of things. But the other four which immediately follow the first, treat concerning the principles posterior to *the one*. And the four consequent to these prove, that *one* being
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taken away, all that was exhibited in the four prior hypotheses must entirely perish. For since the second demonstrates, that *if that one subsists which is conjoined with being*, every order of soul must subsist; the seventh declares, that *if this one is not*, all knowledge, reason, imagination and sense must be destroyed. Again, since the fourth hypothesis declares, that *if this one being* subsists, material species also must subsist, which in a certain respect participate of *one being*—the eighth hypothesis shews, that *if this one being* has no subsistence, what we now call sensible natures would be only shadows and dreams, without any formal distinction or substance whatever. And lastly, since the fifth hypothesis admonishes us, that *if this one being* subsists matter will subsist, not indeed participating of *one being* so far as *being*, but considered as *one*; the ninth hypothesis at length shews, that *if this one being* is taken away, not even the shadow of any thing could possibly subsist.

Thus far Plutarch; who likewise observes that this dialogue was considered as divine by the ancients; and declares that the preceding exposition is partly taken from the writings of the ancients, and partly from his own private opinion.

Now from all this we may safely conclude with Proclus, that all the axioms of theological science are perfectly exhibited in this part of the dialogue; that all the distributions of the divine natures are unfolded in connected continuity; and that this is nothing else *than the celebrated generation of the gods, and every kind of existence, from the ineffable and unknown cause of the universe*. For the ancients by *generation* meant nothing more than the *procession* of things from their cause; and hence the first cause was symbolically called by Orpheus *time*—because, says Proclus,

clus, where there is generation, there time has a subsistence.

That first and imparticipable one then, who is declared to be the cause of all things after an ineffable manner, but who is without circumspection, and does not possess any power or characteristic of a kindred kind with the other gods, is celebrated by the first hypothesis. And from this supereminent cause, as from an exalted place of survey, we may contemplate the divine unities, that is, the gods, flowing in admirable and ineffable order, and at the same time abiding in profound union with each other, and with their cause. And here, says Proclus, an apt resemblance of their progression presents itself to our view. Because a line is the first continuous and divisible nature amongst magnitudes, hence it participates of an indivisible, that is of a point. And this point, though it is allotted a superlinear condition and is indivisible, yet it subsists in the line, is something belonging to it, and is the summit of the line. To which we may add, that many lines in a circle touch by their several points the centre of the circle. In like manner an intelligible and intellectual essence, because it is the first multiplied nature, on this account partakes of an excellent unity. And this unity, though it is neither essence nor obnoxious to essential multitude, yet abides in essence, or rather subsists as its vertex, through which every intellectual essence is a god, enjoying divine unity as the very flower of its nature, and as that which conjoins it with the ineffable one. And as every thing is established in its own species through form, and as we derive the characteristic of our nature from soul, so every god becomes that which he is, or a deity, through the unity of his nature.

Lastly, says he, the intention of the first hypothesis is

to absolve that which is simply one from all the properties and conditions of the unities of the gods; and by this absolving to signify the procession of all things from thence. But our intention in pursuing these mysteries, is no other than by the logical energies of our reason to arrive at the simple intellection of beings, and by these to excite the divine one resident in the depths of our essence, or rather which presides over our essence, that we may perceive the simple and incomprehensible one. For after, through discursive energies and intellections, we have properly denied of the first principle all conditions peculiar to beings, there will be some danger, lest deceived by imagination after numerous negations, we should think that we have arrived either at nothing, or at something slender and vain, indeterminate, formless and confused; unless we are careful in proportion as we advance in negations to excite by a certain amatorial affection the divine vigour of our unity; trusting that by this means we may enjoy divine unity, when we have dismissed the motion of reason and the multiplicity of intelligence, and tend through unity alone to *the one itself*, and through love to *the supreme and ineffable good*.

And here perhaps the reader will be anxious to have an accurate and full account of the various orders of the gods, which as we have already observed the second hypothesis contains. But as this would require a very extended discourse, if treated of as it deserves, it must be reserved for the complete commentary on this most important dialogue, which it is my intention to publish as soon as possible; and which will contain the substance of all that is delivered by Proclus in his invaluable manuscript commentary on this dialogue, with occasional elucidations of my own. For
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the present, therefore, some account of the first procession or order of gods, called the intelligible triad, and a bare relation of the other orders, must suffice: for this order contains paradigmatically all the other orders; and will likewise serve as a history of the origin of the Christian trinity, and convince the intelligent reader how dreadfully one of the sublimest truths has been perverted and abused.

As the first cause then is *the one*, and this is the same with *the good*, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be conceived: for *the first good* must be the cause of the greatest good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of one proximately inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially corporeal, yet *κατασχέσιν*, through *habitude* or *alliance*, are most vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects, and the first of beings are gods. For as *being* is the highest of things after *the first cause*, its first subsistence must be according to a supereffential characteristic.

Now that which is supereffential, considered as participated by the highest or *true being*, constitutes that which is called *intelligible*. So that every true being depending on the gods is a *divine intelligible*. It is *divine* indeed, as that which is deified; but it is *intelligible*, as the object of desire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of *being* itself. But in the first being life

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and intellect subsist according to cause : for every thing subsists either according to *cause*, or according to *hyparxis*, or according to *participation*. That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is), or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun ; the second to the light immediately proceeding from the sun ; and the third to the splendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The first procession therefore from the first cause, will be the intelligible triad, consisting of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which are the three highest things after the first god, and of which *being* is prior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*. For whatever partakes of life partakes also of being : but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life ; since it is the characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond such as are subordinate. But *life* is prior to *intellect*, because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as subsisting according to cause : and consequently number here has not a proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed in superessential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must not suppose that any *essential distinction* takes place, but must consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection. For as it is the nearest of all things to *the one*, its union must be transcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the same time united with the first

first god like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist wholly according to *the united*, τὸ ἑνωμένον; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming from an unknown and inaccessible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to see that perfectly which subsists without distinction, will behold the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we must be content, as Damascius well observes *, with a far distant, scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficultly apprehending a trace of this light, like a sudden corruscation bursting on our sight. Such then is the pre-eminence of the intelligible order, to which, on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a triple division, beholding in our phantasy as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the uniform colour of the sun appears in a

* Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

cloud which possesses three catoptric intervals, through the various coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing distinction in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself a triple division. For we have said that it consists of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*. But in *being* we may view life and intellect, according to cause; in *life* being according to participation, and intellect according to cause; and in *intellect* both being and life according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in the Chaldaic theology to consist of *father*, *power*, and *intellect*; *father* being the same with *hyparxis*, *unity*, *summit*, or *that which is superessential*; *power* being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of *the one* * (or the summit); and on this account, says Damascius, it is present with *father*, as a diffused with an abiding one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but *intellect*, that is *paternal intellect*, subsisting according to a conversion to the paternal one; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an indistinct surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion.

But let not the reader imagine that these names are the inventions of the latter Platonists; for they were well known to Plato himself, as is evident from his *Timæus*. For in this dialogue he calls the artificer of the universe *intellect*, and *father*; and represents him commanding the junior

* Let the reader be careful to remember that *the one* of the gods is their superessential characteristic.

gods to imitate the *power* which he employed in their generation.

But this intelligible triad is occultly signified by Plato, in the *Philebus*, under the dialectic epithets of *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed*. For all beings (says he) consist or are mingled from *bound* and *infinity*; and consequently *being itself*, which we have already shewn has the highest subsistence after the first cause, must be before all things mixed from these two; the former of these, viz. *bound*, being evidently analogous to *the one*, or *father*, and *infinity* to *power*. We may likewise consider him as unfolding the intelligible order in the same dialogue, by the epithets of *symmetry*, *truth*, and *beauty*; which, says he, are requisite to every thing that is mixed. And he adds that this triad subsists in the vestibule of *the good*; evidently alluding by this expression to the profound union of this triad with the incomprehensible cause of all things.

But in the present dialogue, the intelligible order is delivered by Plato, according to an all-perfect distribution into three triads; for the sake of affording us some demonstration, though very obscure and imperfect, of truth so transcendent and immense. In the second hypothesis, therefore, which as we have already observed unfolds the various orders of the gods, each conclusion signifying some particular order, he calls the first of these triads *εἷς ὅν*, *one being*; *power*, or the middle habitude of both, being here concealed through excess of union; so that here *the one* partakes of *being*, and *being* of *the one*; which, as Proclus well observes, is indeed a circumstance of a most wonderful nature. Parmenides therefore calls this triad *one being* without mentioning *power*, because the whole triad abides in unproceeding union, subsisting uniformly and without

distinction. But after this the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible *wholeness*, but its parts are *being* and *the one*; and power, which is situated in the middle, is here distributive and not unific, as in the former triad. But his discourse concerning this triad commences from hence—"Again, therefore, let us consider if *the one* is, what will be the consequences. Reflect then whether this hypothesis does not necessarily signify such a *one* as possesses parts." But he concludes his speculation thus—"That which is *one* therefore is a whole, and possesses a part."

But after these the third triad subsists, in which all intelligible multitude appears; and which Parmenides indeed (says Proclus) calls a wholeness, but such a one as is composed from a multitude of parts. For after that occult union (says he) of the first triad, and the dyadic distinction of the second, the progression of the third triad is produced, possessing its hypostasis indeed from parts, but then these parts compose a multitude which the triad prior to this generates. For *unity*, *power* and *being* are contained in this third triad; but then each of these is multiplied, and so the whole triad is a wholeness. But since each of its extremities, viz. *the one* and *being*, is a multitude which is conjoined through a collective power, each of these is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining united multitude with the multitude of beings, some of these *one being* perfects through progression; but others, *being which is one*, through communion. Here therefore there are two parts of the wholeness *one*, and *being*. But *the one* participates of *being*: for *the one* of *being* is conjoined with *being*. *The one* of *being* therefore is again divided, so that both *the one* and *being* generate a second unity, connected with a
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part of *being*. But *being* which participates of the one *ov ev*, is again divided into *being* and *the one*: for it generates a more particular *being*, depending on a more particular *unity*. And *being* here belongs to more particular deified beings, and is a more special monad. But *power* is the cause of this progression: for power possesses dual affection, and is fabricative of multitude.

But Parmenides begins his discourse concerning this triad as follows:—"What then? Do each of these parts of *one being*, that is to say *the one* and *being*, so desert each other, that either *the one* is not a part of *being*, or *being* is not a part of *the one*? By no means." But he finishes thus: "According to this reasoning, will not that which is *one being* be infinite multitude? So it appears." Proclus adds: "Hence this triad proceeds according to each of the pre-existent triads, *flowing (according to the Oracle) and proceeding into all intelligible multitude*. For infinite multitude demonstrates this flux, and evinces the incomprehensible nature of power.

"But he likewise evinces that this triad is *first begotten*: for this first imparts the power of generating. And hence he calls the multitude which it contains *generating* (*γινόμενον*). Proclus therefore very properly asks, whether the frequent use of the term generation in this part, does not plainly imply that the natures prior to this triad are more united with each other? But the infinity of multitude in this triad must not be considered as respecting the infinite of quantity; but nothing more is implied than that a multitude of this kind is the progeny of the first infinity, which it also unfolds: and this infinite is the same with that which is *all perfect*. For that (says Proclus) which has proceeded according to *the all*, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, on account of a power gene-

rative of all things, is *infinite* ; for it can be comprehended by no other. And thus much concerning the third intelligible triad, according to Parmenides.

“But let us now discourse in general (says Proclus*) concerning all the intelligible triads, and the three conclusions in the Parmenides, by which these three orders are characterised. The first triad, therefore, which is allotted an occult and intelligible summit among intelligibles, Plato, at one time proceeding from that union which it contains, and from its separate supremacy with respect to others, denominates *one* ; as in the *Timæus*—For *eternity* (says he) *abides in one*. But reason demonstrates that the first triad of intelligibles is contained in this *one*. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which it contains, that is from that which is participated, and from that which participates, he calls it *one being* ; not mentioning power here, because it is uniformly and occultly comprehended in this triad. And again, sometimes he calls the whole triad *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*, according to the monads which it contains. And here *bound* demonstrates divine *hyperaxis* ; but *infinite*, *generative power* ; and *mixed*, *an essence proceeding from this power*. And thus (as I have said) by these appellations Plato instructs us concerning the first triad ; evincing its nature, sometimes by one name, sometimes by two, and sometimes by three appellations. For a *triad* is contained in this, according to which the whole is characterised : likewise a *duad*, through which its extremities communicate with each other ; and lastly a *monad*, which evinces through its monads the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first god.

“But he calls the second triad posterior to this ; in the

* In Plat. Theol. lib, 3, p. 168.

Timæus, indeed, *eternity*; but in the Parmenides *the first wholeness*. And if we attentively consider that every eternal is a whole, we shall perceive that these two are allotted the same peculiarity of nature. For whatever is entirely eternal possesses both its whole essence and energy at once present with itself. For such is every intellect which perfectly establishes in itself both being and intellection, as a whole at once present, and a comprehensive all. Hence it does not possess one part of being while it is destitute of another; nor does it participate partially of energy, but it wholly comprehends *total* being and *total* intelligence. But if intellect proceeded in its energies according to time, but possessed an eternal essence, it would possess the one as a whole ever abiding the same, but the other subsisting in generation, differently at different periods of time. *Eternity*, therefore, wherever it is present, is the cause of *wholeness*. To which we may add, that *the whole* every where contains eternity: for no whole ever deserts either its own essence or perfection; but that which is first corrupted and vitiated is particular. Hence this visible universe is eternal, because it is a whole; and this is likewise true of every thing contained in the heavens, and of each of the elements: for *wholeness* is every where comprehensive of its subject natures. Hence *wholeness* and *eternity* subsist together, are the same with each other, and are each of them a measure; the one indeed of all eternal and perpetual natures, but the other of parts and every multitude. But since there are three *wholenesses*, one *prior to parts*, another *composed from parts*, and a third *contained in a part*—hence, through that *wholeness* which is prior to parts, eternity measures the divine unities exempt from beings: but through that which is composed from parts, the unities distributed together with

with beings ; and through that which subsists in a part, all beings and total essences. For these partially contain the parts of the divine unities, which pre-exist unically in the unities themselves. Besides, *eternity is nothing else than an illumination proceeding from the unity connected with being.* But *whole itself* consists of two parts, viz. from *one* and *being*, power being the conciliator of these parts. Hence the duad, according with the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypostasis of the first triad. Besides, Plato in the *Timæus* calls the third intelligible triad *animal-itself, perfect, and only-begotten.* But in the *Parmenides* he denominates it *infinite multitude, and a wholeness comprehending many parts.* And in the *Sophista* he calls it *that which is always intelligible, and distributed into many beings.* All these therefore are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when *Timæus* calls this triad *intelligible animal*, he likewise asserts that it is *perfect*, and that it comprehends intelligible animals as its parts, both according to *the one* and according to *parts.* And *Parmenides* himself, declaring that *one being* is perfect multitude, demonstrates that it subsists in this order. For the infinite is omnipotent and perfect, as we have previously observed, containing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which it likewise produces. And of these parts, some are more universal, but others more particular ; and (as *Timæus* observes) parts both according to the one and according to genera. Besides, as *Timæus* calls that which is *animal-itself eternal, and only-begotten*, so *Parmenides* first attributes to infinite multitude *the ever, and to be generated*, in the following words : “ And on the same account, whatever part is *generated* will *always* comprehend these two parts : for it will *always* contain *the one* and

being, and on the contrary *being* and *the one*; from whence it is necessary that two should *always be generated*, and that there should never *be one*."

"Who then so perspicuously admonishes us of *eternal animal* and of the *first-begotten* triad as Parmenides, who first assumes in this order *generation* and *the ever*, and so frequently employs each of these appellations? *Perfect animal*, therefore, is the same with omnipotent intelligible multitude. For since the first infinity is power, and the whole of that which is intelligible subsists according to this, receiving from hence its division into parts, I rather choose to call this triad *omnipotent*; deviating in this respect from that appellation of *the infinite*, by which vulgar minds are generally disturbed."

Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers' land; after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful sanctuary rise to our view.

But after such a vision, what can language announce
concerning

concerning this transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of number. "And," as Damascius * beautifully observes, "since this is the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call *this* which belongs to it *simplicity*, απλοτης; *something else*, multiplicity πολλοτης; and *something besides this*, universality παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is *one*, *many*, *all*, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be *one* and *many*? Because *many* is the infinite power of *the one*. But how can it be *one* and *all*? Because *all* is the every way extended energy of *the one*. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extension of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is necessary to call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent to each other; viz. *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*. But these in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the same time three†. But it is necessary that we should explain these by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad *one*, and *many*, and *all*, and *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*, and again *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*—so likewise we call it *a monad*, and *the indefinite duad*, and *a triad*, and a paternal nature composed from both

* Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

† Αλλ' αὐται μὲν οὐκ εἰσι κατὰ ἀληθειαν, ὥτε μίαν, ὥτε τρεῖς, ὥτε μίαν καὶ τρεῖς.

these.

these. And as in consequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations as unable to harmonize with the things themselves, we should likewise reject the latter on the same account."

Now from this remarkable passage in particular, and from all that has been said respecting the intelligible triad, it is easy to see what a dire perversion the modern trinity is of the highest procession from the first of causes. For in the first place, this doctrine, instead of venerating the first god, like the pious ancient philosophers, as a cause ineffable, unknown and superessential, barbarously confounds him with his first progeny, and by this means destroys the prerogative of his nature. I say barbarously confounds: for the Trinitarians, instead of asserting that considered as a triad there are three gods in *their* first cause, but that these three from their profound union may be considered as one, they say "the father is god, the son is god, and the holy ghost is god; and yet there are not three gods, but one god." And in the second place they have not the smallest conception that the intelligible triad, from which their trinity is derived, is in reality neither one nor three; and that this ought at least to be asserted of a triad, which is considered, though erroneously, as the first principle of things *.

But

* A superficial reader, who knows no more of Platonism than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, will be induced to think that the genuine Platonic trinity consists of the first cause, or *the good, intellect, and soul*, and that these three were considered by Plato as in a certain respect one. To such men as these it is necessary to observe, that a triad of principles distinct from each other is a very different thing from a triad which may be considered as a whole, and of which each one of the three is a part.

But in order to convince the reader that this doctrine of the intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I shall present him with the following translation from Damascius (*περί αρχων*) *Concerning Principles**, in which the agreement of all the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.

“The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the intelligible gods is as follows: *Time* is symbolically placed for the one principle of the universe; but *æther* and *chaos*, for the two posterior to this one: and *being*, simply considered, is represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad of the intelligible gods. But for the perfection of the second triad, they

part. But *the good* or *the one* is according to Plato superessential, as is evident from the first hypothesis of this dialogue, and from the sixth book of his Republic. It is impossible therefore that *the good* can be consubstantial with *intellect*, which is even posterior to being; and much less with *soul*, which is subordinate to intellect. And hence *the good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, do not form a consubstantial triad. But of this Cudworth had not the smallest conception. Had he indeed been so fortunate as to have discovered this, previous to his composing such a prodigious folio, he might perhaps have given the public in a less compass the *true* Intellectual System of the Universe, free from that sophistical reasoning and immense farrago of quotations, with which the work in its present state abounds. I call his quotations, and of course his system, a farrago: for surely a work merits no better appellation in which the fathers and philosophers, the ancient and modern trinity are blended together, with all the dissonance of *ecclesiastical* confusion. The jumble is indeed as preposterous as a dance composed of the extreme tall and the extreme short, the crooked and the straight, the clear-sighted and the blind.

* Vid. Wolfii Anecd. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a god, or a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth into light. For indeed they philosophize variously concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as *intellect* *, Ericapæus as *power*, and Phanes as *father*. But sometimes † the middle triad is considered according to the three-shaped god, while conceived in the egg: for the middle always represents each of the extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped god subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform god is the separating and discriminating cause of that which is intelligible. Likewise the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united; but the third ‡ according to the god who separates and distributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is as follows. According to them *water* and *matter* were the first productions, from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so that water and earth are established as the two first principles; the latter of these having a *dispersed* subsistence; but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence sufficiently evinced. But the third principle

* ως νοῦς is omitted in the original.

† μηπολις is erroneously printed instead of πολις.

‡ το τεττον is I conceive erroneously omitted in the original.

posterior to these two, *water* and *earth*, and which is generated from them, is a *dragon*, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the god himself. They add likewise that he has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called *undecaying Time*, and *Hercules*; that *Necessity* resides with him, which is the same as *Nature*, and incorporeal *Adrastia*, which is extended * throughout the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established according to essence; and assert, besides this, that it subsists as male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of all things.

“But I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that neglecting the two first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For in the former hypothesis, the highly revered and undecaying *Time*, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this *Time* is neglected, and the principle becomes a *dragon*. It likewise calls triple æther, moist; and chaos, infinite; and Erebus, cloudy and dark; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence the third procession of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not according to a simple but intellectual subsistence: but its middle infinite chaos, considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient, because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelli-

* Read *Διγενεῖς*.

gible triad? I answer, the egg; the duad of the natures of male and female which it contains, and the multitude of all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: And the third among these is an incorporeal god, bearing golden wings on his shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the all-various forms of wild-beasts. This last then must be considered as the *intellect* of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are *many* as well as *two*, correspond to *power*, and the egg itself is the *paternal principle* of the third triad: but the third god of this third triad, this theology celebrates as *Protogonus*, and calls him *Jupiter*, the disposer of all things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him *Pan*. And such is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus therefore commences his genealogy from *Night*, from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent, that *Night* is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is revered even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter—"that he feared lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift *Night* *." So that Homer begins his genealogy of

* ἀζέτο γὰρ μὴ νυκτὶ θεῷ ἀπὸθύμια εἶζοι. So Damascius; but instead of εἶζοι, all the printed editions of Homer read ἐξέδοι.

the gods from *Night*. But it appears to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that Chaos was first generated, signifies by Chaos the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that he produces earth * the first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procreation of the gods. Unless perhaps Chaos is the second of the two principles: but Earth †, Tartarus, and Love, form the triple intelligible. So that *Love* is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus de-

* Τη is printed instead of Γη.

† As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the gods which Hesiod celebrates by the epithets of *Earth, Heaven, &c.* cannot be the visible *Heaven* and *Earth*: for Plato in the *Cratylus*, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the gods, as we have evinced in our notes on that dialogue, plainly shews, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity is the artificer of the sensible universe; and consequently *Saturn, Heaven, Earth, &c.* are much superior to the mundane deities. Indeed if this be not admitted, the *Theogony* of Hesiod must be perfectly absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeable to Homer (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε), "*father of gods and men*"? Shall we say that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of *all* the gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the generation of gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can therefore only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane gods: and his *Theogony*, when considered according to this exposition, will be found to be beautifully consistent and sublime; whereas, according to modern interpretations, the whole is a mere chaos, more wild than the delirious visions of Swedenborg, and more unconnected than the filthy rant of the stool-preaching methodist. I only add, that Τη is erroneously printed in the *Excerpta* of Wolfius for γη.

nominated

nominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But *Earth* for the first, as being first established in a certain firm and essential station. But *Tartarus* for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting and moving forms into distribution. But *Acusilaus* appears to me to establish *Chaos* for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, *Erebus* as male, and *Night* as female; placing the latter for *infinity*, but the former for *bound*. But from the mixture of these, he says * that *Æther*, *Love*, and *Counsel* are generated, forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places *Æther* as the summit; but *Love* in the middle, according to its naturally middle subsistence; but *Metis* or *Counsel* as the third, and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the history of *Eudemus*, from these he produces a great number of other gods. But *Epimenides* establishes *Air* and *Night* as the two first principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior to these two. But from air and night *Tartarus* is generated, forming as it appears to me the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other, an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to *Pherecydes Syrius*, the three first principles are a *Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature*, *Time* †, and an *Earthly Nature*: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But he asserts that *Time* generates from the progeny of itself, *Fire*,

* $\varphi\eta\mu\iota$ in the original should doubtless be $\varphi\eta\sigma\iota$.

† $\chi\theta\acute{o}\nu\omega\varsigma$ is printed for $\chi\theta\omicron\nu\omega\nu$.

Spirit, and *Water*: which signify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these, distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of gods is constituted, which he calls *five-times animated* (*πεντεμψυχος*); and which is perhaps the same as if he had said *πεντεκοσμος*, or a *five-fold world*. But we may probably discourse on this subject at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present concerning the hypotheses derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with respect to the theology of the Barbarians, the Babylonians seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But they establish two principles, *Tauthe* and *Apasoon*. And they consider *Apasoon* as the husband of *Tauthe*, whom they denominate the mother of the gods; from whom an only-begotten son *Mooumis* was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles*. But from these another procession is derived, *Dache* and *Dachus*. And likewise a third from these, *Kissare* and *Assoorus*. And from these again three deities are produced, *Anus*, *Illinus*, and *Aus*. But from *Aus* and *Dache* a son called *Belus* is produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, some of them call all the intelligible and united world *Place*, and some of them *Time*: from which a good divinity and an evil demon are distributed; *Light* and *Darkness* subsisting prior to these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature as having a subsistence which distributes the

* That is, from bound and infinite.

two-fold co-ordination of better natures: one of which co-ordinations *Orosmades* presides over, and the other *Arimanius*. But the Sidonians, according to the same historian, place before all things, *Time*, *Desire*, and *cloudy Darknefs*. And they assert that from the mingling of *Desire* and *Darknefs* as two principles, *Air* and a *gentle Wind* were produced: *Air* evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but the *gentle Wind* raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again that from both these the bird *Otus*, similar to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (without the assistance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Mochus, places *Æther* and *Air* as the two first principles, from which the intelligible god *Oulomus* was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit of the intelligible order. But from this god (yet proceeding together with him) they assert that *Chouforus* was produced, being the first unfolding procession. And after this an egg succeeds; which I think must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding *Chouforus* is intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes an undistributed subsistence: unless perhaps after the two principles *Æther* and *Air*, the summit is *One Wind*; but the middle *Two Winds*, the *south-west* and the *south*; for in a certain respect they place these prior to *Oulomus*. But *Oulomus* himself is intelligible intellect: and unfolding *Chouforus* * the first order after the intelligible series. But the egg itself is heaven; from the bursting of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eu-

* *χρωσώρος* should be read instead of *χρωσώρε*.

demus : we have, however, by means of some Egyptian philosophers resident among us, been instructed in the occult truth of their theological doctrine. According to these philosophers then, the Egyptians in certain discourses celebrate *an unknown Darknefs* as the one principle of the universe, and this *thrice pronounced as such* ; but for the two principles after the first they place *Water* and *Sand*, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more ancient writer Asclepiades, *Sand* and *Water*; from which and after which the first *Kamephis* is generated. But after this *a second*, and from this again *a third*; by all which, the whole intelligible distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraiscus says that the Egyptians, denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, assert that he is *the Sun*; which doubtless signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the above-mentioned authors themselves. It must however be observed, that with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics, or peculiarities of many gods, as may be learned from such as are desirous of consulting their writings on this subject."

Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the ancient theologists with each other in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewise behold the origin of the Christian trinity, its deviation from truth, and the absurdity and even impiety with which a belief in it is unavoidably attended. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldeans concerning the
intelligible

intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his *Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean Theologists* *. “The intelligible co-ordination (says he) is not in the intellectual co-ordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first darkness.” Co-ordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectu co-ordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem intellectualem hierarchiam, in abyssu primæ unitatis, et sub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.

But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions of the gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the *intelligible order*, the *intelligible and at the same time intellectual*, the *intellectual*, the *super-mundane*, the *liberated*, and the *mundane* †. For the *intelligible*, as we have already observed, must hold the first rank, and must consist of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*; i. e. must *abide*, *proceed*, and *return*; at the same time that it is characterised, or subsists principally according to *permanent being*. But in the next place that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* succeeds, which must likewise be triple, but must principally subsist according to *life*, or *intelligence*. And in the third place the *intellectual* order must succeed, which is *triply convertive*. But as in consequence of the existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in *intellect*, and in the last hypostasis of the *intellectual triad*. For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various and per-

* Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

† i. e. θεοι νοητοι, νοητοι & νοεροι, νοεροι, υπερκοσμοι, απολυτοι five υπερουρανοιοι, et ιχκοσμοιοι.

fect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since *fabrication* is nothing more than *procession*, the demiurgus will be to the posterior orders of gods what *the one* is to the orders prior to the *demiurgus*; and consequently he will be that secondarily which the first cause of all is primarily. Hence his first production will be an order of gods analogous to the *intelligible* order, and which is denominated *super-mundane*. After this he must produce an order of gods similar to the *intelligible* and *intellectual* order, and which are denominated *liberated* gods. And in the last place, a procession correspondent to the *intellectual* order, and which can be no other than the mundane gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterised according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal hypotheses.

Now all these orders are unfolded by Plato in the conclusions which the second hypothesis of this dialogue contains; and this in a manner so perfectly agreeable to the Orphic and Chaldaic theology, that he who can read and *understand* the incomparable work of Proclus on Plato's theology, will discover how ignorantly the latter Platonists have been abused by the moderns, as fanatics and corrupters of the doctrine of Plato. To men indeed who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing, who expect ^{to see} by desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay, affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base—to such as these—and, alas! the world is

is full of such—the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a dis-tempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.

But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold ignorance is the disease of *the many*. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding; but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, neither to meddle with the ensuing dialogue, nor with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy; for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied assiduity, and toil for wealth with encreasing alacrity and vigour; as they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. It is well said indeed by Lysis * the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The words

* In Epist. ad Hipparchum.

of such, as the same author beautifully observes (that is the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is through preparatory disciplines and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful can be planted in these savage haunts.

Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskilful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties in the undertaking, are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms of the ocean; must suffer transmutation into a beast, through the magic power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charms of Calypso; and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning; or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skilful traveller, who pursues the right road with an ardour which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of Æneas; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing
land

land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.

Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design ! Pursue with avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honours and fordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast ? A sea,

Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails
The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales,

And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Calypso,

What ships have you, what sailors to convey,
What oars to cut the long laborious way ?

I only add, that I have followed the opinion of Proclus in inscribing this dialogue *On the Gods*: for, as ideas considered according to their summits or unities are gods, and the whole dialogue is entirely conversant with ideas and these unities, the propriety of such an inscription must, I think, be apparent to the most superficial observer.

THE
PARMENIDES

OF

PLATO.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

**CEPHALUS, ADIMANTUS, ANTIPHON,
GLAUCO, PYTHODORUS, SOCRATES,
ZENO, PARMENIDES.**

WHEN we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand, I am glad to see you (says he) Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me. Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance. Tell me, then (says he), what you are in want of. And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes. Entirely so (says he), and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally enquire after? I replied, These my fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory

the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus. You speak the truth, says he. These discourses, therefore (says I), we are desirous to hear. But this (says he) is no difficult matter to accomplish : for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation ; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs. But if it is necessary, we will go to him : for he just now went from hence home ; and dwells very near, in Melita. After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon ; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a copper-smith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me : and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking) ; but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said, that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa : that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age ; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides. He likewise said, that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls ; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings : but that
Socrates

Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related, that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a small part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that when he had repeated it, Socrates said—How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert? Zeno answered, It is. If therefore it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities. Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that *the many* has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to shew that *the many* is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you? Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then said, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship

ship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion: but Zeno says that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this assertion. As therefore you assert that *the one* is, and he that *the many* has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension. That Zeno said—Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions. But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavour to defame it, by attempting to shew that if *the one* is *many*, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing therefore contradicts those who say that *the many* is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is de-

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firous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of *the one*, if both are sufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light—you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss. I admit it (says Socrates); and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the case? For if any one should shew that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should evince *that all things are one*, through

their participating of *the one*, and at the same time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should shew that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for doubtless he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be, should any one shew that I myself am both *one* and *many*? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he desires to shew that I am *one*, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *the one*—so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If any one, therefore, should endeavour to shew that stones, wood, and all such particulars are both *many* and *one*, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not assert that *the one* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor speak of any thing wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men. But if any one should in the first place distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as *similitude* and *dissimilitude*, *multitude* and *the one*, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards shew himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished (says he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labour in the investigation of these particulars:

ticulars : yet I should be much astonished if any one could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species ; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse ; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates : and that in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the pursuit of liberal disciplines ! Tell me, therefore, have you separated as you say certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart ? And does there appear to you to be a certain *similitude* separate from that *similitude* which we possess, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno ? That Socrates said, So it appears to me. And (that Parmenides said) does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself ; likewise of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind ? That Socrates said, It does. And likewise of all such things as we are composed from ; so that there is a certain form of *man*, or of *fire*, or *water* ? That Socrates answered—I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these ; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every

such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair, mud, and filth, or any thing else which is vile and abject; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant? That Socrates said, I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong. That Parmenides then said, You are as yet but a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for in my opinion, when you are received by her you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating retain the appellations: as, for instance, that such things as participate of *similitude* are *similar*; of *magnitude*, *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *justice* are *beautiful* and *just*? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these? That Socrates said, How can there be? Does it then appear to you, that the whole form is one in each individual of *many things*? Or what

what other opinion have you on this subject? That then Socrates said, What hinders, O Parmenides, but that it should be one? As it is therefore one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself. That Socrates said, It would not be so: but just as if this form was *day*, this being *one* and *the same*, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not any thing the more separate from itself; in the same manner every form may be at once *one* and *the same* in all. That Parmenides then said, You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind? That Socrates said, Perhaps so. Will therefore the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual? A different part only. That Parmenides said, These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible, and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form. So indeed it seems. Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one? That Socrates said, By no means. For see (said Parmenides) whether upon dividing magnitude itself, it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself? Entirely so, said Socrates.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal itself, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is less than equal itself? It is impossible. But

some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity ; and that which is *small itself* will be greater than this, this small quantity being a part of *small itself* ; and thus *small itself* will be that which is *greater* : but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, and not greater, than it was before. That Socrates said— This cannot take place. But after what manner then, O Socrates, can individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes ? That Socrates said, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any respect an easy matter to define a circumstance of this kind. But what will you say to this ? To what ? I think that you consider every form as one, on this account ; because, since a certain multitude of particulars appears to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think them to be one great thing. That then Socrates said, You speak the truth. But what if you consider the *great itself*, and other things which are *great*, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is *great* appear to you, through which all these necessarily seem to be great ? It seems so. Hence another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, besides *magnitude itself* and its participants : and besides all these another *magnitude*, through which all these become great ; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude. But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than a *conception*, which ought not to subsist any where but in the soul ; and if this be the case, each will be one : and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue. That Parmenides said, What then ? is each

each of these *conceptions* one, but at the same time a *conception* of nothing? That Socrates said, This is impossible. It is a *conception*, therefore, of something? Certainly. Of *being* or of *non-being*? Of *being*. Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things? Undoubtedly. But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in all things? This seems to be necessary. That Parmenides then said, But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from conceptions; and thus all of them be endowed with intellection? Or will you assert that though they are conceptions, yet they understand nothing? But that Socrates said, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair seems to me to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: *that these forms are established paradigms, as it were, by their nature; but that other things are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms.* If any thing, therefore, becomes similar to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar? There cannot. Is there not therefore a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form? It is necessary. But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be *form* itself? Entirely so. Nothing therefore can be similar to a *form*, nor a *form* to any other. For in this case another *form* will always appear besides some particular *form*: and if this again should become similar to another, another

would be required; and a new *form* would never cease to take place, as long as any *form* becomes similar to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate. So it seems.

That Parmenides then said, Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves? I do very much so. Know then that you do not apprehend what dubious consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants. But that Socrates said, How do you mean? That Parmenides answered, There are many other doubts, indeed, but this is the greatest: if any one should assert that it is not proper *forms* should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally sagacious and acute. But he should be willing to pursue *him* closely who endeavours to support his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who contends that *forms* cannot be known, will remain unpersuaded. But that Socrates said, In what respect, O Parmenides? Because, O Socrates, I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each *form* as subsisting by itself, must allow in the first place that no one of these subsists in us. For (that Socrates said) how if it did, could it any longer subsist essentially by itself? That Parmenides replied, You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and

and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation. That then Socrates said, How do you mean? As if, Parmenides answered, some one of us should be the master or servant of any one; he who is master is not the *master* of servant, nor is he who is servant, *servant* of master; but he sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itself* is that which it is from its relation to *servitude*; and *servitude* in a similar manner is servitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have *they* any authority over us: but I assert that they subsist from themselves and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. That Parmenides then said, Is not science, so far as it is such, the science of that which is true? Perfectly so. But will every science which is, be the science of true being or not? Certainly it will. But will not our science be conversant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us? It is necessary that it should be so. But you have granted that we do not possess forms, and that they are not things with which we are conversant? Certainly not. Is each genus of beings known to be what it is, through the *form*
itself

itself of science? Undoubtedly. But this *form* we do not possess? By no means. No form therefore is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself? It does not appear it can. The *beautiful itself*, therefore, and the *good itself*, and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us? So it seems. But survey this, which is yet still more dire. What? You will say, perhaps, that if there is any certain *genus of science*, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and every thing else? Certainly. If therefore any one possesses *science itself*, will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a god? It is necessary so to assert. But can a god, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself? Why should he not? That Parmenides said, Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves. It was admitted by us. If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the gods will not rule over us, nor will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same reasoning, they will neither though gods be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns. But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive divinity of knowledge? That Parmenides said, These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily

necessarily happen to forms, if they are the ideas of things, and if any one separates each form apart from other things; so that any one who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man of the most excellent disposition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an essence, itself subsisting by itself*: but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these in a becoming manner. That then Socrates said, I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeable to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his thoughts, while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exists to be always the same, and by this means entirely destroys the discursive power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive perfectly the same with myself. That Socrates answered, You speak the truth. What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, being ignorant of these? Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present. That Parmenides said, Before you exercise yourself in this affair, O Socrates, you should endeavour to define what *the beautiful,*

beautiful, the just, and the good is, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful and divine; but collect yourself together, and while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise is this, O Parmenides? And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the *wandering* which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place in such things as are apprehended by reason, and which some one may consider as having a real subsistence. For it appears to me (said Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved that there are both similars and dissimilars, or any thing else which it is the province of beings to suffer. That Parmenides replied, You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this, you should not only consider *if each of the things supposed is*, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise what will result from supposing that *it is not*, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair. How do you mean (said Socrates)? As if (said Parmenides) you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themselves, and to *the one*; and to *the one* with respect to itself, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to consider

consider what will happen both to *the one* and to *the many*, as well to themselves as to each other. And again, if he should suppose *if similitude is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning *the dissimilar*, *motion* and *abiding*, *generation* and *corruption*, *being* and *non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every thing which is supposed either to be or not to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design to survey the truth.

That Socrates then said, You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair? That Parmenides replied, You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labour to a man so old as myself! Will you, then, O Zeno (said Socrates), discuss something for us? And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said—We must request Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for, as he says, it is no trifling matter: or do you not see the prodigious labour of such a discussion? If therefore many were present, it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming,
especially

especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time. But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request. That then Parmenides said, It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of the Ibycean horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said—*Thus also I that am so old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love*; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse: but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. From whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, supposing concerning *the one itself, whether the one is, or whether it is not*, what ought to be the consequence? That Zeno said, By all means. Who, then (said Parmenides), will answer to me? Will the youngest among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will

will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation. That then Aristotle said, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

That Parmenides said, Let us then begin. If *one* is, is it not true that *the one* will not be many? For how can it be? It is necessary, therefore, that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole. Why? Is not a part a part of a whole? Certainly. But what is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole? Entirely so. From both these consequences, therefore, the one would be composed of parts, being a whole and possessing parts? It is necessary it should be so. And so both ways *the one* will be many, and not one. True. But it ought not to be many, but one. It ought. Hence it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if *the one* is one. It will not. If therefore it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, or end; for such as these would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning are the bounds of every thing? How should they not? *The one* therefore is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And without figure, therefore, for it neither participates of the round figure nor the straight. Why not? For the round figure is that, the extremities of which are equally distant from the middle. Certainly. And the straight figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of both the extremes? It is so. Will not therefore *the one* consist of parts, and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure? Entirely so. It is therefore neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.
Right.

Right. And indeed, being such, it will be no where; for it will neither be in another, nor in itself. How so? For being in another, it would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and would be touched by it in many places: but it is impossible that *the one* which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, should be touched by a circle in many places. Impossible. But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: for it is impossible that any thing should not be comprehended by that in which it is. It is impossible. Would not therefore that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and produce both these: and thus *the one* would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. *The one* therefore is not any where, since it is neither in itself nor in another. It is not. But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved. Why can it not? Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration; for these alone are the genera of motion. Certainly. But if *the one* should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one. Impossible. It will not therefore be moved according to alteration? It appears that it will not. But will it be moved locally? Perhaps so. But indeed if *the one* is moved locally, it will either be carried round in the same circle, or it will change one place for another. Necessarily so. But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself rolled about the middle? But can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle

dle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle? There cannot be any. But if it changes its place, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved? In this case it would. Has it not appeared to be impossible that *the one* should be in any thing? It has. Is it not much more impossible that it should *become situated* in any thing? I do not understand how you mean. If any thing is *becoming to be* in any thing, is it not necessary that it should not yet *be* in it, since it is *becoming to be*; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already *become*? It is necessary. If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; since it can neither subsist in *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it will neither change its place by going any where, nor that it may *become situated* in any thing; nor through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration. It does not appear that it can. The one therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for *the one* to be in any thing. We have said so. It can never therefore be in *same*. Why? Because it would now be in that in which *same* is. Entirely so. But the one can neither be in itself nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in *same*. It does not appear that it is. But as it is never in *same*, it can neither be at rest nor stand still. In this case it cannot.

The one, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved. It does not appear that it can. Nor will it be the same either with another, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another. How so? For if different from itself, it would be different from *the one*, and so would not be *the one*. True. And if it should be the same with another, it would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be *the one*, but it would be something different from *the one*. It could not indeed. But if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself? It must. But it will not be different from another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other. Right. In consequence therefore of its being *the one*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can? Certainly not. But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is *different*, and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the same with itself. Why not? Is the nature of *the one* the same with that of *same*? Why? Because when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then? That which becomes the same with many things, must necessarily become many, and not one. True. But if *the one* and *same* differ in no respect, whenever any thing becomes *same* it will always become *the one*, and whenever it becomes *the one* it will be *same*. Entirely so. If therefore *the one* should be the *same* with itself, it would be to itself that which is *not one*; and so that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impossible. It is im-

possible therefore for *the one* to be either different from another, or the same with itself. Impossible. And thus *the one* will neither be *different* nor *the same*, either with respect to itself or another. It will not. But neither will it be similar to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to another. Why not? Because the similar is that which in a certain respect suffers *same*. Certainly. But it has appeared that *same* is naturally separate from *the one*. It has appeared so. But if *the one* should suffer any thing separate from its being one, it would become more than *the one*, but this is impossible. Certainly. In no respect therefore can *the one* suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself. It does not appear that it can. It cannot therefore be similar either to another or to itself. So it seems. Nor yet can *the one* suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than *the one*. More, indeed. But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers *same* is similar. Right. But *the one*, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers *different*, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another. It certainly cannot. *The one* therefore will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself. It does not appear that it can.

But since it is such it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But

to those to which it is incommensurable with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser ; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not ? Is it not therefore impossible that that which does not participate of *same*, should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same ? It is impossible. It will therefore neither be equal to itself, nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures ; and so again it will no longer be *the one*, but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure : but it has appeared that *the one* cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. *The one* therefore neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few ; nor (since it in no respect participates of *same*) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.

But what ? Does it appear that *the one* can be either older or younger, or be of the same age ? What should hinder ? If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equality of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted *the one* does not participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing ? It can in no respect. *The one* therefore will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with it-
self

self or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not therefore be impossible that *the one* should be at all in time, if it be such? Or is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older, always older than the younger? What then? That therefore which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it should *be* now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which *is to be hereafter*: but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor *to be hereafter*, nor *to be*, but to subsist in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence that which is *becoming to be* older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in *becoming to be* younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in *becoming to be*, should *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to *the one*. None. Neither therefore is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed, according to

the decisions of reason. What then? Do not the terms *it was*, *it has been*, *it did become*, seem to signify the participation of the time past? Certainly. And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, signify that which is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the present time? Entirely so. If then *the one* participates in no respect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*; nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*. It is most true. Is it possible therefore that any thing can participate of essence, except according to some one of these? It is not. In no respect therefore does *the one* participate of essence. It does not appear that it can. *The one* therefore is in no respect. So it seems. Hence it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but as it appears, the one neither is *one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it seems. Is it possible therefore that these things can thus take place about *the one*? It does not appear to me that they can.

Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see whether or not by this means any thing shall appear to us different from what it did before? I am entirely willing. Have

we

we not therefore declared if *the one is*, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so? Certainly. But consider from the beginning, if *the one is*, can it be possible that it should *be*, and yet not participate of *essence*? It cannot. Will not *essence* therefore be the *essence* of *the one*, but not the same with *the one*: for if it were the same, it would not be the *essence* of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of *essence*, but it would be all one to say *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypothesis is not *if one*, what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not so? Entirely so. Does it not signify that the term *is* is something different from *the one*? Necessarily. If therefore any one should summarily assert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of *essence*. Certainly.

Again therefore let us say, if *the one is*, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a *one* as possesses parts? How? Thus. If the term *it is* is spoken of *one being*, and *the one*, of *being which is one*, and *essence* is not the same with *the one*, but each belongs to that same *one being* which we have supposed, is it not necessary that the whole of it should be *one being*, but that its parts should be *the one* and *to be*? It is necessary. Whether therefore should we call each of these parts a part alone, or a part of the whole? Each should be called a part of the whole. That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part. Entirely so. What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. *the one* and *being*, desert each other, so that *the one* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *the one*? It cannot be. Again therefore each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at least

be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being*, *the one*; so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*. Entirely so. Will not therefore *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it seems.

But proceed, and still further consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account *one being* appears to be *many*. It does so. But what then? If we receive by cogitation that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many? I think it will be one. But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if *the one* does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of *the one*. It is necessary. If therefore *essence* is one thing and *the one* another thing, neither is *the one*, so far as *the one*, different from *essence*, nor *essence*, so far as *essence*, different from *the one*; but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*. Entirely so. So that *different* is neither the same with *the one* nor with *essence*. How can it? What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will *essence* and *different*, or *essence* and *the one*, or *the one* and *different*, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these? How do you mean? After this manner: Is there not that which we call *essence*? There is. And again, that which we denominate *the one*? And this also. Is not therefore each of them

them denominated? Each. But what, when I say *essence* and *the one*, do I not pronounce both these? Entirely so. And if I should say *essence* and *different*, or *different* and *the one*, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both? Certainly. But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And can any reason be assigned, why of two things each of them should not be one? There cannot. As therefore these two subsist together, each of them will be one. It appears so. But if each of them is one, and *the one* is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three? Certainly. But are not three *odd*, and two *even*? How should they not? But what then? Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three? It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How should it not? But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three? Entirely so. Hence there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It will be so. If therefore this be the case, do you think that any number will be left which is not necessarily there? By no means. If therefore *the one* is, it is also necessary that there should be number. It is necessary. But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you not think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence? By all means I think so. If therefore every number participate
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of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence? Certainly. Essence therefore will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being? In no respect. Essence therefore is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts. It is so. Very many therefore are its parts. Very many indeed. But what, is there any one of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not *one* part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing. It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected. It is so. Can *one being* therefore be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently. I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible. It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state. Certainly. But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its parts. It ought. We did not therefore just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many parts; since it is not divided into more parts than *the one*, but into parts equal to those of *the one*: for neither does *being* desert *the one*, nor *the one, being*; but these two always subsist, equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely so. *The one*, therefore, which is distributed by essence, is many and an infinite multitude. So it appears. *One being* therefore is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that *the one*
which

which is distributed by essence should be many. Entirely so.

And indeed in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *the one* will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole? Necessarily so. But that which contains will be a bound. How should it not? *One being*, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so. As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes? It is necessary. But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole? It cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle. It will. But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle. It could not. And, as it appears, *the one* being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both. It will so.

Will it therefore, being such, subsist in itself and in another? How? For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole. It is so. But all the parts are comprehended by the whole. Certainly. But *the one* is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all. Certainly. Is not *the one*, therefore, a whole? How should it not? If therefore all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *the one* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence *the one* will be comprehended by *the one*, and so *the one* will be in itself. It appears so. But again the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For if it were

in all, it would necessarily be in one: for if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts? In no respect. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser, which is impossible. Impossible. But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere? It is necessary. But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another? Entirely so. So far therefore as *the one* is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so *the one* will necessarily be in itself and in another. Necessarily.

But as *the one* is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved and stand still? How? It must stand, indeed, if it be in itself. For being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *same*, through being in itself. It will. But that which is always in the same, must necessarily without doubt always stand still. Entirely so. But what, must not that on the contrary which is always in another, necessarily never be in *same*? But if it be never in *same*, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved? Certainly. It is necessary therefore that *the one*, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still. It appears so.

But, likewise, it ought to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with and different from others, if it suffers what we have related above.

above. How? Every thing, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole. It appears so. Is therefore *the one* a part of itself? By no means. It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part. For it cannot. But is *the one*, therefore, different from *the one*? By no means. It will not therefore be different from itself. Certainly not. If therefore it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself? It is necessary. But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in *same* in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere? It appears so to me. And in this manner *the one* appears to subsist, being at the same time both in itself and in another. So it seems. Through this, therefore, it appears that *the one* is different from itself. It does so.

But what, if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are not all such things as are not one different from *the one*? And is not *the one* different from such things as are not one? How should it not? *The one* therefore will be different from other things. Different. But see whether *different* and *same* are not contrary to each other. How should they not? Do you think therefore that *same* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *same*? I do not. If therefore *different* is never in *same*, there is no being in which for any time *different* subsists; for if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *same*. Would it not be so? It would. But since it is
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never in *same*, *different* will never subsist in any being. True. Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in *the one*. It will not. *The one* therefore will not through *different* be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *the one*. Not, indeed. Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of *different*. For how can they? But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from *different*, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other? They must escape. But neither will things which are not one participate of *the one*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain respect one. True. Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in consequence of possessing number. Certainly not. But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *the one*? They would participate. If therefore this is entirely *the one*, but those *not one*, neither will *the one* be a part of things which are *not one*, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are *not one* be parts of *the one*, nor yet wholes, as if *the one* were a part. They will not. But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other. We have said so. Must we not therefore assert that *the one*, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are *not one*, is the same with them? We must. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself. It appears from this reasoning to be so.

But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others?

Perhaps

Perhaps so. Since therefore it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it. But what then? Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less? How should it not? If therefore neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner. Certainly. Will not that through which *the one* becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both *the one* becomes the same with others, and others with *the one*? How do you say? Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something? I do: but what then? Do you pronounce the same name often or once? I pronounce it once. When therefore you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the same? Or whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing? But what then? Does not a different name belong to some certain thing? Entirely so. When therefore you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs. It is necessary it should be so. But when we say that other things are different from *the one*, and that *the one* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet signify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name. Entirely so. If therefore *the one* be different from others, and others from *the one*, in consequence of suffering the same *different*, *the one* will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others: but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar? Certainly. But, in the same manner, as *the one* becomes
different

different from others, every thing becomes similar to every thing : for every thing is different from all things. It appears so. But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar ? It is. And is not *different* contrary to *same* ? And this also. But this likewise is apparent, that *the one* is both the same with and different from others. It is apparent. But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others. Entirely so. But *the one* appears to be similar, so far as different. Certainly. So far therefore as it is *same*, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar : or was it not the similar which produced the different ? Certainly. It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same ; or it would not be contrary to different. So it appears. *The one* therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others : and so far as *different* it will be similar ; but so far as *the same* dissimilar. The case appears to be so. And it is likewise thus affected. How ? So far as it suffers *same* it does not suffer that which is various ; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar ; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar : but so far as it suffers *different* it will be various ; and being various it will be dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since therefore *the one* is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others. Entirely so. And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself ; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar ? Necessarily so.

But consider now how *the one* subsists with respect to
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touching itself and others, and not touching. I consider. For *the one* appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself. Right. But is *the one* also in others? Certainly. So far therefore as *the one* is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself. So it appears. And thus, indeed, *the one* will both touch itself and others. It will so. But what will you say to this? Must not every thing which is about to touch any thing be situated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself occupying the place proximate to that in which it is. It ought so. Would not this be the case with *the one* if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the case while it is *the one*? It cannot. The same necessity therefore belongs to *the one*, neither to be two nor to touch itself. The same. But neither will it touch others. Why? Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is separate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things therefore at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place. Certainly. But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much

will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. The contacts therefore less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves. True. If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that such things as are different from *the one* are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different? We have. *The one* therefore is not number in others, as *the one* is not contained in them. How can it? *The one* therefore is neither others, nor two, nor any thing possessing the name of another number. It is not. *The one* therefore is one alone, and will not be two. It will not, as it appears. There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting. There is not. *The one* therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *the one*, as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one* will both touch and not touch others and itself. So it appears.

Is it therefore equal and unequal to itself and others? How? If *the one* were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than *the one*, would it not follow that neither *the one*, because one, nor others, because different from *the one*, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude and the other parvitude, or *the one* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present? Necessarily so. Are there not therefore

therefore two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings. How should they? If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of *the one* or comprehend *the one*? Plainly so. If parvitude therefore is equally inherent in *the one*, will it not be equal to *the one*; but if it comprehends *the one* will it not be greater? How should it not? Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own? It is impossible. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *the one*, but if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the *whole* part of *the one*, as in the whole of *the one*: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent. It is necessary. Parvitude therefore will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself. It does not appear that there will. Neither will magnitude therefore be in *the one*: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being. True. But indeed magnitude itself will not surpass any thing else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself. It will not. Neither therefore will other things be greater than *the one*;

nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitute : nor will these two possess any power with respect to *the one*, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other : nor on the contrary will *the one* be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitute. So indeed it appears. If *the one* therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them ? It is necessary. Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected ? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal ? How should it not ? *The one* therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself : viz. from neither possessing magnitude nor parvitute in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself ; but being equally affected it will be equal to itself. Entirely so. *The one* therefore will be equal both to itself and others. So it appears.

But if *the one* should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself ; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself ; but from being comprehended less than itself : and thus *the one* would be both greater and lesser than itself. It would so. Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides *the one* and others ? How should it be otherwise ? But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere ? Certainly. And does not that which subsists in another subsist as the lesser in the greater ? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another. It cannot. But since there is nothing else except *the one* and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary

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fary that they should be in one another, viz. others in *the one*, and *the one* in others; or that they should be nowhere? It appears so. Because therefore *the one* is in others, others will be greater than *the one*, through comprehending it; but *the one* will be less than others, because comprehended: but if others are inherent in *the one*, *the one* on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than *the one*. It appears so. *The one* therefore is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others. It seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and others; and if of measures, also of parts. How should it not? Being therefore of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others. How? That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal. It is so. Since *the one*, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How should it not? If therefore it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. But will *the one* be similarly affected towards others? For since it appears to be greater than others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others? It is necessary. And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will

be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others. It will so.

Will *the one* therefore participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time? How? *To be* in a certain respect is present with it, since it *is the one*. Certainly. But what else is *to be* than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as *it was* is a communication of essence with the past, and *it will be* with the future? It is no other. It must participate therefore of time, if it participates of being. Entirely so. Must it not therefore participate of time in progression? Certainly. It will always therefore subsist *in becoming to be* older than itself, if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we therefore call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger? We do call it to mind. Does not *the one*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself? Necessarily so. It will therefore become both younger and older than itself. Certainly. But is it not then older when it subsists in *becoming to be* according to the present time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present *now*? It will not. Will it not therefore cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is now* older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing indeed from *the now*, but apprehending
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ing the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and *the now*. True. But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by *the now* or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always cease becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in pursuit of becoming. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will cease *becoming to be*, and then *is* older. Entirely so. Is it not therefore older than that in respect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itself? Certainly. And is not the older older than the younger? It is. *The one* therefore is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*. It is necessary. But *the now* is always present with *the one*, through the whole of its being: for it is always *now* as long as it is. How should it not? *The one* therefore always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself. So it appears. But *is the one*, or does it subsist in *becoming to be*, in a time more extended than or equal to itself? In an equal time. But that which either *is* or subsists in *becoming to be* in an equal time possesses the same age. How should it not? But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger. By no means. *The one*, therefore, since it both subsists in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itself, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* younger nor older than itself. It does not appear to me that it can.

But how is it affected with respect to others? I know not what to say. But this you may say, that things different from *the one* because they are *others*, and not *another*, are more than *the one*. For that which is another is one; but being *others* they are more than one, and possess multitude. They do. But multitude participates of a greater

number than *the one*? How should it not? What then? Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few? We assert this of the few before the many. That which is the fewest therefore is first: but is not this *the one*? Certainly. *The one* therefore becomes the first of all things possessing number; but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*. They have indeed. But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation: and thus others will be younger than *the one*, but *the one* will be older than others. It will indeed. But what shall we say to this? Can *the one* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible? Impossible. But *the one* appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end, and middle. Certainly. Is not therefore the beginning generated first of all, both of *the one* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end? What then? And indeed we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that *the one*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*. We should say so. But the end I think must be generated last of all, and *the one* must be naturally generated together with this; so that *the one*, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others. *The one* therefore is younger than others, but others are older than *the one*. So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning or any other part whatever of *the one*, or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts—must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part?

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Necessarily. *The one*, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation. True. *The one* therefore will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not *the one* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them; and on this account *the one* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *the one*: but, according to the former reasoning, *the one* was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it. Entirely so.

After this manner therefore *the one* subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *the one*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term *becoming to be* as with respect to the term *to be*? Or otherwise? I am not able to say. But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor on the contrary can that which is younger subsist in *becoming to be* younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first. How should it be otherwise? *That which* is therefore cannot subsist in *becoming to be* older or younger than *one being*, since it is always equally different from it
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in age : but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger ; but by no means subsists in *becoming* so. True. That which *is* one, therefore, will never subsist in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings. Never. But see whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older. After what manner ? The same as that through which *the one* appeared to be older than others, and others than *the one*. What then ? Since *the one* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others. Certainly.

But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part ? By a smaller. *The one*, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before ; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so ? Certainly. But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older ? Younger. But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to *the one* be older than before ? Entirely so. That therefore which was generated younger, will subsist in *becoming to be* older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older ; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it ; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged : but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary, they subsist in becoming contrary to each other ; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger : but they are not able to *become*

so.

so. For if they should *become* they would no longer subsist in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *the one* indeed becomes younger than others because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than *the one*, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to *the one*, since they appear to be more ancient and to have a prior generation. So indeed it appears. Does it not follow, that so far as *the one* does not become younger or older than the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that so far as this, *the one* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *the one*? But that, so far as it is necessary, that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior; so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than *the one* and *the one* than others? Entirely so. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itself and others. It is perfectly so. But since *the one* participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time? It is necessary. *The one* therefore was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated. What then? And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely so. There will therefore be science, opinion, and sense of *the one*, since we have now treated of all these things about it. You speak

Speak rightly. A name therefore and discourse may subsist about *the one*, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about *the one*. The case is perfectly so.

In the third place let us consider, if *the one* subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because *it is one* it should participate of essence; but that because *it is not*, it should not at any time participate of essence? It is necessary. Is it therefore possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate? It cannot be possible. It participates therefore at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same. Right. Is not that also time, when it receives *being* and again loses it? Or how can it be possible, that being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it? No otherwise. Do you not denominate the receiving of essence *to become*? I do. And is not to lose essence the same as to perish? Entirely so. *The one*, therefore, as it seems, by receiving and losing essence, is generated and perishes. Necessarily so. But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one? Entirely so. But in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected? It must. And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated?

lated? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized? It must so. But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time. How should it? But that which before stood still, and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation. For how can it? But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor stand still. There is not. But it cannot be changed without mutation. It is not probable that it can. When therefore will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time. It will not. Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes? What thing? *The sudden*, or that which unapparently starts forth to the view. For *the sudden* seems to signify some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still, it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the sudden* is situated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither stand still nor be moved. It will not. Will *the one* also be thus affected with respect to other mutations? And when it is changed from *being* into the *loss of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*,
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does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? And then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes? It appears so. And in the same manner, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated. And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized. It does not appear that it can. But all these passions *the one* will suffer, if it is. How should it not?

But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if *the one* is? We should. Let us relate, therefore, *if the one is*, what other things ought to suffer from *the one*. By all means. Does it not follow that because other things are different from *the one* they are not *the one*: for otherwise they would not be different from *the one*? Right. Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *the one*, but participate it in a certain respect. In what respect? Because things different from *the one* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one. Right. But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole. We have so. But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole. How so? If any thing should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others,

others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one : and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many : and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be any thing belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing else. So it appears. A part therefore is neither a part of many nor of all ; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all : for a part indeed is a part of this. Entirely so. If therefore other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from *the one*. It is necessary. But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts : for it is necessary that each of these should participate of *the one*. For if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one ; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each. Right. But it participates of *the one* as it is evidently something different from *the one* ; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be *the one itself*. But now it is impossible that any thing can be *the one* except *the one itself*. Impossible. But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *the one* : for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part. It is so. Must not therefore those which participate of *the one* participate it, as being different from *the one* ? How should they not ? But things different from *the one* will in a certain respect be many ; for if things different from *the one* were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since the things which participate

pate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of *the one* should be infinite in multitude? How? Thus: they are different from *the one*, nor are they participants of *the one*, then when they have already participated of it. Certainly. Are not those multitudes in which *the one* is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then? If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not be necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of *the one*? It is necessary. By always surveying therefore another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude? Entirely so. And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It will happen therefore to things different from *the one*, as it appears both from *the one* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity. It appears so. And thus things different from *the one*, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound. Entirely so. Are they not therefore similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves? Why? Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is *the same*. How should they not? But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer

fer these passions. Certainly. But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar. What then? According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar. It appears so. And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar. They will so. And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from *the one*, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related. You speak rightly.

Shall we not therefore pass by these things as evident, and again consider if *the one* is, whether things different from *the one* will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone? Entirely so. Let us therefore assert again from the beginning, *if the one is*, what things different from *the one* ought to suffer. Let us. Is therefore *the one* separate from others, and are others separate from *the one*? Why? Because there is no other *different* besides these, *viz.* that which is *different* from *the one*, and that which is *different* from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say *the one* and *others*. All indeed. There is nothing else therefore besides these, in which *the one* and *others* can subsist after the same manner. Nothing. *The one* and *others*, therefore, are never in the same. It does not appear that they are. Are they separate therefore? They are. We have likewise asserted that *the truly one* has not any parts. For how can it? Neither therefore will the whole of *the one* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is separate from *others*, and has no parts. How should it not be so? In no way therefore will *others* participate of *the one*, since

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they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole. It does not appear that they can. By no means therefore are *others the one*, nor have they any *one* in themselves. They have not. Neither then are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from *the one* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of *the one*. Right. *Others* therefore are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of *the one*. So it is. *Others* therefore are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with *the one*, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from *the one* would comprehend in themselves two contrary species. So it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one. Impossible. *Others* therefore are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but these things appear to be impossible. True. *Others* therefore are neither *same* nor *different*, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind. For if *others* could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of *the one*. All this is most true. Hence, then, if *the one* is, *the one* is all things and nothing; and is
simi-

Similarly affected towards itself and towards others. Entirely so.

Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if *the one* is not? We should. What then will be the hypothesis if *the one* is not? Will it differ from the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*? It will indeed differ. Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if *the one is not*? Entirely contrary. But what, if any one should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of *that which is not* as something *different*? Entirely so. Would he not therefore now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he says if *the one is not*; and should we understand that which he says? We should understand. In the first place therefore he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says *the one*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*: for that which is said not to be, will be not the less known, and that it is something different from others: is it not so? It is necessary it should. Let us therefore relate from the beginning, if *the one is not*, what ought to be the consequence. In the first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one says if *the one is not*. True. Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others? Entirely so. Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for when any one says that *the one* is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others,

but of the diversity of *the one*. It appears so. And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *some certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *these*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *the one* be spoken of, nor things different from *the one*, nor would any thing be present with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind. Right. But *to be* cannot be present with *the one* if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of *the many*: but indeed it is necessary that it should, if *the one* is *that*, and is not something different from *that*. If therefore it is neither *the one* nor *that*, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if *the one* is established as *that* and not as *another*, it is necessary that it should participate of *that* and of many other things. Entirely so. Dissimilitude therefore is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from *the one*, will also be foreign from it. Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How should they not? And are not things various dissimilars? Dissimilars. If therefore they are dissimilars to *the one*, it is evident they will be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar. It is evident. Dissimilitude therefore will be present with *the one*, according to which others will be dissimilars to it. It appears so. But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not similitude to itself be present with it? How? If there be a dissimilitude of *the one* with respect to *the one*, discourse would not take place about a thing of this kind as of *the one*; nor would the hypothesis be about *the one*, but about something different from *the one*. Entirely so. But it ought not. Certainly not. There ought

ought therefore to be a similitude of *the one* with respect to itself. There ought. But neither is *the one* equal to others. For if it were equal, it would according to equality be similar to them; but both these are impossible, since *the one* is not. Impossible. But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it? It is necessary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal? How should they not? *The one* therefore will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it. It will participate. But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and parvitude therefore belong to a one of this kind? It appears they do. But magnitude and parvitude are always separated from each other. Entirely so. Something, therefore, always subsists between them. Certainly. Can you assign any thing else between these, except equality? Nothing else. With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these. It appears so. But to *the one which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence. How so? Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for unless this is the case we shall not speak the truth when we say *the one is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so? It is. But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist. It is necessary. *The one* therefore *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while

not being *, but remits something of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*. Entirely so. It ought therefore to have, as the bond of *not to be*, *to be that which is not* †, if it is about *not to be*: just as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is not* †, that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a most eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be*: *being* participating of essence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-essence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be*: but *non-being* participating of *non-essence*, in order that it may *not be that which is not being*; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not*. Most truly so. Since therefore *non-being* is present with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not necessary that *the one* also, since it is not, should participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be*? It is necessary. Essence therefore will appear with *the one*, if it is not. So it seems. And *non-essence*, since it is not. How should it not? Can any thing

* The original is *μη εἶναι μὴ ὄν*, and this is literally *is not non-being*. But the meaning of this difficult passage is as follows: Any remission of *being* is attended with *non-being*, which is the same with *is not*; and if any thing of *is* be taken away, *is not* is immediately introduced, and so it will immediately become *is not non-being*, that is, *it is being*.

† For between *μη εἶναι* and *εἶναι ὄν*, *εἶναι μὴ ὄν* must subsist as a medium.

‡ So *το μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι* is the medium between *το εἶναι ὄν* and *το μὴ εἶναι ὄν*: for *το μὴ εἶναι μὴ* is the same as *το εἶναι*, and connects with *το εἶναι ὄν*; and *το μὴ ὄν* with *το μὴ εἶναι ὄν*. Thompson had not the least glimpse of this meaning, as may be seen from his version,

therefore

therefore which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit? It cannot. Every thing therefore signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner. How should it not? Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it? It is a motion. But has not *the one* appeared to be both *being* and *non-being*? Certainly. It has appeared therefore to be *thus* and *not thus* affected. It has. *The one* therefore which is *non-being* appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from *being* into *non-being*. It appears so. But if it be nowhere among beings, as *it is not* in consequence of *not being*, it cannot pass elsewhere. For how can it? It will not therefore be moved by transition. It will not. Neither will it revolve in *same*: for it will never touch *same*, since *same* is *being*. But it is impossible that *non-being* can reside in *any being*. Impossible. *The one* therefore *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will *the one* be altered from itself, either into *being* or *non-being*: for our discourse would no longer be concerning *the one*, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *same*, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved? How should there? But that which is immovable must necessarily be at rest; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still. It is necessary. *The one which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved. It appears so. But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered; for so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently. There is so. *The one*, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Certainly. But as again

it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered. It will not. So far therefore as *the one which is not* is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered. Certainly not. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, is both altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not necessary that when any thing is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus *the one which is not* will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved. It will not.

But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise. It is necessary, indeed, so to do. Have we not already related, *if the one is not*, what ought to happen concerning it? Certainly. But when we say *it is not*, do we signify any thing else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not? Nothing else. Whether, therefore, when we say that any thing *is not*, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is? Or does the term *is not* simply signify that it is in no respect anywhere, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it *is not*? It signifies, indeed, most simply. Neither therefore can that which is not *be*, nor in any other respect participate of essence. It cannot. But is to be generated and corrupted any thing else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence? It is nothing else. That therefore with which nothing of
essence

essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it? *The one*, therefore, since it in no respect *is*, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever. It is proper it should be so. *The one which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence. It does not appear that it will. Neither therefore will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted. True. But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved? It is necessary. But that which in no respect *is*, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain *same*? How should it not? And thus we must assert that *non-being* neither at any time stands or is moved. For indeed it does not. But likewise nothing of beings is present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence. It is evident. Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it. Certainly not. Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it. It does not appear that they will. But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it? They cannot. Neither therefore are similars nor dissimilars, nor *same* nor *different*, different from it. They are not. But what, can any thing be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or any thing else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not? There cannot. *The one* therefore *which is not*, will not in any respect subsist any where. So indeed it appears.

But

But let us again declare *if the one is not*, what other things ought to suffer. Let us. But in a certain respect *others* ought to subsist; for, unless *others* have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them. True. But if discourse is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the same? I do. But do we not say that *different* is different from different, and *other* is other than *another*? Certainly. With respect to *others*, therefore, if they are about to be *others*, there is something than which they will be others. It is necessary. But what will this be? For they will not be different from *the one*, since it is not. They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing. Right. According to multitudes, therefore, each are different from one another; for they cannot be different according to *the one*, since *the one is not*. But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be *one*, *many* would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it. Most right. But among these masses or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *the one* is not. Eminently so. Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since *the one* is not? There will so. There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one. Entirely so. But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since *the one* will not have a being. They will not. But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said,

said, will appear to be with them ; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small. How should it not? And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps : for it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between ; and this will be a phantasm of equality. It is likely to be so. Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end? How so? Because when any one apprehends by cogitation some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind : but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle ; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive *the one*, since *the one is not*. This is most true. But every thing which any one may apprehend by cogitation, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed ; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without *the one*. Entirely so. But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one : but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of *the one*, because it has no subsistence? It is necessary it should be so in the highest degree. Each therefore of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, *if the one is not*, and other things besides *the one* have a subsistence. It ought to be so. Will they therefore appear to be similars and dissimilars? But how? Since to him who beholds *others* at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear
to

to be one, they will seem to suffer *same* and to be similar. Entirely so. But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of *diversity*. It is so. The heaps therefore will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other. Entirely so. Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with and separate from themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily enumerated, if, though *the one is not, the many* have a subsistence? All this is most true.

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *the one, if the one is not*. Let us relate. Does it not therefore follow that *others* are not *the one*? How should it not be so? Nor yet are they many; for in *the many, the one* also would be inherent. For if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many. True. *The one*, therefore, not being inherent in *others, others* are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor will they appear either to be one or many. Why not? Because *others* cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be present with *others*; for no part subsists with non-beings. True. Neither therefore is there any opinion of that which is not inherent in *others*, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to *others*. It cannot. *The one*, therefore, *if it is not*, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of *others*, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without *the*

one. It is impossible. If *the one* therefore *is not*, neither have *others* any subsistence; nor can *the one* or *the many* be conceived by opinion. It does not appear that they can. Neither therefore do similars nor dissimilars subsist. They do not. Nor *same* nor *different*, nor things in contact, nor such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, *if the one is not*. True. If we should therefore summarily say, that *if the one is not, nothing is*, will not our assertion be right? Entirely so. Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether *the one is* or *is not*, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear. It is most true.

and it is impossible. It is as impossible as that
 that there is no any substance; nor can the law of the
 being be expressed by opinion. It does not appear that
 they can. Neither therefore do they not exist, nor
 do they. They do not. They are not different, nor things
 in common, nor both as one substance, nor both as
 distinct things. And we have already observed, as ap-
 pears to be the case, that the opinion of the truth is not
 higher, nor lower, nor different, nor the same as the
 truth. It is not the same as the truth, nor is it
 nothing, nor will not our opinion be right, namely, if
 the truth is different from us, and this also: that whether
 we are or are not, both itself, as it appears, and others, both
 with us, and without us, and in each other, and contrary
 to each other, and the same time as it is, and as it is not,
 and at the same time do not appear. It is most true.

And now, my friend, I think I have said enough
 to show you that the truth is not the same as the
 opinion of the truth, nor is it different from the
 truth, nor is it nothing, nor will not our opinion
 be right, namely, if the truth is different from
 us, and this also: that whether we are or are
 not, both itself, as it appears, and others, both
 with us, and without us, and in each other, and
 contrary to each other, and the same time as it
 is, and as it is not, and at the same time do
 not appear. It is most true.

THE
TIMÆUS OF PLATO:

A DIALOGUE
ON NATURE.

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A DIALOGUE

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INTRODUCTION.

THE design, says Proclus, of Plato's *Timæus*, evidently vindicates to itself the whole of physiology, and is conversant from beginning to end with the speculation of the universe. For the book of *Timæus* the Locrian concerning nature is composed after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato, deriving his materials from thence, undertook to compose the present dialogue, according to the relation of the scurrilous Timon. The dialogue therefore respects physiology in all its parts; speculating the same things in images and in exemplars, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautiful modes of physiology, delivering things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts on account of wholes, and images for the sake of exemplars; and it leaves none of the primary causes of nature unexplored.

But Plato alone, of all the physiologists, has preserved the Pythagoric mode in speculations about nature. For physiology receives a threefold division, one part of which is conversant with matter and material causes; but a second adds an enquiry into form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and lastly, a third part manifests that these do not rank in the order of causes, but con-

causes; and, in consequence of this, establishes other proper causes of things subsisting in nature, which it denominates *producing*, *paradigmatical*, and *final* causes. But this being the case, all the physiologists prior to Plato, confining themselves to speculations about matter, called this general receptacle of things by different names. For with respect to Anaxagoras himself, as it appears, though while others were dreaming he perceived that intellect was the first cause of generated natures, yet he made no use of intellect in his demonstrations, but rather considered certain airs and æthers as the causes of the phenomena, as we are informed by Socrates in the *Phædo*. But the most accurate of those posterior to Plato (such as Aristotle and his followers), contemplating matter in conjunction with form, considered these as the principles of bodies; and if at any time they mention a producing cause, as when they call nature a principle of motion, they rather take away than establish his efficacious and producing prerogative, while they do not allow that he contains the reasons of his productions, but admit that many things are the progeny of chance. But Plato, following the Pythagoreans, delivers as the causes of natural things, an all-receiving matter and a material form as subservient to proper causes in generation; but prior to these he investigates primary causes, *i. e.* the producing the paradigmatical and the final.

Hence he places over the universe a demiurgic intellect and an intelligible cause, in which last the universe and goodness have a primary subsistence, and which is established above the artificer of things in the order of the desirable, or in other words is a superior object of desire. For since that which is moved by another or a corporeal nature is suspended from a motive power, and is naturally
incapable

incapable either of producing, perfecting, or preserving itself, it evidently requires a fabricative cause for the commencement and continuance of its being. The causes therefore of natural productions must necessarily be suspended from true causes as the sources of their existence, and for the sake of which they were fabricated by the father of all things. With great propriety therefore are all these accurately explored by Plato, and likewise the two depending from these, *viz.* form and the subject matter. For this world is not the same with the intelligible and intellectual worlds, which are self-subsistent, and consequently by no means indigent of a subject, but it is a composite of matter and form. However, as it perpetually depends on these, like the shadow from the forming substance, Plato assimilates it to intelligible animal itself, evinces that it is a god through its participation of good, and perfectly defines the whole world to be a blessed god, participating of intellect and soul.

Such then being Plato's design in the *Timæus*, he very properly in the beginning exhibits through images the order of the universe; for it is usual with the Pythagoreans*, previous to the tradition of a scientific doctrine, to present the reader with a manifestation of the proposed enquiry through similitudes and images; but in the middle part the whole of *Cosmogony* is delivered; and towards the end, partial natures and such as are the extremities of fabrication are wove together with wholes themselves. For the repetition of the *Republic*, which had been so largely treated of before, and the *Atlantic history*,

* Εἶναι γὰρ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔθος, πρὸ τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς διδασκαλίας προτιθεῖν αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ τῶν εἰκόνων τῶν ζήτουμένων σκευμάτων δηλῶσαι. Procl. in *Tim.* p. 10.

unfold through images the theory of the world. For if we consider the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that the summary account of the Republic by Socrates, which establishes as its end a communion pervading through the whole, is an image of its union; but that the battle of the Atlantics against the Athenians, which Critias relates, is an image of the distribution of the world, and especially so according to the two co-ordinate oppositions of things. For whether we make a division of the universe into *celestial* and *sublunary*, we must say that the Republic is assimilated to the celestial distribution; since Socrates himself asserts that its paradigm is established in the heavens; but that the Atlantic war corresponds to generation, which subsists through contrariety and mutation. And such are the particulars which precede the whole doctrine of physiology.

But after this the demiurgic, paradigmatic and final causes of the universe are delivered; from the prior subsistence of which the universe is fabricated, both according to a whole and according to parts. For the corporeal nature of it is fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and is distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too is connected together, according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are distributed so as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital. For partial souls are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected, imitating their presiding
and

and leading gods. Mortal animals too are fabricated and vivified by the celestial gods; and prior to these, the formation of man is delivered as a microcosm, comprehending in himself partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. For we are endued with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father and vivific goddesses as were the causes of the intellect and soul of the universe. We have likewise an ætherial vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which also it is co-ordinate.

If therefore it be proper to contemplate the universe multifariously both in an intelligible and sensible nature, paradigmatically, as a resemblance, totally and partially, a discourse concerning the nature of man is very properly introduced in the speculation of the universe.

But with respect to the form and character of the dialogue, it is acknowledged by all that it is composed according to the Pythagoric mode of writing. And this also must be granted by those who are the least acquainted with the works of Plato, that the manner of his composition is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If therefore Plato any where mingles the Socratic and Pythagoric property together, this must be apparent in the present dialogue. For it contains, agreeable to the Pythagoric custom, elevation of intellect together with intellectual and divine conceptions: it likewise suspends every thing from intelligibles, bounds wholes in numbers, exhibits things mystically and symbolically, is full of an elevating property, of that which transcends partial conceptions, and of the enunciative mode of composition. But from the Socratic philanthropy it contains an easy accommodation

commodation to familiar discourse, gentleness of manners, proceeding by demonstration, contemplating things through images, the ethical peculiarity, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is a venerable dialogue, and deduces its conceptions from on high, from the first principles of things; but it mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative, and prepares us to understand physics, not only physically but theologically. For indeed Nature herself rules over the universe suspended from the gods, and directs the forms of bodies through the influence of their inspiring power; for she is neither herself a divinity nor yet without a divine characteristic, but is full of illuminations from all the various orders of the gods.

But if it be proper, as Timæus says, that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, it will be necessary that the dialogue should contain both that which is physical and that which is theological; imitating by this mean Nature which it contemplates. Further still, since according to the Pythagoric doctrine things receive a triple division, into such as are intelligible, such as are physical, and such as rank in the middle of these, which the Pythagoreans usually call mathematical, all these may very conveniently be viewed in all. For in intelligibles things middle and last subsist in a causal manner; and in mathematical natures both are contained, such as are first according to similitude, and such as are third after the manner of an exemplar. And lastly, in natural things the resemblances of such as are prior subsist. With great propriety therefore does Timæus, when describing the composition of the soul, exhibit her powers, and reasons, and the elements of Nature, through mathematical names: but Plato defines the characteristics of these

these from geometrical figures, and at the same time leaves the causes of all these pre-existing in a primary manner in the intelligible intellect, and the intellect of the artificer of the universe.

And thus much for the manner of the dialogue ; but its argument or hypothesis is as follows. Socrates coming into the Piræus for the sake of the Bendidian festival, which was sacred to Diana, and was celebrated prior to the Panathenaia *, on the twentieth of the month Thargelion or April, discoursed there concerning a republic with Polemarchus, Cephalus, Glauco, Adimantus and Thrasy-machus the sophist. But on the following day he related this discourse in the city to Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth nameless person. On the third day they end the narration ; and Timæus commences from hence his discourse on the universe, before Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates : the same nameless person who was present at the second narration being now absent from the third.

With respect to the term *nature*, which is differently defined by different philosophers, it is necessary to inform the reader, that Plato does not consider either matter or material form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called nature ; though nature has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper to call it soul ; but establishing its essence between soul and corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to itself, but as surpassing the latter through its containing the reasons of all things, and generating and vivifying every part of the visible world. For nature verges towards bo-

* Sacred to Minerva.

dies, and is inseparable from their fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in herself, and subsists both from herself and another; from another, that is, from intellect through participation, and from herself on account of her not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, and at the same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary life. Nature therefore is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, bounds the progressions of incorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs mundane affairs. And she is a goddess indeed, considered as deified; but not according to the primary signification of the word. For the word god is attributed by Plato, as well as by the ancient theologists, to beings which participate of the gods. Hence every pure intellect is, according to the Platonic philosophy, a god, according to union; every divine soul according to participation; every divine dæmon according to contact; divine bodies are gods as statues of the gods; and even the souls of the most exalted men are gods according to similitude; while in the mean time superessential natures only are primarily and properly gods. But Nature governs the whole world by her powers, by her summit comprehending the heavens, but through these ruling over the fluctuating empire of generation, and every where weaving together partial natures in amicable conjunction with wholes.

But as the whole of Plato's philosophy is distributed into the contemplation of intelligibles and sensibles, and this very properly since there is both an intelligible and sensible world, as Plato himself asserts in the course of the dialogue; hence in the *Parmenides* he comprehends the doctrine

doctrine of intelligibles, but in the *Timæus* of mundane natures. And in the former of these dialogues he scientifically exhibits all the divine orders, but in the latter all the progressions of such as are mundane. Nor does the former entirely neglect the speculation of what the universe contains, nor the latter of intelligibles themselves. And this because sensibles are contained in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles according to similitude. But the latter abounds more with physical speculations, and the former with such as are theological; and this in a manner adapted to the persons after whom the dialogues are called: to *Timæus* on the one hand, who had composed a book on the universe, and to *Parmenides* on the other, who had written on true beings. The divine *Jamblichus* therefore asserts very properly, that the whole theory of *Plato* is comprehended in these two dialogues, the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*. For the whole doctrine of mundane and supermundane natures is accurately delivered in these, and in the most consummate perfection; nor is any order of beings left without investigation.

We may behold too the similitude of proceeding in the *Timæus* to that in the *Parmenides*. For as *Timæus* refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first artificer, so *Parmenides* suspends the progression of all things from *the one*. And as the former represents all things as participating of demiurgic providence, so the other exhibits beings participating of a uniform essence. And again, as *Timæus* prior to his physiology presents us through images with the theory of mundane natures, so *Parmenides* prior to his theology excites us to an investigation of immaterial forms. For it is proper, after being exercised in discourses
about

about the best polity, to proceed to a contemplation of the universe; and after an athletic contention through strenuous doubts about ideas, to betake ourselves to the mystic speculation of the unities of beings. And thus much for the hypothesis or argument of the dialogue.

But as a more copious and accurate investigation of some of its principal parts will be necessary, even to a general knowledge of the important truths which it contains, previous to this I shall present the reader with an abstract of that inimitable theory respecting the connection of things which is the basis of the present work, and of the whole philosophy of Plato. For by a comprehensive view of this kind we shall be better prepared for a minute survey of the intricate parts of the dialogue, and be convinced how infinitely superior the long lost *philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato* is to the *experimental farrago* of the *moderns*.

Since the first cause, as we have sufficiently proved in the introduction to the *Parmenides*, is *the good*, and this is the same with *the one*, it is necessary that the whole of things should be the most excellent, that is, the most united that can possibly be conceived. But perfect union in the whole of things can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order coalescing, *κατασχέσιν*, through habitude or alliance, with the summit of an order which is proximately inferior. Again, with respect to all beings, it is necessary that some should move or be motive only, and that others should be moved only; and that between these there should be two mediums, the self-motive natures, and those which move and at the same time are moved. Now that which is motive only and consequently essentially immovable is intellect, which possesses both its essence and energy in eternity; the whole intelligence of

which is firmly established in indivisible union, and which through a cause prior to itself participates of deific illumination. For it possesses, says Plotinus, twofold energies; one kind indeed as intellect, but the other in consequence of becoming as it were intoxicated, and deifying itself with nectar. But that which is self-motive is soul, which, on account of possessing its energy in transition and a mutation of life, requires the circulations of time to the perfection of its nature, and depends on intellect as a more ancient and consequently superior cause. But that which moves and is at the same time moved is nature, or that corporeal life which is distributed about body, and confers generation, nutrition and increase to its fluctuating essence. And lastly, that which is moved only is body, which is naturally passive, imbecil and inert.

Now in consequence of the profound union subsisting in things, it is necessary that the highest beings or intelligibles should be wholly superessential, *κατα σχῆσιν*, according to proximity or alliance; that the highest intellects should be beings, the first of souls intellects, and the highest bodies lives, on account of their being wholly absorbed as it were in a vital nature. Hence, in order that the most perfect union possible may take place between the last of incorporeals and the first of bodies, it is necessary that the body of the world should be consummately vital; or indeed, according to habitude and alliance, life itself. But it is necessary that a body of this kind should be perpetually generated, or have a subsistence in perpetually *becoming to be*. For after intellect, which eternally abides the same both in essence and energy, and soul, which is eternally the same in essence but mutable in energy, that nature must succeed, which is perpetually mutable both in essence and

and energy, and which consequently subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. Such a body therefore is very properly said to be generated, at the same time that this generation is perpetual; because, on account of its divisibility and extension, it alone derives its existence from an external cause: likewise because it is a composite, and because it is not at once wholly that which it is, but possesses its being in continual generation. This body too, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity, may be very properly called a whole with a total subsistence: for every thing endued with a total subsistence is eternal; and this may be truly asserted of the body of the world, when we consider that its being is co-extended with the infinite progressions of time. Hence this divine or celestial body may be properly called *ολος ολικως* or *a whole totally*, just as the limb of an animal is *μερος μερικως* or *a part partially*. But between *whole totally* and *part partially* two mediums are necessarily required, viz. *part totally* and *whole partially* (*μερος ολικως* et *ολος μερικως*). The *parts* therefore, with a *total subsistence* which the world contains, are no other than the celestial orbs, which are consequently eternal and divine, after the same manner as the whole body of the world, together with the spheres of the elements; and the *wholes partially* are no other than the various species of animals, such as man, horse, and the like.

Now this divine body, on account of its superiority to sublunary natures, was called by Aristotle *a fifth body*, and was said by Plato to be composed for the most part from fire. But in order to a more perfect comprehension of its nature, it is necessary to observe, that the two elements
which

which according to Plato are situated in the extremes are fire and earth, and that the characteristic of the former is *visibility*, and of the latter *tangibility*; so that every thing becomes visible through fire, and tangible through earth. Now the whole of this celestial body, which is called by the ancients heaven, consists of an unburning vivific fire, like the natural heat which our bodies contain, and the illuminations of which give life to our mortal part. But the stars are for the most part composed from this fire, containing at the same time the summits of the other elements. Hence the heaven is wholly of a fiery characteristic, but contains in a causal manner the powers of the other elements; as for instance, the solidity and stability of earth, the conglutinating and unifying nature of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air. For as earth comprehends all things in a terrestrial manner, so the heavens contain all things according to a fiery characteristic.

But the following extraordinary passage from Proclus admirably unfolds the nature of this divine body, and the various gradations of fire and the other elements. "It is necessary to understand (says he *) that the fire of the heavens is not the same with sublunary fire, but that this is a divine fire consubstant with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire; while that which subsists in the sublunary region is entirely material, generated and corruptible. Pure fire therefore subsists in the heavens, and there the whole of fire is contained; but earth, according to cause, subsisting there as another species of earth, naturally associating with fire, as it is proper it should, and possessing nothing but solidity alone. For as fire there is illumina-

* In Tim. p. 152.

tive and not burning, so earth there is not gross and sluggish, but each subsists according to that which is the summit of each. And as pure and true fire is there, so true earth subsists here, and the *wholeness* *ολοτης* of earth *; and fire is here according to participation and materially, as earth is according to a primary subsistence. So that in heaven the summit of earth is contained, and in earth the dregs and sediment of fire. But it is evident that the moon has something solid and dark, by her obstructing the light: for obstruction of light is alone the province of earth. The stars too obstruct our sight, by casting a shadow of themselves from on high. But since fire and earth subsist in heaven, it is evident that the middle elements must be there also; air first of all, as being most diaphanous and agile, but water, as being most vaporous: each at the same time subsisting far purer than in the sublunary region, that all things may be in all, and yet in an accommodated manner in each.

“But that the whole progression and gradations of the elements may become apparent, it is necessary to deduce the speculation of them from on high. These four elements, then, fire, air, water and earth, subsist first of all in the demiurgus of wholes, uniformly according to cause. For all causes are previously assumed in him, according to one comprehension; as well the intellectual, divine, pure and vigorous power of fire, as the containing and vivific cause of air; and as well the prolific and regenerating essence of water, as the firm, immutable and undeviating form of

* For it is necessary that the first subsistence of each of the elements should be, as we have before observed, according to *part total*, in order to the perfect union of the world; and this *part total* is called by the Platonists *ολοτης*, or a *wholeness*.

earth.

earth. And this the theologist Orpheus knowing, he thus speaks concerning the demiurgus :

His body's boundless, stable, full of light.

And Th' extended region of surrounding air

Forms his broad shoulders, back and bosom fair.

Again, His middle zone's the spreading sea profound.

And The distant realms of Tartarus obscure

Within earth's roots his holy feet secure ;

For these earth's utmost bounds to Jove belong,

And form his basis, permanent and strong.

“ But from these demiurgic causes a progression of the elements into the universe takes place, but not immediately into the sublunary world. For how can the most immaterial things give subsistence to the most material without a medium; or things immovable be immediately hypostatic of such as are moved in all directions? Since the progression of things is nowhere without a medium, but subsists according to a well-ordered subjection; and generations into these material, dissipated, and dark abodes, take place through things of a proximate order. Since therefore the elements in the demiurgus are intellects and imparticipable intellectual powers, what will be their first progression? Is it not manifest that they will yet remain intellectual powers, but will be participated by mundane natures? For from imparticipable intellect the proximate progression is to that which is participated. And universally progression takes place from imparticipables to things participated, and from supermundane to mundane forms. But what are these things which yet remain intellectual

telleſtual but are participated, and what ſubjection do they poſſeſs? Is it not evident that they are no longer intelleſtual (*i. e.* eſſentially intelleſtual)? But I call thoſe natures intelleſtual which are the forms of intelleſt, and of a truly intelleſtual eſſence. But becoming participated, and being no longer intelleſtual, it is evident that they are no longer immovable natures. But not being immovable, they muſt be ſelf-motive. For theſe are proximately ſuſpended from immovable natures; and from things eſſentially intelleſtual a progreſſion takes place to ſuch as are ſo according to participation, and from things immovable to ſuch as are ſelf-motive. Theſe elements therefore ſubſiſt in life, and are ſelf-motive and intelleſtual according to participation. But the progreſſion from this muſt be maniſeſt. For the immediate deſcent from life is to animal; ſince this is proximate to life. And from that which is eſſentially ſelf-motive, to that which is ſelf-motive according to a participation of life. For ſo far as it proceeds from life to animal, it ſuffers a mutation. But ſo far as it proceeds from that which is immaterial to things immaterial * (that is, ſuch as may be called immaterial when contraſted with mutable matter), and from divine life to a divine eſſence, it becomes aſſimilated to them. If therefore you take away from hence that which is immaterial and immutable, you will produce that which is mutable and material. And through this indeed they are diminished from ſuch as are before them; but on account of the ſymmetry and order of their motions, and their immutability in their mutations, they become aſſimilated to

* He means the divine bodies of the ſtars, and the body of the heavens; which, compared with ſublunary bodies, may be juſtly called *immaterial bodies*.

them.

them. If therefore you take away this order, you will behold the great confusion and inconstancy of the elements; and this will be the last progression, and the very dregs and sediment of all the prior gradations of the elements.

“Of the elements, therefore, some are immovable, imparticipable, intellectual, and demiurgic; but others are intellectual and immovable according to essence, but participated by mundane natures. Others again are self-motive, and essentially lives; but others are self-motive and vital, but are not lives. Some again are alter-motive, or moved by another, but are moved in an orderly manner; and, lastly, others have a disordered, tumultuous and confused subsistence.”

Such then is the progression of the elements, and such the nature of a celestial body. But if the body of the world be spherical—and this must necessarily be the case, as a sphere is the most perfect of figures—and the world the best of effects, there must be some part in it corresponding to a centre, and this can be no other than earth. For in an orderly progression of things, that which is most distant and the last is the worst; and this we have already shewn is the earth. But in a sphere, that which is most distant from the superficies is the centre; and therefore earth is the centre of the world. This conclusion indeed will doubtless be ridiculed by every *sagacious* modern, as too absurd in such an *enlightened* age as the present to deserve the labour of a confutation. However, as it follows by an inevitable consequence from the preceding theory, and this theory is founded on the harmonious union of things, we may safely assert that it is consubstantial with the universe itself. At such a period, indeed, as the present, when there is such a dire perversion of religion, and

men of every description are involved in extreme impiety, we cannot wonder that the spirit of profane innovation should cause a similar confusion in the system of the world. For men of the present day being destitute of true science, and not having the least knowledge of the true nature and progressions of things, in the first place make the universe an unconnected production, generated in time, and of course naturally subject to dissolution; and in the next place, allow of no essential distinction in its principal parts. Hence the earth is by them hurled into the heavens, and rolled about their central sun in conjunction with the celestial orbs. The planets are supposed to be heavy bodies similar to our sluggish earth; the fixed stars are all so many suns; and the sun himself is a dense, heavy body, occasionally suffering dimness in his light, and covered with dark and fuliginous spots. With respect to this last particular, indeed, they boast of ocular conviction through the assistance of the telescope; and what reasoning can invalidate the testimony of the eyes? I answer, that the eyes in this particular are more deceived when assisted by glasses, than when trusting to their own naked power of perceiving. For in reality we do not perceive the heavenly bodies themselves, but their inflammations in the air; or in other words certain portions of air, enkindled by the swiftness of their course. This at least cannot be denied to be possible; and if so, it is not at all wonderful, that a gross aerial inflammation should, when viewed through a telescope, appear dim and clouded with spots. But this is not an hypothesis of my own invention, but is derived from Ammonius Hermeas, who, as we are informed by Olympiodorus in the *Phædo*, was of this opinion, as also was Heraclitus long before him; who, speaking (says Olympiodorus)

Olympiodorus) in his obscure way concerning the sun, says of that luminary "*enkindling measures and extinguishing measures*"—that is, enkindling an image of himself in the air when he rises, the same becoming extinguished when he sets.

Nor let the moderns fondly imagine that their system of astronomy was adopted by Pythagoras and his followers, for this opinion is confuted by Spanheim and Dickinson; and this, says Fabricius*, with no contemptible arguments: and we are informed by Simplicius†, long before them, that the Pythagoreans by the fire in the middle did not mean the sun, but a demiurgic vivific fire, seated in the centre of the earth. The prophecy of Swift, therefore, in his *Gulliver's Travels*, that the boasted theory of gravitation would at one time or other be exploded, may certainly be considered as a most true prediction, at least so far as relates to the celestial orbs.

But to return from this digression. The inerratic sphere, according to the Platonic philosophy, has the relation of a monad to the multitude of stars which it contains; or, in other words, it is the proximate cause of this multitude which it contains, and with which it has a co-ordinate subsistence. But according to the same philosophy, all the planets are fixed in solid spheres, in conformity to the motions of which they perpetually revolve; but at the same time have peculiar motions of their own, besides those of the spheres‡. These spheres too are all concentric, or have the same centre with the earth and the universe, and

* Vid. Biblioth. Græc. vol. i. de Orpheo.

† In Aristot. de Cælo, lib. 2.

‡ For Plato makes no mention of epicycles and eccentric circles.

do not consist of hard impenetrable matter, as the moderns have ignorantly supposed; for being divine or immaterial bodies, such as we have already described, they have nothing of the density and gravity of this our earth, but are able to permeate each other without division, and to occupy the same place together; just like the illuminations emitted from several lamps, which pass through the whole of the same room at once, and pervade each other without confusion, division, or any apparent distinction. So that these spheres are similar to mathematical bodies, so far as they are immaterial, free from contrariety, and exempt from every passive quality; but are different from them so far as they are full of motion and life. But they are concealed from our sight through the tenuity and subtilty of their nature, while on the contrary the fire of the planets which are carried in them is visible through the solidity which it possesses. So that earth is more predominant in the planets than in the spheres; though each subsists, for the most part, according to the characteristic of fire. But let it be carefully remembered, that the peculiarity of all fire is the *being visible*, but that neither heat nor fluidity belongs to every species of fire: and that the property of all earth is the *being tangible*, but that gravity and subsiding downwards do not belong to all.

But in consequence of each of these spheres being an *ελοτης*, or *part with a total subsistence*, as we have already explained, it follows that every planet has a number of satellites surrounding it, analogous to the choir of the fixed stars; and that every sphere is full of gods, angels, and dæmons, subsisting according to the properties of the spheres in which they reside. This theory indeed is the grand key to the theology of the ancients, as it shews us

at one view why the same god is so often celebrated with the names of other gods ; which led Macrobius formerly to think that all the gods were nothing more than the different powers of the sun ; and has induced the superficial, *index-groping* moderns to frame hypotheses concerning the ancient theology, so ridiculous that they deserve to be considered in no other light than the ravings of a madman, or the undisciplined conceptions of a child. But that the reader may be fully convinced of this, let him attend to the following extraordinary passages from the divine commentaries of Proclus on the *Timæus*. And in the first place, that every planet is attended with a great number of satellites, is evident from the following citation :—
 “ There are other divine animals attending upon the circulations of the planets, the leaders of which are the seven planets ; and these revolve and return in their circulations in conjunction with their leaders, just as the fixed stars are governed by the circulation of the inerratic sphere.”—
 εἶδεναι καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα θεία εἰν οὐρανία συνεπομένα ταῖς τῶν πλανωμένων περιφοραῖς, ὧν ἡγεμόνες εἰσιν οἱ ἐπῖα.—καὶ συμπεριπολεῖ, καὶ συναποκαθίσταται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀπλανῆ κρατεῖται ὑπὸ τῆς ὅλης περιφορᾶς *. And in the same place he informs us, that the revolution of these satellites is similar to that of the planets which they attend ; and this, he acquaints us a little before, is according to Plato a spiral revolution. καὶ γὰρ τὰυτὰ τρεπομένα εἰς, καὶ πλανῆν ἔχοντα τοιαύτην, οἷαν εἰρηκεν περὶ τῶν ἐπῖα μικρῶ προτέρων. Again, with respect to their number—“ about every planet there is a number (of satellites) analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, all of them subsisting with proper circulations

* Vid. Procl. in *Tim.* p. 279.

of their own *.”—Εἰ γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀριθμὸς ἀναλογὸν τῷ τῶν ἀστέρων χορῷ, συνυφέτος ταῖς οἰκείαις περιφοραῖς.—And if it should be enquired why, with respect to the fixed stars, there is one monad, the *wholeness* (ολότης) of them; but among the planets there is both an ολότης, *wholeness* or *totality*, that is the sphere of each, and a leader besides in each, that is the apparent orb, he answers in the same place—that as the motion of the planets is more various than that of the fixed stars, so their possession of government is more abundant; for they proceed into a greater multitude. He adds—But in the sublunary regions there is still a greater number of governors: for the *monads* (that is, *totalities*) in the heavens generate a number analogous to themselves. So that the planets being secondary to the fixed stars, require a twofold government; one of which is more total and the other more partial.

But with respect to the satellites, the first in order about every planet are gods; after these, dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and these are followed by partial souls such as ours, as the following beautiful passage abundantly evinces. “But that in each of these (the planetary spheres) there is a multitude co-ordinate to each, you may infer from the extremes. For if the inerratic sphere has a multitude co-ordinate to itself, and earth is with respect to terrestrial animals what the inerratic sphere is to such as are celestial, it is necessary that every *wholeness* should possess certain partial animals co-ordinate to itself, through which also the spheres derive the appellation of *wholenesses*. But the natures situated in the middle are concealed from our sense, while in the mean time those contained in the extremes are apparent, one sort through

* Page 275.

their transcendantly lucid essence, and the other through their alliance to ourselves. But if partial souls are disseminated about these spheres, some about the sun, some about the moon, and others about each of the remaining spheres *; and if prior to souls there are dæmons filling up the herds of which they are the leaders; it is evidently beautifully said that each of the spheres is a world. And this is agreeable to the doctrines of theologists, when they teach us that there are gods in every sphere prior to dæmons, the government of some receiving its perfection under that of others. As for instance with respect to our queen the Moon, that she contains the goddesses Hecate and Diana; and with respect to our sovereign the Sun, and the gods which he contains, theologists celebrate Bacchus as subsisting there,

The Sun's assessor, who with watchful eye
Inspects the sacred pole.

“ They also celebrate Jupiter as seated there, Osiris, and a solar Pan, as likewise other divinities, of which the books of theologists and theurgists are full; from all which it is evident how true it is that each of the planets is the leader of many gods, which fill up its proper circulation †.” — *οτι δε και εν εκαστη τουτων πληθος εστιν εκαστη συστοιχον, κατασκευασειας αν απο των ακρων. ει γαρ η απλανης εχει συστοιχον εαυτη πληθος, και η γη των χθονιων ζωνων εστι, ως εκεινη των ουραنيων, αναγκη και εκαστην ολοτητα παντως εχειν μερικα ατλα συστοιχα προς αυτη ζωα, δια και ολοτητες λεγονται. λανθανει δε ημων τα μεσα την αισθησιν, των ακρων δηλων οντων, των μεν, δια την υπερλαμπρον ουσιαν, των δε δια την προς ημας συγγενειαν. ει*

* This Plato himself asserts in the following dialogue.

† Procl. in Tim. p. 279.

δε καὶ μερικαὶ ψυχαὶ περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐσπαρήσαν, ἀλλὰ μὲν περὶ ἡλίου, ἀλλὰ δὲ περὶ σελήνης, ἀλλὰ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν λοιπῶν, καὶ πρὸ τῶν ψυχῶν δαίμονες συμπληροῦσι τὰς ἀγέλας, ὧν εἰσὶν ἡγεμόνες, ὅθλον ὅτι καλῶς εἰρητὰ κόσμον ἑκάστην εἶναι τῶν σφαιρῶν, καὶ τῶν θεολογῶν ἡμᾶς ταῦτα διδάσκοντων, ὅποταν περὶ ἑκάστου θεοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν δαίμονων, ἀλλοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν τελούντας ἡγεμονίαν, οἷον, καὶ περὶ τῆς δεσποίνης ἡμῶν σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ Ἐκάτη θεὰ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ ἡ Ἀρτεμὶς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ θεῶν, τὸν ἐκεῖ Διόνυσον ὑμνούντες, Ἡέλιος παρὲδρος ἐπισκοπεῶν πόλον ἀγνόν, τὸν Δία τὸν ἐκεῖ, τὸν Ὀσίριν, τὸν Πάνα τὸν ἡλιακόν, τοὺς ἀλλοὺς, ὧν οἱ βίβλοι πληρεῖς εἰσὶ τῶν θεολογῶν, καὶ τῶν θεουργῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἀπαντῶν ὅθλον, ὅπως ἀληθές, καὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἑκάστον, ἀγελαρχὴν εἶναι πολλῶν θεῶν, συμπληρούντων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδίαν περιφορὰν.

Now, from this extraordinary passage, we may perceive at one view why the sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the sun; why the moon seems to be the same with Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. and in short why any one divinity is celebrated with the names and epithets of so many of the rest. For from this sublime theory it follows that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in short every deity, each sphere at the same time conferring on these gods the peculiar characteristic of its nature; so that for instance in the sun they all possess a solar property, in the moon a lunar one, and so of the rest. From this theory too we may perceive the truth of that divine saying of the ancients, that all things are full of gods; for more particular orders proceed from such as are more general, the mundane from the supermundane, and the sublunary from the celestial; while

while earth becomes the general receptacle of the illuminations of all the gods. "Hence (says Proclus *) there is a terrestrial Ceres, Vesta, and Isis, as likewise a terrestrial Jupiter and a terrestrial Hermes, established about the one divinity of the earth; just as a multitude of celestial gods proceeds about the one divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions of all the celestial gods into the earth; and earth contains all things, in an earthly manner, which heaven comprehends celestially. Hence we speak of a terrestrial Bacchus and a terrestrial Apollo, who bestows the all-various streams of water with which the earth abounds, and openings prophetic of futurity." And if to all this we only add, that all the other mundane gods subsist in the twelve above mentioned, and that the first triad of these is *demiurgic* or *fabricative*, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; the second, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, *defensive*; the third, Ceres, Juno, Diana, *vivific*; and the fourth, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, *elevating* and *harmonic*:—I say, if we unite this with the preceding theory, there is nothing in the ancient theology that will not appear admirably sublime and beautifully connected, accurate in all its parts, scientific and divine. Such then being the true account of the Grecian theology, what opinion must we form of the wretched systems of modern mythologists; and which most deserves our admiration, the impudence or ignorance of the authors of such systems? The systems indeed of these men are so monstrously absurd, that we may consider them as instances of the greatest distortion of the rational faculty which can possibly befall human nature, while connected with such a body as the present. For one of these considers the gods as merely symbols of

* In Tim. p. 282.

agriculture, another as men who once lived on the earth*, and a third as the patriarchs and prophets of the Jews. Surely should these systems be transmitted to posterity, the historian by whom they are related must either be considered by future generations as an impostor, or his narration must be viewed in the light of an extravagant romance.

I only add, as a conclusion to this sublime theory, that though the whole of the celestial region is composed from the four elements, yet in some places fire in conjunction with earth (*i. e.* earth without gravity and density) predominates; in others fire, with the summit of water; and in others again fire with the summit of air: and according to each of these an all-various mutation subsists. Hence some bodies in the heavens are visible, and these are such as have fire united with the solid; but others are still more visible†, and these are such as have fire mingled with the splendid and diaphanous nature of air. And hence the spheres of the planets, and the inerratic sphere itself, possess a more attenuated and diaphanous essence; but the stars are of a more solid composition. But fire every where prevails, and all heaven is characterized through the power of this exalted element. And neither is the fire there caustic (for this is not even the property of the first of the sublunary elements, which Aristotle calls *fiery*, πυροειδές) nor corruptive of any thing, nor of a nature contrary to earth; but it perpetually shines with a

* See my notes on the Cratylus.

† That is, in themselves: but they are invisible to us, on account of their possessing but little of the resisting nature of earth; and this is the reason why we cannot see the celestial spheres.

pure and transparent light, with vivific heat, and illuminating power.

And such are the outlines of the system of the world, according to Pythagoras and Plato; which, strange as the assertion may seem, appears to have been entirely unknown from the æra of the Emperor Justinian to the present time. That beautiful mode in which as we have shewn the elements subsist both in the heavens and the earth, has not been even suspected by modern natural philosophers to have any existence; and astronomers have been very far from the truth in their assertions concerning the celestial spheres. In consequence of indolence, or ignorance, or prejudice, or from all three in conjunction, the moderns have invented systems no less discordant with the nature of things than different from each other. They have just been able to gain a glimpse of the beautiful union of things in the vegetable and animal tribes belonging to the earth, and have discovered that the lowest of the animal species and the highest of the vegetable approximate so near to each other, that the difference between the two can scarcely be perceived; but this is the very summit of their researches; they are unable to trace the connection of things any further, and rest satisfied in admitting that

The chain continues, but its links unknown.

The divine nature of the celestial bodies cannot be seen through the telescope, and incorporeals are not to be viewed with a microscopic eye: but these instruments are at present the great standards of truth; and whatever opposes or cannot be ascertained by the testimony of these, is
con-

considered as mere conjecture, idle speculation, and a perversion of the reasoning power.

But let us now proceed to a summary view of some of the principal parts of this most interesting dialogue. And in the first place with respect to the history, which is related in the beginning, concerning a war between the inhabitants of the Atlantic island and the Athenians—Crantor, the most early of Plato's commentators, considered this relation (says Proclus) as a mere history unconnected with allegory; while other Platonists, on the contrary, have considered it as an allegory alone. But both these opinions are confuted by Proclus and the best of the Platonists; because Plato calls it a very wonderful, but at the same time true narration. So that it is to be considered as a true history, exhibiting at the same time an image of the opposition of the natures which the universe contains. But according to Amelius it represents the opposition between the inerratic sphere and the fixed stars; according to Origen, the contest between dæmons of a superior and those of an inferior order; according to Numenius, the disagreement between more excellent souls who are the attendants of Pallas, and such as are conversant with generation under Neptune. Again, according to Porphyry, it insinuates the contest between dæmons deducing souls into generation, and souls ascending to the gods. For Porphyry gives a three-fold distinction to dæmons; asserting that some are divine, that others subsist according to habitude, *κατὰ σχῆσιν*, among which partial souls rank when they are allotted a dæmoniacal condition, and that others are evil and noxious to souls. He asserts, therefore, that this lowest order of dæmons always contends

tends with souls in their ascent and descent, especially western dæmons; for, according to the Egyptians, the west is accommodated to dæmons of this description. But the exposition of Jamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus is doubtless to be preferred, as more consistent with the nature of the dialogue; which refers it to the opposition perpetually flourishing in the universe between unity and multitude, bound and infinity, sameness and difference, motion and abiding, from which all things, the first cause being excepted, are composed. Likewise being has either an essential or accidental subsistence, and is either incorporeal or corporeal: and if incorporeal, it either verges or does not verge to body. But bodies are either simple and immaterial, as the celestial bodies, or simple and material, as those of an aerial nature, or composite and material, as those of earth. So that the opposition of all these is occultly signified by that ancient war; the higher and more excellent natures being every where implied by the Athenians, and those of a contrary order by the inhabitants of the Atlantic island.

But that the reader may be convinced that Plato's account of the Atlantic island is not a fiction of his own devising, let him attend to the following relation of one Marcellus, who wrote an history of Æthiopian affairs, according to Proclus*. "That such and so great an island once existed, is evinced by those who have composed histories of things relative to the external sea. For they relate that in their times there were seven islands in the Atlantic sea, sacred to Proserpine: and besides these, three others of an immense magnitude; one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and another, which is the middle of

* In Tim. p. 55.

these, and is of a thousand stadia, to Neptune. And besides this, that the inhabitants of this last island preserved the memory of the prodigious magnitude of the Atlantic island, as related by their ancestors; and of its governing for many periods all the islands in the Atlantic sea. And such is the relation of Marcellus in his *Æthiopic history*.”

ΟΤΙ ΜΕΝ ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ ΤΙΣ ΝΗΣΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΛΙΚΑΥΤΗ, ΔΗΛΟΥΣΙ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΟΥΝΤΩΝ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΞΩ ΘΑΛΑΤΤΗΣ. ΕΙΠΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΙΣ ΕΠ'ΕΛΑ ΜΕΝ ΝΗΣΟΥΣ ΕΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΩ ΤΩ ΠΕΛΑΓΕΙ ΠΕΡΣΕΦΟΝΗΣ ΙΕΡΑΣ, ΤΡΕΙΣ ΔΕ ΑΛΛΑΣ ΑΠΛΕΙΟΥΣ, ΤΗΝ ΜΕΝ ΠΛΟΥΤΩΝΟΣ, ΤΗΝ ΔΕ ΑΙΜΩΝΟΣ, ΜΕΣΤΗΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΠΟΣΕΙΔΩΝΟΣ, ΧΙΛΙΩΝ ΕΑΔΙΩΝ ΤΟ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ. ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΙΚΟΥΝΤΑΣ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΗ ΜΝΗΜΗΝ ΑΠ'Ε ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΟΝΩΝ ΔΙΑΣΩΞΕΙΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΤΛΑΝΤΙΔΟΣ ΟΝΤΩΣ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΕΚΕΙ ΝΗΣΟΥ ΠΑΜΜΕΓΑΘΕΣΑΤΗΣ, ΗΝ ΕΠΙ ΠΟΛΛΑΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΥΣ ΔΥΝΑΤΕΥΣΑΙ ΠΑΣΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΑΤΛΑΝΤΙΚΩ ΠΕΛΑΓΕΙ ΝΗΣΩΝ. ΤΑΥΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ Ο ΜΑΡΚΕΛΛΟΣ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΑΙΘΙΟΠΙΚΟΙΣ ΓΕΓΡΑΦΕΝ.

Indeed it is not at all wonderful that so large an island should once have existed, nor improbable that many more such exist at present, though to us unknown, if we only consider the Platonic theory concerning the earth, which I have related in my introduction to the *Phædo*, and which the following extraordinary passage from Proclus* abundantly confirms. “It is here (says he) requisite to remember the Platonic hypotheses concerning the earth. For Plato does not measure its magnitude after the same manner as mathematicians; but thinks that its interval is much greater, as Socrates asserts in the *Phædo*. In which dialogue also he says, that there are many habitable parts similar to our abode†. And hence he relates that an island

* In *Tim.* p. 56.

† The latter Platonists appear to have been perfectly convinced that the earth contains two quarters in an opposite direction

island and continent of this kind exist in the external or Atlantic sea. For indeed if the earth be naturally spherical, it is necessary that it should be such according to its greatest part. But the parts which we inhabit, both internally and externally, exhibit great inequality. In some parts of the earth, therefore, there must be an expanded plain, and an interval extended on high. For, according to the saying of Heraclitus, he who passes through a very profound region will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, whose magnitude is such, according to the relation of the Æthiopian historians, that it touches the æther, and casts a shadow of five thousand stadia in extent; for from the ninth hour of the day the sun is concealed by it, even to his perfect demersion under the earth. Nor is this wonderful: for Athos, a Macedonian mountain, casts a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven

rection to Europe and Asia; and Olympiodorus even considers Plato as of the same opinion, as the following passage from his commentary on this part of the *Phædo* clearly evinces. "Plato (says he) directs his attention to four parts of the globe, as there are two parts which we inhabit, *i. e.* Europe and Asia; so that there must be two others, in consequence of the antipodes."

καταγοχαζεται δε τῶν τεσσαρῶν (τοπῶν) ἐπεὶ δύο καθ' ἡμᾶς εἰσιν, ἡ Εὐρώπη καὶ ἡ Ἀσία, ὥστε δύο ἄλλοι κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιποδὰς. Now in consequence of this, as they were acquainted with Africa, the remaining fourth quarter must be that which we call America. At the same time let it be carefully remembered, that these four quarters are nothing more than four holes with respect to the whole earth, which contains many such parts; and that consequently they are not quarters of the earth itself, but only of a small part of the earth in which they are contained, like a small globe in one of a prodigious extent.

hundred stadia. Nor are such particulars as these, which Marcellus the Æthiopic historian mentions, related only concerning the Atlantic mountain; but Ptolemy also says that the Lunar mountains are of an immense height; and Aristotle, that Caucasus is enlightened by the rays of the sun a third part of the night after sun-set, and a third part before the rising of the sun. And if any one considers the whole magnitude of the earth, bounded by its elevated parts, he will conclude that it is truly of a prodigious magnitude, according to the assertion of Plato."

In the next place, by the fable of Phaeton we must understand the destruction of a considerable part of the earth through fire, by means of a comet being dissolved of a solar nature. Likewise, when he mentions a deluge, it is necessary to remember, that through the devastations of these two elements, fire and water, a more prolific regeneration of things takes place at certain periods of time; and that when divinity intends a reformation, the heavenly bodies concur with this design in such a manner, that when a conflagration is about to take place, then, according to Berofus * the Chaldean, all the planets are collected together in Cancer; but when a deluge, then the planets meet in Capricorn. With respect to Pallas and Neptune, who are mentioned in this part of the dialogue, as the reader will find an account of these divinities in the notes to the Cratylus, I shall only add at present, that, according to Proclus, Minerva most eminently presides in the celestial constellation called the Ram, and in the equinoctial circle, where a power motive of the universe principally prevails.

Again, it is necessary to understand, that when the world

* Vid. Senec. Natural. Quæst. III. 29.

is said by Plato to be *generated*, this term expresses its flowing and composite nature, and does not imply any temporal commencement of its existence. For as the world was necessarily produced, according to essential power, this being the most perfect of all modes of operation, it is also necessary that it should be co-existent with its artificer; just as the sun produces light co-existent with itself, fire heat, and snow coldness. The reader must however carefully observe, that when we say it is necessary that the cause of the universe should operate according to power, we do not understand a necessity which implies violence or constraint; but that necessity which Aristotle * defines as the perfectly simple, and which cannot have a multifarious subsistence. And hence this term, when applied to the most exalted natures, to whom alone in this sense it belongs, signifies nothing more than an impossibility of subsisting otherwise than they do, without falling from the perfection of their nature. Agreeable to this definition, Necessity was called by ancient theologists Adrastia and Themis, or the perfectly right and just: and if men of the present day had but attended to this signification of the word, *i. e.* if any edition of Aristotle's works, with a *copious index* mentioning this sense of necessity, had fortunately existed, they would not have ignorantly supposed that this word, when applied to divine natures, signified constraint, violence, and over-ruling power. As intellect therefore is eternal, both according to essence and energy, and as soul is eternal in essence but temporal in energy, so the world is temporal both in essence and energy. Hence every thing prior to

* Metaphys. lib. 5.

soul always *is*, and is never generated; but soul both *is*, and is perpetually generated; and the world never *is*, but is always generated: and whatever the world contains in like manner never is; but instead of being always generated, like the whole world, is so at some particular time. Because the world therefore is conversant with perpetual motion and time, it may be said to be always generated, or advancing towards being; and therefore never truly is. So that it resembles the image of a mountain beheld in a torrent, which has the appearance of a mountain without the reality, and which is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the stream. But soul, which is eternal in essence and temporal in energy, may be compared to the image of the same rock beheld in a pool, and which of course, when compared with the image in the torrent, may be said to be permanently the same. In fine, as Proclus well observes, Plato means nothing more by *generation* than the formation of bodies; *i. e.* a motion or procession towards the integrity and perfection of the universe.

Again, by the *demiurgus* and *father* of the world we must understand Jupiter, who subsists at the extremity of the *intellectual triad*, as we have observed in the notes to the Cratylus; and *αὐτο ζῶον*, or *animal itself*, which is the exemplar of the world, and from the contemplation of which it was fabricated by Jupiter, is the last of the *intelligible triad*, and is the same with the Phanes of Orpheus: for the theologist represents Phanes as an animal with the heads of various beasts, as may be seen in our introduction to the Parmenides. Nor let the reader be disturbed on finding that, according to Plato, the first cause is not the immediate cause of the universe; for this is not through any defect or imbecility of nature, but on the contrary

trary is the consequence of transcendancy of power. For as the first cause is the same with *the one*, a unifying energy must be the prerogative of his nature; and as he is likewise perfectly superessential, if the world were his immediate progeny, it must be as much as possible superessential and profoundly one: but as this is not the case, it is necessary that it should be formed by intellect and moved by soul. So that it derives the unity and goodness of its nature from the first cause, the orderly disposition and distinction of its parts from Jupiter its artificer, and its perpetual motion from soul; the whole at the same time proceeding from the first cause through proper mediums. Nor is it more difficult to conceive matter after this manner invested with form and distributed into order, than to conceive a potter making clay with his own hands, giving it a shape when made through the assistance of a wheel, and, when fashioned, adorning it through another instrument with figures; at the same time being careful to remember, that in this latter instance different instruments are required through the imbecility of the artificer, but that in the former various mediums are necessary from the transcendancy of power which subsists in the original cause. And from all this it is easy to infer, that matter was not prior to the world by any interval of time, but only in the order of composition; priority here implying nothing more than that which must be considered as first in the construction of the world. Nor was it hurled about in a disordered state prior to order; but this only signifies its confused and tumultuous nature, when considered in itself, divested of the supervening irradiations of form.

With respect to the four elements, I add, in addition to

what has been said before, that their powers are beautifully disposed by Proclus as follows: *viz.*

FIRE.

AIR.

Subtle, acute, movable.

Subtle, blunt, movable.

WATER.

EARTH.

Dense, blunt, movable.

Dense, blunt, immovable.

In which disposition you may perceive how admirably the two extremes fire and earth are connected, though indeed it is the peculiar excellence of the Platonic philosophy to find out in every thing becoming mediums through that part of the dialectic art called division; and it is owing to this that the philosophy itself forms so regular and consistent a whole. But I have invented the following numbers for the purpose of representing this distribution of the elements arithmetically.

Let the number 60 represent fire, and 480 earth; and the mediums between these, *viz.* 120 and 240, will correspond to air and water. For as $60 : 120 :: 240 : 480$. But $60 = 3 \times 5 \times 4$. $120 = 3 \times 10 \times 4$. $240 = 6 \times 10 \times 4$. and $480 = 6 \times 10 \times 8$. So that these numbers will correspond to the properties of the elements as follows:

FIRE :

AIR ::

 $3 \times 5 \times 4 :$ $3 \times 10 \times 4 ::$

Subtle, acute, movable :

Subtle, blunt, movable.

WATER :

EARTH.

 $6 \times 10 \times 4 ::$ $6 \times 10 \times 8$

Dense, blunt, movable ::

Dense, blunt, immovable.

With respect to fire it must be observed, that the Platonists consider *light*, *flame*, and *a burning coal*, $\phi\omega\varsigma$, $\phi\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, $\alpha\theta\rho\alpha\varsigma$, as differing from each other; and that a subjection

or

or remission of fire takes place from on high to the earth, proceeding as we have before observed from that which is more immaterial, pure and incorporeal, as far as to the most material and dense bodies : the last procession of fire being subterranean ; for, according to Empedocles, there are many rivers of fire under the earth. So that one kind of fire is material and another immaterial, *i. e.* when compared with sublunary matter ; and one kind is corruptible but another incorruptible ; and one is mixed with air, but another is perfectly pure. The characteristic too of fire is neither heat nor a motion upwards, for this is the property only of our terrestrial fire ; and this in consequence of not subsisting in its proper place : but the essential peculiarity of fire is visibility ; for this belongs to all fire, *i. e.* the *divine*, the *mortal*, the *burning*, and the *impetuous*. It must however be carefully observed, that our eyes are by no means the standards of this visibility : for we cannot perceive the celestial spheres, on account of fire and air in their composition so much predominating over earth ; and many terrestrial bodies emit no light when considerably heated, owing to the fire which they contain being wholly absorbed as it were in gross and ponderous earth.

In like manner, with respect to earth, the characteristic of its nature is solidity and tangibility, but not ponderosity and a tendency downwards ; for these properties do not subsist in every species of earth. Hence, when we consider these two elements according to their opposite subsistence, we shall find that fire is always in motion, but earth always immoveable ; that fire is eminently visible, and earth eminently tangible ; and that fire is of a most attenuated nature through light, but that earth is most dense through darkness. So that as fire is essentially the

cause of light, in like manner earth is essentially the cause of darkness; while air and water subsisting as mediums between these two, are, on account of their diaphanous nature, the causes of visibility to other things, but not to themselves. In the mean time moisture is common both to air and water, connecting and conglutinating earth, but becoming the seat of fire, and affording nourishment and stability to its flowing nature.

With respect to the composition of the mundane soul, it is necessary to observe that there are five genera of being, from which all things after the first being are composed; viz. *essence*, *abiding*, *motion*, *sameness*, *difference*. For every thing must possess *essence*; must *abide* in its cause, from which also it must *proceed*, and to which it must be *converted*; must be the *same* with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time *different* from others and distinguished in itself. But Plato, for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the soul, viz. *essence*, *sameness*, and *difference*; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. But by an indivisible nature we must understand intellect, and by that nature which is divisible about body, corporeal life. The mundane soul therefore is a medium between the mundane intellect and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, and yet a participant of each.

The

The first numbers of the soul are these: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27; but the other numbers are,

	6
8	9
9	12
12	18
16	27
18	36
24	54
32	81
36	108
48	162

But in order to understand these numbers mathematically, it is necessary to know in the first place what is meant by arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic proportion. Arithmetical proportion, then, is when an equal excess is preserved in three or more given numbers; geometrical, when numbers preserve the same ratio; and harmonic, when the middle term is exceeded by the greater, by the same part of the greater as the excess of the middle term above the lesser exceeds the lesser. Hence the numbers 1, 2, 3, are in arithmetical proportion; 2, 4, 8, in geometrical, since as 2 is to 4, so is 4 to 8; and 6, 4, 3, are in harmonic proportion, for 4 is exceeded by 6 by 2, which is a third part of 6, and 4 exceeds 3 by 1, which is the third part of 3. Again, sesquialter proportion is when one number contains another and the half of it besides, such as the proportion of 3 to 2; but sesquitercian proportion takes place when a greater number contains a lesser, and besides this a third part of the lesser, as 4 to 3; and a sesquioctave ratio is when a greater number contains a lesser one, and an eighth part of it besides, as 9 to 8; and this

proportion produces in music an entire tone, which is the principle of all symphony. But a tone contains five symphonies, viz. the *diateffaron*, or sesquitercian proportion, which is composed from two tones, and a semitone which is a sound less than a tone; the *diapente*, or sesquialter proportion, which is composed from three tones and a semitone; the *diapafon*, or duple proportion, *i. e.* four to two, which is composed from six tones; the *diapafon diapente*, which consists of nine tones and a semitone; and the *disdiapafon*, or quadruple proportion, *i. e.* four to one, which contains twelve tones.

But it is necessary to observe further concerning a tone, that it cannot be divided into two equal parts; because it is composed from a sesquioctave proportion, and 9 cannot be divided into two equal parts. Hence it can only be divided into two unequal parts, which are usually called semitones; but by Plato *λειμματα*, or *remainders*. But the lesser part of a tone was called by the Pythagoreans *Diesis*, or *division*; and this is surpassed by a sesquitercian proportion by two tones; and the remaining greater part, by which the tone surpasses the less semitone, is called *apotome*, or *a cutting off*.

But as it is requisite to explain the different kinds of harmony, in order to a knowledge of the composition of symphonies, let the reader take notice that harmony receives a triple division, into the Diatonic, Enharmonic, and Chromatic. And the Diatonic genus takes place when its division continually proceeds through a less semitone and two tones. But the Enharmonic proceeds through two dieses. And the Chromatic is that which ascends through two unequal semitones and three semitones; or *τριμμιτονιον*, according to the appellation of the ancient musicians.

musicians. And to these three genera all musical instruments are reduced, because they are all composed from these harmonies. But though there were many different kinds of instruments among the ancients, yet the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophers used only three—the Monochord, the Tetrachord, and the Polychord; to which three they refer the composition of all the other instruments. From among all these therefore Plato assumes the *diatonic* harmony, as more agreeable to nature; in which the tetrachord proceeds through a less semitone and two tones; tending by this means from a less to a greater semitone, as from a more slender to a more powerful matter, which possesses a simple form, and is at the same time both gentle and robust. And hence, as all instruments are conversant with these three kinds of harmony, Plato, says Proclus, in consequence of preferring the diatonic harmony, alone uses two tones, when he orders us to fill up the sesquitercian, sesquioctave and semitone intervals.

With respect to the first numbers, which are evidently those described by Plato, the first three of these, 1, 2, 3, as Syrianus beautifully observes, may be considered as representing the soul of the world, abiding in, proceeding from, and returning to herself; *viz.* abiding according to that first part, proceeding through the second, and this without any passivity or imbecility, but returning according to the third: for that which is perfective accedes to beings through conversion. But as the whole of the mundane soul is perfect, united with intelligibles, and eternally abiding in intellect, hence she providentially presides over secondary natures; in one respect indeed over those which are as it were proximately connected with herself,

herself, and in another over solid and compacted bulks. But her providence over each of these is twofold. For those which are connected with her essence in a following order, proceed from her according to the power of the fourth term (4), which possesses generative powers; but return to her according to the fifth (9), which reduces them to one. Again, solid natures, and all the species which are discerned in corporeal masses, proceed according to the octuple of the first part (*i. e.* according to 8), which number is produced by two, is solid, and possesses generative powers proceeding to all things; but they return according to the number 27, which is the regression of solids, proceeding as it were from the ternary, and existing of the same order according to nature: for such are all odd numbers.

And thus much for the first series of numbers, in which duple and triple ratios are comprehended: but after this follows another series, in which the duple are filled with sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, and the sesquitertian spaces receive a tone. And here, in the first place, in the duple progression between 6 and 12, we may perceive two mediums, 8 and 9. And 8 indeed subsists between 6 and 12 in an harmonic ratio; for it exceeds 6 by a third part of 6, and it is in like manner exceeded by 12 by a third part of 12. Likewise 8 is in a sesquitertian ratio to 6, but 12 is sesquialter to 8. Besides, the difference between 12 and 8 is 4, but the difference between 8 and 6 is 2. And hence 4 to 2, as well as 12 to 6, contains a duple ratio: and these are the ratios in which the artifice of harmony is continually employed. We may likewise compare 9 to 6 which is sesquialter, 12 to 9 which is sesquitertian, and 9 to 8 which is sesquioctave, and forms a tone; and from
 this

this comparison we shall perceive that two sesquitercian ratios are bound together by this sesquioctave, *viz.* 8 to 6 and 9 to 12. Nor is an arithmetical medium wanting in these numbers; for 9 exceeds 6 by 3, and is by the same number exceeded by 12. And in the same manner we may proceed in all the following duple ratios, binding the duple by the sesquitercian and sesquialter, and connecting the two sesquitercians by a sesquioctave ratio. We may run through the triple proportions too in a similar manner, excepting in the tone. But because sesquitercian ratios are not alone produced from two tones, but from a semitone, and this a lesser, which is deficient from a full tone by certain small parts, hence Plato says, that in the sesquitercian ratios a certain small portion remains *. And thus much may suffice for an epitome of the mode in which the duple and triple intervals are filled.

But the words of Plato respecting these intervals plainly shew, as Proclus well observes, that he follows in this instance the doctrine of the ancient theologists. For they assert, that in the artificer of the universe there are separating and connecting powers, and that through the former he separates his government from that of his father Saturn, but through the latter applies the whole of his fabrication to his paternal unity; and they call these operations incisions and bonds. Hence the demiurgus, dividing the essence of the soul according to these powers in demiurgic bounds, is said to cut the parts from their totality, and again to bind the same with certain bonds, which are μεσοτητες, *middles* or *mediums*, and through which he connects that which is divided, in the same manner as

* The proportion of 256 to 243 produces what is called in music λειμμα, *limma*, or that which remains.

he divides, through sections, that which is united. And as the first numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, represented those powers of the soul, by which she abides in, proceeds from, and returns to herself, and causes the progression and conversion of the parts of the universe—so in these second numbers, the sesquitercian, sesquialter, and other ratios constitute the more particular ornament of the world; and, while they subsist as wholes themselves, adorn the parts of its parts.

I only add, that we must not suppose these numbers of the soul to be a multitude of unities; but we must conceive them to be vital self-motive natures, which are indeed the images of intellectual numbers, but the exemplars of such as are apparent to the eye of sense. In like manner, with respect to harmony, soul is neither harmony itself, nor that which subsists in harmonized natures. For harmony itself is uniform, separate and exempt from the whole of things harmonized; but that which subsists in things harmonized is dependent on others, by which also it is naturally moved. But the harmony of the soul subsists in the middle of these two, communicating harmony to others, and being the first participant of it herself.

In order to understand the figure of the soul, in the first place, mathematically, conceive all the above-mentioned numbers to be described in a certain straight rule, according to the whole of its breadth; and conceive this rule to be afterwards divided according to its length. Then all these ratios will subsist in each part of the section. For if the division were made according to breadth, it would be necessary that some of the numbers should be separated on this side, and others on that. Afterwards let the two lengths of the rule be mutually applied to each other;

viz.

viz. in the points which divide these lengths in half: but let them not be so applied as to form right angles, for the intended circles are not of this kind. Again, let the two lengths be so incurvated, that the extremes may touch each other; then two circles will be produced, one interior and the other exterior, and they will be mutually oblique to each other. But one of these will be the circle of *same-ness*, and the other of *difference*; and the one will subsist according to the equinoctial circle, but the other according to the zodiac: for every circle of difference is rolled about this, as of identity about the equinoctial. Hence these rectilinear sections ought not to be applied at right angles, but according to the similitude of the letter X, agreeable to the mind of Plato, so that the angles in the summit only may be equal; for neither does the zodiac cut the equinoctial at right angles. And thus much for the mathematical explanation of the figure of the soul.

But again, says Proclus, referring the whole of our discourse to the essence of the soul, we shall say, that, according to the mathematical disciplines, continuous and discrete quantity seem in a certain respect to be contrary to each other; but in soul both concur together, *i. e.* union and division. For soul is both unity and multitude, and one reason and many: and so far as she is a whole she is continuous, but so far as number she is divided, according to the reasons which she contains. Hence, according to her continuity, she is assimilated to the union of intelligibles; but, according to her multitude, to their distinction. And if you are willing to ascend still higher in speculations, soul, according to her union, possesses a vestige and resemblance of *the one*, but according to her division she exhibits the multitude of divine numbers. Hence

we must not say that she alone possesses an arithmetical essence, for she would not be continuous; nor alone a geometrical essence, for she would not be divided; she is therefore both at once, and must be called both arithmetical and geometrical. But so far as she is arithmetical, she has at the same time harmony conjoined with her essence: for the multitude which she contains is elegant and composite, and receives in the same and at once both that which is essential quantity and that which is related. But so far as she is geometrical, she has that which is spherical connected with her essence. For the circles which she contains are both immovable and moved; immovable indeed according to essence, but moved according to a vital energy; or, to speak more properly, they may be said to possess both of these at once, for they are self-motive: and that which is self-motive is both moved and is at the same time immovable, since a motive power seems to belong to an immovable nature. Soul therefore essentially pre-assumes all disciplines; the geometrical, according to her totality, her forms, and her lines; the arithmetical, according to her multitude and essential unities; the harmonical, according to the ratios of numbers; and the spherical, according to her double circulations. And, in short, she is the essential, self-motive, intellectual, and united bond of all disciplines, purely comprehending all things; figures in an unfigured manner; unitedly such things as are divided; and without distance such as are distant from each other.

We are likewise informed by Proclus, that, according to Porphyry, a character like the letter X comprehended in a circle, was a symbol with the Egyptians of the mundane soul; by the right lines, perhaps (says he), signifying
its

its biformed progression, but by the circle its uniform life and intellectual progress, which is of a circular nature. But of these circles the exterior, or the circle of sameness, represents the cogitative power of the soul; but the interior, or the circle of difference, the opinionative power: and the motion which is perpetually revolved in sameness, and which comprehends the soul, is intellect.

Again, we have before observed, that, according to the Platonic philosophy, the planets revolve with a kind of spiral motion; while variously wandering under the oblique zodiac, they at one time verge to the south and at another to the north, sometimes advance and sometimes retreat, and being at one time more distant from and at another nearer to the earth. And this motion indeed very properly belongs to them from their middle position, as it is a medium between the right lined motion of the elements, and the circular motion of the inerratic sphere: for a spiral is mixed from the right line and circle. Add too, that there are seven motions in the heavens; the circular, before, behind, upwards, downwards, to the right hand, and to the left. But the spheres alone possess a circular motion. And the stars in the inerratic sphere revolve about their centres; but at the same time have an advancing motion, because they are drawn along towards the west by the sphere in which they are fixed. But they are entirely destitute of the other five motions. On the contrary, the planets have all the seven. For they revolve about their own centres, but are carried by the motions of their spheres towards the east. And besides this, they are carried upwards and downwards, behind and before, to the right hand and to the left. Every star too, by its revolution about its own centre, imitates the energy of the
soul

soul which it contains about its own intellect; but by following the motion of its sphere, it imitates the energy of the sphere about a superior intellect. We may likewise add, that the uniformity in the motions of the fixed stars confers union and perseverance on inferior concerns; but that the manifold and opposite motions of the planets contribute to the production, mingling and governing of things various and opposite.

And here, as the reader will doubtless be desirous of knowing why earth is called by Plato the first and most ancient of the gods within the heavens, I doubt not but he will gratefully receive the following epitome of the beautiful account given by Proclus of the earth, in his inestimable commentaries on this venerable dialogue. "Earth (says he) first proceeds from the intelligible earth which comprehends all the intelligible orders of the gods, and from the intellectual earth which is co-ordinated with heaven. For our earth, being analogous to these, eternally abides, as in the centre of heaven; by which being every way comprehended, it becomes full of generative power and demiurgic perfection. The true earth, therefore, is not this corporeal and gross bulk, but an animal endued with a divine soul and a divine body. For it contains an immaterial and separate intellect, and a divine soul energizing about this intellect, and an ethereal body proximately depending on this soul; and lastly, this visible bulk, which is on all sides animated and filled with life from its inspiring soul, and through which it generates and nourishes lives of all-various kinds. For one species of life is rooted in the earth, and another moves about its surface. For how is it possible that plants should live while abiding in the earth, but when separated from it die,

die, unless its visible bulk was full of life? Indeed it must universally follow that wholes must be animated prior to parts: for it would be ridiculous that man should participate of a rational soul and of intellect, but that earth and air should be deprived of a soul, sublimely carried in these elements as in a chariot, governing them from on high, and preserving them in the limits accommodated to their nature. For, as Theophrastus well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession of soul. Hence there must necessarily be a soul and intellect in the earth, the former causing her to be prolific, and the latter connectedly containing her in the middle of the universe. So that earth is a divine animal, full of intellectual and animastic essences, and of immaterial powers. For if a partial soul, such as ours, in conjunction with its proper ethereal vehicle, is able to exercise an exuberant energy in a material body, what ought we to think of a soul so divine as that of the earth? Ought we not to assert, that by a much greater priority she uses these apparent bodies through other middle vehicles, and through these enables them to receive her divine illuminations?"

"Earth then subsisting in this manner, she is said in the first place to be our nurse, as possessing in a certain respect a power equivalent to heaven; and because, as heaven comprehends divine animals, so earth appears to contain such as are earthly. And in the second place, as inspiring our life from her own proper life. For she not only yields us fruits, and nourishes our bodies through these, but she fills our souls with illuminations from her own divine soul, and through her intellect awakens ours from its oblivious sleep. And thus, through the whole

of herself, she becomes the nurse of our whole composition.

“But we may consider the poles as powers which give stability to the universe, and excite the whole of its bulk to intelligible love; which connect a divisible nature indivisibly, and that which possesses interval in an united and indistant manner. But the axis is one divinity congregating the centres of the universe, connecting the whole world, and moving its divine circulations; about which the revolutions of the stars subsist, and which sustains the whole of the heavens by its power. And hence it is called Atlas, from the immutable and unwearied energy with which it is endued. Add too that the word *τεταμενον*, *extended*, signifies that this one power is Titannic, guarding the circulations of the wholes which the universe contains.

“But earth is likewise called the guardian and fabricator of night and day. And that she causes the night indeed is evident; for her magnitude and figure give that great extent to the conical shadow which she produces. But she is the fabricator of the day, considered as giving perfection to the day which is conjoined with night; so that earth is the artificer of both these, in conjunction with the sun.

“But she is the most ancient and first of the gods in the heavens, considered with respect to her stability and generative power, her symphony with heaven, and her position in the centre of the universe. For the centre possesses a mighty power in the universe, as connecting all its circulations; and hence it was called by the Pythagoreans the tower of Jupiter, from its containing a demiurgic guard. And if we recollect the Platonic hypothesis concerning the earth (which we have mentioned before), that our habitable

bitable part is nothing but a dark hollow, and very different from the true earth, which is adorned with a beauty similar to that of the heavens, we shall have no occasion to wonder at her being called the first and most ancient of the celestial gods."

Again, according to the Platonic philosophy, some of the fixed stars are sometimes so affected, that for a considerable space of time they become invisible to us; and in this case, both when they withdraw themselves from our view and when they again make their appearance, they are said by such as are skilled in these affairs, according to the information of Proclus *, both to produce and signify mighty events. But though it is evident from the very words of Plato, in this part of the dialogue, that this opinion concerning certain stars disappearing and becoming again visible was entertained by all the astronomers of his time, and by the Pythagoreans prior to him, yet this most interesting circumstance seems to have been utterly unknown to the moderns. Hence, not in the least suspecting this to be the case, they have immediately concluded from stars appearing of which we have no account, and others disappearing which have been observed in the heavens for many ages, that the stars are bodies, like earthly natures, subject to generation and decay. But this is not wonderful, if we consider that such men as these have not the smallest conception that the universe is a perfect whole; that every thing perfect must have a first, middle, and last; and that, in consequence of this, the heavens

* In Tim. p. 285. And in p. 333 he informs us, that the fixed stars have periods of revolution, though to us unknown, and that different stars have different periods. See also Chalcidius in Plat. Tim. p. 218.

alone can rank in the first place, and earth in the last.

As the universe, indeed, as well as each of its principal parts or *wholes*, is *perpetual*, and as this perpetuity being temporal can only subsist by periodical circulation, hence all the celestial bodies, in order that all the possible variety of things may be unfolded, form different periods at different times; and their appearings and disappearing are nothing more than the restitutions of their circulations to their pristine state, and the beginnings of new periods. For according to these especially, says Proclus, they turn and transmute mundane natures, and bring on abundant corruptions and mighty mutations, as Plato asserts in the Republic.

In the next place, from the sublime speech of the demi-urgus to the junior or mundane gods, the reader may obtain full conviction that the gods of the ancients were not dead men deified; for they are here represented as commanded by the mundane artificer to fabricate the whole of the mortal race. And with respect to the properties of the sublunary gods, which Plato comprehends in nine divinities, Proclus beautifully observes that *Heaven* bounds, *Earth* corroborates, and *Ocean* moves the whole of generation. That *Tethys* establishes every thing in its proper motion, intellectual natures in intellectual, middle natures in animal, and corporeal natures in physical motion; *Ocean* at the same time moving all things collected together in one. But *Saturn* distributes intellectually only, *Rhea* vivifies, *Phorcys* scatters spermatic reasons, *Jupiter* gives perfection to things apparent from unapparent causes, and *Juno* evolves according to the all-various mutations of apparent natures. And thus through this ennead the sublunary

nary world is in a becoming manner distributed and filled; divinely indeed from the gods, angelically from angels, and dæmoniacally from dæmons. And again, the gods subsisting about bodies, souls, and intellects; angels exhibiting their providence about souls and bodies; and dæmons being divided about the fabrication of nature, and the care of bodies. But it may be asked, why does Plato comprehend the whole extent of the gods producing generation, in these nine divinities? Because, says Proclus, this ennead accomplishes the fabrication of generation. For in the sublunary regions there are bodies and natures, souls and intellects, and these both totally and partially. And all these subsist in both respects, that is both totally and partially, in each of the elements, because wholes and parts subsist together. Hence, as each element ranks as a monad, and contains bodies and natures, souls and intellects, both totally and partially, an ennead will evidently be produced in each. But *Heaven* and *Earth* generate the unapparent essences of these, the former according to union, and the latter according to multiplication; but *Ocean* and *Tethys* give perfection to their common and distributed motion; at the same time that the motion of each is different. In like manner, with respect to the wholes which are adorned, *Saturn* distributes things partial from such as are total, but in an intellectual manner. But *Rhea* calls forth this distribution from intellectual natures into all-various progressions, and as far as to the ultimate forms of life, in consequence of her being a vivific goddess. But *Phorcys* produces the Titannic distinction, as far as to natural reasons. And after these three, the fathers of composite natures succeed. And Jupiter indeed orderly disposes sensible natures totally, in imitation of *Heaven*.

For in the intellectual order, and in the royal series, he proceeds analogous to *Heaven* *. But Juno moves the wholes, fills them with powers, and unfolds them according to every progression. And the gods posterior to these fabricate the partial works of sensible natures, according to the characteristics by which they are distinguished; viz. the demiurgic, the vivific, the perfective, and the connective, unfolding and distributing themselves as far as to the last of things. For these last are all of them analogous to the Saturnian order, from whose government the distributive characteristic originally proceeds.

Again, by the *Crater* in which the mundane soul was mingled, we must understand the vivific goddess Juno; by the term *mingling*, a communion of essence; and by a second mixture in a certain respect the same, but yet deficient from the first in a second and third degree, the similitude and at the same time inferiority of partial to total souls, and the order subsisting among partial souls. For some of these are pure and undefiled, associating with generation but for a short time, and this for the god-like purpose of benefiting more ingenious souls; but others wander from their true country for very extended periods of time. For between souls which abide on high without defilement, and such as descend and are defiled with vice, the medium must be such souls as descend, indeed, but without defilement.

But when the artificer of the universe is said to have distributed souls equal in number to the stars, this must

* For there are six kings, according to Orpheus, who preside over the universe—Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus; and of these Saturn proceeds analogous to Phanes, and Jupiter to Heaven.

not be understood as if one partial soul was distributed under one of the stars, and that the quantity of souls is equal to that of the starry gods; for this would be perfectly inconsistent with what Plato asserts a little before, that the artificer disseminated some of these into the earth, some into the sun and some into the moon, thus scattering a multitude into each of the instruments of time; but, as Proclus well observes, equality of number here must not be understood monadically, but according to analogy. For in numbers, says he, ten is analogous to unity, thirty to three, fifty to five, and entirely all the numbers posterior to the decad, to all within the decad. And hence five is not equal to fifty in quantity, nor three to thirty, but they are only equal according to analogy. After this manner therefore the equal in number must be assumed in partial souls; since there is a number of these accommodated to every divine soul, and which each divine soul uniformly pre-assumes in itself. And hence, when it unfolds this number, it bounds the multitude of partial souls distributed under its essence. Likewise, with respect to these depending souls, such as are first suspended from a divine soul are less in number, but greater in power; but such as are second in progression are less in power, but more extended in number; while at the same time each is analogous to the divine cause from which it proceeds.

Observe too, that when Plato uses the term *the most pious of animals*, man alone is not implied, but the inhabitants likewise or partial souls of the several spheres and stars: for, says Proclus, between eternal animals*, and such as live but for a short period† (*viz.* whose periods of circu-

* *i. e.* stars and spheres.

† *i. e.* men.

lation are short), it is necessary there should be a species of rational animals more divine than man, and whose existence is of a very extended duration. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the soul is conjoined with this gross body through two vehicles as mediums, one of which is ethereal and the other aerial: and of these the ethereal vehicle is *simple and immaterial*, but the aerial *simple and material*; and this dense earthly body is *composite and material*.

Again, when our souls are represented after falling into the present body as suffering a transmutation into brutes, this, as Proclus beautifully observes, must not be understood as if our souls ever became the animating principles of brutal bodies, but that by a certain sympathy they are bound to the souls of brutes, and are as it were carried in them, just as evil dæmons insinuate themselves into our phantasy, through their own depraved imaginations. And by the circulations of the soul being merged in a profound river and impetuously borne along, we must understand by the river, not the human body alone, but the whole of generation (with which we are externally surrounded) through its swift and unstable flowing. For thus, says Proclus, Plato in the Republic calls the whole of generated nature the river of Lethe, which contains both Lethe and the meadow of Ate, according to Empedocles*; the devouring jaws of matter and the light-hating world, as it is called by the gods; and the winding

* εν η κ' η ληθη, κ' ο της ατης λειμων, ως φησιν Εμπεδοκλης, κ' το λαβρον της υλης, κ' ο μισοφαιης κοσμος, ως οι θεοι λεγουσι, κ' τα σκολια ρειθρα, υφ'ων οι πολλοι καταστυρονται, ως τα λογικα φησιν. Procl. in Tim. p. 339. See more concerning this in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries,

rivers under which many are drawn down, as the oracles* assert. But by the circulations of the soul the cogitative and opiniative powers are signified; the former of which, through the soul's conjunction with the body, is impeded in its energies, and the latter is Titannically torn in pieces under the irrational life.

Again, if we consider man with reference to a contemplative life, which is the true end of his formation, we shall find that the head, which is the instrument of contemplation, is the principal member, and that the other members were only added as ministrant to the head. With respect to sight, it must be observed that Democritus, Heraclitus, the Stoics, many of the Peripatetics and ancient geometricians, together with the Platonists, were of opinion that vision subsists through a lucid spirit emitted from the eyes: and this spirit, according to Plato and his followers, is an unburning vivific fire similar to celestial fire, from which it originally proceeds. But this fire, the illuminations of which, as we have already observed, give life to our mortal part, is abundantly collected in the eye as in a fat diaphanous substance, whose moisture is most shining and whose membranes are tender and transparent, but yet sufficiently firm for the purpose of preserving the inherent light. But a most serene ray shines through the more solid pupil; and this ray originates internally from one nerve, but is afterwards derived through two small nerves to the two eyes. And these nerves, through the fat humours of the eyes, winding under the tunics, arrive at length at the pupils. But a light of this kind, thus preserved in the small nerves, and bursting through the narrow pupils as soon as it shines forth

* viz. the oracles of Zoroaster.

into rays here and there, as it commenced from one ray so it immediately returns into one, from the rays naturally uniting in one common ray : for the eyes also, on account of their lubricity, roundness, and smooth substance, are easily moved hither and thither, with an equal and similar revolution. This visual ray, however, cannot proceed externally and perceive objects at a distance, unless it is conjoined with external light proceeding conically to the eyes ; and hence our ray insinuating itself into this light, and becoming strengthened by the association, continues its progression till it meets with some opposing object. But when this is the case, it either diffuses itself through the superficies of the object, or runs through it with wonderful celerity, and becomes immediately affected with the quality of the object. And a resistance, motion, and affection of this kind produces vision ; *viz.* from the vibration of the ray thus affected gradually arriving at the instrument of sight, and by this means exciting that image of the object which is naturally inherent in the instrument, and through which when excited perception ensues. For there are three particulars which belong in general to all the senses : first, an image or mark of the sensible thing impressed in the sensitive instrument ; and this constituted both in passion and energy in a certain similitude to the sensible object : but afterwards we must consider an impression of this kind as now perfect, and ending in species ; *viz.* in the common composite life : and in the third place that inherent reason of the soul ensues, which germinates from the sensitive soul, is accommodated to species of this kind, and is that through which sensitive judgment and cogitation subsist.

But farther, the Platonists admit with Democritus and

Empedocles, that certain material images of things flow through the pores of bodies, and preserve to a certain distance not only the qualities but likewise the shape of the bodies from which they flow. And these radial images are intimated by Plato in this dialogue, in the Sophista, and in the seventh book of his Republic; in commenting on the last of which, Proclus observes as follows: "According to Plato (says he), representations of things are hypostases of certain images fabricated by a dæmoniacal art, as he teaches us in the Sophista: for shadows, of which they say images are the companions, possess a nature of this kind. For these are the effigies of bodies and figures, and have an abundant sympathy with the things from which they fall; as is evident from what the arts of magicians are able to effect, and from what they tell us concerning images and shadows. But why should I speak of the powers of magicians, when irrational animals are able to operate through images and shadows, prior to all reason? for they say that the hyæna, by trampling on the shadow of a dog seated on an eminence, will hurl him down and devour him; and Aristotle says, that if a woman during her menstrua looks into a mirror, she will defile both the mirror and the apparent image."——

οτι κατὰ Πλάτωνα αἱ ἐμφασεῖς ὑποστάσεις εἰσιν εἰδῶλων τινῶν δαιμόνια μηχανῇ δημιουργούμεναι, καθάπερ αὐτός ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ διδάσκει. καὶ γὰρ αἱ σκιαί αἷς τὰ εἰδῶλα συζυγεῖν φησὶ τοιαυτὴν ἔχουσι φύσιν. καὶ γὰρ αὗται σώματων εἰσι καὶ σχημάτων εἰκόνες, καὶ πανπολὺν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν ἐμπιπλοῦσι συμπάθειαν, ὡς ὁλοῦσι καὶ ὅσα μαγῶν (lege μαγῶν) τέχναι πρὸς τὰ εἰδῶλα δρᾶν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλονται καὶ τὰς σκίας. καὶ τί λέγω τὰς ἐκείνων δυνάμεις ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἀλογοῖς ἤδη ζωοῖς ὑπαρξῇ πρὸ λόγου παντός ἐνεργεῖν. ἢ γὰρ ναῖνα φασὶν τὴν τοῦ κυνὸς ἐν ὑφεί καθήμενου

πατήσασα

πατησασα σκιαν καταβαλλει, και θεινην ποιηται τον κυνα. και γυναικος καθαιρουμενης φησιν Αριστοτελης, εις ενοπίριον ιδουσης, αιμα-
τουται, το τε ενοπίριον, και το εμφανινομενον ειδωλον *.

And he likewise informs us in the same place, that these images, on account of their slender existence, cannot otherwise become visible to our eyes, than when in consequence of being established, restored, and illuminated in mirrors, they again receive their pristine power and the shape of their originals. Hence, says he, density is required in the body which receives them, that the image may not be dissipated from the rarity of the receptacle, and that from many defluxions it may pass into one form. But smoothness likewise is required, lest the asperity of the receptacle, on account of the promineney of some of its parts and the depth of others, should be the cause of inequality to the image. And lastly splendour is required; that the image, which naturally possesses a slender form, may become apparent to the sight.

In the next place, with respect to matter, and the various epithets by which Plato calls it in this dialogue, it is necessary to observe, that as in an ascending series of subjects we must arrive at length at something which is better than all things, so in a descending series our progression must be stopped by something which is worse than all things, and which is the general receptacle of the last procession of forms. And this is what the ancients called matter, and which they considered as nothing more than a certain indefiniteness of an incorporeal, indivisible, and intellectual nature, and as something which is not formally impressed and bounded by three dimensions, but is entirely remitted and resolved, and is on all sides rapidly

* Vid. Procl. in Plat. Polit. p. 430.

flowing from being into non-entity. But this opinion concerning matter, says Simplicius *, seems to have been adopted by the first Pythagoreans among the Greeks; and after these by Plato, according to the relation of Moderatus. For he shews us—"that, according to the Pythagoreans, there is a *first one* subsisting prior to the essence of things and every substance; that after this, true being and intelligible or forms subsist; and in the third place, that which pertains to soul, and which participates of *the one* and of intellectual forms. But after this (says he) the last nature, which is that of sensibles, subsists; which does not participate of the preceding natures, but is thus affected and formed according to the representation of these; since the matter of sensible natures is the shadow of that which is primarily non-being in quantity, or rather may be said to depend upon and be produced by this." Hence Porphyry in his second book on Matter, says Simplicius, observes that Plato calls matter, quantity, which is formless, indivisible, and without figure; but capacious, and the receptacle of form, figure, division, quality, and other things of a similar kind. And this quantity and form, considered according to the privation of a uniform reason, which comprehends all the reasons of beings in itself, is the paradigm of the matter of bodies; which, says Porphyry, both Plato and the Pythagoreans call a quantum, not after the same manner as form is a quantum, but according to privation and resolution, extension and divulsion, and its mutation from being. Matter, therefore, according to this doctrine, as Simplicius well observes, is nothing else than the permutation and vicissitude of sensible forms, with respect to intelligibles;

* In Aristot. Phys. p. 50, b.

since from thence they verge downwards and extend to perfect non-entity, or the last of things—that is, to matter itself. Hence, says he, because dregs and matter are always the last of things, the Egyptians assert that matter, which they enigmatically denominate water, is the dregs of the first life; subsisting as a certain mire or mud, the receptacle of generable and sensible natures; and which is not any definite form, but a certain constitution of subsistence, in the same manner as that which is indivisible, immaterial and true being, is a constitution of an intelligible nature. And though all forms subsist both in intelligibles and in matter, yet in the former they subsist without matter, indivisibly and truly; but in the latter divisibly, and after the manner of shadows. And on this account every sensible form is dissipated through its union with material interval, and falls from the stability and reality of being.

But the following profound and admirable description of matter by Plotinus (Ennead 3, lib. 6), will I doubt not be gratefully received by the Platonic reader. “Since matter (says he) is neither soul nor intellect, nor life, nor form, nor reason, nor bound, but a certain indefiniteness; nor yet capacity, for what can it produce? since it is foreign from all these, it cannot merit the appellation of being; but is deservedly called non-entity. Nor yet is it non-entity in the same manner as *motion* and *abiding* are non-beings, considered as different from being: but it is true non-entity; the mere shadow and imagination of bulk, and the desire of subsistence; remaining fixed without abiding, of itself invisible, and avoiding the desire of him who is anxious to perceive its nature. Hence, when no one perceives it, it is then in a manner present; but cannot be viewed by him who strives intently to behold it.

it. Again, in itself contraries always appear; the small and the great, the less and the more, deficiency and excess. So that it is a phantom, neither abiding nor yet able to fly away; capable of no one denomination, and possessing no power from intellect; but is constituted in the defect and shade as it were of all real being. Hence too, in each of its vanishing appellations, it eludes our search: for if we think of it as something great, it is in the mean time small; if as something more, it becomes less; and the apparent being which we meet with in its image, is non-being and as it were a flying mockery. So that the forms which appear in matter are merely ludicrous; shadows falling upon shadow as in a mirror, where the position of the apparent is different from that of the real object; and which, though apparently full of forms, possesses nothing real and true. But the things which enter into and depart from matter, are nothing but imitations of being and semblances flowing about a formless semblance. They seem indeed to effect something in the subject matter, but in reality produce nothing; from their debile and flowing nature being endued with no solidity and no rebounding power. And since matter likewise has no solidity, they penetrate it without division like images in water, or as if any one should fill a vacuum with forms."

Such then being the true condition of matter and her inherent shadowy forms, we may safely conclude that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree, has but little power of recalling itself into one; and that a nature of this kind is ready by every trifling impulse to remain as it is impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten into multitude and non-entity. Hence, as Plotinus beautifully observes (*Ennead 3, lib. 6*), "those who only
place

place *being* in the genus of body, in consequence of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived through the senses, which persuade them that sense is alone the standard of truth, are affected like those in a dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But true elevation and true vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with, the dull mass of body. For indeed a resurrection with body is only a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true, which entirely rises from the dead weight of bodies; for these possessing a nature repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is farther evident from their generation, their continual flowing and decay; properties entirely foreign from the nature of being, substantial and real."

Lastly, when Plato composes the elements from mathematical planes, it is necessary to observe, that as these are physical planes, they must not only have length and breadth but likewise depth, that they may be able to subsist as principles in natural effects. "For the Pythagoreans (says Simplicius *) considered every particular body as a figured quantity, and as in itself matter, but fashioned with different figures. That besides this, it differs from a mathematical body in being material and tangible, receiving its tangibility from its bulk, and not either from heat or cold. Hence, from the subject matter being impressed with different figures, they assert that the four elements of the elements subsist. For these elements rank more in the na-

* De Cælo, lib. iv. p. 139.

ture of principles, as for instance the cubic of earth; not that earth has wholly a cubic figure, but that each of the parts of earth is composed from many cubes, which through their smallness are invisible to our sight; and in the same manner the other elements from other primary figures. They add too, that from this difference of figures all the other properties of the elements ensue, and their mutations into each other. For if it is enquired why much air is produced from a little water, they can very readily assign the cause, by saying that the elements of water are many, and that the icosaedrons of water being divided, many octaedrons, and consequently a great quantity of air, will be produced.

Simplicius likewise informs us, that the more ancient of Plato's interpreters, among which the divine Jamblichus ranks, considered Plato as speaking symbolically in this part concerning the figures of the elements; but the latter Platonic philosophers, among whom Proclus, in my opinion, ranks as the most eminent, explained this part according to its literal meaning. And Simplicius, in the same book, has fortunately preserved the arguments of Proclus, in defence of Plato's doctrine respecting these planes, against the objections of Aristotle.

Should it be asked in what this doctrine concerning planes differs from the dogma of Democritus, who asserted that natural bodies were fashioned according to figures, we may answer with Simplicius*, that Plato and the Pythagoreans by a plane denoted something more simple than a body†, atoms being evidently bodies; that

* De Cælo, p. 142.

† viz. than any visible sublunary body.

they assigned commensuration and a demiurgic analogy * to their figures, which Democritus did not to his atoms ; and that they differed from him in their arrangement of earth.

And thus much may suffice at present for an epitome of some of the principal parts of this most interesting dialogue. For as it is my design at some future period to publish as complete a commentary as I am able from the inestimable commentaries of Proclus on this dialogue, with additional observations of my own, a more copious introduction might at present be considered as superfluous. The difficulty indeed of proceeding any farther might alone very well apologize for the want of completion in this compendium. For the commentary of Proclus, though consisting of five books, is imperfect †, and does not even extend so far as to the doctrine of vision, which in the present introduction I have endeavoured to explain. I trust, therefore, that the candid and liberal reader will gratefully accept these fruits of my application to the Platonic philosophy ; and as this intro-

* *i. e.* active and fabricative powers.

† It is a circumstance remarkably unfortunate, that not one of the invaluable commentaries of this philosopher has been preserved entire. For that he wrote a complete commentary on this dialogue, is evident from a citation of Olympiodorus on Aristotle's meteors from it, which is not to be found in any of the books now extant. In like manner his treatise on Plato's theology is imperfect, wanting a seventh book ; his commentaries on the Parmenides want many books ; his scholia on the Cratylus are far from being complete ; and this is likewise the case with his commentary on the first Alcibiades.

duction and the following translation were the result of no moderate labour and perseverance, I earnestly hope they may be the means of awakening some few at least from the sleep of oblivion, of recalling their attention from fluctuating and delusive objects to permanent and real being; and thus may at length lead them back to their paternal port, as the only retreat which can confer perfect security and rest.

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As the author of this translation has been so long and so laboriously engaged in this work, he has been enabled to collect a great number of valuable materials, which he has now the pleasure to present to the public. He has also been enabled to correct many of the errors which have crept into the original, and to supply many of the deficiencies which it contained. He has also been enabled to add many new materials, which he has collected from various sources. He has also been enabled to correct many of the errors which have crept into the original, and to supply many of the deficiencies which it contained. He has also been enabled to add many new materials, which he has collected from various sources.

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THE
TIMÆUS
OF
PLATO.

SOCRATES, TIMÆUS, CRITIAS, HER-
MOCRATES.

Soc. I SEE one, two, three, but where, friend Timæus, is that fourth person, who being received by me yesterday at a banquet of disputation, ought now in his turn to repay me with a similar repast?

TIM. He labours, Socrates, under a certain infirmity; for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.

Soc. It remains therefore for you, O Timæus, and the company present, to fill up the part of this absent guest.

TIM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour, to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished. For it would be by no means just, that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight.

Soc. Do you recollect the magnitude and nature of the things which I proposed to you to explain?

TIM. Some things, indeed, I recollect ; but such as I have forgotten do you recall into my memory. Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory.

Soc. Let it be so. And to begin : the sum of yesterday's dispute was, what kind of republic appeared to me to be the best, and from what sort of men such a republic ought to be composed.

TIM. And by us, indeed, Socrates, all that you said was approved in the highest degree.

Soc. Did we not in the first place separate husbandmen and other artificers from those whom we considered as the defenders of the city ?

TIM. Certainly.

Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that which was accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed only one particular employment to every particular art, we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only, I mean that of protecting the city ; and this as well from the hostile incursions of internal as of external enemies ; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceness against their enemies in battle.

TIM. Entirely so.

Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both wrathful and philosophic in a remarkable degree ; so that they might be gentle to their friends, and bold and ferocious to their enemies.

TIM. You did so.

Soc.

Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and other becoming disciplines?

TIM. Entirely so.

Soc. We likewise established that those who were so educated should neither consider gold, or silver, or any goods of a similar kind, as their own private property; but that rather, after the manner of adjutants, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be no more than is sufficient to a moderate subsistence. That besides this they should use their public stipend in common, and for the purpose of procuring a common subsistence with each other; so that, neglecting every other concern, they may employ their attention solely on virtue, and the discharge of their peculiar employment.

TIM. These things also were related by you.

Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner, as to be aptly conformed similar to the natures of men; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life.

TIM. This too was asserted by you.

Soc. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you easily remember this, on account of its novelty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly careful that no one might be able to distinguish his own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred; that hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters; but that

the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

TIM. These things, indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.

SOC. But that they might from their birth acquire a disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites, should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no discord may arise in this connection when it does not prove prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction.

TIM. We remember this likewise.

SOC. We also ordered that the children of the good should be properly educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city; yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished.

TIM. Just so.

SOC. Have we therefore sufficiently epitomized yesterday's disputation; or do you require any thing further, friend Timæus, which I have omitted?

TIM. Nothing, indeed, Socrates; for all this was the subject of your disputation.

SOC. Hear now how I am affected towards this republic which we have described; for I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that some one, on behold-

ing

ing beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and struggling as it were to imitate those gestures which seem particularly adapted to the nature of bodies: in such a manner am I affected towards the form of that republic which we have described. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other nations, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a manner worthy of its institution, both with respect to practical achievements and verbal negotiations. For indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert. Indeed that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic tribe; but it appears from hence evident, that as these kind of men are studious of imitation, they easily and in the best manner express things in which they have been educated; while, on the contrary, whatever is foreign from their education they imitate with difficulty in actions, and with still more difficulty in words. But with respect to the tribe of Sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking and in many other illustrious arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid lest, with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals, in warlike undertakings, both in actions and discourse. It remains therefore that I should apply to you, who excel
in

in the study of wisdom and civil administration, as well naturally as through the assistance of proper discipline and institution. For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has arrived in his own city at the highest posts of government and honours. Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of the particulars of which we are now speaking. Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is both by nature and education adapted to all such concerns. Hence, when you yesterday requested me to dispute about the institution of a republic, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For unless you properly adapt the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age from whom it can acquire every thing becoming its constitution. As I have therefore hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you indeed refused this employment, but have with common consent determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast.

HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and prior to

to this in the way thither, we discoursed on this very particular. He therefore related to us a certain ancient history, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

CRI. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

TIM. I assent to your compliance.

CRI. Hear then, O Socrates, a discourse surprising indeed in the extreme, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the most wise of the seven wise men. Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropis, as he himself often relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself informed us), that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time and the destruction of mankind. In particular he informed me of one undertaking more illustrious than the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity as it were with hymns, justly and in a manner agreeable to truth.

SOC. You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement which was not only actually related by Solon, but was once really accomplished by this city?

CRI. I will acquaint you with that ancient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years: for at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I myself was about ten. When therefore that solemnity

was

was celebrated among us which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum* *, nothing was omitted which boys in that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new. But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry the most ingenious of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Amynder, had not engaged in

* The *Apaturia*, according to Proclus and Suidas, were festivals in honour of Bacchus, which were publicly celebrated for the space of three days. And they were assigned this name, *ἡ ἀπατη*, that is, on account of the deception through which Neptune is reported to have vanquished Xanthus. The first day of these festivals was called *δορυπυα*, in which, as the name indicates, those of the same tribe feasted together; and hence (says Proclus) on this day *ευχραι καὶ δειπνα πολλὰ*, splendid banquets and much feasting took place. The second day was called *ἀναρρυσίς*, a sacrifice, because many victims were sacrificed in it; and hence the victims were called *ἀναρρυμὰτα*, because *εἰσρομμένα ἀνω εἰδυέτο*, they were drawn upwards, and sacrificed. The third day, of which Plato speaks in this place, was called *κοιρεωτής*, because on this day *νεῖροι*, that is, boys or girls, were collected together in tribes, with their hair shorn. And to these some add a fourth day, which they call *ἐπιόδα*, or the day after. Proclus further informs us, that the boys who were collected on the third day were about three or four years old.

poetry

poetry as a casual affair, but had made it as others do a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state, in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown. In consequence of this, Amynder enquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair the greatest and most celebrated which this city ever performed; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age. But I beseech you, O Critias (says Amynder), relate this affair from the beginning; and inform me what that event was which Solon asserted as a fact, and on what occasion and from whom he received it.

There is then (says he) a certain region of Egypt called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided. In this place a government is established called Saitical; and the chief city of this region of Delta is Sais, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. These men were friends of the Athenians, with whom they declared they were very familiar, through a certain bond of alliance. In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And upon his enquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge in such particulars superior to others, he perceived that neither himself nor any one of the Greeks (as he himself declared) had
any

any knowledge of very remote antiquity. Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of ancient transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and after the deluge of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have subsisted. But upon this one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there any such thing as an aged Grecian among you. But Solon, when he heard this, What (says he) is the motive of your exclamation? To whom the priest:—Because all your souls are juvenile; neither containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time. But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been and again will be: the greatest of these indeed arising from fire and water; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies. For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself, blasted by thunder—is indeed considered as fabulous, yet is in reality true. For it expresses the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and indicates that, through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire. Hence those who either dwell on moun-

tains,

tains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers, or on the borders of the sea. To us indeed the Nile is both salutary in other respects, and liberates us from the fear of such-like depredations. But when the gods, purifying the earth by waters, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuous inundation of the rivers. On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the waters descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains; but they are naturally impelled upwards from the bosom of the earth. And from these causes the most ancient traditions are preserved in our country. For indeed it may be truly asserted, that in those places where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is always preserved, though sometimes the number of individuals is increased, and sometimes suffers a considerable diminution. But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report, every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day. While, on the contrary, you and other nations commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other inventions which society has employed for transmitting information to posterity; and so again, at stated periods of time, a certain celestial defluxion rushes on them like a disease; from whence those among you who survive are both destitute of literary acquisitions and the inspiration of the Muses. Hence it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the events which
happened

happened in ancient times, as well among us as in the regions which you inhabit.

The transactions, therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables. For in the first place you only mention one deluge of the earth, when at the same time many have happened. And in the next place you are ignorant of a most illustrious and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and your whole city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who were for many ages deprived of the use of letters, and became as it were dumb. For prior, O Solon, to that mighty deluge which we have just mentioned, a city of Athenians existed, informed according to the best laws both in military concerns and every other duty of life; and whose illustrious actions and civil institutions are celebrated by us as the most excellent of all that have existed under the ample circumference of the heavens. Solon, therefore, upon hearing this, said that he was astonished; and burning with a most ardent desire, entreated the priests to relate accurately all the actions of his ancient fellow-citizens. That afterwards one of the priests replied:—Nothing of envy, O Solon, prohibits us from complying with your request. But for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of that goddess who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been educated and founded: yours indeed by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth. But the description of the transactions of this our city during the space of eight thousand

land years, is preserved in our sacred writings. I will therefore cursorily run over the laws and more illustrious actions of those cities which existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure we shall prosecute an exact history of every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves.

In the first place then consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours: for you will find many things which then subsisted in your city, similar to such as exist at present. For the priests passed their life separated from all others. The artificers also exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without being mingled with other artificers. The same method was likewise adopted with shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen. The soldiers too, you will find, were separated from other kind of men; and were commanded by the laws to engage in nothing but warlike affairs. A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts, was employed by each. These we first used in Asia; the goddesses in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use. You may perceive too from the beginning what great attention was paid by the laws to prudence and modesty; and besides this, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated. From such a distribution therefore, and in such order, the goddesses first established and adorned your city, choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw that from the excellent temperature of the region, men would arise distin-

guished by the most consummate sagacity and wit. For as the goddess is a lover both of wisdom and war, she fixed on a soil capable of producing men the most similar to herself; and rendered it in every respect adapted for the habitation of such a race. The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws and being formed by good institutions, in a still higher degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do who are the progeny and pupils of the gods.

But though many and mighty deeds of your city are contained in our sacred writings, and are admired as they deserve, yet there is one transaction which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue. For these writings relate what prodigious strength your city formerly tamed, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Lybia and all Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the continent, which borders on this Atlantic sea. For the waters which are beheld within the mouth which we just now mentioned, have the form of a bay with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And lastly, the earth which surrounds it is in every respect truly denominated the continent. In this Atlantic island a combination of kings was formed, who with mighty and wonderful power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and besides this, subjected to their dominion all Lybia, as far as to Egypt; and

Europe, as far as to the Tyrrhene sea. And when they were collected in a powerful league, they endeavoured to enslave all our regions and yours, and besides this all those places situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea. Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength. For as its armies surpassed all others both in magnanimity and military skill, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and became situated in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. But in succeeding time prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation in the space of one day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, arising from the gradually impeding mud which the subsiding island produced. And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon.

But when yesterday you was discoursing about a republic and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history: for I perceived how divinely, from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon. Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as from the great interval of time since I first re-

ceived them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I considered it therefore necessary that I should first of all diligently revolve the whole in my mind. And on this account I yesterday immediately complied with your demands: for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, immediately as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair. And indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse, yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance, which I had heard in some past period of time, very distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory. In consequence of this, as soon as it was day I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only
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summarily; but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. But the citizens and city which you fabricated yesterday as in a fable, we shall transfer to reality; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived as no other than those ancestors of ours, described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert that your citizens are those very people, who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, according to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another.

Soc. But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacred rites of the goddesses. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history. It is impossible therefore to say how, and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient. Hence it is necessary to confess that you have spoken with good fortune; and it is equally necessary that I, on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be wholly attentive to yours.

CRI. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of disputation. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is particularly knowing in the nature of the

universe, should speak the first ; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city ; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them as about citizens and Athenians.

Soc. I seem to behold a copious and splendid banquet of disputation set before me. It is therefore now your business, O Timæus, to begin the discourse ; having first of all, as is highly becoming, invoked the gods according to law.

TIM. Indeed, Socrates, since those who participate but the least degree of wisdom, in the beginning of every undertaking, whether small or great, call upon divinity, it is necessary that we (unless we are in every respect unwise) who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it is generated or without generation, invoking the gods and goddesses, should pray that what we assert may be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves. And such is my prayer to the gods, with reference to myself ; but as to what respects the present company, it is necessary to pray that you may easily understand, and that I may be able to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of disputation. In the first place, therefore, as it appears to me, it is necessary to define what that is which is always *real being*, but is without generation ; and what that is
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which is generated indeed, or consists in a state of becoming to be, but which never *really is*. The former of these indeed is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with *reason*, since it always subsists according to *same*. But the latter is perceived by *opinion* in conjunction with *irrational sense*; since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never truly is. But whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause. For it is every way impossible that any thing should be generated without a cause. When therefore an artificer, in the fabrication of any work, looks to that which always subsists according to *same*, and employing a paradigm of this kind, expresses the idea and power in his work, it is then necessary that the whole of his production should be beautiful. But when he beholds that which is in generation, and uses a generated paradigm, it is alike necessary that his work should be far from beautiful.

I denominate therefore this universe *heaven, or the world*, or by any other appellation in which it may particularly rejoice. Concerning which, let us in the first place consider that which in the proposed enquiry about the universe ought in the very beginning to be investigated; whether it always was, having no principle of generation, or whether it was generated, commencing its generation from a certain cause. For this universe is visible, and has a body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with sense. And such things appear to have their subsistence in becoming to be, and in being generated. But we have before asserted, that whatever is generated is necessarily generated from some cause. To discover therefore the *artificer and father* of the universe is indeed difficult; and

when found it is impossible to reveal him through the ministry of discourse to all men.

Again, this is to be considered concerning him, I mean according to what paradigm extending himself, he fabricated the world. Whether towards an exemplar, subsisting according to that which is always the same, and similarly affected, or towards that which is generated. But indeed if this world is beautiful and its artificer good, it is evident that he looked towards an eternal exemplar in its fabrication. But if the world be far from beautiful, which it is not lawful to assert, he necessarily beheld a generated instead of an eternal exemplar. But it is perfectly evident that he regarded an eternal paradigm. For the world is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer the best of causes. But being thus generated it is fabricated according to that which is comprehensible by reason and intelligence, and which subsists in an abiding sameness of being. And from hence it is perfectly necessary that this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In this manner then we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are allied to the things of which they are the interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we speak of that which is stable and firm, and intellectually apparent, that our discourse should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every perfection of a similar kind. But that when we speak concerning the image of that which is immutable, we should employ only probable arguments, which have the same analogy to the former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And indeed as essence is to generation, so is truth to faith. You must

not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, since many things are asserted by many concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, if I should not be able to produce the most approved and accurate reasons on so difficult a subject. But you ought to rejoice if it shall appear that I do not employ reasons less probable than others: at the same time remembering that I who discourse, and that you who are my judges, possess the human nature in common; so that you should be satisfied if my assertions are but assimilative of the truth.

Soc. You speak excellently well, Timæus; and we shall certainly act in every respect as you advise. This introduction indeed of your discourse we wonderfully approve: proceed therefore with the subsequent disputation.

TIM. Let us declare then on what account the composing artificer constituted generation and the universe. The artificer indeed was good: but in that which is good envy never subsists about any thing which has being. Hence, as he was entirely void of envy, he was willing to produce all things as much as possible similar to himself. If therefore any one receives this most principal cause of generation and the world from wise and prudent men, he will receive him in a manner the most perfect and true. For as the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil; hence, receiving every thing visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moving with confusion and disorder, he reduced it from this wild inordination into order, considering that such a conduct was by far the best. For it neither ever was lawful, nor is, for the best of causes, to produce any other than the most beautiful of effects. In consequence of a reasoning process, therefore, he found that

that among the things naturally visible, there was nothing the whole of which if void of intelligence could ever become more beautiful than the whole of that which is endued with intellect: and at the same time he discovered, that it was impossible for intellect to accede to any being, without the intervention of soul. Hence, as the result of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he fabricated the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. In this manner, therefore, according to an assimilative reason, it is necessary to call the world an animal, endued with intellect, and generated through the providence of divinity.

This being determined, let us consider what follows; and, in the next place, after the similitude of what animals the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed we must by no means think that he fashioned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part, or have a partial subsistence: for if it had been assimilated to an imperfect animal, it certainly would not have been beautiful. But we should rather establish it as the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered separately and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts. For this indeed contains all intelligible animals comprehended in itself; just as this world contains us, and the other animals which are the objects of sight. For the divinity being willing to assimilate this universe in the most exquisite degree, to that which is the most beautiful and every way perfect of intelligible objects, he composed it one visible animal, containing within itself all such animals as are allied to its nature. Do we therefore rightly conclude that there is but one universe; or is it more right to assert that there
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are many and infinite? But indeed there can be but one, if it be only admitted that it is fabricated according to an exemplar. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever, can never be the second to any other. For another animal again would be required about these two, of which they would be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two. That the world, therefore, from its being singular or alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal—on this account the artificer neither produced two nor infinite worlds; but heaven, or the universe, was generated and will be one and only begotten.

But since it is necessary that a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible—and since nothing can be visible without fire, and nothing tangible without something solid, and nothing solid without earth—hence the divinity, beginning to fabricate, composed the body of the universe from fire and earth. But it is impossible for two things alone to cohere together, without the intervention of a third; for a certain collective bond is necessary in the middle of the two. And that is the most beautiful of bonds which renders both itself and the natures which are bound remarkably one. But the most beautiful analogy naturally produces this effect. For when, either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the middle to the last, so is the first to the middle; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first: then the middle becoming both first and last, and the last and the first passing each of them into a middle position, they become all of them necessarily the same, as to relation to each other. But being made the same with each other, all are one.

one. If then it were necessary that the universe should be a superficies only, and have no depth, one medium would indeed be sufficient, both for the purpose of binding itself and the natures which it contains. But now it is requisite that the world should be a solid; and solids are never harmonized together by one, but always with two mediums. Hence the divinity placed water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and fabricated them as much as possible in the same ratio to each other; so that fire might be to air as air to water; and that as air is to water so water might be to earth. And from this conjunction and composition he rendered the world visible and tangible. Hence from things of this kind, which are four in number, it must be confessed that the body of the universe was generated through analogy, conspiring into friendship with itself from their conjunction, and so aptly cohering in all its parts, as to be indissoluble except by its artificer, who bound it in this union and consent.

The composition of the world, therefore, received one *whole* of each of these four natures. For its composing artificer constituted it from *all* fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of any one of these, nor any power external to the world. For by a reasoning process he concluded that it would thus be a whole animal, in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts: that besides this it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced: and lastly, that it would be neither obnoxious to old age nor disease. For he perceived that the heat and cold from which bodies are composed, and all such things as possess vigorous powers, when surrounding bodies externally, and acceding to them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and introducing diseases

diseases and old age, cause them to perish by decay. Hence, through this cause and this reasoning process, he fabricated the universe one whole, composed from all wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without disease. He likewise gave to it a figure becoming and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was destined to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure must be the most becoming which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence he fashioned it of a spherical shape, in which all the radii from the middle are equally distant from the bounding extremities; as this is the most perfect of all figures, and the most similar to himself. For he considered that the similar was infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.

Besides this, he accurately polished the external circumference of the spherical world, and rendered it perfectly smooth. Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible remained external to itself. Nor were ears necessary; as there was nothing externally audible. Nor was the universe invested with surrounding air, that it might be indigent of respiration. Nor again was it in want of any organ, through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted: for there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For indeed the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its composing artificer considered that it would be much more excellent if sufficient to itself, than if indigent of foreign supplies. But he neither thought
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that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive or reject; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest. For from among the seven species of local motion he selected one, which principally subsists about intellect and intelligence, and assigned it to the world as properly allied to its surrounding body. Hence, when he had led it round according to *same*, in *same*, and in itself, he caused it to move with a circular revolution. But he separated the other six motions from the world, and framed it void of their wandering progressions. Hence, as such a conversion was by no means indigent of feet, he generated the universe without legs and feet. When therefore that god who is a perpetually reasoning divinity cogitated about the god who was destined to subsist at some certain period of time, he produced his body smooth and equable; and every way from the middle even and whole, and perfect from the composition of perfect bodies. But placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the whole: and besides this, he externally invested the body of the universe with soul; and causing circle to revolve in a circle, established the world one singular, solitary nature, able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts he rendered the universe a blessed god. But indeed the artificer did not produce soul, as we just now began to say, junior to body: for he who conjoined these would never permit that the more ancient nature should be subservient to the younger. But we, as being much conversant with that which casually occurs, assert things of this kind in an assimilative way: while, on the contrary, the artificer of the world

world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient than body, as being the proper lord and ruler of its servile nature; and that in the following manner.

From an essence indivisible, and always subsisting according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible about bodies, he mingled from both a third form of essence, having a middle subsistence between the two. And again, between that which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, he placed the nature of *same* and *different*. And taking these, now they are three, he mingled them all into one idea. But as the nature of *different* could not without difficulty be mingled in *same*, he harmonized them together by employing force in their conjunction. But after he had mingled these two with essence, and had produced one from the three, he again divided this whole into becoming parts; at the same time mingling each part from *same*, *different*, and *essence*. But he began to divide as follows. In the first place, he received one part from the whole. Then he separated a second part, double of the first: afterwards a third, sesquialter of the second, but triple of the first: then a fourth, double of the second: in the next place a fifth, triple of the third: a sixth, octuple of the first: and lastly a seventh, twenty-seven times more than the first. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, again cutting off parts from the whole; and placed them so between the intervals, that there might be two mediums in every interval; and that one of these might by the same part exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other; and that the other part might by an equal number surpass one of the extremes, and by an equal number be surpassed by the other. But

as from hence sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave intervals were produced, from those bonds in the first spaces, he filled with a sesquioctave interval all the sesquitercian parts, at the same time leaving a part of each of these. And then again the interval of this part being assumed, a comparison is from thence obtained in terms of number to number, subsisting between 256 and 243. But now the whole of that mixture from which these were separated was consumed by such a section of parts. Hence he then cut the whole of this composition according to length, and produced two from one; and adapted middle to middle, like the form of the letter X. Afterwards he bent them into a circle, connecting them both with themselves and with each other, in such a manner that their extremities might be combined in one directly opposite to the point of their mutual intersection; and externally comprehended them in a motion revolving according to sameness, and in that which is perpetually the same. And besides this, he made one of the circles external, but the other internal; and denominated the local motion of the exterior circle, the motion of that nature which subsists according to *sameness*; but that of the interior one, the motion of the nature subsisting according to *difference*. He likewise caused the circle partaking of *sameness* to revolve laterally towards the right hand; but that which partakes of *difference* diametrically towards the left. But he conferred dominion on the circulation of that which is *same* and *similar*: for he suffered this alone to remain undivided. But as to the interior circle, when he had divided it six times, and had produced seven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple; as each of them are three, he ordered the circles to proceed in a
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course contrary to each other :—and three of the seven interior circles he commanded to revolve with a similar swiftness ; but the remaining four with a motion dissimilar to each other, and to the former three ; yet so as not to desert order and proportion in their circulations.

After therefore the whole composition of the soul was completed according to the intention of its artificer, in the next place he fabricated within soul the whole of a corporeal nature ; and, conciliating middle with middle, he aptly harmonized them together. But soul being every way extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it externally in a circle, at the same time herself revolving within herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time. And indeed the body of the universe was generated visible ; but soul is invisible, participating of a rational energy and harmony, and subsisting as the best of generated natures, through its artificer who is the best of intelligible and perpetual beings. Since therefore soul was composed from the mixture of the three parts *same*, *different*, and *essence*, and was distributed and bound according to analogy, herself at the same time returning by a circular energy towards herself ; hence, when she touches upon any thing endued with a dissipated essence, and when upon that which is indivisible, being moved through the whole of herself, she pronounces concerning the nature of each—asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, from what it is different, to what it is related, where it is situated, how it subsists ; and when any thing of this kind happens either *to be* or *to suffer* both in things which are generated and in such as possess an eternal sameness of being. Reason indeed, when connected with that

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which subsists according to sameness and truth, and when it is conversant as well with *different* as *same*, evolving itself without voice or sound in that which is moved by itself; when in this case it subsists about a sensible nature, and the circle characterized by *difference* properly revolving, enunciates any circumstance to every part of the soul with which it is connected; then stable and true opinions and belief are produced. But when again it evolves itself about that which is rational, and the circle of *sameness* aptly revolving announces any particular thing, intellect and science are necessarily produced in perfection by such an operation. Whoever therefore asserts that this takes place in any other nature than soul, asserts every thing rather than the truth.

But when the generating father understood that this generated resemblance of the eternal gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his work, and in consequence of this delight considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its exemplar. Hence, as that is an eternal animal, he endeavoured to render this universe such, to the utmost of his ability. The nature indeed of the animal its paradigm is eternal, and this it is impossible to adapt perfectly to a generated effect. Hence he determined by a cogitative energy to produce a certain movable image of eternity: and thus, while he was adorning and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this, he fabricated the generation of days and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with it rose into existence. And all these, indeed, are the proper parts of time. But
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the terms *it was* and *it will be*, which express the species of generated time, are transferred by us to an eternal essence, through oblivion of the truth. For we assert of such an essence that it *was*, *is*, and *will be*; while according to truth the term *it is* is alone accommodated to its nature. But we should affirm, that *to have been* and *to be hereafter* are expressions alone accommodated to generation, proceeding according to the flux of time: for these parts of time are certain motions. But that which perpetually subsists the same and immovable, neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has been generated in some period of the past, nor will be in some future circulation of time; nor receives any circumstance of being, which generation adapts to natures hurried away by its impetuous whirl. For all these are nothing more than species of time imitating eternity, and circularly rolling itself according to number. But besides this, we likewise frequently assert that a thing which *was generated*, *is generated*; that what subsists in *BECOMING TO BE*, *is in generation*; that what *WILL BE*, *is TO BE*; and that *NON-BEING IS NOT*: no one of which assertions is accurately true. But perhaps a perfect discussion of these matters is not adapted to the present disputation.

But Time was generated together with the universe, that being produced together they might together be dissolved, if any dissolution should ever happen to these. And time was generated according to the exemplar of an eternal nature, that this world might be the most similar possible to such a nature. For its exemplar is permanent being, through the whole of eternity; but the universe alone *was generated*, *is*, and *will be*, through the whole of time. After this manner, therefore, and from such a

cogitation of divinity about the generation of time, that he might give birth to its flowing subsistence, he generated the sun and moon, and the five other stars, which are denominated planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time. But the divinity, as soon as he had produced the bodies of these stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations formed by the revolution of the nature distinguished by *difference*. The moon, indeed, he fixed in the first circulation about the earth; the sun in the second above the earth; the star called Lucifer *, and that which is sacred to Mercury, in circulations revolving with a swiftness equal to the sun, to whom at the same time they are allotted a contrary power; in consequence of which, these stars, the Sun, Lucifer and Mercury mutually comprehend and are mutually comprehended by each other in a similar manner. But with respect to the other stars, if any one should think proper to investigate their circulations, and through what causes they are established, the labour would be greater than that of the discourse itself, for the sake of which they were introduced. An accurate discussion, therefore, of these particulars may perhaps be undertaken by us hereafter, if convenient leisure should fall to our lot.

When therefore each of the natures necessary to a joint fabrication of time had obtained a local motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order; that according to the oblique revolution of the circle of *difference*, which moves in subjection to the circle of *sameness*, these orbs should, by their revolution, partly form a more ample and partly a

* Venus.

more contracted circle; and that the orb which formed a lesser circle should revolve swifter; but that which produced a greater more flow:—but that in consequence of the motion of the circle of *sameness*, the orbs which circulate most swiftly, comprehending other orbs as they revolve, should themselves appear to be comprehended by the revolution of the more flow. But all these circles revolve with a spiral motion, because they are agitated at one and the same time in two contrary directions: and in consequence of this, the sphere endued with the slowest revolution is nearest to that to which its course is retrograde, and which is the swiftest of all. And that these circles might possess a certain apparent measure of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the motion of the eight circulations might be conspicuous, the divinity enkindled a light which we now denominate the Sun, in the second revolution from the earth; that the heavens might become eminently apparent to all things, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical information from the revolution of a nature similar and the same. From hence therefore night and day arose; and through these revolving bodies, the period of one most wise circulation was produced.

And *month* indeed was generated, when the moon having run through her circle passed into conjunction with the sun. But *year*, when the sun had completely wandered round his orb;—but as to the periods of the other stars, they are not understood except by a very few of mankind; nor do the multitude distinguish them by any peculiar appellation; nor do they measure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpose.

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Hence

Hence it may be said, they are ignorant that the wanderings of these bodies are in reality time ; as these wanderings are endued with an infinite multitude, and an admirable variety of motions. But it is easy to conceive, that a perfect number of time will then accomplish a perfect year, when the eight circulations, concurring in their courses with each other, become bounded by the same extremity ; being at the same time measured by the circle subsisting according to sameness. But the stars, whose revolutions are attended with a procession through the heavens, were generated, that the whole of this visible animal the universe might become most similar to the most perfect intelligible animal from an imitation of a perpetual nature. And indeed the artificer fabricated other forms, as far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of the world's exemplar.

But as the universe did not yet contain all animals in its capacious receptacle, in this respect it was dissimilar to its exemplar. Its artificer therefore supplied this defect by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm. Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived by cogitation in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain. But these ideas are four : One, the celestial genus of gods ; another, winged and air-wandering ; a third, the aquatic form ; and a fourth, that which is pedestrial and terrene. The idea therefore of that which is divine, or the inerratic sphere, he for the most part fabricated from fire, that it might be most splendid and beautiful to behold. And as he meant to assimilate it to the universe, he rendered it circular ; placed it in the wisdom of the best nature ; ordered it to become the attendant of that which is best, and gave it a
circular

circular distribution about the heavens, that it might be a *true world*, adorned with a fair variety in its every part. But he adapted to each of the divine bodies two motions: one by which they might revolve in *same* according to *same*, by always cogitating the same things in themselves about *same*; the other through which they might be led with an advancing motion from the dominion of the *same* and *similar* circulation. He likewise rendered them immovable and stable as to the other five motions, that each of them might become in an eminent degree the best. And on this account such of the stars as are inerratic were generated, which are divine animals; and in consequence of this, always abide revolving in that which is *same*. But the stars which both revolve and at the same time wander in the manner we have described above, were produced next to these. But he fabricated the earth the common nourisher of our existence; which being conglobed about the pole extended through the universe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, and is the first and most ancient of the gods which are generated within the heavens. But the harmonious progressions of these divinities, their concursions with each other, the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles, how they are situated with relation to each other in their conjunctions and oppositions, whether direct among themselves or retrograde, at what times and in what manner they become concealed, and again emerging to our view, cause terror, and exhibit tokens of future events to such as are able to discover their signification—of all this to attempt an explanation, without inspecting the resemblances of these divinities, would be a fruitless employment. But of this enough; and let this

be the end of our discourse concerning the nature of the visible and generated gods.

But to speak concerning the other dæmons, and to know their generation, is a task beyond our ability to perform. It is therefore necessary in this case to believe in ancient men; who being the progeny of the gods, as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe in the children of the gods, though they should speak without probable and necessary arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that complying with the law we should assent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of these gods is to be described.

That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth. That from hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all such as we know are called the brethren of these descended. And lastly, others which are reported to be the progeny of these. When therefore all such gods as visibly revolve, and all such as become apparent when they please, were generated, the Artificer of the universe thus addressed them: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed every thing which is bound is dissoluble: but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and well composed, is the property of an evil nature. Hence, so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble: yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality
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of death; my will being a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn therefore what I now say to you indicating my desire. Three genera of mortals yet remain to be produced. Without the generation of these, therefore, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it may become sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated, and participate of life through me, they will become equal to the gods. That mortal natures therefore may subsist, and that the universe may be truly all, convert yourselves, according to your nature, to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. And whatever among these is of such a nature as to deserve the same appellation with immortals, which obtains sovereignty in these, and willingly pursues justice, and reverences you—of this I myself will deliver the seed and beginning: it is your business to accomplish the rest; to weave together the mortal and immortal nature; by this means fabricating and generating animals, causing them to increase by supplying them with aliment, and receiving them back again when dissolved by corruption.”

Thus spoke the demiurgus; and again into the same crater, in which mingling he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture: in a certain respect indeed after the same manner, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same, but deficient from the first in a second and third degree. And having thus composed the universe, he distributed souls equal in number to the stars, inserting each in each:
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and causing them to ascend as into a vehicle, he pointed out to them the nature of the universe, and announced to them the laws of fate; shewing them that the first generation orderly distributed to all was one, lest any particular soul should be allotted a less portion of generation than another. But when he had disseminated them through the several instruments of time adapted to each, he declared to them it was necessary that an animal the most religious of all others should make its appearance. But as the human nature is two-fold, he shewed them that the more excellent kind was that which would afterwards be called man. And as souls are from necessity engrafted in bodies, and as something accedes to and something departs from such bodies, he declared to them that in the first place one innate sense produced by violent passions was necessary to all; and in the second place, love mingled with pleasure and grief. That after these, fear and anger were necessary, with whatever else is either consequent to these, or naturally discordant from a contrary nature. That such souls as subdue these would live justly, but such as are vanquished by them unjustly. And again, that he who lived well during the proper time of his life, should, again returning to the habitation of his kindred star, enjoy a blessed life. But that he whose conduct was depraved, should in his second generation be changed into the nature of a woman. * That both these, at the expiration of a thousand years, should return to the allotment and choice of a second life; each soul receiving a life agreeable to its choice. That in this election the human soul should pass into the life of a brute: * and that in case the inclination

* The translation of the part between the two stars is omitted by Ficinus.

to evil should not even then cease, but the defilement of vice remain according to a similitude of the mode of generation, then the soul should be changed into the nature of a brute correspondent to its disposition. And that it should not be freed from the allotment of labours, till following the revolution of that *same* and *similar* nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent affections, tumultuous and irrational, adhering to it afterwards from fire, water, air, and earth, and returns to the first and best disposition of its nature.

When he had instructed souls in all these particulars, that he might be in no respect the cause of the future evil of each, he disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others into the remaining different instruments of time. But after this semination, he delivered to the junior gods the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever else remained necessary to the human soul; and gave them dominion over every thing consequent to their fabrications. He likewise commanded them to govern as much as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself. At the same time he who orderly disposed all these particulars remained in his own accustomed abiding habit. But in consequence of his abiding, as soon as his children understood the order of their father, they immediately became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts together, not with the same indissoluble bonds which they themselves participated, but
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gave them a tenacious adherence from thick set nails, invisible through their smallness; fabricating the body of each, one from the composition of all; and binding the circulations of the immortal soul in the influxive and effluxive nature of body.

But these circulations being merged in a profound river, neither govern nor are governed, but hurry and are hurried along with violence: in consequence of which, the whole animal is indeed moved, yet in a disorderly manner; since from every kind of motion its progression is fortuitous and irrational. For it proceeds backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and wanders every way according to the six differences of place. For though the inundating and effluxive waves pour along with impetuous abundance, which afford nutrition to the animal, yet a still greater tumult and agitation is produced through the passions arising from external impulsions: and this either when the body is disturbed by the sudden incursion of external fire, or by the solidity of earth, or receives an injury from the whirling blasts of the air. For from all these, through the medium of the body, various motions are hurried along, and fall with molestation on the soul. But on this account, all these were afterwards and are even now denominated senses. And these indeed both at first and at present are the sources of an abundant and mighty motion, in conjunction with that perpetually flowing river, moving and vehemently agitating the circulations of the soul, every way hindering the revolution of the nature characterized by *sameness*, through flowing in a contrary direction, and restraining its energies by their conquering and impetuous progressions. But they agitate and tear in pieces the circulation of the nature distinguished

guished by *difference*. Hence they whirl about with every kind of revolution each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the mediums and conjoining bonds of the sesquitertian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios, which cannot be dissolved by any one except the artificer by whom they were bound: and besides this, they induce all the fractures and diversities of circles which it is possible to effect; so that scarcely being connected with each other, they are borne along indeed, yet in an irrational manner, at one time in a contrary, at another time in an oblique, and then again in a resupine situation. Just as if any one, in an inverted position, should fix his head on the earth and raise his feet on high; for in such a situation both the inverted person and the spectators would mutually imagine the right hand parts to be on the left, and the left to be on the right. So with respect to the circulations of the soul, the very same affections and others of a similar kind vehemently take place; and hence, when this is the case, if any thing external occurs, characterized by the nature of *same* or *different*, they denominate things the same with or different from others in a manner contrary to the truth. Hence they become false and destitute of intelligence; nor is any revolution to be found among them in such a situation which energizes with the authority of a ruler and chief.

But when certain senses, borne along externally, strike against the soul and attract the whole of its receptacle, then the circulations which are in reality in subjection appear to have dominion: and hence, in consequence of all these passions, the soul becomes insane at present, and was so from the first period of her being bound in a mortal body. However, when the river of increase and nutrition
flows

flows along with a more gentle and less abundant course, the circulations, being again restored to tranquillity, proceed in their proper path; in process of time become more regular and steady, and pass into a figure accommodated to their nature. Hence, in this case the revolutions of each of the circles becoming direct, and calling both *same* and *different* by their proper appellations, they render the being by whom they are possessed prudent and wise. If any one therefore receives a proper education in conjunction with convenient nutriment, such a one will possess perfect health, and will every way avoid the most grievous disease. But when this is neglected by any individual, such a one proceeding along the path of life in a lame condition, will again pass into Hades imperfect and destitute of intelligence. These are particulars, however, which happen posterior to the production of mankind. But it is our business at present to discourse more accurately concerning the first composition of our nature and to shew, in the first place, from assimilative reasons, through what cause and providence of the gods the several members of the body were accommodated to the several employments of the soul.

In the first place, then, the gods bound the two divine circulations of the soul in a spherical body, in imitation of the circular figure of the universe: and this part of the body is what we now denominate the head; a most divine member, and the sovereign ruler of our whole corporeal composition, through the decree of the gods, who considered that it would participate of all possible motions. Lest therefore the head, by rolling like a cylinder on the earth, which is distinguished by all-various heights and depths, should be unable to pass over its inequalities and asperities,

asperities, the gods subjected this upright figure of the body, as a pliable vehicle to the head. Hence, in consequence of the body being endued with length, they extended four naturally flexible members; divinity fabricating a progression through which the body might apprehend any object, might receive a stable support, and might be able to pass through every place, bearing on high the head, our most divine and sacred habitation. For this purpose therefore they furnished us with legs and hands. And as the gods considered that the anterior parts are more honourable and adapted to rule than the posterior, they gave us a motion for the most part consisting of a forward progression. Beside this, it was requisite that the anterior parts of our body should be divided from each other, and be dissimilar: and on this account they first placed about the cavity of the head the face; fixed in it organs subservient to all the providential energies of the soul, and determined that the natural government of man should consist in this anterior part of the body. But they fabricated the luciferous eyes the first of all the corporeal organs, binding them in the face on the following account. Of that fire which does not burn, indeed, but which comprehends our proper diurnal light, the gods fabricated the orbs of the eyes. For the fire contained within our body, and which is the genuine brother of this diurnal fire, they caused to flow through the eyes with smoothness, and collected abundance, condensed indeed in the whole, but especially in the middle of these lucid orbs; so as that the more dense fire might remain concealed within the recesses of the eyes, and the pure might find a passage and fly away. When therefore the diurnal light subsists about the effluxive river of the sight, then similar concurring and

being mingled with similar, one domestic body is constituted according to the direct procession of the eyes; and this too in that part where the internally emitted light resists that which is externally adduced. But the whole becoming similarly passive through similitude, when it either touches any thing else or is it itself touched by another, then the motion produced by this contact diffusing itself through the whole body of the eye, as far as to the soul, causes that sensation which we denominate sight. But when this kindred fire departs into night, the conjunction being dissolved, sight loses its power. For in this case, proceeding into a dissimilar nature it is changed, and becomes extinct: since it is by no means connate with the proximate surrounding air, which is naturally destitute of fire. Hence it ceases from seeing; and besides this, becomes the introducer of sleep. For the gods fabricated the nature of the eye-lids as a salutary guardian of the sight; that these being compressed, the inward fiery power of the eye might be restrained from any further emission: that besides this, they might sprinkle over and equalize the eye's internal motions; and that when equalized rest might be produced.

But when much rest takes place, sleep attended with few dreams is produced. On the contrary, if certain more vehement motions remain, then such as is the nature of these relics, and the places in which they were produced, such and so many will be the similar phantasms within, and of which we shall possess the remembrance when we are externally roused. But with respect to the images produced in mirrors, and all such things as are visible in that which is apparent and smooth, there is nothing in these difficult of solution. For from the communication of the
external

external and internal fire with each other, and from that fire which subsists about the smooth body, and becomes abundantly multiplied, all such appearances are necessarily produced, as take place when the fire of the eyes mingles itself with the fire diffused about the smooth and splendid object of vision. But the right hand parts appear to be the left, because a contact takes place between the contrary parts of the sight and the contrary parts of the object, different from the accustomed mode of perception. On the contrary, the right hand parts appear on the right, and the left hand on the left, when the mingled light leaps forth, together with that with which it is mingled. When the smoothness of the mirrors receives this here and there in an elevated manner, it repels the right hand part of the sight to the left of the mirror, and the left to the right. But if the mirror is turned according to the length of the countenance, it causes the whole face to appear resupine, by repelling the downward part of the splendour towards the upper part, and again the upper towards the downward part. All such particulars as these, therefore, are but causal assistants, which the divinity employed as subservient to rendering the idea of that which is best, as far as possible complete. *But the multitude are of opinion that these are not causal assistants, but the real causes of all things; I mean such things as are capable of giving cold and heat, rarity and density, with whatever produces such like affections, but is incapable of possessing reason and intellect.* For soul must be considered as the only thing among beings by which intellect can be possessed. And this is invisible. But fire and water, air and earth, are all of them visible bodies. *But it is necessary that the lover of intellect and science should explore the first causes of prudent nature: and that he should consider*

such things as are moved by others, and at the same time necessarily give motion to other things, as nothing more than secondary causes. Hence it is proper that we should speak concerning both kinds of causes; separately of such as fabricate things beautiful and good in conjunction with intellect, and of such as being left destitute of wisdom produce each particular in a casual and disorderly manner. Concerning the second causes of the eyes, therefore, conferring to the possession of the power which they are now allotted, what has been already said is sufficient.

But the greatest employment of the eyes, with respect to the use for which they were bestowed on us by the divinity, we shall now endeavour to explain. For in my opinion the sight is the cause of the greatest emolument to us on the present occasion; since what we are now discoursing concerning the universe, could never have been discovered without surveying the stars, the sun, and the heavens. But now, from beholding day and night, we are able to determine by arithmetical calculation the periods of months and years; to acquire a conception of time, and to scrutinize the nature of the universe. But from all this we obtain the possession of philosophy; a greater good than which never was nor ever will be bestowed by the gods on the mortal race. And this is what I call the greatest benefit of the eyes. But why should I celebrate other particulars of less consequence, which he who is not a philosopher, since destitute of sight, may attempt to explore, but will explore in vain? By us indeed it is asserted that divinity bestowed sight on us for this purpose, that on surveying the circulations of intellect in the heavens we may properly employ the revolutions of our cogitation, which are allied to their circulations; and may recall the
tumultuous

tumultuous motions of our discursive energies, to the orderly processions of their intellectual periods. That besides this, by learning these and participating right reason according to nature, and imitating the revolutions of divinity which are entirely inerratic, we may give stability to the wanderings of our cogitative energy.

But concerning voice and hearing, we again assert that they were bestowed on us by the gods on the same account. For the acquisition of speech pertains to these, and is of the greatest advantage to their possession. And whatever utility musical voice brings to the sense of hearing, was bestowed for the sake of harmony. But harmony, possessing motions allied to the revolutions of our soul, is useful to the man who employs the Muses in conjunction with intellect; but is of no advantage to irrational pleasure, though it appears to be so at present. Indeed it was given us by the Muses for the purpose of reducing the dissonant circulation of the soul, to an order and symphony accommodated to its nature. Rythm too was bestowed on us for this purpose; that we might properly harmonize that habit in our nature, which for the most part is void of measure and indigent of the Graces. And thus far, a few particulars excepted, have we shewn the fabrications of intellect. But it is likewise requisite to give a place in our discourse to the productions of necessity. For the generation of the world being mingled, it was produced from the composition of intellect and necessity. But intellect ruling over necessity persuaded it to lead the most part of generated natures to that which is best; and hence necessity, being vanquished by wise persuasion, from these two as principles the world arose. If then any one truly asserts that the universe was generated according to these,

he should also mingle with it the form of an erratic cause, which it is naturally adapted to receive. In this manner then let us return; and assuming a convenient principle of these, again discourse concerning them as about the former particulars, commencing our discussion from their origin. Let us therefore speculate the nature and passions of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens. No one indeed as yet has unfolded the generation of these: but we speak of fire, and the other elements, as if the nature of each was known; and place them as the principles of the universe, when at the same time they ought not to be assimilated to elements, not even as in the rank of syllables, by men who in the smallest degree merit the appellation of wise. But now we shall not speak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things. And this for no other reason than the difficulty of delivering what appears to be the truth about these in the present mode of disputation. Neither therefore is it proper that you should expect me to speak, nor that I should persuade myself into a belief of being able to speak, with perfect rectitude on so difficult a subject. But it is proper, as I told you in the beginning of this discourse, that preserving all the force of assimilative reasons, we should endeavour to deliver that which is not less assimilative of the truth than the doctrine of others; and that in this manner we should discourse from the beginning concerning particulars and the whole. In the first place, therefore, invoking the divinity who is the saviour of discourse, and beseeching him to lead us from an absurd and unusual exposition to an assimilative doctrine, we shall again begin to speak.

But it is necessary that the beginning of our present disputation should receive a more ample division than the former one. For then we made a distribution into two species: but now a third sort must be added. In the former disputation two species were sufficient; one of which was established as the form of an exemplar, intelligible and always subsisting according to *same*; but the other was nothing more than the imitation of the paradigm, generated and visible. But we did not then distribute a third, because we considered these two as sufficient. However, now reason seems to urge as a thing necessary, that we should endeavour to render apparent by our discourse the species which subsists as difficult and obscure. What apprehension then can we form of its power and nature? Shall we say that it is in an eminent degree the receptacle and as it were nurse of all generation? Such an assertion will indeed be true; but it is requisite to speak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally because it will be necessary to doubt previous to its discussion concerning fire and the rest of the elements, why any one of these should be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth; or why any one should be denominated some definite particular rather than all. For it is indeed difficult to frame any certain opinion, or to employ any stable discourse about such intricate forms. After what manner then, and in what respect, and what of an assimilative nature, shall we assert in this dubious enquiry?

In the first place then, that which we now denominate water, when it loses its fluidity by concretion, appears to become stones and earth; but when liquefied and dispersed it forms vapour and air. Likewise air when burnt up be-

comes fire. And on the contrary fire becoming concrete and extinct passes again into the form of air. And again, air becoming collected and condensed produces mists and clouds. But from these still more compressed rain descends. And from water again earth and stones derive their subsistence. And thus, as it appears, they mutually confer on each other generation in a certain circular progression. But since these never appear to be the same, who without being covered with confusion can confidently assert that any one of these is this rather than that? Certainly no one. Hence it will be far the most safe method of proceeding to speak about them as follows: That the nature which we always perceive becoming something different at different times, such for instance as fire, is not fire absolutely, but something fiery. And again, that the nature which we denominate water is not absolutely so, but such like, or watery; and that it is not at any time any thing else, as if it possessed any stability of essence. And lastly, that they cannot be distinguished by any word, such as we are accustomed to employ, when endeavouring to shew that any particular is either this thing or that. For they fly away, incapable of sustaining the affirmation which asserts them to be *this thing, of such a nature, belonging to this*; and all such appellations as would evince them to be something permanent and real. Hence we ought not to denominate any one of these either this, or that; but something such-like, and a perpetually-revolving similitude. Thus we should assert that fire is every where *such-like*, and should speak in the same manner of every thing endued with generation. But we should alone distinguish by the appellations of this, or that, the subject in which each of these appears to be generated, and again to suffer a dissolution.

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But this subject is by no means to be denominated *such-like*, as for instance hot or white, or any quality belonging to contraries, or any thing which contraries compose. However, let us endeavour to explain more clearly what we mean to express. For if any one, fashioning all possible figures from gold, should without ceasing transform each figure into all; and if, during this operation, some one who is present should, pointing to one of these figures, enquire what it is; it might most safely with respect to truth be replied, that it was gold: but he who should assert that it is a triangle, or any other of the figures which are continually generated, and which ought by no means to be denominated beings, would fall from the truth in the midst of his assertion. But we ought to be content with that answer as most safe, which denominates it *such-like*, or of such a determinate nature.

In the same manner we should speak concerning that nature which is the general receptacle of all bodies. For it never departs from its own proper power, but perpetually receives all things; and never contracts any form in any respect similar to any one of the intromitted forms. It lies indeed in subjection to the forming power of every nature, becoming agitated and figured through the supernally intromitted forms: and through these it exhibits a different appearance at different times. But the forms which enter and depart from this receptacle are the imitations of perpetually true beings; and are figured by them in a manner wonderful and difficult to describe, as we shall afterwards relate. At present, however, it is necessary to consider three sorts of things; one, that which is generated; another, that in which it is generated; and the third, that from which the generated nature derives

its similitude. But it is proper to assimilate that which receives to a mother; that from whence it receives to a father; and the nature situated between these to an offspring. It is likewise necessary to understand that the figured nature can never become distinguished with an all-possible variety of forms, unless its receptacle is well prepared for the purpose, and is destitute of all those forms which it is about to receive. For if it were similar to any one of the supernally intromitted forms, when it received a nature contrary to that to which it is similar, or any form whatever, it would very imperfectly express its similitude, while at the same time it exhibited the very same appearance with the supernally acceding form. And hence it is necessary that the receptacle which is destined to receive all possible forms, should itself be destitute of every form. Just as those who are about to prepare sweet-smelling unguents, so dispose a certain humid matter as the subject of the ensuing odour, that it may possess no peculiar smell of its own; and as those who wish to impress certain figures in a soft and yielding matter, are careful that it may not appear impeded with any previous figure, but render it as much as possible exquisitely smooth. In the same manner it is necessary that the subject which is so often destined to receive in a beautiful manner, through the whole of itself, resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally destitute of all that it receives. Hence we should not denominate this mother and receptacle of that which is generated, visible and every way sensible, either earth, or air, or fire, or water; nor again, any one of the composites from these, or any thing from which these are generated: but we should call it a certain invisible species, and a formless universal recipient, which in the
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most dubious and scarcely explicable manner participates of an intelligible nature. Of itself, indeed, we cannot speak without deception; but so far as it is possible to apprehend its nature from what has been previously said, we may with the greatest rectitude assert as follows: that fire appears to be its inflamed part; water its moist part; and that earth and air are its parts in a similar manner, so far as it receives the imitations of these. But we ought rather thus to enquire about these, distinguishing and separating them by a reasoning process; whether there is a certain fire, itself subsisting in itself; and whether this is the case with all such particulars, which we perpetually assert to subsist from themselves; or whether such things alone as are the objects of sight, and which are perceived through the ministry of the body, possess being and truth; so that nothing besides these has in any respect any subsistence; that we in vain assert there is a certain intelligible form of each of these; and that all such forms are nothing but words. Indeed, whether such a doctrine is true or not, must not be asserted rashly and without examination: nor is it proper to add to the present disputation, which is naturally prolix, any thing tedious and foreign from the purpose. But if any definition can be employed in this affair, comprehending things of great moment in a short compass, such a one will be very opportune to our present design. In this manner then I shall relate my opinion on the subject.

If intellect and true opinion are two kinds of things, it is every way necessary that there should be forms, subsisting by themselves, which are not the objects of sense, but which are apprehended by intelligence alone. But if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect,

intellect, every thing which is perceived through body is to be considered as possessing the most certain and stable nature. But in reality these ought to be denominated two distinct things, because they are generated separate from each other, and are dissimilar. For the one of these subsists in us through learning, but the other through persuasion. And the one is indeed always attended with true reason, but the other is irrational. The one is not to be moved by persuasion; the other on the contrary is subject to this mutation. And lastly, of true opinion every man participates; but of intellect all the gods; and but a few of mankind. Such then being the case, we must confess that the form which subsists according to *same*, is unbegotten and without decay; neither receiving any thing into itself externally, nor itself proceeding into any other nature. That it is invisible, and imperceptible by sense; and that this is the proper object of intellectual speculation. But the form which is synonymous and similar to this, must be considered as sensible, generated, always in agitation, and generated in a certain place, from which it again recedes, hastening to dissolution; and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. But the third nature is that of place; which never receives corruption, but affords a seat to all generated forms. This indeed is tangible without tangent perception; and is scarcely by a certain spurious reasoning the object of belief. Besides, when we attempt to behold this nature, we perceive nothing but the delusions of dreams, and assert that every being must necessarily be somewhere, and be situated in a certain place: and we by no means think that any thing can exist, which is neither in the earth nor comprehended by the heavens. All these, and all such

opinions

opinions as are the sisters of these, we are not able to separate from our cogitation of that which subsists about a vigilant and true nature: and this because we cannot rouse ourselves from this fallacious and dreaming energy, and perceive that in reality it is proper for an image to subsist in something different from itself; since that in which it is generated has no proper resemblance of its own, but perpetually exhibits the phantasm of something else; and can only participate of essence in a certain imperfect degree, or it would become in every respect a perfect non-entity. But to true being, true reason bears an assisting testimony, through the accuracy of its decisions; affirming, that as long as two things are different from each other, each can never become so situated in either, as to produce at the same time one thing, and two things essentially the same.

This, then, is summarily my opinion:—that, prior to the generation of the universe, these three things subsisted in a triple respect, *viz.* being, place, and generation. And that the nurse of generation, fiery and moist, receiving the forms of earth and air, and suffering such other passions as are the attendants of these, appeared of an all-various nature to the view. But because it was neither filled with similar powers, nor with such as are equally balanced, it possessed no part in equilibrium; but through the perfect inequality of its libration it became agitated by these passions, and again through its motion gave agitation to these. But the parts in motion being separated from each other, were impetuously hurried along in different directions, similar to the agitations and ventilations which take place in the operations of textorial instruments, and such as are employed in the purgation of corn. For in
this

this case the dense and the heavy parts are borne along one way, and the rare and the light are impelled into a different seat. In the same manner, these four natures being agitated by their receptacle tumultuously moving like the instrument of corn, such as were dissimilar became far separated from each other, and such as were similar became again amicably united. And hence they passed into different seats before the universe was from the mixture of these distributed into beautiful order; but at the same time they all subsisted irrationally, and without the limitation of measure.

But when the artificer began to adorn the universe, he first of all figured with forms and numbers fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of the true elements, but were in every respect so constituted, as it becomes any thing to be from which deity is absent. But we should always persevere in asserting that divinity rendered them as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, when they were in a state of existence opposite to such a condition. I shall now therefore endeavour to unfold to you the distribution and generation of these by a discourse unusual indeed, but to you who have trod in all the paths of erudition, through which demonstration is necessarily obtained, perspicuous and plain. In the first place, then, that fire and earth, water and air are bodies, is perspicuous to every one. But every species of body possesses profundity; and it is necessary that every depth should comprehend the nature of a plane. Again, the rectitude of the base of a plane is composed from triangles. But all triangles originate from two species; one of which possesses one right angle, and the other two acute angles. And one of these contains one right angle distributed with equal sides; but in the other unequal angles are distributed

buted with unequal sides. Hence, proceeding according to assimilative reasons, conjoined with necessity, we shall establish a principle of this kind, as the origin of fire and all other bodies. The supernal principles of these indeed are known to divinity, and to the man who is in friendship with divinity.

But it is necessary to relate by what means four most beautiful bodies were produced; dissimilar indeed to each other, but which are able from certain dissolutions into each other to become the sources of each other's generation. For if we are able to accomplish this, we shall obtain the truth concerning the generation of earth and fire, and of those elements which are situated according to analogy between these. And then we shall not assent to any one who should assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which subsists according to one kind. We must endeavour therefore to harmonize the four sorts of bodies excelling in beauty; and to evince by this means that we sufficiently comprehend the nature of these. Of the two triangles indeed the isosceles is allotted one nature, but the oblong or scalene is characterized by infinity. We ought therefore to choose the most beautiful among infinities, if we wish to commence our investigation in a becoming manner. And if any one shall assert that he has chosen something more beautiful for the composition of these, we shall suffer his opinion to prevail; considering him not as an enemy but as a friend. Of many triangles therefore we shall establish one as most beautiful (neglecting the rest); I mean the equilateral, which is composed from three parts of a scalene triangle. To assign the reason of this would indeed require a prolix dissertation; but a pleasant reward will remain for him who by
a diligent

a diligent investigation finds this to be the case. We have therefore selected two triangles out of many, from which the body of fire and of the other elements is fabricated; one of which is isosceles, but the other is that which always has its longer side triply greater in power than the shorter.

But that which we formerly asserted without sufficient security, it is now necessary more accurately to define. For it appeared to us, though improperly, that all these four natures were mutually generated from each other: but they are in reality generated from the triangles which we have just described:—three of them, indeed, from one triangle containing unequal sides: but the fourth alone is aptly composed from the isosceles triangle. All of them, therefore, are not able, by a dissolution into each other, to produce from many small things a mighty few, or the contrary. This indeed can be effected by three of them. For as all the three are naturally generated from one triangle, when the greater parts are dissolved many small parts are composed from them, receiving figures accommodated to their natures. And again, when the many small parts being scattered according to triangles produce a number of one bulk, they complete one mighty species of a different kind. And thus much may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

It now remains that we should speak concerning the quality of each of their kinds, and relate from what concurring numbers they were collected together. The first species indeed is that which was composed from the fewest triangles, and is the element of that which has its longer side twice the length of the shorter side, which it subtends. But two of these being mutually placed according to the
diameter,

diameter, and this happening thrice, the diameters and the shorter sides passing into the same, as into a centre, hence one equilateral triangle is produced from six triangles. But four equilateral triangles being composed, according to three plane angles, form one solid angle; and this the most obtuse of all the plane angles from which it is composed. Hence, from four triangles of this kind receiving their completion, the first solid species was constituted, distributive of the whole circumference into equal and similar parts. But the second was formed from the same triangles, but at the same time constituted according to eight equilateral triangles, which produced one solid angle from four planes: so that the second body received its completion from the composition of six triangles of this kind. And the third arose from the conjunction of twice sixty elements, and twelve solid angles, each of which having twenty equilateral bases, is contained by five plane equilateral triangles. In this manner, then, the other element generated these. But the isosceles triangle, being constituted according to four triangles, and collecting the right angles at the centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle, generated the nature of the fourth element. But six such as these being conjoined, produced eight solid angles, each of which is harmonized together, according to three plane right angles. Hence the figure of the body thus composed is cubical, obtaining six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There is also a certain fifth composition, which divinity employed in the fabrication of the universe, and when he delineated those forms the contemplation of which may justly lead some one to doubt whether it is proper to assert that the number of worlds is infinite or finite. Though indeed to affirm that there are infinite

finite worlds, can only be the dogma of one who is ignorant about things in which it is highly proper to be skilful. But it may with much less absurdity be doubted whether there is in reality but one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion, indeed, which is founded on assimilative reasons, there is but one world: though some one, regarding in a certain respect other particulars, may be of a different opinion. But it is proper to dismiss any further speculations of this kind.

Let us now therefore distribute the four sorts of things which we have generated into fire, earth, water, and air. And to earth indeed let us assign a cubical form: for earth is the most immovable of all these four kinds, and the most plastic, or adapted to formation, of all corporeal natures. But it is in the most eminent degree necessary that this should be the case with that which possesses the most secure and stable bases. Among the triangles, indeed, established at the beginning, such as are equilateral possess firmer bases than such as contain unequal sides. And hence, among the plane figures composed from each, it will be found that the isosceles is necessarily more stable than the equilateral, and the square than the triangle, both when considered according to parts and to the whole. On this account, by distributing this figure to the earth, we shall preserve an assimilative reason. This will be the case too by assigning to water that figure which is more difficultly movable than the other three; to fire the most easily movable form; and to air that figure which possesses a middle nature. Besides this, we should assign the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and one of a middle kind to air. And again, the most acute body to fire, the second from this to air, and the third to water. But among
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all these, it is necessary that the body, which possesses the fewest bases, should be the most easily movable: for being every way the most acute, it becomes the most penetrating and incisive of all. It is likewise the most light, because composed from the fewest parts. But that which is second to this, possesses these properties in a secondary respect; and that which ranks as the third, in a third gradation. Hence, according to right and assimilative reason, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and seed of fire. But we must assign that form which is second according to generation to air; and that which is the third to water. And it is necessary to consider all these such, with respect to their smallness, that no one of the several sorts can be discerned by us, on account of its parvitude; but that, when many of them are collected together, their bulks become the objects of our perception. And besides this, all these were accurately absolved and harmonized by the divinity, both as to their multitude, motions, and powers, in such a proportion as the willing and persuaded nature of necessity was able to receive.

But among all those natures whose kinds we have above related, the following circumstances appear to take place. And first with respect to earth: when it meets with fire, becoming dissolved by its acuteness, it is borne along; and remains in this dissolved state either in fire, or in the bulk of air, or in that of water—till its parts, associating themselves together, and again becoming mutually harmonized, produce again a body of earth; for it can never pass into another form. But water, when it is distributed into parts by fire or air, when its parts become again collected, produces one body of fire, but two bodies of air. And the sections of air form from one dissolved part two bodies of

fire. Again, when fire receives into itself either air or water, or a certain earth, and being itself small, is moved in many natures; and besides this, when through opposing being vanquished by the agitated forms, it becomes broken in pieces, then two bodies of fire coalesce into one form of air. And when air becomes vanquished and separated into parts, then from two wholes and a half one whole form of water is produced. But again, let us consider this matter as follows: When any one of the other forms becoming invested by fire, is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, then passing into the nature of fire, it suffers no further discription. For no species is ever able to produce mutation or passivity, or any kind of alteration, in that which is similar and the same with itself: but as long as it passes into something else, and the more imbecil contends with the more powerful, it will not cease to be dissolved.

Again, when the lesser are comprehended in the greater many, and the few being lacerated are extinguished, if they are willing to pass into the idea of the conquering nature, they cease to be extinguished, and air becomes generated from fire, and water from air. But if when this transition is accomplished, the composite opposes any of the other species, the agitated parts will not cease to be dissolved, till on account of their dissoluble subsistence being every way impelled, they fly to their kindred nature; or being vanquished, and becoming one from many, similar to their vanquisher, they abide with the victor in amicable conjunction. But in consequence of these passions, they all of them mutually change the receptacles which they once possessed. For the multitude of each kind is distinguished, according to its proper place, through the motion
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of its recipient seat. But such as become dissimilar to each other, are borne along through the agitation to the place of the natures to which they are similar. Such bodies therefore as are unmixed, and the first, are generated from such causes as these. But that other genera are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each element; which not only from the first produces a triangle, together with magnitude, but also such things as are greater and less: and this so many in number as there are different kinds, in the forms themselves. And hence, these being mingled in themselves and with each other, produce an infinite variety; which it is proper he should contemplate who is about to employ assimilative reasons in the investigation of nature. He therefore who does not apprehend in what manner and in conjunction with what particulars the motion and composition of these take place, will find many impediments in the remaining part of this disputation. And these indeed we have already partly discussed; but a part still remains for our investigation.

And in the first place, motion is by no means willing to reside in smoothness: for it is difficult or rather impossible that a thing in motion should subsist without a mover, or a mover without that which is in motion. Hence it is impossible that these should be at any time equable and smooth. And in consequence of this, we should always place an abiding nature in smoothness, and motion in that which is unequal and rough. Inequality indeed is the cause of roughness: and we have already treated concerning the generation of inequality. But we have by no means explained how the several sorts being undistributed according to their kinds, cease to be moved and borne along through each other. This therefore must be the

subject of our present discussion. The circulation then of the universe, since it comprehends the different sorts of things in its circumference, being of a circular form, and naturally desiring to pass into union with itself, compresses all things within its spacious receptacle, and does not suffer a void place any where to subsist. On this account, fire in the most eminent degree penetrates through all things : and air next to this, ranking as the second to fire, on account of the subtilty and tenuity of its parts. And the same reasoning must be extended to the other elements, which are posterior to these. For such as are composed from the greatest parts leave also the greatest vacuity in their composition ; but on the contrary, such as are the smallest leave the least vacuity. But the coalition of compression thrusts the small parts into the void spaces of the large ; and on this account, the small parts being placed with the large, and the former separating the latter, but the larger being mingled with the smaller, all of them are borne upwards and downwards to their respective places of abode. For each, upon changing its magnitude, changes also its situation. Hence, through these causes the generation of a nature contrary to smoothness being always preserved, affords a perpetual motion of these, both at present and in all future periods of time.

But in the next place, it is necessary to understand that there are many kinds of fire : as for instance, flame, and that which is enkindled from flame ; which burns, indeed, but exhibits no light to the eyes—and which, when the flame is extinguished, abides in the ignited nature. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is most pure, which is denominated æther ; but another most turbulent, and at the same time obscure and dark ; and after this
another

another nameless kind is produced, through the inequality of the triangles. But with respect to water, it is in the first place twofold; one kind of which is humid, but the other fusile. The humid, therefore, through its participating such parts as are small and unequal, becomes movable, both from itself and another, through inequality and the idea of its figure. But that which is composed from large and smooth parts is more stable than this kind of water, and coalesces into a heavy body through smoothness and equality of parts. But through fire entering into and dissolving its composition, in consequence of losing its equability and smoothness, it participates more of a movable nature. Hence becoming easily agile, driven about by the proximate air, and extended over the earth, it liquefies, which is denominated a purification of bulk, and falls upon the earth, which is called a defluxion. Again, fire flying upwards from hence, since it does not depart into a vacuum, the proximate air being agitated impels the moist bulk as yet movable into the seats of fire, with which at the same time it mingles itself. But when the bulk becomes collectively thrust downwards, and again receives equability and smoothness of parts, then * fire the artificer of inequality departing, the whole mass passes into a sameness with itself. And this departure of fire we denominate refrigeration: but the coalition which takes place when fire is absent, we call a concretion, and cold rigidity. But among all those which we denominate fusile waters, that which becoming most dense from the most attenuated and equable parts, is of a uniform kind, and participates a splendid and yellow colour, is that most ho-

* Instead of οὐτις, in this part read ἀτις.

noured and valuable possession gold, which is usually impelled through a rock. And a branch of gold, on account of its density most hard and black, is called a diamond. But that which contains parts proximate to gold, which possesses more than one species, surpasses gold in density, and participates but a small and attenuated part of earth, so that it becomes of a harder nature, but from its internally possessing great intervals is lighter;—this is one kind of splendid and concrete waters, and is denominated brass. But when an earthly nature, being mingled with this, is through antiquity separated from other parts of the brass, and becomes of itself conspicuous, it is then denominated rust. In a similar manner other particulars of this nature may be investigated without much labour by the assistance of assimilative reasons. And if any one for the sake of relaxation, omitting for a while the speculation of eternal beings, should pursue the assimilative arguments concerning generation, and should by this means possess a pleasure unattended with repentance, such a one will establish for himself in life a moderate and prudent diversion.

This being admitted, let us run over the assimilative reasons concerning the particulars which yet remain for discussion. When such water then as is attenuated and moist is mingled with fire (being denominated moist through its motion and rolling progression on the earth, and likewise soft, because its bases being less stable than those of earth easily yield to impulsion), this, when separated from fire and deserted by air, becomes more equable, and through the departure of these is compelled into itself: and being thus collected, if it suffers this alteration above the earth, it becomes hail; but if upon the earth, ice; which then takes place in consequence of extreme
congelation.

congelation. But when it is less congealed, if this happens above the earth, it becomes snow: but when upon the earth, and this from collected dew, it then becomes frost. But when many species of water are mingled with each other, the whole kind, which is strained from the earth through plants, is called moisture or liquor. But these liquors being dissimilar on account of their mixtures, exhibit many other nameless kinds: but four, which are of a fiery species, and which become in an eminent degree diaphanous, are allotted appellations. And that which heats the soul in conjunction with the body is called wine. But that which is smooth, and segregative of the sight, and on this account splendid, refulgent, and unctuous to the view, is an oleaginous species, and is pitch, gum, oil, and other things endued with a similar power. Again, that which possesses a power of diffusing the things collected about the mouth, and this as far as nature will permit, at the same time bringing sweetness with its power, is generally denominated honey. And lastly, that which dissolves the flesh by burning, is of a frothy nature, and is secreted from all liquors, is called juice. But the species of earth strained through water, produces a stony body in the following manner. When collected water fails in mingling, it passes into the form of air; but becoming air it returns to its proper place. Hence, as there is no vacuum, it impels the proximate air; and this, if the impulsion is weighty, being poured round the bulk of earth, becomes vehemently compressed, and betakes itself to those seats from whence the new air ascended. But earth, when indissolubly associated with water, through the ministry of air composes stones: the more beautiful sort indeed being such as are resplendent from equal and plane parts, but

the deformed being of a contrary composition. But when all the moisture is hurried away by the violence of fire, and the body by this means becomes more dry, then a species of earth which is denominated fictile is produced. Sometimes, likewise, when the moisture is left behind, and the earth becomes fusile through fire, then through refrigeration a stone with a black colour is generated. But when this species of strained earth in a similar manner through mixture is deprived of much moisture, but is composed from more attenuated parts of earth, is salt and semi-concrete, and again emerges through water; then it is partly called nitre, a cathartic kind of oil, and earth, and partly salt, a substance most elegantly and legitimately adapted to the common wants of the body, and most grateful to divinity. But the parts common to both these are not soluble by water, but through some such thing are thus collected together by fire. Again, fire and air do not liquefy the bulk of earth. For since these naturally consist of parts smaller than the void spaces of earth, they permeate through its most capacious pores without any violence, and neither subject it to dissolution nor liquefaction. But the parts of water, because they are greater and pass along with violence, dissolve and liquefy the mass of earth. Hence water alone dissolves earth when violently composed, but fire alone when it is properly composed; for an entrance in this case is afforded to nothing but fire.

Again, fire alone permeates the most violent association of the parts of water; but both fire and air diffuse themselves through its more debile collection; air through its void, and fire through its triangular spaces. But nothing is capable of dissolving air when collected together by violence, except it operates according to an element: but
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when it coheres together without force, it is resolved by fire alone. Again, bodies which are so composed from water and earth, that the water compressed by force obstructs the void spaces of earth, cannot in this case afford an ingress to the water externally approaching; and in consequence of this, the water flowing round such a body suffers the whole mass to remain without liquefaction. But the parts of fire entering into the void spaces of water, as water into those of earth, and influencing water in the same manner as fire influences air, become in this case the causes of liquefaction to a common body. But these partly possess less water than earth; such as the whole genus of glass, and such stones as are denominated fusile: and partly, on the contrary, they possess more of water; such as all those bodies which coalesce into waxen and vaporific substances. And thus we have nearly exhibited all those species, which are varied by figures, communications and mutations into each other: but it is now necessary that we should endeavour to render apparent the causes through which the passions of these are produced.

In the first place, then, sense ought always to be present with discourses of this kind. But we have not yet run through the generation of flesh, and such things as pertain to flesh, together with that part of the soul which is mortal. For all these are inseparable from the passions subsisting with sense, and cannot without these passions be sufficiently explained; though indeed, even in conjunction with these, it is scarcely possible to unfold their production. We should therefore first of all establish other things; and then consider such things as are consequent to these. That in our disputation therefore the passions themselves may follow the genera in succession, let our
first

first investigations be concerning such things as pertain to body and soul. Let us then first of all enquire why fire is called hot. And the reason of this we shall be able to perceive by considering the separation and division of fire about our bodies: for that this *passion* is a certain sharpness is nearly evident to all. But we ought to consider the tenuity of its angles, the sharpness of its sides, the smallness of its parts, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes vehement and penetrating, and swiftly divides that with which it meets; calling to mind for this purpose the generation of its figure. For fire, indeed, and no other nature, separating our bodies and distributing them into small parts, produces in us that *passion* which is very properly denominated heat. But the *passion* contrary to this, though sufficiently manifest, ought not to pass without an explanation. For the moist parts of bodies larger than our humid parts, entering into our bodies, expel the smaller parts; but not being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our moisture, and cause it through equability to pass from an unequable and agitated state into one immovable and collected. But that which is collected together contrary to nature, naturally opposes such a condition, and endeavours by repulsion to recall itself into a contrary situation. In this contest and agitation a trembling and numbness takes place; and all this *passion*, together with that which produces it, is denominated cold. But we call that hard to which our flesh gives way; and soft, which yields to the pressure of our flesh. And we thus denominate them with reference to each other. But every thing yields to pressure which is established on a small base. But that which rests on triangular bases, on account of its being vehemently firm,
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is of a most resisting nature ; and, because it is dense in the highest degree, strongly repels all opposing pressure.

Again, the nature of heavy and light will become eminently apparent, when investigated together with upwards and downwards. But indeed it is by no means rightly asserted that there are naturally two certain places distant by a long interval from each other : one denominated downwards, to which all bodies tend endued with bulk, but the other upwards, to which every thing is involuntarily impelled. For the whole universe being spherical, all such things as by an equal departure from the middle become extremes, ought to become naturally extremes in a similar manner. But the middle being separated from the extremes according to the same measures, ought to be considered as in a situation just opposite to all things. Such then being the natural disposition of the world, he who places any one of the above-mentioned particulars either upwards or downwards, will justly appear by such appellations to wander from the truth. For the middle place in the universe cannot be properly called either naturally downwards or upwards, but can only be denominated that which is the middle. But that which environs is neither the middle, nor contains any parts in itself differing from each other with reference to the middle, nor does it possess any thing corresponding to an opposite direction. But to that which is every way naturally similar, how can any one with propriety attribute contrary names? For if there be any thing solid and endued with equal powers in the middle of the universe, it will never tend to any part of the extremities, through the perfect similitude which they every where possess. But if any one moves about this solid in a circle, he will often stand with his feet in opposite

site directions, and will denominate the same part of himself both upwards and downwards. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, it is not the part of a prudent man to assert that it has any place which is either upwards or downwards. But from whence these names originate, and in what things existing we transfer them from thence to the universe, it is our business at present to investigate. If any one then should be seated in that region of the world, which for the most part belongs to the nature of fire, and to which it on all sides tends, and if such a one should acquire a power of taking away the parts of fire, and of causing them to balance; or placing the parts in the scale should violently seize on the beam, and, drawing out the fire, hurl it downwards into dissimilar air—it is evident that in this case a less portion of fire would be more easily compelled than a greater. For when two things are at the same time suspended from one power, it is necessary that the less quantity should more easily, and the greater with less readiness, yield to the oppressive force. Hence the one is called heavy, and tending downwards; but the other light, and tending upwards. The same thing happens to us who inhabit this terrestrial region. For walking on the earth, and separating the terrene genera from each other, we sometimes violently hurl a fragment of earth into its dissimilar the air, and this with a motion contrary to its nature; each region at the same time retaining that to which it is allied. But the less portion being more easily impelled into a dissimilar place than the larger, first of all yields to the violence: and this we denominate light, and call the place into which it is violently hurled upwards. But the passion contrary to this we denominate heavy and downwards.

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Hence it is necessary that these should mutually differ from each other; and this through the multitude of genera obtaining contrary situations. For that which is light in one place is contrary to that which is light in a contrary situation: likewise the heavy to the heavy, the downward to the downward, and the upward to the upward. For all these will be found to be contrary, transverse, and every way different from each other. One thing however is to be understood concerning all these, that the progression of each, tending to its kindred nature, renders the proceeding body heavy, and the place to which it tends downwards. But this progression influences in a different manner such as are differently affected. And thus have I unfolded the causes of these passions.

But again, any one who beholds the cause of the *passion* of smoothness and roughness, may be able to disclose it to others. For hardness mingled with inequality produces the one, and equality with density the other. But among the common *passions* which subsist about the whole body, that is the greatest which is the cause of pleasure and pain: to which may be added, such as through the parts of the body detain the senses, and have in these pleasures and pains as their attendants. In this manner then we should receive the causes of every passion, both sensible and insensible, calling to mind the distinctions which we formerly established concerning the easily and difficultly movable nature. For in this manner we ought to pursue all such things as we design to apprehend. Thus, with respect to that which is naturally easily movable, when any slender passion falls upon it, the several parts give themselves up to each other in a circular progression, producing the same effect; till having arrived at the seat of prudence,

they announce the power of that by which the passion was induced. But that which is affected in a contrary manner, being stable and without a circular progression, alone suffers; but does not move any of the parts to which it is proximate. Hence the parts not mutually giving themselves up to each other, and the first passion in them becoming immovable with respect to the whole animal, that which suffers is rendered void of sensation. This last case indeed happens about the bones and hairs, and such other parts of our composition as are mostly terrene. But the circumstances belonging to the easily movable nature take place about the instruments of sight and hearing, through their containing the most abundant power of fire and air. But it is necessary to consider the peculiarities of pleasure and pain as follows: When a *passion* is produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence and abundance, then it becomes the occasion of pain. And again, when a *passion* conformable to our nature is excited, and this with abundance, it causes pleasure and delight. But that which is contrary to these produces contrary effects. But a *passion* the whole of which is induced with great facility is eminently indeed the object of sensation, but does not participate of pleasure and pain. And of this kind are the *passions* subsisting about the sight; to which, as we have above asserted, our body is allied. For such objects as exhibit sections and burnings, and other *passions* of a similar kind, do not cause pain to the sight; nor again does the sight receive pleasure, when it is restored to the same form as before. But the most vehement and clear sensations influence it with pain, so far as it suffers any thing, strikes against, or comes into contact with any object. For no violence subsists in the separation or concretion of the sight.

fight. But such bodies as are composed from larger parts, and which scarcely yield to impulsion, when they transfer the induced motions to the whole body, contain in themselves pleasures and pains; when varied indeed, pains, but when restored to their pristine situation, pleasures. Again, whatever bodies in a small degree receive departures and evacuations of themselves, accompanied at the same time with abundant repletions, since such bodies have no sense of evacuation, but are sensible of repletion, they do not affect the mortal part of the soul with any pain, but on the contrary influence it with the greatest delight. And the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of sweet odours. But such bodies as suffer an abundant variation, and are scarce able to be restored in a small degree to their pristine situation, are totally affected in a manner contrary to those we have just described. And the truth of this is manifest in the burnings and sections of the body. And thus have we nearly discussed the common passions of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to the causes by which they are produced.

Let us now endeavour to explain those passions which take place in particular parts of our bodies, and relate from whence they arise and by what causes they are induced. In the first place, let us if possible complete what we formerly left unfinished concerning humours; since these are passions subsisting about the tongue. But these, as well as many other things, appear to be produced by certain separations and concretions; and besides this, to employ smoothness and roughness more than the rest. For certain small veins extend themselves from the tongue to the heart, and are the messengers of tastes. And when any thing falls upon these so as to penetrate the moist and delicate

delicate texture of the flesh, which through its terrestrial nature is moderately liquefied, it then contracts and dries the veins. Hence, if these penetrating substances are of a more rough nature, they produce a sharp taste; but if less rough, a sour taste. But such things as are purgative of these veins, and which wash away whatever is found adhering to the tongue, if they accomplish this in an immoderate degree, so as to liquefy something of the nature of the tongue, such as is the power of nitre;—all such as these are denominated bitter. But whatever is subordinate to this property of nitre, and purges in a more moderate degree, appears to us to be salt, without the roughness of bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, such things as communicating with the heat of the mouth, and being rendered smooth by it, heat also in their turn the mouth—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, at the same time dividing whatever they meet with in their ascent;—all these, through powers of this kind, are denominated sharp. But sometimes these several particulars becoming attenuated through rottenness, enter into the narrow veins, and compel the interior parts, as well the terrene as those containing the symmetry of air, to be mingled together by moving about each other; and when mingled cause some of the parts to glide round, some to enter into others, and when entered to render them hollow and extended; and this in the place where a hollow moisture is extended about the air. This moisture too being at one time terrene and at another pure, a moist orbicular receptacle of air is produced from the hollow water. But that which is produced from pure water, is on all sides diaphanous, and is called a bubble. On the contrary, that which owes
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its subsistence to a more earthly moisture, and which is at the same time agitated and elevated, is denominated fervid, and a fermentation. But the cause of all these passions receives the appellation of acute. And a passion contrary to all that has been asserted concerning these, proceeds from a contrary cause. But when the composition of the things entering into moist substances is naturally accommodated to the quality of the tongue, it polishes and anoints its asperities, and collects together or relaxes such parts as were either assembled or dissipated contrary to nature, and restores them to their proper and natural habit. Hence all such substances are pleasant and friendly to every one, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated sweet. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

But there are no species about the power of the nostrils: for all odours are but half begotten. But it happens to no species to be commensurate with any odour. And our veins, with respect to particulars of this kind, are too narrow to admit the genera of earth and water, and too broad to receive those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odour of any one of these. But odours are always produced from the madefaction, corruption, liquefaction or evaporation of the elements. For water becoming changed into air, and air into water, odours are generated in the middle of these. And all odours are either smoke or mists. But of these, that which passes from air into water is a mist; but that which is changed from water into air, smoke. And hence it comes to pass that all odours are more attenuated than water, and more dense than air. But the truth of this is sufficiently evident, when any one in consequence of a disagreeable smell violently

draws his breath inwards ; for then no odour is washed off, but breath alone follows unattended by smell. On this account, the varieties of these subsist without a name ; as they are neither composed from many nor from simple species. But two of these alone receive an appellation, the pleasant and the disagreeable : the latter of which disturbs and violently assaults all that cavity which lies between the top of the head and the navel ; but the former allures this part of the body, and by its amicable ingress preserves it in a condition accommodated to its nature. But we ought to consider the third sensitive part of our composition, hearing, in such a manner that we may explain through what causes the passions with which it is conversant subsist. We ought therefore entirely to define voice a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as to the soul : and we should call the motion arising from hence, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, hearing. When this motion is swift, a sharp sound is produced ; but when slow, a flat sound. And the former of these is equal and smooth, but the latter rough. Many voices too produce a great sound, but a small sound is the result of a few. But it is necessary that we should speak about the symphonies of these in the subsequent part of this discourse. The fourth sensitive genus now remains for our discussion ; which contains in itself an abundant variety, all which are denominated colours. But colour is a flame flowing from bodies, and possessing parts commensurate to the sight with respect to perception. But we have already considered the causes from which sight is produced. It appears then that we may now speak of colours according to assimilative reasons as follows :

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Of things which proceeding from other parts fall on the sight, some are greater, others less, and others equal to the parts of the sight. Such as are equal, therefore, cannot be perceived; and these we denominate diaphanous. But among such as are larger or smaller, some of these separate, but others mingle the sight, similar to the operations of heat and cold about the flesh, or to things sour, acute and hot about the tongue. But things which affect the sight in this manner are called black and white; which are indeed the passions of those particulars we have just related, being their sisters as it were and the same with them in a different genus; but which nevertheless through these causes appear to be different. We should therefore speak of them as follows: That the colour which is segregative of the sight is white; but that which produces an effect contrary to this, black. But when a more acute motion, and of a different kind of fire, falls upon and separates the sight as far as to the eyes, at the same time violently propelling and liquefying the transitions of the eyes, then a collected substance of fire and water flows from thence, which we denominate a tear; but the motion itself is a fire meeting with the sight in an opposite direction. And indeed when a fire, leaping as it were from a certain corruscation, becomes mingled with another fire, penetrating and extinguished by moisture, from this mixture colours of all-various kinds are produced. In this case we call the passion a vibrating splendour, and that which produces it fulgid and rutilating. But a kind of fire, which subsists in the middle of these, arriving at the moisture of the eyes, and becoming mingled with it, is by no means splendid: but in consequence of the rays of fire being mingled through moisture, and producing a bloody colour, we denominate the mixture

ture red. And when splendour is mingled with red and white, it generates a yellow colour. But to relate in what measure each of these is mingled with each, is not the business of one endued with intellect, even though he were well informed in this affair; since he would not be able to produce concerning these either a necessary or an assimilative reason. But red, when mingled with black and white, produces a purple colour. And when to these, mingled and burnt together, more of black is added, a more obscure colour is produced. A ruddy colour is generated from the mixture of yellow and brown; but brown from the mixture of black and white. A pallid colour arises from the mingling of white and yellow. But that which is splendid conjoined with white, and falling upon abundance of black, gives completion to an azure colour. And azure mingled with white generates a grey colour. But from the temperament of a ruddy colour with black, green is produced. All the rest will be nearly evident from these, to any one who imitating the former mixtures preserves assimilative reasons in his discourse. But if any one undertakes the investigation of these, for the sake of the things themselves, such a one must be ignorant of the difference between a divine and human nature: since a god is indeed sufficient for the purpose of mingling many things into one, and of again dissolving the one into many, as being at the same time both knowing and able: but there is no man at present who is able to accomplish either of these undertakings, nor will there ever be one in any future circulation of time. But all these which thus naturally subsist from necessity, were assumed in the things which are generated by the artificer of that which is most beautiful and best, when he produced a self-sufficient and
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most perfect god; employing indeed causes which are subservient to these, but operating himself in the best manner in all generated natures. On this account it is requisite to distinguish two species of causes; the one necessary but the other divine. And we should enquire after the divine cause in all things for the sake of obtaining blessed life, in as great a degree as our nature is capable of receiving it; but we should investigate the necessary cause for the sake of that which is divine. For we should consider, that without these two species of causes the objects of our pursuit can neither be understood nor apprehended, nor in any other way become participated. But since to us at present, as to artificers, matter lies in subjection, the genera of causes serving as prepared materials from which the remaining discourse is to be woven, let us again return with brevity to our first discussions, and swiftly pass from thence to the place at which we are now arrived; by this means endeavouring to establish an end and summit to our disputation, which may harmonize with its beginning.

Indeed as we asserted towards the commencement of our discourse, when all sensible natures were in a disordered state of subsistence, divinity rendered each commensurate with itself and all with one another, and connected them as much as possible with the bands of analogy and symmetry. For then nothing participated of order except by accident; nor could any thing with propriety be distinguished by the appellation which it receives at present, such for instance as fire, water, and the rest of this kind. But the demiurgus in the first place adorned all these, afterwards established the world from their conjunction, and rendered it one animal, containing in itself

all mortal and immortal animals. And of divine natures indeed he himself became the author; but he delivered to his offspring the junior gods the fabrication of mortal natures. Hence, these imitating their father's power, and receiving the immortal principle of the soul, fashioned posterior to this the mortal body, assigned the whole body as a vehicle to the soul, and fabricated in it another mortal species of soul, possessing dire and necessary passions through its union with the body. The first indeed of these passions is pleasure, which is the greatest allurements to evil; but the next is pain, which is the exile of good. After these follow boldness and fear, those mad advisers; anger, hard to be appeased; hope, which is easily deceived; together with irrational sense, and love the general invader of all things. In consequence therefore of mingling these together, the junior gods necessarily composed the mortal race. And religiously fearing lest the divine nature should be defiled through this rout of molestations more than extreme necessity required, they lodged the mortal part separate from the divine, in a different receptacle of the body; fabricating the head and breast, and placing the neck between as an isthmus and boundary, that the two extremes might be separate from each other.

In the breast, therefore, and that which is called the *thorax*, they seated the mortal genus of the soul. And as one part of it is naturally better, but another naturally worse, they fabricated the cavity of the *thorax*, distributing this receptacle in the woman different from that of the man, and placing in the middle of these the midriff or diaphragm. That part of the soul therefore which participates of fortitude and anger, and is fond of contention, they seated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck;

neck; that becoming obedient to reason, and uniting with it in amicable conjunction, it might together with reason forcibly repress the race of desires, whenever they should be found unwilling to obey the mandates of reason, issuing her orders from her lofty place of abode. But they established the heart, *which is both the fountain of the veins and of the blood which is vehemently impelled through all the members of the body in a CIRCULAR PROGRESSION*, in an habitation corresponding to that of a satellite; that when the irascible part becomes inflamed, reason at the same time announcing that some unjust action has taken place externally, or has been performed by some one of the inward desires, then every thing sensitive in the body may swiftly through all the narrow pores perceive the threatenings and exhortations, may be in every respect obedient, and may thus permit that which is the best in all these to maintain the sovereign command.

But as the gods previously knew that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of dreadful events, and the effervescence of anger and every kind of wrathful inflation would be produced by fire, they implanted in the body the idea of the lungs, artificially producing them as a guardian to the heart. And in the first place they rendered them soft and bloodless, and afterwards internally perforated with hollow pipes like a sponge; that through their receiving spirit and imbibing moisture, they might become themselves refrigerated, and might afford respiration and remission to the heart in its excessive heat. Hence they deduced the arteries as so many canals through the substance of the lungs; and placed the lungs like a soft thicket round the heart, that when anger rages in it with too much vehemence it may leap into submission, and be-

coming refrigerated may be subject to less endurance, and may be able together with anger to yield with greater facility to the authority of reason. But they seated that part of the soul which is desiderative of meats and drinks, and such other things as it requires through the nature of body, between the præcordia and the boundary about the navel; fabricating all this place as a manger subservient to the nutriment of the body, and binding in it this part of the soul as a rustic and savage animal. But it is necessary that this part should nourish its conjoined body, if the mortal race has a necessary existence in the nature of things. That this part therefore might be always fed at the manger, and might dwell remote from the deliberative part, molesting it in the smallest degree with its tumults and clamours, and permitting it, as that which is most excellent in our composition, to consult in quiet for the common utility of the whole animal; on this account the gods assigned it such a subordinate situation.

But as the divinity perceived that this part would not be obedient to reason, but that it would naturally reject its authority in consequence of every sensible impression, and would be animastically hurried away by images and phantasms both by day and night – considering this, he constituted the form of the liver, and placed it in the habitation of this desiderative part; composing it dense and smooth, splendid and sweet, and at the same time mingled with bitterness; that the power of cogitations descending from intellect into the liver as into a mirror receiving various resemblances and exhibiting images to the view, might at one time terrify this irrational nature by employing a kindred part of bitterness and introducing dreadful threats, so that the whole liver being gradually mingled might represent

present bilious colours, and becoming contracted might be rendered throughout wrinkled and rough; and that besides this, it might influence its lobe, ventricle, and gates in such a manner, that by distorting and twisting some of these from their proper disposition, and obstructing and shutting in others, it might be the cause of damages and pains. And again, that at another time a certain inspiration of gentleness from cogitation, by describing contrary phantasms and affording rest to bitterness, through its being unwilling either to excite or apply itself to a nature contrary to its own; and besides this, by employing the innate sweetness of the liver, and rendering all its parts properly disposed, smooth, and free, might cause that part of the soul which resides about the liver to become peaceful and happy, so that it might even refrain from excess in the night, and employ prophetic energies in sleep: since it does not participate of reason and prudence. For those who composed us, calling to mind the mandate of their father, that they should render the mortal race as far as possible the best, so constituted the depraved part of our nature that it might become connected with truth; establishing in this part a prophetic knowledge of future events. But that divinity assigned divination to human madness may be sufficiently inferred from hence; that no one while endued with intellect becomes connected with a divine and true prophecy; but this alone takes place either when the power of prudence is fettered by sleep, or suffers some mutation through disease, or a certain enthusiastic energy: it being in this case the employment of prudence to understand what was asserted either sleeping or waking by a prophetic and enthusiastic nature; and so to distinguish all the phantastic appearances as to be able

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to explain what and to whom any thing of future, past, or present good is portended. But it is by no means the office of that which abides and is still about to abide in this enthusiastic energy, to judge of itself either concerning the appearances or vociferations. Hence it was well said by the ancients, that to transact and know his own concerns and himself, is alone the province of a prudent man. And on this account the law orders that the race of prophets should preside as judges over divine predictions; who are indeed called by some diviners—but this in consequence of being ignorant that such men are interpreters of enigmatical visions and predictions, and on this account should not be called diviners, but rather prophets of divinations. The nature therefore of the liver was produced on this account, and seated in the place we have mentioned, *viz.* for the sake of prediction. And besides this, while each of such like parts is living, it possesses clearer indications; but when deprived of life it then becomes blind, and the divination is rendered too obscure to signify any thing sufficiently clear. But an intestine which subsists for the sake of the liver, is placed near it on the left hand that it may always render the liver splendid and pure, and prepared like a mirror for the apt reception of resemblant forms. On this account, when certain impurities are produced about the liver through bodily disease, then the spleen purifying these by its rarity, receives them into itself from its being of a hollow and bloodless contexture. Hence, being filled with purgations, it increases in bulk, and becomes inflated with corruption. And again, when the body is purified, then becoming depressed it subsides into the same condition as before. And thus we have spoken concerning both the mortal and divine part of the soul, and have related

related where they are situated, in conjunction with what natures, and why they are separated from each other. That all this indeed is unfolded according to indisputable truth, can only be asserted when confirmed by the vocal attestation of a god: but that it is spoken according to assimilative reasons, we should not hesitate to evince both now and hereafter by a more diligent discussion of what remains.

But it is proper to investigate in a similar manner the subsequent part of our disputation; and this is no other than to relate how the other members of the body were produced. It is becoming therefore in the most eminent degree that they should be composed as follows: Those artificers then of our race well knew that we should be intemperate in the assumption of meats and drinks, and that we should often through gluttony use more than was moderate and necessary. Hence, lest sudden destruction should take place through disease, and the mortal race thus becoming imperfect should presently cease to exist; the gods previously perceiving this consequence, fabricated in the lower parts a hollow receptacle for the purpose of receiving a superabundance of solid and liquid aliment; and besides this invested it with the spiral folds of the intestines, lest the assumed nutriment swiftly passing away, the body should as swiftly require an accession of new aliment; and by producing an insatiable appetite through gluttony, should render our whole race void of philosophy and the muses, and disobedient to the most divine part of our composition. But the nature of the bones and flesh, and other things of this kind, was constituted as follows: In the first place, the generation of the marrow serves as a principle to all these. For the bonds of that life which
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the soul leads through its conjunction with the body being woven together in the marrow, become the stable roots of the mortal race. But the marrow itself is generated from other particulars. For among the triangles, such as are first being unbent and smooth, were particularly accommodated to the generation of fire and water, air and earth; and the divinity separating each of these apart from their genera, and mingling them commensurate with each other, composing by this means an all-various mixture of seeds for the mortal race, produced from these the nature of the marrow. But afterwards disseminating in the marrow, he bound in it the genera of souls. Besides, in this first distribution, he immediately separated as many figures and of such kinds as it was requisite the marrow should possess. And he fashioned indeed that part of the marrow in which as in a cultivated field the divine seed was to be sown, every way globular, and called it *εγκεφαλον*, or the brain; because in every animal, when it has acquired the perfection of its form, the receptacle of this substance is denominated the head. But he distinguished with round and at the same time oblong figures, that receptacle of the body which was destined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul; and was willing that the whole should receive the appellation of marrow. And besides this, hurling from these as anchors the bonds of all the soul, he fabricated the whole of our body about the substance of the marrow, and invested it on all sides with a covering of bones.

But he thus composed the nature of the bones. In the first place, bruising together pure and smooth earth, he mingled and moistened it with marrow; after this he placed it in fire, then merged it in water, then again seated

it in fire, and after this dipped it in water. And thus by often transferring it into each, he rendered it incapable of being liquefied by both. Employing therefore this nature of bone, he fashioned like one working with a wheel a bony sphere, and placed it round the brain; leaving a narrow passage in the sphere itself. And besides this, forming certain vertebræ from bone about the marrow of the neck and back, he extended them like hinges, commencing from the head and proceeding through the whole cavity of the body. And thus he preserved all the seed, by fortifying it round about with a stony vestment. He likewise added joints, for the purpose of motion and inflection, employing the nature of that which is distinguished by *difference* in their fabrication, as this is endued with a certain middle capacity. But as he thought that the habit of the bony nature would become more dry and inflexible than it ought to be, and that when it became heated and again cooled it would in consequence of ulceration swiftly corrupt the seed which it contained, on this account he fashioned the genus of nerves and flesh; that the nerves, by binding all the other members, and becoming stretched and remitted about those hinges the vertebræ, might render the body apt to become inflected and extended as occasion required: but that the flesh might serve as a covering from the heat and a protection from the cold; and besides this might defend it from falls, in the same manner as external supports, gently and easily yielding to the motions of the body. He likewise placed a hot moisture in the nature of the flesh, that becoming in summer externally dewy and moist, it might afford a kindred refrigeration to the whole body; and that again in winter, through its own proper fire, it might moderately repel the externally introduced and surrounding

rounding cold. When therefore the plastic artificer of our bodies had perceived all this through a cogitative energy, having mingled and harmonized together water, fire, and earth, and added to the mixture a sharp and salt ferment, he gradually composed soft and succulent flesh.

But he mingled the nature of the nerves from bone and unfermented flesh, composing one middle substance from the power of both, and tinging it with a yellow colour. And on this account it comes to pass that the power of the nerves is more intense and viscous than that of the flesh, but more soft and moist than that of the bones. Hence the divinity bound the bones and marrow to each other with the nerves, and afterwards invested them all supernally with the flesh, as with a dark concealing shade. Such of the bones therefore as were the most animated he covered with the least flesh; but such as were the least animated he invested with flesh the most abundant and dense. And besides this, he added but a small quantity of flesh to the joints of the bones, except where reason evinces the necessity of the contrary: and this lest they should be a hindrance to the inflections, and retard the motions of the body; and again, lest in consequence of their being many and dense, and vehemently compressed in one another, they should cause through their solidity a privation of sense, a difficulty of recollection, and a remission of the cogitative energy. On this account he invested with abundance of flesh the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the upper part of the arms, and that part which extends from the elbow to the wrist, and such other parts of our bodies as are without articulation, together with such inward bones as through the paucity of soul in the marrow are destitute of a prudential energy. But he covered with
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a less quantity of flesh such bones as are endued with prudence : unless perhaps the fleshy substance of the tongue, which was produced for the sake of sensation, is to be excepted. In other parts, the case is such as we have described. For a nature which is generated and nourished from necessity, can by no means at one and the same time receive a dense bone and abundant flesh, united with acuteness of sensation. But this would be most eminently the case with the composition of the head, if all these were willing to coalesce in amicable conjunction : and the human race possessing a fleshy, nervous, and robust head, would enjoy a life twice as long, or still more abundantly extended, healthy and unmolested than that which we at present possess.

Again, in consequence of those artificers of our generation considering whether they should fabricate our race possessing a life more lasting indeed but of a worse condition, or of a shorter extent but of a more excellent condition, it appeared to them that a shorter but more excellent life was by all means to be preferred to one more lasting but of a subordinate condition. Hence they covered the head with a thin bone, but did not invest it with flesh and nerves, because it was destitute of inflections. On all these accounts therefore the head was added to the body as the most sensitive and prudent, but at the same time by far the most imbecil part of all the man. But through these causes and in this manner, the divinity placing the nerves about the extreme part of the head, conglutinated them in a circle about the neck (after a certain similitude), and bound with them those lofty cheek bones situated under the countenance ; but he disseminated the rest about all the members, connecting joint with

with joint. Besides, those adorners of our race ornamented us with the power of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips, and this for the sake of things which are at the same time both necessary and the best; producing ingression for the sake of necessaries, but egression for the sake of such as are best. Every thing, indeed, which being introduced affords nutriment to the body, is necessary; but the stream of words flowing forth externally, and becoming subservient to prudence, is the most beautiful and best of all effluxions. Besides, it was not possible that the head could remain without any other covering than that of a naked bone, through the extremities of heat and cold in the different seasons; nor again, could it become the instrument of knowledge when invested with darkness, dulled, and without sensation, through the perturbation of flesh. Hence a part of a fleshy nature, not entirely dried, and surpassing the residue, was separated from the rest; and which is now denominated a membrane. This membrane passing into union with itself, and blossoming about the moisture of the brain, circularly invests the head. But the moisture flowing under the sutures of the head, irrigates this membrane, and, causing it to close together at the crown, connects it as it were in a knot. But an all-various species of sutures is generated through the power of the circulations and the nutriment; the variety becoming greater when these oppose each other with greater violence, but less when they are in a state of less opposition. All this membrane the divine artificer of our bodies circularly pierced with fire. And hence, becoming as it were wounded, and the moisture externally flowing through it, whatever is moist, hot and pure passes away; but whatever is mingled from the same natures as the
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membrane itself, this in consequence of receiving an external production becomes extended into length, and possesses a tenuity equal to the punctuation of the membrane. But this substance, from the slowness of its motion, being continually thrust back by the externally surrounding spirit, again revolves itself under the membrane, and there fixes the roots of its progression. Hence from these passions the race of hairs springs up in the membrane of the head, being naturally allied to and becoming as it were the reins of this membrane, at the same time that they are more hard and dense through the compression of cold. For every hair, when it proceeds beyond the membrane, becomes hardened through cold. After this manner then the artificer planted our head with hairs, employing for this purpose the causes which we have mentioned.

But at the same time he understood by a cogitative energy, that instead of flesh a light covering was necessary for the security of the brain; which might sufficiently shade and protect it like a garment from the extremities of heat and cold, but by no means hinder the acuteness of sensation. But that comprehension of nerve, skin and bone about the fingers, being a mixture of three substances and becoming of a dryer nature, produced one common hard membrane from the whole. These indeed were the ministrant causes of its fabrication; but the most principal cause consists in that cogitation which produced this membrane for the sake of future advantage. For those artificers of our nature well knew that at some time or other women and other animals would be generated from men; and that nails would be of the greatest advantage in many respects to the bestial tribes. Hence they impressed in men the generation of nails, at the very

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period of their production. But from this reason, and through these causes, they planted the skin, hairs and nails in the members situated at the extremities of the body. But as all the parts and members of a mortal animal were generated in alliance with each other, and necessarily possessed their life in the union of fire and spirit, lest the animal becoming resolved and exhausted by these should swiftly decay, the gods devised the following remedy. For mingling a nature allied to the human with other forms and senses, they planted as it were another animal; such as those mild trees, plants, and seeds, which being now brought to perfection through the exercise of agriculture are friendly to our nature; though prior to this they were of a rustic kind, being more ancient than such as are mild. For whatever participates of life we may justly and with the greatest rectitude denominate an animal. But this which we are now speaking of participates the third species of soul, which we place between the præcordia and the navel: and in which there is neither any thing of opinion, reason, or intellect; but to which a pleasant and painful sense together with desires belongs. For it continually suffers all things. But when it is converted in itself, about itself, and rejecting external, employs its own proper motion, it is not allotted by its generation a nature capable of considering its own concerns by any thing like a reasoning energy. On this account it lives and is not different from an animal; but becoming stably rooted abides in a fixed position, through its being deprived of a motion originating from itself.

But when those superior artificers of our composition had implanted all these genera for the purpose of supplying nutriment to our nature, they deduced various channels

nels in our body as in a garden, that it might be irrigated as it were by the accession of flowing moisture. And in the first place they cut two occult channels under the concretion of the skin and flesh, *viz.* two veins in the back, according to the double figure of the body on the right hand and the left. These they placed with the spine of the back, so as to receive the prolific marrow in the middle, that it might thus flourish in the most eminent degree; and by copiously flowing from hence to other parts, might afford an equable irrigation. But after this, cutting the veins about the head and weaving them with each other in an opposite direction, they separated them; inclining some from the right hand to the left hand parts of the body, and some from the left to the right, that the head together with the skin might be bound to the body, as it is not circularly divided with nerves about its summit; and besides this, that the passion of the senses might from each of these parts be deduced on all sides through the whole of the body. In this manner then they deduced an aqueduct from hence; the truth of which we shall easily perceive by assenting to the following position. That all such things as are composed from lesser parts are able to contain such as are greater; but such as consist from greater cannot invest those composed from lesser parts. But fire, among all the genera of things, is constituted from the smallest parts. Hence it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and the composites from these; and this in such a manner, that nothing can restrain its pervading power. The same must be understood of that ventricle our belly; that it is able to retain the intromitted meat and drink, but cannot stay spirit and fire, because these consist of smaller parts than those from which the

belly is composed. These therefore the divinity employed for the purpose of producing an irrigation from the belly into the veins; weaving from fire and air a certain flexible substance like a bow-net, and which possesses a two-fold gibbosity at the entrance. One of these he again wove together, divided into two parts; and circularly extended these parts from the curvatures like ropes through the whole body, as far as to the extremities of the net. All the interior parts therefore of the net-work he composed from fire: but the gibbosities and the receptacle itself from air. And lastly, receiving these he disposed them in the animal new formed as follows. In the first place one of the gibbous parts he assigned to the mouth; but as the gibbosity of this part is two-fold, he caused one part to pass through the arteries into the lungs, but the other along with the arteries into the belly. But having divided the other gibbous part according to each of its parts, he caused it to pass in common to the channels of the nose, so that when the one part does not reach the mouth, all its streams may be filled from this. But he placed the other cavity of this gibbous substance about the hollow parts of the body; and caused the whole of this at one time to flow together gently into the gibbous parts, as they were of an aerial texture, and at another time to flow back again through the convex receptacles. But he so disposed the net, as being composed from a thin body, that it might inwardly penetrate and again emerge through this substance. Besides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire should follow in continued succession, the air at the same time passing into each of the parts; and that this should never cease to take place as long as the mortal animal continued to subsist. But in assigning an appellation

lation to a motion of this kind, we denominate it expiration and respiration. But all this operation and the whole of this passion in our nature take place in the body by a certain irrigation and refrigeration conducive to our nutriment and life. For when the breath passes inwardly and outwardly, an interior fire attends it in its course; and being diffused through the belly, when it meets with solid and liquid aliments, it reduces them to a state of fluidity; and distributing them into the smallest parts, educes them as from a fountain through the avenues of its progression: pouring these small particles into the channels of the veins, and deducing rivers through the body as through a valley of veins.

But let us again consider the passion of respiration, and investigate through what causes it was generated, such as we perceive it at present. We should consider it, therefore, as follows: As there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any thing in motion can enter, and as breath passes from us externally, it is evident to every one that it cannot proceed into a void space, but must thrust that which is nearest to it from its proper seat; that again the repulsed nature must always expel its neighbour; and that from a necessity of this kind every thing which is impelled into that seat from which the emitted breath is excluded, must, when it has entered into and filled up this space, attend on the breath in its progression. And all this must take place like the revolution of a wheel, through the impossibility of a vacuum. Hence, when the breast and the lungs externally dismiss the breath, they are again replenished through the air which surrounds the body entering into and riding round the avenues of the flesh. But the air being again externally dismissed, and flowing round the body, impels

the respiration inward, through the passages of the mouth and nostrils.

But we should establish the following as the cause from which the origin of these was derived. Every animal belonging to the universe possesses a heat in the veins and the blood, like a certain fountain of fire; and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extended through the middle of the body, and wholly woven from fire; all such things as are external being composed from air. But it must be confessed that heat naturally proceeds externally into a region to which it is allied. But as there are two progressions, one according to the body externally, but the other again according to the mouth and nostrils, hence, when the breath is impelled inward, it again thrusts back that by which it was impelled. But that which is drawn back meeting with fire becomes heated; while that which is exhaled becomes refrigerated. In consequence therefore of the heat being changed, and such things as subsist according to the other transition becoming more hot, and that again which is more fervid verging to its own nature, hence one thing strikes against and repels another in its course; and as they always suffer and mutually influence each other in the same manner, leaping this way and that in a circular progression, they give birth to the expiration and respiration of the breath. But in this manner also we should investigate the causes of those passions which arise from medical cupping-glasses, from drinking, from things violently hurled, whether upwards or on the ground; together with such sounds as appear swift and flow, sharp and flat, and which are at one time borne along unharmoniously, through the dissimilitude of the motion which they cause within us, and at another time attended with harmony,

mony, through the similitude of motion which they produce. For the motions of such sounds as are prior and swifter ceasing, and proceeding to a nature similar to their own, are comprehended by such as are slower, which now succeed to the swifter and set them again in motion. But during their comprehension of these, they do not disturb them by introducing another motion, but lead on the beginning of the slower lation in conformity to that of the swifter. And these adapting to themselves a similitude of the ceasing motion, mingle together one passion from the union of sharp and flat. From whence they afford pleasure to the unwise, but joy to the wise, through the imitation of divine harmony subsisting in mortal motions. And indeed with respect to all effluxions of water, the falling of thunder, and the wonderful circumstances observed in the attraction of amber, and of the Herculean stone;—in all these, nothing in reality of attraction takes place: but as a vacuum cannot any where be found, and these particulars mutually impel each other; hence, from the individuals when separated and mingled together tending to their proper seats, and from these passions being interwoven with each other, such admirable effects present themselves to the view of the accurate investigator. And indeed respiration (from whence our discourse originated) is generated from these causes, and after this manner, as we asserted above. For fire dividing the aliment and becoming elevated internally, attending at the same time the breath in its ascent, fills the veins from the belly by this joint elevation; and this in consequence of drawing upwards from thence the dissected parts: so that by this means, through the whole body of every animal, the streams of nutriment are abundantly diffused. But the

parts which are recently dissected and separated from their kindred natures, some of which are fruits and others grass, and which were produced by divinity for the nourishment of our bodies, possess all-various colours through their mixture with each other : but for the most part a red colour predominates in them, whose nature is fabricated from a section of fire, and an absterfion in a moist substance. And hence the colour of that which flows about the body is such as appears to the sight, and which we denominate blood ; being the pasture of the flesh and of the whole body ; from whence an irrigation becoming every where diffused, it copiously replenishes all the exhausted parts.

But the manner of impletion and evacuation is produced in the same way as in the universe the lation of every thing takes place ; *viz.* from that cause through which every kindred nature tends to itself. For the natures by which we are externally invested, perpetually liquefy and distribute our bodies, dismissing every species to its kindred form. But the sanguineous parts being distributed and comprehended within us, as is the case with every animal constituted under the heavens, are compelled to imitate the local motion of the universe. Each therefore of the divided parts within us being borne along to its kindred nature, replenishes again that which is void. But when the effluxions surpass the accessions, a corruption of the whole animal ensues ; and when the contrary takes place, it receives an increase. The recent composition therefore of every animal possessing new triangles, like ships formed from timbers unimpaired by age, causes a strong enclosure of them within each other : but the whole of its delicate bulk unites in amicable conjunction,

as being generated from most recent marrow, and nourished in milk. Those triangles therefore from which the liquid and solid aliments are composed, approaching externally, and being received into the animal, as they are more ancient and imbecil than its own proper triangles, are vanquished and cut in pieces by the new triangles: and the animal is rendered of a large size, through its being nourished from a multitude of similar parts. But when it relaxes the root of its triangles, in consequence of becoming wearied and tamed, through many contests with many particulars in a long course of time; then it is no longer able to reduce by section the received aliment into a similitude of itself, but its own parts become easily dissipated by the natures which are externally introduced. Hence the whole animal, becoming by this means vanquished, decays; and the passion itself is denominated old age. But the end of its existence then arrives, when the jointly harmonized bonds of the triangles about the marrow no longer possess a detaining power, but becoming separated through the weariness of labour, desert the bonds of the soul. The soul however in this case being concealed in a state according to nature, flies away with pleasure and delight. For every thing contrary to nature is painful; but that which happens naturally is pleasant. Hence the death which is produced through wounds and disease is painful and violent; but that which is caused from old age, proceeding to an end according to nature, is of all deaths the most free from labour, and is rather accompanied with pleasure than pain.

But it must be obvious to every one from whence diseases are produced. For since there are four genera from which the body is composed, *viz.* earth, fire, water, and
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air, the unnatural abundance and defect of these, and a translation from their own proper to a foreign seat, in consequence of which each of these does not receive that which is accommodated to its nature, together with all such circumstances as these, produce contentions and disease. For each of these subsisting and being transferred in a manner contrary to nature, such things as were formerly heated become cold, such as were once dry become moist, such as were light heavy, and every thing receives all possible mutations. For we assert that when the same thing approaches to and departs from the same, in the same manner and according to analogy, then alone it permits that which is the same to abide healthy and safe. But that which inordinately wanders, either in acceding or departing, produces all-various mutations, diseases, and infinite corruptions. Likewise a second apprehension of diseases may be obtained by any one who is so disposed, from the second compositions of things constituted according to nature. For since the concretion of marrow, bone, flesh, and nerve, is derived from these, as likewise the blood, though from a different mode of coalition, hence many events happen in the same manner as those we have mentioned above; but the greatest and most severe diseases subsist as follows: When the generation of these second compositions takes place inversely, then they become subject to corruption. For the flesh and nerves are naturally generated from blood: the nerves indeed from fibres, through the alliance subsisting between these; but the flesh from the coalition of that which when separated from the fibres passes into a state of concretion. But that substance again which arises from nerves and flesh being glutinous and fat, increases at the same time by nutrition the
flesh,

flesh, which for the most part subsists about the nature of the bones; and likewise the bone itself, with which the marrow is surrounded. And again, that which trickles through the density of the bones, being the most pure kind of the triangles, and the most smooth and unctuous, while it drops and distils from the bones, irrigates the marrow. And hence, when each particular subsists in this manner, a healthy condition of body is produced; but a diseased condition when the contrary is the case. For when the flesh becoming liquefied again transmits the consumption into the veins, then the blood together with spirit becoming abundant and all-various in the veins, diversified with colours and density, and infected with acid and salt qualities, generates all-various bile, corruption, and phlegm. And all these being again thus generated and corrupted, in the first place destroy the blood itself; and this no longer affording nutriment to the body, is every where borne along through the veins, without observing a natural order in its circulations. But these indeed are unfriendly to each other, because they derive no mutual advantages from the properties with which each is endued. They likewise war upon the natural habit of the body, and its perseverance in its proper state, by introducing dissolutions and liquefactions.

A most ancient portion of flesh, therefore, when it is liquefied and rendered difficult of digestion, grows black through ancient burning; but through its being entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and adverse to all the other parts of the body which are not yet infected with corruption. And then indeed the black colour possesses sharpness instead of bitterness; that which was bitter becoming more attenuated; and the bitterness being again
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tinged with blood, possesses a redder colour ; but from the black which is mingled with this, becomes of a bilious nature. But besides this, a yellow colour is mingled with bitterness, when the new flesh liquefies through the fire subsisting about flame. And indeed either some physician will assign to all these the common appellation of bile, or some one who is able to consider things many and dissimilar, and to behold one genus in many particulars deserving one denomination. But such other things as are called species of bile, receive an appellation peculiar to each, according to colour. But corruption (*ιχωρ*), which is the defluxion or whey of the blood, is gentle and mild : but that which is the sediment of black and sharp bile, is of a ferocious and rustic nature, when it is mingled through heat with a saline power. And a substance of this kind is denominated acid phlegm. But a portion of recent and delicate flesh is often liquefied together with the air, and is afterwards inflated and comprehended by moisture : and from this passion bubbles are produced, which taken separately are invisible on account of their smallness, but which when collected into a large bulk become conspicuous, and possess a white colour on account of the generation of froth. And we denominate all this liquefaction of delicate flesh, and which is woven together with spirit, white phlegm. But we call the sediment of recent phlegm, tears and sweat ; together with every thing of that kind into which the body is every day resolved. And all these indeed become the instruments of disease, when the blood does not naturally abound from liquid and solid aliment, but increases from contraries in such a manner as to violate the laws of nature. When therefore any part of the flesh is cut off, but at the same time
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the foundation of it remains, the calamity possesses but half its power; for it is capable of being easily recovered. But when that which binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased, and the blood flowing from it and the nerves no longer nourishes the bones and binds the flesh, but instead of being fat, smooth, and glutinous, becomes rough and salt through bad diet; then, in consequence of suffering all this, and being separated from the bones, it is refrigerated under the flesh and nerves. For the flesh falling from its roots, leaves the nerves bare and drenched in a salt humour; and hence, gliding again into the circulation of the blood, it increases the number of the diseases we have already described. And these passions indeed which subsist about the body, are of a grievous nature: but those which precede these, are still more afflictive and troublesome. But this takes place when the bone through the density of the flesh does not admit sufficient respiration, but being heated through filthiness becomes rotten, receives no nutriment, but falls upon the flesh, which is on the contrary refrigerated; and the flesh again falls on the blood, so that by this means diseases more severe than the former are produced. But the extremity of all maladies then happens, when the nature of the marrow becomes diseased through some defect or excess; for then it produces the most vehement and fatal diseases; as the whole nature of the body is in this case necessarily dissipated and dissolved.

But it is requisite after this to understand that the third species of diseases receives a tripartite division. For one of the divisions is produced by spirit, the other by phlegm, and the other by bile. For when the lungs, those distributive guardians of the breath, being obstructed by de-
fluxions,

fluxions, cannot afford a free passage to the breath; then, as there is no emission of the breath in one part, and more is received into another part than is requisite, the parts without refrigeration become rotten; but that which is received in too great abundance passing through the veins, distorts them and liquefies the diaphragm situated in the middle of the body: and thus ten thousand grievous diseases arise from hence, together with an abundance of sweat. But often, when the flesh becomes separated within the body, breath is produced; and this being incapable of departing externally, causes the same torments as the breath when entering from without. It produces however the greatest pains, when surrounding the nerves and neighbouring veins it inflates them, and stretches and distorts the ligaments and nerves continued from the back. And these diseases, from the stretching and inflating passion, are denominated tensions and contorsions from behind; and of which it is difficult to find a cure. For fevers taking place, dissolve these diseases in a most eminent degree. But the white phlegm possessing a difficulty of respiring externally, through the spirit of the bubbles, variegates the body indeed in a milder nature, yet sprinkles it with white spots, and generates other diseases of a similar kind. But when this white phlegm is mingled with black bile, and becomes dissipated about the circulations of the head, which are of a most divine nature, then it disturbs these circulations; and if this happens in sleep, the perturbation is less violent; but if to those who are awake, it cannot without difficulty be expelled. And as this is a disease of sacred nature, it is most justly denominated a sacred disease.

But a sharp and salt phlegm is the fountain of all such diseases

diseases as are produced by a defluxion of humours : and because the places into which this phlegm flows possess an omniform variety, it generates all-various diseases. But whatever parts of the body are said to be inflated, are thus affected from the inflammation of bile: which when it expires, produces externally various tumours from its fervid nature ; but when inwardly restrained, generates many inflammatory diseases. It is however then greatest when being mingled with pure blood it removes the fibres from their natural order, which are scattered into the blood for this purpose, that it may possess tenuity and density in a commensurate degree ; and that it may neither through heat (as it is of a moist nature) flow from the thin body, nor when becoming more dense and of consequence more unadapted to motion, may scarcely be able to flow back again through the veins. The fibres therefore are very serviceable on this occasion, which if any one should collect together in the blood when dead, and in a state of frigidity, all the remaining blood would become diffused ; and when poured forth they would be swiftly coagulated, together with the cold by which they are surrounded. But as the fibres possess this power in the blood, and the bile naturally becomes ancient blood, and is again liquefied from flesh into this, such things as are hot and moist falling gradually the first of all, hence it becomes collected together through the power of the fibres. But when the bile is coagulated and violently extinguished, it causes a tempest and tremor within. But when it flows more abundantly, vanquishing the fibres by its own proper heat, and becoming fervid in an inordinate degree, it then preserves the body : and if it retains its conquering power to the end, it penetrates into the marrow ; and burning the
bonds

bonds of the soul, as if they were the cables of a ship, dissolves her union, and dismisses her from thence entirely free. But when it flows with less abundance, and the body becoming liquefied opposes its passage, then finding itself vanquished, it either falls through the whole body, or being compelled through the veins into the upper or lower belly, like one flying from a seditious city, it escapes from the body and introduces defluxions, dysenteries, or gripings of the intestines, and all diseases of a similar kind. When the body therefore is eminently diseased through excess of fire, it then labours under continued burnings and fever; but when through excess of air, under quotidian fevers: under tertian through water, because water is more sluggish than fire and air; and under quartan, through excess of earth. For earth being the most sluggish of all these, is purified in quadruple periods of time; and on this account introduces quartan fevers, which it is scarcely possible to disperse. And in this manner are the diseases of the body produced.

But the diseases of the soul, which subsist through the habit of the body, are as follows. We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect. But there are two kinds of folly; the one madness, the other ignorance. Whatever passion therefore introduces either of these, must be called a disease. And we should establish excessive pleasures and pains as the greatest diseases of the soul. For when a man is too much elevated with joy or depressed with grief, while he hastens immoderately either to retain the one or to fly from the other, he is not able either to perceive or hear any thing properly, but is agitated with fury, and is very little capable of exercising the reasoning power. But he who possesses
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a great quantity of fluid feed about the marrow, and who like a tree laden with a superabundance of fruit riots in the excess, such a one being influenced by many pains and pleasures in desires, and their attendant offspring, will be agitated with fury for the greatest part of his life through mighty pleasures and pains: and though the soul of such a one will be diseased and unwise from the body with which it is connected, yet it will be falsely considered not as diseased, but as voluntarily bad. But in reality venereal intemperance for the most part becomes a disease of the soul, through a habit of one kind, from the tenuity of the bones, in a body fluid and moist. And indeed it may be nearly asserted, that all intemperance of pleasures of whatever kind, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad: but he who is depraved becomes so through a certain ill habit of body, and an unskilful education. But these two circumstances are inimical to all, and productive of a certain ill. And again, the soul, when influenced by pain, suffers much depravity from this through the body. For when sharp and salt phlegm, and likewise bitter and bilious humours, wandering through the body, are prevented from passing forth externally, but revolving inwardly mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the soul; in this case they produce all-various diseases of the soul, in a greater and less degree, and less and more numerous. They are introduced indeed to three seats of the soul; and according to the diversity of the place, each generates all-various species of difficulty and sorrow, of boldness and timidity, and still further of oblivion and indolence. But besides this, the vicious manners of cities, and discourses both private and public, often contribute to in-

crease this malady: nor are any disciplines taught in the early part of life, which might serve as remedies for such mighty ills. And thus all such as are vicious are so through two involuntary causes; the existence of which we should always rather ascribe to the planters than to the things planted, and to the educators rather than to the educated. We should therefore endeavour to the utmost of our ability, by education, studies, and disciplines, to fly from vice, and acquire its contrary, virtue. But these particulars indeed belong to another mode of discourse.

Again, therefore, with respect to the contrary of these, it is now proper to explain in a becoming manner by what culture and from what causes we may preserve both the body and cogitative energies of the soul. For it is more just to discourse concerning good things, than of such as are evil. But every thing good is beautiful; and that which is beautiful is not destitute of measure. An animal therefore which is about to be beautiful and good, must possess commensuration. But perceiving certain small particulars of things commensurate, we syllogize concerning them; while at the same time we are ignorant of such as are greatest and the chief. For indeed no symmetry and immoderation is of greater consequence with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, than that of the soul towards the body. But we consider no circumstance of these; nor do we perceive that when a more imbecil and inferior form is the vehicle of a robust and every way mighty soul, and when on the contrary these two pass into a state of concretion, then the whole animal cannot subsist in a beautiful manner: for it is incommensurate through the want of the greatest symmetry. But the animal whose composition is contrary to this, affords a spectacle to him who is able

to behold it, of all spectacles the most beautiful and lovely. When the body therefore possesses legs immoderately large, or any other member surpassing its just proportion, and becomes through this incommensurate with itself, it is rendered at the same time base, in the endurance of labour suffers many molestations and many convulsions, and through an aggregation of accidents becomes the cause of innumerable maladies to itself. The same too must be understood concerning that composition of body and soul, which we denominate an animal. As, for instance, that when the soul in this composite is more robust than the body, and possesses it raging and transported, then the soul agitating the whole of it inwardly fills it with diseases; and, when she vehemently applies herself to certain disciplines, causes it to liquefy and waste away. Lastly, when the soul employs herself in teaching and literary contests, both in public and private, through a certain ambitious strife, then inflaming the body she dissolves its constitution; and besides this, introducing distillations of humours, she deceives the most part of those who are called physicians, and induces them to consider these effects as proceeding from contrary causes.

But again, when a mighty body and above measure frigid is conjoined with a small and imbecil cogitation, since there are naturally two-fold desires in man, one of aliment through the body, but the other of prudence through the most divine part of our nature;—in this case, the motions of that which is more powerful prevail, and increase that which is their own: but render the cogitative part of the soul dull, indocile, and oblivious, and thus produce ignorance, which is the greatest of all diseases. But this one thing alone is the health and safety of both—neither to

move the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul; that being equally balanced in their mutual contentions, the health of the whole composite may be preserved. Hence he who vehemently applies himself to the mathematics, or to any other cogitative exercise, should also employ the motion of the body, and be familiar with gymnastic. And again, he who is careful in forming his body aright, should at the same time unite with this the motions of the soul, employing music and all philosophy; if he is to be rendered such a one as can be justly called beautiful, and at the same time truly good. In the same manner too we ought to take care of the parts of the body, imitating the form of the whole. For when the body through such things as are introduced from without is inflamed and refrigerated, and is again rendered dry and moist by externals, and suffers every thing consequent to these affections; then if any one in a quiet state gives up his body to motions, he will be vanquished by them and dissolved. But if any one imitates that nature which we called the nourisher of the universe, so as never to suffer the body to be in a state of rest, but perpetually moves and agitates it throughout, he will then assist the internal and external motions according to nature; and, in consequence of a moderate agitation, will reduce into order and adorn the wandering passions and parts of the body, according to their alliance with each other. Such a one indeed, as we said in our former discourse about the universe, will not by placing foe against foe suffer war and disease to be produced in the body; but, combining friend with friend, will thus render the body healthy and sound. But of all motions, that is the best in any nature which takes place in itself from itself; for this is particularly
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allied to the cogitative motion of the universe. But that motion is of the worse kind which is produced by another. And that is the worst of all motions, when the body, being in a recumbent and quiet state, is moved by others according to parts. And hence, of all the purgations and concretions of the body, that is the best which subsists through gymnastic. The next to this is that which takes place through easy carriage, whether in a ship or any other convenient vehicle. But the third species of motion is only to be used when vehemently necessary, and at no other time by any one endued with intellect: and this is that medical motion which is performed by pharmaceutical purgations. For diseases, unless they are extremely dangerous, are not to be irritated by medicines. For every composition of diseases is in a certain respect similar to the nature of animals. And indeed the association of the animal nature is allotted stated periods of life; both the whole genus and every individual, containing in itself a fatal term of living, separate from the passions which necessity produces. For the triangles which from the very beginning possessed the power of each animal, are sufficiently able to cohere together for a certain time: but life beyond this period cannot be extended to any one. The same mode of composition likewise subsists about diseases; which if any one destroys by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diseases from small ones, and many from a few. On this account it is necessary to discipline all such maladies by proper diet, according as every one's leisure will permit; and to avoid irritating by medicines a most difficult disease. And thus much may suffice concerning the common animal and its corporeal part; and how these may be disciplined and governed in such

such a manner as to produce a life according to reason in the most eminent degree.

But that which is destined to govern, ought much more and by far the first to be furnished as much as possible with such materials as may render it capable of disciplinative sway, in a manner the most beautiful and the best. To discuss accurately indeed particulars of this kind would require a treatise solely confined to such a discussion : but if any one slightly considers this affair in a manner consequent to what has been above delivered, such a one by thus proceeding will not unseasonably arrive at the end of his pursuit. We have often then previously asserted that there are three species of soul within us, triply distributed; and that each has its own proper motions. And we shall now therefore briefly affirm, that when any one of them is in a torpid state, and rests from its own proper motions, it necessarily becomes most imbecil ; but that, when it is employed in convenient exercises, it becomes most vigorous and robust. We should therefore be careful that the several species may preserve their motions, so as to be commensurate to each other.

But with respect to the most principal and excellent species of the soul, we should conceive as follows : that divinity assigned this to each of us as a dæmon ; and that it resides in the very summit of the body, elevating us from earth to an alliance with the heavens ; as we are not terrestrial plants, but blossoms of heaven. And this indeed is most truly asserted. For from whence the first generation of the soul arose, from thence a divine nature being suspended from our head and root, directs and governs the whole of our corporeal frame. In him therefore who vehemently labours to satisfy the cravings of desire
and

and ambition, all the conceptions of his soul must be necessarily mortal; and himself as much as possible must become entirely mortal, since he leaves nothing unaccomplished which tends to increase his perishable part. But it is necessary that he who is sedulously employed in the acquisition of knowledge, who is anxious to acquire the wisdom of truth, and who employs his most vigorous exertions in this one pursuit;—it is perfectly necessary that such a one, if he touches on the truth, should be endued with wisdom about immortal and divine concerns; and that he should participate of immortality, as far as human nature permits, without leaving any part of it behind. And besides, as such a one always cultivates that which is divine, and has a dæmon most excellently adorned residing in his essence, he must be happy in the most eminent degree. But the culture of all the parts is indeed entirely one, and consists in assigning proper nutriment and motion to each. But the motions which are allied to the divine part of our nature, are the cogitative energies and circulations of the universe. These therefore each of us ought to pursue; restoring in such a manner those revolutions in our head (which have been corrupted by our wanderings about generation), through diligently considering the harmonies and circulations of the universe, that the intellective power may become assimilated to the object of intelligence, according to its ancient nature. For, when thus assimilated, we shall obtain the end of the best life proposed by the gods to men, both at present and in all the future circulations of time. And now that disputation which we announced at the beginning concerning the universe, as far as to the generation of man, has almost received its consummation. For we shall briefly run over

the generation of other animals, and this no further than necessity requires : for thus any one may appear to himself to preserve a convenient measure in such a disputation. Let us therefore speak concerning these as follows :

Those who on becoming men are timid, and pass through life unjustly, will according to assimilative reasoning be changed into women in their second generation. And at the same time through this cause the gods devised the love of copulation ; composing an animal or animated substance, and placing one in us but another in the female nature. But they produced each in the following manner. That procellion of liquid aliment which passes through the lungs under the reins into the bladder, and which being compressed by the breath is emitted externally ;—this the gods receiving, they deduced it after the manner of a pipe into the concrete marrow, through the neck and spine of the back : and this is what we called feed in the former part of our discourse. But this, in consequence of being animated and receiving respiration, produces in the part where it respire a vital desire of effluxion ; and thus perfects in us the love of begetting. On this account, that nature which subsists about the privy parts of men, becoming refractory and imperious, and as it were an animal unobedient to reason, endeavours through raging desire to possess absolute sway. In like manner the privities and matrix of women, forming an animal desirous of procreating children, when it remains without fruit beyond the flower of its age, or for a still more extended period, suffers the restraint with difficulty and indignation ; and wandering every way through the body, obstructs the passage of the breath, does not permit respiration to take place, introduces other extreme difficulties,

cultiés, and caufes all-various difeafes ; till the defire and love of the parts educe feed like fruit from a tree : but when educed, they fcatter it into the matrix as into a field. Hence women conceive animals invifible at firft through their fmallnefs, rude and unformed ; when they become large, through difperfon of the feed, nourifh them within ; and laftly, leading them into light, perfect the generation of animals. In this manner, therefore, is the generation of women and every thing female performed. But the tribe of birds fucceeds in the next place, fashioned from men, and receiving wings inftead of hairs. Thefe are produced from fuch men as are indeed innocent, but inconfant and light ; who are curious about things fituated on high ; but are fo infatuated as to think from the testimony of the fight, that demonstrations about things of this kind are the moft firm and incontrovertible of all. But the pedestrian and favage tribe of animals was generated from men, who being entirely deftitute of philofophy, never elevated their eyes to any object in the heavens ; and this becaufe they never employed the circulations in the head, but followed the impulfé of thofe parts of the foul which rule in the belly and breaft. Hence from ftudies of this kind drawing the anterior members and head to the ground, they fix them through proximity of nature in the earth. Befides this, they poffefs long and all-various heads ; as the circulations of each are through idlenefs compreffed and broken : and by this means their race becomes quadruped and multiped ; the divinity affigning many feet to fuch as are more unwife, that they may be more ftrongly drawn towards the earth. But the moft unwife of thefe, and every way extending all their body on the earth, as if there was no longer any occafion of feet, the gods gene-

rated without feet, and destined them to creep on the earth. The fourth genus is the aquatic, which was produced from such men as were stupid and ignorant in the most remarkable degree; and whom those transformers of our nature did not think deserving of a pure respiration, on account of their possessing a soul in an unpurified state, through extreme transgression. And hence they impelled them into the turbid and profound respiration of water, instead of the attenuated and pure respiration of air: from whence the genus of fish and oysters, and the multitude of all aquatic animals arose; and who are allotted habitations in the last regions of the universe, as the punishment of extreme ignorance. And thus after this manner, both formerly and now, animals migrate into each other; while they are changed by the loss and acquisition of intellect and folly. Our discourse therefore concerning the universe has now obtained its conclusion. For this world, comprehending and receiving its completion from mortal and immortal animals, is thus rendered a visible animal containing visible natures, the image of an intelligible god, sensible, the greatest and best, the most beautiful and perfect; being no other than this one and only-begotten heaven.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

- Page 17, line 8. Instead of *or Myrines*, read, *or the same thing Myrins.*
line 9. For *Batica* read *Batica*:
Page 32, line 8 of the note. For *idiom* read *characteristic*.
Page 131, line 11. For *Batila* read *Batica*.

