

**Outlines of a plan for the general reform of the British land forces / by the Hon. Brig. General Stewart.**

**Contributors**

Stewart, William, 1774-1827.  
Royal College of Surgeons of England

**Publication/Creation**

London : Printed by C. Roworth, for T. Egerton, 1806.

**Persistent URL**

<https://wellcomecollection.org/works/xw6h3uqx>

**Provider**

Royal College of Surgeons

**License and attribution**

This material has been provided by This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England. where the originals may be consulted. This work has been identified as being free of known restrictions under copyright law, including all related and neighbouring rights and is being made available under the Creative Commons, Public Domain Mark.

You can copy, modify, distribute and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, without asking permission.



Wellcome Collection  
183 Euston Road  
London NW1 2BE UK  
T +44 (0)20 7611 8722  
E [library@wellcomecollection.org](mailto:library@wellcomecollection.org)  
<https://wellcomecollection.org>

(7.)  
OUTLINES

OF A

PLAN

FOR THE

GENERAL REFORM

OF THE

*BRITISH LAND FORCES.*

---

BY

THE HON. BRIG. GENERAL STEWART,  
95TH REGIMENT.

---

THE SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED.

---

LONDON:

*Printed by C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Temple Bar,*

FOR T. EGERTON, AT THE MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL.

---

1806.

OUTLINE

OF

PLAN

FOR THE

GENERAL REFORM

OF THE

BRITISH AND FOREIGN

THE HON. RICHARD STANLEY

1832

THE SECOND EDITION ENLARGED

LONDON

Printed by E. Curran, Fleet Street

At the MINTON PRESS, WHITEHALL

1832

1832



*Cambridge, April 23, 1806.*

THE following pages will be found to differ, in some respects, from the preceding edition; more consideration has been bestowed upon the subject, and although still incomplete, the Author feels it his duty to give publicity to his sentiments, as now corrected: if by any communication of his reflections he be so fortunate as to call attention to the great national question, the Improvement of the Military Establishment, or to suggest one idea which may tend to the benefit of his country, the object which he has in view will be obtained.

---



THE following pages will be found to differ  
in some respects from the preceding edition,  
more consideration has been bestowed upon the  
subject, and although not altogether the same  
view is taken in this book as in the former to his  
treatment of the subject, it is not any con-  
sideration of his relations to the public that  
has led to this edition to the great national question,  
the improvement of the military establishment,  
or to the views which may be held to the be-  
nefit of his country, the object which he has in  
view will be obtained.

---

---

## INTRODUCTION.

---

THE Author of the following pages ventured, about twelve months ago, to submit to the consideration of the public some suggestions relative to a general reform in the military establishment of this country. The necessity which then existed for reform, has, by subsequent events, been increased tenfold.

We have an Enemy to contend with, who aims at nothing less than the subjugation of the whole civilized world, and among the number of whose victims, although probably the last, we may expect to fall, unless energies similar, in degree, to his own, be exerted on our part. We must depend solely on our own efforts for the protection of our rights, for the vindication of our rank and consequence, as an independent  
A 3 nation;



nation ; foreign alliance must be banished from our calculation, and whether we receive aid or not from abroad, to operate a diversion of the enemy's force, we must act as if the whole brunt of his hostility were to be resisted by our own unassisted exertions.

To this important object the attention of Government has, at length, been seriously directed; those who attempt the salutary reform will have much difficulty and prejudice to encounter, for superficial observers will ever endeavour to discredit the larger views of more comprehensive minds. The nation is however prepared for the reception of measures which may render it both secure and formidable ; a complete renovation must be produced on the public mind with regard to the system of defence, and to the military service in general.

In the following outline, which is brought into as concise a form as the nature of the subject will admit, it is hoped, that the disinterested and truly patriotic, will find such improvements proposed, as may be immediately adopted, and are consistent with the present circumstances of the nation. Suggestions which recommend simplicity and œconomy cannot, now, be ill-timed.

So



So critical a period being therefore arrived, it becomes the more necessary to take an enlarged view of the present state of our land forces: the aspect of affairs on the Continent is, in fact, so serious, that there seems to be no other alternative for this country, than to adopt measures of uncommon vigour in her war department, or to submit disgracefully to her enemies. France has assumed the character of a nation of warriors; the British empire must acquire a new character likewise. Its existence and its honor will hereafter depend on the good organization of the naval and military establishments, on full success attending the national levies, on the army possessing the highest discipline and patriotism, and on the adoption of such political measures as shall create a general partiality for the profession of arms.

Without a radical change in our present military system, Britain will certainly not long continue to be either formidable abroad, or secure at home. The contemplation of *invasion* has hitherto absorbed our whole attention, our views have been too much confined to feeble and ineffectual means of security, and the spirit of a free people, "whose existence should be identified with "their glory," has been hitherto called forth to



act on the defensive alone : every military measure, during this war, instead of having embraced general objects, seems almost exclusively to have pointed to the solitary possibility of invasion.

Previous to the investigation of a system which may appear to require reform, the general nature and object of military establishments should be considered ; the subject ought to be taken up on an extensive scale ; those original principles, which operate on mankind by invariable laws, must be referred to ; the practice of other nations ought never to be lost sight of ; the prevailing sentiment in our own country should, in particular, be seized, and above all, a union of interests, one common feeling, between the soldier and the citizen, must be created : “ The  
“ hearts of the people must be secured, if we  
“ would preserve the independence of this coun-  
“ try.”\*

The natural objects of every military establishment must be to render a nation secure at home, and successful in attacking its enemies ; this will be found equally interesting to every

\* Cobbet's Political Register.



country : the preservation or the loss of a State must depend upon the measures, which are employed to attain this object, being conducted on true, or on false principles : before we, however consider this subject with reference to our own country, a clearer view of our purpose will be given by a short recurrence to some of those general principles and received opinions, which men of thought and research have adopted.

To the superiority of regular and well disciplined armies the greatest revolutions in the affairs of mankind may be ascribed ;\* reliance on forces imperfectly disciplined has ever led to disaster, and, on the other hand, in proportion as armies have been effective, they have uniformly proved themselves to be sources of internal strength, as well as of extensive dominion. The only means of giving troops this distinctive superiority, is by a judicious course of discipline, which shall, by degrees, mould the intractable passions of men into habits in many respects repugnant to the feelings of ordinary life, and

\* See Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, part 1, book 5 :—the whole of this section should be read by those who bestow attention on military subjects.



by the due cultivation of those moral qualities, which are only to be attained by a long process of careful instruction. It is not so much on mechanical dexterity, as on the acquirement of peculiar moral habitudes that the superiority of regular troops depends; the profession of arms is one of those pursuits in which the mind strongly participates; with regard to our countrymen it is a mistaken view of the subject to consider it as mechanical.

Some of the strongest natural feelings must certainly be forced into an artificial direction, and be subdued in those, whose employments are immediately connected with the preservation of life, or with the infliction of death; in the profession of surgery, or of arms, this fact is strongly marked; and amiable as the heart may naturally be, amidst scenes, which are apparently in opposition to every tender feeling, an artificial insensibility of mind, the result of a long process of discipline, must be acquired. This discipline of the mind is not to be understood as excluding it from the reception of milder impressions; subordination in an army is rendered most perfect when authority is softened by the feelings of honor and affection, but in order to attain a full degree of vigor, must be incorporated



rated with the better sentiments of the heart. It has invariably been the object of great commanders to mingle authority with lenity, to inspire their troops with confidence in their own capacity, to call forth their enthusiasm, and to create a common feeling between the officer and the foldier. Upon these principles, Frederick, Suwarrow, and the *great* Nelson acted, and we need not cite further examples.

How these principles are to be acted upon to their full extent, or how these feelings are to be created, excepting in *regular armies*, it seems impossible to conceive: without a control of superior efficacy, without a degree of preliminary training, which may reconcile the mind to the horrors of a battle, and to the resignation of life itself, and without sentiments of honor or feelings of affection, all regulations, which relate to influence on the character, must ever be nugatory and useless: to these fundamental springs it seems, in fact, necessary that the whole contrivance should be adapted.

If this view of the subject be correct, how will the several parts of our present military system be reconciled to common sense, or to any insight into men and things. Let us investigate  
it



it with impartiality, try it on military principles, or by the rules of plain reason.

Volunteer  
force consider-  
ed.

In the Volunteer system, generous and patriotic as may be the motives of those whom it includes, there must be a total want of control, and of that habit of mind, which progressively forms the soldiers' character. How is it possible to incorporate into this institution any principles of discipline, when the officers possess no power of exacting obedience, no authority by which they can render their favor or their disapprobation of the slightest consequence, or when the persons thus *nominally* commanded can, by resignation, at once dissolve all connection, rendering the enforcement either of public or bye-laws, equally futile. Every perilous profession must be upheld by some fear of shame, or by some love of glory, but in this system the seeds of neither can be traced. No establishment can be permanent, which depends on the variable feelings of the multitude, or on the transient influence of national alarm.

The whole measure, indeed, if we have in view the combating our enemies in the field of battle, the confronting peril with resolution, and the bearing with patience the evils so peculiarly



culiarly incident to the ordinary operations of war, is calculated to promote the most dangerous deception, and to train men to a sort of mimicry of military evolutions, rather than to form them as soldiers, fit for any of the stern purposes of war. So wide is the difference between the discipline of the mind, and the precision of *tactique*, that the want of the latter, which is observable in the manœuvring of any French brigade, formed of troops whose character to discipline is unquestioned, would lead to a conclusion, that such a degree of proficiency must have been attained in those qualities which perfect the military character, as actually to supersede the necessity of all that scientific dexterity, upon which, in less disciplined corps, the whole success of the machinery seems to depend.

Let it be remembered, that the Volunteer corps will be opposed immediately to those veteran armies of France, who, flushed with victory, have, for twelve years, been accustomed to conquer the finest troops in Europe. The physical strength, the native valor, and the ardent patriotism of our Volunteers, is probably superior to the same qualities in any other people in the world; but bravery without discipline,



cipline, and without long preparation of the mind for the dreadful trade of war, will not avail. That it is, however, adviseable, during war and arduous times, to introduce a system of voluntary armament, throughout a nation, for the purpose of internal good order, for the general diffusion of the knowledge of arms, and as an occasional aid to the movements of our regular forces, during invasion, (the yeomanry cavalry is chiefly alluded to,) is not about to be denied; but that bodies of men, whose services and extent of instruction shall be *voluntary*, and who can be bound by none of those ties so immediately connected with discipline, as have been above described, should form a component part of our regular system of national defence, in opposition to the formidable armies of our enemy, is in no respect intended.

#### Militia.

A force constituted as the militia, altho' the erroneous principle, on which it has hitherto been levied, be abandoned, must, by the nature of its limited service, be for ever defective in these moral qualities, which have been stated as essential to the military character. In that service control may exist, but the relation between the officer and the foldier, which, in regular armies, constitutes the basis of all discipline, is of so relaxed a description, that it is difficult to trace



trace its effects in the militia regiments. It is natural to admire those who have exposed themselves to danger, and from admiration to feel an inclination to imitate; this propensity cannot however exist in a force, where the officers and the oldest foldiers, have probably never had an opportunity of encountering a single peril of war. Those principles of honor and enthusiasm, which enable men to overcome the original weakness of human nature, to await the approach of danger without dismay, and to stand the shock and carnage of such hostile battalions, as honored the field of Austerlitz by their steady valor, these principles can, in a militia force, never be matured. The officers, in particular, who enter upon the duties of the profession as an amusement, more than as a scientific pursuit, will never be animated to any valuable exertion of talent or duty, while the former motive prevails, nor until their adherence to the profession becomes an object of anxious ambition, and a *means of livelihood*.

If the external appearance of a large proportion of the militia, as to dress or even as to manœuvre, be contrasted with that of the regular regiments, the difference may not be considerable; but the question is—can moral qualities  
be



be created without previous cultivation, can that immovable front, that *æs triplex circa pectus*, so indispensable in the day of battle, be possessed, without danger or hardships having ever been experienced?—and not whether evolutions shall be best performed by the regular or the irregular force, when no enemy is at hand to disturb the proceedings of either?

Additional  
force.

In the *additional force*, the important objects which are required from effective armies, may, in a greater degree be attained, the service being less limited than in the militia, and the officers being those of the regular army. The principal error has hitherto been in the compulsory nature of its levy, and in its injurious effects, in common with other temporary establishments, upon the recruiting of our regular forces. But as that part of the measure is likely soon to be abandoned, further remarks upon this force will be deferred until a subsequent part of this treatise.

The conclusion, which it is natural to draw from these reflections is, that effective and well disciplined forces are the best, (they will ultimately be found to be the *cheapest* for every state) and that, without the agency of these, Great Britain



Britain can never be secure at home, command dominion abroad, and far less effect that revolution in the political world, which may restore Europe to any degree of *equilibrium*.

That an efficient and powerful army, under the immediate control of government, is now indispensable to our very existence as a nation, no one will deny: that the aggregate of our various description of force even exceeds, in number, the whole regular army of France, is equally true; but it is patriotism under the influence of firm discipline, more than numbers, which constitutes the strength of armies. If standing armies be, therefore, so much preferable to temporary levies, the object most worthy of consideration must be, how to clear the machine of all obstructions which may impede its motion, and how to raise such a proportion of land force as shall be adequate, in every respect, to the peculiar exigencies of the state. The whole military establishment must, in this case, accord with the national feelings of the time, be as simple as possible in its principle, and be founded on such measures as may be easily carried into execution: “plans of defence on which all men



"are to act, all men ought to understand."\* In what degree have these considerations been attended to in this country?

We have too much reason to conclude, by the extreme difficulty with which our levies have been hitherto completed, that the forming them upon any principle of unison with national sentiment has been entirely neglected; the present state of our land forces, consisting of *four* completely distinct descriptions of troops, regulars, additional force, militia, and volunteers, indicates also that as little attention has, as yet, been given to any regularity or simplicity in our plans. Before the great work, however, of amendment is entered upon, it will be prudent to consider the extent of those means which we already possess, and the comparative risque incurred by reform. Alterations ought to be more than specious, they must be decisively for the better, or are to be adopted with great caution; if their utility, on the other hand, be demonstrated, and a clear view of probable consequences be given, it will be the consummation of weakness to delay them. "The season of peril and of deep anxiety, the season that rivets on the public

\* Cartwright's *Ægis*.

"interest



“ interest national attention, raising in the public cause national energy, and the season when selfishness and faction dare not encounter the public eye, this is the season for reformation.”\*

Our enemy is grasping at universal empire; he gives us no time to lose, and scarcely a choice, unless between defeat and victory.

Many words need not be expended to prove that the system of our levies has hitherto been confused and complicated in the extreme; it has appeared to delight in the most unnatural combinations; to have introduced into the *regular army*, a species of voluntary slavery, which service for life may justly be termed; to have converted parish officers into recruiting sergeants, as in the *additional force*; to have debarr'd one important branch of our establishment, the militia, from the ordinary chance of encountering a foe, or experiencing military hardships; and finally, to have produced, as in the *volunteer force*, soldiers who are not subject to martial law. The actual existence of four unconnected plans, for the attainment of one object, must suffice to demonstrate, that the mea-

\* Cartwright's *Ægis*.



tures which have been, of late years, pursued cannot, according to the premises already advanced, be founded on good sense; the whole system of national defence has, in fact, been for many years, disturbed, and as it were, paralyzed by the jarring operation of contradictory plans. An army can only fulfil its office effectually when the system for its appointment, its maintenance, the direction of its operations and the preservation of its discipline is both regular and simple; in proportion as this system is defective, the army must approach to decay.

The increase of the regular forces being therefore essential to the glory and to the security of our country, the mode of effecting this increase must be that which shall be the least expensive to the state, and which shall be promoted by positive encouragement, by honors, privileges and rewards, peculiar to the profession of arms. Attachment to that profession may be easily created, and armies may, by judicious measures, be raised among our countrymen, to any amount, without recurrence to ballot and measures of compulsion, or to the present degrading and expensive system of mercenary temptations. “As much alliance of in-  
“terest, and as much intercourse of sentiment

“ must



“ must, at the same time, be maintained be-  
 “ tween the military part of the nation, and the  
 “ other orders of the people, as shall be consist-  
 “ ent with the discipline of an army.”\* The  
 watchful jealousy of Parliament cannot fail of  
 being annually excited over these standing armies,  
 and the greater part of those consequences,  
 which are supposed to attach to this description  
 of force, are too distant and too little connected  
 with our present critical situation, to be within  
 the range of rational speculation. It will, in-  
 deed, be scarcely possible that our land force  
 should be converted into an engine of arbi-  
 trary power, while the officers of rank con-  
 tinue to be closely connected with the natural  
 aristocracy of the country.† Unless the soldiery  
 can be detached from all sympathy of feeling  
 with the body of the people, it can scarcely be  
 imagined that they will become instrumental in  
 fixing a yoke upon their fellow subjects. It

\* Cobbett's Register,

† “ Where the sovereign is himself the general, and the prin-  
 “ cipal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers  
 “ of the army; where the military force is placed under the  
 “ command of those who have the greatest interest in the sup-  
 “ port of the civil authority, because they have themselves  
 “ the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can  
 “ never be dangerous to liberty.”—*Smith's Wealth of Nations*,  
*Part 1, Book 5,*



must however be granted that tyranny assumes its sway by silent imperceptible steps, and that the sole command of the military force being in the hands of the executive government, at first view may alarm the most indifferent patriot. The fact however is, that minor considerations must sometimes give way to more pressing evils, and that whilst a fastidious jealousy, at confiding the whole force of the empire to the hands of the executive government alone, may be too long persisted in, the day of trial may at once deprive us of that empire, that constitution, and the whole of those civil and political rights, for the preservation of which the contest has been so long maintained. If we dare not rely on the general complexion of manners, on the general attachment to liberty, which all classes among us feel, and on an amelioration of the military state, for our being secure, both at home, and from abroad, it is not in the power of human intellect to devise means which shall remove those unfounded alarms.

After what has been said, *one* extensive regular army, which shall be equally disposable for every military purpose, at home or abroad, might, on a first view of the subject, appear to answer our purpose most effectually; attention must,



must, however, be given to collateral circumstances; a description of force, which shall be confined to the defence of the empire at home, may be found more congenial to general feelings; it may, therefore, be advisable to raise a *second levy*, exclusively for this limited purpose; any farther refinement of system for establishing the permanent force of this country, will only tend to clog the operation of the whole machine, and divert our attention from the grand object, to which it ought uniformly to be directed.

The following suggestions will, therefore, be confined to the improvement of the regular army, and to the plan for levying a second force, to be attached to the infantry regiments, in the form of *additional battalions*.

The public attention having, since the first edition of this treatise, been forcibly called to the raising of a *subsidiary force*, (misnamed a levy en masse), wholly distinct from either the regular army, or the additional battalions, a third section will be employed in offering some observations on this subject, and on the mode in which the *voluntary* exertions of our countrymen may, with utility, be employed.



## SECTION I.

## THE REGULAR ARMY.

---

---

THE primary objects of reform appear to be the *errors* which have hitherto prevailed in the regular army, the *mode* by which the additional force has been raised, the *militia*, and the *expence* of the volunteer infantry. The immediate consequence of the reform proposed in two of these establishments, will be the final termination of those acts of compulsion, which have appeared under the various forms of ballot, assessment, and fines, and which have actually rendered the office of magistrate or parish officer irksome to the more respectable classes of the community. A more favorable sentiment towards the military profession may be expected to ensue, when the country shall be relieved, (as Mr. Windham proposed in his speech on the 3d of April), from duties of a nature at once so complicated and so generally inconvenient. The charge of levying the whole of the land forces should be confided to those who are responsible for the employment of them, and the appointment of all officers to those forces entrusted to the Crown alone.

It



It may, at the same time, be imprudent to deprive ourselves of the service of any part of these forces, except in proportion as those, which it is proposed to substitute in their place, become complete. Much sanguine expectation may, however, be safely indulged, that such a degree of partiality will be created for the military profession, if our armies be new modelled, on the plan about to be suggested, that the greater part of the additional force and the militia, will transfer their services to the regular army,—that the militia will, at least, assimilate their engagement to that of the present additional force, and both be consolidated under the head of the home force ;—and that a considerable proportion of even the volunteer infantry may be induced to enter the last mentioned levy ; the present militia and additional force are already engaged for the duration of the war, the continuation therefore, of their services, in some mode or other, is of course to be required. If permanent rank, as high as captain, be on *this peculiar* occasion, given to the officers of militia and volunteers, in proportion to a specified number of men which they may bring with them into the more regular forces, there is little doubt of the success of the measure.

In



In order to render the military profession an object of pride and attachment among our countrymen, to implant in the breasts of our soldiers some of those patriotic feelings, which are common to citizens of a free country, or rather, which are peculiar to our own, and in order to give to our armies a *stimulus* to action, and an attachment to their standards hitherto unknown, numerous obstacles must be removed: those errors which are the most prominent in the present system of things must be amended; something new, some great change must take place, which shall produce a powerful effect upon the minds of the nation at large, and of the army in particular.

To describe positive abuses is ever an ungracious task; nor are military men in general most competent to judge of subjects which are not merely professional; with respect, however, to particular defects, in any military establishment, as they are the first who feel the consequences of them, they may perhaps be more justified in pointing them out to public observation: the errors which have been chiefly alluded to may be thus classed:

1st, Perpetuity of service,

2d, Inadequacy of pensions and rewards,

3d, Fre-



- 3d, Frequency of corporal punishments,
  - 4th, Length of service abroad,
  - 5th, Want of fixed head-quarters in each regiment,
  - 6th, Want of promotion from the lower ranks,
  - 7th, Inadequacy of officers' and non-commissioned officers' pay.
- 

FIRST. Perpetuity of service, or rather an engagement without *limitation of time*, although it <sup>Service for life.</sup> be originally founded on a voluntary act, upon the part of the individual who enlists, is contrary to the genuine spirit of freedom, and to the usual practice of those states which possess a liberal system of government: our national character includes strong sentiments of independence; this manly feeling should be cherished, in order to promote cordiality in the execution of duty: it cannot be doubted that the present system of enlistment is a principal cause of the reluctance which is generally shewn to enter the regular army, and of the enormous desertion which unfortunately prevails.

In lieu of so indefinite an engagement, a positive limit should be affixed to the services of a soldier; three distinct periods of enlistment should be established, *two* of which should comprise  
*twenty-*



*twenty-one* years, and be for service in the regular regiments of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, and the last in veteran battalions. The first for *twelve* years ; and the second for *nine* years : the third, as the veteran period, to be for *six* years. The enlisting into each, to be voluntary, and a soldier to have his discharge, if he require it, whenever a period expires, except it be during war, when it will be impossible to dispense with his service ; in this case he shall continue his service, but receive whatever advantage, in pay, may be attached to the second period : he shall be entitled to his discharge six months after the ratification of peace, unless he, in the mean time, regularly enrol himself for the whole period. In the event of his doing so, credit should be given him for *past* service ; a small pension should accompany his discharge, at the close of the first period, if he will not re-engage.—An increase of pay, at the rate of 2d. per day, for the rank of private, 3d. for corporal, and 4d. for serjeant, ought to be attached to the second period, and a full bounty be given to a regular re-enlistment for the whole of it : a pension, considerably increased, ought to accompany the discharge at the close of the second period ; if this period expire during the war the soldier to be placed in a veteran battalion ; and if he re-engage for the whole of the veteran period, he will be entitled to the full



full bounty. Any foldier having been discharged, but willing to re-enter the service, will be placed in it where his previous services may entitle him : of course, at the commencement of a period.

It may appear unfair thus to require a continuation of a foldier's service, during war, but if the nation give a liberal increase to pay for past service, and make a permanent provision at the close of two fixed periods, it has a right to demand that this service shall be given in a manner the most beneficial to the State : it is indispensable to secure the continued services of trained and experienced men.

The foldiers of the second period should bear some distinguishing mark on their dress.

The whole of the regular army, now serving, can *claim* no exemption from the voluntary engagement already entered into : neither justice or liberality demand it ; it appears however just, that a period should be fixed, (the completion of the twenty-first year) on arriving at which every foldier should be discharged, except it be during war, or placed in a veteran battalion, and receive the advantages which it is proposed to attach



attach to the completion of the second period: \* if the increased pay of the second period be at once granted, according as a soldier may have entered it, the liberality of the measure will have immediate and most beneficial effect.

Pensions and  
rewards

SECOND. If the labourer be worthy of his hire, so is he of his reward, if he fulfil his engagement; the term *reward* must, however, be employed in a more extended acceptation than that in which it is usually considered; distinctions in society, certain rights in common with their fellow subjects, and not merely *money*, should be the recompence of our army, in order that we may fill its ranks, and while amply rewarding faithful service, give to every British soldier an interest in the country which he defends.

To the completion of the *first* period, it may not be advisable to attach any civil right or immunity, but reserving these as the ultimate re-

\* It was suggested in the former edition that, the whole of the regular army now serving should be placed on one or other of the periods, according as *past* service may class each soldier, it being understood that he shall be placed on the first year of each, excepting in the event of twenty-one years having already been completed, in which case he ought to be now placed in a veteran battalion.

The propriety of this measure is still recommended to consideration, and the inequality of the periods will obviate the inconvenience of the general discharge of the present army occurring in one year, in the event of peace.

ward



ward for longer service, merely grant a small pension,\* for those who will not renew their services.

For the *second* period a soldier should acquire a right of settlement, and of exercising a trade in any parish of the United Kingdom, upon which he may decide; his pension should be augmented by one half more than for the former period, and the important civil right of the *elective franchise* should be the reward of twenty-one years service in his country's cause.†

*Veteran*-battalions, whose extent of service should be limited to the home possessions, and whose period of enlistment should be only for *six* years, may be established for those old soldiers, who having completed their 2d period, shall be effective, and still willing to serve: no other description of veteran, or, as they are sometimes termed, garrison battalions, should be admitted. The full bounty to be given on enlisting, and the increased pay of the 2d period, to be that of the veteran service: an augmentation

\* This pension to be 6d. per day for privates, and in proportion to non-commissioned officers.

† This may be arranged by causing the soldier's pension to be paid by the receiver general in each county out of the land-tax, thus qualifying him as a freeholder: if pensioners of the first period also, have their option of being so paid, much comfort will accrue to them.



of pension, similar to that of the 2d period, (making up that for the *privates* to 1s. per day,) to follow the veteran's discharge: the enjoyment of the civil rights and immunities previously specified for the 2d period, to be continued to the veteran, at the conclusion of his military service.

All men disabled by wounds received in the service, should be pensioners on the pay of the period, in which they may have been serving when disabled, according to their rank.

The widow of a foldier killed in action, ought to receive, as a pension, *one half* of the pay which her husband may have been receiving at the period of his death: their children should invariably be provided for in a military asylum.

No foldier once discharged, or a pensioner, ever to be called upon again for his services, unless he voluntarily tender them. The present custom of calling on pensioners to serve, or forfeit their pension, and the pitiful allowance, which most of them have hitherto received, (4d. per day,) are serious causes of discouragement to the profession in general.

An augmentation of the pensions granted to  
officers



officers' widows, seems likewise requisite; no deduction whatever, in aid of the Chelsea fund, ought to be made from the pay of any officer or soldier, in the army; the liberality of the country, must, in every instance, be manifested towards the profession of arms.\*

THIRD. No circumstance can mark a want of just discrimination, more than the very general recurrence, in any stage of society, to that description of punishment, which, among the same class of men, and with the alteration of the profession alone, bears a stamp of infamy in the estimation of every man. The frequent infliction of corporal punishment, in our armies, tends strongly to debase the minds, and destroy the high spirit of the soldiery; it renders a system of increasing rigour necessary, it deprives discipline of the influence of honor, and destroys the subordination of the heart, which can alone add voluntary zeal to the cold obligations of duty. Soldiers of naturally correct minds, having been once punished *corporally*, generally become negligent and unworthy of any confidence. Discipline requires the intervention of strong acts to maintain it, and to impress it on vulgar

Corporal punishment.

\* It may be adviseable to establish a regular system of half-pay for officers, who may have completed a *fixed number* of years service.



minds ; punishment may be formidable but must not be familiar : generosity, or solemn severity, must at times be equally resorted to : pardon or death have been resorted to with equal success, but the perpetual recurrence to the infliction of infamy on a soldier by the punishment of flogging, is one of the most mistaken modes, for enforcing discipline, which can be conceived.

In the French army, a soldier is often shot, but he rarely receives corporal punishment, and in no other service is discipline preserved on truer principles.

This abuse of martial law may be restrained within more moderate bounds, by causing the articles of war to specify the crimes which shall merit such punishment ; it should be confined to crimes connected with infamy, and to such, as by the municipal law, would meet with nearly similar treatment. It may also be restrained, by requiring courts martial, competent to adjudge it, to be more numerously and respectably composed.

A judicious use of prudential restraints, as confinement, drill, turn-coat, &c. is, in most cases, to be preferred to corporal punishment ;  
in



in serious cases, a deduction might be made from the credit of each soldier's service, as was observed in the French army. The great object however, in all cases of crimes, whether of little or great importance, is the specifying the amount and nature of the punishment which shall follow them : this is the practice in our municipal law, and too wide a deviation from it seems to be sanctioned in the martial code, by the loose indefinite clause in the 24th section, " all crimes " not capital, &c."

For the crime of desertion, the offender should, for the first offence, be returned to the 1st year of the period he may be in, and for a repetition, be invariably returned to the 1st year of the 1st period ; a third desertion certainly merits death.

FOURTH. Prolonged absence from a native <sup>Foreign ser-</sup> country, naturally creates much reluctance to the <sup>vice.</sup> profession, which is the cause of such absence : certain regulations should therefore not only be established, for the quicker succession of service in our distant colonies, and for the more regular return of a regiment from abroad, but an increase of service might be credited for every year passed in either Indies. On the return of a regiment from those stations, it will be expedient



pedient to allow men to transfer their services to regiments remaining there; soldiers enured to those climates being of great value: the bounty on this occasion to be only *one guinea*.

All soldiers who may be discharged abroad, should be conveyed home at the expence of government, and receive pay until their arrival at the destined port: if the discharging a soldier during peace, in the distant colonies, be attended with inconvenience to the public service, a power may be vested in the commander in chief there, to detain such soldier *six months* beyond the expiration of a period, and which detention should be credited to him if he re-engage.

ermanent  
bats.

FIFTH. Much regularity and public convenience, and a considerable degree of attachment to the service, would ensue, if all regiments of cavalry as well as infantry, have fixed depots, after the custom established by the great Frederick for the Prussian army; these should be established in those counties of the United Kingdom, which it is proposed that each regiment should assume the name of, and by which county name, a regiment ought to be as much distinguished in future, as by its number: it is conceived that a degree of local attachment, of patriotism, and common interest with his countrymen, will by these



these means, be created in every soldier: the system hitherto pursued, of causing regiments to be no where stationary, has been at complete variance with this principle.

At these depots, the recruits should be collected and disciplined, and the women, children and stores remain there, when detached from the regiment; scenes of the greatest distress too generally occur among the soldiers wives and children, at the embarkation of a corps for foreign service, which not unfrequently cause the desertion of the best men in a regiment. A regimental school should also be established at this depot, and to this *home* a corps should invariably return, when not required on service elsewhere.

SIXTH. As the most natural incitement to good conduct, as a source of laudable ambition to the lower ranks in the army, and as affording to the inferior orders of the community, an immediate prospect of bettering their condition, a degree of gradual promotion, from the rank of private to that of officer, should become general throughout the service. A warrant commission of cadet, (sub-cornet or ensign,) ought to be established in each troop or company,\* (at a pay of 3s. 6d.

Promotion of  
soldiers.

\* Except the chosen troop or company.



per day for the infantry,) and be a necessary intermediate step for a serjeant, prior to his being appointed a commissioned officer.† Inferior as the quality of a very large proportion of the soldiery may at present be, from a variety of causes, the prospect of such promotion being but once opened, would not only induce the finest young men to quit the militia and volunteer corps, but the sons of respectable families, in the middle class of society, would also be powerfully attracted.

The strictest measures must be adopted for conferring the cadetships solely on serjeants of merit and education; and if a regimental board, consisting of *five* field officers and captains, after examination of the claims and merits of the individual, on certain *fixed* heads of military qualification, be required to lay a certificate and memorial of his ability and title to promotion before the colonel of the regiment, previous to appointment; the introduction of unworthy characters into the higher ranks of our army, from this source, may be obviated.

That, in the military profession, a soldier is,

† If this appointment take place, it will supersede the necessity of a 2nd lieutenant in each company of infantry or troop of dragoons, except in the *chosen*, vide page 44.



in general, precluded from rising to a higher station, than that of serjeant, however great his merit, or viewing that profession as a trade, that the common *artizan* in it should be debarred from the prospect of becoming an *over-seer*, however long and sedulously performed may have been his apprenticeship, are circumstances which excite an equal degree of surprise and regret.

SEVENTH. Although it cannot be disputed that regimental officers have general admission <sup>Inadequacy of pay.</sup> into the profession of arms, without the necessity and consequent expence of any *preparatory education whatever*, yet their pay not having kept a proportion with the depreciation in the value of money, has become truly inadequate: the energies of their mind, in lieu of being directed to professional duties, are too frequently exerted, in these times, to the keeping themselves free from pecuniary embarrassment; it may be advisable to increase their pay at least 20 per cent. every rank of regimental officers equally requires this aid, and the allowance of forage to field officers ought certainly to be granted, to majors for *two*, and to lieutenant colonels for *three* horses,\* and the indemnification for horses lost in service, &c. Many of the allowances which regimental

\* This does not allude to the allowance in the field.



officers receive in the field and in barracks, and under the heads of non-effective and contingency, arise from sources so numerous and so petty, that they only tend to multiply accounts, both at the regiment and in the War office; means might be adopted, with benefit to the officers and œconomy to the State, for consolidating the greater part of these, and for issuing the whole under *one* head of pay or allowance.

The best mode of encouraging the private foldier to emulate his superiors and to merit promotion, will be by giving every possible degree of importance to the rank of the non-commissioned officers: their pay should be augmented; that of the staff-serjeants should be fixed at 2s. 6d. ; of serjeants at 2s. ; and of corporals at 1s. 6d. per day. All those petty allowances, known by the terms of extra price of bread and meat, beer money, emery money, and stationary quarters, the total of which do not exceed 2d. per day, ought, for the sake of simplicity of accounts, as well as œconomy, to be consolidated, and thrown into the daily pay of each rank.\* The difference of pay between a drummer and a

\* These consolidated allowances have been included in the pay of the non-commissioned officers above recommended, and will not cause an increase of more than  $1\frac{1}{4}$ d. to the present pay of corporals, nor of more than  $3\frac{1}{4}$ d. to that of serjeants.



private is unnecessary, and both should, in future, be fixed at 1s. 2d. per day, including all allowances. The marching money should be completed to 1s. per day. Rations, when issued on service, may be charged at an additional price, in proportion to the *fixed* increase of pay.

These regulations refer to infantry: the pay of the other forces will be regulated accordingly.

---

Exclusive of those points which have been adverted to, as requiring most immediate reform, there are several others which call for amendment, if the design be to give an entirely new character to the British service, to induce men of respectability and talents to leave the walks of civil life for those of the military profession, to raise that profession into a scientific pursuit, and to surround it with those accessions of honor which may at once reconcile it to national feelings.

FIRST. No subject is more open to a diversity of opinion, than that of His Majesty's commissions being a species of commercial article. <sup>Officers commissions.</sup> The bare mention of such a circumstance, impresses



presses one at first with the idea, that it must be an abuse which requires immediate reform: it may, however, be shortly stated, that the appointment of officers will ever take place by one of three modes—by interest, by purchase, or by merit; the latter is of course the most desirable, but as human nature is constituted, the first will be found to have most sway. Property, on the other hand, carries with it as good a title to promotion as interest, it is infinitely less open to abuse, and in this country has in general been employed as a criterion of *intellectual* qualification. Is military skill, then, and preparatory education to have no weight in the choice of those to whom we entrust the security of our lives, our property, and our national honor, while, in every other profession, preparatory qualifications are indispensably requisite: they certainly ought to have an important place, but it may be justly observed, that the means for estimating this skill would be open to every degree of undue influence; the perpetual fluctuation of our temporary levies has hitherto precluded all possibility of attending to the qualification of officers. As our choice, therefore in this, as in many cases in life, lies between the least of evils, the object to aim at must be, that the appointment and promotion of officers be as free from partiality, and as much the result  
of



of merit and actual service as possible. It will, therefore, be advisable to enforce the existing regulations which relate to commissions, and to the service which is required of officers prior to promotion; in order to render these regulations the more impressive, they ought to be entered in the articles of war, the infringement of them to subject the parties to trial, as invariably as for any other act of disobedience or impropriety.

The general improvement of the profession will give a new character to officers; subsequent consideration may probably suggest the propriety of their being required to pass certain examinations, in different stages of regimental rank, as in the navy. If these examinations on certain points of talent and information were to take place at the three periods of *entering the service*, of becoming a *captain*, and of arriving at the rank of *field officer*, by boards of officers abroad, and at the Horse-guards, Edinburgh and Dublin, at home; and if these testimonies of ability were *necessarily* to accompany the commissions for His Majesty's signature, some such plan might entirely do away the system of purchase, and would evidently introduce a superior class of officers into our armies.\* A regular supply of  
individuals

\* It seems impossible by academies, maintained at the public



individuals, amply qualified, would offer itself from among the cadets in each corps.

Company of  
merit.

SECOND. Emulation is the soul of military improvement, it may be effectually promoted by forming in every regiment of cavalry and battalion of infantry, *one* troop or company, which shall take post on the *right*, be selected solely for merit, and every foldier in which, without reference to rank, but merely as a distinction, shall, like the grenadiers in most foreign armies, receive the additional pay of *one* penny per day. In the heavy cavalry this may be termed the *cuirassier* troop, and in the light, the *hussar* troop: in the heavy infantry, the *grenadier* company, and in the light infantry battalions, the *chasseur* or *rifle* company. From these chosen troops and companies His Majesty's guards should alone be selected.

It, therefore, follows, that the present system of selecting men for the grenadier companies, merely on account of their height and appearance, without the least regard to character or talent,

lic expence, to establish a sufficiently extensive system of military knowledge: the mode proposed would obviate this difficulty, as each parent would cause his son to be educated accordingly.

(which



which in grenadier battalions have often decided the fate of battles,) should no longer be adhered to; it likewise follows that the plan of having light troops in *whole corps*, as is universally the case in foreign armies, should be adopted, as preferable to a company being assigned to each battalion of infantry, at present the case in our service. As riflemen, in the usual acceptation of the term, are merely the *élite* of light troops, their post on the right of each light infantry battalion, appears to be more appropriate than in whole bodies, as in the 95th regiment. This service is, however, open to much improvement, and if it were placed on the footing of a corps of science, a very different plan for the disposing of riflemen might be suggested.

THIRD. It will greatly tend to the benefit of The guards. the service, in general, if the regiments of guards be formed on a principle now obsolete, but which originally caused the institution of all guards, the surrounding a throne with men of established military character, who should add to its security as well as to its splendor. The guards should become corps solely of merit; they should be objects of emulation which should be aspired to by every regiment in the regular army: all recruiting for the guards should cease, and approved



proved men, and distinguished officers, from other corps, (each regiment of the line having its quota to supply,) should alone be admitted into their ranks.

It will be expedient, for numerous reasons, to limit the amount of this force to two regiments of cavalry, of 500 rank and file each, and to *four* regiments of infantry, being *single* battalions, of 1,200 rank and file each; this force to be in the first instance formed by a selection from the present corps. It will be indispensable for the preservation of discipline, to quarter the guards, or any other regiments which may aid in the duty of the metropolis, in barracks, erected beyond the precincts of the town.

Cavalry.

FOURTH. A considerable reduction may safely be made in the cavalry, excepting in the event of Continental campaigns; the expence of this force, if compared to infantry, appears to bear an unfair proportion; twenty-five regiments, or 20,000 rank and file, may probably suffice, even if a larger proportion, than is now there, were sent to India\*.

\* May it not be advisable to form *four* of the heavy dragoon regiments into light, and abolish the term of *guards* for the heavy cavalry?

FIFTH.



FIFTH. Regularity and method are of equal <sup>Fixed Estab-</sup> importance in the field as well as in an office ; <sup>lishment.</sup> strict adherence to the regulated establishment of each branch of an army, is indispensable for its good organization ; we have the example of all foreign armies to guide us on this subject ; whatever may be fixed as the establishment of cavalry, artillery, or infantry, each branch ought precisely to conform, and no corps in either of the three should differ in its establishment from others of the same arms.

A regiment of artillery ought, in time of war, to consist of 1200 rank and file, horse included, in twelve troops and companies. A regiment of cavalry of 800 rank and file each, in ten troops\*, with only 70 horses per troop. A regiment of infantry, either *heavy* or *light*, of two battalions of 1000 rank and file each, in ten companies each battalion ; and the veteran battalions of 800 rank and file each, in ten companies. All troops and companies ought, by special order, to be kept nearly equalized in every corps. A recruiting troop or company, consisting only of officers and non-commissioned officers, should be attached to each regiment of cavalry and ar-

\* The cavalry has been lately placed on this establishment.



tillery, and to each battalion of infantry, except the veteran battalions.

General Officers.

SIXTH. If all general officers be prohibited from holding regimental commissions except as colonels of corps, a more regular discharge of regimental duty will be the consequence, and the second lieutenant-colonels may be generally dispensed with; a fixed pay might be established for general officers upon a plan similar to that of admirals in the navy; in the event of a general officer having purchased his regimental commissions, the sale of his lieutenant-colonelcy, at the strict regulation price\*, will, if the above system be adopted, be of course acceded to.

Army Accounts.

SEVENTH. Some plan should be adopted for consolidating the various allowances and contingencies which are granted to general and other staff officers, and for issuing those allowances, as well as their pay, at the shortest possible period after they may be due; this suggestion extends itself to garrison and military appointments of every description, which are now *intentionally* kept in arrears; an idea appears to be entertained, that a saving accrues to the state

\* If the pay of officers be increased, the price of commissions will be regulated accordingly.

by



by thus withholding pay ; it seems an erroneous one ; accounts which are now kept open for two and three years, must naturally be attended by numerous war-office and agency expences ; an actual increase of five per cent. would be made to the pay of the general and staff officers, if it were received when due. All army accounts whatever should be passed more quickly, and might be simplified by consolidating petty charges and items in every branch and department ; a vast saving would accrue to the public on this ground alone.

EIGHTH. The drafting of soldiers from one Drafting. corps to another, excepting by their own free choice, should be prohibited ; good faith ought, on every occasion, to be particularly adhered to, and no delusive prospects should be held out at the period of enlistment ; a recruit ought to be permitted to engage for a specified regiment, and not for the service in general. So important, in fact, is the necessity of impressing upon a soldier's mind an attachment to his regiment, and to his colours, that, after the manner of the Romans, every recruit, on first joining his corps, should, under those colours, and on full parade, have the oath of fidelity, (too carelessly administered in general at the period of his enlisting,)

D

renewed



renewed to him, by the chaplain of the regiment ; the good effect of this measure, if it were, on desertion alone, might be considerable.

Chaplain and  
Schoolmaster.

NINTH. The office of chaplain ought to be restored to the service ; a chaplain should be appointed to each regiment of artillery and cavalry, and to each battalion, or at least to each regiment of infantry, with such an adequacy of pay, (fifteen shillings per day, without a deduction,) as shall ensure his respectability of character, and his constant attendance at the headquarters of his corps ; it is unnecessary to point out how essentially their attention to duty, (and by their being placed under the controul of a bishop, this may be enforced,) will contribute to the good order of the service in general, and to the morality of every regiment in particular\*. It is unaccountable how a military establishment, which is founded on the principle of sacrificing life and earthly considerations, should have so long existed without more attention having been drawn towards this main-spring of good conduct and discipline. Under bad regulations however, the appointment of chaplains may be

\* The regimental chaplains should be competent to instruct the officers in those points which are subjects for examination at the boards suggested in page 43.



productive of injury equally to religion and to decorum.

A school-master ought likewise to be allowed to each regiment and battalion, with rank and pay as a staff serjeant. Means of giving general instruction, particularly to soldiers' children, of forming excellent non-commissioned officers, and ultimately officers for the service, will be thus afforded to every corps.

TENTH. It is conjectured, that a considerable saving might ensue to the public, if the clothing of the army were undertaken by government, in lieu of the colonels of regiments, after the manner practised in Austria. At all events, it seems expedient that the stoppages should be limited to the actual strength of each regiment. It is, at the same time foreseen, that public contracts are open to abuses of many descriptions, and it must be allowed, that the British army is the best and most regularly clothed in Europe.

Distinction in clothing is of more importance than may at first appear necessary. His Majesty's guards ought not be clothed like the rest of the army. It is recommended that they



should retain the present dress of breeches and long gaiters, but that the red pantaloons, of a cloth the same as the jacket, should be universally adopted for the regiments of the line; the article is more convenient on service, and will have a martial appearance; the white breeches should likewise be worn by the heavy dragoons only; the blue pantaloons to be entirely substituted for breeches in the light cavalry, and not *both* admitted.

Bounty.

ELEVENTH. No part of our present system more strongly marks the mistaken principles on which it has proceeded, than the circumstance of the high bounties which are now giving for recruits in every description of our land forces, and the necessity which has arisen of alluring men into the army by pecuniary motives, and by enormous bribes; if the enlistment of men be conducted on principles of commerce, a market price must be given for the article *man*, and a limit might, with equal propriety, be offered to that of corn, or any other commodity; if the trade of a soldier were made as good as it ought to be, it may not be too much to assert, that no bounty whatever would be necessary; it ought, at all events, to be only sufficient to defray the expence of necessaries, (which necessaries



ries should be furnished no where but at the head-quarrrters of a regiment,) with the *douceur* of one guinea to a recruit on enlisting, and another on joining his comrades and company; including one guinea for all party expences, the sum total ought not to exceed *six guineas*, or pounds\*; for all transfers of men from one corps to another, the only gratuity should be *one guinea*.

Any deviation from this moderate rate of bounty will assuredly tend to encourage desertion, and to increase that general immorality, to which, under the best regulations, the recruiting service gives too much encouragement†.

TWELFTH. Much as has been expressed by <sup>Order of Merit.</sup> men of reflection against the institution of orders of merit, and badges of distinction, upon the ground of public estimation being the only solid reward for virtuous actions, yet if the army be raised to a superior character, these honors and distinctions, distributed with judgment, may have the most salutary effect.

\* It ought to be the same for every description of force.

† As the marines will probably be placed on a footing similar to that of the regular army, the same advantages may be expected to ensue to these corps, both in the facility of their procuring recruits, and in the diminution of bounty.



Ambition and the love of distinction are the ruling passions of soldiers, prompting them to encounter every hardship, they are, in fact, the best support to every perilous profession, and the means of bringing forth the most arduous exertions, at a price the least expensive to every state. The institution of military orders has prevailed from the earliest days of history, and approaches at present almost to uniformity in every army, our own excepted, throughout Europe.

Exclusive of the gift of *honorary arms*, (swords,) which should be distributed to officers and to non-commissioned officers, at the discretion of his Majesty\*, *two distinct* orders of merit should be instituted, of which the officers and soldiers should equally be members, in different stages of each order; the *one* to denote length of service without stain; and the *other* to be confined to acts of valour; in both cases however, the circumstance which shall give a title to become a member of the order must be precisely specified, and not left to the judgment or partiality of any board, or individual†; the rewards

\* This honor to be conferred by recommendation of commanders of corps, through the commander in chief of the forces.

† This was the case among the Romans of old, and is now observed in the Austrian army.



in order to be impressive, must be few, as in the *order for service*.

For officers, Twenty-five years, without censure by court martial.

For soldiers, Completion of second period, never punished corporally; — never deserted; been eleven years a non-commissioned officer, &c. &c.

*In the Order of Valor,*

For officers, With inferior force, having overcome superior, and having exceeded the mere line of duty, &c. &c.

For soldiers, The same as for officers.

Regular certificates of claims to these orders, to be transmitted to the Commander in Chief, and if finally approved of by His Majesty, to be inserted, for soldiers as well as for officers, in the Gazette: a college to be instituted for the record of these military honors.



## SECTION II.

## ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS.

amble. ALL speculation upon the propriety of any other description of force, for every operation of war, than a regular army, lies so much open to diversity of opinion, that there can be but little satisfaction in suggesting any thing, in so dubious a case: there certainly may be, in this, as possibly in every other country, a large proportion of men, whose voluntary services will never be obtained, in the first instance, beyond the limits of home possessions. Is this, however, really the case? or would not the same propensity to a military life, which leads men to a limited service, rather induce them to engage at once in that which is more general, if there existed no other? If this be proved, it must be absurd to have *two* descriptions of force in order to effect *one* single purpose. Granting, however, that the former supposition is the correct one,



one, (for amidst the confused and compulsory modes, whereby our limited forces have hitherto been raised, it is impossible to decide one way or other;) the next consideration must be, whether it is better to have that force assimilated in every respect, except extent of service, to the regular army, or to have it as the militia, raised by local influence, more limited in its service, and commanded by individuals of rank and property, not appointed by the Crown; in the one case the force will, in point of discipline, be more efficient, the nation will consequently have most value from it *for its cost*; in the other, there may be more facility in recruiting it, and much weight will be given to the contest in which we are engaged, by inducing the most important individuals in the country to draw the sword in its defence; this appears to be the impartial statement of the case.

After the sentiments expressed in the introduction to these "Outlines," the Author need not state to which force he gives the preference: he is averse to a militia, even if continued by recruiting as for the line, not only on account of its being so little disposable, but on account of its officers, being individuals, whose general avocations will never, in spite of the genuine  
military



military spirit of some among them, fail to divert their attention from professional duties.

He, therefore, proposes that the home force, and to which he would continue the term of *additional force*, should be raised by recruiting,\* as for the regular army, and in order to assimilate it as much as possible to that force that it should be attached, as *third* battalions, to the regiments of the line.

Additional  
battalions.

These battalions should be of the same strength as each of the service battalions, distinguished companies be formed on their right, but without additional pay, and the roster of officers to be the same throughout the three battalions: this should be the strength of each regiment of infantry during war time. The period of enlistment should be for *seven* years, a discharge invariably following, except during war: in this case, whatever time a soldier may have been retained beyond the expiration of his term, will be credited to him, as in the general service: every soldier having completed *fourteen* years, or two periods, in the additional battalions, ought to receive the same pension as is granted

\* Chiefly confined to counties which give the name to the regiment.



to the general service foldier after his first period; having completed *twenty-one* years, or three periods, he should receive the pension of the second period of the general service, and in addition, have the right of settlement, and of exercising a trade. As nearly the whole of the national rewards and privileges should be confined to the services of the regular army, no increase of pay, from period to period, no order of merit, except for valor, and no right of voting for a member of parliament appear due to those who engage in this limited service, which ought to be considered more as a *reserve* and nursery for the line, than as an efficient part of it. As an encouragement, however, for them to engage in the general service battalions, every year passed in the additional battalions should be credited as a half year in the former: general permission should be given for them to transfer their services, and the transfer bounty (one guinea) will accompany the new engagement. The extent of the service of the additional battalions will be the same, as at present; and it is proposed that the fifty seven battalions, now generally attached to regiments as their second battalions, become their third, and that *all* infantry regiments of the line be, without exception, equalised to the establishment



ment of two *general*, and one *home* service, battalions. It need scarcely be added that the service already performed by each man, in the present additional force, ought to be credited to him (from his first enlisting) for the periods now regulated. This home force will consist solely of infantry. The bounty given to recruits will be the same, and for reasons specified in page 52, as that for the regular army: a distinction in clothing ought to be made; this should be confined to the pantaloons, which in the *additional battalions* in lieu of red ought to be *blue*: the Hungarian Corps are thus distinguished from the Austrian. The regulations respecting the permanent depôts, in page 36, will prove of equal benefit, and accommodation to the additional battalions.

The preceding sections having comprised the whole of the Author's suggestions relative to the levy and organization of what may be termed the *regular land forces*, circumstances will, of course, decide, as to the amount of these standing armies: if the numerous forces of our enemy be however considered, the amount of our population, and that of some part of our present levies, which it is proposed to reduce, or rather to

amount of  
ces.



to transfer, the following estimate may not be too great, for the war establishment :

	Bns.	R. F.
1100 Regiments of infantry	{ general service 200	200,000
	{ home service 100	100,000
	Total	300,000

If to these be added the three hundred recruiting companies, the *six* regiments of horse and foot guards, the twenty-five regiments of cavalry, the ten battalions of artillery, (it may be expedient to form an additional battalion) the veteran battalions, the waggon, gun drivers, and staff corps, &c. the total may be estimated at 360,000 rank and file.

The Foreign and Colonial corps, which may Foreign corps. be estimated at 35,000 rank and file, exclusive of the East India Company's army, have not been included in the above, and will give to the Government a solid force of nearly 400,000 rank and file : the sooner, however, that the system of admitting foreign corps, as a component part of our military establishment be relinquished, probably the better ; they are as expensive as our own levies, and Great Britain is, of all nations, that which neither requires, or ought to have



have foreign mercenaries. The circumstances under which the Hanoverian regiments have been taken into our service are peculiar; these corps certainly merit an exception.

Although it be impolitic to have *whole corps* of foreigners, yet the admission of a certain proportion of *aliens* into our regiments, and giving them, in addition to naturalization, the same rewards for faithful service as to our own troops, may, under strict regulations, as to their admission, be productive of national benefit. With regard to the East India Company's army, a period may, ere long, arrive when it may be judged expedient to take the whole system of defence in India into the hands of Government.

The whole amount of the preceding estimates is considerably less than the ostensible numbers now reported to Parliament, but it must ever be remembered, that the merit of armies depends on their composition, on their disposable nature, and not on a formidable array of numerical figures: the most alarming feature, perhaps, of our present land force is the inefficiency of it, when contrasted with its nominal amount.

Peace establishment.

It is conceived that the system, which has been proposed, suggests the means of forming the



the future peace establishment of the army on a very simple plan: all battalions may progressively be reduced to any standard of numbers, not below 600 rank and file each, and if further reduction be required, the second and third battalions of junior corps may be disbanded in *toto*, without no weaker establishment, for those which remain can be advisable: exclusive of the greater facility of procuring officers of talent to command regiments and battalions, when less numerous, the variety of uniform, latitude of thinking, and in the style of command, among a multiplicity of weak corps, cause each to form, as it were, a separate division in an army, and to become a distinct point of distraction; hence the strength of the French and Austrian *divisions*, the *legions* of the Romans, &c. and from the same motive large regiments have been recommended in these "Outlines."

The regiments of cavalry ought not, during peace, to be reduced below two-thirds of their war establishment.



## SECTION III.

VOLUNTEER AND SUBSIDIARY  
FORCE.

---

IT has been stated, in the introduction, that the less a military force is *regular* and *disposable*, the less is its value: if it be doubtful whether any description of force, exclusively for home defence, be worthy of much attention, it is equally so, whether much reliance is to be placed on volunteer corps, or on a levy en masse.

The circumstance which ought to decide, as to the merit of either, is the *expence*: in exact proportion as these levies cost little or nothing to the state, do not impede the recruiting for the army, and do not obstruct the *productive* industry of the country, is their value: the more that the nation is armed, and the greater interest that every man takes in keeping out the common enemy, decidedly the better: the  
question



question is not, therefore, whether arms shall be entrusted to the great mass of the people, for if there be danger in this, all plans will be equally futile, but whether the pecuniary resources of the country are adequate to so many various descriptions of armed bodies? the state of our finances answers this in the negative, and obliges us to limit our pecuniary aid, if any is to be derived from the state for so secondary an object, to that proportion of irregular force, which shall decidedly be the most useful: to the remainder every encouragement may be given, excepting money.

The force which most immediately claims that aid, appears to be the yeomanry cavalry in both kingdoms, and the yeomanry infantry in Ireland. In the event of the regular cavalry being much reduced, the former will be essentially necessary; in aid of the civil power, as a branch of the *posse comitatus*; and, should invasion ensue, for the military purposes of escort, convoy, or as guides, a select description of them may be highly useful: in Ireland, the yeomanry infantry may also be of essential service for the same objects. The present system, however, requires amendment and *economizing*: the allowances are too great; persons of more substance,

E

(*principals,*)



(*principals*,) ought alone to be admitted ; the days of muster should be regularly *fixed* by lieutenants of counties at stated periods ; the enrolment of each individual should be for the *year* ; severe fines should be levied for non-attendance at muster ; no permanent duty should be admitted, and twenty-four days annual drill be deemed sufficient.

The cavalry should be cloathed in *red*, and the Irish infantry, like the armed associations, in *blue*.

All other volunteer corps, whether of cavalry or infantry, should be termed *armed associations* : they will probably come forward only in large towns and populous districts, but ought to be generally encouraged, particularly in the metropolis, in distant parts of the kingdom, and in sea-ports : they should produce no charge to the state, excepting for arms, accoutrements, and ammunition : their clothing should be uniform, in both kingdoms, and as during the last war, consist of *blue coats*.

It seems indispensable that the usual gradations of rank, expressed in the customary terms of field officers, captains, &c. should be continued



continued to all volunteer corps, according to their numbers, but that no volunteer officer should have command of an officer of the line, who is above the rank of captain: the gradation of command should afterwards be by the next rank in juniority.\*

All volunteer corps to be under the generals of districts, and report to them monthly: the yeomanry to be under the inspection of officers appointed by government: the associations under that of the generals of districts.

It follows, from these regulations, that all pecuniary allowances, which are at present granted to the whole of the volunteer infantry in Great Britain, and to a considerable portion in Ireland, for drill and inspection days,—for clothing,—for care of arms, and for their permanent serjeants, should cease, and that all future expences and contingencies, be defrayed by those individuals, who may still continue their patriotic services.

\* Lieutenant-colonel of yeomanry or armed associations, to command a captain, major to command a lieutenant, and captain to command an ensign of the line.



With regard to a plan for training to arms, or, what is perhaps, of equal importance, for having the names enrolled of a certain proportion of the population, who may be called upon in event of invasion, the principle is good, in as much as it entrusts arms to the nation at large: it is open, however, to numerous objections; it can never amount to any thing valuable, in point of military instruction, without great expence, and it will unsettle the minds, and obstruct the productive labour of a large portion of the community: whether it may ultimately aid the regular army, by giving it a supposed propensity to the military profession, is equally doubtful, for few fly to arms through *amor patriæ* alone, or contract partiality for a musket, when accompanied by the smock frock and peasants clothing: at all events, if the measure be a compulsory one, it is feared that the disadvantages attending it will increase ten-fold: those who attend must receive pay, the show of confidence in the national patriotism will be lost, individual oppression, for substitutes, will be greatly felt, (for personal service will, of course, not be resorted to,) and the general interruption to industry, may rather create an aversion, than a partiality for the profession of arms.

As



As the spontaneous act of a certain proportion of each class\*, who may be disposed for little or no pecuniary consideration, annually to enrol themselves, and submit to a portion of military instruction, a subsidiary force, or in other words, an *armed peasantry*, may have some merit. In this case, the times of assembly must be fixed by government, and the points of rendezvous in the several hundreds, or parishes, must be arranged by the civil administration, in each county. It is however, matter worthy of much reflection, whether it be not preferable, that the burthenfome duties of war, should be undertaken by that portion of the people only, who may be hired as champions in defence of the rest, and who, in regular armies, may devote their whole labour to this occupation, than, that the industrious part of the community should be perpetually disturbed, or the tranquil order of society thus unnecessarily intruded upon.

If the author, however, err in his view of this subject, and if it be the intention of govern-

\* Mr. Windham proposed, on 3d April, that the population of the country should be classed in three parts for this levy, the oldest person not to exceed the age of 40.



ment to arm the peasantry of this country, and at the same time to retain the militia,\* the only mode of giving effect to the former, appears to be through the medium of the local connections of the latter ; by causing that force to revert to its original institution, and become stationary in its counties ; by distributing a certain portion of its officers and non-commissioned officers in the several hundreds, weapontakes, &c. in each county, for the purpose of bringing forward, and training the subsidiary force, and by placing it under the control of an inspecting field officer of the line ; by fixing the days and hours of drill, at central points ; by requiring the attendance of an inferior civil officer, and exacting discipline thro' the medium of fine and imprisonment ; by causing no man to leave his roll, under the term of one year, except it be to enlist in the army : and finally by exempting no man from the ballot, if it be a compulsory measure, except those who are usually so exempted, and members of the yeomanry and armed associations :

\* If the militia be retained, the additional force will, of course, be consolidated with it, when, as the home army, it may be adviseable to give it more solidity, and augment it to 100,000 rank and file : but in this case, the militia must assume a new character, and be returned to its respective counties, to be there quartered in *barracks*.

these,



these, and a variety of other regulations will be indispensable: the necessity of them, however, improves the extreme difficulty of giving to any system of subsidiary force, either organization or stability; of ever rendering it an object worthy of the expence which it will entail upon the nation, or of preventing it from diverting the attention of government, from plans of national defence, which are infinitely more simple in their principle, and more important in their object.

CON-



*CONCLUSION.*

THESE suggestions shall be closed by a few remarks upon that subject, the consideration of which is necessarily becoming more and more inseparable from every measure, which relates either to the security or to the honor of our country, the œconomy of its pecuniary resources.

A considerable increase of expence may appear to have been recommended, particularly under the heads of pay, chaplains, pensions and the repetition of bounty, which will ensue from the frequent discharges: but on a general review of the whole, it is conceived that many sources of œconomy will be found to arise out of the greater part of the system which has been proposed; these may appear fully to justify measures,



ures, if any justification were necessary, which have ultimately most important national objects in view.

Among these sources may be considered,

1st, The reduction of a large body of cavalry, Cavalry, Volunteers, &c.  
and of the regiments of guards. The diminution of expence in the whole volunteer system, and the small diminution in the pay of trumpeters and drummers.

2d, The reduction of the second lieutenant Regimental officers.  
colonels, in all regiments of cavalry or infantry, in consequence of the regimental commissions being taken from general officers, and the removing one of the lieutenants in every troop or company, if the appointment of cadet be made.

3d, The diminution of bounty, which from Bounty.  
*twenty-two* guineas per man now given for recruits, may, as has been stated, be reduced at least to *ten*, as soon as that partiality for the service shall have been created, which the preceding suggestions have aimed at effecting, and when the market for recruits shall be shut in every other direction,



direction, than for the regular army or additional battalions.

Desertion.

4th, The decrease of desertion and the necessity of discharging so many men; the serious annual amount of both of which is best ascertained by a reference to the returns laid before the House of Commons; a superior description of men will, it is presumed, be hereafter induced to follow the profession of arms, and will be presented with numerous motives for continuing their services in our armies.

Army accounts.

And finally, The reduction of various regimental, war office, and agency accounts, in consequence of the general consolidation of allowances, contingencies, &c. wherever practicable. The more speedy closing of all army accounts whatever. The consequent discharge of clerks, and the reduction of arrears. And, the uniting under one description of agency, that of the regular army, the whole of those numerous offices, which the present diversity of our land forces has naturally given rise to, considerably to the injury of the public purse.

To conclude, in short, with the sentiment of an author of much ingenuity on these subjects

and



and whose sentiments are worthy of general attention.\* “Were our system of national defence  
“reduced to a simple and intelligible method, in  
“which nothing shall be admitted, that is not  
“plainly calculated for national advantage,  
“abuses, in the administration of it, must cease  
“to be practicable, as they will no longer be  
“capable of concealment.”

\* Macdiarmid on National Defence.

FINIS.



and whose sentiments are worthy of general at-  
tention. " Were our system of national defence  
" reduced to a simple and intelligible method, in  
" which nothing shall be admitted, that is not  
" plainly calculated for national advantage,  
" and in the administration of it, must cease  
" to be practicable, as they will no longer be  
" capable of concealment."

Macmillan on National Defence

FINIS

2  
1  
2  
1  
1  
2  
2  
1  
2

Printed by C. Rowland, 11, York Street, London.