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CIVICS.

BEING A STUDY IN
APPLIED ETHICS

By J. C. McWALTER, M.A., LL.D., M.D.

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1916.



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

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INDEX.

PAGE

I.	Applied Ethics	3
II.	Civics	7
III.	Some Conceptions of Ethics	9
IV.	Public Health Conscience	10
V.	Pragmatism and Civics	13
VI.	Ancient and Modern Ideas of Civics	16
VII.	The Nature of Private Property	18
VIII.	The Obligations of Civics	20
IX.	Civism	22
X.	The Minimum Right of Every Man	25
XI.	Civics and the Family	27
XII.	Municipal Laws and Legislation	29
XIII.	Civics and Party Government	30
XIV.	Civics and the Executive and Administrative Powers	31
XV.	The Citizen and the Jury	32
XVI.	Respect for Law	34
XVII.	Civics and Industry	35
XVIII.	Civics and Athletics	36

I.—APPLIED ETHICS.

Applied Ethics deals with rules of conduct which make for the happiness of persons considered as members of communities. The ideal of conduct to be considered is not such as is most fitting to a rational being. It is not what one should desire to be universal conduct. It will possibly be such as may lead to the greatest good of the greatest number, but its object is rather to promote the greatest happiness from the most numerous points of view.

The function of Applied Ethics is a humble but possibly a useful one. It is allied rather to that regulation of public conduct known as municipal law than to the elucidation of what is demanded by the nature of a rational person.

The Art of Life is an eternal compromise between opposite tendencies. Self-preservation is the first law of Nature—to sacrifice one's life for one's friend is the ideal of human duty. It is the part of Applied Ethics to dissect out what is the real worth, to the community, of the principle of self-preservation as compared with that of self-immolation, and to ascertain under what circumstances the one instinct must be encouraged to prevail over the other.

The State interferes in social life more and more every day, and it is desirable to elucidate what principles should guide us in encouraging or in limiting the activities of the State in reference to social well-being.

The worst State, we are told, is that which has the greatest number of laws—that which seeks on the greatest number of occasions to interfere with the liberty of the subject. On the other hand, it is probable that the ideal State is most nearly approached by that one which seeks to offer collective help to its subjects in the greatest number of objects of well-being.

A certain minimum of Right is assumed to be the possession of every man. He is presumed to have the right to live, to liberty, and to some degree of respect. No community which does not vindicate at least these privileges for its members is regarded as deserving of existence. These elementary rights really mean that a very considerable degree of civilisation must exist in the State which claims to ensure them. If a man have a right to liberty, it must not be taken from him so long as he obeys the laws and conventions of the State. It must not be abridged or limited except for grave cause. No man's liberty may be lessened unless we can

show that thereby the liberty and rights of his fellow-men are preserved or augmented to a considerable extent, and it is part of the function of Applied Ethics to ascertain how much, and how often, it may be proper to diminish a man's liberty in order to increase that of his fellows.

The Right to Live clearly involves not merely the sustaining of life, but also a certain frugal comfort—a sufficiency of food and clothes, a freedom from disease and pain, and some degree of skilled help for the inevitable accidents of life.

The Rights of Property hold a place distinctly subordinate to the Rights of Life and Liberty. The right of any man to the possession of lands or money or means of producing wealth is subject to the condition that the right of his fellow-man is not imminently prejudiced—that the possession by the one man shall not cause hunger, thirst, extreme poverty, or any considerable limitation of the rights or the liberties of another. The State alone can secure a man in the possession of his goods. On a man's death his property naturally lapses into the hands of the State except in so far as the State chooses to recognise the claims of his children or kin. Clearly the State can indicate the conditions on which a man's heirs can succeed to his property. Manifestly the State must not allow one man to enjoy or monopolise advantages in such a way that other citizens may be deprived of reasonable means of enjoying life, or of those liberties and advantages which would naturally pertain to their state of life.

This view of the nature of property and of the rights of possession is sometimes called Socialism. It is really only a statement of the limitations which the law, properly interpreted, places on the claim of any man to utilise goods, lands, or any other advantages to his sole use or enjoyment. Emerson, in one of his Essays, has beautifully described that principle of compensation which pervades all human activities. Man becomes more dependent on the aid of his companions every day. The human machine has become so intricate that unless each part of the mechanism discharges its function smoothly and accurately the whole organism may break down. Nobody is self-sufficient, but leans on another, and must be prepared to help even as he is helped.

The theory of the British law is that no man must die of starvation, however destitute he may be. In the last resort he can enter the workhouse and receive a certain amount of food as well as shelter and clothing. Should he not be well acquainted with his rights as regards the Relieving Officer, he can heave a stone through the first glass window he sees, and when he is confined to jail he will get an amount of food sufficient to keep him in fair

health. The cost of all this, the cost of keeping not only the unfortunate, but wastrels and criminals, must be paid by the State, which extracts it from the pockets of the decent and thrifty citizen. Should the thrifty citizen hesitate to pay this tax, his goods will promptly be distrained, and he himself will be cast into prison.

The State, then, recognises a duty to preserve even the most worthless and criminal of its citizens from positive hunger or want. It is prepared to feed, clothe, house, physic, and supply spiritual comfort to every citizen within its borders, be he never so depraved or worthless. Certain States have, of course, laws to prevent the deposit on their shores of those whom disease or character seems likely to make burdens on the public, but the proportion of undesirables kept out by this means is negligible.

These undesirable denizens are, furthermore, allowed to propagate their kind without a thought of contributing to their support. The vices of their parents are certain to be accentuated in their children, and physical characteristics increase the moral tendency towards vice and crime. Hereditary disease augments hereditary disposition towards unchecked indulgence in evil habits; but the burden of providing for these remains on the back of the law-abiding citizen, and the State always acts the indulgent father, occasionally intervening to administer a little disciplinary restraint of so mild a character and so mixed with philanthropy that an occasional committal to prison only acts as a rest cure to the criminal.

St. Paul proclaimed of old—"If a man will not work, neither shall he eat." Now a man shall eat and drink, be clothed, housed, and cared, whether he work or not. If he goes to the workhouse he costs the community £30 a year. If he is sent to prison he will not cost less than £50. If, through his own fault, he falls sick he will become a still more costly burden. Like the Old Man of the Sea, he is on the neck of the patient citizen, and threatens to strangle if he is not allowed to rob him. If he were forced to go into the army something might be made of him, but there is no compulsion, and of course he keeps out.

When Louis XIV. asked his obsequious courtiers what he had done to deserve the loving service of his subjects, one of them replied—"Sire, your Majesty took the trouble to be born." The sot, the wastrel, the idler, and the loafer have only to take the trouble to be born, and all the resources of civilisation in a great city are at their service—splendid streets, spacious rivers, magnificent asylums, hospitals, almshouses, museums, picture galleries, parks—everything to delight the eye or the brain. They were paid for by the sweat of the brow of the worker, and they all stand ready for the loafer. To secure his enjoyment of them there are an army and a navy kept up.

Let us trace the life-history of a loafer. Long before he was born his mother received assistance from the rates—after all, the mother must not be starved if the child is to be strong. The father had deserted her, and the mother must have recourse to the infirmary of the workhouse for her confinement. All this means, of course, keeping up an expensive and well-staffed institution. When such a child is born the mother will not be allowed to leave the workhouse without it, and accordingly both mother and child are kept there for a couple of years. After this interval the mother is good for nothing, and when she takes her departure she can only find the worst-paid and most casual employment. If she has a second child she will be getting outdoor relief, and this will continue, at very considerable cost, until the children are about fifteen years of age. Meanwhile they are sent to school, probably from the age of four, and this involves the State in a colossal outlay for buildings, teachers, inspectors, etc. To this must be added the daily-increasing burden of feeding school-children, as well as the expenses of medical and dental inspection, etc. Between the expenses of upkeep and education, such a child will cost the State, even from its early years, about £20 per annum. As it grows to boyhood, for the want of proper moral care by parents, it soon gets a taste for vicious company and crime, and becomes familiar with the police courts. Probably an industrial school interval may be added to the boy's education, but this results often in making him acquainted with the very class most likely to encourage him in criminal ways. A few visits to prison will soon cause him to regard such retreats with comparative indifference and contempt, and once this frame of mind has been acquired the penal code has no horrors for him. Indulgence in vice or crime may safely be participated, with the confident knowledge that no greater calamity is to be feared than a temporary deprivation of liberty. Meanwhile the mere virtuous worker has to sustain all the cost of the attempted reform and upkeep of the criminal.

A child may thus grow to manhood's age, may have cost the public many hundreds of pounds, and may never have done an honest day's work. Such a one will be an exception, but certainly it is possible for an incorrigibly idle or evilly-disposed lad to live in a state of indifference to work, to be a burden to society, and yet never to want for a meal or a roof. The criminal class have grasped the fact that the average denizen of the jails is better clad, better fed, and better housed than the hard-working labourer of indifferent health and casual employment, and he clearly sees that no punishment which he is likely to undergo will be as severe as the daily lot of many a poor but honest man.

What is the remedy when such a state of society has been evolved that even the most worthless man must be provided at the expense

of his fellows with those means of living which he takes no pains to acquire? Clearly a tax is put on the philanthropic community. The more a community seeks to realise its duties towards the erring, the weak, the old, and the ailing, the more these classes throng into its gates, and the more the worthy citizens of such a State are crushed to keep up the unworthy. The remedy lies in the application of a policy whereby the unworthy are excluded, and only those are allowed to enjoy the advantages of a city or a community who are prepared to do their part in shouldering its burdens—in proving their fitness and worthiness to be citizens of such a State. This spirit, which teaches that man must be worthy of his citizenship, is sometimes called Civism, and the study of what the rights and duties of citizens are with regard to their city is now known as "Civics."

II.—CIVICS.

No part of an organism can discharge highly specialised functions until it becomes more or less differentiated from the rest. The eye could not become adapted to seeing, or the ear to hearing, unless its nervous structure was elaborated from the other parts of the body so as to discharge its appropriate duties.

A community becomes elaborated from mankind living in a wild state, when certain members decide to live together for self-protection and self-help, and become subject to certain laws devised and agreed on to promote justice, harmony, and security. A still more specialised community springs up when a certain picked class of that community decide to build habitations and live in close proximity—taking advantage of some desirable natural features, as the presence of a river, or closeness to the sea, or fertility of a valley.

Most cities have sprung from the outer works of a fortified castle, or from the proximity of a monastery, or from the fertile plains watered by pleasant rivers. Scarcely do the beginnings of a city come into being, scarcely does it exist, when the original inhabitants become jealous of their advantages and privileges, and they seek to retain them for themselves and their families, or only permit others to enter on sufferance or on paying tax.

There were older cities than Rome, but the modern as well as the mediaeval notions of a city have all sprung from that town on the Tiber. The Roman law has coloured all the codes of the world even to the present day; it is still substantially the law of the European continent, and the Roman law is imbedded in the notion of a city, supreme amongst similar habitations of men, to be a freeman of which was an honour not to be despised even by great men—a city which laid down laws which the inhabitants did not think of dis-

obeying—whose magistrates did not tremble before Kings—but a city whose privileges no outsider could think of claiming unless after many years of eminent service to the Roman city itself.

St. Paul, threatened with a shameful death, insisted on his rights as a Roman citizen, and his proud claim of "Civis Romanus sum" indicates how high a privilege such citizenship was esteemed. The success of the Romans as colonisers was clearly due in large measure to the fact that each proconsul and his legion carried with them into strange lands their precious status as citizens of the Imperial City, and each conquered State was gradually admitted to some of the rights and privileges of the Roman State. Cities sprang up in conquered countries, in Gaul and Spain and Britain, whose fondest dream was to be, in some faint measure, like to Rome. Their citizens eagerly vindicated every claim which marked them off as the possessors of advantages over their extra-urban countrymen, and jealously sought to exclude every man who could not, by kinship, servitude, or eminent services, prove his right to be admitted as an equal.

Thus arose that spirit of civism which even in its attenuated and ghostly form still helps to make men proud of the city sacred to them as the scene of their birth, or their successes, or even of their sojourn. But the more eminent a city is, the greater the advantages it offers; and if it have power to pick and choose its inmates, the less of the poorer and the more of the better classes will it contain. That is to say, a city can offer very considerable attractions provided only that it can shut its gates on such as are liable to be burdens, and encourage the entry of those of the moneyed, skilled, or cultured classes.

It is quite a modern idea to suppose that a city should be free and open to everyone who chooses to live or trade therein. It is claimed that to leave trade and commerce free and untrammelled for anyone, from any part of the world, who cares to take part in it, leads to such a quickening of industry and such an increase of wealth that those cities which adopt these principles soon become wealthiest and greatest.

The considerable amount of truth in this view of the effects of free trade need not lead one into the fallacy of supposing that beneficial effects will always follow from throwing open the advantages of cities to all comers. The modern franchise in cities dates practically from the Local Government Act of 1898. Since that time the Municipal Debt has increased over threefold. The weight of taxation is crushing every city. Towns seek to outvie each other in the enormous extent of the advantages in sanitation, water, light, splendid streets, baths, hospitals, and libraries which they offer openly to every comer; but soon the burden will be unbearable.

It is customary to refer in terms of contempt to the ancient charters of cities as mere devices to perpetuate monopolies and to prevent the free flow of commercial enterprise. On examination it will be found that what are looked on as the most reactionary customs of old cities are pure and simple trade unionism such as everybody lauds nowadays.

The origin of the privileges of great cities, like London, Bristol, or Dublin, arose from the determination of the original inhabitants to secure the advantages of those places for themselves and their descendants. In the country the value lies in the land, and the house is a mere adventitious appanage. In the city the house is the only object of importance, and the land is an accidental excrescence. Householders joined together, elected their chief man or mayor, insisted on being governed by their own municipal laws, bade defiance to any other authority, and refused to let strangers within their gates. The members of each notable trade soon formed a guild or company, made laws governing their own community, and assisted the mayor by investigating and settling disputes amongst their fellows. No man was admitted into such a guild until he had proved himself a fit man by a long apprenticeship and a fine. Strangers were indeed occasionally admitted from other cities, but only by paying certain sums known as "intrusions," and regular subscriptions known as "quarterings." Each guild or company sent one or more wardens to assist the mayor in governing the city. Usually each member was required to fit himself with appropriate weapons of defence. The whole city then became the common property of the Common Council, and it decided when and under what restrictions fairs might be held. The guilds of merchants insisted that foreigners should only sell their wares by wholesale, and should not be allowed to store them except for a few days. It is probable that one reason why markets were established by civic authorities is that it became necessary not only to have the most plentiful supply possible of foodstuffs and fabrics offered to the public, but it also became necessary to have contracts completed between parties who were subject to the same jurisdiction. The local authority had ample means, in every public market, of enforcing agreements between buyer and seller, or of forfeiting the goods if any attempt was made to evade the law.

III.—SOME CONCEPTIONS OF ETHICS.

The classical description of Politics is that of Aristotle, who described it as that art which considered and laid down rules by the application of which the greatest happiness of persons living as a community might be secured. "Civics" is usually taken to mean the study of the methods by which the best interests of persons living in cities may be attained. There is, perhaps, no generally

accepted definition of a city as distinct from a borough or a great town, but in mediaeval times at least a city was distinguished from other great towns as being the seat of a bishopric.

It is of the essence of the proper conception of a city that the ground should be the property of the citizens collectively. The local authority should be the ground landlord. To allow a private speculator to profit by the unearned increment which he gains from his plot of ground, not by anything which it produces of itself, but only because of its contiguity to the centre of a city, because of a value merely due to the concourse of citizens at that particular part, or because of the public money spent on surrounding streets and buildings, is a grave wrong. Every day the burden of expense becomes greater on the city authority—every day the amenities of life offered to the inhabitant become more desirable—and every day the ground landlord will derive a greater income—earned not by him but due to lavish civic expenditure—unless the city insists on vindicating its right to the increase in value caused by such expenditure. The only way in which the money sunk in city improvements can be turned to the benefit of those who expended it is by securing that the adventitious advantages which arise from the concentration of a large population at a certain spot shall accrue for the good of the community generally, and not for a few speculators.

IV.—PUBLIC HEALTH CONSCIENCE.

By conscience we mean right reason applied to action, but we further consider the action in its relation to an individual. Where there is a crowd, or a community, we find that the individuals constituting that crowd act very differently in their personal and in their corporate capacity. A man's first duty is towards his own family, but if any other family in the city be guilty of infractions of municipal law designed to secure peace or health or comfort, it is equally harmful to the community. To the ideal citizen, then, it must be equally a matter of sorrow that some obscure dweller in the slums lacks physiological righteousness—as it would be if he himself were guilty. In like manner it must be a cause of equal sorrow to him if the poorest child of the slums goes to school hungry or badly clad, as if his own children went breakfastless or barefoot—they are alike the budding youth of the city, and the welfare of one is as important to it as the welfare of the other.

The white man's burden is the sick, the destitute, or the ailing child. Modern medical science is often praised because of the numerous physically weak persons who have been preserved from disease and death. However admirable this may be from the philanthropic point of view, from the purely biological standpoint it must be regarded as a grave detriment to the race. Nature's plan is

clearly to produce in lavish abundance, and to allow only the strong, the vigorous, the physically adapted to survive. Modern biology has shown that absolutely millions of seeds or even eggs are produced by nature when only units are required, and when it is only possible for units to survive. To suppose that this loss and waste of material does not subserve some most important purpose would be absurd. To meddle with it by seeking to perpetuate the unfit is to seek for that failure by which Nature invariably punishes interference with her schemes. The whole fabric of modern civilisation is weighted with the burden of endeavouring to eliminate disease and to keep the diseased and enfeebled alive. This endeavour is due to the fallacy of supposing that disease is necessarily a bad thing for the race, and that long life is essentially a thing to be sought and cherished.

It is easy to prove, from statistical and physiological considerations, that the marriage rate is lower, and that marriages take place at a late period of life, according as civilisation is more advanced. It is also the fact that the children of late marriages tend to be weaklings, no matter what care is expended on their bringing up. A further well-proved fact is that a higher level of development and health is found in those who are the survivors of a family than in a family which has lost no members—that is to say, the five surviving members of a family of eight will exhibit a higher level of development and strength than any given five out of a family of five.

Probably our entire campaign against disease is worse than merely futile. It is almost certain that the net result is harmful. Our boast is that the expectation of life of every child now born is twice what it was a century ago. Biologically this is a vain boast. Statistically it is founded on a fallacy, because although it may be true that the actual expectation of life—that is, the average number of years which an infant, on being born, will, on an average, live—it by no means follows, and is not the fact, that the expectation of life of children one year old is doubled, or that the expectation of life at the age of five years is greatly increased. We do succeed in keeping alive for some years infants who formerly would have died off before they attained their first anniversary—we even bring some of them to manhood's age—but they transmit a feeble offspring who call for still greater care and skill. It is probable that in spite of all scientific advances the expectation of life at the age of sixty is less than it was a century ago, and it is almost certain that at the age of seventy a man might reasonably expect to live longer a hundred years ago than now.

A peculiar paradox, then, exists in the relation of a community to an individual member. It must be insisted that every possible thing is done to preserve the health and life of that individual—but

it may necessarily follow that this effort to keep alive the weakling of the flock may be quite a bad thing for the community. There can be no doubt that a certain Spartan method makes for the physical and moral elevation of the community. Nobody imagines that the blind, the halt, or the lame, however morally excellent, are desirable citizens. Nobody wishes to see them treated, either by the family or by the State, otherwise than with lavish kindness and generosity. Nobody likes to grumble at the burden of their upkeep, but nobody doubts it is a burden. Clearly as everybody recognises this fact, it is not perceived that every ailing member of the community, every child normally below its fitness in physical health or stamina, every sufferer from grave disease or physical defect, is to a great, though perhaps lesser, extent an undesirable citizen and a burden on his fellows.

In the battle for life much must depend on heredity as well as much on environment. A contented mind may be more than riches. but a sound physical frame, a hardy constitution, an absence of proclivities towards disease, are much more important to the community than considerable wealth. The social crime of transmitting disease, debility, or organic disorders to one's offspring is not adequately understood or sufficiently reprobated. If a man commits some crime of violence, the evil done may be repaired at comparatively little cost; if he persists in his evil courses he can be confined and rendered harmless; but if a man transmit to his children an unstable nervous organisation, a craving for alcohol, a tendency to epilepsy or tuberculosis, he will impose a burden on the State very grievous to be borne, and which will continue through generations. Nothing is more obvious than that Nature's way of limiting a disease is simply allowing it to so spread as to become attenuated and comparatively innocuous, or to so enfeeble its victims that after a couple of generations they die out altogether. In so far as society may seek to check the spread of such devastating epidemic diseases, it does indeed a great service to individuals, but scarcely to the State, because a great number of weakly and susceptible individuals are thereby preserved and enabled to propagate their defects and infirmities.

It is doubtful if the attempts of modern medical science to check the dissemination of epidemic contagious diseases can be really considered a success. The tendency of modern therapeutics is towards the use of vaccines for the treatment of disease, but a vaccine, in its essence, is really the agent whereby a mild form of the disease is produced. The scourge of smallpox is justly regarded as one of the greatest scourges of humanity. The treatment of this disease by vaccination is justly regarded as one of the most striking triumphs of medical science, but vaccination means really the preventive treatment of smallpox by the artificial induction of an allied disease.

Alcoholism—meaning thereby a craving for, and an excessive indulgence in, some form of alcohol, which the patient is unable to successfully resist—is perhaps the disorder which inflicts the most damage, directly and indirectly, on the modern community. The cost of lunacy is a crushing one, but from twenty-five to fifty per cent. of the lunacy cases are due to alcohol. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether it is not absolutely futile to attempt to treat it either by total abstinence or by prohibition. We are faced with the phenomenon that those races which drink most alcohol, and which drink it most continually, at all hours of the day and from the earliest years, are really those in whom absolute drunkenness is most uncommon. We also find that the absolute amount of alcohol consumed by an individual has little to do with its injurious effects on the organism. The Continental drinker of bock, who starts early and ends late, easily consumes twenty pints of bock in the day. This is equivalent to about twenty ounces of absolute alcohol, which would certainly be enough to kill a couple of people unaccustomed to its use. Nations like the Jews, who have habitually taken alcohol for thousands of years, are notoriously sober.

It is important to note that according as the State makes itself responsible for the health, the education, the housing, and the feeding of the individual, the employer must, pari passu, be made responsible for the health of the worker, for the number of hours he may work, for the amount of wages paid by the day or the hour, for the various conditions, with whom, and under what circumstances he may work. Such conditions are necessary to preserve the health and well-being of the worker, and to improve his efficiency as a working machine; but each of them tends to limit and abbreviate his liberty, and he becomes reduced, in practice, to the condition of a slave under the Roman Empire—well-fed and cared for, just as the horse or any other valuable animal is well looked after, but no longer a free man. The Right to Work connotes an obligation to give work, and the right to live in frugal comfort for the worker's wife and family generates a right in the employer to the contrivances and competent services of the worker, such as can be exercised only if the worker lives as completely under the care and control of his employer as if he really were a slave.

V.—PRAGMATISM AND CIVICS.

Pragmatism is a term popularised by William James for a species of philosophy—or, rather, for a mental attude towards philosophical questions—which seeks to test their value by the question: How will it work? If, in effect, a certain philosophic or psychological tendency has a generally beneficial effect towards the happiness of society generally, Mr. James and his disciples will declare that it has justified its existence, that it merits approval, and they decline

to inquire too particularly into the logic of the issue. Pragmatism, as a mentality, means that what works well must be good. It suggests that the end justifies the means, or at least that the means may be sanctioned with approval because the end is found to be good. It is, as Mr. James confesses, largely based on empiricism, but on an empiricism that means experience rather than experiment. Pragmatism is invoked as the cloak of much sloppy thinking, but its utility, as a rough guide to the pedestrian philosopher, is undoubted. It has a certain kinship to eclecticism, but whilst pragmatism seeks to accept what is best in every system as proved by positive results, the end of eclecticism is to select the theoretical best of philosophical teaching. In Applied Ethics—in Ethics as applied to a community and not to individual conduct—the utility of pragmatism is undoubted, because as it looks to results in practice it must take account of innumerable modifying circumstances and conditions whose existence was, perhaps, unknown until their effects had come into play. Systems of thought more logically sound may demonstrate that certain effects will inevitably succeed in certain causes, or that given antecedents will undoubtedly have given consequents, but in the actual practice of life the actual set of circumstances can never recur, and cases identically the same may never again be experienced. In the physical world the temperature changes every moment, and a host of electrical and magnetic alterations supervene. Man is the victim and plaything of the elements, and rhythmic as well as fortuitous modifications of every bodily activity constantly occur. What is true of the individual is even truer of the multitude. Never for two consecutive days can it think alike, and a certain fluctuating change in the mental attitude of the crowd towards any matter seems almost a necessity of its existence. In biology it is well known that if the products of the life activity of an animal be not constantly removed, it will soon be killed by its own secretions. In the world of psychology the crowd, to use the popular phrase, runs an idea to death. Activity in any philosophical direction is quickly carried to such absurd extremes as to aggravate those very evils it was intended to remedy. Happiness, says Aristotle, is seated in the mean; but to the multitude the mean is an abomination. Hence what experience shows to be good must always be better than what theory points out as more desirable.

There is a succinct saying of Bishop Butler—"Probability is the guide of life." As a statement of fact this is true; as a maxim to direct one in the intricate paths of life it is of little help, because all the difficulty lies in finding the "probability." The whole art of success in life, whether for the man or the multitude, lies in the elucidation of this probability. Much more intricate is the elucidation of the probability of a given alteration being a benefit to the well-being of a community. One's surest guide must be whether it

makes for the betterment of the individual, for his fulness of life, for the preservation of the race, for the greater good of the greater number; but the probability is obfuscated with such doubt that only eternal vigilance can hope to discover the better path. For inquirers less keen and anxious a certain spirit of pragmatism is quite a useful guide.

Neither Logic nor Psychology take any account of the abnormal. Pathological psychology is supposed to be for the physician, and pathological logic for the prison or the lunatic asylum; but the crowd contains many abnormal and ill-regulated individuals, and the impulse of the mass is largely swayed by them. The theories of Lombroso and his school—that all crime is due to some physical or mental defect—is no longer so fashionable as in its earlier days, but it contains a definite percentage of truth. It may well be argued that one's duty is to legislate for the normal ninety-five per cent. and not for the five per cent. of decadents; but the activity of the latter is far beyond their numbers.

Excellent as is the maxim of Kant for the individual, I do not think it so helpful in Applied Ethics. "Act so as you can desire to be universal law" will seldom bring a person astray, but apply the same imperative to a community and it will not seem the sum of wisdom. Let us see. "Tell the truth always" seems an admirable maxim, but if it were enforced as positive law it might have serious and untoward consequences. The truth, after all, is what one thinks the truth; and the truth about one's neighbour may not be the truth as it appears to one's neighbour. If I insist on telling another what I believe to be the truth about his person, property, past, or character, I shall probably lead to a breach of the peace. If I insist on telling the multitude some home truths about themselves in the market-place, they will certainly stone me. If I publish the truth about certain persons in the newspapers, I shall certainly suffer in an action for libel. Now, in the court, on oath, the judge will not permit me to tell the truth—if he does not think it legal evidence in the case.

Generosity is surely the most amiable of the virtues. A man may well think that no law universal could be more desirable than that a man should be generous, charitable, kind to another. We know from experience that nothing is more harmful than to attempt to practise on the large scale, or to enforce, generosity.

If a public authority, as representative of the community, attempts to be generous, it wastes the public money. Instead of encouraging thrift, universally recognised as the proper virtue for such a body, it soon generates a tolerant, easy-going, slack spirit which overlooks offences, encourages sloth, enlarges extravagance.

In one of his most thoughtful essays Emerson tells us of that wonderful scheme of compensation which prevails through life. What one gains in prudence, one loses in generosity. What one gains in theory, one loses in practice. What one saves from sleep, one loses in strength. What one gains in multiplicity of experiences, one loses in vividness. What one loses in minute accuracy, one gains in a general grasp. It is common wisdom, but it was never brought home so vividly to one. Too far east is west, and too much learning maketh a man mad. Now, it is mere mathematics that a crowd contains more extremes than a single unit of it, and each unit is, therefore, saner than the crowd. Thus every extreme and extravagance which a person will normally indulge in will be prepresented on an enlarged and augmented scale in the crowd. If it be difficult to map out a rule of conduct such as is helpful to the individual, it is beset with many more troubles when one seeks to do the best for the many.

"Thou shalt not kill" seems an imperative most fitting to be universal law for a community, but every State claims to have power to take away life in punishment of murder, or to slay the enemy if the existence of the State is threatened. "Love thy neighbour as thyself" seems the most beautiful of all moral maxims, but clearly no law could insist on it, no authority could try to enforce it. Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and the care of one's family, to the exclusion of other families, seems to be an inherited instinct necessary for the survival of the family.

VI.—ANCIENT AND MODERN IDEAS OF CIVICS.

Aristotle of old divided his State between manual workers, soldiers, and the governing class. Clearly any modern State must also have a class of rulers, who will probably be aristocrats or capitalists, and also of defenders of the State as well as workers. The problem for the modern State which is of most pressing importance is the question of providing for the workers. Provision for the sick and helpless and the providing of a class suitable for fighting are also important questions.

Most people oscillate between opposite errors in this matter of State subvention of workers. For long the theories of the Manchester School were regarded as sound. The height of wisdom was to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. The doctrine of laissez faire dominated men's minds. Labour was invested with the faculty of being able, like water, to find its own level. The laws of supply and demand regulated the wages of the worker, and the law of competition ensured that the worker got sufficient value for his money to keep himself and his family. Hardship, in the view of mid-Victorian philosophers, only inured

men to work and induced hardiness in their offspring. Marriage was looked on as a luxury, to which only the best-conducted of the workers might aspire, and in return for which a man must be expected to give himself up thankfully to a life of toil. Wages merely meant the sum below which the most wretched of men could not be got to work, and the enforcement of public health laws was looked on as an impertinence, an unwarrantable interference with liberty, and the unwarranted infliction of doctors' fads on sensible people.

The evolution of a sense of responsibility for the health, and hence for the lives, of the people is interesting. The view that the whole world simply exhibited a gigantic output of teeming life, engaged in a perpetual struggle for existence, from which contest only a few—endowed with certain qualities which fitted them for the fight—could hope to survive, long held the field. It was gradually discovered that survival in the struggle depended not only on individual endowments, but also on environment. Medical science being applied to the problem, it was discovered that health and life depended, in large part, on the existence of certain zymotic or contagious diseases. In order to check the spread of these plagues, improved sanitary conditions became necessary. Thus the environment might be improved. It was soon discovered that in order to check epidemics it was necessary not only to improve the dwellings of the rich, but, more urgently, those of the poor. In the Roman, as in the Indian, cities the workers dwelt outside the gates, and the epidemics which devastated them might, perhaps, be excluded from the city gates, but in more modern cities it is difficult to keep the aristocratic quarters so isolated as to be free from danger of infection from the poorer quarters.

Hence it became necessary to exclude contagious fevers like typhus, typhoid, smallpox, plague, and cholera from the poorer parts as well as the richer. To do this involved an effort on the part of the civic authority to improve sanitation, drainage, and housing conditions. This required not only an expenditure by the better for the poorer class, but a recognition of the obligation that a community owed a duty towards the more helpless, and ought to help the needy to maintain their health and to avoid sickness.

It soon became evident that a number of factors combined to produce health, and that if the local authority did not assist the workers to maintain health by having good houses and good food, its labours were in vain. The Trade Union movement next appeared, and insisted that a certain minimum wage was necessary for a man to live in any kind of health, and gradually this principle came to be recognised.

Ignorance was soon seen to be one of the fruitful sources of disease, and hence the local authority had to provide schools to

banish ignorance. It was further soon found that it was in vain to build good schools, to provide excellent teachers and other advantages, if the children attending school were half-naked, hungry, and even diseased.

Hence the State, or the local authority, had to feed the school-children, and often to clothe them. The next step was to provide medical examination for such disorders, like diseases of the eye or ear, which made instruction futile. Thus there sprang up an army of medical officers whose function it is to investigate those bodily infirmities and drawbacks which prevent school-children from deriving proper benefit from the courses of instruction which they attend. It is obvious that if the school medical officer only discovers the physical defect he will have simply demonstrated the necessity of remedying it. A further step is clearly the curing of the child's ailment or defect. This will involve the services of a staff of highly skilled oculists, rhinologists, dermatologists, and other medical specialists, with their appropriate clinics, nurses, instruments, and the like.

Many of the children will be found suffering either from tuberculosis or from some form of malnutrition and inanition which actually invites consumption. Unless these are strengthened or cured, the whole apparatus of education exists in vain for them. But to combat successfully such morbid conditions of health in the young involves questions which go to the very root of modern sociology and modern civilisation. School-children will be tuberculous unless they are well housed, well fed, well clad, and well cared. It is impossible that the State should insist on parents finding this provision for their children when the parents, although most willing, are, through poverty, unable. Thus the State will be finally forced not only to provide education, but also to provide, in a greater or a less degree, housing, food, clothing, fire, and expert medical attendance.

VII.—THE NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.

When one proceeds to discuss whether the State is justified, at the general expense of the community, is entitled, or is bound to provide, at least to some extent, for the food, clothing, and housing of the children of those members of the community who cannot themselves provide them, it seems desirable to consider what is the nature of private property.

One may dismiss at once the old-time Socialist notion that private property is immoral or even undesirable. It may be admitted that man has a right to private property—that he has a natural right to monopolise for his own benefit, and for that of his family, a certain definite amount of land or chattels, property, in his possession.

But what is the nature of the right, and what is its extent? There is, we assume, a certain fact of physical possession, and a certain moral right to retain possession. With regard to the fact of possession, this could only endure so long as the owner was able to defend his possession against the attacks of others. In that state of nature described by Hobbes, where man is a wolf to man; under those conditions outlined by Carlyle, where the only question which one man asks himself on viewing another with an object of desire—"Can I kill him, or can he kill me?"—possession would be a very precarious tenure. Presumably in such circumstances the more numerous, stronger, and powerful class would simply deprive the owner of his possession, and his moral claim, if any, would be worthless.

On the other hand, in a civilised community it would be the duty of the lawful authority to vindicate possession to the proper owner. But authority depends, in the last analysis, on force, and the authority cannot enforce the law in favour of the owner unless a large majority of the citizens are prepared to help it. Such a large majority of the citizens can clearly not be of the wealthy or aristocratic class, for wealth connotes a possession of far more than the average of goods. To secure any man in the ownership of his goods it will be necessary to demonstrate that he has himself an irrefragable moral and legal claim to them. On scrutiny it will be found that no man can claim exclusive ownership of any commodity, whether land or goods, as against a starving populace. Their need is more immediate and pressing than his, and he has no right to exclusive benefit as against them. Thus no man is bound to starve whilst bread lies in the baker's shop. No child should be allowed to die whilst milk is in the dairy. Clearly if men were starving, or thought themselves starving, and proceeded to help themselves to their neighbour's bread, a tumult would arise and the peace could no longer be kept. Probably the point of agreement would never be attained between the baker as to the degree of necessity which would entitle a man to seize his bread, and the hungry man who felt he had been starving all too long. It is the clear function of the State to step in, keep order, and regulate the respective rights of the parties. If a man be starving he must be fed. If a baker has loaves, his right to them is not to prevail against a man's life. It evaporates and disappears. That the State, under such circumstances, has the right to commandeer the bread, and to give the baker in return some allowance, cannot be denied. The like argument applies to every other kind of property. It is not denied that a person has a right to property, but such right is not an absolute thing—that is, it is not absolute for all the property. It depends on the needs of other members of the community; only when they are free from dangerous need can the right of any man to monopolise

any thing be tolerated. Hence the duty of the State is to regulate the ownership of goods or lands so that other members of the community shall not suffer unduly. A convenient way of attaining this end is by taxation. If it happens, therefore, that the result of taxation is to deprive a rich man of half or three-quarters of the yield of his possessions, he cannot complain, he suffers no injustice. His only security in the enjoyment of his property is the power of the State to secure him against aggression. If the State insists, in return, on distributing half his wealth for the general good, he has no right to complain.

Wealth, in modern communities, is simply due to the concentration of population. It is largely the result of an unearned increment. The needs of a teeming population, their necessities and their luxuries, are the prolific sources of wealth. If a man make money because of the presence of a multitude of his fellow-men, it is right that he should be made to spend it for the benefit of the needier ones amongst them.

When a man dies it is the obvious duty of the State to decide to whom his property shall revert. Any fair system of government will ensure that the natural right and duty of a man to provide for his children will be ensured. It by no means follows that a man can be allowed to transmit all his belongings to his children or descendants. It is, in fact, a well-recognised principle of the law that perpetuities shall be discountenanced if not forbidden. No man has a right, either legal or moral, to keep his lands or goods in his own descendants from generation to generation. It is against public policy. It tends to intensify morbid proclivities if a long line of descendants are permitted to enjoy wealth without working for it. It excites discontent if a State is forced to guard property and preserve it to be enjoyed by one family to the exclusion of others. Most of all must this practice be checked in cities. Lands require cultivation to be rendered profitable, but if they be uncultivated the owner is the principal loser. Hence, in a sense, it is his own affair. Not so with manufactures, or commerce, or such callings as are carried on in a city. A city owes its health and continued existence, owes its prosperity and its growth, to the free play of those conditions which make for successful commerce and manufactures. These involve the free circulation of wealth, the free sharing of the amenities of life, and full supplies of labour. If any monopoly of the wealth or facilities of a city be locked up in a given family for generations, it will gravely interfere with the prosperity of that city.

VIII.—THE OBLIGATIONS OF CIVICS.

Civism involves obedience to a benevolent despotism. Should you spit in the streets of New York you will be sent to jail. Not even Nero would have punished a man for expectorating in Rome,

though the dirty habit would have done quite as much harm in the Via Sacra as in the Broadway. The Americans think themselves a free people, but they compel people to submit to drastic regulations to prevent a possible danger. You dare not build your house in London one inch outside of a line laid down by the authority, and you dare not introduce into the fabric an ounce of stuff which has not received official sanction. If you do, your house may be pulled down. Never in the days of the greatest tyranny of Greece or Rome was a house pulled down because the tyrant did not like the substance it was built with; but we quietly acquiesce. We think it wise that a competent authority should protect the citizens against any one of their number who should endanger them by building a house of inflammable or unsafe material.

In order that the city shall be beautiful and well-built we are prepared to suffer many inconveniences, but to any commercial city a constant supply of labour, of men and women ready to work at the required trades, is an absolute necessity. It is equally necessary that they can be obtained at a moderate wage, otherwise the trade departs to another city where labour is cheaper and more plentiful. For the labourer, however, wages merely means the minimum sum which will enable him to feed, clothe, and house himself and his family. This sum varies in every city, being obviously in the direct ratio to the prevailing rates of rent and cost of food and clothing.

It, therefore, becomes the duty of the municipality to provide houses for the workers, if private enterprise have not done so. It will also be its duty to provide for the children of these workers adequate school accommodation. It is further necessary to provide for the feeding of the school-children of the working classes, for there must be periods of unemployment when adequate nutriment cannot be supplied by their parents.

Every working man being a distinct and necessary asset to such a city, it becomes needful to preserve infant life, which is so prone to be wasted in working class communities. The municipality must, therefore, help the expectant mother and the nursing mother. It must supply skilled nursing as well as nutriment to the child. All this sounds like Socialism, but it is merely Economics. If the man be of value to theState, the child is of value. If the one must be kept alive, the other must be nourished. The Insurance Acts have sanctioned the view that provision must be found for the family when the bread-winner is sick, and that those crippled by work must be helped back to health; but the position of children is not directly dealt with by it.

A function of the city authority which has lately sunk into desuetude is that of regulating the price of commodities required by

the citizens. It is now generally accepted that an important function of any municipality is to provide articles of universal need and use—such as water, light, traction—for the benefit of the citizens. With regard to articles not controlled by the local authority, there is an obvious duty to prevent their being sold at too high a price. It was a familiar custom of the mayors of cities in former days to regulate the price of bread and meat and other articles of consumption. Ideas of free trade, and the feeling that competition will always be certain to reduce prices to a proper limit, have almost abolished the practice. The tendency to those combinations of holders or producers known in America as "Rings," or trade associations, makes it possible to drive the price of the necessities of life in a given district far above the market value.

IX.—CIVISM.

Civism, considered as a word to denote the study of the conduct proper to a citizen, seems to have originated with the encyclopædists of the eighteenth century. It was first used to denote one who sympathised with the theoretical aspirations of the French Revolution. It suggested one whose ideal was to be a good citizen rather than a loyal subject. Neither the term civics nor "civism" awakened much popular interest or enthusiasm until the latter end of the nineteenth century, when certain evolutionary views of the nature and functions of a civic community began to be studied.

The study of man as a member of a social community was quite customary with the Greeks, and all modern views on the subject inevitably become coloured with the views of Plato and Aristotle. So thoroughly had these philosophers developed the idea that little of worth has been added from their time almost up to the present day. A great stimulus to the study of the relations of man living in a city to his fellow-man has been given by the consideration of the enormous outlay which every modern city makes, of its overwhelming energy and activity in making and enforcing new laws, and in the perfect obedience which it exacts from all its citizens. A certain civic pride has usually been engendered by these circumstances, and a desire for a more scientific understanding of the rights and duties of a citizen has arisen.

As the organism gradually develops from a very simple structure to one of highly specialised parts, each differentiated from the others by the capability to discharge most perfectly its own function, the modern city is built up, not merely by a conglomeration of units, but by the development of special functions, due to the organisation of its parts. The city, as an organism, is greater than the sum of its parts. It is welded into a huge machine, capable of producing results for the happiness and well-being of the multitude which its various elements are quite incapable of bringing about,

The fusion and unity of its several parts—of the energy of the various individual citizens—produces a cumulative result which brings a share of happiness and fullness of life to each citizen far greater than that which he himself has put into the common fund. This arises from perfect specialisation, whereby each part is called on to perform only that function which it is best adapted for. Each person is asked to do only that work in which he is most skilled. The whole community then produces the greatest possible amount of that work of which it is capable; it also produces the highest quality of work, because it is that in which it is most skilled.

The best interests of the city are, then, the best interests of each citizen. He cannot benefit himself more than by being a good citizen. To realise what constitutes a good citizen may need some study, and such study will properly be called the Science of Civics.

As the city represents the totality of the best interests of the citizens, it must always be regarded as of superior importance, not only to any single citizen, but even to any number of them. The test of a man's worth, then, is how much he has done, or how much he can do, for the city. The Stoics' ideal of a perfect man must yield to the conception of the perfect citizen. There persists a corporate soul after each member of the commonwealth dies, and, being eternal, it is of more value than the transient units which composed it. "Love thy neighbour as thyself" assumes a deeper meaning, for one's neighbour is clearly one's fellow-citizen, and one's service to them is a serving of the city. That a man should give his life for the city is, then, reasonable rather than laudable, for the interest of the community far outweighs that of any man, and a man can offer his life for no better purpose than the good of his fellows. That a man should offer the fruits of a lifetime—his money, his works, his houses—to his fellow-citizens is simply to obey a natural sociological instinct.

The city thus becomes something of an army. The interest, the honour, the existence, the success of the army is everything. No individual is worth consideration except in so far as he makes for its honour or its interest. The transient units of the army come and go, they constitute it, but it is an ideal far above and beyond them. All private interests must be forgotten, all individual desires must be obliterated, lest they interfere with the well-being of the organisation. It lives for ever, defections only purify it, and deaths relieve it of encumbrances. The city, considered from the standpoint of civism, is an analogous entity. Each year makes it nobler, grander, more renowned. Its children are intoxicated with the sweetness of her breasts. To live and die a worthy citizen is a sufficient ideal for any man. Even as St. Paul was proud to claim himself a Roman citizen after he had been lifted up to the seventh heaven, even as

Socrates sought to get himself to be regarded as a worthy citizen of Athens, so no man can be so noble or so great but that he must gladly claim to belong to no mean city.

The pleasing practice of electing distinguished men as honorary freemen of great towns bears glad witness to this fact. In some measure this ceremony of admitting to the freedom of a city meant that the person honoured was no longer kept outside the gates, but was free to enter and be accepted as a friend and brother. That charming ceremony whereby even the Sovereign is forced to halt at Temple Bar and await the pleasure of the Lord Mayor before he can be suffered to enter the City of London, although regarded by some as archaic mummery, is really a splendid vindication of the independence of the city even of the Crown.

Happily for the science of civics, already a couple of cities have been founded—those of Bournemouth and Port Sunlight, as well as that of Letchworth—where an attempt has been successfully made to put into operation the principles of civism.

The net result has been to prolong life, to increase fertility, to improve production, and to cheapen the cost of manufacture. More noteworthy still, the hours of labour have been shortened, and means for the enjoyment of life multiplied and made available for all.

It has been demonstrated, then, by actual experiment, not in one city but in several, that it is possible, at the one operation, to increase the happiness, the health, and the wealth of the workers, to increase at the same time their economic productiveness, to increase greatly the birth-rate, to greatly prolong life, and almost to abolish sickness. This has been brought about by an intelligent grasp of the meaning of the principles of civics, and an active desire to put them into concrete operation.

One cannot have a city without citizens. One cannot have a good city without good citizens, and stunted, sickly, undergrown people can never be good citizens in the full sense. They are either burdensome to the community or at best they cannot discharge with full perfection the duties of a citizen. Healthy citizens are those born of strong and comparatively young parents. As either parent advances in life the offspring is more or less debilitated or diseased. Early marriages are, therefore, a necessity for good citizenship. If, from economic reasons, it seems impossible for persons to marry at an early age, then the State must supply provision necessary to help a young couple to rear a family. The pressure of civilisation tends to induce persons to put off marriage to a date far too late, and in consequence the offspring are few and delicate. These tend to transmit their delicacy of frame, and thus resistance is lessened and disease spread.

In some weak and inadequate way the State is beginning to recognise its duty towards child-bearers. The endowment of motherhood is faintly adumbrated by the reduction of income tax allowed on account of children, as well as by the maternity provisions of the Insurance Act. The effective treatment of infantile mortality must commence long before an infant is born. Mal-nutrition in the mother produces a condition of mal-development and feebleness in the offspring which years of good feeding are insufficient to clear away. Whilst brood mares and calving cows are sheltered, protected, and well fed, whilst they are permitted to do no work lest the offspring should suffer, the mothers of most of the working class are required to work hard during the entire period of their pregnancy. Their food is usually inadequate and insufficient, their clothing faulty, their anxiety extreme, and their hygienic conditions of the most deplorable type. Hence their children are so puny, so short-lived, so prone to contagious diseases, so stunted and weakly. If it be the duty of the municipality to provide for the well-being of its citizens, it is a far more pressing duty that it should provide for the lives and health of helpless infants, who are the coming hope of the city. Recent legislation recognises the propriety of providing for the needy expectant mother.

X.—THE MINIMUM RIGHT OF EVERY MAN.

There are certain primary necessities of life which every citizen may reasonably expect to enjoy. These are water, air, light, heat. For the poorer part of the community it may be requisite to supply housing, milk, and even clothing or food. Certain of the amenities of life have also become a necessity in modern civilisation. Thus the raising of clouds of dust or the scattering of lakes of mud by motor-cars becomes not only a menace to health but a destruction of clothes. The ear-splitting screeches of motor-horns rack the nerves. The incessant sound of the clamant tram-gong tears the tympanum. The never-ending noise of the traffic on the street stones exhausts the nerves. The stench of the motor fumes asphyxiates and paralyses. It is part of the science of civics to deal with these public nuisances so that their evil effects may be minimised.

POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE.

Air being the first necessity for life, it is of prime importance to preserve its purity and to enhance its advantages. Certain variations of the atmospheric pressure, in the temperature and the amount of moisture in the air, are controlled by forces beyond the command of any sublunary authority; but its purity, its freshness, and the absence of contamination, of unpleasant effluvia or of impurities, may be secured in some measure at least by intelligent activity on the part of health authorities.

A clean city is a healthy city, and no atmosphere can be wholesome where impurities abound in the streets and slums. The whole problem of preventing disease and prolonging life is clearly bound up with the problem of properly purifying the air which we breathe. Every slum dwelling constantly exudes mephitic vapours into the air, and these exhalations spread disease and foster pathogenic micro-organisms. Every focus of foulness must be eliminated before one can with absolute safety breathe the city air, because each portion of decaying or diseased matter pours forth myriads of pathogenic organisms. This has been recognised by law for many generations, for anything that constitutes a public nuisance must always, and at any cost, be abated by peremptory proceedings.

Now, morbific effluvia can arise from widely different sources—from manufactures, noxious trades, slum dwellings, and noisome exhalations. To prevent them radically in a large city requires that necessary manufacturing operations shall be carried on under such conditions that unpleasant odours shall not arise. It will also be requisite to provide houses for the workers in these factories, at a convenient distance and on an adequate scale.

This leads to the conception of Town Planning as an outcome of a proper civic spirit. Town planning is the logical consequence of the conception that if a man have a civic spirit he ought to have a city, and that a city is not really a fortuitous congeries of dwellings, but an organism whose every part is directed to the end of providing the greatest possible health and happiness for every one of the residents in its ambit. This can be achieved only by an architectonic effort—by a conscious endeavour to adapt the means to the end, and by an adequate knowledge of the requirements of a large city, present and potential. The soil below, the air above, the material and construction of the houses and of the streets, the various provisions for the health of the inhabitants and for the producers of manufactures, all must be provided for by the most skilled expert knowledge.

Between town planning and the æsthetic sense the connection is more close and obvious. The cultivation of a taste for beauty, of the æsthetic sense, not only widens the joy of living, but increases the love and devotion which the citizen will have for the place of his habitation. The love of beauty needs to be encouraged and cultivated by the contemplation of beautiful objects of art and nature. These can only be provided by that exalted conception of the true meaning of a city which is possible only when a city is so conceived and planned as to exemplify beauty in itself.

Museums, picture galleries, and libraries all tend to increase that fullness of life which it is the part of the true city to offer to its inhabitants. It will not now be denied that a public health con-

science is indispensable to any community which wishes to grow physiologically righteous. Many drastic enactments are enforced to encourage the spread of health, to limit the ravages of disease. All these make for mere physical well-being. Man as a composite being cannot develop or perfect himself on physical lines alone. He needs the perfection of the whole being, spirit as well as body. It is impossible to discharge the duties of a citizen without some conception of their ethical obligation on each person, and the development of the spiritual side of man's nature is a necessity to his proper conception of ethical relations. To expand, develop, and ennoble the mind is as truly the function of a city authority as to provide baths for their bodies or gymnasia for their muscles. A sense of beauty needs culture and care and proper direction before it can be developed so as to ennoble life or make its owner a better citizen. A generally spread instinct for the beautiful ennobles the taste of the whole city, checking the meaner and encouraging the finer instincts of the citizen. Thus a loftier ideal of achievement for each city is finally evolved and consecrated, and a more exalted type of citizen comes into being.

XI.—CIVICS AND THE FAMILY.

Civics has been described as the Art of Living as a member of a community. It is both a science and an art. A science when we seek to learn the root principles which should guide the normal man in his relations to his brother-men of the community. It is an art when we seek to apply these principles in practice.

That great Irish scholar Duns Scotus held that all wrong-doing arose from ignorance. It did not arise, he contended, from malice or ill-will, but from imperfect knowledge. Man is so constituted that when the better part is made manifest to him he must adopt it. If, therefore, there were a perfect citizen, one who adequately realised his rights and his duties, his privileges and his powers, he would need instruction neither in the art nor the science of civics. Such men, if they exist, are so rare that it is unnecessary to consider them. The normal man, the ordinary citizen, is usually more or less earnestly anxious to do his duty, but he has usually so imperfect a grasp of his duties and his interests that his path is strewn with blunders and ill-directed efforts.

THE FAMILY.

The family is the normal unit of human society, and the community will attain perfection according as it becomes like the family. In this conception of a family we mean a number of persons living together under a common head whom they reverence and obey,

subject to the same laws, bound by a common affection. We further conceive the family as consisting of a number of different persons with different attributes and qualities, but each helping the other and exerting his own peculiar art to the utmost for the common good. We assume that each member helps the other when in want, or sickness, or pain, or trouble ; we suppose that each one is anxious to increase the sum of happiness of the others, and that each is prepared to make some sacrifice without murmur for the common good. As the community approximates to such a family it will certainly approach the ideal, but even in the best-regulated families there are often one or more black sheep ; there is much failure, much misery, much fissiparousness. Further, the family can thrust out the black sheep and shut the door in his face. This convenient practice has always been regarded as the undoubted right of the most excellent families. The community can by no means so readily get rid of its undesirables. They remain a burden on its neck always. Even excellent members of the same family have jars and discords and debates, they do not see eye to eye. Clearly the community, composed not only of the well-meaning and the good, but of the bad, the indifferent, the degenerate, and the defective, will have a far harder task to live in harmony and to promote happiness.

DEVELOPMENT OF CIVISM.

We have insisted that every man has certain rights which cannot be taken from him. The right to live, to liberty, to property, to honour. As correlatives to these rights, he has certain duties—chiefly not to interfere with the rights of others, but rather to help them to secure theirs. The essence of community life is that it increases automatically the amount of effort which each individual puts into it to secure the safety and the happiness not only of himself but of others. It multiplies the results of the labours of each member for the common end. The common good is thus promoted, and certain persons who have rendered eminent services for the common weal can get not only their rights, but certain privileges.

Privileges are usually the reward for special services, whilst rights belong to every member. It is equitable that whilst there is a certain minimum standard of right which each must be granted, greater favours may be given for greater services. Now, it is in the matter of privileges that civism offers the greatest reward to the earnest citizen. Special duties are exacted of him, foresight, patience, generous outlay, public spirit, public service ; but in reward both he and his family and fellow-citizens may expect to get much that makes for happiness—abundant amenities of life, multiplied means of social intercourse and enjoyment, facilities for education and health, the increase of home comforts.

XII.—MUNICIPAL LAWS AND LEGISLATION.

The merest schoolboy knows of the powers of the Roman Prætor or the customs of the Court of Carthage. Of the powers and duties, of the privileges or of the possibilities of his own local Council he knows nothing. He usually regards it as an assemblage of worthless, ignorant, and self-seeking persons. Almost every city thinks it has the worst possible Corporation. The normal householder's conception of his entire duty as a member of the community is to pay unwillingly and on threat rates which he cannot possibly avoid paying. That it is his duty to appreciate the labours of men who, from a sense of public duty, take part in public business, never occurs to him. That it is the duty of a good citizen to promote reverence to the local authority, to promote respect and obedience to its by-laws and regulations, never comes within the ambit of his imaginings. That the schoolboy should be taught something of the origin of the City Council, something of its history, its evolution, its development, its trials and difficulties, and something of that respect which the true citizen owes to the legislative authority of his city—such a conception never occurs to the normal parent. He never refers to the Council but as a nest of intriguers, a hotbed of jobbery and corruption, or in similar derisive epithets. He has a subconscious idea that thereby he discharges some honourable function of citizenship. Such views become the common beliefs of each younger generation, and they are led to believe that public life is nothing but a squalid struggle for place, power, or pelf, and that those who take part in it are simply inspired by mean or unworthy motives. Such a mental attitude inevitably leads to the degrading of public life, to the obliteration of civic ideals, to the lowering of the standard of civic conduct. If it be assumed that worthless and venal men will be found in public life, then assuredly men of that type will not hesitate to come forward. If a whole Council be classed as inept, extravagant, and insincere, the worthiest citizens will not ambition to be members of it. If the boy at school be not taught that reverence is due to rulers, that every citizen is responsible for the shortcomings of the local Council, that it is each one's solemn duty to purify it, to exact respect for it, to encourage the best men to become members, to take pride in its achievements and to feel pain at its shortcomings, then a most valuable part of his education has been omitted, and an important element in his development as a true citizen has been overlooked.

PUBLIC OPINION.

The most potent factor in regulating the life of the community is public opinion. Law is merely the formal expression of the general opinion as to the propriety of an action, coupled with a punishment if the law is disobeyed. What is generally known as public opinion

deals with matters of conduct and custom which do not rise to the importance of misdemeanours or crimes. Where the standard of public opinion is low, the energies of the individual are directed, not to avoid crime, but rather to escape punishment. It is well recognised that not the severity of the punishment to the perpetrator of a crime, but the certainty of punishment, is what makes laws be respected and obeyed. The influence of public opinion creeps into every society, it is active and present wherever a few persons meet or can be seen, and if healthly and rightly directed it exalts the standard of conduct in a community more effectively than the most drastic and mercilessly imposed restrictions. The formation of a sound public opinion is, therefore, the most important work of civism. The education of the rising scholar in the elements of civics is intended to make him an active factor in the generation of that wholesome public opinion which is so desirable. Public opinion should be the expression of the public conscience. A lesser part of civism consists in the development and the spread of a public conscience. In due time this public conscience becomes almost an instinct, people recognise and appreciate the right, they become intolerant of the wrong. A certain fine development of brain enables them to understand that certain courses of action not obviously harmful at the moment are certain to result inimically in the community.

XIII.—CIVICS AND PARTY GOVERNMENT.

In Parliament and in City Council alike the party system is looked on with great dislike by many well-meaning men. In actual fact it is almost a necessity of the constitution of our legislative bodies. In a given assembly a certain number of the members will be in favour of alterations which they regard as improvements; a certain number will also be in favour of maintaining and conserving the existing state of affairs. Hence two parties are naturally formed who look at every question from different points of view. There may be a certain amount of bickering and unpleasant antagonism, but the result in practice is that each party tries to convert the other to his point of view, and all the arguments for and against every course are carefully examined and minutely inspected. Moreover, men being aware that every action of theirs will be keenly scrutinised by their opponents, will be careful not to unduly expose themselves to criticism. The endeavour of those in charge of public affairs is to have everything working automatically. Thus labour is saved and the maximum results obtained. But automatism is the grave of initiative, and a body would turn a deaf ear to many suggestions or complaints unless some of its members had a keen reason for listening to them. This is supplied by the party system, where one party is continuously striving against the other. Thus also a higher standard of public conduct is exacted, for no sooner does one

side insist on a lofty philanthropic or moral standard in the treatment of a given question but the other side lays claim to an equally exalted standard of virtue. Men are further tempted to act loyally towards and to support that party which makes a special claim to their allegiance. They will make sacrifices for the sake of a section which they would refuse for the sake of the whole body. This feeling is an interesting psychological factor in the success of many movements. A man has a certain parental love for the party or the measure which he has initiated or adopted or supports. His interest in it is often in the inverse ratio of the number of its supporters. It is in direct proportion to its need of helpers. He takes an interest even in collateral movements which may in some way help, and his interest often overflows into channels remote from the original object of his desire. Thus we find that a man interested in one public object or question is soon led to take an acute interest in many other analogous ones. We further find that the spirit of veneration, or esteem and respect, the spirit of desire to help and of sacrifice which a man experiences or exhibits as a member of the family circle is shown very often by him as a member of the community and as a member of the oligarchy directing public affairs.

XIV.—CIVICS AND THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.

Almost every citizen in Athens, and every citizen in Rome, was liable to fill some judicial office. Each citizen from his earliest years was trained to fill the office with dignity and credit when he might be called on to do so. He, therefore, studied the history of his country, and more especially of his city; for to the Greek and Roman alike the conception of fatherland was a great city rather than a State. He studied its laws, for he would probably be called on to administer or to modify them. He sought to encourage, both by precept and example, obedience to and reverence for the law, for otherwise the task of enforcing it would be aggravated. The Greek or Roman citizen, too, had the keenest interest in propagating respect for all civic institutions or traditions, for an appeal to the sentiments of love and veneration in the citizens was always the most potent means of enforcing obedience to orders. The inhabitant of a modern city lives in direct contact with the administrative authority only when he casts a vote—and that duty he discharges usually in a sullen, perfunctory, and indifferent fashion. His only connection with the executive is probably the office of a juryman, which he always tries to escape, and ever regards as an imposition and a bore. This mental attitude makes him regard those who really are prepared to devote time to public affairs as persons to be stigmatised as politicians—at best—or as self-seekers or place-hunters.

The old system of Crafts, Guilds, and Corporations, though in course of time it became engrafted with many abuses, did great service in its time by indoctrinating its members with a sense of civic and fraternal duty, a sense of responsibility and of readiness to sacrifice. One reads in one of Dr. Lucas' pamphlets, demanding the liberties of the City of Dublin, that he was sent to the Common Council of the City as one of the representatives of the Guild of St. Mary Magdalene, representing the Surgeons and the Apothecaries; and that every such freeman of the Guild had to take a solemn oath that he would attend the meetings of the Common Council as often as he was called on, and that no excuse except sickness should ever keep him from discharging any office to which he might be called, or serving on any Committee, or being present at the election of the Mayor. Membership of such Guilds was zealously sought for. It was obtained by serving one's time to the craft, sometimes by fine, sometimes by parentage or descent, sometimes by grace especial or honorary admission; but the root idea of a privilege on being admitted, and a duty to defend the liberties and rights of the Guild, was always insisted on. In course of time abuses arose; those who had no connection with a craft sought the freedom of its Guild merely to qualify themselves for membership of the City Council; foreigners were made to pay fines known as intrusions and quarterings; and many abuses went on. Hence all the old City Guilds in Dublin were swept away as to their municipal privileges by the Municipal Corporations Act, 1843, which threw the franchise open to practically everybody who had a certain property qualification. This free throwing open of the vote, although it cleared away some defects and anomalies, had yet the result of removing the old desire to be a freeman of an honoured Guild, to get thus, at some expenditure of time and trouble and perhaps money, a certain status and privilege, and the power to exercise the privileges earnestly and for the good of the city.

XV.—THE CITIZEN AND THE JURY.

No higher judicial duty can be cast on any citizen than that of serving on a jury, and there is none he so much abhors or so strenuously tries to escape. The great question of life or death—the whole Kingdom of Fact in every relation that can exist between men, the most momentous results affecting commerce and industry—all these lie at the bare arbitrament of twelve men. Yet, instead of esteeming the honour, which makes them for the moment the masters of a man's life or death, the arbiters of his destiny, the controllers of his property, it is looked on as a task onerous, repulsive, unfair, burdensome—to be avoided at any cost. It may at once be confessed that the present jury laws and the jury system in vogue do impose terrible inconveniences on citizens, but the fault

rather lies in the system, which no attempt is made to remedy, and to the general attempt to shirk the duty. This involves sending for five or six times the number of men who are required, and keeping them waiting for many hours. Clearly the juryman is a most important element in any question of civics, and if he could be trained to realise the privileges, the responsibility, and the honour of the post he might be led to regard the duty with less aversion. If the burden were cheerfully taken up as an honourable duty, attempts at evasion would be infrequent, and the constant supply of suitable material for a jury would make it easy to select a sufficient number out of a very small panel. Women are clearly as adequate to act as jurors as most men, and in some cases it is impossible to have a woman tried by her peers unless the jury be composed of women. There are a considerable number of women of intelligence and education who would make most admirable jurors, and nothing would tend so much to extend, round off, perfect, and mature the education of a young woman as a course of instruction in civics if she realised that the principles enunciated would probably be put in practice by herself.

CIVICS AND FEMINISM.

By Feminism one means, in the present context, the theory that women are entitled to enjoy the privileges, bear the burdens, and accept the duties of citizenship. By Civics we shall understand the art and practice of living as a worthy member of a community. There seems to be little reason why a woman should not develop into an admirable citizen. No class of the community is more keen to recognise the principles which are at the foundation of true citizenship than educated women, and none are more earnestly anxious to accept their share of responsibility. In most County Councils in England, and in the Borough Councils in Ireland, women are already either eligible for membership or already members. In the few instances where they are not already eligible they will certainly become so in a short time. The primary claim to representation is certainly taxation, and the most clamant claim for a vote is the payment of a tax. There are scarcely any duties falling to the lot of a citizen which a woman cannot discharge well. The question of a combatant defender of the city scarcely arises now-a-days, and in almost every other activity a woman can do the required work as well as a man. There are, indeed, many duties of citizenship which in a mixed community women can do even better than men. Take a coroner's inquest on the body of a woman. Surely a jury of women are most likely to elicit facts and promote justice. The same is true of almost every case in which a woman must answer for an offence before the Court. It is not suggested that women jurors or women judges will be more merciful or even fairer. It is highly probable that they will exact justice more unerringly

and punish wrong-doing more infallibly. The training in the true civic spirit which a term of service as a juror or otherwise in the administration of justice would give should have a tendency to increase broadmindedness and toleration.

XVI.—RESPECT FOR LAW.

Civics is sometimes defined as the Art of Living under a Settled Government. The Sovereign may be one or many. Sovereignty may be in the hands of a King, with power to rule absolutely, or it may be in an elected legislature. This legislature may have sovereign power or it may be limited by a written constitution or checked by a referendum, but in any modern State the citizen will in practice be governed by laws agreed on by himself through his elected representatives. The sanction of government will then be the consent of the governed, and the function of civics will be to teach men how to govern and be governed so as to secure the greatest sum of happiness for all. In every well-ordered State the Executive will be distinct from the Legislature, and it must always be possible to bring even the highest of the governing body before a court of law to answer for any wrong which is charged against him. No man can claim to be above or beyond the law, and every man must have some power in making the law. Respect for the law, confidence in its administration and in its power to rectify wrongs, must be the mark of the true citizen. The measure of the respect for the law must be the measure of the degree to which the community has acquired the true civic spirit. In local matters the law will be enforced by local bodies under a system of local government. In matters which concern the whole country it will be decided by the Houses of Lords and Commons, aided by responsible Ministers. It will be enforced by an efficient Executive, and a Judiciary must always be ready and accessible to define the rights and remedy the wrongs of any citizen. Still a vast, expensive, efficient, and incorruptible judicial system may be in existence, and yet a desirable system of justice be wanting to the citizen. Magna Charta decided that no man should be denied justice, should be delayed justice, or should be sold justice, yet in effect our expensive system of jurisprudence always delays, and practically sells, if it does not deny. justice. The aim of the whole elaborate and intricate paraphernalia of the law is to obtain and secure justice to every citizen. In fact and practice the law courts are avoided by every sage citizen, for he well knows that the net result of invoking their aid will almost certainly be loss, financial and otherwise. Even those tribunals which deal more especially with municipal law—the police courts—are rightly regarded as repellant, horrifying, and generally loathsome. It is not right that persons whose offence is riding a bicycle without a light, or forgetting to have the footpath swept, should be

forced to appear in a court with cut-throats, thieves, murderers, and persons charged with unnameable offences. It is shocking that children charged with playing handball in a thoroughfare should be kept in court with such people. It would be impossible to have such abuses tolerated if a proper spirit of civic pride and self-respect were encouraged in our people. The punishment of a crime is not merely the number of days' imprisonment or of shillings fine, it is also the public notoriety, contempt, and obloquy which conviction involves. If this latter be the same for a forger as for one who drives his motor-car too fast, the whole intent and purpose of penal legislation is a failure. It must be, therefore, the task of civics to secure that the punishment shall fit the crime, and the court the offence. Clearly for children's offences there should be children's courts, and for the minor charges, at least, brought against young women there should be women's courts.

XVII.—CIVICS AND INDUSTRY.

If civics be the science of the State and of its constitution, we shall find that one of its functions is to promote political economy because it makes for the public good. A very harmful view has become very prevalent—namely, that the citizen's only relation to the municipality is as a mere taxpayer. This is an unfortunate view. The more clearly the citizen conceives the duty of the public authority, the more ready will he be to insist on that duty being performed. Amongst such duties of the public authority will be the provision of pure water, good drainage, good air, light, possibly means of traction, as trams or trains, means of communication, as telegrams, post, and telephones. In certain conditions it may be the duty of the municipal authority to supply coal, or bread, or milk. Clearly it is its duty to secure that no exorbitant prices be charged by merchants or shopkeepers for any of the necessaries of life. Probably pawnbroking, or some system of advancing small sums of money, should be in the hands of the local authority. It is its duty to regulate hours of labour, especially with regard to women and children ; to ensure healthy workshops and proper food and accommodation for all indoor workers. It is furthermore its duty to preserve trees, forests, birds, fishes, sea-fronts, etc., which augment and maintain the natural advantages of the environments. Again, it is the duty of the local authority to subsidise certain manufactures or industries, where such help will be for the general good, and to encourage art and give premiums for technical excellence. The diseases of the city will, of course, be an ever-present object of care, but they must be treated not only as at present existing, but also with regard to their past prevalence in the history of the city and the measures necessary to prevent their future prevalence. Disease, as Professor Geddes points out, must be treated by the civic autho-

rity, not only as a defect, but as a vice and a crime. It must be watched in order to ascertain how far it is the child and how far the parent of vice and moral and physical deformity. It is significant that the greatest of the cities may have citizens with the civic spirit least developed. The Londoner seldom has this spirit so proudly strong as the inhabitant of a provincial city, but this simply means that the ponderous machinery of the State is so highly organised and specialised that the mere individual citizen finds little left for him to reform.

It has been said that everybody's conception of a city is either Platonic or Aristotelian, either that of an ideal city or that of the best practicable one. From the point of view of civics, the Aristotelian model must prevail. One's conception of the city must be synoptical ; there must be a perpetual endeavour to bring together in the one spot the greatest number of advantages proper to a place for everyday acts. Babylon, Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, all these were great cities, each with some individual charm ; they all flourished, they all degenerated, they all can yield to the earnest student some lesson of how they came into greatness and why they fell away. This scrutiny must not merely be patchy and microscopic, it must be comprehensive. If one could daily survey London from St. Paul's, or Dublin from the top of Nelson's Pillar, a synoptic glance could be secured of at least the physical aspect as it presents itself. A deeper knowledge would enable the observer to penetrate into the habits of the people, their diseases, their defects. But man is the creature of environment. Where the house is comfortable, convenient, habitable, healthy, he will seek the domestic fireside ; the bond of the family will easily bring all its members together to enjoy the luxuries of domestic life. Where the home is in the midst of pestilential purlieus, a mean room in a repulsive tenement house, each member of the family will seek to spend as little time as possible there ; they will seek for enjoyment in the streets, the theatres, the publichouses, and the picture-houses. The pride of the mother in her home is gone ; she allows it to become slovenly and comfortless. Disease develops, systems are undermined for lack of loving care, there is no pride in the home, there can be none in the city.

XVIII.—CIVICS AND ATHLETICS.

It is wonderful how much wisdom there is still to learn from the Greeks. The provision of gymnasia for the youths of a city by the civic authorities is still so great an innovation now in the twentieth century that very few towns have any public provision made for the purpose. Yet we know from Aristotle that the Athenians regarded very rightly such exercises as a most essential part of the

education of youth, and ample facilities were made for providing instruction. It is not yet clearly recognised that modern habits of newspaper reading, and the daily supplying by the Press of the most up-to-date information on every subject which is of interest at the moment, has made very much of the literary teaching of our schools, which is commonly known as education, utterly superfluous and unnecessary. The intelligent reader of the daily paper—and the humbler the class from which the reader springs, the more intelligent a reader he usually is—is far better versed in the geography and history of contemporary events than one who has received a most expensive and elaborate education. On the other hand, physical education is seldom supplied in later life. Even when there are facilities for gymnastic exercises available for those at work, they will seldom be utilised except by those who have practised athletics in their schooldays. It is a most pressing duty of every civic authority. A man's worth to the city depends largely on his strength, on his health, and on his ability to resist disease. These are all largely dependent on athletic exercises, and it is the duty of the State not only to provide gymnasia, but to insist on compulsory attendance at them far more than at schools where only reading and writing are taught. All kinds of drill exercise, whether as boy scouts or volunteers, are an important part of education, strengthening not only the muscles, but developing moral qualities of discipline, obedience, punctuality, and clean living, which are of the very essence of sound citizenship.

CIVICS AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT.

In the state of nature man is a wolf to man. His hand is against every man, and every man's hand is against him. The weakling goes to the wall. The fittest survive, the unfit are weeded out. The tendency of civics is absolutely opposed to the abolition of even the most unfit, and therefore a burden unbearably great will grow up if the unfit be a large proportion of the population. Nothing is gained by denying that the method of Nature in sweeping away the enfeebled, the diseased, the weak-witted, and the maimed, by epidemics or by hardships, is a rough-and-ready way of dealing with the problem which results in a residue of sound lives. On the other hand, it is certain that an intelligent and humane treatment of the problem will result not only in the saving of thousands of lives, but in a vastly exalted standard of human comfort and moral outlook. One smiles vastly now-a-days at the mid-Victorian scientist who thought he had solved the riddle of existence by a few cant phrases about "evolution," "struggle for existence," "heredity and environment," "survival of the fittest," and so forth. Each of these conceptions had probably a large percentage of truth; not one of them is now regarded as entirely true, and the mystery of life is infinitely

more obscure than ever. "Survival of the fittest" is a pretty phrase, not devoid of some truth or of some meaning; but the truth evidently depends on the meaning. "Fittest" may mean fittest for the environment, for the individual himself so far as regards his development; or fittest for the race; or fittest for the man's contemporaries or co-citizens. It is often found that those attributes which are best fitted to preserve the life of a man are not those most fitted to preserve the race, at least after a few generations. Nature, we know, is concerned to preserve the type; of the individual she is supremely careless. Now, civics has a tendency to preserve the unfit—in the physical sense—in existence, and therefore it must exert every effort to prevent unfitness. This is almost entirely a matter of training and education. A cripple is eminently unfit, judged by the standard of the woods and the chase. He may, with due care and training, be an ideal citizen—earnest, altruistic, industrious, benevolent, fired by artistic and æsthetic sense that makes him the benefactor of his fellows. His deformity begets a compensating activity in directions which only need intelligent tuition to be most fruitful in good. It is needless to multiply instances. Almost all of the world's great geniuses have suffered from physical defects which would have caused them to be rejected as not worth rearing by any Spartan family.

We have had of late an epidemic of criminologists, worthy gentlemen, mostly of the Italian school. They told us, what was partly true, that crime was a disease the result of some physical defect, and not the result of a vicious moral tendency. Exact researches have shown that a certain proportion of criminals, perhaps half, perhaps a quarter, have an undue proportion of physical abnormalities. It is important to keep this in mind when we seek to punish the criminal or to check crime. But it is certain that the greater part of crimes is due to conditions such as destitution, poverty, hunger, hardship, vicious early training, and other influences which a proper conception of civics should prevent in any community. It is also certain that, for a certain proportion of criminals, some form of punishment, such as may not injure the criminal, is the only form of deterrent which can induce him to avoid crime. All this means that earnest, continuous education in the rights, duties, and privileges of man in his relations towards his fellow-men and towards the civic authorities, in his duties as an enlightened citizen, in the development of his own physical and moral endowments, in "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control," is imperatively necessary for every child from the dawn of reason to the decline of manhood. Else he becomes a burden and a wastrel. The great need and the great difficulty is to practically inform the general body of citizens of this imperative necessity, to make them realise, in any practical sense, that it is a privilege to

hold citizenship, and a duty to increase its value for others as well as one's own family; that it is, further, a constant daily obligation to make every other individual realise that he also, be he never so lofty or never so low, has duties which he must discharge in order to pay his tribute to the common good.

Civic pride is a virtue. There is a notable lack of it even amongst the inhabitants of some cities of great name, of notable history, of magnificent amenities. Its genesis lies in the appreciation of the fact that the city is the outward manifestation of the inward worth of the citizens. The worst kings have often been the best rulers, for statesmanship is very different from private conduct. One also finds that people very estimable in their private relations and habits make but very indifferent citizens. This is because they have not realised the importance of Civics.

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