

The fragments that remain of the lost writings of Proclus, surnamed the Platonic successor / translated from the Greek, by Thomas Taylor.

Contributors

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
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The largest of these Fragments
 consists of Eighteen Arguments in
 in proof of the Eternity of the
 World.

Of the five instances recorded
 by Proclus of persons who have re-
 turned to life, after they had
 been buried, two are very
 extraordinary; one being in the 6th &
 the other in the 9th month, after in-
 terment.



Tracts 1437 (1.)
THE


FRAGMENTS

THAT REMAIN OF THE

LOST WRITINGS OF PROCLUS,

SURNAMED

THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR.



Translated from the Greek.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Ἐξ ὀμμάτων ἐπορισμένη φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὐ μείζον ἀγαθόν οὐτ' ἦλθεν
οὐδ' ἤξει ποτε τῆ ἀνητῶ γένει δωρηθῆναι ἐκ θεῶν.

PLAT. *Tim.* p. 40. *Edit. Beck.*

Εἰ δὲ τὸ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς βλέπειν ἦδύ, τὸ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὀμμάσιν
ὀξυδερκεῖν ἐστὶ θάυμαστον.

ARISTOT.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.

AND SOLD BY BLACK, YOUNG, AND YOUNG, TAVISTOCK-STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.

1825.

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LONDON :

PRINTED BY J. MOYES, BOUVERIE STREET.

LONDON :

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR

BY J. MOYES, BOUVERIE STREET.

1831

TO

MRS. ELIZABETH HOWARD,

A LADY

NO LESS DISTINGUISHED BY HER GREAT MORAL EXCELLENCE,
THAN BY HER VERY EXTRAORDINARY
LITERARY ATTAINMENTS,

THIS WORK

IS RESPECTFULLY AND GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY HER MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

THOMAS TAYLOR.



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PREFACE.

To the lovers of the wisdom of the Greeks, any remains of the writings of Proclus will always be invaluable, as he was a man who, for the variety of his powers, the beauty of his diction, the magnificence of his conceptions, and his luminous development of the abstruse dogmas of the ancients, is unrivalled among the disciples of Plato. As, therefore, of all his philosophical works that are extant, I have translated the whole of some, and parts of others,* I was also desirous to present

* I have translated the whole of his Six Books on the Theology of Plato, and have added a Seventh Book, in order to supply the deficiency of another Book on

the English reader with a translation of the existing Fragments of such of his works as are lost.

Of these Fragments, the largest, which is on the Eternity of the World, and ori-

this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost; the whole of his Commentary on the Timæus of Plato; and of his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid. I have also translated nearly the whole of his Scholia on the Cratylus; and have given a translation of the substance of his Commentaries on the First Alcibiades and Parmenides of Plato. These are from the Greek. From the barbarous Latin version of Morbeka,* I have also translated his admirable Treatise on Providence and Fate; all which are published. And I am now waiting for an opportunity, which I trust will soon be afforded me, of publishing my Translation of his Solution of Ten Doubts concerning Providence, and his Treatise on the Subsistence of Evil.

* This Morbeka was Archbishop of Corinth in the twelfth century.

ginally consisted of eighteen arguments, wants only the first argument to render it complete; and of this I have endeavoured to collect the substance, from what Philoponus has written against it. There is a Latin translation of the work of Philoponus*—in which these Arguments are alone to be found—by Joannes Mahotius: Lugdun. 1557. fol.; from which, as the learned reader will perceive, I have frequently been enabled to correct the printed Greek text. The acute Simplicius is of opinion, that this work of Philoponus is replete with garrulity and nugacity, and a considerable portion of his Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens, consists of a confutation of the sophistical reasoning of this smatterer in philosophy.

* The Greek edition of this work of Philoponus against Proclus was printed at Venice, 1535, fol.

In doing this, likewise, he invokes Hercules to assist him in the purification of such an Augean stable.

It is remarkable, that though the writings of Proclus are entirely neglected, and even unknown to many *who are called scholars*, in this country, yet they are so much esteemed in France and Germany, that such of his works as were only before extant in manuscript, have been recently published by the very learned Professors Boissonade, Victor Cousin, and Creuzer.* The second

* Of the works of Proclus, the first of these Professors has published the Scholia on the Cratylus; the second, the Commentaries on the First Alcibiades, and Five out of the Seven existing Books on the Parmenides of Plato; and also, from the version of Morbeka, the Treatise on Providence and Fate; A Solution of Ten Doubts concerning Providence; and the Treatise on the Subsistence of Evil: and the third, the Commentaries on the First Alcibiades, and the Theological Ele-

of these learned men, indeed, conceived so highly of the merits of Proclus, as to say of him, “ that, like Homer himself, he obscures, by his own name, the names of all those that preceded him, and has drawn to himself alone the merits and praises of all [the Platonic philosophers].” The eulogy therefore, of Ammonius Hermeas, “ that Proclus possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity,”*

ments. All these learned men have done me the honour to speak of me in the handsomest manner, both in the letters which I have received from them, and in the above-mentioned publications. The last of them, in particular, has adopted most of my emendations of the Greek text of the Theological Elements.

* *Εἰ δὲ τί καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνήθειμεν εἰσενεγκεῖν περὶ τὴν τοῦ βιβλίου σαφηνεῖαν, ἀπονημονεύσαντες τῶν ἐξηγήσεων τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν διδασκαλοῦ Προκλου τοῦ πλατωνικοῦ διαδοχοῦ, τοῦ εἰς*

will be immediately assented to by every one who is much conversant with the writings of this most extraordinary man. Perhaps, however, the ignorance in this country, of the writings of this Corypcean philosopher, may be very reasonably accounted for, by what Mr. Harris says in the Preface to his *Hermes*, viz. “ ’Tis perhaps too much the case with *the multitude* in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves and their own affairs, so, out of this *narrow sphere of knowledge*, they think nothing worth knowing. As we, BRITONS, by our situation, live divided from the whole world, this, perhaps, will be found to be more remarkably our

ακρον της ανθρωπινης φυσεως την τε εξηγητικην των δοκουντων
 τοις παλαιοις δυναμιν, και την επιστημονικην της φυσεως
 των οντων κρισιν ασκησαντος, πολλην αν τω λογιω θεω χαριν
 ομολογησαιμεν.—*Ammon. Herm. de Interpret.* p. 1.

case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own countrymen ; that in *philosophy*, in poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.”

A

TRANSLATION

OF

THE FRAGMENTS

THAT REMAIN OF THE

LOST WRITINGS OF PROCLUS.

ON LIGHT.*

IF with respect to light, one kind is material, but another immaterial, according to the difference of those illuminating natures, fire and the sun, the light which is immaterial is, *in a certain respect*,† corrupted ; but material light, in a certain respect, pervades through material substances : for the whole air appears to be no less illuminated by the sun than by the fire that is procured by us. And when clouds pass under the sun, the light is in

* This and the five following Fragments are to be found in the Treatise of Philoponus against Proclus, on the Eternity of the World.

† Immaterial light is, *in a certain respect*, corrupted, because the recipient of it is corruptible ; and when this is corrupted, the light which it received departs to its fountain, the sun.

one part intercepted, and we do not receive the whole of it. For how can the light which is in the heavens be continuous with that which is in the air? since the latter is corruptible, but the former not. And the one, indeed, is suspended from its proper principle; but the other, if it should so happen, is cut off, and sometimes is not. The corruptible, however, is not continuous with the incorruptible: for two things of this kind are specifically different from each other.

*In Defence of the Timæus of PLATO, against the
Objections made to it by ARISTOTLE.*

ARISTOTLE objects to the very name of paradigm, asserting that it is metaphorical; and he is much more hostile to the dogma which introduces ideas, and particularly to that of animal itself, as is evident from what he says in his *Metaphysics*. . And it appears, that this man is not so averse to any of the dogmas of Plato as he is to the hypothesis of ideas; not only in his *Logical Treatises* calling ideas sonorous trifles, but also in his *Ethics* contending against the existence of *the good itself*. In his *Physics*, likewise, he does not think it proper to refer the generations of things to ideas: for he says this in his *Treatise on*

Generation and Corruption. And this his hostility to the doctrine of ideas* is much more apparent in his *Metaphysics*; because the discussion there is concerning principles: for there he adduces numerous arguments against ideas, in the beginning, middle, and end of that treatise. In his *Dialogues*, also, he most manifestly exclaims, that he cannot assent to this dogma, though some one may think that he speaks against it for the purpose of contention.

THE maker always existing, that which is generated by him likewise always exists. For either God does not always make; or, he indeed always makes, but the universe is not always generated;† or, he always makes, and the universe is always generated. But if God does not always make, he will evidently be [at a certain time] an efficient in capacity, and again an efficient in energy, and he will be an imperfect Demiurgus, and indigent of time. If, however, he always makes, but the

* See my *Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle*, in which the opposition of Aristotle to Plato's doctrine of ideas is shewn to have been employed for the purpose of *guarding* from misapprehension, and not of *subverting* that doctrine.

† Proclus here uses the word *γίνεται*, *generated*, because the universe, on account of the flowing condition of its nature, is always rising into existence, or *becoming to be*.

universe is generated at a certain time, an impossibility will take place. For when that which makes is in energy, that which is generated will also be generated in energy. Both, therefore, exist always; the one being generated, and the other producing perpetually.

The world is always fabricated; and as the Demiurgus fabricated always, and still fabricates, so likewise the world is always fabricated, and now rising into existence, was generated, and, having been made, is always generated [or becoming to be]; so that the world is always fabricated. And as the Demiurgus always did fabricate, and still fabricates, so the world was always and is fabricated; and while it is becoming to be, was generated, and having been generated, is always generated.

Proclus assents to what is said by Aristotle concerning the perpetuity of the world; but he says it was not just in him to accuse Plato. For *to be generated*, does not signify, with Plato, *the beginning of existence*, but a subsistence *in perpetually becoming to be*. For the natures which are established above time, and which are eternal, have the whole of their essence and power, and the perfection of their energy, simultaneously present. But every thing which is in time has not its proper life collectively and at once present. For whatever is in time, though it should be

extended to an infinite time, has an existence at A CERTAIN TIME. For that portion of being which it possesses exists in a certain time. For time is not [wholly] present at once; but is generated infinitely, and was not produced at a certain period in the past time. The universe, therefore, was thus generated, as not having a subsistence such as that of eternal beings, but as that which is generated, or becoming to be, through the whole of time, and always subsisting at a certain time, according to that part of time which is present. And again, the universe was generated, as not being the cause to itself of its existence, but deriving its subsistence from some other nature, which is the fourth signification of a generated essence; I mean that which has a cause of its generation.

But if Timæus [in Plato] calls the world a God which will be at a certain time (for perhaps this may give disturbance to some), and induce them to ask whether he gives to the world a generation in a part of time? For *the once*, or *at a certain time*, must be admitted by us to be a certain part of time. To this we reply, that every thing which is in time, whether in an infinite or in a finite time, will always exist at a certain time. For whatever portion of it may be assumed, this portion is in a certain time. For the whole of time

does not subsist at once, but according to a part. If, therefore, any thing is in time, though it should be extended to an infinite time, it has indeed an existence at a certain time. But it is generated, or becoming to be, to infinity, and is always passing from an existence at one time* to an existence at another. And it was at a certain time, and is at a certain time, and will be at a certain time.† This existence too, at a certain time, is always different. The world, however, when it exists at a certain time, has a no less [continued] existence. Hence that which has its hypostasis in a part of time, at a certain time is becoming to be, and at a certain time is, and at a certain time will be. But that which exists in every time [or for ever] is

* In the original, *αλλ' ουποτε εις αλλο αι μεβισταμενον*. But the sense requires (and this is confirmed by the version of Mahotius,) that we should read, conformably to the above translation, *αλλ' απο του ποτε εις αλλο, κ. τ. λ.*

† The corporeal world is continually rising into existence, or *becoming to be*, but never possesses *real being*. Hence, like the image of a tree in a rapid torrent, it has the appearance of a tree without the reality, and seems to endure perpetually the same, yet is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the stream. The world therefore was, and is, and will be at *a certain time*, in the same manner as it may be said of the image of a tree in a torrent, that it was yesterday, is to-day, and will be to-morrow, without any interruption of the continuity of its flux. Philoponus, not perceiving this, has, with his usual stupidity, opposed what is here said by Proclus.

indeed at a certain time, but is *always generated*, or becoming to be; and in perpetually *becoming to be*, imitates that which always *is*.

This, therefore, alone ought to be considered, whether it is necessary to denominate a celestial body, and in a similar manner the whole world, a thing of a generated nature. But how is it possible not to assert this from the very arguments which Aristotle himself affords us? For he says that no finite body has an infinite power; and this he demonstrates in the eighth book of his *Physics*. If, therefore, the world is finite (for this he demonstrates), it is necessary that it should not possess an infinite power. But in the former part of this treatise we have shewn that eternity is infinite power. The world, therefore, has not an *eternal* subsistence, since it does not possess infinite power. If, however, it has not an eternal hypostasis, (for a thing of this kind participates of eternity, but that which participates of eternity participates of infinite power,) it is necessary that the world should not always *be*.* For to exist always, is, according to Aristotle himself, the peculiarity of eternity, since, as he says, eternity

* In the original, *αναγκη μη ειναι τον κοσμον αι.* For the world is not always, *αλλα γιγνεται αι.* i. e. but is always *becoming to be*, or, *rising into existence*; since it has not an *eternal sameness* of being, but a perpetually *flowing* subsistence.

from this derives its appellation. For that which is true of eternal being, is not true of that which is always generated [or becoming to be], viz. the possession of infinite power, through being perpetually generated, but this pertains to the maker of it. Hence, too, it is always generated, acquiring perpetuity of existence through that which, according to essence, is eternally being; but it does not possess perpetuity, so far as pertains to itself. So that the definition of that which is generated may also be adapted to the world. Every thing, therefore, which is generated, is indeed itself essentially entirely destructible; but being bound by true being, it remains in becoming to be, and the whole of it is a generated nature. Hence [though naturally destructible] it is not destroyed, in consequence of the participation of existence which it derives from true being. For, since the universe is finite, but that which is finite has not an infinite power, as Aristotle demonstrates; and as that which moves with an infinite motion moves with an infinite power, it is evident that the immovable cause of infinite motion to the universe, possesses itself an infinite power; so that, if you conceive the universe to be separated from its immovable cause, it will not be moved to infinity, nor will it possess an infinite power, but will have a cessation of its motion. If, how-

ever, you again conjoin this cause with the universe, it will be moved to infinity through it. Nor is there any absurdity in separating by conception things which are conjoined, in order that we may perceive what will happen to the one from the other; and, in consequence of perceiving this, may understand what the inferior nature possesses from itself, and what it derives, from its co-arrangement, from that which is superior to it. For, in short, since, in terrestrial natures, we see that they are partly corrupted through imbecility, and are partly preserved through power, much more will perpetuity and immortality* be inherent in things incorruptible, through infinite power: for every finite power is corrupted.

FOR the celestial fire is not caustic, but, as I should say, is vivific, in the same manner as the heat which is naturally inherent in us. And Aristotle himself, in his Treatise on the Generation of Animals, says, that there is a certain illumination from which, being present, every mortal

* In the original, *πολλῶν μάλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀφθαρτοῖς ἢ ἀφθαρσία διὰ δύναμιν δηλονοτι ἀπειρον*. But from the version of Mahotius,—which is, “*Multo magis his, quæ non intereunt, conveniat perpetuitas, atque immortalitas, propter vires, easque infinitas,*”—it appears that, for *ἡ ἀφθαρσία*, it is requisite to read *ἡ αἰδιότης καὶ ἀθανασία*, agreeably to the above translation.

nature lives. All heaven, therefore, consists of a fire of this kind ; but the stars have, for the most part, this element, yet they have also the *summits* of the other elements.* Moreover, if we likewise consider, that earth darkens all illuminative natures, and produces shadow, but that the elements which are situated between earth and fire being naturally diaphanous, are the recipients of both darkness and light, and yet are not the causes of either of these to bodies, but that fire alone is the supplier of light, in the same manner as earth is of darkness, and that these are at the greatest distance from each other,—if we consider this, we may understand how the celestial bodies are naturally of a fiery characteristic. For it is evident that they illuminate in the same manner as our sublunary fire. If, however this is common to both, it is manifest that the fire which is here, is allied to the fire of the celestial bodies. It is not proper, therefore, to introduce to the universe a celestial nature, as something foreign to it, but placing there the *summits* of sublunary natures, we should admit that the elements which are here, derive their generation through an alliance to the nature of the celestial orbs.

* Viz. the sublunary elements have, in the stars and in the heavens, a *causal* subsistence. See more on this subject in the third book of my translation of Proclus on the *Timæus* of Plato.

*The Original of the following Extracts, from the same Treatise of PROCLUS, is only to be found in the Commentary of SIMPLICIUS on the Third Book of ARISTOTLE's Treatise on the Heavens.**

IN answer to the objection of Aristotle, that if the elements are generated by a dissolution into planes, it is absurd to suppose that all things are not generated from each other,—Proclus observes, “that we must assert the very contrary. For the phænomena do not accord with those who transmute earth, and move things immovable. For we never see earth changed into other things; but terrestrial natures are changed, so far as they are full of air or water. All earth, however, is un-

* In order to understand what is said by Proclus in answer to the objections of Aristotle, it is requisite to relate, from Simplicius, the hypothesis of the Pythagoreans and Plato, respecting the composition of the elements from the five regular bodies. “They supposed two primogenial right-angled triangles, the one isosceles, but the other scalene, having the greater side the double in length of the less, and which they call a semi-triangle, because it is the half of the equilateral triangle, which is bisected by a perpendicular from the vertex to the base. And from the isosceles triangle, which Timæus calls a semi-square, four such having their right angles conjoined in one centre, a square is formed. But the union of six such triangles† having eight angles,

† Viz. of six squares, or six times four isosceles triangles, whose right angles are conjoined in one centre.

changeable, because earth alone becomes, as it were, ashes, or a calx. For in metallic operations, the whole of the moisture in metals is consumed, but the ashes remain impassive. Not that earth is entirely impassive to other things; for it is divided by them falling upon it; yet the parts of it remain, until again falling on each other, they from themselves make one body. But if it should be said that earth, on account of its qualities, is changed into other things, being itself cold and dry, earth will be more swiftly changed into fire than into water; though water, indeed, appears to be burnt, but earth, when subsisting by itself, (*i. e.* when it is pure earth, and earth alone,) is not burnt." He adds, "And the heaven, indeed, is neither divisible nor

forms a cube, which is the element of earth. The semi-triangle, however, constitutes the pyramid, the octaedron, and the icosaedron, which are distributed to fire, air, and water. And the pyramid, indeed, consists of four equilateral triangles, each of which composes six semi-triangles. But the octaedron consists of eight equilateral triangles, and forty-eight semi-triangles; and the icosaedron is formed from twenty equilateral triangles, but one hundred and twenty semi-triangles. Hence, these three, deriving their composition from one element, viz. the semi-triangle, are naturally adapted, according to the Pythagoreans and Plato, to be changed into each other; but earth, as deriving its composition from another triangle specifically different, can neither be resolved into the other three bodies, nor be composed from them."

mutable; but the earth existing as the most ancient of the bodies within the heaven, is divisible, but not mutable; and the intermediate natures are both divisible and mutable."

Aristotle observes, "that earth is especially an element, and is alone incorruptible, if that which is indissoluble is incorruptible, and an element. For earth alone is incapable of being dissolved into another body." The philosopher Proclus replies to this objection, yielding to what Aristotle says about earth, viz. that it is perfectly incapable of being changed into the other three elements. And he says, "that Plato, on this account, calls it the first and most ancient of the bodies within the heaven, as unchangeable into other things, and that the other elements give completion to the earth, in whose bosom they are seated, viz. water, air, and sublunary fire. But in consequence of being, after a manner, divided by the other elements, it becomes one of them; for division is a passion which exterminates continuity. If, however, it suffers being divided by the other elements, and energises on them, embracing, compressing, and thus causing them to waste away, it is very properly co-divided with those things from which it suffers, and on which it energises according to the same passion in a certain respect. For there is a division of each,

though the more attenuated are divided by the more sharp in one way, as in the arts by saws, augers, and gimlets; and the more gross in another way, by trampling and compression."

In the next place, Aristotle says, "But neither in those things which are dissolved, is the omission of triangles reasonable. This, however, takes place in the mutation of the elements into each other, because they consist of triangles unequal in multitude."

The philosopher Proclus here observes, "that in the dissolution of water into air, when fire resolves it, two parts of air are generated, and one part of fire. But when, on the contrary, water is generated from air, three parts of air being resolved, the four triangles which are mingled together from the same cause, viz. from condensation, together with two parts of air, make one part of water." He adds, "But it is not at all wonderful, that they should be moved in a certain form; for it must be granted, that in all mutations there is something without form, to a certain extent; but being vanquished by some form, they pass into the nature of that which vanquishes. For we also acknowledge, that, in the mutation of the elements with which we are conversant, certain half-generated parts frequently remain."

Aristotle adduces, as a fourth absurdity, "that

this hypothesis makes the generation of body simply, but not of some particular body. But if body is generated upon body, it was before shewn that there must necessarily be a separate vacuum, which the authors of this hypothesis do not admit. For if body is generated, it is generated from that which is incorporeal. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some void place the recipient of the generated body. Hence, if they say that body is generated from planes, it will not be generated from body; for a plane has length and breadth alone." To this, however, Proclus replies, "that natural planes are not without depth; for if body distends the whiteness which falls upon it, it will much more distend the planes which contain it. But if the planes have depth, the generation of fire will no longer be from that which is incorporeal; but the more composite will be generated from a more simple body."

In the next place Aristotle observes, "that those who attribute a figure to each of the elements, and by this distinguish the essences of them, necessarily make them to be indivisibles. For a pyramid or a sphere being in a certain respect divided, that which remains will not be a sphere or a pyramid. Hence, either a part of fire is not fire, but there will be something prior to an element, because every body is either an element

or from elements ; or not every body is divisible." Proclus, in reply to this, " blames him who makes fire to be a pyramid, and who does not abide in the Platonic hypothesis, since Plato says that a pyramid is the *figure* of fire ; but he does not say that it is fire. For fire is a collection of pyramids, any one of which is invisible, on account of its smallness ; nor will fire, so long as it is divided into fire, be divided into pyramids. One pyramid, however, is no longer fire, but the element of fire, invisible from its smallness. If, therefore, this pyramid were divided, it would neither be an element, nor composed of elements, since it would not be divided into pyramids or planes. And why is it wonderful that there should be something inordinate in sublunary bodies ? For, in the mutation of the elements with which we are conversant, there is something inordinate." Proclus adds, " that certain differences also are produced, which occasion pestilential consequences in the whole genus, and turn the elements into a condition contrary to nature. But what impossibility is there," says he, " that this section of an element being taken, and fashioned into form and figure by atoms, should again become a pyramid, or some other element, in consequence of being assimilated to the natures which comprehend and compress it."

The sixth argument of Aristotle endeavours to shew, that if the elements are fashioned with the above-mentioned figures, there must necessarily be a vacuum which is not even asserted by the advocates for planes. But he shews this from there being but few figures, both in planes and solids, which are able to fill the place about one point, so as to leave no vacuum.*

* In planes this can only be accomplished by the equilateral triangle, the square, and the hexagon; viz. by six equilateral triangles, four squares, and three hexagons. But in solids, the pyramid and cube alone can fill the place, which is about one point. Of the first part of this admirable theorem, which is also mentioned, with the praise it deserves, by Proclus in his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, the following demonstration is given by Tacquet.—In order that any regular figures frequently repeated may fill space, viz. may form one continued superficies, it is requisite that the angles of many figures of that species composed about one point make four right angles; for so many exist about one point as is evident from Coroll. 3. Prop. 13. of the First Book of Euclid. Thus, for instance, that equilateral triangles may fill place, it is requisite that some angles of such triangles composed about one point should make four right angles. But 6 equilateral triangles make 4 right angles; for 1 makes $\frac{2}{3}$ of one right angle, and therefore 6 make $\frac{12}{3}$ of 1 right, *i. e.* 4 right angles. The 4 angles of a square, also, as is evident, make 4 right angles; and this is likewise the case with the 3 angles of a hexagon. For one makes $\frac{1}{3}$ of 1 right, and consequently 3 make $\frac{3}{3}$ of 1 right, that is, again 4 right. But that no other figure can effect this, will clearly appear, if, its angle being found, it is multiplied by any number; for the angles will always be less than, or exceed, 4 right angles.

Proclus observes, in reply to this argument of Aristotle, “ that the elements being placed by each other, and supernally compressed by the heaven, the more attenuated are compelled into the places of the more gross. Hence, being impelled, and entering into the place about one point, they fill up the deficiency. For Plato also assigns this as the cause of no vacuum being left, viz. that less are arranged about greater things. For thus the cavities of the air have pyramids which fill up the place ; those of water have dispersed octaedra ; and those of earth have all the figures ; and no place is empty.”

In the seventh argument, Aristotle says, “ that all simple bodies appear to be figured in the place which contains them, and especially water and air.” He adds, “ it is impossible, therefore, that the figure of an element should remain ; for the whole would not on all sides touch that which contains it. But if it were changed into another figure, it would no longer be water, if it differed in figure ; so that it is evident that the figures of it are not definite,” &c.

Proclus, in opposition to this seventh argument, observes, “ that he does not admit that the elements have a characteristic figure, since they can neither have it stably, nor abandon it.” He also says, “ that it is not the *wholenesses* of these four

bodies which are fashioned with these figures, but the elements of these, viz. those small and invisible bodies from the congress of which these sensible natures, fire, water, air, and earth, are produced. But the *wholes* of the elements have a spherical figure, being on all sides assimilated to the heaven. For each of them has something better than its own characteristic property, from more divine natures, just as things which approximate to the heaven have a circular motion. It is evident, therefore, that the last of the pyramids which are with the circumambient, (*i. e.* which are in contact with the sphere of the moon, this being the sphere in which fire is proximately contained,) though they consist of plane triangles, yet, being compressed, they become convex, in order that they may be adapted to the cavity of the heaven. But the parts existing in other things, as in vessels, and receiving configuration together with them, do not destroy the figure of the elements. For the bodies which contain others are from right-lined elements, and nothing prevents them from concurring with each other. But we, expecting to see the superficies of the containing bodies to be cylindrical or spherical, in consequence of being ignorant that they also consist of right-lined elements, are involved in doubt. All the containing natures, therefore,

were from the same things as the natures which they contain, and all are adapted to each other, according to planes.”

In the eighth argument, Aristotle says, “that neither flesh nor bone, nor any other composite, can be generated from the elements themselves, because that which is continued is not generated from composition, nor from the conjunction of planes: for the elements are generated by composition, and not those things which consist of the elements.”

Proclus, in objection to this, says, “that composition is not produced from air alone, nor from water alone. In these, therefore, things that have the smallest parts, being assumed between those that have great parts, fill place, and leave no void. But if this is opposition, and not union, you must not wonder; for it is necessary that they should be distant from each other. And if, when placed by each other, they are with difficulty separated, neither is this wonderful: bodies which consist of larger planes, not being naturally adapted to yield to those which consist of smaller, nor those which are composed of firmer, to those which derive their composition from easily movable planes.”

Aristotle, in the ninth argument, says, “that if the earth is a cube, because it is stable and abides; and if it abides not casually, but in its proper

place, and is moved from a foreign place, if nothing impedes it; and if this, in a similar manner, happens to fire and the other elements,—it is evident that fire, and each of the elements in a foreign place, will be a sphere or a pyramid, but in its proper place a cube.”

In opposition to this ninth argument, Proclus says, “that though the elements are in their proper places, yet such as consist of easily movable figures are not without motion; for pyramids are always moved from the dissimilitude of the vertex to the base. Thus also with respect to air, the elements of it, when it exists in its proper place, are assimilated to things perpetually flowing; and the elements of water love collision. For the summits are adjacent to the bases of their similars, and being impelled, they strike against the whole in the place in which each is contained. But being thus moved, they imitate the motion in a circle, neither being moved from the middle nor to the middle, but revolving about each other in their own place. The elements of earth, however, remain, because they have their summits the same with their bases. But nothing similar acts on the similar, whether they possess similitude according to figures, or according to power, or according to magnitude.”

“Farther still,” says Aristotle, “if fire heats

and burns through its angles, all the elements will impart heat, but one perhaps more than another; since all of them will have angles; as, for instance, the octaedron and the dodecaedron. And according to Democritus, a sphere also burns, as being a certain angle; so that they will differ by the more and the less. This, however, is evidently false."

Proclus, in opposition to this tenth argument, says, "that it is improperly assumed that an angle is calorific, and that a false conclusion is the consequence of this assumption. For Timæus assumes from sense, that sharpness and a power of dividing are certain properties of heat. But that which cuts, cuts not simply by an angle, but by the sharpness of the angle, and tenuity of the side. For thus also the arts make incisive instruments, and nature sharpens the angles of those teeth that are called incisores, and giving breadth to the grinders, has attenuated the sides. An acute angle also is subservient to rapid motion. Hence a power of this kind is not to be ascribed to an angle simply, but to the penetrating acuteness of the angle, the incisive tenuity of the side, and the celerity of the motion. It is likewise necessary that magnitude should be present, as in the pyramid, that it may forcibly enter. If, therefore, in fire alone there is acuteness of

angle, tenuity of side, and swiftness of motion, this element alone is very properly hot. This, however, is not the case with all fire, but with that alone which consists of larger pyramids; on which account, as Timæus says, there is a certain fire which illuminates indeed, but does not burn, because it is composed of the smallest elements. And according to this, fire is visible."

Aristotle adds, "at the same time also it will happen that mathematical bodies will burn and impart heat; for these likewise have angles; and atoms, cubes, spheres, and pyramids, are inherent in them, especially if, as they say, these are indivisible magnitudes. For if some of them burn, and others do not, the cause of this difference must be assigned, but not simply so as they assign it."

Proclus, well opposing what is here said, does that which Aristotle desires, viz. he assigns the difference consequent to the hypothesis according to which some bodies burn, but mathematical bodies do not burn. For Plato says, that burning bodies are material and moved figures; on which account also he says, that ζ is added to the name, this letter being the instrument of motion. Not every thing, therefore, which is angular, is calorific, unless it is acute-angled, is attenuated in its sides, and may be easily moved.

Again, Aristotle says, "let it be reasonable, therefore, that to cut and divide should be accidents to figure; yet, that a pyramid should necessarily make pyramids, or a sphere spheres, is perfectly absurd, and is just as if some one should think that a sword may be divided into swords, or a saw into saws."

To this also Proclus replies, "that fire dissolves the elements of that which it burns, and transmutes them into itself. But a sword does not act upon the essence of that which it cuts. For it does not dissolve the essence of it, but by dividing it, makes a less from a greater quantity; since it has not its figure essentially, but from accident. If, therefore, nothing which cuts changes that which is cut into the essence of itself, nor dissolves the form of it, how can it make a division into things similar to itself? But it may be said, Let bodies which are burnt be dissolved into triangles, for instance, water and air, and the elements of them, the icosaedron and octaedron, yet what is which composes the triangles of these into the figure of fire, viz. into the pyramid, so as that many such being conjoined, fire is produced? Plato therefore says, in the *Timæus*, that the triangles being dissolved by fire, do not cease to pass from one body into another until they come into another form; for instance, the triangles of

the icosaedron, which are divisible into octaedra, or rather till they pass into fire, which is of a dividing nature. For if they are composed into the nature of fire, they cease their transition; since similars neither act upon, nor suffer from each other. But it will be well to hear the most beautiful words themselves of Plato: 'When any one of the forms (says he), becoming invested by fire, is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, then, passing into the nature of fire, it suffers no farther discription. For no form is ever able to produce mutation or passivity, or any kind of alteration, in that which is similar and the same with itself; but as long as it passes into something else, and the more imbecile contends with the more powerful, it will not cease to be dissolved.' It is evident, however, that the planes are not composed casually, and as it may happen, at one time in this, and at another in that figure; but that which dissolves them exterminates the aptitude which they had to that figure, for instance, to the icosaedron, this aptitude being more gross and turbulent, and transfers it to the purer aptitude of the air which is near. And in the first place, they acquire a bulk from octaedra. Afterwards being dissolved by fire, they are more purified and attenuated, and become adapted to the composition of a pyramid. But it is evident that

to whatever form they are adapted, from their figure, they easily receive this form, and on this account, from water air is first generated, and then from air fire."

In the next place, Aristotle says, "that it is ridiculous to attribute a figure to fire for the purpose of dividing alone; for fire appears rather to collect and bring boundaries together, than to separate. For it separates accidentally things which are not of a kindred nature, and collects especially those which are."

Proclus opposes this argument, and says, "that the very contrary is true. For fire essentially separates, but collects things together accidentally; since to take away things of a foreign nature from such as are similar, predisposes the concurrence of the latter into each other, and their tendencies to the same thing. For all fiery natures, according to all the senses, have a separating power. Thus, heat separates the touch, the splendid separates the sight, and the pungent the taste. And farther still, all medicines which are of a fiery nature have a diaphoretic power. Again, every thing which collects strives to surround that which is collected, at the same time compelling it; but fire does not endeavour to surround, but to penetrate through bodies." Proclus adds, "that according to those, also, who

do not give figures to the elements, fire is thought to rank among things of the most attenuated parts. But a thing of this kind is rather of a separating nature, entering into other things, than of a collective nature. That what essentially separates, however, belongs to fire, is evident from this, that it not only separates things heterogeneous from each other, but every particular thing itself. For it melts silver, and gold, and the other metals, because it separates them."

Aristotle farther observes, "in addition to these things, since the hot and the cold are contrary in capacity, it is impossible to attribute any figure to the cold, because it is necessary that the figure which is attributed should be a contrary; but nothing is contrary to figure. Hence all physiologists omit this, though it is fit either to define all things or nothing by figures."

This objection also, Proclus dissolving says, "that the argument of Aristotle very properly requires that a figure should be assigned adapted to the cold; but that it is necessary to recollect concerning heat, how it was not said that heat is a pyramid, but that it is a power affective, through sharpness of angles and tenuity of side. Cold, therefore, is not a figure, as neither is heat,

but *it is the power* of a certain figure*. And as heat is incisive, so cold has a connective property. And as the former subsists according to sharpness of angles and tenuity of sides, so, on the the contrary, the latter subsists according to obtuseness of angles and thickness of sides. Hence, the former power is contrary to the latter, the figures themselves not being contrary, but the powers inherent in the figures. The argument, however, requires a figure, not in reality contrary, but adapted to a contrary power. Such figures, therefore, as have obtuse angles and thick sides, have powers contrary to the pyramid, and are connective of bodies. But such figures are the elements of three bodies. Hence all things that congregate, congregate through impulsion; but fire alone, as we have observed, has a separating power. †

* It is well observed by Simplicius, (De Cælo, p. 142,) “ that Plato and the Pythagoreans by a plane denoted something more simple than a body, atoms being evidently bodies; that they assigned commensuration and a demiurgic analogy [*i. e.* active and fabricative powers] to their figures, which Democritus did not to his atoms; and that they differed from him in their arrangement of earth.”

† Simplicius here remarks, “ that it may be doubted, how the powers which are in figures, being contrary, the figures themselves will not be contrary; for powers are adapted to the

Aristotle adds a fifteenth argument, after all that has been said, objecting to magnitude, and shewing that the Pythagoreans make the power of cold a cause, as consisting of great parts, because it compresses and does not pass through pores, as is indicated by what Plato says in the *Timæus* about cold.* Proclus, however, in op-

things by which they are possessed. Perhaps, therefore, he [*i. e.* Proclus] calls the four figures, the pyramid and the other regular bodies, which not being contrary, their powers are contrary; since their powers are not according to their figures. For neither the thick nor the thin, neither that which has large nor that which has small parts, neither that which is moved with difficulty nor that which is easily moved, are the differences of figure. Perhaps, too, neither are acuteness nor obtuseness of angles simply the differences of figure, since neither is an angle simply a figure. If, therefore, the dispositions of the hot and the cold, which are contrary, are effected according to these contrarieties, no absurdity will ensue. Hence the proposition which says, that things which are determined by figures are not contrary, requires a certain circumscription. For they are not contrary according to figures, yet they are not prevented from having contraries. If, however, some one should insist, that contrarieties are according to figures, it is necessary to recollect that Aristotle in this treatise says, that there is also in figures a certain contrariety."

* What Plato says on this subject in the *Timæus*, is as follows: "The moist parts of bodies larger than our humid parts, entering into our bodies, expel the smaller parts; but not being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our moisture, and cause it through equability to pass from an anomalous and agitated state, into one immovable and collected.

position to this, observes as follows : “ We do not determine the elements of simple bodies by magnitude alone, but also by thinness and thickness, by sharpness and facility of motion, and by immobility and difficulty of motion, which give variety to forms, and cause things which have the same form, not to differ by magnitude alone. For the magnitude of planes makes the largeness or smallness of parts in bodies ; since the parts of them are called elements. Thus, the pyramids of fire, of which fire consists, are the parts of fire, and octaedra are the parts of air. For the octaedron is greater than the pyramid, both being generated from an equal triangle. But the composition, together with so great a multitude, make the acute and the obtuse. For more or fewer triangles coming together, an angle, either acute or obtuse, is generated ; an acute angle, indeed, from a less, but an obtuse from a greater multitude. But the characteristic property of the planes produces facility or difficulty of motion ; these planes existing in a compact state, through similitude, but being prepared for tendency

But that which is collected together contrary to nature, naturally opposes such a condition, and endeavours by repulsion to recall itself into a contrary situation. In this contest and agitation, a trembling and numbness takes place ; and all this passion, together with that which produces it, is denominated cold.’

through dissimilitude. Large pyramids, therefore, do not belong to things which refrigerate, but to the larger parts of fire; just as larger octaedra belong to the larger parts of air, and larger icosaedra to larger parts of water. For from this cause waters are thin and thick, and airs are attenuated and gross; since it is evident that these are determined by quantity."

*From the Treatise in which a Solution is given of
Ten Doubts against Providence.*

PROVIDENCE, therefore, as we have said, being defined by *the one* and *the good*, and *the good* subsisting prior to intellect, — for intellect and all beings aspire after *the good*, but *the good* does not aspire after intellect, — it is necessary that the knowledge of providence should be above the knowledge of intellect. And thus it is also necessary that providence should know all things, by *the one* of itself, according to which one, it likewise benefits every thing intellectual and non-intellectual, vital and non-vital, beings and non-beings;* impressing in all things a unity, as an

* In the original, immediately after *καθὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν πάντα τὰ νοούντα*, it appears to me that the words *καὶ τὰ μὴ νοούντα, καὶ ζῶντα*, are wanting. This defect I have supplied in the above translation.

image of its own one. In short, when we assert that this one is productive of all things, we likewise say, that all things are preserved by it,—as that which has an hyparxis more true than all essence, and more manifest than all knowledge,—not being divided with, nor moved about, the objects of knowledge. For of these things, physical and intellectual knowledge has the peculiarities. For every intellect is *one many*, both in its existence, and its intellection. And every soul, since it is motion, intellectually perceives in conjunction with motion. But the one of providence abiding in its unity, being at one and the same time intransitive and indivisible, knows all things after the same manner; and thus knows, not only man and sun, and every other thing of this kind, but also every thing which ranks among particulars. For nothing escapes the knowledge of this one, whether you speak of its existence, or its capability of being known. Thus, the transcendently united knowledge of providence, is a knowledge of all divisible natures, in the same impartible one, and likewise of things the most indivisible, and of such as are most total. And as it gave subsistence to every thing by its own one, so by the same one, every thing is known by it.*

* This extract is to be found in the Treatise of Philoponus against Proclus *on the Eternity of the World*.

*From the Fifth Book of PROCLUS on the Timæus
of PLATO.**

IN this book, in which he explains the doctrine of Plato concerning material forms, he says, that qualities and all material forms derive their subsistence, according to Plato, from non-being, and again perish by returning into non-being, when the composite is dissolved. He then adds as follows: "Would it not, however, be better to say, that material forms, and not only qualities, are the things which are said to enter into and depart from matter; for these, and not qualities, are the resemblances of intelligibles? It is worth while, therefore, to survey whither this form departs. If, indeed, it departs into nature, an absurdity will ensue: for nature would receive something similar to the things which are posterior to it, and which proceed from it. Just as if some one should say, that any thing departs from generation into an intelligible essence. But if we should assert that this form departs into another matter, we should speak contrary to what is evident. For when fire is extinguished, and the matter is converted into air, we do not see

* This extract is only to be found in the Treatise of Philoponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.

that another matter is enkindled [after its departure]. And if material forms are in themselves, they will be intelligibles, and self-subsistent and impartible natures. Whence, therefore, does bulk derive its subsistence? Whence interval? Whence is the war to obtain possession of a common subject derived? For things which are in themselves do not contend in a hostile manner for a common seat; since neither are they indigent of a certain subject. But if material forms are neither in nature nor in themselves, and it is not possible that such forms should be in matter after their corruption, it is necessary that they should proceed into non-being. For this universe would not remain, matter always remaining, if form alone subsisted without generation, and perished without corruption.”*

* Forms, when they proceed into matter, and in consequence of this become materialised, resemble (as Plotinus beautifully observes in his *Treatise on the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures*) “shadow falling upon shadow, like images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream.”

ARGUMENTS

IN PROOF OF

THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD.

1. THE first argument is unfortunately lost; but from what may be collected from Philoponus, the substance of it appears to have been this: “that the artificer of the world being an eternally energising being, and energising essentially, the universe must be consubsistent with him, in the same manner as the sun, which produces light by its very being, has the light so produced consubsistent with itself, and neither is light prior or posterior to the sun, nor the sun to light; just as the shadow which proceeds from a body that is situated in the light, is always consubsistent with it.”*

* Thus, too, Sallust, in cap. 7, *De Diis et Mundo*: αναγκη δια την του θεου αγαθοτητα οντος του κοσμου, αιτε τον θεον αγαθον ειναι, και τον κοσμον υπαρχειν, ωσπερ ηλιω μεν και πυρι συνυφισταται φως, σωματι δε σκια. i. e. “Since the world subsists through the goodness of divinity, it is necessary that divinity should always be good, and that the world should always exist; just as light is consubsistent with the sun and with fire, and shadow with the body [by which it is produced].”

Argument the Second.

THE paradigm of the world is eternal ; and his existence, as a paradigm, is that which is essential, and not accidental to him. But because he possesses the power of being a paradigm essentially, hence, as* he is eternal, he will be eternally the paradigm of the world. If, however, an existence eternally is present with the paradigm, the image also will necessarily always exist ; for a paradigm is a paradigm with reference to an image. But if the image was not when the paradigm was not, neither will the paradigm be when the image is not ; † since, in this case, it will no longer be a paradigm. For either it will not be a paradigm if the image is not, or it will not be the paradigm of the image. Of things, therefore, which are predicated with reference to each other, the one cannot exist if the other is not. Hence, if the paradigm of the world is eternally the paradigm of it, the world *always* is an image of an eternally existing paradigm.

* For *διᾶτι*, in the original, it is necessary to read *διᾱτι*.

† Because the paradigm here is essentially a paradigm, so as not to exist without being a paradigm.

Argument the Third.

IF a fabricator [or demiurgus] is the fabricator of a certain thing, he will either be always a fabricator in energy, or at a certain time in capacity only, so as not to fabricate eternally. If, therefore, there is a fabricator in energy, who is always a fabricator, that which is fabricated by him will always exist, as being a thing fabricated according to an eternal energy. For Aristotle says, that when the cause exists in energy, the effect will also in a similar manner be in energy; viz. if the cause be a builder in energy, there will be that which is built; if the cause be that which actually heals, there will be that which is actually healed. And Plato, in the *Philebus*, says, that the maker is the maker of a certain thing which is made. But if that which is fabricated does not subsist in energy, neither will that which fabricates it be in energy. If, however, the fabricator is not in energy, he will be in capacity; viz. before he fabricates, he will possess in capacity the power of fabricating. But every thing which is in capacity a certain thing, says Aristotle, becomes that thing in energy, through some other thing which exists in energy. Thus, that which is hot in capacity becomes actually hot, through that

which is hot in energy ; and the like is true of the cold, the white, and the black. Hence the fabricator, who had a prior subsistence in capacity, will become an actual fabricator, through some one who is a fabricator in energy. And if the latter, indeed, is always in energy the cause of the former being a fabricator, the former will always be a fabricator through the preceding axiom,* which says, when the cause is in energy, the effect also produced by it will be in energy ; so that the thing which is fabricated by an eternally energising cause always is. But if this cause is at a certain time the cause in capacity of the fabricator fabricating, again this cause will require some other cause, which enables it to be in energy the maker of the energising fabricator ; and this in consequence of the second axiom, which says, that every thing which is in capacity requires that which is in energy, in order that it may itself have a subsistence in energy. And again, the same reasoning will take place with respect to that other cause, and we must either proceed to infinity, in investigating one cause before another, which

* It appears, from what is here said, that certain axioms preceded this work, which, as the beginning is wanting, are lost ; and this being the case, it is more than probable that these arguments of Proclus were originally in the form of propositions, like his Physical and Theological Elements.

leads the proposed cause from capacity to energy, or we shall be compelled to grant, that there is a certain cause which always exists in energy. But this being granted, it follows that the effects of that cause must likewise always subsist in energy, and that the world is always fabricated, if the Demiurgus of it is always the Demiurgus. This follows from the two axioms, one of which is, that such as is the condition of one of two relatives, such also is that of the other, viz. that if the one is in capacity, so also is the other; and if the one is in energy, the other also is in energy. But the other axiom is, that every thing which is in capacity, changes into another thing in energy, through a certain thing which is in energy, the thing so changed being first in capacity and afterwards in energy.

Argument the Fourth.

EVERY thing which is generated from a cause essentially immovable is immovable. For if that which makes is immovable, it is immutable; but if immutable, it makes by its very being, not passing from efficient energy into non-efficiency, nor from non-efficiency into efficiency. For if it had transition, it would also have mutation, viz. a

transition from the one to the other. But if it has mutation, it will not be immovable. Hence, if any thing is immovable, it will either never be an effector, or it will always be so ; lest, in consequence of being effective at a certain time, it should be moved. So that if there is an immovable cause of a certain thing, and which neither never is not* a cause, nor is a cause only at a certain time, it will always be a cause. If, however, this be true, it will be the cause of that which is perpetual. If, therefore, the cause of the universe is immovable, (lest, being moved, he should be at first imperfect, but afterwards perfect, since every motion is an imperfect energy ; and lest, being moved, he should be in want of time, though he produces time,)—this being the case, it is necessary that the universe should be perpetual, as being produced by an immovable cause. Hence, if any one wishing to conceive piously of the cause of the universe, should say that he alone is perpetual, but that this world is not perpetual, he will evince that this cause is moved, and is not immovable, in consequence of asserting that the world is not perpetual. But by asserting that this cause is moved, and is not immovable, he must also assert

* *Ovz* is here erroneously omitted in the original, and appears also to have been omitted in the MS. from which Mahotius made his translation.

that he is not always perfect, but that he was at a certain time likewise imperfect, because all motion is imperfect energy, and is indigent of that which is less excellent, viz. of time, through which motion is effected. He, however, who asserts that this cause is at a certain time imperfect, and not always perfect, and that he is indigent of time, is transcendently impious. *Hence, he who fancies that he is pious towards the cause of the universe, in asserting that this cause alone is perpetual, is, in thus asserting, remarkably impious.*

Argument the Fifth.

IF time subsist together with heaven [*i. e.* with the universe], and neither* can the universe exist if time is not, nor time if the universe has no existence; and if time was not, when the universe†

* ΟΥΤΕ is here omitted in the original, but it is obviously necessary that it ought to be inserted; and this is confirmed by the version of Mahotius, who found ΟΥΤΕ in this place in his MS.; for his version is “neque cœlum est, si non sit tempus,” &c.

† ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ is here wanting in the original; or, at least, it is requisite to conceive it to be implied. Philoponus, however, not perceiving this, though it must be evident to every one who understands the reasoning of Proclus, has, as usual, made himself ridiculous in his attempt to confute this fifth argument.

was not, neither will time be when the universe does not exist. For if the universe *was* when time was not, it then follows that time *was* when time *was not*. For that which *once* was is said to have existed *once*, in consequence of at a certain time not having existed; since it is neither that which eternally exists, nor that which never exists, but is the medium between both. But wherever there is the *once*, there time exists. And if the universe will be when time will not have an existence, thus passing from existing at a certain time to not existing at a certain time,* in this case, time will then be when there will be no time [because time and the universe are consubsistent]: for the term $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$ (or, at a certain time) is temporal. If, therefore, the universe neither was when time was not, neither will it be when time ceases to exist. For a subsistence at a certain time ($\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$) which pertains to both these, time not existing, will yet be temporal.† Time therefore always is. For to a subsistence at a certain time, either *the always* is

* If the universe *will be* when time has no existence, it will then not exist *at a certain time*, because time is no more. But as *will be* pertains to time,—time, as Proclus says, will then be when there will be no time.

† Because if time once was not, or if time hereafter will not be, then in either case there will be a time when there is no time, which is absurd.

opposed, or *the never*. But it is impossible that *the never* should be opposed to it; for, in short, time has an existence. Hence, time is perpetual. But heaven [or the universe] is consubsistent with time, and time with heaven. For time is the measure of the motion of heaven, just as eternity is of the life of animal itself;* which thing itself shews that time is perpetual. For if this be not admitted, either eternity will be the paradigm of nothing, time not existing, though eternity exists, or neither will eternity itself possess the power of always remaining that which it is;† in consequence of the paradigm of either passing from non-existence into existence, or into non-existence from existence. The heaven therefore always‡ is, in the same manner as time, proceeding into existence together with time, and being generated

* Eternity is the second monad, and animal itself, or the paradigm of the universe, is the third monad of the intelligible triad. See the Third Book of my Translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

† The original of this sentence is, *ινα μη ο αιων η μηδενος η παραδειγμα χρονου, μη οντος αιων υπαρχων, η μηδε αυτος εχη το αιι μενειν ο εστι.* But it is necessary to alter the punctuation of the former part of it, so as to render it conformable to the above translation; and instead of reading *παραδειγμα χρονου, μη οντος αιων υπαρχων*, to read *παραδειγμα, χρονου μη οντος, αιων υπαρχων.*

‡ In the original, *και ο ουρανος αρα εστιν*; but it is obviously necessary to read *και ο ουρανος αιι αρα εστιν.*

neither prior nor posterior to time ; but, as Plato says, it was generated, and is, and will be, through the whole of time.*

Argument the Sixth.

THE Demiurgus alone can dissolve the world : for Plato says [in the *Timæus*] that it is in every respect indissoluble, except by him by whom it was bound ; for every where it is the province of him who knows [and is the cause of] a bond, to know also the mode of dissolving that which he bound ; and it is the province of him who knows the mode of dissolution to dissolve. But the Demiurgus will never dissolve the world. For it is he who says [in the *Timæus* of Plato], “ that it pertains only to an evil nature to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonised and constituted well.” But as it is impossible for him who is truly good to be evil, it is impossible that the world should be dissolved. For neither can it be dissolved by any other, because it is possible for the Demiurgus alone to dissolve it ; nor can it be dissolved by its fabricator, because it is the pro-

* This is asserted by Plato, of heaven, or the universe, in the *Timæus*.

vince of an evil nature to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonised. Either, therefore, he has not beautifully harmonised the world, and, in this case, he is not the best of artificers; or he has beautifully harmonised it, and will not dissolve it, lest he should become evil, which is a thing impossible. Hence the universe is indissoluble, and therefore incorruptible. But if incorruptible, it was not generated* [according to a temporal generation]. *For corruption pertains to every thing which is generated*,† as Socrates says in his conference with Timæus on the preceding day,‡ not in his own words, but professing to utter what the Muses assert. And it is evident that Timæus did not consider this dogma of the Muses to be superfluous; since he admits that there is a certain incorruptible genus. If, therefore, this be true, that which is incorruptible is unbegotten, [*i. e.* never had any temporal beginning of its existence]. But the world is incorruptible, and therefore is unbegotten. Hence also the world is perpetual, if it is unbegotten and incorruptible.

* Ου γενομενον is here erroneously omitted in the original; but this deficiency is supplied in the version of Mahotius, which has here “ne ortum quidem est.”

† In the original, παντι γενομενη φθορα εστι, but after παντι it is necessary to add γαρ.

‡ This is asserted in the Eighth Book of the Republic; for it is there said, γενομενη παντι φθορα εστιν.

Argument the Seventh.

IF the soul of the universe is unbegotten and incorruptible, the world also is unbegotten and incorruptible. For the soul of the world, and likewise every soul, is essentially self-motive; but every thing self-motive is the fountain and principle of motion. If, therefore, the soul of the universe is perpetual, it is necessary that the universe should always be moved by this soul. For as the universe was not moved by the motion of soul, either prior or posterior to soul, it is not possible that soul should not be the principle of its motion, since it is essentially self-motive, and on this account is the principle of motion. Moreover, soul, through being self-motive, is unbegotten and incorruptible. The universe, therefore, is unbegotten and incorruptible. Hence it is evident that every [rational soul] first ascends into a perpetual body [as into a vehicle], and always moves this body.* And likewise, when it is in corruptible bodies, it moves them, though the bodies which are perpetually moved by it.

* Concerning this vehicle of the soul, which is ethereal, see my Translation of the Fifth Book of Proclus on the *Timæus* of Plato.

Argument the Eighth.

EVERY thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by the incursion of something foreign to its nature, and is corrupted into something foreign to itself; but there is nothing external or foreign to the universe, since it comprehends in itself all things, being a whole of wholes, and perfect from things of a perfect nature. Neither, therefore, will there be any thing foreign to the universe, nor can it be corrupted into any thing foreign, or be generated by a nature foreign to itself. Hence it is incorruptible, and, in consequence of this, it is likewise unbegotten. For every thing which is generated, is generated from something which, prior to what is generated, was foreign to it; so that there will be something which is foreign to the universe. But this will be external to that which is generated. Hence, there will be something external to the universe, which is foreign to the universe before it was generated. But if this be the case, there will be something contrary to the universe from which it was generated. Contraries, however, are produced from each other, and change into each other; and these being two, there are two paths between them, as is demonstrated through many arguments in the *Phædo*, in which it is

shewn, that of contraries the one yields to the other, and that nature is not idle. It is evident, therefore, indeed, that what has an orderly arrangement is opposed to that which is disorderly and without arrangement. But if these are opposed as habit and privation, and there is a mutation from privation to habit, much more is there a mutation from habit to privation; for the former is much more impossible than the latter, because certain privations cannot be changed into habits.* If, therefore, that which is more impossible to be generated was generated, in a much greater degree will that be which is more possible; and that which has an orderly arrangement will be changed into that which is without arrangement, and this will be conformable to nature and the will of divinity: for he who produces that which is more impossible, will much more produce that which is more possible. But if these are contraries, according to the law of contraries, the universe will be changed into the contrary of that from which it was generated. It has been demonstrated, however, that the universe is incorruptible. It will

* The original here is erroneous, for it is *διότι στέρησις ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ στέρησις εἰς ἐξίν ἀμεταβλητοί*. Instead of which, it is requisite to read *διότι τινες στέρησις εἰς ἐξίν εἰσιν ἀμεταβλητοί*. Conformably to this, the version of Mahotius has, “quæ nonnullæ sunt privationes, quæ in habitum sunt immutabiles.”

not, therefore, be changed into any thing contrary; so that neither was it generated [in time], and therefore is perpetual. For it is not possible, when there are two contraries, that there should be a path from the former of the two to the latter, and yet not from the latter to the former. Nor is it possible in privation and habit, that there should be a path from privation to habit, but not from habit to privation. For in certain things, there is not a path from privation to habit. There is, however, a mutation of contraries into each other, as Socrates says in the Phædo. So that either the universe is not incorruptible, or it is in a much greater degree unbegotten than incorruptible, whether that which is without arrangement is contrary to that which has arrangement, or whether that which is without arrangement is the privation of that which is arranged.

Argument the Ninth.

EVERY thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by its own evil.* For it is not corrupted by its

* This is asserted by Plato, in the Tenth Book of the Republic, as follows, το ξυμφυτον αρα κακον εκαστου και η πονηρια εκαστον απολλυσιν.

own proper good, or by that which is peculiar to it, and which is neither good nor evil, but of an intermediate nature.* For every thing of this kind neither injures nor benefits, so that it neither corrupts nor preserves. If, therefore, the universe could be corrupted, it would be corrupted by its own evil. But Plato says [in the *Timæus*], that the world is a blessed God, and in a similar manner that all the Gods are blessed; and on this account, every genus of Gods being unreceptive of evil, is also unreceptive of mutation. The universe, therefore, to which nothing is evil, will never be corrupted; because it also is a God. But if the universe is incorruptible, because it has not any thing corruptive in its nature, neither has it a temporal generation. For that from which the generation of a thing is derived, is corruptive of that thing. For if it is vanquished, indeed, it is an assistant cause of generation; but if it vanquishes, it is an assistant cause of corruption. Hence, if there is nothing which can corrupt the universe, neither will it have any thing from which it can be generated. But there is nothing which can corrupt it, since there is nothing which is an evil to it. For what can corrupt that which has an orderly arrangement, except that which is

* For *διαφορου* here, it is necessary to read *αδιαφορου*. The version also of Mahotius has "*medium*."

without arrangement, or that which is adorned, except that which is deprived of ornament? for this is an evil, to that which is adorned, and arranged in an orderly manner. If, therefore, there is any thing which is evil to the universe, the universe will contain in itself the unadorned and the unarranged, into which it will be dissolved: but if there is nothing which is evil to it, there will not be a certain privation of order and ornament hostile to the universe, which is arranged and adorned. If, however, it is free from all hostile privation of ornament and order, neither was it generated from any thing deprived of order and ornament, since neither is a thing of this kind hostile to it. But if nothing is evil to it, neither will it have any thing from which it can be generated; and there not being any thing from which it can be generated, it must be unbegotten. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated, should be generated from something, since it is impossible that it should be generated from nothing.

Argument the Tenth.

EACH of the elements of which the world consists, when in its proper place, either remains in

that place, or is moved in a circle ;* but when it is not in its own place, it endeavours to arrive thither. If, therefore, the elements of the universe either remain in their proper place, or are moved in a circle ; if they remain in the place which is natural to them, they are then in a natural condition of being ; but if they are moved in a circle, they will neither have an end nor a beginning of their motion.† And this being the case, it is evident that the universe is immutable, some things in it having places adapted to them according to nature, but others being moved without beginning and without end. For the natures in this sublunary region are changed, in consequence of being in a foreign place, and the things of which they consist hastening to obtain their proper abode. If, therefore, the elements of the universe are in their proper places, and nothing which ranks as a whole tends to a foreign place, nor if it did, could offer violence to that which is in its proper place, it is necessary that the universe should be immutable ;

* This was an axiom of Plotinus, and also of Ptolemy, which in the original is, *παν σωμα απλου εν τη οικειη τοστω ον, ακινητον μινει, η κυκλω κινιται.* Vid. Procl. in Tim. pp. 142 and 274.

† This is demonstrated by Aristotle, and by Proclus, in Lib. II. Element. Physic. Theorem. XVII. See my Translation of Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens, Book II. Chap. 3.

since all things always subsist in it according to nature, not only such as rank as wholes, but those that permanently abide in it, and those that are moved. Hence, if before the universe was adorned, the natures which it contained were in their proper places, they either permanently remained in it, or were moved in a circle, and thus again the universe was adorned before it was adorned, and had no temporal beginning of its adornment; all things subsisting in it in a similar manner, both now and formerly. But if the several natures which the universe contains were in foreign places, (for they were entirely in places, being bodies,) *they would require a transposition derived from an external cause.** Hence, there will be two principles, one of that which is preternatural, but the other of that which is according to nature; and *that which is preternatural will be prior to that which is according to nature;†* that which is preternatural being a

* The original in the latter part of this sentence is defective, since from the version of Mahotius it appears, that after μεταθεσιως it is requisite to add εζωθεν προσδιδωνται. For his version of this latter part is, "Transpositione aliunde indigebant."

† In the original, και προτερον το παρα φυσιν του κατα φυσιν, which is doubtless the true reading; but Mahotius most erroneously translates this passage as follows: "Atque id quod est secundum naturam, prius est eo, quod est contra naturam."

departure from nature. But nature having no existence whatever, (if these things are admitted,) neither will there be that which is preternatural; just as if art had no existence, neither would there be that which is not conformable to art. *For that existing which is not according or conformable to a certain thing, will be in consequence of that existing to which it is not conformable.* So that if there were places of these according to nature, it is immanifest whether these places, being more ancient, subsisted naturally for an infinite time. But if there were no other places which were the proper receptacles of these, neither would those places be foreign in which they were situated: for that which is foreign is referred to that which is proper or peculiar. If, however, then also these natures were not in foreign places, when they were in the receptacles which they then had, just as now they are not in foreign places, it follows that they then likewise had an existence according to nature, in the same manner as they now have. Hence, the world will always exist; at different times different things subsisting, either according to nature, or preternaturally, with reference to the beings which the world contains. Hence, too, the world, so far as it is the world, is perpetual. But a thing of this kind exists in the world

alone.* And if such a thing does not always exist, the universe will be transformed, yet still will be perpetual. And as that preternatural subsistence is to what now exists, so is what is now preternatural to that. Both in that state of things likewise, and in this, all things existed in their proper places; but differently at different times. Empedocles, likewise, wisely supposes the world to be made alternately, except that he supposes this to take place frequently; but we admit it to take place only twice.†

* *i. e.* A thing which at different times has either a natural or a preternatural subsistence.

† Proclus, in asserting that he admits the world to have been made only twice, doubtless alludes to what is said by Plato in the *Timæus*, viz. “That the Demiurgus, receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved in a confused and disorderly manner, led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former.” This separation, however, of the unadorned from the adorned never actually existed, but only exists in our conceptions, as Proclus observes, at the end of the Fourteenth of these Arguments; and, as Porphyry and Iamblichus very properly remark, only indicates how the whole corporeal-formed composition subsists, when considered itself by itself, viz. that it is then disorderly and confused. This twofold state, therefore, of the world, *i. e.* the unadorned and adorned, is the twofold fabrication admitted by Proclus.

Argument the Eleventh.

MATTER (says Plato) subsists for the sake of the universe, for it is the receptacle of generation; but that for the sake of which matter exists, is nothing else than generation. If, therefore, matter derives its existence from nothing, it will exist casually for the sake of something; and that which is generated will have matter fortuitously. Nothing, however, which subsists fortuitously is necessary; so that we must say, that neither does the fabrication of things possess stability. But if matter is from a certain cause, and for the sake of generation, these, viz. matter and generation, necessarily subsist in conjunction with each other. For that which exists for the sake of a certain thing, and that for the sake of which a thing exists, are in conjunction with each other; for they have a reference to each other, or are relatives. If, therefore, matter is perpetual, and, so far as it is matter, exists for the sake of something else, generation also is perpetual: for it is necessary that this also should subsist for the sake of a certain thing, because it is generation. Hence, matter and generation are consubsistent with each other for ever, in the same manner as that for the sake of which a thing

exists, and that which exists for the sake of that thing. For matter exists for the sake of something, viz. for the sake of the form which it contains. For a certain matter is then matter, when it has form. Hence, artists cause matter, which has not been yet adorned, to become adapted to the reception of a certain form;* and according to the proficiency which they make in preparing the matter, in such proportion also does form accede. For stones are not the matter of the form of the house, till they are made smooth, if it should happen to be requisite, and become properly adapted, and then they are the matter (from which the house can be built). When, therefore, the stones become truly the requisite matter, then form is instantaneously present. If, therefore, that which is simply matter, is entirely the matter of all generation, and is all things in capacity, and is not indigent of any thing in order to its existence as matter, as is the case with that which ranks as some particular thing, (for that which exists simply, is every where a thing of this kind, and is so primarily, and is not in want of any thing to its existence,)—this being the case, all forms simultaneously exist

* In the original, *διο και ευεργον ποιουσιν οι τεχνιται, την μηπω ουσαν υλην*. But for *ουσαν* in this passage, I read, conformably to the above translation, *κοσμουσαν*.

in that which is simply matter ; for matter not being in want of any thing to its existence, it is also not indigent of any thing in order to its possession of forms. Hence, it derives from the cause of its existence, the forms of which it is the matter. But it is unbegotten and incorruptible, lest it should be in want of another matter, though it exists as matter simply considered. Forms, therefore, subsist in it perpetually, and also the world, for matter is the matter of the world, and not of that which is disorderly, and deprived of ornament. Matter also existed for the sake of the world, and not for the sake of that which is destitute of order. For matter does not exist for the sake of privation, but for the sake of form : and hence the world subsists from that cause from which the matter of it is derived.

Argument the Twelfth.

EVERY thing which is generated requires matter, and an efficient cause ; so that, if that which is generated does not exist always, but only sometimes, this takes place either through the inaptitude of the matter, or through the efficient cause failing in productive energy, or

through both these; neither the matter being adapted, nor the maker possessing a sufficiency of productive power. If, therefore, the world formerly was not, or will not be hereafter, this will happen to it either through the matter of which it consists, or through the cause by which the world was produced. The maker of the world, however, always possesses a sufficiency of productive power, since he is eternally the same, and does not subsist differently at different times. Either, therefore, neither now does the maker of the world possess a sufficiency of effective power, or he possesses this now, and did formerly, and will hereafter. And with respect to matter, either it was always adapted to be adorned after the same manner as it is now, or neither now, though it always subsists after the same manner: for matter remains invariably the same, just as the maker of the world is immutable. If, therefore, every thing which at one time is, but at another is not, is such, either through the insufficiency of the maker, or through matter not always possessing a proper aptitude; but the maker of the world, is not at one time sufficient to produce it, and at another not sufficient, nor is matter at one time properly adapted, but at another not;—if this be the case, the world will not exist at one time, but at another not. The Demiurgus, therefore,

produces, matter is adorned, and the world is for ever.

Argument the Thirteenth.

PLATO says, “ that Divinity imparted to the world a motion adapted to a spherical body, viz. a circular motion, which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom.” If, therefore, he grants that this motion is adapted to the world, he will also grant that heaven, or the universe, naturally resolves in a circle ; but if it has this motion according to nature, we must say, that neither a motion upward, nor a motion downward, [nor a progressive motion,]* pertain to it. These, however, are the motions of the sublunary elements.† It is necessary, therefore, that heaven should be exempt from the rectilinear

* The words within the brackets are added from the version of Mahotius, whose version of this sentence is, “ Quare si à natura motum hunc obtinet, neque eum motum, quo sursùm itur, neque eum, quo deorsùm descenditur, neque progressionem ipsi convenire dixerimus.” But the Greek is, *εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν, οὐτ’ ἀντὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνω κίνησιν, οὐτε τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φαιμεν αὐτῷ προσηκείν.* It appears, therefore, that immediately after *κατὰ*, it is requisite to insert the words *οὐτε τὴν κατὰ πορείαν.*

† This sentence shews the necessity of the above emendation. For the motion of fire and air is upward, of earth downward, and the motion of water is *progressive*.

motions of [sublunary] bodies. Hence, it is neither fire, nor earth, nor any one of the bodies which are situated between these; nor is a celestial body light or heavy, if that which tend downwards is heavy, and that which tend upward is light; but if that which is moved in a circle is no one of these elements, it will be something different from them. If, therefore, generation and corruption, are among the number of things contrary to each other; but things which have contrary motions according to nature, are contraries, and one thing is contrary to one, (for this is said by Plato in the Protagoras,)—if this be the case, these things, indeed, will be corrupted and generated; but a celestial body will be unbegotten and incorruptible. If, however, these [*i. e.* the celestial and sublunary wholes] are in their parts, indeed, generated and corrupted, but the wholes always exist according to nature, remaining in their proper places, and if the world consists of these, viz. of heaven, and the wholes of the four elements;—this being the case, the world will be without generation, and without corruption. Such things, therefore, as are in any way whatever generated and corrupted, are the effects, and not parts* of

* “Part” (says Proclus, in his Commentary on the Parmenides of Plato,) “has a manifold signification; for we call that

the world, the Gods which it contains (as Plato says)* borrowing parts from the world, and the genera of efficient causes, as things which are

a part, which is in a certain respect the same with the whole, and which possesses all such things *partially*, as the whole does totally. Thus, we call each of the multitude of intellects, a part of the intellect which ranks as a whole, though all forms exist in each; and we say, that the inerratic sphere is a part of the universe, though this sphere also comprehends all things in itself, yet in a manner different from that in which they are comprehended by the world. In the second place, we denominate that to be a part which gives completion to a certain thing. Thus, we say, that the whole [celestial and sublunary] spheres, are parts of the universe, and that the ratiocinative power, and the power by which we opine, are parts of the soul; the former of which give completion to the universe, but the latter to the soul. In addition to these, likewise, we denominate, according to a common signification, every thing a part, which in any way whatever is co-arranged with certain things, in order to effect the consummation of one thing. For thus it may be said, that each of us is a part of the world, not that the universe, so far as it is the universe, receives its completion through us; for neither would the universe become imperfect, by the destruction of any one of us; but because we also are co-arranged with the parts of the universe that rank as wholes, and are governed in conjunction with all other things, and are, in short, in the world as in one animal, are ourselves parts of the universe, and give completion to it, not so far as it exists, but so far as it is prolific." What is here said, therefore, by Proclus, about the natures which are generated and corrupted in the world, are parts of it, according to the last signification of part, as above explained.

* See the Note on Argument the Fourteenth.

again to be restored to it. These, however, have the appearance of being parts of the universe, which are comprehended in it; though other effects also are comprehended in their proper causes, and are connected by them. Hence, if the world consists of things which are unbegotten and incorruptible, it will itself be unbegotten and incorruptible in a much greater degree. For the whole would be less excellent than its parts, if it indeed had generation and corruption, but the parts, on the contrary, were without generation, and without corruption; though it is Plato himself who says, that the whole is more excellent than the parts. For the whole is not for the sake of the parts, but the parts are for the sake of the whole. But that for the sake of which a thing exists, [or the final cause,] is better than those things which subsist for the sake of the final cause. The elements, however, are parts of that which has its composition from them. And hence, that which consists of the elements, is more excellent than the elements of which it consists. If, therefore, heaven, or the universe, consists of unbegotten and incorruptible elements, it will also itself be unbegotten and incorruptible. And this likewise is demonstrated from Platonic principles.

Argument the Fourteenth.

EVERY artist either gives subsistence to the matter of that which is the subject of his art, or he causes the matter which already exists to be adapted to his purpose. And if he makes the matter which already exists to be adapted to his purpose, he makes the matter [on which his art operates]. For the thing which is properly adapted to his purpose, indicates the matter [of his art], and not simply a subject. So far, therefore, as matter is without adaptation, it has not the power of matter [*i. e.* not of a matter fit for the operations of art]. Whether, therefore, the artist gives subsistence to his proper matter, or whether he makes the matter when it merely exists as a subject, to be adapted to his purpose, he is entirely the maker of the matter of his proper work. But if this is true of every partial artist, much more does the divine Artist make his proper matter, either giving subsistence to matter itself, or causing it to be adapted to his purpose; in order that he may not be more ignoble than the artificers of sublunary natures, by borrowing matter which he does not return, and to which he does not give subsistence; since these restore the parts which they borrowed from him, in order to accomplish

the generation of mortal natures.* Since, therefore, the artificer of the universe is also the artificer of matter, which is defined to be the receptacle and nurse of generation,† he likewise made it to be the receptacle of generation. For it has no other existence than an existence as matter, since the definition of it is to be the receptacle of generation. Hence, whether the Demiurgus of the universe gave it the requisite adaptation, he made it to be the receptacle of generation, viz.

* Proclus here alludes to the following passage in the *Timæus* of Plato: *νοησαντες οι παιδες την του πατρος ταξιν, επειδοντο αυτη, και λαβοντες αθανατον αρχην θνητου ζωου, μιμουμενοι τον σφιστερον δημιουργον, πυρος και γης υδατος τε και αιρος απο του κοσμου δανειζομενοι μορια, ως αποδοθησομενα παλιν, κ. τ. λ. i. e.* “As soon as his children [*i. e.* the junior gods] understood the order of their father [*viz.* of the Demiurgus], they became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they should restore back again,” &c.

† Matter is thus defined by Plato in the *Timæus*: for he there says of it, *τινα ουν δυναμιν και φυσιν αυτο υποληπτειον, τοιανδε μαλιστα πασης ειναι γενεσεως υποδοχεν αυτο, οιον τιθηνην.* But for *οιον τιθηνην*, which is the reading of all the editions of the *Timæus*, it is necessary, both from the citation of Proclus and the version of Ficinus, to read, *και οιον τιθηνην.* For his version of the latter part of this extract is, “*Hanc utique generationis horum omnium receptaculum, et quasi nutricem esse.*” So that, according to Plato, “matter is the receptacle, and, as it were, nurse of all generation.”

he made it to be matter ; or whether he gave subsistence to matter, he immediately made it to be the matter of the world. Hence also every artist makes one of these. But whichever he makes of these, he makes, as we have said, matter. If, therefore, the artificer of this universe made matter to be the receptacle of generation, he either gave subsistence to the vestiges of forms, by which matter became moved in a confused and disorderly manner, being of itself immovable and perfectly formless ; or we must say that these vestiges of forms proceeded into matter from some other source, viz. from some other deity, who belongs to the intelligible order.* If, therefore, the artificer of the universe is the cause of these vestiges of forms, is it not most absurd that he should make matter properly adapted to be the receptacle of generation, and should likewise impart these vestiges, through which matter would not be adapted to be properly fashioned, but would with difficulty be rendered fit for the hypothesis of generation ? For that which is disorderly is hostile to that which is orderly. But the receptacle of generation is not hostile to generation

* Viz. from Phanes, according to Orpheus, or *animal* itself, according to Plato, which deity subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. See the Second Book of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus.

which has an orderly arrangement. If, however, there is a certain other cause of the vestiges of forms, is it not irrational to suppose that this cause makes matter to be properly and easily adapted, but that the other causes it to be adapted with difficulty; and that the former of these causes should wait, till that which he had produced with a proper adaptation should first become unadapted, in order that he might afterwards make this universe, for the sake of which he caused matter to have a proper adaptation, as if he was not able to give perfection to that which is adapted, till it became unadapted? For it is absurd to suppose that he made matter to be easily adapted, in order that it might alone itself, by itself, receive the vestiges of forms. For in this case he would cause it to be properly adapted, that generation might be inordinately produced. But if he made matter for the purpose of its receiving generation with arrangement, how is it possible that, from those things from which, at the same time that he caused matter to be properly adapted, he gave subsistence to generation, he should wait till a disorderly arrangement took place, in order that he might thus give arrangement to that which was without arrangement, just as if he was incapable of giving subsistence to order without the privation of order? If, therefore, these things are

absurd, and the vestiges of forms were not prior in time to the arrangement of them, and the subject matter, together with the vestiges of forms, is unbegotten, the order likewise which is in them is unbegotten; nor is there any thing pertaining to these which is prior or posterior. Moreover, neither was matter first generated, and afterwards the vestiges of forms; for the very essence of it is to be matter in conjunction with the vestiges of forms. Hence, it contains these vestiges, from which it derives its subsistence as matter, and is not prior to these vestiges. For, at the same time that it is adapted to receive them, the cause which imparts them, also imparts that which is the very being of matter. Hence, if matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, having a perpetual existence, it always possessed the vestiges of forms; and, together with these also, it possessed order, as we have demonstrated.* Order, therefore, is unbegotten and incorruptible. And no one of these three ranks as first, or second, or third [according to a temporal subsistence]; but these distinctions exist only in our conceptions. Hence, this distinction in conception being taken away, all these have a simultaneous existence, viz. matter, the vestiges

* See more on this subject in the Second Book of my Translation of Proclus on the *Timæus*.

of forms, and order. But from that from which order derives its subsistence, the world also is derived ; so that the world will be unbegotten and incorruptible.

Argument the Fifteenth.

THE paradigm of the world is celebrated [by Plato]* by these three names, viz. *only-begotten*, *eternal*, *all-perfect*. And the last of these names pertains also to the universe, but to no other generated nature ; for no other generated nature is all-perfect. With respect to the *only-begotten*, this is not present with all mundane natures, though it is with all the celestial orbs : for each of these is only-begotten. A perpetual existence, however, is common to all forms ; for if this is not, we shall not find any thing of which all forms participate in common. But if it is necessary that every form should possess perpetuity, for this is an image of the eternal, it is requisite to consider what is the meaning of *the ever*. Whether, therefore, does it signify that which exists for an infinite time, both with reference to the past

* This is asserted by Plato of the paradigm of the world in the *Timæus*, which, as we have before observed, is there denominated by him *αὐτοζῶον*, or *animal itself*.

and the future, or that which, with respect to the past, has indeed a beginning, *but, with reference to the future, has no end?** For if this is the meaning of the ever, what will that be which is similar to *the eternal?* For the eternal has in no respect whatever a subsistence at a certain time only, nor any extension of existence, nor the prior and posterior, but is infinite according to both these. But the infinite is not simultaneously present with the universe,† but subsists in becoming to be [or in perpetually rising into existence].‡ If, however, the eternal is that [which we have above said it is], either nothing is similar to it, or, prior to all things the world, resembles it. But it is absurd, since the Demiurgus is most excellent, and wishes to make, and does make, things similar to the paradigm of the universe, [that the world should be

* The original is here defective, for it is *κατα βασιρα δε τελευτην*. But it is obviously necessary to read, *κατα βασιρα δε ου μην τελευτην*. Mahotius also, in his version, has “*ex altera autem finem non habet.*”

† In the original of this sentence there is nothing more than *ουχ αμα δε το απειρον*; and, conformably to this, the version of Mahotius has “*infinitum autem non simul constat.*” But it appears to me to be necessary to read *ουχ αμα δε το απειρον τῷ παντι παριστιν*, agreeably to my translation.

‡ Conformably to this, Proclus says of the universe (in *Tim. lib. ii.*) “that, always rising into existence, it is always perfect” — *αι αρχαμενον, αι τελειον ιστι.*

in no respect similar to its eternal paradigm].* The world, therefore, being in the greatest possible degree similar to its paradigm, possesses perpetuity both with reference to the past and the future, and not according to one of these only. For if this is denied, that which is without arrangement will be similar to the paradigm of the universe, through being unbegotten; and that which possesses arrangement will be similar to it, through its incorruptibility. If these things, therefore, are impossible, every thing which is unbegotten is incorruptible, and every thing incorruptible is unbegotten; in order that both may be similar to the eternal [paradigm], and not infinite only, according to one of these. And on this account, that which is arranged is no more infinite than that which is without arrangement. That which was generated, therefore, conformably to the paradigm, ought, according to both these, to be similar to the paradigm. But that which was generated conformably to the paradigm, was

* The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, and are supplied from the version of Mahotius. For in the Greek there is nothing more than *αλλ' ατοπον, το μηδενα τροπον του δημιουργου αριστου οντος, και βουλομενου ομοια ποιειν τω παραδειγματι και ποιουντος*. It is requisite, therefore, immediately after *το μηδενα τροπον*, to add, *τον κοσμον ομοιον ειναι τω παραδειγματι αιωνιω*.

the world. Hence the world, not having [a temporal] generation, is incorruptible, nor, being unbegotten, will it ever be corrupted. For a thing of this kind [viz. a thing which may be corrupted,] is only infinite with reference to the time past. But the world is unbegotten, and at the same time incorruptible. It also possesses infinity according to both these, in order that, as Plato says, it may be in every respect similar to its eternal paradigm.

Argument the Sixteenth.

IF there are two wills in the Demiurgus, one indeed will be this, that what is moved in a confused and disorderly manner should not exist, as Plato says [in the *Timæus*]; for being willing [says he] that there should be nothing evil, he brought that which was confused from the inordinate into order. And if the Demiurgus has likewise another will, viz. that the universe should be bound, (for, speaking to the junior Gods, he says, "You shall never be dissolved, in consequence of obtaining my will, which is a greater bond than any of those bonds by which you were

connected at the commencement of your generation ;”)—and if these wills are the very being of the things which partake of them, one of them willing that the inordinate should not exist, but the other, that what is orderly should be preserved ;—if this be the case, it is necessary either that these wills should always exist in the Demiurgus, or each of them sometimes, or one of them always, but the other at a certain time. It is false, however, that either of these wills should exist only at a certain time. For it is evident, that to be willing at one time, and at another not, can by no means accord with the nature of an eternal being, though he should at first not have been willing, but afterwards should be willing ; or, on the contrary, should at first have been willing, but afterwards unwilling. For there will be in this willingness and unwillingness the prior and posterior, and the was, and the will be. But these, Plato says, are the species of time. Time, however, is not in the Demiurgus, but proceeds from, and is posterior to him. Hence he was always willing that the confused and disorderly should not exist, and that what has an orderly arrangement should exist. His will, therefore, essentially producing that which he wished, and both the inordinate and the orderly having a perpetual subsistence, he always produces them by

his very being.* If, however, he always produces that which he wishes to produce, he will certainly, through one of these wills, always abolish the inordinate, but will preserve, through the other, that which is reduced into order. For thus he will effect, through both, that which it is proper for him to effect; destroying that which he does not wish to exist, and preserving and defending that which he wishes to exist. Each of these wills, therefore, of the Demiurgus, effecting that which it is its province to effect, it is necessary that what is produced by each should be perpetual. For the maker and the thing made exist simultaneously with each other, as Plato says in the Philebus: for there he asserts, "that the thing which is becoming to be beautiful, and the artificer and maker of it, subsist together, and that the one is not without the other." † That which is disorderly, therefore, is always abolished,

* This sentence in the original is, *της ουν βουλησειως αυτη των ειναι ποιουσης ο βουλεται, η αι εκατερα αι των ειναι ποιησει.* But for *η αι, κ. τ. λ.* it is necessary to read *και αι, κ. τ. λ.* conformably to the above translation, and also to the version of Mahotius, which is, "cum igitur voluntas ipso esse, quod vult efficiat, et semper sit utraque, semper ipso esse efficiet."

† Hence, as the world subsists in *becoming to be*, and the artificer of it is an *eternally* energising being, and the one cannot exist without the other, the world must necessarily be perpetually rising into existence.

through the eternal will of the Demiurgus that it should not exist, and that which is orderly is preserved, on account of his will that it should always exist; each of these wills being eternal. But if both the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually generated, the inordinate will not be prior to the orderly, nor the orderly to the inordinate. If, however, the inordinate is not prior to the orderly, that which is orderly will not have a beginning posterior to the inordinate; and if the orderly is not prior to the inordinate, it will not have an end prior to the inordinate.* But if it neither began posterior to, nor will end prior to, the inordinate, order is without a beginning and without an end, and is both unbegotten and incorruptible. Moreover, the world is nothing else than order, and that which is arranged. The world, therefore, is unbegotten and incorruptible. For it is absurd to say, since there are two wills in divinity, either that one of these should be always effective, but the other not always; or that one of these should produce by its very being, but the other not; since both possess the same essence, and have through the same cause an eternal subsistence.† For one

* This follows from what is above demonstrated, viz. that both the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually generated.

† For το ευλογον here, in the original, I read το αιωνιον.

of these, in consequence of being good, as Plato says, was willing that the disorderly should not exist; but the other, in consequence of not being evil, was willing that the orderly should exist. By how much, therefore, to be essentially good, is more adapted to divinity than not to be evil, by so much more divine is the will that what is inordinate should not exist, than the will which ordains that what is orderly should exist. For to be good is more adapted to divinity than not to be evil. Hence, it is perfectly absurd to make the will which is more adapted to him, not to be more eternal and efficacious, if it be lawful so to speak, since it is more divine. So that if it is consequent to these wills that the world should be unbegotten through one of them, but incorruptible through the other, it will be in a greater degree unbegotten than incorruptible; since it possesses the former through the more principal and more divine will of the Demiurgus, but the latter through a subordinate will. Moreover, one of these, viz. the incorruptibility of the world, is manifest to all; and consequently the other will be much more manifest than this, viz. that the world is unbegotten. If, therefore, the two are one, the universe will be similarly unbegotten and incorruptible. But if they are two, but that which exists in consequence of being good is more powerful than that which

exists in consequence of not being evil, the universe is in a greater degree unbegotten than incorruptible. It would, however, seem, that there is rather one will in the Demiurgus than two wills: for it is the province of the same will to reject the inordinate, whether it be prior or posterior to order, and to produce, without any temporal beginning, that which is orderly, and preserve it in arrangement without end. For there is not any thing which is more adapted to every artificer than order. Every artificer, therefore, wishes to give a proper arrangement to the work which he produces; so that order, so far as he is an artificer, is to him the object of desire. But if there is one object of desire, the appetite also is one, being the appetite of order. If, however, there is one appetite and will, which are directed to the object of the will, there will certainly be one will always producing prior to time that which is arranged, and connecting a thing of this kind for ever. But being one, it is absurd, or rather impossible, to distribute it into parts, and to attribute one part of it to divinity, and this the more imperfect part, but not to attribute to him another part, and this of a more perfect nature. For that which is more perfect pertains to divinity, since it has a greater power than that which is more imperfect.

Argument the Seventeenth.

THE following axioms, which are Aristotelic, are by a much greater priority Platonic, viz. "Every thing which is generable, is also corruptible, and every thing unbegotten is incorruptible." * For the former of these is mentioned by Plato in the Republic, and the latter in the Phædrus. In the Republic, therefore, Socrates, personating the Muses, says, "Since every thing which is generated is corruptible;" † and [in the Phædrus] he says, since the soul is unbegotten, it is necessarily also incorruptible. For he shews that every principle is unbegotten, and because unbegotten, he demonstrates that it is also incorruptible. ‡ For these things being true, it is necessary that every thing which is corruptible should be generable; since, if it is unbegotten, the corruptible will be incorruptible, which is impossible. Every thing also which is incorruptible is unbegotten; for if generable, the incorruptible will be corruptible. These things, therefore, necessarily following, if the universe is incorruptible,

* This is demonstrated by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Heavens. See Book the Second of my Translation of that work.

† See the Eighth Book of the Republic.

‡ Vid. Phædr. Art. p. 22.

it is also unbegotten;* as is evident from the above premises. For the Demiurgus, according to Plato, is the source of immortal natures;† but the immortal is indestructible, as it is said in the Phædo. For scarcely will any thing else be indestructible, if the immortal is not a thing of this kind.‡ And this, indeed, Cebes says, and Socrates grants.§ If, therefore, every thing which was generated by the Demiurgus is indestructible, (for that which was generated by him is immortal, and this is indestructible,) it is also necessary that it should be unbegotten, through what we have demonstrated to be consequent to the two preceding axioms; one of which is, that every thing generable is corruptible; but the other, that every thing ingenerable is incorruptible. So that, not only according to Aristotle, but also according

* In the original, *τουτων δε επομεινων, εξ αναγκης ει αφθαρτον το παν εστιν*. But it is evidently necessary between *το παν* and *εστιν*, to insert *και αγενητον*, and instead of a comma after *επομεινων*, to place a comma after *αναγκης*, conformably to the above translation. The MS. also, from which Mahotius made his translation, appears to have wanted the words *και αγενητον*.

† This is asserted in the Timæus.

‡ In the original, *σχολη γαρ αν τι αλλο ειη ανωλεθρον, ει το αθανατον ειη τοιουτον*. But both the sense and the version of Mahotius require, that after *αθανατον* we should read *ουκ ειη τοιουτον*.

§ See my Translation of the Phædo.

to Plato, it is demonstrated through these two axioms, that the world neither had a temporal generation, nor is corruptible. For if* that which is inordinate is unbegotten, but that which is arranged is incorruptible, that which is without arrangement will be more excellent than that which is arranged. For as the ingenerable is to the generable, so is the incorruptible to the corruptible; so that it will be alternately, as that which is ingenerable is to that which is incorruptible, so is that which is generable to that which is corruptible: and as that which is generable is to that which is corruptible, so is generation to corruption. If, therefore, generation is better than corruption, and the generable is essentially more excellent than the corruptible, the ingenerable also will be more excellent than the incorruptible. Hence, if that which is inordinate is ingenerable and corruptible, but that which is arranged is incorruptible and generable, that which is without arrangement [so far as it is ingenerable] will be more excellent than that which is arranged; and that which from the inordinate produces that which is arranged, will produce that which is less from that which is more

* In the original, *και γαρ εστι το μεν ατακτον, αγενητον*. But it appears to me to be evidently necessary to read, agreeably to the above translation, *και γαρ ει εστι, κ. τ. λ.*

excellent ; in consequence of producing from that which is ingenerable and corruptible, that which is afterwards generable and incorruptible. One of these, therefore, will not be ingenerable and corruptible, but the other generable and incorruptible ; or *vice versa*. But neither is the maker evil ; so that what is arranged is not corruptible. And if that which is arranged is from that which is without arrangement, the unarranged is not incorruptible ; since it is not, when that which is arranged has an existence. Or, if this is not admitted, each of these will be generable and corruptible. But whether that which is inordinate is generable, being generated from that which is arranged ; or whether that which is arranged is corruptible, he who corrupts that which is well arranged, either did not properly harmonise it, and therefore is not good ; or he corrupts that which is well harmonised, and is evil. All these consequences, however, are impossible. Hence, that which is inordinate is not prior to that which is orderly : and therefore it follows, that what is orderly is unbegotten, and in like manner that it is also incorruptible.

Argument the Eighteenth.

IF things which always subsist according to sameness, and in a similar manner, alone pertain to the most divine of all things, as Plato says in the *Politicus*,—if this be the case, and if the Demiurgus ranks among the most divine of beings, it pertains to him to subsist eternally after the same and in a similar manner. But if he does not rank among the most divine of things, neither must we say that he is a God who has an eternal existence, nor that he is the best of causes. We assert, however, these things of him as it is written in the *Timæus*. A subsistence, therefore, according to the same and in a similar manner, is adapted to his nature. For, if that which does not exist always should possess a subsistence according to invariable sameness, that which does not exist always will always be the same. And if that which is the best of causes does not exist invariably the same, it will not be the best. But these things being absurd, it is necessary that the best of causes, and which exists eternally, should be most divine; and that being most divine, it should subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner. It pertains, however, to that which thus subsists, never to have any variation

in its existence: for this is contrary to an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence. But it pertains to that which never at any time subsists differently, never at one time to cease from being an effective cause, and at another to be effective; or at one time to be, and at another not to be effective. For this is to subsist differently at different times; viz. to be now effective, but afterwards not, and not to be now effective, but to be effective afterwards. But that which never at any one time is not efficient, and afterwards efficient, or now efficient, and afterwards non-efficient, must necessarily always be an efficient cause in energy, or always not be such a cause. For there are no other consequences besides these. For the extremes are, to be always efficient, and to be always non-efficient. But the media are, for the efficient cause to produce that afterwards which it did not produce before; or, on the contrary, not to produce again that which it had once produced.* It is, however, impossible that the De-

* For that which produces afterwards what it did not before, so far as it produces, unites with that extreme, which is always efficient. And that which does not produce again what it had once produced, so far as it does not produce, unites with the other extreme, which is always non-efficient. They are therefore media between these two extremes.

miurgus being the Demiurgus, should never at any time be an effective cause: for it is not adapted to an artificer to be always unemployed. For how can he be an artificer who never produces any thing? It is necessary, therefore, that the Demiurgus should be an efficient cause, and that he should always fabricate that of which he is the efficient. But the Demiurgus, who always fabricates, must necessarily always make the world. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should neither have a temporal beginning of being fabricated, nor an end. For, if it had a beginning, it would not always have been adorned; and if it should have an end, it will not always be adorned. It is necessary, however, that the world should always be adorned, because it is also necessary that the Demiurgus should always adorn. But this will be the case, if he always makes with invariable sameness of energy: and he will thus make, if he always subsists after the same and in a similar manner. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should be a world without a beginning and without an end, and that it should be unbegotten and incorruptible. Hence, if the Demiurgus possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, it is necessary that the world should be without generation, and without corruption. So

that if Plato clearly asserts this [of the Demiurgus], the world also, according to him, is unbegotten and incorruptible.

If, therefore, Plato says, in the *Politicus* and the *Timæus*,* that God is absent from the world, and again is present with it, being first absent from, and afterwards present with it, (for after this manner, says he, the universe subsisted, as it was likely it should, when Divinity was not present with it); and if Plato similarly asserts both these things, and therefore says, that at one time the world is changed from a disorderly into an orderly condition of being, but that at another time it passes from an orderly into an inordinate state, until Divinity again assumes the helm of government;—if, therefore, this is asserted by Plato, it

* In the *Politicus* Plato says, “that the universe at one time is conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the Demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itself, and being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions.” See vol. iv. p. 122 of my Translation of Plato, in which the fable, of which these words are a part, is beautifully explained from Proclus. And in the *Timæus*, it is said by Plato, “that when the Demiurgus began to adorn the universe, he first of all figured with forms and numbers, fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain vestiges of the true elements, but were in every respect so constituted as it is likely any thing will be from which Deity is absent.” See vol. ii. of my Translation of Plato.

is not proper that Atticus should alone direct his attention to what is said in the *Timæus*. For there Divinity, who was at one time absent from, is represented as being at another time present with, that from which he was absent. But it is requisite that Atticus should also consider what is asserted in the *Politicus*, in which the Divinity, who at one time was present with, is represented as absent from that with which he was present. And as through the former he produced order from that which was in a disorderly state, so through the latter, after order, he caused a privation of order to take place. If, therefore, Plato says, that both these mutations were produced by the Demiurgus, respecting that visible god the world, prior to the existence of the world, it is impossible that they should have any subsistence except in our mental conception. For, since Divinity always exists with invariable sameness, he does not say that the world subsists differently at different times, as if possessing this variable subsistence through him, which can only be asserted of partial natures ; but he says [speaking enigmatically], that the world is either arranged, or deprived of arrangement, through Divinity being differently affected at different times. If, however, it is impossible that Divinity should be thus affected, because he possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, it is

likewise impossible that the world should have at one time a disorderly, and at another an orderly existence. And I should say, that this is truly a divine contrivance of the wisdom of Plato, by which he infers, from the eternal energy of Divinity, that the world is at one and the same time unbegotten and incorruptible; and assigns the absence and presence of Divinity as the cause of the order and disorder of the world.* For, if Divinity alone is the cause of the alternate order and disorder of the world, and it is impossible for him not to subsist, because it is impossible for Divinity to subsist differently at different times, it is also absurd to conceive an alternate subsistence of order and disorder about the world. If, therefore, Divinity is always invariably the same, he is not at one time present with, and at another absent from the world. And if this be the case, the world is not at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement. For the presence of Divinity indeed with the world would confer order, but his absence the privation of order

* Plato does not mean to insinuate by this, that Divinity is actually at one time present with, and at another absent from, the world, for he is eternally present with it, and in a manner invariably the same; but in thus speaking, he only indicates what would be the necessary consequence of his being alternately present with and absent from the universe.

on it. But if the world was not at one time arranged, nor at another was, or will be, without arrangement, it always was arranged. But if it was always arranged, it was arranged from an infinite time, and will for an infinite time continue to be arranged. And this Plato proclaims in such a manner, as to become manifest even to the deaf, viz. that the paradigm of the world exists through all eternity, and that the world always was, and is, and will be. As, therefore, the world will be to infinity, so likewise it was from infinity, and it is not proper, since Plato gives it an infinite duration, both with respect to the past and the future, that the friends of Plato should make it to be finite with respect to the past, but infinite with respect to the future; but it is requisite that they should speak conformably to the decision of their master. For thus the world will possess an imitation of the perpetuity of eternity; not having only the half, but the whole of the infinity of time. This, however, was the thing proposed by the Demiurgus, viz. to assimilate time to eternity, and the world to eternal animal [its exemplar], by giving it an existence through the whole of time.

The principal result, however, of all that has been said is this, that no one, with respect to the world, is so pious as Plato, or any other who, conformably to him, says, that the world subsists in a

disorderly condition, when Divinity is no longer invariably the same, viz. when the Divinity [by whom the world was fabricated] is not an intelligible God. For a subsistence according to invariable sameness pertains to the intelligible gods. Either, therefore, both the world and the Demiurgus are gods, or neither of them is a god. And in the latter case, one of them not being a god, will produce disorder, but the other a subsistence which is not invariably the same. And the privation of order of the one will arise from the want of an invariable sameness of subsistence in the other. For the one [*i. e.* the world] will no otherwise be disorderly, than because the other [*i. e.* the Demiurgus] is not with invariable sameness, either present with or absent from the world : for it is necessary that the world should be entirely similar to its maker. If, therefore, in conception only, Divinity is at one time present with and at another absent from the world, it follows that the world, in conception only, is at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement. For it is necessary that what subsists in conception only should pertain to both ; so that if, from Divinity being present, the world is arranged, it necessarily follows that it is not arranged when he is not present. But if, in *reality*, [*i. e.* not in conception

only,] the universe is at one time* arranged, and at another without arrangement, by a much greater priority, Divinity will in *reality* be at one time present with, and at another absent from the universe. For it will not follow [absolutely], from the world being arranged, or being without arrangement, that Divinity is either absent from or present with it; but the contrary will take place: so that the prior assertion will be true, to which this is necessarily consequent.† If, therefore, this is impossible, because Divinity subsists eternally with invariable sameness, it is also impossible that the world should at one time be without arrangement, and at another be arranged. For that which is consequent to what is impossible, is necessarily impossible; since, as the dialectic laws say, the possible is consequent to that which is possible. Hence, by admitting that it is possible for the world to have been once

* In the original, *πότε* is erroneously omitted, as is evident both from the sense of the passage, and the version of Mahotius.

† By the prior assertion, Proclus means this, that the world, *in conception only*, is at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement, in consequence of the maker of it being, *in conception only*, at one time present with, and at another absent from it.

without arrangement, it will also be possible for it to have been arranged at a certain time, and for Divinity to have been once absent from, and again present with, the world. If, therefore, the latter is impossible, the former likewise is impossible: hence the world is always arranged, and Divinity is always present with the world. And neither was the world arranged from a prior disorderly state of subsistence: for neither was Divinity once absent, and afterwards present; nor will the world, from being arranged, afterwards be without arrangement. For the maker of it was not once* present with, and afterwards will be absent from it. And, according to Plato, if the world is necessarily generable and corruptible, there is an equal necessity that the Demiurgus of the world should not rank among the most divine of beings, though it pertains to him to have an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, it is necessary to be piously disposed towards the maker of the universe, it is also necessary to be thus disposed towards the world; or if we form erroneous conceptions about the latter, our conceptions will, by a much greater priority, be erroneous and unbe-

* In the original, *ουτε γαρ εκεινος ου παρων αυθις ου παρσσι*. But for *ου παρων*, it is requisite to read *ποτε παρων*. The version of Mahotius also is, conformably to this emendation, "Non enim ille *ante* præsens, *postea* non præsens erit."

coming about the former ; and not only about him, but likewise about every thing divine. For, if an invariable sameness of subsistence is common to all divine natures, it is necessary either to preserve this in all of them, and after the same manner to preserve it with respect to the Demiurgus ; or, if we reject this in one of them, neither will it be credible in the rest.

CONCERNING PLACE.*

SIMPLICIUS having observed, that Proclus is the only philosopher that he is acquainted with, who thought that place was a body, adds, "he, therefore, admitting the axioms of Aristotle concerning place, and the fourfold division of the investigation of it, says it is necessary that place should be either matter or form, or the boundary of the containing body, or an interval equal to the space between the boundaries of the containing body. For, if place is not any one of the things that are in it, nor of the things which surround it, it cannot be locally changed, if nothing that is in it or about it sustains any mutation. The natures, however, which are in it are form and matter ; but the natures which surround it are the boundary of the circumambient, and that which is intermediate." Proclus having demonstrated, therefore, that place is neither matter nor form, through the same arguments as are used by Aristotle, and having subverted the hypothesis that it is the boundary of the containing body, from the absurdities with which

* This fragment is extracted from the Commentaries of Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle, p. 143.

the hypothesis is attended, infers that place is an interval; and thus he adapts the demonstration to his own opinion. Since, however, he clearly and concisely explains his hypothesis, it will perhaps be better to hear his own words, which are as follow: "it remains, therefore, if place is neither the form of that which is in place, nor matter, nor the boundary of the comprehending body, that the interval which is between the boundaries of the containing body must be conceived to be the primary place of each body. All the mundane interval, however, of the whole world will be different from the above-mentioned interval. This, therefore, is either nothing, or it is a certain thing. And if, indeed, it is nothing, local motion will be from nothing to nothing, though all motion is according to something which ranks among beings. Places, likewise, which are according to nature, will be nothing, though every thing which subsists conformably to nature is necessarily something belonging to beings. But if it is a certain thing, it is entirely either incorporeal or corporeal. If, however, it is incorporeal, an absurdity will follow: for it is necessary that place should be equal to that which is in place. But how is it possible for body, and that which is incorporeal, to be equal? For the equal is in quantities, and in homogeneous quantities, as in lines with lines, superficies with

superficies, and bodies with bodies. Hence, place is a body, if it is an interval. But if it is a body, it is either moved, or immovable. If, however, it is in any way whatever moved, it must necessarily be moved according to place; so that again place will be in want of place. But this is impossible, as it also appeared to be to Theophrastus and Aristotle. Hence Aristotle says, that a vessel is place which may be moved, but that place is an immovable vessel; indicating by this, that place is naturally immovable.

If, however, place is immovable, it is either incapable of being divided by the bodies that fall into it, so that body will proceed through body, or it may be divided by them, in the same manner as air and water are divided by the bodies which exist in them. But if, indeed, it may be divided, the whole being cut, the parts will be moved on each side of the dissevered whole. And first, place will be moved, since the parts of it are moved; but it has been demonstrated that it is immovable. Secondly, the parts being cut, we must inquire whither that part which is cut proceeds: for again there will be found another interval between the parts of the dissevered whole, which is the recipient of the divided part, and into which this part proceeding is said to be in place; and this will be the consequence to infinity. Place, there-

fore, is an indivisible body. If, however, it is indivisible, it will either be an immaterial or a material body. But if material, it is not indivisible. For all material bodies, when other material bodies proceed into them, become divided by those bodies; as when, for instance, our bodies fall into water. But immaterial bodies alone are not adapted to be divided by any thing; and this from necessity. For every immaterial body is impassive; but every thing which may be divided is not impassive, since division is a passion of bodies, destructive of their union. For of that which is continuous, so far as continuous, you will not find any other passion than division, which destroys its continuity. Place, therefore,—that we may collect all that has been demonstrated,—is a body, immovable, indivisible, immaterial. But if this be the case, it is very evident that place is more immaterial than all bodies, both than those that are moved, and those that are immaterial in things that are moved. Hence, if light is the most simple of these, for fire is more incorporeal than the other elements, and light is more incorporeal than fire itself, place will be the most pure and genuine light which is in bodies. If, therefore we conceive that there are two spheres, one of light alone, but the other consisting of many bodies, and that both these are equal to each other in bulk, but that the one is

firmly established together with the centre, and that the other is inserted in this, we shall see the whole world existing in place, and moved in immovable light. And this light, indeed, is, according to itself, immovable, in order that it may imitate place, but is moved according to a part, in order that it may possess something less than place.

“This hypothesis is rendered credible from what is asserted by Plato, in the [tenth book of the] Republic. For the light which is there mentioned, and is adapted to the rainbow, is said by him to be place. It is also confirmed by the Chaldean oracles respecting the fontal soul; since it is there said, that this soul ‘abundantly animates light, fire, æther, and the worlds.’ For this is the light which is above the empyrean world, and is a monad prior to the triad of the empyrean, ethereal, and material worlds. This light, too, is the first recipient of the eternal allotments of the gods, and unfolds self-visible spectacles in itself to those that are worthy to behold them. For in this light, according to the Chaldean oracle, things without figure become figured. And perhaps it is on this account called place (τοπος), as being a certain type (τυπος) of the whole mundane body, and as making things which are without interval to possess interval.”

After this, Proclus doubts, against himself, how body can proceed through body, and whether this light is inanimate, or participates of soul. "But," says he, "it is impossible that it should be inanimate, both because it is more excellent than the animated natures that are in it, and because the oracles say that this is animated prior to other things. If, however, it is animated, how is it immovable? And he dissolves the first doubt from the impassivity of immaterial bodies: for an immaterial body neither resists nor is resisted, since that which is resisted possesses a nature capable of suffering by the things which resist. Nor, since it is impassive, can it be divided; so that neither will it be possible to adduce that absurd consequence, that the whole will proceed through that which is smallest; for if an immaterial body is not adapted to be divided, neither will it be divided equally with that which is smallest. But if this will not be the case, neither will the whole proceed through it." Again, he solves the second doubt, by saying, that this immaterial body is animated by the fontal soul, and that it has a divine life, and is essentially self-motive, but not in energy. For if we admit that in [the rational] soul the self-motive is twofold, the one according to essence, but the other according to energy, and if we assert that the one is immovable, but the other

moved,* what should hinder us from asserting that place participates of a life of this kind, and that it lives according to an immutable essence, but the world according to an essence self-motive in energy. "If, however," says he, "you wish to see the motion of place according to energy, you must survey it as motive of the bodies that are moved, and which evolve the parts of place according to interval; because they are neither able to be in every place, nor to be present with all the parts of place according to each of its parts. And this is an intervening medium with reference to soul, which moves without interval. For it seems that life, indeed, so far as life imparts motion, but place being that which primarily participates of life, confers motion according to the parts of itself, and thus peculiarly unfolds local motion, causing each of the parts of that which is moved to desire to be in the whole itself, since it is unable, through the natural peculiarity of interval, to subsist in a divided manner in the whole itself. For every thing which desires to be a certain thing, but fails of becoming that which is the object of its wish through a defect of nature, continues nevertheless to aspire after that which, through imbecility, it

* For the rational soul is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy. Hence, according to the former, it is immovable; but according to the latter, is moved.

is unable to obtain. For it is requisite," says he, "that the medium between an incorporeal and intransitive life, such as is that of the fontal soul, and a transitive and corporeal life, should be a life which is intransitive, indeed, but corporeal." He adds, "but it appears to me, that the centres of the whole world, considered as one thing, are fixed in this immaterial body. For if the oracles assert that the centres of the material world are fixed in the æther which is above it, we must say, by ascending analogously, that the centres of the highest of the worlds are established in the light of this world. May it not likewise be said, that this light is the first image of the paternal profundity,* and on this account is supermundane, because that profundity is also supermundane?" †

* The paternal profundity, according to the Chaldaic Theology, consists of three triads, each of which triads contains *father*, *power*, and *intellect*. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles, in the Classical Journal.

† In addition to the above-mentioned opinion of Proclus concerning place, the following is the hypothesis of Damascius of Damascus, the preceptor of Simplicius, a man most inquisitive, and who laboured much in philosophy. His disquisitions on place appear to me to be no less admirable than novel. From the utility of place, therefore, he wishes to discover its essence, and he thus writes: "Every thing in generation, in consequence of falling off from a nature impartible, and without interval, both according to essence and energy, has a twofold separation,—the one according to essence, but the other according to energy, or passion.

That also in generation, which is according to energy, is twofold ; the one being connascent with essence, according to which, essence is in a continual flux ; but the other proceeding from essence, according to which it energises differently at different times, possessing extended, and not at-once-collected energies. And the separation, indeed, of energy is immediately in want of motion ; and motion is consubsistent with it. The separation, also, according to motion, becomes energetic or passive. But the separation of essence becomes likewise twofold ; the one being a divulsion into multitude, but the other passing into bulk. And the separation, according to magnitude and bulk, becomes immediately connected with position, in consequence of the parts falling into different situations. Position likewise is twofold ; the one being connascent with essence, as of my body, the head is upward, and the feet downward ; but the other being adventitious, as at one time I have position in a house, and at another in the forum ; and it is evident that the former continues as long as the thing exists, but that the other becomes different at different times. But we properly say, that those things have position, the parts of which are extended, and are distant from each other. Hence position appears properly to belong to magnitudes, and the boundaries which they contain, because these are distant according to continuity. But numbers, although they are separated, yet, at the same time, do not appear to have position, because they are not distant and extended, unless you should say that these also receive magnitude and interval. For all intervals, in consequence of destroying a subsistence collected into one, cause that which is in them to be changed into another, in which also they are said to be placed by position, losing, as it were, independent power ; just as, by departing from themselves in their energies, they are said to be moved, and to change. Of these intervals, therefore, in order that they may not be perfectly extended to the indefinite, there are collective measures ; time, indeed, being the measure of some things, according to the energy in motion : but of others, definite multitude, which is number, being the mea-

sure, according to a distinction of essence : and of others, definite magnitude, as a cubit, or something of this kind, according to continuity. Of others, again, place is the measure, according to a dispersion of position. Hence, things that are moved are said to be moved in time ; but they are said to have position of essence, and motion itself, in place, so far as essence itself also participates of being moved. And that place indeed subsists about position, and is something belonging to things situated, is evident. For we say, that those things are in place which have position ; and upward and downward are the differences of place, surveyed according to position ; in the same manner as the right hand and the left, before and behind.

“ But that place bounds, measures, and orderly arranges position, you may learn from hence : for we say, that a thing has position, though it should be disorderly posited, in any way whatever ; but a thing is then said to have its proper convenient position, when it receives its proper place, just as any thing, whatever it may be, proceeds into being, but then has its proper opportune subsistence, when it exists in a becoming time. Through place, therefore, every part of a thing has a good position ; the head of my body, indeed, upward, but the foot downward ; the liver in the right-hand parts, but the heart in the middle : and the eyes, through which seeing, we walk, are before ; but the back, by which we carry burthens, is behind. These, indeed, are differences through place ; just as of the parts of an embryo, one is fabricated before another, through time, and one age orderly proceeds prior to another ; nor are the Trojan confounded with the Peloponnesian transactions : for prior and posterior are the differences of time, just as upward and downward, and the other four divisions are the differences of place ; as also Aristotle acknowledges. The parts of the world, therefore, have their proper position in the whole, on account of place. Hence, speaking superficially, *place, simply so called, is, according to this conception, that which bounds the position of bodies ; but speaking of place as having a natural subsistence, it is that which*

bounds the position according to corporeal parts, conformably to nature, both with respect to each other and to the whole, and also the position according to the whole with respect to the parts. For, as different parts of the earth and the heavens are arranged in different situations, on account of place, and some parts are northern but others southern, so the whole heaven and the whole earth, being parts of the world, have a convenient measure of position, and an orderly distribution on account of place; the former being allotted the circumference of the universe, but the latter possessing the middle of it: and it is place which imparts coincidence to the parts of the universe. If, likewise, *place* (τοπος) is denominated from *conjecture*, (εκ τουτο παζειν, lege εκ του τοπαζειν) becoming place from being situated near to things *conjectural*,* as being a certain *conjecture* of intellectual distinction, thus also what has been said of place will accord with this etymology. For to *images*, which have a *conjectural* subsistence, place imparts an establishment, and a similitude to their paradigms. For unless each of the parts of things, which are separated by interval, was situated according to its proper place, an image would never be similar to its paradigm, but every order, convenient measure, and elegant arrangement, would vanish. And, indeed, if you take away place, you will see the disposition of bodies extraneous and disordered, and tending to perfect indefiniteness. For in what position will each of the parts stop, when they are not adapted to any? On this account, therefore, things which are naturally moved, are moved in order that they may obtain their proper position; and things which are permanent, abide in a convenient measure of position through a love of place. Hence place is the cause of something to bodies, and to all corporeal natures, and what it is may perhaps be understood from what has been said.

“ It will follow, however, from this, that such a place is neither

* Sensible objects are *conjectural*, because the proper knowledge of them belongs to *opinion*.

the boundary of that which contains, — for how is this the cause of order or distinction, since it is rather defined by the things which exist in, and are comprehended by it?—nor yet will it be body; for, though some one should say that it is an immaterial body, which has parts distant and different from each other,—this also will require that which may arrange it, and cause this part to be situated in the middle, and that in the circumference. Nor is it possible that a thing of this kind can be interval: for, through the same causes, interval, in consequence of possessing difference, and having its parts differently situated, will also require a certain convenient position. Place, therefore, appears to be the measure of things posited, just as time is said to be the number of the motion of things moved. Since, however, position is twofold, the one being essential, and the other adventitious, place also will be twofold, the one becoming the perfect element of that which has position, but the other subsisting according to accident. There is also a certain difference of essential position, so far as, in a certain respect, wholes themselves have the proper position of their proper parts, both with respect to each other, and to the universe; or so far as parts have a proper position with reference to the whole and the remaining parts. Hence, place also becomes twofold; the one peculiar, belonging to individual places; but the other being defined according to position in the whole. For, as whole is twofold, the one belonging to each of the parts,—according to the definite and distinct subsistence of each, according to which we say, that the earth is a certain whole, and not the earth only, but also an animal and a plant, and each of the parts in these; but the other being more comprehensive, as when we say the whole world, the whole earth, and the whole air, and of each *wholeness** there are proper parts;—in like manner, of place

* The world is a *whole of wholes*, which *wholes* or *wholenesses* are the celestial and elementary spheres. See the Introduction to my Translation of the *Timæus* of Plato.

we say, that one is the convenient position of the proper parts of a thing, as of my parts in the whole of my body ; but another the convenient position of the whole as of a part, in the place of its more comprehensive *wholeness*. Thus, the place of the earth, is the place of terrestrial natures ; and this so far as earth possesses the middle of the universe. For, though the earth should be deprived of its position about the middle of the universe, it would still retain the convenient position of its proper parts in their proper whole ; but it would not then possess its convenient position as a part of the universe. Hence, if the whole earth were hurled upward, it would fall again to the middle ; and the parts which it contains would preserve their formation with respect to each other, even when it was removed from the middle. Thus, also, a man suspended in the air would have the convenient order of his proper parts ; but he would no longer have the convenient order as of a part to the whole. And since parts belong more to things more total, than wholes themselves do ; for they do not so much vanquish subordinate, as they are vanquished by more excellent natures ; and this because first are in a greater ratio to second natures, than second to third natures ;—this being the case, though a clod of earth should have a proper convenient position in the air, yet it would tend downward, through a desire of that which is more total. For that which is peculiar is every where dead and cold, when divulsed from that which is common, and deprived of its appropriate connexion ; just as plants, when torn up by the roots, though they are in complete possession of all their parts, yet immediately droop, in consequence of being divulsed from their common wholeness. For all things live on account of the one mundane animal. Hence, as long as every thing is rooted in the world, through proximate wholenesses, so long it lives, and is preserved ; but if it is divulsed from its proximate, it is also torn from the common wholeness. Thus, therefore, the natural tendencies of bodies, and their permanencies in their proper places, are preserved, by admitting place to be a thing of this kind. And the

local motion of things which are moved, is nothing else than the assumption of different positions, at different times, till that which is moved obtains its appropriate position ; the intermediate air or water being divided, and receiving the position which it then has, as long as that which is stronger proceeds. The position, also, of the parts of air, is that which a clod of earth or I receive when moved. The place to which I change is not definitely my peculiar place, but the place of surrounding air, in a different part of which I am also naturally adapted to become situated at different times. Hence, it being dubious how things which are moved are moved in place, since things in place may be justly said to be at rest rather than to be moved, let us see how the philosopher Syrianus states the doubt, and gives the solution of it :—‘ Some one may ask,’ says he, ‘ how things which are moved, are moved in place, since things moved, are rather *from whence, whither*. For, in short, things in place appear to be at rest. May we not, therefore, say, that things which are moved, are in place and not in place ? For they are not in the first, and, as it were, proper place of themselves ; since if they were they would be at rest. But they are in place, surveyed according to its extent ; just as we say that the sun is in the constellation called the Lion, because the extent of the Lion comprehends the sun. We also say that a flying eagle is in the air, and that a ship sailing with a prosperous wind is in the sea : for all these have place considered in its extent, or assumed with a greater latitude, but they have not a first and peculiar place, as long as they are moved.’ And most of those, indeed, who speak about place, appear to me especially to direct their attention to this external place. For, on being asked, what is the place of the earth ? they reply, that it is the middle of the universe ; which is the peculiar place of the universe, and of the earth as in the universe. On being also asked, what is the place of the heavens ? they say, that which surrounds ; but they do not, in their reply, adduce that place of the earth which gives convenient position to its parts ; and, in a similar manner, that

place of the heavens through which its parts are orderly arranged. Hence, all men, as it seems, assert that place is separate from that which is in place. For, in reality, that which pertains to each particular from more total place, is separate from that which is in place, and is not precedaneously the place of that thing. They also consider place as immovable, looking to this more common place, and which is considered in its extent. For the peculiar place of every thing, and which is co-essentialised with it, is also moved together with it. But common place abides, being peculiar to that which is more total and comprehensive, as body."

From *OLYMPIODORUS*, in *Aristot. Meteor.* p. 59.

“IT is requisite to know that the divine Proclus, in his Commentaries on the *Timæus** of Plato, refers metals to the seven planets, and says, that lead is ascribed to Saturn, through its weight, dulness, and coldness. But electrum [or a metal composed of gold and silver] is referred to Jupiter, through the well-tempered and vivific nature of the star. In a similar manner, also, with respect to the metal which is called *migma*;† but the *migma* is more highly valued than gold, and is well tempered. Again, iron is ascribed to Mars, on account of its incisive power and sharpness; but gold to the sun, which is, as it were, the fountain of light. Copper is referred to Venus, on account of its florid nature; and also because

* This extract probably formed a part of a Sixth Book of Proclus on the *Timæus*, which is lost, as it is not to be found in any of the Five Books that are now extant.

† From what Proclus says of this metal, called *migma*, or, a *mixture*, it appears to be the same with *orichalcum*, which Plato, in the *Critias* or *Atlanticus*, says, “shines with a fiery splendour.” Pliny, in *Hist. Nat. lib. xxxiv. cap. 2*, says, that this kind of metal has not existed for a long time, owing to the barrenness of the earth. It is, however, mentioned by Martianus the lawyer, who flourished in the time of Alexander Severus, as if it then existed.

Venus is near to the sun, in the same manner as copper is to gold. Tin is referred to Mercury, through its clearness and splendour, and at the same time, likewise, because Mercury is near to the moon, just as tin is to silver. And silver is ascribed to the moon; since silver when placed near to gold, appears to be illuminated by the gold, and to become more splendid, in the same manner as the moon is illuminated by the sun."

*From the MS. Commentary of PROCLUS on the Tenth Book of the Republic of PLATO.**

PROCLUS having observed, that some persons in his time have been seen sitting or standing on the sepulchres in which they had been buried, which, says he, is also related by the ancients of Aristeas, Hermodorus, and Epimenides, subjoins the following examples, the first of which is taken from the History of Clearchus, the disciple of Aristotle.

Cleonymus, the Athenian, who was a man fond of hearing philosophic discourses, becom-

* The learned reader, who is desirous of seeing the original of the above Translation, will find it in the Notes to my Translation of Plato's Republic.

ing very sorrowful on the death of one of his associates, and giving himself up to despair, apparently died, and was laid out according to custom ; but his mother, as she was folding him in her embraces, taking off his garment, and kissing him, perceived in him a gentle breathing, and, being extremely joyful on the occasion, delayed his burial. Cleonymus in a short time afterwards was restored to life, and narrated all that he saw and heard when he was in a separate state. He said, that his soul appeared, as if liberated from certain bonds, to soar from its body, and that having ascended above the earth, he saw in it places all-various both for their figure and colour, and streams of rivers unknown to men ; and that at last he came to a certain region sacred to Vesta, which was under the direction of dæmoniacal powers in indescribable female forms.

The second example is from the historian Naumachus, who flourished (says Proclus) in the time of our ancestors, and is of one Polycritus, who was an illustrious and principal man among the Ætolians. This Polycritus died, and returned to life in the ninth month after his death ; came to the general assembly of the Ætolians, and joined with them in their consultations about what measures were best to be

adopted. Hiero, the Ephesian, and other historians, testify the truth of this, in that account of transactions which they sent to king Antigonus, and their other absent friends.

The third is as follows: In Nicopolis, not long since, the same thing happened to one Eurynous. This man, who was buried in the front of the city, revived fifteen days after, and said that he saw and heard many wonderful things under the earth, which he was ordered not to relate. He lived some time after this, and his conduct was more just after his revival than before.

The fourth is of Rufus, a priest of the Thessalonians, who lived near the time of the historian Naumachus. This man was restored to life the third day after his death, for the purpose of performing certain sacred ceremonies, which he had promised to perform, and having fulfilled his promise, again died.

The fifth and last is of one Philonæa, who lived under the reign of Philip. She was the daughter of Demostratus and Charite, who lived in Amphipolis, and died soon after her marriage to one Craterus. She revived, however, in the sixth month after her death, and, through her love of a youth named Machates, who came to Demostratus from his own country Pelle, had

connexion with him privately for many nights successively: this amour, however, being at length detected, she again died; previous to which, she declared that she acted in this manner according to the will of terrestrial dæmons. Her dead body was seen by every one lying in her father's house; and on digging the place, which prior to this had contained her body, it was found to be empty, by those of her kindred who came thither, through unbelief of what had happened to her.* The truth of this narration is testified both by the epistles of Hipparchus and those of Arridæus to Philip, in which they give an account of the affairs of Amphipolis.

Proclus then, with his usual sagacity, observes, concerning the cause of this phænomenon, as follows: "Many other of the ancients have collected a history of those that have apparently died, and afterwards revived; and among these are the natural philosopher Democritus, in his writings concerning Hades, and that wonderful Conotes, the familiar of Plato†; * * * for the death was not, as it seemed, an entire desertion of the whole life of the body, but a cessation,

* See this instance of revivification more fully detailed by Phlegon Trallianus, in his *Treatise de Mirabilibus et Longævis*.

† There is an unfortunate chasm here in the Manuscript of two or three lines.

caused by some blow, or perhaps a wound ; but the bonds of the soul yet remained rooted about the marrow, and the heart contained in its profundity the empyreuma of life ; and this remaining, it again acquired the life which had been extinguished, in consequence of becoming adapted to animation."

Lastly, Proclus adds : " that it is possible for the soul to depart from, and enter into the body, is evident from him who, according to Clearchus, used a soul-attracting wand on a sleeping lad ; and who persuaded Aristotle, as Clearchus relates in his Treatise on Sleep, that the soul may be separated from the body, and that it enters into the body, and uses it as a lodging. For, striking the lad with the wand, he drew out, and, as it were, led his soul, for the purpose of evincing that the body was immovable when the soul was at a distance from it, and that it was preserved uninjured ; but the soul being again led into the body, by means of the wand, after its entrance narrated every particular. From this circumstance, therefore, both the spectators and Aristotle were persuaded that the soul is separate from the body."

THE END.

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TO
DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT,
&c. &c.

ANSWER

DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT

NEW EDITION

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ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

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THOMAS TAYLOR

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AN
ANSWER
TO
DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT

TO HIS
NEW ANALYSIS
OF
ARISTOTLE'S WORKS;
IN WHICH THE
UNFAITHFULNESS OF HIS TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS IS UNFOLDED.

BY
THOMAS TAYLOR.

Ἡρακλείτης ἐγὼ τι με ὦ κατὰ εἴηκετ' ἀμουσοί ;
Οὐχ' ὑμῖν ἐποιουν, τοῖς δὲ μ' ἐπισταμενοῖς
Εἰς ἐμοὶ ἀνθρώπος τρισμυριοὶ οἱ δ' ἀναριθμοὶ
Οὐδεὶς ταύτ' ἀδῶ καὶ παρὰ Περσέφονη.

DIOG. LAERT.

Begone, ye *blockheads*! Heraclitus cries,
And leave my labours to the *learn'd* and *wise* ;
By *wit*, by *knowledge*, studious to be read,
I scorn the *multitude*, alive and dead.

JOHNSON.

LONDON:

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ANSWER

TO THE

SUPPLEMENT OF DR. GILLIES, &c.

DR. GILLIES having thought proper to *attempt* a confutation of the proofs which I had brought forward to the public of his not having given either the *manner* or the *matter* of Aristotle in a work which he calls a translation of the Ethics and Politics of that philosopher; and as he has also presumed to ridicule the most sublime of Plato's doctrines, and to calumniate the best of his disciples, displaying in this attempt no less ignorance than illiberal invective, it now becomes necessary that I should fully unfold to the public the injustice which he has done to Aristotle in that work, and also to the best of the Platonists, in the Supplement to his Analysis of Aristotle's speculative works.

I shall begin with examining what he has advanced in his Supplement, as preparatory

to the specimens of ignorance and unfaithfulness which will be so copiously displayed in criticizing his translation of Aristotle's Ethics. In the first place, then, I think it may be fairly presumed, that the man who is so ignorant of the style of Aristotle in his acroamatic writings as not to know that it is remarkably obscure, cannot by any means have penetrated the depth which those writings contain. That he did not know this, is abundantly evident from the following passage, in which, also, from his inability to correct a very obvious error in the Greek text of a quotation from Simplicius, he has made that philosopher contradict himself. The passage I allude to is in a note to the Supplement of his Analysis, p. 215, octavo: "That he (Simplicius) gave into the mode of allegorical interpretation appears from the following short sentence, containing the just praise of Aristotle's perspicuity: Ουδε μυθοις ουδε συμβολικοις αινιγμασι ως των προ αυτου τινες εχρησαντο, αλλ' αντι παντος αλλου περιπελασματος την σαφειαν προετιμησε. Simplic. in Procem. Lib. των κατηγοριων. "He made not any use of fables, or dark symbols, like some

philosophers before him, but preferred perspicuity to every other ornament." Strange! that Simplicius should praise Aristotle for his perspicuity, when, in another place quoted by Dr. Gillies, he says, that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroamatic writings, "ut segniores ab eorum studio repellerit et dehortaretur." *Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic. fol. ii **. See p. 23 of the Life of Aristotle, prefixed to the translation of his Ethics, by Dr. Gillies, octavo edition. It is evident, therefore, that in the above passage for *περιπετασματος* we should read *παραπετασματος*, and for *σαφειαν ασαφειαν*, and then Simplicius

* For the sake of the learned reader, I will give the whole passage from which Dr. Gillies has made this extract. *Διχη δε διηρημενων αυτου των συγγραμματος, εις τε τα εξωτερικα, εια τα ιστορικα, και τα διαλογικα, και ολως τα μη ακρας ακριβειας φρονιζοντα, και εις τα ακροαματικα, ων και αυτη εστιν η πραγματεια, εν τοις ακροαματικοις ασαφειαν επιτηδευσε, δια ταυτης τους ραθυμοτερους αποκρουομενος, ως παρ' εκεινης (lege ωσπερ εκεινοις) μη δε γεγραφθαι δοκειν. Τοι γαρ ουν Αλεξανδρου μετα την Περσων καθαιρεσιν ταδε προς αυτον γεγραφοτος. Αλεξανδρος Αριστοτελει ευπραττειν. ουκ ορθως εποιησας εκδους τους ακροαματικους των λογων. τινι γαρ ετι διοισομεν ημεις των αλλων, ει καθ' ους επαιδευθημεν λογους, ουτοι παντων εσονται κοινοι; εγω δε βουλοιμην αν ταις περι τα αριστα εμπειριαις η' ταις δυναμεσι διαφερειν. αυτος ταδε αντεγραψεν. Αριστοτελης βασιλει Αλεξανδρω ευπραττειν. εγραψας μοι περι των ακροαματικων λογων, οιομενος δειν αυτους φυλαττειν εν απορρητοις. ισθι ουν αυτους και εκδεδομενους και μη εκδεδομενους. συνετοι γαρ εισι μονοις τοις ημων ακουσασιν. ερρωσο. i. e. "The writings of Aristotle receiving a twofold division, into the exoteric,*

will speak accurately and consistently, and the translation of the whole passage will be as follows: “Aristotle neither employed fables nor symbolical enigmas, like some philosophers before him, but preferred obscurity to every other veil.” That this is the true reading is likewise evident from an ancient Latin version of Simplicius on the Categories, printed at Venice, 1588, folio, in which the above passage is thus translated: “Verumtamen neque fabulis, neque ænigmatibus, conjecturis metaphoricisque implicitis, quemadmodum nonnulli ante ipsum

such as the historical, and those composed in the form of dialogue; and, in short, those which do not pay attention to extreme accuracy, and into the acroamatic, to which class the present treatise belongs—this being the case, in his acroamatic writings, he studies obscurity, through this deterring the more indolent, as if their very appearance evinced they were not written for them. Alexander, then, after the subversion of Persia, wrote to him as follows: Alexander wishing prosperity to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your acroamatic works: for in what shall we surpass others, if the doctrines in which we were instructed become common to all men? I indeed would rather excel others in the knowledge of the most excellent things than in power. To this Aristotle returned the following answer: Aristotle to king Alexander, wishing prosperity. You wrote to me concerning my acroamatic works, thinking that they ought not to have been divulged. Know, therefore, that they are published and not published: for they can be understood by my auditors alone, Farewell.” Simplicius adds, that, according to Plutarch, this letter of Alexander refers to the metaphysics of Aristotle,

usus est, sed pro omni alio velamine et involuto dicendi modo obscuritatem maxime laudavit et probavit." It is likewise indisputably manifest, from what immediately follows this passage, in which Simplicius investigates the reason why Aristotle adopted this mode of writing, as the learned reader who has the original in his possession will immediately perceive. It may be fairly concluded, therefore, that Dr. Gillies knew not that it was the general practice of the earliest writers of antiquity to employ different modes of concealing their wisdom from the vulgar, and that Aristotle adopted for this purpose obscurity of diction, though the former particular is well known to every tyro in the history of philosophy, and the latter is obvious to the meanest capacity.

Having premised thus much, I proceed, in the next place, to examine his Supplement. In p. 167, then, he endeavours to show "that those supposed entities, called by the Pythagoreans *numbers*, and by the Platonists *ideas*, and considered by them as eternal and immutable essences, the true causes of the universe, have not any real substantial existence in nature, but are merely

fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting action of human thought, expressed and embodied in language." This, he says, is evident from the doctrine of Aristotle, according to which, "definitions are the pure fountains of science only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient comparison of individual objects; so that individuals have a real existence in nature; but general names, expressing many individuals of the same kind, have not any correspondent archetypes." To this I answer, that I have already shown, in the Introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, that Aristotle did not essentially differ from Plato in the doctrine of ideas; and I shall now farther observe, that the Stagirite would not be consistent with himself unless he admitted that those ideas which subsist in Deity with fabricative power and unerring knowledge, subsist also in the human soul in a manner accommodated to its nature; so as to possess partial instead of universal knowledge, to be deprived of productive power, and to be wakened from dormant capacity into energy by objects of sense. This is evident from the doctrine delivered by Aristotle in the first

book of his Posterior Analytics, that universals for the purpose of demonstration are superior to particulars; that demonstrations are conversant with things more universal; and that the principles from which demonstrations are composed have a *priority* of existence, and a *precedency** in nature to particu-

* Aristotle, in the second chapter of the first book of his Posterior Analytics, having enumerated the three conditions of true science; viz. 1st, that the cause of the thing must be known, or, in other words, that the middle term of the demonstration must be the cause of the conclusion; 2d, that this cause must be compared with the effect, so that we may know it to be the cause of the conclusion; and 3d, that this conclusion must have a necessary subsistence, observes as follows: Εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι, οἷον ἐθεμεν' ἀναγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι, καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμεσῶν, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, καὶ προτέρων, καὶ αἰτιῶν τοῦ συμπερασματος. οὕτως γὰρ εἰσὼνται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκείαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνευ τούτων ἀποδείξεις δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην. ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπιστάσθαι· οἷον ὅτι ἡ διαμέτρος συμμετρος. ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδεικτῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστησείαι μὴ ἔχων ἀποδείξιν αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστάσθαι ὡν ἀποδείξεις ἐστὶ, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν ἀποδείξιν ἐστίν. αἰτία τε, καὶ γνωριμωτέρα δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ πρότερα. αἰτία μὲν, ὅτι τότε ἐπισταμέθα, ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν. καὶ πρότερα, εἴπερ αἰτία. καὶ προγινωσκομένα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ξυγιεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐστὶ. πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμωτέρα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτον, πρότερον τῇ φύσει, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον. οὐδὲ γνωριμωτέρον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρον. λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τὰ ἐγγυτέρων τῆς αἰσθησεως· ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τὰ πορρωτέρων. ἐστὶ δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν, τὰ καθολοῦ μαλίστα. ἐγγυτάτω δὲ, τὰ καθεκάστα. καὶ ἀντικεῖται ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις. i. e. "If then science is such as we have established it to be, it is also ne-

lars, and are the causes of the propositions they prove. If, therefore, the causes of demonstrations are *universals*, and these universals have a *precedency in nature to particulars*, it is evident that individuals are not the only things which have a *real existence in*

cessary that demonstrative science should consist from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion: for thus they will be the proper principles of that which is demonstrated. For there may be a syllogism indeed without these conditions; but there will not be demonstration, since such a syllogism will not produce science. It is necessary, therefore, that the things from which demonstrative science consists should be *true*, because that which is not cannot be *scientifically* known; as, for instance, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with its side. It is also necessary that they should be from things *first and indemonstrable*, because they will not be *scientifically* known without demonstration. For to know scientifically things of which there is demonstration, and this not from accident, is to possess demonstration. It is likewise necessary that they should be *the causes of, more known than, and prior* to the conclusion. *Causes*, indeed, because we then know scientifically, when we know the cause: and *prior* because they are the causes. They are also *previously known*, not only from our understanding what they signify, but from our knowing that they are true. But things prior and more known subsist in a twofold respect. For that which is prior to nature is not the same with that which is prior to us; nor is that which is more known to nature the same with that which is more known to us. By things prior and more known to us, I mean such as are nearer to sense; but *things simply prior and more known are such as are more remote from sense*. And *things more remote from sense are such as are especially universal*; but such as are most near to it are particulars, and these are opposed to each other."

nature, and that particulars are in the order of things subordinate to universals.

In the next place Dr. Gillies endeavours to illustrate his remarks by presenting the reader with what he calls a translation of the fourteenth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, prudently omitting to give the original, at the same time that he vilifies my translation of the same chapter. That the learned reader, however, may see how he has deformed the text of Aristotle by a rambling paraphrase, which neither preserves the manner nor the matter of its author, I shall give both the original and the

Doctor's translation : Φανερον δε εξ αυτων τουτων το συμβαινον και τοις τας ιδεας λεγουσιν ουσιας τε και χωριστας ειναι αμα, και αμα το ειδος εκ του γενους ποιουσιν, και των διαφορων. ει γαρ εστι τα ειδη και το ζων εν τῷ ανθρωπῳ και ιππῳ, ητοι εν και ταυτον τῷ αριθμῳ εστιν, ἢ ετερον· τῷ μεν γαρ λογῳ δηλον οτι εν. τον γαρ αυτον διεξεισι λογον ο λεγων εν εκατερῳ. ει ουν εστι τις ανθρωπος αυτο καθ'αυτο, τοδε τι και κεχωρισμενον, αναγκη και εξων, οιον το ζων, και το διπουν, τοδε τι σημαινειν, και ειναι χωριστα και ουσιας· ωσε και το ζων. ει μεν ουν το αυτο και εν τῷ ιππῳ, ωσπερ συ σαυτῳ, πως εν χωρις ουσιν εν εσαι, και δια τι ου και χωρις

αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο; ἐπεὶτα εἰ μὲν μεθεξὶ τοῦ
 δίποδος καὶ τοῦ πολυπόδος ἀδύνατον τι συμβαίνει.
 ταναντία γὰρ ἀμὰ ὑπαρξῆς αὐτῶ, ἐνὶ καὶ τῷδε οὐτι.
 εἰ δὲ μὴ, τίς ὁ τρόπος, ὅταν εἴπῃ τίς τι ζῶον εἶναι
 δίπουν ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ' ἰσῶς συγχεῖται καὶ ἀπ'εἶναι,
 ἢ μεμικῆναι. ἀλλὰ πανῆα ἀτοπα. ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐν ἑκάστῳ.
 οὐκ οὐκ ἀπειρα ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν εἶναι, ὡν ἡ οὐσία ζῶον.
 οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐκ ζῶου ὁ ἀνθρώπος. ἐτι
 πολλὰ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον. οὐσία τε γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ
 ζῶον. οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλου λεγέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξ
 ἐκείνου εἶναι ὁ ἀνθρώπος, καὶ γένος αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο. καὶ
 ἐτι ἰδέσθαι ἀπανῆα ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀνθρώπος· οὐκ οὐκ ἀλλου
 μὲν ἰδέσθαι εἶναι, ἀλλου δ' οὐσία. ἀδύνατον γὰρ. αὐτὸ
 ἀρα ζῶον εἶναι ἑκάστον τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. ἐτι, ἐκ τίνος
 τούτου. καὶ πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ζῶου; καὶ πῶς οἷον τε
 εἶναι τὸ ζῶον ὁ οὐσία τούτου αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον;
 ἐτι δ' ἐπι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα τε συμβαίνει, καὶ
 τούτων ἀτοπωτέρα. εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως εἶναι, δῆλον
 ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἰδέα αὐτῶν οὕτως, ὡς τινες φασίν.

Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter is
 as follows: "With the same absurdities are
 those chargeable who regard ideas as sub-
 stances and separable substances; consider-
 ing the more general ideas as constituting
 the less general included under the same
 common term: for example, the ideas *ani-
 mal, biped, reason*, as constituting and com-

posing the *idea man*. Suppose *ideas* to be substances, and the *idea animal*, for instance, existing in *man* and *horse*; this idea in those two kinds must either be numerically one and the same thing, or two different things: in definition it is plainly one and the same, for we mean the same thing by the word *animal* when we say that men are animals, and that horses are animals. If the *idea man* existed as a separate being or entity, it would follow of course that the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, composing the *idea man*, should also exist as separate beings; so that the *idea animal*, if it were precisely one and the same thing in *man* and *horse* in the sense in which you are identically the same with yourself, would subsist the same individual entity in *man* and *horse*; and thus the same individual entity would subsist separately from itself! Farther; if one and the same *idea animal* subsists both in *man* and *horse*, in *man* a *biped*, and in *horse* a *quadruped*, must not the same individual be at once a biped and a quadruped, and thus the same subject be at once endowed with two mutually exclusive attributes? As this cannot happen by actual participation of those attributes, so neither

can it possibly be brought about by juxtaposition, mixture, or in any other way. The *idea animal* must therefore be numerically different in *man* and *horse*; and there must be many separate entities having the *idea animal* for their essential constituent, since this *idea* enters not adventitiously, but essentially, into their respective definitions. The *idea animal*, therefore, is many, constituting *man*, *horse*, and other species or tribes; whose different names cannot be reciprocally predicated of each other, because in that case all those different *ideas* would be one and the same *idea*, which is totally absurd. It is impossible, therefore, that the *idea animal* can have any substantial or separable existence, or be any thing beside what is found in all the different tribes of animals. The absurdity of realising general terms will appear still more monstrous if from species or tribes we descend to the individual objects of our senses, and say that this man or this horse is constituted and composed of *ideas*. There cannot, therefore, be any such *ideas* or *entities* as those spoken of by some philosophers."

Such is Dr. Gillies's translation of a most abstruse passage, from a book written by its

author, as is evident, from what has been above stated, with avowed obscurity of diction; a book written, as Plutarch well observes, not for the unlearned, but for men who have made a proficiency in philosophic attainments *. Such a passage from such a book, when the extreme accuracy and unexampled brevity of diction adopted by its author are also taken into account, ought indisputably to be translated with the utmost faithfulness and the most literal exactness. A few instances will shew how little claim the translation of Dr. Gillies has to these requisites. In the first place, he has entirely perverted the meaning of the very first sentence; for this, literally translated, is as follows: “From these very things that which happens to those who assert that ideas are *separate* essences, and who at the same time make form to consist from *genus* and *differences*, is manifest.” Compare this with the translation of Dr. Gillies: “With the same absurdities are those chargeable who regard ideas as substances, and *separable* substances;

* Αληθως γαρ η μετα τα φυσικα πραγματια προς διδασκαλιαν και μαθησιν ουδεν εχουσα χρησιμον υποδειγμα τοις πεπαιδευμενοις απ' αεχνης γεγραπται. Plutarch in Alexan. p. 668.

considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the same common term." Here the reader will easily perceive that what Aristotle says is a deduction from prior reasoning; but in the translation of Dr. Gillies something else is, as usual, substituted for the genuine meaning. In the next place, Aristotle is speaking of those who assert that ideas are *separate* essences, and accordingly he uses the words *ουσιας τε και χωριστας*, but, according to the translation of Dr. Gillies, he must be supposed to be speaking of those who regard ideas as *separable* substances. This, however, is very far from being the case, for the ideas of which Aristotle is here speaking are incorporeal natures resident in Deity, and perfectly *separated* from matter; but *separable* ideas are the universals inherent in and predicated of the multitude of sensible particulars, which Aristotle everywhere admits, and which in modern language are no other than *abstract ideas*. Dr. Gillies's translation of the remaining part of the sentence is so very remote from the accurate meaning of Aristotle, that it may rather be called a conceit of the Doctor's than a translation; and

any one who compares it with the original might fairly conclude that the Doctor knew not the distinction between genus and difference.

The next sentence, which, literally translated, is: “ For if forms and animal are in man and horse, there is either one and the same, or a different animal in number,”—is entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies. This also is the case with the next sentence: and in short, there is so little of the matter, (for of the manner there is none) of Aristotle in the whole of it, that it is in vain to compare it with the original, as must, I presume, be obvious to every Greek scholar, however moderate his skill may be in that language. Because my translation of this passage is faithful and literal I am accused by Dr. Gillies of having “ travestied Aristotle into unintelligible gibberish ;” and this merely because I have not made that by translation to be *obvious to every one which was never intended by its author to be so*, and because I have been more solicitous, by endeavouring to preserve the accurate meaning and manner of the original, to gain the approbation of the wise and worthy, than to do violence

to Aristotle in order to please the vulgar, and, in the language of trade, *manufacture a saleable book.*

After this Dr. Gillies endeavours to show that I have falsely charged him with ignorance, in the new arrangement which he has made of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. As a full answer to this, I deem it will be merely necessary to state to the reader, that in criticizing Dr. Gillies's arrangement of the *Metaphysics*, I regarded that order alone in which those books have been transmitted to us from the ancients; in which order they were first published by Aldus, and translated into Latin by Bessarion. This too is the order, which I presume every man of good sense would suppose Dr. Gillies objected to in his new arrangement. Far otherwise. Du Val, from not understanding the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, had, long before Dr. Gillies presumed to alter the arrangement of some of the books; and Dr. Gillies in making a new arrangement uniformly quotes Du Val's edition of Aristotle, and blames the order in which the *Metaphysics* are there published, as if it were the same with that adopted by the ancients; from which circumstance I

think it is most evident that he knew not at that time that Du Val's arrangement differs from that of the ancients. Afterwards, however, and most likely from my animadversions, he appears to have discovered his mistake, but with great subtlety endeavours to fix the charge of ignorance in this particular upon me. For in p. 173 of his Supplement he says: "I think it right to observe, that this deep student in Aristotle seems not aware that the book published as the twelfth by Aldus and Bessarion stands as the fourteenth in Du Val's noble edition." The liberal reader, however, will, I trust, readily admit that in criticizing Dr. Gillies's arrangement of the *Metaphysics*, I had no right to suppose that he referred to any other order than that in which these books were at first published from the most ancient manuscripts, especially as Dr. Gillies does not mention in any part of his *Analysis*, that he alone blames the arrangement of these books as published by Du Val.

Again, Dr. Gillies, in p. 99 of his *Analysis*, had asserted, "that the real subject of what is called Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is the

vindication of the existence and nature of truth against the cavils of sophists, and those now called metaphysicians; and this doctrine concerning truth illustrated in demonstrating the being of one god, in opposition to atheists on one hand and polytheists on the other." To this, in p. 48 of the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, I replied as follows: "That if by polytheists Dr. Gillies means men who believed in a multitude of self-existent beings independent of each other, and of one first cause, there were no such men among the Greeks and Romans, as must be obvious to every one who is conversant with the writings of the heathens, and as is fully evinced by Dr. Cudworth in his *Intellectual System*; nor am I acquainted with any nation who entertained an opinion so monstrous and dire. But if by polytheists he intends to signify men who believed in the existence of divine natures the immediate progeny of one first cause with which they are profoundly united, Aristotle is so far from opposing this doctrine in his *Metaphysics*, that in the eighth chapter of the twelfth book

(Aldus's edition) he demonstrates their existence. In this chapter he expressly says, "*It is necessary that each of the revolutions of the celestial orbs should be moved by an essentially immoveable and eternal essence; and that these essences should be as many in number as the revolving spheres* *." And the conclusion of it is remarkably strong in support of this opinion: "OUR ANCESTORS," says he, AND MEN OF GREAT ANTIQUITY, HAVE LEFT US A TRADITION INVOLVED IN FABLE, THAT THESE FIRST ESSENCES ARE GODS, AND THAT THE DIVINITY COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE OF NATURE. *The rest, indeed, is fabulously introduced for the purpose of persuading the multitude, enforcing the laws, and benefiting human life. For they ascribe to THE FIRST ESSENCES a human form, and speak of them as resembling other animals, and assert other things consequent and similar to these.* BUT IF AMONG

* Αναγκη και τούτων εκαστην των φερων υτ' ακινητου τε κινειθαι καθ' αυτο, και αιδιου ουσιας. η τε γαρ των αστρων φυσις, αιδιος ουσια τις ουσια, και το κινουν, αιδιον, και προτερον του κινουμενου· και το προτερον ουσιας, ουσιαν αναγκαιον ειναι. φανερον τοιουτου, οτι τοσαυτας ουσιας αναγκαιον ειναι, την τε φυσιν αιδιους και ακινητους καθ' αυται, και ανευ μεγεθους, δια την ειρημενην αιτιαν προτερον.

THESE ASSERTIONS ANY ONE, SEPARATING THE REST, RETAINS ONLY THE FIRST; VIZ. THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE FIRST ESSENCES TO BE GODS, HE WILL THINK IT TO BE DIVINELY SAID: AND IT MAY BE PROBABLY INFERRED; THAT AS EVERY ART AND PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN INVENTED AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE, AND HAS AGAIN PERISHED, THESE OPINIONS ALSO OF THE ANTIENTS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED AS RELICS TO THE PRESENT TIME. *Of the opinions of our fathers, therefore, and men of the highest antiquity, thus much only is manifest to us *.*" To these first essences also he alludes in the following beautiful passage in the second book: "*As are the eyes of*

* Παραδεδοται δε υπο των αρχαιων και παλαιων, εν μυθου σχηματι καταλελειμμενα τοις υστερον, οτι θεοι τε εισιν ουτοι, και περιεχει το θειον την ολην φυσιν. τα δε λοιπα μυθικως ηδη προσηχθη προς την πειθω των πολλων, και προς την εις νομους και το συμφερον χρησην. ανθρωποειδεις τε γαρ τουτους, και των αλλων ζων ομοιους τισι λεγουσι, και τουτοις ετερα ακολουθα και παραπλησια τοις ειρημενοις· ων ει τις χωρισας αυτο λαβοι μονον το πρωτον, οτι θεους φοντο τας πρωτας ουσιας εισαι, θειως αν ειρησθαι νομισειε, και κατὰ το εικος πολλακις ευρημενης εις το δυνατον εκαστης και τεχνης και φιλοσοφιας, και παλιν φθειρομενων, και ταυτας ται δοξας εκεινων, οιον λειψανα περισεσσωσθαι μεχρι του νυν. η μεν ουν παλριος δοξα, και η παρα των πρωτων, επι τοσουτον ημιν φανερα μονον.

*bats to the light of day, so is the intellect of our soul to SUCH THINGS AS ARE NATURALLY THE MOST SPLENDID OF ALL *.*" So prevalent, indeed, was this doctrine among the antients, that even so late as the time of the Emperor Commodus the elegant Maximus Tyrius observes, "That there is in all the earth one according law and opinion, that there is one god, the king and father of all things, and many gods, sons of God, ruling in conjunction with him. This is asserted by the Greek and the barbarian, by the inhabitant of the continent, and by him who dwells near the sea, by the wise and by the unwise. And if you proceed even as far as to the utmost shores of the ocean, there also there are gods, rising very near to some, and setting very near to others †."

* Ωσπερ γαρ και τα των νυκτεριδων ομματα προς το φεγγος εχει το μεθ' ημεραν, ουτω και της ημετερας ψυχης ο νους προς τα τη φυσει φανερωτατα παντων.

† Ενα ιδοις αν εν παση γη ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεω. ταυτα δε ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος· και επι του ωκεανου ελθης τας ηιονας, κακει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε καταδυομενοι. Dissert. 1.

The only reply which the Doctor makes to all this in his Supplement (p. 175) is the following: "In the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, (which is the eighth of the fourteenth book in Du Val's edition) Aristotle, in deference to the opinion delivered down by the antients, and which prevailed in most ages of paganism, speaks of different gods presiding over the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the sentence immediately preceding this passage, and which Mr. Taylor entirely omits in his refutation of my opinion, maintains the unity of the first cause, the eternal spring of motion, himself immoveable. This principle, on which heaven and earth depend, is one in number as well as essence."

Is it possible that any reply can be more foreign from the purpose than this? Dr. Gillies had asserted that one design of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* was to demonstrate the being of one god in opposition to polytheists. My answer to this most clearly proved that Aristotle could have no such design, according to the proper meaning of the word polytheist, or that meaning which was

adopted by antiquity ; but in order to evade this evidence, and, if possible, conceal his ignorance, Dr. Gillies tells his readers that I have omitted a sentence, in which Aristotle maintains the unity of the first cause. As if the existence of divine natures the progeny of one *first* cause invalidated the subsistence of that cause. Surely not more so than the existence of children subverts the prior existence of their father. But this affair will be more fully unfolded in the answer to the Doctor's next paragraph.

“ The existence (says he) of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united, is not asserted by the Sagirite in the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, or in any other part of his invaluable writings. Such mysterious language, indeed, occurs frequently in the works of Plotinus and other eclectics, or new Platonists, as they are called, the pretended reconcilers of Plato and Aristotle ; visionaries whose wild dreams seduced the old age and dotage of reason under the declining empire of Rome, and imposed on its childhood and imbecility at

the first revival of letters in modern Europe. Of such philosophers Mr. Taylor, as will presently appear, is not an unworthy pupil."

The man who, like Dr. Gillies, presumes to analyse and translate the acroamatic works of Aristotle without having even discovered that in these works he is designedly obscure, and that the profundity of his conceptions is no less extraordinary than the brevity of his diction, must also, like Dr. Gillies, perpetually err on subjects which are necessarily from their very nature most arduous and abstruse. The truth of this observation was never more fully displayed than in the above paragraph, as will be at once evident from the following observations: Aristotle having demonstrated, in the seventh chapter of the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, that there is a certain eternal and immoveable essence separated from sensibles, in the next chapter enquires whether only one essence of this kind * is to be admitted or more than one; and in this chapter he proves that there

* Ποτερον δε μιαν δετερον την τοιαυτην ουσιαν, η πλειους, και ποσας, δει μη λανθαινειν.

are many *such like* essences. Now if we attentively consider that Aristotle uses the word *τοιαυτη*, *such like*, on this occasion, and demonstrates that *such like* essences do exist, it will most evidently appear “that the Stagirite does admit the existence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united.” For the term *such like* is equivalent to *similar to*; and *similitude* is defined by Aristotle to be a participation of *sameness*, and *sameness* to be a *union* of essence*. Hence as Aristotle demonstrates the existence of one first cause, clearly asserting at the same time that there can be but one first; and as he also proves that there are many essences *similar* to this first cause, it necessarily follows, from his own definition of *similitude*, that these divine essences are *united* to their great producing cause. This single instance, as it shows the ignorance of Dr. Gillies in a strong point of view, shows also the necessity

* Ομοια λεγεται τα τε ταυτο πεπονθοτα. i. e. “Things are said to be similar which are passive to (or participate) the same thing.” And η ταυτοτης ενότης τις εστιν του ειναι. i. e. “Sameness is a certain unity of essence.” Metaphys. lib. v. cap. 9.

of adhering to the most rigid accuracy in translating the acroamatic writings of Aristotle.

In the remaining part of Dr. Gillies's Supplement there is but little deserving of notice, as it chiefly consists of misrepresentation and invective. I shall therefore only select two or three passages, as most incontestible proofs that he must necessarily advance absurdities and contradictions who writes on subjects which he does not understand, and who dares to calumniate where he cannot confute. Of the truth of this remark take the following specimen in p. 190 :
 “ The chimeras of those visionaries (Moderatus and Nicomachus) which would now entitle their professors to cells in a mad-house (so unaccountable to one age seem the follies of another !) were adopted by the whole tribe of later Platonists, and nearly a century before their times by the learned and sensible Plutarch, one of the finest painters of actions and manners in public and private life. But this excellent writer, an exuberant source of instruction and entertainment to all ages and nations, was both a Pla-

tonic philosopher and a priest of Apollo." Thus, according to Dr. Gillies, Plutarch, though a learned and sensible man, though an excellent writer, and an exuberant source of instruction and entertainment to *all* ages and nations; yet this same Plutarch, had he lived in these luminous days, would have been entitled to a cell in a madhouse !

No less absurd and *insane* is the following specimen : " The main end of their philosophy (that of the later Platonists) was to attain intellectual union with God, and thus to see all truths at one glance in the divine understanding. Deity they mysteriously describe as everywhere and nowhere ; penetrating and sustaining all things, yet in nothing present, and ever totally unmixed: as the unity of unities, the root of being, the perennial fountain of spiritual existences ; and the more irreverently they strove in this mystical language to exalt the Creator, the more material became their images, and the wilder the contradictions in which they were inextricably involved." (Supplement, p. 208.) According to the *sagacious* and *pious* Dr. Gillies, therefore, that philosophy is contemptible whose main end is to attain

intellectual union with deity, and *irreverent* are those conceptions of the Divinity which assert him to be everywhere and yet nowhere; *every where*, as illuminating all things with divine light, and *no where*, as being perfectly exempt from the nature of the things illuminated; penetrating and sustaining all things; and subsisting as the root of all being. The man, however, who presumes to call such conceptions as these *irreverent* is (to speak Platonically) unconscious that the greatest eye of his soul (το μεγαλειον της ψυχης ομμα) is blinded with ignorance and buried in error.

In the last place, Dr. Gillies, speaking of me, observes: "If that translator of the *Metaphysics* had been as skilful in Greek as he is profound in philosophy, he would not have recommended, as essential to the right understanding of Aristotle, the commentary of Alexander Aphrodisiensis. Alexander's commentary on the *Metaphysics* now exists only in a Latin version, and cannot, therefore, afford much assistance to a man capable of reading the Greek original, and who wishes to convey its sense clearly to his countrymen in their native tongue." I am

very much mistaken if there is not as much nonsense in this passage as malevolence. For can any thing be more absurd than to assert that the commentary of Alexander cannot afford much assistance to a man capable of reading the Greek original of Aristotle, because it now exists only in a Latin version? when at the same time Alexander was one of the most famous, and, except Simplicius, the best of all Aristotle's interpreters. And can any thing be more malevolent than the insinuation that I am not skilful in Greek because I availed myself of the assistance of this commentary in a Latin translation, not being able to consult the original because it is lost? Is it possible, likewise, that there can be a greater contradiction in terms than to suspect my knowledge of Greek, and yet confess that I am profound in philosophy? For if I am profound in philosophy it must be in that of Plato and Aristotle, since I have studied and profess no other. How then did I acquire my profundity? for, exclusive of my own translations, there is no English translation of any part of Aristotle's works, except his Poetics and his Politics, nor of the more abstruse of Plato's writings: and the

Doctor observes, in the paragraph above quoted, “That Latin translations from the Greek are seldom intelligible except where their assistance is superfluous to a Greek scholar.” As I have therefore no knowledge whatever of any languages but English, Latin, and Greek, it is evident that this profundity must have been obtained from the Greek. And thus the malevolent insinuation of Dr. Gillies confutes itself, and is as imbecile as his answers to my strictures and his abuse of the Platonic philosophers.

Having therefore answered all those parts of Dr. Gillies’s Supplement which appeared to me most deserving of notice, I shall, in the next place, present the reader with specimens of the manner in which he has translated, or rather mutilated and deformed, the Ethics of Aristotle. I shall begin, then, with the first chapter of the first book, and with the very first sentence of that chapter, as the extreme inaccuracy with which it is translated affords of itself a sufficient proof of the Doctor’s total incapacity to translate a writer so uncommonly accurate and profound as Aristotle. The original is as follows: Πασα τεχνη και πασα μεθοδος, ομοιως δε

πραξις τε και προαιρεσις, αγαθου τινος εφισταται
δοκει· διο καλωσ απεφηναντο ταγαθον, ου παντα
εφιεσαι. i. e. “ Every art and every method,
and in like manner every action and delibe-
rative tendency to that which is in our power
(pre-election) appear to desire a certain
good : hence they well assert *the good* to be
that which all things desire.” The transla-
tion of Dr. Gillies : “ Since every art and
every kind of, knowledge, as well as all the
actions and deliberations of men, constantly
aim at something which they call good ;
good in general may be justly defined, “ that
which all desire.” Here, in the first place,
the word *μεθοδος*, *method*, which properly sig-
nifies a path to, or means of acquiring a cer-
tain end, and in which sense it is here used
by Aristotle, is translated by Dr. Gillies,
“ *every kind of knowledge!*” In the next
place, the word *προαιρεσις*, *pre-election*, which
Aristotle himself, in cap. iii. lib. 3, defines to
be “ a deliberative tendency to or desire of
things in our power :” η προαιρεσις αν ειη
βουλευτικη ορεξις των εφ’ ημιν, is translated by
Dr. Gillies merely “ *deliberation.*” And, in
the third place, the words διο καλωσ απεφηναντο
ταγαθον ου παντα εφιεσαι, “ hence *they* well assert

the good to be that which all things desire," are miserably perverted by Dr. Gillies, who translates them, "good in general may be justly defined that which all desire." For Aristotle alludes here to Plato and the Pythagoreans, who called the supreme principle of the universe *ταγαθον*, *the good*, and said that it was the object of desire to all things, as must be obvious to every tyro in the doctrines of those philosophers.

Dr. Gillies, likewise, does not appear to have had the smallest conception that Aristotle in this sentence passes gradually from things more particular to things more universal. For *art* is less universal than *method*, because every art is a method, but not every method is an art, since many things are effected by inartificial methods. Again, *action* is more universal than *method*: for every method is a habit, but not every action is a method; since many things are done without method. And *pre-election* is more universal than *action*, because every true action proceeds from pre-election, but many things are the objects of this deliberative tendency which are not performed. The proposition, therefore, in this sentence, always proceeds to

things more universal, just as if, for instance, it should be said, every *man*, every *animal*, every *body*, participates of being.

Again, from the following specimen, the reader will see how little Dr. Gillies has preserved either the manner or the matter of Aristotle. It is the first part of the second chapter of the same book. Εἰ δὲ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ βουλομένηθα, τὰ ἀλλὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα· (προεισὶ γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὡς εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαιὰν τὴν ὀρέξιν·) δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτ' ἀνείη ταγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρίστον. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν; καὶ καθάπερ τοξοῦται, σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἀν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δεοῦτος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τυπῶ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτό, τί ποτε ἐστὶ, καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυναμῶν· δοξείε δ' ἀν τῆς κυριωτάτης, καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαυτὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. *i. e.* “ If there is a certain end of practical objects, which we wish for its own sake, but we choose other things on account of this, and not every thing for the sake of something else, (for thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that desire would be empty and vain,)—if this be admitted, it is evident that this end will be the good, and that which is most ex-

cellent. May we not, therefore, say that the knowledge of it is of great importance with respect to life ; and that, like archers, having this for a mark, we shall more readily obtain what we want ? If, then, this be the case, let us endeavour by a rude delineation to show what this end is, and to what science or faculty it belongs. It may indeed seem to belong to the most principal and master science, and such the political science appears to be." Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is as follows: " But if there be an ultimate end of all *human pursuit*, an end desirable merely in itself, (and unless there be such an end, desire, proceeding to infinity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this ultimate end must be what is called good, and of goods the best. The knowledge of it also must greatly contribute to the benefit of life ; serving as a butt to bowmen for *the direction of* our views and actions. Let us therefore endeavour *to delineate it carefully*, first premising that the investigation of it belongs to that master science called politics."

Again, in the beginning of the fourth chapter, the words *επειδη πασα γνωσις και προαιρεσις αγαθου τινος ορεγεται* ; *i. e.* " since all

knowledge and pre-election aspire after a certain good," are translated by Dr. Gillies, "since all our thoughts and desires aim at some kind of good;" and this, though the word *pre-election* is considered by Aristotle of such importance that he has devoted the whole of one chapter to the investigation of its nature. In the same chapter, too, the words, *εὐ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπορεῖ τούτο καὶ ἐζητεῖ*, *i. e.* "Plato well doubted and investigated," are rendered by Dr. Gillies, "Plato therefore doubted;" no notice whatever being taken of the compliment which Aristotle pays to his venerable master.

Again, in the beginning of the thirteenth chapter, Aristotle says, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖα τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν*; *i. e.* "Since felicity is a certain energy of the soul according to perfect virtue;" but by Dr. Gillies he is made to say, "since happiness results from virtuous energies," which is very far from his real meaning. For Aristotle here repeats nearly the whole of that accurate and beautiful definition of felicity which he had before given; *viz.* "that it is the energy of the soul according to the most perfect virtue in a perfect life." So that fe-

licity, according to Aristotle, is not merely the result of virtuous energies, but of the energies of the most perfect virtue. Again, in the same chapter, Aristotle says, *ει δε ταυθ ουτως εχει, δηλον, οτι δει τον πολιτικον ειδεναι πως τα περι ψυχην* ωσπερ και τον οφθαλμους θεραπειουσα, και παν σωμα* και μαλλον οσω τιμιωτερα και βελτιων η πολιτικη της ιατρικης. i. e.* “ If this be the case, it is evident that the politician (the man who is capable of managing the reins of government) ought to know the manner in which things pertaining to the soul subsist, just as he who intends to administer remedies to the eyes ought to have a knowledge of the whole body; and this by how much the more honourable and excellent the political is than the medicinal science.” Compare this with the following translation of Dr. Gillies: “ The true statesman, therefore, ought to know the mind as much, or rather more, (because his pursuit is still more excellent) than the physician does the body.” Here the very beautiful and important dogma contained in the original, and which Aristotle derived from the Charmides of Plato, is entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies. The dogma I al-

lude to is this: that he who intends to cure a part ought to have an accurate knowledge of the whole body, and that the former cannot be properly effected without the latter. Dr. Gillies too has destroyed by his translation the beautiful analogy implied by Aristotle in this sentence; I mean that the most exalted virtue, in which felicity consists, has the same relation to the whole soul that the eye has to the whole body. For the most exalted virtue, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book, is theoretic, which has evidently the relation of an eye.

Again, near the end of the first book, Aristotle says, “that of the virtues some are dianoetic and others moral,” λεγομεν γαρ αυτων τας μεν διανοητικας, τας δε ηθικας; and this division he also repeats in the beginning of the second book. Dr. Gillies, however, not knowing the accurate meaning of the word *dianoetic*, translates *διανοητικας* *intellectual*, and thus destroys all the accuracy of Aristotle’s meaning in this place, which is founded on that scientific division of the parts or powers of the soul made by him, particularly in his third book on the Soul, and alluded to in many of his other various works. For, ac-

according to Aristotle, in these writings *διανοια*, or *the dianoetic power*, is, in its most accurate signification, that faculty of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect; but *intellect* is that power which perceives truth without affirmation or negation, because it does not understand by composition or division, but simply, and with immediate vision sees the forms of things. See the sixth chapter of the sixth book of his Ethics, the tenth book of the same work, and the latter part of the third chapter of his third book on the Soul. There is an absolute necessity therefore of using the word *dianoetic* in translating the acroamatic works of Aristotle, because there is no word in the English language, nor perhaps in any other language, equivalent to its accurate meaning: for even in Latin the word *cogitatio*, which is the translation of it given by Cicero, conveys a very imperfect, or rather no idea whatever, of its primary philosophical signification.

Farther still, the beginning of the second chapter of the second book is as follows:

Ἐπει οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά
 ἐστίν, ὡσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι· οὐ γὰρ ἰν' εἰδῶμεν τι ἐστίν ἢ

αρετη, σκεπτομεθα. αλλ' ιν' αγαθοι γενωμεθα, επει ουδεν αν ην οφελος αυτης. *i. e.* “ Since then the present treatise is not for the sake of theory, like our other works : for we do not speculate that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good, since otherwise it would be attended with no benefit, &c.” Which is thus translated by Dr. Gillies : “ Since the present treatise is not merely a theory, as other parts of our works (for the inquiry is not ‘ wherein virtue consists,’ but ‘ how it may be best attained,’ without which the speculative knowledge of it is not of the smallest value) &c.” Here the reader will easily see, that Dr. Gillies, by his random translation perverts, as usual, the meaning of Aristotle. For the inquiry in Ethics is not “ how virtue may be best attained,” since a man may know this without being virtuous ; but we speculate on this subject, as Aristotle says, “ that we may become good ;” the end of this inquiry, as he elsewhere observes, not being knowledge but action.

Again, near the end of the third chapter of this book, Aristotle says, *Περι δε το χαλεπω-
τερον αει και τεχνη γινεται και αρετη* και γαρ το ευ-
βελτιον εν τούτω.* *i. e.* “ Both art and virtue are

always conversant with that which is more difficult, for in this there is a more excellent good." Compare this with the version of Dr. Gillies: "But the most difficult part, is that best fitted for showing the excellence of the performer." In this translation, as the reader will easily perceive, neither the accurate meaning, nor any thing of the manner of Aristotle, are preserved.

Compare also the following passage, in the fourth chapter of this book, with the Doctor's version. It is the beginning of that chapter.

Απορησειε δ' αν τις, πως λεγομεν οτι δει τα μεν δικαγια πραττοντας δικαιους γινεσθαι, τα δε σωφρονα σωφρονας· ει γαρ πραττουσι τα δικαγια και τα σωφρονα, ηδη εισι δικαιοι και σωφρονες· ωσπερ ει τα γραμματικα και μουσικα, γραμματικοι και μουσικοι. η ουδε επι των τεχνων ουτως εχει; ενδεχεται γαρ γραμματικον τι ποιησαι και απο τυχης, και αλλου υποθεμενου· τοτε ουν εσαι γραμματικος, εαν και γραμματικον τι ποιηση και γραμματικως, τουτο δεσι το κατα την εν αυτω γραμματικην. *i. e.* "It may be doubted why we say that men from performing just things must necessarily become just, and from performing temperate things, temperate: for if they do such things as are just and temperate, they are already just and tem-

perate ; just as those who perform things grammatical and musical are grammarians and musicians. Or may we not say that neither is this the case with the arts ? For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical both casually and from the suggestion of another. Hence he will then be a grammarian, if he both does something grammatical and in a grammatical manner ; that is, if he does it according to the grammatical art which he contains in himself." The translation of Dr. Gillies is as follows: " A doubt arises, why we should say that men acquire justice by doing just actions, or become temperate by observing the rules of temperance ; since if they perform such actions and observe such rules, it should seem that they must be already endowed with those virtues ; in the same manner as a man who writes or who performs according to the rules of grammar and music is already a grammarian and a musician. *But this does not hold true even with respect to the arts ; for a man may write grammar merely by imitation, by chance, or by the direction of another ; but to be a grammarian he must himself understand the art.*" Here one part

of this passage, which is evidently a question in the original, is made an assertive sentence in the version of Dr. Gillies; and in the concluding part the meaning of Aristotle is entirely perverted. For Aristotle says that *a man is then a grammarian when he both does something grammatical and in a grammatical manner*; but he does not merely say that *to be a grammarian he must himself understand the art*. For simply to understand the art of grammar does not make a man a grammarian; but to be so he must *do something grammatical, grammatically*.

Again, in the second chapter of the third book, pre-election ($\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$) is everywhere confounded in the translation of Dr. Gillies with *election* and *preference*, though, as we have before observed, it is defined by Aristotle himself to be *a deliberative tendency to, or desire of things in our power*. It is not therefore the same either with *election* or *preference*, since a man may *choose* or *prefer* one thing to another without *deliberation*, but in this case his energy is not pre-elective.

I shall pass on to the fifth book; for it would be an endless task to enumerate all the inaccuracies of Dr. Gillies's translation.

In the fourth chapter, therefore, of this book Aristotle treats of corrective justice and its analogy, and having shown that it holds the middle place between loss and gain, and that it is the business of a judge to find this middle term, which is an arithmetical mean between the greater and the lesser extreme, he illustrates his meaning as follows: *Ισαι αι εφ'ων, αα, ββ γγ, αλληλαις* απο της αα αφηρησθω το αε, και προσκεισθω τη γγ, το εφ'ων γδ* ωσε ολη η δγγ, της αε υπερεχει τω γδ, και τω γζ. της αρα ββ τω γδ:*

α	ε	α	
β		β	
γ	ζ	γ	δ.

i. e. " Let there be three equal right lines, *aa, bb, cc.* From the line *aa* let there be taken a part *ae*, and let this part be added to the line *cc.* Let this part also be *cd.* This being done, the whole line *d c c* will surpass the line *ae* by the line *cd*, and the line *cf.* Hence it will surpass the line *bb* by the line *ed.*

<i>a</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>a</i>	
<i>b</i>		<i>b</i>	
<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d."</i>

Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is no-

thing more than "This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram!"

Again; take the following specimen of the Doctor's translation from the beginning of the eighth chapter of the same book:

ΟΝΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΚΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ, ΑΔΙΚΕΙ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΕΙ, ΟΤΑΝ ΕΚΩΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΥΤΑ ΠΡΑΤῆΗ· ΟΤΑΝ ΔΕ ΑΚΩΝ, ΟΥΤ' ΑΔΙΚΕΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΕΙ, ΑΛΛ' ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ· ΟΙΣ ΓΑΡ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΕ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΙΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ἢ ΑΔΙΚΟΙΣ, ΠΡΑΤῆΟΥΣΙΝ. ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΗΜΑ ΩΡΙΣΑΙ Τῷ ΕΚΟΥΣΙῳ, ΚΑΙ ΑΚΟΥΣΙῳ· ΟΤΑΝ ΓΑΡ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ ἢ ΨΕΥΓΕΤΑΙ· ΑΜΑ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑ ΤῶΙΕ ΕΣΙΝ. ΩΣΕ ΑΔΙΚΟΝ ΤΙ ΕΣΑΙ ΜΕΝ, ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑ ΔΕ ΟΥΔΕΠΩ, ΕΑΝ ΜΗ ΤΟ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ ΠΡΟΣῆ. ΛΕΓΩ ΔΕ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ ΜΕΝ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ, Ο ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΕΦ' ΑΥΤῷ ΟΝΤΩΝ ΕΙΔΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΑΓΝΩΩΝ ΠΡΑΤῆΗ, ΜΗΤΕ ΟΥ, ΜΗΤΕ ὦ, ΜΗΤΕ ΟΥ ΕΝΕΚΑ. ΟΙΟΝ ΤΙΝΑ ΤΥΠῆΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΙΝΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΕΝΕΚΑ, ΚΑΙ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ ΕΚΑΣΟΝ, ΜΗ ΚΑῖΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ, ΜΗΔΕ ΒΙΑ· ΩΣΠΕΡ ΕΙ ΤΙΣ ΛΑΒΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΧΕΙΡΑ ΑΥΤΟΥ, ΤΥΠῆΙ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ· ΟΥΧ ΕΚΩΝ ΔΕ· ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΕΠ' ΑΥΤῷ. ΕΝΔΕΧΕῖΤΑΙ ΔΕ ΤΟΝ ΤΥΠῆΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΠΑῖΕΡΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΤΟΝ Δ' ΟΤΙ ΜΕΝ ΑΝΘΡῶΠΟΣ ἢ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΩΝ ΤΙΣ ΓΙΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ, ΟΤΙ ΔΕ ΠΑῖΗΡ ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ. ΟΜΟΙΩΣ ΔΕ ΤΟ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΙΩΡΙΣΘῶ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΥ ΕΝΕΚΑ, ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΑΞΙΝ ΟΛΗΝ. ΤΟ ΔΗ ΑΓΝΟΟΜΕΝΟΝ. ἢ ΜΗ ΑΓΝΟΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΜΕΝ, ΜΗ ΕΠ' ΑΥΤῷ ΔΕ ΟΥ, ἢ ΒΙΑ ΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ· ΠΟΛΛΑ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ἸΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΩΝ ΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΤῆΟΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΧΟΜΕΝ, ΩΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ, ΟΥΤΕ

ακρουσίων εσιν οἷον τὸ γηραλ, ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἰ. ε.

“ Just and unjust actions then being those which we have enumerated, a man acts justly or unjustly when he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily he neither acts unjustly nor justly, except from accident: for he does those things which happen to be either just or unjust. But an unjust and also a just deed are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary: for when these deeds are voluntary they are blamed; but at the same time an unjust action is then performed. So that *something unjust* will indeed take place, but will not yet be *an unjust deed* unless it is accompanied with the voluntary. But the voluntary, as was before observed, takes place when any one does that which is in his power knowingly, and is neither ignorant of the person to whom, nor with what, nor on what account he does it; as, for instance, when he is not ignorant whom he strikes, with what instrument, and on what account, and when he does each of these things, not from accident, nor by compulsion, as would be the case, if some one, taking his hand, should strike another person with it; since in this

instance he would not strike willingly, because it was not in his power to prevent it. It might also happen that he who was struck was the father of him by whom he was struck, and the son might know indeed that he was a man, or some one of the persons present, but might not know that he was his father. A similar distinction must likewise be made with respect to that for the sake of which a thing is done, and with respect to the whole action. Hence, that which is done ignorantly, or if not ignorantly, could not be prevented by him who did it, or was done by him through compulsion, is an involuntary deed. For we knowingly both do and are passive to many things, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; such, for instance, as old age or death." In order to understand the meaning of Aristotle fully in this passage, it is necessary to observe, that, near the end of the seventh chapter, he makes a very accurate distinction between *the just* and *a just deed*, and also between *the unjust* and *an unjust deed*. "For," says he, "*the unjust* or *the just* derives its subsistence from nature or law; but the same thing when done is *a just* or *an*

unjust deed, and not before it is done. For prior to this it is *the just*, or *the unjust*."

Διαφέρει δε το αδικημα και το αδικον, και το δικαιωμα και το δικαιον· αδικον μεν γαρ εσι τη Φυσει, η ταξει. το αυτο δε τουτο, οταν πραχθη, αδικημα εσι· πριν δε πραχθηναι, επω, αλλ' αδικον· ομοιως δε και δικαιωμα.

Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is as follows: "Injustice, as applicable to actions, consists in what we have now said, but it does not belong to persons unless it be committed voluntarily; for when a man acts without intention the quality of his action, as good or bad, just or unjust, is, in reference to the agent, merely an accessory, not springing essentially from himself, and neither entitling him to praise nor subjecting him to blame. That therefore which is unjust is not injustice in the agent unless it be committed voluntarily; that is, as formerly explained, unless the action, with all its circumstances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed knowingly, with intention, and without constraint. Thus, to make the act of striking *parricide*, we must know the person whom we strike, the nature of the instrument with which the stroke is

inflicted; and the motive through which we are impelled to such a horrid crime. The action must also depend entirely on our own power; for in many natural events we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily; witness old age and death." Here, in the first place, there is no vestige whatever in this translation of the distinction which Aristotle makes between *the unjust* το αδικον, and *an unjust deed*, το αδικημα. In the next place no notice is taken of the illustration adduced by Aristotle of one man taking the hand of another and striking a third person with it. And, in the third place, Aristotle says nothing about making "the act of striking parricide;" for this is an interpolation of the Doctor.

Entire chapters, likewise, are translated by Dr. Gillies with the same unskilfulness and inaccuracy; and in these the same unpardonable liberty is everywhere taken of arrogantly interpolating, and rashly omitting, as may best serve the purposes of random paraphrase. Of this the following chapters are instances. The first is the third chapter of the sixth book: Αρξάμενοι ουν ανωθεν, περι αυτων παλιν λεγωμεν. εσω δη οισ αληθευει η ψυχη τω

κἀφαναι ἢ ἀποφαναι, πεντε τον αριθμον· ταυτα
 δ' εστι, τεχνη, επισημη, φρονησις, σοφια, νους· υποληψει
 γαρ και δοξη ενδεχεται διαψευδεσθαι. επισημη μεν ουν
 τι εστιν, εντευθεν φανερον, ει δει ακριβολογεισθαι, και
 μη ακολουθειν ταις ομοιοτησι· παντες γαρ υπολαμ-
 βανομεν, ο επισαμεθα μη ενδεχεσθαι αλλως εχειν. τα
 δε ενδεχομενα αλλως, οταν εξω του θεωρειν γενηται,
 λανθανει ει εστιν, ἢ μη. εξ αναγκης αρα εστι το επι-
 σητον· αἰδιον αρα· τα γαρ εξ αναγκης οντα απλως,
 αἰδια παντα· τα δ' αἰδια, αγενητα και αφθαρτα.
 ετι διδακτη πασα επισημη δοκει ειναι, και το επισητον,
 μαθητον. εκ προγινωσκομενων δε πασα διδασκαλια.
 ωσπερ και εν τοις αναλυτικοις ελεγομεν. η μεν γαρ
 δι επαγωγης, η δε συλλογισμῳ. η μεν δη επαγωγη
 αρχη εστι και του καθολου· ο δε συλλογισμος εκ των
 καθολου. εισιν αρα αρχαι εξ ων ο συλλογισμος, ων
 ουκ εστι συλλογισμος· επαγωγη αρα. η μεν αρα
 επισημη εστιν εξις αποδεικτικη, και οσα αλλα προσ-
 διοριζομεθα εν τοις αναλυτικοις· οταν γαρ πως πισειη,
 και γνωριμοι (lege γνωριμωτεροι*) αυτω ωσιν αι
 αρχαι, επισαται· ει γαρ μη μαλλον του συμπερασ-
 ματος, κατα συμβεβηκος εξει επισημην. περι μεν ουν
 επισημης διωρισθω τον τροπον τουτον. i. e. "As-
 suming, therefore, a more elevated exor-

* The necessity of this emendation will be at once evident to any one who reads the second chapter of the first book of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Indeed this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

dium, let us again speak concerning these. And let those things through which the soul asserts the truth, by affirming or denying, be five in number; viz. *art, science, prudence, wisdom, intellect*: for by *hypolepsis* and *opinion* it is possible to be deceived. What science therefore is, will be from hence evident, if it be necessary to employ accuracy on this occasion, and not to attend to similitudes. For we all are of opinion that what we know scientifically cannot admit of a various subsistence. But with respect to things which may subsist variously, when they are out of our view, we are ignorant whether or not they exist. The object of scientific knowledge, therefore, is from necessity. Hence it is eternal: for all such things as are simply from necessity are eternal: and things eternal are unbegotten and incorruptible. Farther still, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of science is the object of discipline. But all learning is produced from things previously known, as we have said in our *Analytics*. For one kind of learning is acquired by induction, but another by syllogism. And induction indeed is a principle,

and is the principle of that which is universal*, but syllogism is composed from universals. Hence the principles from which syllogism consists are not derived from syllogism. They are known therefore by induction. Hence, too, science is a demonstrative habit, and whatever else we have added to its definition in our analytics. For when a man believes in a certain way that a thing is, and the principles of that in which he believes are more known to him than the conclusion, he then possesses scientific knowledge. For if they are not more known to him than the conclusion, he will possess science accidentally. Let science therefore be thus defined.”

Compare this with the following version of Dr. Gillies: “Let these habits be the five following; art, science, prudence, wisdom, intellect. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived, not so in matters of science. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, unless when they are actually

* By that which is universal, Aristotle means in this place every indemonstrable principle, or, in other words, every axiom, and definition.

perceived ; the latter is conversant about things unalterable, necessary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption ; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty. All science may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, those truths which are previously known by experience or reason. The first principles are acquired by induction, that is by intellect operating on experience. Science then may be defined a demonstrative habit, distinguished by those properties which we have ascribed to it in our Analytics. The principles of science must be perceived with the clearest evidence ; for unless they be more evident than the conclusions drawn from them, those conclusions will not form science, strictly so called ; because their truth does not necessarily proceed from the truth of their premises, with which they are connected, not essentially, but only by way of accession or appendage.”

In this translation of Dr. Gillies it is obvious that, in the first place, no notice whatever is taken of the word *υποληψις*, *hypolepsis*, though, considered as one of the powers of

the soul, it is a word of great importance in the philosophy of Aristotle; and though the Doctor himself admits (in the introduction to this book) that “the powers of intellection differ as widely from each other as those of sensation.” This word, however, is used by Aristotle to signify *the definite assent of the soul to the discursive energies of the dianoetic power.* And, in the next place, by the rambling paraphrase of Dr. Gillies, the accuracy of Aristotle’s reasoning is entirely destroyed, as must be obvious, by comparing it with the original, to any one in the smallest degree familiar with the very scientific mode of writing employed by that philosopher.

Again, the sixth chapter of the same book is as follows: Επει δὴ ἐπισήμη περὶ τῶν καθολοῦ ἐσὶν ὑπολήψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀναγκῆς οὐτῶν, εἰσὶ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπισήμης· μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπισήμη· τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπισήτου, ἅτ’ ἀν ἐπισήμη εἴη, ἅτε τέχνη, ἅτε φρονησις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπισήτον, ἀποδεικτικόν· αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαὶ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχομένα ἄλλως εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστὶ· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων εἶναι ἀποδείξιν ἐσὶν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν, καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδομεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχομένα, ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχομένα ἄλλως εἶναι, ἐπισήμη, καὶ φρονησις ἐστὶ, καὶ σοφία, καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τριῶν μὴ θέν

ενδεχεται ειναι· λεγω δε τρια, φρονησιν, σοφιαν,
 επισημην· λειπεται νουν ειναι των αρχων. That
 is, “ Since science is a definite assent to
 universals, and things which have a neces-
 sary subsistence; and since there are prin-
 ciples of the objects of demonstration and of
 all science (for science subsists in conjunction
 with reason)—this being the case, of the
 principles of the objects of science, there
 will neither be science, nor art, nor pru-
 dence. For the object of science is demon-
 strable; but art and prudence are conversant
 with things which have a various subsistence.
 Neither can wisdom pertain to these things:
 for it is the province of a wise man to possess
 demonstration of certain things. If there-
 fore the powers by which we assert the truth,
 and are never at any time deceived either
 about things which have not or which have
 a various subsistence, are, science, prudence,
 wisdom, and intellect; and if no one of
 these three can have principles for its ob-
 ject, (I mean by the three, prudence, wis-
 dom, and science,) it remains that intellect is
 conversant with principles, or is that power
 by which we know the principles of sci-
 ence.”

Compare this with the following translation of Dr. Gillies: "Since the object of science, as above observed, is universal and demonstrable truth, and whatever is demonstrable must be founded on principles, it is manifest that there must be primary principles, which are not science any more than they are art or prudence. They are not science, because *all science is demonstrable*; they are not art or prudence, because these have for their subjects things contingent and variable: neither are they wisdom, because, as we shall see hereafter, wisdom, and the highest wisdom, is conversant about truths susceptible of demonstration. Since then none of the four habits just mentioned; neither science, nor art, nor prudence, nor wisdom, can afford those primary principles; and since all the habits of the understanding are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, operating on experience, is the only source from which those great and primary truths can be supposed to flow."

Here, in the first place, no notice whatever is taken of the word *υποληψις*; and, in the next place, *science* is confounded with *the object of science*. For the words *το μεν γαρ*

επιστητον, αποδεικτον; i. e. for the object of scientific knowledge is demonstrable, are rendered by Dr. Gillies, "because all science is demonstrable*." In the last sentence, too, of Dr. Gillies's translation, Aristotle is made to assert that concerning intellect which neither the text authorizes, nor his own doctrine as delivered by him in the second chapter of his Posterior Analytics, which we have already noticed. For he there expressly says, "that the principles of demonstration (axioms and definitions) are *by nature* prior to the conclusions of which they are the source;" so far is he from asserting, "that intellect operating on experience is the fountain whence these principles flow.

Again: the latter part of the eighth chapter of the same book is as follows: Οτι δ' η Φρονησις ουκ επιστημη φανερον του γαρ εσχατου εστιν, ωσπερ ειρηται το γαρ πρακτικον τοιουτου. αντικειται μιν δη τῶ νῶ ο μιν γαρ νους, των ορων, ων ουκ εστι λογος. η δε του εσχατου, ου ουκ εστιν επιστημη, αλλ' αισθησις ουχ η των ιδιων, αλλ' οια αισθανομεθα οτι το εν τοις μαθηματικοις εσχατον,

* This observation was made by me long since, in p. 44 of the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics; but Dr. Gillies very prudently takes no notice of it in his Supplement.

τρίγωνον* στήσεται γὰρ κακεί· ἀλλ' αὐτὴ μᾶλλον
 αἰσθησις ἢ φρονησις· ἐκείνης δέ, ἄλλο εἶδος. *i. e.*
 That prudence is not science is evident:
 for, as we have said, it is conversant with
 that which subsists as an extreme: for that
 which is practical is a thing of this kind.
 But it is opposed to intellect: for intellect is
 conversant with terms or limits, (*i. e.* axioms)
 of which there is no definition; but prudence
 is conversant with that extreme, the percep-
 tion of which is not the province of science
 but of sense. Not, indeed, that it is a sensi-
 ble perception of things which are the pro-
 per objects of sense, but it is of that kind, as
 when we perceive that what is last in mathe-
 matical figures is a triangle; for figures stop
 there*. This perception, however, rather
 belongs to sense; but that which pertains to
 prudence is specifically different."

Compare this with the following transla-
 tion of Dr. Gillies: "Prudence is manifestly
 different from science, being the perception
 of those particular and practical truths which
 admit not of demonstration; whereas intel-
 lect is employed about those general and pri-
 mary principles which require not any proof.
 In the chain of mental faculties intellect and

* *i. e.* All figures are ultimately resolved into triangles.

prudence then form the two extreme links; prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intellect that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common sense, since it is conversant about objects of sense; but in a manner specifically different from that in which the other senses are respectively conversant about their particular objects."

Here, in the first place, what Aristotle says respecting a triangle is entirely omitted, as I have before observed in the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; and, in the next place, no part of this passage can with propriety be called a translation, as must be obvious even to the most careless reader.

Thus much for Dr. Gillies's translation of the sixth book. Without proceeding to notice similar inaccuracies and deformities in his translation of the seventh book, I shall only observe, that he has entirely omitted the four last chapters of this book, which treat of pleasure; because, says he, "they are mere transcripts from the sixth book of the *Ethics to Eudemus*; and the subject is more fully and more philosophically explained in the tenth book of the *Ethics to Nicomachus*." Can any thing be more ab-

surd than to omit translating these chapters because they are transcripts from another work of which he has given no translation? Besides, these chapters were evidently designed by Aristotle to form a part of this book, as appears from the concluding sentence, which is as follows: Περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας, καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἰρηται, καὶ τί ἐκάστων, καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐσὶ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐρούμεν. *i. e.* “And thus we have spoken concerning continence and incontinence, *pleasure and pain*, what each of them is, and in what respect some of them are good and others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship.” Are such omissions as these to be justified? And will any man presume to call him a translator who takes such liberties with his original?

Without proceeding to notice every thing worthy of reprehension in the remaining books, I shall finish this selection by presenting the reader with the original of the whole of the seventh chapter of the tenth book, as it is one of the most beautiful and important in the Ethics of Aristotle; and will show in a strong point of view how Dr. Gillies has deformed the manner, and destroyed the accu-

räte meaning of the Stagirite by his translation.

Εἰ δ' εἰν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεία, εὐλογον
 κάβα τὴν κρατίστην· αὐτὴ δ' εἴη τοῦ ἀριστοῦ εἴτε δὴ νοῦς
 τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὁ δὲ κάβα φύσιν δοκεῖ ἀρχεῖν καὶ
 ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐννοίαν εἶχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων· εἴτε
 θείον οὐ καὶ αὐτο, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον· ἡ
 τοῦτου ἐνεργεία κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία
 εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' εἰσι θεωρητικὴ εἰρήται. ὁμολογουμένον
 δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δοξείεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς προτέρον, καὶ τῷ
 ἀληθεῖ· κρατίστη γὰρ αὐτὴ εἰν ἡ ἐνεργεία· καὶ
 γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνῶστων, περὶ αὐτοῦ
 νοῦς. ἐτι δὲ συνεχέστατη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυναμέθα
 συνεχῶς μάλλον, ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. οἰομέθα τε δεῖν
 ἡδονὴν παραμεμιχθῆαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ'
 ἀρετῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως εἰσι.
 δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ σοφία θαύμασας ἡδονὰς εἶχειν καθ' ἑαυτὴν
 καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ. εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδοσι τῶν ζήτουντων
 ἡδῖω τὴν ἀγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢτε λεγομένη αὐταρκεία, περὶ
 τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλισ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ
 ζῆν ἀναγκαιῶν, καὶ σοφός, καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ
 δεόνται· τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένων, ὁ μὲν
 δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὐς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μεθ' ὧν
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σωφρων, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστος. ὁ δὲ σοφός, καὶ καθ' αὐτοῦ ὧν, δυναταὶ θεωρεῖν·
 καὶ ὁσῶν ἂν σοφός ἢ, μάλλον· βελτίον δ' ἰσῶς συνεργούς
 εἶχων· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς αὐταρκεσῆτος. δοξείε δ' ἂν αὐτὴ
 μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπασθῆαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι
 παρὰ τὸ θεωρησῆαι. ἀπο δὲ τῶν πράξεων, ἢ πλείον ἢ

ελαττον περιποιουμεθα παρα την πραξιν. δοκει τε η
 ευδαιμονια εν τη σχολη ειναι· ασχολουμεθα γαρ ινα
 σχολαζωμεν, και πολεμουμεν, ινα ειρηνην αγωμεν.
 των μεν ουν πρακτικων αρετων, εν τοις πολιτικοις η
 τοις πολεμικοις αι ενεργειαι· αι δε περι ταυτα πραξεις,
 δοκουσιν ασχολοι ειναι. αι μεν ουν πολεμικαι, και
 παντελως· ουδεις γαρ αιρειται το πολεμειν, του πολεμειν
 ενεκα, ουδε παρασκευαζειν πολεμον· δοξαι γαρ αν
 παντελως μιαιφονος τις ειναι, ει τους φιλους πολεμιους
 ποιοιτο, ινα μαχαι και φονοι γιγνοιντο. εσι δε και η
 του πολιτικου ασχολος, και παρ' αυτο το πολιτευεσθαι,
 περιποιουμενη δυνασειας και τιμας, η την γε ευδαιμονιαν
 αυτω και τοις πολιταις, ετεραν ουσαν της πολιτικης,
 ην και ζητουμεν· δηλον ως ετεραν ουσαν. ει δη των
 μεν καλα τας αρετας πραξεων αι πολιτικαι και
 πολεμικαι, καλλει και μεγαθει προεχουσιν· αυται δε
 ασχολοι και τελους τινος εφεινται, και ου δι' αυτας
 εισιν αιρεται· η δε του νου ενεργεια σπουδη τε διαφερειν
 δοκει, θεωρητικη ουσα, και παρ' αυτην εδενος εφιεσθαι
 τελους, εχειν τε ηδονην οικειαν· αυτη δε συναυξει την
 ενεργειαν· και το αυταρκες δε και σχολασικον, και
 ατρυτον, ως ανθρωπινον, και οσα αλλα τω μακα-
 ριω απονεμειται, καλα Ιαυτην ενεργειαν φαινεσαι οντα·
 η τελεια δη ευδαιμονια αυτη αν ειη ανθρωπου λαβουσα
 μηκος βιου τελειον· ουδεν γαρ ατελες εσι των της
 ευδαιμονιας. ο δε τοιουτος αν ειη κρειττων βιος, η καλα
 ανθρωπον· ε γαρ η ανθρωπος εσιν, ετω βιωσεται,

ἀλλ' ἢ θειον τι εν αὐτῷ υπαρχει. οσῷ δε διαφερει
 τουτο του συνθετου, τοσούτῳ και η ενεργεια της καλα
 την αλλην αρετην. ει δη θειον ο νους προς τον ανθρωπον,
 και ο κατα τουτον βιος, θειος προς τον ανθρωπινον
 βιον. χρη δε ου κατα τους παραινουντας, ανθρωπινα
 φρονειν, ανθρωπον οντα, ουδε θνητα τον θνητον·
 ἀλλ' εφ' οσον ενδεχεται απαθανατιζειν, και απαντα
 ποιειν προς το ζην κατα το κρατισον των εν αὐτῷ·
 ει γαρ και τῷ ογκῷ μικρον εστι, δυναμει και τιμιότητι
 πολυ μαλλον υπερεχει παντων. δοξειε δ' αν και εκασον
 ειναι τουτο, ειπερ το κυριον και αμεινον. ατοπον ουν
 γινοιτ' αν, ει μη τον αυτου βιον αιροιτο, αλλα τινος
 αλλου. το λεχθεν τε προτερον αρμοσει και νυν· το
 γαρ οικειον εκασῷ τῇ φυσει, κρατισον και ηδισον εσθ'
 εκασῷ· και τῷ ανθρωπῷ δη ο καλα τον νουν βιος, ειπερ
 μαλιστα τουτο ανθρωπος. ουτος αρα και ευδαιμονεσας.

i. e. “ But if felicity is an energy according
 to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is
 an energy according to the most excellent
 virtue; and this will be the virtue of that
 which is best. Whether, therefore, this be
 intellect, or something else which appears to
 rule and be the leader by nature, and to
 have a conception of things beautiful and
 divine; or whether it is itself divine, or the
 most divine of all our parts, the energy of
 this, according to its proper virtue, will be

perfect felicity. But we have said that this energy is contemplative. And this appears to accord with what we before asserted, and also with truth. For this energy is the most excellent; since intellect is the best of all our parts, and of objects of knowledge those are the most excellent about which intellect is conversant. This energy also is most continued: for we are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform any action whatever. We likewise think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity; but the energy *according to wisdom* is acknowledged to be the most pleasant of all the energies according to virtue. Wisdom therefore appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who *possess* knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*. That too, which is called self-sufficiency, will especially subsist about the contemplative energy. For of the necessities of life, the wise and the just man, and the rest of those who possess the moral virtues, are in want; but even when they are sufficiently supplied with these, the just man is in want of those towards whom, and toge-

ther with whom, he may act justly ; and in like manner the temperate and the brave man, and each of the rest. But the wise man when alone is able to contemplate ; and by how much the wiser he is by so much the more does he possess this ability. Perhaps, indeed, he will contemplate better when he has others to co-operate with him ; but at the same time he is most sufficient to himself. This energy alone, likewise, will appear to be beloved for its own sake, for nothing else is produced from it besides contemplation. But from things of a practical nature we obtain something more or less besides the action itself. Felicity also appears to consist in leisure : for we engage in business that we may be at leisure, and we wage war that we may live in peace. The energies therefore of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions ; but the actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment. This indeed is perfectly the case with military transactions : for no one chooses to wage war, or prepare for it, for the sake of waging war ; since he would appear to be perfectly a homicide who should make enemies of his

friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter. The energy too of the politician is of a busy nature, and, besides the management of public affairs, is employed in procuring dominion and honour, or a felicity for himself and the citizens different from the political energy, which also, as something different, we evidently investigate. If, therefore, political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous actions, but these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain end, and are not eligible for their own sakes; but the energy of intellect, which is contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor, and to desire no other end besides itself; if also it possesses a proper pleasure, which increases its energy, and has, in addition to this, self-sufficiency, leisure and unwearied power, so far as the condition of human nature will permit, with whatever else is attributed to the blessed, and appears to subsist according to this energy;—if such be the case this will be the perfect felicity of man when it receives a perfect length of life: for nothing belonging to felicity is imperfect. Such a life, however, will be more excellent than that which is merely human:

for man will not thus live so far as he is man but so far as he contains in himself something divine. And as much as this part excels the composite so much does its energy surpass the energy belonging to every other virtue. If, therefore, intellect is divine with respect to man, the life also according to intellect will be divine with respect to human life. Nor ought we, according to the exhortation of certain persons, to be wise in human affairs, since we are men, nor to regard mortal concerns, since we are mortal; but as much as possible we should immortalize ourselves, and do every thing in order to live according to our most excellent part. For this part, though it is small in bulk, far excels all things in power and dignity. It would seem also that each of us is this part *, since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent. It would therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life but the life of something else. That too which was before asserted accords with what is now said: for that which is intimately allied to any na-

* The *true man*, both according to Aristotle and Plato, is intellect: for the essence of every thing is the *summit* of its nature.

ture is most excellent and most pleasant to that nature; and hence a life according to intellect will be most excellent and pleasant to man, since this part is most eminently man. This life, therefore, is also most happy."

Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter is as follows: "If happiness consists in virtuous energies the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man, which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity. The greatest human happiness then is theoretic and intellectual, which well accords with the properties which we formerly found by investigation to be essentially inherent in that most coveted object. The intellect is the best principle in man; its energies are the strongest, and the objects about which it is conversant are far the most sublime. The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in theorizing and thinking much longer than in

performing any action whatever. Pleasure, it was observed, must be an ingredient in happiness; but contemplative wisdom offers pleasures the most admirable in purity and stability, and the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it: certainty concerning the sublimest truths affording still higher delight in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered. That all-sufficiency, which we remarked as a property of happiness, belongs to intellectual energies more than to any other; for though the sage, as well as the moralist or the patriot, stands in need of bodily accommodations, yet in exerting his highest excellencies he is not, like them, dependent on fortune both for his objects and his instruments; for objects towards whom he may exercise his virtues, and instruments which may enable him to effectuate his ends. Even unassisted and alone, though perhaps better with assistants, he can still think and theorize; possessing in the energies of his own mind the purest and most independent enjoyments. These enjoyments are valuable peculiarly on their own account, since they

terminate completely in themselves; whereas all practical virtue has, beside the practice itself, some distinct and separate end in view. The tranquillity of leisure is naturally more agreeable than the bustle of business; we toil for the sake of quiet, and make war for the sake of peace. But the practical virtues are most conspicuously exercised in political and military functions, the latter of which none but the most savage and sanguinary minds would submit to from choice, converting friends into enemies for the mere pleasure of fighting with them. Politics, too, forms an operose and troublesome occupation, which would not be undertaken from the sole love of exercising political functions, independently of distinct and separate ends; power, wealth, and honour; in one word, prosperity to ourselves, friends, or fellow-citizens. But intellectual energies are complete and perfect in themselves, supplying an exhaustless stream of pure and perennial pleasure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens the energies, and thus increases and refines the source from which it unceasingly springs; all-sufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is compatible with the condi-

tion of humanity. Were unalterable permanency added to such a life, its happiness would be more than human; but even within a limited term, its inestimable delights may be enjoyed by those who attain the perfection of their ages and faculties; living not merely as partners with a frail and compound nature, but according to the simple and divine principle within them, whose energies and virtues as far transcend all others as the intellectual substance in which they reside excels all other substances of which our frame is composed. We ought not, therefore, according to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal, to regard only mortal things; but, as far as possible, to put on immortality, exerting ourselves to taste the joys of the intellectual life. This is living according to the best part of what we call ourselves, which, though seemingly small in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things besides. The intellect indeed is the best and sovereign part of our constitution, and therefore strictly and properly ourselves. It is absurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. What was above observed will apply here. The plea-

sure and good of each individual must consist in that which is most congenial to his nature. The intellectual life, therefore, must be the best and happiest for man, since the intellect is that which is peculiarly himself."

Such is the translation of Dr. Gillies, in which, besides continual inaccuracy and presumptuous interpolation, the manner of the original is entirely destroyed. For where in this translation is any vestige to be seen of that most accurate and syllogistic method which so eminently characterizes the writings of Aristotle? Where is that invincible force of reasoning to be discovered which in Platonic language everywhere presents itself bound with *geometrical necessities*? (*γεωμετρικαὶς ἀναγκαίς*.) Where that modest caution with which the Stagirite in this chapter, in conformity to his general custom, introduces the dogmas of his philosophy? And, if we turn our attention to the matter, we shall find it no less unworthy the beauty and profundity of the original. For instance, in the very first sentence, Aristotle says, "If felicity is an energy according to virtue, *it is reasonable to suppose* that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue; and

this will be the virtue of that which is best." Compare this with the version of Dr. Gillies : " If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness *must* consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man, which *must* be the *virtue* or *perfection* of his best part." Here the word *ευλογον*, " *it is reasonable to suppose,*" is translated by Dr. Gillies " *must :*" and thus the modesty of Aristotle in this sentence is entirely destroyed. That the reader too may see how Dr. Gillies has deformed the most scientific method of reasoning adopted by Aristotle, let him compare the whole of the first sentence of the Doctor's translation with the original. For Aristotle's reasoning is as follows : " If felicity is an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue. The most excellent virtue is the virtue of the best part : the energy of this part, therefore, according to its proper virtue, will be perfect felicity." Where is this geometric reasoning to be found in the following rambling translation of Dr. Gillies : " If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of

the greatest virtue in man, which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity."

Again, compare the following sentence with the version of Dr. Gillies: "This energy, also (says Aristotle, *i. e.* the energy of intellect) is most continued: for we are able to *contemplate* more incessantly than to perform any action whatever." But by Dr. Gillies he is made to say, "The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in *theorizing* and *thinking* much longer than in performing any action whatever." By this version it is evident that Dr. Gillies had not the smallest conception of what Aristotle means by *intellectual energy*; and that he is himself unfortunately deprived of its possession. For this employment, as Aristotle observes in this chapter, is *an energy according to wisdom*; and wisdom, as he defines it in the sixth book of these Ethics, is "the intellectual

perception of principles and things most honourable by nature," *ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῆ φύσει, καὶ νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν.* And these *principles* and *things most honourable by nature* are the first cause and his divine progeny, as is evident from what we have already observed. By no means, therefore, does this energy consist in merely *theorizing and thinking*; for this may be easily accomplished by any one, and the power of performing it is not attended with the possession of *intellectual virtue*.

Compare also the following with the translation of Dr. Gillies: "Wisdom, says Aristotle, appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who *possess* knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*." "Pleasure, it was observed (says Dr. Gillies) must be an ingredient in happiness; but contemplative wisdom offers pleasures the most admirable in purity and stability, and the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it; certainty concerning the sublimest truths affording still higher delight in proportion to the in-

tense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered." Here much is added by Dr. Gillies, which is not only unwarranted by the original, but evidently shows that the Doctor has entirely mistaken Aristotle's meaning. For though it is true "that the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it;" yet this is not what Aristotle says, nor does it contain the smallest vestige of his real meaning. For Aristotle says, "It is reasonable to think that those who *possess* knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*." In which sentence the nature of *intellectual energy* is indicated by the opposition of the *possession* of knowledge to the *investigation* of it. For as *intellectual energy* consists in *direct immediate* vision of the *intelligible*, or the proper object of intellect, the *full possession* of knowledge is previously necessary to the exercise of this energy. Hence Aristotle, in the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, speaking of intellect, expressly says "that it *energizes possessing**." He, therefore, who is capable of this energy, lives more pleasantly than him who *investigates*; because

* Ενεργεί δε έχων.

investigation is laborious, but *intellectual energy*, from being *immediate vision*, is unattended with labour, and is necessarily accompanied with delight. What Dr. Gillies therefore adds, "that certainty concerning the sublimest truths affords still higher delight in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered," has nothing to do with the meaning of Aristotle in this place, but is, as usual, introduced by the Doctor to conceal his ignorance and please the vulgar. Not to mention that Aristotle's modest form of expression, "it is reasonable to suppose" (*ευλογον*) is entirely unnoticed by the Doctor. The reader who is disposed to compare the remaining part of Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter with the original, even if he is but moderately skilled in the philosophy of Aristotle, will find that Dr. Gillies everywhere deforms the *matter* of the Stagirite by unskilful interpolations, and completely destroys the *manner*, by breaking his geometrical chain of reasoning, in order, through the medium of popular diction, to gratify the public ear.

Having presented the reader with so many

specimens of deformities and inaccuracies, of important omissions and rash interpolations, in the translation of Dr. Gillies, I shall leave him to judge what opinion ought to be formed of the following assertion in p. 236 of the Doctor's Introduction to the first book. "*My aim throughout,*" says he, "*is to adhere rigidly to the sense of Aristotle; to omit nothing which he says, to say nothing which he has omitted!*" From these specimens, too, I would hope it is nearly obvious to every one, that in translating the abstruse or acroamatic writings of Aristotle, it is necessary to observe the most rigid accuracy and the most literal exactness. For such is the pregnant brevity of diction, such the syllogistic method uniformly adopted by the Stagirite in these works, that in translating them it is no less necessary to copy his *manner* than faithfully preserve his *matter*; since, from the scientific nature of the composition, the union between the two is so great that the former cannot be neglected without essentially injuring the latter.

Similar deformities, and equally numerous, might be easily selected from Dr. Gillies's translation of Aristotle's *Politics*; but

the specimens which have been already adduced afford, I trust, a sufficient proof that the Doctor is very far from having fathomed the profundity of the Stagirite's mind, and is therefore unequal to the task of transfusing that profundity into English.

And now, I presume, Dr. Gillies is by this time furnished with a sufficient answer to the following observation in the conclusion of his reply to my *Strictures*. "The nature and scope," says he (p. 229 of his *Supplement*) "of my literary labours are so totally different from those of Mr. Taylor, that it is not easy to understand how our roads could cross, or why he should step forth as my determined antagonist. Utility, common and vulgar utility, above which that sublime author proudly soars, was my great or rather sole aim." Had Dr. Gillies in his translation faithfully given the *manner* and *matter* of Aristotle to the best of his ability, had he discovered by his translation that he was a *genuine* lover of truth, that he was a candidate for honest fame, and not for the applause of the vulgar, my road, so far from crossing, would have been perfectly parallel to his, and I should have rejoiced to find

him running with me the same race, a competitor for the same honours, and tending to the same goal. But perceiving that Dr. Gillies, so far from having been a legitimate student of Aristotle's more abstruse writings, had not even discovered that they were composed with studied obscurity of diction, and that, through a presumptuous confidence in his own abilities, he despised the best of Aristotle's Greek interpreters without being in the smallest degree familiar with their works, and in consequence of this had mutilated and deformed some of the noblest productions of the Stagirite, I did indeed step forth as his determined antagonist. Such, however, being the real state of the case, is it difficult to understand why I should do so? Is it possible I could act otherwise, professing, as I do, the sincerest regard for truth, and believing it to be, as Plato says, the source of every good both to God and man? Could I patiently submit to see a work presented to the English reader as a translation of the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, in which the sense is injured, and the beauty of the original deformed, in every page? especially as I professed myself a student of Aristotle, and

one who had employed no common labour for a considerable number of years in the study of his philosophy; gladly availing myself, in order to penetrate its depth, of every assistance that could be obtained, and not scorning the labours of his best disciples, through an unlawful confidence in the strength of my own mind, or a desire to gain a noble end by ignoble means.

But, after wondering that I stept forth as his antagonist, Dr. Gillies adds, “that utility, common and vulgar utility, above which Mr. Taylor proudly soars, was his great, or rather sole, aim.” Dr. Gillies is ignorant, I am afraid, that in the human species, as well as in every order of beings in the universe, there is a first, a middle, and last, that the progression of things may form one unbroken chain, originating from deity, and terminating in matter. In consequence of this connexion, one part of the human species naturally coalesces through transcendency with beings of an order superior to man; another part through subjection unites with the brutal species; and a third part, which subsists as the connecting medium between the other two, possesses those properties which charac-

terize human nature in a manner not exceeding, but exactly commensurate to the condition of humanity. The first of these parts, from its surpassing excellence, consists of a small number of mankind. That which subsists as the middle is numerous. And that which ranks as the last in gradation is composed of a countless multitude,

“ Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks
In Vallambrosa.”

In consequence of this beautiful gradation the most subordinate part of mankind are only to be benefitted by good rulers, laws, or customs, through which they become peaceful members of the communities in which they live, and make a proficiency, as Maximus Tyrius* well observes, not by the accession of good, but by the diminution of evil.

If Dr. Gillies, by professing to aim at common and vulgar utility, means an endeavour to benefit this lowest order of the human race by disseminating among them truths of a nature so arduous and sublime, that they can only be understood by the highest class of our species, I own, and I glory in the confession,

* See p. 19 of my translation of his Dissertations.

that I do soar above such an endeavour, because it is not attended with any advantage, but is no less idle than profane. But if he means by this an attempt to be useful to the middle class of our species, (for such the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle are calculated to benefit) I am no less anxious than Dr. Gillies to do good to this part of mankind by the publication of such truths as they are capable of understanding. A very considerable part of the Dialogues of Plato are largely calculated to accomplish this end; but in translating these I have not violated the meaning of the original in order to gratify the most subordinate part of our species, and sacrificed truth to vulgar applause.

And this brings me, in the last place, to an apology for the manner in which I have published to the world the philosophy of Plato in an English garb. It is necessary then to observe, that Plato, in conformity with the earliest philosophers of antiquity, delivered the abstruse dogmas of his philosophy obscurely, in order to conceal from the profane and vulgar eye certain sublime truths, which that eye may fancy it sees, but which it can never perceive in reality. That he did so is abundantly evident from the fol-

lowing passages extracted from his Epistles. In his second epistle, then, which is to Dionysius, he says: “According to the report of Archidemus, you say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the nature of the first (god). *I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents*.*” The passage which then immediately follows is one of the most deeply mystical in all the writings of Plato; but he who has penetrated its depth will acknowledge that it is no less admirable than profound, no less sublime than obscure. Near the end of this epistle also he observes: “*For as it appears to me there are scarcely any particulars which will be considered by the multitude more ridiculous than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those that are well born †.*”

* Φησ γαρ δη κατα τον εκεινου λογον, ουχ ικανως αποδειχθαι σοι περι της του πρωτου φυσεως. φραστεον δη σοι δι' αιγιματων, εν' αυτη η δελτος η ποντου, η γης εν Ιουχαις παθη, ο αναγνους μη γνω.

† Σχεδον γαρ ως εμοι δοκει, ουχ εστι τουτων προς Ιους πολλους καταγελαστοτερα ακουσμαλα. ου δ' αυ προς τους ευφυεις θαυμαστοτερα τε και ενθουσιαστικωτερα.

In his seventh epistle also he observes as follows: " Thus much, however, I shall say respecting all those who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves) that they have not heard any thing about these things conformable to my opinion: for I never have written nor ever shall write about them *. For a thing of this kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself." And shortly after he adds: " But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the *multitude* by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I

* Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about *intelligibles* or *true beings*, the proper objects of intellect.

think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain excellent things *.”

As Plato therefore promulgated the most sublime of his doctrines obscurely, in order to conceal them from the vulgar, but at the same time delivered them scientifically, in translating the writings which contain those doctrines it is necessary to observe the most

* Τοσονδε γε μην περι παντων εχω φραζειν των γεγραφοτων και γραψαντων, οσοι φασιν ειδεναι περι ων εγω σπουδαζω, ειτ' εμου ακηκοοτες, ειτ' αλλων, ειθ' ως ευροντες αυτοι, τουτους ουκ εστι κατα γε την εμην δοξαν περι του πραγματος επαίειν ουδεν. ουκ ουν εμον γε περι αυτων εστι συγγραμμα, ουδε μη ποτε γενηται. ρητον γαρ ουδαμως εστιν, ως αλλα μαθηματα, αλλ' εκ πολλης συνουσιας γιγνομενης περι το πραγμα αυτο, και του συζην, εξαιφνης οιον απο πυρος πηδησαντος εξαφθεν φως, εν τη ψυχη γενομενον αυτο εαυτο ηδη τρεφει. — ει δε μοι εφαινετο γραπτεα δ' ικανως ειναι προς τους πολλους και ρητα, τι τουτου καλλιον επεπρακτ' αν ημιν εν Ιω βιω, η τοις τε ανθρωποισι μεγα οφελος γραψαι, και την φησιν εις φως τοις πασι προσαγαγειν; αλλ' ουτε ανθρωποις ηγουμαι την επιχειρησιν περι αυτων λεγομενην αγαθον, ει μη τισιν ολιγοις, οποσοι δυνατοι ανευρειν αυτοι δια μικρας ενδειξεως. των τε δη αλλων, τους μεν καταφρονησεως ουκ ορθως εμπλησειεν αν ουδαμη εμμελους, τους δε υψηλης και χαυνης ελπιδος, ως σεμν' ατλα μειμαθηκοιας.

rigid accuracy and the most literal exactness, in the same manner as in translating the acroamatic works of Aristotle. As all his dialogues too are the progeny of consummate science, he who in translating them presumes to omit some words and interpolate others, or to give what he conceives to be the general meaning of the sentences; and, in short, alters the manner of Plato in order to accommodate his matter to the multitude,—he who does this will inevitably destroy the profound meaning of the original, and obtrude his own rambling ideas on the reader for the scientifically accurate conceptions of Plato. Let him who desires to be convinced of this read any of those dialogues in my translation of Plato's works, in which the substance of the Commentaries of Proclus, Hermias, and Olympiodorus are given in the notes.

And here I cannot help remarking concerning these most excellent interpreters, and the latter Platonists in general, as they are called, how fully the prophecy of their divine master has been verified in the fate of their works. The prophecy I allude to is contained in the latter part of the extract just

cited from his seventh epistle, in which he observes, that the man who writes perspicuously on the sublime dogmas of his philosophy will only benefit a few who are able to discover these abstruse particulars, but that in others he will produce either contempt or arrogant hope. For these admirable men, in order to preserve the recondite parts of their master's philosophy to posterity, unfolded all that is sublime and mystic in the doctrines of Plato into the most pleasing and admirable light. For more than a thousand years, however, very few indeed appear to have been in the smallest degree benefitted by their labours; and I know of none that for this extended period may be said to have studied them sufficiently to derive all that advantage which they are largely calculated to afford. Hence, as I have elsewhere observed *, "the beautiful light which they benevolently disclosed may be said to have, hitherto unnoticed, illumined philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins." And yet though these philo-

* See the General Introduction to my translation of Plato's works.

sophers have been treated with such undeserved contempt by a pigmy race of critics and sophists, will any man undertake to prove, that since the age of Plato there has lived a philosopher of so much profundity as Plotinus, so learned as Porphyry, so skilled in the deepest mysteries of theology as Jamblichus, so acute as Syrianus, or who has unfolded such treasures of wisdom as Proclus? Till this at least is attempted to be proved let critics be silent, and cease to defame writings which they have never studied, and doctrines which they do not understand.

But to return from this digression. Let this then be my apology for endeavouring to translate the works of Plato with such accuracy and literal exactness,—that it would not have been otherwise possible to have preserved either his manner or his matter; and that he who attempts to translate them without diligently attending to the accurate meaning of every word, may indeed compose a book more conformable to modern taste, and more captivating to the vulgar reader, but his work will cease to be a translation, and will lose in faithfulness what popularity can never compensate. Let the following

also be my apology for having introduced into my translation of Plato certain unusual words of Greek origin—that as the most abstruse doctrines of the Platonic philosophy had never before been promulgated in English, there were no words in our language equivalent to their accurate meaning, and that a paraphrase of them could not be adopted, because they very frequently occur; that to introduce Greek terms into any modern language is to enrich that language; that every art and science is full of words derived from the Greek; and that philosophy, as being the mistress of all arts and sciences, has a much prior and more legitimate claim to this privilege.

And now again declaring that I have no personal enmity whatever to Dr. Gillies, and that what I have said against him has been solely dictated by a love of truth, I shall, most probably, take my leave of him for ever. The accomplishment of a task, no less arduous than glorious, will for some years occupy all my leisure hours, and call forth my most strenuous exertions—that of translating into English the whole of Aristotle's works, with the substance of the commentaries of his best Greek interpre-

ters. The completion of this Herculean labour will so fully engage my attention, that I shall neither have time nor inclination to attend to the defamation of Dr. Gillies, or any other writer who is a candidate for the honours of the multitude, and whose eye is not *solely* fixed upon truth. As this work too, when completed, will be published in a manner so truly independent, as to be, perhaps, without a parallel in this respect since printing was invented, I shall have nothing to fear from illiberal criticism or malevolent invective *. That in such an age as the present both these should unite in opposing the labours of a man who neither writes for *hire* nor with any view to sordid emolument, is so far from being wonderful, that it is the necessary consequence of extreme corruption of manners and depravity of taste †. Divi-

* The reader, who is desirous of seeing perfect specimens of such criticism and such invective, is referred to an account of my translation of Plato's works, in two fungous productions, one of which is called *The Imperial Review* and the other *The Literary Journal*.

† The hand of barbaric despotism having destroyed the schools of the philosophers for more than twelve hundred years, knowledge has become venal, and book-making a trade. Science on moral and intellectual subjects has been in consequence of this entirely lost; and through the attempt to make *every man wise in every thing* all *real knowledge* on the sublimest subjects of speculation has been lost.

nity, however, has manifestly declared itself in favour of my undertakings; has obtained for them the most noble and the most liberal patronage; has enabled me, while engaged in them, to struggle successfully with adversity; and has made situations highly unfavourable to the cultivation of the Platonic philosophy the instruments of its promulgation in my native tongue. Relying, therefore, with firm confidence on the continuance of that support, compared with which the strongest human aid is perfect impotence, I shall devote the remainder, as I have done a considerable portion of the former part of my life, to preserve to posterity the elements of the virtues and the rules of truth, committing these to writing for common advantage, as a paternal and immortal inheritance.

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