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Medical Jurisprudence.

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ON

MADNESS.

BY

JOHN JOHNSTONE, M. D.



Birmingham,

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF J. BELCHER,
AND SOLD BY J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD,
LONDON.

—*—
1800,

2!

MADNESS.
- - - CUR AJAX HEROS AB ACHILLE SECUNDUS

PUTRESCIT; - - - - -

QUI SPECIES ALIAS VERIS, SCCLERISQUE TUMULTU

PERMISTAS CAPIET, COMMOTUS HABEBITUR. - - -

HORAT. SAT. 3. LIB. 2.

THE following pages are a brief compendium of the doctrines of insanity, as they appear to me. It was not my intention, when they were first composed, to print them separately, as they form but a small part of my collections on subjects relating to medical jurisprudence. The trial of Hadfield has however interested the public mind so deeply, that it cannot be unseasonable, nor useless to publish them at the present moment, whilst all are anxious, and many doubting, and some without question are entirely ignorant of the subject. This trial is indeed a high triumph to the truly loyal, who must shudder at any premeditated attack on the life of the King, and to all those who wish that law should ever go hand in hand with the progression of science. For when we reflect upon the political station of the great personage attacked, upon the decision itself, not merely as it related to the accused, but as implicating a question of incalculable

importance, and upon the prejudices that would naturally hang about it, I do not know of any trial in which the accusers, the defenders, and the judges, ever merited greater honour for their calmness, attention, discernment, and impartiality. It is surely no inauspicious sign of the future, when we have two such recent instances in our courts of law—of one chief justice minutely examining and patiently hearing the best evidences (and the best may sometimes be tedious) of the improvement of art in a question of mechanical invention, and deciding according to the spirit and the principle—the other admitting all the light of science to elucidate the fact of sanity or insanity of mind, in one of the most momentous cases on which a jury was ever impanelled. Would to God, all similar trials had been heretofore conducted with like moderation, and discrimination! The records of our criminal law would not then have had the reproach of such decisions as the condemnation of Mrs. Hickes and her infant daughter, of Lord Ferrers, and perhaps

haps we may add, of Mr. Oliver. At the trial of Mr. Oliver it was proved, that his ancestors, in a near degree, his aunt and his grandfather had been insane—that his own temper was melancholy and depressed, though his moral character was above reproach—that from the period of his rejection by Mr. Wood, as the suitor of his daughter, his melancholy was aggravated—that near the time of the homicide, his behaviour was so much changed, that persons accustomed to him before were afraid of him—and that he had committed such inattentions in the way of his business, as were only excusable on the supposition of his being out of his mind. In one instance he was about to depart, leaving the lancet sticking in the arm of the person he went to bleed. His own servant, from comparing his conduct, verily believed him to be insane. Dr. Arnold, a physician well known to the learned world for an elaborate and ingenious work on insanity, and who had kept maniacs in his house for 30 years, and Dr. Edward Johnstone, proved the state in which they

found him at their different visits—insane, on an hallucination the most common to the mind of maniacs. But they were not allowed to give an opinion on the whole evidence, though this had been permitted in the case of Donellan. In the latter case, it was observed that the opinion of the physicians was necessary to discriminate the poison, or whether the person suspected to be poisoned, were really so. In the former case it ought to be observed, that the opinion of physicians was necessary to determine the insanity.

It surely is not much to the purpose to urge that by so doing, men of science decide upon the circumstances of the case; that they stand in lieu of the jury. If this be granted, they do it equally in both cases. In swearing that a certain individual was or was not poisoned by a certain poison, or that he was or was not mad at any given time. In truth, in both cases, they come as men of science and reputation to give an opinion on particular

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cular facts not easily judged of by the generality of men, and their opinion can only have that degree of weight it seems to deserve from its plainness, fairness, and probability.

On medical testimony, I am ready to admit with Dr. Hunter, "that too much is sometimes left to our decision. Many of our profession are not so conversant with science as the world may think, and some of us are a little disposed to grasp at authority in a public examination, by giving a quick and decided opinion, when it should have been guarded with doubt." But in the case of Oliver no such plea as this could possibly be urged, though I am not quite so sure on the case of Donellan. Mr. Hunter's testimony on that trial was wisely guarded with doubt, and yet it was overborne by the decided, and in some respects unscientific evidence of the other medical witnesses. But if there be any doubt of sanity, surely the evidence of men of acknowledged science and
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reputation should at least be listened to, especially in capital offences, lest the execution of the maniac “ be a miserable spectacle both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and be no example to others*.”

It cannot be necessary to enter upon any serious refutation of that senseless and inhuman cackle and gabble of sophistry, that madmen who commit great crimes should not merely be shut out of society, but like all other rabid animals, should be hunted out of life. This may do very well in the Poissarderie, or in the assemblies of Galla, or Agows, or Caffres, but men of common understanding and humanity should blush to hear it. Society may obtain an adequate protection by the confinement of maniacs, without blood.

“ No † end can ever justify the sacrifice of a principle.”

* Coke in Blackstone.

† Roscoe.

It is far from my intention to dive into the depths of metaphysical research on the subject of madness. Plain matter of fact, divested as much as possible of theory, the most obvious phenomena, undecorated, and unvarnished, are all that the renunciator ought to attempt, and I have attempted no more. For whatsoever be the changes of figure, distance, site, or magnitude of the parts subservient to thought, that cause madness, we certainly are not acquainted with them. And I am not disposed to enlarge my treatise with those dark, but important enquiries, so often affording scope to the figments and whimsies of men of sense—the genealogy of the passions, the origin of ideas, and the generability of mind. These have all been treated of very fully, and very ably, in the writings of the school of metaphysical medicine. Nor have I aimed at collecting much of what has been said on the subject of insanity by others. The Anatomy of Melancholy, the works of Battie, Arnold, and Crichton, have exhausted all that can be
quoted

quoted * on the subject, and with Haslam's Practical Inquiry, and the Philosophy of Zoonomia, nearly the whole that has ever been said. To these writings therefore the inquisitive reader may refer. I have made an effort indeed to compress, not to expand my materials; and such as they are, I now deliver them to the public, with the hope, that they will tend to familiarise the scientific doctrines of insanity.

* The names of Willis (de anima brutorum) and Monroe cannot be forgotten among the number, by the physician, who may find in Ploucquet, initia Bibliothecæ Medico-Practicæ, 43 quarto pages, full of the names merely of writers on "Mania and Melancholia" their "Anatomie, Causæ, and Therapia."

To the scholar, the simple but exquisite delineations of the Greek tragedians (1); and their power of describing the diseases of the mind, as well as of moving and controuling its more healthy affections, need not be pointed out. Herodotus (2) too has painted in glowing colours the insanity of the son of Cyrus, and his chief hallucination (the hallucination of all tyrants), his cruelty to his nearest relations and friends, his caprice, and his contempt and violation of the manners and laws of nations. But Aretæus (3) on this subject is most characteristic, descriptive, and energetic, employing upon it all his great talent of discrimination, both as a fine writer, and skilful physician.

(1) Æschyli Chœphoræ, l. 1021. Eurip. Orestes, l. 255, 306. Sophocl. Ajax.

(2) Thalia, p. 171, 175. Gronov. Ed.

(3) Morb. diurn. lib. 1. c. 5 & 6.

Birmingham, July 10.

ON

ON MADNESS.

THE derangement of the intellectual faculties called madness, consists in some unknown morbid state of the brain and sensorial powers, and appears in the assumption of a certain fact, or of a certain number of facts, which are so constantly associated with all the chains of thought, the mind of the maniac is employed upon, as to disturb the healthy process of right reasoning.

In general the facts so assumed, are untrue; it is not material, however, whether they be true or not, since truth wrongly associated will necessarily engender absurdity. If a maniac, for instance, associate the idea of ruin with profuse expence, he will first reason right, that the way to avoid such ruin is not to incur debt. By many steps of reasoning, all of them just in themselves, as they bear a

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relation to some other particular facts, he will at last arrive at an utter abhorrence of all persons who are in debt, so as to avoid seeing his nearest friends or relations. He will deny himself the necessaries of life, and finally will require the interposition of his friends, and restraints upon his own freedom of action.

Such is generally the progress of the mania of avarice, than which, none rages with greater constancy, or is dislodged with greater difficulty, when once it gets possession of the mind,

All maniacs have a predominant idea, which masters every other, and is hegemonic in most of their propositions *; yet they frequently

* "One strong idea masters every other, and subdues the mind that is no longer able to drive it away, or lose sight of it. Preserving all his presence of mind, all his perspicuity and justness of thought on other subjects, but no longer desirous of occupying himself with them, no longer capable of any business, nor of giving advice but with pain; he had unceasingly before his eyes, the enemy plundering his house, as Pascal always saw a globe of fire near him, Bonnet his friend robbing him, and Spinello the devil opposite to him."

Tissot's Life of Zimmerman.

The author of Oceana, after a long and unjust imprisonment, was disordered in his mind. "He was allowed to discourse of most things
as

quently argue right, from their propositions, when the premises are formed without the intervention of the predominant idea. But their reasonings are never to be depended upon, since it is most probable, that the predominant idea will mingle with, and of course corrupt them.

Every human action, or affection, may be the source of the predominant idea of the maniac, or as it is usually termed, his Hallucination.

In all states of civilization, thinking beings have been subject to derangement of the intellectual faculties; Love the most ardent of our instincts, Ambition the most restless inciter to action, and disturber of our repose, jealousy, fear, revenge, and all the malignant passions, ever must in a partial degree, have produced this malady. It takes however, a

as rationally as any man, except his own distemper, fancying strange things in the operation of his animal spirits, which he thought to transpire from him in the shape of birds, flies, bees, or the like; and those about him reported that he talked much of good and evil spirits, which made them have frightful apprehensions. But he used, they said, sometimes to argue so strenuously, that this was no depraved imagination, that his doctor was often put to his shifts for an answer. He would, on such occasions, compare himself to Democritus, &c."

Toland's Life of Harrington, p. 37.

wider range, as luxury and refinement extend their influence, though infinitely varied by government, by religion, and by climate. In the more simple forms of society *, the seeds of this evil are fewer, and the soil is less productive; but they become more numerous, and flourish with greater luxuriancy, as unreal wants and artificial sentiments afford them nourishment and protection.

In the earliest accounts that are handed down to us, either by political or philosophical history, madness is painted with the same general colouring, and the outline is the same as at the present day. The melancholy man is represented gloomy and superstitious, lost to social intercourse, and to active life; suspicious, fond of solitude, and continually resting upon some one notion, which soon recurs to his mind, and is uttered in his conversation, whatsoever might have been the first topic of his private meditations or discourses with his friends. The maniac is sometimes furious, and sometimes gentle. His air and countenance are wild. He often

* "After much enquiry, I have not been able to find a single instance of madness, melancholy, or fatuity, among the Indians."

Rush's Medical Inquiries, Rob. vol. i. p. 25.

converses rationally, till the hallucination that disturbs his understanding is brought into his mind; then is every topic of his discourse mixed with it. He raves and mufes by turns, refuses food and drink, mistakes his friends, or imagines them to be his enemies, sleeps little, and bears, without repining, the extremes of heat and cold.

Every particular madness is characterised by the topic on which the mind of the maniac is most busied. The violent and anxious passions of the heart are most frequently fixed upon, as their roots lie deepest in the mind; but any trivial topic is equally capable of producing the hallucination, where there is a predisposition to insanity.

Madness is fixed to no one particular temperament*. They whose minds are inclined to rest long upon one idea, anxious, passionate, and ingenious men, are more subject to it than the dull, insensible, and unthinking. The female in our climate is said

* Out of 265 maniacs, 205 were of a swarthy complexion, with dark or black hair. the remaining 60 were of a fair skin, and light-brown or red hair.

Mr. Haslam's Observations on Insanity, p. 35.

to be more frequently affected by this disorder of the understanding than the male sex, contrary to the observation and the opinion of the antients. Very young or old persons are hardly ever known to go mad, properly speaking. The middle period of life*, when the senses have attained their full vigour, and the mind has arrived at a certain degree of maturity, is chiefly disposed to insanity.

Some men suppose, that in madness there is always organic injury of the brain; but it has never been discovered what this injury is. Organic læsions by instruments, falls, bursting of blood vessels, and cutting of nerves, frequently produce maniacal disorders, but not immediately; for the immediate effects of these injuries is either inflammation and delirium, or loss of action. In no part of the body does irregular or disturbed

* The following table of the age, number cured, &c. is taken from Mr. Haslam's valuable practical work on Insanity, p. 112.

Age between.	No. admitted.	No. cured.	No. uncured.
10 and 20	113	78	35
20 and 30	488	200	288
30 and 40	527	180	347
40 and 50	362	87	275
50 and 60	143	25	118
60 and 70	31	4	27
Total;	1664	574	1090

action

action necessarily suppose an actual organic læsion: more especially in the brain, whose functions are so obscure, and which so often acts even without the apparent intervention of external agency. Indeed, in this organ we know that uncatenated and irregular actions produce the worst effects of organic injury: as on a stringed instrument of music harmony is the effect of regulated motions of the chords, and discord of irregular and accidental touches. If the instrument be broken, harmony cannot be produced even by regulated movements, no more than on the brain, perceptions can be expressed, when that organ is lacerated. All the dissections hitherto made, prove nothing at all as to the state of the mad person. The brain in some cases has been supposed to be harder, earthy substances have been discovered in it; it has been fuller of blood, its coats less transparent, &c. &c. But whatsoever be our particular theories, there is certainly no evidence of the discovery of such a state of the brain by dissection, as would prove whether the person had been insane or not. If the brain be found hard, this does not prove it; for anatomists know that infinite are the diver-

fities of the consistency of the brain, from season, period of life, and the time the body has been kept after death.

The hereditary disposition in children to the diseases of their parents, is a subject involved in deep obscurity. Yet the evidence of the fact is indisputable, as some of the noblest families of Europe have daily to lament, the inflictions of punishment not deserved immediately by themselves, but transmitted by the sins of their fathers, even to the third and fourth generation. The cause perhaps, partly originates in similarity of structure, acted upon by reiterated imitation, and consequent acquirement of the habits of those with whom we live. It were strange to suppose that the embryo is impregnated with all the diseases of ancestors, or even with the particular diseases of the immediate parent. Of all the hereditary diseases, madness is supposed to be most constant and persevering, for even if one generation escape, the taint is presumed to cling to the succeeding branches, till either by admixture with a purer stock, or by education and management, it is neutralized or drained away. But
 though

though the evidence of the fact in these cases is indisputable, yet may we hope that much is misrepresented, and much exaggerated, since the subject, as generally understood, must naturally rouse the most dreadful apprehensions in the minds of those whose views are directed to the future health of their progeny. Similarity of organic structure, acted upon by a peculiar mode of education, and influenced by particular habits and caprices, by unwholesome management both of body and mind, is the general foundation of the disposition to madness. This disposition sometimes lies dormant, but often is called into action by different circumstances during the progress of life—by passions inordinate, by love, by ambition, by avarice, by jealousy, and by intemperance of every kind. It may be readily supposed, that a peculiar structure of the brain disposes to madness, but what this structure is, has never been demonstrated. It may also be readily presumed, that a peculiar structure of the brain may be generated, as well as of feature or limb. A madman, if we grant this, is more likely to beget children with a structure of brain disposed to receive maniacal impressions,

impressions, than a man of sound mind. On the actions of the brain however, we cannot reason far; we know little or nothing, how much or how little, the sound mind depends upon structure, but we do know that it almost entirely depends upon education, and we may therefore lay it down as a practical rule, that the education and habits of certain persons are more likely to produce the disposition to madness, than structure; and that those children of madmen, who have been educated with them, and of course contracted some of their habits, and acquired in some measure their dispositions, are more likely to become insane, than those who have not been placed in the way of such imitation and assimilation. The hereditary disposition to madness is therefore a fair ground of evidence in cases of imputed derangement of mind: the evidence should however be measured by the circumstances above enumerated, and perhaps should never be traced further back than a grandfather, or to those cases in which the education among insane persons can be pointed out.

Maniacal diseases have usually been divided
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into two classes, melancholy and madness. Some authors have branched them out into distinctions as numerous as the desires or aversions of men, which are their general cause. There is certainly no ground except for this more popular distinction—and even this may be considered as too nice*. Whatsoever be the affection of the organs of thought in madness, we are not more acquainted with it, than with that which causes melancholy. We do not know that they have even a different proximate cause; and there can be no reason therefore for marking them as different genera of diseases. We shall not follow then those nosological writers, who distinguish and distribute insanities according to the predominant idea. Such a distribution would not lead us to a more perfect knowledge of facts, and in some cases would involve the subject in inextricable confusion. A man whose hallucination is politics, is mad exactly in the same way as the man whose hallucination is love. It would therefore be an unnecessary waste of distinction

* *Insaniæ autem tot sunt, fere quot sunt passionum ipsarum species; procedit tamen aliquando a prava organorum constitutione vel læsione, aliquando etiam a passionis vehementia, vel duratione longa læduntur organa. Utrobique tamen ejusdem generis est insania, &c.*

Hobbes's Leviathan, c. 8, p. 37, &c.

and of words, to call one politico-mania, and the other erotomania. The mind is deranged by some morbid affection of the brain and organs of thought, by certain notions abiding in it too long, in both cases; and the actions depending upon the insanity, are not diversified by the two ideas, any more than they would be, were the understanding sound. The disease is mania in both cases, which requires watchfulness and controul; and physicians must determine whether it is likely to become dangerous to the individual, or to society, and to require confinement and coercion. In one case the lover may be furious, whilst the politician is timid, and vice versa.

The hallucination always takes its direction from the temperament of the maniac. He who is accustomed to the indulgence of every propensity, and to indulge unrestrainedly all his passions, will be more furious and ungovernable when his reason is overthrown. During its derangement the mind will still be swayed by its peculiar propensities as when sound, and the maniac will be proud or humble, or passionate, or revengeful, according to the bent of his character previous
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to disorder. Persons of lively manners, and good disposition of temper, are gay and full of hope, every thing appears delightful to them: even superstition elevates the minds of such persons to the most dazzling and splendid visions of enthusiasm: heaven and heavenly joys are constantly in their imaginations. But far more frequently does she assume her more gloomy and threatening aspect to the timid and desponding maniac; and one insanity grounded on this topic is characterised as melancholy, from the marks of terror, the gloom, and despair with which it is accompanied. Taking it therefore for granted that the proximate cause of madness is always the same, whatsoever be the hallucination, that is, that the organs of thought are always affected in the same manner, only in different degrees, there can be no great use in minutely discriminating the different sorts of madness. The diseases of the organs of thought now under consideration, discover themselves by an unusual arrangement of the ideas of the persons affected, by an arrangement unsuitable to their former modes of conversing and acting, unsuitable to the habits and actions of the generality of men,
and

and sometimes inconsistent with the order and comfort of society.

Nor is the man who has a settled and recurring hallucination of insanity to be trusted, or to be accountable for his actions, though he may at times reason right*, and appear
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* For madness and melancholy drive high; and we have proved by divers instances, that a man may be most ridiculously and absurdly wild in some one thing, and yet sound and discreet in the rest: as Gazius handsomely sets it out in the story of an old man that conceived himself God the Father. And Acoſta verifies it in a true history of his own knowledge, concerning a certain learned and venerable professor of divinity in the kingdom of Peru, whom he doth affirm to have been as perfectly in his senses, as to soundness of brain, as himself. The Peruvian doctor would sadly and soberly affirm that he should be a king, yea, and a pope too, the apostolical see being translated to those parts; as also, that holiness was granted unto him above all angels and heavenly hosts, and above all apostles; yea, that God made proffer unto him of hypostatical union, but that he refused to accept of it: that he was appointed to be redeemer of the world, as to matter of efficacy, which Christ, he said, had been no further, than to sufficiency only. That all ecclesiastical estate was to be abrogated, and that he would make new laws, plain and easy, by which the restraint of clergymen from marriage should be taken away, and multitude of wives allowed, and all necessity of confession avoided. Which things he did maintain before the judges of the inquisition with that earnestness and confidence, with so many and so large citations out of the Prophets, Apocalyps, Psalms, and other books, with such unexpected applications, and allegorical interpretations of them, that the auditory knew not whether they should laugh more at his fancy, or admire his learning. But himself was so well assured of the matter, that nothing but death could quit him of the delirium: for he died a martyr to this piece of madness of his, to the eternal infamy
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sedate and rational, and even design and contrive. On the trial of Hadfield, the Attorney-General observed, " that there was thought, design and contrivance in all he did, and therefore he had a mind equal to design and contrivance." If Hadfield had been of sound mind, his thought, design, and contrivance were all evidences of guilt; but in themselves they are no proof of sound mind. Madmen think, but their thoughts and conceptions of things are false and inadequate; and as to design and contrivance, madmen are frequently very subtle in compassing their ends. Madmen are generally conscious of their actions, or of the results of their cogitations, and indeed the means employed to coerce or correct them are employed upon this principle. But the origin of the evil lies in the mind, which in its diseased state can never be expected to think right or to act right, though it may perchance do both; and

of his judges, who were either so unwise as not to know that melancholy may make a man delirious as to one particular thing, though his intellects be sound in others; or else so cruel and barbarous as to murder a poor distracted man.

More on Enthusiasm, § 41.

Vide sect. 32 for other cases, and sect. 33, &c. for the case of David George, a seaman, who called himself the Messias, and sect. 42 for another.

thinking

thinking and acting right “ are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature,” that they ought never to be supposed capable of disjunction.

Insanity may be produced by many obvious diseases of the human body, independent of, or at least not apparently connected with that latent cause, which lies beyond our reach, solely in the organs of thought. It may also be called into action by anxiety, or by excess in drink, or venery. Fevers of the low, debilitating kind, often produce incapacity of mind, not to speak of delirium, which is their more usual attendant. Intermittent fevers are frequently attended with delirium during the hot fit, and even after the fever is cured this periodical delirium sometimes recurs. But in these cases the defect of understanding depending upon the disease is not madness, but delirium, though it is possible in persons disposed to madness that this state of mind may also occur. After parturition, delicate and irritable females are often liable to insanity, which at first shews itself in the form of delirium, but gradually degenerates into madness. This diseased

diseased state is probably occasioned by organic læsion, and its duration is proportional to the injury sustained. It sometimes lasts but a few hours, at others for many weeks: there is great heat and quick pulse along with it. Whensoever there is an obvious cause of insanity, with the exception of palsy and epilepsy, and such wounds of the head as are not remediable by art, the prognosis is much more favourable than when it is apparently spontaneous, that is, produced by causes of which we are ignorant. In fevers, and in all læsions for instance, there is a mixed disease of the mind from the irritation of fever, partaking much of the nature of delirium, and probably more allied to it than to madness, even in cases where the predisposition to madness is known to exist. This state of the brain for the most part ceases with the exciting cause, and the mind becomes sound as the body returns to health. It is possible indeed, that the habit of disease may continue for some time after the original cause is removed. In such cases, there will be either fatuity, or want of memory, or an hallucination of insanity. Wounds of the brain often produce these effects, permanently, but the fury which comes on be-

fore they are healed, is entirely delirious. The best general rule in all these cases is, that the disease of mind will disappear with the cure of the organic læsion. This rule will apply to injuries of all parts of the body, to the stomach, the liver, the diaphragm, and the spleen, organs which have all been supposed more especially to affect or influence the understanding.

From every cause the prognosis is less favourable, in proportion to the length of time the madness continues. When from long continuance the insanity degenerates into fatuity, or moody madness, which it is apt to do, the prognosis is most unfavourable of all. On a celebrated and afflicting occasion, the probability of recovery after 50 became a matter of dispute; and Dr. Willis gave it as his opinion, that the age signified nothing unless the patient had been afflicted before. Dr. Warren is said to have discovered, by examining the reports of the hospitals of London, that the chances were three to one against recovery. If we take Mr. Haslam's calculation we shall find, that of 1664 patients admitted into Bethlem Hospital, between 40 and 50, the chances
were

were four to one against recovery, and between 50 and 60, near six to one; that between 10 and 20, 78 were cured out of 113, between 20 and 30, 200 out of 488, and between 30 and 40, 180 out of 527.

It is well known that convulsions and insanity often meet in the same person, and by turns exert their influence on the body and mind. On this fact a learned physician has built his theory of madness, with what firmness and consistency must be left to posterity to decide. It cannot, however, have escaped observation, that although this reciprocation of disease is frequent, it is not constant, and that the expression of volition being exerted in undue degree to relieve bodily pain is as much a theory, and leaves us as much in the dark as other theories.

“ Among the bodily particularities which mark this disease, may be observed the protruded, and oftentimes glistening eye, and a peculiar cast of countenance which, however, cannot be described. In some, an appearance takes place which has not hitherto been noticed by authors. This is a relaxation of the integuments of the cranium, by

means of which they may be wrinkled, or rather gathered up by the hand to a considerable degree. It is generally most remarkable on the posterior part of the scalp; as far as my enquiries have reached, it does not take place in the beginning of the disease, but after a raving paroxysm of some continuance. It has been frequently accompanied with contraction of the iris*.”

The general state of bodily health in idiopathic madness, is various: for the most part the bodily powers are sluggish and inactive; the pulse is slow, the bowels are costive, and vomiting is excited with difficulty. Real maniacs seldom complain of great extremes of heat or cold—they bear hunger and thirst without complaining—and in the selection of their food are indiscriminating, often eating their excrement, and whatsoever falls in their way. In some maniacs, however, there is a tendency to fever, quick pulse, florid countenance. Dr. Arnold has treated this part of the subject so minutely, and his opportunities of observation were so numerous, that I shall refer to his book for every

* Haslam on Insanity, p. 34.

further

further information on the different hallucinations and habits of maniacs. What has been already said is sufficient to characterise the appearances of madness, and to form a contrast with some of the other disorders or defects of the understanding.

Persons attacked by fevers, or whose brains and vital organs are injured, in some stages of their disorder grow delirious, or as it is sometimes called phrenitic. In delirium, the whole chains of thought have little or no reference to external objects—The delirious dreams, though awake. His organs of sense do not convey the impressions of external sensation, so vividly to the brain, as to overcome the internal motions of that organ, caused by fever or organic læsion. Hence the unconnectedness of his conversation, and its want of relation to the surrounding objects.

It has been the fashion of late, to attribute the formation of ideas to certain motions of the organs of sense, and undoubtedly to a very considerable extent, this is just. But in my opinion, the organs of sense are only the primary agents—They are springs of ideas,

which are continually passing into the brain, the great reservoir of thought. They convey, and they impress upon the brain, the images of things, which dwell there so long as the mind is sound, and are called into action with greater or less facility in proportion to the force of attention, dependant upon some physical cause we do not well understand, at the moment of impression. Thus, when I see a particular book, if I have received any great delight from its perusal, or had my attention deeply fixed upon its contents, certain notions are likely to be impressed upon my mind. In health these notions being rightly associated, will be called into action whensoever the same state of brain recurs which existed at the instant they were impressed. The same will take place in delirium; but as the state of the brain continually varies from the impulse of disease, there will, of course, be a rapid succession of ideas according to the changes that take place in the brain. If the brain be circumstanced as it was when the notion of the book was first impressed, this notion will recur, and probably be expressed; and so on, without any relation to external objects, or to the healthy associations of the sound mind.

Here

Here then is the distinction. In delirium there is an obvious bodily disease which occasions a peculiar action of the brain: there is no one predominant idea, but a wild and incoherent jumble of ideas.

In madness, there is frequently no visible bodily disease: there is always some predominant idea: external objects make nearly the same impression as when the mind is whole, till the hallucination interferes, and deranges all the trains of thought with which it is intermixed.

From idiocy, madness is readily distinguished. The idiot cannot reason, the madman reasons falsely; the idiot acts from animal appetency, he has no will; the madman wills, but his reason being disturbed, his actions are not suitable to the usual relations of society.

In appearance too, the discriminating marks are striking. The delirious is flushed with fever, or shrunken with emaciation and debility; the madman stares wildly, sometimes gaily, sometimes gloomily; the idiot is pallid, and often deformed, his coun-

tenance unmeaning, and without illumination, gaping, drivelling, grinning.

From these characters, of the different species of mental defect or derangement, it will not be difficult to distinguish them. Indeed, madness holds so conspicuous and elevated a station above the rest, that she can never be mistaken for them.

But it is a more difficult task to determine the exact boundaries of her reign—to determine when madness has passed away, or has intermitted to such a degree as to constitute a lucid interval of reason sufficient for carrying on, or executing the offices of the sound understanding.

Melancholy persons generally appear fit for society—their insanity being in its infancy, they are not totally incapable of acting rightly: though their minds begin to be darkened, they are not totally eclipsed. In the more severe and despairing degrees of melancholy, the same cannot be said with justice, for as the mind is then occupied by the predominant idea, all its ratiocinations will probably be disturbed. In the former case,
which

which may be termed hypochondriacism, the insanity not being formed, there is for the most part a capacity for action; whereas in the latter, reason is entirely overthrown, so far as the more important affairs of life are concerned.

If the predominant idea interfere, in the most trivial transaction, and give it a wrong direction, there cannot be said to be a lucid interval, in any case, in which the insanity was before indisputable. In some madmen, the hallucination does not recur frequently, and in the intervals of its recurrence, conversation is carried on so much in the usual manner, and there are so many appearances of reason, that it may be even suspected whether they be actually insane. But let the hallucination be touched upon, then will the truth appear*. Volumes of facts illustrate

* See Mr. Erskine's most admirable speech on Hadfield's trial, and as the best illustration of the point in question, that part of it: "Lunatics are also known, Gentlemen, and innumerable instances have occurred, in which they have proved themselves subtle in the highest degree. The unfortunate prisoner, in chusing me for his advocate, has not chosen one who is favourable to the general doctrine of lunacy; but, in his case, I have no doubt I shall be able to convince you, Gentlemen, by the evidence I shall bring forward, that he has for some time laboured under a settled derangement of intellect.

trate this point, which is more frequently observed to happen in confirmed madness, than in the first stages of derangement or melancholy.

intellect. I do not contend, that at the time the prisoner bought the pistol he did not know what it was; he certainly did know what it was—but I say, that in buying it, or firing it, he had no malicious or mischievous intention against the life of his Sovereign. I remember, Gentlemen, the case of a man who indicted the keeper of a mad-house at Hogsden, for imprisoning him; and in the course of the trial, though I endeavoured by every means in my power, by every question I could put, to draw from him some proof of the real state of his mind, yet such was his subtlety, and such his caution, that he fairly baffled me at every point. And it was only by Dr. Sims appearing in court that he discovered himself; for he no sooner saw the doctor, than he addressed him as the Lord and Saviour of mankind. The keeper of the mad-house was therefore acquitted. But such was the subtlety and perseverance of this man, that, recollecting the doctor had one day confined him in his house in town, he again indicted him in London for the same offence; and so well did he remember what it was that lost him his cause in Middlesex, that nothing could extort from him the same behaviour; and yet there was not the smallest doubt on the mind of any one who knew him, but that he was really and truly a lunatic.

“ Gentlemen, in the time of that great and venerable judge, Lord Mansfield, I was applied to in order to attend the assizes at Chester, in a case of lunacy; and I waited on that highly revered character at his residence near town, to learn from him the particulars of a case which I understood had come before him for trial. From him I learned, that the man who was endeavoured to be proved a lunatic had absolutely eluded, by his coolness and subtlety, every question which tended to effect this purpose; and appeared as perfectly rational and collected as possible till Dr. Battie came into court, who asked him what had become of the princess he had corresponded with in cherry-juice? He instantly forgot himself; replied it was very true; he had been confined in a castle with a very high tower, and denied the use of ink; on which he wrote to the princess in cherry-juice, threw the letter into the river, and it swam down the stream.”

In

In melancholy of the severe and despairing kind, the mind is so constantly fixed upon its hallucination, that the insanity can never be doubtful. In weak and capricious persons the insanity is always discoverable by unusual manners and habits, by freaks and whims, and oddities. Such persons oftentimes sleep during the day, and sit up during the night, select the most singular vestments and articles of food, and reverse the general rules and customs of society. In some respects, and upon some topics, such persons appear rational, as most maniacs do, but so long as they have an hallucination, whether it be more or less evident, they are not to be trusted in affairs, nor are they accountable for their actions. In all doubtful cases, evidence should be adduced of the habits and character of the individual previous to his madness, during it, and at the disputed time. These different states should be compared together, and if he be found to act as he did in health, if when the hallucinations of his insanity are mentioned, he does not dwell upon them, does not associate them wrongly, does not act improperly, does not stare wildly; if this state be tried frequently, and be always found corresponding and uniform;

form ; if he sleep better, complain of weariness on taking exercise, and wish for food, then may it be determined safely, in a few weeks, that the madness has disappeared.

It is necessary here to notice the opinions of lawyers on the subject of madness, and of what they term lucid intervals ; and sorry am I to observe, that the consideration and mercy so generally characteristic of our laws, are on these topics not to be found. On the contrary, a principle seems to be adopted which religion, morality, and law have usually kept in the back ground, though in human systems it cannot be entirely forgotten—that of reasoning from the possibility of abuse. In matters of property, it is the opinion of lawyers, that the lucid interval is only to be determined by a return of soundness and reason. If a man were evidently mad on Monday, and on Wednesday, the law pronounces that there was no lucid interval on the intervening day. In criminal matters, the capacity for acting is determined not by the proximity of the past, or of the subsequent insanity. If there are signs of reason at the moment of the commission of a crime, more especially of a heinous crime, the law judges

judges such signs of reason to constitute a lucid interval*.

In support of the first position, we have the Chancery decision of Lord Thurlow, who emphatically observed at the time, that to decide otherwise, “ would be letting Bedlam loose upon mankind.” In support of the second, we have the venerable authority of Judge Hale†, and the comments upon his judgment, in the trials of Lord Ferrers, &c.

I trust that the general doctrine of infa-

* I hope the illustration I shall now adduce to prove that even the heads and luminaries of the law may sometimes err in matter of benevolence, will not be deemed impertinent.—“ A more tragical story we have in the whole trial and examination of Mrs. Mary Hickes, and her daughter Elizabeth, only nine years of age, who were condemned the last assizes held at Huntingdon for witchcraft, and there executed on Saturday the 28th of July, 1716. With an account of the most surprising pieces of witchcraft they played whilst under their diabolical contract, the like never heard of before: their behaviour with several divines who came to converse with them whilst under sentence of death; and last dying speeches and confessions at the place of execution.” London, 12mo, 8 pages.—A substantial farmer apprehends his wife and favourite child, the latter for some silly illusions practised on his weakness, the former for the antiquated folly of killing his neighbours in effigy: and Judge Wilmot suffers them to be hanged on their own confession, four years after his wiser brother had ventured his own life to save that of an old woman at Hertford.

Gough's British Topography, vol. i. p. 439. Huntingdonshire.

† Hist. Placitorum Coronæ, c. iv.

nity

nity, laid down in the foregoing pages, is sufficiently intelligible to every man in the smallest degree acquainted with the subject, to render a repetition no further necessary, than to explain some parts which may be misrepresented or mistaken—for we cannot but suppose them at least capable of being misunderstood, since the law of our country countenances two different interpretations of a fact, which being ever the same in its own nature, can have received two interpretations only from the want of knowledge, or the want of caution of those who pretend to explain it. For how can we otherwise account for this strange solœcism, that the laws decree a man to be mad, and incapable of alienating property, who might be hanged for the destruction of the life of a fellow creature, because he *appeared* composed and rational at the time, though confessedly insane before and afterwards. Such a dispensation of law is so contrary to science, such an abominable outrage against society, so high a treason against nature, that it ought instantly to be done away. There can be no compromise in such a case—prejudices, fears, vague and arbitrary maxims of prudence, ought all to yield to the law of right, “ that
effluence

effluence of the bright essence" of truth—the will of the Almighty.

Infanity is a disease marked by certain symptoms. If a man be mad, it is only by observation and examination that his disease can be ascertained; and of this, as of every other part of human knowledge, the ground work is experience. Madness has no lucid intervals, except we choose to denominate that calmness, and apparent indifference when the hallucination is not touched upon, a lucid interval. A man at any given moment is either mad or not—his brain and sensorial powers must either actuate him to the actions of the sound mind or not. He may appear rational when he is not—he may converse upon indifferent subjects with apparent reason one minute, and the next may strangle you in a fit of frenzy. But can this be termed a lucid interval!

In fact, whilst that state of the brain, and sensorial powers, which constitutes the disposition to infanity, remains, there is no security. Every moment may produce the hallucination, and the consequent appearances of madness, as they are exhibited by
different

different habits and temperaments. The hallucination may not be started in the mind for several hours, or even days, and during this interval, reason may be presumed by those unaccustomed to maniacs to be restored. For it is only by the recurrence of the hallucination, and its association with the several trains of reasoning, joined to a particular appearance of the countenance, and sometimes, though not even generally to a certain state of health, that madness is discoverable.

Some persons imagine that insanity never exists, without being marked by some frantic or furious action. Society would have been long ago in ruins, were this actually the case: for of the numberless tribe of madmen that has burthened the earth, hardly one in a million has discovered or sullied his insanity by atrocious actions.

It is in vain to urge "the difficulty of defining the indivisible line that divides perfect or partial insanity*"—that there will be no

* Judge Hale says—1. There is a partial insanity of mind; and
2. a total insanity.

"The former is either in respect to things, quoad hoc vel illud
insanire;

possibility of ascertaining when madness exists, or does not exist, and consequently that it may be made the plea for every atrocious action. In the present imperfect state of our nature and our knowledge, the wisest institutions may be abused, and that great criminals may take advantage of abuses, must be acknowledged and lamented, but ought seldom to be acted upon. For unless it be established

insanire; some persons that have a competent use of reason in respect to some subjects, are yet under a particular dementia, in respect to some particular discourses, subjects, or applications; or else it is particular in respect of degrees; and this is the condition of very many, especially melancholy persons, who for the most part discover their defect in excessive fears and griefs, and yet are not wholly destitute of the use of reason, and this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter capital, for doubtless most persons that are felons of themselves, and others, are under a degree of partial insanity, when they commit these offences: it is very difficult to define the indivisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, and on the other side too great an indulgence given to great crimes: the best measure that I can think of is this—such a person as labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or felony. . . . Again, this accidental dementia, whether total or partial, is distinguished into that which is permanent or fixed, and that which is interpolated, and by certain periods and vicissitudes; the former is phrenesis or madness, the latter is that which is usually called lunacy, for the moon hath a great influence in all diseases of the brain, especially in this kind of dementia; such persons commonly, in the full and change of the moon, especially about the equinoxes and summer solstice, are usually in the height of their distemper; and therefore crimes committed by them in such their distempers, are under the

as a rule of law, that it is more safe to punish every maniac, than to use coercion and confinement, the plea of insanity should be scrutinised most narrowly and profoundly, and whensoever there are such symptoms before, and soon after the commission of any action of consequence, as denote in the judgement of experienced men a derangement of reason, it should be determined as the wisest and most merciful opinion, that the action itself was committed during madness—a link in the chain of the accused's insanity, which connects the derangement proved to have existed before it, with that, which is also proved to have existed after it. For in these cases, it is necessary to have recourse to a chain of evidence to do full and impartial justice, and avoid “any kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature.”

same judgment as those whereof we have before spoken, namely, according to the measure or degrees of their distemper; the person that is absolutely mad for a day, killing a man in that distemper, is equally not guilty, as if he were mad without intermission. But such persons as have their lucid intervals (which ordinarily happen between the full and change of the moon), in such intervals have usually at least a competent use of reason, and crimes committed by them in these intervals are of the same nature, and subject to the same punishment, as if they had no such deficiency, nay, the alienations and contracts made by them in such intervals are obliging to their heirs and executors.”

Hale's *Historia Placitorum Coronæ*, c. iv.

It

It is true, that the act of the accused for which he is tried, may be the first ouvert act of madness; the continuance of the insanity afterwards should then be brought into evidence. Sometimes an alteration in the state of the brain may be brought about by the commission of some heinous act, by a maniac, and that act may be the last, in which his insanity appeared. In this case, as there can be no evidence of insanity posterior to the act, the evidence of the previous madness should be well marked, and come up very close to the moment of its commission, "and all the circumstances should be duly weighed and considered, both by the judge and jury, lest there be too great an indulgence given to great crimes."

To a certain extent, all great crimes may be said to be committed in a moment of insanity, without appealing to the maxim of the Stoics*, and without the aid of any topic of declamation†, I believe cases may exist, in

* Stoici duplicem furorem dixerunt, alium insipientiæ genus, quo omnem imprudentem insanire probant: alium ex alienatione mentis, et corporis compassione.

Coelii Aureliani. Tard. pass. lib. i. c. 5.

Vide D. Heinsii de Sat. Horat. lib. ii.

† Honourable C. Yorke's speech on Lord Ferrers's trial.

which there is such an obscure disease of understanding*, as will not appear in common life, or to common observation, yet under the influence of which great crimes may be committed. But on this insanity human agents are not competent to decide, and in such cases the law must take its course. Unless indeed in some future stage of the progression of science, the matter may be made so obvious, and brought into such evidence, as entirely to clear up all doubts, and enable the law to decide otherwise. Of this stage of human knowledge, the dawn is at present so obscure, that hope alone can tinge the

* Vir Suecus, mente sanus, probus, bene moratus, inter populares satis commodus, media luce quadrimulum puerum, ante fores paternæ domus, palam in vico inter æquales colludentem corripit, cultroque in fauces adaçto interimid. Ille comprehensus et in iudicium adductus, nec factum negavit, nec excusavit nec facti pœnam deprecatus est. Imo vero inquit, me mortem, commeritum esse scio, eamque ut a vobis impetrarem hac arte usus sum, cum probe norim vix tutiorem esse ullam salutis æternæ adipiscendæ viam, quam cum sensibus integris corpore valido nec morbis debilitato, excedit anima, piis ad deum religiosorum hominum sublevata precibus, eorumque consiliis et adhortationibus, excitata et adjuta. Quod mortis genus ut per vos oppeterem, cum fieri non posse intelligerem, nisi aliquo delicto capitali admisso; levissimum id esse judicavi, quod a me perpetratum est, occiso puero, nondum vitæ hujus corruptela infecto, parentibusque egenis, et numerosa prole onustis, erepto. Quibus dictis, capite damnatus, lætus ac renidens, sacrosque hymnos pleno ore decantans, supplicio affectus est.

P. D. Huetii Comment. de rebus ad eum pertinentibus.

Lib. ii. p. 110.

dark

dark clouds that hang over the future, with any of her golden hues.

It is a common prejudice that there is a temporary insanity, admitting of lucid intervals, which is aggravated at particular lunar periods. This insanity is termed lunacy; and I have observed in some trials of criminals, this term used by the judge, to signify partial insanity, as distinguished from the constant disease of the understanding, universally called madness. Lunacy, as a term expressing the influence of a certain planet on the diseases of the mind, is a most ridiculous one. I do not assert that madness, and many other diseases, are not aggravated at particular periods; but we certainly have no knowledge of any effect that the moon has upon the human body. On the term partial insanity, I shall only observe further, that every madness characterised by one hallucination, may be termed so by ignorant and unexperienced men, for in these cases, when the predominant idea is not touched upon, reason is apparently undisturbed.

The cure of madmen, and the claims of society for safety and protection, now remain

to be considered. There is no universal remedy for the diseases of the understanding, any more than for the particular diseases of the several organs of the body. The general circumstances of each case must point out the plan of cure, and hellebore and indiscriminate evacuation will often be forgotten or discarded. In sanguine plethoric habits, when the madness is attended with fever, bleeding and other evacuations, with sparing diet, will be requisite. In meagre, pale, and debilitated maniacs, with small pulse, a tonic invigorating system of medicine and diet will be as requisite. In few instances do opium or ardent spirits contribute to the ease or sleep of maniacs, and in far the greater number they inflame and infuriate*. Observation and good sense must guide the experienced practitioner in his method of cure so far as medicine is concerned, and it must be confessed, that all the medicaments of Anticyra are oftentimes inefficacious—Both for the individual, and for society, much more can generally be done by moral means, by controul, and coercion.

* The use of large doses of digitalis in plethoric mania is of late asserted.

As the degrees of deviation from right reason take the wide circuit of all mental imperfection, it is evident, that there are an infinite number of insanities, which with respect to society may be considered so far harmless, as not to require confinement. We must therefore, in casting up our knowledge of the whole subject, estimate all the circumstances, and draw some general inference sufficiently warranted as a rule of action.

Idiots and fatuous old persons are incapable of acting from a want of knowledge of the different relations of things, from such a deficiency of reason, as leaves the mind dark, with respect to the most common occurrences and actions of life. They cannot will.

Melancholy persons, or those in the insipient stages of insanity, having their minds fixed upon some painful idea, are rendered incapable of acting, when this idea interferes in their ratiocinations, and diverts them from their proper channel. In affairs of trifling import they may act properly, and are therefore not fit objects of confinement. They only require coercion when the gloomi-

ness and despair of the predominant idea leads them to suicide, or which very rarely happens, to outrage upon others.

Among the numerous insanities classed under the general term of madness, there is not one which does not require watchfulness and controul; many require coercion, and some few confinement. Controul is the least severe of these methods of management; and consists in the adoption of a fit regimen, and a constant guard over the maniac. It is by no means necessary in this state, that he should be always thwarted; much greater good may be generally done by kindness and compliance*.

When the maniac shews any signs of virulence or fury, then coercion becomes necessary, which consists in such punishment as a judicious and humane superintendant may think it necessary to inflict: denial of exercise, food, indulgence, and constant controul. Every thing unusual, or that has a tendency to injure the individual, such as filthiness, sloth, too long lying in bed, eat-

* Quorundam discutiendæ tristes cogitationes, &c. Celsus, lib. iii. c. 18.

ing and drinking too much, or too little, too violent exercise, excessive study anger or lust, profusion in gifts and expences; indeed every thing excessive must be prevented, and the current of ideas turned as much as possible, into a channel different from that in which it has been accustomed to flow.

When from well-known traits of character, from attempts to do mischief to himself or others, the maniac may be suspected of harbouring evil intentions, or of committing actions hurtful to society, then confinement becomes necessary; which consists in such a restraint of the person of a maniac, as will prevent him from injuring any one. The means are obvious, and are necessarily severe, straight waistcoat, darkness, &c.

There are few cases, comparatively speaking, that require this latter mode of treatment. For though it is possible that the least suspicious maniacs may have sudden paroxysms of wildness and fury, yet cannot such exceptions to the general rule authorise the confinement of persons who were habitually mild and gentle previous to their insanity, and who during it shew no symptoms of
of

of virulence, and are therefore only to be dreaded, on account of the possibility of such attacks. On the other hand, persons of a sanguine, ardent, irascible, revengeful temper, are always to be dreaded and suspected, when they become mad, and on the slightest appearances of jealousy or fury, should be confined. There are some few instances of melancholy persons committing atrocious actions, who before their insanity were amiable in their dispositions, and for the most part during its continuance were mild and tractable. In persons the least suspected, and particularly when the countenance is marked with ferocity, on recalling to memory their hallucination, I should not hesitate to advise a high degree of coercion, nearly approaching confinement.

In no case then should the person of the maniac be confined, and detained from the public view, except when there is a great probability of his committing acts of violence or fury either on himself or others. The possibility of such acts being committed, does not justify confinement; for it is possible that a paroxysm of frenzy may seize the most benevolent and merciful of men. In all cases

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we must be guided by the urgency of the symptoms, and those appearances of furious madness should not be obvious to one or two only, but to several well-informed professional men, before any very harsh measures are put in execution.

In a moral and political view, the confinement of maniacs assumes another shape—or at least their seclusion from the society of young persons. If, as I suspect, the maniacal disposition may be encreased, may be called into action, nay so far as our insight into the phœnomena of causes can lead us, may be also generated by imitation, surely prudence cannot be too rigorous in precaution against so dreadful an interruption of human happiness, and so humiliating a degradation of human dignity. To thinking beings, life can be no further valuable, than as the appendage and the associate of reason, and poor indeed would be the benefit conferred by the one, if they who have the superintendance of education, instead of protecting, nourishing, and invigorating, leave the other to the chance not merely of destruction, but far worse, of withering and rotting

rotting away, an unseemly and disgusting spectacle to the rest of the creation.

The laws have wisely confided the controul of houses for the reception of maniacs, in a certain degree, to physicians; but their powers are not sufficiently ample, nor accurately defined. The qualifications of persons who open houses for the reception of maniacs, and of those who are to judge of the propriety of confining maniacs, should be ascertained. All those who have the lawful qualifications, should be empowered to inspect at all times the apartments in which maniacs are detained, and to examine their food, apparel, and treatment. A journal should be kept in every mad-house, in which the name and symptoms of disease of each patient shall be inserted, their diet, medicines, treatment, and the means, and the quantity of coercion.

By these means, the abuses so much complained of must be diminished; nor would it be in the power of wicked and interested men to outrage the rights and the feelings of nature, by detaining the innocent objects
of

of avarice or ambition; and shutting them out from the enjoyment of their property, and the harmless amusements of society.

Thus then it appears, that melancholy, lunacy, insanity, madness, are the same disease—a disease of the organs of the mind, often called into action by vehement passions, or by injuries of different organs of the body.

It discovers itself by a peculiar arrangement of the ideas of the diseased person, and by a consequent train of volitions not consistent with the usual offices of society.

The most general and obvious appearance, is the assumption of a particular fact, which is continually associated with the several tribes of ideas and reasonings of the maniac. Hence the irrationality of maniacs—and their unfitness for conducting themselves or others, from the probability of irrationality and absurdity intervening in any judgment on any topic of human affairs.

Every affection of the human mind may be the subject of insanity, or the hallucination of the maniac.

Madness is a disease of no particular temperament, but most frequently affects the adult.

Madness can only be deemed an hereditary disease, inasmuch, as children have a structure similar to that of their parents who have been mad, and as this peculiar organization is likely to be acted upon by the peculiar manners and habits of the parent in education.

Madness has no lucid intervals; a man is either insane or not insane at a particular moment: unless indeed we be allowed to term every period, in which the hallucination of the maniac does not appear, a lucid interval. But this would be most absurd, for madness is a disease of the brain, and sensorial powers, and seldom discovers itself equally at all times. Madness is not always distinguishable from manner—for it assumes the form of the character, whatsoever that may be.

The countenance of maniacs is marked by a peculiar wild stare, not to be mistaken by experienced persons, generally mixed with a suspicious,

suspicious or timid, and sometimes with a furious look. Their health is not always visibly affected, though for the most part the fibres of maniacs, or their powers of motion, are less irritable or mobile, than in good health. Hence they are costive, and difficult to be purged or vomited. Their sensorial powers, in some measure, benumbed; hence they feel pain with less acuteness, and are capable of bearing great extremes of heat and cold, hunger and thirst. Their pulse is generally slower than common, when there is no irritation, nor disorganization.

When it is determined that a man is mad, he ought to be supposed incapable of acting. He may perchance act wisely, but reason being absent, it is solely from accident if he does so. A maniac cannot commit crimes, and therefore he ought not to be amenable to human law for their commission. He does not discriminate right and wrong.

All maniacs should be controuled, but all do not require confinement. The necessity of confinement must be determined by the degree of fury, by the temper, and the habits of the maniac.

Finally,

Finally, maniacs should never be entrusted with the management either of themselves, or any other persons, especially the young. There is no faculty more familiar to us than that of imitation; it is the first exercised by the infant, and it grows with his growth. Maniacs therefore should not be suffered to associate with young persons, who will be likely to imitate their actions. For by reiterated imitation, by slow yet certain steps, we acquire habits, which not only fix the moral character of man, but frequently produce the most pernicious and incorrigible diseases, both of body and mind.





