

## **The prevention of unemployment.**

### **Contributors**

National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution.

Hobson, J. A. 1858-1940.

Wood, George Henry.

Webb, Sidney, 1859-1947.

Royal College of Surgeons of England

### **Publication/Creation**

London : National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution, [1910?]

### **Persistent URL**

<https://wellcomecollection.org/works/a9c2db3n>

### **Provider**

Royal College of Surgeons

### **License and attribution**

This material has been provided by This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England. where the originals may be consulted. Conditions of use: it is possible this item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).



Wellcome Collection  
183 Euston Road  
London NW1 2BE UK  
T +44 (0)20 7611 8722  
E [library@wellcomecollection.org](mailto:library@wellcomecollection.org)  
<https://wellcomecollection.org>

# THE PREVENTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT.



THE STRUGGLE FOR WORK.

This picture illustrates a typical incident in the life of the casual worker. Some months ago during a dispute at the Hamburg docks an office was opened in London to recruit dockers from the East End to replace the German strikers. Notwithstanding the feeling against "blacklegging," which must have kept thousands away, it was necessary to engage a large force of police to control the crowds which daily attended on the chance of securing temporary employment in a foreign city. At times they fought to gain admission to the office—some even clambering up the gutter pipe and entering by the window.

**A**NY complete scheme for remedying unemployment resolves itself naturally into two parts. The first part must deal with the arrangements necessary to prevent the occurrence of unemployment and the second with the character of the provision which must be made for the maintenance of those who, in spite of our preventive measures, are still unable to obtain work or wages.

On the present occasion we are only concerned with the first part of the problem, the prevention of unemployment. That unemployment, even under present industrial conditions, is to a very large extent preventable was perhaps the most unexpected and certainly the most welcome piece of information which the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission had to give to the world. Practically all previous writers, with the exception of Mr. Beveridge, whose book on unemployment appeared a few weeks before the Reports of the Royal Commission, accepted the phenomenon of unemployment as an inevitable accompaniment of capitalism and competitive industry,

and confined their attention to the problem of how to provide for the "out-of-work" and his family. The Minority Commissioners, however, after a more extensive and searching investigation than had ever before been undertaken, came to the conclusion that unemployment was mainly due to defects of industrial organisation which it is fully in the power of the State to remedy, if and when it chooses. As a consequence of this new knowledge *we are now as a nation morally responsible for the continued existence of the great army of "out-of-works" in our midst in a far more direct and unmistakable sense than ever before.* It is in our power to deal with the causes of this great evil if we will.

What are these causes? Broadly they are three—cyclical fluctuations of trade, seasonal fluctuations, and the prevalence of casual labour. The term

## Cyclical Fluctuations

refers to the alternate periods of boom and depression, affecting all trades more or less simultaneously, with which we are so familiar. These



fluctuations, in so far as they reach us through the medium of our foreign trade, we cannot control; but we can, as is shown in the special articles by Mr. J. A. Hobson and Mr. G. H. Wood which follow, very considerably modify their practical effect on the labour market. Depressions and booms are essentially cumulative in character. A reduction of the demand for some one commodity throws some of the producers of that commodity out of work. These workers, being wageless, can no longer purchase the commodities they usually consume, and so the general demand is still further depressed. What is clearly necessary is in the first place that we should arrange to neutralise the effect of fluctuations coming from abroad by deliberately concentrating as much as possible of our controllable demand for various commodities in the lean years of the trade cycle; and in the second place that obeying the dictates of humanity and economic science alike, we should take care that when a group of workers are accidentally thrown out of employment their standard of life—i.e., their consumption of ordinary commodities—is not substantially reduced. On the first point Mr. G. H. Wood is able to speak with considerable authority, and we strongly commend the practical scheme which he has worked out for one great industry to the attention of doubters—if any such there be. On the second point Mr. Hobson, the first economist to realise fully the vital connection between unemployment and the distribution of demand, makes it clear that all measures which tend to equalise demand and which, whether by insurance or otherwise, secure full maintenance to the unemployed and their families not only palliate but actually prevent the rapid spread of unemployment which characterises a depression of trade.

#### Seasonal Fluctuations

occur at certain times of the year in nearly every trade, and in some—e.g., the coal and building trades—are very serious. But what the Minority Commissioners discovered was that, taking all trades together, there is practically no seasonal fluctuation at all. In each month of the year some trades are at their busiest and some at their slackest, but the total demand for labour remains much the same. It should therefore be possible, at least as regards the more unskilled class of workers (for the skilled, trade union insurance provides the most satisfactory remedy), to “dovetail” one trade with another, a winter trade with a summer trade, so that the workers in such trades may secure constant employment all the year round. This must be the business of the Labour Exchanges, especially of their juvenile departments, which ought always to advise any youth who is entering a seasonal industry to take up at the same time some other trade which is busy when the first is slack.

#### Casual Labour

is perhaps the most prevalent and far-reaching, certainly the most demoralising, of all the causes of unemployment. Briefly stated, the problem is this: Practically every big employer employs a certain proportion of casual hands, and each strives to keep a reserve of such labourers hanging round his gates sufficient to meet his greatest demand. But since they are never all busy at the same time, the consequence is that the aggregate of all these reserves in any one district is far in excess of the total needs of that district on its busiest day. The only remedy is to induce all employers of casual labour, if necessary by legal compulsion, to draw from a single centralised reserve (i.e., the Labour Exchange), thus enabling the chronic unemployment due to this cause to be reduced to a minimum.

These are but the outlines of a great problem. Some of the details are filled in in the articles which follow, but for a comprehensive treatment of the whole subject we must refer the reader to Part II. of the Minority Report: “The Public Organisation of the Labour Market.” There he will find these proposals fully discussed, together with further proposals as to the provision which should be made for those whose unemployment the State has failed to prevent. To this latter problem another Supplement will be devoted.

### UNEMPLOYMENT AND TRADE DEPRESSIONS.

BY J. A. HOBSON.

THERE are many well recognised causes of unemployment. Bad weather brings slackness in some trades; many more are subject to seasonal fluctuations; leakages between jobs affect many workers in fairly regular employment; changes of taste and fashion are continually producing expansion and shrinkage in the demand for certain kinds of labour; the introduction of labour-saving machinery or other changes of industrial methods, though not in the long run responsible for any net reduction in the total volume of employment, may cause considerable temporary displacement. Trades shift their locality; others decay or are reduced by foreign competition.

Such are the most obvious causes of unemployment inherent in the ordinary working of our industrial system. Though no one of them is quite regular or calculable in its operation, they are so numerous and various that the aggregate volume of unemployment due to their joint action will not widely vary, comparing one year with another. Even in the best times all these causes are operative. They may not unreasonably be held responsible for the two or three per cent. of unemployment which the trade union returns give as the average during a boom year. But if so, it seems evident that they cannot be adduced to



explain the excess over that figure during worse times. If the normal flexibility of trade explains two or three per cent., the eight or ten per cent. registered in periods of deep depression require an additional explanation.

Now, if in these periods of depression there were an excessive supply of labour and a deficiency of capital, the large unemployment of labour might be attributed to a failure to provide enough capital. Or if miscalculation caused too much capital and labour to flow into some employments, too little into others, such misplacement might occasion much distress and waste in the overstocked trades. But all business men conversant with general trade are aware that no such explanation can suffice. For the characteristic features of a trade depression are, first, its generality, and secondly, the fact that all the agents of production simultaneously stand in excess. For although all trades are not affected simultaneously by the depression, it is general in the sense that few trades escape its influence and that the aggregate amount of production of wealth is for the time greatly reduced. The gravest misunderstanding of the causation of unemployment is due, however, to the undue concentration of interest upon the labour aspect of depressions. The problem of cyclical unemployment is the problem of the simultaneous excess of all the factors of production. For in a trade depression, all parts of the machinery of production are slowed down or stopped. The mills and mines and workshops, with their machinery and tools, that were in full work last year, may this year be standing idle with the labour that formerly worked with them. And this state of things is found in all or most of the staple trades of the country.

It might, of course, be the case that though plenty of buildings, machinery and other fixed capital were available, the trouble arose from a shortage of raw materials to feed the machinery of industry. If it could be shown that great fluctuations in crops and other natural supplies corresponded in time and in amount to the trade depressions, the latter might seem to be inevitable. But statistical evidence adduced to this end completely fails, both in respect of periodicity and of magnitude. No such simultaneity of world-crops is proved as is at all adequate to explain the amount of the deficiency of employment. Moreover, the loose reasoning which suggests that bad harvests, by damaging the incomes and purchasing power of farmers, will cause them to demand less manufactured goods, and so cause unemployment in the manufacturing trades, which in turn will be communicated to other industries, thus multiplying greatly the original damage, has no warrant either from theory or practice. Bad harvests, if they are general, do not cause a corresponding shrinkage in the incomes of the farming classes, and if they did, the other classes, spending less on these goods, would spend more on other articles,

for there is no warrant for imputing to them diminished incomes. Though, therefore, a failure of raw materials, as in the recent depression of the Lancashire cotton trade, may be a cause of unemployment, there is no ground for supposing it can afford a general explanation of trade depressions. For during most trade depressions materials are abundant and cannot get used up, warehouses being already glutted with unsaleable goods.

Equally futile is what is called the psychological explanation; the notion that some periodicity of confidence and depression in the minds of business men, unrelated to and uncaused by industrial facts, induces them to launch out *en masse* into business arrangements in excess of the requirements of future markets. In a period of psychical buoyancy, we are told, they strain all their credit in putting up more industrial apparatus, extending their business operations, and preparing to flood the markets with commodities. They then discover that their sanguine mood has carried them too far, and that there is no reasonable chance of acquiring markets to fulfil their expectations.

This appears a quite satisfactory explanation to people who look at the financial and book-keeping aspect of industry as if it could run a course of its own, divorced from the realities of industrial life. But they fail entirely to explain why the collapse should occur, or otherwise, why actual arrangements for industrial production should be able to become excessive. With every increase of productive power, however brought about, there is born a corresponding power to purchase and consume. This is of the very essence of commerce. There seems no reason why the apparatus of industry should get ahead of the requirements of the consuming public, and to explain that it does so because of an excess of confidence is no explanation at all, but merely a verbal proposition.

At the same time, though this psychological theory explains nothing, it does point clearly to the substance of the malady, viz., the failure of consumption to keep pace automatically with every increase of producing power.

Although in theory everything that is produced ought to be able to get consumed, since it belongs to someone who wants either to consume it or to exchange it for some other article of consumption, in practice things turn out differently.

The failure of consumption to keep pace automatically with increased powers of production is not a speculative theory, but an observed fact. That competition is keener among sellers than among buyers, not merely in bad times, but in ordinary times, is a commonplace of the business world. It can only mean the operation of a chronic tendency of supply to exceed demand. This failure of consumers to take out of the industrial machine the products as fast as they can be produced, when it has gone a certain way, must cause congestion of the machine and stoppage.



After the machine has been slowed down for a time actually below the level of current consumption, the congestion is relieved and industrial activity again sets in at a pace which will eventually repeat the congestion and the stoppage.

Although I own to a theory explaining why, in the present maldistribution of wealth, this state of under-consumption is inevitable, this is no place for arguing what, at the best, is only an hypothesis. The existence of an excessive quantity of capital and labour, beyond what will suffice to furnish the actual current of consumption, is a statement of the actual phenomena of unemployment. It is therefore a fact with which preventive and curative proposals must reckon. For it will furnish a practical test for their validity. Only in so far as a practical remedy for unemployment reduces the tendency of production to outrun consumption can it reduce the aggregate unemployment.

The great merit of the Minority Report proposals consists in the fact that in a variety of different ways they all contribute to this end. Evidently there are two modes of valid remedy—to reduce the rate of production, and to increase the rate of consumption. Now so long as the labour markets are flooded with cheap child labour, with married women, and with the inefficient labour of aged persons, semi-invalids and defectives of various orders, and so long as no effective limits are set upon the hours of labour in most occupations, the aggregate supply of labour will continue to exceed the normal demand. There is a foolish theory that modern industry will not work without a large margin of waiting labour—waiting for the abnormal activity of a trade boom. That theory begs the question, for it assumes the inevitability of the present violent fluctuations of trade. But the magnitude of the fluctuations is itself due to the presence of so large a mass of spare labour. Just as the alternation of over-work and unemployment in the seasonal dress-making trades arises from the fact that women can be got to work all day and night to press through a special order, so it is with trade in general. Remove large sections of the young, the old, mothers, invalids, inefficients, unemployed from the labour markets, and regulate those markets so as to remove the excess of casuals, and to limit the hours of labour, it will no longer be possible to press on the periodic spurts of excessive production, to be followed by corresponding dips of depression. The Minority reforms, which make for these reductions of supply of labour, will not only remove directly large bodies of workers who suffer and cause much unemployment, but they will indirectly abate the violence of trade fluctuations. Removed from the supply side of the economic equation, these classes will reappear on the demand side. The provisions for keeping unemployed workers, by putting some on insurance funds, by training others while their

families are kept, by tending those who are in ill-health, and maintaining in penal settlements able-bodied shirkers, will operate in two important ways to raise the aggregate consumption of the nation. For this work of insurance, regulation, education, hygiene and restraint, will involve a considerable amount of wholesome public expenditure, a raising of the actual expense of maintenance for the classes concerned. Though the excess of this expenditure over what, in various public and private ways, is at present expended on these classes may be smaller than at first sight appears, it will imply upon the whole a considerable addition to the total consumption of the nation. For a large proportion of these defectives are living at a standard of comfort definitely below that prescribed by decency and humanity. Their proper treatment will cause, therefore, an addition to the aggregate demand for commodities.

More important, however, will be the indirect effects upon the national consumption of removing from the labour markets the classes whose competition at the base of every trade cripples efficiency of organisation and helps to keep down rates of wages and conditions of employment. The stoppage of the desperate struggles of unemployed to displace those employed by under-bidding them, the drainage of the morass of inefficiency and destitution everywhere, will enable regular efficient workers in all trades to organise effectively, and to apply methods of collective bargaining which will help to secure for them and their families that steady standard of efficiency which only a fortunate minority can at present attain. This will mean that a larger proportion of the general income will pass, through wages, into demand for commodities, and will so help, not merely to raise consumption towards the level of production, but to regularise industry, by increasing the proportion of national demand that goes to the supply of standard articles of consumption. To increase the proportion of the general income which, passing into wages, on the one hand, raises the regular volume of working-class consumption, and passing into public revenue, on the other, raises the standard of state and civic life, will at the same time secure a better distribution of wealth and a larger steadier volume of employment.

Finally, such reforms are not, as shallow criticism might lead one to suppose, inimical to capital. On the contrary, the larger volume of aggregate production which they render practicable, will not only remedy the present unemployment of labour but that of capital as well. The larger aggregate of wealth produced and consumed will imply and require an increased use of capital. The contemplated increase of wealth which goes in wages is, therefore, not inconsistent with an increased quantity of interest and profit, the result of the fuller and more regular employment of invested capital.



## HOW TRADE DEPRESSIONS MAY BE NEUTRALISED.

BY GEORGE H. WOOD, F.S.S.

ONE of the recommendations of the Minority Report which seems so far to have had comparatively little attention bestowed upon it, is the recommendation that we should administer the State and other public demand for commodities so as to smooth out the cyclical waves of unemployment due to what is called depression of trade. Opponents of the Minority Proposals usually refer to the proposal as one of spending forty millions in ten years to provide work for the unemployed. This, of course, is either a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation. The proposal is not to *spend* one farthing for the provision of work, but to *administer* in ten years, upon a definite plan for each decade, forty out of the nearly two thousand millions of money we now spend in that period on public services.

At the outset there are obvious limitations to the amount which we can so administer. We cannot postpone or anticipate building battleships because trade is busy or slack, neither can we buy perishable goods in a bad year and save them up for a good year. It would seem, therefore, that some trades cannot be assisted in this way, until we remember, for instance, that there are thousands of "standard" fittings, brass iron, and copper, about a battleship which may just as well be bought in bad times, when the labour market needs the order and also when prices are low, as in good or boom times, when nobody wants to make them and prices are high. There is not a trade in the country which, if it supplies either the State or local authorities, cannot be assisted in some degree towards lessening the difference between a boom year and a dull one.

In such a matter there is a lot of room for the working out of details. We need to know what can be done, and what will be its effect on many trades. As a general rule, least can be done in those trades which produce mainly for export, and most can be done in those trades in which production for home consumption predominates. We cannot hope to regulate our over-sea customers' demands; the influences affecting them are too many and diverse. Yet, even in the case of over-sea trade, if there is any truth whatever in the proposition that imports and exports pay for one another, we should find that a smoothing out of the fluctuations in our home trades would react on our buying from, and therefore on our selling to, our colonies and foreign countries.

An official connection with the great staple industry of the West Riding naturally induces me to examine how far we can use the public purchases of wollen and worsted goods of all sorts to smooth out the recurrent trade depressions in that industry. I do not speak of the depressions caused by great calamities, such as the Australian

droughts of 1900 and 1904-5, and the South African War, which produce unemployment through shortage of materials to work with. Over such things as these we can have no control. On the other hand, there are annually large quantities of cloth purchased by the Government and by municipalities (not to mention the railway companies, over whom the Railway Department of the Board of Trade ought to have some control in this matter) for making into uniforms for soldiers, sailors, postmen, tram-car drivers and conductors, as well as horse-cloths, blankets, and many other kinds of woollen goods. In a year of good trade like 1906, the value of the output of the whole woollen and worsted trade was about 85 millions sterling, of which, in one form or another, about 38 millions were exported and 47 millions retained at home. Of that retained at home, not less than one million was purchased by the Government (mainly) and various local authorities. Probably the amount so purchased was nearer two million than one million, but to be on the safe side I take the latter figure.

This State and other public expenditure is a practically constant sum, and the goods bought are not subject to deterioration by being kept. It is, therefore, a simple matter to postpone or forestall purchases according to the state of the labour market, once a sufficient reserve in hand has been established.

The position accordingly is as follows. We have 38 millions over which we have no direct control, 47 millions purchased privately (or by quasi-public bodies whom we cannot, at present, force to "take thought for the morrow") and one million to our hands for use in smoothing out cyclical fluctuations. What we can do with this depends on the extent of the depression during the cycle from one year of very good trade to the next, and on the extent to which the privately controlled demand for clothing, etc. (a secondary necessity of existence), can be regularised by the smoothing out of the fluctuations in the other industries. The Minority Report suggests a ten years programme; as a general rule the period between any point in one trade cycle and a similar point in the next cycle is seven years, so that if we analyse the problem for six years that will be sufficient.

Starting with a year when trade is "very good" and overtime is being worked, (meaning by overtime, not the casual overtime of an ordinary year, but continuous overtime, so that on the average of the year more than ordinary mill hours were worked) we find that the changes in trade from year to year will be first from "very good" to "good," next year to "moderate," the next to "bad," then back to "moderate" again, then to "good," and in the seventh year back to "very good" once more. This, for all practical purposes, is the course of trade and employment. If we take it that in a year of "good" trade there is an equilibrium between work and workpeople, so that in the nett result the overtime balances the



under-time, we shall be safe in saying that in "very good" years the nett overtime worked equals about 4 per cent. of the ordinary hours; in "moderate" years unemployment (or nett under-time) reaches 4 per cent., and in "bad" years it reaches 8 per cent. This is a variation of 12 per cent. between the worst and best years.\* How much of this 12 per cent. can we smooth out?

One thing is certain. Little or none of the State demand for woollen goods is wanted by the trade in the "very good" years. The State can, therefore, once having a supply in hand, save up all the

possible purchases in these years, and at least one-half of the possible purchases in "good" years, and use it when the state of trade makes it desirable that a more than normal public demand should be made. In the table which follows I have analysed what, in my judgment, can be done, and its effects on the state of employment. I ignore, of course, any expansion of the trade, and assume that the amount of its output remains relatively stable from one trade cycle to another. In other words, I eliminate the secular trend and consider only the fluctuations.

#### SIX YEARS OF THE WOOLLEN TRADE.

| Year. | State of Employment. | UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.   |                             |                     |  |   | UNDER "REGULARISATION" ADMINISTRATION. |                      |                        |                        |                                   |                                    |                             |  |
|-------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--|---|--|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
|       |                      | Index Number of Employment. | Value of Output.*<br>£ Mil. | Amount of Output.   |  |   | Private Purchases<br>£ Mil.            | Public Expenditure.  |                        |                        | Sums of Cols. (8) & (9)<br>£ Mil. | Sums of Cols. (5) & (12)<br>£ Mil. | Index Number of Employment. |  |
|       |                      |                             |                             | Exported.<br>£ Mil. | Privately Purchased at Home.<br>£ Mil. | Purchased by State and Local Authorities.<br>£ Mil. |  | Ex-pended.<br>£ Mil. | Accumulated.<br>£ Mil. | Anticipated.<br>£ Mil. |                                   |                                    |                             |  |
|       |                      |                             |                             |                     |  |   |  |                      |                        |                        |                                   |                                    |                             |  |
| 1st   | V.G.                 | 104                         | 85                          | 38                  | 46                                     | 1   | 44 $\frac{1}{4}$                       | 0                    | 1                      | —                      | 44 $\frac{1}{4}$                  | 82 $\frac{1}{4}$                   | 102 $\frac{1}{4}$           |  |
| 2nd   | G.                   | 100                         | 81 $\frac{1}{2}$            | 36 $\frac{1}{2}$    | 44                                     | 1   | 43 $\frac{1}{2}$                       | $\frac{1}{2}$        | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$        | —                      | 44                                | 80 $\frac{1}{2}$                   | 100                         |  |
| 3rd   | M.                   | 96                          | 78 $\frac{1}{2}$            | 35                  | 42 $\frac{1}{4}$                       | 1   | 43                                     | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$      | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$        | —                      | 44 $\frac{1}{4}$                  | 79 $\frac{1}{4}$                   | 98 $\frac{1}{4}$            |  |
| 4th   | B.                   | 92                          | 74 $\frac{1}{2}$            | 33 $\frac{1}{2}$    | 40 $\frac{1}{2}$                       | 1   | 41 $\frac{1}{2}$                       | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$      | —                      | $\frac{1}{4}$          | 44                                | 77 $\frac{1}{2}$                   | 96 $\frac{1}{2}$            |  |
| 5th   | M.                   | 96                          | 78 $\frac{1}{2}$            | 35                  | 42 $\frac{1}{4}$                       | 1   | 43                                     | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$      | —                      | $\frac{1}{2}$          | 44 $\frac{1}{4}$                  | 79 $\frac{1}{4}$                   | 98 $\frac{1}{4}$            |  |
| 6th   | G.                   | 100                         | 81 $\frac{1}{2}$            | 36 $\frac{1}{2}$    | 44                                     | 1   | 43 $\frac{1}{2}$                       | $\frac{1}{2}$        | —                      | —                      | 44                                | 80 $\frac{1}{2}$                   | 100                         |  |
| (1)   | (2)                  | (3)                         | (4)                         | (5)                 | (6)                                    | (7)   | (8)                                    | (9)                  | (10)                   | (11)                   | (12)                              | (13)                               | (14)                        |  |

\* At stationary prices. If prices varied, as they would do, the values in succeeding years would vary accordingly, but the amount of employment would be unaffected.

In this table col. 4 shows what would normally be the value of the output in six years, if prices remain unchanged and the trade neither permanently expands or contracts†; cols. 5, 6, and 7 show how it would, under present circumstances, be distributed; col. 8 shows what would probably be the effect of regularising the State demand in other trades on this trade (and here I think I have underestimated); cols. 9, 10, and 11 show how the present public expenditure of at least one million could easily be administered; col. 12 shows the combined effects of direct administration through public purchases of woollen goods, and in direct administration through regularising public purchases of other goods and smoothing out the cycles in other trades; col. 13 shows the total effect of these influences on the gross product of the industry; and col. 14 shows the changes in employment resulting therefrom. We do not entirely smooth out the cycle, but we do smooth it out so far as the home market is concerned, and this is considerably more than one-half of the total. In the worst year, instead of having 8 per cent. unemployed, we have only 4 per cent., an amount which would be met by short time and "playing for warps" instead of unemployment.

If, at first sight, it should be thought that this

is impracticable, it is only necessary to realise how a depression in the home woollen market is caused now. Clothing is a necessity ranking second only to food and shelter, and when trade is good the demand is constant and regular. A depression on the North East Coast is felt by every woollen mill in the Colne valley; an order for a big ship at Barrow or Belfast soon means work for a Bradford wool-comber or spinner, and a Dewsbury, Leeds, Halifax or Huddersfield weaver. No trade more quickly responds to an improvement in another trade and district than the woollen trade.

I have not said anything about the effect outward from the woollen trade to other trades. Just as a change in the state of the coal, cotton, iron, steel, furnishing, printing, paper-making, building, and a host of other trades re-acts on the woollen trades so will a change there re-act on all the rest. The clothing trade, of course, would follow immediately, and locally, (i.e., in the woollen districts) all other trades would be affected. The feverish rush to get textile machinery during boom times, and the intense depression in bad years would both be avoided, so that with regular trade conditions in the great staple industry, regular conditions would follow in places like Dobercross.

It may be possible to exaggerate the good to be anticipated from the form of administration the Minority Report advocates, but I do not think that I have exaggerated in this article, and I am certain that opponents of the Minority Report very much underestimate its value.

\* The woollen trades do not fluctuate from trade depressions and expansions as much as, e.g., the iron and steel trades, and it must not be assumed that the above percentages hold good for all trades.

† This, of course, makes our measurement one of quantities rather than of values.



## THE FUNCTIONS OF LABOUR EXCHANGES.

IN every town of over 100,000 inhabitants in Great Britain a Board of Trade Labour Exchange has now been established, and from half a dozen to twenty-five officials have been appointed with instructions to organise the labour market. From one point of view the scheme appears to be almost prodigally generous. But when it is remembered that the officials do not possess the power to compel a single employer or a single workman to come near their Labour Exchange, the enormous importance of the education of the general public on the reasons for the establishment of the Exchanges becomes clear. On that education depends, firstly, the extent of the immediate success of the Labour Exchanges in their present form, and, secondly, the granting by Parliament of the compulsory powers which are absolutely essential for the effective working out of certain parts of Labour Exchange policy. For these reasons we may be permitted to restate here the three main arguments for Labour Exchanges—the Obvious, the Economic and the Social.

### The Case for Labour Exchanges.

The Obvious argument represents the Labour Exchange as a signpost, as a means of directing unemployed workpeople to work which is actually waiting for them, but of which, owing to imperfect information, they are unaware. Labour Exchanges are thus seen to be needed on the one hand to ensure that no job shall go begging for an instant so long as there is an unemployed person within reach capable of doing it, and on the other hand to abolish the useless and wasteful tramp for work; in a word, to remove the purely accidental element in unemployment.

The Economic argument refers to the use of the Labour Exchange as a means of "Decasualising" the labour market. This idea of decasualisation is probably, next to the principle of the National Minimum, the most important discovery which has been made in Sociology during the last thirty years. The application of the idea to the large "stagnant pools" of low-grade casual labour which exist in all thickly populated districts is already thoroughly familiar to students of the Minority Report, and need not be repeated here. But it is more difficult to grasp fully the fact that owing to lack of organisation in the labour market nearly all branches of industry are carried on with an unnecessarily large reserve of labour—both skilled and unskilled. When the Whisky Trust was formed in America it was able to shut down five-

sixths of the distilleries and produce exactly the same amount of whisky with one-sixth of the plant formerly in use. It is not to be suggested that the productivity of this country could be maintained if five-sixths of the Labour power now intermittently used were suddenly withdrawn. But it is true that the Labour power of the nation is used wastefully in a manner exactly and literally analogous to the wasteful use of the distilleries in America before the days of the Whisky Trust. The practice would in any case be foolish from the narrowest economic standpoint. From a broad business standpoint it is disastrous, because human labour power deteriorates from disuse and neglect more rapidly than plant. The Economic argument for the Labour Exchange is therefore that they may be used to remedy this economic waste by reducing the necessary reserve of idle labour to a minimum.

The Social argument for Labour Exchanges is given in a paragraph, which cannot be re-read too often by New Crusaders, in Mr. Beveridge's work on Unemployment (pp. 215-6):—"If all the jobs offering in a trade or district are registered at a single office, then it is clear that any man who cannot get work through that office is unemployed against his will. He may be relieved without deterrence. So long as the community leaves the search for employment to individuals it must put pressure on them to continue the search by giving public relief only under harsh, degrading or otherwise repellant conditions." The Labour Exchange is thus a practically perfect test of willingness to work, and by its power of discriminating between the willing and the "work-shy" provides the basis for the humanisation of the attitude of society towards the unemployed—the reserve army of Labour.

### Labour Exchanges in Practice.

The rapidity with which the Labour Exchanges have developed their obvious function as a medium of communication between employers and workpeople may be seen from the fact that up to the end of November, i.e., during their first ten months of existence, over 250,000 vacancies were filled through their agency. The value of the published statistics, however, is somewhat discounted by the fact that no attempt is made to distinguish between temporary and permanent places, between casual jobs that last a few hours and good positions that may be retained for a lifetime. The same may be said of figures which show the "number of applications remaining on the register," and which amounted at the end of November last to 100,273. This figure will become increasingly important as a direct measure of unemployment, but at present it is of comparatively little use because it depends upon the number of the unemployed in any district who take the trouble to apply for work (and to renew their applications weekly) at the Exchange, which in turn depends upon how



much the Exchange is used by local employers requiring hands.

Although the problem of decasualisation is a very complex one and could hardly be solved in a single year by the Labour Exchanges even with compulsory powers, nothing has occurred to suggest that a solution is impracticable, and some interesting experiments have already been begun, notably at the Special Exchanges for Cloth Porters in Manchester and for cotton warehousemen in Liverpool. But as long as the Exchanges are dependent upon the goodwill of employers it will not be possible to do very much in this matter. In the experiments mentioned special arrangements were made with the employers as a body, but in general employers cannot be made to see that any useful purpose would be served by their refusing to engage the men who choose to hang round their gates, and compulsion of some sort is clearly called for.

Once, however, the stream of casual labour is made to pass through the Exchange, the process of decasualisation proceeds a good deal more smoothly and automatically than might be imagined. There is a constant and natural tendency for the available work to be more and more concentrated in the hands of the best men, and, moreover, the discouragement offered by the Labour Exchange to possible new recruits to the trade plays an important part. At Middlesbrough the supply of dock labourers is controlled and their numbers deliberately limited by the Union by agreement with the North-Eastern Railway, and the men are sent out from a special building which is practically a Labour Exchange. It would probably be impossible for a public labour exchange completely and formally to adopt such a policy, but it is important to remember that in so far as the inflow of newcomers into overcrowded occupations can be checked decasualisation will gradually work itself out automatically.

In the matter of willingness to work the Labour Exchanges already provide a pretty effective test. It is safe to assume that they are notified of almost every vacancy which an employer cannot fill promptly for himself. An unemployed man, therefore, who takes the trouble to renew his application at the Exchange every week, so as to keep his name and qualifications on the "live register," may be taken to be genuinely unable to get work. Moreover, the brown registration card which he is given and which is stamped with the date each time he renews his application is a simple and unmistakable piece of evidence on the subject.

#### **Special Problems and Difficulties.**

The British Labour Exchanges are passing through exactly the same phase of criticism from the Trade Unions as the German Exchanges ex-

perienced some years ago. The principle of absolute impartiality as regards wages and conditions is clearly the only one which can be adopted by a public Labour Exchange. But there are certain difficulties which arise in the practical application of this principle.

It is possible that in a particular place the only employers who make use of a newly-established Exchange may for a time be those who find difficulty in obtaining workpeople owing to the bad conditions in their workshops. If it appeared that this occurred to any considerable extent Trade Unionists would certainly have a legitimate grievance. But in point of fact there is no reason to suppose that the Labour Exchanges have been preponderantly used by bad employers. And in any case it is mere quixotic foolishness for Trade Unionists to boycott the Labour Exchanges, for by doing so not only do they deprive themselves of the opportunity of keeping an eye on the work and preventing the growth of such abuses, but they give the Labour Exchanges no option but to send non-unionists even to jobs where the standard rate is paid.

Another matter of great difficulty is the question of strikes and lock-outs. The regulations lay down that when a vacancy is notified from a firm which is concerned in a strike or lock-out applicants shall be informed of the vacancy in the ordinary way, but all the facts relating to the dispute shall also be placed before them, and they shall be left entirely free to choose whether or no they go to interview the employer.

There is no doubt that this regulation would prove satisfactory if the Exchange were the normal centre for the engagement of labour. But under present circumstances there are certain dangers due largely to the facility with which employers can communicate with the Exchanges from a distance, which threaten to obscure the impartiality of the Labour Exchange Regulations. These dangers, however, might be avoided if Trade Unions would always arrange in time of trouble to keep some of their members on the register of the Exchange for the purpose of obtaining information about all vacancies which are notified. They should, moreover, take the greatest care to inform the Manager of the Labour Exchange in writing as soon as any dispute breaks out or appears likely to break out. Accredited representatives of any Trade Unions can always obtain copies of the schedule which is authorised for the purpose of notifying disputes, and whose contents must by statutory regulation be communicated to applicants for any situations which are affected. If these precautions were taken by Trade Unions in an effective manner the dangers of the misuse of the Exchanges in case of disputes, even in the present stage of their development, would be practically ended.



**INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT.**

BY SIDNEY WEBB.

WE shall hear a great deal, in the course of the next few months, of schemes of insurance in respect of unemployment and of sickness. These two possible spheres of insurance have some points in common, but are otherwise very different.

Let us note, to begin with, that insurance does not prevent. To insure against fire is not to diminish either the frequency or the extent of conflagrations, or to lessen the loss of life and loss of wealth that conflagrations cause. We may recommend fire insurance—we may even make it compulsory, as some governments do—but it would still be no rational alternative to fire-preventing building regulations or to a fire brigade. So with sickness insurance. It does not prevent the occurrence of disease. So with unemployment insurance. It does not prevent the occurrence of unemployment. Hence the best possible schemes of insurance in no way obviate the need for the measures of prevention that the Minority Report demands. The wanton slaughter of the innocents; the daily tragedy of child neglect; the physical and moral degeneration of the undisciplined adolescent; the ruin of the uncared-for feeble-minded; the persistence among us of the "white scourge" of phthisis, and other preventable diseases; the waste of the ill-health that these inevitably cause, and the premature deaths that the doctors fail to prevent; the unnecessary throwing into idleness of millions of pounds' worth of capital and hundreds of thousands of workmen by periodical or seasonal unemployment; the demoralisation of chronic underemployment; the consequent inability to enforce personal obligation for self-maintenance or parental responsibility—all these evils are untouched by schemes of even universal insurance. There is something curiously "thriftless" in the idea of many good folk that it is better to start insurance schemes, to defray part of the financial cost of these unnecessary evils, even at the expense of millions of pounds sterling levied on other people, than to do anything to prevent their occurrence! Or perhaps it is really an outcome of ignorance—of the unconscious feeling of the Early Victorian, that disease is still an unpreventable "visitation of God," and unemployment an inevitable feature of modern industry, which it is almost impious to seek to obviate!

What is suggested by the Minority Report is that the proper sphere of insurance in the prevention of destitution (like that of hospitals for the sick, or that of training establishments for the maintenance of the unemployed) is merely as an adjunct to the preventive measures themselves. It is useful as affording a convenient alternative,

which any provident person may choose to prefer, to the treatment that would otherwise be meted out to him. Thus, the trade unionist subscribes for unemployment benefit to-day so that he may have out-of-work pay in freedom, rather than be driven to the relief works of the distress committee. Moreover, insurance is useful in providing benefits additional or supplementary to the normal treatment whether in the form of additional provision for wife or children, or in that of longer and more comfortable holidays, or otherwise. The payment of the insurance premium is, in these cases, an act of individual foresight, which has a bracing effect on personal character. The drawback is that the chronic liability to unemployment is, at present, so great, and the yearly earnings of one-third of the nation are so small, that it is not practicable for them to provide the premium necessary to cover the whole risk. For this reason, the Minority Report advocates the payment of a Government subsidy to approved voluntary organisations (the so-called "Ghent System"), in order, whilst preserving the advantages of voluntary insurance, to bring its benefits within the reach of a much larger proportion of the manual workers than the five per cent. who at present claim them. This has the advantage, not only of stimulating individual thrift and foresight, but also of actually promoting the development of the voluntary associations dealing with the matter, without destroying their independence.

Any voluntary scheme of insurance will, however, necessarily leave outside its scope a considerable number of persons who are too poor or too ignorant, too negligent or too thriftless to pay in advance any optional premium. It is, therefore, very tempting to propose to make the insurance compulsory; and thus to ensure that every person shall be provided for without drawing appreciably on the rates and taxes. This is the idea underlying the Government scheme of unemployment insurance, as adumbrated by Mr. Winston Churchill in his speeches, and by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade) in his British Association address ("Economic Journal," Dec., 1910). What is contemplated, to put it briefly, is (a) to apply the scheme to all persons, skilled or unskilled, employed for wages in the engineering, shipbuilding and housebuilding industries only (three millions of operatives); (b) to require employers to deduct a penny a week from each wage-payment, and to contribute, by means of stamps on wage-lists, a second penny themselves; (c) to authorise the State to add, from general taxation, a further two-pence to each such two-pence; (d) out of the Government insurance fund thus formed, to pay unemployment benefit of seven or ten shillings a week, during a maximum of eight or twelve weeks, to any insured person involuntarily unemployed.

This is a bold project, which would, if adopted,



deal with about one-fifth of all the adult manual working wage earners. But it has many difficulties to overcome, and some inherent drawbacks. Compulsory unemployment insurance exists in no country as yet, even the expert bureaucracy of Germany having pronounced it impracticable. But that is no reason why England should not experiment. Unemployment insurance seems to stand on an entirely different footing from compulsory sickness insurance. Sickness is a fact ascertainable by examination of the individual. The unemployment to be insured against (involuntary unemployment of the able bodied) is a social phenomenon, requiring for its diagnosis more complete knowledge of the contemporary state of industry than any government yet possesses, and perhaps more compulsion on employers than is yet customary. Such knowledge ought, however, to be obtained; and if the government insurance scheme leads (as it probably will) to the universal and compulsory use of the Labour Exchanges for all industrial vacancies, as is already the case for the whole mercantile marine, nobody except the signatories of the Majority Report need regret it.

Apart, however, from these considerations it is to be noted that the Government scheme, though compulsory, does not offer us the advantages of universality. It may be that other industries could be subsequently included, so that, from one-fifth of the workers, the scheme might come to cover one-third, one-half, or two-thirds. But, founded as it is on compulsory deductions from wages, it seems inherently impossible that the machinery could ever be made applicable to the millions of extremely poor (a) casual labourers; (b) independent workers, whether jobbing craftsmen, hawkers, peddlers; (c) out-workers employed in the guise of independent piece-working producers selling their product. Moreover there would always be also the men "not yet in benefit" or "run out of benefit," for whom, when in distress through unemployment, some other provision would necessarily have to be made. Thus, the so-called "universal" Government insurance cannot, even when extended as far as possible, offer the advantage (any more than does the German scheme of "universal" sickness insurance), of making obsolete our present Poor Law or our existing Unemployed Workmen Act; or in any way rendering unnecessary the maintenance under training demanded by the Minority Report. Its "universality" is an illusion.

More fundamental is perhaps the criticism that the Government scheme is illusory in pretending to offer us the moral advantages of insurance. To make insurance universal, obligatory and automatic is, at any rate, to impair, and probably to destroy, its moral value as a stimulus to foresight and thrift. The compulsory deduction of a penny—which would presently come to seem only the payment of nineteen and elevenpence a week,

instead of a pound—would have by no means the same effect on personal character as the voluntary act of contributing the penny in a society of fellow-workers. Whether a deduction that was universal, automatic and obligatory would, merely because it was officially designated an insurance premium, long retain any more advantageous effect on personal character than the levy for local rates seems open to doubt. Universal and compulsory "insurance" is, in fact, on its revenue side, only a method of taxation; and a method to be compared with other methods, for which it is necessarily an alternative. Now, to propose to raise several millions a year in order to provide for the unemployed, by a tax on every employer of labour, amounting to four and fourpence per annum per workman, and by a direct poll-tax on every workman of a penny a week, does not seem to be in accordance with the classic canons of taxation. It is, of course, a fallacy to suppose that the economic incidence of a tax varies according to the application of its proceeds. A protective tariff, for instance, has its own economic effects (whatever these may be deemed to be), irrespective of whether the money yielded is spent in improving harbours or in firing royal salutes. So a tax on wages has its own economic effects, whether good or bad, irrespective of whether the money is spent on unemployment benefits or on an enlarged navy.

We get into a further range of considerations when we enquire what will be the result of a Government unemployment insurance fund on Trade Unionism; what will be its effect on the maintenance of the standard rate; and what is to be the position of the "closed house" and the "unfair shop." It is clear that the Trade Unions will have to secure carefully thought-out guarantees, or they may find their members falling away when they are no longer in need of the Trade Union "out of work pay"; they may witness the unemployed workmen driven to fill the vacancies of those employers who pay less than the locally current standard rate, on the threat of having the State unemployment benefit withheld if they refuse such places when offered to them; they may see their own members deprived of this benefit because they will not work in a "closed shop," or accept wages below the Trade Union rate.

On the other hand, any large Government schemes of insurance in respect either of sickness or of unemployment have—even if they are not universal, even if they do not have the bracing effect of individual foresight—nevertheless, their own advantages. If we could somehow get provided, for every person who was so ill as to be unable to go to work, both medical treatment and "sick-pay," though this would in no way prevent the occurrence of disease, it would be an enormous boon. So, too, if we could somehow get provided, for every person for whom the Labour Exchanges could find no situation, anything like "out of work pay," though this would in no way



prevent the occurrence of unemployment, we should have taken the edge off a problem that may yet cut modern society to pieces. To continue to let preventable sickness and preventable unemployment occur for lack of measures of prevention, and then to meet part of the pecuniary waste from an insurance fund, may be an extravagant way of dealing with the problem of destitution. But in so far as the insurance extends, it is a way of dealing with it. Whatever we may think of State schemes of insurance in their other aspects, they do, at any rate, offer the solid benefits of State responsibility and State provision. For the Government to assume responsibility for the medical treatment and "sick pay" of all sick persons, on the one hand, and, on the other, for providing "out of work pay" for all unemployed persons in certain specified industries, would represent an immense onward stride in the recognition of that "indissoluble partnership," on which, as the Minority Report asserts, the maintenance of any definite standard of civilised life depends. To get that much onward, we may put up with some imperfections and run some risks. Our aim should be by carefully thinking out the dangers, to get inserted such provisions as will minimise these imperfections and risks; and, also, on the other hand, such provisions as will make the "benefits" as genuinely "curative" and as nearly universal as possible.

*New and Revised Edition now ready*

## The Industrial System:

An Enquiry into Earned  
and Unearned Income.

*Containing a Theory of Cyclical  
Depressions and Unemployment.*

BY

J. A. HOBSON.

*Price 7s. 6d. net.*

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

## A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON UNEMPLOYMENT.

- BEVERIDGE, W. H.—Unemployment: A Problem of Industry. (1909. Longmans. 7s. 6d.)
- CHAPMAN, S. J., and H. M. HALLSWORTH.—Unemployment: The Results of an Investigation made in Lancashire. (1909. Manchester University Press. 2s.)
- DEARLE, N. B.—Unemployment in the Building Trades. (1909. Dent. 3s. 6d.)
- HOBSON, J. A.—The Problem of the Unemployed. (1908. Methuen. 2s. 6d.)
- JACKSON, CYRIL.—Unemployment and Trade Unions. (1910. Longmans. 1s.)
- KELLY, E.—The Unemployables. 1907.
- RAWLINSON, SIR R.—Public Works in Lancashire for the Relief of Distress, 1863-6. 1908.
- SCHLOSS, D. F.—Insurance against Unemployment. (1909. King. 3s. 6d.)
- SUTHERS, R. B.—My Right to Work. (1906. Clarion. 1s.)
- TAYLOR, ISABEL.—A Bibliography of Unemployment and the Unemployed. (1909. King. 1s. 6d.)
- WOOD, G. H., and MISS E. F. RATHBONE.—Report of Inquiry on the Conditions of Labour at the Liverpool Docks. 1904.
- BOARD OF TRADE.—Fluctuations in Employment in the United Kingdom and certain Foreign Countries. 1904. Cd. 2337.
- BOARD OF TRADE.—Report on Agencies for Dealing with the Unemployed. 1893. Cd. 7182.
- CENTRAL (UNEMPLOYED) BODY FOR LONDON.—Reports. (King.)
- CHARITY ORGANISATION SOCIETY.—Report of Special Committee on Unskilled Labour. 1905.
- LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL.—Report by Medical Officer on Homeless Persons. 1907.
- POOR LAW COMMISSION.—Minority Report: Part II. 1908.
- SQUIRE, MISS R. E., and A. B. STEEL-MAITLAND.—Report to Poor Law Commission on The Relation of Industrial and Sanitary Conditions to Pauperism. 1909. Cd. 4653.
- JACKSON, CYRIL, and REV. J. C. PRINGLE.—Report to Poor Law Commission on The Effects of Employment or Assistance given to the Unemployed since 1886 as a Means of Relieving Distress outside the Poor Law. 1909. Cd. 4795.
- CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES ASSURANCE SOCIALES.—Rapports. L'assurance contre le Chômage involontaire. 1908.
- CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE DU CHÔMAGE.—(Paris. Sept., 1910.) Rapports.



# THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DESTITUTION

HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PUBLICATIONS:

Which may be obtained at 37, Norfolk Street, or from P. S. KING & SONS, 2 Great Smith Street, Westminster, S.W.

**THE MINORITY REPORT OF THE POOR LAW COMMISSION.** Cheap Edition in Two Volumes. Part I.—*The Break up of the Poor Law.* Price 1s. (postage 4d.). Part II.—*The Unemployed.* Price 1s. (postage 3d.).

**THE MINORITY REPORT FOR SCOTLAND.** Cloth covers 88 pp. 6d. (Scottish National Committee to Promote the Break-up of the Poor Law, 180, Hope Street, Glasgow.) From all Booksellers (or by post 1½d. extra).

*BOOKLETS, consisting of reprinted chapters of the Minority Report bound separately in paper covers. Price 3d. each, post free.*

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. <b>THE CARE OF THE CHILDREN.</b> 80 pp.                            | 2. <b>THE TREATMENT OF THE SICK.</b> 88 pp. |
| 3. <b>BIRTH AND INFANCY.</b> 58 pp.                                   | 4. <b>THE RECOVERY OF COST.</b> 37 pp.      |
| 5. <b>THE DISEASE OF UNEMPLOYMENT.</b> 86 pp.                         |   |
| 6. <b>THE SCHEME OF REFORM.</b> Part I.— <i>The Poor Law.</i> 80 pp.  |   |
| 7. <b>THE SCHEME OF REFORM.</b> Part II.— <i>Unemployment.</i> 90 pp. |   |
| 8. <b>SUPERVISION AND CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.</b> 41 pp.  |   |
| 9. <b>GRANTS IN-AID.</b> 47 pp.                                       |   |

*TRACTS, explaining briefly the general outline and the various parts of the Scheme. Price 1d. each, post free.*

1. **An Outline of the Proposal to Break-up the Poor Law.** 16 pp.
2. **The Failure of the Poor Law.** 8 pp.
3. **How the Minority Report deals with Unemployment.** 16 pp.
4. **How the Minority Report deals with the Sick.** 20 pp.
5. **How the Minority Report deals with the Children.** 16 pp.
6. **What the Minority Report means to Women.** By MRS. MACROSTY. 8 pp.
7. **The Poor Law Medical Officer and his Future.** By MRS. SIDNEY WEBB. 8 pp.
8. **The Reports on the Poor Law.** By the RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN GORST, K.C. 16 pp.
9. **The New Charter of the Poor: What is Meant by the Break-up of the Poor Law.** 8 pp.
10. **Seven Reasons for Supporting the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission.** By J. W. WILLIS BUND, Chairman of the Worcestershire County Council. 4 pp. (Two copies for 1d.).
11. **The Sphere of Voluntary Agencies under the Minority Report.** By the VERY REV. THE DEAN OF NORWICH. 24 pp.
12. **The Majority Report and Why we should Reject it.** By J. THEODORE DODD, M.A. 16 pp.
13. **The Minority Report in its Relation to Public Health and the Medical Profession.** By MRS. SIDNEY WEBB. 24 pp.

**A Bill Embodying the Minority Scheme,** specially drafted for the use of Debating Societies and Local Parliaments. Price 6d. The same, enlarged to complete Parliamentary form, with appendices of statutes and full explanatory notes, folio size, 1s. post free.

## TERMS OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE.

Non-subscribing members are cordially welcomed, but in general the Committee's literature can only sent to subscribers, as follows:—

- 5s. a year and upwards covers a copy of the Minority Report, "THE CRUSADE" and all the Committee's literature as published.
- 2s. 6d. a year covers the smaller literature and "THE CRUSADE."
- 1s. 6d. a year covers "THE CRUSADE" alone.

All sympathisers are earnestly invited to communicate with the Honorary Secretary, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand, London.