

The Christian or true constitution of man, exposing the fallacies of Mr. Combe's "Constitution of man", and of his work "On the relation between science & religion." / by Phineas Deseret.

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Publication/Creation

Edinburgh : M. MacPhail, 1858.

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THE CHRISTIAN

OR

TRUE CONSTITUTION OF MAN,

EXPOSING THE FALLACIES OF

MR COMBE'S "CONSTITUTION OF MAN,"

AND OF HIS WORK

"ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE & RELIGION."

BY

PHINEAS DESERET.

SECOND EDITION

Edinburgh :

MYLES MACPHAIL, 11 SOUTH ST. DAVID STREET.

1858.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

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THE LIMITS OF INSTINCT

AND

THE RANGE OF REASON,

OR

A CHAPTER FROM A NEW SYSTEM OF COMPARATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY.

By PHINEAS DESERET.

NOTICE

TO COUNTRY NEWS-AGENTS AND BOOKSELLERS.

H. ROBINSON

Begs to inform the Country Trade that he is now supplying all the Edinburgh Papers,—*Weekly Herald, North Briton, Caledonian Mercury, Express, Scotsman, &c. &c.*, by the first early morning Trains, all in one Parcel.

H. ROBINSON,

WHOLESALE NEWS-AGENT AND BOOKSELLER,

No. 11 GREENSIDE STREET,

EDINBURGH.

P R E F A C E.

THE following pages were written for the sole purpose of exposing the fallacies of "The Constitution of Man," and of a pamphlet "On the Relation between Science and Religion," by Mr George Combe, works which, from their popular form and lofty pretensions, were peculiarly calculated to affect the principles and beliefs of unlettered readers. The author of the present brief treatise is not ignorant of phrenology. On the contrary, he is familiar with all that has been written on the subject since its first promulgation by Gall and Spurzheim ; and what he demurs to in it is its embodying, so far as it has been investigated, anything approximating a complete philosophy of man capable of explaining all the complicated and wonderful phenomena of his mental framework. That the system of Gall and Spurzheim establishes an empirical connection between particular portions of the brain and certain mental manifestations of individuals, is what the writer most readily concedes ; but what he as positively denies is, that the general functions attributed to these portions of the brain are such as to explain all the operations of the human mind. The doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim, indeed—to which Mr Combe not only gives his unqualified assent, but on which he builds up a system of philosophy and morals—proceed on the hypothesis that certain classes of objects in the universe have special mental faculties assigned them in man, and these objects, and these only, excite such faculties to activity.

Now a faculty of the mind is something widely different from this, for although a particular faculty may be more powerfully excited by one class of objects than by another, yet we would hold that unless it had a distinct and clear relation to every object and being in universal nature, it was no faculty of the mind at all, but only a manifestation of a faculty in a particular direction ; and hence that the authors of the system had, by a limited induction of facts, been misled into a false or empirical generalization. In fact, that if such an unscientific view of the mind were possible, the human faculties would require to be multiplied to an extent that the brain could not by possibility embrace their organs. For example, according to the system the large and beautiful structure of the cerebellum is assigned to the sexual desire alone. Another organ is given to philo-progenitiveness, or the love of offspring, including all unprotected creatures. A third is devoted to friends, inducing friendship. A fourth, combativeness, is assigned to enemies, &c., thus embracing in their catalogue a considerable multiplicity of objects and beings without attempting to exhaust the infinitude of objects and beings in nature. According to this system, moreover, there are other faculties which are more expanded in their range of operation ; for example, causality may embrace most objects in the material world coming within the scope of man's senses ; so also may comparison, &c. Thus it appears that one set of faculties are limited in their scope to comparatively few objects, while others have a relation to most objects in nature. Now we are not a little struck with the fact that Mr Combe did not see the necessity of every faculty of the

mind possessing the same universality, or in other words, of being of the same commensurate expansiveness, running parallel with each other throughout the entire circumference of thought. The narrow range of one set of faculties, and the great expansiveness of others, might have suggested to Mr Combe that phrenology had not yet afforded a clue to all the elementary principles of our nature.

What the present writer, therefore, objects to phrenology as a system of philosophy, is not its being untrue to the extent that it goes, but that it cannot yet be regarded as a complete view of human nature. That it may and does contain in it innumerable recondite and important facts, but that there is not unfolded in it such a complete view of man that it is capable of being yet made the ground plan of any system of philosophy or morals.

All these topics the present writer, however, has not attempted to canvass in the following short treatise ; what he has addressed himself to principally is to establish that phrenology is not yet a system of mind capable of accounting for all the manifestations emanating from human nature ; that even apart from the subject of religion, it fails to account not only for the loftier flights of genius, but even for the ordinary range of thought possessed by the most commonplace men. Nay, the author has, he thinks, proved that the entire views of Mr Combe, even taking his own definitions, are purely sensational, and more clearly applicable to the mental constitution of the mere animal than to the far-seeing nature of man, and hence the atheism and other false consequences to which his system necessarily leads.* The author has merely introduced Christianity to unfold the expanded system of human nature on which it is founded, and consequently to show what it has actually done for mankind, viewed as a mere intellectual method of thinking apart and independent of its religious and moral aspects, thus embracing a range of thought, the laws of which neither Mr Combe's "Constitution of Man," nor his work "On the Relation between Science and Religion," attempts to explain. In fact, that Christianity, even intellectually regarded, embraces a field of view so infinitely large, that no system of mind of a sensational or empirical description can touch its confines or traverse its circumference, and that consequently Mr Combe ought to have rested satisfied with his empirical facts, and waited patiently until a deeper insight into his subject unfolded a larger and truer view of human nature. The author has especially avoided quoting texts from scripture, for he considered it more philosophical to take up the subject on purely secular grounds, and to point out scientifically where the errors of Mr Combe's system lie. In order to simplify his objections to the works of Mr Combe, the author has thrown them into the form of a treatise on education.

LEITH, 4 EASTFIELD, *April* 1858.

* Simultaneously with this, the author has published a Chapter from a System of Comparative Psychology, shewing the limits of one of the mental faculties in the animal, and its expanded range in man, establishing the distinction between instinct and reason, and illustrating, by a reference to their structures and habits, the existence and relative strength of the faculty in question, among various species of the animal kingdom.

THEORIES OF EDUCATION,— SECULAR AND CHRISTIAN.

IF no general system of education has yet been devised to meet the wants and requirements of Britain, it is certainly not owing to any apathy either on the part of the public or of public men. It has times without number formed the subject of Parliamentary discussion, and a greater number of pamphlets have lately issued from the press, presenting every phasis of the inquiry, than have been devoted to all other subjects whatever; so much so, indeed, that the country is now actually nauseated with the very mention of the term, education. Though this state of things is not as it should be, we are not at all astonished that it is so. As long as sober minded and otherwise right thinking men will allow their passions and angry feelings to appear in such a question, rendering the term education a war cry and the subject a cause of dissension, virulence, and abuse, so long we trust will Parliament, and the great body of the public, turn a deaf ear to its settlement. The subject of education is surely of too great importance to be arranged amidst a war of the passions, prejudices, and conflicting interests of the various denominations of Christians,—for at present with the combatants, it is more a fight for victory, or for the aggrandisement of their respective churches, than for true education and the good of Britain. We ourselves maintain, however, that Protestant Christianity is a necessary element in every true system of education, not on the vulgar and empirical ground, that the clergy are the best conservators of public morals, but on the higher ground that the simple doctrines of Christianity form an organon without which the mind cannot acquire that expansion which is indispensable to large and clear intellectual vision: Religion in the deepest and largest sense embraces not only a knowledge of the relation that man stands in to God and eternity, but it includes as well all the duties incumbent upon man to his fellow-man. The contemplation of these subjects awakens the subtlest portions of our intuitional and emotional nature, and gives rise to the deepest and most extended range of insight into visible and invisible truth. It em-

braces in its grasp the laws of these phenomena. To know these laws is to know the subtlest and profoundest laws of the universe, and after the acquisition of them all other knowledge is comparatively simple. Hence Christianity is the only form of religious truth that impresses the human mind with a correct and comprehensive idea of law. It is, accordingly, an organon infinitely larger in its scope than the organon of Aristotle or the more modern and materialistic organon of Bacon. It embraces both indeed in a mere point of its amplitude, and will survive after all other organons and methods of thinking have perished. The wonder therefore is, that the secular educationist, with his lofty pretensions to intelligence, does not adopt Christianity as a mere scientific organon, better fitted than any other to enlarge his scientific views, or inculcate it upon his offspring, that they may look at the universe through the large truths which it unfolds. We do not throw out these remarks to insult or taunt the secular educationist, but merely to show him how infinitely larger than his is the narrowest application of Christian thought, and in the sequel we shall take occasion to demonstrate how much superior it is to his own even in a mere utilitarian point of view. The unthinking and fashionable world, therefore, need not feel amiss that persons deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity should regard mere secular education as little more than sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.

During the last thirty years, considerable efforts have been made in Britain by philanthropists and other public spirited men to promote education and the diffusion of knowledge among the middle and humbler classes of society. At the first blush of this laudable endeavour, a party long since extinct set up an unhallowed and unworthy opposition to it, and that upon grounds which we could not now mention without rekindling against them public indignation, and we prefer permitting their memories to enjoy the undisturbed oblivion to which they have long since been consigned. Among the promoters of education and a higher culture, appeared men of all ranks and of every complexion and shade of religious opinion. John Foster's essay on the evils of popular ignorance had previously presented to the reflecting portion of the public some home truths which could not miss attracting much attention, and the prominent existence in society of the evils which he reprobated in all their flagrant magnitude, assisted largely to force upon the public the necessity for a change. The evils pointed out by Foster and others not only disturbed but threatened the dissolution of civilized society. It could not therefore be matter of wonder that men with religious creeds, as well as men without them, should have bestirred themselves in such a crisis. It was indispensable that a great struggle should be made to preserve to the country the very germs of civilization, and but for a simultaneous effort made from all quarters, it was more than probable that the then form of society would fall to pieces. But the struggle took place, and it was sustained with an energy and perseverance equal to the magnitude and importance of the interests at stake. Christians of almost every denomination, Jews, Deists, Atheists, and all men having the good of their country sincerely at heart, were for once harnessed to the same vehicle and pulled lustily in the same direction. By this means an impetus was given to education

and the diffusion of useful knowledge, that we trust will not cease to operate till a higher culture be placed within the reach of the poorest in the land.

But the benefits arising to the great masses of the population had no sooner exhibited themselves, than a breaking up of the coalition that had worked so harmoniously began to take place. The clergyman of the high church party, in the spiritual pride of his order, feeling the awkwardness of being allied with such a motley mixture of earth's mould, and being now quite safe in the enjoyment of his living, could not help looking askance at the extraordinary brotherhood to which he found himself united. He had no one sentiment in common with them, excepting a desire to preserve the present order of things, and that being accomplished, their fellowship must cease. Nay, he commenced sifting and analysing from his own point of view, the opinions, on the subject of education, of the clergy of other Protestant denominations, and finding that their demands were founded on a broader basis than the Established Church, or had some sectarian interest in their eye, he broke from them with greater indignation than he had manifested towards those who were actuated only by general benevolence, or a sense of duty irrespective of all religious influences. Thus a disseverance was originated and established among the various denominations of Christians on the subject of education, for, overlooking the great interests of mankind, they fought with and abused each other about distinctions that would have been submerged and forgotten before the lapse of a year after the settlement of the question.

Thus, the subject of education has of late suffered chiefly from the unseemly broils and differences which have arisen among its pretended friends. Its enemies, if it now has any, have long since withdrawn all opposition, or left it to the result of the civil warfare which is now being waged in the camps of the various denominations of Christian brethren. The war-cries which have been raised by the different combatants have led reflecting men to consider the connection that subsists between religion and education, and whether they are attracted by a mere fashionable sentiment to the side of Christianity, or are influenced by a deeper insight into its vital power, the great majority of statesmen and thinkers have adopted the Christian view. These tendencies, however, may spring from no deeper source than the all-pervading opinion of society, and thus our statesmen may be nothing more than the mere mirrors of popular thought. We would gladly persuade ourselves, however, that they are guided by a more penetrating insight into the real nature of the question,—that they see in all its bearings the searching and far-reaching spirit of Christianity, and form a just estimate of it as an element in mental culture. Be this as it may, a decided sentiment has set in in favour of Christian in preference to mere secular education; for although the secular educationists are still in the field, and are struggling to maintain their ground, they are fast giving way before the overwhelming energy of Christian thought. As the secularists, however, are one and undivided in point of feeling on the subject of education, and as the various denominations of Christians are in a state of the most violent hostility to each other on the same subject, so much so that

the tide of public opinion may take a sudden turn, and set in as strongly in favour of secular education as it is now against it, we are anxious that the ground-plan of Christian education should rest not merely on a religious, but likewise on a broad scientific basis. By presenting this aspect of the question we are not afraid that many well-intentioned but misguided secularists will favour our views, for though not actuated themselves by religious sentiments, they may be induced to adopt the Christian method on mere scientific and utilitarian grounds.

We naturally come first, therefore, to examine the nature and tendencies of mere secular education, for, by unfolding its defects as a system, we will be the better able to discover what Christianity has actually to supplement, and the consequent place which it occupies as the great intellectual and moral regenerator of the human family.

The modern schemes for secular education originated first in France, so early as the times of Voltaire, Rousseau, and others of the same school. The despotic spirit of the French monarchy, and the oppressive and haughty bearing of the French noblesse, united with the fanatical, irrational, and persecuting genius of Romanism, naturally enough kindled the flame of distrust and opposition in the national mind of France against all her dominating institutions. Among the scientific and literary men the simplicity and beauty of a knowledge of nature and her laws, in contradistinction to the fantastic and fanatical dogmas and symbolism of a bastard Christianity, appeared in such striking contrast that it can now be no matter of wonder that they promoted the cultivation of the former, and repudiated altogether any genuine influence of the latter. Voltaire, Rousseau, and many of their followers fell back upon natural religion. This was an inevitable consequence of the fanatical and despotic spirit of the prevailing Christianity of France. They advocated a cultivation of the sciences and arts, and ridiculed with unsparing severity both the doctrines and formulas of religion. They not only privately inculcated freedom of thought and the interchange of opinion on these subjects, but they openly promulgated these doctrines, by incorporating them in their writings. The national mind became speedily imbued both with their political and religious dogmas, until the former germinated and produced the French revolution, with its overwhelming horrors; and the latter, festering and spreading its cancerous sores over the national spirit, resulted in France as a nation declaring the non-existence of God, and setting up in his stead human reason as its deity. Having thus abandoned the anchor of humanity's highest hopes and purest relationships, the only object in view on the very outermost confines of human reason, France now rushed with demoniacal fury into the perpetration of the most frightful atrocities. Thus there was only but one step between the exclusive cultivation of mere material and secular knowledge and the intellectual, moral, religious, and civil anarchy of France. Having foolishly lost sight of the last phenomenon on the outside of the human field of view, France had no longer power to look in the direction even to descry the infinitude of objects and interests that lay between,—and losing sight of these, her government and people had no higher principle to direct them than mere animal instinct, and hence the anarchy into which they fell.

Thus the history of France at this period presents one of the most remarkable examples of the consequences of a country renouncing all faith in the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe. While it marked the utter profligacy and abandonment of the leading men of the country, it evinced that the general intelligence and good sense of the nation had disappeared. But secular education has originated in Britain with a different order of men from Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, and others of the same description. To these men, secular education and a knowledge of nature and her laws appeared a proper antidote against the fanatical and persecuting spirit of Romanism. In Britain no such gross fanaticism or persecution has recently existed, and accordingly secularism in this country could not originate from either of these sources. In Britain secularism has been adopted by a class of men, who, by their mental constitutions are incapable of appreciating any higher system of culture, and could not by any intellectual effort of which they were capable, discover why education should be connected with religion. We, for the sake of distinction, would describe this new order of thinkers as materialists, not because they may or may not believe that the human mind is nothing more than mere organised matter, but because their range of thought never extends beyond the circle of visible and material things; nay, we would not attribute to them all that range of intuition that is embraced within the circumference of the visible, for even in this circle their mental insight is circumscribed, much like that of the animal, to the relations in which external and visible objects stand in to themselves. It is certainly somewhat extraordinary, that in the middle of the nineteenth century, such a class of men should imagine themselves to be philosophers, or still more so, that their works should be perused with approbation even by the humblest description of readers. Mr George Combe, of phrenological notoriety, is the *facile princeps* of this school, and his "Constitution of Man" is the recognised organon of secularism.

In the introduction to the first of his three lectures on education, Mr Combe sets forth that—

"Owing to the want of a philosophy of mind education has hitherto been conducted empirically, and instead of obtaining from it a correct view of the nature of man, and of the objects and duties of life, each individual has been left to form upon these points theories for himself, derived from the impressions made upon his own mind by the particular circumstances in which he has been placed. No reasonable person assumes himself to know the philosophy of astronomy, or of chemistry, or of physiology, without study, and without reaching clear, consistent, and certain principles; yet in the philosophy of mind the practice is quite different. Every professor, schoolmaster, author, editor, and pamphleteer,—every member of parliament, counsellor, and judge, has a set of notions of his own, which in his mind hold the place of a system of the philosophy of man, and although he may not have methodised his ideas, or even acknowledged them to himself as a theory, yet they constitute a standard to him by which he practically judges of all questions in morals, politics, and religion."

Mr Combe goes on to remark, that—

"To enable us to form a just estimate of our position as intelligent and accountable beings, introduced into a world prepared for our reception and

adapted to our nature by divine power, wisdom, and goodness, let us briefly investigate,—1st, The general aspect of external nature ; and 2d, Our own constitution.”

Mr Combe refers his readers for a knowledge of these vital enquiries to his work on “*The Constitution of Man considered in relation to external objects,*” and for the estimation in which this work is held, he mentions in the preface that since its price was reduced to 1s. 6d., somewhere about 80,000 copies have been sold in this country, and that it has been translated into the French, German, and Swedish languages. But if Mr Combe regards the quantity sold to be a criterion of the worth and quality of a literary production, then he must look upon Reynolds’ *Mysteries of London* and his *Miscellany*, of which we believe three hundred thousand copies were sold in an incredibly short space, two of the most moral and truth breathing works that England has produced ! We must not, however, construe Mr Combe’s present exultation too literally. It is probably, moreover, a weakness incident to all authorship to think somewhat highly of one’s self. We must look into the book itself and inquire whether in reality this notable work contains a view of the “*constitution of man considered in relation to external objects ;*” or whether there is even indicated in it any clear notion of what the constitution of man means ; or is it like most of its predecessors, only another ingeniously compounded quack-drug widely advertised to cure all manner of diseases, and vended to the ignorant and unwary in all the highways and byeways of existence ?

As Mr Combe very plainly sets forth that in order to conduct education effectively, it is indispensable that the educationist should be thoroughly acquainted with the constitution and workings of the human mind, and as according to the same authority, this is only to be acquired by a thorough acquaintance with phrenology, we have ample scope for discovering from Mr Combe’s *Constitution of Man*, what he conceives a knowledge of the human mind to consist of, and still a clearer insight into his notions concerning its workings. He seems to complain, moreover, both here and elsewhere, that all religionists answer his appeals by referring him to the Bible and the doctrines inculcated there. His reply is not without foundation, for he maintains that God has made two revelations to man, first, that exhibited in the works of creation, and the laws, physical and moral, he has established in the universe, and second, the revealed will of God as unfolded in the Old and New Testaments. He very justly observes that the will of God as revealed in his word, must always be interpreted consistently with that manifested in his works. This is no doubt taking very high ground, but as Mr Combe has the selection of his subject and materials, as well as of the manner of treating them, we think that he should be freely indulged, and that unless there are latent errors in his method, he is entitled to pursue his investigation after what fashion he chooses, and to follow whithersoever it may conduct him. As the vitality and proper management of education, however, turns, as he himself justly observes, upon a thorough knowledge of the true philosophy of man, it is of the last importance to enquire into the nature of Mr Combe’s notions on this subject, for al-

though his work is sufficiently crowded with the most abstract metaphysical and philosophical terms, yet, as has frequently happened to greater thinkers than Mr Combe, there may lie concealed under them, views and opinions which, when stripped of their dress and decoration, he himself would have shrunk from entertaining. We shall take the liberty, therefore, of unclothing as delicately as we can, some of Mr Combe's leading notions concerning the nature of the human mind, and if after this simple operation they appear either to himself or even to a half rational creature, anything like natural or the products of nature, we shall willingly resign ourselves to his leading strings, to be conducted to that limbo of thought and opinion, to which all error and falsehood necessarily lead.

Let us examine shortly then, into the nature of Mr Combe's opinions on the subject of the human mind :—

“According to the phrenological theory of human nature,” says Mr Combe, “the faculties are divided into propensities common to man with the lower animals and sentiments proper to man and intellect. Every faculty stands in a definite relation to certain external objects ; when they are presented to it they excite it to activity, and delight it with agreeable sensations. Human happiness or misery are resolvable into the gratification of one or more of our mental faculties, or with the feelings connected with our bodily frame. The faculties in themselves are mere instincts ; the moral sentiments and intellect being higher instincts than the animal propensities. Every faculty is good in itself but all are liable to abuse. Their operations are right only when they act in harmony with each other—enlightened intellect and sentiment holding the supremacy.”

Mr Combe lays the ground-work then of all his opinions on the subject of man in phrenology. Now although we regard the phrenological form of enquiry as in the last degree interesting, especially as presenting many curious and striking physiognomical facts, yet to us and most other thinkers, it has failed to unfold the great laws and principles of human thought, for it has not approached the true evolution of those faculties in man which originate his absolute sense of law, nor does it indicate, excepting in the vaguest and most shadowy fashion, that portion of his nature which points to his future destiny. In the above generalized view of the subject, Mr Combe sets forth that “every faculty stands in a definite relation to certain external objects ; when they are presented to it they excite it to activity, and delight it with agreeable sensations.” Now we would ask Mr Combe, whence or how is it that the mind contemplates its own operations, which, of course, are not external to it ; or whence or how is it that it embraces the contemplation of its Creator, who is invisible to every human eye, and whose nature and attributes are so much above human ken, that the mind can form not the slenderest conception of them, and in the effort is at last forced to humanize them, assigning to him only our short-sighted notions of Benevolence and Justice.—Deity was never presented to man to excite the faculties of wonder and veneration. He has never made himself visible, still all mankind believe as firmly in his existence as they do in the existence of the material world itself. Neither can the intellect, as defined by Mr Combe, comprehend or originate man's impressions of the existence of Deity. According to Mr Combe, “Comparison gives the power of dis-

covering analogies, resemblances, and differences. Causality traces the dependencies of phenomena, and the relation of cause and effect." Now the relations in which man stands to God and eternity, are not within the range of either of these faculties, for we have no experience coming from the region of observation upon which these faculties can operate,—nothing coming from without to stimulate them,—still all mankind, according to the strength or weakness of their mental framework, place implicit faith in these relationships. Thus Mr Combe's analysis of the highest of the human faculties infers the existence of no principle in man to embrace in its grasp all that class of subject which lies on the outermost confines of human thought and enquiry, and phrenology cannot, therefore, be regarded as anything approaching a complete view of man. Nay, the view taken by Mr Combe of the human intellect, seems rather to be characteristic of the form of intelligence peculiar to the lower animals,—at least there is nothing necessarily human in his outline.

Throughout Mr Combe's work there is a wonderful harmony of thought and opinion. Accordingly, when he comes to define the operations of the human mind, they are made to appear as miserably narrow and circumscribed, as his analysis of the human faculties are materialistic and imperfect. In defining the term law, upon which the whole spirit and thought of Mr Combe's work depends, he says:—"A law, in the common acceptation, denotes a rule of action, it implies a subject which acts,—and that the action or phenomena which that subject exhibits, take place in an established and regular manner; and this is the sense in which I shall use it when treating of physical substances and beings." Here Mr Combe's view of the term law has reference only to the nature of the mere animal, at least it does not include any mental characteristic peculiar to man. Now a law, in the human acceptation of the word, has no necessary reference to an action at all, nor does it imply a subject, as stated in the passage quoted. A law of nature is an absolute, and universal truth, which is recognisable only by a being endowed with reason, or faculties capable of embracing universal truth. Such a being is man, whose sense of law applies to phenomena which existed in the infinite past, and will exist in the infinite future. Thus the conception of a law by man altogether transcends his range of action or the possibility of it. It implies his capacity of recognising truth itself in its most absolute form; and, accordingly, although it may constitute a rule of action for man, it is infinitely larger than this, for it includes the idea that it has been and will be the rule of action of all created beings in all time; and it is still larger than this, for it would have formed the rule of action of all possible beings. Thus man's idea of law is an absolute and abstract conception independent of all action or manifestation whatever. But Mr Combe's definition of a law applies only with peculiar nicety to the case of the mere animal. For example, the dog not only feels the sense of comfort and enjoyment from a fire during cold, but generalises the fact in so far as itself or the object of its attachment is concerned, and makes this a rule of conduct for itself ever after. To the dog the sense of law is co-extensive with its rule of action, and hence it fulfils all the conditions of a law indicated by Mr Combe. Thus, in treating of the most

abstruse metaphysical questions, abstract principles or analyses of mental phenomena peculiarly applicable to man, Mr Combe unconsciously limits himself to delineations of these, characteristic only of the nature of the animal, and lays them down as doggedly, and illustrates them as seriously, as if they were gospel truths, and beyond the boundary of all possible criticism.

Having glanced thus briefly at Mr Combe's notions concerning the human intellect and its products, let us examine his views with respect to the "sentiments proper to man," and discover the sort of supremacy which, taken together, they are said by him to exert over the propensities common to man and the animal. The first mentioned is described by Mr Combe as common to man and some of the lower animals:—

"1. **BENEVOLENCE**—*uses*.—Desire of the happiness of others, compassion for the distressed, universal charity, mildness of disposition, and a lively sympathy with the enjoyment of all animated beings.—*Abuses*.—Profusion, injurious indulgence of the appetites and fancies of others, prodigality, facility of temper.

"SENTIMENTS PROPER TO MAN.

"2. **VENERATION**—*uses*.—Tendency to venerate or respect whatever is great or good; gives origin to religious adoration.—*Abuses*.—Senseless respect for unworthy objects consecrated by time or situation, love of antiquated customs, abject subserviency to persons in authority, superstitious awe. To these Mr Scott adds 'undue deference to the opinions and reasonings of men who are fallible like ourselves; the worship of false gods, polytheism, paganism, idolatry.'

"3. **FIRMNESS**—*uses*.—Determination, perseverance, steadiness of purpose.—*Abuses*.—Stubbornness, infatuation, tenacity in evil.

"4. **CONSCIENTIOUSNESS**—*uses*.—It gives origin to the sentiment of justice, or respect for the rights of others, openness to conviction, the love of truth.—*Abuses*.—Scrupulous adherence to noxious principles when ignorantly embraced, excessive refinement in the views of duty and obligation, excess in remorse, or self condemnation.

"5. **HOPE**—*uses*.—Tendency to expect future good; it cherishes faith.—*Abuses*.—Credulity with respect to the attainment of what is desired, absurd expectations of felicity not founded on reason.

"6. **WONDER**—*uses*.—The desire of novelty; admiration of the new, the unexpected, the grand, the wonderful, and extraordinary.—*Abuses*.—Love of the marvellous and occult; senseless astonishment; belief in false miracles, in prodigies, magic, ghosts, and other supernatural absurdities.—*Note*. Veneration, hope, and wonder combined, give the tendency to religion; their abuses produce superstition.

"7. **IDEALITY**—*uses*.—Love of the beautiful and splendid, desire of excellence, poetic feeling.—*Abuses*.—Extravagance and absurd enthusiasm, preference of the showy and glaring to the solid and useful, a tendency to dwell in the regions of fancy, and to neglect the duties of life."

Such is Mr Combe's account of those faculties in man which not only controul and direct his animal propensities, but which originate all those higher relations in which he stands to God and his fellow-man. According to Mr Combe, it is by the legitimate and healthy excitement of these powers that man is enabled to act a moral and religious part in this world, and the manner in which this is accomplished is by keeping their proper objects constantly before them, and by excluding as much as

possible the objects of the animal propensities. Such is the machinery, according to Mr Combe, by which the entire operations of the human mind are carried on; in other words, it is by preserving the proper balance of these impulses, always keeping the higher sentiments on the ascendant, that man can be regarded as a moral and religious being. Thus, what moralists have hitherto termed conscience, duty, or moral obligation, is nothing more according to this philosophy, than the healthy play and exercise of a series of fleeting impulses that come and go as their objects are presented or withdrawn, and the highest among them are accordingly as subject to abuses of the most grovelling sort as the lowest. In all this there is nothing new, for it is neither more nor less than an attempt to revive the sensational philosophy of Hartley and others of the same school, only connecting it with a material organology which neither adds to nor impairs its strength.

Such are the profound and original views of the human mind entertained by Mr Combe, and regarding these as the only materials with which he has to deal in education, we are not at all astonished that throughout his works he should inculcate the necessity of constantly keeping proper objects before the minds of youth, in order to preserve the healthy play of their moral and religious sentiments. Thus Mr Combe regards all morality and religion as dependent upon certain classes of fleeting and ephemeral emotions. According to this new philosophy, in the ratio that these are strong or weak, in the same ratio is the moral or religious complexion or condition of the individual. Now, although we cannot deny that there exist in the world individuals who appear to be almost purely sensational and impulsive, yet we would regard it as extremely unphilosophical in any man having pretensions to be the spiritual guide of his fellows to assert that such men are types of humanity, or that there was nothing higher or larger in human nature. But Mr Combe maintains and insists upon this doctrine. Now as he is peculiarly wedded to the Baconian or inductive method of philosophizing, we shall take him into the world and exhibit to him some specimens of sensationalism as pure as they can be found, and if, after contrasting them with the law-feeling, and true Christian nature, Mr Combe still adheres to his dogma, we must just leave him to his errors and bewail his blindness. Every common observer is acquainted with persons who, actuated by no higher principle than sensational benevolence, expend large sums in charity. They act this part in conformity with this peculiar form of their impulsive nature. The giving of alms, or occasionally doing kindly actions, gratifies such persons in the same way as food satisfies their hunger. Numerous individuals, too, are conscientious upon a similar plan,—they act from a feeling of duty narrowed to the impression of the moment. The novels of Dickens teems with such representations—such are *Pickwick*, *Nicholas Nickleby*, *Cheeryble Brothers*, and a long catalogue of his first-class characters. Dickens holds the mirror up to nature, but with him it only reflects the impulsive or sensational form of man's inner being, and although accompanied with admirable delineations of life and manners, it stops far short of the truth. Scott again, with all his minuteness of finish, imparts to his highest characters an absolute

sense of law that never deserts them. It is this principle in them, that radiating out upon the universe, guides and directs them whithersoever they turn their steps. Accordingly, Scott's Jeanie Deans, with an affection for her sister Effie of the strongest and purest description, will not tell a lie to save her, although she might have done so with the most perfect impunity in so far as all earthly power was concerned. Her sense of law is so large and imperative that although the simple statement that Effie had secretly communicated her condition to her, would have saved her sister's life, she cannot make it. Her feeling of moral obligation is so large, strong, and absolute that it is only comparable with the invariable laws of creation. It is not the impulsive conscientious feeling of a moment. It is that sense of law which, looking into the infinite depths of the past, present, and future, can descry nothing there but records of truth and absolute goodness, and she must conform her conduct to the spirit on which the universe itself has been constructed. Henry Morton, in *Old Mortality*, is actuated by the same form of nature, and by means of it is piloted through the troublous times of the Scottish covenant. A great variety of Scott's other characters illustrate the all embracing nature of the same principle.

The form and consequences of the sensational nature of man is likewise exhibited, not only in every day life, but especially in the lives of criminals. For example, the most flagrant criminals, frequently from being placed in situations where no temptations are presented to them, conduct themselves with considerable propriety even down to middle age, but circumstances changing, they plunge into an abyss of profligacy and crime that to superficial observers is inconsistent with their previous tendencies. Now the inherent defects which led to their crimes existed before, and were open and patent to all who had depth and penetration to descry them. Even the notorious murderer Burke conducted himself with a fair show of propriety and decency till he was 35 years of age, and accordingly the phrenologists found that his organs of benevolence, conscientiousness, and veneration were well developed, and they accounted for the frightful enormity of his crimes by attempting to shew that his amativeness, combativeness, destructiveness, secretiveness, and other animal propensities, were still larger. In other words, they applied their sensational system to account for the conduct of Burke, but they failed to indicate the deficiency of any principle that rendered him so purely sensational. In fact the phrenologist does not admit the existence of any such principle as belonging to the human mind. Agreeably to this, the system occasionally goes a far way to account for the conduct of notorious criminals, whose chief characteristic is their being almost purely sensational, but when it deals with the higher forms of mind, it fails to account for anything. Accordingly the phrenologist dwells with peculiar gusto and delight on the heads of the most abandoned criminals, from that of the celebrated Jack Shepherd, who was executed for murder about the beginning of last century, down to that of Bennison who recently underwent the same punishment at Edinburgh for the murder of his wife. They refer, moreover, to numerous examples of persons preserving for a long period a respectable character, but being exposed to evil

influences they were tempted and sunk into criminality. Such were the celebrated Dr Dods, Fauntleroy, Thurtle, Burke, and a long list of criminals. Many of these persons were remarkable for their apparent benevolence, truthfulness, and piety. They gave to the poor, performed offices of kindness to their fellow-men, scrupulously discharged all their obligations, and attended strictly to religious ordinances. Nay, some of them were esteemed so highly that they were actually regarded as patterns of virtue, and yet they ultimately lapsed into the deepest sinks of crime. Such persons are actuated by purely sensational tendencies, at one moment performing benevolent and honourable actions, and at another guilty of the worst of crimes. In other words, whatever be the strength of their mere emotional natures, they are not in the slightest degree influenced by that large sense of law from which springs all man's real intellectual and moral strength, and for which the phrenologist has no name, nor the indication of any, in his vocabulary.

But let us follow this class of thinkers to their analyses of men of the loftiest genius, and here we will find that their system affords no clue for the unravelling of such sphinx riddles. It regards, indeed, the highest efforts of man as the products of a description of mind that does not even unfold the mental peculiarities of the mere animal, and its professors frequently speak of men of genius with an indifference or contempt that is only strikingly indicative of the feebleness or malformation of their own mental framework. Hear, for example, Mr George Combe on the cranium of our national poet Burns :—

“ The portions of the brain which manifest the animal propensities are uncommonly large, indicating strong passions and great energy in acting under their influence. The group of organs manifesting the domestic affections (Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness,) is large; Philoprogenitiveness uncommonly so for a male head. The organs of Combativeness and Destructiveness are large, bespeaking great heat of temper, impatience, and liability to irritation.

“ Secretiveness and Cautiousness are both large, and would confer considerable power of restraint, where it felt restraint to be necessary.

“ Acquisitiveness, Self-esteem, and Love of Approbation are also in ample endowment, although the first is less than the other two; these feelings give the love of property, a high consideration of self, and desire of the esteem of others. The first quality will not be so readily conceded to Burns as the second and third, which indeed were much stronger; but the phrenologist records what is presented by nature, in full confidence that the manifestations, when the character is correctly understood, will be found to correspond with the development, and he states that the brain indicates considerable love of property.

“ The organs of the Moral Sentiments are also largely developed. Ideality, Wonder, Imitation, and Benevolence are the largest in size. Veneration is also large. Conscientiousness, Firmness, and Hope are full.

“ The knowing organs, or those of perceptive intellect, are large; and the organs of Reflection are also considerable; but less than the former. Causality is larger than Comparison, and Wit is less than either.

“ The skull indicates the combination of strong animal passions, with equally powerful moral emotions. If the natural morality had been less, the endowment of the propensities is sufficient to have constituted a character of the most desperate description,” &c.

We have surely quoted enough to shew that Mr Combe might have attributed a similar organization to the first energetic carter or coalheaver he met, without exciting any man's special wonder; but he has failed to point out whence it was that such an organization could have produced those lyrics which, for depth of feeling, clearness of intellectual vision, and force of expression, transcend all the best Greek and Roman lyrical writers. With his moderate share of "wit" and imperfect measure of "reflective intellect," how can this school account for the surpassing genius of Burns? and that too without high culture, fortune, or other adventitious circumstances favouring his powers! According to their system, the complexity, strength, and conflicting character both of his animal and moral impulses, would more naturally account for Burns ending his days on the scaffold, than for the production of his immortal songs,—and the scorn of mankind must everywhere follow a class of men who are either the supporters or abettors of a philosophy which, with such lofty practical pretensions, is incapable of accounting for the most prominent phenomenon in Scottish history! According to the same system, Sir Isaac Newton is distinguished chiefly by large organs of wonder, weight, and locality, and his reflective intellect is not above the average size. The celebrated Richard B. Sheridan is characterized by large individuality and eventuality, and deficiency in the higher powers both of intellect and feeling. Mr Combe, in remarking upon Homer and Shakespeare, says:—"When a favourable combination, a fine temperament, and large size are conjoined in an individual, they constitute the perfection of genius. This I conceive to have been the case in Homer and in Shakespeare,—vivacious buoyancy, ease, and fertility arising from the first and second causes, joined with depth, strength, comprehensiveness, and masculine energy the result of the third, place these authors above all others whom the world has ever seen." We say nothing to the meagre and measured form of Mr Combe's ideas of Shakespeare and Homer, for it is only in striking conformity with his sensational philosophy; but although left to imagine any amount of cerebral development he chuses, yet he cannot, it appears, account for their productions without superadding a fine temperament, an element that is not indicated either by the form or size of the brain,—and in many cases, such as that of Burns, he superadds a superior quality of the brain to supplement his philosophy, and quality of the brain is not to be determined even by *post mortem* examination.

Now, on the whole, we consider the systems of Gall and Spurzheim as invaluable in so far as they record a large series of curious and interesting observations, but that either they or Mr Combe have evolved from them a complete philosophy of man, we entirely demur to. Even taking all their facts for granted, their philosophy neither accounts for the loftiest manifestations of genius, nor even for that more common-place ability that conducts the ordinary business of life. According to this system of human nature, man is alternately subject to the play and influence of the good or bad impulses that prevail, and hence there is no more absolute sense of law or moral obligation in him than in an organ that emits the sounds in accordance with the keys that are struck or touched. This is

the sensational philosophy of Hartley put in its plainest and worst form ; and it has been ably illustrated by the works of Reynolds and other novelists of the same school. The phrenologist regards, indeed, morality and religion only as the healthy play of the organs of benevolence, conscientiousness, hope, and wonder—and immorality and irreligion as resulting from the undue excitement of amativeness, combativeness, destructiveness, acquisitiveness, secretiveness, &c. This is verily the religion and morality of the Gibbet reduced into form ! There are no doubt numerous persons in society who are influenced and directed by no higher impulses than merely sensational ones, but it would surely be extremely unphilosophical to base a system of human nature on so partial a view. We have known many individuals who within one short hour would seriously perform their devotions and be guilty of the most flagrantly immoral and unprincipled actions—nay, we are familiar with men who every morning return thanks to God, and pray for a continuation of his goodness, and are daily engaged in systematically cheating and swindling their fellow-men ! These individuals, moreover, are passing honourable in certain matters, on the utilitarian principle that thieves are honest towards each other, and their “causality” and “comparison” are sufficient guides to pilot them through all such difficulties !

Now we have assuredly no fault to find with Mr Combe that he does not make sufficiently frequent use of the terms “religion,” “Christianity,” “the moral sentiments,” “reason,” and a long catalogue of such phrases, for every page of his work is studded over with them, but our objection is that all this fine rhetorical phraseology is more clearly applicable to some grovelling hybrid between the animal and humanity, than to the physical, moral, intellectual, and religious constitution of man. From what we have said, indeed, it is no difficult matter to discover that this class of thinkers, whatever may be their professed religious creeds, have never been imbued by the true spirit of Christianity. Nay, their intellects have never been enlightened by those secondary truths that have merely been kindled at her flame, and which have long since spread themselves over the civilized world. From the reflection of themselves embodied in such works as Combe’s “Constitution of Man considered in relation to external objects,” it is plain that they belong to the materialistic and utilitarian order of thinkers, and are incapable of any range of thought beyond the immediate, the practical, and the sensuous. In perusing such works as Mr Combe’s, they foolishly imagine, with its author, that they are diving immeasurable depths into the nature of man, while they are actually reaching no deeper than the instincts of the animal ; and as might be expected, erect upon this narrow and fragile foundation a system of utilitarianism and practical atheism, as lofty, grotesque, and idle, as the tower of Babel itself, clouding and overshadowing in themselves every form of universal truth.

Such is the boasted philosophy of man upon which the principal class of secularists would construct a system of education. It both theoretically and practically denies that man is capable of being impressed with an absolute sense of law either with respect to the impulses of his own nature, or with regard to the phenomena of the material universe. It

denies, indeed, the existence of the leading attribute of humanity, without which neither education nor progress of any kind are possible. Accordingly, in all the secular schools which we have seen, children are made acquainted with objects of every description, made to repeat their uses and go through a system of training that might be applied to the parrot, monkey or other imitative animal. In America, this frightfully vulgar and material system is pursued until the youthful mind is so crammed with all sorts of facts, that it becomes as confused as an animal that is attempted to be trained to a diversity of operations, and hence the young enter upon life with a confused mass of undigested facts, incapable of application to any practical or useful purpose. So much for the philosophy and practical skill as teachers, of the secular educationists. But let us turn from them to the Christian aspect of the subject.

Neither a true philosophy of man nor even modern ideas, science, literature, and manners, could possibly have sprung up in juxta-position with paganism. The largest form of thought of Greece and Rome consisted in a belief in innumerable deities all influenced or affected by passions, prejudices, and fancies similar to those that belong to humanity. all the phenomena of nature were believed to emanate from these deities, and the variations that took place in these phenomena were attributed to the prevailing temper or sentiment of the gods. Thus the religion of Greece and Rome drew an impenetrable veil and impassable barrier between man and his investigation into the phenomena of the material universe. All nature and her operations were the immediate handywork of the immortal gods, and man need enquire no farther. This state of things rendered the world ripe for a new religious organon, but from whence was it to arise? The Jews were the only believers in the one true God, Jehovah, but their peculiar temperament and habits of thought required the exhibition of visible and living sacrifices, and their whole system was thus more adapted to a peculiar people than to the human race. It was too materialistic, exclusive, and full of dogmatic formulas, to gain proselytes even among surrounding nations. It might possibly blend with, but it could not in the nature of things overshadow or absorb into itself all other creeds. Such was the religious condition of the world when Christ appeared. The simple declaration of Christ that man was originally created perfect, but that he had lapsed into sin by disobeying God;—that he himself came from God, his Father, to seek and to save sinners that they might enjoy eternal life,—for there still existed in the soul of man, debased as it was, an absolute sense of law, which with divine assistance was adequate to his guidance,—was a doctrine so large and Godlike that it was naturally adapted to every condition of humanity. Christ's injunctions to his followers more emphatically enunciated and enforced the important nature of this doctrine, for what is his charge to them to "do unto others as you would wish others to do unto you," but this absolute idea of law reduced to the form of a precept? These doctrines were calculated equally to satisfy the longings and aspirations of the philosopher, and the feeble and glimmering hopes of the untutored mind. This new religion, indeed, appeared to bear the same relation to the utmost requirements of the human soul that the laws of nature

do to the highest possible intellectual condition of man under the highest civilization. Nay, the idea of law impressed in the former is more absolute and determinate than in the latter, for the whole phenomena upon which it operates lie constantly within its field of view, and therefore its judgments whithersoever they reach, are always more defined and accurate. In the moral world, indeed, the idea of law is always absolute, fixed, and invariable, and from its decisions there is and can be no appeal.

Christianity thus presented itself to the ancient world in two distinct phases. 1st. As a religion it emphatically announced the existence of one God, the creator and governor of heaven and earth, and it fixed and determined man's true relation to God and eternity. In this aspect it was calculated to affect the inmost recesses of the human soul, and to dissipate from thence every existing form of superstition. Having accomplished this, the human mind was free to investigate nature and to penetrate whithersoever its tendencies conducted it. It not only enlarged and strengthened the vision and prospects of the human spirit, but it swept away all the barriers which superstition had erected between man and nature. Man was now therefore free to investigate every thing that fell within his cognisance. 2nd. But Christianity was not only the true form of religious belief, and thus indirectly affected all intellectual pursuits, but it was in the strictest sense of the term an intellectual organon immeasurably larger than the organon of Aristotle, or the more modern and materialistic one of Bacon. It is the ground plan and basis of all future methods, and as such will survive on earth with the last remnants of the human family. But intellectually regarded, what is the true nature and precise form of this Christian organon?

Christianity as a mere intellectual organon presented itself again in two distinct aspects to the ancient world, and although the development of philosophy and science out of her bosom has been comparatively slow, owing to the selfish and narrow intellectual vision of mankind, yet it was as certain as that when the sun should arise and spread light and warmth over the physical world, that life and animal existence should spring up and be strengthened thereby. Christianity, indeed, is the intellectual light of the universe, and although no spiritual Newton has arisen to gauge with precision her laws and motions, yet it may be permitted to us who have only been indirectly affected by her rays to indicate the direction in which these are to be discovered.

First then, man's true relation to God and eternity opened up by Christianity, thus unfolded to him intellectually as well as otherwise, a field of view both in the circle of the visible and invisible, so expanded and profound that all the phenomena and laws of the universe now lay before him, and his possible range of intellectual vision was only bounded by the existence and idea of God himself. Second, the absolute sense of law in man, for the first time so strikingly impressed by Christ's doctrine, having this infinitely enlarged and profound compass of vision, worked in a circumference in every direction without limit or confines, and under this new organon man has evolved all the deepest and farthest stretching laws already known, and will go on evolving new laws so long as a remnant of his race exists upon earth.

Thus, even looking with the cold unflinching intellectual eye of a mere demon, all future human progress, after Christ appeared, must spring from Christianity. His doctrines were unmeasurably larger than the reason of man clouded and overshadowed by paganism. Nay, they were infinitely more expanded than mere human reason after being stripped of all superstition; and, warmed and excited by the prospect of a higher destiny than any other religion had presented, man must now look with larger and clearer eyes on the universe. But before he could do so, Christianity must supplant paganism. It must first remove from the souls of millions, a religion which was the growth of numerous centuries, and must then take its place. It must further root up all the weeds and noxious plants that had shot up and flourished in this untoward soil and impure atmosphere, and supply both a soil and climate for the healthy development and growth of the newly sown seed. Paganism, indeed, had nursed, for more than three thousand years, both in the Asiatic mind and in that of the south-east of Europe, a sensational species of religion which had now impressed a too permanent sensational mould upon the human soul. One advantage which the new religion apparently had was that this form of mind was readily affected. It seized upon the new doctrines with a glowing enthusiasm commensurate only with their simplicity and truth; but, lacking the law-seeing element, it was as easily to be impressed by fancies and other extrinsic agencies as by truth itself. Accordingly, Christianity became speedily incorporated in Asia Minor and the south-east of Europe, with as many fanciful and garish doctrines and formulas as the old religion had errors. The worship of images and the prayers offered up to the Virgin and Christian saints was neither more nor less than superinducing polytheism on Christianity, and thus enshrouding her doctrines in the fancies of paganism. The Christian doctrine, indeed, now participated largely of the spirit and sentiment of the old religion, and its true life and soul were little better than dead. Thus the sensational mould of man's nature, which it required many centuries for paganism to form, now accommodated Christianity itself to its own nature, and encumbered it with dogmas and formulas so fantastic and idle, that the underlying spirit of Christianity itself was no longer visible. Out of such a bastard and unreal religion no new truth could come. It blinded man's mere inductive intellect and thoroughly overshadowed his reason. It supplied him, indeed, with innumerable ingenious and curious fancies, but it shut up effectually the gateway to truth and nature. Man had not yet looked truly at the universe through the eyes of Christian thought.

In the beginning of the seventh century of the Christian era, a reflection and incarnation of the sensational religion both of Asia Minor, a portion of Asia proper, and south eastern Europe, arose in the person of Mahomet. He himself was the highest type of the Arab mind, and, endowed with a large but only sensationally religious nature, he promulgated a new creed. He announced there was but one God and Mahomet was his prophet. To all his followers, whom he styled the faithful, he promised an eternity of the highest sensuous and sensual enjoyments. Meeting with persecution, he mustered an army and speedily overran

Arabia Felix. Thus in the end, with the sword in one hand and the Koran in the other, Mahomet and his successors, the Caliphs, anon carried their conquests over all the old Christian countries of the east, especially Asia Minor and south eastern Europe. Wherever Mahomet or his successors conquered, there they introduced the Koran both as the law and religion of the state. The doctrines of the Koran were not merely to be contemplated, but they must anon be reduced into practice. If they were out of conformity with the highest laws of man's nature, and were followed by a death-like and invariable want of progress, he must constantly work with the spirit of the Koran in his view, in order to preserve it as a dogma. Hence all the countries that were overrun by the followers of Islam, are directly sensational in their religion and government. They are governed by an absolute despotism, the largest practical representation of the sensational spirit, for here the will of the sovereign is higher than all law or authority.

But the followers of Islam were unequal to the conquest of all the countries of western Europe ; and Christianity, although thoroughly corrupted even there by the debasing dogmas and formulas which heathenism had superinduced on it, still a Christian church existed. It had spread itself to the uttermost confines of Scandinavia, and even stretched to the farthest point of Britain. The spirit of Christianity, indeed, gradually became incorporated with the laws, institutions, and manners of all the countries of the north and west. They all wore a milder and more subdued aspect under her benign influence, and if every human heart was not made a temple of the living God, it was everywhere overawed by the grandeur and power of the Church. Her gorgeous formulas constantly impressed mankind with the idea of her presence and the laws which she framed, and the institutions to which she gave birth, unequivocally marked her power. During the middle ages, indeed, the entire idea of the church was aggrandizement and the extension of her authority. Beyond this the Christian church had now no living principle in her. Her priesthood presided at and directed every institution connected with municipal government, and even held in their grasp the consciences of kings. The church reached the culminating point of her power in the pardoning of sins and the selling of indulgences. Murder and the worst of crimes were pardoned or permitted by the church at a fixed price. This of course inferred the profligacy of the leaders among her clergy, for their lives could not possibly be less profligate than their principles. They openly abandoned themselves to the indulgence of every vice, and were unscrupulous in the commission of crime. The church became a sink of atrocities so monstrous that they reacted on the popular mind. The slumbering principle of conscience and moral obligation in the laity, was roused by the darkness of her deeds, and even a section of the clergy responded to the popular feeling. The martyrdom of John Huss was only a vigorous protest against the darkness of her doings.

The flagrant errors of the church, and the profligate lives of the clergy, first kindled the flame of reform in the Saxon and Norman-Saxon mind. The deep sense of right which distinguishes these races was first pro-

foundly impressed by the enormity of the church's errors, and while the well disposed among the laity felt the scandal put upon religion by the church, many of the clergy themselves called loudly for reform. The Roman Church, however, maintained her infallibility, and denied all abuses. In these circumstances the Reformation was inevitable. Wickliff in England, Martin Luther in Germany, and John Knox in Scotland, exposed the church's errors, and appealed to the gospels; they were seconded and supported in their efforts by the plaudits of the people, whose opinions they but reflected,—and in these countries the Reformation progressed as rapidly as the current of public opinion set in in its favour.

The Reformation and the invention of printing are the two great facts in modern history. The one reacted on and powerfully assisted the other. The Reformation stripped Christianity of the false dogmas, fantastic formulas, and idle trappings with which the church had invested her. It restored to the human mind at one and the same moment both a religious and an intellectual organon,—and Europe at once awoke from the sleep of a thousand years. But the Roman religion had performed one important office for modern Europe, for if she thoroughly hood-winked and blinded human reason, her priesthood transcribed and preserved through a period of Cimmerian darkness innumerable copies of the Old and New Testaments in all their purity, and they further saved and handed down the literature of Greece and Rome. Thus modern Europe had preserved to her not only a religious and intellectual organon, but likewise the elements of literature and civilization. The former cleared and strengthened her intellectual vision, and the latter gave to her a tongue and form of expression.

But the opening up of the religious and intellectual organon of modern Europe was the more important fact of the two. In the Saxon and Norman-Saxon mind, which is naturally more largely endowed than any other with the idea of law, it found a ready recipient. The new organon of the West imparted to the Saxon and Norman-Saxon races two distinct ideas that were in striking conformity with their spirit,—and these we have already put in the form of two propositions. The one gave them a boundless field of view both in the circle of the visible and invisible; and the other invested them with the idea of absolute law pervading the universe. Thus the Saxon and Norman-Saxon races now possessed an intellectual organon, larger than any other that mankind had previously possessed, and their function was to examine not only the world under their feet, and their own spiritual frame-work, but the regions of boundless space through its eyes. They must unfold and see law and order in every thing in the universe, otherwise they have not looked nor seen truly through their new organon.

Thus, after being promulgated for fifteen hundred years, Christianity found a more congenial soil for its growth and development in the Saxon and Norman-Saxon mind than it had found elsewhere. The character of the Asiatic races was too sensational, and so thoroughly wanting in power and comprehensiveness, that no profound truth could yet take root in it. The Celt had too feeble a sense of his own rights, or of those

of his fellowmen, to be able to disunite himself from his chief, king, emperor, or head of his visible church, to attach himself to any set of mere abstract ideas. He must live and die in the faith of his chief and his forefathers. Although a portion of the Celtic race and the modern Roman are highly intellectual, especially in the region of the visible, they lack much of that form of nature that penetrates deeper,—visible and tangible science is the region in which they shine. And hence, for the sake of the visible and gorgeous shows and formulas of the church, they have preserved her doctrines. These races, moreover, have every where evinced a greater attachment to their state or government than to the rights and privileges of their countrymen. With them country is every thing, the individual nothing. The earliest accounts mark out the Saxon mind as peculiarly possessing a high idea of its own individual rights, and an equal appreciation of the rights of others. Hence the Saxon from the earliest period has been tried by his peers. A deep underlying idea of law and order constituted the staple of the Saxon nature, and he must have it practically realised to him. His god Thor, though an agency of great power, directing the thunder, had likewise a sense of justice. The Saxon mind was thus peculiarly adapted for the reception of Christianity. He not only comprehended its abstract truth, but the realization of it was in striking harmony with his nature. The God of Christianity, with his law-directing attributes, was powerful beyond the reach of all human imaginings, and easily supplanted the god of thunder. Christianity thus both strengthened and enlarged the Saxon character. It conducted both his higher instincts and reason into purer channels, and directed them to loftier objects. To him it became both a theoretical and a practical organon.

After the Norman conquest, a certain blending of the Norman and Saxon races took place in England. The Anglo-Saxon derived all the largeness and far-seeing form of his reason from his Norman ancestry, but the basis of his sturdy independence was purely of Saxon origin. Both elements were indispensable to the formation of the Anglo-Saxon mind, and, elevated by Christianity, they have grown up and strengthened ever since William the Conqueror subdued England. Though out of the bosom of Christian thought in her least happy aspects, men of genius have arisen in every department of human endeavour,—for Italy herself has produced some of the greatest,—yet more genius, and that of the most vigorous and powerful description, has sprung up in connection with freedom. What we mean by freedom is, that every man should have liberty to act as he thinks best in harmony with the Christian doctrine. This could only obtain under Protestant Christianity, where every human soul may, if it has strength and sufficient capacity, become a temple of the living God. The human soul indeed is the only true Church of Christ upon earth, from which arises the only true orisons. It is this simple fact, and the Anglo-Saxon's idea of his inalienable right to it, that constitutes the peculiar power of England. The lofty and far-seeing genius of Newton, is neither more nor less than the spirit of Protestant Christianity in a feeble tenement of clay, looking far into the universe, and detecting laws that operate in the boundless regions of space. Shake-

speare himself, is nothing more than an incarnation of the same spirit, in an Anglo-Saxon form, for, embracing in his intellectual glance a complete view of the human family, he delineates every variety of character and condition of life, and does so in harmony with the profoundest Christian sympathies. Looking through his Christian organon nothing is concealed from his view. Even Burns, the national Poet of Scotland, intellectually regarded, is a genuine flower of Christianity, whose memory will be revered wherever the domestic affections hold their sway, and his lyrics will go down the stream of time, shedding around them a rich perfume that must always strengthen and enlarge the cause of virtue. All modern science has sprung out of the Christian organon—and all the true science of the future must come out of it—and that for this simple reason, that it has given to the human mind a length, and a breadth, and a height and depth co-extensive with visible and invisible nature.

But Christianity is not only an organon indispensable for the evolution of new truth, but it is as imperatively indispensable for the preservation of the old. It has impressed upon modern society an idea of law so absolute and invariable in its form, that law and fact have become identical. When the mind recognises a fact it is only receiving a law in a concrete form. Accordingly, the youthful mind, when thoroughly impressed with the idea of law, searches for this all pervading element in every phenomenon or fact in nature. Modern deism, pantheism, and every other large species of infidelity, derive all that is true in them from Christian thought. They have all been lighted at her fane, and kept burning through the heat she imparts to them. Let modern society lose the idea and sentiment of Christianity as a religious belief, her intellectual nature loses hold of that organon which originated and preserved so much knowledge, and, collapsing into narrower forms, gradually lapses back into the barbarism that distinguished the natives of Britain when Julius Caesar first landed on her shores. The first questions that childhood puts at the earliest dawn of reason are, Who made me? Whence did I come? and whither do I go? The impression made upon the mind of childhood by the answers marks it out as the future denizen of civilization, or the proper after intellectual anarchy and misrule. The true answers prepare its mind for the reception of a larger intellectual organon than it was otherwise capable of receiving, and possessed of this, it regards and examines nature with an eye not only susceptible of being impressed with the mysteries already disclosed, but even of discovering some of her still deep lying secrets.

Christianity then, even viewed merely intellectually, has accomplished more for mankind than all the systems of philosophy and methods of thinking that have been promulgated. All the great truths, indeed, which have been unfolded since Christ appeared, have sprung from that infinitely expanded and law-seeing element with which Christianity first deeply impressed mankind, and it is by the proper cultivation of this form and range of thinking, that all future human progress is rendered possible. It has thus not only cleared and strengthened the intellectual eye of man, but it has opened up to it a field of view, both in the regions of the visible and invisible, as boundless and illimitable as creation itself

so that the sweep of the human intellect is now only hemmed in and circumscribed by the idea and existence of God himself. The highest and largest orders of mind only see vividly a few hand-breadths deeper and farther than their fellows, in this boundless circumference, and we describe that characteristic in them, by which they are enabled to do so, as genius, inspiration, and by other such vague and fanciful epithets, and regard them all with special wonder and admiration. In this natural gratitude and hero-worship which we instinctively render to Shakespeare, Dante, Petrarch, Milton, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and a long list of similar far-seeing men, we are too ready to lose sight of the fact, that they are all taken together, only but a few feeble reflected rays of Christianity that have lightened up a small portion of the illimitable gloom of infinitude, and that by dwelling too much or too long upon them, or what they have accomplished for us, we are losing sight of the Creator of the universe, and that religion which gave birth to the spiritual forms of their being. It is only indeed by the worship of the one and the true culture of the other that even civilised man is preserved from idolatry and savagism, and that whether we individually believe in Christianity or not, it is only in virtue of the amount and strength of the Christian thought that pervades society, that we are floated down the stream of civilization. If the secularist cannot see even from this rude and ill-digested sketch, that Christianity is actually the largest and only true intellectual organon that ever appeared, we must just leave him to the miserable materialistic philosophy in which his soul is enshrined, and lament that his religion, like the other products of his mental constitution, is little better than the necessary Atheism of the mere animal, which, by the very form of its nature, is intellectually limited to noting the few relations in which external and visible objects stand to itself, or the immediate objects of its attachment.

In this rapid, and necessarily imperfect sketch, we have confined ourselves to Christianity as a mere intellectual organon or method of thinking. In her higher aspects she has been treated of so fully, both theoretically and practically, in such works as those of Jeremy Taylor, Isaac Barrow, Tillotson, Butler, and a long array of others, that it would have been a piece of supererogation in us to have attempted the same field. We regarded it of some importance to view Christianity from the mere intellectual and utilitarian point of view, that we might, if possible, enlist under her banners a description of thinkers that her truths have not hitherto reached, and if we have only somewhat cleared the way towards the accomplishment of this object, these few desultory observations will not have been made in vain.