

Insanity : modern views as to its nature and treatment : a portion of the Morison lectures on insanity, delivered in 1879 / by W.T. Gairdner, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Medicine in the University of Glasgow.

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INSANITY:

MODERN VIEWS AS TO ITS NATURE AND TREATMENT.

*A PORTION OF THE MORISON LECTURES ON INSANITY,
DELIVERED IN 1879.*

BY

W. T. GAIRDNER, M.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, AND PHYSICIAN
IN ORDINARY TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN SCOTLAND.

*AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE CLOSE OF THE WINTER SESSION 1884-85,
BEFORE THE GLASGOW UNIVERSITY MEDICO-CHIRURGICAL SOCIETY,
BY THE HONORARY PRESIDENT.*

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“Orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano.”—*Juvenal X*, 356.

“There is no health in us.”—*Book of Common Prayer*.

“The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact.
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold,
That is the madman: the lover, all as frantic,
Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt:
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven:
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.”

Midsummer Night’s Dream. Act V, Scene I.

“Where definitions are attempted [of insanity], especially in courts of law, they fitly become a matter of ridicule, or causes of contradiction and perplexity. Mental derangement, however the name may be used, is not one thing, nor can it be treated as such. It differs in kind not less than in degree; and in each of its varieties we may often trace through different cases all the gradations between a sound and unsound understanding, on the very points where reason is thus disordered.”—Sir Henry Holland, *Chapters on Mental Physiology*, 1852, page 110.


THE lecturer commenced by intimating that his Address, though unpublished in its present form, was not new, having already formed a part of the Morison Lectures on Insanity, delivered at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, in June, 1879. He expressed his strong sense of the necessity for more attention being paid to this subject in the medical curriculum of study, and pointed out that recent instances had tended to show that public opinion would not much longer tolerate a state of the law and practice in dealing with the insane, in which the most delicate and important questions arising as to the insane mind might be submitted to persons medically educated, but in reality wholly devoid of experience, or even of systematic instruction, in this department of the healing art. The object of the address, however, and of the whole series of the Morison Lectures of which it forms a part, was to show that the principles underlying the modern treatment of the insane are precisely the same as those which have been emerging into more and more prominence in connection with what are admittedly bodily diseases. In assenting to the representations made to him as to the publication of the address in the *Glasgow Medical Journal*, Dr. Gairdner thought it desirable, for the sake of completeness, to include a considerable amount of introductory matter which, originally presented in the Morison Lectures, could not be so compressed as to admit of delivery in the time allotted to the academic address, and which, moreover, preserves, as now issued, the form of the Morison Lecture, rather than of its second destination. The notes added in the Appendix have an interest, in some respects, even apart from the argument of the lecture itself; and it is hoped that their publication may not only add to the force of the argument, but attract the attention of some who are not habitual readers of medical literature.

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ADDRESS, &c.

WHAT is Insanity? The attempt to answer this question by means of definitions has been notoriously unsuccessful; and among the distinguished legal visitors here present,* there is probably not one who has not often been in the position of watching the struggles of a scientific expert to free himself from the coils of some verbal entanglement of this kind, to which he has rashly committed himself in cross-examination. But without too much anticipating what I shall have to say hereafter as to the sources of these difficulties, it may be proper to inquire, at the outset, how it has come about that a word which, according to its etymology, simply means *unsoundness*, has in the special field of mental pathology become the cause of so many opposing theories and puzzling dilemmas. The mere verbal questions may be almost dismissed with the remark, that there is probably no real difference implied or expressed between the alternatives allowed in our English and Scotch schedules for dealing with the insane, by which they may be pronounced "lunatic," or "of unsound mind," in preference to the more usual general designation of "insane." For myself, I almost always prefer the expression "of unsound mind," to the others, both as less under the suspicion of being biassed by theory, and as on the whole more comprehensive, and more intelligible to the average man. It admits, no doubt, of the metaphysical subtlety or quibble that one cannot be absolutely sure that it is after all the *mind*, or *soul*, that is unsound in the technical sense of the word; and of the moral paradox that in any case the unsoundness is too

* The Morison Lectures on Insanity are delivered, on the invitation of the President and Council of the Royal College of Physicians, to audiences including senators and members of the College of Justice, as well as distinguished clergymen and members generally of the medical profession.

general to become a distinction; for, is not our whole spiritual nature, according to the New Testament, as well as the most orthodox theologies, thoroughly unsound? It is hardly necessary at this stage to do more than merely suggest, as tending to complicate the question of insanity, the doctrine that underlies the sober language of the general confession in the English Prayer Book, that "there is no health (*i. e.*, no wholeness or soundness) in us." So that the first question comes to be, when we pronounce a man technically insane or of an unsound mind (in the medical sense of these words), how do we differentiate him from the general average of unsound minds (in the Prayer Book or theological sense)? and, further, how do we assure ourselves of anything in our patient's case that should send him to an asylum rather than to an infirmary; to a hospital for the insane rather than to a hospital for the sick and hurt?

I do not propose at present to take up the details of fact which the schedules referred to invite us to put on record as the grounds of our opinion; my object being simply to suggest to you thus early the first and most ordinary, and certainly not the least difficult, of the questions presented to practical men in connection with insanity. We are required to initiate proceedings founded on the belief that a certain person is a "person of unsound mind," or a lunatic, or an insane person; and further, that being such, he is also "a person fit to be detained under care and treatment." What are the leading notes, so to speak, of the conditions so designated? and what are the fallacies which may chiefly tend to pervert our judgment concerning them?

Obviously, it was never intended, and would not in practice be tolerated, that a mere eccentricity, whether of opinion or of habit, or (within certain limits) of conduct, should be adjudged to place a man in the category of the insane. The men of eccentric genius—for example, the Shelleys, the Byrons, the Edward Irvings, nay, even the Swedenborgs, and others whom Bacon, if he had known them, would have probably regarded as minds typically under the influence of the "Idols of the Cave;"—such men of genius and thought, even if we, individually, should represent them to ourselves as *morbid* in some respects, are not on that account to be treated as objects of the more strictly *medical* care referred to. At least, it is not in these cases until the eccentricities and individualities of genius and talent are complicated by some of those circumstances which would be similarly interpreted in the cases of other and commoner men, that we allow ourselves to administer the

flattering unction to our own every-day natures, that "great wits to madness nearly are allied." In a celebrated essay on "Liberty," John Stuart Mill has contended strongly for giving free scope to eccentricity, or at least full license to the utmost extremes (even when popularly adjudged wrong or absurd) of individual opinion, on the ground that the progress of society tends more and more to convert men living in the world into members of a kind of limited liability company in ideas, pledged in advance to average notions, and wholly incapable of rising to the position occupied by those who, in the realms of intellect and of action, are, through their eccentric individuality, the salt of the earth. Much might be said in favour of this view, and perhaps something also on the other side; and I cannot help adding, by the way, that Mr. Mill himself took full advantage of an eccentric position when, in another brilliant political treatise, he assailed the entire structure of human society, from the earliest ages down to the present day, and deliberately affirmed, as the outcome of his reading of history, that almost all the customs and conditions of the family life, from Abraham down to Queen Victoria, are nothing else than an organised oppression, and a base conspiracy of the male sex for debasing the political status of one half of the human race, and compassing, through violence and fraud practised from generation to generation, the "subjection of women." *

But if opinion, in the most general sense of the word as mere opinion, is to be held free from the imputation of technical insanity even when it passes into such delusions as those of table-turning and spiritism in our own day, what shall we say of those dark and terrible fanaticisms that in past ages, called by some, in a peculiar sense, the ages of faith, gave rise to deliberate and relentless cruelties at which humanity shudders? What shall we say, for example, of the judicial processes for witch-finding, practised both in Roman Catholic and in Protestant countries from the middle of the 15th to the end of the 17th century; by which tens of thousands of the most helpless and miserable of women were tortured and burnt, or otherwise sent to the most horrible of deaths, amid the exultation and execrations of those who called themselves the leaders of thought and religion? That the poor victims of these cruelties—the alleged witches—were in many cases insane is now universally conceded; † but a far more important and puzzling question is, what was the state of

* Appendices A and B (pp. 35, 37). "John Stuart Mill."

† *Calmeil, De la Folie*, Paris, 1845, contains much valuable historical research on this subject.

mind of their persecutors? Was that fearful reading of the text, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live;" were these atrocities of Christian men, exceeding in their hideousness most of those ascribed to African savages, founded on an insane delusion? Or were they merely a grave error of judgment, arising naturally, when all the circumstances are considered, in minds of average, or even more than average, stability and intelligence, under the influence of historical prejudices, evolved and matured into a sort of orthodoxy, so to speak, of irrational inference by ages of conflict, enthusiasm, and passion?

Melancholy as the survey is, and must ever be, of this sad page in the history of human opinion, there can be, in the end, no doubt that our judgment upon it must be in accordance with the view I have just expressed. The opinion itself, which lay at the foundation of all supposed demonology and witchcraft;—the *possession* (in a supernatural sense) of men and women, and even cattle and inanimate objects, by the impersonated powers of evil, and the existence of a regular traffic in souls with the arch enemy through witches, such as to make these poor wretches alike odious to God and a danger to society,—is one which may well be called, in a very real though not technical sense of the word, an insane opinion; but the men who held it in those days were by no means individually insane. We can read in the early fathers of the Church how the opinion arose, and by what perversions or one-sided views of truth, adopted in the days of the heathen persecutions of Christianity, it came to be established. We can trace it from its birth-place in the East and in remote ages (but in classic and pagan times subordinated to other and perhaps not less injurious, but certainly less ghastly, superstitions) playing its part in a mythology only half believed in even by the common people, but often casting a lurid shadow over the conceptions of the "wise and prudent;" until, in the early Christian ages, it came to be left almost alone, and even to be borne aloft in the triumph of those moral forces which, in the age of Constantine, placed the whole power and authority of the Roman state—once so tolerant, and even indifferent, as regards religious and spiritual truth—at the absolute disposal of men taught by persecution to value their own views of truth above the common rights of humanity. That an inverted and subjugated polytheism should, in the ages of the early Christians, have become a polydæmonism; that the belief in one God and in Jesus Christ as the light of the world, should by its very brightness have deepened the shadows cast by the old superstitions among

populations only half-weaned from paganism and unenlightened by science, was almost a necessary, if not a reasonable, phase of opinion; and thus the legions of devils, *incubi*, *succubi*, &c., grew up almost naturally in the mediæval imagination to take the place of the "gods many and lords many" whom Christ had dethroned.*

The curious and most surprising fact is, that this current of irrational opinion from below, founded on popular ignorance and the terrors of the imagination, should have grown up, in a few centuries, almost uncontradicted, into a firmly rooted scheme of professedly Christian doctrine which commanded the assent of popes and councils, established itself as part of the common law of Europe, and in the end so prevailed as to make dissent from it equivalent to a charge of heresy or of atheism; so that the almost indescribable horrors for which Pope Innocent the Eighth on the one hand, and our Puritan forefathers in Scotland and in Massachusetts on the other, were alike responsible, inevitably followed.† Yet it can hardly be an error to say that an opinion which was firmly held and acted on by a judge like Sir Matthew Hale; which, moreover, was carefully and elaborately defended, from the legal point of view, by Sir George Mackenzie, of Rosehaugh, and from the advanced scientific, and even latitudinarian, point of view by Joseph Glanvil, both in the latter part of the 17th century, must be regarded as consistent with sanity in those who individually held it in those days, however revolting and absurd it may appear to us.

I have dwelt thus far on this illustration because it enables me to formulate a principle—viz., that a perversion of the judgment, however unreasonable, can scarcely ever be pronounced *insane* as regards the individual, if it emerges from data that are admitted by a large proportion of men of average intelligence, fit for—at all events, not obviously disqualified for—the duties of citizenship, and the conduct of the common affairs of life. "The master of superstition," says Lord Bacon, "is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools; and arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order." The test of an insane delusion, therefore, as opposed to a mere popular error, must be, in some measure at least, its exceptional character, and its being tenaciously held, in the face not only of objective fact, but also of common or average opinion or belief.

* See Appendix C (p. 48). "Christianity, Witchcraft, and Demoniactal Possession."

† "Witch-finding and Witch Prosecutions in Scotland—Historical Remarks—Sir George Mackenzie," &c. (See Appendix C, p. 48.)

But you will at this point remind me of a former part of my argument—viz., that the eccentricities of genius are not to be held as insane, although opposed to the average of contemporary public opinion; while, according to the present view, popular delusions, and even such as are, or have been, the most noxious and terrible, are also not always to be regarded as inconsistent with sanity. These two lines of argument might seem to be, in some degree, mutually interfering and incompatible; and yet I do not think that either of them can be seriously disputed. If the peculiarities or eccentric individualities of genius are to be exempted because they are individual, and the delusions of the crowd are to be passed over because they are too much “in the air” so to speak, to be attributed to individual errors of judgment; then it may possibly be asked of us, of what materials, other than these, is a really insane delusion composed?

To understand this dilemma aright, it must now be further admitted that, in both of the cases supposed, there is another side to the argument. The eccentricity, or individuality, of genius is not indeed, in the legal or medical sense of the word, to be set down as insane by reason merely of its eccentricity; but we need not again retreat upon Dryden’s hackneyed lines to show that, in widely different ages and circumstances, the noblest gifts of the poet, the artist, the prophet, the orator, have been regarded as a kind of “inspired madness” (as Plato has it*), without which nothing great can be effected, nor even admission secured into the temple of the Muses. There is a curious parallelism (which might be drawn out at much greater length did time permit) between the elaborate argument of Plato here and the splendid passage in the “*Midsummer Night’s Dream*” which gives a poetical sanction by one of the healthiest, as well as the greatest, of this order of minds, to the alliance of “the lunatic, the lover, and the poet.” The experience of all ages, and, not least, of our own century, teaches that if the sensitiveness which too often accompanies great gifts of genius be, in any individual case, too studiously nursed; or if it be exaggerated, and driven by external circumstances to feed upon itself, as it were, there is already a grave danger that eccentricity may cease to be merely potential, and may become actual, insanity. Tasso, Chatterton, Collins, Haydon, Blake, perhaps Beethoven, are examples,† among others, which will occur to those familiar with the history of literature and art, in days not too far removed

* Plato, *Phædrus*, 244-5; Jowett’s translation, vol. ii, p. 121.

† Appendix D, p. 61. “Genius and Insanity.”

from our own. Some one (I think Macaulay) has said that next to the Newgate Calendar, the saddest reading to be had anywhere is that of the biographical records of the "*genus irritabile vatum.*" And surely it is not without significance that one of the greatest of them all in our day, has written of his order as—

"Men cradled into poetry by wrong,"

who—

"Learn in suffering what they teach in song."

The peculiar mental temperament which was thus closely allied with the poetic gift in Shelley, was undoubtedly most perilously near the line, at times, which divides eccentricity from mental disease. Eccentricity, therefore, if it is not technically an insanity, may be said to have a leaning in that direction, in many cases, even when allied to genius. May we not say the same of the eccentricities of the crowd, the *idola fori*; the cherished, but unsound, opinions of sects, parties, or even of nations?

This question is more easily asked than answered. Let us suppose a gross popular delusion, a fanaticism, leading to the most extreme extravagance of fashion or of conduct; how far is it to be regarded as covering, so to speak, the insane errors of the individual man? Clearly, it would be a questionable proceeding to infer insanity in this case directly from the mere absurdity, or even monstrosity, of the delusion itself; but it is not at all questionable that, in many sad cases, individual minds are unhinged, and become thoroughly and completely insane in the most technical sense of the word, under the influence of epidemic waves of emotion, such as are apt to be connected with political and religious movements of great intensity; or sometimes, indeed, even to arise spontaneously, or at least without any evident exciting cause, in the midst of populations predisposed by ignorance and misery, or by the presence of actual physical disease, to unhealthy modes of mental excitement. Such were the dancing manias, so powerfully and, at the same time, soberly depicted by Hecker in what is perhaps the most generally interesting of his treatises on the *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, known to the English reader through the excellent translation of Dr. Babington. It is easy to perceive, in the description of these strange phenomena, the same factors which were at work in the witch persecutions; the love on the one hand, the fear and awe on the other, attending on anything strange and marvellous, or which seems to be supernatural, aided by the power of sympathy or of imitation, which tends indefinitely to reproduce, in certain organisations,

the feelings, thoughts, and physical phenomena which are witnessed with a certain amount of approbation. It would require a whole lecture to expatiate on these historical facts, and on their intimate association with other forms of similar disease—epidemic hysteria, for example, and the convulsions arising in the course of many religious revivals—in more recent times. How far these belong to the technical realm of insanity may be questioned, perhaps, just as it is even now a moot question among the most skilful and experienced physicians how far the strange phenomena of hystero-epilepsy, described by M. Charcot and others, belong to the one or to the other province of disease, or perhaps are in many cases modified by the simple and well known fact of malingering, or, in other words, by the desire of weak and impressionable women to figure as marvellous creatures in the eyes of men of science.

But there is one fact in common which connects together all these epidemic crazes—whether inclining to the terrible, as in the case of supposed demoniac agency in witchcraft, or to the ludicrous, as in some aspects of the dancing manias. This is the fact of public attention aroused and concentrated upon phenomena, supposed to be involuntary and mysterious, but yet, which may be fairly assumed to be to an indefinite and unknown extent under the dominion of the will. When, for example (to appeal to some of the more modern instances), Wesley and Whitefield came to differ about the cause and nature of the physical manifestations or convulsive phenomena attending their equally impassioned religious addresses; the former believing them to be supernatural, while the latter discouraged them as being merely unwholesome phases of religious excitement, it followed as an inevitable consequence that these peculiar manifestations should persist under Wesley's, and should disappear under Whitefield's, ministry. And we have all of us recently witnessed a tide of religious revival, under the leading of two American evangelists which, while inferior to no preceding one in this country in the general sympathy it aroused, was almost wholly free from such physical manifestations. If you will read by the side of this piece of contemporary history, the account given in the Statistical Account of Scotland of what occurred at Cambuslang in the year 1742; or the numerous and humiliating records of the demonstrations common at American camp-meetings, and among the Shakers or Jumpers, it will be perfectly apparent that these phenomena are at once arbitrary and controllable; that so far as the individual is concerned

they are often apparently involuntary; but, on the other hand, that they are entirely separable, in fact as well as in idea, from all the genuine phases of religious emotion, and therefore capable of being repressed or suppressed, when strongly discountenanced by the prevailing tone of feeling, or by the character of the appeals made in the name of the Gospel of the Prince of Peace.* It is not for a mere lecturer on insanity to venture much farther into this region of thought; but I cannot help remarking that Messrs. Moody and Sankey should have the good-will of physicians and of psychologists, in respect of their having demonstrated, once for all, on the largest scale, the absence of any necessary connection between evangelical religion, even when appealing most strongly to the emotions, and all such forms of morbid physical excitement. But in truth, it is neither religion, nor its opposite, that can be said to be really responsible for such disorders. The dancing manias of the Middle Ages were certainly not religious, in any Christian sense of the word, in their origin; and if the name of St. John, or St. Vitus, became attached to them, it was rather because the power of religion came to be secondarily involved to displace, or exorcise, what many supposed to be a demoniacal possession. Indeed, if Hecker is to be trusted, the wild revels which so suddenly and inexplicably sprang up in July, 1374, associated with the name and day of St. John the Baptist, were the development of superstitions reaching back to heathen times, associated with the kindling of the "Godfyr," and transferred by the Germans to a Christian festival, very much as our Beltane fires, or fires of Baal,† were maintained in Scotland in connection with the first of May, perhaps from Druidical, or at all events pre-Christian times. There was probably just as much, and as little, real religion in these shocking, and often obscene orgies, as in the more refined, but not less senseless, vagaries of the modern spirit-rapping and table-turning confraternity. The principle and root of the evil is in both cases the same, and cannot be regarded otherwise, by the philosophical and impartial historian of epidemic mental

* For a comparatively recent instance of such epidemic manifestations, at least as alarming and remarkable in some respects as any of those recorded in the Middle Ages, but judiciously met, and practically suppressed by treatment on purely physiological principles; see Constans, *Rélation sur une épidémie d'Hystéro-démonopathie en 1861*; deuxième Edition, Paris, 1863.

† Pennant's *Scottish Tour*, Vol. I, p. 111. See also numerous other references to survivals of Pagan superstitions in Sir Walter Scott's *Demonology and Witchcraft*, Letters 3 and 4.

delusions, than as a kind of proximate, if not actual insanity—a diseased condition of the faculty of wonder.

The lesson which I propose to draw from these considerations, in the meantime, is simply this—that the line between sanity and insanity cannot be, judging from historical evidence, very abruptly or definitely drawn. It is, therefore, not an affair of definitions, nor even of doctrines as to what insanity essentially is; but a question of practical adjustment, so to speak, between society and the individual; between the average sane mass (or mob if you like) of commonplace persons or “Philistines” on the one hand, who control, and at the same time constitute, the social machinery, and the eccentric, abnormally good or bad, or otherwise peculiarly endowed individualities on the other hand, dwelling within the protection of law, and therefore responsible to public opinion. Thus, it comes to be ruled in practice, and after due experience, that certain of these minds are, and others are not, capable of spontaneously giving effect to those limitations which must, in the interests of all, not less than of the insane themselves, be imposed upon individual freedom. That this is the only just view of the question of sane and insane, from the historical and political, or rather social, aspect, has been ably set forth in a preceding course of Morison Lectures, by Dr. John Sibbald, one of the Commissioners in Lunacy for Scotland.* So thoroughly do I agree with Dr. Sibbald in almost all that he has written upon this subject, that it is only from a desire to avoid repetition of what has been so recently uttered by my predecessor, that I refrain from stating more at large my own individual views, or, what would probably be still better, quoting very largely from these admirable Lectures. I may, however, for the sake of those who were not privileged to hear or to read them, state that the argument of Dr. Sibbald goes to show that the legal demarcation of the insane in different times and places proceeds upon what might be called a kind of sliding scale of social necessity or convenience, the ultimate rule being that in every society some persons must be more or less permanently separated from the average multitude, while others must be deprived of political or social rights, on account of acts which appear to society *as then constituted* to be inconsistent with the practical enjoyment of liberty and civil status by those who commit them. Of course, it is a tacit, if not an expressly formulated, condition of this practical sifting of the social organism, that *mere* eccentricity is to be

* *Insanity in its Public Aspects*; three of the Morison Lectures for the year 1877. Lewes: Alex. Rivington.

tolerated, if there be sufficient practical control to hinder it from becoming *socially* worse; whether it be the eccentricity of high genius, or the "crankiness" of evil habits, superinduced upon the feebleness of sheer commonplace, distorted by vanity, or greed, or by special, perhaps latent, vicious indulgences. Thus, the eccentricity of a De Quincey or a Coleridge is tolerated, because it is, after all, socially speaking, only an inconvenience, although really, and in essence, truly morbid, because springing in a large degree from chronic poisoning by opium, and therefore quite as absolute and genuine insanity (to the extent of this habit) as any case of *delirium tremens*. And the minor eccentricities of such men as Samuel Johnson, Oliver Goldsmith, Charles Lamb, Thomas Carlyle, and many others, of whose lives we care to know the "seamy side" only because we are fascinated by the native power and nobility of the whole character—these partial deviations from normal habits, though questionably sane in some respects, are still more easily tolerated, because they are controlled by a large amount of common sense, and redeemed by divine gifts of genius, rendering the men possessing, or possessed by, these infirmities indispensable to humanity at large. But even our modern British society, though pervaded by what is in the opinion of J. S. Mill too little, and in that of others too much, respect for individual liberty, would be startled into intolerance if a Mahomedan dancing or howling dervish, or an Indian *fakir*, should insist on going through the more extravagant of his performances in the streets of London. The choice would then be between the asylum and the police-office; and who shall declare which would be the more just and true solution of such a complicated social problem? Nor are like ambiguous instances wanting, or indeed at all unusual, among ourselves, in the very atmosphere of Mrs. Grundy, surrounded by the Philistinism and "gigmanity," which aims at reducing all men to a dead level of respectability. We deliberately allow a poor, stunted, spoiled, and semi-demented type of humanity like Mr. Windham, of Norfolk,* to become a prey to the spoiler, to utterly ruin himself, to extinguish the credit of an old county family, and finally to die almost an imbecile, because, after spending £30,000 in vain to prove him insane, it seems too great an interference with "liberty" to protect him against his own monstrous eccentricities and evil companions. On the other hand, we equally deliberately adjudge a notoriety-hunting, and by no means very stupid, person called Oxford

* See Appendix E (p. 64). "The Windham Case."

to be insane because, when he shoots at the Queen, it is found equally difficult and inconvenient to let him go scot-free, or to hang him as for high-treason! The tacit convention of society accordingly is, that all eccentricities of conduct ought to be controlled by the spontaneous action of the will, guided by reason, so far at least as not to become a social nuisance. If so held in control, they are to be tolerated indefinitely; if not, they are either to be punished as crimes, or to be adjudged formally unsound in a legal and technical sense; and the test of sanity in the latter case is the practical one—the actual power of the individual to control his own eccentric individuality.

In the earlier ages of our history, the legal field of insanity is, technically, more restricted than in these later ages; the defining line is drawn somewhat narrowly around the furious maniac on the one hand, and the imbecile or demented person on the other; the object being chiefly the protection of society, and hardly at all, if at all, the cure of the sufferer. With regard to all eccentric or even plainly abnormal minds not manifestly falling within these two categories,* an immature social organisation is disposed to be utterly regardless, or even reckless, in its abstention from pronouncing them insane. Such persons are simply allowed to *drift*, so to speak; until they come into collision with some stronger current of feeling than that which is aroused by the presence of mere mental unsoundness, and then society has its revenge by denouncing them as heretics, witches, ordinary criminals, or vagabonds, according to the prevailing impulses of law, directed by public opinion. It seems natural under these circumstances to believe (and Dr. Sibbald's Lectures contain something like proof of the fact), that in the Middle Ages a considerable proportion of those who would now certainly find their way into asylums were summarily executed under the severe laws in force against all these supposed anti-social categories; and as the actual treatment of the admittedly insane was little, if at all, to be preferred to death, there was not much to choose between the one or the other alternative, or to induce even the most benevolent reformers to urge the plea of insanity against the penal retributions demanded by what was supposed to be stern justice. "Exceptional conduct," writes Dr. Sibbald of the mediæval period, "was attributed to the worst conceivable causes, and every effort was used unsparingly

* Technically the "furiosus" and the "fatuus" of Roman law; the distinction of which, imported into the practice of the Scottish law courts, gave rise to the distinction (now abolished) between the "Brieve of furiosity" and the "Brieve of idiocy" in the "cognition" of the insane.

to stamp it out. The sternness, or we may say the brutality, with which this determination to stamp out all such deviations was carried out, was a consequence of the fact that the efforts of civil government at the time were devoted almost exclusively to the preservation of the existence of the state. The political organisation had nowhere fully attained to a condition of consolidated stability, and society was in many cases still trembling near the verge of anarchy. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that persons, whether sane or insane, who committed breaches of public order, should in most cases be dealt with by the public executioner. But it also resulted from this necessity, real or supposed, that many insane enthusiasts, and others not guilty of actual violence, were also subjected to capital punishment.' It is some small comfort that Dr. Sibbald is able to add—"We have evidence that the insane did not universally come to such tragic ends. Some must have been cared for in an intelligent manner. And we know that a considerable number who possessed a certain amount of shrewdness and drollery were received into the great houses and protected, partly from feelings of kindness, and partly because their eccentricities provided a source of amusement."

"But we cannot doubt that a large number were also to be found among the herds of outcast vagabonds who existed in a worse than savage condition, wandering about the outskirts of the more civilised localities. These bands were truly sources of injury and danger to the community, and were, as might be expected, subjected to severe treatment when brought within the power of the law. Just before the adoption of a more humane system in the time of Elizabeth, 'we find the magistrates of Somersetshire capturing a gang of a hundred at a stroke, hanging fifty at once on the gallows, and complaining bitterly to the council of the necessity for waiting till the assizes before they could enjoy the spectacle of the fifty others hanging beside them.'"

These statements have a most obvious bearing on the question that has been raised by the statistical returns of the insane within the present century, as to the supposed alarming increase of insanity among us, due to the form and pressure of modern civilisation. I do not intend to go fully into this question at present, but it must be already evident that

* *Loc. cit.*, pp. 21, 22. For other illustrations in detail of these pregnant and, I believe, truthful representations of mediæval practice, I must refer to the reprint of Dr. Sibbald's Lectures, just cited, or to the *Journal of Mental Science*, October 1877.

if we take into account all the abnormal phases of the human mind falling under the designations just given, in the Middle Ages; and if we advert, further, to the numerous epidemic crazes of which we have already spoken, there is but little probability that the *sum* of actual insanity in those days was less, in its proportion to the population, than in our own. The presumption is, rather strongly, I think, that it was much greater, although as might be expected, very few data exist for settling the question, even approximately, on a numerical basis. One such attempt has been roughly made by Dr. Sibbald, in respect of one section only of the insane at a period somewhat nearer to our own day. I will not trouble you with the details, as they are confessedly only such a use of statistics as is to be justified where better cannot be had. But, according to Dr. Sibbald's judgment upon the few facts attainable, it would appear that for more than three quarters of a century after the death of Queen Elizabeth, when William Shakspeare and the great Lord Verulam, each in his own sphere of literary activity, was breaking up the clods of prejudice and sowing the seeds of what we may call the modern spirit; during the period, too, when the art of medicine, in particular, was reaping the fruits of Harvey's labours in physiology, and of Sydenham's improved observation of disease; in the age which saw the foundation of the Royal Society, the experimental researches of Boyle, and the earlier mathematical and physical discoveries of Newton; throughout that period in literature which embraced Shakspeare, and Milton, and Jeremy Taylor, and Chillingworth, and the earlier works of Dryden and of John Locke—"under the rule of the Stuart kings, a proportion of nearly one out of every four persons who would, with our present views, have been sent to an asylum was actually sent to the stake and burnt as a witch.* It was so far" (adds Dr. Sibbald) "a terrible solution of problems regarded at the present day as of the utmost importance—how to deal with patients so as to prevent a recurrence of their malady, and how to prevent them from propagating an insane predisposition to a succeeding generation." †

Yet witchcraft was only one, as we have seen, of several forms under which the ban of the Middle Ages was habitually passed upon all that seemed out of harmony with the ruling principles of society then existing, whether in church or state. If we in this nineteenth century of ours have become more

* See Appendix C (pp. 48 *et seq.*), "Witch-finding and Witch Prosecutions in Scotland," &c.

† *Loc. cit.*, p. 28.

tolerant, and, as we think, more charitably minded; if we can no longer conscientiously burn our witches and our heretics, and send our vagabonds by fifties at a time to the gallows without waiting for an assizes; if the more settled state of our social fabric admits of greater individual liberty, and has reduced indefinitely the number, gravity, and apparent danger of political offences; nay, if even in the case of the most indubitable crimes, and those of the deepest dye, society hesitates now-a-days at inflicting the last penalty of the law—and in the opinion of many it has become merely a question of time when capital punishments are to disappear altogether—we may cheerfully accept as a counterpoise to this large and, on the whole, beneficent increase of individual liberty the trifling, almost fanciful danger to our freedom which springs from the wider range given to the legal definition of insanity, and the consequent increase and multiplication of asylums. Given the practical dilemma, that in every stage of civilisation there must be a certain or uncertain number of individuals with whom eccentricities, intellectual, moral, or emotional, are so developed in the *direction* of disease and of criminal acts as to render their complete responsibility doubtful, and their entire and unchecked liberty socially inexpedient or impracticable, is it better to deal with these (let us suppose) questionable instances after the mediæval or after the modern method? The answer to this question can only, I think, be qualified now-a-days by one very curious and perhaps too remotely theoretical consideration which, however, has been appealed to as in favour of the older method, and it is quietly suggested by the irony conveyed in the last sentence I quoted from Dr. Sibbald. What if, by sparing the lives of a large proportion of our eccentrics and insane, we are tending, in an ever increasing ratio, to the hereditary propagation of insanity in the race? What if the benevolence which allows half-mad people to go at large unmolested, should be poisoning the springs of mental soundness for the next generation? I do not say that this question, thus formulated, is altogether free from difficulties, but it is only part of a much larger one. It is indisputable that modern sanitary regulation, and perhaps also the art of medicine, have contributed largely to save from death an immense number of weakly and ailing infants in many places, and to render life possible under improved conditions of diet, cleanliness, ventilation, clothing, warmth and comfort in the dwelling, &c., to numberless adults who, even a century ago, would probably have died of fever, ague, dysentery, inflammations; and three

or four centuries ago would have been secluded as lepers, or have become the victims of the black death, the plague, or the sweating sickness. Is the saving of these weaklings alive a cause of deterioration of the race? Is every scrofulous infant, for instance, artificially sustained among us till the age of puberty, a proximate danger to society; and should we therefore revert to the laws of Lycurgus, or to the principles so oddly, but with apparent seriousness, set forth in Plato's *Republic*, that the care of the family is a duty directly of the state, and that the lives which from physical delicacy are not likely to be of advantage to the state, should be deliberately sacrificed in the infantile period, or quietly allowed to drop in the adult?

To those who may be disposed to entertain these puzzling and almost transcendental questions of political and social economy, I will only suggest in the meantime two considerations which may serve to reconcile them to the modern methods and expedients for prolonging life.

First, it is not yet certain whether society and advancing civilisation do not tend to introduce many new forms of death, while they remove or mitigate the old ones; and, *second* (for this is the one germane to my present theme), we have already seen that Mr. John Stuart Mill regards it as one of the political dangers or disadvantages of modern society, that it tends to repress individual character; that men are too much subdued to one colour, and that they tend to act and to think in social aggregates or mobs (more or less educated); that "Philistinism" is too rampant, and that individuality and eccentricity have too little scope? I have carefully reserved my opinion on this subject; and, in fact, I am not at all sure that I quite agree with Mr. Mill; but to one who does agree with him, and who is as much disposed as Mr. Mill commonly was, to carry a paradox to its logical consummation, it might fairly be set forth as one of the greatest benefits to be derived from the modern way of dealing with insanity, from the enlargement of its legal definition, and the resort to medical means rather than physical cruelty in its treatment, that a large store of eccentricities and individualities is thus preserved to us (in our asylums and otherwise), whereby society may be secured from the growing evil of a too slavish conformity to the average type of opinion and of character! At all events, such considerations as these, even if they partake of the nature of caricature and paradox, may reconcile us to the idea that our first duty to the insane is to treat them, so far as our knowledge extends, according to the dictates of humanity and justice; and to leave questions of social and poli-

tical economy as much as possible to time, and to the operation of those moral laws which are greater than our conceptions, and which, like the laws of physical nature, may be trusted in the end as representing not a chaos, but a cosmos.

At this point, then, we begin to feel our way towards the physician's view of insanity; the essence of which is that mental unsoundness, however its definition may be enlarged or restricted on suggestions proceeding from the lawyer, the divine, the moralist, or the social philosopher, is in fact, so far as the individual is concerned, simply *a disease*, and therefore to be regarded according to the analogies of bodily disease and function, and treated accordingly. In what remains of this lecture, accordingly, I desire to point out some of those analogies which, though of course they are not to be blindly followed, yet as a rule tend to bias, and often to determine, the judgment of the physician in his dealings with mental unsoundness.

In the first place, it may be certainly affirmed that the whole, or nearly the whole, of those modern improvements in the treatment of the insane, those vast and beneficent changes with which the names of William Tuke, and Pinel, and Charlesworth, and Gardiner Hill, and Conolly are associated, have been the direct result of the conception that insanity is, more or less, a condition having analogies with the diseases of the body; like them, that is, in arising often from very appreciable and sometimes from removable bodily causes; like them, also, in being often limited or controlled by physical remedies, or hygienic circumstances, acting directly upon the bodily health; but, above all, like them in consisting essentially of *altered, disordered, or deranged function*; so that, as in the case of bodily disease, the physiology comprehends and at the same time illuminates the pathology; the careful study of normal function is the one indispensable condition for the just appreciation and skilful management of the abnormal. It is this last point of view that I propose to illustrate a little further on the present occasion.

It does not appear to me to be quite a correct statement of the claims of the physician in respect of insanity to say, as some have said, that it is by the application of remedies to the body, and by physical influences acting through the body, that the disorders of the mind have been in these modern times first brought within the scope of rational treatment. What is, however, I think, a perfectly correct statement is that, until Pinel was appointed to the charge of the Bicêtre

at Paris, in 1792, the methods and resources of real medical science had scarcely at all been employed, or even much thought of in the management of the insane. It was not that there was any lack of so-called medical remedies in mental disease; for, from the times of Galen and Dioscorides, hellebore had been vigorously used, as every one knows from classical allusions; and in the Middle Ages both bleeding and purgation, and all manner of perturbatory remedial expedients were, no doubt, freely employed in all cases bearing the character of *phrenitis*, which may be taken as the equivalent of acute mania. But the whole tendency of opinion was, to let the curative be subordinated to the restraining influences. The medical care of the individual patient was simply lost sight of in the more urgent social interest involved in keeping (as it seemed) a sort of wild animal in safe custody; and, as a natural consequence, only that kind and quality of medical skill was even allowed to be exercised which could be harmonised in principle with the cruel or thoughtless severities, unredeemed by sympathy, that were long considered to be of urgent social necessity in all cases of insanity, except those which, by their entire freedom from apparent risk of violence, or other objectionable manifestation, allowed humane feeling to get room for its exercise. I should be inclined, indeed, to hope, for the sake of our common humanity, that careful research might possibly discover some exceptions to this broad statement; that in those very "ages of faith" when witches, heretics, and mad folk were most relentlessly dealt with after the manner that has already been sufficiently indicated, it might, perhaps, be found by the historical antiquary that in some Franciscan refuge, or Dominican monastery, a practical work was being done for God and man alike by reclaiming some of these outcasts, as we know was done in respect of the lepers and the plague-stricken, under the grand impulse of Christian love and brotherhood, whether with little science or with much. But in the main, the treatment of insanity was so debased by the mere moral paralysis, so to speak, of fear, that medical aid, if afforded at all, was subdued to the atmosphere (noxious and poisonous alike physically and morally) within which it was permitted to work by the prevailing public opinion. Nor is it at all necessary for my argument to maintain that medical opinion was on the whole much in advance of public opinion. Rather is it a remarkable thing that, when the great compacted systems of medical thought which had occupied the first half of the eighteenth century had been almost played out, and

when systems of medical belief having authority had been even fatally disparaged, because brought into hostile competition with such utterly unphilosophical and unscientific doctrines as those of Brunonianism, there should have arisen two distinct and apparently unconnected movements for the more humane and scientific treatment of the insane, both in the last decade of the century—one in England, under the beneficent guidance of the Society of Friends, and one in France, in the very midst of the Revolution, and on the eve of that Republic which shortly afterwards erected the guillotine and deluged the streets of Paris with innocent blood.

It is scarcely possible to conceive of two medical characters formed in the midst of more entirely different associations than those of Tuke and Pinel; and the only view, I think, that will meet the case historically is that here, as in so many other crises, the "fulness of the time" was come when, by a certain maturity of medical doctrine and of public sentiment alike, it was at last possible (though not without many obstructions and hesitations) to bring together the social forces which tended at once to enlighten the public mind, and to restore the long disturbed equilibrium of feeling towards the insane. What has been accomplished since then in the name of humanity and civilisation, has been described so often and so well, and even in preceding courses of Morison Lectures, that I shall not detain you upon it now; but what may require to be indicated more clearly is the relation of these beneficent changes to the change that has been going on during the same period in the whole range of medical science, whether as regards the theory or as regards the practical management of disease.

The modern conception of the healing art differs from the more ancient chiefly, perhaps, in this:—That disease is no longer regarded as an *entity*,* so to speak; a physical, or metaphysical, or metaphorical *something* introduced into, and yet separate from, the organisation; but rather as a change

* This statement is not quite exact, and might even be considered to be the reverse of the fact, were attention given chiefly to the ever-increasing domain of *micro-organisms* in their relation to modern pathology. But no one, ancient or modern, has ever affected to deny that a parasitic origin is justly to be assigned to many diseases. The mode of thought in respect to disease here criticised as existing generally in the past, is that which, by an hypothesis greatly in advance of any ascertained facts, presumes the existence of an objective cause for all diseases, and adopts remedies *for the disease* (not the *patient*) corresponding with the hypothesis entertained. Boerhaave's theory of a "spontaneous gluten" was a marked instance in point, in not too remote times.

superinduced upon the healthy modes of activity of the functions, which may be thus expressed—*Normal function acting under abnormal conditions*. The old humoral pathology, which reigned supreme in the schools (with some exceptions) from the Hippocratic age down to the last century, busied itself chiefly with the study of a *materies morbi*, or essential matter of disease; concocted, it is true, out of the normal *humours* or elementary principles recognised as existing in different proportions (or *temperaments*) in differently constituted individuals; but still to be viewed essentially as a foreign material having to be driven out, either through artificial purgation, or through some spontaneous process of elimination, aided by time and by the use of various drugs and chemicals, or by blood-letting and other mechanical methods of withdrawing the vitiated fluids from the system. And this, it is to be observed, was the most advanced and scientific, as well as the most accepted, theory of disease in almost every age previous to the time of Morgagni's great work on anatomical pathology. The medical observations of Sydenham, for instance, are pervaded by this theory; and all his efforts are directed by means of this humoral pathology, and also by the more accurate study of details, to overcome the more obscurantist conceptions of his day, such as those which attributed to certain fevers a mysterious or occult quality of *malignancy*, akin to a kind of supernatural or demoniac influence. And of the vitalistic, or, as we might now term it, the spiritualistic or non-material hypothesis of diseased action, it may be said that without any countervailing advantage in respect of philosophical insight, it lends itself far more than the humoralistic to all sorts of superstition and charlatanism; insomuch that from Paracelsus to Hahnemann there is not a single revolutionary system of universal medicine that does not attempt to find a short cut into the mysteries of disease, by throwing over as useless the study of function associated with structure—*anatomy, physiology, and pathology*—in favour of some wild hypothesis which reduces the whole science of medicine to a formula of phrases, and the whole art to an administration of *specifics*. The disease, in other words, is by most of these systems regarded as something inscrutable or occult; the remedy, therefore, must be something which has been discovered by a stroke of genius, and is accordingly to be accepted upon the *ipse dixit* of its inventor; or, if a theory of cure is also wanted, some plausibly simple general law is set forth, by means of which *all* remedies must needs act, and the application of

which, to a particular case, dispenses with the aids of genuine science, and, in fact, with the study of normal function altogether. The disease and the remedy are, as it were, in theory made expressly for each other; the disease as an *entity*, the remedy as its providential antidote, acting and reacting on each other; the nature of the connection between them being, like the nature of the disease itself, inscrutable, and therefore not worthy of investigation in detail.*

Now, to this mode of viewing diseases and remedies, modern science opposes a different method altogether. It does not, indeed, repudiate formally the humoral pathology, nor does it in all cases deny the existence of a *materies morbi*; but it exacts evidence founded on detailed investigation both of the one and of the other. Neither does modern medical science affect to deny that many diseases are still unsolved problems; but it denies that they are insoluble problems. Behind the disease, it aims at thoroughly understanding, and so curing, the living man with his many functions or faculties, and his complex organisation; behind the abnormal function it discovers, and inquires into, the normal function, in the due support of which safety and cure are alike to be found if at all. And the result of almost all such inquiries is that normal function is found to be still in operation, still struggling, as it were, to assert itself, even in the midst of the most extreme derangements caused by disease. † The heart beats, and circulates the blood, even although its action is impeded; the nutrition of the tissues is not suspended, even although the disturbing cause of a fever is leading to increase of waste; the nervous system still exerts a controlling and regulating influence over the other functions, even although the mind is at the time

* See paper by the author on Homœopathy, in *Edinburgh Essays*, by Members of the University. Adam & Chas. Black. 1857.

† The Hippocratic method of expressing this truth is to be found in the well known aphorism or axiom—*Νούσων φύσεις ἰητροί* quoted above from an ancient treatise, where it lies like a nugget of gold in the midst of a confused heap of formless material, probably wrongly attributed to the great master—but often wrongly apprehended when it is supposed to cover general assertions or laws as to “Nature” in the cure of disease; as for example, in a well known book by the late Sir John Forbes. The notion of “Nature” as a purely beneficent power universally over-ruling, or combating, disease is an abstraction, I suspect, of comparatively modern growth. The original is at once more subtle and more exact—“Our natures are the healers of our diseases;” in other words, the functions of the body, which are disturbed in disease, and which in the aggregate constitute the *Φύσις*, or nature, of the body, are themselves the sources of healing; as when a wound, or a fractured or necrosed bone, is healed by the throwing out of granulations or of callus.

wandering in delirium, or sunk in coma. And the problem of cure consists, for the most part, not in the administration of antidotes, or the discovery of specifics, but in the careful study of all the details and modes of functional activity, normal and abnormal, with the view of removing obstacles, strengthening weak points, and, in general, affording the most efficient assistance possible towards enabling normal function to overcome abnormal, in the individual case. We have come to aim at treating not so much the *disease*, as the *man affected with the disease*; administering our remedies, not upon the principle of warring with an occult foe in some obscure corner of the man, but on the far higher principle of dealing with the whole man, and assisting, as well as may be, all that is sound in him to overcome what is unsound.

It would be easy to give illustrations of this truth from the modern practice in particular forms of bodily disease; but I must be content here to refer to the healing of wounds and of fractures by simple protective agencies and by antiseptics; the substitution of nourishment for depletion in all forms of acute disease; the greatly increased employment of hygienic agencies, both in acute and chronic diseases; the use of regulated exercise, and of electricity in paralytic disorders; the whole field, so recently opened up, of preventive medicine, as examples of the modern spirit at work in the dealing with disease, not as a separate *entity*, but as a disturbance, or series of disturbances, of the normal functional activity, from external causes acting unfavourably on the functions, rather than from an internal warfare with an unseen and unknown antagonist.

But if this last conception, which in one shape or another dominated almost the whole of the ancient pathology, was a very imperfect and misleading conception even of bodily disease, you will easily perceive how disastrous such a conception must become when applied to the case of insanity. The hypothesis of disease as a metaphysical entity, separate and apart from any manifestation of normal mental function, lends itself, in fact, with a fatal facility to two popular impressions and theories of the unsound mind, each of which has been productive of enormous suffering to the insane, and corresponding moral degradation to all who have had to do with them. One of these is the theory of demoniac possession, to which I have already adverted in connection with witchcraft; the other is the theory that the insane mind is in fact an altered personality—another mind, *mens aliena*—disputing with the sound mind the empire of the

body, and compelling it to the performance of acts, and the use of expressions, not only differing from those of the sound man, but having no relation at all with the manifestations of normal mental and bodily function.

It is not necessary to assume that these theories have been always frankly and thoroughly adopted without reservation in any past age, or that they have been logically and coherently maintained even by those who have in practice been mainly guided by them. The second is obviously a much milder and attenuated form of the first; but just as the humoral pathology left it entirely doubtful, in most cases, whence the *materies morbi* in a particular disease of the body was derived, so this pathology of the insane mind leaves us quite in the dark as to whence the *other* mind or personality comes which thus usurps the functions and takes possession of the bodily organs of the madman. It may be admitted that the phenomena of the insane mind are hard enough to interpret in any case; and that simply as a figure of speech the monomaniac who loudly proclaims his own altered personality—who, in his raving, affirms that he is St. Paul, or Julius Cæsar, or the Wandering Jew—may be admitted to be “beside himself,” and to be directed, in a certain allegorical and quite non-scientific sense of the word, by another spirit than his own. But the French have preserved, even in their scientific nomenclature, a vague impression, or survival (so to speak) of this crude metaphysical conception, by fixing upon the phrase “*aliénation mentale*” as the most general expression of insanity. And even now it is in the main correct to say (although the impress of modern medical opinion has not failed altogether in making itself felt) that the legal theory of the capacity of the insane for civil acts has been largely guided by the presumption that a man insane is, by the very fact of his insanity, moved or impelled by something within him that is not *himself*, and therefore that he becomes, as a changed personality, legally incapable of any sound or valid civil act whatever.

There can be no doubt, I think, that this popular idea of the *alien* mind, the altered *ego*, or personality of the insane man, the idea that a madman is a being “out of his mind,” “beside himself,”—*possessed*, in short by something that is *not* himself, and that acts and speaks independently of the man himself, is largely responsible for many of the cruelties practised upon the insane in this and other countries, even in times when the more superstitious, but also more logical, conception of

demoniacal possession had nearly become obsolete. The state of the public mind which permitted an English judge (Tracy) in 1723 deliberately to liken a madman to "a brute or wild beast" without unfavourable remark, shows an advance, perhaps, in some respects, on the demoniacal hypothesis; but on the other hand it corresponds only too well with the shocking condition of the patients in "the first lunatic asylum in England unconnected with ecclesiastical administration,"—the hospital of St. Mary of Bethlem, well known, and afterwards notorious, under the abbreviated and typical name of Bedlam. "Up to the year 1770," writes Dr. Sibbald, "the patients were exhibited to the public like wild beasts in cages, on payment of a penny; and they are said to have afforded much sport to the visitors, who flocked to see them, in numbers estimated at not less than 48,000 annually." Evidently the idea of cure, in this so-called hospital, was entirely in abeyance, much more so probably than during the century and a half when it was under monkish supervision. Over the gates of Bedlam might well have been inscribed Dante's celebrated and awful motto for the portal of hell, "*Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'intrate.*" One of Hogarth's most impressive pictures will recur to every one as a vivid representation of the horrors here alluded to, showing that the condition of the insane in England in his day was in many respects much worse than that of the "beasts which perish." Indeed, there was not even the pretence, for the most part, of "care and treatment" in the Bedlams of this period. The violent or dangerous lunatic was simply regarded as a portent and a terror, or (as we have seen) a show; or at all events as something to be put out of the way with as little ceremony as possible; a being, human in form no doubt, but having so little real humanity remaining as not to be fit to be soothed and comforted, much less cured, by medical treatment, or even by exorcism and prayer; but simply chained up and allowed to wear himself out in struggles, and curses, and filth and degradation both moral and physical. The innocuous lunatic, on the other hand, the born idiot, or "natural," as he was called in Scotland, was, as most of us well know and remember, allowed up to a much later period simply to become the sport of circumstances—to drift, as I said before, often without even the amount of care and kindly domestic supervision which is commonly secured by public opinion and private feeling alike for the Swiss *crétin*, or *chretien*; a feeling very probably the result of a lingering survival of the ancient superstition of

possession,* but in this instance, fortunately, supposed to be possession by a good, instead of an evil, spirit. What became of the intermediate grades of the insane in England in the eighteenth century, it is difficult to say. Probably they too were allowed to drift, until under the influence of hard usage and hard fare, perhaps of positive persecution and wrong, evil passions were aroused, the "brute or wild beast" came uppermost, and thus a qualification was obtained for entering a Bedlam on the one hand, or on the other for a speedy release from all the "evil done under the sun," through the summary processes of vindictive retribution to which I have already alluded.

It is impossible to present to the mind, or even to the bodily senses, a greater contrast to all this than is to be found in the wards of a well regulated modern asylum. Here we have the whole resources of the healing art, in the largest and most liberal sense of the term—hygienic, dietetic, medicinal, moral—placed at the disposal of the physician, for the cure if possible, if not, then for the relief and comfort, of the insane mind. And observe the principle adopted—for it is this, and not the mere triumph of beneficence and clemency over harshness and cruelty to which I am anxious to call your attention. The principle which led Pinel, in 1792, to strike the chains from the limbs of the first eighty lunatics in the Bicêtre, was undoubtedly the same which has mainly guided the improved practice of medicine in all its departments during the last half century. That principle is that in the whole pathology of disease normal function must be held to underlie abnormal function; that in the cure of disease, in like manner, the sound elements still remaining must be carefully respected; strengthened and built up again if possible; in all cases, however, anxiously tended and nursed; the sane man within the insane being, so to speak, supported and buttressed up, so as to overcome, or reduce to a minimum, the encroachments of disease. I am by no means confident, indeed, that Pinel thoroughly appreciated this principle in its far-reaching applications to the whole field of pathology—and indeed there is pretty good evidence in his writings that he did not; but there is also evidence that he opened the way, with firm and undeviating convictions and brilliant success, in that particular field of medical science and art which was most in

* Dr. A. Constans, *Relation d'une Epidemie d'Hystero-démonopathie en 1861*, has described with many curious details an example of the survival of the older form of the superstition in a little village in Savoy; where the cure, however, was brought about by modern, not mediæval, treatment.

arrear in this respect. From Pinel to Conolly, and from Conolly to the present hour, a whole cloud of witnesses can be produced to show that the remedies for the unsound mind are such things, for the most part, as tend to strengthen and confirm the "sound mind in a sound body." Not wrath against wrath, violence against violence, hunger and cold and filth against the insane neglect of bodily comfort; but the quiet and steady power of the sane will controlling and gradually dominating the insane, good food, active employment, carefully adjusted so as to draw out the latent or oppressed faculties; exercise, if possible, in the open air; books, pictures, newspapers, music; strictly enforced cleanliness and ventilation; and occasionally medicine for the body; such are the chief elements of the modern treatment of insanity; and these are employed (restraint and confinement being as much as possible dispensed with), not on merely sentimental grounds, but as the result of a profound and growing conviction that it is only by educating and restoring the sane mind underlying the insane, that the disturbed condition of the whole of these functions can ever be brought back to order and sanity. And thus, even in the worst cases, the educated physician of the insane proceeds upon exactly the opposite principle from that implied either in demoniacal possession or in the *aliena mens*; he makes it his duty carefully to search for and follow up all the normal elements still acting in the diseased or insane mind: and in order to do this effectually he makes it his first business to inquire into all the events in detail which have led to a gradual alteration or violent disruption of the old sound existence and modes of thought, and thus to the loss or obscuration of the sense of continuity of life, and therefore of personal identity. So labouring he often succeeds; sometimes, no doubt, he fails; but on the whole the condition of every public asylum in this country is now-a-days a standing testimony to the fact that the insane, as a class, are largely ruled by the same motives, attracted by the same pleasures, interested in the same events, as the sane. And as a corollary to this discovery, the discipline of asylums approximates more and more to the discipline of a large, well regulated, sane community, provision being made, of course, by a proper assortment of cases and distribution of attendants, for the personal security of all, and for the watching, control, feeding, nursing, and cleanliness of those whose habits or whose feebleness most require it. No more brilliant application of medical science than this has ever been known in any age of the world's history.

APPENDIX OF NOTES.

A.—*On the Early Training and Mental History of John Stuart Mill, considered in reference to some peculiarities in his writings.* The casual reference in the text to one of the greatest names in contemporary philosophic literature derives a new interest, in connection with the subject now before us, from the carefully guarded statements of Mr. Bain in a recent article on John Stuart Mill (*Mind*, No. XV, July 1879, pp. 379-83). Every reader of the *Autobiography* published in 1873, must have retained a vivid impression of the process by which, from the earliest childhood, Mr. Mill's intellectual faculties were cultivated at the expense of the feelings, and of all that usually makes a normal childhood enjoyable, not to say loveable. The singular discipline which, beginning with lists of Greek vocables at three years old, proceeded through elaborate readings and expoundings up to a "complete course of political economy at thirteen;" and the not less singular omissions in that severely logical training, as recorded by Mr. Mill himself with perfect simplicity and good faith, must be taken as based upon certain principles deliberately adopted and sternly, almost relentlessly, carried out by his father James Mill, with the actual result of producing what the son at a later period calls, with a slight tone of regretful criticism on his own early career, "a mere reasoning machine" (*Autobiography*, p. 109). The principles, so far as they went, were good, and were carefully guarded from the usual errors of a too precocious training; there was no undue display, leading to a too early self-consciousness; and no mere exercise of memory, apart from judgment; "mine was not an education of cram" (p. 31). The "reasoning machine," accordingly, was actually produced in a wonderful state of perfection, and set to write at the age of seventeen, or earlier, necessarily without any experience whatever of an ordinary human kind, on all the highest problems of practical life simultaneously, in a succession of contributions to the pages of the *Westminster Review*. That the younger Mill escaped the worst consequences of such a wholly unnatural discipline in early childhood, and of the restlessly premature activity that followed up to his twentieth year, is evidence of the inherent strength of his physical and mental constitution, and fully justifies the remark of his latest biographer, that he (Mr. Bain) is "unable to produce an instance of a man going through as much as Mr. Mill did

before twenty, and yet living a healthy life of seventy years." But that this was not accomplished without a most imminent risk, is now abundantly evident. Taking once more, as the sources of the best information available, the *Autobiography*, chapter V, and the article above referred to, it may be very clearly inferred that what Mr. Mill himself calls "a crisis in my mental history" in 1826, and two subsequent illnesses in 1836 and 1839, were nothing less than incipient, if not fully developed insanity (though perhaps without positive and tangible delusions), arising from what Mr. Bain calls "over-working the brain;" *i. e.*, the too exclusive education and exercise of the reasoning faculties, and the absolute *starvation*, at once of all the social instincts of childhood, and of all the feelings bound up with the family affections, as well as with the life of the soul in its highest sense, which James Mill had systematically, and from apparently conscientious motives, suppressed (see *Autobiography*, chapter II). The need for repairing some, at least, of these omissions was learned, but all too late, during the mental crisis above referred to. "I had now," he writes, referring to his twenty-first year, "learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished and enriched as well as guided. I did not, for an instant, lose sight of, or undervalue, that part of the truth which I had seen before; I never turned recreant to intellectual culture, or ceased to consider the power and practice of analysis as an essential condition both of individual and of social improvement. But I thought that it had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it. The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, now seemed to me of primary importance. The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed. And my thoughts and inclinations turned in an increasing degree towards whatever seemed capable of being instrumental to that object. I now began to find meaning in the things which I had read or heard about the importance of poetry and art as instruments of human culture. But it was some time longer before I began to know this by personal experience." (Pp. 143, 144.)

The restoration appeared to come, in this instance, through an intense devotion to the poetry of Wordsworth. The whole subject is of painful interest, and cannot be left out of sight in estimating even the most mature judgments of Mr. Mill's mind upon practical subjects. For the present it may be sufficient to point out how his conceptions of the family life

were unfavourably influenced, and even gravitated into paradox, under the circumstances referred to above; and also how these circumstances tended towards the mature and deliberate cultivation of eccentricity in opinion, as advocated in the Essay on Liberty. I have added in another appendix (B) a further illustration of these remarks which, written as it was long before the question of Mr. Mill's leanings in the direction of mental unsoundness was raised by his autobiography, may perhaps now be more or less profitably read in this connection. I had occasion to write for the *Glasgow Medical Journal*, August, 1869, a review of John Stuart Mill's well known work, then only just published, on *The Subjection of Women*; a work which is on all hands regarded not only as typical of its author's personal qualities and mental history, but also as the philosophical basis of a peculiar political and social creed. In reprinting this review, which deals with the medical and physiological aspect of the question rather than the political, I have omitted one paragraph only, not because of anything in it requiring qualification, but because it contained a personal tribute very proper to be rendered during Mr. Mill's lifetime, but now more than superfluous, to "his fine intellect, his noble perseverance, his splendid enthusiasm on behalf of what he conceives to be for the good of the human race, &c." In all other respects, the review professes to be, and in fact is, the result of a perfectly unbiassed and absolutely fresh study of the book, rather than of the author of it; and as such, I desire to commend it here to the notice of those who, in the pursuit of a political ideal, have allowed their judgment to be carried away by a far-reaching fallacy, advanced under the ægis of a great name.

B. — *The Subjection of Women*. By John Stuart Mill. London: 1869. pp. 188. (*Glasgow Medical Journal*, Aug. 1869.)

We do not intend to review this remarkable book *ad longum*, inasmuch as such a review would carry us far beyond the province of a medical journal; but, on the other hand, the argument of the book itself, the thesis on which it is founded, the philosophical and political creed which it inculcates, cannot but invite notice from the physiological side; and if, as we hope to show, the argument is unsound, and the creed defective or fallacious considered from this point of view, then the very delicacy of the topic, the kind of treatment it requires as a question of sex at the hands of the physiological reviewer, sufficiently indicate that a medical or scientific journal is the proper medium for what we shall feel bound to write.

The fundamental thesis which (it is not too much to say) is taken for granted throughout this work, is nowhere brought out with sufficient brevity for our present purpose; but we think it will bear without injustice the following strictly logical statement:—All men ought to be, politically, equal; but women are men; therefore men and women ought to be, in a political sense, equal and co-ordinate. And, perhaps, it would appear on due inquiry also, that Mr. Mill would not repudiate the *historical necessity*, so to speak, of a stage or phase of political inequality as a part of the development of the human race; but he holds, and powerfully pleads in his first chapter, that the arguments and traditions of this imperfect and rudimentary stage of human society ought not to be used so as to obstruct that more exalted and refined social organisation which aims at ultimately setting aside the law of force, and recognising the *inherent equality of every adult human organism* (we suppose it is necessary to put it thus, in order to avoid the too palpable absurdity of raising a question about the subjection of babies) in regard to every political and social privilege, whether in the family or in the state. With these preliminary hints the question may be indicated in general terms, yet so as to include all the necessary qualifications in Mr. Mill's opinion, in his own words at p. 3 of this treatise:—"In practical matters, the burthen of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition; either any limitation of the general freedom of human action, or any disqualification or disparity of privilege affecting one person or kind of persons, as compared with others. The *à priori* presumption is in favour of freedom and impartiality. It is held that there should be no restraint, not required by the general good, and that the law should be no respecter of persons, but should treat all alike, save where dissimilarity of treatment is required by positive reasons, either of justice or policy." (Chap. I, p. 3.)

Mr. Mill holds it to be very hard and very wrong, that while these axioms, so to speak, of politics are generally admitted and acted upon as respects men, they are utterly repudiated in the case of women. He further holds, and argues with a vigour proportioned to the earnestness of his convictions, that the legal position of women (especially married women) in modern society, is much worse than that of slaves in ancient times; that, in fact, women were from the beginning really enslaved by men through sheer force for their own selfish ends, and that they have continued ever since the victims (sometimes he admits the willing victims) of

a slavery far more extreme and inexcusable than any other, inasmuch as in the isolation of the family there is scarcely any room for the combinations and organised resistance which sometimes gave the weakest of subject races in antiquity the power of enforcing conditions against the strongest and most despotic of masters. In the ordinary case of women in the family life, says Mr. Mill, "Every one of the subjects lives under the very eye, and almost, it may be said, in the hands of one of the masters—in closer intimacy with him than with any of her fellow-subjects; with no means of combining against him, no power of even locally overmastering him, and, on the other hand, with the strongest motives for seeking his favour and avoiding to give him offence. In struggles for political emancipation, everybody knows how often its champions are bought off by bribes, or daunted by terrors. In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined." (Pp. 19, 20.)

Accordingly, it is argued that no form of slavery has been, that none could be expected to have been, nearly so permanent as that of women under the oppression which they suffer from men; the latter having employed their superior physical force, not only to secure the absolute subserviency of the bodies of women, but also to place them under circumstances of control tending "to enslave their minds."

"The masters of women wanted more than simple obedience, and they turned the whole force of education to effect their purpose. All women are brought up from their very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission and yielding to the control of others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature to live for others; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections. And by their affections are meant the only ones they are allowed to have—those to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children who constitute an additional and indefeasible tie between them and a man. When we put together these three things—first, the natural attraction between opposite sexes; secondly, the wife's entire dependence on the husband, every privilege or pleasure she has being either his gift or dependent on his will; and lastly, that the principal object of human pursuit, consideration, and all objects of social ambition, can in general be sought and obtained by her only through him, it

would be a miracle if the object of being attractive to men had not become the polar star of feminine education and formation of character. And this great means of influence over the minds of women having been acquired, an instinct of selfishness made men avail themselves of it to the utmost as a means of holding women in subjection, by representing to them meekness, submissiveness, and resignation of all individual will into the hands of a man, as an essential part of sexual attractiveness. Can it be doubted that any of the other yokes, which mankind have succeeded in breaking, would have subsisted till now if the same means had existed, and had been as sedulously used, to bow down their minds to it?" (Pp. 27, 28.)

Therefore, it is not surprising that, while Aristotle's well known assumption as to the existence of "slaves by nature" is no longer received (except by a lingering superstition in connection with American slavery), as justifying the political domination of one race or colour of men over another, it is everywhere accepted without question, in its widest and largest sense, in the case of women, and thus constitutes a social anomaly of the most widespread and almost incurable character: viz., that the law of sheer force, superseded in every purely political relation by concessions more or less complete to the law of justice and social equality, still reigns undisputed, and almost undisturbed, in the family relation, "a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one thing of most universal interest; as if a gigantic dolmen, or a vast temple, of Jupiter Olympius, occupied the site of St. Paul's and received daily worship, while the surrounding Christian churches were only resorted to on fasts and festivals." (P. 36.)

We have already indicated that it is not the purpose of this review to follow Mr. Mill far into the realm of politics, or even of social philosophy. Were it otherwise, we should have felt bound to analyse minutely the whole of the facts and arguments presented in the glowing and singularly readable chapter from which we have hitherto quoted, and in perusing which the reader feels himself hurried along by the mere impetus of the author's thought, over stumbling-blocks in assertion more extraordinary even than the "gigantic dolmen" with which he has presented us above. But Mr. Mill himself would not, we believe, accuse us of over-stating, or of mis-stating, the general effect of his argument in the samples just given of it; nor have we the slightest interest in doing so, our object being, not to convict Mr. Mill of absurdity, or to expose his

errors (if any) in law or logic; but rather to suggest certain aspects of the argument which we think he has overlooked, or to which, at least, he has not given the importance they deserve. We believe, indeed, that the comparison between the state of womanhood in the family, and the state of political servitude in a subject race or aggregate of people, is radically unsound, simply because the family, or *οἶκος* (to use Aristotle's expression), is absolutely and essentially a different *kind* of aggregate from the *πόλις*, or community of citizens, whether national or municipal; and we are strongly persuaded that it is through his more or less completely overlooking this difference, or rather through deliberately shutting it out from view, in his intellectual worship of the idol of liberty (the one political ideal that seems to satisfy his mind), that Mr. Mill has been led into so many apparent paradoxes as the ordinary reader finds in this startling and eminently *sensational*, but not on that account the less able and sincere book. It will not be necessary to deal with each individual paradox, or to sift the accuracy of each assertion, if we can show that the foundation of the whole argumentative structure is insecure.

Mr. Mill's idol worship (as we venture to term it) of liberty produces, in the present instance, an effect which, having regard to his highly intellectual character, is rather remarkable, and yet is not unfamiliar in certain highly exalted states of the religious consciousness as observed in very sensitive natures. The every-day facts of human life are viewed in the light of a theory which completely ignores, or (perhaps it would be more correct to say) utterly repudiates and rises in rebellion against the plainest and most necessary physiological instincts of humanity. So far from being at all subdued in the assertion of his theory by the endless facts of human experience as written in history from the beginning of the ages, he converts this too evident contradiction into the materials for a general arraignment of human nature and history at the bar of the theory: as who should say—I admit that the facts of experience are against me, but then we all know that human nature is wholly depraved and corrupt, and, therefore, incapable, from first to last, of giving even the elements of a wholesome experience. No Buddhist soaring through the four stages of contemplation in search of Nirvâna, no Indian fakcer wearing a shrivelled limb as the proof of his piety, no ascetic of the monastery or the convent insisting upon a "religious" life as a life of utter separation from the common interests of humanity, is apparently more assured

than Mr. Mill that the first instincts of humanity are grievously in the wrong. He does not hesitate in pronouncing the whole framework of human society, in so far as it conflicts with the gospel of absolute political and social equality for the two sexes, a mistake and a cruel injury to the weaker sex, at the instance of the stronger. Marriage, according to him, is, and has ever been, a legalised oppression; the family is an organised school of tyranny, in which men have persistently maintained, for their own selfish purposes, the liberty of doing evil unchecked. Mr. Mill's position is not that of the ascetic who, for himself and others, repudiates the family arrangement as derogatory to personal holiness. But he, nevertheless, appears to us to hold what would be, if fully worked out in practice, even more an anti-social doctrine than that of the ascetic, who simply forms one of a sect apart in a world which he considers as not worthy of him. Accepting the family arrangement as an *institution* for society at large, Mr. Mill deals with the family throughout as if it were a merely human institution; *i. e.*, a part of the artificial and conventional arrangements of society, instead of a direct and inevitable product of the law of *sex*, a law not in any sense artificial or conventional, but coeval with humanity itself. And as a consequence of this primary misconception of the family relation, we find Mr. Mill assuming throughout his argument that all social arrangements bearing upon the family relation are purely artificial, the result of bad laws, made in the exclusive interest of the stronger sex; nay, that marriage itself, instead of being the crown of perfection for all true womanhood, is nothing more than "the destination appointed by society for women;" (p. 63)—here again (it is clearly assumed) in the interest and for the advantage of the men only.

Now, on all of the points here indicated, we have no hesitation in saying that we hold Mr. Mill to be utterly in the wrong; and not only in the wrong as to his conclusions, but as to the very principles from which he sets out. We desire, as far as may be, to avoid using merely technical phraseology, either medical or theological; but there is a physiological as well as a moral sense in which the family, as founded on and maintained by the law of sex, is most truly of *divine* origin; and in not acknowledging or not regarding this ultimate fact of human nature, Mr. Mill has exposed himself to the remark that he aims not only at the reformation, but literally at the regeneration of humanity; that he seeks not merely the improvement of the relations between the sexes, but also the creation anew of all that is distinctive of sex, with special

reference to the confessedly novel political doctrine of liberty, equality, and (shall we add?) fraternity.

What is the real nature of the instinct that demands of a woman to be modest, quiet, retired, domestic? which forbids her to come to the front in battle, to engage hotly in party politics, to talk slang, to assert herself prominently and unattended in society, to appear independently on platforms and in public places, even (let us say) for the defence or discussion in miscellaneous assemblies of such subjects as the so-called "rights of women?" Mr. Mill would probably say that the majority of these attributes and disqualifications are purely artificial; that they are due to the unjust "subjection" of which he so eloquently complains as having been the lot of women from the beginning of our present social system. We, on the other hand, maintain that all these characteristics of sex are distinctly and quite naturally related to the central function of sex; to the physiological *necessity* which prescribes to the male the active, and to the female the passive, part in that function; and which accordingly gives to the male the mental as well as the bodily organisation required for conquest, while to the female is assigned a physical structure that must be held in "subjection," and mastered by "force," before its physiological destiny can be accomplished. How idle, to plead on behalf of women for exemption from a law of her very being; a law, too, which her whole material organisation, as well as her moral attributes, and the great fact of maternity, agree in representing as the chief glory of her womanhood!

Once, at least, in the course of the long ages of man's history it has happened that "the subjection of women" has very nearly ceased to be a fact. In the later times of the Roman empire all those traditions and conventional distinctions (as Mr. Mill considers them) which have ruled the demeanour of the sexes towards each other since the patriarchal ages, were greatly relaxed, if not quite overthrown; and women assumed a degree of practical freedom which ought to have brought about a millenium of sexual "equality" in the course of a few generations. The state of morals then existing has been told us in the sixth satire of Juvenal; but in case he should be suspected of poetic license, let us take the account given by Seneca of the "girl of the period" in the time of Nero. With all earnestness we request Mr. Mill to weigh well these terrible words, and not to stop short at the first impression they are sure to produce, but to consider their inner significance, and to determine for us, if he can, how far the equality of the sexes (in the sense of the abolition of conventional restrictions), can

be regarded as compatible with the real virtues and chief graces of womanhood. In the course of a long indictment against Roman society, not less vigorous than Mr. Mill's first and second chapters, and probably not a whit more open to the charge of exaggeration or caricature, Seneca remarks on the frequency of gout and of baldness among the women of his day to the following effect:—

“Maximus ille medicorum (sc. Hippocrates), et hujus scientiæ conditor, feminis nec capillos defluere dixit, nec pedes laborare. Atqui hæc jam et capillis destituuntur, et pedibus ægræ sunt. Non mutata feminarum natura, sed vita est. Nam quum virorum licentiam æquaverint, corporum quoque virilium vitia æquaverunt. Non minus pervigilant, non minus potant, et oleo et mero viros provocant: æque invitis ingesta visceribus per os reddunt, et vinum omne vomitu remetiuntur: æque nivem rodunt, solatium stomachi aestuantis. Libidine vero nec maribus quidem cedunt, pati natae. Dii illas deæque male perdant! adeo perversum commentæ genus impudicitiae, viros ineunt. Quid ergo mirandum est, maximum medicorum, ac naturæ peritissimum, in mendacio prehendi, quum tot feminae podagricæ calvæque sint? Beneficium sexus sui vitiis perderunt: et quia feminam exuerunt, damnatae sunt morbis virilibus.” (*Epist. ad Lucilium*, 95.)

Of course, no one would think, even for a moment, of imputing to Mr. Mill the most remote intention of being accessory to a state of social corruption and degradation, and we shall anticipate for him the answer that in Roman society, and long before the age of Seneca, the *men* had become frightfully corrupt, and that the degradation of the enslaved women was a necessary, though a long delayed, consequence of the vileness of their masters. But the remarkable fact is, that among all the women of antiquity, the matrons of Rome, in the later republican and imperial times, lived in a quite exceptional state of moral as well as legal freedom; a condition which, no doubt, led to many noble examples of chaste and exemplary womanhood, and of high intellectual gifts combined with all the domestic virtues (as in the case of the mother of Seneca himself); but which also, as we have seen, failed to save the general society of those times from a degree of sexual demoralisation on the side of the women such as has rarely been known before or since. It would not be difficult to show from the writings alike of the poets and moralists of Rome, that some of the darkest features of those dreadful days were directly associated with the so-called “emancipation” of women; *i. e.*, with their self-centred independence, their special

pursuits, their impatience of control, and consequent unfitness for the restraints and quiet "subjection" of the family life. In particular, the widely diffused desire to avoid, or to evade, the duties and responsibilities of maternity; the familiar, and almost open, use of multiplied expedients to procure abortion, and of other still more shameful, if not more criminal, modes of indulging the passions without the tedious and burdensome penalty of bearing and rearing children, are insisted on so much that we can scarcely doubt the existence of a feeling widely diffused (whether exaggerated or not in its expression we do not stop to inquire) that the foundations of the social fabric were then being slowly undermined by the unwillingness, or unfitness of womanhood to be obedient to its first law, that of maternity, the very *raison d'être* of the sexual distinction. And it is rather remarkable that complaints of the same kind (especially as regards the habitual production of abortion and the unwillingness to have families) are again becoming only too common (once more we admit that the facts may have been described with more or less of exaggeration) in regard to some of the most cultivated and "advanced" communities of modern times. The literature of, and concerning, the great cities of the United States, and the well known facts as regards the capital of modern France, seem to show that in proportion to the conventional "emancipation" of women from domestic restraints, there is a sure retribution for society in the shape of their unwillingness to fulfil domestic duties.

Do we then argue on behalf of the slavery, or, as Mr. Mill calls it on his title-page, the "subjection" of women? Only to this extent, that we most positively and definitively repudiate the argument on the other side which springs from the position assumed by Mr. Mill. When we deny, as we do most distinctly deny, that the social and political "equality" of the sexes can be taken as the starting-point of an argument, we have not the smallest desire to see one sex exalted at the expense of the other; nor is it necessary to discuss their relative position otherwise than as it bears on the organisation of the family. It is evident that *within the household* we have the germ, not only of society, but, in a certain sense, of the whole political fabric. It is historically true that the earliest political organisations are universally modelled on the household; are, in fact, only an extension of the rule and government that is dictated by the first instincts of man and woman as displayed therein. Nor can we for a moment assent to Mr. Mill's assumption, that the rule of the stronger sex is in this case

essentially an unjust and tyrannical rule. That it has often been grossly and repulsively tyrannical, we admit; that it is necessarily so, we deny. On the contrary, it seems to us clear, that the very attribute of superior physical force (which is the only superiority Mr. Mill will admit on behalf of the male sex), constitutes a claim to rule within the household that cannot be refuted, inasmuch as it transcends, and at the same time underlies, all human law. It may be, we freely grant that it is, highly expedient to correct the abuses of this necessary rule; but not at all to reform it by denying its justice, or by admitting the woman to a co-ordinate jurisdiction, which would only lead to a multiplication of domestic quarrels, and a state of chronic anarchy in the very first elements of every society at present existing under the sun.

The sum of the argument we would be understood as opposing to that of Mr. Mill is this:—It is vain to talk of equality as between the sexes in the government of the family; it is equally vain to raise questions as to the relative capacity of the one sex or the other for duties which may be, under favourable circumstances, within the competency of both. We are not opposed even in feeling (much less in point of principle), to the increase and multiplication of well chosen employments for women; and we hold that the future must decide for us how far the law of sex will persistently interfere with their assumption of many of the social duties now chiefly performed by men. But there is at least one function, that of *maternity*, with all its obviously attendant duties, which has been so clearly assigned to one of the sexes exclusively, that we might fairly have presumed, even had the fact been less apparent, a special disposition of all the powers of body and mind with a view to the accomplishment of that end. Such a disposition of faculties we find not only in the human female, but throughout the animal creation; and as a counterpart we also find that the faculties bestowed on the male are exactly those which will enable him to perform his part in the domestic drama—the larger frame, the more powerful organisation of muscle and nerve being as much a part of the endowment necessary for the bread-winner, as the converse of these, and the more retiring and domestic disposition of the female are obviously her original and providential attributes with reference to her destiny as a mother.

Hence it is to us perfectly obvious that the superior strength, the self-asserting intellect, the governing will of the *man*, are just as naturally and providentially opposed to the more yielding nature, the quietness, modesty, and gracefulness

of the *woman*, as are the more prominent sexual characteristics of the one to those of the other. In each case we find structures, forms, and qualities in a beautiful harmony with function; and to argue, as Mr. Mill does, that the practical results of these differences, including the "subjection" of women, are the result of a continuous education from the earliest period of the human race, is simply to show that men and women have, from the first, spontaneously recognised and assumed the place assigned to them by the laws of their being.

Further than this we do not desire to follow the argument in this place. We by no means refuse to Mr. Mill the credit of having made some good points, and suggested some valuable considerations for the reform of the laws relating to the sexes. On the contrary, we are well disposed to any carefully considered effort to improve the lot of women by increasing their resources, developing their information, and placing legal restraints upon the cruel tyranny too often exercised over them by brutal and degraded men. But the satisfaction with which we follow Mr. Mill's arguments when they are sound, is greatly marred by the exaggerations in which he has allowed his pen to luxuriate, and by our inability to accept the first principles from which he appears to derive so many questionable conclusions. The questions of female suffrage, female occupations and professions, marriage settlements, the right of separation and divorce, are all very important; but they are beyond the scope of this *Journal*. Upon these questions, accordingly, we shall make only one remark, and it follows naturally from all that has been said above. Since the family is the original, as well as the most real and essential, of all the elements of a society, the proper government of the family must, in the first instance, be provided for; and every form of social and political rule inconsistent with that, must sooner or later give way to the decomposing influences exerted on it from the domestic sphere. The rule of the family is the law anterior to all codes of law, because it arises directly from the constitution of human nature itself. But in assuming that this rule has hitherto been all in the wrong, and that the most striking and beautiful sexual characteristics of women are purely artificial, Mr. Mill has been guilty of a paradox not less monstrous in principle, though, of course, somewhat less open to ridicule, than if he had accused the tyranny and oppression of the male sex of having, in the course of ages, by a sort of ultra-Darwinian process of "selection," not only enfeebled the minds and dwarfed the brains of women, but also denuded their faces of that primitive symbol of virility—the beard!

C.—*Christianity, Witchcraft, and Demoniacal Possession.* The Roman Catholic church has, of course, the first responsibility for this, as for many other monstrous outgrowths of human error and ignorance, engrafted by the abject terrors of some of her votaries, and by the love of dominion of others, on the religion which alone and above all the faiths of the world, recognises the human spirit as absolutely free within the realm of conscience. But earnest Protestants will do well to consider their own case before they fling the first stone. Let any one read in sequence, the admirable work of Reginald Scot, published in 1584, *The Discoverie of Witchcraft* (about which I shall have more to say in a subsequent page in this Appendix, p. 60), and then follow up this most enlightened and most Christian, as well as Protestant treatise, by an investigation into the doings and sayings of King James, in connection with his only too successful reply to Wier and Scot, *A Treatise on Demonologie*, at the close of the century; then let him read the narratives in some detail of the hideous cruelties that marked the course of the next hundred years both in England and Scotland, hounded on (especially in the latter country) by all the machinery of a thoroughly and even severely Protestant and Calvinistic inquisition; and he will find that there is but little to choose between Catholic priests in the fifteenth century, and Puritan or ultra-Protestant presbyters in the seventeenth. Even in Massachusetts, the very home of Puritan freedom and enlightenment, the holy war against witchcraft was, if possible, more stupid, and at the same time, more convinced and bloodthirsty than in Scotland, where the state of opinion that produced it has been reflected for all time in the work of a professor of Philosophy (!) in the University of Glasgow. See "Satan's Invisible World Discovered; or, a choice collection of modern relations, proving evidently against the Saducees, and Atheists of this present age, that there are devils, spirits, witches, and apparitions from authentic records, attestations of famous witnesses, and undoubted verity. By Mr. George Sinclar, late Professor of Philosophy in the Colledge of Glasgow. Edinburgh, 1685." (Reprinted in a handsome edition, with prefatory notice and supplement, by Thomas George Stevenson, 1871.)

Witch-finding and Witch Prosecutions in Scotland. The raw material of a "Witch," medically observed — Case. Historical Remarks. Sir George Mackenzie. Reginald Scot's "Discoverie of Witchcraft."—"Witch-finding, or witch-pricking, became a trade, and a set of mercenary vagabonds roamed about

the country, provided with long pins to run into the flesh of supposed criminals. It was no unusual thing then, nor is it now, that in aged persons there should be some spot on the body totally devoid of feeling. It was the object of the witch-pricker to discover this spot, and the unhappy wight who did not bleed when pricked upon it, was doomed to the death. If not immediately cast into prison, her life was rendered miserable by the persecution of her neighbours." *Charles Mackay, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, 1841, vol. 2, p. 230. "The Witch Mania."

"At the trial of Janet Peaston, in 1646, the magistrates of Dalkeith caused John Kincaid of Tranent, the common pricker, to exercise his craft upon her. He found two marks of the devil's making; for she could not feel the pin when it was put into either of the said marks, nor did the marks bleed when the pin was taken out again. When she was asked where she thought the pins were put in her, she pointed to a part of her body distinct from the real place. They were pins of three inches in length." *Pitcairn's Records of Justiciary*, quoted in Mackay, *ut supra*, p. 245.

"Two good helps may be used [for the discovery of witches]: the one is, the finding of their mark, and the trying the insensibleness thereof; the other is, their floating on the water; for, as in a secret murder, if the dead carcass be at any time thereafter handled by the murtherer, it will gush out of blood, as if the blood were crying to Heaven for revenge of the murtherer (God having appointed that secret supernatural sign for trial of that secret unnatural crime); so it appears that God hath appointed (for a supernatural sign of the monstrous impiety of witches) that the water shall refuse to receive them in her bosom, that have shaken off them the sacred water of baptism, and wilfully refused the benefit thereof." King James VI of Scotland. *Treatise on Demonologie and Witchcraft*, quoted *Ibid.*, p. 235.

These three extracts, taken for convenience of reference from the popular, but by no means inaccurate or exaggerated essay referred to in the first of them, may be regarded as fairly representative of proceedings in respect of witchcraft, only too common during the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries of the Christian era, whether under the Catholic or the Protestant regime, in almost every country in Europe. These passages could easily be reinforced by more copious references, not only to the witch persecutions of the Middle Ages, but to the proceedings of Scotch Presbyteries during the last of these centuries. In the Presbytery of Brechin, for instance, I find

that the first and leading *fact* set forth as the ground of accusation of these unfortunates is usually that A. B. is "under a reigning brute"—*i. e.*, generally reputed a witch by her neighbours; and from this, there almost inevitably follows an outpouring of every kind of petty scandal and gossip to the disadvantage of the unhappy woman—old or ugly, or only helpless and poor and miserable as the case may be, who chances to have been thus placed under the ban of popular opinion.* It would be too much to say that no attempt at the judicial sifting of these vile calumnies ever took place, for I find in the proceedings of several presbyteries such accusations dismissed, after inquiry, as false or untenable, and their propagators severely reprimanded, or even punished ecclesiastically, as malicious troublers of the peace. But the prepossession of all minds was such as to give to such scandals an altogether factitious importance; and questions which no modern court of justice would entertain even for a moment, were, under the influence of the horror and fear which in those days the very name of a witch inspired, most seriously considered, and almost invariably with a strong bias against the accused; a bias which was diligently cultivated, especially in ecclesiastical courts, through the instructions frequently issued as to the alarming increase of witchcraft and witches, and as to the solemn duty incumbent upon all parish ministers and kirk-sessions to have all supposed witches properly "dilated" and brought to trial. Thus, in the parish of Skene, in 1602 (a few years after the publication of King James' notorious Treatise above cited), it was "concludit, that their be ane privie inquest of the hail parochin, of wiches, *and sic as are dilate*, that thair names, with thair dictay (accusation), be wwritten in ane roll, togidder with the names of sic as they knaw maist meit to pass on thair assye, that knawis their life best; and this inquisitione to be maid betwixt (this date) and the first of August nixt, and immediately send to the moderatour, Mr. Archebell Blakburne, to be send inclosit be him to the Marques of Huntlie, that the land may be purget of sic instrumentis of the dewill." †

In the *Abbotsford Miscellany*, vol. i, pp. 133-185, will be found the whole legal details of seven trials for witchcraft in

* *Extracts from the Records of the Presbytery of Brechin, from 1639 to 1660.* Dundee: William Kidd, 112 Nethergate. 1877. This small pamphlet of only 64 pages is full of most interesting details of accusations of witchcraft, and still more curious confessions of the victims of such accusations.

† *Minutes of the Kirk Session of Aberdeen.* Spalding Club: 1846, p. 188.

Orkney, between the years 1624 and 1643. The facts adduced in support of these accusations are neither more nor less convincing than usual; but every one of these seven women was condemned and burned as a witch at the first assize, excepting only Katherine Cragie, who was tried on 16th June, 1640, and acquitted; but only to be again accused and tried on 11th June, 1643, on which occasion she too, like the others, was condemned to be burnt as a witch.

So wide was the sweep of the witch-finder's net, that even the most ordinary tricks of the healing art, such as have been practised in almost all ages by those who were not above using mystifications and physically harmless superstitious observances, were very apt to bring about a presumption of witchcraft, if unsuccessful, or if on any other grounds such a charge was considered appropriate. It would be very easy to set forth, even out of medical treatises of good reputation in their day, and certainly out of many popular treatises not under suspicion of commerce with the powers of evil, practices more open to objection than those on account of which Isabell Smith was "dilate of witchcraft" at Banchorie, on the 23rd of July, 1607.* It appears clear on the record that all that was done in this case was done in the supposed interest of the patient, and at the request of the mother, who went to Isabell Smith and besought her assistance on behalf of the sick girl. Being thus led "be hir earnest sollicitation and offers of geir," Isabel Smith "put a thried about her (the patient) to see giff the sickness was the feweris or not." After the thread was wound round the body of the patient, she was "commandit to gang anes about, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Halie Gaist;" but in all this the accused expressly denied all witchcraft. Unfortunately the girl, in the end, died; and accordingly "it was allegit that Smyth had wiced hir." The issue of this case is not given, but the absolute childishness of the accusation, and the great probability that after all no evil was either intended or done, make it a noteworthy instance in the present connection. Even in the present day such superstitious practices are probably not uncommon in some parts of the country: and I know of at least one county in England where a well informed parish clergyman writes to me that "it is quite within the facts to say that there is hardly a parish in this county that has not some one in it who has actually consulted a 'wise man' or 'wise woman.' I could give chapter and verse for at least half a dozen instances of people within pistol shot of my own door who have

* Spalding Club, 1846, *ut supra*, p. 199.

resorted during their life time to 'witches and other night gear.'"

These facts being premised, as illustrations from various sources of the traditional witch element in Scottish, and partly in English, society, I may now submit to the reader some of the medical details of a case which has been repeatedly under my own personal observation, and in which it appears more than probable that two centuries ago a "reigning brute," and a formal accusation thereon following, might have given an unhappy notoriety to the quiet and unpretending, and I believe perfectly harmless, life of a sufferer from hysterical analgesia, with depression of spirits and *tædium vitæ* developed almost to the point of monomania. It was out of such materials, undoubtedly, more or less developed into activity by the current fanaticism and panic, that the typical "witch" of the past ages was formed; and yet no one in the present day can look upon the unfortunate sufferer whose case is here recorded as anything but the victim of a *neurosis* allied, at least, to insanity, and needing only sympathetic and humane treatment whether in an asylum or out of it. For obvious reasons, I think it only due to this poor woman to suppress every detail that might make her the object of a notoriety founded on mere curiosity; and I have no doubt that all the members of my hospital staff, and of several clinical classes, who have heard me speak of her as "a modern witch," will aid me in so protecting her from undue publicity. I will only add that, in a letter from an old pupil in charge of a workhouse in which she was temporarily resident, I have ascertained that various distinct delusions, and also tendencies, not hitherto very strongly developed, towards suicide, have been added to the evidences of a disordered mind which appeared at the date of the first report.

A Modern Witch, medically investigated.—Mrs. X. Y., when I first made her acquaintance more than six years ago, was a woman already for several years past child bearing, and although there was no obvious reason for it as regards the state of her functions, she had, as matter of fact, been childless throughout nine or ten years of a married life. I could not ascertain, after strict inquiry, that she was positively estranged from her husband, or that he treated her ill, in any very tangible sense; but the impression left on my mind by such inquiries as could be properly made under the circumstances was that he was a harsh and domineering man, with a hot temper, and that, without being absolutely cruel to

his wife, he was extremely difficult to get on with. She did not appear to have taken it to heart that she had no family, but admitted in general terms that she had had "a deal of trouble" during her married life; and although not in extreme poverty when I first knew her, was always more or less on the verge of it (she has since been in the work-house), and always worked hard to support herself. She was not at all sure as to her age, but had derived from her neighbours the idea, apparently not inconsistent with the facts, that her present disorder was to be associated with the "change of life" which had occurred some years before. There was no reason whatever to suspect disease of the uterine organs at any time, and there was no "ovarian hyperæsthesia" at the time of examination in April 1879. Her whole tone of mind was despondent, but at the same time quietly so, and without any obviously hysterical manifestations of the ordinary kind; nevertheless, at times there was observed a kind of tremor or "shudder" (as expressed in the report) which, together with the more permanent and congenital deformity of a wry neck, and her forlorn and rather unsociable ways, gave her at times a rather "weird" appearance. This phenomenon is thus described about a month after her admission, and in connection with a demonstration to the class of the facts to be presently indicated. "The chief manifestations (of hysterical emotion) observed are a kind of almost choreic spasm of the head and neck, sometimes extending to the upper extremities, but hardly amounting to more than a momentary tremor or, as it were, a little shudder, so often repeated, however, and with such accompaniments as to raise the suspicion that she is under a paroxysm of emotion." This, however, she maintained not to be the case, in as far, at least, as any immediate exciting cause was concerned; but she admitted that attacks of the kind referred to had occurred occasionally throughout her complaint. It may, perhaps, be added, as an afterthought, that I never personally observed her to shed tears on any of these occasions (an indubitable sign of a witch, according to ancient opinions). To me she always appeared a perfectly simple and more than usually innocent and guileless person, though a prey more or less to melancholic impressions, if not delusions; but with her odd, and certainly ungainly appearance, her unsociable ways, her notable physical infirmities, and her own strong impression of a desire to be done with this world altogether, one could not but think with horror of what would have been the inevitable issue, had she been brought into suspicion by a "reigning

bruite" of witchcraft (say in the Presbytery of Brechin) in the middle of the seventeenth century. I may add that I have no evidence to put on record in her case bearing on King James's *second* test of a witch—"their floating on the water," as this did not fall within the bounds of a legitimate clinical experience; but as regards the *first*—"the finding of their mark and the trying of the insensibleness thereof," the facts are sufficiently curious to demand a little more detail.

The only actual complaint of this poor woman, as being the apparent source of so much misery to herself, and the only appreciable and definite fact, other than the general ones above stated, pointing to disease of the nervous system, was what she herself called a "want of feeling," associated with perfectly indescribable internal sensations; she sometimes called this a "numbness all over," and at other times gave expression to it as a kind of vague uneasiness, not amounting to actual pain. This ever present sense of personal inconvenience is variously alluded to in the course of the history she gave of her disease, as extending back for about nine months before admission. Thus, on one occasion, she spoke of "queer sensations going up to her head," and of "something moving about inwardly all through the trunk of the body," and of a sensation beneath the sternum, or about the front of the lower thorax, "as if something was being drawn out of her," but at the same time saying that it was not a pain, and speaking in general of all her sufferings with calmness and moderation, and only as the result of much questioning about them. The one exception to this, perhaps, was the constantly obtruded expression that she was "tired of life, and did not care what came of her;" and the only reason assigned for this, with unvarying consistency, was that she "could not feel anything as she ought to do," and accordingly felt miserable and woe-begone. She repeatedly and spontaneously said that she "would rather be dead," and when asked to explain herself on this, added that she had "no pleasure in life," because she "feels so queer" when moving about or doing anything.

It remains to be added that a most careful analysis of the above symptom, carried over many examinations at intervals, (the details being much too long to be fully recorded here) satisfied us that the symptom itself was not properly *anæsthesia* (as in such cases too often described even by skilled observers), but purely and solely *analgesia*, or deficiency in the sense of *pain*, as it is most ordinarily and decidedly manifested in normal subjects. The very fact that she occupied herself much with knitting showed that there was no *anæsthesia* in the proper

sense of the term ; but, further, experiments carefully conducted by the usual tests for tactile, thermometric, and ordinary cutaneous sensibility showed them to be at least as active and precise in their indications as in any average person in good health. The special senses were unaffected, except that a certain amount of deafness had increased upon her between 1879 and 1883, even while the other more special symptom of analgesia was, if anything, diminishing in its intensity. The reflexes, so far as examined, were all correct, except that the sensation of tickling the sole of the foot was by no means acutely felt. With all this exemption from true *anæsthesia*, however, it was constantly observed that *on both sides*, and, so far as observed, all over the surface of the body, the sense of pain was extremely deficient. "A pin can be stuck into any part of her surface so far as hitherto tried, or even passed through a fold of integument again and again without her wincing in the slightest degree, or giving even the least evidence of pain" (at a later period, in 1883, this statement had to be somewhat modified). She *felt* the contact, and knew exactly where it was, and that it was that of a pin, but the sensation was not of pain, but "just a little bit more" than that of mere contact. The mucous membranes, also, participated in this peculiar form of insensibility, in so far as that the tongue could be perforated through and through by a long needle without her showing, or apparently feeling more uneasiness than in the case of the external integument, and the conjunctiva of the eyes, although, when roughly handled or pricked tears followed (the only tears I observed her shed), might also be perforated (as far as was deemed expedient in the way of experiment), without any really painful sense of what was done being aroused (this statement also had to be modified in 1883).

Cases like that of Mrs. X. Y. have been frequently recorded on the Continent, since the well known work of Briquet on Hysteria,* by Charcot and others, but almost always in the form of *hemi-anæsthesia*, or of localised anæsthetic patches, more or less scattered over the surface; these last corresponding with the points "totally devoid of feeling" so persistently explored by the "witch-finders." I have, therefore, thought it worth while to place this one on record, not only as being medically and physiologically interesting in itself, but as presenting to the general reader, in the most striking way possible, what in the heading of this note I have

* *Traité Clinique et Thérapeutique de l'Hysterie.* Paris. 1859.

ventured to call the "raw material" of a witch. Given, an elderly and unattractive person, with some notable peculiarity or deformity, solitary habits, and a melancholic temperament, public opinion, as then existing, and as it was fomented and almost regularly organised by the presbyteries, would be sure to do all the rest. And, as regards Scotland, no one can read the testimony of Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, a believer in witchcraft, and responsible as King's Advocate for many of the prosecutions in his day, without feeling that even the ablest and most independent legal minds of that age were dragged unwillingly in the wake of the popular fanaticism, and compelled to witness its victories over poor, friendless, and, in reality, quite innocent, women, upon evidence quite worthless, and often prompted by malice, or instigated by wretches capable of any wickedness in the way of misleading their victims, and hounding them on to destruction, sometimes by confessions extorted under physical or mental torture.

Sir George Mackenzie is, indeed, quite a typical historical figure, not only in connection with witchcraft, but in respect of the whole of the political and religious movements which agitated Scotland in the latter part of the 17th century. Born in 1636, and educated partly at home and partly on the Continent, he passed as an advocate in 1659: and, with the exception of some comparatively unimportant literary occupations, the very first work in which we find him engaged was as "justice-depute," appointed to repair "once a week at least to Musselburgh and Dalkeith, and to try and judge such persons as were there or thereabout accused of witchcraft." He was a man of firm character and strong convictions, religious after his own (which was not, however, the popular) fashion, and evidently involved in the partizanships of the time more from necessity than from choice, as his real bent of mind was that of a thinker and a student. This disposition he maintained with such devotedness and pertinacity that, after the revolution, and at the close of a public career of great distinction, he retired to Oxford, and was admitted there as a student at fifty-four years of age, in June 1690; thus carrying out in practice what he had adopted in theory as his true ideal at least twenty-five years earlier when, in his "Moral Essay upon Solitude," he exalted that state above public employment with all its advantages; notwithstanding which, he acted, with a short interval only, as king's advocate, or public prosecutor, from 1674 to 1688, during all those most exciting and terrible years when Scotland was working out, in blood, her own

emancipation from a civil and religious tyranny as ruthless as that of Alva in the Netherlands, though happily much less successful. There is no doubt at all, therefore, that of the civil side of prosecutions for witchcraft this eminent lawyer must have seen and known more than any other Scotsman of his day, and there is equally little doubt that his own personal convictions were thoroughly in accord with the general belief, even as professed among his political and ecclesiastical opponents. "That there are witches," he writes, "divines cannot doubt, since the word of God ordains that no witch shall live; nor lawyers in Scotland, seeing our law ordains it to be punished with death."* And lest these should be taken as merely official utterances, he proceeds with all the apparent strength and intensity of a fixed and rooted belief in demoniacal agencies, to dispute under several heads the opinions of "Wierus, that great patron of witchcraft," in a manner far more plausible, if not more earnest and convincing, than that of King James, in the treatise above referred to, which inaugurated the new era of witch-persecutions under Protestant rule, in the very beginning of the century. But while the general principle of the punishment of witches, even with death (since witchcraft is "the greatest of crimes, accompanied with murder, poisoning, bestiality, and other horrid crimes") is thus steadily maintained, Mackenzie goes on to argue—"Yet from the horridness of this crime, I do conclude, that of all crimes it requires the clearest relevancy and most convincing probation. And I condemn, *next to the witches themselves*, those cruel and too forward judges who burn persons by thousands as guilty of this crime, to whom I shall recommend these considerations."

Here follows an extremely logical and well balanced argument under twenty-six heads, in which it is plain that the author's experience, here placed deliberately before the public only ten years before the close of his career as a Crown official, and, therefore, with the most complete information, as well as under the fullest sense of responsibility, had led him greatly to distrust, and even strongly to deprecate, the current judicial proceedings under which "poor ignorant creatures, and oft times women who understand not the nature of what they are accused of, and mistake their own fears and apprehensions

* *Discourse on the Laws and Customs of Scotland in matters Criminal*. 1678. Title X, "Witchcraft." This chapter will be found entire, with much other extremely interesting matter bearing on this subject, in a little volume reprinted in 1877. (Gardner, Paisley.) *A History of the Witches of Renfrewshire*.

for witchcraft," are deliberately tormented with the view of making them confess. In his earnest pleadings to this effect, Sir George Mackenzie appears to much greater advantage than in those political trials which procured for him in Scotland the evil reputation of "the bloodthirsty advocate." The vivid impression he leaves on the mind, *ex certissima scientia* (as he says) of "poor creatures, confounded with fear, and so starved for want of meat and sleep, that hardly wiser and more serious persons than they would escape distraction;" of others, "tortured by their keepers, who, being persuaded that they do God good service, think it their duty to vex and torment poor prisoners;" and the admission "that most of all that ever were taken were tormented after this manner, and this usage was the ground of all their confession," taken in connection with the very loose methods of procedure which he denounces in measured, but still powerful and convincing language; all these suggestions, proceeding from a man by no means too tender hearted, and believing in witchcraft as "the greatest of crimes," demanding for its punishment "the most ignominious of deaths," form a picture not easily to be surpassed of strong common-sense fighting with inveterate prejudice. And when we consider the rather timid, but profoundly wise recommendation he makes, to "remit to physicians and others to consider what may be the effects of melancholy"—*i. e.*, insanity, in their bearing upon witch prosecutions; we feel bound to reflect, in the name of justice and charity, that many of those who accused Sir George (probably with abundant justification) of bloodthirstiness were themselves the chief abettors of these monstrous prosecutions, and would have regarded a "remit to physicians" in such cases on the ground of insanity as sheer enmity to God and collusion with Satan.

But whether the physicians of those days, under any conceivable form of judicial "remit," could have risen to the height of the duty thus sought to be imposed on them, must be regarded as doubtful; inasmuch as I have not encountered a single instance in Scotland, during the period referred to, in which such a remit was formally made. In England, however, we know that at one assize, at least, one of the most eminent, and probably also one of the most humane, of her many great judges, Sir Matthew Hale, was supported by the opinion of one of the most delightful of medical authorities (speaking of him in a literary sense), in using the powers of the law then existing in the sternest manner, and apparently after every possible consideration, against this imaginary

crime. The occasion was the condemnation of two old women at the assizes held 10th March, 1664, at Bury St. Edmund's, in Suffolk, on an indictment for bewitching seven persons. Sir Thomas Browne, the celebrated author of the *Religio Medici*, gave evidence at this trial, and expressed his opinion that the persons named in the indictment were actually bewitched. The testimony as to the guilt of the accused persons, however, was in other respects conflicting; and the judge, in addressing the jury, declined to repeat or comment upon the evidence, but strongly affirmed the reality of witchcraft, appealing to the Scriptures, and also to "the wisdom of all nations, which had provided laws against such persons." The blameless integrity and impartiality of this judge, and the remarkable benignity of his personal character, combine to make the issue of this solemn proceeding peculiarly impressive. "He desired the jury strictly to observe the evidence, and implored the great God of heaven to direct their hearts in so weighty a matter; for to condemn the innocent, and to let the guilty go free, were both 'an abomination to the Lord.' The jury found the prisoners guilty upon the several indictments, thirteen in number. The judge and all the court *being fully satisfied with the verdict*, judgment of death was given, and the penalty was suffered."

The details of this trial are to be found in a rare treatise published in 1683, a copy of which is in the British Museum; also in *A Collection of Modern Relations of Matter of Fact Concerning Witches and Witchcraft upon the Persons of the People, &c.*, 1693. This last collection contains also an unfinished meditation, said to have been written by Judge Hale, "the next Lord's day after his trial of the witches." Mr. Cotton Mather printed this trial in his *Wonders of the Invisible World*; and the opinion of Sir Matthew Hale must therefore be held to have had some influence, more or less, in justifying at the time the frightful outbreak of fanaticism among the Puritans of New England, which distinguished the closing years of the century, 1689-93.

In Mr. Lecky's *History of Rationalism** will be found the most modern and, in some respects, the most broad and philosophical view of the whole of this dark subject, considered as a phase of the evolution of European civilisation and progress. But I cannot leave it, even in a note, without expressing, more strongly than even Mr. Lecky does, the

* *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe.* By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. 2nd Edition. 1865. Vol. ii, Chap. 1, "On Magic and Witchcraft."

unqualified admiration and surprise which arise in the mind on finding that in 1584, or eighty years before the trial just referred to, there was at least one man in England, and he not a physician, nor yet a lawyer, nor a divine, who could scan the whole field of demonology, and all its terrible results in history, with an eye as clear from superstition, and a judgment as sound and unwavering in its opposition to abuses, as that of Mr. Lecky himself. There is only one book, so far as I know, in any language, written in the 16th or even the 17th century, that merits this praise; and it is a book which, notwithstanding its wide human interest, its great and solid learning, and a charming English style that makes it most readable even at the present day, has never been reprinted for two hundred years, and is therefore extremely inaccessible to most readers. Reginald Scot's *Discoverie of Witchcraft** has been often referred to by persons who, I have reason to think, had never even seen it; and being included

* The full title of the original edition of this remarkable volume is as follows:—*The Discoverie of witchcraft, Wherein the lewde dealing of witches and witchmongers is notablie detected, the knaverie of conjurors, the impietie of inchantors, the follie of soothsaiers, the impudent falshood of couseners, the infidelitie of atheists, the pestilent practises of Pythonists, the curiositie of figurecasters, the vanitie of dreamers, the beggerlie art of Alcumystrie, the abomination of idolatrie, the horrible art of poisoning, the vertue and power of naturall magike, and all the conueiances of Legierdemaine and iuggling are deciphered: and many other things opened, which have long lien hidden, howbeit verie necessarie to be knowne. Heervnto is added a treatise vpon the nature and substance of spirits and diuels, &c: all latelie written by REGINALD SCOT, Esquire.*—“I IOHN, 4, 1—Belieue not everie spirit, but trie the spirits, whether they are of God; for manie false prophets are gone out into the world, &c. 1584.”

Well might King James, from his opposite point of view in the controversy, protest against “the damnable opinions of . . . one called Scot, an Englishman, [who] is not ashamed in publicke print to denie that there can be such a thing as Witchcraft, and so maintains the old error of the Sadducees in denying of spirits”—an argument much more fully and ably maintained, nearly a century afterwards, by Joseph Glanvil, late Chaplain-in-Ordinary to His Majesty, and Fellow of the Royal Society, in his *Saducismus Triumphatus*; in reference to whose position in philosophy, literature, and theology, the reader will do well to consult Mr. Lecky's book, above mentioned, and also the admirable work of the Very Rev. Principal Tulloch on *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century*.

along with the treatise of John Wier (*De Prestigiis Dæmonum et Incantationibus ac Veneficiis*, Basil, 1566), in a common condemnation by the royal witch-hunter, King James VI, it may on this account alone, besides its intrinsic merits, be said to have a historical importance. Nothing, however, is more evident than that Scot, however indebted to Wier (and both of them, probably, to Cornelius Agrippa, whose life has been so pleasantly portrayed for us by Mr. Henry Morley), was far in advance of either in the clearness of his views and the unwavering steadiness of his leanings to the side of humanity and justice. The book stands brightly out amid the darkness of its own and the succeeding age, as a perfectly unique example of sagacity amounting to genius, indeed, it is rather more than probable (as Nathan Drake has endeavoured to show) that Shakspeare may have drawn from it many of his allusions, and, in one point at least, a part of the more substantial machinery of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*. It gives me great pleasure to mention here that a reprint of this curious book is in progress, edited by my friend Dr. Brinsley Nicholson, a member of the new Shakspeare Society, and a well known student of Elizabethan literature. It will shortly be published by Mr. Elliot Stock. The work of John Wier has also been recently reproduced in an old French translation in Paris, under the auspices of the journal *Le Progrès Médical*, edited by Charcot and Bourneville, as bearing upon the medical questions referred to in this note.

D.—*Genius and Insanity*.—In a recent Essay on “Mad Poets,” in the *Journal of Psychological Medicine* (I believe by a very distinguished former physician to an Asylum, and afterwards Commissioner in Lunacy), twenty-four leading instances are advanced, the types of insanity exhibited being chiefly (according to the anonymous author) melancholia, mania, monomania, and moral insanity, in the order of frequency here set down. Objections might be taken to this classification, and even to some of the instances given, the most noted of which, however, are Alfieri and Tasso, Rousseau, Chatterton, Collins, Savage, Swift, Cowper, Charles Lamb, Coleridge, Bloomfield, Tannahill, E. A. Poe. One is scarcely reconciled to finding Schiller and Charles Lamb (surely in many or most respects among the sanest of men of genius) in this list, at least if Shelley, Byron, Keats and others of lesser note, are rightly left out.

Thus far I had written in illustration of the statements in the text, upon a subject equally interesting from the

medical and from the psychological side, without being aware that one of the most able and eminent of modern authorities on the latter aspect of the question had formulated his views upon it with a far greater wealth of literary illustration than was possible for me, and in language which I should be only too glad, for the most part, to adopt as my own. Mr. James Sully, the author of a well known psychological study on "Illusions," published in 1881, and of several cognate works, has contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* magazine for June (published the very same day as this address) an investigation of the relations of "Genius and Insanity," from which I trust I may here be excused for quoting a few passages only, in order to show what the reader may expect from a perusal of the whole article. I will only add, in the way of remark, that the undesigned coincidences between Mr. Sully's views and those here expressed are very apparent throughout, so that I feel tempted rather to avoid selecting parallel passages, and to indicate the drift of the argument rather by a few excerpts marked with the peculiar impress of the author's method of psychological analysis.

After directing attention to the most recent literary illustrations afforded by the publication of Carlyle's *Journals and Letters*, as bearing upon "the long-standing puzzle, 'Is genius something wholly normal and sane?'" Mr. Sully proceeds to show how inevitably the distance, the loneliness, and therefore the apparent eccentricity of genius tend to create a prejudice against it as "a thing unnatural and misshapen." And thus arises, in the first instance, the paradox in common opinion, that the "human intellect rejoicing in titanic strength," and "that same intellect disordered and pitiably enfeebled" are both of them abnormal, in respect that they are equally and strangely differentiated from the "ordinary type of intelligence." "Indeed, as has been well said, the original teacher has this much in common with the man mentally deranged, that he 'is in a minority of one;' and, when pains are not taken to note the direction of the divergence, originality may readily be confounded with the most stupid singularity."

When the Greeks came to adopt a view of all such phenomena which tended to invest with supernatural attributes all the higher manifestations of genius, by connecting these in idea with the superior quality of the *δαίμων* which attended each individual from his birth, it was a further approximation to the conception, oriental in origin, but at a later period degraded into a mere base superstition, "of an evil spirit

taking captive the human frame and using it as an instrument of its foul purposes." Thus madness and genius were linked by the further association of a spiritual agency apart from the inner human spirit proper to the individual, a mode of association, however, which in the first instance was so regarded as to elevate madness, rather than to depress genius, in the balance of a philosophic judgment.

"It was remarked by Aristotle, who was a long way the shrewdest and most scientific observer of antiquity, that all men of genius have been melancholic or atrabilious. He instances Empedocles, Socrates, and Plato, and the larger number of the poets. And the page of modern biographic literature would supply many a striking illustration of the same temperament. The pessimism of Johnson, Swift, Byron, and Carlyle, of Schopenhauer and Lenau, of Leopardi and of Lamartine, may perhaps be taken as a signal manifestation of the gloom which is apt to encompass great and elevated spirits, like the mists which drift towards and encircle the highest mountain peaks."

But the association between genius and insanity may be stated in terms more precise than the above. The tendency to suicide, and the numerous instances of "fully developed mental disease" which are recorded as occurring among those eminent for great gifts of mind, and the "number of great men that have died from disease of the nerve-centres," go to show that there is a disproportionate proclivity to physical, as well as psychical disorganisation in the very faculties that minister to genius. Even "the lesser forms of nervous disorder—headache, malaise, and recurring periods of nervous prostration—are too common among all brain-workers to call for special notice here. The latest biography of a woman of genius strikingly illustrates this milder form of the penalty which mortals have to pay for daring to aspire to the ranks of the immortals. In George Eliot we have one more name added to the list of great ones to whom, to use the words of a French writer, has been granted '*le funeste privilège d'entendre crier à toute heure les ressorts de leur machine.*'"

After a very full and, I think, unbiassed criticism of all that can be alleged in qualification of the argument as brought out with a great variety of striking examples, the following paragraphs may be taken as representing the author's ultimate conclusions:—

"In the present state of our knowledge, then, genius must be looked upon as the most signal and impressive manifestation of that tendency of nature to variation and individuation

in her organic formations which modern science is compelled to retain among its unexplained facts. Why we have a Shakespeare, a Michael Angelo, a Goethe here and now, is a question that cannot be answered. Our ignorance of the many hidden threads that make up the inextricable skein of causation forces us to regard each new appearance of the lamp of genius with much of the wonder, if with something less of the superstition, with which the ancients viewed it."

"Our conclusion is that the possession of genius carries with it special liabilities to the action of the disintegrating forces which environ us all. It involves a state of delicate equipoise, of unstable equilibrium, in the psycho-physical organisation. Paradoxical as it may seem, one may venture to affirm that great original power of mind is incompatible with nice adjustment to surroundings, and so with perfect well-being. And here it is that we see the real qualitative difference between genius and talent. This last means superior endowment in respect of the common practical intelligence which all men understand and appraise. The man of talent follows the current modes of thought, keeps his eye steadily fixed on the popular eye, produces the kind of thing which hits the taste of the moment, and is never guilty of the folly of abandoning himself to the intoxicating excitement of production. To the original inventor of ideas and moulder of new forms of art this intoxication is, as we have seen, everything. He is under a kind of divine behest to make and fashion something new and great, and at the moment of compliance reckes little of the practical outcome to himself. And such recklessness is clearly only one form of imprudence, and so of mal-adaptation.

"But if improvident, he is improvident in a high cause. Emerson and others have taught us the uses of the great man. The teacher of a new truth, the discoverer of a higher and worthier form of artistic expression, is one in advance of his age, who by his giant exertions enables the community, and even the whole race, to reach forward to a further point in the line of intellectual evolution. He is a scout who rides out well in advance of the intellectual army, and who by this very advance and isolation from the main body is exposed to special perils. Thus genius, like philanthropy or conscious self-sacrifice for others, is a mode of variation of human nature which though unfavourable to the conservation of the individual, aids in the evolution of the species."

E.—*The Windham Case.* The following brief summary of this famous and altogether discreditable litigation will be

found in the *Annual Register* for 1862. And since many of my readers may probably have forgotten, or even not have been aware of the facts, and of the impression produced by them at the time on the public mind, I have also added extracts from contemporary leading articles in the *Spectator*, *Saturday Review*, and *Lancet*, as indicating the general tenor of lay, as well as medical, opinion. It may be added that the scandalous waste both of time and of money involved in the trial, and the confusion and utter incongruity of the evidence submitted to the jury were so evident as to bring about almost immediately a reform in the English procedure in such cases, in consequence of which Commissioners *de lunatico inquirendo* were directed in future to limit the extent of the inquiry into the facts (which in Mr. Windham's case had been allowed to range over the whole life of the alleged lunatic); and also formally to exclude the evidence of scientific experts, in so far as it proceeded merely on opinion, and not on any personal acquaintance with the facts of the case. A Bill, with these objects in view, was introduced into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor (Westbury), on 27th February, 1862, and after a long and interesting debate, in which all the legal authorities of that house took an active part, was sent down to the House of Commons, where in committee, on 14th July, 1862, the exclusion, as proposed, of the medical evidence of opinion only was strenuously resisted by Sir Hugh Cairns and others, but after a division was ultimately carried and remained part of the Bill. This "Lunacy Regulation Act" received the Royal Assent on 7th August, 1862, and is now the law of the land; a very remarkable testimony to the widespread and irresistible current of legal as well as general opinion whereby, without admitting any essential failure of justice, the legislature, heretofore passive in the presence of more or less similar facts of daily occurrence, suddenly awakened to a new sense of duty, and came at once to recognise the existence of grave abuses unavoidable under the existing forms of legal procedure. What is, however, perhaps still more remarkable is that in all the discussions and proceedings, in Parliament and elsewhere, arising out of the Windham case, and issuing, as we have just seen, in a very much needed, though incomplete, reform in England, so little attention seems to have been given to the fact that in Scotland, by a usage in the Court of Session extending over much more than a century (from 1730)—and confirmed on appeal by the House of Lords itself after lengthened debate and consideration in 1828—a much simpler course is usually adopted, which gives satisfaction to the

country and to all concerned, and in all but an insignificant number of cases has made recourse to the troublesome and expensive process of "cognition" before a jury wholly unnecessary.* The case on which the appeal was taken (James Bryce, John Dickson, and others, *appellants*; Walter Graham, *respondent*) was not without points of resemblance to the Windham case, such as to make it more than probable that, had the latter occurred in Scotland, a few hundred pounds, at most, instead of so many thousands, would have been spent in litigation. Moreover, the supercilious critics of the *Saturday Review* would not then have enjoyed the supreme satisfaction of cynically contemplating with approval the wretched prodigal "brought down to the husks and the swine troughs;" while the "filthy and often incredible details," the free publication of which for thirty-four successive days in the newspapers was so great an aggravation of the scandal, would have been confined, for the most part, to the four walls of a court. And, what is perhaps of more consequence than all, the well known simplicity and reasonableness of the procedure, thus tested on every side by so many years' practical experience in Scotland, would in all probability have arrested the prodigal's downward career (without, at all events unnecessarily, interfering with the freedom of his person) through the simple appointment of a *curator bonis* to administer the estate, subject to the direction of the court. Is it, then, a part of the creed of the average Englishman, as it appears to have been of the *Saturday Reviewers*, that the Windham case, here briefly recorded, is a great and beneficial moral lesson which requires from time to time to be repeated as a warning to "prodigals," and for the edification of society? It may be safely affirmed that outside of England, perhaps even of London, no such opinion would at any time have been possible. At all events, in no other country in Europe, and least of all in Scotland, would the physical and moral utter ruin of Mr. William Frederick

* See Wilson & Shaw's *Reports of Cases Decided in the House of Lords on Appeal from the Courts of Scotland*, 1826-28, vol. ii, p. 481; and vol. iii, p. 323. Also, *Cases Decided in the Court of Session*, 1828, vol. vi, p. 425. I am happy to acknowledge here the kind assistance of Mr. James Graham, of A. J. & A. Graham, Glasgow, in giving me access to these references; and also of Mr. R. Bruce Johnston, W.S., of Edinburgh, by whose favour I am enabled to state that the entire number of applications to Chancery for briefs of cognition of alleged insane persons in Scotland, from 1864 to 1st June 1885, has been sixteen (or less than one in each year); while the applications for the appointment of a *curator bonis* during the same period have been very numerous.

Windham, of Felbrigg Hall, have been allowed to proceed to its final consummation, in the much abused name of "liberty," without some kind of more or less effective legal supervision and control.

Annual Register, 1862, p. 472.—"At the commencement of this year the attention of the public was much occupied by an inquiry which had been legally instituted to ascertain the mental competency of Mr. William Frederick Windham, of Felbrigg Hall, Norfolk, to manage his own affairs. This young gentleman, the only son of the late Mr. Howe Windham, who died in 1854, and the great grandson of Mr. Windham, the celebrated politician,* became of age on the 9th of August, 1861, when he succeeded to the Felbrigg Hall estate, worth upwards of £1,200 a-year, and to other properties in which he had a life-interest, and which, in the year 1869, would yield him £9,000 a-year more. During his minority he had been left to the guardianship of his uncle, General Windham, of Crimean renown, and of his mother, Lady Sophia Hervey, sister of the late Marquess of Bristol.

"From infancy he had exhibited many loathsome peculiarities of disposition, and many unhappy infirmities of mental capacity. As he grew up, these peculiarities and infirmities (in defiance of every effort made to eradicate them) appeared to strengthen rather than diminish; and when he became of age, one of his first acts—in addition to many of a very unbecoming nature—was to marry a woman of loose character, upon whom he bestowed jewellery of the value of £1,200 or £1,400, and upon whom he settled a present annuity of £800, with a further annuity of £1,500, contingent upon his coming in to the whole of his property in 1869. He also sold, in a wild and reckless way, and upon terms of the utmost disadvantage, the whole of the timber, ornamental as well as useful, on the Felbrigg estate. Altogether, his conduct, as soon as he became his own master, was such as to threaten a speedy dissipation of the whole of his property, and to raise a reasonable doubt as to his being mentally capable of managing his own affairs. Under these circumstances, Gen. Windham, his late guardian, felt it incumbent upon him to take some steps to preserve the Windham estates from

* The *Lancet* denies that the unfortunate subject of the "Windham Case" was a descendant of the well known statesman. "The famous Windham transmitted his name and fortune to a family named Lukin. The late Admiral Windham was one of this family. The fact is, no Lukin has been able to acquire the intellect of a Windham by donning this illustrious name. That mould has long been broken up."—*Lancet*, 1st February, 1862, p. 127.

becoming utterly wasted. At his suit, therefore, a commission *de lunatico inquirendo* was issued, to ascertain the state of the young man's mind, and to say whether he was or was not fit to be entrusted with the management and control of the large property of which he was the inheritor.

"This commission was opened in the Court of Exchequer by Mr. Samuel Warren, a Commissioner in Lunacy, and a special jury of twenty-one (*Qu.* twenty-two, see following footnote) persons, on the 16th of December, 1861, and did not close till the 30th of the January following, thirty-four of the intervening days having been wholly occupied by the inquiry; upwards of one hundred and fifty witnesses having been examined, and almost all the leading talent of the Bar of England having been heard in support of the various interests involved in the investigation.

"Into the details of this case, as developed in evidence before the commission, it would be inconsistent with every sense of decency and propriety here to enter. No public advantage would be derived from bestowing upon them such a permanent record as these pages would give; whilst every sensitive mind, recoiling from the description of them, would earnestly desire that so sad, so humiliating, and so revolting an instance of human infirmity should be left without a historian. It is enough to say that the courses of this young man's life, as exhibited in his habits, tastes, and conversation, were shown to be such as to leave no doubt of his being completely unworthy of the station to which he was born; but upon the main point of the inquiry—the question of whether he laboured under such a congenital infirmity of the brain as to render him irresponsible for his actions, and to incapacitate him for the management of his affairs—the medical testimony was so discordant and conflicting as to carry no clear or positive conviction with it. At the close, therefore, of the thirty-fourth day of the inquiry, the jury,* after an anxious summing up of the whole case on the part of the Commissioner, returned a verdict in these words: 'We find Mr. William Frederick Windham to be of sound mind, and capable of managing himself and his affairs.' By the public, who had narrowly watched the proceedings from the commencement—with no sympathy, it must be confessed, for the depravities of the alleged lunatic, but with the keenest

* "A diversity of opinion prevailed among the twenty-two special jurymen who sat on this celebrated inquisition. Fifteen considered the alleged lunatic of sound mind, while seven thought otherwise."—*Lancet* of 8th February, 1862, p. 162.

jealousy lest the cherished liberty of an Englishman to do what he likes with his own should be in the slightest degree infringed—this verdict was accepted with general approval.

“What was thought of the whole matter in the graver quarters to which these popular impulses did not extend, may be gathered from the words of Lord Justice Knight Bruce, who, in refusing to exonerate the alleged lunatic from the payment of the whole of the costs consequent upon the inquiry—costs amounting to something like £20,000—said:—‘The jury had decided that Mr. Windham was not a congenital imbecile, and he (the Lord Justice) did not mean to impugn their decision, but if he were asked to go further he should not be prepared to do so. He did not doubt that there was a sufficient case for the inquiry, nor could he question the motives of the original petitioners when he considered what had occurred shortly after Mr. Windham came into possession of his property. Upon the whole, his opinion was that the original application was *bonâ fide*—not made from personal motives or considerations, but with a view to the best interests of this petitioner; and, whether the Court had or had not jurisdiction to entertain this application, he thought the petition ought to be dismissed, so far as it related to the question of costs.’”

The Spectator, 1862, p. 95.—“There is no need to dwell on the filthy and often incredible details of the evidence. It discloses a sort of Walpurgis night, in which this miserable representative of an ancient house is to be seen surrounded by a gibbering circle of degrading associates—low lodging-house keepers, sharp money-lenders, railway guards, policemen, prostitutes, and attorneys, all eager for booty—while the pigeon, not very clearheaded even at the best of times, muddled yet more by the discrepancy between his comparatively narrow present income and his really splendid future prospects, yields himself an easy prey, until, finally, his relations, irritated by his follies, their family pride revolted by the shameless imprudence of his marriage, attribute, in their indignation, to mental disease the consequences of an evil training for which it is impossible to hold them wholly irresponsible.”

The Saturday Review, 1st February, 1862, p. 122, adopts also the view of legal sanity, but in the usual “Saturday” manner proceeds as follows:—“By giving Windham a verdict, you consign him to certain beggary. And why not? Why should not the certain and tremendous consequences of unbridled lust and egregious folly follow? Why should not the prodigal who wastes his substance on harlots and riotous

living be brought down to the husks and the swine troughs in the end? Windham spurned from the door of the wretched creature who has helped him to ruin is a better example to society than Windham fat, idle, and well cared for under mild and domestic supervision at Turnham Green."

The Lancet, 1st February, 1862, adopts the alternative of sanity (in a legal sense) as in accordance with the whole evidence, but with the following important reservation—"His proper settlement may perhaps be found in the border-land between sanity and insanity. We shall not be proud to welcome him as a denizen of the land of healthy mind. But we cannot find it in our hearts to banish him to those dreary realms which lie beyond the limits of rational and free humanity."