

The treatises of Aristotle on the soul, etc / Translated from the Greek with copious elucidations from the commentaries of Simplicius on the first of these treatises. By Thomas Taylor.

Contributors

Aristotle.

Simplicius, of Cilicia.

Taylor, Thomas, 1758-1835.

Publication/Creation

London : Printed for T. Taylor by Robert Wilks, 1808.

Persistent URL

<https://wellcomecollection.org/works/a4qtftxd>


License and attribution

This work has been identified as being free of known restrictions under copyright law, including all related and neighbouring rights and is being made available under the Creative Commons, Public Domain Mark.

You can copy, modify, distribute and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, without asking permission.

**wellcome
collection**

Wellcome Collection
183 Euston Road
London NW1 2BE UK
T +44 (0)20 7611 8722
E library@wellcomecollection.org
<https://wellcomecollection.org>



11216/c



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

<https://archive.org/details/b22006874>

THE TREATISES
OF
ARISTOTLE,
ON THE SOUL,
&c. &c.

THE HISTORY

A. B. I. S. T. O. R. Y.

OF THE

...

THE
TREATISES
OF
ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL,
ON SENSE AND SENSIBLES,
ON MEMORY AND REMINISCENCE,
ON SLEEP AND WAKEFULNESS,
ON DREAMS,
ON DIVINATION BY SLEEP,

ON THE COMMON MOTION OF ANIMALS,
ON THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS,
ON LENGTH AND SHORTNESS OF LIFE,
ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, LIFE AND DEATH,
AND
ON RESPIRATION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

WITH

COPIOUS ELUCIDATIONS

FROM THE COMMENTARIES OF SIMPLICIUS ON THE FIRST OF THESE TREATISES.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

JOVE HONOURS ME, AND FAVOURS MY DESIGNS.

POPE'S ILIAD, Book 9th, v. 717.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR,

MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH, SURREY;

BY ROBERT WILKS, 89, CHANCERY-LANE, FLEET-STREET.

1808.

TREATISES
OF
ARISTOTLE

ON THE COMMON MOTION OF ANIMALS
ON THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS
ON LENGTH AND SHORTNESS OF LIFE
ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, LIFE AND DEATH
AND
ON RESPIRATION

ON THE SOUL
ON SENSE AND SENSIBILITIES
ON MEMORY AND REMINISCENCE
ON SLEEP AND WAKEFULNESS
ON DREAMS
ON PROGNOSTICATION BY STARS

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

WITH

COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS

FROM THE COMMENTARIES OR SIMPLICIUS ON THE FIRST OF THESE TREATISES

BY THOMAS TAYLOR

TO THE HONOURS OF HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE THE THIRD
BY HIS MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY KING GEORGE THE THIRD

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR

BY ROBERT AND JAMES JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD

1809.

INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION.

THE present volume is much more remarkable for the importance, than for the variety of information, great as it is, which it contains. The first of these treatises, in particular, demands our most earnest attention. For what can be so interesting to man as the knowledge of his soul? since intellect, as we are taught by Aristotle, is the true man himself; and all our wisdom and happiness consist in the knowledge of ourselves.

This treatise, however, which is written with all that scientific accuracy by which the works of the Stagirite are so pre-eminently distinguished, and for which they are so justly celebrated, is also composed with a studied obscurity of diction, like all the other acroamatic writings of this sublime genius. The reader, therefore, must not expect to understand it, however great his abilities may be, unless he is in the possession of scientific habits, and a preparatory knowledge, is a sincere lover of truth, and applies himself to the study of it with a mind at once ardent, unembarrassed, and liberal. There are, I know, many who are deterred from perusing the more abstruse writings of Aristotle by their ob-

scurity; *there are also some who, that they may not be ranked among the ignorant, dare to calumniate what they cannot understand*; and there is a third class, who labour in vain in attempting to fathom the Stagirite's profundity. The first of these exhibit their indolence, the second their improbity, and the third their folly. They detract nothing, however, from the authority of Aristotle. For to abstain from the most beautiful and useful pursuits on account of their difficulty, is an indication of the most abject mind. To approach to the more abstruse works of Aristotle, with "unwashed feet, and unhallowed lips," as the Chaldean Oracle expresses it, and without a previous acquaintance with the introductory part of his writings, is insanity. *And no man is accustomed to blame what he does not understand, except one who is evidently worthless, and a sophist.* I trust, however, that the reader who applies himself to this admirable treatise, with the proper requisites, will, by means of the copious elucidations it contains, from the excellent Commentaries of Simplicius, be able to understand it. Had my solicitations to two learned men for the loan of these Commentaries, for a few months, been successful, the elucidations would have been still more ample; but the time and great labour spent by me in transcribing from the copy of them in the British Museum¹, prevented me from being more diffuse.

That the reader, however, may have all the information which it is in my power to give him, as preparatory to the comprehension of this very difficult treatise, I shall largely discuss, from ancient sources,

¹ To learned men, as they are called, of the present day, i. e. to grammarians and critics, I am very little indebted; but I owe much to the library of that excellent institution, the British Museum.

the powers of the soul, and the division which Aristotle gives of the rational part of it.

Of the other treatises I shall only add, that they are consummate in their kind; that they follow each other in a scientific order; and that they are replete with the most interesting information. In this last particular, indeed, a genuine modern will doubtless be surprized to find the Stagirite asserting, in his treatise *On Sense and Sensibles*, (p. 141,) “that it is possible colours may subsist after the same manner as symphonies; and that all colours have a ratio to each other.” And still more will he be surprized to find, that the third Newtonian law, as it is called, that *action and re-action are equal*, was known to this mighty genius, but was also known by him more accurately than by Newton. For Newton asserts that action and re-action are *always* equal; but Aristotle shows, in his treatise *On the Generation of Animals*, (p. 390,) that this equality in some instances does not take place. The former, however, only ranks among the *greatest of modern mathematicians*; but the latter ranks among the *greatest of ancient philosophers*. And,

The race of *these*, superior far to *those*,

As he that thunders to the stream that flows.

Pope's Iliad, book xxi. v. 207.

In order, therefore, to understand the following treatise *On the Soul*, it is necessary to speak, in the first place, of the powers of the soul, and show in how many ways they are divided, and what appellation each of them is allotted. In the next place, it is requisite to enumerate the opinions of the ancients respecting these powers: and in the third place, to unfold, from division, the true opinion concerning them. In the first place, then, the psychical powers, (or powers belonging to the soul,)

soul,) receive a twofold division. For some of them are rational, but others irrational. And each of these powers is again divided in a twofold respect. For of the rational powers, some are vital and orectic, (or pertaining to appetite,) but others are gnostic. In a similar manner, also, the irrational powers are divided. Again, the rational and gnostic powers of the soul receive a triple division. For one of them is opinion, another is dianoia, and another is intellect. Opinion, therefore, is conversant with the universal which is in sensibles; since it has a knowledge of this. For it knows that *every* man is a biped, and that *all* colour is the object of sight alone. And, farther still, it knows the conclusions of the dianoetic energy, but has no knowledge of the causes of those conclusions. For it knows *that* the rational soul is immortal, but it does not know *why* it is immortal, because this is the province of dianoia. But it is the province of opinion to know only *that* it is immortal. Hence opinion is that power which knows the universal in sensibles, and the conclusions of the dianoetic energy, whence, also, opinion is well defined in the Sophista of Plato, to be the termination of dianoia. For the dianoetic power syllogizing that the rational soul is immortal, opinion receiving this conclusion, only knows *that* soul is immortal. But dianoia is that power which completes, as it were, a certain path, by passing from propositions to conclusions, from which, also, it derives its appellation. Thus, for instance, dianoia investigates whence it is that the rational soul is immortal. Afterwards, beginning from things more manifest, it passes on to the object of investigation, and says that soul is self-motive. That which is self-moved, is always moved: But this is immortal: Soul, therefore, is immortal. And this is the employment of dianoia. Hence it is the discursive, or evolved energy of reason, and when unperverted, is that power of the soul which

reasons

reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. But the employment of intellect, properly so called, is to apply itself to things by simple projections, and in a way superior to demonstration. For as sense by its projecting energy, when it meets with something white, or some particular figure, has a knowledge of it superior to demonstration; since it is not in want of syllogism, in order to perceive that this thing is white, but it knows *that* it is by simple projection; thus, also, intellect knows intelligibles by a simple application of its gnostic power, in a manner superior to demonstration. The energy of intellect, however, is alone present with those who have arrived at the summit of purification and science, and who, through the carthartic virtues, are accustomed to energize without imagination and sense². For intellect is, as it were, the most perfect habit of the soul; whence, also, Plotinus, speaking of this, says, "He who energizes according to it will know what I say," because it is not possible to explain such an energy by words. But of these powers, intellect has the first order, and opinion the last, and dianoia ranks in the middle, the energy of which is appropriate to our soul, since it also possesses a middle order in the universe. Through this power, likewise, I mean the dianoetic power, our soul is elevated to the contemplation of intelligibles, which is the perfection of the soul. For, since our soul is nourished with, and allied to sensibles, it is impossible, in consequence of her association with the senses, that she can immediately elevate herself to the contemplation of intelligible and immaterial forms; but at first she thinks that these also are bodies, and have magnitude, and other sensible properties. Thus, also, Plato in the Phædo says, that

² See this explained in the notes on the third book.

this

this is the extremity of all evils, that if, at any time, we are at leisure from the attendance of the body, and wish to apply ourselves to the contemplation of divine natures, then, invading us on all sides in our investigations, it causes agitations and tumults, and so vehemently impels us, that we are not able, through its presence, to perceive the truth. For the phantasy intervening, induces us to think that a divine nature is corporeal, and has magnitude and figure, and does not suffer us to form conceptions of divinity, incorporeally, and unattended with figure. On this account it is necessary that the soul, when proceeding to her perfection, should first energize according to the dianoetic power, from its being conversant with objects that have a middle situation between intelligibles and sensibles; for such are dianoetic objects; such are our soul, and the theory pertaining to it; and also the mathematics, since mathematical forms have an essential subsistence in the soul. For, by being accustomed to energize immaterially about these, we shall be able gradually to ascend to the contemplation of those intelligible forms which have their subsistence in deity, and which are the paradigms, or models, of every thing that has a perpetual subsistence according to nature. Hence Plotinus says, that youth should be led through the mathematics, in order that they may become accustomed to an incorporeal nature³.

It

³ The following beautiful account of the utility of the mathematical science, is extracted from the Commentaries of Proclus on Euclid, p. 6. "Timæus calls the knowledge of the mathematical disciplines, the path of erudition, because it has the same relation to the science of wholes, and the first philosophy, which erudition has to virtue. For the latter prepares the soul, by the possession of worthy manners, to a perfect life; but the former enables our reasoning power, and the eye of the soul, to ascend from the obscurity of sensible information. Hence Socrates, in the Republic, rightly observes, 'that the eye of the soul, which is blinded and buried by other studies, is

alone

It is owing, likewise, to the illuminations of a separate intellect infused into the soul, that all men have common conceptions, which are certain vestiges and resemblances of intellect; and the knowledge of these conceptions is indemonstrable, or, rather, is superior to demonstration. And these are such, as that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other; that if equal are taken from equal things, the remainders are equal; that in every thing there is either affirmation or negation; that all things desire good; and the like. For to a belief of

alone adapted to be resuscitated and excited by the mathematical disciplines; that by these it is again elevated to the contemplation of real beings, is transferred from images to realities, and from darkness to intellectual light, and, in short, is extended from a cavern, and its detaining bonds, and the fetters of matter, to an incorporeal and impartible essence. For the beauty and order of the mathematical reasons, and the firmness and stability of the contemplation they afford, conjoin us with intelligibles themselves, and perfectly establish us in their essences, which are always adorned with divine beauty, perpetually remain the same, and preserve a mutual order, without end.' But Socrates, in the *Phædrus*, delivers to us three characters who are elevated from a sensible to an intellectual life, and who, according to him, give completion to the primary life of the soul, viz. the *philosopher*, the *lover*, and the *musician*. The principle, however, and path of elevation to the lover, is from apparent beauty, by employing, as steps in the ascent, the middle forms of beautiful objects. But to the musician, who is allotted the third rank, the transition is from sensible to unapparent harmony, and the reasons it contains. And to the one sight, but to the other hearing, is the instrument of reminiscence. To him, however, who is naturally a philosopher, whence, and by what means is the reminiscence of intellectual knowledge effected, and the excitation to real being and truth? For this character, also, on account of its imperfection, requires a proper principle. It must be excited, therefore, from itself; and he who is naturally such, is astonished by the contemplation of real being."

And again, p. 9, he observes, "that Plato clearly evinces that the mathematical sciences have a power of purifying and elevating the soul, removing, like the Homeric Minerva, the darkness of sense from the intellectual light of the dianoetic power, which is better worth saving than ten thousand eyes; so that these disciplines not only partake of Mercurial gifts, but, also, of those of Minerva."

these we require no proof, but we know them immediately, and our knowledge of them is better than that of demonstration. These common conceptions, therefore, which all men possess, are evidently resemblances of intellect. Hence intellect is said to be the principle or science, by which we obtain a knowledge of intelligibles. And Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics, says concerning this, against those who are of opinion that there is no such thing as science, that we not only say, there is science, but also, the principle of science by which we have a knowledge of terms; by terms, either meaning common conceptions, or intelligibles, which are the boundaries of beings. For a term, as the geometrician says, is that which is the end of something; and intelligibles are the highest extremities of beings.

But of the irrational powers of the soul, some are gnostic, and others are vital and orectic. And the gnostic, indeed, are phantasy and sense. These, however, differ from each other, because sense is extended to externals, but the phantasy possesses knowledge inwardly. For sense only knows that which is present, and which it apprehends externally; but the phantasy receiving the types, or impressions of sensibles, from sense, fashions these in herself. Whence, also, Aristotle calls it passive intellect; intellect, indeed, as having the object of knowledge inward, and applying to this object by simple projections, like intellect, and without proof; but passive, because its knowledge is attended with impressions, and is not unfigured. It is also called *phantasy*, as being *φαντασία τις*, or *a certain permanency of appearances*; for it establishes in itself those things which are externally apparent. Each of these powers, however, is extended about a partial object; for it knows *this particular* white thing, and not *every* thing white. But they differ, because the one knows that which is external, and the other that which is
internal.

internal. And the phantasy, indeed, receives the impressions of the five senses; but each of the senses, alone, knows its proper sensible object.

Again, of the orectic and vital powers, one is anger, but the other desire. For, since Providence sent us hither, in order that we might adorn a terrestrial nature, he committed to us this allotment, which he was willing we should preserve. And that we might accomplish this, since there are many things which are detrimental to this allotment, and our mortal nature is flowing and obnoxious to corruption, it gave us anger and desire, that by the former we might repel whatever is detrimental, and by the latter might re-weave what we lose by continual effluxion.

The practical rational powers, however, are will and pre-election. And the will, indeed, is alone directed to good; but pre-election is of an ambiguous nature. And the will is of the rational soul, as itself subsisting by itself; but pre-election pertains to the rational soul, so far as it is complicated with irrationality. For when the soul is beyond generation, she alone energizes according to will; since she is then in good alone. But when she subsists in generation, since irrational powers are then connected with her essence, she possesses, as the consequence of this complication, pre-election, because at one time she is conversant with irrationality, and at another time with reason, and chooses this thing *prior* to that.

Besides these powers, however, there are what are called the vegetative powers; and these are three, the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative. But they are called vegetative, because these alone are seen in plants. For when plants are irrigated and manured, they are nourished and increased, and generate that which is similar to

themselves. For the vine is from a vine, and the olive from an olive. In short, we are men and animals, and animated natures. And so far as we are men, we have the rational powers already enumerated; but so far as we are animals, we have the irrational powers; and so far as we are animated, we have the vegetative powers. For we also say that plants are animated; since to be nourished, to be increased, and to generate beings similar to themselves, pertain to animated natures. Plants, therefore, are also said to live and die. But life and death are produced by the presence and absence of soul. Such beings, therefore, as have the more excellent lives, have also, from necessity, those that are subordinate; but the converse is not true. For it is not possible that the rational powers can be possessed without the previous possession of those that are subordinate. In the senses, also, it is not possible for an animal to participate of the more excellent sense, which does not participate of a subordinate sense. Such animals, therefore, as participate of sight, participate also of hearing, and the other senses; and such as participate of hearing, these, likewise, have the smell, the taste, and the touch; but they do not entirely participate of the sight, as is evident in the mole. Indeed, there are some animals which alone participate of the touch, as the sponge. Hence it is not possible for an animal to participate of the more excellent without participating of the subordinate power. This, however, is not because the superior are in want of the inferior powers to their subsistence, but, on the contrary, the body is not able to participate of the more excellent, unless it previously participates of the subordinate powers. Thus the body cannot participate of the irrational without a previous participation of the vegetative power; nor of the rational power, without a participation of both these. For, since it is necessary that no form should

should perish, lest the universe should be imperfect; for the world is a plenitude of forms; and it is impossible that sublunary natures should remain numerically the same, since they are generable and corruptible;—hence these, also, participate of perpetuity, as far as they are able, since all things desire eternity, or the first perpetuity, as their proper principle. And each individual participates of this according to its own measure. Hence, also, terrestrial natures, not being able to be numerically perpetual, each of them participates of perpetuity, by generating a being like itself. And this work of nature, viz. for every vital being to generate another like itself, is what nature proposes to herself, as her principal scope. Since, therefore, we require generation, but the generative power subsists in a definite magnitude, on this account we require increase. Since, also, increase is produced through nutriment, we are in want of the nutritive power; and hence, both we, and irrational animals, participate of physical powers; so that when we energize according to these powers, we energize as plants; but when according to anger and desire, we energize as irrational animals; and we alone energize as men when we employ the reasoning power. Hence, also, Plotinus very divinely says, “that those who furiously energize according to the nutritive powers, are in danger of being changed into trees.”

It is worth while, however, to consider what the difference is between desire⁴, and those natural powers, the generative and nutritive. For we do not see that desire energizes about any thing else, than about

⁴ It must be carefully observed by the reader, that *desire*, in conjunction with *anger*, form the two great orectic and vital powers of the soul; that these powers are irrational; and that consequently *desire*, as an irrational power, is not merely *a wish to enjoy any thing*, because, in this sense of the word, there are rational as well as irrational desires.

nutriment

nutriment and the generative powers, so that it would seem to follow that desire is the same with the vegetative powers. What, then, shall we say? That it is not the same. For desire, indeed, energizes in conjunction with sense; but the vegetative powers energize without sense. Hence irrational animals are excited to appetite by the view of females; so that desire is attended with a certain knowledge, but this is not the case with the vegetative energies. Indeed, we frequently emit the seed when asleep, no sense or imagination having preceded the emission, and we do this in consequence of energizing according to the vegetative powers. For, as when reason is enslaved by the irrational part, it employs every means to gratify luxurious appetite, and yet we do on this account say, that reason is the same with the vegetative powers; thus, also, we say with respect to desire. The peculiarity, however, of the vegetative powers is simply to aspire after nutriment and coition, unattended with sensation; but the peculiarity of desire is to aspire after certain nutriment, a certain coition, and, in short, after that which produces delight. Is there, then, one and the same end of desire, and of the vegetative power? There is not. But of the latter, the end is simply nutriment, or coition, and of desire the end is pleasure. This, however, is the end of desire, in order that by this tendency we may preserve the condition we are allotted in the universe, and the succession of our race. But to reason, when it enslaves itself to desire, there is not a certain peculiar end of this energy, because such an energy is unnatural to it. And things which are unnatural, are not directed to a certain end. For reason in this case, like a slave, procures pleasure not as its own end, but as the end of desire. Have we, then, three souls, and are we governed by three souls? To this we reply, that as the soul, from its
union

union with this body, appears, indeed, to form but one thing, yet in reality is not one thing; thus, also, by the conjunction of the irrational and vegetative powers, it produces, through contact, one certain continuity. For the irrational is proximately suspended from the rational part; but the vegetative from the irrational part. And through the sympathy arising from this contact, we say that there is one soul; and that the irrational part uses the subordinate or vegetative powers as instruments. Of these powers, however, I mean the irrational and the vegetative, some are more, and others less near to the rational soul. The irrational powers, indeed, are more near, because they are capable of being obedient to reason. On which account, by reprovng desires, we render them more mild. Hence Homer represents Ulysses striking his breast, and thus addressing his heart :

Poor suff'ring heart ! he cry'd, support the pain
Of wounded honour, and thy rage restrain.

Hence, also, the precept, accustom yourself to subdue anger, pleasure and pain, and the like. But the vegetative powers, as not being obedient to reason, are more remote from the rational soul. For it is not possible to order the nutritive power to nourish, or the augmentative to increase, or the generative to generate only to a certain extent. If, however, we render the generative power more moderate, it is evident that we do not simply repress this power itself, but desire; for the power remains nevertheless, though it does not energize. And such are the rational, irrational, and vegetative powers of the soul.

In short, with respect to the soul, some of the ancients say, that it
is

is incorporeal, but others, that it is a body. And of those who say it is a body, some assert that it is a simple, but others that it is a composite body. And of those who assert that it is a composite, some say that it is composed from conjoined, but others, from unconjoined bodies. But of those who assert that the soul is a simple body, some, indeed, say that it is an etherial, i. e. a celestial body, as Heraclides Ponticus. But others say that it is fire, as Heraclitus, since, according to him, fire is the principle of things, and thus the soul is of a fiery nature, on account of the facility of its motion. Others, however, say, that the soul is aerial, as Anaximenes, and some of the Stoics. But others, that it is aqueous, as Thales, and Hippo, who was surnamed the Atheist. For, since they saw that seed is from a moist essence, on this account they thought that water is the principle of things. No one, however, has dared to call the soul earth, on account of the gravity and immobility of this element. These, therefore, are the philosophers who said that the soul is a simple body, since there are only these five simple bodies; and these, also, alone, among those who said that the soul is a body, are able to assert that it is immortal. But of those who thought that it is a composite body, some assert that it consists of unconnected elements, as Democritus and Leucippus, and, in short, those who introduce atoms. For they said, that the principles of things are atoms, and a vacuum; and hence, that the soul is composed from spherical atoms, on account of the facility of its motion. But others said, that it consists of connected elements, as Critias, who was one of the thirty tyrants. For he said, that the soul is blood; since he asserts that the conceptions of men are the blood that surrounds the heart. Of those, however, who were of opinion that the soul is
immortal,

immortal, some say that it is separable from the body, but others that it is inseparable. And of those who say that it is inseparable, some assert that it is the ratio of the temperament; as, that if a double or a sesquialter quantity of fire, or fire in any other ratio, is mingled with water, it will produce soul. For that double or sesquialter ratio is the soul. But others assert that the temperament itself is the soul. Others, again, assert that it is *entelecheia*. But *entelecheia* is the perfection and form of the subject. Ratio, however, differs from temperament. For ratio is surveyed in quantity, such as in the sesquialter, or in the double, and the like. And, in short, the definite habitude, according to quantity, of this thing to that is the ratio of the things mingled. But temperament is the quality which arises from the mixture of qualities. Thus, for instance, a certain temperament, i. e. the tepid, is produced from the hot and the cold, or a brown colour from the white and the black. But *entelecheia*, as we have said, is the perfection of the subject, i. e. it is the form which accedes to matter from a certain composition of the elements; as to clay the form of a shell accedes. But of those who assert that the soul is separable, some say that every soul is separable from the body, the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative; and this was the opinion of Numenius, who was deceived by what Plato says in the Phædrus, "that every soul is immortal," though he is there evidently speaking about the human soul. Others again assert, that every soul is inseparable from the body, and is on this account mortal, among which is Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who also endeavours to draw Aristotle to his opinion. But others assert that the rational soul is separable, but that the irrational and vegetative are inseparable. Of these, however, some assert, that both the irrational and vegetative

soul are inseparable from this gross body ; but others, that the vegetative soul alone is inseparable from it ; and that the irrational soul is indeed separable from this body, yet is inseparable from a certain pneumatic body, which is the true opinion, and which was also adopted by Plato and Aristotle.

It is not, however, proper to acquiesce in the assertions of the ancients, unaccompanied with proofs of their truth, but we should procure demonstrations of every thing ; for these dogmas extend to the whole of our life. To which we may add, as we have before observed, that nothing can be more appropriate to us than the knowledge of ourselves. We shall demonstrate, therefore, that every soul is incorporeal, and that the rational soul alone is separable from all body, and on this account is immortal ; that the irrational soul, indeed, is separable from this gross body, but is inseparable from the pneumatic vehicle ; and, farther still, that after its egress from this gross body, it remains for a certain time ; and that the vegetative soul has its being in this body, and perishes together with it.

That all the above-mentioned opinions, therefore, which assert that the soul is a body, whether simple or composite, are false, that we may give a confutation of them all in common, is evident, from the following arguments : Every body is, according to its own nature, dissolvable, and is divisible to infinity. Hence it requires something to connect it. With respect to this something, therefore, by which it is connected, since it is either soul, or some other power, whether is it a body, or incorporeal ? If, indeed, it is a body, there will again be wanting that by which it is connected. Again, therefore, we may interrogate concerning this connecting something, whether it is a body, or incorporeal ; and this will be the case to infinity. Hence it

is necessary that the power which is connective of body should be incorporeal. But soul is connective of animated bodies. Every soul, therefore, is incorporeal. In the present treatise, however, Aristotle, after having in many ways confuted these opinions, adds, "Why do I speak of the other powers, since the last of the gnostic powers of the soul, sense, is demonstrated to be incorporeal by linear necessities." If, therefore, the last power is incorporeal, much more are the superior powers. How, therefore, does he demonstrate this? No body, says he, is capable of receiving contraries in the same time, according to the same part. For the whole finger cannot, at one and the same time, partake of black and white; nor can it be, at the same time, according to the same part, refrigerated and heated. But sense at once apprehends contraries in the same time. For in reading it apprehends, at once, black and white. Hence it knows that this is first, and that second, by distinguishing the black letters from the white paper. How, therefore, does the sight apprehend contraries in the same time? Shall we say that it apprehends them according to the same part; or that, by one part, it apprehends the black, and by another part, the white? If, therefore, it apprehends them according to the same part, it apprehends them impartibly, and is incorporeal. But if by another and another part, it is just as if I perceived one thing, but you another. Just as if you should say, that which I saw is different from that which you saw. For it is necessary that what judges should be one and the same, and that it should also apprehend the objects that are judged according to one and the same. But it is impossible that a body can apply itself, in the same time, according to the same part, to contraries, or, in short, to different things. Sense,

however, in the same time applies itself to white and to black. Hence it applies itself impartibly; and on this account is incorporeal. For, if it apprehended the black and white according to another and another part, it would not be able to distinguish the white from the black. For no one distinguishes that which is seen by himself from that which is seen by another.

That the phantasy, also, is incorporeal and impartible, is evident from the following arguments. For whence comes it to pass that the supervening types, or impressions, do not obliterate the pre-existent types? which, if it were a body, would be the case, as is evident in wax; in which the supervening obliterate the pre-subsisting impressions. The vegetative soul, also, which is subordinate to sense; and physical reasons themselves, are clearly demonstrated to be impartible, and on this account incorporeal. For in each part of the seed there are the same vegetative reasons, or producing principles, having an impartible subsistence, as there are in the whole seed, viz. the nutritive, the augmentative, and the plastic principles. For as the whole emitted seed, if it is contained in the matrix, produces a perfect animal, thus, also, if not the whole, but a part is received by the matrix, it will nevertheless generate a perfect animal. If, therefore, the vegetative reasons of the animal were a body, the principles of the head, of the feet, and of all the parts, would not be able to exist at the same time in the same part. Now, however, they are in the same part; and, therefore, they are incorporeal. For that which is impartible is also incorporeal. As, therefore, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers are contained in the whole tree, thus, also, they are contained in the branch and the kernel.

Some,

Some, however, may perhaps doubt whence monsters originate? Whether it is not because the seed is deficient, or abounds? And why, again, if corn is mutilated, the remaining part no longer germinates? Why the bark of a tree does not produce a leaf, or any thing of this kind, though these also are parts of the tree? With respect to monsters, therefore, it must be observed, that matter is the cause of these; since to the formation of a perfect animal, it is necessary that there should be an aptitude of matter, both according to quantity, and according to quality. But the matter of animals is the menses. If, therefore, this matter is superabundant, or deficient, or receives any preternatural quality, then it is the cause of monsters. And, in short, these powers are incorporeal, but have their being in a subject body, and require to their existence a subject commensurate both in quality and quantity. But if, in short, the powers in the whole tree, and in the parts, are found to be deficient, it is from no other cause, than that they are of themselves impartible. For if they were bodies, they would not exist wholly in the amputated branch, and the tree would be mutilated. If, however, some one should observe that it may be said, there are bodies of similar parts which pervade through the universe, and that in bodies of similar parts there is the same form in the part as in the whole, as is evident in flesh, since a part of flesh is flesh;—to this we reply, that bodies of similar parts could not wholly proceed through the whole of the subject matter; for it is impossible that body should pervade through body. If, therefore, the subordinate psychical powers are incorporeal, much more is the rational power, which is much more excellent. For that the rational power is incorporeal, is demonstrated through common arguments; but we shall also speak peculiarly of it, as follows:—

No

No body itself knows itself, nor is converted to itself; for neither the hand, nor any other part of the body, knows itself. But neither do the irrational powers, though they are incorporeal, know themselves; for neither does the sight, nor the hearing, nor, in short, sense, know itself, nor investigate in what its nature consists; but it is reason which makes them the subject of inquiry. The rational soul, however, itself knows itself. It is itself, therefore, which investigates, and itself which is investigated; it is itself which discovers, and itself which is discovered; itself which knows, and itself which is known. It is clearly, therefore, demonstrated to be incorporeal. The powers, also, which are in the subject body, arrive at their acme together with the body, and decay together with it; and such are sense, anger, and desire. On the contrary, the rational soul rises in vigour when the body wastes away. It is not therefore, in the body as in a subject. Again, nothing endeavours to destroy the subject of itself; for all things aspire after being. But the rational soul despises the body, tames it by virtuous labours, and often entirely deserts it. The rational soul, therefore, has not its being in the body as in a subject. Thus, then, it is demonstrated, that no psychical power is a body.

In addition to these things, also, it is requisite to demonstrate that the rational soul has an essence exempt from all body; but the other souls have their existence in the body. And the irrational soul, indeed, has its existence in the pneumatic vehicle, but the vegetative, in this gross body. In order, therefore, that we may demonstrate this, it is necessary to pre-assume, that Aristotle delivers to us a rule in the preface of this treatise, which is adopted in common by all philosophers, both by those who conceive the soul to be mortal, and by those who believe it to be immortal. The rule is this: It is necessary, says he, to form
a judg-

a judgment of essences from their energies; since every essence has a co-ordinate energy. Every essence, therefore, says he, which has no one energy separate from body, is not itself separate. For if, having a separate essence, it has no energy separate from body, when it is separated from body it will have no object for its energy; so that it will be in vain. But neither God nor nature make any thing in vain. Neither, therefore, is it possible that a separate essence should have no energy separate from body.

Again, another rule is as follows: Every essence which has an energy separate from body, is also itself necessarily separate from body. For if it were not separate, it would happen that the thing caused would be more excellent than the cause; and that what is subordinate would be better than what is superior, which is absurd. For it is always necessary that the cause should be better than the thing caused; and that what is naturally prior should be superior to that which is posterior. How, therefore, does this take place? We know that all energy is derived from power, and all power is derived from essence. Energy, therefore, has the third order from essence. Hence, if essence is inseparable from body, but energy is separate, and that which is separate is better than that which is inseparable, energy is better than essence; viz. the effect is better than the cause, and that which is naturally posterior than that which is naturally prior, which is absurd. It is impossible, therefore, that an energy which is separate from body should not proceed from an essence which is itself separate. These, then, are Aristotelian rules, the latter of which is useful to the discussion of the rational part, but the former to the discussion of the other parts, of the soul. At present, therefore, we shall speak of the rational part. If, then, no essence which is inseparable from body has a separate energy, but

: we

we can demonstrate that the rational soul has an energy separate from body, there is every necessity that it also should be separate. When, therefore, the soul, by the dialectic method of Plato⁴, ascends through well-ordered gradations to being itself, and at length arrives at the ineffable principle of things, it is evident that it has such an energy as this entirely separate from body. And this is also the case when it investigates itself. For in these energies it does not employ the co-operation of the body, nor does it itself energize about the body. So that such an energy is entirely separate from the body, and even from the phantasy itself. For though, as we shall observe from Simplicius, those energies which are conversant with intelligibles according to an external projection, (as when the soul by a reasoning process endeavours to prove the existence of these luminous beings,) are not without the phantasy, so far as it follows, yet does not co-operate with them, just as a shadow follows a body in the light;—though so far as this is the case, these energies are inseparable from the phantasy, yet the stable energy of the soul, and which is contracted into the essential, is perfectly separate, and is not at all moved in conjunction with the motion of any corporeal-formed appetite, or knowledge. But if the energy is separate, the essence also of the rational soul will be necessarily separate. And if the essence is separate, there is every necessity that it should also be perpetual. For this all men acknowledge in common, that every essence which is separate from bodies is also perpetual. For, consider, if the rational essence being separate, is not perpetual, but generable and corruptible, before it was generated, it was either capable, or not capable

⁴ See this master science copiously explained in the Introduction to and notes on my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

of being generated. And if, indeed, it was not capable, it would not be generated ; for that which is impossible cannot be effected. But if it was capable, it was entirely material. For the capability of some time or other being or not being this particular thing, is the province of matter. If, however, the natures which are separate from matter are immaterial, they will not pass from a subsistence in capacity to a subsistence in energy, but will always be in energy.

Again, whatever is corrupted, is corrupted according to two modes ; either by the analysis of bodies into their elements, or by the extinction of the form of incorporeal natures, through the incongruity of the subject in which it has its being, in the same manner as the harmony is destroyed when the chords of a musical instrument are relaxed. According to neither of these modes, therefore, can the rational soul be corrupted, nor after the manner of corporeal natures ; for it is incorporeal. Nor can it be corrupted after the manner of things which are incorporeal, indeed, but have their being in a subject body. For it has been demonstrated, that it is separate from body ; so that if it is demonstrated to be separate from body, it is at the same time demonstrated that it is perpetual. And thus much concerning the rational soul.

In the next place, let us speak concerning the irrational and vegetative soul ; for that these are inseparable from the body, is evident from the above-mentioned rule. For if we can demonstrate that they have no energy separate from body, there is every necessity that they should be themselves inseparable from body. All the energies, therefore, of these souls are in and about the body. For the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative powers are in body, energize through, and are conversant with the body. Farther still, this is also the case with anger and desire. For the former moves the blood which is about the heart,

d

and

and the latter thus disposes the liver, i. e. excites it as the instrument of desire. Hence they are in body, and energize through the body, and are also conversant with the body. For desire is the appetite either of food, or colours, or, in short, corporeal things; and anger is wholly intent on avenging incidental molestations. Hence, if the energies of these are not without the body, this also must necessarily be true of their essences. For if separated, about what would they energize? What would they nourish, or increase, or generate? What incidental molestation would anger avenge; or what pleasurable objects would excite the appetite of desire? If separate, therefore, they would be in vain. But if it is impossible that any being should exist in vain, the essence from which such energies proceed is inseparable from body. The vegetative soul, however, is inseparable from this gross body, and is corrupted together with it; and its powers, after the departure of the rational soul, remain for a short time in this body. Since, whence does the putrid and easily dissoluble increase arise? For in dead bodies the nails and hairs are increased. But if there is evidently a vestige of the augmentative power after death in the body, it is also necessary that there should be a vestige of the nutritive power; since nutriment is for the sake of increase. Hence, therefore, it is evident that these powers have their existence in this body; and if these powers, it is also necessary that this should be the case with the generative power. For it is of the same co-ordination, because where the former are, there the generative power is necessarily seen to be. The irrational soul, however, no longer has an existence in the dead body. For after the departure of the soul from this gross body, the vehicle and subject containing the spirit remain, which also is itself composed from the four elements,

ments, but from the predominance of air in it is said to be aerial ; just as this gross body, from the predominance of earth in it, is said to be terrestrial. Whence, however, is it evident that the irrational life has its being in this vehicle ? Or rather, whence, in short, is it manifest that there is a pneumatic body ? For it is proper, in the first place, to investigate whether there is such a body, and afterwards to show that the irrational life subsists in this. It is acknowledged, then, or rather is demonstrated, that our soul, after its departure from this body, passes into an invisible state, called Hades, and there suffers the punishment of its evil deeds in the present life. For Providence not only pays attention to our being, but also to our well being. Hence the soul is not neglected when it falls into a preternatural state of existence, but participates of a providential attention adapted to its condition. Since, also, its errors arise from the sweetness attending the gratification of desire, its purification must from necessity be effected through pain. For in the present life, also, contraries are the remedies of contraries. On this account the soul, which is purified in the places of judgment under the earth, suffers pain through punishment. If, however, the soul is incorporeal, it is impossible that it should suffer. How, therefore, is it punished ? We reply, it is perfectly necessary for this purpose, that a certain body should be suspended from it, which body, when it is immoderately dissolved or congealed by excessive heat or cold, pains the soul from sympathy ; just as in the present life, when this outward body suffers, the soul is pained, in consequence of the physical bond, and the sympathy arising from it ; since that which is itself by itself incorporeal cannot suffer from any thing. What kind of body, therefore, is this which is suspended from the soul ? It evidently is not this gross outward body ; for this is resolved into the elements from which it is com-

posed. But it is that which we call the pneumatic body^s. Anger and desire, therefore, are in this body, as in a subject, and are inseparable from it. For if the soul, immediately on its departure from the present life,

^s "The spirit," says Proclus, (in Tim. p. 311,) "comprehends the summits of the irrational life, and these, together with the vehicle, (i. e. the ethereal vehicle of the soul,) have a perpetual subsistence, as being produced by the demuirgus himself. But these summits becoming extended and divided, produce the life which the junior gods are said by Plato to weave, and which is mortal, because it is necessary that the soul should divest herself of this distributed life when, through purification, she returns to her pristine state of felicity. This distributed life, however, has a more extended existence than the life of this gross body, and on this account the soul has a life of this kind, when making choice of lives in Hades. For, by verging to a subordinate condition of being, she receives this mortal life from the junior gods. If this be the case, the demuirgus gives subsistence to the summits of the irrational life, but does not produce the irrational life itself; since, giving subsistence to dæmons, he also produces the irrational life which is in them, yet not that which the junior gods weave in us; for this latter is alone adapted to souls falling into generation. The gods, therefore, (that is, the mundane gods,) also illuminate their vehicles with rational-formed lives, they themselves having intellectual souls. But those dæmons who are peculiarly distinguished by reason, use irrational powers, but keep them in subjection to reason. Much more, therefore, have our souls a life in the ethereal vehicle which is irrational, when compared with that of dæmons, but is more copious, by assuming another irrational life, which is a degeneration of the life in the spirit, which degeneration is woven by the junior gods. The whole, therefore, of that life is immortal, which the soul possesses in imitation of wholes; but the additional life pertains to the secondary and mortal life. If, therefore, in the ethereal vehicle there is one impassive sense, this generates in the pneumatic vehicle one passive sense, and this one passive sense generates in the outward gross body many and passive senses. The orectic power, also, in the ethereal vehicle, produces many orectic powers in the pneumatic vehicle, which have something separable from the outward body, and are capable of being disciplined; and these produce, in the outward body, ultimate and material powers."

From this remarkable passage it follows, that the first subsistence of the spirit is with the ethereal vehicle of the soul; that it contains in itself the summits of the irrational life; and that the irrational life which is in the pneumatic vehicle is a degeneration from the life in the ethereal vehicle,

life, was liberated from these passions, it would be entirely purified from generation. But being liberated from generation and the passions, it would dwell on high, and would not be confined in the places of judgment under the earth. For it is impossible that the soul should be liberated from generation which has not purified herself. For since she is self-motive, and voluntary falls from good, it is necessary, in order that she may be led back to her pristine perfection, that she should herself purify herself. Those subterranean places of judgment, however, are not able to elevate her, but only convert her to herself. Hence, when she repents of her errors, she becomes purified by her own proper impulse, and voluntarily divests herself of that sympathy by which she was voluntarily bound⁶. Hence, after the subterranean places of judgment,

vehicle, and is also mortal. The reader will find much interesting information on this subject, by consulting my translation of a part of Synesius *On Dreams*, in the *History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology*, vol. ii. p. 269 of my translation of Proclus on Euclid.

⁶ "The extremity of all evils," says Synesius, (see p. 272 of my History above mentioned,) "consists in not perceiving the present evil; for this belongs to such as have no desire to emerge, but like those whose skin is hardened by disease, as they are no longer tormented with pain, so neither are they anxious to be cured. Hence penitence possesses a peculiar power of re-elevating the soul. *For he who endures his present state with sorrow and remorse, will meditate his flight; and the will is the greatest part of purgation.* Indeed, through the means of this, both our deeds and words extend their hands to assist us in our ascent; but this being taken away, the soul is deprived of every purifying machine, because destitute of assent, which is the greatest pledge of reconciliation. Hence, both here and elsewhere, punishments bring with them the greatest utility to the order of things, while they oppose molestation to delight, and banish stupid pleasure from the soul. Misfortunes, too, which are said to happen contrary to our deserts, are of the greatest advantage in extirpating the passions by which we are captivated with externals: and thus the doctrine of a providence is confirmed to the intelligent, from the very circumstances which produce diffidence in the ignorant."

ment, the soul becomes again a resident on the earth, till, being purified by herself, and liberated from generation, she becomes adapted to ascend. Then, therefore, when she ascends, she lays aside anger and desire,

To the above most excellent citation, the following also may be added, as no less admirable, from the MS. Commentary of Olympiodorus on the *Gorgias* of Plato. See my translation of that Dialogue, p. 455. The passage in Plato, on which Olympiodorus comments, is as follows. "Radamanthus, likewise, sees that such a soul, (i. e. a soul in which nothing is right, in consequence of its having been educated without truth,) through power, luxury, and intemperate conduct, is full of inelegance and baseness. On seeing, however, a soul in this condition, he *directly* sends it into custody with disgrace; whither, when arrived, it will suffer the punishment which it deserves. But it is proper that every one who is punished, if he is rightly punished, by another, should either become better, and derive advantage from his punishment, or become an example to others, that others, perceiving his sufferings, may be terrified and made better. Those, however, are benefited, and suffer punishment both from gods and men, who have been guilty of curable offences: but at the same time the advantage which they derive both here and in Hades takes place through torments and pain; for they cannot by any other means be liberated from injustice. But those who have acted unjustly in the extreme, and have through such crimes become incurable, serve as examples to others. And these no longer derive any advantage as being incurable; but others are benefited on perceiving these suffering through *the whole of time*, the greatest, most bitter, and most horrid punishments for their guilt, being, indeed, suspended in the prison of Hades as examples, spectacles, and warnings to the unjust men that come thither."

On this very important passage, Olympiodorus thus beautifully comments. "It is necessary to know that souls which have moderately sinned, are punished but for a short time, and afterwards being purified, ascend. But when I say they ascend, I do not mean locally, but vitally: for Plotinus says, that the soul is elevated, not with feet, but by life. But souls that have committed the greatest crimes are *directly* sent to Tartarus; Plato using the word *ευθεως*, *directly*, instead of *swiftly*; a right line being the shortest of lines which have the same extremities. It is here, however, worth while to doubt, why Plato says they are always judged, and are never purified. What, then, is there never any cessation of their punishment? If, however, the soul is always punished, and never enjoys good, she is always in vice. But punishment regards some good. It is not proper, therefore, that the soul should always continue in a state contrary to nature.

desire, together with this pneumatic vehicle. After this pneumatic vehicle, however, there is another body perpetually suspended from the soul, which is celestial, and on this account perpetual, and is luciform,

OR

ture. If, therefore, punishment does not in any respect benefit us, nor bring us to a better condition, it is inflicted in vain. Neither God, however, nor nature, does any thing in vain. What, then, are we to understand by the term *ever*? We reply as follows: "There are seven spheres, that of the moon, that of the sun, and those of the other planets; but the inerratic is the eighth sphere. The lunar sphere, therefore, makes a complete revolution more swiftly; for it is accomplished in thirty days. That of the sun is more slow; for it is accomplished in a year. That of Jupiter is still slower; for it is effected in twelve years. And much more that of Saturn; for it is completed in thirty years. The stars, therefore, are not conjoined with each other in their revolutions, except rarely. Thus, for instance, the sphere of Saturn and the sphere of Jupiter are conjoined with each other in their revolutions in sixty years. For if the sphere of Jupiter comes from the same to the same in twelve years, but that of Saturn in thirty years, it is evident that when Jupiter has made five, Saturn will have made two revolutions; for twice thirty is sixty, and so, likewise, is twelve times five; so that their revolutions will be conjoined in sixty years. Souls, therefore, are punished for such like periods. But the seven planetary spheres conjoin their revolutions with the inerratic sphere, through many myriads of years; and this is the period which Plato calls *τοῦ αἰῶνος*, for *ever*. Souls, therefore, that have been patricides or matricides, and universally souls of this description, are punished *for ever*, i. e. during this period. Hence the soul converts herself to herself gradually, and again receives an organ on the earth adapted to her desert. It is necessary, therefore, to know that a pneumatic vehicle is suspended from the soul, and that this is punished by becoming either very much heated or refrigerated. It may also be said, that certain dreadful objects present themselves to the view, such as the tragedian speaks of, viz. virgins with a bloody aspect, and the like.

"It is likewise necessary to know, that punishment makes the soul more sane, and renders her more adapted to be purified. We must not, therefore, think that punishments are purification itself. For, if the soul should be punished without being converted to herself, she would not be purified. When, therefore, she becomes sober and converted to herself, as being self-motive, then she is purified; since a physician also purifies a depraved body, but he does not render it strong by his purification. The diseased person, however, recovers his health afterwards, by taking

care

or starry. For the soul ranking among mundane natures, it is perfectly necessary, since she is a part of the world, that she should have a certain allotment to maintain. And if she is always self-moveable, and
it

care of himself, and not acting in a disorderly and irregular manner by the assumption of improper food. And again, as he who comes from health to disease forgets what he did when he was well, but as he recovers his health again remembers; so the soul coming into the present life forgets the punishments which she formerly endured, and thus acts erroneously. For if she was always conscious of this, she would not sin. This forgetfulness, however, happens to her for a good purpose; for if she remembered, and did not err through fear, she would preserve through fear her proper good, and thus would no longer be well conditioned, or act like a self-motive nature. She becomes oblivious, therefore, that she may explore good as being self-motive; since we also love servants, and consider them as of more worth when they serve us voluntarily, and not through fear.

“Souls, therefore, are punished here, but they appear to be especially purified hereafter; since a life without body (i. e. without this gross body, and even the aerial vehicle,) is more adapted to them. If, however, some one should ask, why the poor, also, are not punished, who have the will to act unjustly, but only the powerful; since the poor, if they had instruments subservient to their will, such as wealth and the like, would likewise sin,—we reply, that the poor, also, if they had an unjust will in the present life, are punished; but the measures are different. For he whose injustice extended no farther than to his will, is not punished similarly with him whose will has proceeded into energy, and who has acted unjustly. And, lastly, the soul by suffering becomes herself amended, and is an example to those that behold her.”

I shall only observe, in addition to this admirable extract, that Olympiodorus in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo of Plato, assigns another reason why some souls are said by Plato to be punished *eternally*, which, I think, is even superior to that already given. “We must say, (he observes) that the incurable soul is punished *eternally*, calling eternity her life, and the partial period of her existence. For, in reality, souls which have offended in the highest degree cannot be sufficiently purified in one period, but *are continually in life, as it were, in Tartarus*; and this period is called by Plato eternity.” Such is the philanthropy of genuine philosophy, which no less harmonizes with our *unperverted* conceptions, than with the *goodness* of divinity. For to suppose that Divinity punishes eternally offending souls, *that are capable of being reclaimed,*

(and

it is necessary that she should always energize, it is necessary that she should perpetually have a certain dependent body, which she may always vivify. Hence she always has a luciform body, which is also perpetual. From what has been said, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a pneumatic vehicle, and that from this, anger and desire should be inseparable.

It is evident, also, that as the vital and orectic powers of the irrational soul are in the pneumatic vehicle, so, likewise, the gnostic powers of this soul. For if the subordinate powers may be separated from this gross body, much more may the superior powers; and the gnostic powers, viz. phantasy and sense, are superior. Though, however, the irrational powers of the soul have their being in this pneumatic vehicle, yet certain vestiges proceed from it to this gross body; just as common conceptions proceed from intellect to all souls. For that the illuminations of the irrational life pervade as far as to this outward body, is evident. For anger, as we have before observed, moves the blood about the heart, and causes it to become fervid; and desire disposes the liver in conformity to its own motions. All the senses, likewise, illuminate the brain. For the sensitive power is imparted from the brain to the sensoria through the nerves; and when the brain is injured, the senses become unenergetic, as physicians demonstrate. And when the part pertaining to the back is injured, the superior part, indeed, of him who is hurt is still sen-

(and the number of those that are incurable must be small, indeed,) is to make him a greater tyrant than Caligula, or the most execrable potentate that ever disgraced the annals of history. The abject minds that entertain such a dreadful opinion, look only to the omnipotence of deity; are ignorant that his attributes are exerted in inseparable conjunction; and that, in consequence of this, while irresistible power is the concomitant of his will, the most consummate goodness is blended with all the energies of his power.

e

sitive,

sitive, but the inferior parts become destitute of sensation, because the sensitive power is no longer supplied from the brain, in consequence of the organ, i. e. the nerve, being injured. If, also, a nerve is tied, again the lower part is deprived of sense, but the upper part remains sensitive.

From the evidence, however, of things themselves, it is still more manifest that there is a pneumatic vehicle, and that from this anger and desire are inseparable. For whence are shadowy phantasms seen in sepulchres⁷? For the soul is not figured, nor is, in short, visible. But unpurified souls, after their departure from this body, wander for a certain time with the pneumatic vehicle; and this becomes apparent about sepulchres. Hence every attention must be paid to rectitude of conduct in life. For the pneumatic vehicle and its spirit becoming thickened from a depraved mode of life, the soul is attracted about the passions. For this spirit possesses something of the vegetative life; since it is nourished. It is not, however, nourished like this gross body, but through vapours, not by parts, but wholly through the whole of itself, in the same manner as sponges receive vapours. On this account more worthy men pay attention to a thinner and drier diet, in order that the spirit may not be thickened, but attenuated. Hence one of the Chaldæan oracles admonishes that we should not defile *the spirit*, nor give depth to a *superficies*; by *the spirit* signifying the pneumatic vehicle of the soul and its spirit, and by *the superficies*, its ethereal and lucid vehicle. For this purpose, also, purifications are to be employed. For this outward body is cleansed by water; but the pneumatic vehicle by purifications through vapours; since through some vapours it is nourished, and is purified

⁷ See the Phædo of Plato, where this is asserted.

through

through others. It is not, however, distributed through various instruments, but wholly energizes through the whole of itself according to the senses, and apprehends sensible objects. How, therefore, does it appear in sepulchres endued with members and organs, and sometimes in a human shape, but at other times having the form of some other animal? To this we reply, in the first place, that it frequently appears to have a human shape, in consequence of being thickened by an improper mode of living, and receiving the impression of the surrounding body; just as ice receives the impression of the vessels in which it is congealed. How, therefore, is it seen to have different forms? Perhaps when the soul wishes it to become manifest, by moving the phantasy, it at the same time impresses the pneumatic vehicle. Or, perhaps, through the co-operation of some power superior to the soul, it appears, and again becomes unapparent, in consequence of becoming rarefied and condensed. For being aerial, it is rendered visible by condensation, and invisible by dispersion and rarefaction⁸. And thus much concerning the pneumatic vehicle of the soul. Let us now return to what more immediately concerns the present treatise.

In this treatise, then, it is concluded by Aristotle, that the essence of the soul may be known from natural philosophy, so far as it is the form of animals, viz. so far as it is a form by which animals are defined, as animated beings. Of which, also, Aristotle is dubious, whether it ought to be denominated soul, or a part of soul, or that which is not without

⁸ Nearly the whole of the above is extracted from the Preface of Philoponus to this treatise of Aristotle. In making these extracts, however, I have been careful to supply, as far as I was able, what was deficient in Philoponus, and to leave him wherever I found him adulterating the divine conceptions of Ammonius with his own crudities, and distorted notions. What follows is from the Preface of Simplicius.

soul ; so far as it has the power of increase and sensible perception, and is the cause of local motion. For so far as the soul is intellective, it is to be known by the first philosophy, or metaphysics, which has a knowledge of intelligibles themselves, and of the intellect to which they are objects of contemplation ; and which not only knows the intellect exempt from soul, but that likewise which is the summit of our essence. For by our intellect those intelligibles are surveyed ; and the intellective and intelligible being relatives, are contemplated by one and the same science ; in the same manner as the sensitive power, and the sensible object. Hence the theory of the soul is neither simply physical nor metaphysical, but adheres to both. Aristotle, however, seems, by considering both physiology and metaphysics as philosophy, to elevate the former, and produce the latter as far as to soul. For it is evident that the soul is not an essential boundary, in the same manner as natural forms are the boundaries of bodies ; since the latter are boundaries as of bodies, but the soul is a boundary as the form of animals. And the latter, indeed, are the principles of being moved, but soul is the principle of moving, or is the motive principle. For to be moved by themselves is the peculiarity of animated natures, as Aristotle observes in the eighth book of his *Physics*. Nor is the intellectual part of the soul, such as are supernatural, purely impartible, perfectly stable, and genuine forms. The science of the soul, therefore, is a medium between metaphysics and physics ; just as the essence of the soul is a medium between supernatural and natural forms, and has something which communicates with the former, and something which inclines to the latter. Hence, since the intellect of the soul is considered by Aristotle, and not only the physical parts of it, it is evident that the discussion of the soul is not simply physical.

The

The consideration of the soul whoever, which is in mortal animals, seems to be the only scope to which this treatise is directed. For Aristotle does not appear to speak of the soul of the celestial orbs, unless so far as he considers the mathematical demonstrations of Timæus about it. Perhaps, also, he was satisfied with the Platonic theory on this subject, animadverting on it only so far as was necessary to prevent the reader from adopting the *apparent* meaning of these demonstrations. And, perhaps, through what is said about the summit of our intellect, he thinks fit to lead us to a celestial soul. For the soul of the universe, says he, is [always] such, as what is called intellect sometimes is. For it is neither such as the sensitive power, nor such as that power of the soul which is the source of desire; since the soul of the universe is pure intellectual reason, which is wholly, through the whole of itself, unmingled with secondary lives, because it neither verges to bodies, nor becomes any thing pertaining to them; but while it abides in itself, bodies derive their subsistence from it. Hence its motion is circular, in consequence of the conversion of the whole to the whole of itself. Nor does Aristotle appear to have discussed any thing concerning the different allotments of the human soul, or the variety of its choice in different lives; well knowing that these particulars had been sufficiently considered by his preceptor. Nor does he consider the soul as inseparable from the body. For, in the third book, he assigns the cause of our having no recollection of a separate life, indicating by this the existence of the soul prior to its connexion with the body. But he alone precedaneously discusses the soul which is in mortals, leaving no power nor essence of it unexplored. In the first place, however, he assigns the formal cause in common in all souls, not as the cause of bodies, but of vital organs. For nature is the
formal

formal cause of bodies, so far as they are bodies, and not soul. But that which gives form to body as a vital organ, is either soul, or a part of soul, or is not without soul. And this, indeed, is the formal cause, according to which the thing formalized is able to be vitally moved. The cause, however, by which the animal is moved, is different from this; for it is moved by soul, in the same manner as the ship by the pilot; the cause which moves vitally being different, as we shall learn, from that by which the animal thus moved is defined⁹; since the motive power is not the same with that which is moved, but is divided about it. It is not, however, the body simply, but the living body which is moved with vital motions, such as walking, flying, and respiration. And the body is vital according to the life which it contains; so that according to this it is vitally moved. Since, therefore, the moving power in the animal is soul, whether is this the same with that according to which it is moved, or is this impossible? For the whole animal being formalized according to this, would be both moved and motive, and the soul would not, conformably to the doctrine of Aristotle, move, but the animal be moved. The instrument, however, is different from that which uses it; and consequently the form which is characteristic as of an instrument, is different from that by which it is used. That also, which uses the instrument, is the *entelecheia* of it, in the same manner as the sailor is of the ship. For *entelecheia* is twofold; the one being that by which the ship exists; but the other subsisting as the sailor.

In the next place, Aristotle assigns the differences of souls, and at

⁹ The cause by which *the animal is vitally* moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded, is *entelecheia*.

the same time surveys in each that which is common to all of them. And he surveys some of them, indeed, as more inclining to the organic part, but others as more established according to the power which uses that part. He also asserts that every soul is the entelecheia of an organic body, yet not every soul according to each of its powers. For he clearly says, that intellect contains nothing of body, and that it does not use the body as an instrument in its energies. He also sufficiently distinguishes whatever pertains to the intellectual power of souls; perceiving that the practical intellectual power which employs the phantasy according to the minor or partial proposition, is one thing, and the theoretic power another. This latter power, likewise, he considers as twofold, the one subsisting according to an energy proceeding from essence, this energy being either imperfect or perfect; either falling from its imperfection into a subsistence in capacity, according to the prior signification¹ of the term, or being established according to a more perfect subsistence in capacity; and either subsisting according to an energy which does not, indeed, employ the phantasy, but has it for an attendant, as being moved together with the energetic contemplation which proceeds and departs from the essence of the soul. But the other division of this power subsists according to a stable energy, collecting itself into one and the same with essence, by which it imitates the intellect exempt from soul. This power, also, is in its essence energy, according to which alone the soul is immortal, as through this

¹ By the prior signification of a subsistence in capacity, must be understood the condition of one who is capable of acquiring certain knowledge, for instance, the science of geometry, but has not yet acquired it; and the more perfect subsistence of knowledge in capacity, is that of a geometrician, when he does not energize geometrically.

being

being conjoined with eternal natures. And this power, indeed, always possesses stability genuinely in a separate life, but in a certain respect departing from itself in verging to subordinate natures, yet not so as in no respect to be permanent. It is, therefore, a stable nature in a secondary degree. That part of the soul, however, which verges to externals is not immortal, as being conversant with mutation, and as not being present in a separate life.

Dividing, also, the orectic from the gnostic powers of the soul, he discusses what are the loco-motive powers of animals; and the whole of this theory is completed in the second and third books. But in the first book, after having explained the scope of the treatise, and shown what are to be considered as the objects of its investigation, he also defines the mode of discussion, beginning from opposites, and through energy, as a medium leading us to the essence of the soul. He likewise, in this book, relates the opinions of the ancients concerning the soul, and through those which he admits, and those which he rejects, asserts it to be both gnostic and motive; and, besides this, that it is incorporeal, impartible, and unmoved with corporeal motions. He also demonstrates, that it is neither corporeal harmony, nor corporeal composition, nor any ratio of mixture. But he asserts that it is a principle, not as an element, nor as a composite from the elements, but as reason and form. And he is of opinion that there is one soul in each animal, and that the soul in rational animals has all the vital essences and powers; according to which its appetite is rational, or is characterized by anger and desire; and according to which it knows intellectually, or doxastically, (i. e. by opinion), or imaginatively, or sensibly. And, besides these, he considers the soul as in the last place possessing the physical powers,

Again

Again, in the third book, surveying the rational part of our soul in the middle of animals that are situated in the extremes, at one time he assimilates it to the sensitive, and at another, to the intellectual powers. And at one time he considers it as deviating to the sensitive power, but at another, as ascending to the imitation of an intellectual life; at one time contracting itself, as far as it is able, into an impartible nature, and wholly abiding in itself, when it imitates an intellect superior to itself; but at another time departing, after a manner, from itself, in verging to externals, energizing according to outward projection, and proceeding into a partible condition of being. It does not, however, in this case perfectly depart from opposites. For the separation of it is in conjunction with a contraction into the impartible; its outward projection is attended with a conversion to itself; and its apostacy from, subsists together with a permanency in itself, this being obscured when it verges to externals. This, however, is in order that it may abide, and at the same time be changed, through its middle condition between natures that abide, and those that are perfectly changed, our soul, in a certain respect, communicating with each of the extremes; in the same manner as it is in a certain respect divided, and becomes, as it were, at one and the same time impartible, and is without generation; is in a certain way corrupted, and is preserved incorruptible. Hence we must neither admit with Plotinus, that something belonging to it always remains pure, and in the same condition of being, nor that it entirely proceeds in verging to generation; but that it wholly proceeds, and genuinely remains in its tendency to subordinate natures.

Again, in the third book, regarding the rational part of our soul in the middle of nature that is situated in the extremes at one time is assimilated to the sensitive, and at another, to the intellectual power. And at one time he considers it as deviating to the sensitive power, but at another, as according to the inclination of an intellectual life: at one time contrasting itself, as far as it is able, into an intellectual nature, and wholly yielding to itself, when it inclines an intellect superior to itself; but at another time departing after a manner from itself, in yielding to external, depending according to outward projection, and proceeding into a partial condition of being. It does not, however, in this case participate from the opposite. For the assimilation of it is in conjunction with a combination into the intellectual; its outward projection is attended with a conversion to itself; and its departure from, and its yielding to the sensitive, in itself, this being observed when it yields to external. This, however, is in order that it may abide, and at the same time be changed, through its middle condition between nature that abides, and those that are partly changed, our soul, in a certain respect, communicating with each of the extremes; in the same manner as it is in a certain respect divided, and becomes, as it were, at one and the same time intellectual, and is without generation; it is in a certain way conspecific, and is participated incommensurable. Hence we must neither stand with notions, that something belonging to it always remains pure, and in the same condition of being, nor that it entirely proceeds in yielding to generation; but that it wholly proceeds, and continually remains in its tendency to subordinate nature.

