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BY
ARTHUR HOLMES

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
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
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PRINCIPLES OF CHARACTER MAKING

BY
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"THE DECAY OF RATIONALISM," "THE CONSERVATION OF THE CHILD," ETC., ETC.



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
To

EDGAR F. SMITH

PROVOST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

WHOSE DEVOTION TO THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL
WELFARE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS IS A DISTINCT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACADEMIC WORLD FAR EX-
CEEDING MANY DISCOVERIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRUTH,

THIS VOLUME IS
RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED



FOREWORD

THIS book aims to be what its title implies. It is, in a sense, a text-book on applied psychology, with psychology in its modernized form applied to the most vital function of the home, the school, the individual and the nation.

It endeavors to see the subject of child-training from the genetic point of view. The child on his way to manhood is assumed to climb the stairs in well-marked stages. His modes of growth are definite and fairly well-fixed. He is neither plastic nor hard. He is organic, living, developing. He cannot be kneaded like dough, nor hammered like iron, nor carved like marble, but he can be guided like a vine upon a trellis.

To trace his stages of growth a beginning is made with the remotest origins of the individual. Back of the germ-cell and beyond to the time of pre-cell formations character is traced to find its sources. Heredity is presented, not as a terrible and determined ogre, but full of potentialities unpredictable. From this point of view efforts at child-improvement after birth are practicable and full of promise. Environment and education are the final arbiters of man's destiny. Ideas can exercise the controlling force in a man's life and conduct.

While the book is worded as nearly as possible in language any reader can understand, it is not therefore unscientific. The dominating thought in its preparation has been to make it usable both to parents and teachers and at the same time scientifically sound. It attempts to ground

its conclusions upon modern physiological psychology. Novel and only half-accepted theories in the psychological world have not been laid down as bases nor incorporated as necessary parts in the superstructure. At the same time, conventional and easy explanations by metaphysical dogmas have been avoided as much as possible. The tone, while tempered with scientific openness of mind, is optimistic. The work of the parent, teacher and society is set in bold relief and given the impetus of hope directed by knowledge.

Here let me add my thanks to friends for the advice and suggestion, and especially for the criticism and reading of the manuscript, without which help this book would probably never have been written. It is sent forth to do service for the millions of children in the land, bespeaking for them more intelligent sympathy from adults and a brighter life than they can ask or even think.

ARTHUR HOLMES.

STATE COLLEGE, PA.,
June 10, 1913.

INTRODUCTION

THERE is a widespread need of a clear understanding of what even the unreflective mind believes to be essential in the education of each individual. We have talked about moral education and we have endeavored in countless ways to accomplish the moral discipline of the individual. Some of these ways have been wise, others have not, and it is most important that we should come to some definite understanding of the meaning of education and the place that moral education has in the wider concept of educational endeavor.

In attempting to define the end of educational endeavor in the Republic, it is well to keep in mind the fact that in part the aim of the school is to prepare the individual for the widest possible participation in governmental functions. The interest of the State in education is primarily that of guaranteeing to itself, and therefore to its own perpetuity, an enlightened citizenry. It seeks to achieve this result by imparting to each pupil as effectively as possible the common elements of an approved education. These elements, expressed in the formal elements of the curriculum, are the tools of democracy. The keynote here is education for co-operation, to the end that the entire population may be able to think together and thus plan to live together under civil order.

In another sense, the aim of our educational endeavor is to fit each individual for the widest possible participation in the legitimate activities of organized society. To

accomplish this, it seeks also so to discipline the mind as to make it readily capable of a rational approach to the real problems of life. It also aims in this connection to inform the mind upon such substantial and fundamental matters as underlie all economic procedure. The keynote here is education for orderly co-operation, to the end that the individual may make a maximum contribution to the common good.

The school aims also to conserve the physical well-being of the individual: by securing proper physical environment during the school years; by systematic training in wholesome physical disciplines; and by imparting such a fund of practical knowledge relating to hygiene as to guarantee the continuance of this care by the individual as a self-regulated, informed unit of society. Knowledge must not be bought at the price of health. The keynote here is education for the conservation of the health and, hence, of the physical vigor of the race.

Finally, it aims, by its organization and administration, and by formal instruction, to establish such habits of reaction on the moral side as to establish the conduct of the individual, both as a citizen and as an economic unit above criticism. This moral phase of our education seeks to secure from each pupil courtesy, which is the virtue of the social life; and dependableness, which is the virtue of the ethical life. It also endeavors, as to be typical must succeed, in establishing in each pupil the crowning good of a humble spirit, which is the virtue of religion. The keynote here is a reverent regard for the rights of others and a wise orienting of the individual for right living.

It may, therefore, be claimed that the education provided by the Republic aims to establish a stable, enlightened

citizenry capable of performing satisfactorily the social, vocational, and moral obligations incumbent upon each citizen.

In this treatise we have set forth in order the principles underlying what is generally regarded as moral education. The Author has chosen a happy title, for, in the last analysis, moral education has no meaning worth considering unless it projects itself into the character and crystallizes itself into the activities of the individual. We are all fairly well informed as to what right conduct is, but we are not all impelled to follow right conduct. Our appreciation of it as an intellectual discernment is one thing, and our incorporation of it as a life procedure is quite another thing. The problem always facing the young is to elevate the plane of conduct to the plane of thought, thus achieving in conscience that which, without this, is purely intellectual achievement. There must be a lessening of the tension between the way the individual thinks and the way the individual acts. When this tension is not lessened by the elevation of conduct to the plane of the ideals entertained by the individual, it almost invariably follows that the individual forsakes his ideals and becomes merely a creature of impulse expressing itself in terms of conduct. It is always an unfortunate thing when the ideals of the individual, planted by the institutions of the school, the home, and the church, are not vitalized steadily and absorbed consciously in the actions of the individual.

Character making has not achieved its present work in the schools for the reason that there has been no common basis of accepted guidance and, what is more important, pedagogically, there has been no interpretation of these

principles into concrete specific terms within the reach of the child mind. We need a literature of moral material couched not only in the vocabulary of childhood, but also in the thought forms of childhood. This literature should be so suffused with emotional predisposition as to make it easy, if not necessary, for the reactions of the individual to be in harmony with the moral content of the material presented. There is to-day no more pressing need than the need for this type of literature for our schools.

Such material, of course, must conform in its quality to certain definite guiding principles, and this volume is a presentation in a definite way of these guiding principles. It is therefore the preliminary step to the solution of the most important phase of modern education.

The Author's wide experience as a teacher, and his scientific training, coupled with his extended research in applied psychology, justify the conclusion that this statement of the underlying principles in the making of character and, therefore, in the equating of conduct, is a most valuable contribution to the pedagogy of that part of education which ought to claim first place with all right-thinking people.

M. G. BRUMBAUGH.

June 12, 1913.

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PRINCIPLES OF CHARACTER MAKING

CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER.

The work of life is character,
The crown of work is worth.

The Necessity of a Plan and Purpose in Work.—

One day a brooding artist paced the streets of Jerusalem dreaming over the half-formed plan of a picture. Pensively he raised his eyes to a balcony at the end of the thoroughfare, and there, as clear as a tableau, the perfect picture appeared,—figures, colors, details, all as vivid as the fatal reality. An instant it tarried, then faded as quickly as it had come. But the instant was enough. The artist-soul had caught the vision. Home he hurried with its image clutched to his heart and transferred the “*Ecce Homo*” to immortal canvas.

What here transpired so dramatically is the essential process in every work of art. Before the sculptor astonishes the world with his palpitating marble, he has conceived his idea, brooded over it, limned it on paper, wrought its form in plastic clay, and when at last he stands before the block of stone, he knows to a certainty what image is to spring from it. Every chiselled statue, every radiant picture, every cunning invention, is first

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outlined in the airy and impalpable elements of imagination. "It is just as I saw it," sighed the invalid bridge-maker Roebling when they wheeled his chair to the window and let him gaze for the first time upon the link that bound an island to a continent.

Even so is it with all makers and builders. Whether the artist works in stone or iron, or in the delicate fabric of flesh and blood imbued with that mysterious thing called life, he must follow the same law. Nothing will more effectively mar the work of him who undertakes to build a man or woman than a confused or fleeting notion of what he is going to make. To his task he must come with his plan and purpose fixed, and, with this in mind, must work as worthily as the inspired artist who creates a masterpiece.

The Ideal of the Child-trainer.—What shall the ideal be? What shall the child-trainer make? Every one answers easily, "Why character, of course." This is the end and aim of all nursing, discipline, book-learning, culture, in the home, in the school, and on the playground. Whatever other good may reside in each particular activity, the end of ends, by which the whole must be judged, is character. That end must take precedence over all other considerations in deciding such general propositions as the system of education and such details as the particulars of discipline.

But this answer, so readily given, does not solve all difficulties. In fact, the problem is little more than proposed; or to be more accurate, it has only been roughly outlined. Of course, much is gained by formulating any answer whatever. So many child-trainers—especially parents—proceed along paths of Stygian darkness with no

guiding thought beyond having as little trouble as possible for the present moment with the young irritants, that too often come unbidden into the world to disturb adult ease and self-indulgent idleness. For such people to have any goal whatsoever is a great gain. The goal may be vague. Its exact location may be unknown. Its distance may be over- or under-estimated. Nevertheless, it determines the general direction of child-culture and introduces at least a slight modicum of consistence into an otherwise fitful training and arbitrary discipline.

The Child-trainer Must Have a Distinct Ideal.—

But for genuine results to come from child-nurture, the child-leader must have a far more distinct idea of his aim than that suggested by the hazy name of "character." Character means too much. It includes everything, and every variety of a thing, from the piece of paper held hopefully in the outstretched hand of the applicant for a position to the noblest product of some cosmic epoch. Inspiringly writers have written and grandiloquently orators have spoken upon the subject; poets have praised and preachers have exalted this essence of all that is counted most noble and desirable in man. Yet true it still remains that when the practical maker of character seeks a tangible, usable definition of what he is to make, or an idea of it that is clear enough to shape principles and methods of procedure, he is met with a bewildering amount of ethical and metaphysical vagueness. Such words as personality, temperament, soul, heart, essence, principle, quality, internal constitution, intrinsic worth, incarnation of ideals, etc., rise up readily enough, but as far as practical information is concerned, like the bubbles of a sodium spring, they end in bursts of nothingness.

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Emerson's Idea of Character.—This admission may seem inexcusable to some people. They will indignantly remind us of Emerson's splendid elucidation of the matter, and point to his clean-cut epigrammatic phrases that make the idea of character as translucent as water in a crystal globe. But let the reader pause a moment and analyze this abstruse "character" so brilliantly illuminated by the touch of literary genius. Unless I am much mistaken, he will find it receding to a mystical obscurity behind a pageantry of words. No man can see it, hear it, touch it, handle it. Yet in its presence every one instinctively acknowledges it by some subtle reaction in his own soul. It is an immediately intuited unknowable. To the reader of properly attuned emotional tone such scintillating suggestiveness gives abundant inspiration, but for the practical seeker of a plan by which to train his children it is as indefinable as luminous ether. The following lines illustrate the transcendental nature of Emerson's character, and incidentally, too, illustrate admirably how the very vagueness of an idea may be so clearly set forth that the reader fancies he is reading an accurate description of the thing itself, when in fact the thing represented by the idea does not sensibly exist.

"This is that which we call character—a reserve force which acts directly by presence and without means. It is conceived of as a certain undemonstrable force, a Familiar or Genius, by whose impulses the man is guided, but whose counsels he cannot impart; which is company for him so that such are often solitary, but can entertain themselves very well alone. The purest literary talent appears at one time great, at another time small, but character is of a stellar and undiminishable greatness. What others affect

by talent or by eloquence, this man accomplishes by some magnetism. Half his strength he put forth. His victories are by demonstration of superiority and not by crossing of bayonets. He conquers because his arrival alters the face of affairs. 'O Iole! How did you know that Hercules was a god?' 'Because,' answered Iole, 'I was content the moment my eyes fell upon him. When I beheld Theseus I desired that I might see him offer battle, or at least guide his horses in a chariot race; but Hercules did not wait for contest; he conquered whether he stood, or walked, or sat, or whatever thing he did.' Man, ordinarily a pendant to events, only half attached, and that awkwardly, to the world he lives in, in these examples appears to share the life of things, and to be an expression of the same laws which control the tides and the sun, numbers and quantities."¹

Such Character Cannot be Made.—You will note, when your enthusiasm for the exalted, kindled by the cumulative power of fine phrasing, has cooled to calm and practical analysis that the man of "character" owes what he is to a "Familiar," a "Genius," a Greek "daimon" or "demon." All that is splendid, and some heroes of history, like Socrates, who felt himself possessed by such a spirit, may have owed all their effect to that kind of spiritual essence embodied in their otherwise quite ordinary beings. But we who are parents and teachers are dealing with Johnny Joneses and Mary Smiths, who in all probability would not recognize a "daimon" if they met it anywhere, much less possess one in all their humble lives. Hence, while we find no fault with the inspiring message

¹ Emerson, Essay on Character.

of the New England prophet, we remain unable to use it for the norm by which to mould our common clay.

Character as Being.—One step removed from this transcendental conception of character, but equally impossible to reduce to the reign of law, is the “being” contrasted with the “doing,” so comforting to idealists. The pith of that idealism is voiced by Lowell in his lines so bold and clear:

The thing we long for, that we are
For one transcendent moment.

But he does not tell us that the longing will leave behind it a trace more visible than the track of a meteor in the sky or a ship in the water. Upon such transcendent moments, Browning, the metaphysicist in verse, has contributed words beautiful as strings of pearls.

What I aspired to be
And was not, comforts me,

he flings out like a banner to the breeze. Neither does he make it a momentary longing but fixes it forever, if not in this world, then in a brighter and a better one.

All that is at all,
Lasts ever past recall,
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure.
What entered into thee
That was and is and ever shall be.

While such aspirations do not transcend human experience as Emerson's character does, still they are contrasted in Browning's mind with their baser and more vulgar supplements, external actions.

Not on the vulgar mass
Called work must sentence pass,
Things done that took the eye and had the price,
O'er which from level stand,
The low world laid its hand,
Found straightway to its mind, could value in a trice.

Undoubtedly such stirring stanzas arouse in the reader's breast the truest motives to endeavor. Every word rings with encouragement. Not one good resolution is to be lost. The remotest and most obscure emotion toward the smallest virtuous act must forever work its beneficent will. "Think finely," is the message, "if that is all you can do. Dream noble dreams though the will is ever too weak to translate them into acts. Fear not; they cannot be lost. All are gathered up into that permanent matrix of spiritual life called 'character' and abide there forever safe."

Yet there is another mood, less poetical perhaps, and, we confess humbly, less inspired, but much more everyday and usable; a mood that calls in stentorian tones for a translation of high purposes into vigorous acts. After all, character, if it does but dream noble dreams, lacks something. The gossamer threads of the loftiest idealism will not sustain the weight of daily living. "Do or die," comes as a mandate of the real world. "You cannot dream yourself into character," says Froude, "you must forge and hammer yourself into one." And the forging and the hammering is just that "vulgar mass called work" upon which the world is so eager to lay its hand.

Character as Doing.—So almost reluctantly we turn away from the poets with their assurance of the eternity of our dreams, and even from our transcendental philosopher and his "Thinking is living," to that sternly morose

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but, after all, common-sense Scotchman, Carlyle, with his strident call to the calloused duties of this world. "Know thy work and do it," he cries, and when he thinks of those speculating Grecians, his Scotch temper gets the better of him, and he adds vindictively, "'Know thyself:' long enough has that poor 'self' of thine tormented thee; . . . Think it not thy business, this of knowing thyself; thou art an unknowable individual; know what thou canst work at; and work at it like Hercules! That will be a better plan." . . . And then having relieved himself by this ebullition, he brings us close to our subject by telling us how he thinks character is made. "Consider how even in the meanest sort of labor, the whole soul of man is composed into a kind of real harmony the instant he sets himself to work. . . . The man is now a man. . . . Labor is Life."²

Character as Scientists View It.—Which shall it be? Which shall it be? Doing or dreaming? The outer or the inner? In which shall we find the essence of true character? Well, I suspect that it resides wholly in neither, and that the epigrammatic finality of the apostle of work is as far wrong one way as the dreaming *dolce far niente* of the poet is the other. True character must be formed in a just and righteous balance between these two tendencies. With this hint we will leave the domain of poets and popular thinkers and turn to those who are avowedly scientific students of human character. A summary of several views by grave thinkers is given by Payot, and we cannot do better than to quote his own words.³

² Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present*.

³ *The Education of the Will*, Jules Payot. Trans. from 30th French Ed., pp. 30-33.

"The theory which considers character as unchangeable is false in itself and regrettable in practice. This hypothesis, set forth by Kant and repeated by Schopenhauer, is supported by Spencer.

"According to Kant, we have chosen our character in the noumenal world and our choice is irrevocable. Once 'descended' into the world of space and time our characters, and consequently our wills, must remain as they are, without our being able in the slightest degree to modify them.

"Schopenhauer also declares that different characteristics are innate and immutable. It is impossible, for example, to change the nature of the motives which affect the will of an egotist. You may by means of education deceive him or, better still, correct his ideas and lead him to understand that the surest way to attain prosperity is by work and honesty, and not by knavery. But as to rendering his soul sensible to the suffering of others, that idea must be renounced. That would be more difficult than turning lead into gold. 'We may convince an egotist that, giving up a small profit, he may gain a much larger one; or we may convince a wicked man that, by causing pain to others, he may inflict worse pain upon himself. But as for convincing them of the wrong of such selfishness and depravity in themselves, you can no more do it than you can prove to a cat that it is wrong to like mice.'

"Herbert Spencer takes quite a different view. He agrees with the English school that, under certain external forces, the human character can after a time be transformed along general lines by the force of external circumstances and varying conditions in life. But such work requires centuries. This theory is discouraging in practice,

because I, as a student, cannot calculate on living ten centuries. I can at most rely on only twenty years of plasticity. Even if I wanted to set to work on my own moral amelioration I could not do it. I could not struggle against the character and heritage which were bequeathed to me by my ancestors, and which represent thousands, and perhaps millions, of years of experience organically recorded in my brain. What could I do against a formidable combination of ancestors; as soon as I try to rid myself of a part of the inheritance transmitted to me, they array themselves against my feeble personal will. It would be unreasonable even to attempt insurrection. Defeat from the start would be certain. I may, however, console myself by dreaming that, in fifty thousand years, my descendants, by the continued influence of social environment upon heredity, will resemble so many perfected machines, wound up through the ages, and will grind out devotion, initiative spirit, etc."

Such Character is Evolutionary.—The more we consider these views of character, the more they impress us with a trait that renders them unapplicable for our purpose as makers of men. This attribute is their insistence upon the fixedness of character. It is something immutable, set, crystallized; or, at least, the individual, who appears as an atom in the mass of evolutionary material, is fixed and predetermined by forces over which we seem to have no control.

None of These Theories of Character Can Aid the Child-trainer.—All of the above-mentioned theories of character,—the transcendental, the mystical, the innate and therefore immutable, the racial,—all these offer no foothold for the man or woman who is confronted with the

individual child and the duty of making him into the best man possible. Either the character so described is not tangible, palpable, substantial, or objective enough; or else it is somehow located in that imponderable mass of on-moving hereditary transmissions which vary from age to age only according to the impersonal laws of mechanical evolution. On either basis one can imagine the hopelessness of commanding a trainer to make his charge into any other character than that already pre-determined.

Character and Personality.—Before coming to a working definition which we shall offer further on, it might be well to pause a little time to discuss a human trait often confused with character. Personality so frequently passes for character, because both may reside in the same person. The two are distinguishable. Personality with all the brilliancy of its attributes cannot always obscure the absence of solid worth. Probably the ancient Greeks offered as many examples as any nation of charming personalities and unstable characters. The classic example is Alcibiades, handsome in person, brilliant in intellect, talented in many directions, but dissolute and unstable to the end. Personality he had, but character—at least in the stern Anglo-Saxon conception of the term—he had not. His accidental juxtaposition at a banquet with the hopelessly unprepossessing but thoroughly noble Socrates furnishes one of the most dramatically epitomized contrasts between character and personality in all literature.

Into the home of Agathon, where he is uproariously welcomed, Alcibiades staggers, and is given a place at the banquet board beside Socrates, whom he crowns with a wreath of ivy as the conqueror of all mankind in the art

of conversing. Then he launches into his drunken eulogy of Socrates, declared by Mahaffy to be the most wonderful picture of that grand old Greek ever drawn, setting him forth, as it does, "in all his ugliness, his fascination, his deep sympathy, his iron courage, his unassailable chastity." Of this strong man's words Alcibiades says, "For my heart leaps within me . . . and my eyes rain with tears when I hear him. And I observe that many others are affected in the same way. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, but though I thought they spoke well, I never had any similar feeling, my soul was not stirred by them nor was I angry at my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading. . . . For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my soul . . . therefore, I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same, for I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me." ⁴

In these two men personality and character were contrasted as in no other two. One possesses all the charms of physical beauty and of social grace; the other drinks deep of the internal and spiritual. Personality is superficial; character has depth. The effect of both is immediate; the one is transitory and fades with acquaintance; that of the other is abiding and grows with friendship.

⁴ Plato, *The Symposium*. Trans. by Benjamin Jowett.

Character and Other Traits.—Character, then, is not physical perfection. Neither is it all mind in the sense of intellect. Neither is it mere emotion, nor “soul,” though it may possess both. Nor yet is it “strength of will,” which is merely one of its attributes, possibly a necessary one. It is all of these and yet more, for it is composed of all these elements mixed and mingled in a single individual in due and balanced proportions.

We have presented a wide though a hasty survey of what various types of thinkers have called character. All this has been done, not primarily for the purpose of criticism but in order to consider these views and then to gather up, if we can, the various strong points of each definition into a statement that will suit the purpose we have before us. That means not that we try to present a logical definition of character, but merely a practical, fairly definite ideal that shall act as a goal for us in making men and women.

Character Defined for Our Purpose.—The practical purpose of our task will now compel us to describe plainly and simply what we mean by character. It will also impel us away from the common tendency to place the essence of character in some metaphysical or transcendental entity somehow underlying and conditioning everyday behavior. Such entity may or may not exist. Into that question we will not go. It happens fortunately that the “psychology of character-making” can be well satisfied without delving into such mysteries. Neither will we be permitted to seize upon one element, or process, or trait, and make that the essential achievement in character-building. That is forbidden by the catholicity of our aim. Character as our end or goal of child-training must be as broad and as

inclusive as the idea of full and rounded manhood or womanhood, as objective as a man or a woman, as non-metaphysical as the phenomena of psychology, and as possible of achievement as the objects of ethics or pedagogy. With this appreciation of our needs, and with some knowledge of the impossibility of fully defining character, we offer this working definition: *Character is the total customary reaction of an individual to his environment.* By total we mean to include all he is internally and externally, his dreaming, his doing, and his being; by customary we emphasize the usual, habitual nature of his reactions constituting his character; and by reactions we seek to limit his character to those processes, physiological and psychological, which are aroused by stimuli from his environment, and which are open to observation and introspection.

A Broad Definition.—Broad as the definition is, it excludes some connotations. For instance, it does not consider the soul as a part of character; nor any “subconscious” personalities or selves, nor any transcendental egos or “unities of apperception,” nor, in short, any metaphysical or theological *residua* after qualities observable have been abstracted from. All these may have their places in other connections, and, indeed, in any complete consideration of character, but here, remember, we are considering only the psychology of our subject and not its entire implication.

Character, Thus Defined, is Not Superficial.—With these eliminations I am sorely afraid our subject has lost half its charm. It will probably be considered a superficial, unstable thing, stripped and destitute of draperies which make it so fascinatingly mysterious to many enthusiastic students. To the ardent soul such a definition

must come like a chill. It is particularly discouraging to those speculative minds who love to consider things "deep." The mystery is vanished. The impossibility of ever arriving at solutions is gone. Non-committal moralizings are replaced by plain, common, everyday behavior which demands instant and practical conclusions on manifold points. Well, be it so. Behavior, habit, muscular contractions, sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, volitions,—in short, total reactions,—these are the stones and mortar of which we are to erect our edifice of noble and enduring proportions.

It Agrees with Common-sense.—But, before the disgusted student gets out of ear-shot, let it be said that some problems are left. After all, this superficiality itself may be superficial. Character thus conceived may be all that everyday opinion upon careful analysis really means by the same word. Grant for a moment that character must and does imply an independent, self-existent, imperishable spiritual entity connected with each human being. Very well, who is concerned about that abstraction? Nobody, really. What everybody is anxious about is how the man Jones reacts inside and out to circumstances. When he presents a "character" to an employer, for instance, the paper tells what he has done, does now, and is likely to do. His employer wants to know,—not his transcendental *character*,—but how he reacts to the beginning whistle, to a novel piece of work, or an extra pile of correspondence; whether these give him a headache, or backache, or periods of peevishness, or act as stimuli to tap new sources of energy and make him buckle down to work with extraordinary vigor. Habitual reactions—fits of temper, blues, good-humor, attention to duties, regular-

ity, seriousness or frivolity, energy or slothfulness, lying, stealing, cheating, drinking, gambling, courtesy, and a thousand-and-one other so-called *expressions of character*—are what the great public is interested in and what brings the individual into harmony or into discord with his environment.

In all these, not the mythical substratum, but the customariness of the acts, is what is final in the last analysis. What we mean when we say “a man has character” is either that he *does* act so and so, or that he *will* act so and so, and we predict his future actions by the regularity or customariness of his past actions under similar conditions. Whether he really has some spiritual substratum determining his future action or not, is entirely immaterial. The fact that he *has done* predicts that he *will do*. *What* he has done presages *what* he will do. This is really all that is ordinarily and necessarily involved in the common usage of the word character.

Dewey's View.—This thought of the comprehensiveness of character is very well expressed by Dewey.⁵ He emphasizes the two-fold aspect and hints at the regularity of action as the essence of character which he identifies with “good” character:

“If we take the moral feelings, not one by one, but as a whole, as an *attitude* of the agent toward conduct, as expressing the kind of motives which upon the whole moves him to action, we have *character*. And just so, if we take the consequences willed, not one by one, but as a whole, as the kind of end which the agent endeavors to realize, we have *conduct*. Character and conduct are, morally, the

⁵ John Dewey, *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, 1891, pp. 9, 10.

same thing, looked at first inwardly and then outwardly. Character, except as manifest in conduct, is a barren ideality. Our moral judgments are always severe upon a man who has nothing to show but 'good intentions' never executed. This is what character comes to, apart from conduct. Our only way of telling the nature of character is the conduct that issues from it. But, on the other hand, conduct is mere outward formalism, excepting as it manifests character. To say that a man's conduct is good, unless it is the manifestations of a good character, is to pass a judgment which is self-contradictory."

Character is Made up of Five Classes of Reactions.—For the sake of convenience, and for our purpose, we will run the risk of seeming to be somewhat stiff and formal by dividing the total reaction of the human being into five kinds of reactions. The first of these are usually termed automatic, and consist of those actions like the heart-beats, which do not require stimuli external to the body to initiate them or to keep them going. The next are reflexes, those comparatively simple mechanical actions requiring some external stimulus to set them in motion. Neither of these two classes of reactions, though undoubtedly playing a large part in the character of any individual, will, because of their comparative fixity and imperviousness to ordinary means of character-making, possess much interest for us.

Of the next class of reactions, the very opposite is true. The instincts or instinctive reactions, those comparatively large and complex activities usually involving the organism as a whole, performed for some end not known to the actor, are the first, according to some writers, like Romanes, in which a mental element appears. The manipulations

of the instincts form one of the largest and most important problems in our task.

In importance the instincts rival even the ideational or voluntary actions which differ from them chiefly in the one fact that the latter are preceded by an idea or conscious purpose or end. These reactions are usually considered the most important of all by the orthodox moralist or teacher, who makes his chief appeal to the ideals for the purpose of suppressing the instincts.

The last class of the five comprises the acquired habits. In their perfect form they approach in their nature very closely to the inherited habits or automatic actions. They take their origin in instincts and in ideational acts, and ultimately reach the point where they seem to begin and continue their rhythmic course without any excitant external to the body.

Their importance in character is paramount. Their place we have already emphasized in our definition by the word "customary." In traditional systems of moral training, habit is everything. We have heard it extolled until, if we do not believe it is all of character, at least it is the *summum bonum* of individual endeavor. Yet no virtue resides in a habit *per se*. Some habits are good, some are bad. All save the organism extra exertion, but that is not always beneficial. Habit reduces the quantity, so to speak, of consciousness. Routine brings monotony, and monotony may eventually produce stupidity.

Three Leading Questions in Character-making.—

But after we have decided upon our notion of character one more item still remains. It is not simply character that we are to make, but good character.

To work out the plan of making such character, three

leading questions must be formulated and answered. The first is: What is the character-maker going to make? Second: Out of what is he going to make what he makes? Third: How is he going to make it?

The first question is one of morals and involves the science of ethics. We will discuss this question and its answer far enough to make the objective of the character-maker clear. The second question is biological and psychological. This we will take up fully and enter into the problems of heredity and psychological processes as deeply as a volume suitable for teachers admits. The third question is pedagogical, and this we will touch only far enough to illustrate and articulate the other two discussions with the pedagogical. The first question: What are we going to make? seems by its nature preliminary and we have discussed it briefly in the above chapter.

CHAPTER II.

VIEW-POINTS IN MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

The Popularity of Psychology.—Psychology, a study with a long development and a short history as an independent science, is to-day one of the most popular branches of knowledge. Much of this popularity is due to the practical applications of mental science to the art of teaching. Much more of it in recent years must be credited to the deliverances of popular and semiscientific writers wholly unacquainted with the real body of its doctrines. Like all realms of knowledge, long hovering in the twilight zone between superstition and science, psychology has become invested with its share of misconceptions and fantastic theories. Hypnotism, thought-transference, telepathy, psychic phenomena, spiritualism, and other half-illuminated domains wherein exact science has not yet cast its beams, are popularly supposed to be the favorite ghost-walks of this spirit-loving study. The mass of people, uncritical because of their simple ignorance, have accepted the ebullitions of heated imaginations in magazines and novels as the statements of cold fact. As a result, the word "psychology" is on the tip of every tongue making any pretense of culture; though, actually, people in general know as little of its real significance as they do of alchemy.

The Essentials of Psychology.—For our purpose it is necessary to give only the barest outline of psychology to bring out those facts and theories upon which we will

later base our theories of child-training. We must be extremely careful, since we are undertaking the practical and important task of building character, not to lay a weak foundation; nay, more, not to put into the foundation even one stone that will be doubtful, misplaced, or misfit. Hence, in suggesting a psychological basis for child-training, we will eliminate with a merciless hand all the fascinating and illustrious figments which have so wrought upon the popular mind, and will retain only the bare and solid body of accepted truths. If in the future new truths are added to the old, they will serve merely to truss and to stay what we have already built. On the other hand, such a proceeding may render our consideration wholly uninteresting to the mind that has been dwelling so long in the penumbra of psychological myths and fantasies.

Definition of Psychology.—The word psychology is derived from the Greek *Psyche*, which means a “soul.” This in itself is likely to lead astray any one possessed of little knowledge. For, unthinkingly, he will put into the word “soul” all the age-long theological and metaphysical suggestions of that word, forgetting that the modern meaning and the Greek meaning may be entirely different. Therefore, when he begins with the etymology of the word but finally comes to a true understanding of the subject he is very apt to exclaim, “What, psychology without a soul!”

The fact is that instead of beginning with etymology and searching for the meaning of mental science, we must begin an inductive search into the writings of accredited psychologists in order to find out from them what psychology really is. Such a process may be a little tedious, but this seems to be the only way of finding a definition. This

plan has at least the august endorsement of Socrates, who went about Athens, not indeed poring over musty tomes in libraries, but stopping people in the agora or on the public highway and demanding from them their conception of virtue. In the same spirit, if not by the identical method, we will glance rapidly through some of the modern authorities on psychology.

Omitting Spencer's clumsy definition and beginning with the older moderns, we have from Baldwin this statement:

"We may accordingly define psychology as the science of the phenomena of consciousness, being careful to include consciousness wherever and in whatever stages it may be found; or, if we emphasize, not so much the facts with which we deal, as the mode of our knowledge of those facts, and its entire separateness from abstract theory, as the science of mind as we know it."¹

With this Ladd agrees, saying:

"With the understanding then that the statement is only provisional, we define psychology as the science which defines and explains the phenomena of consciousness, as such."²

Sully amplifies these definitions:

"Psychology (from *psuche* soul, and *logos* reasoned account) is commonly defined as the science that investigates and explains the phenomena of mind, or the inner world of our conscious experience. . . . Psychology or Mental Science seeks to supply a general theory or

¹ James Mark Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology, Senses and Intellect*, 2d Ed., 1890, p. 8.

² George Trumbull Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, 1895, p. 1.

doctrine of this group of phenomena. That is to say, it aims at giving us an accurate description of the phenomena themselves in their main varieties, and a precise statement of the general laws by which we may understand and account for these phenomena.”³

Professor James expresses himself more concretely in his statement that

“Psychology is the science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings and the like.”⁴

Professor Wundt, the founder of modern psychology, says:

“Physiology investigates those sensations which are given us by sense-perception as bodily organic processes and as such make up a part of the surrounding external world. Psychology, on the other hand, seeks to give an account of the relations of these sensations which are given us by our own consciousness, or which we conclude from the life-manifestations of other beings, which are referred back to a consciousness like our own.”⁵

And again:

“Psychology has to investigate that which we call internal experience, *i.e.*, our own sensation and feeling, our thought and volition, in contradistinction to the objects

³ James Sully, *The Human Mind*, 1892, vol. i (Part I, Provisional Definition).

⁴ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. i, p. 11.

⁵ Wilhelm Wundt, *Gründzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie*, 1908, vol. i, 6th Ed. Introduction, p. 1 (*Principles of Physiological Psychology*).

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of external experience, which form the subject matter of natural science.”⁶

One of the simplest and best definitions is given by Miss Calkins.

“We may define psychology more exactly by naming it science of the self as conscious.”⁷

Out of these conceptions we draw several items of information. Psychology is not a science of the soul in the sense that it studies some abstract conception or some metaphysical entity loosely related to the body, but existing entirely independent of it. Psychology is a science of consciousness. It begins with consciousness and ceases when consciousness ceases. There is no psychology of sound sleep, but there may be psychology of dreams. There is a psychology of insane and idiotic minds; there is a psychology of religion, of advertising, of hypnotism, of psychic phenomena, of suggestion and of every other kind of conscious phenomena. There is no psychology of the “subconscious” if the subconscious means the self-contradictory assertion that the particular “subconsciousness” under discussion has no consciousness connected with it. Every human activity that sinks to the level of mechanical reflexes becomes a fit subject for physiology but not for psychology, or only indirectly so, and only in so far as that physiology affects conscious states.

The Field of Psychology.—Having now roughly out-

⁶ Wilhelm Wundt, *Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology*, 1892. Trans. from the German Ed. by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, 1894. (Par. 1, p. 2, Lecture 1).

⁷ Mary W. Calkins, 1910, *First Book in Psychology*. See also, *On Definition of Psychology*, James Ward, *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. i, Part I, 1904.

lined our conception of psychology we may turn to a further delineation of its field. Probably it has already occurred to the reader that if psychology is defined as the study of self-consciousness all of the phenomena of the universe can be included in its field. That is, if any one will take the trouble to analyze the external world he will find that the things of every-day life can all be reduced to internal or psychical elements. The solid substantial chair upon which he sits is ultimately made up of sensations,—color, touch, impenetrability, weight, temperature, sound when he lets it fall, and of other common-sense qualities. The most substantial part of his being—his own body—can be resolved into the unsubstantial fabric of a dream. Descartes, in his universal doubt, saw his body so resolved, and rehabilitated himself again only by positing the goodness of a God who would not deceive his trustful creatures, thus finding comfort in St. Augustine's phrase, "Lord, if we are deceived, it is by Thee!"

Illustrated by Color.—Probably color furnishes the best illustration of the unreality of what we ordinarily call the external world. Color certainly does not reside in a body. Every one remembers how the tints and tones of some spectacular stage exhibition vanished and changed themselves from red into purple, to gold, to green, to all the opalescent colors of the rainbow, merely by the manipulations of properly colored screens and lights behind the scenes. There, as nowhere else, one gets the sense of the unstability of color by which it demonstrates that it is not a permanent quality of a real material thing.

But beyond this fact that it depends upon light, and that in the dark all cats are black, in other ways color furnishes still more striking proof of its own subjective

nature. In certain diseases of the eye, green and red are to the patient exactly the same. A color-blind man will look at a cherry-tree covered with green leaves intermingled with brilliantly red fruit and see absolutely no difference between the fruit and leaves except shape. Both look green to him; and they look so because color does not belong to the thing itself but is manufactured by the visual apparatus of the spectator.

The same thing is true of every other bit of external nature perceived. Everything is ultimately reducible to sensation. How much of the sensation is given and how much is made, whether or not there remains a residual "Unknowable" beyond the pale of knowledge are questions we can waive. What we are now concerned with is the fact that all of astronomy, for example, since it is made up of sensations and chiefly visual sensations, falls within the scope of psychology. The stars of the heavens, the flowers of the fields, the birds of the air, the fishes of the sea, the animals of the earth from the tiniest insect to the ponderous prehistoric mastodon are each and all of them so many objects of consciousness, and though their peculiar study may be claimed by astronomy, botany, theology, and hosts of other sciences, nevertheless in some aspects they fall rightly under the domain of the psychologist.

How Psychology is Distinguished from Other Sciences.—Then how shall we define or delimit or separate psychology from other sciences? If it includes within its ken the whole universe, it annihilates itself, for what is the study of all is the study of nothing. Where shall the line be drawn around the peculiar realm of psychology? How

shall its field be definitely fenced off from the other sciences?

Probably the most popular way to define its peculiar field is to say that psychology deals with that knowledge which an individual knows, and nobody else in the world does know. Such knowledge begins with the sensations of one's own body. If I have a toothache, it is *my* toothache. Nobody can feel it directly. He may see my grimaces, he may look upon my swollen maxillary, he may hear my vivid description of a "throbbing, jumping, penetrating chain-lightning, absorbing pain," but every one of these expressions are mere signs or symptoms of something within myself. He may look into his own consciousness, and if, at the moment, he is a fellow sufferer, he may relate the symptoms of what he considers the same experience within his own cosmos; but still, all he knows immediately and directly is *his own toothache*. Mine is a peculiar possession and for the life of me I cannot connect it directly with the most tender and sympathetic fellow-mortal in all the wide earth. Even if, as Karl Pearson has suggested, at some indefinite day, nerve-grafting did become such a fine art that the particular tri-facial nerve fibre which is giving me so much trouble could be grafted to a similar trunk of my dearest enemy, the difficulty would not be overcome. For then instead of *my* toothache, he would become immediately and wholly possessed with *his* toothache; and I having once been set free from the painful bonds would be as utterly incapable of knowing *his* toothache as just a little while before he was utterly incapable of appreciating *my* toothache.

While for illustration I have chosen this striking and painful experience the same law applies to all our conscious

life. The fact is we do not know that anybody else possesses a consciousness. Such things, if they do exist, in the words of Professor Clifford, are to be called "ejects." In respect to our knowledge of them we are in the same position as we are in the case of souls in lower animals, consciousness in sensitive plants, Venus fly-traps and other organisms of nature, which are granted full consciousness only by the hylozoists. In short, psychology is the study of all that I directly and immediately know, hence Professor Wundt says:

"The second or empirical definition, which sees in psychology a 'science of inner experience,' is inadequate because it may give rise to the misunderstanding that psychology has to do with objects totally different from the objects of so-called 'outer experience.' It is, indeed, true that there are certain contents of experience which belong in the sphere of psychological investigation, and are not to be found among the objects and processes studied by natural science; such as our feelings, emotions, and decisions. On the other hand, there is not a single natural phenomenon that may not, from a different point of view, become an object of psychology. A stone, a plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, when treated as natural phenomena, objects of mineralogy, botany, physics, etc. In so far, however, as they are at the same time *ideas*, they are objects of psychology, for psychology seeks to account for the genesis of these ideas and of those physical processes, such as feelings, volitions, etc., which are only indirectly set in motion by external objects. There is, then, no such thing as an 'inner sense' which can be regarded as an organ of introspection, and as distinct from the outer sense, or organs of objective perception. The ideas of which psychol-

ogy seeks to investigate the attributes, are identical with those upon which natural science is based; while the subjective activities of feeling, emotion, and volition, which are neglected in natural science, are not known through special organs, but are directly and inseparably connected with the ideas concerned with external objects.

"It follows, then, that the expressions outer experience and inner experience do not indicate different objects, but *different points of view* from which we take up the consideration and scientific treatment of an unitary experience. We are naturally led to these points of view, because every concrete experience immediately divides into two factors: into a *content* presented to us, and our *apprehension* of this content. We call the first of these factors *objects of experience*, the second, *experiencing subject*. This division indicates two directions for the treatment of experience. One is that of the *natural sciences*, which concern themselves with the *objects* of experience, thought of as independent of the subject. The other is that of *psychology*, which investigates the whole content of experience in its relations to the subject and also in regard to the attributes which this content derives directly from the subject. The point of view of natural science may, accordingly, be designated as that of *mediate experience* since it is possible only after abstracting from the subjective factor present in all actual experience; the point of view of psychology, on the other hand, may be designated as that of *immediate experience*, since it purposely does away with this abstraction and all its consequences."⁸

Psychology, then, accepts the whole universe as its

⁸ Wilhelm Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, 1905. Translated by Charles Hubbard Judd, 1907, from 7th Ed.

field, but the universe viewed from one aspect only. The view-point is the individual, the self. The astronomer assumes that the stars twinkle and the stately planets go by absolutely irrespective of any sentient being in the world; the geologist pictures his Azoic world without the slightest question concerning its "real" existence. Of such starry and ante-zoic worlds the psychologist knows nothing save as they live in the consciousness of some sentient creature. The world for him begins and ends with the Ego. Self-consciousness is his stock-in-trade.

The Fundamental Assumption of Psychology.—Of course the psychologist does not deny the objective reality of an external world. Neither does he prove it. He begins, as scientists do, with a basic assumption or working hypothesis. This asserts, as the quotation from Wundt shows, that the internal and external worlds are really one at heart.

The scientific name for the theory is psycho-physical parallelism. A discussion of the theory would lead us into metaphysical disquisitions from which we would probably not emerge by the end of the volume, and from which we would receive no useful information for our practical purposes of child-training. This much only needs to be kept in mind: the body and the mind, or consciousness, are conceived as one with two different aspects, and we talk about the mind or we talk about the body, according as we are looking at the same thing from different points of view. The working principle that emerges is thus popularly and broadly stated: Whatever affects the body affects the mind; whatever affects the mind affects the body.

This is the Reform Principle of Educational Psychology.—Upon that principle nearly all the recent

innovations in the educational world have been directly or indirectly based. Modernized buildings, play-spaces, manual training, school-hygiene, school feeding, open-air classes, medical inspection for dental, visual, auditory, nutritional and constitutional defects—and a host of other pedagogical activities—have sprung from this prolific principle. How much moral education is really physiological education is just beginning to be understood. In olden times when a boy was bad they said, “He hath a devil.” Now they say, “He hath an adenoid,” and hail him, not before the disciplinarian but before the surgeon. But more on this subject later.

Varieties of Psychology.—Besides the meaning of psychology and its field, the various classifications of the subject itself are puzzling to those who are not acquainted with its history. Confusion worse confounded has arisen by confounding the “new psychology” with the “new thought”—just as if there was ever such a thing as “new thought.” Vaguely, of course, it is understood that if there is a new psychology, an old one must have existed. What the old was and the new is, and how they are related, is but dimly understood by those who are not specialists on the subject.

Manifestly this is no place to go into the history of the matter. Suffice it to say, that the old psychology is the one with which the people are most familiar. It dealt with the human soul, and divided that soul into intellectual, emotional, and volitional faculties. These were again subdivided into as many minor faculties as might be desired. The new psychology dates from about the year 1879, when Professor Wundt, of Leipsic, founded the first psychological laboratory in the world. The new psy-

chology differs from the old in that it does not deal with mental faculties but with processes of consciousness. The content of the new psychology is limited strictly to that which appears in consciousness. All the rest is secondary to it. The contents of consciousness are studied both by introspection,—that is, by the subject's looking in upon his own conscious processes and telling what goes on there,—and also by responses of the body to certain stimulations arranged for in a laboratory. Hence on account of the latter fact, the new psychology is called experimental or laboratory psychology, meaning by that that the information gained is the result of laboratory experimentation. How much has been done, how many hundreds of thousands of individual tests have been made, how these items have been statistically treated, marshalled, classified and reduced to general formulæ would be too tedious for us even to mention. It is enough to know that upon such a foundation psychology, as an independent science, is built, and only by this slow and laborious process can the living and interesting problems of the human mind find solution.

The Method of Studying Psychology.—This method, of course, places psychology—the real psychology—safely beyond the superficial efforts of mere speculators. Thus conceived and thus studied, it demands in order to produce valid results, not only a thorough education but likewise a perfect training in laboratory methods. The human mind cannot be studied in an arm chair, but must be studied by an apparatus-filled laboratory. Psychological conclusions must be based upon observation and elaborated according to a strict scientific method by means of the most abstruse and difficult mathematical calculations.

The Two Aspects of Psychological Phenomena.—

Yet one more distinction must be made clear (if the patience of the reader will bear it). This regards the problem of child-training with probably more closeness than any of the preceding psychological distinctions we have just enumerated. Generally speaking, all the psychological processes can be illustrated in almost any daily experience. Say I carelessly drop my hand upon a hot stove. A message immediately runs up from my hand to my brain. In the cortical cells, or gray matter of the brain, great commotion ensues. Certain vibrations, or certain chemical reactions, are set up, and these excitations are hurried forward by transmissive fibres in the brain to what are called the motor centres. Here again vigorous excitations are aroused, and these again are sent skimming along by outgoing fibres to muscles. The muscles contract and the hand is jerked from the over-warm stove.

This course, beginning with the incoming, afferent or sensory impulses, with the commotion in the brain, and the outgoing or efferent impulses, completes an arc. So far, all of it is absolutely mechanical and physiological but in no wise mental.

However, correlated with the commotion of the cortical cells in the brain is the feeling of painful heat. This is psychical, mental, conscious. Exactly what part it plays in the whole process is a matter of metaphysical dispute; but, as we have said, the physiological psychologist assumes that it plays a vital and necessary part. What we are just now concerned with is the two-fold aspect of this process: the impressive and the expressive; or, the sensory and the motor sides. The motor side is conduct; and conduct, as we shall see later on, is the chief element of character as we shall discuss it. Hence, the expressive

side of psychology will receive our largest attention. Incidentally it will be necessary for us to speak of perceptions, imaginations, memories and reasonings, but into the study of these processes and their development we will not go.

How Ideas Arise.—In order to leave no confusion about these processes let us say a word about each of them. The old psychology spoke much of the emotional, volitional and intellectual faculties. The new psychology has eliminated "faculties" entirely. It deals only with processes of consciousness. Consciousness itself is made up of sensations. Sensations grouped together in certain ways form ideas. For example, one looks at a piece of furniture, notes its shape, its size, its color, its weight; hears it emit certain sounds, and combines all these qualities into the idea "piano." So ideas come from sensations.

But not all sensations of consciousness come from the external world. From the various organs of the body certain sensory nerves run into the brain. These are constantly carrying messages to the cortical cells, and correlated with the action of these cells are certain sensations or feelings. When these feelings are grouped together in ways analogous to sensations from the external world, we have emotions, according to the theory proposed by Professor William James and Professor Lange. Emotions are never the cause of actions but are the result of actions. To put it in James' self-denominated "slap-dash" style, "A man does not run away from a bear because he is afraid, but is afraid because he runs away." So arise fear, hope, love, joy, hate, melancholy and all the host of natural humors which come to bless or blacken human lives.

Volitions are Feelings of Muscle-strain.—In a

similar fashion, the will no longer occupies its regnant place as an abstract determiner of the destinies of a man. This will along with the other faculties, making up the old-time psychology,—and even some modern character-making studies,—has been largely resolved into sensations. These sensations are feelings of muscular strain, and they come chiefly from the throat and its surrounding regions. That is why, when a man makes up his mind to an appalling task, he must take a deep breath, shut his teeth, set his jaw, clench his fist and stiffen every muscle about his body. The feelings or sensations, arising from various muscular contractions, are denominated volitions. If any man believes that independently of these contractions he has a will that he can use, let him try to make up his mind to some difficult and disagreeable choice without contracting even the minutest muscle in his anatomy. Let him recline placidly in a chair, relax his body from head to foot, and then, without even hardening the larynx, determine upon some high and holy line of conduct in the face of some deep-rooted and long-loved passion. Then he will discover how much of his “willing” is wrapped up with muscle-strain and how it happens that sick men, overcome with fatigue, would often rather die than make the necessary decision to save their lives. Ideas, emotions, and volitions, all like mental molecules, come from groupings of consciousness-atoms or sensations.

Summary.—Let us re-survey rapidly our psychological assets for character-making. The psychological principles we have laid down in this chapter are the stones and the mortar which we are to use to make a man or woman. We have limited ourselves, first of all, strictly to consciousness, and found that ultimately this content is composed of sen-

sations. Sensations grouped together in certain ways form ideas; grouped together in other ways, emotions; grouped together in still other ways, volitions. Hence in our determinants of character we will not be able to count upon any transcendental faculties, but will be compelled to work with the constituents of conscious life. Beyond this, one assumption we have made, namely, that the external and internal worlds are ultimately one. Hence we have deduced and roughly stated the proposition that whatever touches the body touches the mind, and whatever touches the mind touches the body.

With these few and preliminary statements concerning the general view-points of modern psychology, we will leave the subject, trusting that whatever points are still vague in the mind of the reader will be cleared up farther along by the practical application of these psychological principles to the making of character.

CHAPTER III.

THE SOURCES OF CHARACTER.

Inherited Character.—Helpless as the new-born babe appears to be, he does not come into the world entirely destitute. His beating heart is an automatic machine; his enunciatory cry is a reflex; his seeking, finding, and taking food is an instinct without which he would starve to death. The fact has been noted by philosopher, psychologist, and biographer. Professor Preyer,¹ the psychologist, one of the first systematic observers of childhood, quotes the philosopher Schiller as follows: "The human child seems to bring nothing at all with him, but [seems] to learn everything. In reality, however, he brings everything; or at any rate, far more than does the lower animal that creeps all complete out of the egg. But he brings everything in a miniature condition, because there is in him so much to be developed that in nine months of embryonic life it can only be prefigured in germ. So then in the progressive development of the infant brain, the maturing of tendencies goes hand in hand with learning—*i.e.*, with the modification of these tendencies by exercise." In a more popular way, Henry Drummond brings before us the importance of *heredity*. "Students of biography will observe that in all well-written lives attention is concentrated for the first two chapters upon two points. We are first introduced to the family to which the subject of

¹ W. Preyer, *The Mind of the Child, or The Senses and the Will*. Trans. by W. H. Brown, 1892.

the memoir belonged. The grandparents, or even more remote ancestors, are briefly sketched and their chief characteristics brought prominently into view. Then the parents are photographed in detail. Their appearance and physique, their character, their disposition, their mental qualities, are set before us in a critical analysis. And, finally, we are asked to observe how much the father and the mother respectively have transmitted of their peculiar nature to their offspring. How faithfully the ancestral lines have met in the latest product, how mysteriously the joint characteristics of the body and mind have blended, and how unexpected yet how entirely natural a recombination is the result—these points are elaborated with cumulative effect until we realize at last how little we are dealing with an independent unit, how much with a survival and reorganization of what seemed buried in the grave.”²

Character Acquired.—On the other hand, heredity is not everything. Armed as the baby is with inherited breathing and eating impulses, he would perish immediately did not beneficent environment furnish the first blast of air to his lungs, the food ready at hand to eat and the wherewithal to live and thrive. Drummond, as well as other writers, has noted the essential part played by this second factor in character-forming.

“In the second place,” he goes on to say, “we are invited to consider more external influences—schools and schoolmasters, neighbors, home, pecuniary circumstances, scenery, and by and by, the religious and political atmosphere of the time. These also we are assured have played

² Henry Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, pp. 253-254.

their part in making the individual what he is. We can estimate these early influences in any particular case with but small imagination if we fail to see how powerfully they also have moulded mind and character, and in what subtle ways they have determined the course of the future life.”³

“Thus what biography describes as parental influences, Biology would speak of as Heredity: and all that is involved in the second factor—the action of external circumstances and surroundings—the naturalist would include under the single term Environment. These two, Heredity and Environment, are the master-influences of the organic world. These have made all of us what we are. These forces are still ceaselessly playing upon all our lives. And he who truly understands these influences; he who has decided how much to allow to each; he who can regulate new forces as they arise, or adjust them to old, so directing them as at one moment to make them co-operate, at another to counteract each other, understands the rationale of personal development.

“Of these two universal factors, Heredity and Environment, it is unnecessary to balance the relative importance here. The main influence, unquestionably, must be assigned to the former. In practice, however, and for an obvious reason, we are chiefly concerned with the latter. What Heredity has to do for us is determined outside ourselves. No man can select his own parents. But every man to some extent can choose his own environment. His relation to it, however, largely determined by Heredity in the first instance, is always open to alteration. And so great is his control over Environment and so radical its influence over him, that he can so direct it as either to

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

undo, modify, perpetuate or intensify the earlier hereditary influences within certain limits." ⁴

No Real Line between Heredity and Environment.—So early in human life does the relationship between heredity and environment begin and so intimate does it continue, that to draw a sharp line showing where heredity begins and environment leaves off would be impossible. Rather than seek such a line or oppose these two factors of character-making as distinct forces, one working one way and one another, we should look upon them as two aspects of the same general process, so nicely supplementing each other in every period of human growth that one is impossible without the other. Dr. Thomson in his *Heredity*, in a paragraph headed "Nature and Nurture," points out this intimacy: "The fertilized egg-cell implicitly contains in some way we cannot image, the potentiality of a living creature. . . . If this rudiment is to be realized there must be an appropriate environment. . . . Surrounding influences . . . begin to play upon the developing germ, and without these influences the inheritance could not be expressed, the potentialities could not be realized. Thus the organic inheritance implies an environment, apart from which it means nothing and can achieve nothing." ⁵

A Logical Distinction.—But for the purpose of study and convenience of thinking it is well to make a logical distinction between heredity and environment. When this distinction is made, we naturally want to know next, what this heredity is, about which we hear so much in these

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 257-258.

⁵ J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, p. 6.

days of "eugenics" and "orthogenics," and the development of the individual and the race in general.

Hereditary Effects Thought to be Unchangeable.—

Like all terms used both scientifically and popularly it has many meanings. We will begin with the popular conception, and work toward the scientific. Most people dwell first upon the immutability of hereditary effects. They think of heredity as the power predetermining and fixing the destiny of man. To this source all those traits and talents are assigned which crop out in an individual in spite of his training and environment. When Verdi, destined by his parents for some more lucrative and respectable profession, opposes their will, battles with poverty, overcomes all obstacles to a musical education and finally pours forth the music of his soul in an "Il Trovatore," they say it is heredity. When a man born of good family with noble parents and the best of training, deliberately seeks the depths of immorality, they call it heredity. When a Judas, enjoying the most enviable moral association possible to man, is yet overcome by his love of money and encompasses the destruction of his Master for gold, it is heredity. Such a conception is expressed in many proverbs like "Blood will tell"; "A chip off the old block"; "What the cradle rocks the grave will cover"; and most strikingly in tales like Ibsen's "Ghosts," Zola's "Dr. Paschal"; in fables like "The Ugly Duckling"; in Disraeli's epigram, more forceful than true: "Race is everything"; in Herbert Spencer's more moderate dictum "The inherited constitution must ever be the chief factor in determining character," and in the hopeless view of a medical writer that "For the practitioner the concept of heredity is quite useless. . . . What is wrought out in the life of the individual can be

dealt with. What is due to the parents is unalterable." "This last," says a more equitable writer, "is the extreme expression of practical pessimism which many feel."

Heredity as All That is Born.—Many people think of heredity, too, as all that is born. With this goes the corollary from the other meaning, that what is born is necessarily fixed and unalterable, a view especially fallacious and erroneous. For, during the prenatal period, many forces acting upon the future of the offspring are as mutable and humanly controllable as bad neighborhood or moral discipline. They should not, therefore, be classed with fixed hereditary factors. Not only are the forces themselves not inexorably fixed, but the effects of such forces upon the individual born under their beneficent or malign influence are not certainly eternal and unalterable. A "born drunkard," for example, meaning by that term one born with an alcoholic tendency, or with some neurosis calling for a narcotic or stimulant, theoretically, at least, may be as open to reformation as a tavern-made drunkard. We know that some prenataally acquired diseases are curable. A disease by its very nature cannot be hereditary, for it is an infection, and theoretically it is entirely immaterial at what time the infection occurs. "A microbe cannot be a part of an inheritance."

The Scientific Meaning of Heredity.—Scientific exactness compels us to consider a long series of prenatal influences environmental in character and controllable in their effects, before we come to heredity proper. These intra-uterine forces may be divided into two classes, the mental and the physical. To the former belong all the conscious life of the mother—thoughts, emotions and volitions, her hates, hopes and fears, sorrows, joys and pleas-

ures, and those special events called maternal impressions, popularly accepted, but scientifically rejected. The physical causes include all prenatal injuries, infections and toxic effects due to the parent's indulgence in stimulants or narcotics.

Maternal Impressions are Not Hereditary.—With instances of maternal impressions affecting both the mental and physical character of the offspring old wives' fables and medical literature of a certain kind are literally alive. Dr. Copeland mentions a woman frightened by a rattlesnake who afterwards bore a son with a face and teeth resembling those of a reptile.⁶ One of the child's arms wriggled involuntarily like a serpent's body and the mere mention of the word "snake" was enough to throw him into convulsions of terror. And so one might go on quoting from antiquity to the latest newspaper yarn.

Undoubtedly, such instances will continue to engage unscientific minds who mistake *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*—after this, therefore, on account of this,—and who will allege the most striking and particular instances of such connections. Science, however, demanding impartial investigations into numerous cases with at least seventy-five per cent. turning out one way or the other will not be so readily convinced. Certainly, though, no scientist should carry the matter so far as the imaginary German professor who deliberately exposed his wife to the effect of ugly portraits and was chagrined to find that his daughter, instead of demonstrating a horrible hypothesis, grew up to be a disappointingly fair young lady.

Alcoholic Effects.—On the other hand, certain physical factors seem to have a very marked and certain effect

⁶ Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 1839, p. 98.

on the future character of the offspring. So numerous are they that it would be impossible here to give instances of all of them or even all classes of them. Toxic effects, especially those of alcohol, have been so widely considered and so much talked about that it might be worth while to mention one or two such instances, inconclusive in themselves, it is true, but nevertheless striking and interesting.

In the Mechanics' Institution, Manchester, England, the casts of seven microcephalic children are on exhibition. The father of the unfortunate boys was a tavern keeper, a dipsomaniac of the most inveterate order, practically never sober. The mother was a woman of average intellect. Of these parents, and under these circumstances the seven boys were born idiots with remarkably small skulls, due to non-development of the brain. Later on, through the father's excesses, the tavern was lost, and he was compelled to remain sober at least a part of the time. Under these new conditions a son was born who was normal in every way.⁷

Marcé tells of a man twice married who continually drank to the point of insanity. By his first wife he had sixteen children, fifteen of whom died in convulsions within a year of their birth, and the other continued a miserable existence as an epileptic. The second wife had eight children, seven of whom died in convulsions and one lived, though afflicted with scrofula.⁸

Though the whole matter of alcoholic inheritance is still under hot discussion, the general view is well and continuously expressed by Tyson. "There is reason," he says, "to believe that the children of alcoholics are not only more

⁷ Martin W. Barr, *Mental Defectives*, 1904, p. 106.

⁸ *Ibid.*

susceptible to the degenerate effects of alcohol, but also to other diseases, such as gout, rheumatism, syphilis, and diseases of the nervous system. Among the latter may be mentioned epilepsy, melancholia, dementia, and insanity.”⁹

True Heredity.—Facts like these compel two issues: we must not believe that all that is born is truly hereditary; second, we must push farther back toward the real origin of all individual life in order to discover true heredity. This origin, this very true heredity, begins where the individual begins, namely, in the fertilized ovum or germ-cell. “The embryo of the future man,” says Henry Drummond, “begins life, like the primitive savage, in a one-roomed hut, a simple cell. This cell is round and almost microscopic in size.”¹⁰

The Two Aspects of Heredity.—We have now reached an accurate physical meaning for heredity. The fertilized germ-cell is heredity, is also the individual, his character and his inheritance. At this stage all four are one. In this tiny circumference are encompassed all the ancestors a man may ever claim; there they have laid up his whole heritage; within this minute organism are compacted all the potentialities of his future growth.

Now, while this gives a perfectly definite meaning to heredity, and I am emphasizing it for good reason, still it does not wholly satisfy one’s mind. There seems to be something more to heredity. There is; and what it is lurks in that word “potentialities.” It seems as if there are two distinct varieties of things to be considered: first, the material cell, the physical basis of heredity; and, secondly,

⁹ Tyson’s Practice of Medicine, 1906, p. 1156.

¹⁰ Henry Drummond, The Evolution of Man, Lowell Lectures, 1893, p. 65.

the potentialities, or powers, or whatever they are, that proceed to mould that physical basis. Let us, while holding on tightly to the fundamental meaning of heredity as all that is contained in the germ-cell, look into the potentialities of the cell.

A potentiality is an inherent capacity for development. If nothing develops, there is no potentiality. *When* something develops, and not sooner, we know what the potentialities are. We have two questions about these hereditary potentialities. First, how did they get into the germ-cell? Second, how do they develop? We will consider the first question later. Taking up the second first, I believe that all of them will naturally develop by inherent force *if environment permits it*. For simplicity's sake, if nothing else, I look upon heredity as containing infinite possibilities of variety in human development. Any organism can come from a germ-cell. That one will come which environment permits; all the others will be suppressed by environment.

Heredity is the Name of a Relation between Generations.—Heredity then will be no more dangerous and threatening than environment permits it to be. It is not an entity, nor an evil genius, nor a hammer of the gods, nor a visitation of Providence. As Burbank well says: "Heredity means much, but what is heredity? Not some hideous ancestral spectre forever crossing the path of a human being. . . ."

"Heredity is not the dark spectre, which some people have thought merciless and unchangeable, the embodiment of fate itself. This dark, pessimistic belief which tinges even the literature of to-day comes, no doubt, from the general lack of knowledge of the laws governing the inter-

action of these two ever-present forces of heredity and environment wherever there is life.”¹¹

Positively and simply stated it is a relationship between generations, and the physical basis or the physical connection between one generation and another is the germ-cell. Professor Thomson puts it clearly in these words: “The organism and its inheritance are, *to begin with*, one and the same. It is easy to make this clear. Every living creature arises from a parent or from parents more or less like itself; this reproductive or genetic relation has a visible material basis in the germinal matter (usually egg-cell and sperm-cell) liberated from the parental body or bodies; by inheritance we mean all the qualities or characters which have their initial seat, their physical basis, in the fertilized egg-cell; the expression of this inheritance in development results in the organism. Thus, heredity is no entity, no force, no principle, but a convenient term for *the genetic relation between successive generations*, and inheritance includes *all that the organism is or has to start with in virtue of its hereditary relation*.”¹²

“What he has to start with” can be predicted only in general terms. He certainly has an indefinite number of possibilities. Which ones develop will depend upon environment. What they will be nobody knows absolutely.

But we have said enough about heredity and inheritance. If it is not now clear it will never be made clearer by the multiplication of words. What we want to keep in mind is that in speaking of heredity or inheritance as sources of character we must invincibly resist the tempta-

¹¹ Luther Burbank, *The Training of the Human Plant*, 1907, pp. 68, 81.

¹² J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, p. 6.

tion to stray from the germ-cell and all it contains in actuality and in promise. If we keep this one limitation clearly in mind we will have no further trouble with the concepts. Now let us turn back to a brief consideration of that marvellous organism, the fertilized germ-cell,—“the one-roomed hut” in which man first takes up his mortal abode.

The Germ-cells of All Mammals Appear to be Similar.—Henry Drummond says of it, “When fully formed it measures only one-tenth of a line in diameter and with the naked eye can be barely observed as a very fine point. An outer covering, transparent as glass, surrounds this little sphere, and in the interior, imbedded in protoplasm, is a bright globular spot.”¹³ Simple as this organization appears externally, its internal constitution contains truly wonderful possibilities. Inexplicable enough is it that to such a simple and humble beginning should be traced all the varied endowments of one human creature, but this is only the beginning of the wonder. For no matter how infinitely varied and how incomparable are the characters of the myriad sons and daughters of the human family each of them goes back for his or her origin to similar cell structures. In their beginning all men are equal. Nor does the marvel stop here. From this same origin must be traced the beginning of every animal of the lower orders. All things that breathe and move spring from germ-cells between which, in their early stages, there are no discernible differences of form or structure. This first remarkable affinity between man and all the rest of living things enlarges beyond all vision the unsearchable richness of hereditary possibilities.

¹³ Henry Drummond, *Evolution of Man*, p. 65.

"There is no good physiologist," Meckel, the physiologist, is quoted by Huxley as saying, "who is not struck by the observation that the original form of all organisms is one and the same, and that out of this form, all, the lowest as well as the highest, are developed in such a manner that the latter pass through the permanent forms of the former as transmigratory stages. Aristotle, Haller, Harvey, Kiemeyer, Autenrieth, and many others, have either made this observation incidentally, or, especially the latter, have drawn particular attention to it, and deduced therefrom results of permanent importance for physiology."¹⁴

"In form, in size, in composition," continues Drummond in his vivid and fascinating manner, "there is no apparent difference between this human cell and that of any other mammal. The dog, the elephant, the lion, the ape, and a thousand others begin their widely different lives in a house the same as man's. At an earlier stage, indeed, before it has taken on its pellucid covering, this cell has affinities still more astonishing; for at that remoter period, the earlier forms of all living things, both plant and animal, are one. It is one of the most astounding facts developed by modern science that the first embryonic abodes of moss and fern and pine, of shark and crab and coral polyp, of lizard, leopard, monkey, and man are so exactly similar that the highest powers of mind and microscope fail to trace the smallest distinction between them."¹⁵

"Even under the highest magnifying power of the best microscope," says Haeckel, "there appears to be no essential difference between the eggs of man, of the ape, of the dog, etc. This does not mean that they are not really dif-

¹⁴ Darwinian Essays by Thomas Huxley, 1901, vol. ii, p. 218.

¹⁵ Henry Drummond, *Evolution of Man*, p. 65.

ferent in these different mammals. On the contrary, we must assume that such differences, at least in point of chemical constitution, exist universally. In accordance with the law of individual variation, we must assume that all individual organisms are, from the very beginning of their individual existence, different though often very similar. But with our rough and incomplete apparatus we are not in a position actually to perceive these delicate, individual differences, which must often be sought only in the molecular structure."

How Individuals Get into Germ-cells.—If from these apparently absolutely similar spheres of matter come such a bewildering variety of after-products, such antipodes as a Napoleon or a peasant, a titmouse or an elephant, what causes the variation? What is there in these cells, what potentialities, hidden powers, unknown forces, molecular constructions, which bring about such diversified results? And further, to press this subject of origin to the bitter end, where did these forces arise, and how did they find their way into these cells? These are hard questions. As usual, when science is pressed for an answer regarding absolute origins, she stammers and falters and fails. However, there are a number of explanations offered for this particular phenomenon—explanations which may be classified as theological, metaphysical, and scientific.

The Preformation Theory.—During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even a part of the nineteenth centuries, the origin of every individual was explained by assuming that a miniature copy of him was already placed in the ovum. If a microscope of sufficient power could be invented, it was believed that in each germ the individual that was finally to emerge could be seen complete with all his form and

features in place. "But how," it is objected, "did the miniature get in the germ-cell?" Well, this question did not occur to a great many, for no fallacy is so common in the explanation of the origin of large things as that of assuming that they grew from smaller things—things so infinitesimal as to be beyond the natural and artificial vision of human beings. To many people,—amongst them some acute scientists,—it did not occur that the origin of the infinitesimally small miniature was just as hard to explain as the origin of the elephant or the whale or a mountain or a sea. When the question was pressed, some replied that the miniature was placed in the germ-cell by the hand of God. The preformation theory, as it was called, therefore allies itself very closely to the distinctly theological doctrines that the germ of life at conception is possessed by a spirit, which hereafter guides it in all the tortuous evolutions of its development, the spirit coming straight from God, its Creator.

The Metaphysical Theory.—The metaphysical theory rested the final origin of distinctive characteristics in individuals upon some force inherent in the nature or the substance of the germ-cell. Harvey, the discoverer of blood circulation, maintained that "the living creature begins in an apparently small *primordium* in which no part of the future offspring exists *de facto* but all parts *in potentia*," which amounts to nothing more than expressing in a laborious Latin-laden way, "We do not know how a creature begins to be." As one writer suggests, it is like explaining the movement of a clock by the principles of "horology," or the movement of a locomotive by an imaginary horse inside.

The Pan-Genesis Theory.—Turning now to the scien-

tific theories, we find two classes of explanations with a number of variations. One of these, the older, is called the theory of pan-genesis. All its variations have this in common, "they seek to explain the uniqueness of the germ-cell by regarding it as a centre of contributions from different parts of the organism."¹⁶ That is, to take a rather crude illustration which may not fit in all details, each organ of the body sends a representative to the germ-plasm to represent and perpetuate it just as each state in the United States sends a representative to Congress to perpetuate its part in the nation's life.

The Continuity of Germ-plasm.—The most recent theory and the one which seems to be gaining ground continually asserts the continuity of germ-plasm. According to its author Weismann, the substance of the theory is: "The splitting up of the substance of the ovum into a *somatic* part, which directs the development of the individual, and a propagative part, which reaches the germ-cells and there remains inactive, and later gives rise to the succeeding generation, constitutes *the theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm* which I first stated in a work which appeared in the year 1885."¹⁷

Again, to illustrate this rather abstruse and difficult matter by a homely illustration or two, we may say that the germ-plasm from which a new being springs in the body of its parent is like the old leaven, which a baker always retains to leaven each day's mass of dough. From the dough he bakes his bread for the day's needs, but retains some of the leaven for the next day. Then he makes

¹⁶ J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, p. 403.

¹⁷ Weismann's *Theory*, quoted in J. Arthur Thomson's *Heredity*, 1908, p. 415.

a new quantity of dough, stirs in the old leaven which leavens the whole lump, and disposes of the next day's bread, still retaining some of the old leaven. Thus from day to day the old leaven is retained and each new daily baking owes its origin to the continuous lump of leaven. Or the germ-plasm is like the curds always retained in the milk-jars of some African tribes, into which they pour their fresh milk each day and from which they daily take their supply of curdled milk, leaving, however, always a little curd in the bottom. So it is believed that in the body of each animal there is a living substance from which the germ-cells originate and develop. These germ-cells themselves develop into new individuals, but a part of their cellular substance, namely, the germ-plasm, does not develop into tissues of the body but remains with its original reproductive powers unchanged to form the protozoa or the ova of a new generation. How this continuous germ-plasm gives variety and distinction to individuals, is too intricate and speculative to consider in this place. For a fuller explanation of the theory the reader is referred to a few works noted below.¹⁸ Suffice it to say that ultimate changes in the germ-plasm are determined by imaginary substances seeming to do spontaneously or indescribably just what we want to have made clear.

The Real Origin of Individual Character.—In general, what shall we say of these attempts to find the real

¹⁸ A. Weismann, *Die Continuität des Keimplasmas, als Grundlage einer Theorie der Vererbung*, 1885; *The Evolution Theory*, trans. by J. A. and M. R. Thomson, 1904; Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, 1863, vol. i, p. 181 *et seq.*; Charles Darwin, *Variation in Plants and Animals under Domestication*, 1868; W. K. Brooks, *The Law of Heredity*, 1883; Francis Galton, *A Theory of Heredity*, 1875.

origin of an individual? Has biological science to-day no clear and explicit method for analyzing a human being into his final elements? Back through his physical development we may trace him to the time when he was a babe in arms, back farther through his prenatal life, and still beyond this back to the time when he was a bit of protoplasm. In each of these stages we can give a description of his development more or less exact. By means of staining fluids and microscopes we can gain a fairly minute knowledge of his earliest cell construction. But concerning forces which act upon this matter to mould it into its varying and variable shapes science can yet give no conception whatever. One of the fairest-minded writers thus summarizes the situation: "We have still to confess our inability to solve the old problems: How are the characteristics of the organism potentially contained within the germ-cells? How do they gradually find expression in development? What is the nature of the compelling necessity that mints and coins the chick out of a drop of living matter? What is the relative principle that secures the order and progress which, by devious and often circuitous paths, results in the fully formed organism?"¹⁹

The Practical Outcome of This Chapter.—Possibly the mind of the reader has been drawn so far afield in this abstract discussion that he does not see the practical outcome of this chapter. A few additional words will make clear what I have hoped to accomplish. First, we have traced the hereditary portion of character to its origin. We found our first stopping place at the germ-cell. That and all it contained actually and implicitly we agreed to call heredity or inheritance.

¹⁹ J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, pp. 413, 419.

Next we took up two questions: How did the potentialities get into the cell? And, What potentialities will develop? To the first question science is compelled to give a negative answer. We do not know how individual characters get into individual cells. This we do know. At present there is no assurance that the individual characteristics in any cell are put there by the stern hand of mechanical laws, which are bound to have their way in developing a certain individual in spite of anything anybody can do. "There is no such thing in the world," says Burbank, "there never has been such a thing, as a predestined child—predestined for heaven or hell." To the second question: "What potentialities will develop?" only general answers can be given. First, the theory may be proposed that only those possibilities that environment permits will become actualities. Secondly, and more specifically, statistical investigations show that certain racial, national and family qualities in certain combinations are likely to develop if a large number of children are taken. But here again science cannot predict what any individual child will be. All it can do is to try every conceivable surrounding and every method of education that parents, teachers and society can devise. When all efforts have been tried and found fruitless and the perverse criminal lies dead in his coffin, we can close the chapter of his mishaps by writing "Heredity" above his misspent life. But before that final event, to stamp any one individual whatever with the stigma of hereditary hopelessness is absolutely unscientific.

The Richness of Heredity.—This last statement is based upon the infinite richness of hereditary possibilities. Our Johnny Jones's heredity is not his father, his mother,

his grandmothers and grandfathers back to the tenth generation, but our Johnny's heredity reaches back through all the human family to his first father Adam, and then only begins. Back of these, through the countless millenniums of zoologic generations we must reach, and then we have not come to the end. Before us lies all the luxuriance of the vegetable kingdom and in all of its wilderness of magnificent growths we must seek the partial ancestors of Johnny. For in the beginning he himself, his heredity, his inheritance and his character are all one,—a germ-cell, like unto the germ-cells of plants and animals and human beings. Through an almost timeless evolution nature has worked and wrought upon this virgin bit of protoplasm, has poured into it countless impulses and has at last selected, how many of these no mind of man knows, and rendered them incarnate in the body of this Johnny Jones. What is born in him no mortal man can tell. What myriad possibilities lie dormant in this soul only the eye of the gifted teacher will believe. If, like Garfield, the teacher has the gift of second sight, he will feel like doffing his hat to every boy he meets, not knowing what marvellous power may reside under the bosom of that tattered shirt.

The practical result then, I think, of this biological investigation for the teacher and parent is, first, a clear conception of what heredity means; and second, based upon this my plea against predetermining the destiny of any single individual and the maintenance of an unfailing optimism regarding the ability of teachers to develop the innumerable mines of hereditary potentialities in any child that is given to them.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEREDITARY CHARACTER.

TURNING now from the ultimate origin of human character in the dim sources beyond cell-formation, we will follow the development of hereditary character, beginning where we found that true heredity begins,—in the fertilized germ-cell.

Germ-cell Structure.—Before the cell has reached its full development and is ready for fertilization, it undergoes some mutations of structure. As we have said before, in the case of all mammals, the cell is a spherical bit of clear protoplasm, in the middle of which floats a bright red dot called the nucleus. In this nucleus, so the present-day students of biology believe, reside the elements whose curious and seemingly purposive actions are fraught with so much importance to character.

Chromosomes or Color-bodies.—Besides several other microscopic bodies, in this nucleus are found those naturally invisible threads which readily take a stain and so appear clearly under a microscope. From their coloring properties they are called chromosomes, or color-bodies. Now, one of the significant discoveries of recent biology is the fact that the number of chromosomes varies with the different species, each species having a characteristic number. Hence, when they are colored by the stain and can be counted under the microscope the first distinctive characteristic emerges by which the biologist can predict not exactly what kind of an individual is to be developed from this germ, but to what species the individual will belong.

The Physical Basis of Paternal and Maternal Traits.—This alone would be an interesting fact, but it brings in its train another discovery even more significant to the student of character-making. In the first step of cell-growth the spherical nucleus begins to elongate somewhat and, with many other internal changes after fertilization which need not detain us, the following action of the chromosomes takes place. From the centre of the nucleus part of the male chromosomes and part of the female chromosomes move away from the others. Simultaneously with the elongation of the nucleus, a depression appears running all the way around the cell, making it look like a sack tied in the middle. Eventually the cell is cut in two, and in place of one, two cells exactly alike appear. By such means it is easy to see how part of the father's and part of the mother's traits may be mingled in each part of a new body. Here, then, we have a physical basis for that well-known appearance of mingled paternal and maternal traits in sons and daughters.

Cell Development.—Interesting as this cell division, and especially the distribution of the chromosomes are in themselves, they are not at all comparable to the profound and marvellous transformations of the embryo during the six short weeks before it takes upon itself the form of a human being. Cell division continues until a globular mass of cells is formed; then probably because the innermost ones cannot absorb enough nutriment, a small core of clear liquid appears in the centre. This gradually enlarges until instead of a globular mass we have only a shell of cells filled with a clear watery fluid. On one side an indentation next appears, just as when some one begins to compress a rubber ball with his thumb. This inden-

tation progresses until instead of a hollow sphere we have a cup-shaped hemisphere, like that formed by pressing the ball until the two sides meet.

How the Human Takes on Human Form.—Now begin in earnest those transformations the wonder and delight of all who have been fortunate enough to watch the process through a microscope. No description of them can surpass the vivid and enthusiastic pen-picture given by Drummond.

Drummond's Description.—"But the evolutionist sees concentrated into these few months the labor and progress of incalculable ages. Here before him is the entire stretch of time since life first dawned upon the earth; and he watches the nascent organism climbing to its maturity, he witnesses a spectacle which for strangeness and majesty stands alone in the field of biological research. In all this, for a long time, there is nothing the least like man. What he sees is a succession of animal forms, of strange inhuman creatures emerging from a crowd of still stranger and still more inhuman creatures—a vast procession of the lower forms of life. And it is only after a prolonged and unrecognizable series of metamorphoses that they culminate in some faint semblance of an image of one of the newest yet the oldest of created things. It is an amazing and almost incredible story. In the successive transformations of the human embryo, there is visible, actual, physical representation of part of the life history of the world. Human embryology is a condensed zoology, a recapitulation and epitome of the main chapters in the natural history of the world. . . .

"After the early stages of human development are passed, the transformations become more definite, and

the features of the contributory animals more recognizable. Here, for example, is a stage in which the embryo in its anatomical characteristics resembles that of the Vermes or Worms. As yet there is no head, nor neck, nor backbone, nor waist, nor limbs, a roughly cylindrical headless trunk—that is all that stands for the future man. One by one the higher Invertebrates are left behind, and then occurs the most remarkable change in the life-history. This is the laying down of the line to be occupied by the spinal chord, the presence of which henceforth will determine the place of Man in the Vertebrate sub-kingdom. . . .

“We are not nearly half-way up the ascent yet, but the outline of the marvellous process will be seen. Up to this point man is but a first rough draft, an almost formless lump of clay. As yet there is no distinct head, no brain, no jaws, no limbs; the heart is imperfect, the higher visceral organs are feebly developed, everything is elementary. But gradually new organs loom in sight, old ones increase in complexity. By a magic which has never yet been fathomed the hidden Potter shapes and reshapes the clay. The whole grows in size and symmetry. Resemblances, at this time to the embryos of the lower vertebrate series, flash out as each new step is attained; first, the semblance of the Fish, then the Amphibian, then the Reptile, last the Mammal. Of these great groups the leading embryonic characters appear as in a moving panorama, some of them pronounced and unmistakable, others mere sketches, suggestions, likeness of infinite subtlety. At last the true Mammalian emerges from the crowd. Far ahead of all this stage stand out three species—the Tailed Catarrine Ape, the Tailless Catarrine Ape, and last, differing physically

from these mainly by an enlargement of the brain and a development of the larynx—Man.”¹

Huxley's Description.—The process is somewhat more coldly treated, though without essential modification of the above facts, by Huxley. Quoting a German physiologist, he begins: “Meckel proceeds to exemplify the thesis, that the lower forms of animals represent stages in the course of the development of the higher, with a large series of illustrations. . . . From the lower vertebrates to the highest, and to the highest forms among these, the comparison between the embryonic conditions of the higher animals and the adult states of the lower can be more completely and thoroughly instituted than if the survey is extended to the Invertebrata, inasmuch as the latter are in many respects constructed upon an altogether too dissimilar type; indeed they often differ from one another far more than the lowest does from the highest Mammal; yet the following pages will show that the comparison may also be extended to them with interest. In fact, there is a period when, as Aristotle long ago said, the embryo of the highest animal has the form of a mere worm; and, devoid of internal and external organization, is merely an almost structureless lump of polype substance. Notwithstanding the origin of organs, it still for a certain time, by reason of its want of an internal bony skeleton, remains worm and mollusk, and only later enters into the series of Vertebrata, although traces of the vertebral column even in the earliest periods testify its claim to a place in that series.”²

¹ Henry Drummond, *The Evolution of Man*, Lowell Lectures, 1893, p. 65, ff.

² *Darwiniana Essays*, T. H. Huxley, 1901, vol. ii, pp. 218, 219.

The Human Embryo Passes through Animal Stages.—This fact stands out indisputably true. The human embryo goes through stages analogous to the orders of the lower animals. This process is sometimes designated as embryological recapitulation. Such a relation between human beings and the lower animals would seem *prima facie* to betoken a closeness of kin far more intimate and vital than that indicated by the almost interminable processes of ascending evolution, though, of course, the truth of one theory is vouchsafed by the other. Still, even though it be admitted that the human being *passes through* these stages the still more absorbing question is: Does he carry any vestiges of this transmigration into his human existence?

Physical Remnants of Animal Stages.—First, of the physical remnants of his embryological stages, Drummond says:

“As the embryo unfolds, one by one these animal actors come upon the stage, file past in phantom-like procession, throw off their drapery and dissolve into something else. Yet as they vanish each leaves behind a vital portion of itself, some original and characteristic memorial, something itself hath made or won, that perhaps it alone could make or win . . . to be the inheritance of the race. . . . Nature husbands all it gains. A momentum won is never lost. Each platform reached by the human embryo in its upward course represents the embryo of some lower animal which in some mysterious way has played a part in the pedigree of the human race, which haply has itself long since disappeared from off the earth, but is now and forever built into the inmost being of man.”

Character Remnants of Animal Stages.—Still we

have not come to the heart of the matter yet. Admitting that any particular boy does go through these various stages and does carry with him through life vestigial remains of his embryological experiences, what have these to do with his character? Do these rudimentary appendages have any more to do with his mental make-up than the splashes of mud on his clothes or the demure color of his eye after an interesting engagement with a fellow-pupil? Do not all these purely physical attributes pass away and leave no visible traces upon his mental being?

Our definition of character must here be recalled. Character is a total reaction and not a mental fragment. If any physical trace of any experience whatever remains over it is fair to assume that it will have *some* bearing upon the total after-reactions of the individual.

But further, let us recall also the fundamental assumption of physiological psychology. It assumes a most intimate relation between body and mind. If, then, certain physical remnants of prehistoric stages abide in the form of embryological vestiges, it would be not wholly unreasonable to argue *a priori* that we may expect also some mental remnants of these experiences to remain. We are already prepared to agree with Maudsley when he says: "Every child is the heir of the ages in that it possesses a potentiality of all that man hath done of good or evil."³

Evidence from Idiocy.—Happily we are not left altogether to speculation about this matter. The intimacy of the connection between physical remains of the prenatal period and mental and moral character is well illustrated by examples taken from the studies of biology and psychology.

³ H. Maudsley, *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, 1876.

The theory of parallelism between individual and racial development, hinted at by Agassiz and Von Baer, enunciated by Fritz Muller, and since elaborated by Balfour, Marshall and many others, is expanded into the parallelism between the physical and the mental development of children. Drummond,—to quote our oft-quoted authority once more,—in his *Ascent of Man*, most clearly sees and states the necessary animal characters through which the growing human passes. “The mind of a child, in short, is to be treated as an unfolding embryo; and just as the embryo of the body recapitulates the long life-history of all bodies that led up to it, so this subtler embryo in running its course through the swift years of early infancy runs up the psychic scale through which, as evidence from another field will show, mind probably evolved. . . . Now each phase of mental development in the child is also permanently represented by some species among lower animals, by idiots, or by the mind of some existing savage.” And the same progress is true, not only of purely intellectual processes, but also of the emotions. “These emotions, as already hinted, appear in the mind of the growing child *in the same order as they appear on the animal scale.*”

As he further acutely suggests, idiocy furnishes clear examples of retarded mentality linked with retarded physical growth. Seguin, the first great authority upon the education of idiots, notes this correlation in the following significant words: *

“At a time when a deficiency takes place it stops the foetal progress and gives permanency to the transitory type through which the foetus was passing; these

* Edw. Seguin, *Idiocy*, 1866, p. 40.

transient types being to some extent analogous to the persistent forms in lower animals. For instance, the *atresia palpebrarum* testifies to the presence of the cause of arrest of development of the inter-auricular septum which leaves the human heart homologous with the heart of fishes; similar early arrest in the nutrition of the encephalon leaves its circumvolutions unfinished at the low types of the orang-outang, the calf, or even lower."

Evidence from Mongolianism.—Another example of general physical arrest accompanied with mental deficiency is presented by the so-called Mongolian idiots. These children advance far beyond any animal stage but remain in a state analogous to that of primitive man. The child so afflicted belongs to another age, another race, another clime. He is as one born out of due time. Though his parentage may be of the purest Aryan stock—American or European—he comes into the world with the black hair, brachycephalic, oval skull, yellow skin, slant eyes, flat nose, thick lips and shortened stature of the unfinished Mongolian. His brain does not grow, his mind remains undeveloped, and though his parents may be intellectually capable, he remains an idiot and his unfinished frame early succumbs to the diseases of our day. All this is due to some mysterious cause which operates to check this primitive child's growth at a stage millenniums ago passed by the twentieth-century man. Though not exhibiting any anomalies of the lower animals such a being exhibits comprehensively the close correlation between an *intra-uterine* stoppage at a lower stage of physical growth and the concomitant mental arrest.

Evidence from Cretinism.—In both of the above examples the nervous system in general and the brain in par-

ticular were affected. Between these types of physical arrest and mental deviation it is easy to see an immediate relation. The next instance is a striking illustration of the highly important rôle played by a non-nervous, comparatively unimportant organ in making mentality. It proves both negatively and positively, both by the absence and the presence of organs similar to those in lower animals, the vital effect of apparently remote non-neural physiological functions upon human character.

In a peculiar form of idiocy called cretinism, the individual so affected does not grow physically or mentally, but remains a dwarf both in mind and body. He is short, stout, with sparse wiry hair, eyes apparently sunken in fat, broad nose, heavy mouth, a guttural raucous voice, which he uses only in monosyllabic words, first when he is eight or nine years old. He is unable to walk, or to play, to dress himself, eat as other children until late in life, and will never be able to learn even the rudiments of reading, writing, or arithmetic, but must always remain in the darkness and stupidity of the idiotic world.

For a long time the cause of this condition was not known. Lately, however, it has been discovered that such individuals suffer from no other defect than the absence or the non-functioning of the thyroid gland,—a ductless gland situated in the neck, considered for a long time to be of no particular importance and classed as a vestige of some evolutionary stage. The indispensable nutritional part played by this obscure gland in the psychophysical development of man, and likewise the identity of function performed by a similar organ in one of the lower animals, is witnessed conclusively by the fact that when a child suffering from cretinism is given powdered doses of the

thyroid gland of a sheep, he soon begins to lose his bestial character, grows physically and mentally sometimes at a startling rate, and, in some cases, if the feeding is begun early enough and kept up continually, reaches a mental capacity that is indistinguishable from that of a normal man. Of course we do not wish to go the extravagant length of asserting that a human soul can be manufactured from the thyroid gland of a sheep, but in the light of such experience as this and of the other illustrations given above, we do wish to suggest the recognition of a closer and more significant relation between human character and embryonic stages than the ordinary teacher or parent is in the habit of assuming.

The Meaning of Embryology for the Teacher.—

To come back, therefore, from our incursion into the realm of pathological psychology, let us see what significance this may have for Boyville. What bearing does all this have upon our irrepressible Johnny Jones? Just this. A boy is not only and merely the product of a genealogy traced back to William the Conqueror, nor is he the latest and most finished product of an evolution going back to a primitive germ-plasm identical with that of the apes, but the startling fact for father and mother and teacher to dwell upon is that our Johnny *was* quite recently a worm, a fish, a frog, an ape; or, at least, that he has just passed through stages of organization analogous to those of these animals. If, through countless generations of culture, human beings have not been able to eliminate this physical series of animal stages, can they expect the boy to escape the later culture stages after he is born and leap at once into a modern paragon of perfection?

Yet the mere physical cousinship with lower animals

is not the really vital or significant part. This twentieth-century youngster has not only gone through these stages but remains of his experiences still cling to him in signs as plain to the eye of the biologist and psychologist as the rents in his clothes after one of his peculiarly strenuous wrestlings with an obstreperous briar-patch. Shall we be surprised, when he runs away, to find him making for the water? Will he not love to wade? to swim? to glory in the element for which his nascent organism was one time fitted? For, was he not a fish? Will it presage any adult degeneracy to find him wallowing in the mud? Was he not an amphibian? And shall it strike his mother's heart dumb with the terror of the inexplicable to find him hanging head down from the limb of a tree? Was he not once an ape?

The Vestiges of Animal Stages Affect the Self.—Later on we shall see that the "self," or empirical ego, is a complex of organic sensations. These feelings come surging up into consciousness from various organs of the body. This self cannot possibly escape the coloring received from the feelings arising in vestigial organs remaining from prehistoric and prenatal modes of development. The significance of this coloring will appear more fully in the chapters on the "The Self" and "The Will."

Laws of Heredity.—Besides these strange and far-flung affinities with the lower animals the inheritance of the child is determined also and in a larger way by his human relations. There are certain laws of heredity and certain modes of inheritance.

The first law is that of Uniformity, expressed in the familiar phrase "Like begets like," or, more cautiously, "Like tends to beget like." This states nothing more than

the well-known fact that children bear strong resemblances to their parents, and these resemblances, to be strictly hereditary, must be between filial and parental characteristics inherited and not acquired by the parents; for the transmission of acquired characteristics is not yet verified.

Law of Similarity Illustrated by Idiocy.—Nowhere in human inheritances does this law manifest itself with such regularity as among mental defectives of the feeble-minded type. According to writers like Dr. Barr at least 66 per cent., and according to Dr. Tredgold, 80 per cent. or 90 per cent., of the idiocy of the world can be attributed to hereditary taints. Some of the physicians of the Royal Commission make it even higher, asserting that all feeble-mindedness is an inheritance.⁵ The transmission appears to be entirely independent of environment. Such children can be early transposed to the most salubrious surroundings and put under the best training and yet the fatal law holds for their children and children's children.

The Jukes and the Ishmaelites.—The classic examples of heredity and environment combined are furnished by the well-known Jukes⁶ and the Ishmaelites.⁷ These two families exhibit every gradation and variety of criminal, pauper, and imbecile heredity intensified and nourished to luxuriant viciousness by a perfectly congenial social inheritance. The mere summary of the Jukes statistics is appalling enough. From one lazy, good-for-nothing vagabond, nick-named Jukes, born about the beginning of the eighteenth century, through his two sons who married

⁵ Mental Defectives, Martin W. Barr; Amentia, A. F. Tredgold; Report of Royal Commission, 1904, vol. viii.

⁶ Richard Dugdale, *The Jukes*, 1878.

⁷ Oscar C. McCulloch, *The Tribe of Ishmael*, 1891.

into a family of five degenerate daughters, came seven generations (including Jukes himself) numbering about 1200 persons. Of these 709 were traced by Dugdale who followed them through every degree of idleness, pauperism, viciousness, lewdness, criminality, disease, insanity, and idiocy known to the human family. Of the total seven generations about 300 children died in infancy (for which we can murmur devout thanks); 310 were professional paupers kept in almshouses, a total of 300 useless and wasted years; 440 were physically wrecked by their own weaknesses; more than one-half the women fell into prostitution; 130 were convicted criminals; 60 were thieves; 7 were murderers; only 20 learned a trade, 10 of these while in state prisons; and altogether they cost the State of New York \$1,250,000, and their terrible account with society, according to last reports, still mounting up.

Dr. Winship has prepared a most striking contrast between the Jukes' generations and those of Jonathan Edwards. In 1900 the latter had "1394 descendants, of whom 295 were college graduates; 13 presidents of our greatest colleges; 65 professors in colleges, besides many principals of other important educational institutions; 60 physicians, many of whom were eminent; 100 and more clergymen, missionaries, or theological professors; 75 were officers in the army and navy; 60 prominent authors and writers, by whom 135 books of merit were written and published and 18 important periodicals edited; 33 American states and several foreign countries, and 92 American cities and many foreign cities have profited by the beneficent influences of their eminent activity; 100 and more were lawyers, of whom one was our most eminent professor of law; 30 were judges; 80 held public office, of whom one was

vice-president of the United States; 3 were United States senators; several were governors, members of Congress, framers of state constitutions, mayors of cities, and ministers of foreign courts; one was president of the Pacific Mailship Company; 15 railroads, many banks, insurance companies, and large industrial enterprises have been indebted to their management. Almost if not every department of social progress and of the public weal has felt the impulse of this healthy and long-lived family. It is not known that any one of them was ever convicted of a crime.”^s

The recent account given by Dr. Goddard, of Vineland, New Jersey, of the Kallikak Family, illustrates most admirably the double-edge of the hereditary sword. Somewhere back in Revolutionary days, a normal man had an illegitimate child by a feeble-minded girl. From that unfortunate union came 480 descendants, only 46 of whom were known to be normal. The rest presented an unsavory variety of criminals, feebleminds, and degenerates. Thirty-six were illegitimate children, 82 died in infancy, 3 were epileptics, 3 were criminals, 33 were prostitutes, 8 keepers of houses of prostitution, 24 were confirmed alcoholics, and 102 were unknown or doubtful cases.

The same young colonial, ancestor of this blackened line, later married a normal woman. From this normal pair came 496 descendants. All of them were mentally normal except one who became insane; and all were morally upright except two: one a drunkard and one sexually loose. Only fifteen died in infancy. There were among them no illegitimates, no feeble-minded, no epileptics, and no crim-

^s Wm. E. Kellicott, *The Social Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 187-188.

inals. Respectable members of many professions were found among them: doctors, lawyers, judges, educators, traders, and landholders.⁹

This is a remarkable case of hereditary effect, for in a limited extent it was a controlled experiment as far as our usual social conditions can make it. It shows terribly and admirably the potentialities for good and for evil that reside in one being and how these potentialities can be turned to the right side or the wrong by mating.

The Law of Diversity.—The second so-called law of heredity is diversity. No offspring is exactly like either of its parents. "For several reasons," says Thomson, "for instance, because the new life usually springs from a fertilized ovum which combines maternal and paternal contributions—the child is never quite like its parents."

Yet these two laws of heredity—uniformity and diversity—are not laws set in opposition. They do not signalize two opposing forces. "Living beings do not exhibit unity and diversity, but unity in diversity. These are not two facts, but one. The fact is the individuality in kinship of living beings. Inheritance and variation are not two things, but two imperfect views of a single process."¹⁰ All the diversities may be due to omission of parental traits or to the descended traits of more remote ancestors. "Much obscurity of thought has been due to the false antithesis between heredity and variation," says Thomson.

⁹ Henry Goddard, *The Kallikak Family*, 1912. For other readable studies of heredity and character see *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, C. B. Davenport, 1911; *Heredity and Eugenics*, lectures by several authors, 1912.

¹⁰ W. K. Brooks, *Heredity and Variations*, *Logical and Biological Proceedings American Philosophy*, Section XLV, No. 182, p. 71.

“When we say that like tends to beget like, that offspring tend to resemble their parents and ancestors, we are stating a fact of life. But when we speak of an opposition between a force or principle of heredity, securing resemblance between offspring and their parents, and a tendency to variability which makes offspring different from their parents, we are indulging in verbiage. . . . The inheritance which was expressed in the development of the parent may be almost identical with the inheritance which is expressed in the development of the offspring, but in most cases the inheritance does not persist in this intact way from generation to generation, and then we speak of variation. The contrast is not between heredity and variation, but between inertia and change, between continuity of persistence and novelty or mutation, between completeness of hereditary resemblance and incompleteness of hereditary resemblance.”¹¹

The Law of Diversity Reduced to the Law of Uniformity.—The fact is that this law of diversity can be reduced to the law of uniformity by assuming simply that out of the extravagant richness of past parentage any characteristic whatever might come to the surface in the offspring of present-day parents. Instead, then, of resembling his parents or grand-parents of a few generations back, it would be necessary only to assume that the child reverts to some yet earlier ancestor for his peculiarities. He is, then, not *unlike* his ancestors, but simply unlike *some* of his ancestors who happen to be more immediate. The usual rule is that he will resemble his nearest parents the most.

Galton's Law of Inheritance.—How much each ances-

¹¹ J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, p. 68.

tor does contribute to the hereditary character of the offspring has been worked out in Galton's law.¹² He asserts that the parents contribute on the average one-half—the father one-quarter and the mother one-quarter; the four grand-parents one-quarter, or each one-sixteenth; the great-grand-parents one-eighth, and so on, each generation contributing one-half of the immediately preceding one. The series is infinite; that is, one's ancestors are infinite in number. Various re-statements of this law have been made by Pearson, Yule, Weldon and others, but all agree practically regarding the main facts. It must be remembered that the law does not apply to individuals, but is statistical and is true on the average when large numbers of individuals are taken. It will apply, therefore, to single persons only approximately. Still, even as a rough approximation it is interesting for the fact that it emphasizes again the illimitable richness of hereditary possibilities.

Modes of Inheritance.—In addition to the more general laws of heredity there are certain modes of inheritance. Children often exhibit a blending of both parents, a mixture of both their natures. Happy is the one in whom these are well balanced and at peace with one another. The ideal is expressed in the lines to Milton by Dryden:

Three poets in three distant ages born
Greece, Italy and England did adorn.
The first in loftiness in thought surpass'd;
The next in majesty; in both the last.
The force of nature could not further go:
To make a third she joined the two.

¹² Francis Galton, *The Average Contribution of Each Several Ancestor to the Total Heritage of the Offspring*, Proc. Royal Society of London, lxi, 1897, pp. 401-413; *A Diagram of Heredity*, Nature, lvii, p. 293.

The poet Goethe, according to Galton, was a happy combination of hereditary forces. His mother, the delight of children, the favorite of poets and princes, and a correspondent with royalty, was married at seventeen to a man whom she did not love. He "was a cold, stern father, a somewhat pedantic, truth-loving, upright-minded man. From him the poet inherited the well-built frame, the erect form, correct carriage. . . . From him also came that orderliness and stoicism. . . . The lust for knowledge, the delight in communicating it, the almost pedantic attention to details . . . are all traceable in the father."¹³

Particulate Inheritance.—Some parental characteristics are mixed in the offspring but their father's and mother's traits are descended to them in separate and sometimes warring impulses. "Whatever specialties of character and faculty in me are due to inheritance, I inherited from my father. Between my mother's mind and my own I see scarcely any resemblance, emotional or intellectual," says Herbert Spencer in his autobiography, but does admit that his "visceral constitution was maternal rather than paternal." Lombroso indicates Schopenhauer as a distinguished example of this mode of inheritance. "In Schopenhauer, also," he says, "the insane and neurotic hereditary tendency was well marked. On his father's side he was descended from an old family of Dantzic merchants; his great-grandfather was a man of very strong and energetic character; his grandfather, a man of quiet business habits, seems to have brought the property into the family, but the grandmother had an aunt and a grandmother who were insane. Schopenhauer's father seems to have been a skilled man of business; a republican, he

¹³ Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, 1892, pp. 225, 227.

possessed the native arrogance of a democratic patrician; inclined to deafness from childhood, he had attacks of rage from which even the domestic dog and cat fled terrified. With the increase of his deafness he became more irritable, and suffered, if not from actual insanity, at least from morbid fears. It was suspected that he committed suicide. He presented various characters of degeneration: large ears, very prominent eyes, thick lips, a short, upturned nose; he was, however, of considerable height. Schopenhauer's mother, married at the age of nineteen, was witty and ambitious, and, as he himself said, very frivolous."¹⁴

Exclusive Inheritance.—Probably the most usual inheritance is one in which the children "take after" one or the other parent distinctly. In such cases the parent from whom the traits come is said to be dominant. Usually the healthier or the younger parent is the dominant one. "The crossing of white and black guinea pigs," says Kellicott, "gives hybrids that are all black like one parent. That is, when the black and white crosses are brought together these do not appear to blend into a gray . . . the black one seemed to cover up or blot out the white. The black color is said to dominate over the other and the two traits are said to be dominant and recessive respectively."¹⁵ Lombroso gives a whole list of geniuses who have inherited from their mothers:—Cicero, Cuvier, Buffon, Sidney Smith, Cowper, Napoleon, Cromwell, Scott, Byron, St. Augustine, Kant, Wellington. On the other side are Bacon, Raphael, Weber, Schiller, Milton, Alberti and Tasso who are said to inherit from their fathers.¹⁶

¹⁴ Cesare Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, 1891, p. 148.

¹⁵ William E. Kellicott, *Social Direction of Human Evolution*, 1911, pp. 84, 85.

¹⁶ Cesare Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, 1891, p. 142.

Unexpected Dominant Traits.—The far-famed Jukes family, mentioned above, furnishes more than one illustration in their otherwise villainous heredity of dominant traits injected into the degenerating line by an outsider. For instance, in the fifth generation an already criminal young woman married an honest, hard-working coal-burner. Their daughter, instead of following her mother's ancestors in their evil ways, grew into a decent, well-behaved, virtuous girl. The long-standing good character of the father was able to overcome five generations of vicious inheritance. Another, a boy of the seventh generation of the same family, was brought to the Children's Aid Society of New York City, placed first with a widow in her own home, and later with a farmer in the far west. There the boy grew to manhood, did well in school, became earnest, studious, a good worker and respected in the community for his sound moral habits and evident worthiness. When last heard of by the Society he was starting out in life for himself with every evidence to show that either the law of uniformity did not hold, or he had reverted to a dominant virtuous trait in a long-lost heredity, or that environment in one short life-time had wiped out the effect of seven generations of evil.

Germinal Variations.—Under the heading of diversity in heritage there is still one more example of character-origin possessing, if viewed rightly, both abundant hope for the evolution of the race and inspiration to the teacher. At indefinite intervals the world is startled with the spectacle of apparently entirely new beings. These unusual organisms are called "freaks" or "sports" among animals and plants, and geniuses or degenerates among men. The organic world of both plants and animals contains many more of these strangers than is ordinarily thought. The

list includes wonder-horses, like Linus, with a mane eighteen feet long and a tail twenty-one feet long; Shirley poppies arising from a single discontinuous variation; Star primroses; the sports of the common jelly-fish; and finally the classic example of De Vries' primrose from which two entirely original species seemed to have arisen in a short time. It seemed to be at the very height of a sporting mood, and under the care of its discoverer, fairly revelled in new varieties of form, color, times of blooming and other qualities, all of which mutations seemed to rise by leaps and bounds.

As yet no theory has been ventured to explain these evolutionary leaps. "Natural selection," says De Vries, "may explain the survival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the fittest." "In certain moods," says Thomson, "biologists are in the habit of saying that they do not know anything in regard to the causes of variation. They imply that it is the essence of the living creature to vary, that variability is a primary property of organisms. The sequence of generations is a life-stream, changing as it flows."

Summary.—In the last two chapters we have been dealing with origins of character. We have pushed the beginning of an individual as far back as we could conceive it possible to go. In the previous chapter it led us into theories of continuity between generation and generation by means of a germ-plasm. The causes of the variations in this germ-plasm that make individuals differ from individuals could not be found. Equally futile did it appear to search for the causes of variation amongst individuals developing from similarly constructed germ-cells by studying the theories of preformation and pan-genesis. The

beginning of the individual, and the origin of his peculiarities, were alike plunged into unrelieved mystery. In the present chapter we found some order in the processes of inheritance, some law to heredity and regulation of the modes of inheritance. But when we came to the origin of variations again we found ourselves compelled to be satisfied with germinal variations. These are in inexplicable changes wrought in the germ-plasm itself.

The Meaning for the Teacher.—The teacher ought to receive some satisfaction from this study. Nowhere is she hemmed in by a closed circuit. Her material is not hereditarily predetermined to take certain bents and to come out at certain places regardless of education and environment. What she has to deal with in the person of any individual child is a bundle of unlimited possibilities. In general, the mass of children, taken as a mass, will conform to well-known statistical laws. But each individual child will deviate from that general average, how far and in what quality nobody can predict. Occasionally the teacher will receive under her instruction a germinal variation. Because he is original she may do all in her power to crush out the originality and conform him to the average mediocre student. On the other hand, she may recognize her one glorious, life-long opportunity and guide this fragment of a new order into stable and useful lines of effort for the whole race. One thing she knows, then, about every pupil. She knows he may possess infinite possibilities. Knowing this she cannot be hopeless about his future until he has demonstrated beyond a doubt that his environment has utterly suppressed the good in him and permitted the evil to find full sway. This cannot be known certainly until his life is fulfilled.

CHAPTER V.

THE INSTINCTS.

The Powers of the Baby.—Our last chapter shows that the birth of a baby is not the beginning of his life. He is old, old as his parents, old as life upon this hoary earth; and yet young as the unknown possibilities tucked away under his pink skin. Viewed from any angle he is a wonderful being. His mother's claims for him may seem extravagant to the cold onlooker. He may wonder how anybody can see anything attractive in this gelatinous mass of purple humanity, with its globular head, bulbous body, rudimentary limbs, its wall-eyed face and its ridiculously helpless and random wriggles. If he were imaginative, he would picture before him an epitome of the race; if he could see with the mother's eye he would behold the rosiest of future possibilities; if he were an analytic scientist he would perceive only certain reactions, automatisms, like the heart-beat, reflexes and instincts. These he would inform the glowing mother are the total present available assets in hand out of which she is to manufacture the surpassing being of her dreams. Other capabilities there are, to be sure, but for the present they are dormant, and for years some will remain rudimentary. Automatisms, reflexes, instincts, these are the stock-in-trade with which man sets up business in this world, backed up by a promise of other inheritances when the time is ripe. What shall the child-trainer do with these?

With the automatisms he can do little. They are movements like the heart-beat that arise by stimulation from

within the body. They come ready-made and fairly finished. How much they contribute to the peculiarities of an individual is little known, and how they may be modified by training is still less known. The same is true of the purely mechanical reflexes. They are purposive and random movements, excited by objects from without the body, the latter increasing in number and becoming a perfectly riotous series of explosions of nervous and muscular energy.

Instincts Form the Foundation of Character.—

Instincts, then, are the only reactions left upon which the character-maker can at first exercise his skill. Though other processes of consciousness will speedily supervene, during all of childhood the primary impulses to action and the most prolific source of habits will be these blind impulses to action. Later, we shall see, too, under the discussion of the will, that from the instinctive and reflexive movements come the ideas of motion upon which ideational or voluntary actions depend. The instincts, therefore, in the sum of reactions play a far more important rôle than is ordinarily credited to them.

Instincts and Emotions are Treated Together.—

In our consideration of instincts we will, for two reasons, include the emotions. First, they play much the same part in character-making. That is, both reinforce and render interesting certain ideas of actions; or else, they antagonize and oppose ideas of other actions. Both instincts and emotions must be overcome by other instincts or emotions, by ideas, by fitting physical exercises and physical surroundings, and, since both are of physiological origin, by certain dietary and hygienic habits.

Secondly, the emotions and instincts are closely allied in their psychological nature. "In speaking of the in-

instincts," says Professor James, "it has been impossible to keep them separate from the emotional excitements which go with them. Objects of rage, love, fear, etc., not only prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke characteristic alterations in his attitude and visage, and affect his breathing, circulation, and other organic functions in specific ways. When the outward deeds are inhibited, these latter emotional expressions still remain, and we read the anger in the face, though the blow may not be struck, and the fear betrays itself in voice and color, though one may suppress all other signs. *Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well.* Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with the exciting object."¹

The Popular Conception of Instincts.—It is so hard to make instinct human. This is due to the feeling in men that instincts belong to the inferior animals. They are despised as something low; something essentially sensuous, feral, bestial, opposed at all points to rationality.

As Conway Lloyd Morgan puts this popular conception, "The man who acts without deliberation is said to do so instinctively. A girl who shrinks, she knows not why, from the companionship of some of her school-fellows, is guided, it is said, by her natural instincts."² This conception of instincts sets forth a common antithesis to rational acts and emphasizes them as something independent of

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. ii, p. 442.

² Conway Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*, 1896, p. 27.

volition and deeply ingrained in nature. But, as we intend to use them, they must not be limited to those impulses ordinarily thought of as man's animal nature. Quite the contrary, we will see that from them spring some of the noblest actions man is capable of performing. No other impulses excel the beauty or the depth of parental love, surpass the sacrifice of patriotism, exceed the constancy of friendship, or supersede the aspirations of religion, all of which spring directly or indirectly from instincts. "If a single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts," says Emerson, "and there abide, the large world will come round to him." Browning sees instinct as the finest impulse of the soul:

The ultimate angel's law,
Indulging every instinct of the soul,
There, where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing.

Scientific Definitions of Instincts.—Science expresses its conception of the same impulses in a little more precise language. "Instincts are congenital, adaptive and co-ordinated activities of relative complexity," says Conway L. Morgan again, "and involving the behavior of the organism as a whole. They are not characteristic of the individual as such, but as similarly performed by all the like members of the same more or less restricted group, under the circumstances which are either of frequent recurrence or are vitally essential to the maintenance of the race."³

Reflexes and Instincts.—According to Romanes, the marked distinction between a reflex action and an instinc-

³ *Ibid.*

tive one is the fact that the latter involves an element of consciousness. He says, "Instinct is reflex action into which there is imparted the element of consciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those faculties of the mind, which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to the individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends obtained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all individuals of the same species."⁴

Psychological Definition of Instinct.—Both of the above definitions may be said to be biological in that they deal with the preservation of life and emphasize this end of an instinct rather than its psychological content. Professor William James, on the other hand, emphasizes the psychological aspect of instincts. According to him, "Every instinct is an impulse." He goes on most entertainingly to describe the actions of men and animals resulting from such impulses. "Why do men always lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on hard floors? Why do they sit around a stove on a cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, with their faces towards its middle rather than to the wall? Why do they prefer saddle of mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the world? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that every creature *likes* its own ways, and takes to the following them as a matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find that

⁴ Geo. J. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, 1884, p. 159.

most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more. If you should ask him *why* he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philosopher, he will probably laugh at you for a fool. . . . It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the *why* of any instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside-down? The common man can only say, "*Of course we smile, of course* our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, *of course* we love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved. . . . To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object it is to her." ⁵

The Feeling of Finality in Instincts.—This finality, this right-beyond-question feeling, is what gives instincts their peculiar place in human character. It makes them unquestioned arbiters of our daily acts and of whole trains of vital performances. Morals, manners, religions, customs,

⁵ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. ii, pp. 386, 387.

institutions, constitutions of state, wars and foundations of empires ultimately rest upon these blind impulses in man to do the obvious. This finality, too, is what hides their identity. Over and over we ask why such and such a deed was done; we repeat the "Why" to the answer, then to the next answer, and so on, step by step tracing the reasons back to an instinct—an impulse in consciousness—and there stop, feeling we have reached a perfectly valid ultimate, but not waiting long enough to tag it with a name. So it is that the instincts escape their share of odium and of honor for much that is counted rational in human conduct.

The Number of Human Instincts.—A glance at the number of human instincts will verify this statement of the large part they play in our lives. Though psychologists do not altogether agree as to their number, Professor James believing them numerous and Professor Preyer thinking them few, the difference depends upon what activities are included in instincts and what in reflexes. Professor Preyer divides the movements of infants into three classes, impulsive, reflex and instinctive. The first class includes random movements of the limbs, body and voice with no aim and without perception. Reflex movements include sneezing, snuffling, coughing, sighing, sobbing, gagging, hiccoughing, moving the limbs when tickled, touched or blown upon, etc. The instincts proper, according to Preyer, Schneider and James, are sucking, biting, chewing, licking, grimacing, spitting, clasping, carrying to the mouth, crying or smiling, shaking the head for a negative or as a gesture of rejection; holding the head erect, sitting up, standing, walking, talking, imitation, emulation, pugnacity, anger, resentment, sympathy; the hunting instinct,

fear of many things, like strange men, strange animals, black things, dark places, appropriation or acquisitiveness growing sometimes into kleptomania; constructiveness, play, curiosity, sociability, shyness, secretiveness, cleanliness, modesty, shame, love in all its phases, and jealousy. Prodigious is this array of instincts, and prodigious also is their importance in determining human character.

Most Habits Come from Instincts.—Their first rôle in shaping human destiny in this world is their close and productive relation to habits. Of these they are the prime source. How true this is a concrete paragraph from James will show better than much abstract discussion.

“In a perfectly-rounded development, every one of these instincts would start a habit toward certain objects and inhibit a habit toward certain others. Usually this is the case; but, in the one-sided development of civilized life, it happens that the timely age goes by in a sort of starvation of objects, and the individual then grows up with gaps in his psychic constitution which future experiences can never fill. Compare the accomplished gentleman with the poor artisan or tradesman of a city: during the adolescence of the former, objects appropriate to his growing interests, bodily and mental, were offered as fast as the interests awoke, and, as a consequence, he is armed and equipped at every angle to meet the world. Sport came to the rescue and completed his education where real things were lacking. He has tasted of the essence of every side of human life, being sailor, hunter, athlete, scholar, fighter, talker, dandy, man of affairs, etc., all in one. Over the city poor boy's youth no such golden opportunities were hung, and in his manhood no desires for most of them exist. Fortunate it is for him if gaps are the only anomalies

his instinctive life presents; perversions are too often the fruit of his unnatural bringing up.”⁶

The Uniformity of Instincts.—Our emphasis upon the number and the prominence of instincts may have induced the feeling that, the matter being so, there is small chance for the individual in the struggle against this inherited, inevitable, invariable, mass of onmoving impulses, ready at birth to work their will. Generation after generation they seem to appear with invariable force. Animals follow their fateful paths. Swallows build now as they built in the ark; bees stick to the same old hexagonal last for their cells; ants lay up their usual stores; the lemmings migrate over river and mountain, and, finally coming to the sea, plunge in and swim on to exhaustion and death; a beaver kept in a garret toilsomely drags the furniture to a corner for a dam; wild pigeons return to their roosting places and seals to their breeding grounds with the fatality of a moth’s attraction to the candle, till their ranks are decimated almost to extinction by their enemies; and yet the great blind ogre of instinct urges them on. If human beings are also dominated by this same power, how can any character be made by training or education? Will not a dead, blank uniformity settle down over generations and over individuals? To make clear the way of escape we will look a little into the origin and characteristics of instincts. Let us take the origin first.

Origin of Instincts.—So closely are they allied to the habits of human beings formed in a lifetime, and so precisely and beautifully do they conserve purposes which ordinarily come only within the purview of rational beings, that it seems almost necessary to assume that once upon a

⁶ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 441.

time, in the dim past, some one ancestor deliberately performed the action which has now become automatic in the species. This theory of the origin of instincts is the one most commonly held. One of its strongest modern supporters is G. J. Romanes, "By the effects of habit in successive generations, actions which were originally intelligent become, as it were, stereotyped into permanent instincts. Just as in the lifetime of the individual adjustive actions, which were originally intelligent may, by frequent repetition and heredity, so write their effects on the nervous system, that the latter is prepared, even before individual experience, to perform adjustive actions mechanically, which in previous generations were performed intelligently. This mode of origin of instincts has been appropriately called the 'lapsing of intelligence.'"⁷

This Theory Depends Upon the Truth of the Transmission of Acquired Characters.—Such a theory binds the habits of ancestors upon their children. Happy indeed are they, according to this hypothesis, whose pedigree can be traced to halls of panelled oak hung with ancestral portraits of stern and hardy forbears. By virtue of their accidental acquirements of culture and of learning, their fortunate offspring is born with a superfineness of character, inherited and entailed to him against any vicissitudes of his environment. Happy is he, though his perfect joy may be marred by the thought of his less fortunate brothers, who have not such an inheritance, but who begin their careers under the incubus of bad parentage. "Is my grandfather's environment my heredity?" both may ask, and the theory of transmission of acquired characters answers, "It is."

⁷ Geo. J. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, 1884, p. 177.

The Transmission Theory Has a Long History.—

The theory of the transmission of acquired characteristics has a long and respectable history. Aristotle refers to the transmission of the exact shape of a cautery mark. Kant was the first modern to express a disbelief in the transmission-theory, and other scholars in various fields of science agree with him more or less fully, notably Sir Francis Galton, who was the first to really focus the skepticism of the present day. Lamarck, the father of the modern theory, although it did not originate with him, formulated clearly his conception of transmissibility or modifications caused by increased, decreased and altered usage of organs and of modifications due to change in environment.

The Meaning and Implications of the Theory.—

Before committing ourselves unreservedly to the theory, let us examine its meaning and its implications. Hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics means the inheritance by the children, according to the laws of heredity, of changes or the effects of changes, made in the bodies of the parents during their lives. It follows from this, first, that if habits and other acquired traits are transmitted by heredity to children, they must, in spite of all precautions, somehow appear in the children. Culture and refinement, ignorance and grossness cannot obliterate them altogether. This is what is meant by a hereditary trait. Secondly, the traits must not be due to *intra-uterine* influences. These, as we have shown, are environmental in their genesis and changeable in their nature. Truly transmitted hereditary characters must originate in the germ-cell. Thirdly, transmission must be the rule and not the exception. This is the meaning of scientific law. This last insistence rules out of court an immense amount of

anecdotal and incidental bits of evidence for the theory. Thereby it suffers much; for, in the minds of the masses at least, it rests heavily upon wonderful and exceptional incidents. Fourthly, social inheritance, money, houses, etc., must not be confused with organic inheritance.

Are Acquired Traits Always Transmitted?—With these refinements upon our theory we are ready to ask some practical questions regarding its possible operation. Are the acquired characteristics of the parents *always* transmitted to their children? Or, to put it another way: Are the sins of the fathers inexorably visited upon their offspring? To this question both science and popular opinion answer an emphatic “No.” Neither directly nor indirectly are many acquired characteristics of parents visited upon their children, but multitudes of the fairest youths have sprung from parents who in their lifetime have become crippled, sick or sinful. The Jukes girl and the Jukes boy, both with generations of dissoluteness behind them, built for themselves worthy and excellent testimonies to the non-universality of immoral transmissions. Upon this matter a few quotations from Travis’ wide investigations will be appropriate.

Travis’ Investigations.—“I have examined the record of 106 children,” he says, “who had been placed in families by the Minnesota State School for Neglected and Dependent Children, in the hope of getting some information on this subject. The history-book of the institution showed that one or both of the parents of all these children were distinctly bad. The least of which any of them had been guilty was habitual drunkenness and desertion of their families. In 39 instances intemperance, insanity, or criminality was found in both parents, and 39 of the

mothers were known to be prostitutes. The fathers of 2 had been convicted of murder, and 3 were serving a sentence in the penitentiary. This is certainly a good ancestry to produce criminals, if the effect of heredity is beyond control. The children . . . were more than 17 years of age. . . . Fifty-two of these children were classed by the State agent as excellent, 36 as good, and 18 as bad, . . . Of all those of known bad parentage, then, 83.02 per cent. developed into young men and women of good character when placed in better surroundings.

"At the Wisconsin State School I studied the records of 91 children. The same rules of procedure were followed as before, except that a few between the ages of 16 and 17 were admitted. Both parents of 19 children were either intemperate or insane, or had committed a crime, and 13 of the mothers were prostitutes. In this school 12 were classed as excellent, 73 as good, and only 6 had turned out badly. . . .

"When it is remembered that these children remained with their parents long enough to imbibe a good deal of immorality by conduct, the significance of these figures greatly increases. Besides, the children are placed under an indenture contract, and, except in rare instances, are treated as servants by those who take them. They are usually valued in proportion to the work they can do. . . .

"We seem thus forced to conclude that, barring the degenerates, and they are comparatively few, children should not be classified as good and bad. They have tendencies and instincts, some of racial and others of family inheritance, but their permanent dispositions are yet unformed and will be mainly determined by their environ-

ment, which, of course, includes all that enters into their experience and education.”⁸

Are Any Acquired Traits Ever Transmitted?—

Are any life changes whatever of parents ever transmitted to their children? Here we reach a realm of doubt. Science stammers over the answer; medical men and stock-breeders favor the affirmative side; psychologists and biologists favor the negative, and the tendency in modern times seems to be toward the negative.

In spite of the general feeling voiced by the Duke of Argyll that the world is strewn with illustrations of such transmissions, innumerable, as Dr. Haacke would have us believe, as the sands upon the seashore, yet when they come to examine the cases narrowly, scientists are compelled to admit with Reid, “that though for years this problem has engaged the unremitting attention of many of the acutest and best-instructed intellects in the world, that though the battle on this question has raged everywhere—in Europe, in America, in Australia, in Japan—that though the whole plant and animal kingdoms have been ransacked, yet no single indisputable instance of the transmission of an acquirement has been proved.”⁹

“If,” says another open-minded writer, “there is little or no scientific warrant for our being other than extremely skeptical at present as to the inheritance of acquired characters—or better, the transmission of modifications—this skepticism lends greater importance than ever, on the one hand, to a good ‘nature,’ to secure which is the business of careful mating; and, on the other hand, to a good ‘nur-

⁸ Thomas Travis, *The Young Malefactor*.

⁹ G. Archdall Reid, *Alcoholism, A Study in Heredity*, 1901, p. 19.

ture,' to secure which for our children is one of our most obvious and binding duties; the hopefulness of the task resting especially upon the fact that, unlike the beasts that perish, man has a lasting external heritage, capable of endless modification for the better, a heritage of ideas and ideals, embodied in prose and verse, in statue and painting, in cathedral and university, in tradition and convention, and above all in society itself."¹⁰

The Question is Still Open.—We need not stop longer over a discussion of these abstract theories. A full consideration of the question on both sides must lead to the conclusion that the question is still open. Saleeby sums up the matter by saying "this doctrine of transmission by acquired characteristics of heredity is, as we have seen, repudiated by biologists. It is generally believed by the medical profession and the public, notwithstanding the fact that, for instance, the skin of the heel of the newborn baby is almost as thin and delicate as it is anywhere else, though for unthinking generations all the ancestors of that baby on both sides have greatly thickened the skin of both heels by the act of walking."¹¹

With this view Galton agrees, saying, "I am unprepared to say more than a few words on the obscure, unsettled, and much discussed subject of the possibility of transmitting acquired faculties. The main evidence in its favor is the gradual change of the instincts of races at large, in conformity with changed habits, and through their increased adaptation to their surroundings, otherwise apparently than through the influence of natural selection.

¹⁰ J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, pp. 248, 249.

¹¹ Caleb W. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 1909, p. 153.

There is very little direct evidence of its influence in the course of a single generation, if the phrase of the acquired faculties is used in perfect strictness and all inheritance is excluded that could be referred to some form of natural selection, or of infection before birth, or of peculiarities of nurture and rearing.”¹²

In entire agreement with this statement are the figures of Karl Pearson indicating that no correlation exists between parental alcoholism and various common childish defects. Thus, the drinkers' children averaged 47.9 inches in height and 55.0 pounds in weight; the non-drinkers' children averaged 47.5 inches in height and 53.8 pounds in weight. The correlation between the parents' alcoholic intemperance and the children's health was equally indecisive. Upon the much mooted question of intemperance and intelligence, the returns show that to intemperate fathers were born 34 per cent. of defective sons and 30 per cent. of defective daughters; to similar mothers, 40 per cent. of defective sons and 24 per cent. of defective daughters. To sober fathers were born 41 per cent. and 31 per cent. of defective sons and daughters respectively; and to sober mothers 39 per cent. and 30 per cent. of defective sons and daughters. Eye-sight and death-rate show the same unexpected tendencies. Such figures, as Dr. Pearson is careful to say, do not at all close the question, but they do keep it open and do compel a suspension of judgment, at least upon this application of the theory of organic transmission of acquired parental traits.”¹³

Transmission Nullifies Itself by Cutting Both Ways.—We cannot do better than to close this discussion

¹² Francis Galton, *Natural Inheritance*, 1889, p. 14.

¹³ *American Magazine*, vol. lxxv, No. 3, pp. 51, 52.

by recalling that the theory of transmission cuts both ways. If good characters are transmitted, then bad are transmitted also. This, then, throws squarely upon society the duty to take pains that individuals during their lives do not acquire bad characteristics. If they are not transmitted, so much the better. If they are, it is still within the power of society to reduce the chances of their origin. With this final quotation we will leave the matter: "The fact is undoubted that the initiatives of moral character are in some degree transmissible, though, from the nature of the case, the influences of education, example, environment, and the like are here more potent than in regard to structural features. We cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, though the plasticity of character under nurture is a fact which gives us all hope. Explain it we cannot, but the transmission of the raw material of character is a fact, and we must still say with Sir Thomas Browne: 'Bless not thyself that thou wert born in Athens; but, among thy multiplied acknowledgments, lift up one hand to heaven that thou wert born of honest parents, that modesty, humility, and veracity *lay in the same egg*, and came into the world with thee.'"

The Darwinian Theory of the Origin of the Instincts.—If instincts do not arise by transmission of parental habits to their offspring, then how do they come into being? The Darwinian school both opposes the Lamarckian-transmission theory and sets up a counter theory of its own. Darwin in one place cries, "Heaven forfend me from Lamarck nonsense of a tendency to progressive adaptations from slow-willing of animals." Wallace adds, "The hypothesis of Lamarck has been repeatedly and easily refuted by all writers on the subject."

Huxley said, "The Lamarckian hypothesis has long since been justly condemned," and Ray Lankester longs for the day when the last blot of Lamarckism will be obliterated from science. Yet the neo-Lamarckians still live, gripping firmly the general and uncontrovertible fact that "the organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive, living creature—to some extent, master of its fate."

Instincts Originate in the Germ-plasm.—The Darwinian school would lodge all origins of this kind in germinal variations. This means that on account of yet indescribable conditions, changes occur in the germ-plasm itself. Out of these conditions emerge impulses to act in certain specific ways. If these ways are salubrious for the animal, he succeeds better than his fellows, prolongs his life and leaves behind a fertile progeny. Of course since this mode or activity was born in him according to the strictest laws of heredity, he can transmit some of these unto his offspring. These young creatures endowed with extra ability for success, succeed and are prolific, while their less fortunate brothers, not endowed by heredity with the same abilities, are gradually weeded out in the struggle for existence.

New Instincts May Arise at Any Time.—Such germinal variations may occur at any time. The tendency is strong to explain them by some coincident changes in the environment of the parental stock. De Vries' American primroses, which exhibited such riotous deviations from hereditary uniformity did so in the foreign soil of a Holland potato patch. If, then, instincts arise by germinal variations, a strong presumption remains that they arise from environmental changes, as well. Theoretically, at least, they are not beyond human control. Further, when

they do thus arise, they can develop only in the appropriate environment. And lastly, they are subject, in the human being, like other older instincts, to the modifying influences of ideas. With these restrictions we can hold that the character-maker, though he must use the instincts as his chief material all through the infancy and childhood of his subject, may still feel free to believe that the outcome of his efforts is not in the hands of some fateful force hidden behind the veil of heredity, hypocritically permitting him to go through the pantomime of a sham performance, but that it is in his own hands and under his own power.

The Hope for the Teacher.—What is the result for the teacher? He need not be hopeless over the worst material that was ever bred of the prison or the slums. The incrusted ignorance of generations may disappear in one lifetime. Parental sins, though they be as scarlet, can be cleansed with the hyssop of proper training, and the children be made as white as snow. The teacher has a place. His work is not in vain. A democracy is not a Utopian dream. Citizenship is not predetermined in the womb of remote and alien ancestry, but can be re-made in the homes and public schools of a nation. The door of hope is wide open in every life.

So much for the origin of instincts and the theory of transmitted habits. Now let us examine the nature of instincts with an eye especially for their similarity in different individuals.

Human Instincts Vary.—What I said some time ago about the uniformity of instincts must not lead us astray. If it is true, as the older biologists taught, that instincts are invariable from generation to generation and individ-

ual to individual, there would be no individuality arising from this source. Every human being would be born into the world with the same instinctive potentialities, and given the same environment he would express his instincts in the same way. As a result, similarity in habits would be far greater than it is at the present time. As a matter of fact, we know that human beings differ in their instincts and the habits which arise from their instincts. There is, as we shall see later, an instinctive individual preference during childhood, for one part or section of environment; and in adolescence, for one ideal rather than another, both preferences going far to determine what the individual will eventually be.

Animal Instincts Vary.—Late investigations show that even in animals where instincts are far less variable than in human beings, there are still great differences. Birds do not always build their nests the same. The swallow that builds under the eaves of the barn may or may not shape her nest after the same pattern that she used under the eaves of the ark. Individuals themselves differ, and differ in natural conditions. George and Elizabeth Peckham show that the solitary wasps do not sting their victims always in the same place and in such a manner as to paralyze them for a specified length of time so that they come to life just at the moment when the larvæ of the wasp hatch and are ready for their first voracious meal. The fact is that when the wasp attacks the spider which is to furnish the future larder of the infant wasp, a lively tussle ensues. The wasp stings its victim sometimes more than once, sometimes kills him outright, and sometimes stuns him only temporarily so that the spider regains consciousness in time to give the baby a fight for his meal.

In making their nests in the ground one female wasp covered up her eggs with a few pellets of stone edged into the orifice, kicked over this a little dust and her housekeeping was done. Another worked for an hour, first filling in the burrow with fine dust, arranging the surface with scrupulous care and finally sweeping her dooryard around the house for quite a little distance. Still another picked up a small pebble and used it as a mallet to ram down the earth. These divergencies of instinct are sufficient to make all the difference between a good housekeeper and a poor housekeeper.¹⁴

Variableness in Instincts Allows Divergency in Character.—Differences like this among human beings are more than enough to account for all the idiosyncrasies which distinguish personal dispositions from one another almost from the cradle. Without overstepping the wide limits of moral character, predilections for certain ideals, tastes, modes of conduct and life-professions, still furnish ample play for all varieties of good character. Instinctively, one son in the family will follow the sedate occupation of his bucolic father while the other will hie away to sea and roam the world over; one girl play the part of dreamy Mary and the other of bustling Martha. Such innate divergencies of character, the far-seeing parent or teacher, who builds for the greatest good to the greatest number, and not to satisfy some parental whim or shortsighted theory, will take into account and use as an asset of great value. Within just restrictions, the largest play of individuality possible shall be sought.

Instincts are Transitory.—Another peculiarity of the same impulses is their transitoriness. Instincts come and

¹⁴ George and Elizabeth Peckham, Wasps, Social and Solitary.

go like measles. They have their period of infection, of incubation, development, crisis and decline. What the boy ardently desires now with his whole soul and heart and mind will, in a little while, be a thing that is as dead as a forgotten memory. The reason why the conduct of young people looks so foolish in the eyes of older people is because the older people have forgotten their perfectly natural impulses of long ago to do exactly the same things at the same age. The illustrations of this transitoriness among comparatively well-fixed animal instincts are manifold. Chicks a few days old will follow a living object, and once they begin to follow it, cling to that particular object, whether it be a hawk, a ferret, or a human being, or a hen, —whether the bitterest foe or the closest friend. After once connected with their one beloved object they will flee from every other. Calves born in the wilderness at first will follow any large moving object, but after a few weeks will flee from a man as would a wild deer.¹⁵

Human Instincts are Also Transitory.—The nature of the human species goes through the same kind of experiences. Though marvellous as it may seem, it is only recently that men have begun to know and study these peculiarities of their own kind. Until the beginning of ontogenetic psychology and its consequent observation of children, it was officiously assumed that boys and girls were little men and women, pocket editions, as it were, of adults, and were exhorted to be “ladies” and “gentlemen.” The apex of child-perfection was the most perfect imitation of their elders. Dickens’ Jellyby children were typical products of the method.

¹⁵ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. ii, p. 298.

The Epoch Theory Applied to Instincts.—Modern study has changed all this. Now we understand that instincts in children, as well as in animals, come and go. The clue to their ebb and flow is found by some in the social progress of the race from savagery to civilization. Through similar stages, all children, and especially boys, are supposed to pass, though the parallelism is not complete. The stages do not follow one another in an invariable way. Sometimes one or several stages may not appear at all in a particular child; but in the main, the typical boy is assumed to begin as a little savage, then becomes a barbarian, then a nomad, then an agriculturist, then a knight of chivalry, and finally develops into a twentieth-century gentleman.

Difficulties with the Theory.—Of course there are disputants concerning this theory, and of course there are difficulties in its way. Certainly it would seem far more simple to study actual children and to decide from observation whether children in general pass through such periods, than first laboriously to work out the social progress of the race and *a priori* conclude that the child goes through analogous stages. However, this theory has the merit, first, of arriving by the *a priori* high-road to a point where possibly a life-long induction would eventually land us. Secondly, the study of childhood is so new and will require so many years for generalizations that unless we adopt some such theory as this we will have to wait a long time for a better one based on facts. Thirdly, this theory does at least offer a clue to the periodic passage of the average children from one instinctive stage to the other.

Danger of the Theory.—The danger of it consists in taking it too seriously. If any teacher, or any parent,

assumes that he has a ready-made series of moulds into which he can pour the plastic material of childhood, and believes that through them it must run its course eventually to be fixed in the highest stage of development possible, he is as utterly wrong as the older child-trainer, who insisted that all children were alike because they were all little men and little women. The prime error of attitude toward children always to be guarded against is the fallacy of assuming that they are identically alike; that their growth is the same; that any general rule whatsoever can be applied absolutely and in detail to any one child in particular. Tempered with charity for all and conservative to the core is the statement that any adult who holds a finally fixed and eternally crystallized theory regarding children is unfit to deal with them. The first article in the adult's creed of childhood must be the inviolable individuality of each child.

How to Treat the Instincts.—The way in which the epochal instincts break out will be discussed in the chapter on play, for it is in play that children express their instincts more clearly and more freely than in any other of their activities. Just now the question is pertinent as to what the parent or teacher shall do with childhood instincts.

To use a homely illustration, the problem is precisely the one the steamboat captains used to have on the Mississippi River in the good old days when boat-racing was common. In order to secure sufficient steam pressure a daring captain would sometimes place a colored deck-hand on the safety-valve. It was always a problem of the finest judgment to know how long to continue the man in his repressive capacity. If he stepped down too soon the pressure fell and the race was lost. If, on the other hand, he

sat there too long, it was quite possible that pieces of the boat and relics of the passengers would be picked up along the shore as mementoes of a miscalculated repression. Exactly the same problem presents itself to the one dealing with a bursting and energetic boy who is seething internally with instinctive impulses longing to express themselves in some absurd activity. He wants to do, nine cases out of ten, exactly what his fond father wishes to save him from doing, exactly the things his father counts his own youthful errors: to play exactly the games and to have the toys his wise parent now considers a waste, an absolute waste of juvenile time that might be employed in learning something useful, something that would eventually enable the boy to gain a larger place amongst his future adult fellows or possibly secure for himself a little more of the world's goods. The untutored father cannot for a moment imagine that success in life can be measured in terms of a boy's world; is utterly oblivious to the fact that a boy is an individual; that he has a real world of his own; that in that world he has as much moral right to succeed in his way as his father has to succeed in his world in his way. The father does what he instinctively feels is right; the boy wants to do what he instinctively feels is right. The father is bursting with ambition to make himself a place in his world; the boy is bursting with ambition to make himself a place in his world. The friction comes about because the father is foolish enough to wish to impose his instincts upon the instincts of the boy. He will forever insist that it is possible to put an old head on young shoulders.

Let Some Instincts Express Themselves.—Therefore the first thing to do with the instincts is to let *some*

express themselves. Remember that I say *some*. The cry "back to nature" has its value and its place, especially in an over-ripe and intemperately progressive civilization, where artificial diversification outruns human adaptation. But if "back to nature" means "follow your instincts" it is not only folly but even more, it is suicide. In spite of the dictum of Emerson, that "If any single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts and there abide, the large world will come round to him," the fact is, that if any man will constantly and persistently follow his instincts for a period of years he will either land in the penitentiary, the insane asylum, or the grave. Trappers live year in and year out taking wild animals with the same bait and the same trap, because animals follow their instincts, unguided by reason and untaught by experience. Therefore, whatever I say further, concerning the expression of instincts, must be modified in the reader's mind by what I say now, namely, that only *some* instincts should be permitted free expression.

Of course a part of these are concerned with every-day vital necessities. By far the larger number of instincts should be permitted only a modified expression, that is, they should either express themselves as they are, but only under certain conditions and at specified times, or, they should not be permitted to express themselves in their innate form at all, but in some other form. For example, laughing, crying, eating, walking and talking should all express themselves in their native form, but only at specified intervals, and under certain conditions. Alternate permission and repression must here be the rule. When to permit and when to repress, demands the wisdom of the proverbial Solomon.

Some Instincts Need to be Suppressed.—Certainly some instincts need to be suppressed. Cruelty is one example. It has not the saving grace of a single virtue. Undoubtedly it played its part and had its use in the primitive stages of mankind; but that stage has been outgrown, and to-day it should receive no encouragement at the hands of civilized teachers. On the other hand, it must be understood that the boy comes to a period of natural cruelty. One fond father who believed devoutly that all things in children were inculcated, and who had carefully injected into his blue-eyed boy sympathy for all kinds of lower animals, one day when giving the boy a nature-study lesson on a humming and struggling house-fly, was horrified to have his carefully reared offspring say, "Stick a needle through him, Father; that is the way to hold him." In spite of most careful nurture, nature—positively blind and foolish nature—had taken care to develop the innate cruelty of this son of Adam.

How Shall Instincts be Suppressed?—Suppress some instincts we must. The question of how to suppress them is the interesting one. Since it does not belong strictly to the psychology of character-making but really to pedagogy, or to child-training proper, we can only hint here that instincts can be suppressed by playing instinct against instinct, beginning with the higher and working downward as far as necessity compels us to go. I mean that since aversion to pain is one of the most primitive and ancient instincts we ought not lazily to begin first with corporal punishment, but to resort to that mode of repression, only when, as parents, we are obliged to admit that we have brought into this world a degenerate, who can be compelled in no other way. Secondly, we can oppose ideals

to instincts. Here again the promise of rewards, rewards consisting of pleasurable and useful activity, rather than mere material possessions or sensual satisfactions, should be tried before the promise of deprivations or punishment.

Many Instincts Should be Modified.—However, it is in the field of modifications of instincts that the chief difficulties lie, where the ingenuity of the teacher is taxed and will be taxed to the uttermost, and at the same time where the richest results will reward the tactful and patient caretaker of children. It is into this fairly unexplored field that modern pedagogy, in the broadest sense, has so liberally expanded. Almost all modern educational movements are in the direction of modifying children's instincts. Manual work, industrial education, school-gardens, observation periods, and a thousand and one other activities are all so many attempts to seize upon and to fit to modern society instincts inherited from primitive mankind. Surprising it is to see how constantly in great urban school-systems attempts are made to imitate a return to country life. We will give one example which must serve as an illustration for a whole myriad of like activities. It is instinctive for a boy to throw. Throw he will, and throw he must, for the simple reason that his ancestors at one time preserved their lives and got their living by their ability to throw quickly and to throw straight. Civilization in which we live to-day is grounded upon the instinct to throw as one of its chief corner-stones. Along with this impulse to throw comes the destructive instinct, born again from the millennial-aged destructive processes of our ancestors. Nothing on earth then is so peculiarly inviting to a boy with gravel under his feet as the impudent stare of a pane of glass in an empty house. By all the known laws

of the boy-world, and we may add, by the reverberating command of a million generations, the healthy red-cheeked, clear-eyed normal boy is bidden to shatter that pane of glass with a well-aimed stone. Now, how shall the wise trainer modify that instinct? Not with a policeman's club. Stupid and stolid society has been trying to do that ever since the rise of modern cities. The wise man will do as the country school teacher did. He came out in the yard one day to find the boys throwing stones at trees and fences. Of course there was an immediate cessation of the exercise and a momentary stillness on the playground. The weather looked particularly stormy just then. In a moment, however, it cleared, for the wise old teacher said in a casual, complaining tone, "Why in the world don't you boys set up that dish-pan and practice on it?" A modern teacher in a New York school tells how she sent downstairs and asked the janitor to bring up a piece of glass. This was set up in her schoolroom and she had a particularly destructive young imp satiate his destructive throwing impulses by standing across the room and breaking that glass into a thousand pieces. Then when she had established this point of contact with him she was able to talk on the modifications of his instincts.

Play-Modified Instincts on a Large Scale.—But again the question will present itself: How are we to do this on a large scale? The reply must be: Chiefly by games and play. The boy whose right arm is aching to throw a stone can have that same energy wisely directed to driving a baseball across the diamond where it will do nobody harm and everybody good. Destructive impulses should be turned into analytic channels. A boy must be trained for life in the modern world. Why not let him take his world

apart and look at it? Let him disembowel an old clock. No boy's education is complete until he has picked at least one watch to pieces. Let him investigate likewise a sewing-machine, a gas-engine, a phonograph, a steam-engine, a water-spigot; let him take apart to his heart's content, a model house with its joists, rafters, and beams in place, and in spite of dirty fingers and dirty clothes, let him explore the mysteries of a thousand every-day objects in the jungle of life all about him. If he is too young to handle large objects, let him begin with puzzles that can be taken *apart*, not put together. The putting-together stage, paralleling social progress, will come in the adolescent period. Before that time, the boy sings with the poet

All the world I saw or knew,
Seemed a complex Chinese toy,
Fashioned for a bare-foot boy,—

and fashioned to be taken apart, to be analyzed, to be subjected to the most searching exploration by fingers, and eyes, and, if possible, by ears, and quite likely, too, by tongue and nose. Luther Burbank, who is a good theoretical kindergartner as well as plant gardener, says pithily: "Every child should have mud-pies, grasshoppers, water-bugs, tadpoles, frogs, mud-turtles, elderberries, wild strawberries, acorns, chestnuts, trees to climb, brooks to wade in, water-lilies, woodchucks, bats, bees, butterflies, various animals to pet, hay fields, pine cones, rocks to roll, sand, snakes, huckleberries and hornets; and any child who has been deprived of these has been deprived of the very best part of his education."¹⁶

¹⁶ Luther Burbank, *The Training of the Human Plant*, 1907, p. 83.

Summary.—To sum up, then, very briefly, we can say, first, that some instincts should be suppressed. The art of suppressing requires more parent-training and teacher-training than the average adult ever acquires in this world. Secondly, some instincts should be permitted full expression, yea, in some instances like the maternal impulses of girls, should be intensified with all normal opportunity for expression in housekeeping with doll-houses, nursing dolls and real babies, and all the little arts of home-making. Thirdly, by far the largest section of instincts should be modified by monopolies of environment which will consume all their force in expressions for good and leave no energy for the cultivation of bad habits. The play-ground and all out-doors must be drawn upon without stint and without limit for this task. No human ingenuity is great enough to keep juvenile energy employed in-doors.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF HABITS.

The Problem of Child-Training Before Twelve.—

The problem of character-making with the child from one to twelve years of age resolves itself into making good habits by having the child do things. The ideal way to have him do things is to connect these things with his primary or secondary interests, as the pedagogues love to call them. Such a distinction is really superficial, for ultimately all his interests resolve themselves into instincts. Therefore, briefly, the fundamental problem of child-training to the period of adolescence is to establish good habits by repetition of instinctively interesting actions. This, we must warn the literalist, is not the whole task nor yet the only conceivable method of fulfilling it. There are the sensory processes of consciousness to be aroused and exercised; there may be other qualities of character besides mere habit to be generated; and there may be other appeals to make to the child besides those to his instincts; and lastly, there are many different kinds of children. Still, it remains true, that with the ordinary child, the primary and fundamental task is to do as we have already stated above. If this is done, thoroughly and wisely, by far the largest part of character-making with the ordinary child is cared for. The highly intelligent child at the one extreme, and the animally perverse stupid at the other, may require respectively only the suggestion of an ideal of con-

duct or endlessly reiterated lessons with heavily impressed incentives.

Habit-making and Habit-breaking.—Habit-making, and,—because habits grow up like weeds from the soil of instinct,—habit-breaking, from long clothes to long clothes again, is the chief task of the character-maker. Notice that I say of the character-maker and not the child. This distinction is primary. It marks a view-point determining whole theories of child-training. It is another distinctive mark of the work to be done before adolescence. In childhood the trainer makes the child; during adolescence the youth makes himself. In childhood habits are forged by the unreasoned processes of reiteration; during youth they are made by the voluntary acceptance of an inner ideal and the conscious nurture of that ideal. For the child habit-making should be as unconscious as breathing; for the youth it should be his deliberate and high-born duty. A wise teacher will never *talk* habits to children; before they know it, she will have them chained—no, that is a hateful and vicious figure,—she will have them free as the wings of a bird in the unconscious and happy regulations of their lives.

The Physical Basis of Habits.—To know something of the manner by which the untamed instincts of boys and girls are to be thus captured and domesticated to the happy routine of every-day life, we will have to study the physical basis of habits. This is to be found in the physiological processes which underlie or parallel the psychological ones. It may be well to keep in mind, too, that the physiological processes involved herein are of two sorts. Though all conscious life involves the activities of certain neurological structures, ideation particularly concerns the end-organs

of the special senses. The eyes, ears, tactile, gustatory and olfactory organs play a preliminary part in the formation of ideas which precede ideational or voluntary acts. At the same time the various other organs of the body through their sensory nerves are sending into consciousness the news of their activities. This mass of organic sensations constitutes feelings, emotions, instincts,—differing from each other in their complexity or in their motor expressions. Whether habits arise from the later processes or from the former, their underlying physical basis is the same.

In making our approach both to the physical origin and to the meaning of habits, we cannot do better than to follow Professor James. He tells us that habits are by no means confined to human beings or organic structures in general. The stone and the apple have a habit of falling to the earth; springs bent in one place generate molecular habits which tend to make them bend easier in that place. "It fits like an old shoe," is merely an expression for the fact that the shoe has taken on certain habits of conformation just as do old clothes. To quote him exactly: "The change of structure here spoken of need not involve the outward shape; it may be invisible and molecular, as when a bar of iron becomes magnetic or crystalline through the action of certain outward causes, or India-rubber becomes friable or plaster 'sets.'"¹ And then he adds the words of Dumont in the same strain. "Everyone knows how a garment, after having been worn a certain time, clings to the shape of the body better than when it was new; there has been a change in the tissue, and this change is a new habit of cohesion. A lock works better after being used some time; at the outset more force was required to over-

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. i, p. 105.

come certain roughnesses in the mechanism. The overcoming of this resistance is a phenomenon of habituation. It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it has been folded already. This saving of trouble is due to the essential nature of habit, which brings it about that, to reproduce the effect, a less amount of the outward cause is required. The sounds of a violin improve by use in the hands of an able artist, because the fibres of the wood at last contract habits of vibration conformed to harmonic relations. This is what gives such inestimable value to instruments that have belonged to great masters. Water, in flowing, hollows out for itself a channel, which grows broader and deeper; and, after having ceased to flow, it resumes, when it flows again, the path traced by itself before."

The Formation of a Simple Ideational Habit.—

Human habits in their gross aspects arise in something of the same manner. Let us take for illustration the simplest kind of a habit learned in the laboratory. Suppose we are performing simple reaction-time experiments with an ordinary telegraph key and touch stimulus. I am sitting all expectant with my finger on the lever waiting for the operator to touch my to-me-invisible knuckle. All at once I feel the signal, jump inwardly and let go the waiting impulse to jerk my finger off the key. At first my action will be slow, and the time of repeated trials will vary much. Gradually, however, the interval will be reduced to a minimum and finally my finger, upon the instant of the signal, will come off the key with the regularity and simplicity of an automaton. A habit has been established. So with the simpler habits of life derived from instincts, like walking, talking, and the like; and with all those derived from ideational processes, like dressing, washing, running a type-

writer, playing a piano, and the thousand and one daily duties performed for the preservation and well-being of our existence.

The Nervous Mechanism of Habit.—To understand the more intimate physical mechanism by which such habits are generated in a human being, we had better begin with the simplest of nervous units called the neuron. This consists of a nerve fibre carrying an impression from its external or peripheral end to—say—a nerve cell in the gray-matter or cortex. This incoming impression will set up an excitement and that will spread itself like the enlarging circles made by a pebble dropped into a quiet pool; or better, like the waves of a wireless transmitter going off in every direction; or since no figure fits exactly,—like the vibrations of a spider's web set up at a distant point by a struggling fly and retransmitted to all points by the sudden and savage onslaught of the spider from his central den. All of these similes limp somewhat but they will serve to give us something of an idea of the situation. One of these excitements, travelling along a certain transmissive fibre, eventually arouses a cell in the motor area of the cortex. From this cell an efferent or outgoing fibre carries the message down to the muscle. The muscle contracts and an act has been performed. This is the description of the matter in remoter anatomical and physiological terms.

Why the same act should result upon the re-presentation of the same stimulus, why, in short, habits are formed, is graphically depicted by James. "The only impressions," he says, "that can be made upon them [brain structures] are through the blood, on the one hand, and through the sensory nerve-roots, on the other, and it is to the infinitely attenuated currents that pour in through these latter

channels that the hemispherical cortex shows itself to be so peculiarly susceptible. The currents, once in, must find a way out. In getting out they leave their traces in the paths which they take. The only thing they *can* do, in short, is to deepen old paths or to make new ones; and the whole plasticity of the brain sums itself up in two words when we call it an organ in which currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear. For, of course, simple habit, like every other nervous event—the habit of snuffling, for example, or of putting one's hands into one's pockets, or of biting one's nails—is, mechanically, nothing but a reflex discharge; and its anatomical substratum must be a path in the system. The most complex habits, as we shall presently see more fully, are, from the same point of view, nothing but concatenated discharges in the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of systems of reflex paths, so organized as to wake each other up successively—the impression produced by one muscular contraction serving as a stimulus to provoke the next, until a final impression inhibits the process and closes the chain. . . . A path once traversed by a nerve-current might be expected to follow the law of most of the paths we know, and to be scooped out and made more permeable than before; and this ought to be repeated with each new passage of the current. Whatever obstructions may have kept it at first from being a path should then, little by little, and more and more, be swept out of the way, until at last it might become a natural drainage channel. This is what happens where either solids or liquids pass over a path; there seems no reason why it should not happen where the thing that passes is a mere wave of rearrangement in matter that does not displace

itself, but merely changes chemically or turns itself round in place, or vibrates across the line.”²

How Do Habits Actually Begin?—We can now visualize readily enough in a figurative way,—and possibly literally enough, too,—how once a nerve current has run over a certain path it is likely to do so again. But why did that particular current take that particular path the first time? This is the initial problem, the *crux* of the whole matter in habit-making. For it can be easily seen, that, because of the interlacing of all these fibres and their inter-communication with movement-originating cells, if an impression goes into one fibre, say A, and can be switched off to any one of the three, B, C or D, but in reality goes to D, which in turn sets up another association and it contributes its effect to the resulting action, the route along which any first impression propagates itself to a large extent determines the resulting action. If, as has been suggested, chance determines this initial itinerary, it would seem that we must ultimately reduce habit-making to a matter of chance. This is just what our oft-quoted author does admit. “All this is vague to the last degree,” he says, “and amounts to little more than saying that a new path may be formed by the sort of chances that in nervous material are likely to occur. But, vague as it is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter.”³

The Kinds of Chances Open to Habits.—The kinds

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 108.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

NOTE.—For further information Professor James advises the reader to consult J. Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. xi, pp. 142-146, and Spencer's *Principles of Biology*, sections 302 and 303, and his *Physical Synthesis of his Principles of Psychology*.

of chances, however, that are open to neural variations are determined to a large extent by heredity in the first place, and by the action of environment upon the nervous organism in the second. These two factors of character, met at the very beginning of cell-life, we now meet again among the intricacies of the primitive neurological processes. Here they combine for the determination of the first paths and the first associations of incoming stimuli, and the apparent arbitrament of resulting actions. Hand in hand they walk and work and what quantum of influence is contributed by one and what by the other is as much an open question here as it is anywhere in all their long path.

Habits Due to Nervous Structures.—Acquired human habits are determined by an underlying mesh of nervous structures. Like a net they stretch themselves over the entire body. In and out along their lines excitations run. In certain centres—the cord, mid-brain, and cortex—the sensory impressions pass over to motor. What paths they will take in this switch-over depends upon “chance” within the limits of hereditary and environmental bounds. If a net were loosely stretched over a support and I struck one of its knots, the quiver of that knot would run over intervening cords to other knots. It would conceivably follow those strands best suited by their structure or their tautness to propagate the motion. So with the human nervous system. And so, too, just as I can stop the net-vibrations in certain directions, so can the passage of nerve currents in the human brain be stopped or deflected.

Habit Comes from Rebuilding Broken-down Structures.—The fact that paths are formed in the brain, resulting in the fact that an action committed is easier

to commit again, is the most valuable trait about habits. This trait depends upon the trophic peculiarity that when a nervous structure, whether it be a cell or a fibre, expends its energy in the transmission or the relaying of an impulse, it builds up again in such a manner that it is more susceptible to the same stimulus again. The apparatus can be looked upon as a self-loading cartridge reloading itself each time with a percussion cap more sensitive to a particular kind of a blow. This, according to Professor James, is due to nutritive renovation. "It must be noticed that the growth of structural modification in living matter may be more rapid than in any lifeless mass, because the incessant nutritive renovation of which the living matter is the seat, tends often to corroborate and fix the impressed modification, rather than to counteract it by renewing the original constitution of the tissue that has been impressed. Thus, we notice after exercising our muscles or our brain in a new way, that we can do so no longer at that time; but after a day or two of rest, when we resume the discipline, our increase in skill not seldom surprises us. I have often noticed this in learning a tune; and it has led a German author to say that we learn to swim during the winter and to skate during the summer."⁴

Breaking Habits.—In this attribute of nerve-tissue we have come upon the basis of two common experiences with habits. One has been named: Practice makes perfect. The converse is just as important: Neglect of practice brings decay of habit. Untravelled paths in the brain become overgrown and choked up. Writers disagree upon the degree of obliteration, some affirming and some denying that all traces are ever quite completely annihilated, but

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 110.

the most recent research seems to tend to the former view. For all practical purposes they can be obliterated and the period of their decay depends upon several well-known factors like time of use and the intensity of stimulus, or weight of the load, as it were.

As to the method of neglecting brain-paths we can only pause here long enough to say that it cannot be accomplished by the complete suspension of conscious life. This seems almost unnecessary to say but attempts at hermetic isolation voluntarily and involuntarily performed, for precisely this purpose, have not yet entirely ceased in the world. Prohibition, another form of the same method, is often but negative suggestion. The woman who, on the point of leaving her children at home, admonished them *not* to put beans in their noses, of course, found all of them in that plight when she returned. The good mother who stopped in her walk, waited until her lagging son came up, pointed out to him a most inviting puddle of water with the vehement command not to step into it should not have been so unutterably amazed when the young barbarian promptly splashed into the middle of it. This deliberate tantalization of his amphibian instincts was too much for nature to stand. No,—isolation, reduction of conscious life, prohibition, negative suggestion—these are not the methods of neglecting brain-paths. Neglect means neglect—positive and negative. Say nothing about the habit at all. Suggest it in no way. Out of the myriads of instincts bubbling up in child-life select those that are the remotest from the habit to be broken and stimulate them by example and environment. Of these ideals that lie closest to these instincts, choose those remotest from the habits and invest them with all that is pleasing for child-

hood. With these lay out in the yet untraversed brain-areas new paths and with unshaken faith in the certainty of neural laws, secure iterated and reiterated passage along these lines. Barring an old path by the erection of a "No Trespass" sign may stop people's walking that way but it may also compel them to cut a new path in another part of the meadow. The infliction of pain *may* stop energy from flowing along an old brain-path only to divert it into other channels of mischief. The positive formation of new paths insures the stoppage of the old and the right direction of the new.

The Psychological Basis of Habit.—We have said so much about the physiological side of habits that what remains to be said of their psychological constitution can be much foreshortened. This is the aspect so familiar, too, that not much can be said that the reader has not observed either in his own or in other people's experience.

First Stage of Habit-making.—Instincts as impulses in consciousness are the primary psychological sources of habits. Two qualities of instincts immediately strike us in this connection. They are thoroughly in line with the physiological characteristics we have enumerated. The first is the fact that an instinct once touched off by a certain object is more susceptible to that object in the future. The second is that an instinct once aroused by a certain object is more insensible to other objects to which it might have at first reacted. It seems to open wide the door to any visitor who has once come to it and to shut the door to others. How much these two laws taken together mean for the right pre-emption of childish instincts we have already hinted at in another place.

Second Stage of Habit-making.—The next stage of

the habit formation arrives when the external stimulus is no longer required to arouse the act. Either the idea of the exciting cause or the memory of the act or its pleasant results is enough to excite the tremulous nerve substance and to send its reverberating messages to the uttermost parts of the person's being, arousing a storm of desire such as can be allayed only by prompt repetition of the act. At this point pure habit has not arrived. Consciousness of all the proceeding is acute. Ideation is active and warnings, rebukes, punishments, delicious anticipations and certain remorse all follow one another pell-mell.

How sad and mad and bad it was!
But then, how it was sweet!

The Third Stage of Habit-making.—One more psychological characteristic clinging to habits needs to be touched upon. A habit constantly diminishes the amount of attention that needs to be given to its performance. This is true to some extent to those formed from instincts but remarkably true of all ideational processes of learning. In this peculiarity habits find their chief justification. This is their real value. From a psychological point of view, they save the organism, they diminish work, they reduce every-day, necessary duties to matters of routine and free the critical processes for original research and invention. Indirectly to habits all the progress of the world is due. If routine performances required always the same amount of attention to detail that they do in their beginning, the world would be at a hopeless standstill. Professor Maudsley has pictured the dire effects of such a state.

"If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or two deeds—that no progress could take place in development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing himself; the attitude of his body would absorb all his attention and energy; the washing of his hands or the fastening of a button would be as difficult to him on each occasion as to the child on its first trial; and he would, furthermore, be completely exhausted by his exertions. Think of the pains necessary to teach a child to stand, of the many efforts which it must make, and of the ease with which it at last stands, unconscious of any effort. For while secondarily automatic acts are accomplished with comparatively little weariness—in this regard approaching the organic movements, or the original reflex movements—the conscious effort of the will soon produces exhaustion. A spinal cord without . . . memory would simply be an idiotic spinal cord. . . . It is impossible for an individual to realize how much he owes to its automatic agency until disease has impaired its functions."⁵ Professor Bain notes the same attribute. "At first accompanied with feeling they gradually lose that character, and are at the same time narrowed in their operation to the precise members needed for the work. The first efforts at manipulation are intensely conscious; and there is a corresponding agitation of the features, with gesticulation of the whole body; while, as the education

⁵ Maudsley, *Physiology of the Mind*, p. 155.

proceeds, the intensity of the feeling and the diffusive manifestations subside together.”⁶

Pure Habit.—This diminution of the consciousness attending habitual acts gives rise to some of the most interesting questions attending their making and breaking processes. If consciousness does decrease, does it decrease to nothing? Does a habit ever arrive at the point of an inherited reflex? Undoubtedly it does. In the quotation given above James calls simple habits like snuffing or putting one's hands in one's pockets, “nothing but reflex discharges”; and Maudsley has just noted the ease with which a child stands after he has laboriously learned the art—“unconscious of any effort.” A little thought will give many illustrations of the total unconsciousness of habits, especially if they concern acts out of sight of the eyes, like tricks of facial expression, accents, nasal-twangs, the use of slang; and then parts of ordinary actions like the position of the toe in walking, the individual finger movements in writing, in playing a piano, in tying one's shoes,—and so *ad infinitum*. The fact is, one is soon tempted to say that a habit is not truly acquired until it has passed over entirely to the charge of the reflex centres and leaves consciousness free to pursue its thoughts unmolested. The smoker has fallen into the habit when he is unconscious of his cigar; when without thinking he fills and lights his pipe and becomes conscious of it only when it is recalled by some reminder. Franklin prided himself upon the fact that he could eat his dinner and immediately entirely forget what he ate. Possibly he never knew. We do hear of absent-minded men—men with their minds fixed on something

⁶ Alexander Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, 3rd ed., 1888, p. 6.

else—who have sat down to the table and had to be convinced of their devouring a meal by the empty dishes. Mechanics on piece-work sometimes make intricate measurements when their minds are far away upon something else. Typesetters habitually set type with a minimum of errors without being conscious of a word they are setting up nor of a letter they are choosing from the case. By far the greater bulk of our daily, habitual routine is wholly unconscious. The train is set off with some conscious impulse—an instinct or an idea—and the rest follows like the working of a clock or the speech of a phonograph. Such a situation, we may assume from the very nature of the case, more readily arises in the case of habits growing out of instincts than in the case of those growing out of ideational acts.

Degrees of Habit.—From this point of view we can discern differences in habits. Some are absolutely destitute of consciousness. These we might term pure habits. Some are accompanied during their entire sequence with a vague and shadowy perception of what is being done. These we might term partial habits. Some again are sometimes conscious, sometimes entirely unconscious. These we will call mixed habits. We need not inquire too closely into the logical coherence or the scientific exactness of such a classification. I hope to justify it in a few moments upon practical grounds alone and in the following way.

How to Break Pure Habits.—Pure habits are without consciousness. They are reflexes and are as imperceptible to the actor as the movements of his stomach in digestion, of the twitches of his face in St. Vitus' dance. How, then, would any teacher undertake to break such a habit? Certainly one with a spark of ethical feeling would not under-

take to punish a child for a reflex? Or the St. Vitus' dance! That would be too preposterous for the most ardent advocate of the ever-ready rod as a panacea of all children's faults.

Neither will "nagging" under the gentle euphemism of "reminding" the child of his habit answer in all cases of this class. Suppose it is a facial trick entirely beyond the perceptive faculties of the child, like talking on one side of his mouth, for example. He cannot be "reminded" of this trick simply because he never has had any idea of it. He talks the way it feels right to him. To be told that he talks on one side of his mouth does not give him an idea of how he talks. To be told he is wrong does not remind him of the unknown right. He might as well be asked to draw a picture of the space behind his shoulder-blades, or to recall the color of the ultra-violet rays, or the sound of vibrations above the capacity of his ear.

The first step in breaking such a habit is to ignore it entirely. There are at least two methods of doing this. The child may be placed in an environment where by unconscious imitation he will acquire the correct habit and the old one will fall away without notice. This is the method of playing an instinct against a habit. With peculiarities of dialect and with baby-talk it is peculiarly efficacious. Sometimes, however, children are found who persist in the infantile stammer. Upon an early instinct the habit has been so firmly grafted that later growth among right-speaking people is insufficient to overcome it. The child is taken to a speech-trainer. Of course such a specialist wastes no time in threats or scoldings or naggings. He immediately analyzes the faults in the child's phonetics; then begins at the beginning and by means of mirrors,

candles, feathers, and his own vocal organs impresses upon the child's mind by definite, conscious processes, the correct idea of each phonetic element and combinations of elements until a new habit has been formed and the child speaks correctly. Probably in the whole course of instruction not a word is said about habit. Assuredly the child's will is not appealed to in a realm where he has no will. In all habit-breaking the first determination of the teacher must be this: Does this habit belong to the class of pure habits or unconscious actions or not?

How to Break Mixed Habits.—With the remaining two classes of habits consciousness is present to some extent. In the case of mixed habits, consciousness in its acuteness may be present. Here the child in his forgetful periods can be reminded of what he is doing and his action brought into the realm of the conscious and ideational actions. In both these cases the will is involved, and after the child is made conscious of his fault and clearly conscious of what is expected of him, the breaking of the old habit really turns itself into the conscious and voluntary formation of a new one. This involves the "training of the will" and will be dealt with under a succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SERIOUS SIDE OF PLAY.

Play as a Maker of Character.—We have already shown that instincts are the clay and the mortar and the bricks and the stones out of which character is fashioned. From them the first serious habits spring and habits are the matrices into which later fluid adolescent character is poured. We now turn to an instinctive activity of childhood that has more bearing on the making of character than any other single educational factor. This activity expresses the inborn instincts of the child, forges habits from these instincts as no other institution does or can do, and develops his real moral nature beyond the power of any adult-framed and outwardly-impressed résumé. This unique factor is simply play; and what we have to say further about play will confirm what we have just now asserted.

History of Play.—Curiously enough, the attitude of the world in measuring the educational and moral value of play has travelled in a circle. History here, as in many places, has repeated itself. As early as the civilization of the Egyptians, the play of children was recognized as an educational factor. Occasional references to it are found in Persian writings. The ever-youthful Greeks, considering it necessary both for children and adults, and important both to the individual and the nation, brought play to its highest development and place of greatest importance in antiquity. The Olympian games were national events, festivals of worship, periods of universal rejoicing and

peace, during which intertribal hostilities were suspended, and by which historical dates were marked. Amongst the Athenians, noted for their culture, their art and their philosophy, children's toys were numerous, and unlike those of Sparta and Persia, were intended more to please and amuse the child than to equip him for life.

Greek Philosophers' Attitudes Toward Play.—The wisest of Greek philosophers and the greatest of their statesmen, recognizing the ideal of *Mens sana in corpore sano*—a sound mind in a sound body—thought this subject not too insignificant for their consideration. Some of their statements after a lapse of two thousand years exhibit more knowledge of child nature than many of our modern views.

Plato laid himself open to the charge of "soft pedagogy" when he said, "Do not use compulsion but hold education to be a sort of amusement," and "Education should begin with the right direction of children's sports"; and since, "The plays of children should be along the lines of their future occupations," so important did he consider the chance to play that he believed "The plays of children should be subject to law." Aristotle, following Plato, adds, "The child should have entertaining employment."

These recommendations were not uttered by some over-enthusiastic Greek youth recently laurel-crowned for some athletic excellence, but by sages, serious, aged, with minds seasoned by deep and long reflection. Plato was a disciple of Socrates who never wrote down a word of all his spoken wisdom. What young Plato heard his master say he mingled with his own thoughts and preserved in his Dialogues. Where Socrates leaves off and Plato begins nobody knows. We do know, though, that the history of play is richer for the mingled wisdom of two philoso-

phers. Neither does the approbation of Aristotle spring from the lips of idle youth, but from the most universally learned mind of the Greek era if not of all time. From eighteen to thirty-eight he went to Plato's school; became the teacher of Alexander the Great for eight years; then returned to Athens and formed a school of his own. He was never seen without a book in his hand, and often when his labors continued far into the night, he would study—so rumor says—with a brass ball in his hand, so that, when his mind staggered and his weary body relaxed, the ball would clatter down from his nerveless fingers to a brazen dish below and summon him once more to his endless task of study. From such workers and thinkers as these come the strongest endorsement of children's play.

Play in the Roman Period.—With the Roman period the happy and exhilarating view of play was somewhat modified by the seriousness of the Roman ideal. Here, not a sound mind in a sound body, but the citizen-soldier, blindly unquestioningly obedient, was the demand of that militarism which reduced the many to unthinking machines for the benefit of the few who commanded. "In a Roman family," says Mr. Bagetot, "the boys from the time of their birth were held to a domestic despotism, which well prepared them for a subjection in after life to a military despotism. They were ready to obey their generals because they were compelled to obey their fathers; they conquered the world in manhood because as children they were bred in homes where the tradition of passionate valor was steadied by the habit of implacable order."

The ideal citizen is set forth in that little tale told of the Roman general whose army was surrounded by a

superior force whose general sent a messenger requesting an immediate surrender that further bloodshed in useless battle might be spared. In the presence of the messenger the Roman general turned to one of his soldiers and said: "Leap over the cliff!" Without a moment's hesitation the soldier leaped and was dashed to pieces on the rocks below. Turning to another soldier the general commanded, "Fall upon your sword!" Immediately the soldier fell upon his sword and expired before them all. "Now," said the general turning to the messenger, "go back to your master and tell him I have ten thousand such soldiers!" And as the story goes, when the opposing general heard this, he immediately withdrew his forces, thinking it impossible to combat an army of such determination and implacable courage. To any one desiring only to develop non-thinking, machine-like, dependent creatures like those soldiers we commend the ready ear to the cautions of Quintilian who complains against too much play, saying, "There must, however, be bounds set to relaxation lest the refusal of it beget an aversion to study, or too much indulgence in it a habit of idleness." The good rhetorician made the common mistake of identifying play and relaxation.

The Eclipse of Play.—The wheel of history revolves and brings to the top the monk as the world ideal. Men forgot the sanity of the Greeks and even the vigorous, military obedience of the Romans, and substituted for both the mortification of the body for the saving of the soul. During the mediæval period the utmost was done to quench the play-spirit, and to quell the play-habit. It was generally viewed as Satan's work, a thing to fill idle moments, and idleness is the devil's workshop. Studying the catechism was the way for a well-regulated child to

pass his leisure moments. Only the jousts and tournaments of chivalry kept alive the spirit of play and lent any color to the leadiness of the age.

The Revival of Play.—The Renaissance revived not only science and religion, but stimulated lines of education. The enthusiastic and searching thinkers of the time could hardly overlook play. Like searchers among ruins, they cautiously feel their way back to the ancients. "Studies," ventures Rabelais, "should be made amusing and interesting," and good old Fénelon moderately adds, "Plays are efficacious in education." Over and beyond these cautious utterances the modern spirit leaps with the vigor and strength of a Greek athlete, only instead of a gymnast it is a philosopher, John Locke, who announces this principle of education. "The chief art is to make all that children have to do sport and play." Richter looks into the child-world and sees that "The plays of children are as serious and as full of meaning in reference to their future, as ours are to our future." And, finally, we are brought to the heart of the matter, by the apostle of play, Froebel, whose utterance is almost reverential when he says, "Play is the purest and most spiritual activity of man." Beyond this philosophy, so mechanized by modern kindergartners, appreciation cannot go. With Froebel, play reached the pinnacle of pedagogical importance; and, though educators have not yet given it the supreme place assigned it by the seer and prophet of childhood, the world is steadily climbing to Froebel's point of view.

The Practical Application of the New Play-Theories Followed Slowly.—However, the dawning light did not immediately penetrate to the minds of the lesser leaders in education. On account of the religious influence,

and especially as that influence was manifested in America, play, as an actual activity in child-life, did not come to its own for a long time after the announcement of its theoretical place.

Just how closely on the one hand the theory of play follows the theological spirit of the times, and on the other hand just how closely it is paralleled by the terrible crowding of young children into factories, shops and mines, is a story yet to be written. Between a nation's theological doctrines, its theories of play and its exploitation of child-labor, I believe a close and interesting relation subsists,—but we cannot talk about that here. At any rate as late as 1790 we find good old Dr. Rush, of Philadelphia, saying, “The Methodists have wisely banished every species of play from their college,” and adding that “all amusements of the Moravian children at Bethlehem, Pa., are derived from the subordinate part of several mechanical arts.”

The Recent Expansion of Play.—To-day we are in the mid-dawn of the present movement for play. Everywhere the spirit of it is abroad in civilized lands. No longer is it thought that children may or may not play, but it is understood that they must play. For them games and playgrounds are as necessary as bread to eat, clothes to wear, and houses to live in. Everywhere, beginning from the sand gardens in Berlin and Boston, we see the movement of playground associations spreading, levelling city blocks, fighting upward to fresh air and blue sky, equipping playgrounds, with first expenditures of millions of dollars and the annual appropriation of thousands of dollars for such apparently frivolous things as giving youngsters a chance to shoot marbles and pitch balls.

Verily we have travelled in a circle, and again in these

days of much play we find ourselves in the atmosphere of the ancient Greeks with their love of games, and we sigh, contentedly, as though we had passed through a long black night, to find ourselves once more facing a new day with the sun breaking through the mist and the morning full of promise.

Froebel Made Play Altogether Spiritual.—Much of this new spirit is due to the new conception of play. Froebel told us it was the “purest and most spiritual activity of man.” How could such a thing be? Surely, more spiritual than this are magnificent music, the finest literature, and the devotion of the soul to worship! Yes, these are, if we are considering matters from the view-point of the adult. Except those who have the divine grace of understanding the heart of childhood, all will say that assuredly more spiritual solace is to be found in worship, more lasting good in reading and more exaltation in music than in ball-playing, or skating or swimming or making mud pies. But remember, that it was also said by the Teacher who knew how to teach, “Except ye turn and become as these little children ye shall in no wise enter the kingdom of heaven”—even like these little children who dwell among us to-day and who are so commonplace and yet so passing strange.

Froebel, with his genius for child exploration, understood and meant what he said about play. For he saw that the essence of play does not consist in physical operations but in the internal accompaniments. Play is a mental attitude. In the same city within a few squares of each other two base-ball games are going on simultaneously. One is in a vacant lot where a crowd of boys are gathered and are making the bare walls of the adjoining factories

and houses ring with their cries. They are in full pursuit of happiness, for they are pouring out their natures in unrestricted play. The other game is behind a brick wall, upon a manufactured green, with thousands of spectators looking on and the players are hard at work. Both men and boys are playing the same game,—they are doing practically the same things, they are making almost identical motions,—and yet one is play and the other is work. What is the difference? The one, as Kant says in his pedagogical works, is an activity performed for the enjoyment of the operation itself and not for some ultimate end. The boys are not playing for money, nor yet even for the sake of beating, but for the fun of the thing. The men, if their salaries were cut off, would stop in the middle of an inning. This, if not all the differentiation between work and play, marks a very large difference between the two, and explains Froebel's opinion of the spiritual and internal side of play as opposed to the physical or external side. There are, however, other meanings to his expression which will come out later.

Why Children Play at All.—Very closely allied to the definition of play are the various theories proposed to explain why children insist on playing at all. Some time ago Schiller suggested a theory, later taken up by Herbert Spencer and given a more scientific expression, in which they both agreed that play is due to an exuberance of energy. Very probably children do play more when they are thoroughly rested than at other times; but nothing is more common than the pathetic and pitiable sight of little people with wearied bodies and pinched faces released from shops and factories, ready at the least excuse, and often without excuse, to burst forth in some unexpected form

of play. What mother is there who has not had her boy come home from school, drop down in a chair dejected and disconsolate, let his books fall on one side and his cap on the other with every expression of utter hopelessness in his posture and face. If under such circumstances she has gently inquired why this physical enfeeblement she has received some mournful response concerning the slave-driving propensities of the school teacher and the heartily expressed wish of the boy that he was dead. If she has dared gently further to suggest the necessity of having some one bring a pound of butter from the grocer, she will remember a collapse tragic in its suddenness and completeness. If Tommy was limp before, he is now lifeless. He is too far gone to protest. Just before his mother decides to send for the doctor—or undertaker—someone outside whistles. Tommy lifts his head, cocks one ear expectantly, slides over to the window, and sees his chum with a new bat and ball. In a moment fatigue and gloom and wasted energies are forgotten. He grabs his cap, is out of the door, and in a few minutes his amazed mother sees him chasing the ball two squares down the street! Certainly such a phenomenon as that cannot be attributed to any surplus of energy. What farmer boy is there who in his early youth has not followed the reaper all day till he felt that his next step would be his last; that he would fall down dead with sheer fatigue, and vows within himself that if ever night *should* come and release him once more from the heartbreaking work, he will go home, wash his face, eat his supper, and go to bed and see if he can ever feel rested again. And yet when night does come at last, and supper is eaten, he finds himself running a mile across the fields to play ball in the village until night shuts down upon

the reluctant game and brings him back to a realization of his broken vows to rest forever.

Play as a Change of Occupation.—Another theory which need not detain us long was advanced by the German Lazarus, suggesting that play is merely a change of occupation. We need hardly more than mention that the mere change of one activity to another does not constitute change from work to play, but may merely mean a change from work to work. Further, granting that children play from an exuberance of energy or from a desire for change, neither one of the above theories explains why they play the games they play.

Why Children Play What They Play.—Even the most superficial observer has noticed and possibly wondered at the iron-bound necessity of boydom that lays upon its subjects a succession of games according to some inflexible law. Imitation toys—cats, dogs, horses, fire-engines,—then marbles, tops, balls, bows and arrows, pop-guns, air-guns, all have their little day, consume the interest of the hour and sadly as the toys of “Little Boy Blue” find themselves neglected and forgotten. Like toys, games have their incubation period, their development and their convalescence. Tommy catches “cops-and-robbers,” “cow-boy-and-Indian” games just as he does measles or whooping cough, and will, if not treated too seriously, recover from the games as easily as from the diseases. Who is so sublimely supercilious towards the games of “kids” as he who has just passed through their infection and convalescence? All of these phenomena, and many more, must a comprehensive theory of play explain.

Groos' Theory.—Dr. Groos has modestly advanced a theory which, though not claiming to be final or perfect,

yet seeks to explain why children play the games they play. That theory makes play a résumé or a recapitulation of the activities of the race in its efforts to secure a livelihood from primitive savagery to civilized industry. Boys' play is a re-enactment of human history,—a world-drama with the tragedy omitted, too serious to the boy to be called a comedy, much less a burlesque, and too frivolous and too unproductive to be comprehended by the materially blinded adult who stands and looks on complacently superior, like the elder brother that he is, who has gone through it all. To the parent, play is play; to the child, it is life; to the philosopher, it is a reverberating echo of the long-lost past.

The Epoch Theory Applied to Play.—From this point of view it makes character, just as the character of the race has been developed from actual work which now turned into play, in turn fits the boys for their work in life. According to Groos then, we can expect that games of children will in a general way, though not absolutely and exactly, figure forth the past stages through which the race has gone in its steady climb to civilization.

The Savage Stage.—There will be a period called by Dr. Woods Hutchison the "root and grub stage," in which the occupation of the child will be wholly taken up with eating. Its whole purpose in life will be to pick up everything and transfer it to its mouth. Following this will come a stage of mere mimicry—erratic and haphazard movements upon which are superadded some imitative games with toy horses, toy wagons and other things of common life. As soon, however, as the boy begins to develop his own individuality the love for savage arts will manifest itself in games of the chase. Weapons will be his chief delight. He will long for a bow and

arrow, then quickly leap to a desire for a gun or a pistol, and if this instinct passes over to a habit, his air-gun will change to a powder rifle, this to a shot-gun, and this again be followed by a full equipment of the hunter, who will, all his life long find something familiar in the caress of a gun-stock, an answering soul-call to the bay of the hounds and a primitive abandonment to the lure of frosty mornings on woods or meadows brown and bare.

The Barbarian Stage.—After the savage period comes the barbaric. Not distinguished from the savage is it except that the games and toys are more elaborate and the instinct for chasing and running are more marked. It is particularly the Wild West time for the American boy, a period of Indian scouts, Indian suits, turkey feathers, long and stealthy stalking of the foe, the murderous yell and the mighty onslaught upon the settler, with the consequent fierce and bloodless fray in which poor Lo is forced back one more step toward the fading west.

The Nomadic Stage.—The nomadic period usually begins its development not alone but with other natural activities. When some day the boy of the house brings home a forlorn and disreputable stray dog, which by some subtle canine intuition has discerned the psychological moment to make his approach to the young nomad, in whose sentiment-blinded eyes he becomes instantly the finest specimen of canine excellence in the world, the parents may know the nomadic period has arrived.

In the critical situation what can a mother do? Well, if she wishes to sear the soul of her boy with a scar more terrible than a meningital scar upon the brain, let her seize a broom and heartlessly drive the impudent dog out into the cold hard world. The gods have decreed that such

a scar cannot heal over. Some day a full-bearded broad-shouldered man may smile about it all, but his eye will yield a pensive look and the shadow of a long regret; for

The tender touch of a day that is dead,

will never come back to him.

The wise mother will comprehend the situation. She will read the look in the boy's eyes, almost canine, and know that the souls of these two are knit together like the souls of a Jonathan and a David; that she stands back a hundred thousand years nearer chaos, in the primeval forest not with her son, but his primitive forbear, alone with his dog. She need not weep over the brute, nor praise him, nor even pat him, but simply suggest to Tommy that he build a house in the corner of the yard for his pet, feed him, wash him and care for him. More lessons will come to Tommy, I venture to say, by these exercises than by all the moral instruction fables he may ever hear, or all the eulogies to mother-love ever carved on tardy tombstones.

The Agricultural Stage and Age of Chivalry.—Upon the nomadic, but still more indistinctly, follows the agricultural period, manifesting itself in the sudden desire for a little garden of flowers or vegetables or a love of fields and woods. Then comes the age of chivalry, the dawn of adolescence, the day of putting off childish things, when all play turns into overt and conscious or disguised arts of courtship, when athletic contests wherein victory looms largest in the egoistic mind, relieve the overcharged motor-centres and express what is left of the fighting animal in primitive man. Later adolescence softens down the egotism; the altruistic and social grow and the amalgamation

of the individual with the team forecasts the merging of himself in the larger social life of the community.

Whether the games of children actually express the past history of the race or not is of secondary importance. If nothing more, the theory is at least interesting, but it certainly is something more. It aligns itself with evolution in general and gives to plays apparently disconnected and haphazard, a unity and coherence, and furnishes to the child-trainer a clue to the suitable games for children at different ages. If any one wishes to avoid complicating hypotheses, the theory that these stages express the social progress of any race and question of the necessity of studying first the social progress of a race, may be dropped from consideration and a systematic study of children's plays themselves substituted. Much such study and many stages of play have been suggested.

The Adult Viewpoint.—Now that we have given the scientific viewpoint of play we must turn to consider it from the point of view held by the ordinary adult and by the child himself. The adult ordinarily looks *down* upon the child's play-world. As a result he cannot see it; first, because his location reduces all its sights and sounds to a distant and uninteresting medley and robs the whole scene of all its feeling; and secondly, his superficial eye sees only the external and material when the true play-world is entirely spiritual. Hence, we cannot expect much enlightenment on play from the ordinary conventionally-minded adult.

The Child's Viewpoint.—The child's point of view is all important. For we are studying the effect of play upon his character. His character is affected, nay, more, consists of his internal as well as external reactions, both of

which are determined, not by what others think of play, but what he himself feels, thinks and does in play. His private point of view is therefore everything to us and to him. It makes play. A tourist standing on a balcony in a strange city looks upon a political parade as a well-meant show gotten up for his lazy interest, though to the paraders it may be a life and death matter. To actors and spectators both, "the play's the thing," but in what different senses! The Battle of Bull Run was a thing tragically antipodal to the sightseers who looked on and the soldiers who were being shot to pieces. So with the child-world of play and the onlooker. Play to the child is not *play*. It is the sincerest occupation of his life. Other activities are shadow-lands, vague in their borders and reaches, ruled by adults, full of twisted byways that lead out into the great, irresponsible nowhere of the future. Play is a solid, substantial meaningful thing that everybody understands and everybody wants to do. The apostles of play in the past and the leaders in educational programmes of their times have caught this view of the matter. "Gutmuths," says Chamberlain,¹ "came very near the heart of the question when he said (259, p. 22): 'Work, serious occupations, and converse with adults are artificial *rôles* of youth, in which they gradually make their *debut* on the grand stage of life; plays, however, are natural *rôles* in their own youthful paradise.'

"'In a word, the plays of childhood are a microcosm possessing almost all the elements of life. *Amour propre*, self-confidence, courage, astuteness, order, command, obedience, all are there.' The infinitude of child-play is capa-

¹ Alex. F. Chamberlain, *A Study in the Evolution of Man*, p. 12.

ble of exciting any feeling of emotion. As Mme. Kergomard says, 'Play is the child's labor, its trade, its life, its initiation into society.' "

The Inner Essence of the Play-world.—To greet this view of play with the cordial comprehension it deserves one must ponder upon its inner essence. The play-world is the internal world of a child when he is doing something that he enjoys. The enjoyment is not a mere titillation of feeling like grown people's amusements, nor a passing pleasurable wave of the moment. It is a solid and abiding satisfaction that consumes the whole being. Its closest analogue amongst grown persons is the divine passion which comes to the artist when he feels himself pouring into his work the best that ever yet came to his soul; the unified, totally-devoted feeling that comes to all of us at intervals when we enter those rare moments of exaltation linked with doing the thing that springs from the profound depths underlying the flimsy nothings of daily trivialities.

Child-play is Hard.—Such enjoyment of activity does not come from doing easy things. No one expends more energy in his tasks than a child in his play. He will tug, and try and sweat and pant, will submit to failure after failure and still come back with the set determination to do or die. This most invaluable of pedagogical assets attends play all the way from the tot's first unco-ordinated efforts to pick up a ball to the last adolescent supreme expenditure of heart-blood in a heated contest. The child plays and plays *hard*.

The Child Cannot Quit Playing When He Chooses.—Neither does the pleasure of play spring from the fact that a child can quit when he pleases. It is true

that play has a safety-valve. A child *does* quit this side of fatigue, but not always this side of weariness. He will keep on in spite of aching muscles, sometimes because the game demands it, sometimes because his chums demand it, sometimes because the fascination of the events compel it. Tree-climbing for the sake of tree-climbing is certainly play; and yet nobody who has ever tried it believes for a moment that he can quit when he pleases! After he has reached a peculiarly difficult perch and must then come down, with what shivers, anxieties, awful muscular pains and heart-throbbings, to say nothing of lost cuticle and splintered hands, is the descent attended! Does that stop the climbing? Not in the least. Though the descent is as certain as the ascent and the pains thereof as painful as death, the primitive boy is urged by a force *a tergo* the satisfaction of which outweighs all the secondary discomforts that attend the expression of it. So with play. A child plays hard and plays long because he is urged on by an impulse that will give no peace till it is satisfied. In this respect he is precisely like the person who waives all patent disagreeable attendants and does his duty for the sake of easing his conscience. We all understand how one may be filled with layers of feeling, the upper ones being more or less disagreeable, but the whole result a profound soul-satisfaction for having done what one's innermost nature demands. It hardly seems necessary to stop and say that such acts have always been counted the most worthy and the most beautiful that erring human beings perform.

The Real Joy of Play is Self-expansion.—In general, I take it, that the joy that makes any activity play and not work is the feeling of expanding selfhood; the

feeling of pouring out oneself in free, untrammelled, impulsive activity. By free I do not mean without regulation and co-ordination; but free from external and unsympathetic demands that have no living interest. Activities so demanded are mere drudgery. Neither do I mean an aimless *dolce far niente*, mere butterfly sipping of this and that pleasure. That is dribble. True work is the happy mean between drudgery and dribble. Then it is play.

From this point of view we can readily grant the boy and girl all the play they can possibly want. It is their best and most productive activity. We can quite agree with John Locke in his command to make all that a child has to do amusement and play.

But will such a system fit a boy for his after-life? The tragedy of that question ought to give us pause. Should after-life be anything else than an opportunity for the finest and most productive activity, done in a spirit of pouring out the best there is in us? Certainly it should not; and if it is anything else then something is wrong with the order of the world and not with the psychology of the child nor with the theory that makes play pre-eminent in his character-making. Further, if such a world sounds too Utopian, we may still cling to our ideal as a goal *in the direction* of which we may always work in our reformatory efforts. If we *must* decide between going toward the all-play theory of Locke and Froebel and the no-play theory of such a good man as Dr. Rush, we can at least, go as *far* as practical limits will let us toward the land where all people play all the time. That must be a land of serenest joy, a land of most wholesome

effort, a land filled with artists and their immortal wares. Since the mediæval days the schoolroom has moved with happy acceleration toward that ideal. Look back a moment at some of the milestones and then take heart and go on.

The Older School Ideals.—We need not go so far back as the Dark Ages for our start. The picture toward the end of the mediæval period is dismal enough. The first dawn of the Renaissance was breaking. Agricola (1443–1485) says: “A school has been committed to me. That is a difficult and vexatious thing. A school is like a prison in which there are blows, tears and groans without end. If there is anything with a contradictory name it is a school. The Greeks named it *schola*, that is, *leisure*; the Latins, *ludus literarius*,—*literary play*; but there is nothing farther from leisure than a school, nothing harder and more opposed to play. More correctly did it receive from Aristophenes the name *phrontizerion*, that is a place of care.”²

Probably not one modern school-teacher would ever dream of summing up his life-work as did the school-teacher quoted by another authority who says, “Not long ago, as history measures time, a Suabian school-master pointed with pride to the results of his fifty-one years of teaching. He had given 911,500 canings, 121,000 floggings, 209,000 custodes, 136,000 tips with the ruler, 10,200 boxes on the ear, and 22,700 tasks by heart.” It was also recorded to his credit (!) that “he had made 700 boys stand on peas, 6000 on the sharp edge of wood, 5000 wear the fool’s cap, and 1700 hold the rod. Our early school-masters were certainly not troubled about the action of

² F. V. N. Painter, *A History of Education*, 1894, p. 336.

matter upon mind, whatever ideas they may have had regarding the mind's action."

The same author quotes Crabbe's school-master as saying that students

. . . like horses on the road,
Must be well lashed before they take the load;
They may be willing for a time to run,
But you must whip them ere the work be done;
To tell a boy that if he will improve,
His friends will praise him, and his parents love,
Is doing nothing,—he has no doubt
But they will love him, nay, applaud without;
Let no fond sire a boy's ambition trust,
To make him study, let him know he must.³

This advice, resembling the old Virginian's faith that whip and corn-bag were good for slaves and horses, mixes horse-flesh and child-nature promiscuously enough to make an evolutionist shudder. It is an acute combination of both onto-genetic and phylo-genetic psychology closely allied to the Hoosier School-master's laconically expressed doctrine, "The more lickin' the more larnin' "!

A Bit of Progress.—Modified perhaps, and hidden under more refined drapings possibly, but still there in germ, is this same thought of childish depravity and the necessity of grim suppression found in Edith M. Thomas' school, described in her "Counterpoise."

When I was a child and laughed at school,
(For laughter little or nothing would do!)
That I might not break our Draco's rule,
I thought of the saddest things I knew;

³ James Swift, *The Mind in the Making*, pp. 95, 103. Quoted from Barnard's *English Pedagogy*, 2nd series, pp. 327, 328.

Of the homesick dark, when I tossed on my cot,
 And cried for the light and the homeward way;
 Of the singing-bird my hand forgot
 Till, starved on the floor of its cage it lay!

God wot that was many a year ago!
 Now, often I laugh that I may not cry;
 And I think of the blithest things I know,
 And the follies dear in the days gone by.

I make me mirth where'er I can;
 I jest with the jester of brave relief,
 Nor the griefs of the world too closely scan,
 Lest I sit me down in my helpless grief!

And probably that school-mistress' justification for her suppression of children's laughter was the necessity of preparing them for the "serious things of life"!

The Modern Spirit.—But the sweep of the new day goes on apace. We are not at the noon-tide yet but we are well into the morning and no institutions are making more happy progress than our great army of schools. All enlightened men agree with Chamberlain, "That children have some right in the matter, is a view that is slowly but surely fixing itself in the minds of the people,—that school should be something more than an intellectual prison-house, a mental and moral tread-mill, a place to put children in out of the way of the family, a dark cave into which happy, freedom-loving, joyous childhood must perforce retire from that communion with nature which makes the health of its body and the salvation of its soul. This false theory is vanishing . . . before the teachings of the new psychology and the new anthropology, which demands a knowledge of what the child is, feels,

thinks, before they will be party to any attempt to *make* him be, feel, think, something different. The school is but a modified form of society, of its fundamental institution, the family.”⁴

The Dream of the Future.—Time and space would fail me if I tried to illustrate in the most sketchy way the effects already accruing to the real education of children through this new psychology and anthropology. The school-room instruction has been modified in almost every particular; the school-yards are become paradises for children; the home is revolutionized; medicine has changed its nauseous doses; theology has softened its harsh strictures; society has amended its barbarous laws; civil courts have reformed their procedures;—everywhere the scientist has followed the patten of little feet. The way has already been straightened and softened and the paths of virtue have been made easier and more delightful to walk in. When, in a commercial country like America with its pioneer’s exaggeration of the value and rights of private property, the child reaches out and at one fell swoop seizes and turns to its own use for a play-ground nearly two million dollars’ worth of houses and lands in a crowded city, we grow almost dizzy counting the flying milestones of progress. Some of us are already daring to raise our eyes to that Utopian time when our city streets will be swept clean of their hordes of marred and pallid little creatures who will go whistling by on their new way like the hero of that deepest seer into the heart of childhood, the Quaker Poet, from whom even New England’s rock-bound Puritanism could not efface the tender memories of his youth.

⁴ Alexander F. Chamberlain, *The Child and Childhood in Folk-Thought*, 1896, p. 234.

His lines are full of truth, of philosophy, of psychology and pedagogy.

Blessings on thee little man,
 Bare-foot boy with cheek of tan!
 With thy turned-up pantaloons,
 And thy merry-whistled tunes;
 With thy red-lip redder still,
 Kissed by strawberries on the hill;
 With the sunshine on thy face,
 Through thy torn brim's jaunty grace:
 From my heart I give thee joy,—
 I was once a bare-foot boy.
 Prince thou art,—the grown-up man
 Only is republican.
 Let the million-dollared ride!
 Bare-foot trudging at his side,
 Thou hast more than he can buy
 In the reach of ear and eye,—
 Outward sunshine, inward joy,
 Blessings on thee, bare-foot boy!
 O for boyhood's painless play,
 Sleep that wakes in laughing day,
 Health that mocks the doctor's rules,
 Knowledge never learned of schools,

.
 For eschewing books and tasks,
 Nature answers all he asks,
 Hand in hand with her he walks,
 Face to face with her he talks,
 Part and parcel of her joy,—
 Blessings on thee bare-foot boy!

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SELF.

A Connecting Word.—At this chapter the treatment of character-making naturally reaches a distinct point of transition. The whole life of a child can be divided into five stages: embryonic, foetal, infancy, childhood, adolescence. These parts may be included under three grand divisions. First, the prenatal growth may include the embryological and *intra-uterine* periods. These have been treated in Chapters III and IV dealing with problems of heredity. Second, childhood, including infancy, is the period from birth to twelve years. It has been treated in Chapters V to VIII and is chiefly concerned with making habits from instincts. Third, adolescence is the final stage, the period of conscious self-making, the maturing of the will, the formation of genuine moral character. In this period ideals are uppermost in mind and in power. The emphasis of treatment shifts from instincts—though these remain as powerful as ever—to ideas. Self is the thought of the period and we will consider it first.

The Common Notion of Self.—Until one begins to think about it the Self is the most familiar personage there is in all the wide world. It is an entity perfectly certain, unitary, fixed and continuous. Whatever changes may come in my surroundings, however my circumstances may fluctuate, raising me to the height of affluence or plunging me into the barren depths of poverty, however much time may corrode my physical frame or changing

influences float me away from my dearest prejudices and deepest faiths, still my Self remains sublimely untouched by the vicissitudes of life. It stands immutable. It orders my comings and goings. It stands forever just within beck and call, watching with a sleepless eye over all my acts and ready at a moment's notice to frame a judgment and hand down a decision. Such is our common notion of the Self.

The Function of the Self.—Of its action within us we have also very fixed though not very clear ideas. We believe that most of our actions are directly attributable to the "Self." What this Self decides is final. From it there is no appeal. Yet it resides in such an inaccessible place that, like some absolute monarch within his court, it is impossible to reach the Self with pleas of reform, education or discipline. Yet at the same time, the Self is held responsible for the acts of the person as a whole and the good man or the bad man is held to be good or bad according to whether he is a good or a bad "Self."

From our point of view, laid down in the first chapter on character, the Self as a part of man's total customary reactions can be interesting only as one actor in the play. Possibly this Self plays the leading rôle. If it does do the final deciding for all the other activities, then it is of supreme importance. At least, we must examine it and find its psychological constituents and try as far as possible, to define its place and its function in character-making. With us, however, the first importance must always be given to the "Whole Self" and not to any one particular "Self." The reason for this we have explained in our former chapter.

The Truth is There are Many Selves.—The moment

we turn to the examination of the Self everything becomes vague and complex. The third vowel, "I," stands for so many different personages. "I" means all of *me* and all of *mine*. It seems to include the material and external as well as the mental and internal. There is first and foremost the pure Ego or Transcendental Self, identified in theology and metaphysics with the Soul. Then there are the Material Self or body; the Egoistic or Selfish Self with its inturned eye always jealous for some personal gain; the Social or Larger Self with its sweep of vision over the outer world and readiness to help others; and finally the Psychological Self, the core of our inner life, a steadfast feeling of unity amid changing, flexing and shifting feelings, ideas and volitions. Let us impartially examine these Selves and see what they are and what rôles they play in making us good men and women.

The Transcendental Self or Pure Ego.—Naturally the conventional point of view would place the Transcendental Self at the apex of importance in Character-making. The first difficulty is our black and oblivious ignorance of such a Self. As long as we stick to abstractions and talk in general terms, we are all certain enough about it. We are sure of its existence; we know it is always with us; even when we sleep it lives on and takes up the broken threads of life where our tired hands last laid them down; many of us still believe that this entity transcends the power of death and continues a freer and better existence in the world to come. We feel at home with Kant and the transcendentalists when they talk about an Ego of this sort, calling it the Transcendental Ego, making it Free, and giving it the chief office of patching together or synthesizing all our discrete experiences, the sights and sounds

and odors and touches that seem to come from one object which may at the same time not be one. In this office it is known as the "transcendental unity of apperception."

Possibly there is such an Ego. About it we can say nothing. It never comes into the purview of human consciousness. By its very nature it is an unknowable, one of those far-wandering and invisible dark-stars of the metaphysical firmament which must be there because the visible and knowable things behave as they do. As such this Ego cannot be useful for the character-maker. It is beyond his reach, fixed in the sublimity of its isolation and beyond the care of rewards or punishments. This Entity, if it does exist, has never in this world had the slightest discoverable influence upon character. If there be such a thing in existence, we have nothing to say concerning its modes of existence or the possibility of its improvement. Dr. Wayland, for instance, says, "Of the essence of Mind we know nothing," and goes on, "All that we are able to affirm of it is that it is *something* which perceives, reflects, remembers, imagines and wills; but what that something is which exerts these energies we know not. It is only as we are conscious of the action of these energies that we are conscious of the existence of mind. It is only by the exertion of its own powers that the mind becomes cognizant of their existence. The cognizance of its powers, however, gives us no knowledge of that essence of which they are predicated. In these respects our knowledge of mind is precisely analogous to our knowledge of matter."¹ And to these words Professor James adds, "The only self we know anything positive *about* Kant thinks is the empirical *me*, not the pure *I*; the self which is an object among other

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, p. 347.

objects and the 'constituents' of which we ourselves have seen, and recognized to be phenomenal things appearing in the form of space as well as time." ²

The Material Self.—Probably the most patent and obtrusive "I" is the bodily one that is principally referred to when, with my finger on my breast, I say, "Here am I." Yet no one, after a moment's reflection, will assert that his body alone is all there is of him, or even that that is the important part of him. Much less will he seriously say that his houses and lands, his books and bonds are "himself" though somehow intimately affecting and moving that permanent entity called "Self." No, the "Self" is certainly not some external objective thing. It is somehow within us. It is then something mental, and rightfully, a subject of psychological study.

The Social Self of Altruistic Impulses.—Yet we are all familiar with a "Self" that does seem to go beyond "ourselves." "Our hearts go out" to suffering humanity; we glorify the "larger self" that swallows up ego-centric, small-arc'd desires in sacrificing deeds; we all know the Social Self and feel it our duty to cultivate it. Yet our real Social Self cannot actually reside in social institutions, parties, balls, charities, missions beyond the sea. It resides in us and not in things.

Our wives, our children and our friends all contribute their share to the inner life we call our own. These external things give us sensations, arouse emotions, excite our desires and aversions and suggest ideas. Ultimately they are all reducible to elements of consciousness. The Social Self then resolves itself into all those feelings, emotions, instincts with their concomitant ideas, that go out to others

² *Ibid.*, p. 362.

besides ourselves. They can be all massed together as the other-regarding or altruistic instincts or feelings and their centres of ideas. Sympathy, love, patriotism, paternal and maternal affection, friendship,—many of such feelings which we may eventually reduce to the gregarious instinct in man,—these make up the Social Self.

The Self as Egoistic Instincts.—This delineation of the Social Self immediately brings out of the dark another self—for want of a better name, called here the Selfish Self. It represents another colony of ideas and feelings all reducible to the self-regarding ideas and impulses, or egoistic instincts. Vanity, conceit, courtship, æstheticism, love of contests, in short, all those activities in life which may be primarily connected with the instinct of self-preservation or preservation of one's own life in contradistinction from the life of the family, tribe, clan, or nation, or society.

Between this Self and the Social Self, all too well we know the warfare that goes on. How they set themselves in grim array against each other and torment us with their determination each to have his own way! How sometimes one conquers and sometimes another we sadly acknowledge. By these outcomes, men begin to name us "good" or "bad," selfish or unselfish, noble or ignoble, a patriot or a parasite. These selves and their warrings we know.

The Psychological Self.—But it is these very warrings that compel us to insist upon another "Self." It is the unmoved spectator of these battling other and lesser selves. It stands between them, or over them, and often by its interjection of something, puts an end to the jangling

contention, brings order out of heated chaos and sends forth to the waiting muscles the edict to act thus or so.

Yet familiar as it is when we undertake to separate it from the stream of consciousness that flows on under our observation it immediately seems to disappear into a vague nothingness. We feel as though we were standing on the river bank watching the current flow by carrying its bits of this and that. While standing there the picture of the river, of its surface, and of ourselves seems sure enough, but the moment we try to turn around in our tracks and see ourselves looking on we immediately disrupt the whole picture. It is as hard to form a clear image of ourselves looking upon the stream of consciousness as it is to frame a mental picture of the region behind our shoulder blades. As Professor James says, "Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head."³

The Self is a Feeling of Bodily Movement.—The result then of our analysis leads us to the conviction that the self is first a feeling, and second, it is a feeling of bodily motions. To quote again from the same author, "In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, *the 'Self of selves,' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat.* I do not for a moment say that this is *all* it consists of, for I fully realize how desperately hard is introspection in this field. But I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions

³ William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. i, p. 300.

are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am *most distinctly aware*. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, *it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked.*" . . . "The notion of his ego as such is, like every notion, derived from sensibility, for the process of apperception itself comes to our knowledge chiefly through those feelings of tension which accompany it." . . . They are reactions, and they are primary reactions. Everything arouses them; for objects which have no other effects will for a moment contract the brow and make the glottis close. . . . In the midst of psychic change they are the permanent core of turnings-towards and turnings-from of yieldings and arrests which naturally seem central and interior in comparison with the foreign matters, *apropos* to which they occur, and hold a sort of arbitrating, decisive position, quite unlike that held by any of the other constituents of the Me."⁴

With such a conception of the empirical ego Professor Wundt, the great German psychologist, entirely agrees. "The images of feelings," he says, "we get from our own body, and the representations of our own movements distinguish themselves from all others by forming a permanent group. As there are always some muscles in a state either of tension or of activity it follows that we never lack a sense, either dim or clear, of the positions or movements of our body. . . . So we come to conceive this permanent mass of feeling as immediately or re-

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-303.

motely subject to our will and call it the consciousness of ourself.”⁵

The Changes in the Self.—While we have defined the empirical self as that mass of feeling which is fairly permanent in consciousness, we must not conclude that it is absolutely fixed in its attributes nor in its modes of existence. The self is born; lives only intermittently and may eventually die before the body does. The conditions under which it passes through these vicissitudes are both natural and unnatural.

The Origin of the Self.—The origin of the self in consciousness, that is, the child's realization that a psychic part of him remains the same day after day amid the pantasmagoria of sensations, feelings, emotions and volitions playing before his outer and inner senses, is sometimes accomplished in the twinkling of an eye and sometimes dawns as gradually as a clear morning. Tennyson describes the latter process in three stanzas of his *In Memoriam*.

The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is pressed
Against the circle of the breast
Has never thought that “this is I.”

But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of “I” and “me”;
And finds I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch.

So rounds he to a separate mind,
From whence clear memory may begin,
As thro’ the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

⁵ Physiologische Psychologie, 2 te Aufl., Bd. II, S. 217-19.
Quoted by James, vol. i, p. 303.

Some Ways of Losing Self.—With the cessation of selfhood by natural means we are all perfectly familiar. Nightly sleep robs us of all precious possession of it; immersion in some fascinating occupation; entire loss of “self-possession” in a moment of excitement; “self-forgetfulness,” in some revery, in some passion, or some intense point of absorbing interest, whether it be a play at the theatre or a tragic moment in real life,—all these phenomena we know approach in varying degrees the destruction of that self which otherwise keeps unremitting guard over our thoughts and lives. So tiresome does this sense of self become to some people that they cannot withstand the tormenting temptation to annihilate this pursuing thing though only temporarily, in one grand debauch, out of which they come repentant but refreshed to face their upbraiding self whose monotonous presence for a time has been replaced with other alcoholically excited organic sensations.

Against this “self” other people struggle in vain as did Alphonso Daudet who cries, “Oh, this terrible second me, always seated while the other is on foot, acting, living, suffering, bestirring itself. The second me that I have never been able to intoxicate, to make shed tears, or to put to sleep.”

Unnatural Ways of Losing Self.—The unnatural ways of losing one’s “self” are more interesting than the natural for the reason that they are more unusual. Of course, it is impossible to draw any fast and hard line of demarcation between these natural and unnatural disturbances. The distinction is made merely for purposes of better analysis. Where, for example, shall we place cases of sudden religious conversion in which the “old self dies”

and the "new self rises to newness of life"? Such events are comparatively unrare, yet startling enough in their suddenness and inexplicability.

Total Amnesia, or Loss of Memory, Brings Loss of Self.—Accidents, blows on the head or falls sometimes cause the loss of self. Dr. Hanna, described by Dr. Boris, lost himself by a fall from his buggy and regained his old self only after months of treatment. Athletes have been known to go through whole sections of a game, answering signals, making right combinations, playing with all their mind and strength, yet without being able later to recall a single event from the time they received an injury in the game. Dr. Palmer tells how he fell from his horse and walked past two gates to his own home leading his animal with him, and was recalled to himself only after he heard his wife's voice speaking to him. Sometimes memory of self remains but self is gone. Asylums sometimes offer examples of living-dead patients who solemnly affirm their non-existence and add the date and details of their demise. Ribot mentions a soldier described by Folville.⁶

This man had been wounded in the battle of Austerlitz and when asked afterward about his condition would say, "You wish to know how fares old Lambert? He is no more; he was carried off by a cannon-ball. What you see here is not himself, but only a wretched machine that has been made like him; you ought to ask them to make another one." In speaking of himself he never said "I" but "that thing." His case is explained by Ribot as follows:

"Before his accident this soldier, like everybody else,

⁶ Th. Ribot, *The Diseases of Personality*, 1891, pp. 34, 35, quotes Foville, *Annales medicopsychologiques*, 1856, p. 249, *et seq.*

had his organic consciousness, the sense, the feeling of his own body, of his physical personality. After the accident an internal change was brought about in his nervous organization. Concerning the nature of this change, unfortunately, we can only form hypotheses,—the effects alone being known. Whatever it may have been, it resulted in giving birth to another organic consciousness—that of a ‘wretched machine.’ No amalgamation had been affected between the latter and the older consciousness—the recollection of which had tenaciously remained with the patient. The feeling of identity is accordingly lacking; because in the organic states as well as others this feeling can only result from a slow, progressive and continuous assimilation of the new states. Here the new states did not enter the ego as an integral part.”

The Self Owes Its Dominance to Its Permanency in Consciousness.—Such an illustration and explanation throws a flood of light upon the essential constitution of the empirical self. It is not memory alone, but a feeling of identity between two successive mental states, or parts of such states. That identical part in each, the thread that runs through all my separate experiences of yesterday and of to-day, is the massed-together-in-one-lump feelings that come from my bodily organs. That mass is fairly identical from day to day. Because it is the most familiar member in my mental family—and not because it acts differently from other members in other respects—I give it a name above every other name, capitalize it into an “I” and set it lord over all the rest of the more unstable tenants of the realm.

Since this is an entirely autonomous act, and not because this “I” rules by any divine right, the whole body-

politic with perfect equanimity permits this one tenant to speak of "my," "mine," and to say "I will" and "I won't," knowing full well that each member shares in the same powers and prerogatives in proportion to its own permanency in consciousness. If this master-feeling slips out of consciousness, like all other feeling it loses its power of compelling action even as the most superficial idea. If this feeling remains only in memory it has no more influence than any other dead and gone reminder of the mournful past. A friend it was, a dear familiar face, but now gone, and its influence fades like a withering leaf. If memory of such a feeling perishes with the feeling itself then the break between the new and the old is absolute. The new man is wholly a new man; the old self is as if it never were. Psychological literature of a certain sort is full of these cases which play a notable part in the religious phenomena like sudden conversion, and its allied phenomena.

Double and Multiple Personalities.—Nowhere is the instability of the self more manifest than in the experiences of those suffering with double and sometimes alternating personalities. Janet, James, and Sidis, among others, have dealt with these cases at length and have detailed the vagaries and transmutations of remarkable and sometimes almost unbelievable varieties.

Of the permanent doubling of the self Daudet, according to James,⁷ presents an illuminative example. The

⁷ William James, *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, Lecture VIII, p. 167. See also *Alterations of Personality*, Alfred Binet, trans. by Baldwin, 1896; *Multiple Personality*, Boris Sidis & Simon P. Goodhart, 1905. Dr. Sidis gives the physical basis of personality in the nervous systems of the lowest animals to man.

experience was not pleasant as the sufferer indicates in his cry, "Homo duplex, homo duplex! The first time that I perceived I was two was at the death of my brother Henri when my father cried out so dramatically, 'He is dead, he is dead!' While my first self wept, my second self thought, 'How truly given was that cry; how fine it would be at the theatre.' I was then fourteen years old." Annie Besant, St. Augustine, the French philosopher Jouffroy, John Stuart Mill and many others, according to the same author, present symptoms of the same malady.

The cases of temporary doubling and finally uniting are numerous; that is, comparatively numerous. By that I mean that many more cases of this sort are on record than the man of normal experiences and usual lines of reading would suspect. We have room for only one, the now well-known case of Dr. Hanna reported by Professor Sidis.⁸

The Case of Dr. Hanna.—The subject, Rev. Thomas Carson Hanna, was a college graduate, a man of considerable intellectual attainment, of good parentage, with no known neurotic taints, and of good health and sound mentality. On April 15, 1897, he attempted to alight from his buggy, fell and was picked up in a state of unconsciousness. When he recovered consciousness he had forgotten every last vestige of his past life. Not an inkling of knowledge of anything remained to him. "The world was to Mr. Hanna but a chaos of sensations, not as yet elaborated and differentiated into a system of distinct percepts and concepts; neither objects, nor space, nor time . . . existed for him." Movement alone attracted his attention.

⁸ Sidis and Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, 1905, Part II, Chaps. I-XVI.

By entirely chance movements he learned to control his limbs. Everything was close to his eyes. He reached for pictures on the wall and for people surrounding his bed. The watchers promptly retreated, thinking he was in a delirium.

From this state of complete amnesia, or forgetfulness of all his previous life, he very quickly rose to a new knowledge of himself and his surroundings. His ability to learn was marvellous. The world at first appeared to him as one complete jumble of things coming and going so rapidly that he could get no connected idea of persons and things. He learned first to move his own muscles, to breathe voluntarily, to shake his head, to move his arms and legs. He could remember words when he heard them once, but, of course, they had no meaning to him for some time. His first word was "apple." He ate the fruit and then, when he was hungry again, said the same word "apple." When the attendant brought him apple he, still being hungry, cried "apple, apple," though he was surfeited with apple and wanted some other food. It took him two days to learn this word. After that words came rapidly. He soon learned to talk, to write and to read. "He learned so rapidly in these days that it seemed almost miraculous." This was due to the fact that his faculties were entirely complete but they lacked any content or material. He learned to play the banjo in about an hour though he never played before,—and the piano in a little longer time though he had learned that before his accident.

To make a long story short, he again built up his world from its very foundations, relearning some of the old lessons and acquiring some that were entirely new. By May 26, 1897, he had built up a fairly consistent and

adequate knowledge of his new world. Concerning the past beyond April 15th, he was still absolutely blank; "what occurred in his former life, before the accident, is unknown to the personality formed after the accident. So that we may say *two personalities dwell within the same individual.*"

Gradually his old life began to return in vivid dreams which he did not recognize as memories of actual happenings. Then in hypnoidal states his memory would come back falteringly. Finally on June 8th, after a trip to New York City, he awoke at about 3 A.M. and asked where he was. A moment's investigation by his brother who was with him, proved that Mr. Hanna had returned fully to his former self. The last he remembered was the Thursday evening of the accident, to him just the evening previous. At first it was impossible for him to believe that for six weeks he had lost all account of his former life. After sitting up about an hour he fell asleep again and awakened at 9 A.M. in his *secondary state*. This alternation of personalities continued for some weeks. First he was the old self, then the new. This curious state remained until June 14th when the most important and the most weird of all his experiences took place.

He was lying on a sofa in an office and appeared to be awake yet deeply engrossed in some inward struggle. Later, when fully aroused he told his physician what had been happening. "The two personalities, that of the primary and that of the secondary state, arose simultaneously and confronted each other. Each of them was the 'I' of Mr. Hanna, and still they differed from each other." Here was a terrible dilemma for a human being to be

placed in: Which of his two selves should be chosen? which one should be annihilated?

The question finally resolved itself into taking one or both lives. "I determined," says Dr. Hanna, "to end the struggle and make a final decision. I decided to accept both lives as mine—a condition that could not be worse than the uncertainty that I was in." This he did. The two lives were brought together. Mr. Hanna has fully recovered, the detached portions have become dovetailed, the two sharply defined personalities have been fused into one healthy, normal person.

This experience is not only interesting for its clear analysis and the intelligence of the patient, but also as illustrating one meaning of personality. It will be noticed that between the two persons—the old with its host of experiences, and the new with its more meagre equipment,—there was a third something that *decided* to merge these two "personalities" into one, and finally accomplished the operation. The old "self" was a great group of memories; the secondary self was a smaller group of memories; the real self that decided between them was the mass of permanent sensations that underlay and accompanied both states of consciousness. Memory, in the early stages, alone failed to connect the two parts of Mr. Hanna's life.

Other Double Personalities.—To this account might be added many more of the same kind. Binet has given many in his "Alterations of Personality," beginning with the one of Miss MacNish, first described in 1816, and continuing through the stories of Felida whose secondary personality was highly different from her primary self and who never recovered, through Emile X, Louis V and many more. These were considered pathological cases, but

like Dr. Hanna's case, illustrate well the one fundamental fact that the self is not that fixed and permanent unity we so commonly feel that it is. Unlike Hanna, some of Binet's cases not only lost entire recollection of their past lives while in one state but also changed their moral and temperamental nature as well. In such cases the "self" determined the character of the individual.

Case of Many Selves.—Surprising as these accounts of double personalities at first appear, they are thrown entirely into the background by Dr. Morton Prince's account of Miss Beauchamp. The book, though presenting itself as a serious and reputable transcription of scientific observations by a man whose reputation and skill preclude the possibility of error, reads like a fairy tale of the wildest imagery. The reader must constantly stop and recall himself to the soberness of the facts before him.

The Case of Miss Beauchamp.—The substance of this curious matter is this. In the spring of 1898, Miss Beauchamp came to Dr. Morton Prince, of Boston, for treatment on account of some nervous condition. In April, 1898, while Miss B. was under hypnotic treatment, the secondary personality called B III, also known as Chris, and later as Sally, made her startling appearance. While B herself was a perfectly lady-like, correct-mannered personage, this Sally was a harum-scarum girl of about thirteen or fourteen, full of pranks, practical jokes and questionable escapades. On June 7, 1899, while the subject was again in a hypnotic state, another personality, B IV, christened by Sally the "Idiot," made her appearance. She was unlike Miss B., later known as B I, and totally unlike Sally. The last appearance, B IV, was high-tempered, independent, wilful, and always wanted her own

way. On November 1, 1899, Dr. Prince obtained the story which gave the clue to the first disintegration of the original Miss Beauchamp's personality. B I remembered everything, from the hospital episode in 1893 to the present; and B IV remembered everything before that time; while Sally insisted that she had lived a submerged existence through the whole life of Miss Beauchamp. It was through Sally that in November, 1899, Dr. Prince discovered that when B I and B IV were hypnotized they both became the same persons or their two personalities merged into one consciousness. This person was called B II. An attempt was then made to bring B II out of her hypnotic state and still have her retain her individuality. The attempt was bitterly opposed by Sally, who, in case the experiment should prove successful, would be relegated to the under-world of Miss Beauchamp's subconsciousness, where she had remained so long an unwilling prisoner. In the spring of 1904 the feat was accomplished. The two personalities, B I and B IV, who when hypnotized, became B II, were united and the original Miss Beauchamp, until that time an unknown personage in this weird drama, appeared upon the scene as the chief actress. She was a mixture of the two others, B I and B IV, but as a whole, unlike either. It is needless to say that she did not in any particular resemble the poor Sally whose complete annihilation was necessary for Miss Beauchamp's reincarnation.

For some months the reintegration remained intact. Then on account of overwork the dissolution again returned with the same characters as before, with Sally specially prominent asserting that she had lived all the intervening time conscious of what was going on in Miss Beauchamp's life and mind and even in her dreams, but totally unable

to make herself known to anybody in the world. Again the treatment was begun and finally a second reintegration was accomplished and the patient cured. Sally passes off the stage to reappear no more. Whether she lives on in her dungeon below the surface of Miss B's consciousness, penned in with her own desires and memories, fretting like a prisoner at the window of his prison, or has passed out entirely, no one can tell.

In the complex events of the few years when Miss B. was broken into so many fragments, the most exquisitely intricate and unbelievable relations existed between these several occupants of the same body. Discord was the order of the day, as might well be expected. To make matters worse, none of these separate individuals loved each other. A hint of Sally's temper is already had in her naming B IV the "Idiot." She and the "Idiot" made no secret of openly, vindictively and continually plotting the destruction of poor, melancholy B I, whose forlorn and infrequent occupancy of the body they so detested. Only a few details of these plots and counter-plots, open warfares and armed truces can be given here.

Sally, who dies the tragic death or suffers the imprisonment worse than death at the end, is easily the most interesting of the trio, though her part as the mischievous *soubrette* makes it impossible to call her the heroine. Of her first appearance as a personality with power of expression we have already written. It was not till a later time that she was able to seize upon the body whenever she pleased and make it the vehicle of her will. That was accomplished in spite of Dr. Prince's wish. One day while B I was dreaming over a book, Sally, always alive inside, seized B I's hands, rubbed her eyes and "willed"

to come; then B I disappeared and Sally came into full possession of the precious body, mistress for the first time of the domicile in which she had so long lived.

For it must be known, that Sally asserted that she had always lived with Miss B. From the earliest conscious-life she had been there. The two had gone to school together and when the lessons were bad, B I would mourn but Sally would laugh.

There's one of us who's broken-hearted o'er his sins,
And one who unrepentant sits and grins.

This antipathy of Sally to books and study was the chief reason why she so cordially hated B I who loved the quiet, sedentary life of a student. She could read French which Sally could not understand; and write stenography which Sally could not decipher. These limitations were all the more wonderful since Sally *knew all of B I's inner life*, her thoughts, her volitions, and even her dreams. In fact, Sally knew things about B I that B I did not know herself. For instance, Sally told what B I did and thought in a delirium; told what she dreamed nightly; told how she tore up and threw away a bill of money thinking it was a photograph; told how she lost money while reading and where it had rolled unobserved into the cornice-gutter.

What poor B I endured from her tormentor probably nobody will ever conceive. Because she was forgetful about the money Sally put her on a strictly limited allowance and hid the pocketbook; put caterpillars, spiders and mice in her boxes or clothes; and worse than all, made up with a former sweetheart, now discarded, of B I and arranged an elopement with him. One day the proper

Miss B I came back to the body with a jerk to find herself sitting in a chair with the burnt end of a cigarette in her fingers! Sally loved to smoke. Yet through it all B I never knew of the existence of Sally and the restored Miss B did not either.

With B IV it was different in this respect. While she hated Sally with the ardent hatred of a high-strung and jealous soul, she could not well do without her. For B IV could never tell anything about what B I was doing just before she would at odd moments, leave the body and permit B IV to come in. B IV could talk directly to Sally and Sally could write to B IV. As Sally knew immediately B I's mind, she could carry tales to B IV. In other words, Sally was the connecting link between two otherwise dissociated personalities, each of which was directly unknown to the other. So Sally was both hated by and necessary to the "Idiot," so named because her thoughts could not be read by her enemy.

Often their relations would be strained beyond the breaking point. Then B IV mounted her dignity, refused to recognize, speak to or otherwise have anything to do with her immature and barbarian mate. Then Sally's powers of vengeance were wonderful to behold. She had two enormous advantages: she never slept and she could feel no pain. When B IV was ready for bed and safely tucked in for sleep, Sally would come, get possession of the body, pile bedclothes, rugs, furniture, bric-a-brac and everything at hand in one promiscuous heap on the floor. Then she allowed B IV to return, undo the mischief, straighten out the snarl of things, and wearily get into bed, only to have exactly the same scene repeated. Finally, B IV, utterly beaten, would wrap up in a rug and sleep

on the floor, and sometimes, in the morning, long-suffering B I would return and have to tidy the room! Sally would pile furniture to a precarious height, mount to the top disrobed, and then let B IV return and call for help if she dared. Once at least, Sally deliberately lacerated her arms with needles and let B IV suffer the exquisite agony of the operation.

Such statements seem the vagaries of a disordered mind engaged in far-fetched romances instead of the sober statements of an accredited scientist in the twentieth century, based upon observations made upon a person in a civilized and cultured city.⁹

Cases of Multiple Personalities Common.—Such instances made Professor James say that probably there were men and women to-day walking the streets of our cities who betray many if not all the symptoms of those unfortunate creatures ascribed in the New Testament with demon-possession. We need involve ourselves in no theological speculations regarding these extreme instances of broken and fragmentary selves. Our whole purpose in quoting them here is to show conclusively to the minds of men and women practically engaged in the making of character and yet bound by ancient and philosophic notions concerning the unity and non-mutability of the dominating "self," that times have changed and with them theories; and that the new theories of the self are not like the old because a wealth of inductive material has been laid at the door of psychology in recent years by careful study of the facts without metaphysical preperceptions as to their meaning.

Conclusions.—From our study in this chapter we are

⁹ Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, 1898.

compelled to conclude, then, that the "self" is never single; that is, the thing for which the symbol "I" stands is by no means always the same. "I" stands for many different ideas and different things. It may be the body, the whole self or person, the social self, the inner self, or "stream of consciousness" as a whole, or the "core" or comparatively permanent mass of feelings contrasted with the changing surface ideas, feelings, emotions and volitions, or it may refer to the Transcendental Ego, a metaphysical entity whose existence is posited as an explanation of certain known facts but whose attributes and nature are totally unknown and unknowable. Except the last, all of these selves can be reduced to experiences in consciousness,—to feelings, instincts, emotions, ideas, grouped together in somewhat well-defined and independently operating groups. The Social Self may be thought of as composed of the altruistic instincts and their ideas; the Selfish Self as the egoistic instincts and their groups of ideas; the Psychological Self as the mass of permanent body-feelings, tensions of muscles and flitting sensations from these continual and almost unnoticed tensions. These selves may be linked together by remembrance of each other; or they may fall entirely asunder and appear as strangers because they forget each other. The other selves may change and the Psychological Self, or core, may remain intact; the Psychological Self may change suddenly, so suddenly as to be called a "new self" by the other selves of consciousness who remember the old Self.

An Idea Dominates the Self.—In all these matters, the Self instead of appearing as one actor playing the dominating rôle in the total drama of life, seems to act many parts, to be tossed about here and there, broken in

fragments, patched together, appearing and disappearing now under one guise and then another, one time saintly as a nun and another reckless as a flirt. Sometimes, when certain centres of consciousness group about them discrete masses of knowledge each unknown to the other, as in the case of Dr. Hanna, the Self, through the power of an idea, suggests that they unite and they do unite. Sometimes, when the Self appears utterly bereft of such suggestive power, as in the case of Miss Beauchamp and others, another person can suggest the idea of unity and bring the scattered selves together. An idea, then, is the organizing power which builds together and holds together the Self. Not only is this true but an idea may, according to Binet, create a new Self. "Suggestion may," he says, "have its end and aim in the creation of a new personality. The experimenter then chooses the sort of personality he wishes to induce and obliges the subject to realize it. Experiments of this kind succeed in a great many somnambulists . . . [and] have long been known and have been repeated, one might say, almost to satiety within the last few years."¹⁰

Lest we be thought to bring forward instances drawn only from pathological cases because the phenomena are found there only and not in healthy people, let us remember what Binet says: "It has now become trite that the majority of experiments performed upon hysterical patients give very nearly the same results with healthy persons, but less conspicuously."¹¹ This fact, taken with the foregoing one, that the Self or selves, whatever their constitu-

¹⁰ Alfred Binet, *Alterations of Personality*, 1891. Trans. by the Baldwins, 1896, p. 248.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

tion may be, are finally dominated by ideas, places the making and the controlling of the whole self squarely in the hands of the teacher of youth. With that power he can break up the old self and form the new, "choosing what personality he may wish to induce and obliging the subject to realize it."

This the teacher can do when the subject is helpless. The subject is not always helpless. He himself can sometimes at least decide what he will be. Though the decision cost him the agony of Dr. Hanna yet he *can* unite his warring selves into one normal, healthy whole and cease to live the life wherein what he would not do that he does and what he would that he does not.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL.

The Will in the New Psychology.—For some time, I am sure, the reader who is used to dissertations on moral training and character-building must have been looking for a chapter on the education of the will. To most educators the will is still the key-stone to the arch of character. But the “will,” as ordinarily conceived, like so many other metaphysical entities, has disappeared from modern psychology. The old view is summed up by Binet in these few lines. “We recall that for psychologists of the old school all the states of consciousness, so numerous, so varied and so blended, that compose the mental life, are referred to the faculties of the mind. There was a faculty of memory, a faculty of reasoning, a faculty of perception, a faculty of volition. This terminology has been criticized with reason, as having the disadvantage of supposing the existence of certain imaginary entities. It was believed that *a* memory, *a* will, and so on, really existed. To-day we no longer allow ourselves to be deceived by this mistaken terminology.”¹

It is not then with any particular entity that we have to deal when considering the will. It is with a process, or a phase of the process of consciousness. Dewey clarifies the situation somewhat by saying, “The term will has a narrower and a wider sense. In its broad sense, it is

¹ Alfred Binet, *Alterations of Personality*, 1891. Trans. by Helen G. and J. Mark Baldwin, 1896, p. 349.

synonymous with all psychical activity having a mental and not merely a physiological stimulus, and which accomplishes any result whether intended or not. In the narrower sense the word is limited to action arising from an idea and ending in making this idea real; in changing it from an idea into a presentation.”² The distinct characteristic which marks out a voluntary act as contrasted with reflexes or automatisms, is the presence of an idea of the purpose or end subserved by the act. Hence, will has to do with an idea and muscular contraction of some sort which if successful results in the accomplishment of the end aimed at. Let us first see if there is any abstract entity, faculty or power *between* the *idea* and the *muscle innervation*. It is absolutely impossible by introspection or any other method to discern volition by itself. How then does the voluntary or ideational act take place?

How We Perform Voluntary Acts.—Almost any one with a fairly good sense of analysis for his own mental process can determine this. For example, let him hold his arm out straight and then determine to bend it. Note what happens. I think he will find that just before his arm bends he will have a very vivid consciousness of what it feels like to bend his arm, or else he will have a picture in his mind of what his arm looks like in the new position. The feeling of the motion psychology calls a kinæsthetic memory-image or simply a memory of motion. The image of how his arm looks in the new position is called a visual memory image. In some diseases, like locomotor-ataxia, the patient loses his kinæsthetic image for walking. He is utterly unable to remember how it feels to have his feet upon the ground or balance his body in a certain position

² John Dewey, *Psychology*, 3d ed., 1896, p. 347.

with a consequent tension of muscle and bending of joints. When this happens he is unable to take a step except by looking at his feet. As long as his visual memory remains intact and he can see his feet making their motions, he is able to walk. If his eyes stray for a moment he is in danger of falling.

Ideomotor Action.—Voluntary action, by some writers, has been called ideomotor action. The theory was first proposed by Dr. Laycock, in 1844, in *The British and Foreign Medical Review*, January, 1845. The term itself was used by Dr. Carpenter in 1874 in his book, "Principles of Mental Physiology,"³ and there he defines these actions as follows:

"Although it has been usual to designate by the term voluntary all those muscular movements which take place as the result of mental operations, save when they are the result of emotional states, yet a careful analysis of the sources from which many of even our ordinary actions proceed, will show that the Will has no direct participation in producing them; and that they are psychologically speaking, the direct manifestations of Ideational states excited to a certain intensity, or, in physiological language, reflex actions of the cerebrum."

The germinal thought, here only partially developed, contains the kernel of the matter in the statement that voluntary actions do not involve the will in the old sense, but do proceed directly from ideas of movements, or are caused by certain cellular excitations in the cortex.

"It is the dominant idea," he adds, "which really determines these movements, the Will simply permitting

³ Wm. B. Carpenter, *Principles of Mental Physiology*, 6th ed., 1881, Chapter VI, Section 3, pp. 279, 281.

them; and the more completely the volitional power is directed to other objects, the more completely automatic are the actions of this class."

James' Ideo-motor Action.—Since the time of Carpenter the theory of ideational action has been extended so as to become the norm of all movement included under the term volitional. Probably Professor James has treated the whole question with as much clarity, and certainly with more vivacity, than most writers. His chapter on the "Will" is too long to treat even briefly. I will try to summarize one or two of his chief conclusions and then illustrate the force of ideas from one or two other sources.

Continuing Carpenter's analysis, James takes up two varieties of ideo-motor action, the first of which answers this question:

"Is the bare idea of a movement's sensible effects its sufficient mental cue, or must there be an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement can follow?"

"I answer: Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express consent, has to intervene and precede the movement. The cases without the fiat constitute the fundamental because the more simple, variety. . . . For the present let us turn to ideomotor action, as it has been termed, or the sequence of movement upon the mere thought of it, as the type of the process of volition.

"Whenever a movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately upon the notion of it in the mind, we have ideomotor action. We are then aware of nothing between

the conception and the execution. . . . We think the act and it is done; and that is all introspection tells us of the matter.

"We may then lay it down for certain that every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind." ⁴

First Class of Ideational Acts.—This, in the briefest summary, is James' view of the first and simpler kind of ideational acts. Their characteristic element is the absence of any conflicting idea of another movement. This situation he illustrates by every-day acts such as picking up a pin while following some line of talk. Not long ago a student of mine came to the desk to ask about some point in a lecture. My watch was lying before him on the desk while he was talking. Suddenly while yet deeply pondering the question in hand, his eyes fell upon the timepiece. For a moment, though the line of his major thought was not interrupted for an instant, his eyes remained fixed absent-mindedly on the watch-face; then his hand went out, deliberately picked up the watch and transferred it to his pocket, where it came in contact with his own watch. At the same time I made some facetious remark about the transaction which called his attention to the action of his hands. "Why, it looks just like my watch," he said most irrelevantly, yet giving in those words the very cause of his act. For without doubt, when his eye fell first upon the watch, a half-vague notion "like-my-watch" struggled

⁴Principles of Psychology, 1890, vol. ii, Chap. XXVI, pp. 522 *et seq.*

into his already well-occupied consciousness; the ideomotor force of that idea was shunted off down the well-worn paths of picking up "my" watch and putting it in its proper place. Immediately that act was performed, consciously in a dim, vague way, yet without any awareness of the real situation.

Every day's multitudinous duties, the more routine the better, give numberless instances of the same actions. Far from being the unusual they form the large bulk of our so-called volitional acts, though they are the most common in the performance of those duties which have become half-habitual. By their aid we go through highly complex, conscious, remembered processes, yet carrying on all the time a series of reflections upon some remote and non-interfering subjects.

Second Class of Ideational Acts.—The second class of volitional acts, more complex than the first, are yet reducible to the same type. The essential difference is not in the mode of their expression, but in the fact that more than one idea of movement is in the mind at the same time. The result, a wavering between two courses with all the signs of deep and worried reflection, marks these as the more deliberative actions, the ones in which the "Will," under the older figure of thinking, is supposed to play its supreme and decisive part.

Again we turn to James for some illustrations and statements regarding this phenomenon. "Try," he says by way of introducing the subject with an every-day act, "to feel as if you were crooking your finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the imaginary change of position; yet it will not sensibly move, because *its not really moving* is also a part of what you

have in mind. Drop *this* idea, think of the movement purely and simply, with all breaks off; and presto! it takes place with no effort at all."

This simple experiment will serve to introduce the keen observer into the deeper mysteries of the more complex volitions. The picture is that of consciousness, not simply dominated with one clear idea, but consciousness as the battleground of an ideational host, two armies with their clearly pictured front ranks joined in conflict and behind them their cohorts of auxiliary ideas reinforcing and strengthening the wavering and breaking lines. Eventually one line irresistibly advances, overthrows the other and marches triumphantly to victory. The external observer of the man's consciousness sees the man stop, deliberate, decide and go on his new-chosen path.

To sum up the whole matter we may briefly say with Professor James, "Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind," and further, "Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in the voluntary life."

Ideas are Supreme in Character-making.—Such a theory, of course, places ideas at the very pinnacle of importance for character-making. They are the real stuff out of which we are made. As John Stuart Mill said, "Feeling and thoughts are much more real than anything else; they are the only things which we directly know to

be real.”⁵ At any rate they are the immediate causes of our voluntary actions. To put it bluntly, whatever a man thinks, that he will do.

The Rôle of Ideas in Every-day Acts.—Probably the clearest comprehension of this theory and certainly its force for the child-trainer, can best be brought forward by illustrations. We might choose thousands from every-day life. Ideo-motor action is so common that it constantly passes our attention without notice. Professor James writes a breezy paragraph on the common act of getting out of bed on a cold morning. “We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing morning in a room without a fire, and how the very vital principle within us protests against the ordeal. Probably most persons have lain on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable to brace themselves to the resolve. We think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day will suffer; we say ‘*I must get up, this is ignominious,*’ etc.; but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and postpones itself again just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive act. Now how do we *ever* get up under such circumstances? If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often than not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly find that we *have* got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the warmth and the cold; we fall into some revery connected with the day’s life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us, ‘*Hollo! I must lie here no longer*’—an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces

⁵ Posthumous Essay, p. 202.

immediately its appropriate motor effects. It was our acute consciousness of both the warmth and the cold during the period of struggle, which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of rising in the condition of *wish* and not of *will*. The moment these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted its effects.”⁶

Ideas in Hypnotism.—However, it is exceptional events of life which bring out such action more clearly than the usual acts of every-day life. For example, hypnotism gives most beautiful illustrations of this psychological process. The consciousness of the hypnotic subject is first wiped out; then the operator lets fall one idea or group of perfectly consistent ideas. Suppose that he tells the subject that he is in a theatre where the audience is breathlessly waiting to see him dance. He is commanded to go to the platform and satisfy them. The subject will inevitably perform the suggested action because of the “absence of any conflicting notion in his mind.” He will dance until a contrary idea is given him. Suppose the operator says, “You are not in a theatre; you are not being admired. You cannot dance. In reality the people are highly amused at your antics.” Immediately the man comes to a standstill; the two conflicting ideas overcome each other and act adversely upon his nerves and muscular mechanism. Men have lost their lives on account of this psychological process. One instance comes to mind now. An old man attempted to cross the railroad tracks at a certain station, but was stopped there by a dividing fence, which he had not noticed. He turned to go back again to safety; just then, round the curve a train came thundering along.

⁶ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, 1890, pp. 524, 525.

The old man was in the middle of the track, but could have reached safety easily enough had not the spectators at the station become excited and begun to shout commands at him. Some cried, "Come on! Come on!" and others shouted, "Go back! Go back!" As a result of the confusion from the oncoming train and the contradictory ideas conveyed by the interested and excited spectators, the old man came to a dead standstill in the middle of the track. There he stood until the train was almost upon him when he leaped back to the wrong side, was caught between the fence and the coaches, and crushed to death. Very probably it is this psychology which affected Xenophon's soldier who stood like one transfixed while the scythe-bearing chariots of the Persians bore down upon him. Probably, too, this is what makes crossing a crowded street so dangerous.

Ideas in Mind-reading.—Even more illustrative of this same law is the thought willing or mind-reading. In some cases the subject is asked to stand up with his arms outstretched and his fingers pointed in opposite directions, and he is told to think of any number from one to ten. The mind-reader watches him carefully and is soon able to tell what is in his mind. Or again, the operator may be blindfolded, an object is hidden in the room. The operator, still blindfolded, is brought into the room and lays the tips of his fingers upon the fingers of the one who has hidden the object, and is led by him gently backward and forward across the room. All the time the subject is told to keep his mind fixed on the place where the article is hidden. Inevitably, and seemingly by some occult power, the mind-reader stops in front of the hidden object. The "Ouija" board and planchette

are instruments of the same mystical significance. In the latter form of the instrument, two flat plates are used, the upper one rolling loosely in a horizontal plane upon three balls. To this movable plate is attached a writing point. The operator takes his place before the planchette, rests his fingers gently upon the upper movable plate, lets his mind run free and in a very short time the pointer begins to write words or even sentences. By the superstitious these are taken to be prophecies of the future and are accepted as infallibly true as the mutterings of Tycho-Brahe's idiot concerning stars.

Mind-reading Explained.—The same simple fundamental principle underlies all these mysterious phenomena. The subject who stands with his arm outstretched and fingers pointed in opposite directions, thinking hard on some number, say, "three," unconsciously, in almost microscopic movements, begins to make "three's" in the air with the ends of his fingers. The acute observer can guess pretty cleverly what his motions signify. The mind-reader who rests the tips of his fingers upon the subject's fingers is really a muscle-reader. The subject cannot think of the hidden object and pass by it without giving ever so gently a pull in that direction. The pull is detected by the mind-reader who quickly locates the hidden thing. The planchette operator lets his mind go free, with the result that certain ideas become vivid in consciousness, and if anything is particularly on his mind he is very apt, under the suggestions of the experiment, to be astounded by seeing the very thoughts of his heart written out before his eyes. All of these phenomena go back to the same fundamental principle that what a man thinks, that he will do.

Stigmatization.—Not only these comparatively common marvels can be explained by this principle, but even such seemingly miraculous phenomena as stigmatization fall under the same law. If we except the possible case of St. Paul, the first stigmatization was that of St. Francis of Assisi, born 1182. The first twenty years of his life were spent in reckless indulgence and dissipation. After a severe illness he rose from his bed a changed man. He forsook his old friends and his old haunts and began a life of meditation and penance. In 1208 with seven hundred others like himself he founded the Franciscan order, a company of brethren given up to austerities of poverty and to holy living. In 1224 on Mt. Alverno, St. Francis saw appearing before him a vision of the crucifixion. Upon this he meditated deeply and profoundly, until in an ecstasy of prayer for the meaning of this vision the marks of the crucifix as he had seen them in the vision, appeared on his own body; the nail wounds on his hands and feet and the spear thrust in his side. These remained until his death, two years later, and the marks are attested by Pope Alexander the Fourth, St. Bonaventura and other witnesses who saw the wounds both before and after his death.

The Case of St. Catherine of Siena.—One hundred and eleven years after the death of St. Francis, St. Catherine of Siena was born, and became the second possessor of the coveted marks. She practiced austerities, flogged herself at six, fasted at seven, and saw visions frequently. When twenty-three years old she fell into a trance as she had frequently done before, and during that time went through the tragedy of the cross. In a vision she saw the

light streaming from the wounds of Jesus' body, and when she awoke found that she had been stigmatized.

The Case of Louise Lateau.—The most authentic case on record is that of Louise Lateau.⁷ She was born in 1850, in Belgium, and died in 1883. Concerning her case there can be no doubt. She was examined by the Belgian pathologist, Warloment, by Dr. Lefebvre, Professor of Medicine at the University of Louvain, by Dr. Schwann, the biologist, a professor at Louvain, by Virchow, a Roman Catholic, and many other equally careful and painstaking scientists. They all agreed that imposition was impossible. The marks were either miraculous or due to some neuropathological condition.

Up to seventeen years of age Louise Lateau was healthy, worked hard, exercised self-control, and showed good common-sense. After an exhausting illness in 1868 she was so near death that the sacrament was administered. From that moment recovery set in and in five days she walked three-quarters of a mile to the church, and three days later, on Friday, she found blood flowing from a wound in her side and a week later her feet were marked, and in still another week blood came from the backs and palms of her hands. Some months later the marks of thorns appeared on her brow. For four years, on every Friday, the hemorrhages continued, and during each time she lost about seven-eighths of a quart of blood. At other times the wounds were dry, glistening red patches which later became continuously painful.

The Case of Mrs. Stuckenberg.—The latest case on record is given by Myers and was recorded first in the

⁷ G. E. Day, *Louise Lateau, A Biological Study*, MacMillan, vol. xxiii, pp. 488 to 498.

Courier Journal of Louisville, Ky., in 1891, through Dr. M. F. Cooms and several other physicians. The patient, Mrs. Stuckenberg, was a devout Roman Catholic. In June of 1891 she had been stigmatized with wounds on her hands and feet and on her side; a cross on her forehead; a large cross and a heart on her chest, and the letters "I. H. S." on her right shoulder. She made no attempt at any publicity, and did not receive any benefits in any way from her condition.⁸

Stigmatization Analogous to Hypnotic Suggestion.—Of course, in ages past, these marvellous manifestations were considered miraculous. In modern times they are more easily reduced to the forms of description already accepted for other scientific phenomena. Explanation of course can never be given for these events any more than for the regular and the simple happenings of every-day life. However, we can see the likeness between those instances of stigmatization and other psychological occurrences like those of hypnotism. For example, pieces of cold iron have been applied to the skin of a hypnotic subject who was told that it was red hot and would sear his flesh. As a result a blister appeared and he suffered from the effects of a real burn. The same experiment has been tried with cold water. The patient was told that it was boiling; blisters resulted from touching him with a point dipped in the cold liquid. In one case some of the water was spilled over his skin, and every place it touched him a blister was raised.

⁸ F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death*, vol. i, p. 95. For other instances see *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, Geo. B. Cutten, 1908, Chap. VIII.

The hypnotist has been able to drive the blood out of a subject's arm, leaving the arm as pale as death. Then, at the operator's command, the blood would come surging back again to its normal state. In other instances a red spot appeared on the patient's body wherever the operator laid his finger. Writing with smooth instruments brought out red letters. Tears of blood wept by a woman of twenty-two are recorded by Myers. The cases of post-hypnotic suggestion are even more marvellous. One of the most striking instances is that of the young marine suffering with hysterio-epilepsy. It was suggested that his nose would bleed at a certain hour in the afternoon, and several drops of blood did exude from one nostril. At another time it was suggested to him that his arms would bleed along certain lines traced by a dull instrument, spelling out his name. At the appointed hour the letters stood out clearly, and in several of the letters drops of blood appeared. Later on this same subject was able to perform the seemingly miraculous feat of dividing himself into two persons, and then one of these personalities suggested to the other the appearance of certain red marks upon his arm. The red marks appeared in accordance with a suggestion.

Ideas Have Power to Affect the Physical Organism.—In all of these instances the effects upon the body were due wholly to suggestions or to ideas lodged in the mind of the subject by the operator. Every one of them illustrates the power of an idea over the physical organism. While they are striking, almost to the point of miraculous, they are quoted simply to illustrate and bring into bold relief what has come in other forms to every ordinary person every day and every minute of his

waking existence. The last instance above wherein the subject was able to suggest to himself the appearance of certain conditions, gives us a hint of the value of ideals for character-making. If a suggestion coming from one's "subconsciousness" can so work upon the body that a visible and unusual mark is left, how important is it for us to think regularly and rightfully on the common issues of life.

The Rôle of Ideas in Character.—Granted now that ideas do control the so-called voluntary actions, what relation do ideas sustain to the other reactions of the human being that go to make up his character as we have defined it? First, we can rule out easily enough the automatic and mechanical reflexes. They go on without consciousness of their particular processes, unless, as we saw previously, they contribute their share of feeling to that mass of organic feeling denominated the ego. Secondly, then, the instinctive reactions are the first to which any consciousness is attached, but their distinctive peculiarity is that they give no hint of their end. They are blind impulses; feelings in consciousness with motor force that is almost fatal in its power to express itself. When instincts first dawn in consciousness their congruent acts may be checked in two ways: first, by other and opposing instincts, like curiosity and bashfulness; secondly, by ideas of the consequences of allowing the instinct expression, these being ideas gained from past experience with similar instincts or from other people's warnings. In no case, however, can an idea check a perfectly new instinct. Its expression is fatal and inevitable. Thirdly, what we have said of the instincts can be equally well said of the emotions as far as the latter are prompters of acts. We have considered

these two classes of feelings together and their differences are so small here that they do not need separate consideration. Fourthly, habits lead to actions. If the habit is pure, *i.e.*, performed without any consciousness of it by the agent, of course no idea can initiate it or inhibit it. If it is mixed, *i.e.*, with consciousness attending a part of its operation, it can conceivably be inhibited by an idea. In both cases a habit may be broken up by the eruption of a new and strong instinct. How often is parental love, for example, potent to check the temper, the extravagance, the selfishness or even grosser habits of a man when all other means have failed?

Ideas Are in Control.—Ideas then, control all other reactions subject to the character-maker's power. In the hierarchy of reactions automatisms and reflexes are fatally fixed; instincts, however, after several involuntary performances, change to ideational acts and yield to ideas; habits, even pure habits, can be brought back to consciousness and be made to acknowledge the sway of ideas.

Can Ideas Be in Any Way Regulated?—Such a conclusion will bring alternate hope and discouragement to the teacher. One will say, "If ideas are paramount then the work of the teacher is absolutely supreme. For the teacher deals in ideas. If ideas ultimately determine character, then the teacher is the character-maker *par excellence*." On the other hand, another teacher will say, "But do not ideas rush into one's mind pell-mell, all in a jumble, just as chance or the individual may happen to desire?"

Ideas Submit First to the Laws of Association.—The answer to the last question is "No." In spite of their anarchistic and chaotic play, in spite of their myriad num-

bers, their flightiness and their transiency, ideas do *not* come into consciousness and go out again without rhyme or reason. They follow laws. And in all the universe, from the law of the humblest amoeba to the laws of starry cycles, no laws are so important to the teacher as just these *laws of the association of ideas*. When a teacher knows them, knows how to use them, and is self-controlled enough *to* use them, he can not only impart information but control a school, quell a mob, or rule an empire. When a mad butcher flourished a knife before Kant and shouted, "I am going to kill you!" the man of ideas promptly replied, "No, not to-day. To-day isn't killing day; to-morrow is killing day!" And the crestfallen madman acknowledged the power of association and retired. "On to the Bastile!" was an association of ideas that drowned old France in blood. "Liberty!" an abstract idea, and its associates, made America. So we might go on showing that not only are ideas powerful to sway human conduct but that ideas themselves are bound together by invisible chains sometimes stronger than intensest passions, stone walls or laws of nations.

When, therefore, we look into our own minds and watch our current of thoughts we see a certain system in their coming and going. They do not visit us haphazardly, just dropping in for a few moments and then leaving at will. They come and go in certain orders, following each other according to their associations. For, in ideas as well in human companions, there are certain well-defined affinities and these are fraught with as much danger and with as much charming promise as are real friendships. Just as we remember our friends by the persons or things they associate with, by their resemblance to others, by their

unlikeness to others, or by the mood we happen to be in, so we recall our ideas.

All Ideas of Movements are Memories.—The first limitation upon conduct that the teacher must keep in mind is this: No pupil will ever perform a *wholly new* voluntary movement. He will not, simply because he will never achieve a wholly new idea of a movement. We are “no more endowed with prophetic vision of what movements lie within our power than we are endowed with prophetic vision of what sensations we are capable of receiving. . . . We learn all our possibilities by way of experience. When a particular movement, having occurred once in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end and deliberately willed.”⁹ Away back in our infant days we began to store memories of our acts by seeing the reflexes and the instincts fling out purposely or at random certain motion-expressions. We gradually learned that some of these brought home to our consciousness certain agreeable or disagreeable feelings and accomplished certain ends. One day we came to a realization that somehow, by that mysterious machinery of memory-image or idea, and of nervous-mechanism we were able to repeat past performances at will with fairly creditable imitation. To this wealth of action we later added the observed actions of others. Then we expanded our accumulative powers by learning from verbal description what could be done, and found that these ideas of acts, as well as our own hard-earned and hoarded treasures, enabled us to perform the miracle of volitional action.

⁹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 467.

Contiguity the Fundamental Law of Association.—

Ideas not only *come back*, but, as we said above, they come back in certain definite order. That order is largely determined by the order of their first occurrence. When objects have been linked together in experience their memories tend to come back in that same order. Not only that, but the thought of one object in a series, or one part of an object, tends immediately to bring before the inner eye the whole series. If I think now of the long, upward-inclining cloud of smoke from a distant locomotive, almost inevitably I see the outlines of its dark hulk, its serpentine, jointed train and the landscape beyond. What I have seen together comes back together. The thought of one element in the picture brings back the whole picture. A moment's introspection will satisfy the reader that this is the commonest experience of mental life. Yet it remained for the moderns like Hobbes, Hume, Hartley, Hodgson, Mill and James fully to note and to describe this process and to reduce it to the so-called Law of Contiguity, the fundamental law of association.

Partial Reconstruction of the Past.—Though ideas tend to come back as they first occurred to us, still they do not unwind themselves exactly like the impressions made on a phonographic roll. Sad indeed it would be if *every* idea inexorably called up everyone of its past associates good or bad, without regard to the ghastly inappropriateness of the present moment. No, thank heaven, we *can* forget some things, and forgetting is as much a part of character-making as remembering. Some spots in our checkered careers can be blotted out. Unless the "damned spot" is a memory-idea of an experience terribly intense, very recent, too often repeated, marvellously like something

present, or persistently resuggested by our own state of feeling, it will "out." *Recency, intensity, frequency, similarity* (which includes contrast) and *congruity of feeling* determine what thoughts will come to us next. "Flowers" recall a recent funeral; "teeth," a severe dental operation; "the old horse," the old wagon, and "it snows" brings a whoop from the healthy, happy schoolboy, a groan from the saddened widow, a "Dear, how lucky!" from the belle, a "Ho!" to the home-sick traveller's horse. Out of the many possible associations by contiguity these laws will determine the one to come next. They are not, I must hasten to say, accurate enough to predict with any certainty just exactly what particular thought any man will have next. Mind-readers are affirmed to exist who can *follow* a train of thought, but nobody yet has dared to prophesy the coming of one who will *predict* from what I now have in mind precisely what I will think the next hour, or the next minute, for that matter. What I will *do*, then, is equally unpredictable. All I know is that *if* a certain thought secures the centre of the stage in my thinking its congruent act will inevitably stalk forth. We have now brought our analysis of ideational or voluntary acts to the point where we can say with James, "To sum it all up in a word, *the terminus of the psychological process of volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is always an idea.*"¹⁰

A Partial Summary.—When we have reduced the intricate processes of volitional action to the play of ideas we have by no means completed our analytic task. We have, in a general way, accomplished something. We have, for example, defined the boundaries of our battlefield. We

¹⁰ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 567.

know now that the fight for character, the battle against temptation, the onward upstriving after a better life, is not located in the comparatively grosser and palpable factors called external acts. We are forewarned and therefore forearmed against any security that might come from keeping conduct respectable while welcoming and entertaining mental pariahs. Our house-cleaning must be thorough; and the house must not remain vacant lest seven other devils worse than the first come back with the old familiar one. These things at least we have learned and will not forget.

Next, we have bounded the teacher's problem. We have shown that the possible number of ideational acts is limited distinctly by the pupil's life-experience; that his ideas will further unroll according to contiguity; and again according to his habits of mind, the recency and intensity of his experiences, the similarity and dissimilarity of ideas, and last but not least, according to his present state of feeling. In other words, he cannot choose *any* idea from an unknown and infinite multitude, but his ideas are handed him by these laws.

Why One Idea Dominates.—Now, we know that out of the ideas handed him, *all* will not work themselves out into action. Only one at a time conquers in the inner battle. What peculiarity do these conquering heroes possess? Why do some ideas seize upon the imagination of the adolescent and become for him dominating ideals of character? Why do others, as high and as holy as their congeners in ethical standing, fall with absolute deadness upon the consciousness of the youth? Or, further, why does it happen that certain ideals constantly reiterated fail, until in some most unexpected moment and manner, time-

worn and weary though they are, they flare up in consciousness with an over-powering brilliancy and become guiding stars of conduct through life? Why, in short, does a particular idea acquire a dominating motor force?

Attention Gives an Idea Its Ideo-motor Force.—

Those ideas will express themselves in action which succeed in prevailing "stably in the mind." Once an idea becomes fixed in the mind it *must* work itself out. All we have said on ideo-motor action illustrates that trait. The obsessions of pathologic minds show it. The comparative inaction of dreamers who drift from idea to idea without stopping on any, at one end of the scale, and stubborn people, not rich in will but poverty-stricken in ideas,—at the other, furnish extremes of this same law. An idea, to become an act, must be still a moment, must tarry in the mind. In the words of James, "We thus find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process it is that the thought of any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind."¹¹ That process is *attention*. *Attention is the primordial process in character-making*. "It seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impulsiveness . . . in a preliminary phenomena, the urgency, namely, with which it is able to compel attention and dominate in consciousness."¹² "The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind."¹³ If it held fast but a moment it might make all the difference between a righteous and a ruined life. "The delay thus gained

¹¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 561.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 559.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 559.

might not be more than a second in duration—but the second might be critical; . . . where two associated systems are nearly in equilibrium it is often a matter of a second, more or less of attention at the outset, whether one system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop itself, and exclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other. When developed, it may make us act; and that act may seal our doom.”¹⁴

How an Idea Can Become an Ideal.—We have now reduced voluntary action to a matter of ideas, or, to be precise, to the retention of an idea in consciousness even if it is only for a second. An idea thus retained becomes an ideal. By its presence in consciousness it gathers about it a fringe of feeling—indecision, reflection, meditation, agreeable rumination, growing enthusiasm, a whole-souled aspiration, an overwhelming determination to do or die,—a fringe that is thin and foggy or strong and masterful.

Two Kinds of Ideas.—Some ideas seem to come with their halos of feeling already about them. They are welcomed like old friends. And, indeed, in most cases they are. They have come so many times before and always bring with them such delightful pleasures and leave such good results that we are glad when they appear. To give them time and attention requires no effort. The hard part is to urge them to stay long enough for their presence to work its full effect.

Some of these ideas are too agreeable. They are like boon companions whose influence we know is bad, but whose social qualities are too enticing to deny. Such ideas are fringed with whole series of fascinating feelings, zones of emotion that though we know by many sad experiences,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 453.

lead only to repentant sorrow, yet are too delicious to turn out into the cold and close the door against.

These two varieties of ideas, relatives in the same agreeable family, owe their interest to their close relationship to instincts. Nearly all, if not all of them, as close analysis I believe will show, have sprung directly or indirectly from instinctive impulses or actions, or to-day represent means to some instinctively desired end.

Another class of ideas do not receive so cordial a reception. They come into consciousness usually unwelcomed and often unbidden. They stand for cold, hard, stern duties. Not by their agreeableness do they tarry, but by the demands of an inexorable will. When attention is paid to them it is at the cost of effort, of strain and much weariness. Still, because they *ought* to be realized in conduct they must be called ideals. They have their "fringe" of feeling but it is not agreeable. Ultimately they may be related to instincts, but the relationship is remote and the process of tracing their genealogies to parent primary impulses is long and laborious.

How to Gain Entrée for Ideas into Consciousness.

—An idea becomes an ideal by tarrying in consciousness. Any idea held in mind long enough will work itself out in some kind of action. It may be a passing whim resulting in a frivolous act; it may be the germ of a new theology and work a reformation; or the seed of liberty and bring a revolution. If it persists it *will* bring an act. Hence, the teacher's business is to give pause to righteous ideas. To *keep* them in his pupil's mind he must first *get* them in mind. How woefully few of all our good ideas ever *get* into our pupil's minds at all! What splendid counsel we give, what illimitable advice, what warnings multiplied!

And they slide off the mind like water off a duck's back. What can we do to get one serious thought into a boy's mind? And then, how shall we make him keep it, hold it before himself as an ideal altogether lovely? The first question first: Ideas by the thousands come to children's minds. They come in trains, every car in the place appointed by the laws of association. To get any of *our* ideas into *his* mind *we must couple them into the train at the proper places*. To do that we must know his mental structure. Let us apply this thought to children and adolescents.

The Nature of the Child and the Laws of Association.—In childhood, as we have already seen, ideas do not play a prominent part in character-making. Hardly any ideas recur often enough or sink deeply enough to become permanent ideals of character. Boyhood and girlhood habits come chiefly from instincts fired and refired by environment. The instincts change from age to age and with them the children's dominating ideas, their acts, their games, their special interests and their habits, except those habits preserved by inertia or careful training. Thought associations hold and thoughts bring their congruent acts, both of which psychic facts can be used by the teacher. For example, a wise child-leader will never suggest an undesired act by prohibiting it, or even by over-much emphasis upon some tiresome virtue. Instead of the much praised drill in a few virtues she will flood the young life with a variety of ideas chosen to fit the varying, but at the moment, dominant instincts of the children. She will not fear to destroy the "refinement of nature" which they never had, nor "shock the sensibilities" of their savage young minds. The process of shocking is nearly always

reversed, if you will notice. It is the perfectly unsophisticated teacher who is shocked to glimpse the world of primitive and sylvan imaginations rioting behind the self-protective blankness of angelic innocence habitually worn by wise little ones. Children soon learn that it is dangerous to reveal how much they know. When one knows what they know, and more, what they feel, he can suggest ideas that fit into their nature like cut gems into a setting.

The Laws of Association Applied to Youth.—If there is any truth in our reiterated statement that adolescents live by ideals, the laws of association are all-important for the teens. With the advent of puberty the whole tableau of character-making changes. What these changes are will be treated more fully later. But here I am going to be illogical for the sake of an immediate application of the laws we have been studying to the nature of the youth.

First, habits of thinking, as we have seen under the law of frequency, determine to some extent the flow of thoughts. If ideas recur and recur in the mind of a boy or girl they are certain to change the face of character as the tramp of many feet will cut up a campus. Child-habits of *doing* things now are noticed. The youth considers his doings and finds reasons for them. The reasons in turn become ideals strengthened with the feelings that come with habits made conscious,—feelings of justification of and antagonism toward rebuke for them. If the habits are right the soil is prepared for their deeper rooting. Thoughts connected with them take on a newer, fresher, deeper meaning than ever before. They will seize and hold the youth as many a moral and many an admonition never held the boy.

If the habits are bad there will never come a better time for breaking them. The laws of intensity and recency can be invoked to overcome the law of frequency. New experiences of the profoundest order are now awakening in the soul of youth. Let these experiences be directed and purified by words of wisest counsel and the thoughts of these words vivified by the inpouring of new meanings will go down like driven wells to the deep waters of boy and girl life. One evening party will sometimes break up a hoidenish rudeness of ten years' growth and put more neatness into a boy than his mother could instil in him in a lifetime of words.

Secondly, the law of congruity of feeling will render yeoman service in this period of intense and vivid experiences. Life for the youth is painted in contrasts. It has only high-lights. Joy is absorbing and uncontrolled. The "blues" are oceanic depths of profoundest suffering, wastes of sadness to be loved and nourished for their own sake and for the sake of the astonishingly melancholy thoughts they bring. What girl can go through her first spell of "blues" without secret admiration for her depth of nature? If grown people want young people to be serious why not catch them in such moods and then attach to them the much desired serious thoughts? Certainly that is more psychological than the perfectly contradictory process of *commanding* seriousness amid the uproar of torrential fun. What can thunderous threats avail when high-running spirits cry

On with the dance! let joy be unconfined;
No sleep till morn, when Youth and Pleasure meet
To chase the glowing hours with flying feet.

The morning's the time, the morning with its feeling-tone all changed and the reaction of fitful youth already coming on. To wait, to watch patiently and wisely for this play of emotion, is the part of a real leader and guider of youth. To be as wise as a serpent and as harmless as a dove with the most gentle of suggestions wins through the inexorable power of the law of emotional congruity. A thought grafted upon a feeling, will grow there as a part of the stock and will bear a wondrous fruitage.

Probably nothing is complained of more by teachers than the vagaries of youthful feelings. Their stage-like insincerity is especially exasperating to adults whose organic habits have become well adjusted. Yet the adults hardly ever give thought to the cause of this burlesque riot of youthful emotion. They probably look back upon their own callow foolishnesses and thank heaven for a strength of will that overcame their ridiculous impulses. Little do they know that if just at this moment by a wave of magic their own bodies could be rejuvenated their boasted wills would fly into fragments against the onset of physiologically generated emotions. Here, if anywhere in all character-making, we must remember the psychology of emotions and instincts and know that both these allswaying powers depend upon bodily conditions. Many a teacher who believes in the infallible efficiency of the sacrosanct rod to drive a mischievous thought out of a boy's head forgets all his materialistic philosophy when he is confronted with morbid tendencies in the emotions of youth. Yet, if his philosophy ever did apply it applies with multiplied force now. Only now he must admit the painful inefficiency of the rod. The helpless boy could not resist; the robust youth can. He demands scientific

treatment in the shape of regulated diet, full and free outdoor exercise, plenty of water, and the elimination of all stresses and strains due to any physical defects whatever and any excessive excitements whatever. If, for thirteen hours of intense daily application the constitutionally weak Jonathan Edwards could control his thought-processes by a carefully arranged diet, what could be done for our boys and girls who are driven this way and that by the ideas thrust into their minds by organic feelings crowding up from ignorantly neglected bodies? No law of the association of ideas can be controlled with such mechanical precision as this law of feeling congruity.

Finally, the adolescent's new-found love for reasoning ought to bring the law of similarity into action. For reasoning proceeds by similarities and dissimilarities. The reason why a man should sacrifice his temporary pleasure for the good of his fellow-men is because of the similarity of that action with other acts he knows will bring him pleasure. The others are more direct in their action and their relation of cause and effect easier to grasp. But the moment that he sees that self-sacrifice is like one of these in its pleasure-giving power he is converted. He understands; he gets a new idea. Henceforth his conduct is less selfish. He does not rebuff the idea of duty. He sees that it is related to one he has always welcomed into consciousness and so welcomes it. He may not have changed his fundamental instinct—desire for happiness—one iota, but he has filled in the ideational links between it and self-sacrifice. He has seen a new relation between the good in two kinds of acts. This similarity the teacher must see, not only sporadically, but with clearness and conviction, and must point out to the reasoning mind of youth the

good that intertwines everything in the world. Even in Gehenna he must see a bit of Paradise. Milton's Satan had endurance at least.

How Ideas Can Command Attention.—We are now ready for our second question: How can ideas be made to stick? Already much of the answer has been given in the answer to the first question. For, if ideas can be suggested to the mind of a pupil often enough, they will stick. The law of frequency takes hold. A habit of thinking is formed and the recurring idea receives power to act. That is one way to make an idea stick; the commonest way, perhaps the simplest and easiest way for the teacher and probably the poorest way.

Yet we all know that sometimes a child can parrot words to the point of idiotic echolalia and yet not improve his character. How astonishingly frivolous appears the out-of-door characters of high school students fresh from the literature and deeds of immortal heroes! Is it even theoretically possible that teachers can teach and parents can guide so that worthy ideals will be implanted in the minds of youth? Does the theory of determinism and does the force of environment, to name two amongst other factors, determine what he shall think and to what he shall pay attention? These three items we will take up in detail in answer to the question.

Allowance Must Be Made for Abnormal Minds.—Theoretically, it is possible and practically we know that it is done. The teacher *can* implant correct ideals in normal minds. Of course, abnormal minds come into the world which do not obey ordinary psychic laws. And these very ones are to blame, innocently of course, for so much confusion on this subject of character-making by ideals. So

few teachers realize the comparatively enormous number of aberrant minds found in school and passing for perfectly normal ones, that because right principles of teaching fail so many times in their experience, they lose faith in all principles. If the teacher had the ability to recognize feeble-mindedness and moral imbecility every time she had to deal with them, she would not be led astray in her application of pedagogical principles. If she could only grasp the fact that probably 800,000 of the 20,000,000 school-children in America are feeble-minded and that 20,000 of them should be in asylums she would begin to understand why some of her best-laid plans for teaching fail. How many more are intellectually capable but morally incapable has never even been estimated. Some experts have guessed that fully 50 per cent. of the known criminals are feeble-minded. In any suggested theory of character-making these vital facts must be considered and not permitted to overthrow systems of character-making applicable only to normal children.

Can All Normal Children Pay Attention?—The answer to this question brings us face to face with a very old question in new form. For it is easily seen that it brings up the ancient, honorable and still unsettled problem of free-will. I say unsettled, though it is assumed to be true by the average teacher and parent, without ever thinking deeply or independently about it. The fact is that the ordinary man does not even know the strict meaning of the term. With him freedom of will means simply and only freedom from *physical necessity*. But physical necessity is clear to him only in its bolder outlines. He admits that reflexes are necessitated, that a child must sometimes sneeze or must digest his dinner. He would not punish

a culprit caught red-handed stealing money in his sleep. Those things he would call necessitated. But how he would call a decision free that was extorted from a child under a beating passes his meagre understanding as well all reason. The fact that such a decision is *not* free he himself admits in his surprised and sympathy-soliciting expression: "I can't tell what ails that boy. He will not mind. I punish him one minute and the next minute he turns around and does the same thing over again." Certainly. Because he is a free-will being; because he is free from physical necessity. "But that is just the reason I punished him!" cries the bewildered wielder of the rod. Well, that is merely due to gross and animal-instinctively-compelled ignorance—or any other string of illimitably and eternally condemnatory expletives. The facts are again, that such an individual—if he is not a criminal in the making by abysmal misunderstanding—is feeble-minded and *cannot mind*. At any rate, and this is the point I want to enforce now, he is being treated exactly as if he had no freedom in the world. His punishment assumes that he *can be made* to mind; not that he *can* pay attention, *if he will*, but he will be made to pay attention, willy nilly. Against this theory I am not arguing. It is the one actually adopted in treating all children; the one in vogue at home and at school and in all reformatories and all asylums. I am only trying with all the force of truth to make it clearly understood that such procedure *denies* freedom of the will and assumes that actions can be *compelled*. It is a mixture of physical necessity and the necessity I shall discuss in the next paragraph.

Ideally Controlled Conduct.—There is another kind of necessity besides physical necessity. To my mind it

is just as powerful and just as determining. It is the kind we have been discussing through this whole chapter under ideo-motor force. It assumes that an *idea* of a reward or a punishment *will compel* action, will control conduct, will make a youth good or bad. Such a theory is really held by every well-intentioned dispenser of punishment. He never punishes a child *because* he has done something wrong but in order that the memory-idea of the punishment will surge up irresistibly in the mind of the culprit whenever a like temptation occurs and will be closely attended to and will infallibly prevent a repetition of the same offense. If repeated admonitions, rewards and punishments fail, the well-informed person knows he faces two alternatives: either the culprit is physically necessitated to his evil way by abnormal brain formation or else he is a free-will being. In the first instance he may be like a lower animal with only very limited moral responsibility; that is, with only small capacity for responding to the memory of punishment. Most people, for example, would punish the family cat caught with its head in a cream pitcher; but very few even of the most cruel advocates of "every transgression must receive its reward," would punish the same cat three days after it had swallowed the family canary. Some children are on the same moral level as the cat.

Real Free Will.—Freedom of the will means neither merely freedom from physical necessity nor merely freedom from control of ideas. It means absolute and complete freedom from any circumstance, passion, motive, end, purpose or reason, past, present or future, *at least to some degree*, in making a decision. Neither the whole decision—much less the whole act—is free; nor is even a part of it

usually free. But the contention of the free-willist is that it *can* be free. At any moment of decision the individual *can* make a decision regardless. When he has made it and some one asks why he decided that way he must answer, "There is no reason. I am *free*; free from causes, free from reasons, free from everything that would influence my last and final decision in this matter." That is free-will. Naturally, like many other popularly accepted theories, when free-will is clearly stated many people find they do not believe in it. They see immediately that all they wish to accept is freedom from physical necessity but devoutly wish to maintain control by ideas. They see that moral responsibility is simply responsibility to *ideas* of right and wrong and ability to pay attention to such ideals as are good.

Freedom of the Will and the Teacher.—Now, with freedom of the will and determinism both robbed of half their terrors, let us come back again to our question, "Can every normal child pay attention?" First, remember that his ideas are handed him by the laws of association and *by the teacher*. The more the latter's ideas fall into harmony with the laws of association the more attention they are likely to receive. Secondly, an idea once in mind seems impossible to eradicate by an instantaneous act of free-will. For how can a man *will* away an ideal? Does he not think of it when he wills it away. Suppose he does arise in the righteous indignation of an outraged soul and say, "Begone, base thought!" Does it go? Nine times out of ten it grins diabolically to itself and by the viciousness of the exorcism takes a firmer hold upon its tormented host's mind. No, ideas do not leave the mind by a mere act of the will. They may be overcome by

passion, by repugnance, by bare indifference, by other associations and other thoughts. But all of these instruments are tools equally under control of the teacher who ought to handle them with superior skill and overcome any antagonism of a pupil against receiving and attending to an idea. The purveyor of ideas should be at least as skilful as the salesman who sells, not the necessities of life to purchasers who must buy, but to indifferent and even unwilling customers who need his wares. Surely, good ideas can be made as attractive as evil ideas. Terrible it would be if notions of vice can be tricked out in adornments more alluring than the habiliments of simple virtue. If they can, the nature of youth should not be blamed but the unskilfulness of teachers and parents.

Freedom of the Will and Determinism as Abstract Theories Have Little Application to Character-making.—As both James and Sidgwick, and others as well, have pointed out, the theory of free-will and determinism really has little actual application to the problems of life. Granted freedom of the will in all the sense demanded by the most ardent believer in the doctrine and it is so limited that it counts for little. If it means—as it does—that a man chooses without reason, absolutely without respect to the nature of the act, there are just as many chances that he will choose right as that he will choose wrong. In fact, free-will is usually invoked to retain what little striving after the good poor human nature is supposed to have left.

Determinism, on the other hand, touches our problem at two points at least. First, sometimes a young man is making a long and noble fight against some besetting sin and meets a determinist who tells him that striving is all

vain and void because everything is determined beforehand by merciless laws of cause and effect. The effect of the arguments kills all further effort. Of course such an argument is utterly fallacious, determinism or no determinism. The real issue is not "Can anyone succeed by striving?" but "Can anyone strive?" This man is striving. The mere fact that he is fighting his fight augurs that he will win. He is attending to an ideal. Attention determines the decision. Determinism says all is caused. This striving is already caused. It is also a cause. Therefore, strive! That ought to be the message. The trouble is that the struggling man gets his mind on the opposing vice and lets go utterly of the inspiring virtue. He ought to remember, even if everything is caused, that nobody knows which cause will win in any contest. His natural chances are just as large for a virtuous life as they are for a vicious life. The act of striving may determine the balance for good.

Secondly, it is argued that because a man finds in him strong propensities for one course or another that he is therefore hereditarily predestined one way or the other. Against this assumption I have contended in several preceding chapters. Omitting for the moment all mention of free-will and the possibility of a man's power to choose regardless of circumstances, I see no reason whatever on a sound deterministic basis for thinking that hereditary causes are any more powerful by their nature than environmental or educational affects. Why should not solid, objective environment be so manipulated that it will overcome any nascent germ-plasm tendency ever conceived? Why should not a full-grown teacher or parent, products

of the same sort of original plasm, overcome forces in that more or less doubtful abode of heredity?

Free-will May Be True.—But turning to the merits of the question itself, we have already shown that a purely mechanical, tightly interlocked mechanical theory of the origin and development of any one individual is, to say the best of it, not yet formulated. One's self, or one's inheritance, is not chained at all points by known, mechanical, scientifically describable connections with the past. There are breaks in many places. Why or how germ-cells, similar in constitution, differentiate themselves and grow into entirely discrete human beings; why or how inheritance blends or particularizes certain traits; why or how germinal variations arise; what is the origin of instincts which give such vivid color and ideo-motor tone to certain ideas; why some impulses for the first time take the cortical paths they do,—these fundamental concomitants of character-growth are as yet unexplained, and some writers believe that some of them never will be by the methods of science now in vogue. Hence, at present, at least we may say that it is possible that somewhere among several points, original and spontaneous action *may* be within the power of a human being and he may construct himself, to some degree, as he sees fit. The genus, the species, the race, may be determined as a whole and yet the individual may not be. A crowd may surge through the streets to some anticipated point by a perfectly predictable path but no one can foresee which direction each individual will take. The possibility of holding the doctrine of free-will and assuredly the doctrine of determination by education is still open. If any man can draw inspiration from them to

higher endeavor he can do so without stultifying his intellect.

Does Environment Control Ideas?—Possibly a lingering doubt remains in the minds of some regarding the force of environment to withstand the power of the teacher. May not the ideas that come into the mind of a boy come from his surroundings? The things that impinge upon his senses, especially those of sight and hearing, are the elements out of which ideas are made. How can it be possible, then, that he can be freed from outer determining influences?

A superficial reply might be made by saying that the youth should be surrounded with good influences. That is not always possible. A man must live, and eat to live, and work to eat. He is necessarily thrown into the vortex of daily activities and that philosophy of character-making which would shield the youth from temptations into which he will inevitably be thrown is valueless for this struggling earth. There must be and there is a way of looking at this matter which preserves at least some power to those who would aid him in his righteous battle.

The Twofold Aspect of Environment.—The fact is that environment has a twofold aspect. Two people, for example, sitting in the same room and listening to the same speech go away with entirely different ideas of the room itself and of the subject discussed. The pictures on the walls, the architecture of the room, the words of the speaker seem to be fixed and certain qualities and quantities. Yet it remains tritely true that one man sees certain pictures on the wall and does not see others, notes certain items of the environment and omits others, hears certain thoughts and is deaf to others. Environment is

not an external affair at all; it is wholly internal. Crudely, and in a sense, self-contradictorily, it may be defined as that portion of the outer world which gets into consciousness. The refinements of such a theory may be left to the Kantian philosophers to settle. Certain it is that anything not sensed by an individual does not for him exist. And it seems equally true that most of what he does sense is determined by his mental preoccupations, his so-called "apperceptive mass," or what he already thinks and believes.

Illustrations of This Law.—Almost any text-book on psychology gives a number of illustrations of this law. Certain figures are placed there which may mean a rabbit or a duck, according to the idea that is in the mind of the beholder. If he is a farmer he is likely to see a duck; if he is a hunter, he sees a rabbit. The ancient story of the three similarly uninformed soldiers, the oak tree, what it meant to each of them and the wise deductions as to their previous occupations by the shepherd immediately comes to mind. A host of similar illustrations might be taken from every-day life. We are all familiar with the "expulsive force of new affections." We know how the potter at his wheel is oppressed with the fatigue of his work, with the dragging hours, with his aching back, with his wearying fingers, and his longing to be free from the oppressiveness of his toil. Only a little less familiar are we with that other worker in clay, the sculptor, fired with some internally burning vision working with undiminished ardour through the day and possibly through the night, insensible to aching muscles, wearying hands and the passage of hours. He has in his mind an ideal that excludes a greater part of his environment. Hegel, so they say, finished one of his philosophic essays in the midst of a war,

and rushing downstairs to find a publisher, found himself in the midst of a battle raging in the streets. Socrates, wholly consumed with the ideas of his mind, stood in one place all day and all night, insensible to fatigue that would otherwise be overpowering. Still more common than these instances are the insensibilities to wounds, sometimes received without pain during the excitement of battle, in a game, or in religious ecstasies. Martyrs have rushed into the flames and have been consumed without betraying any other feeling than the exaltation of supreme happiness. For them the flames were as though they were not.

Illustrations from Hypnotism.—In hypnotism the same phenomena come out even more strikingly and illustrate perfectly the power of an idea to determine environment. Books are full of instances where anæsthesia was produced by the hypnotic state. The operator suggests that there is no feeling in the arm of the subject. A pin can be driven to its head in his arm and the subject never flinches. Under the same influence major operations have been performed. Bramwell reports hundreds of such cases, one of them recording the removal of a man's thigh. In another instance, he tells how an experiment was performed to prove that a subject was insensible to every other influence except the operator who had placed him in the hypnotic state. Another operator undertook to command the subject. All of his commands were fruitless; the subject heard nothing. Every other effort was in vain. Finally the operator lifted the eyelid of the subject and rubbed his finger over the pupil of his eye with absolutely no result. An idea had rendered the man insensible to what at any other time would have been most excruciating agony. Instances of the same sort could be enumerated

indefinitely. One quoted from Bernheim by Binet must suffice for many more like it. Bernheim said to the subject, a girl of eighteen, "‘When you awake you will no longer see me, I shall be gone.’ When she awoke she looked about for me and did not seem to see me. I talked to her in vain, shouted in her ear, stuck a pin in her skin, her nostrils, under her nails, and thrust the point of a pin in the mucous membrane of her eye. She did not move a muscle. As far as she was concerned I had ceased to exist, and all the acoustic, visual, tactile, and other impressions emanating from myself made not the slightest impression upon her; she ignored them all. As soon, however, as another person touched her with the pin unknown to her, she perceived it quickly and drew back the member that had been pricked."¹⁵ The extreme power of an idea to annihilate whole sections of the so-called real world is here most vividly portrayed. In normal subjects there is no reason for thinking that a lesser result could not be achieved.

"Honi soit qui mal y pense" is true in more senses than one. There is such a thing as selective attention and that is determined by ideas. Whether *all* ideas are lodged originally in the foundations of the soul as the Platonists and German Rationalists, like Leibnitz, would have us believe, or *all* of them arise by mere clubbing together the impressions made by things of environment as Aristotle and the English Empiricists like the Lockian school assert, daily experience teaches infallibly the power of ideas to alter environment, to screen off unhealthy sights and sounds from the one occupied internally with calls

¹⁵ Alfred Binet, *Alterations of Personality*. Trans. by the Baldwins, 1896, p. 305, from *Revue de l'hypnotisme*, Dec. 1, 1888.

from the heights. The pure souls see purity. This is illustrated by classic and by humble illustrations. The scientist may demonstrate it in his laboratory and the teacher may find it in her school. When a slum teacher once asked her class to bring something illustrating light for next day, one little fellow brought a shockingly immoral poster and held it up before his teacher's face with evident triumph. Her heart ached for the early debauchment of the poor. Seeing that something was wrong, the boy cried, eagerly, "Don't you see it? Don't you see it?" The teacher sadly shook her head. "There! There!" he quivered, pointing to a window in one corner through which the crescent moon could be seen. It was the only pure thought in the whole picture. It shed light and "light" was the thought dominating that little fellow's consciousness.

Professor James, whom we have quoted so many times, adds more concrete illustrations of the same law. "When watching for the distant clock to strike," he says, "our mind is so filled with its image that at every moment we think we hear the longed-for or dreaded sound. So of an awaited footstep. Every stir in the wood is for the hunter his game; for the fugitive his pursuers. Every bonnet in the street is momentarily taken by the lover to enshroud the head of his idol. The image in the mind is the attention; the preperception, as Mr. Lewes calls it, is half the perception of the looked-for thing.

"It is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those aspects of things which they have already been taught to discern. . . . In Kindergarten instruction one of the exercises is to make the children see how many features they can point out in such an object as a flower

or a stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know already, such as leaves, tail, bill, feet. But they may look for hours without distinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc., until their attention is called to these details; thereafter, however, they see them every time. In short, *the only things which we commonly see are those which we preperceive*, and the only things we preperceive are those which have been labelled for us, and the labels stamped into our mind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst of the world.”¹⁶

Some Practical Thoughts for the Teacher.—To summarize this rather long chapter let me briefly point out some helps to the teacher that might come from it. First and foremost, the teacher and parent, in dealing with voluntary acts, are not dealing with some abstract and unreachable faculty called the “will.” This fact should serve as a warning as well as an aid. No teacher should feel satisfied if she has traced some difficulty in a child to his “will” and there stops. The will itself should be attacked and trained in a very real sense. Secondly, the possibility of changing a person in his most voluntary processes is open. No determinism need stop the trainer. Real determinism is his strongest ally. Heredity cannot be urged as the final arbiter in this realm any more than in some other realms. Finally, the mode of changing volitions is indicated. The ideas are all-powerful. They are ordered according to laws. The wise teacher will study those laws. The idea with the dominant force will work itself out into conduct. To give an idea such force it must be made agreeable in order to obtain recognition or

¹⁶ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 442-444.

attention in consciousness. It must, therefore, be closely connected with fundamental interests or instincts. Great classes of ideas appeal at one time to a child's nature while other classes appeal at other times. These times and these classes of ideas must be studied. The youth, or adolescent, is supremely under control of ideals. His nature craves for certain norms which can be given him. Those ideals must fit his instinctive or emotional and his intellectual natures. To do this is the peculiar genius of the real teacher. It can be done. There is no abstract theory in all science that should for one moment be permitted to paralyze the hand or the hope of any sincere worker to this end.

CHAPTER X.

THE IMPULSES AND IDEALS OF YOUTH.

Adolescence in General.—The adolescent stage is the romantic period of life marking the zone lying between boyhood and manhood. It is the period of stress and strain, of "*Sturm und Drang*"; the age of contradiction, the time of transition. The old is passing away, the new is becoming. The child-self with his habits and instincts is fading out of existence never again to return and in his place comes the new self forged out of the glowing material of youth, driven by new and strange impulses, formed by the environmental forces of the new world into which he is ushered and led on by the ideals that come like vivid dreams of the night.

The Physical Changes of Adolescence.—The dream-like vividness of his ideals probably has the same physical basis as dreams themselves. For both dreams and ideas made brilliant by the cluster of feeling which so characteristically clings to them in adolescence, come from organic changes. "If the reader," says Ribot, "will conceive the multitude and diversity of the vital actions . . . he will be able to form a certain idea of what must be understood by the expression: physical basis of personality. . . . A clear example of this exists in dreams (whether pleasant or painful) aroused by organic sensations; as nightmares, erotic dreams, etc."¹ The

¹ Th. Ribot, *Diseases of Personality*. Trans. 1891, p. 25.

whole psychological nature of the youth is based upon the changes in his physical being. There is change everywhere, and all changes are rapid. Blood-pressure increases, the red-corpuscles multiply, association fibres in the brain become more numerous, the sense of touch becomes more keen, and probably the other senses with it, chemical disturbances are going on all over the body, the voice changes, the peculiar sex organs develop and the body shoots up in height while increasing also in weight. "The annual rate of height, weight and strength," says the apostle to youth, G. Stanley Hall, "is increased and often doubled and even more. Important functions previously non-existent arise. . . . Bones and muscles lead all other tissues, as if they vied with each other, and there is frequent flabbiness in tension as one or the other leads. Nature arms the youth for conflict with the resources at her command—speed, power of shoulder, biceps, back, leg, jaw,—strengthens and enlarges the skull, thorax, hips, makes man aggressive and prepares woman's frame for maternity."²

Social Discords.—Somatic changes like these cannot, according to the laws of physiological-psychology, be without their psychic correlates. Discords of body must bring discords of mind. The youth will be restless within and without. His social world will feel to him too cramped and stale. Truancy from school will lead to running away from home. That will lead to crimes against property and sometimes life. The results are told in the sad increase of youthful criminal statistics from fourteen to twenty. "There are new repulsions felt toward home and school,

² For full account of these changes see *Adolescence*, G. Stanley Hall, vols. i and ii, 1904, a comprehensive work; and *The Child*, Amy Tanner, 1904, a smaller, but very good work.

and truancy and runaways abound. The social instincts undergo sudden unfoldment and the new life of love awakens. It is the age of sentiment and religion, of rapid fluctuation of mood, and the world seems strange and new. Interest in adult life and vocations develops. Youth awakens to a new world and understands neither it nor himself. The whole future life depends on how the new powers now given suddenly and in profusion are husbanded and directed. Character and personality are taking form, but everything is plastic. Self-feeling and ambition are increased, and every trait and faculty is liable to exaggeration and excess. It is all a marvellous new birth, and those who believe that nothing is so worthy of love, reverence, and service as the body and the soul of youth, and who hold that the test of every human institution is how much it contributes to bring youth to the ever fullest possible development, may well review themselves and the civilization in which we live to see how far it satisfies this supreme test.”³

The Prime Interest of Youth.—Underneath the surface of tumultuous and eddying currents, driving hither and thither, we may discern several impulses that have certain and continuous direction. The one impulse that seems most prevalent and most powerful, the one that gives tone and color to life and its new activities for the youth, that unconsciously to him, guides thoughts, habits and customs, that dictates his manners, talk, dress, games and intellectual predilections is his interest in the opposite sex. Most wonderful to state, that though we all recognize the regnancy of this interest for both young men and young women, and know its power for good and evil, yet

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 15.

we as teachers and parents have done almost nothing seriously to seize upon this universal director of conduct and make it the pedagogical asset it really is. It has been a subject rather to be shunned than discussed; something passing, sentimental, soft, unwomanly and unmanly, a necessary evil to be hurried through like the measles and other troublesome diseases. Yet the life and character of many of the world's best men and women have been profoundly affected through all their useful careers by this same emotion. According to M. Paul-Louis Hervier, in *Mercure de France*, Dickens was inspired by his early adulation of a little six-year-old girl with "magnificent hair which fell in golden tresses over her young shoulders" to depict some of his finest characters.

Later "we find her with golden hair in no fewer than five of Dickens' novels." According to the same author, who quotes Professor Baker's book on "Charles Dickens and Maria Beduell," this Maria is the original of both *Dora*, so ardently and excruciatingly loved by *David Copperfield*, and the *Flora* of *Little Dorrit*. The man who left the world his gallery adorned with human pictures unsurpassed, whose brain children live and will always live because they were his own heart-children, too, was inspired to much that he did by his childish affection for a little girl.

The Stages of Sentiment Between the Sexes.—

To use this standard emotion of the human heart we must first study it. Dr. Hall has divided it into five different varieties. We need hardly pause over some of these varieties. To name them is all we can do. The first occurs between boys and girls under eight and is as unconscious

and transparent as the air.⁴ The only harm that can come from it is the meddling sentimentalism of older people who sometimes talk as if the future of these babies would be determined by such an infantile choice.

The Second Stage.—The second stage, conscious and acute, develops between the ages of twelve and fourteen. In this instance the beloved is followed at a distance, gifts are secretly given, no confession results, but confusion in each other's presence dominates. At this delicate period teasing is often fatal, leading sometimes to denials, accusations and hatred, though the girl is said to be more aggressive than the boy. A study of children's games at this age finds that thirty out of eighty-three involve embracing, kissing and the like. Probably no one passes through this period without becoming familiar with "Spin the Plate," "Post Office," "Drop the Handkerchief," "Blindman's Buff" and some other equally good and old-fashioned games which certainly do not continue because of their intellectual or æsthetic values.⁵

The effect upon the boy involved is not altogether bad. His emotional storm may lead him to a primitive outbreak against a revival, or it may work itself off in gymnastic feats,—hanging by the toes, walking fences, wrestling, courting danger, scuffling, horse-play, grandiloquent talk, ostensibly for others but in reality all for the girls' eyes and ears.

To this repertoire of over-athletic fascination the girl usually responds by ignoring the feats of her prancing

⁴ Sanford Bell, *Emotion of Love between the Sexes*, *American Jour. of Psychology*, July, 1902.

⁵ Lippincott's Magazine, March and September, 1886. *American Anthropology*, vol. i, p. 243.

captivator. Her eyes are for all Boyville except him. She may carry her repulse so far as to slap him on occasion, she openly condemns red hair, freckles, or any other prominent physical defects he may unfortunately possess. In secret the attitude of her mind is quite different and she may include him in her prayers with her cat, or dog, or other pets.

The Third Stage.—The third stage we will mercifully pass over. It is the abnormal affection of a much younger person for an older one of the opposite sex. The cure is to give the younger person a full opportunity to mix freely with children of his own age.

Fourth Stage.—Likewise the fourth stage can be treated very briefly. It is the time of drawing apart of the sexes for a season. "The barks of love," as Dr. Hall^c poetically puts it, "built before, are mostly too frail to cross the breakers that separate childhood from youth." The new interests now born are too many, strange, subtle and absorbing. The youth is a new creature, and all relations, ideals and ideas are changed. Very probably another reason for the withdrawal is the social arrangement which advances the girl into a company of older persons much more rapidly at this period than it does the boy. Hence it takes her some time to readjust herself and it leaves him without the companionship of the girls he formerly knew. Consequently, a break comes in both their sentimental partnerships.

Fifth Stage.—With the dawn of adolescence the age of true love slowly supervenes. It comes to claim a part in nearly all of the activities of both sexes. Amongst the primitive races the same instinct expressed itself by muti-

^c Adolescence, vol. i, p. 105.

lations of the nose, lips, teeth, skull; with scarifications; with tattooing; with treating the hair in most diverse fashion; in games; in dances, songs and cries.

Marked by Love of Clothes.—Many of these primitive expressions, modified of course and refined with a veneer of civilization, express themselves among more advanced peoples. Nowhere, perhaps, does this change exhibit itself more conspicuously than in personal appearance. A boy of eleven counts it no greater happiness than to slip downstairs and away to school without washing his face and hands. His personal appearance bothers him not one moment. Combing his hair is a painful ordeal. Washing his hands and face is a waste of good time. Puberty changes all this. Personal appearance threatens to become the central passion of life. Clothes are everything; their cut and color, their fashionableness and seasonableness, their accessories like scarfs, pins, jewelry, —all these flare up in consciousness as objects of extreme solicitude and weighty importance that will brook no slighting. If parents could only be a little patient and did not submit to the world-old fallacy that says all virtues are inculcated habits begun in childhood, they would be thunderstruck to note how easy it is at *this* period of a boy's life to teach all those lessons of æstheticism, love of nature, tidiness, neatness, order and cleanliness which, but a little while ago, were so heart-rendingly hopeless. Often, however, the boy has been so long nagged about these virtues that he seizes his new-found freedom from restraint deliberately to rebel against system and order.

Indicated by Muscle-intoxication.—Along with this new-found æstheticism, often as ludicrous as a new-fledged owl, comes the muscle-intoxication that will not

be satisfied except with the most violent exercises. At this period the boy can run fastest, hit hardest, talk loudest, is more stimulated to excel, to perform rash and fool-hardy feats, to stand straighter and walk more erect than at any other period of his life. Now is the time to have the boy or girl correct postural defects, to lift up drooping shoulders and fill out depressed lung spaces. If the boy passes this stage with a postural defect, or indeed any other defect, he will almost surely carry it with him through life. This is his hey-day of existence, the bright new morn of self-making and his thoughts naturally run out to his physical perfection first. For the points of most ready attraction between the sexes at this time are physical and not mental or moral traits. Boys and girls see only the exterior and have little patience to investigate character or temper in their mates, or to foresee the fruition of certain habits and tendencies. Investigations into the features that attract the sexes show that by far the greatest proportion are comparatively incidental attributes like bearing, height, complexion, cut of clothes, eyelashes, color of eyes, hands, shape of fingers, voice, jewelry, canes, mode of dressing the hair, quantity of hair, teeth, lips, modish and faddish externalities and—God save the Mark!—three per cent. of the girls answering confessed that they fancied cowlicks.⁷ Upon such slender and unstable props are the edifices of future happinesses reared.

The Adult's Attitude Toward This Sentiment.—What shall we older, wiser and sadder souls say concerning these sentimental vagaries of youth? We may call this "callow, calf love" and dismiss it with a smile or tear,

⁷ Pedagogical Seminary, vol. ii, p. 504.

as our several humors dictate, or we may magnify it with the poet into the most universal of forces.

In peace love tunes the shepherd's reed,
In war, he mounts the warrior's steed,
In halls in gay attire is seen,
In hamlets dances on the green,
Love rules the court, the camp, the grove,
And men below and saints above;
For love is heaven and heaven is love.

By serious and sober makers of men this sentimentalism, so flitting and evanescent to the older onlooker, must be taken at its true value. Again the adult stands in the same relation to the love-life of youth as he did to the play-life of the child. No matter how the emotional plays of adolescence appear to older people, their true value can be gauged only by looking at them as the participants themselves do. Profound sympathy, not maudlin and deteriorating, but based upon knowledge of the *whole* history and meaning of the instinct, is the first requisite for treating this chiefest symptom of adolescence. That knowledge must include the racial as well as the individual aspect of love. We must recognize that it is as old as the race. It made its first appearance in Eden and will probably remain to the last to lighten the Adamic curse and soothe the final shuddering sigh of a departing world. It is a play as old as the ages and as new as life. Generations may come and go but it will go on forever. "Thus," says Stanley Hall, "Boyville and Girlhood re-enact in pantomime a love-life that was old when history began, and these crude rehearsals are more essential and true to life than many

of the more highly elaborated expressions of it that modern romance and conventions have superposed.”⁸

Two Other Impulses.—Growing immediately out of this primary sex-interest are two other classes of feelings playing each a large part in the reactions of life. According to some writers they are in reality nothing more than secondary sex-interests. We need not enter that discussion but content ourselves merely with pointing out the fact that they are in the youth and must be taken into full account. Some writers reduce the two to one, but their number and relation are matters of secondary consideration for us, if we keep in mind their reciprocal relation and understand that they can be recognized apart only in extreme instances. “There are sometimes,” says Dewey, “said to be two distinct *kinds* of feelings for persons; one, the feelings for self, egoistic or personal feelings, properly so-called; the other, feelings for others, altruistic, or social feelings. This division . . . overlooks the necessary *reciprocal* relation of egoistic and altruistic feelings. There can be no egoistic feelings except as the self is distinguished and set over against them; there can be no altruistic feelings, except as others are recognized in their relations to self, and compared with it.”⁹

This reciprocal relation will explain the apparent paradoxical situation that these two apparently contradictory impulses can dwell side by side in the same person. The connecting link between them, remote and discrete as they appear, is the sex-interest which blends in itself latently at once such antipodal emotions as the mating and the parent-hood impulses, desire for personal admiration and the

⁸ Adolescence, vol. i, p. 105.

⁹ John Dewey, Psychology, 1896, pp. 326-27.

willingness to make the completest self-sacrifice. Egoism expresses itself most prominently in all the arts of courtship, egotism, vanity, love of applause, love of contest, and in the innumerable self-regarding thoughts and activities in which self comes first.

Egoism.—Egoism is the first law of the adolescent. He is engaged in self-making. Like all the eruptions of instincts with him, this one comes into consciousness with an exaggeration and an overflow that frequently drowns every other feeling. "I have no doubt," says Benson, "that the disease of self-consciousness is incident to intelligent youth."¹⁰ To this the girl is no exception if we can take the word of a medical woman, Dr. Scharlieb: "As far as we can judge, she is a mass of vague perceptions, of ambitions, and, alas! of vanities. . . . It, no doubt, appears to her that no one ever was exactly like her, and that, therefore, no one can really understand, sympathize and help."¹¹ This assertion is further corroborated by the journals of adolescent girls who have pretended to tell the exact truth about their inner lives. The most noted of these is that of Marie Bashkirtseff.

The Journal of Marie Bashkirtseff.—It would be interesting to quote the whole Journal,¹² but we will have to be content, not only with a summary, but with selections from the summary. The young lady herself was a Russian of noble family. In 1873, at the age of twelve, she began to write a journal which would be absolutely true and frank, with no pretence, affectation or concealment. The

¹⁰ From a College Window, 1906.

¹¹ Adolescent Girls from the Viewpoint of a Physician, Child Study, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 121.

¹² Journal of a Young Artist, New York, 1889, p. 434.

journal certainly does appear to be true and frank, and to leave nothing concealed, but at the same time it is so extreme in all its vagaries and outpourings that it will never be accepted, at least by the feminine half of the world, as a true expression of the adolescent female heart. Her journal continues for eleven years, through the vicissitudes of adolescent tastes and fears, and through the increasingly tragic pains of a fatal disease, and terminates with her life when she is twenty-three, with the last entry made only eleven days prior to her death. Dr. Hall says, "She agonizes before the glass on whether or not she is pretty and resolves to ask some young man, but prefers to think well of herself even if it is an illusion. When her voice improves she welcomes it with tears and feels an all-powerful queen. Her journal she resolves to make the most instructive book that was or ever will be written. She esteems herself so great a treasure that no one is worthy of her; pities those who think they can please her; thinks herself a real divinity; prays to moon to show her in a vision her future husband, and quarrels with her photograph.

"In some moods she feels herself beautiful, knows she will succeed . . . and yet in the next paragraph the fever of life at high-pressure palls upon her and things seem asleep and unreal. . . .

"When the doctor finds a serious lung trouble and commands iodine, cod-liver oil, hot milk and flannel, she at first scorns death and refuses all, and is delighted at the terror of her friends, but gradually does all that is necessary; feels herself too precocious and doomed; deplores especially that consumption will cost her her good looks; . . . tries to grapple with the terrible question,

‘What is my unbiased opinion concerning myself?’; pants chiefly for fame.”¹³

These few lines give but a faint hint of the whole effect made upon the reader while tracing the tragic thirst of this young girl for the things of life she so terribly desires, and to see this craving alternate with that other self-annihilating impulse which renders certain of her moods sublime. The journal is the most exquisite picturing of the play and counter-play between egoism and altruism, with all the storm and stress of adolescence thrown in, even to the tears, agonizings and strong weepings, every one *joyed and rejoiced in at the same moment!* The ruling passion, strong in death, that makes her create a sensation by refusing treatment for her malady, endures almost to the last sad moments when her journal takes on a more serious mood and ends just before her death.

The Diary of Mary MacLane.—Another diary of the same order, and curiously enough from that of a feminine hand, is that of Mary MacLane. This one, however, does not smack of the sincerity belonging to Marie Bashkirtseff’s soul expositions. There is a decided appearance of labor for the sensational and the attempt of youth to be shocking. A quotation of this from Dr. Stanley Hall will give some idea of what it is.

“She announces at the outset that she is odd, a genius, an extreme egotist; has no conscience; despises her father, ‘Jim MacLane of selfish memory.’ She is a female Napoleon passionately desiring fame; is both a philosopher and a coward; her heart is wooden; although but nineteen she feels forty; desires happiness even more than fame, for an hour of which she would give up at once, fame, money,

¹³ Adolescence, vol. i, p. 554-59.

power, virtue, honor, truth, and genius to the devil, whose coming she awaits. She loves but one in all the world, an older 'anemone' lady, once her teacher. She cannot distinguish between right and wrong; love is the only thing real which will some day bring joy, but it is agony to wait. 'Oh, damn! damn! damn! damn! every living thing in the world!—the universe be damned!' herself included.

"She has a litany from which she prays in recurrent phrases, 'Kind devil, deliver me'—as, *e.g.*, from musk, boys with curls, feminine men, wobbly hips, red notepaper, codfish-balls, lisle-thread stockings, the books of A. C. Gunter and Albert Ross, wax flowers, from soft old bachelors and widowers, from nice young men, tin spoons, false teeth, thin shoes, etc. She does not seem real to herself, everything is a blank. She describes the fascination of making and eating fudge; devotes a chapter to describing how to eat an olive, etc., etc."¹⁴

Egoism Should Not Be Wholly Suppressed.—The intelligent maker of character will not of course suppress this bone and muscle of the adolescent's character. He will look upon egoism and even its most vain expression, self-conceit, as a possible asset for making something worthy and noble. Our genial friend the Autocrat has a good word to say even for conceit itself. "Talk about conceit as much as you like, it is to human character what salt is to the ocean; it keeps it sweet and renders it endurable. Say rather it is like the natural unguent of the sea-fowl's plumage which enables him to shed the rain which falls on him and the wave in which he dips. When one has had all of his illusions dissipated, his feathers will soon soak through, and he will fly no more.

¹⁴ Hall's *Adolescence*, p. 559-560., vol. i, Chap. VIII.

“ ‘So you admire conceited people, do you?’ said the young lady who has come to the city to be polished off for—life’s duties.

“I am afraid you do not study logic at your school, my dear. It does not follow that I wish to be pickled in brine because I like a salt-water plunge at Nahant. Even in common people, conceit has the virtue of making them cheerful; the man who thinks his wife, his baby, his house, his horse, his dog, and himself are severally unequalled, is almost sure to be a good-humored person, though liable to be tedious at times.”

Altruism.—As we have more than once stated, this intense egoism is paralleled and often opposed by a profound altruism. One is imbedded in the nature of the youth just as deeply as the other. While the egoism is more prominent and more dominant in early adolescence, or from twelve to fifteen, the other slowly rises to a place of more and more prominence and power. Finally, it reaches to the position of regnancy and exhibits itself in a closer amalgamation of the man with society in membership in secret organizations, in team-play, patriotism, utilitarian ethics, religion and parenthood. How this class of impulses go back for their roots in the sex-interest is a little more difficult to see than in the case of egoism. The link, according to students who love to parallel racial development with individual, is parenthood. One of these writers, Miss Tanner, in her splendid little book on “The Child” makes this clear by saying: “Closely connected with the instinct of sex is the parental instinct, which seems also to be the centre of a large group of acts which are not commonly considered instinctive. We can hardly question that the care of the helpless young is instinctive, but we

do not usually look upon teaching and philanthropy in all its forms as instinctive. What we know of social evolution, however, seems to point to the fact that altruistic activities in general have been the outgrowth of the instinct to care for helpless children. The original instinct has become so covered, so varied, and so modified by its expressions, that it seems a misuse of terms to call philanthropy instinctive; and yet in the genuine philanthropist there is some impelling force that cannot be turned aside by reasons or difficulties or even his own willing. He springs to relieve the suffering even of the most worthless as a mother springs to snatch her child from danger.

"From this standpoint, Mr. Phillips' investigations as to the existence of a teaching instinct do not seem unreasonable. . . . He concludes that teaching is probably a special form of the parental instinct, manifesting itself as that instinct does, more strongly in women than in men."¹⁵

Altruism as Patriotism.—This altruism is so deep, so true, and so holy, that the greatest sacrifices of the earth have come from youth. According to Jane Addams, of the two million five hundred thousand soldiers that enlisted during the Civil War on the Northern side, two million were under the age of twenty-one; one million under the age of eighteen, and one hundred thousand under the age of fifteen. "Even in those stirring times," she says, "when patriotism and high resolve were at the flood, no one responded as 'the boys' did, and the great soul who yearned over them, who refused to shoot the sentinels, who slept the sleep of childhood, knew as no one else knew, the precious glowing stuff out of which his army was made.

¹⁵ Amy Tanner, *The Child*, 1904, p. 270.

But what of the millions of boys who are now searching for adventurous action, longing to fulfil the same sort of high purpose?"

It is the boys who will literally go out and lay down their lives for their country. Men in the midst of life deterred by many responsibilities will not go. But the responsibilities alone are not the cause of their staying. They know, and know it well, that the fires of patriotism that burned so brightly in their youth have died down, and they take what they call a more common-sense view of things. Not so with the adolescent. His fire is burning hot; his zeal is true; his patriotism is as real and as vital as the soil upon which he treads. The flag means literally to him all that orators say. Pure and unsullied runs the current of patriotism and when the opportunity comes that patriotism bears him out on its broad tide, often to leave him a torn and stricken sacrifice to his altruism.

Though to colder, logical minds egoism and altruism are opposites and incompatibles, the youth is not unequal to the task of harmonizing the two. Queed, aged twenty-four, in Henry Sydnor Harrison's novel, says, "'As I say, I sacrificed everything to reason,' continued Queed, obviously struggling against embarrassment, 'and yet pure reason was never my ideal. I have impressed you as a thoroughly selfish person—you have told me that—and so far as my immediate environment is concerned, I have been, and am. So it may surprise you to be told that a life of service has been from the beginning my ambition and my star. Of course I have always interpreted service in the broadest sense, in terms of the world; that was why I deliberately excluded all purely personal applications of it. Yet it is from a proper combination of reason with—the

sociologist's consciousness of kind—fellow-feeling, sympathy, if you prefer, that is derived a life of fullest efficiency. I have always understood the truth of this formula as applied to peoples. It seems that I—rather missed its force as to individuals. I—I am ready to admit that an individual life can draw an added meaning—and richness from a service, not of the future, but of the present—not of the race but . . . well, of the unfortunate on the doorstep.' 'Do you understand,' he asked abruptly, 'what I am trying to tell you?'" Even to a young man whose cosmos was described as all ego, the altruistic demands expressed through fellow-mortals was too strong wholly to ignore when later adolescence had begun its retarded workings in his heart.

Division and Fusion are Normal to Adolescence.—

The normal adolescent process is first a division and then a fusion on a higher plane. The process under ideal conditions would be so gradual, guided so wisely and so sanely that little or no shock, no emotional cataclysms or social maladjustments would result. The boy would pass over into the man as the water of a brook flows into a deep river. The man would be a unit in whom instincts would arrange themselves in one harmonious hierarchy dominated by appropriate ideals. Usually, however, there is friction and turmoil sometimes never healed. An internecine war springs up between egoistic and altruistic impulses and this becomes so violent that the personality is disrupted. Such a state should argue for no peculiar depravity in any adolescent, though it should give rise to grave examination of the kind of training he is receiving. The suppression usually exercised with girls should be modified by intelli-

gence and construed with sympathy. Dr. Scharlieb¹⁶ gives in one condensed paragraph a picture of the girl's struggles against herself.

"The whole nervous system, however, is in a highly unstable condition, and its various functions have not had time to acquire proper co-ordination, hence the extraordinary vagaries, the incoherencies, and inconsistencies of human nature as specially evident in the adolescent girl. Her view on life, and her opinions, religious, political, and social, appear to have as little organic unity as the colored fragments of glass whose varying combinations delight us in a kaleidoscope. Those adults who have not the key to the enigma think that all these rapid changes betoken moral obliquity, or at least insincerity. This is by no means always the case, and the girl who during adolescence is an ardent suffragette one day, and an exceeding proper Quaker-like body the next, whose politics rapidly vary from old-fashioned Toryism to the rankest Socialism, is by no means the girl who is going to grow up feather-headed and untrustworthy."

The transition from the smaller, more painful viewpoint of early adolescence to the more comfortable feelings of adult life is charmingly depicted by Benson, in his "From a College Window."

"I have no doubt that the disease of self-consciousness is incident to intelligent youth. Marie Bashkirtseff . . . when she passed the threshold of the room breathed a prayer, 'O God, make me worth seeing!' How often used one to desire to make an impression, to make oneself felt and appreciated.

¹⁶ Mary A. D. Scharlieb, *Adolescent Girls from the Viewpoint of the Physician*, Child Study, vol. iv, No. 4, Jan., 1912, p. 121.

"Well, all that uneasy craving has left me. . . . The result is that having got rid to a great extent of this pompous and self-regarding attitude of mind, I not only find myself more at ease, but I also find other people infinitely more interesting. . . . Instead of desiring to make conquests I am glad to be tolerated. I dare, too, to say what I think, not alert for any symptoms of contradiction, but fully aware that my own point of view is but one of many, and quite prepared to revise. In the old days I demanded agreement; I am now amused by divergence. In the old days I desired to convince, I am now only too thankful to be convinced of error and ignorance. I now no longer shrink from saying that I know nothing on the subject; in the old days I used to make a pretence of omniscience, and had to submit irritably to being tamely unmasked. It seems to me that I must have been an unpleasant young man enough, but I humbly hope that I was not so disagreeable as might appear."

The Mind of Youth.—Interesting indeed as are the instinctive impulses of the youth, his intellectual characteristics are even more varied and striking. By intellectual characteristics I do not mean to assert that he has conscious processes different from those of adults, but simply that during this period of fermentation certain conscious processes are more pronounced than at any other time. They loom larger in consciousness, take up a greater proportion of time, and, as it were, space in his inner life; are more vivid and vivacious than they are at any earlier or later period.

Scepticism.—Of course in this process of changing from the childhood's self to the real man we must naturally expect the destruction of the old and a construction of

the new. Between thirteen and nineteen the boy disappears and the man emerges. The first mark then of this mental change will be scepticism. Scepticism itself has a negative and a positive side. The first phase demands that the boy shall forget his boyhood gods, to him they are become idols lent by others. They have served their little day and must pass out. Now the time has come for the erection of his own one true god, his very own and his very true deity. Equally is this true in the moral world. Whereas as a child he has dutifully accepted the moral system of his father, or mother, or teacher without question, he now begins to think for himself. Not only does he question the moral statements of individuals, but he must needs plunge deeper than all this and demand a reason for the whole moral system. Once he was quite satisfied to be told a thing was wrong, and his prompt and ready conscience would back that statement without question. Now the statement that a thing is wrong is only an irritant that brings forth innumerable questions. It is the adolescent that is the true casuist. Not confronted with conditions he is perfectly willing to theorize, not being compelled to action by the stern necessities of life he is perfectly willing to spend his leisure in inanities of disquisition. The field of theology and morals, both by the nature of their uncertainty, and because of his own budding social instincts that are driving him out from his safe boyhood haven of accepted beliefs into the unknown seas of adult readjustment, offer him a fascinating opportunity for everlasting speculation.

We need not hearken to Tennyson's stanzas

There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds,

to understand that this period of scepticism is of untold value to the boy. If he is ever to have a real self, or a real morality or a real religion, he *must* go through the process of clearing the ground from all tangled rubbish of his past. If in the place of the old a new temple is not erected that is the fault of his teachers. Much of the patience required by them will be given if they understand that this period of doubt is quite natural and exactly like the period through which the teachers themselves passed in order to come to the clear and vitally significant grasp of their own doctrines. The truth we have doubted the most and fought the hardest, when last it overcomes us, becomes the surest truth we possess. The world's greatest men of faith have come from the ranks of its most stubborn sceptics. St. Augustine was in the thirties when he was finally overpowered by the doctrines which he so gloriously upheld the rest of his life.

Rationalism.—The reverse of his scepticism, and fortunately there is an opposite side, demands a reason for things. The youth is pre-eminently rational. He no longer is satisfied with mere perception, with mere intuition, but metaphysician that he is, he is ready to plunge underneath the superficial phenomena of life and search for the reason of all things. Hence he must know why lying is wrong, if it is wrong. He is not satisfied with any categorical imperative, and an ultimate "ought" has no force with him. In his philosophy there are no ultimates; everything must be brought to the bar of searching reason. Every one must give the reason for the hope that is within him. "Why? Why? Why?" is the insistent question always on the lips of his mind, and whether he knows it or not, or whether this is simply a blind and instinctive impulse, or "regulative" function of his reason, as Kant

would have it, or "an insatiable desire of the human mind," as Karl Pearson puts it, certainly he is seized in the vise-like grip of a new intellectual force that will never let him rest until he thinks he has found a reason.

Both sides of this experience are delightfully shown in the case of Madame Roland, as described by Dr. Hall, "Later she experienced to the full the revulsion of thought and experience which comes when doubt reacts upon youthful credulity. It was the age of the encyclopædia, and now she came to doubt her creed and even God and the soul, but clung to the Gospels as the best possible code of morals, and later realized that while her intellect had wandered her heart had remained constant. At seventeen she was, if not the most beautiful, perhaps the noblest woman in all France, and here the curtain must drop upon her girlhood. All her traits were, of course, set off by the great life she lived and yet greater death she died.

"When she passed from the simple and Catholic faith of her grisette mother to the atmosphere of her cynical grandmother at Nohant, who was a disciple of Voltaire, she found herself in great straits between the profound sentiments inspired by the first communion and the concurrent contempt for this faith instilled by her grandmother for all these mummeries through which, however, for conventional reasons she was obliged to pass. Her heart was deeply stirred, and yet her head holding all religion to be fiction or metaphor, it occurred to her to invent a story which might be a religion or a religion which might be a story into any degree of belief in which she could lapse at will. The name and the form of her new deity was revealed to her in a dream. He was Corambé, pure as Jesus, beautiful as Gabriel, as graceful as the

nymphs and Orpheus, less austere than the Christian God, and as much woman as man, because she could best understand this sex from her love from her mother. He appeared in many aspects of physical and moral beauty; was eloquent master of all arts, and above all of magic of musical improvisation; loved as a friend and sister, and at the same time revealed as a god; not awful and remote from impeccability, but with the fault of excess of indulgence. In this 'gentle hallucination' she could lose herself in the midst of friends and turn to her hero deity for comfort. There must be not only sacred books, but a temple and ritual, and in a garden thicket, which no eye could penetrate, in a moss-carpeted chamber she built an altar against a tree trunk, ornamented with a wreath hung over it. Instead of sacrificing, which seemed barbaric, she proceeded to restore life and liberty to butterflies, lizards, green frogs, and birds, which she put in a box, laid on the altar, and 'after having invoked the good genius of liberty and protection,' opened it. In these mimic rites and delicious reveries she found the germs of a religion that fitted her heart. From the instant, however, that a boy playmate discovered and entered this sanctuary, 'Corambé ceased to dwell in it. The dryads and the cherubim deserted it,' and it seemed unreal. The temple was destroyed with great care, and the garlands and shells were buried under the tree."¹⁷

With some, happily, this process of dissolution and reconstruction in morality and religion is as gradual and as placid as the renovation of spring life from the bulbs of a lily.

Idealism.—But there is something further to say about

¹⁷ G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. i, pp. 547, 548, 549.

this rationalism of the adolescent. Not only does he ask why, but he wants his answer not in forms of cause or effect, but in terms of purpose or end. To him the world and its existence is a mystery. He wants to know why it is here. To be told that it originated in some far-off primal stardust in which motion was inherent and by which motion coagulating centres were formed whence spheroids of molten matter emerged, and these in turn threw off other lava planets, and in process of time from one of them arose a combination of elements in a drop of ocean slime whence originated all that was, or is, of life and beauty evolving according to a mathematical and mechanical law until to-day we have the earth and the fulness thereof with all its heterogeneity, its passion, its beauty, and its glory, in nowise satisfies his ardent and burning soul. To this long and learned disquisition likely as not he will reply with the persistent but ungrammatical question, "But what is the whole thing *for*?" Little does he know that he is voicing the sentiments of the rationalists, that the heart of his question is the statement of Leibnitz, that the reason of things cannot be found in any single terms of the series, nor yet in the whole series, but must be looked for in the Eternal Mind. An analysis of them would lead us to a *regressus ad infinitum*, and to whatever anterior search we may go back, one will never find a perfect reason why forsooth there is any world at all. Of course the boy has not formulated this philosophy in words, but knows only that he is obeying the voice from the depths of his being. It is the poet in him that sings unceasingly

One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off, divine event
To which the whole creation moves

though how or why he does not know. His faith is unbounded in this and he doubts not at all "that through the ages, one increasing purpose runs." In this sense the young man and woman are idealists.

If this unanalyzed view can be called scientific at all, it expresses the scientific or abstract *Welt-anschauung* of the youth. It has its practical application as well and enters most wholesomely into the making of his character. The glass of the future holds before his eye not only the consummation of the world, but also accomplishments of high order in which he must take part. Duties are to be done, tasks performed, reformations to be worked, and a self to be made. These are his practical ideals.

An ideal is an idea transfigured by emotion. It is something desirable or dutiful. Ideas that have grown old and cold to the practical man of affairs often become the nuclei round which gather those new emotions coming surging up in the consciousness of the young man for the first time in his life, and, he thinks, for the first time in the world's life. He espouses them as his own; cherishes them in his bosom and is ready to lay down his life for them.

The idealism of youth is as broad as the earth and as nebulous as the milky way. If he is going to be a physician, he will be the best in the world, but he will devote his energies to the alleviation of suffering among mankind. If he is to be a lawyer, he will study international or at least constitutional law. If he is to be a merchant he will become the richest man in the world and then give his money to the poor. "Oh!" cried a fifteen-year-old Russian boy, "Oh! If I were the Czar, I would lay down my life for the people!" While the adolescent soul is in search of the highest and truest purposes for uplifting mankind,

he will at the same time scorn a simple concrete duty. He will lift up the world, but will utterly refuse to carry up a bucket of coal from the cellar. Gradually the tug of the practical will modify his idealism. A little later he will be satisfied instead of reforming the world to reform his own nation; then his own state; then his own city, and possibly when he arrives at the age of forty, he will be quite content to secure a few sanitary reforms in his own ward. But just now nothing will content him but some high and holy purpose which he is endeavoring with the new-found powers of his growing imagination to make as concrete and definite as possible.

Imagination.—Consequently imagination is a process that takes up much of his intellectual activities. Having no hard experience upon which to base practical propositions for reasonable and possible works to be done, he must needs lay out in his own mind schemes as great as his own soul for the good of the world. He imagines because he must imagine. He imagines because he has disrupted and discarded his old system of life; because upon these ruins he is building a temple surpassing grand, a mechanism having an end or purpose that will satisfy his rational longings. Because he cannot actually do this his imagination takes up the task, and with materials unknown to this planet, in colors beyond the dream of an artist, he fashions and moulds the world in which he expects to live.

The Youth as a Hero-worshipper.—This world, it is almost needless to say, revolves around himself; more than that, it is usually himself. Blessed be the thought, and happy are we to say it, he is usually more vitally concerned with the making of himself into some grand and noble character than anything else. With the kind of a

man that he ought to be and longs to be, his imagination grapples, partially pictures, and then falls back upon itself helpless. His idealism is too vague to limn perfectly the stature and the features of the man to be. If, at this moment there comes into the horizon of his life a man like unto his strivings, that man immediately becomes his hero. Concretely there is presented to him, without further effort, the very image of himself as he sees himself in maturity. The hero has arrived, and the boy is a hero-worshipper. His hero may have some defects, but the glamour of youth will cover them with the mantle of adulation. Happy is he if later on he finds that his demigod is all gold, and not partly gold, partly iron, partly brass, with feet of clay.

CHAPTER XI.

GOOD CHARACTER.

What is Good Character?—Character, as we have defined it, and definite to the verge of superficial as we have made it, is still too indefinite to answer for the goal of a child-trainer. He must aim, not alone at total customary reactions, but at good customary reactions. In other words, his goal must be good character. “Good” is what is right. A good man is one who does what is right. This much being clear, the immediate question to settle is, What is right? And then, How shall the child be made to *do* the right.

Almost everybody thinks it is easy enough to *know* what is right; but to *do* what is right,—ay, there comes the rub. Yet I venture to assert that, on the whole, it is as easy to *do* what is right as to *know* what is right. That is, I believe we make just as many mistakes in asserting what is right and what is wrong as we commit transgressions of so-called known moral laws. The primary problem, then, contrary to all usual doctrines, is to decide what is right.

The Opinions of Common People on Right.—Ask any group of intelligent people to give a judgment on any one of the thousand and one every-day incidents requiring moral decisions, and note the result. Will unanimity prevail in the assemblage? Will these grown people immediately and decisively dispose of concrete instances involving lying, stealing, promise-keeping, trust-breaking and

even murder? By no means. Their moral judgments will be no more sweetly unanimous than their artistic appreciations or opinions of the latest books and fashions. Over the simplest moral acts of every-day life,—over “what we shall eat and what we shall drink and wherewithal we shall be clothed,”—we can generate unlimited heat but very little light.

These differences of opinion, remember, do not concern academic distinctions, nor imaginary acts in a Spencerian perfection of society, but throb with the insistency of every-day duties clamoring to be done. Nor are these discrepancies limited to any one class or people. They are not engendered by Cervantes’ “convocation of casuists.” Philosopher and prophet, common man and child are called upon to make moral decisions and to perform moral acts, and frequently (so much is the mind occupied with the difficulty of doing), with never a thought that any doubt can exist about the determination of their moral value.

Illustrations.—For illustration, let us take that little crippled Italian boy whose mother peddled leeks and onions and garlic in the city where they lived. One morning it happened that the boy arrived at his school before anyone else except another pupil older than himself, who was busily engaged in preparing some lessons. While the crippled boy was standing idly by, looking on, two other pupils came in,—young snobs who belonged to a wealthier class of people. Almost immediately they began to tease the cripple. With jibes and taunts they tried their best to wring from him some expression of anger or humiliation. But he endured their insults with assumed indifference, though his reddening cheeks and heaving bosom told how much he was inwardly feeling their cruel references to his

misshapen body. They mimicked his deformity; they walked with humped backs; they pounded on the floor with one leg to imitate his crutch; they called him "camel-back," "cripple," "clown," "hobgoblin"; but to all these taunts he made no reply, till finally, they turned their attention to his mother. Then, when one of the boys marched across the room, his arms bent as though carrying a couple of baskets, and in mocking tones mimicked the pedlar woman's cry of: "Onions for sale! Leeks for sale! Garlic for sale!" the little fellow could stand it no longer. Beside himself with rage at this intolerable insult to his mother, he seized an ink-well from the desk and threw it with all his might at the head of his tormentor. The boy dodged; the ink-bottle sped on and struck the teacher, who entered the door just at that moment, full in the breast. No one spoke. The teacher looked from one face to another. For a minute dead silence reigned. Then in a quiet voice she asked, "Who threw that ink-bottle?" No one made a reply. With some asperity she asked the question again. A moment's silence and then the studious pupil, who had taken no part in the affair whatever, arose from his seat and said, "I did, teacher." She looked at him, then at the cripple, and then at the two cringing cowards who had been the cause of all the mischief, turned to the boy who had confessed, and said, "You may be seated, Giordano. I understand the situation perfectly." Then wheeling upon the two guilty ones she said, with withering contempt, "As for you two, I consider you cowards of the most despicable kind!" With that she turned and left the room, and nothing more was done.

Such an illustration, whether true or not, absolutely bristles with moral questions. Did the cripple do wrong in

resenting the insult to his mother after enduring the insult to himself? Did the studious boy who came to the rescue of the crippled boy, do right? If he did right, did he not lie? And is lying ever right? Did the teacher do right in passing over the matter—the treatment of the cripple boy? the patent untruth of the sacrificing pupil? What ought she to have done in the matter?

The two tormentors certainly did wrong. We agree there. Our contempt for them flows free and untrammelled. But can we go farther and be agreed?

Out of such a simple instance we see how almost endless discussions would arise. But some one will object that this is not a true story; that it is the easiest thing in the world to propose imaginary situations where answers to moral questions will be difficult, whereas in real life such wire-drawn cases do not come up.

Is Lying Justifiable?—Very well, then, let us take one that actually occurred. A man who had a wife and four children was in the habit of going on sprees. His employer had reached the limit of his patience. He had given his employe his last chance, and being a man of his word, all knew that he meant what he said, particularly the drunkard himself. But the temptations were too strong for John—let us call him—and while out with some boon companions on a Saturday night he got drunk. Somehow, on his way home, he became separated from his drinking companions, and accidentally passed the house of a man,—a good Christian gentleman, a deacon in a church,—who knew the drunkard and his circumstances, and was fully aware, too, that if he should continue his debauch over Saturday night to Sunday he would be in no condition to go to work on Monday. The whole situation flashed

through the good man's mind. The drunkard would lose his place; he could not soon secure another; his wife and children would fall into absolute want. The gentleman opened his door, and after some parleying persuaded the man to come into his house and made him a bed upon a sofa where he might sleep off the effects of his drink.

Hardly had John dropped off into a drunken slumber before a couple of his companions who had traced him part way, came to the door and asked if he were there. The gentleman of the house realized the situation. He knew that if John went out all would be lost. He himself did not have the power to restrain him; these fellows could make enough noise to awaken him and then John would go with them. What was to be done? Possibly many things could have been done, but only one thing occurred to the deacon. He looked them squarely in the face and replied, "John is not here," and took his place with the nun who saved Jean Valjean, with the fourth wise man who protected the babe at Bethlehem, and with the galaxy of other saints who lied to save others. But did he do right? Was he justified? And does the statement that a lie is sometimes justifiable mean anything else than, as a general rule, one should not lie, but occasionally it is right for him to lie?

In order, however, that we may not seem to bring up only isolated cases let us consider just one more actual occurrence. A woman who had feared intensely all her life that she would fall a victim to cancer, was pronounced by her physician to be dying of the very disease she most dreaded. In order, however, to save her as much anguish as possible, she was told that her malady—a cancer of the stomach—was nothing more than a bad case of indigestion.

This story she accepted with just a grain of doubt, and was especially anxious to see her favorite nephew, in whose word she had implicit confidence. Finally the nephew came. Before he saw his aunt the doctor explained to him the circumstances. The young man was ushered into his aunt's room and was almost immediately confronted with the inquiry, "Now, John, I know you will tell me the truth, have I cancer of the stomach?"

"Why no, Aunt," the young man replied with perfect assurance, "you have nothing in the world but a bad case of indigestion!"

Did he do right? Was the lie justified by the circumstances? Undoubtedly, there is again room for endless discussion, and these discussions will in no wise be clarified by the statement of the fact that the woman did not have cancer of the stomach, but did have an acute attack of indigestion, and eventually got well! Now what shall we say of the situation? Did the young man lie? Could he lie when he stated the facts? Certainly it would seem that he told the truth in the sense that he described the true condition. Was the doctor justified in this case in telling his patient what he believed to be untrue for the sake of saving her mental anguish, but which turned out to be true and which probably saved her life?

Well, if these instances arouse unanswerable questions in the mind of the reader the purpose of recording them is served. For all I want to do just now is to show how difficult it is not only *to do* right, but simply *to know* what is right to do, and that these difficulties are in no wise confined to a theoretical sphere but enter into the actions of every-day life.

The Answer of Moral Codes.—When we turn away

from a promiscuous group of people and study the moral codes, obtaining in different professions and different social castes, the condition is a little better. At least the differences are not so haphazard. Moral standards stand out more clearly above personal opinions. The differences are between groups and not so much between individuals. What is right for the business man is wrong for the clergyman, and what is wrong for the clergyman may be right for the lawyer. Certain standardized departures from the truth furnish the most illuminating illustrations. They vary all the way from "mental reservations" in public acceptance of creeds to the hopeful but false statements of physicians made to their patients for psychotherapeutic value; or to the felicitations of members of society to each other. The clergyman with advanced theological opinions who always has the curate read that portion of the service which he himself does not believe, or the curate in turn who only mumbles that part he does not believe, the business man who sends his clerk to give a perjured testimony at the customs' office, the society dame who sends down word by her maid that she is "Not in," or the one who, in Goldsmith's phrase,

When time advances, and when lovers fail,
She then shines forth, solicitous to bless,
In all the glaring impotence of dress;

the host who greets his troublesome guest with effusive hospitality, the man who smiles when he is sick at heart—all of these deviate from the absolute standard that unflinchingly demands the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Yet men and women practice these things without thinking them wrong. By custom they are

justified within certain limited spheres. Outside of those spheres they are condemned. Universalized they would be subversive to the society which, in some instances, they pretend to adorn. Therefore, according to Kant's categorical imperative, they are wholly immoral.

However, condemn them as we will, they are the moral customs of adults. By such moral plasticity men and women fit themselves into their little worlds, carry on happy commerce with their fellows, prosper withal, and gain the reputation of being solid, substantial, respectable citizens. Now, if they do such things, if they give and take credit to and from their peers for such morality, why should they not apply that same theory of morals to the child-world? If, in compliance with the dictates of her world, milady sweetly garlands the rocky outlines of bare truth with rosy figures of speech, shall not her daughter also obey the laws of *her* world?

The Answer of Specialists.—But enough of parley. Let us turn to experts for advice.¹ A writer of acknowledged authority in this field was the late Professor Sidgwick. To him we will go. With as much acumen and acuteness as any man could bring to the task he examined the general opinions of people on the subject, and came to the conclusion that, while there were many methods of ethics, or ways of telling what was right and wrong, they are all reducible to three general systems. Here, certainly, is a great gain over haphazard, individual opinions, and it

¹ For other authorities see: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*; Janet, *Theory of Morals*; Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*; Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, vol. i; Bain, *Moral Science*; Mill, *Utilitarianism*, *Dissertations and Discussions*; Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*.

behooves us to make an examination, necessarily limited, of these systems.

Egoistic Hedonism.—The first of the three systems, called Egoistic Hedonism, or enlightened self-interest, can be dismissed with very little consideration. In spite of its Epicurean origin and its long list of advocates, popular opinion of the straiter and stricter kind will not tolerate it as morality at all. Even, if, with good old John Hobbes, we traced our most self-oblitative aspirations and our tenderest charities to their sources in the cold-blooded springs of self-satisfaction, we would, I feel sure, be rewarded with only a sceptical shake of the head. Despite then, its origin in Greek classicism, its closeness to much of our instinctive nature and its plausibility as a scientific mode of explaining ethical acts, egoism is dead. *Requiescat in pace!*

Intuitionism.—Opposed to Egoism stands Intuitionism. It commands moral action regardless of self-pleasure. It is the traditional morality, the exalted, Stoic kind, that demands "justice though the heavens fall," and regards neither the antecedents nor the consequences of the act. "Do right for Right's sake" is its high-born command.

The rightness or the wrongness of an act somehow resides in the act itself. It is intuitively and immediately perceived by the "moral sense" just as by the "artistic sense" a connoisseur perceives the worth of a picture regardless of the lesson it may teach, or the results it may have ulterior to those of exciting a sense of its essential beauty. That such a sense is either naturally very partially distributed among people, or else its powers soon decay, is clearly demonstrated by the diversity in moral judgments noted above. This, indeed, is the chief fault with the system.

People will not agree with each other in their judgments framed by the moral sense, concerning the right or the wrong of the same concrete situation; and, more, they will not always agree with themselves on two different occasions concerning the same acts. One time the moral sense says one thing, another time another. This inconsistency, if an absolute standard exists, and it is fully apprehended by the moral sense, ought not to continue for a moment. But it does. And more, it is justified by every good man and woman on the ground that we grow in moral grace. We learn what is right. We do not permit ourselves liberties this year we enjoyed last year. What was then right is now wrong.

Utilitarianism.—On account of this dual demand—for absolute moral agreement on the one hand and moral progress on the other—Intuitionism has usually called in Utilitarianism to help it out of its dilemma. Utilitarianism, or Universal Hedonism, demands the greatest good—or happiness—to the greatest number. Intuitionism admits this is right. Hence the two systems come into close agreement. Further, when Intuitionism is at a loss for a dogmatic answer, Utilitarianism can supply one as far as erring human judgment can supply it.

Results so Far Obtained.—From our summary account of these three systems of ethics several items should be gripped and held firmly in mind. First, it is undeniably true, confusing as it may be to all and unwelcome as it may be to the absolutist, that the three systems are in daily use among grown people deciding their actions and condoning or condemning or rewarding their practices. Naturally such a situation brings moral confusion; and there is moral confusion, and there will be moral con-

fusion as long as men and women are not clear upon the most fundamental and most practical of all life's lessons. If this were universally recognized it would save endless moral dissension. For, I dare say, that nine-tenths of moral discussions hinge on the assumption of one system or the other by the respective disputants. If, at any point in the dispute, the moralists would stop and define their positions, the argument would, nine times out of ten, cease immediately. For, why should two men argue about the color of a variegated shield as long as one stands on one side of it and the other on the opposite side. If it is black on one side and white on the other, the two men will argue till doom's day and never agree unless they look at it from a common viewpoint. And so it is with moral questions among adults, and a thousandfold more forceful is the same truth for the child-trainer. For if it is true that adults cannot agree on moral questions until they agree upon a common *method* of deciding their questions, how much more true is it that no teacher of morality can establish a point of moral contact with his pupils until *both* can find a common moral system? This is the heart of moral education. Secondly, each system has its own conscious or unconscious supporters. For them its judgments are good and righteous altogether. The reason why they abide by the decisions of their favorite system is not clear to them. Probably they would be indignantly shocked if told that ultimately they accept its decrees by reason of their ruling instincts, which have been allowed to dominate them because they have never had systematic nor efficient moral training. Thirdly, generally speaking, the majority of people *say* they believe in Intuitionism. That is, they believe in some absolute moral standard and think that

moral judgments are immediate and final. Whenever their moral judgment falters and fails they fall back upon utilitarian principles to help out their intuitions. If they do follow egoistic principles they strongly deny the validity of that system as a moral code. To make egoism palpable at all it must be sugar-coated with vague sentiments about the "largest self" which ultimately turn out to be the happiness of the greatest number.

The Common Element or Essence of Morality.—

Can we find any common element in these three systems? I believe we can; at least, one common and final enough to act as a goal to character-makers in the present stage of social evolution. Note that Intuitionism ignores absolutely all results of an action. Be just though the heavens fall. Tell the truth though perdition seize the world. The results have nothing to do with making an act good or bad. Do right for Right's sake; herein is righteousness. The motive or intention, not the thing to be gained by self or anybody else, constitutes the morality of the act. For Intuition, then, right resolves itself into a right motive or a right intention. A man should love the right and act with the intention of upholding the Right. This is the Right of the Intuitionist.

On the other hand, Utilitarianism and Egoism unblushingly confess ulterior ends as justifiers of their actions. The greatest happiness for self or the greatest happiness to the greatest number determines their morality. For our discussion on this point we can for the moment ignore Egoism and consider only the broader moral system. Utilitarianism commands us to act for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. What makes for that end is right; what does not is wrong. The rightness or the

wrongness of an act, then, resides in the *results* of that act. So far, so good.

But here we immediately meet an obstacle. The *results* of an act go on forever. If right is in the result we can never know what is right. Suppose Uncle Harry buys Johnny a pair of skates for Christmas. Papa and Mama and Johnny are delighted. The act then is right. Suppose that, instead of visiting his little chum, Johnny goes skating Christmas Day, falls down and breaks his arm. The previous delight is changed to consternation. Uncle Harry's judgment, if nothing more, is impeached. But the next day brings further developments. Johnny's chum, slightly ailing on Christmas Day, comes down with diphtheria. Johnny did not catch it because he was busy learning to skate. Again the hedonistic complexion of the situation is changed. All concerned, while not glad that Johnny broke his arm, are still glad he got the skates. Thus we might go on imagining the sequences, and shifting the moral worth of the uncle's act backward and forward like a shuttle-cock.

The Results of an Act are Interminable.—Of course it will be objected that the total consequences of an act are never considered in judging an act.² The act must be judged only by those consequences foreseen and intended by the actor. Very true, and very good. But this removes the morality of an act from its consequences and lodges it in the mind of the actor. If he intends to act for the greatest good of the greatest number his act is morally good. If his plans miscarry, if his means are illy chosen, we can reproach him with an error of judgment, but upon

² See Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*, 1891; Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

his solemn asseveration of good intentions we must accept his statement and praise him accordingly. This then, is the absolute utilitarian standard of moral conduct. A morally good man is one who intends the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number by every one of his acts.

"In brief," says a writer on this point, "the difference is that a prudential act is measured by the *result*; the moral, by the *motive*. A man may *intend*, for example, to gain a certain advantage for himself by embarking in a certain line of action, but his knowledge is limited. New circumstances occur, and his purpose is thwarted. The action turns out to be a disadvantageous or *imprudent* one. But if a man *intends* a moral action the result cannot be immoral, however unforeseen or deplorable it may be. On the other hand, an act which appears rash at the time may, by lucky and opportune happenings, result in gain. But an act whose *purpose* is immoral cannot result in morality, no matter how beneficial to any one it may be. If a surgeon intends to save a man's life, and performs an act with that motive solely, and the result is the man's death, the result is deplorable, but it is not wrong. If a man intends to kill another, but, failing, unwittingly does the man a great benefit, the *result* is a desirable one, but the action is immoral. *Actions, in short, that are judged from their motives alone are acts lying in the moral sphere.*"³

Intention is Common to the Three Systems of Morality.—What has been said of intention with regard to Utilitarianism of course applies with equal force to Egoism. In both systems intention is supreme. And,

³ John Dewey, *Psychology*, 3d ed., 1896, pp. 399, 400.

going back to what we have already said about Intuitionism, we see the same is true again. Here then is a common element running all through the three systems. The mental content, not the overt act, is the source of final morality. *What* a man does has its significance and bearing, but *why* he does it determines his moral worth. The thing in his heart and in his mind at the time of acting assigns each act to its place; and the larger purpose or intention of the man's whole life assigns him to his place. This infallible categorizer of men looking beyond the identical actions of two fellow-deacons, performing exactly the same functions, names one "hypocrite" and the other "righteous" according to the purposes in their hearts.

An Illustration.—Better, however, than general references, one concrete instance will bring home the truth that intention and not the palpable act decides the morality of any situation. Recently, in one of our cities, two men and a woman seized a small child, and despite its struggles and screams, while one man and the woman forcibly held it, the other deliberately gashed the child with a knife until the blood came. The inhuman cruelty of this incident is further heightened when it becomes known that the man and woman were the father and the mother of the poor child. As the case stands it is a piece of cruelty almost unexampled in civilized society. Yet it was done in a modern city and with full sanction of the law. For the third man was a physician and he was vaccinating the child against small-pox. Had these persons been inflicting pain upon a helpless child for their own pleasure alone, the act would have been the basest cruelty conceivable to degenerate minds. But their intention to save their child from possible future suffering changed absolutely and

wholly the aspect of the act from inhuman viciousness to angelic mercy. A thousand instances of the same nature could be taken from daily life and all would emphasize the same truth that intention makes the act.

Who Can Judge an Intention?—Alas, the moment we feel our feet on firm ground up starts another difficulty to confront us. If morality really resides in the intention of an act or action in general—and all analyses point that way—who then can tell who is moral? For the intention is an *idea* of the purpose or end of the action, a thing hidden from mortal view in the mind of the agent. The overt act is merely a means to an end. It is neither moral nor immoral and exhibits nothing except good or bad judgment. About the act we can say and do much; but about the intention lying back of the act, about the very citadel and home of morality, what can we say?

Yet society has always said much about morals. Men are tried, condemned and sent to prison or to death because they are bad,—or at least, that is the common assumption. The annals of history are full of prosecutions and persecutions of men and women counted immoral reprobates. Jesus, Socrates, Savonarola, Galileo, Bruno, Latimer, Ridley, Moore, and an almost endless host of canonized saints, received at the hands of their contemporaries legal judgments upon their acts and paid the penalties assigned to criminals and sinners. We believe to-day their intentions were the best. Possibly some men of their own time believed likewise. Yet society condemned them and sent them to the cross, the cup, the scaffold or the stake.

If the annals of child-life could be fully written, probably the world would stand aghast at the infinitely blacker record of the same kind of child-torture. Possibly the stake

and the scaffold would not figure so prominently, though strange, barbaric cruelty would be black enough. The more refined and exquisite tortures practiced upon inexperienced and tender souls not yet able to temper their present woes by the thought of their transiency, not able to distinguish passing fallible judgments from eternal condemnations, would satisfy the most savage believer in the inexorable law of arbitrary recompense for every transgression. Much of the heartless cruelty would be seen to come from the unrestricted belief that morality is open to inspection and immorality must be punished without mercy. If adults would pause just a moment in their dreadful anxiety to inflict pain and inquire quietly about the motive or the intention of some childish performance, how much happier this world would be for three-fifths of the human race. Patterson Dubois gives several illustrations of infantile suffering coming from over-hasty adult zeal for the right. One of them has its humorous as well as pathetic side—unless one feels entirely with the child, and then his heart both fears and aches.

Illustrations.—"The minister's little three-year-old had a beautiful head of golden curls, and thick 'bangs' that hung over his fair forehead down to his eyebrows. This lovely head was real gold to the proud mother, and quite as much so to the father, whose bald head set a high estimate on a fine crop of hair.

"One day the child was left in a darkened room to take his midday nap, as usual. In due time his mother moved quietly into the boy's room, supposing him to be asleep. But the little fellow, seeing her shadowy form, called out, 'Here, mamma! Here's some hair!' at the same time holding up a handful of yellow locks.

"The shocked mother instantly saw the situation. A pair of scissors had been left on the bed, and the boy had diligently applied them quite close to the cranium.

"The mother held no Fireside Court, but called the act by the name that seemed, on hasty judgment, to fit it best, and delivered her opinion of the moral aspect of the deed with an immediate paddling.

"Her custom seems to have been the commoner one of condemning and punishing first and then interrogating afterward. The criminal's trial follows his punishment in such cases. So the mother took the boy on her knee and said, 'Little son, what made you do that?'

"The beautiful lips trembled, the great, glorious eyes overflowed with tears, and with convulsive sobs the child answered, 'Mamma, I was trying to look like papa.'"⁴

Another case has in its more attributes of the tragic elements of the theory that parents should be hard on principle and not because their hearts are hot with anger or cold with cruelty. Such parents, on account of their organic legacies they leave to their children, and in spite of their hard-hearted methods of training, are often full of pride because of the splendid men and women their children eventually become. In many instances the strong characters of their children are no more the results of their methods of training than they were in the case given below.

William J. Stillman, who grew up to be a distinguished diplomat, journalist, artist, and man of letters, lived in a boyhood home where strictness to routine was supreme. He tells how one day when he was returning from school to dinner a farmer stopped him and asked him to do some short service for him, for which he would pay

⁴ Patterson Dubois, Fireside Child-Study.

him with two large pumpkins. William, knowing the poverty of the family and what a boon such an addition to their larder would be, gladly consented. The task took a little longer than he expected. At home dinner was ready; his mother and the rest of the family were ready to sit down. Twelve o'clock came but no William. Five minutes passed; ten minutes, with the mother's eye alternately upon the clock and the strap in the corner. At last she could stand it no longer. She arose, seized the strap and went to the front door. Just about that time William came staggering in joyously laden with his wages. But let us continue the story in his own words: "It is more than sixty years since that punishment fell on my shoulders, but the astonishment with which I received the flogging, instead of the thanks I anticipated for the wages I was bringing her, the haste with which my mother administered it lest my father should anticipate her and beat me after his fashion, are as vivid in my recollection as if it had taken place last year."⁵

Just one more illustration of the same fact that intention makes the morality of an act. A teacher in a Sunday-school had just treated herself to a new fur muff. She was careful of it; very, very careful, first, by nature, and second, because her salary as a country school teacher did not permit of much indulgence in her native taste for pretty things. On the Sunday following her new purchase, a few weeks before Christmas, she came to her Sunday-school, carefully bestowed her treasure with her gloves inside, upon a seat and began to teach her boys. One of the mischievous fellows spied the furs and gloves, eyed them seriously, then moved over toward them, and

⁵ *Ibid.*

to the consternation of the lady, picked them up, examined them with curious eyes, ruffled them, and most impertinently flirted them about, much to the apparent interest and amusement of the rest of the class. The teacher, torn by conflicting emotions over her furs, the evident inattention of her scholars and her desire not in any way to estrange this especially difficult class of hobble-dehoy boys, didn't know what to do or say and so wisely refrained from doing or saying anything.

Christmas came and with it a box of gloves much finer than the teacher was in the habit of wearing. The card told that it came from her class of harum-scarum boys. That touched her more than the value of the present. Her next anxiety was the fit of the gloves. They bore her exact number and they fitted perfectly. She was completely happy.

"But how did you get my size?" she asked next Sunday after thanking her boys for their goodness.

"Don't you remember your gloves and muff and how I pretended to play with them?" said the culprit of the preceding escapade. "Well, I was getting the number of your gloves that day."

Charity for Children.—If our analysis leads to nothing more it ought to lead to that charity for children which, in moral realms, says, "Judge not lest ye be judged." Any so-called infraction of moral laws calls not for "instant" condemnation and inevitable punishment. It calls for the most patient inquiry, the kindest sympathy, the freest exchange of confidences and finally, for true moral education. In general, the view we have come to calls for an elimination of "good" and "bad" as categories of children. The child alone, astounding as that may appear to those who do not understand the true nature

of morality, is the only judge of his moral status, a prerogative that every grown person asserts most lustily for himself but does not hesitate to deny to children.

Social and Anti-social Conduct.—But we must take cognizance of something in human actions, whether we call it “moral” or “immoral”; we cannot have chaos. If we are ever to have any character at all, the home must be livable, the school must be orderly, society must be preserved; all of which is true. Upon these things should the emphasis be laid. Their preservation depends upon action, or upon the conduct of the individuals composing them. But conduct, as we have already shown, is a large and essential part of character. To control and to conform conduct to certain regulations is then a most important part of character-making. But to call this moral, to take the same attitude toward it as toward moral education, and, more than anything else, to confuse with this training all the implications and more or less vaguely conscious canons of retribution and moral responsibilities, is the unpardonable sin in child-training. Conduct, freed from morality, separated entirely from it, and standing alone, is comparatively simple and easy to deal with. It is objective; it is overt; it is open to inspection; it subverts or conserves certain ends equally concrete and objective. In accomplishing one or the other end it is neither morally bad nor morally good, but simply social or anti-social. If it does not bring about the greatest good to the greatest number in any particular group, it is anti-social, no matter how good the actor’s intention may be. Waiving all reference to intentions, the transgressor of good order should be coldly and impartially informed that his conduct will not be tolerated. If he persists in it he should be elim-

inated from the body politic as sympathetically and scientifically as a diseased appendix is removed from the body corporeal by a surgeon. Some day this same insurgent may grow into a Patrick Henry who will set liberty above life. With such possibilities, organized sections of society cannot be concerned, because social institutions like the home, the school, and industry are organized for the greatest good to the greatest number in the judgment of the majority. The minority may have its opinions and keep up its agitation until one day it may become the majority.

"The deep opposition between these two contrasted sides of goodness is mirrored in the conflicting moral ideals of conservatism and radicalism, of socialism and individualism, which have never been absent from the societies of men, nor even, I believe, from those of animals. Conservatism insist upon unity and order; radicalism on wealthy life, diversified powers, particular independence. Either, left to itself, would crush society, one by emptying it of initiative, the other by splitting it into a company of warring atoms. Ordinarily each is dimly aware of the need of an opponent, yet does not on that account denounce him the less, or less eagerly struggle to expel him from provinces asserted to be its own."⁶

Summary.—Now, for a summary that will set forth briefly the results of our discussion and apply our knowledge to the making of a good character.

First, I have tried to show that promiscuously chosen adults do not at all agree about moral questions. The professional codes make some approach towards group-morals but even analyses by experts leave us three moral

⁶ George H. Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, 1903.

systems not altogether unified or consistent with one another.

All this was done, not to disprove the existence of absolute morality, but, to impress the primary need in moral training, namely, that of clearly defining the goal of that training; then to lead up to a more perfected system of moral education; and, lastly, and incidentally, to beget charity for children.

Therefore, I may have painted a rather dismal picture, but its gloom was intended more to darken the councils of those straight-up-and-down moralists who so fluently damn the other half of mankind, and especially childhood, because the latter does not see things through the same moral lenses as they do. If anything could be said or done that would inject just a minimum ingredient of doubt,—and hence, charity—in their moral laws for others—Medean in their fixity and Solonic in their penalties—I would be glad to say it or do it. On the other hand, this view of the fluid uncertainty of the moral world is not intended to discourage the really earnest and sincere seeker of children's moral welfare. It may be used for a caution against over-zealous anxiety for dotting the i's and crossing the t's of the moral law, against a fearful scrupulousness for exactness in details in virtue lest the child who purloins a pin be hung for murder later on,—but that is all. Nowadays a saving knowledge of genetic psychology, as well as a genetic sense of ethics, preserves the enlightened from such fearsome anticipations. Hence, the message moral flexibility has for the over-anxious mother, father, or teacher, is—"Don't worry." Remember, as Montaigne says, "I find that the best virtue I have has in it some tincture of vice."

An Illustration.—For instance, two ladies, strangers to each other, were eating at the same table in a quiet restaurant. One of them, evidently greatly worried by something on her mind, leaned over to the other and said, "I have never in my life before addressed a stranger, but I cannot longer restrain myself. Tell me, as you appear to be a mother yourself, what would you do if you had a seven-year-old daughter who was a liar? I have one, and she is driving me crazy."

"My dear madam," replied the other more quiet soul, "what would you do if you had a seven-year-old daughter who *always* told the whole truth? I have one, and she keeps me constantly guessing what she will say next. The other evening when I kissed her 'Good-night' she looked me critically in the face and said, 'My, you are homely, mamma dear!' And when I answered, 'Do you know that when mamma was young some people used to think her good-looking?' she answered naïvely, 'Gracious, how you must have changed!' So I am becoming a little bit anxious; for you know that a girl who is so severely honest as that can never be amiable enough to succeed in society."

Then when we finally come upon the element in any act which distinguishes it from all other acts as moral we found that element to be the intention of the agent and not to reside in the act itself or in the results of the act. But at the same time, we know that the world insists upon judging acts themselves as right or wrong and meting out rewards and punishments accordingly. This has led and is still leading to endless friction between individuals and society. The world has frequently martyred its best members because they refused to conform their practices to its decrees. Later, when these martyred reformers

through their disciples have had their way, the world has with equal alacrity proclaimed them the best of men. This same inequality of moral judgment, here sketched in world-outlines for the purpose of making the issue clear, enters, I believe, into many of the difficulties incident to the moral training of children. These difficulties arise from the same cause, namely, from the mistake of calling conformation of conduct to some social order—the home, the school, the adult-world—morality, and treating the offender against such an order as intrinsically bad. My plea is that the child shall never be called “bad” or “good” until his intentions are known; and that his conduct shall be treated upon another plane entirely. In dealing with conduct the primary aim should not be to conform the child to an adult-world but to his own.

For the purposes of clear thinking and careful moral training I have set morals and conduct in sharp contrast. That they are really somehow related will be the feeling of all readers and thinkers. Most assuredly they are; and even more assuredly they ought to be perfectly united. But between the intention and the consummation stands the means. This is a matter of individual judgment and of slow and toilsome social evolution. Some day the Intuitionist may intuitively agree with the Utilitarian. Right and Good or Happiness will then be their common goal. The Egoist may grow to the point where he will see that his Largest Self is but another name for the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number. Then, in that distant Utopia, that Kingdom of Ends, that New Jerusalem or Kingdom of Heaven, as the dreamers and seers have variously styled it, one Universal Intention will rule the nation and every man's judgment will infallibly select the correct means for its perfect realization.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF MORAL EDUCATION.

Moral Education.—The subject of moral education can be reduced *prima facie* to a very simple formula: The moral educator makes the child a good man. Everyone, however, knows that these few and simple words cover a multitude of difficulties so overwhelming in their character and extent that up to the present time no system of moral education has been formulated having any claim to scientific exactness nor to widespread adoption. In fact, statistics in civilized lands make an almost tragic comment upon those institutions explicitly avowing their purpose to make good citizens, by showing an alarming increase of crime and a terrible percentage of adolescent criminals.¹ Though children are born good, observation proves that something in our social system converts a large number of them into criminals before the age of twenty. Such facts should at least give us a more open ear to the whole problem of moral education.

The Factors in Moral Education.—In order to lay the psychological foundation for the matter we will have to glance a moment at the factors entering into any single case of moral education. We must consider at least the teacher, the pupil, the morality taught and the method of teaching. These factors are in themselves by no means simple. They almost immediately break up into several minor parts.

¹ G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*; Amy Tanner, *The Child*.

Moral Instruction and Moral Training.—We have already seen that the concept good is anything but a simple or an easy term to use. The largest single net result to be carried over from our last chapter into the present one is the clear demarcation between true morality and its allied species we have called social conduct. The distinction is made for both practical and logical purposes. It offers a basis for a plea against drum-head court-martials and summary executions of juvenile offenders against so-called moral laws. Secondly, it permits a clearly differentiated discussion of moral instruction and moral training, the two halves of moral education. The first endeavors to make an individual's intentions right; the second, to make his conduct social. This distinction becomes vital as soon as we undertake a discussion of moral training.

The Paradox of Moral Training.—Now, the popular notion of moral training loosely concedes it to be the process of making children good; or to express it a little more accurately, the process of forming good habits in children. But real morality, as we have seen frequently, depends upon the presence of an intention in the mind of the agent at the time of his act. Such an action, or reaction alone can be called moral. Of all the human reactions,—automatic, reflex, instinctive, ideational and habitual,—only the fourth class are moral. All the others are indifferent or a-moral. Ideational action is the same as voluntary action. Moral action must be free action. By that we mean that it cannot be controlled by the will of another. But if such action cannot be controlled by the will of another, how can we form "moral" habits in others? If we form his habits we *make* him repeat certain acts. He is not free. And as soon as his action becomes

habitual it ceases to be moral action at all. Moral training, therefore, as it is ordinarily conceived and attempted, is self-contradictory and wholly impossible; and failing, as it does, to carry out the real intention of the moral teacher, is itself "immoral."

A Psychological Confusion.—The ground for this confusion is partly ethical and partly psychological. The latter is almost necessarily bound up with the fact that hardly any act of any rational creature is purely automatic, reflex, instinctive, ideational or habitual. Even the rudimentary efforts of children grown to a stage of fairly developed consciousness merge the distinctive characteristic of these reactions so inextricably that it is almost impossible to analyze the different parts. Now and then, it is true, a portion of the total action does stand out with enough prominence to be seen and examined. The man—just "sworn off"—who lights his pipe and puts it into his mouth while wholly absorbed in some business problem, two friends walking in deep conversation, the musician who plays while talking, Dr. Carpenter's colonel who swore habitually for years, broke the habit, but fell into it again entirely unconsciously while reviewing some troops in his old environment,—these furnish exceptional examples of almost pure habits. But to hold a person under such circumstances responsible for breaking his vow of abstinence, for a misstep, for a false note, or even for the oaths seems to depart from the ordinary rule of moral responsibility, because the agent is neither free nor conscious. Yet we all recognize that somehow and somewhere we must hold people responsible for such acts and must find a way to break such habits especially in children. To say that an act is morally right because a man does not think when

he does it, is one degree worse than saying it is right because he thinks it is right.

The Confusion Explained and Removed.—Such confusion as this, it seems to me, can be cleared up by keeping in mind two distinctions we have already made. The first is the essential difference between real morality and social conduct. What one person calls moral is not necessarily the same thing that society calls moral. The individual decides that an act is moral or immoral according to the intention he has in his mind; society calls an act immoral that is anti-social, that threatens established institutions and popularly conceived welfare.

The second distinction, closely allied to the first, is the psychological fact that only ideational or voluntary acts are truly moral. But as soon as any act or any mental process whatsoever has become a pure habit it has changed its psychic nature from ideational to habitual, from voluntary to non-voluntary; and hence, its ethical nature from moral to a-moral.

How the Confusion Affects Moral Training.—Some of this confusion has entered the field of moral education and not only greatly obscured its processes but has led to the fundamental paradox pointed out above. To chastise a boy for the *habit* of swearing because it is *immoral* is a contradiction in terms and in procedure, and hence, immoral in itself. To punish a boy for the *habit* of swearing because it is *anti-social* is sane and rational; but *morally right* only insofar as the punishment is actuated by a right intention in the chastiser. The punishment may be entirely "right," *i.e.*, socially; and so far as the punisher is concerned, at the same time, wholly "wrong," *i.e.*, morally wrong. This practical difficulty

can be cleared away by keeping in mind, first, the distinction between real morality and social conduct; secondly, the distinction between ideational reactions and others; and thirdly, by distinguishing between moral training and moral instruction. Moral training is one thing; moral instruction is another. The rules of moral training, therefore, must be distinct from the rules of moral instruction because they apply to distinct processes. Our earliest duty to the child is to give him proper moral training, that is, to fit him to his world* by making his conduct social.

Moral Training is the Work to be Done Before Twelve.—I insist therefore that the primary and almost exclusive emphasis upon moral education of children up to twelve years should be upon the formation of habits which fit him to his world—not, “Will he fit his world?” Or, “Does he fit someone’s else world?” DOES he fit HIS world? If he does fit it now he is in a fair way toward fitting it later on; and if he continues to fit it later on, the second-rate part of moral training has been as well accomplished as our poor machinery at hand usually permits. True it is that such training emphasizes conformity, conservatism, respectability and all such safe virtues of the smugly righteous; but in spite of it, I opine that heroes will arise, who, regardless of the self-annihilation required, will break over established customs and drive the world a step or two before them upon higher planes of living. If, too, our suggested conformity saves some men from becoming martyrs and reformers, it will also save more from becoming criminals. Therefore, then, I emphasize supremely the task of making social conduct by moulding the first reflexes of the baby into correct habits and by

directing the blind instincts of the boy into proper channels of usefulness until he is at least twelve years old.

Not a Teacher's First Duty to Inculcate Morality.—

Such a view will, at first sight, appear shocking to those who are thoroughly imbued with the idea that it is a teacher's or parent's first business to "inculcate morality." It is not. It is a teacher's or parent's first duty to find out what morality really is. After that she must study child-nature. Then she should study how to inculcate morality. We have tried to show that real morality lies in the intention of an act; that it is subjective; that it can be judged only by the overt act; and in the act society is chiefly interested. Instead of wasting time and nervous energy over intentions, the good teacher will aim to engender in each of her children such a body of habits that his conduct will be a predicable quantity, so that, for example, it will be infallibly known how he will react to the jam-cupboard, or the cash-box, or the casting of his vote. As far as intentions regulate and habituate this conduct they are important. This is a psychological study for a later part of this chapter. Just now we are saying that, beyond this, society has as little practical interest in intentions as we do with those of a horse that delivers our coal or milk, or groceries.

Codes Adjust Adults to Their Worlds.—To rejustify our emphasis in another way let us recall again our discussion of codes. These devices are just so many unconscious inventions of grown people made to fit men into their smaller, cellular worlds. Within these microcosms codes prescribe certain salubrious modes of conduct and proscribe certain others. Within well-defined spheres grown people accept their decrees as unquestionably right.

A man who offends against them is guilty of unethical conduct. He is condemned by his fellows, loses caste, becomes a pariah and is visited with something of the same venomous persecution meted out to an erring sister by the feminine world. On the other hand, one who scrupulously keeps the code of his world, retains his eminent respectability within his little circle.

Codes Do Not Always Agree with General Morality.—Yet the standards of the larger moral world do not always agree with such codes. The layman recognizes very clearly that *he* would not call a practitioner who advertises his cures guilty of unethical conduct; nor would he praise a lawyer who defends a known criminal on merely technical grounds; nor shield a physician who has handled a case with inexcusable ignorance; nor use certain business tricks; nor practice certain social subterfuges. Yet he tacitly recognizes the right of such codes to exist and believes that very likely, if he knew all the factors involved he would eventually judge events exactly as do the men engaged in such practices. In short, he recognizes a difference between a good *business* man and a good *man*.

Children's Codes Should be Respected.—Now, my earnest plea for the children is that we apply the same rule to their world that we do to the adult's professional world. First, that we recognize differences in moral conduct; and second, that we recognize the child's world. Why, if we adults acknowledge the validity of our own codes, should we not also respect juvenile codes? Why should we not "train up a child in the way that he should go so that when he is old he will not depart therefrom" by insisting that he shall conform his conduct to his own

sphere and not to some adult standard of which he can have only the vaguest comprehension?

Moral Training Rests Upon Instincts.—Moral training resolves itself into conforming the child to his world by cultivating him in habits of social conduct. The habits arise by repetition of acts. The acts, in the period before twelve years, are largely prompted by instincts. In adolescence they grow chiefly from ideals though each moral act is more of a deliberate decision to act according to some ideal than it is the largely unconscious expression of a multitude of past acts. With pre-adolescent boys many habits do spring from deliberate or ideational acts though by far the largest number come directly from instincts. Even in the case of ideationally formed habits, such as reading, writing, dressing, and a host of others, including also many "moral" acts, the ultimate basis of their repetition goes back to instincts. For many of such acts are done for the sake of reward or the fear of punishment. Both of these feelings are instincts; and many times, to the utter incomprehension of grown people, a boy will be so powerfully actuated by some particular instinct moving him to do something sure of almost immediate punishment, that he cannot refrain from giving the forbidden instinct free play. Ultimately then, it seems to me, that the moral training of boys reduces itself to an appeal to their instincts. The method of doing this is first, by example; secondly, by environment; thirdly, by play—and the greatest of these is play. Example appeals to the imitative instinct; environment stimulates and suppresses a host of instincts; and play creates the boy's own world and fits him to it. These three factors of moral training

we will now take up one after the other and suggest briefly the method of their operation.

Imitation in Moral Training.—The most efficient and most powerful instrument placed in the hands of adults by a beneficent Creator to shape and polish the facets of young life for adorning the social setting in which they are placed is the instinct of imitation. Imitation is his most universal instinct. What he sees others do he will do naturally and unthinkingly. It is as futile to teach honesty and to act dishonestly before a child as it is to heap water in a sieve. The nervous mechanism of the child is as hopeless and as helpless as a wireless receiver to the influence of Hertzian waves. His nervous system is built to react to external stimulation to act automatically and reflexly. Against this he has no will. Of it he is utterly unconscious; upon him it makes its indelible impress. Against that impress verbal instruction, high ideals, punishments, threatened and administered, are but as the foam of the sea upon the rocks of the cliff. Imitation, on one side, and example on the other side, are the first two great factors of moral training in childhood.

Conformity to Environment.—Closely allied with unconscious imitation of persons is the unconscious conformity to environment which every child undergoes every day of his life. Of this force he is totally ignorant. To it he yields with the same slow glacier motion that makes him like his personal example in imitation. Hardly any more aware are moral teachers of this same effect. They recognize it only in general terms. They see its manifestations in and by the large when contrasting slum-children and the children of the upper classes. Sometimes the change effected in a growing boy by his removal from the

country to the city, or from the slums to better conditions, calls special attention to the power of environment working unconsciously in the lives of children, but it seldom is given the vital and absolute place it should have in any scheme of moral training worthy of the name. As the northern grouse turns from leafy brown to white with the falling of the snow, as the chameleon merges with his colored surroundings, as the Alpine hawk-weeds develop new leaves in botanical gardens; as De Vries' American primrose rioted in new species in the Holland potato-patch; in short, as the world of organic structure reacts with the world of inorganic structure, so does the child mechanically and unknowingly react to his environment in all its minute degrees.

Unconscious Moral Training.—We have discussed two methods of conforming children to their artificial worlds. Both of them have been developed from and based upon the psychology of the child. Each of them naturally flows out of that nature. Human beings seem to have little voluntary share in the matter. It seems to go on with or without their connivance, whether they know what is being done or not, and whether they care or not. All of this, let me again reiterate, is moral training just as much as any agonizing solicitude and floods of advice, instruction and tears which may be lavished upon any child. We now come to the kernel of moral training, the *real* moral training in popular conception.

Specific Moral Training.—So far we have moved softly and smoothly along the road of fitting children into their artificial worlds. It has seemed so easy that the man or woman who must always associate moral training with hardness and harshness, with rebellions and punishments

and tears, with contritions, with confessions, broken wills and broken hearts, is beginning to grow impatient with this "soft pedagogy" and namby-pamby truckling to childish whims. They insist that "Life is real, life is earnest," not a foolish playground. Even if a boy's childhood could be passed in play he would some day have to face the stern realities of manhood and to do things that demand wills of heroic mould. How shall he meet these rocky experiences of life unless his feet have been hardened by walking some stony paths in his childhood?

The Fallacies of Arbitrary Hardships for Children.—How much fallacy there really is in this argument I have never been able completely to fathom. That there is much I am sure. The first one is the hoary-headed fallacy that the best way to get ready for future hardship is by present pain. The second is the assumption that life is of necessity a hard road to travel. The third is belief that play is enervating to character. And I might go on almost indefinitely showing that such a position rests upon many false and outworn theories of life, not the least of which is the acceptance of the present order of things as right and final.

The Issue Stated.—Let us understand one another. First, we certainly agree that hardness for hardness' sake is an outworn creed. Second, that doing hard tasks now in order to be ready for them if they should ever come is as good an argument for slum-life and child-labor as it is for moral training. If either of these principles is admitted at all there is no point at which it may stop. If this world is a hard world such doctrines have done much to harden it more.

Still, there is just one more point and I think it is the

crux of the matter. We all know from experience that certain duties running with our inherited talents and native instincts are sweet and beautiful to do. Others, however, cut across the grain. Our souls shrink from them as raw blistered palms shrink from the hoe-handle. Still, as the Autocrat has pointed out, with the grim application of will and persistent energy, the hoe-handle softens down its first sharp agony and before the afternoon sun has sunk to the horizon, we have entered into the swing of labor, have forgotten the pain of sore hands and have whiled away the time with a song. How many times does it happen that a piece of drudgery taken up from a sense of duty and pursued with earnest application becomes eventually the most pleasant occupation we have! The greatest lesson I learned in all my schooldays was just this one of turning the drudgery of hated grammar into play. How shall we train the boys and girls to perform their joyless, unliked tasks with the persistence that will turn them into pleasures?

Our Task.—Let us get clearly before our mind's eye our task. We have a child who refuses to acquire some habit. The habit is good. We believe that when he acquires it he will like it. What shall we do?

The mediæval view says, "Make the child do it whether he likes it or not." That has the virtue of simplicity and the vice of naked brutality. It gets things done at the cost of men. I darkly suspect that that formula has done its full share in filling the penitentiaries with young men. We are not trying to get things done but make men; not *hard* men, but *strong* men.

Next, no general rule can be laid down for all children. This leads to a positive injunction. Every case must be

individually diagnosed. Be sure that the refusal is not for some reason good in the child's mind, and that he has arrived at the age when he *can* like that task.

Try the example of performing that particular piece of work with the pleasure that should come from it. Give the child another piece of work similar to this one which he does enjoy. Make this hard piece of work a part of some game. Putting away play-blocks can be made part of the game. Song and music can accompany a very arduous piece of work. When natural incentives fail artificial ones can be found. Again instincts can be matched against instincts. Aversion can be met with desire. In this game of matching always the highest and not the lowest instincts should be appealed to first. Rewards should come before punishments. Deprivations should precede infliction of pain. Only as a last resort and in peculiar cases, like open physical rebellion or cruel infliction of pain, should a trainer of normal children be compelled to step down to the physical plane of matching his brute powers against those of his pupil. For, remember once more, that the purpose is to make men and women, not merely to get things done. To build a man with revenge in his heart, with hardness in his soul, with punishment-taught deceit at his core is just as bad as to let him grow with some of childish dereliction unconquered. Even though he may be compelled to give outward obedience in youth it may be worse than of no avail later. Many men and women have developed a heart-breaking scepticism in religious matters because they were compelled blindly to attend church when young.

Moral Training Should Begin in the Cradle.—Finally, the difficulties of dealing with recalcitrant chil-

dren would be largely overcome if they were taught obedience from their very birth. Here again we reap the fruits of our sharp distinction between real morality and conformation of conduct to one's world. If the theory is held that all the morality a child ever attains is due to inculcation of moral precepts, doubts and discussions may arise as to just the right moment for beginning a child's moral training. When, however, it is understood that real morality is genetic and will grow from the instincts quite naturally, but that social conduct is another thing and must be drilled into a person, these difficulties fly. If the baby's egoistic demands, made known by his crying, are firmly and intelligently put into the background and his health and the peace of the family consulted from the first, the proper basis for social conduct-training is established. If it is consistently carried on through all the minor acts of his developing life,—his time of rising, dressing, washing, playing, studying, his habits of truth-telling, honesty, courteousness, and all the rest,—it will not be difficult to meet the selfish impulses of such a child with the assurance that a duty to be done is in the end for the best good of all; himself included. Most spoiled children are spoiled during the first six months of their lives.

Fitting the Child to His Own World.—The harder part is done. The more disagreeable business has been finished. Let us now turn our feet into more pleasant paths and see how moral training, the sweet, untearful, wholesome kind, is accomplished in the life of a child when he builds his own world and fits himself to it at the same time.

Here we need not tarry long to find out what the natural world of a child is. It is not his home, nor his school, nor

society at large. His own peculiar world is the one in which he is free as the birds of the air, not because it is any more lawless than the air, but because its laws are the boy's laws; the fair, just and terrible expressions of his own nature which to obey is Right, and which to offend is Wrong forever and forever. Small hope is there in this world for the slinking, outskirting, jackal-like renegade who snatches the sustenance of his play-soul on the outskirts of Boyville, ostracized for some evil of his nature by the citizens of that ancient and noble state. Him we may pity; pity to the bleeding of our hearts, when he is one well-born in the robustness of true boy nature, but thwarted by an overfond and foolish mother in his natural cravings for a full and frank expression of his barbarism. But whether such a deformed soul or not, we can still pity and try to cure, knowing well that if boydom has diagnosed his moral case and pronounced such judgment there is of a surety some deep-seated and virulent infection present. No matter how angelic a boy may be before his elders, if boys pronounce him bad his doom is sealed before the final tribunal. No matter how bad a boy may be before his elders, if boys say he is good, let the world withhold its harshness. A volume could easily be filled from the experiences of social-workers showing that boys who have lost all citizenship rights in the artificial world but who are loyally upheld by their fellow citizens in the real world, are good at bottom and some day, when their chance comes, will show the superior nobility of their souls in some magnanimous act. Fighting Mary who saved the sweetest morsel of her charity dinner, a pie that she caressed, hugged and kissed, and then tucked away for her sick mother,

brought repentant tears to the eyes of the good ladies who had always called her bad.

The Intellectual and Moral Value of Play.—The child's own world, then, is his world of play. Play has a physical and a mental side. The intellectual and moral values of play run into almost unlimited lists. Authors have dwelt upon them from many points of view and have catalogued them until they are familiar to every student of the subject. Comparing our modern view of child-activity with the mediæval suppression of all childish tendencies, it is refreshing to live in an age when courage, tenacity, persistence, self-reliance, magnanimity, generosity, co-ordination, will power, health, strength, morals and mind are all said to be cultivated as freely upon the playground as in the best-ordered schoolroom or class.

Self-discovery by Play.—All of these statements and many more are true. All I need to do is to emphasize the value of play for generating and developing what I consider one of the most valuable of all traits for character-making. That is the discovery of the child by himself. Call it auto-education, self-expression, self-reliance, self-dependence,—what you will,—I believe that any activity or process that reveals hidden and unforeseen powers for good to anyone whomsoever makes that person a stronger character. Grown people know well the value of such discipline when it comes to them through sorrow and sacrifice. What mother is there who has played the awful game of life and death facing the grim spectre night and day, day and night, fighting inch by inch for the life of her first-born till her first strength was gone, and her second, and her third and yet new sources of hidden power were opened within her and she held out to the end,—what

mother who has done that has not come forth from her experience with something like awe for the hitherto unsounded depths of human nature when those depths are sounded by primary instincts? Well she knows that no other, merely external force in all creation, could call forth from her the same measure of sacrifice and devotion and no later experience of life can take away the new sense of reserve power within her. "I don't know how I bore it," she says; and "I didn't think it was in her," her friends say. What the tragic after-events of adult life teach grown-up scholars, the playground, the realest world of all worlds to the child,—teaches him. There he is in his native element; there his tasks are his own appointed tasks, changed by the alchemy of imagination into giants, dragons, dark, mysterious, underground forces, which arouse in his childish breast the latent feelings of long-ago ancestors who fought their battles with real beasts and triumphed in the savage game of life. Nobody can for a moment catch a glimpse of what a children's playground really is unless he has gone through the wild passions of the thing himself. An ordered, ornamented, regulated, sanded, sodded, apparatus-equipped, citified bit of childish-innocent civilization is it? With smiling nurses, mothers, Kindergarten young ladies and rather bored directors? Yes, on the outside; but inside, to the children, it is one grand rehearsal of perfectly primitive reversions to savage, barbaric ancestry in which are re-enacted the tragedies of the deep-wood battle with the quarry driven to bay, the heart-stilling, spirit-watching night-prowl, the last, self-abandoning death struggle with the light of reason gone out and spirits taking possession and the boy playing on like Wellington at Waterloo or possessed like the Man of Destiny at the Battle of the

Pyramids. Contrast, if you please, some gentle and thoroughly refined "copy-book exercise" repeating to the point of coma "Practice makes perfect," with the hero-making games of the play-world and you can gain some idea of the yawning chasm yet to be bridged by education before it makes men and women of the calibre necessary to do just battle with the dragons of our present day. Not that I would disparage book-learning or deem it of no importance. My sincere hope is, however, that into all the lessons of boys and girls there will eventually be put something of that soul-searching spirit of play so that out of the lessons will come the solid character-making results of the best playground.

Play Develops the Real Self.—Seeing play in this light one can easily understand how the willing conformation of one's self to such a self-constituted world spells the truest moral-training in the world. What a man is in his heart-of-hearts he is really. That is the measure of the essence of morality—his self-respect. What a child is in play he is in the holy of holies of his being. If the rules of the game will not hold him, if the high-call of "fair play" will not inspire him, if the judgment and ostracism of his peers will not correct him, then indeed is he an incorrigible. His play-world is his larger self. If against this larger self the smaller self of infinitesimal interests conflicts and continues to conflict, the saddening prophecy is almost inevitable that the adult will be dominated in the larger world by the same relative small self. But, in all childhood, no force is better calculated to eradicate just these small tendencies and to develop in wholesome expansion the larger self that on the playground is the real self. Kant's whole theory of morals rested upon

a categorical imperative which drew its validity from the fact that it was autonomous, or was accepted as right and good by the very ones who made it. Such a rule resulted in a Kingdom of Ends wherein people were both subject and king. The only place on earth approaching such a wished-for consummation is a child's play-world, wherein he enters the games because he wishes to, wherein the rules of the game are his own making, wherein non-conformance immediately and automatically excludes the offender from the game. For the average child the threat of such exclusion is a little more fearful than the doctrine of eternal annihilation is to adults.

Adolescent Moral Training.—When we leave the domain of the child in which moral training consists chiefly in fitting him to his world by the formation of habits from instincts, and enter the world of the adolescent our task changes altogether. Here, the problem is no longer to form habits from instincts by getting things done, but moral training merges with moral instruction. For, now we must *inspire* the youth with moral ideals. We must instil ideas into his mind so that they will regulate all his instincts. These ideas will take their color from his instincts; those that are nearest to his instincts will appeal to him most, but they must not be overcome by his blind impulses but modify, direct and guide them. This merging of training and instruction will carry us over to the second part of this chapter, namely, the psychology of moral instruction.

Contrast Between Moral Training and Moral Instruction.—A moment's contrast between moral training and moral instruction may be illuminating at this point. Moral training, be it remembered, is the manufacture of

social conduct disregarding—for the moment—the motives or the intention of that conduct. Moral training emphasizes the external, the overt act, the happiness-producing or happiness-destroying effect of the act, and not the internal springs. Moral instruction, on the opposite side, deals primarily with the intention. What intentions should be taught, how they can be taught, when they shall be taught,—these are questions of moral instruction which we now proceed to consider.

Moral instruction is that part of moral education which concerns itself primarily with the generation of right intentions in a child's mind. Already we have seen how intentions give an act its peculiar flavor called moral. Without an intention an act can be neither good nor bad. The life-intention, that is, the purpose of a man's life or his most general intention, makes him what he is. His particular intentions make his acts what they are. If his acts are in harmony with his life-intention, they are good morally; if not, they are bad morally. Our last chapter made it clear that there are at least three life-intentions open to a man any one of which appears "right" to a fairly large number of people. Which one of these shall the teacher decide to inculcate in the child?

Why a Man Adopts a Particular Moral Intention.—

Besides saving considerable friction between teacher and pupil in the future, it is a splendid preparation for any moral preceptor to ask himself, "Why do I intend to do right for Right's sake? Why do I intend to act for the greatest good to the greatest number? Why do I intend to act for my own greatest good?" If he will reflect long enough I think he will eventually answer, "Because I love Right. Because I love mankind. Because I love myself."

The Motive Back of an Intention.—Such a process reveals to us the presence of something in us beyond the intention but which determines the intention. This is the Motive of an act and exists in the shape of a desire for the intended result. It is an emotional or instinctive impulse, blind because we can give no further reason or end for its existence. A man may seek his own happiness because he desires his own happiness. But why does he desire it? Why prefer more of what tastes good? Why drink champagne instead of ditch-water? Simply, again, because such ways are men's ways and each creature loves its own ways. Again we find ourselves at the feet of the instincts.

Egoistic, altruistic and abstract likings are in us, powerful and robust springs of decision throwing us into one moral class or another and making us feel that one particular intention is so obviously and everlastingly right that we wonder how any sane person can have any doubt about it.

The Moral Tinting Power of Instincts.—Nothing in all the repertoire of instincts is more obvious and yet more elusive than their ability to color their desired acts so as to make them look exactly right. Behold the folly of asking about the universal desire to eat, "Is it right?" Remember again what Professor James says about preference for mutton to hard-tack, for eating more of what tastes good, for loving the maiden so flagrantly made to be loved, and the hen's startled suspicion that there may be a creature in this benighted world to whom a nest full of eggs is not that utterly fascinating and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object it is to her. Even so do men prefer one intention to another intention, and if you ask "Why is this one right?" instead of "revering you for

a philosopher" they will "condemn you for a fool"; for to them, as Bishop Berkely has said, it takes a mind debauched by learning to make the obvious seem doubtful or unreal.

How Instincts Change Morality.—Yet curious as it may seem men never once seem to think that the present certainty-giving instinct is but a temporary occupant of their character; that shortly, perhaps, another may take its place and it will give exactly the same tinting of right to an exactly opposite moral judgment. For most people the last moral seeming is real. They never set it in perspective. They forget the long series of moral stages through which their instincts have already led them and never dream of another long train of moral steps yet before them. The now is Absolute. What feels right is Right—as long as that feeling is a blind, universal, human instinct.

Such instinctive acts on the whole may be good for the race as a whole. But the average man does not know it. He knows only that he feels *this* is Right. Beyond that the super-man may by transcendent genius see another step farther along toward another ideal of conduct; but as for the common-man, he stands in the same relation to that new ideal as the untutored savage or the growing boy stands to his Right. For the savage, the boy, the common-man and the super-man the strongest feeling that it is right is Right. Macaulay, in his essay on Machiavelli's *Prince*, has noted this same tendency in nations. There he vividly portrays the first commendatory reception of the book that centuries later is condemned as the most hypocritically Satanic work that ever fell from the mind of mortal man. What was acceptable and right to the Italian

of that day is altogether rejected as diabolically despicable by the Anglo-Saxon straightforward, face-to-face fighter who might pride himself upon knocking his enemy's brains out with a club in a fair encounter but would hang himself with shame if he stabbed him in the back with a poisoned dagger. Yet the instinctive love for such open and barbarous fighting can be shown to decrease with the advance of civilization and the intricacies of its relationships. The world moves on; other instincts rise to more eminent places in consciousness and the standards of Right are adjusted to fit.

Moral Development.—This point of view adds a new meaning to moral development. We all understand and freely admit that people ought to grow better year by year. That means, first of all, that anybody making any pretense of leading a virtuous life is doing better in his own eyes this year than he did last year. He is living nearer to his own moral standard. Secondly, our point of view adds this thought: a virtuous person must think differently about right and wrong acts from the way he did last year. Some acts he counted right are now wrong; some he counted wrong are now right. As soon as this is stated it is readily admitted as quite fitting and proper for grown persons.

Now astounding as it may appear their whole attitude changes when adults turn their attention to the instruction of children. Yet, if anybody should be expected to grow in a knowledge of right and wrong, it is the child. But ordinarily no such privilege is granted him. He is expected from the moment of his dawning morality, to adopt at once and forever as the absolute and unchangeable guide of his conduct, the moral standards which grown people

pretend to live up to and any deviation from this is visited with "condign" punishment. The attempts for his moral welfare are confined chiefly to conforming him to the law of his parents or teachers—and a sorry time he sometimes has between them—in whatever stage of development that law happens to be, with never a hint to the child that the standard may change, and with never a hint that morality means to live up to his own standard as formulated by himself.

All Morality is Genetic.—What we need to recognize in dealing with children is that morality for them as for all, is genetic. It grows; it changes; it develops. Not only will a child *act* morally differently at twelve than he did at three, but that he will *think* morally differently at twelve than he did at three. Take, for example, our old friend lying—the ever-present help in time of trouble—and look at it genetically as Professor Earl Barnes does. A lie from a three-year-old child is normal; from a six-year-old child it is unimportant; from a nine-year-old child it is serious; from a twelve-year-old youth it is tragic.

Childish Evils Usually Perish with the Instincts That Give Them Rise.—Lamarckians teach that the instincts of children are merely the transmitted habits of the parents. For the sake of the parents,—as well as other very cogent reasons,—I doubt such a theory. But, again let the remembrance of its possibility temper the condemnation of the father and mother and teacher toward Johnny's predilections for things that seem to them the essence of moral perversity. Let their tongues be still a moment before they utter the ever-ready punishment-justifying formula, "You are a bad boy." Johnny may not be bad. Johnny may be the most righteously righteous,

righteously begotten son that ever grew up to honor his parents with a life of completest integrity and renown. Read Swift's "Mind in the Making,"² especially the chapter on the criminality of boys and see there the youthful records of so many potential criminals who afterward became their country's greatest assets in honor,—Patrick Henry, Lowell, Darwin, Newton, Goethe, Hegel, and others; and then read the confessions of respectable teachers, lawyers, doctors and ministers who committed enough boyish crimes to condemn them all to penitentiary. Do not overlook the deliberate opinions of the same men that in their youth they were "born criminals" in the Lombroso sense, if love of crime can be a criterion. Like St. Augustine, when he stole the green pears, they committed their crimes for the love of wickedness itself. So I say again, fret not over those innocent outcroppings of Johnny's inborn instincts. The majority of them are not rudimentary but vestigial. They are not the roots of future evil but merely signs of animal ancestry. Bye and bye they will fall away like embryonic tails and other outgrown inheritances; that is, they will unless treated improperly. They hate the light and thrive in darkness. To nourish them into the very evil habits most feared, summarily dismiss their first incipient expressions by identifying them, innocent as they may be in themselves, with the evils which may develop from them. The suppressing formula is the familiar "That is *bad*" used upon the fallacious assumption, that to eliminate any germinal childish defect one need only to call it bad, or better, to call the child who commits the act "bad." Under such circumstances the instinctive impulse is not annihilated; it is merely carried

² Also the Young Malefactor, Th. H. Travis, 1908, p. 9, *et seq.*

into the subcellar of the child's consciousness, and there like tubers in the dark, it will send out its long, livid creepers ready for the day when in the license of youth, they can lift up their heads in noisome and pestilential plants.

The Effect of the Genetic View Upon Moral Instruction.—This genetic view of morality will modify to some extent the various viewpoints of moral instruction, but it will not essentially alter its general aim. The essential duty of the moral teacher, namely, the modification of the child-nature with reference to certain well-established ideals, remains the same. The new factor introduced by the genetic conception is the successive comprehension by the child of unfolding ideals of conduct which seem valid or right to him because of his growing instincts and his growing mental powers. In general, then, moral instruction can be stated as the modification of a child's instinctive conduct by giving him as rapidly as his growing intellectual powers will admit of it, new ideals for the guidance of his moral life; or, more generally stated, it is the partial molding of child-nature according to certain ends or purposes which he himself adopts as acceptable. How far his nature can be bent out of its natural trend depends upon its elasticity, as it were. To bend it too far means to break it; not to bend it at all means the breeding of a self-willed man.

The Method of Moral Instruction in General.—The method of moral instruction in general will involve, first, a study of child-nature as a whole; secondly, the difference between pre-adolescent and adolescent nature; thirdly, the instincts that dominate pre-adolescence and those that dominate adolescence; fourthly, the systems of morality that will best fit these various stages; and lastly, the best

methods of fitting these systems of morality to the natures of the pupils. Let us, then, proceed to an analysis of the boy and youth and especially to the unfolding instincts of both.

The Nature of Child-nature.—Nothing is so fatal as the assumption that child-nature is plastic; fluid, flux-like, ready to be turned hither or yon and poured into this or that form as a molder guides the molten metal into what channel he pleases. Child-nature is neither plastic like this, nor is it flinty rock to be chipped into shape like the granite of the sculptor. It is a living thing. Within it are forces so gently moving that the flying of a feather across their path may deflect them for eternity and others so determined and irresistible that like the glacier, they will follow their paths though they grind to dust and powder the mountains in their way. Terrible indeed is it to stand athwart these innate tendencies of one little child. For in him is epitomized all the persistent forces of the human race. He is not a child but Man; and not Man only but all the organic kingdom; and back of that he reaches into the dark awfulness of the primæval forest and claims a brotherhood with the trees and flowers. Therefore, I like to think of a child as a vine. He must grow or die. He will climb or crawl. If he is supplied only with soil, moisture and nutriment, his growth will be wild and untrammelled. But he can be supplied with a trellis and so guided and so trained that when the fruition of life comes that trellis will be hidden under the abundance of blooms covering it.

The Moral System That Will Modify His Instincts.—Next after his general nature, his instincts are to be considered as the most important factors of child-

nature to be bent into proper form by moral ideals. Here again, the problem of too much or too little is supreme. If ideals beyond the child's instincts are proposed, they are so far removed, so barren and peak-like in their lonely isolation that the child cannot be interested in them. Here, the teacher must remember that her duty is not mere conformation of conduct to some standard in her own mind, but the inner, happy acceptance by the child of some standard that he accepts as right. No matter how rudimentary that standard may be, or how little the child may really grasp its full significance, the vital thing in the operation is that he shall accept what he accepts as *just and valid for him*. From all we have said, we can easily see the peculiar rôle played by the instincts in making the moral ideal, or the intention, take hold, as it were, of the child.

Boyhood Instincts Differ Widely from Adolescent Instincts.—First, then, as the most general proposition, we may say that boyhood instincts are going to be different from adolescent impulses. This distinction is so widely known and well-accepted that we need have no fear about asserting it with all strength of emphasis. It is a distinction, however, that many teachers either forget or else never knew.

Boyhood Instincts Follow the Social Progress of the Race.—Secondly, when we come to a clearer classification of boyhood instincts, genetically made, we come into a more disputed territory but one which is still roughly marked out. It behooves us here to have a theory of the evolving forces that make a boy pass his moral judgments upon right and wrong, primitive as those judgments are; crude, strong, homely as those of our rude forefathers,

but Right, oh so indubitably Right—to the boy! Does he fly into a perfectly savage rage at some foolish taunt of another boy and pound him into jelly before anybody can interfere? Does that startle his ultra-cultured father into an unnamed fear that his son may be a “degenerate” without moral sense? There is no fear. The boy feels—yea, is—far more “Right” in his action than the same father is when he in a moment of the most righteous indignation, administers a thrashing to that same boy. Our clue to this enigmatic outburst is to be found in the epoch-theory of social recapitulation. The boy goes through the stages of the race in his instincts.

Adolescent Impulses.—When we enter that mysterious country marked off from boyhood’s days by puberty, our analysis of instincts becomes at once more difficult and more easy; difficult because of the tormenting host of impulses inextricably bound together, and easier, because here, as Preyer has remarked, particular instincts arise in their primitive distinctiveness and stand forth with unadulterated strength.

The period is one so full of contrasts and surprises that it never tires of study. We have already devoted a chapter to it and can only touch upon its salient features here. In general it is a period of flux, fluidity, plasticity, of swirling currents, eddies, under-tows and vortexes. Bold and blatant conceit contrasted the next moment with self-abasing embarrassment over nothing; the flush of a world-ambition, the pallor of a paralyzing discouragement, the gnawing hunger for recognition of self, the sublimest self-abnegation; rudeness, chivalry, courage, fear, joy and melancholy, pride and humility, and a thousand and one other emotions, ideals, and high resolves chase each other

over the perturbed soul of the youth like dark and light waves upon the surface of a river. But,—to carry out our figure,—underneath this surface flows a strong and vigorous current. It divides almost immediately into two great classes of impulses—Egoistic and Altruistic. The self-regarding and the other regarding impulses alternately direct a boy's course; here, one in the driver's seat; there, the other; here one tugging forward with demon strength and the other holding back with all the forces of conscience helping it; both always at war, one triumphing at first, the other never beaten, finally slowly and painfully fighting its way upward to a place of dominance in the moral life, aided and abetted by the moral ideal of an altruistic community.

The Hierarchy of Instincts.—Though morality is ultimately a matter of instinct, it is not a matter of instincts. A moral man is not a democracy of instincts each having its own sweet, or bitter, unhindered way. Such a state would be the direst anarchy. A moral man is a hierarchy of impulses. Certain ones have the primacy and must be infallibly obeyed. Sometimes lesser valuable instincts arise in a sudden gust of popularity and demand their satisfaction at whatever cost to the body politic. At such moments the sway of reason totters, or else, holds aloft the calm, cold Ultimate purpose of life—the satisfaction of the supreme Instinct to do Right, to act for the greatest Self-happiness in the long run, to act for the greatest Good of the greatest number. These instinctive ends are admitted to be supreme but they are ends held in mind as ideas. The ability to comprehend ends of conduct, or the ability to discern between the values of various impulses and to determine what one should be suppressed for the

maintenance of another more worthy, depends upon an individual's intellectual ability. With what degree of success he accomplishes this delicate and highly important weighing of impulses and ends will depend upon his experience and upon his comprehension of more removed ends.

Moral Instruction Must Not Only Wait Upon Instincts But Also Upon Intellect.—Hence it is that we must carefully analyze the intellectual characteristics of boy and youth. For if blind impulse alone move him he is not more moral than an animal. It is only when he remembers and forms in his own mind an idea of actions prompted in the past by instincts, and makes that idea his intention in an act that the act becomes moral. Impulses, remember, will always be present in consciousness and will lend their persuasiveness to convincing the actor that such and such an act *must* be right; they will make one intention rather than another seem the rightest Right of all, but still the intention must be present in mind to make the act moral and the capacity must be there to make the intention possible. Therefore, we must study a moment the child's intellectual growth.

Childhood Intellectual Processes.—Concerning the intellectual processes of childhood we have little to say except repeat what we have already said in a previous chapter. The whole field of child investigation is so new that not more than a rough sketch of his mental life can be given and this is always complicated by the difficulties suggested by Kant and others, enforcing the seeming truth that even the smallest bit of genuine consciousness involves all the mental processes of the human being. This ought to guard us against assuming that we can set off by high walls certain mental activities, treat them alone

and entirely separate from others. The most we can do is to learn by observation that certain phases in the unitary process called consciousness predominate, or are more striking or frequent than other parts. These, in childhood, as we have before said, are perception, memory and imagination. The child is busy getting acquainted haphazardly with his external world. He is seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling things. These items he stores up in his memory, all sorts of odds and ends jumbled together without regard to logical associations. His chief law of association is by contiguity. Out of these fragments he reconstructs fanciful situations in fairy-tale worlds organized more upon the plan of primitive man's universe than the modern world, or else satisfying childish cravings for things to eat or of juvenile illusions of grandeur touching heroic deeds under imaginary circumstances.

Intellectual Life of the Adolescent.—The intellectual life of the adolescent presents more vividly outstanding processes. Certain mental traits or modes of thinking as inexplicable and unconscious in their purpose to him as instinctive impulses to conduct, make him sceptical, rational, idealistic and imaginative. Why these intellectual modes dominate and their relation to character-making in general we have already discussed. Now comes the opportunity of connecting them more closely with the method of true moral instruction. Just one word might be said on the contrast between boyhood and adolescent mentality. The boy's mind is not fully developed; it is in process of formation. The adolescent's mind is fully developed. His capacities or powers are at their highest pitch. He lacks experience but he has fully ready all the molds into which experience can be poured.

The Morality to be Inculcated.—From our whole discussion of morality in the preceding chapter and from the genetic nature of psychology, some hint must have already permeated the mind of the reader regarding the view of moral instructions here to be suggested. The heart and soul of it is this: The morality to be inculcated must fit the mind of the child. But we have already seen that the child is growing, developing, changing from stage to stage, and as he changes, becoming successfully one new being after another. He is not fixed in body, in mind, nor in any of his environment. Almost every year sees him enter into another new world and sees him explore its mystery with decreasing wonder until finally it grows old and he is ready for the next. Finally in adolescence he reaches his last stage, there develops his true character, there lays down his ultimate morality and henceforth ceases to do more than explore the real world into which he has at last entered.

The Learning Process in General.—The learning process, or apperception as it is psychologically denominated, has always appealed to me under the homely figure of old leaven and new dough; or, possibly, to introduce a small modicum of classicism into the discussion, we ought to think of such a dignified process somewhat like Weissmann's theory of germ-plasm contiguity and introduce the figure of the African tribes who pour their daily supply of fresh milk into the vessels containing some curds in order to curdle the whole amount. The learning process under this guise is far more than merely parroting set formulas or phrases or definitions or ideas or acquiring certain mechanical habits. It is the process of psychological assimilation, of receiving into the mental constitution

new material capable of being digested, circulated, and finally, by some alchemy of apperception, of being turned into stuff like the old material and making it a part of the whole.

The Learning Process in Moral Instruction.—Whether this theory is true of general education or not it is remarkably true of moral instruction. Moral instruction is not negative. It does not consist of a series of “Don’ts” either expressed in the form of a nagging teacher or a code of maxims. The fact that a child eventually conforms his conduct to the series of negative restrictions is not a proof that he has been morally instructed. He may have been morally *trained*; his conduct under certain circumstances may be beyond reproach; but still he may fall far short of real moral instruction. For morality—the intention to act in conformity with some internal standard—must be inculcated in a fashion that will lodge the ideal of conduct—however rudimentary, childish or imperfect—in the child’s mental constitution to become there a regulative instrument of real force.

Whatever, therefore, that is to be taught the growing child, whatever is to be taken up into his very being, as morality must be if it is to amount to anything in his life,—these things must be fed into his apperceptive machinery in the right *quantities* and right *forms* for the most perfect absorption and assimilation. Into his psychological structure we must fit a moral system that will dominate his riotous impulses, bring order out of chaos, suppress all that is low and preserve all that is fine and noble. True moral instruction is not the destruction or condemnation of adolescent nature, not the disruption of its psychological machinery nor such a disarrangement of

its parts as to dissipate its fine power in useless friction with inapt teaching; true moral instruction is supplying the machinery with a governor. The governor must fit the machine. It must be fashioned with care and put into place with all the delicate skill of a master-mechanic.

The Morality That Fits the Child and the Youth.—To do this we must remember the child-psychology of previous chapters with its various stages of development, and the three systems of morality with their salient features. Briefly stated, I believe that, just as the growing child goes through the social stages of the race, he likewise parallels the moral growth of the race. He passes through all three systems of morality. He begins without morality; then he gradually develops into an Intuitionist, then passes into an Egoist and finally emerges a full-bred Utilitarian,—or at least, this is what he would do under right moral education. As the matter now stands this whole process is confused and obscured by the mass of contradictory moral teachings he receives. In the end he usually emerges an irrational complex with no particular system predominating; or else, he becomes chiefly an egoist, intuitionist or utilitarian as accident of circumstance or innate predilection dictates.

The First Stage of a Child's Moral Life.—The first stage of the baby's life is without any hint of morality whatever. "Take," "Eat," these are the two instinctive commands of his nervous mechanism and he obeys these blindly and with utter devotion. Everything, from his toes to the moon, is a thing to be reached for, and once clutched to be carried straight into the automatically opening mouth. Only after some experience with recklessly seizing a gas-flame in spite of the agonizing "Don't, don't, don't"

of his poor mother does there come swiftly into his reflex nervous system and more slowly into his developing consciousness the second lesson, "Some things are to be taken and other things are to be let severely alone." Possibly a little later experience with mouthing a tack, or some other hard substance, teaches the same lesson with regard to eating.

The Second Period or Intuitionism.—During this period of experimentation with life-forces and pleasure-giving and pleasure-taking processes, lasting possibly from two to six years, the morality of the child is necessarily a rudimentary and fragmentary thing. It is a series of inchoate gropings after the light with here and there a streak of dawn breaking through the gray morning. Experiment is backed and bulwarked with countless "Don't's" and "Do's"; with "If you do . . .", "If you don't . . .", and "I told you so's . . .", and "You see what has come of it's." By all of this process that slumbering inheritance called conscience is gradually aroused and stands alert ready to throw its influence in the direction often but most vaguely intimated by the nascent power of reason revealing dimmest relations between a concrete contemplated act and the germs of a general truth precipitated by sundry previous experiences coupled with memories of acute consequences. This lively but unedifying feeling compels the youngster to formulate his first real moral principle, "I must not do this because it is Wrong," or it can be expressed in a positive form. At that moment, he has become an Intuitionist.

In this state he is likely to remain until he is twelve years of age. Of course, he is not a pure Intuitionist. He does not, any more than his elders about him, decide every

concrete case by this system. He mixes his systems and methods and, again like his elders, arrives at blissfully contradictory moral judgments. Quite readily he acts from self-regarding motives; and equally, when pressed for a moral reason, helps out his short-paced Intuitionism with Utilitarian arguments. Neither is he a deductive Intuitionist with one fundamental principle from which he deduces his lesser moral maxims. Far from it. He is just a hit-or-miss "I feel it is right" or "I feel it is wrong" moralist. In fact, it is "rights" rather than Right that interests him; a crude sense of justice expressed in "It is fair" both for himself and others that sways him, and not an abstract principle. These rights get themselves expressed in moral maxims and these maxims go back for their authority to a more less vague standard of Right.

Intuitionism Fits Child-nature.—The boy, during these years, is exactly in the stage of moral development exhibited by those nations who have catalogued their moral experiences in codes. Like the nation, too, he can be satisfied for final authority by appealing to some Ultimate, clear or obscure, and the more anthropomorphic the better he likes it. In short, during the pre-adolescent period the moral system fitting boy-nature *par excellence* is Intuitionism. Both by his mental possessions and deficiencies he is ready for this modifying system. He changes his worlds periodically according to his instincts. In these new worlds he can still apply his old particular rules partially or wholly, where a general principle would of necessity be shattered to pieces because of its inelasticity. His perception, memory and imagination are working; his consciousness of selfhood is but poorly developed; his

reasoning powers are almost unnoticed. To these conditions, external and internal, Intuitionism fits with wonderful precision and will form the basis of the other systems in succeeding years.

Adolescent Moral Instruction.—With the dawn of adolescence at thirteen the method of moral instruction changes. To enumerate the most prominent changes, the youth now begins to make his own character. Heretofore, his environment and his teachers have determined his destiny. The boy has been dominated by his instincts regulated by environment. Now he will be led by his ideals. Secondly, his moral training, as distinct from his moral instruction, will be the expression of his ideals. As far as the teacher is concerned, moral instruction and moral training both will largely coalesce in giving him the right ideals. Thirdly, the moral instruction of young men and young women may be different. It will depend upon sex-differences in psychology. Generally, the girl will abide more closely by the intuitionism of her childhood, and, possibly, be always more regulated in her conduct by conformation to her particular world than the man.

Moral Instruction Must Fit the Youth.—However, for both, the problem of moral instruction is the same as with the child in one important respect, namely, the problem of making that instruction fit the psychology of youth. By that, I do not mean merely to render the instruction sweet and palatable, though I can see no harm in the world in making good things enjoyable and bad things bitter. What I mean is to make the instruction psychologically assimilative, to make it possible, learnable; to present it in such form that inevitably by the laws of the being of youth, it *must* enter into his character

and become a part of him because his soul longs for moral nourishment of just that kind and he takes to it as eagerly as the heart pants for the water-brooks. A fanciful ideal this may appear to those unacquainted with the heart of youth, to the cynical man or woman who has had his youthful idealism seared over with the iron of baser motives or weak discouragement. But remember, oh discouraged teacher, wearied with the lightning-like alterations in the whimsical character of sapient youth, we are not here dealing with conduct. We are talking about real morality, the thing internal that gives the virtuous hue to action and classes it as brave or base. We are studying together how to mix the constituents of moral ideals so that they may have a ready affinity for the aspirations of youth.

The Moral Systems That Fit the Adolescent.—Let us for a moment recall some of the conditions of moral instruction. First, we are trying in moral instruction to have the youth accept certain intentions as ends of all his conduct; secondly, we know that there are several "right" intentions or ends extant amongst adults, named Intuitionism, Egoism and Utilitarianism; thirdly, the acceptance of any particular intention as a life-goal depends upon instinct. We have shown that the adolescent is dominated in the early part of his youth from thirteen to fifteen with a great class of egoistic impulses. He is self-centred. He is making a "self." He is becoming individualized. A little later—from sixteen to nineteen—he will be just as busy enlarging that "self" and extending it to many social activities driven, as he is, by altruistic impulses. What systems of morality shall he be taught? What intentions shall be held before him as ideals?

Certainly not Intuitionism. That has been swallowed up in his new scepticism. The searching light of a new day is being poured in upon all his old beliefs. Morality cannot escape the light. Moreover the boy has begun seriously to reason. Likewise he wants an end or a purpose to life. With the formation of these things his imagination is wrestling, especially with the half-successful attempts to form some conception of that self his egoism so longs to realize. For him, at this stage, one and only one system of morality can make a heartfelt appeal. That is Egoistic Hedonism. It is new to him; it offers an end; it rationalizes conduct; it sets for its ideal the dearest wish of the boy's heart, namely, the fullest possible satisfaction of egoistic desires.

But in a few years the dawning of a larger Self will want something more satisfactory than Egoism. New masses of impulse will arise and become dominant. Altruistic longings reaching out after new friends, social duties, patriotism, citizenship with all its calls to unselfish and other—regarding emotions will make Egoism look small and mean. Then it is that Utilitarianism must come with its preservation of the rationalism, idealism and imagination of Egoism but now invested with the halo of service for others.

The Moral Progress of the Adolescent.—The moral progress of the adolescent may move somewhat in the following manner. Suppose he has arrived at his sceptical period. He has been taught to tell the truth,—or rather, with the usual negative fatality,—he has been taught not to lie. His notion of a lie has been always rather vague. Now he begins to speculate upon definitions and the meaning of things. He soon comes to the question, "Why

should I not lie?" When he asks that his real moral education has begun. Before that his morality was all second-hand. Now it is a living thing. "Why should I not lie?" "Because it is wrong" should be the test answer. If that satisfies him, let the matter rest. He has not yet reached the age of true moral instruction,—unless he is afraid to ask more for fear of shocking his teacher. In that case he is on the high-road to hypocrisy. If, however, he asks again, "Why is it wrong?" one may take heart and know for a surety that the boy has entered upon the road to rationalism and all his questions are enlivened with a sense of the new self. "Why is it wrong? Why is anything wrong?" urges this new being. "Because," blandly replies the wise teacher, knowing well his quarry, "Because it will bring you more pain than pleasure. You will fail of the largest self." That settles it—for a time. Few philosophers in their early teens will think of going beyond that instinctive wall of the perfectly obvious Right, namely, "One ought to seek his own largest happiness."

The Utilitarian Answer.—Yet a little later, due somewhat to an environment that harps upon the essential meanness of selfishness, but more to the firmer growth of new social instincts and the dawning comprehension of an expanding self in an enlarging world, the youth returns to his query, "What is right?" Now the answer has changed. It is, "Seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number." And somehow that appeal, so lately flat and dead with the weight of a burdensome duty, takes to itself a halo of warm radiance, speaks to vibrating chords in the adolescent soul and vaguely calls as a voice out of the depths to all his patriotic, his social, and his human instincts. Then, for the first time, he knows him-

self to be a man, bearing a man's duties with a man's strength and breadth of shoulders.

Beyond this no wider vision will come. The horizon of the youth's world has expanded to the rim of the world and his family are the inhabitants of the earth. Later on practical wisdom and slow necessity will make him put his own family first in his affection, will limit his patriotism to his own country, will reduce his world-wide reformatory efforts to his own ward; but all these restrictions will still be guided by the greatest good to the greatest number.

The Growth of Selfhood.—Or, suppose for the sake of the non-hedonists, we look upon the growth of morality as an expanding egoism or the attainment of the largest self. Then the early adolescent need not change his first aspiration. He maintains always his ideal of the Self as the end of his actions. His first conception of Self is the narrow one of satisfying his immediate self-regarding desires. Self-pleasure and Self are at first identical. Then he may come to understand that not merely his pleasure-giving activities are to be developed but that all his human attributes demand their share of attention. He may be told that by systematically curtailing the range of his sympathies that faculty will atrophy and die and he will be saved many needless pains at the sight of his fellow-men's sufferings. Likewise, if he hardens his heart and refuses to allow it to expand to a warm and broadening affection for his fellows he will save himself much heartache. For it is risky to love. Friends may prove false, children may die, acquaintances may move to the ends of the earth, and what then will compensate a man for the pain of parting and the emptiness of his existence? All the risk can be

saved by trimming away these pain-giving potentialities and cultivating only the pleasure-giving faculties.

The Largest Self is the Adolescent Goal.—To such sophistries how warmly does the youth protest! He instinctively rebels against any limitations whatever to the growth of himself. He wants all his faculties to reach their fullest and ripest maturity. He turns away with a shudder from the imbecile who sits all day in a perfect rapture of non-understanding happiness conscious only of the organic pleasures his peculiar constitution constantly gives him. Not for all the hedonistic values of the world would a healthy young egoist exchange his chance for full development though that be involved in certain suffering and full of potential pains. He wants to live the largest life; to function as a human being in the fullest way. If love costs, still he wants to love. Tennyson, poet of human nature, with his heart broken, sounds the instinctive note of normal manhood,

'Tis better to have loved and lost,
Than never to have loved at all.

The Largest Self by Self-sacrifice.—To the youth strangely torn betwixt the warring impulses to save the self and to sacrifice the self, the paradox of attaining the largest self by self-sacrifice presents no surprising situation. He knows he wants to do both; not alternately always, but both at once. The Isaac and the Ishmael are contending in his soul and give him no peace. If a moral teacher comes and presents to him the possibility of attaining the largest Self by the road of self-sacrifice, it is enough. He walks in it gladly. All the details may not be clear to his

mind. His idealistic nature will seize upon it; reason will stamp it with its hasty approval; imagination will clothe it with a hazy and magnificently outlined form; emotion will play over it in such a chiaro-oscuro that the high-lights will be all beautiful and the parts unlovely be lost in the shadows of youthful inexperience. Later when the stern reality of life compels the closer painting-in of these same dusky spots, the momentum of habit will keep the man at his appointed task.

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