Strictures on phrenological doctrines upon the human intellect : in a letter addressed to Dr. Spurzheim / by John Manesca.

STRICTURES

ON

PHRENOLOGICAL DOCTRINES

UPON THE

HUMAN INTELLECT,

IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO

Dr. SPURZHEIM.

BY JOHN MANESCA.

New-York:
PUBLISHED BY BETTS & ANSTICE,
No. 214 Broadway.

1832.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The present work, which for the last four months has occupied my leisure hours, had just been finished, and I was waiting until the distinguished individual to whom it is addressed should arrive in this city, and begin his public lectures, before I would venture to publish it, when the newspapers brought the sorrowful information of his untimely death. The next impression that followed the painful sentiment I experienced at the sad news, was the regret of my having toiled in vain ; but upon consideration, it appeared to me that the demise of Dr. Spurzheim could not affect the object for which my letter was intended, and that strict propriety would not be opposed to its publication, headed, as it is, with the name of the illustrious supporter of Phrenology. Consequently, I at length determined upon delivering my manuscript to the printer, prefaced with my humble request, that the public will deign to accept the respectful dedication of this little performance.

To Dr. SPURZHEIM.

Sir,

I at first hesitated to express to you, thus publicly, my doubts and objections concerning the phrenological doctrines which you profess, as I feared it might be disagreeable to your feelings ; but a little reflection satisfied me that my apprehensions were ill-founded. "Superior men," said I to myself, "are too well aware how accessible the human mind is to delusion, and they have too much at heart the interest of truth, not to appreciate and welcome all rational objections tending to rectify the ideas which they promulgate." Such a thought, sir, put an end to my hesitation, and I immediately made up my mind to address to you the present letter, which, unable as I am at this moment to form a proper estimate of the whole extent of the field that I shall have to explore, may, or may not, be the last I shall have the honour to write to you.

Although I have not the advantage of knowing you personally, still I am not altogether unacquainted with your labours and works ; and, limited as my knowledge of them is, in consequence of my deficiency in *anatomical* science, it has been sufficient, however, to produce my conviction of the great extent of your scientific acquirements, and inspire me with admiration for your indefatigable zeal for the advancement of science ; insomuch that, while with great diffidence I dare express opinions which are at variance with your doctrines, the respectful sentiments which animate me are commensurate with your claims to public gratitude and consideration.

I am aware of the difficulties and disadvantages under which I shall labour throughout this performance : one, or perhaps two letters, will afford me but a scanty space for the numerous evolutions necessary to present a front against, and assail with success, every point of an ingeniously defended system ; and it is in the midst of my daily avocations, and thousand troubles incident to civil and domestic life, that I must think and write, in a foreign language too, which, at all times, is an unwieldy weapon to attack with, and not unfrequently more dangerous to the assailant than to his adversary. To this, I must add my want of your writings, nay, of all other works upon phrenology, except the elements of that science, by Mr. George Combe, on which, and a few notes hastily taken, some eight or nine years ago, from your *physiognomical system*, I shall have to depend for *point d'appui* in my intended attack. With these obstacles before me, when

I consider the poverty of my means, and then your extensive information and deserved celebrity, my courage, I confess, is near forsaking me, and nothing short of the conviction that a little good for the world may still be the result of so unequal an encounter, can sustain my resolution to go through the adventurous task.

Craniology, that is, the study of the various appearances which the human skull presents to our observation, may be considered as a new science, for the existence of which, the world is indebted to Dr. Gall and his followers, among whom you, sir, are occupying a conspicuous place. Until Dr. Gall's time, the multifarious differences and varieties in forms and sizes, which exist among the heads of men, had not probably been unobserved; but, so far as I am informed, he was the first who thought of methodizing the study of those phenomena in order to ascend to their causes.

In the course of his researches, that ingenious man soon found out that all protuberances of the cranium corresponded with cavities upon the under surface of the skull; and subsequent observations convinced him that these cavities are effected by corresponding similar protuberances upon the periphery of the brain; insomuch that, in such series of facts so intimately connected, the Doctor, with plausibility, concluded that the most obdurate scepticism could not refuse to admit that *there* exist cause and effect.

So far, I have myself nothing to object; neither do I feel any reluctance in admitting that those differences and inequalities upon the surface of the brain are effected by certain correspondent developements of its internal organs, which opinion, it appears, has been substantiated in the course of the observations that have been made upon its organic structure.

Without possessing anatomical or physiological knowledge, any person will easily comprehend and believe, that the muscular appearances observed upon the arm of a strong athletic man, are the necessary results of an internal developement commensurate with the exterior developement of the member; but that, in the best modelled limb, there should exist a single essential constituent organ which is not to be found in the weakest and least developed; that a single position and motion, in which strength is not necessary, can be assumed and performed by the former, that the latter is incapacitated to assume and execute, no reasonable man will imagine, no phrenologist or physiologist, I think, will pretend to maintain.

I am ready to concede, that the brain and its amazing convolutions, are necessary to produce the phenomena that we call mind; but so long as I shall not be shown that that organ is *not* complete and perfect in every individual; that its properties depend on its *size* and *mass*, and not on its primitive constitution, I will look for an explanation of those intellectual and moral differences observable among the individuals of our species, to some circumstances which have a more direct relation with that attribute which we designate by the term *mind*. An equilateral triangle, no matter how small, has the same properties with the largest equilateral triangle imaginable; the most diminutive human creature is necessarily provided with the same

organs of all kinds, that the most gigantic are ; *smallness*, *bigness*, are relative terms which may interest our worldly concerns, but when it is a question of a *simple indivisible* attribute, such as a mental perception is, I am at a loss to comprehend where the analogy lies.

Physiologists tell us that the attribute of *sensibility* is the appendage of the nervous apparatus which is spread *all over the body ;* but they do not wish us to believe that *sensibility* can actually take place without those nerves being acted upon ; in like manner, the organs of the brain, endued with the property of *perceiving*, cannot be pretended to produce the phenomena of perception, unless they are stimulated by something ; it follows, that the nerves spread throughout the body, and the organs of the brain, are not *independent* agents in the acts of *sensibility* and *perception ;* hence, when I see a man deficient in such or such idea or ideas, I do not feel warranted to say that his organic constitution is deficient, but I merely conclude that those organs which possess the property of producing such idea or ideas, have not been acted upon.

I conceive an attribute to be *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable*. A *sensation* or *perception* is an attribute, but *contraction* and *vibration* are not, for they are *motions* occupying time and space ; consequently, any affection upon the nerves or the organs of the brain, that we can imagine and suppose to be produced by external agents when *sensation* and *perception* take place, *should not* be confounded with *sensation* and *perception :* hence, I consider it hazardous in the extreme, to have assumed that *thinking agitates* the brain, *affects* it, *causes* its developement, and ultimately produces those effects upon its surface ; and yet such is the hypothesis upon which phrenology has established its doctrines of intellect.

But, sir, let us suppose that the developement of the brain is immediately effected by mental phenomena ; that those external appearances upon the surface of the brain are the result of such developement, and, consequently, signs of those phenomena, where must we apply for genuine proofs for your mental subdivisions into faculties and propensities, located in this or that section of the brain ? Your answer is not difficult to anticipate : you will tell me that those numerous *coincidences* which have been observed among men possessing the same faculties and propensities with similar appearances, are *facts* sufficiently strong to support all phrenological deductions concerning the human intellect. But, sir, are we never deceived by or rather *about* facts ? The first man who put his staff into water and drew it out, and repeated over and over the experiment, must have judged, from *facts*, that water bent his staff, while the air straightened it ; whence he might have concluded that the former element had the property of bending sticks, and the latter that of straightening them ; upon which he could have, very naturally and logically, indulged in strange speculations upon the specific constitution and properties of the two above named elements, which sceptics could not have objected to without incurring the risk of being silenced by the argument of *facts*, produced by the experimentalist. The Indian strictly attends

to facts, who says, "*I shoot nothing, I catch nothing; I get great medicine, then I shoot every thing, never miss, and get fish as many as I can. Huh! is not that owing to the great medicine?*"

(See *Westward Ho!*)

Mankind, sir, with all their errors, and conceits, and prejudices, cannot be reproached for not attending to facts: the links which connect them they are apt to overlook. For my part, I am suspicious of facts that force me into conclusions which contradict and annihilate all my previous experience. The human intellect, such as experience has made me conceive it, is the exclusive result of the operation of external agents upon the sensitive and perceptive system of man; nothing will persuade me that the actual absence of sensation or perception is owing to any thing but the actual want of external agency, and any alleged *fact* which leads to a different conclusion, I think to be deceptive.

At the time Dr. Gall began his phrenological career, he was young, inexperienced, and his notions upon the human mind partook of the errors and prejudices of that period.

"Dr. Gall was a child," says Mr. George Combe, in the preliminary observations which are found at the beginning of his book, "when he was first struck with the moral and intellectual differences which are found among the individuals of the human species. Some of his schoolmates were characterized by the beauty of their *penmanship;* some, by their success in *arithmetic;* and others, by their talents for acquiring a knowledge of *natural history* and *language.*"

Surely, those differences have escaped the observation of few men; but the true manner of accounting for them has been, even to this day, apprehended by a still smaller number. Every one has felt that a knowledge of the human mind would unfold the mystery; but the proper course to be followed, in order to acquire that knowledge, was, and perhaps still is, as great a mystery. The ideas of Dr. Gall, upon the whole subject, were, in my opinion, extremely crude, and of such a nature as to remove him more and more from the proper point of view in which he should have been placed to discover the truth.

"He reflected," says Mr. G. Combe, "that his brothers and sisters, and schoolfellows, had all *received very nearly the same education;* but that he had still observed each of them unfolding a distinct character, *over which circumstances appeared to exert only a limited control,*" &c.—(See *Preliminary Observations.*)

It would be impossible for me to maintain the unity of argumentation in the present strictures, if I did not suppose that the opinions, expressed in the proposition italicised, in the foregoing extract, and, indeed, all the opinions of Dr. Gall, transmitted to us by Mr. G. Combe, *are yours, sir, as well as every other modern phrenologist's;* for, if phrenologists now admit that *education exclusively creates the mind;* if they now concede that *no two individuals can ever receive the very same education,* and that all intellectual and moral differences observable among men, are the necessary results of education, then they materially differ from the founder of the science which they profess; then phrenology is based upon two contradictory principles, and

my criticism of its doctrines must assume a twofold character, viz. the one opposing Dr. Gall's fundamental views, and the other discussing yours, together with those of reformed phrenology; so that, the very thing I might say against the phrenology of Dr. Gall, I should have to unsay when I alluded to modern reformed phrenology: the same things I should have alternately to commend and to condemn, as they would belong to the one or the other principle, which would be extremely puzzling to me, and still more so perhaps to my readers. But as it is not less my interest than it is theirs, that new difficulties should not be added to those which already are in my way, I will adopt the first alternative; and the more readily, as not only no formal declaration to the contrary, from modern phrenologists, has ever reached me, but, because phrenology, as it is developed in your works, sir, and in your public lectures, appears to me to stand on the identical foundations upon which Dr. Gall erected it.

Thus, sir, the father of phrenology conceived that individuals, *having received nearly the same education*, and being, notwithstanding, intellectually and morally different from one another, must have been made so by some other causes than those which act upon *sensibility*; but, if we exclude those causes by which our sensitive and perceptive organs are acted upon, when sensation or perception, that is, MIND, is produced, what remains? NOTHING: except it be assumed, that the organs themselves possess the faculty of setting themselves in action, that they create their own activity; in short, that *sensation*, *perception* or *mind*, MAKES ITSELF.

We should not be surprised, that, after so bold an assumption, Dr. Gall felt no reluctance in concluding that there existed certain *faculties* and propensities unequally distributed or developed among individuals, which, independent of extraneous influences, produced those differences observable among them; and such conclusion, sir, and the erroneous opinion whence it sprung, which appear to me a complete misconception of the human intellect, are the foundation of *his* phrenological doctrines, such as they are promulgated by *all* phrenologists of the present day. Let us see whether my assertion is well founded. Mr. G. Combe, who, I think, is still living, in his preliminary observations, expresses himself about Dr. Gall, in the following manner.

"He also observed, that those whose education had been conducted with the greatest care, and on whom the labours of teachers had been most freely lavished, remained far behind their companions in their attainments."

This extract from Mr. G. Combe plainly shows how strangely contracted *his*, as well as Dr. Gall's ideas upon education, must have been; else how could either of them have imagined that education consists in the pompous *niaiseries* which youth are taught in colleges and universities, &c.? With so contracted, so mean an idea of the term education, Dr. Gall, and his follower, Mr. G. Combe, do not appear to me competent judges to pronounce upon the *greatest care* or the *labours* of teachers. Very few men, among the millions, are qualified to pass a sound judgment upon teaching or education; but these few

will never be found among those who imagine that there exists such a thing as independent spontaneous mental faculties.

"Many of us," continues Mr. Combe, speaking in the name of Dr. Gall, "were accused of want of *will*, of deficiency in *zeal*, when we could not, even with the most ardent *desire*, followed by the most obstinate *efforts*, attain in some points even to mediocrity."

From the foregoing extract, it appears that Dr. Gall did not know that *will*, *zeal*, *mental efforts*, *desires*, like all other *perceptions*, cannot produce any given *perception* that has *never been previously experienced*, nor that they can even reproduce a given perception previously experienced, if the latter has not been duly *associated with them ;* and if Mr. G. Combe is also ignorant of that important principle, are we not warranted to conclude that *phrenology* has done more harm than good to the science of the mind? The teachers alluded to by Dr. Gall, who, like him, were ignorant of that fundamental law of the mind, fancied that *will*, *zeal*, &c., can, at any time, create any perception, no matter whether it has been or not previously experienced and associated; hence, they rebuked the poor youth for their want of *will*, *zeal*, while they ought to have blamed themselves for their own ignorance. Dr. Gall explained the phenomena in a different manner. He concluded, that since *will* and *zeal* and *mental efforts* could not make his schoolmates experience certain ideas, it was a proof that internal faculties create ideas, and that his friends were deficient in the organs that possess the faculties through which they would have been enabled to experience such ideas.

"But, in some points," says Dr. Gall, "some of us surpassed our schoolfellows *without an effort*, and almost, it might be said, without perceiving it ourselves;" therefore, thought the Doctor, *such as succeeded in that manner, were exclusively endued with special mental independent faculties, to which they were indebted for their success.*

This, sir, I cannot allow to be the true philosophy of the human mind; and if the science of phrenology, as it is now professed, still maintains such doctrines, I must beg leave to express my decided opinion, that it tends to stop, for centuries, perhaps, all progress in the science of the human understanding.

Dr. Gall was so sadly deficient in sound ideas concerning the human intellect, that, had I not, in Mr. G.Combe's book, a proof that the phrenologists of the present time partake of his errors upon the subject, I should not imagine it to be possible. As early as the epoch when the founder of phrenology began his career, a wholesome opinion was spreading among thinking and well informed men, viz. that *all possible intellectual and moral differences, observable among individuals, were the necessary result of perceptions dependent on accidents and circumstances.* That that luminous thought had no effect upon Dr. Gall's mind, immersed as he was in the prejudices of his time, is nowise surprising; but that the present phrenologists should still remain insensible to a truth which has been since, and which is still daily gaining ground, may well cause our astonishment.

"Dr. Gall," says Mr. Combe, "observed that a *great number of philosophers* and *physiologists asserted* that *all* men are born with *equal*

mental faculties ; and that the differences observable among them, are owing either to *education, or to the circumstances and accidents in which they are placed.*" This momentous assertion did not, as it has been observed, affect Dr. Gall's preconceived opinion, but it drew from him the following ominous declaration, which Mr. Combe has transmitted to us with praiseworthy *naïveté*, viz. that, "if *accidental* circumstances, (in sound language, *sensations* and *perceptions,*) PRODUCED the differences observable among men's minds, THEN there *could be no natural sign of predominating faculties*, and, consequently, that the project of learning, by observation, to distinguish the functions of the brain, MUST BE HOPELESS."—(See *Preliminary Observations.*)

This candid declaration of Dr. Gall, evidently shows that phrenology is exclusively grounded upon the hypothesis of *original organic faculties, possessing self-activity, independent of external causes, and unequally distributed among men ;* and I consider it the more precious, as it puts the question in an unequivocal point of view, and gives a decided character to the present strictures.

For, sir, if the opinion which, at the epoch when Dr. Gall commenced his phrenological career, was beginning to spread under the benign influence of Locke's ideas, and was entertained by a *great number* of philosophers and physiologists ; which is so rational, and in so perfect concordance with the simplicity of nature's means ; which elevates and dignifies the human species ; if that opinion, I say, is founded on truth, it overturns *your* phrenological system, unless it is now built on principles different from those upon which Dr. Gall's phrenology was erected.

But Dr. Gall could not ascertain the truth of *his* principles by an *à priori* procedure ; he could not, with his scalpel, cut his way through the mental labyrinth, and sever the knot which unites the intellectual *perception* with its appropriate cerebral organ ; in short, it was out of the question for him to attempt to surprise nature in the fact ; and, therefore, he must look elsewhere for *proofs*. Let us see how he proceeded about it.

"Some years afterwards," says Mr. Combe, "he observed that his schoolfellows, gifted with the talent of *learning to repeat*, (talent !) possessed *prominent eyes*. He also ascertained the same fact in the world, and at the university where he entered subsequently. Dr. Gall," adds Mr. Combe, "could not believe that the *coincidence* of the two circumstances was entirely *accidental*."—(See *Preliminary Observations.*)

The word *accidental* is without meaning, and decidedly unphilosophical, if it does not carry the idea of *cause* and *effect ;* and it cannot be supposed that Mr. Combe used the term unphilosophically ; therefore his last proposition should be thus read : Dr. Gall could not believe that a coincidence could be *entirely without a cause*. The solicitude of Mr. Combe for Dr. Gall's fame is praiseworthy ; but he might have dispensed with the precaution, for nobody would suppose Dr. Gall to have entertained such a belief.

But, then, can there be no cause for *prominent eyes* except the talent, as Mr. Combe calls it, of *learning to repeat ?* Might not this

coincidence be the effect of a cause quite foreign to, or, at least, more or less remote from, that to which Dr. Gall attributed it? May not *prominent eyes*, in parrot-like school boys, be the consequence, (this, sir, is a mere suggestion,) of an early, long standing, brutifying habit of intensely converging the visual organs upon the letter of the book, and, at the same time, abstracting thought? But, no; it having been settled beforehand, that the mind was subdivided into independent faculties, located in this or that section of the brain, prominent eyes, happening to coincide with a retentive memory, must, of necessity, be the effect of the developement of the faculty of repeating; which, of course, must have its place behind the eyes.

"*Il n'y a que le premier pas qui coute:*" the ice was broken, and the Doctor, satisfied with his first experiment, ran *tête baissée*, from coincidence to coincidence, through a maze of phrenological speculations, and the system of the subdivision of the mind into distinct special organic faculties and propensities, assumed more and more a scientific character. In one section of the brain, the Doctor found out the faculty for *drawing;* in another, he discovered that for *music;* here he ascertained the organ which *distinguishes places;* there he marked out the locality of *time;* in short, behind every protuberance of the skull, thus tested with the probe of coincidences, he ascertained the presence of a mental feature, with as much readiness and confidence as a mason, with a trowel in his hand, would detect the presence of a beam, by knocking along a plaster ceiling.

A truth, sir, is still a truth, although no proof is given to demonstrate it; but then it can scarcely be of any use to mankind, who, unable to distinguish it from error, are, out of prudence, necessitated to reject it altogether, with the theoretical and practical benefits which might result from its being adopted. The whole phrenological system, so far as it concerns the human mind, appears to me to be in such a predicament: even if it were true, still we could not refrain from rejecting it, in TOTO, for fear of getting entangled in a vortex of dangerous consequences. No proofs, of a higher value than Dr. Gall's *coincidences*, have been presented in support of phrenological assumptions respecting the human mind; prudence, therefore, would bid us distrust and reject such doctrines, even if their tenets did not decidedly jar with all the experience that we have acquired upon the human understanding.

But phrenologists attach great importance to those coincidences, which they call incontrovertible facts. So they may be; suppose they are. Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that *all* those *coincidences* are unobjectionable, general, incontrovertible; suppose that those appearances are not deceptive, that they are real, evident, so well apart from each other, so distinct, so striking, so unequivocal, consistent and true, that they could never be mistaken; what conclusion, I ask you, sir, could you then reasonably expect from us? Why, nothing beyond this; that men, among whom certain *tastes, aptnesses, sentiments* OR *ideas*, were common, happened to have also, in common, certain similar marks upon the periphery of their brains and skulls; more than this, philosophy and common sense would for-

bid us to concede ; more than this, reason would not authorize you to exact ; and yet, sir, see how far phrenologists would have us go with them ! Upon the shadowy evidence of their *coincidences*, we must proceed along with them to the autopsy of the human mind, adopt their division of it into four distinct independent faculties, subdivided into smaller groups, each of which having its particular location and developement behind this or that section of the brain ! But, sir, how do phrenologists know that mental energy (self energy) operates from the centre to the periphery ? Can they tell that that energy is not centripetal ? What good reasons have they to think that such energy does not operate in zig-zags ? But this is not all : phrenologists have located their discovered faculties in the vicinity of the surface ; yet, they will not pretend, I hope, that there are none in or towards the centre of the brain ; they will not probably reduce the functions of its inner organs to a mere sinecure ; they will surely admit there are as many faculties *below* as they have been pleased to mark out upon the surface. Now, then, since they will have it, that the physical developement which is observed upon the surface of the brain, is the necessary effect of the developement of some mental faculty located in the section so developed ; unless they are prepared to show that the inner faculties have no developement at all, they must give us good reasons why those protuberances, observed upon the surface of the brain, which are considered by phrenologists as signs of faculties *there* located, are not wholly, or at least partially, the effect of the developement of faculties underneath, more or less deep, in a more or less straight direction towards the centre of the brain. For it is evident, that the expansion of any internal locality could not take place without encroaching upon the contiguous one which, in consequence of the impulse, would, in its turn, press upon the next immediate, and so on, up to the faculty lying at the surface ; an operation which would, of course, make the latter *not the real*, but merely the *apparent* cause of the external protuberance so confidently asserted by phrenologists to be its exclusive effect and sign. A man, standing in the middle of a suffocating crowd, should not blame his immediate neighbour who innocently presses upon him ; for the real cause of the pressure is equally remote from both.

Neither have phrenologists ascertained, that among the many hundred millions of human beings who breathe life upon our earth, there are not millions who possess the faculties and propensities without having the respective external signs ; and millions of others upon whose heads the latter may be found, although they are deficient in the correspondent mental attributes.

The various conformation of heads, among different nations and tribes, is the effect of causes as yet unknown, incident to climate and to atmospheric and other phenomena in the physical world, for some ends, likewise unknown, but no doubt necessary for the preservation of the species ; but such a variety of conformation, in my humble opinion, is not the effect, or the cause of, and still less an obstacle to, the developement and expansion of the human mind.

Place a new born Hottentot among the best civilized people ; allow

him all possible chances for intellectual and moral developement, and he *will* succeed as well as white children placed in the same circumstances. Still, notwithstanding the developement of the intellectual and mental faculties of a Hottentot thus situated, physiologists well know that the alteration and changes operated in the organic constitution of his skull would not make it materially different from those of other Hottentots; insomuch that, possessing all the intellectual and moral qualifications found among the best civilized people, he would still retain his original physical features; the organic structure of his skull would not materially differ from those of his countrymen; which ought not to be the case, however, were the developement of the organs commensurate with, and the effect and sign of, the developement of the intellectual and moral faculties, as they are called.

I think that phrenologists are mistaken, and mislead us upon the true nature of the mind; they observe it under a false point of view; they are deceived with respect to its real character and attributes: phrenology cannot thrive, except it be at the expense of genuine mental philosophy. If we are led to believe that we can sufficiently see and comprehend the human intellect through external protuberances, and that there is no other channel that will give us access to it, what can we do better than turn our exclusive attention to those exterior phenomena, and proceed to collect new coincidences, and trace new subdivisions? But, I confess to you, sir, that I am at a loss to perceive what benefit to mankind would be derived from such inquiries. Until this moment, I have been unable to comprehend the utility and importance of any truth, relating to the human intellect, that is not intimately connected with EDUCATION, that is, the *intellectual*, *moral* and *physical* improvement of man. But, sir, in order to attain that great end, *education*, the question is not, whether such or such intellectual developement is followed by such or such organic modifications. A certain configuration of a man's coat behind, *may*, *sometimes*, be a sure sign that the individual who wears it is hunchbacked; yet, the appearance teaches us not how the bunch has grown, and still less the means by which it might have been prevented. The question then, is, how such or such an intellectual and moral developement is to be produced or modified? The external appearance of a strong, active, athletic man, is so different from that of a weak, effeminate individual, that every body, at first sight, can tell which of the two possesses activity, strength and power; but no one will presume that the mere appearance of the athletic man would teach the most sagacious the manner of proceeding from the birth of a man to his manhood, so as to produce strength, activity and physical beauty.

With the exception of a few ostensible truths, as well known to the vulgar as to the philosopher, the whole science of the mind, principles and all, are, as yet, immersed in obscurity; and, I am sorry to say it, to this melancholy circumstance alone phrenology is indebted for the proselytes it has obtained. It is the ignorance of the mind which has given birth to phrenology; and phrenology, like a tender and grateful offspring, will endeavour to support its mother. It deserves no small

share of our blame for the slow progress that the art of education has made since Dr. Gall's time.

A philosopher has said, that a child, seven years old, has already obtained more information than he can ever acquire afterwards, through the medium of books and artificial teaching. If this is true, how considerable must be the number of unnoticed mental perceptions which man experiences from his birth to the age of seven ; that is, at that epoch when, *already provided* with the elements of universal knowledge, he comes, under artificial tuition, erroneously supposed by his teachers to be completely ignorant of those branches of science which often are about to be so clumsily taught to him. But, if we only consider that no two individuals can ever be placed in the same physical, moral and intellectual position, can we be surprised at those differences and varieties observable among men, and will it not appear to us preposterous, to account for such differences by other facts than those which are so profusely exhibited throughout the early stage of the sensitive and perceptive existence of man ?

Yes, the countless myriads of sensations and perceptions which man experiences from the moment when his sensitive faculties are assailed by the elements in which he is immersed, until the age of seven, nay, perhaps of seven months, present, for our researches and observations, a vast field, so productive of satisfactory causes for all intellectual, moral and physical differences, that reason forbids us to attribute those differences to an imaginary and abstruse principle which we could not admit, without supposing that beings of the same species, who are destined for the same end, have not been equally endued with the necessary faculties to reach it ; and that some among them, to the exclusion of the others, have been constitutionally provided with means to meet certain future events that they may never experience ; while such events may be encountered by those who have not been favoured with the proper faculties to resist them ; in short, that nature's laws are blind, whimsical and cruel.

When we have studied, with more attention than we have done until now, the first years, the first months, nay, the first moments of intellectual man ; when we have so far divested ourselves of our vanity which blinds us to the belief that the real education of man is the exclusive work of our wisdom ; when, in short, the term *education* shall be better understood, and that which is now called by that name shall be worthy of such an appellation, then, perhaps, we shall more generally acknowledge how absurd it is to attribute to an organic conformation the pretended talent, for instance, of *retaining* and *repeating words*. That talent, I very much suspect, was held in great estimation in Dr. Gall's time ; nay, it is sufficiently notorious that, even at the present epoch, many teachers set a high value upon it ; but such a talent, in my opinion, is so far from having been contemplated and constitutionally provided for by nature, that I consider it to be the symptom of an abnormal state of the mind. Nothing, in the whole course of man's unsophisticated existence, is ordered by nature to be thus learned and repeated by heart.

Where is the teacher of language, whose mind is taken up with

phrenology, who, after ascertaining that the *retaining* and *repeating* faculty is totally wanting in a pupil, will think of questioning the soundness of his mode of teaching, which has just failed him with that pupil? How can such a man even imagine that the *memory*, which is necessary for his pupil's acquiring the language, depends much more on the teacher than the scholar? How will he suspect that the power of *retaining* and *speaking* (not repeating) a language, is to be created by the proceedings which are to be adopted in order to teach it as it should be taught?

Believe me, sir, *prominent eyes* have nothing to do with the learning of languages. I do not presume to intimate that those coincidences, observed by Dr. Gall, you, and other phrenologists, were not real; but thus much I will assert, that the inferences which have been drawn from them, are erroneous. All mortals learn their mother tongue, and learn it well, because *nature* is an unerring teacher. If we would study her mode of imparting knowledge; if we could teach as she does, all our pupils would succeed as well as her own, whether they had or had not *prominent eyes*. In order to convince you that I do not speak lightly upon the subject, I am willing to put the matter to the test of an experiment. I offer myself to teach the French, my native language, to twelve young men or women, over the age of seventeen, all chosen by you, one half of them possessing the phrenological advantages, and the other half completely destitute of the pretended faculties, merely reserving to myself the right of challenging, among the latter, such as I may find wholly unfit for the experiment. And if, contrary to my perfect conviction, I shall not equally succeed with ALL, I pledge my word that I will turn a phrenologist; provided, that *you*, sir, in the case of my being successful, will give up your doctrines, and turn the powers of your acute mind and eminent talents to the true study of the human intellect.

I know, sir, that the condition to which I would have you subscribe, would be rather a hard trial for you. It is painful for a man to give up a cherished system, the offspring of a whole life of unremitted labours; yet, your enthusiastic devotion to the cause of truth, is a sufficient pledge for me that the sacrifice would not be above your strength.

On the other hand, sir, the giving up of my own conceptions, if I should fail in my experiment, would not be less trying to me than the abandonment of yours would prove to you. Indeed, it does not appear to me a trifling matter to subscribe to a doctrine which locates behind such or such protuberances organs for *destructiveness*, *combativeness*, *acquisitiveness*, *secretiveness*, &c. &c. For instance, I, who, until this moment, have earnestly believed every act of *volition*, antecedent to an act of *destruction*, to be the result of *various motives*, very seldom alike, nay, perhaps never the very same at every new act of *destruction*. It is now my opinion that a wish to destroy may be produced by the idea of saving *one's* own or some body's life; or that it may proceed from the divers ideas of attaining some supposed legitimate end; of avoiding some dreaded misfortune; of enjoying

pleasure ; of avoiding pain ; of defending real or imaginary rights ; in short, I now really think that motives to destroy, whether good or bad, lawful or unlawful, are various and innumerable. A cook destroys, so does a conqueror. A hero, a soldier, a butcher, a fisherman, a hunter, a rat-killer, are destroyers of one sort or another ; but every act of volition of each one of those destroyers, is the result of a different motive. Now, sir, should I be compelled to adopt your doctrines, must I believe that the various ideas which constitute those multiform motives, are grouped, united, located in the same section of the brain ? Must I comprehend those myriads of heterogeneous, adverse *mental series* under the same head and the identical bump which phrenologists are pleased to notice as the sign of destructiveness ?

Perhaps you will say, that, by *destructiveness*, you merely mean the act of *volition*, antecedent to the act of *destruction*, and independent of any previous ideas ; but then, I cannot perceive in what manner such a restriction will benefit the cause of phrenology, and make its doctrines more palatable. For, in such a case, the developement of the organ of destructiveness would not be less commensurate with the number of the acts of *destruction* and *volition*, produced by destroyers throughout their destructive career ; hence, we could not doubt that the *destructive propensity* is as much more developed upon the heads of Messrs. Magendie, Broussais, Lawrence, &c. &c., without excluding yours, sir, than it is upon the skull of a Burke, for instance, as the number of innocent living animals which each of you gentlemen have directly or indirectly destroyed, is greater than the number of human victims that have fallen by the hands of the murderer, through the course of his homicidal career.

No one, I hope, will reproach *me* for here comparing human life with the lives of brutes. I am arguing against phrenology ; and phrenology alone is answerable for an argument, the principle of which is displayed in its own tenets. If I remember rightly, that disposition in children to break and destroy their toys, is held out by phrenologists as an indication of the presence and developement of the propensity of destructiveness : verily, men are above brutes ; but the existence of toys, is, at least, as much beneath that of animals, as the existence of man is above that of brutes.

The study of the mind, I insist upon it, should lead to some practical benefit ; otherwise, it is an idle curiosity, unbecoming rational men. I conceive two highly important objects to be attained by a correct knowledge of the human mind ; viz. first, the art of communicating ideas, imparting instruction, and regulating intellectual, moral and physical habits ; and, secondly, that of anticipating, counteracting and correcting such habits as may oppose the wellbeing of man. But, sir, I cannot say that I perceive, in the whole field of phrenology, any thing which will furnish us with means to accomplish these two important ends.

Here, sir, allow me to suppose a case. One of the wretched inmates of a prison has just died ; upon which a phrenologist, followed by a train of friends, prompted by curiosity, comes forward, examines

the head of the deceased, and pronounces that the fellow was a thief. "How so!" exclaims a bystander, "how can you guess, sir?" "Do you see that protuberance?" "Protuberance? I don't see any thing; oh! now, I feel; no I don't; yes, there is something like a bump." "Well, sir," resumes our phrenologist, "it is *acquisitiveness* prodigiously developed; but a little practice would soon enable you to find them out with ease." At this moment, one of the gentlemen present intimates his wish to have his own head examined; the phrenologist assents, feels his friend's skull, and, with a cautious smile, declares that *acquisitiveness* is tolerably well developed with him. This prognostic provokes, among the company, considerable mirth, in which the gentleman himself heartily partakes. He does not, in the least, feel displeased; why should he? He is a merchant, or a banker, or, perhaps, a dealer in stocks, who justly prides himself in his skill in the lawful game of money-making. "Well, then," observes our caviling bystander, "the same identical bump, on different heads, makes an honest man and a thief!" "A little familiarity with the science," replies the phrenologist, "would soon teach you to discriminate between the one and the other. Here, sir, feel this: it is *cautiousness*, pretty well developed; the gentleman is cautious how he acts. Now, there is another protuberance, which is the sign of BENEVOLENCE, not so decidedly marked as the other bump; but, in recompense, here is a prodigious one! This is the *love of approbation*. Well, sir," proceeds our phrenologist, "let us look to that rascal's skull. *Benevolence*, absolutely wanting; *love of approbation*, flat; *cautiousness*, deep, hollow! The fellow was evidently *minus* in those sentiments and propensities which alone can counteract the energy of *acquisitiveness*, or direct it to lawful deeds; and that is the reason why he turned a thief."

Upon this, suppose the bystander should say: "I knew the man, sir, when he was alive, and I am satisfied that a thousand difficulties, into which he got entangled through inexperience, ignorance and dire necessity, brought him to the performance of deeds against which his heart and reason would have protested, had they not been silenced by the thundering voice of imperious want. He was once an industrious and upright man; but work failed him; his industry was paralyzed; compulsory idleness led him to vice; he insensibly sunk into poverty, misery and despair. Had his own wants been his only prompters, a long time might have elapsed before he would have yielded to their imperious summons, and committed any criminal act; but the wretch was not alone: a young wife, and half a dozen children, were the sharers in his distress. You can discover no sign of *benevolence* upon that skull, and yet, sir, the man was benevolent; but he had no portion of that sentiment to spare to his fellow citizens, by whom he thought himself wronged, contemned and shunned, while its whole energy was concentrated upon those beings who were indebted to him for their lives, who suffered with him, and whose existence he could no longer sustain by his honest exertions. That miserable man, sir, was very far from being insensible to *approbation*, notwithstanding you do not find out the protuberance which you pre-

tend to be the sign of such sentiment. The love of approbation was probably not the least enticement that allured him into the continuance of his predatory life ; for tyrannical want, which exclusively ruled the feelings of his family, scarcely allowed his broken-hearted consort and starving children, whenever he brought them relief, obtained unlawfully, to feel and express any other sentiment than that of gratitude and approbation ; and this was the *stimulus* which excited him to expose himself to the thousand dangers he had to encounter in the fatal career into which a series of unforeseen and uncontrollable accidents and events had insensibly precipitated him. The sign of *cautiousness* is not observed upon that skull, and you conclude that the man did not possess the quality. But, sir, do you suppose that an individual could remain so long a time as this one did, in a state of warfare against society, and put out of scent, for years, the hounds of a vigilant police, if he possessed not an uncommon share of *cautiousness* and *prudence?* As to *acquisitiveness*, I have nothing to say, since you pretend to see a proof that he was not wanting in that propensity. I will only observe, that it availed him very little, while he was carrying on his lawful trade. And now, sir, why is it, that the skull of this dead outlaw, who actually possessed those very moral attributes of which you imagine him to have been deprived, does not show us any of those redeeming protuberances which you made us remark upon the head of that gentleman ?"

Your intellectual system, Dr. Spurzheim, pardon me for saying it, does not throw the smallest light upon the nature, origin, introduction, succession, associations and reproduction of mental perceptions ; and yet, if we are not made acquainted with the character of those perceptions, of which our thoughts are made up, how can we acquire the art of imparting knowledge ? How can we regulate and train the intellect ? How shall we be able to acquire proper means to anticipate erroneous modes of the mind, and substitute wholesome for pernicious opinions ?

I do not say that phrenology has a tendency to render us more merciless than we already are towards the guilty ; but it has no tendency, that I can perceive, to make us their reformers. It does not present to my view the smallest clue to those imperceptible series of early feelings and perceptions, under which intellectual man is unwarily led to become the benefactor or the scourge of his fellow mortals.

What sort of information, sir, can be derived from the observations of protuberances upon the heads of youth ? Suppose that, at any early period in life, a perverse protuberance is discovered ; the mischief is already done ; how will phrenology afford us the means of remedying that which it does not enable us to anticipate ? Perhaps you will say, that we must then immediately set about cultivating the counteracting, the redeeming faculties and propensities. But I would beg you to observe, that phrenology does not tell us how we should proceed in this important and difficult task ; nay, it discourages us from the undertaking. Witness the following extract : " Dr. Gall never observed that the individual, who, in one year, had displayed

selfish and knavish dispositions, became, in the next year, a good and faithful friend."

Thus we see that phrenology not only gives us no information respecting the constitution and structure of the mind, by which we might be enabled to discover the means to cultivate it, but it even endeavours to persuade us to relinquish all hope of applying, with success, any remedy to intellectual and moral aberrations.

A sensible man, with a philanthropic heart, never despairs of human nature. When he sees that individuals, who *have displayed selfish and knavish dispositions, persevere in them, and never become good and faithful friends*, he concludes that they still are under the influence of those noxious principles which have corrupted their moral amosphere ; he pities the unfortunate, and hopes for the time when science will reveal to man the secret for purifying the moral world of those deleterious principles by which the source of intellectual life is contaminated. Instead of this, what would phrenology have us believe ? That such individuals cannot but remain selfish and knavish, because they possess the immutable organs of selfishness and *knavishness*.

However harmless your theory of coincidences might be in itself, apart from phrenological inferences upon the human mind, still, I could not assent to its being tolerated, even so little as to allow it to be only an object of amusement. For it appears to me impossible, that any portion of the phrenological system should, in any manner, engage man's attention, without leading him into the consequential errors with which it is associated ; it appears to me impossible that any one should accept your protuberances as signs of intellectual and moral dispositions, without, at the same time, subscribing to your subdivision of the mind into *faculties* and *propensities*, located in this or that section, and more or less developed, in proportion with the organic developement of the brain ; and, consequently, interpret human actions, volitions, errors and opinions, through the greater or less developement of the cerebral organs. Indeed, sir, I cannot but think, that phrenology is essentially incompatible with a correct view of the human mind, and that its general adoption would put an end to any further progress in the art of improving man.

Man, I believe, is, at any moment of his intellectual existence, indefinitely modifiable, and susceptible of being amended and improved. Every individual of the species is originally and essentially constituted with the same intellectual, moral and physical faculties, as every acorn is essentially qualified to produce the finest oak. I take it to be an interesting truth, that all men are created with equal power and susceptibility to experience this or that sensation and perception ; to enjoy this or that pleasure, and suffer this or that pain ; that no one is constitutionally debarred from having such or such taste ; such or such sentiment ; such or such aptness ; or from performing such or such action, prompted by such or such volition, resulting from such or such want, (*perception*,) felt, according as future circumstances and accidents, that is to say, future sensations and perceptions (*education*) may happen to cross the stream of his sensitive existence. This principle appears to me so beautiful, so consoling, so encouraging for our spe.

cies, that, borrowing the expression of a celebrated Frenchman, on a different subject, I would say :

" S'il n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer."

For, it is under its propitious influence alone, that experience, observation and study, will enable us to obtain a control over those circumstances and accidents which impede the march of mind, and produce misery and suffering among mankind.

Now, sir, if phrenology subscribes to the above principles, its protuberances and coincidences are useless ; or, at best, they are but a matter of mere idle curiosity. But if, on the contrary, it opposes and rejects them, it is a mischievous doctrine, the futility and fallacy of which, every unprejudiced man, who has at heart the proper cultivation of the science of the mind, should endeavour to demonstrate to the world.

The philosophy of the human understanding, I have already suggested, is very little understood ; a fact which ought not to surprise us, if we consider the personal avocation of the men who have, at all times, attempted to study that important branch of human knowledge. Theologians, mathematicians, physicians and physiologists, are all too distant from the proper point of view, to observe the mind in its true light. The dissecting room, and the pulpit, are as unpropitious places, as the compass and the microscope are unfit instruments for intellectual researches. I know of only one situation suitable for successful observations upon the phenomena of the mind : *the school-room*. Teachers, I mean, independent, philosophical teachers, such as we might have, if sound ideas upon education were popular ; teachers, I say, are the only men so situated as advantageously to examine and study the human intellect ; and to them alone we are to look for correct information respecting its wonderful mechanism.

Meanwhile, as the character of the present strictures imposes upon me a sort of obligation to substitute for phrenological doctrines some principles which may ultimately lead us to a rational, consistent and useful system, I will presently submit to you, sir, and those who may chance to read this letter, an elementary sketch of a theory of the human intellect, a close contact with which, during nearly twenty-five years of teaching and observation, has afforded me opportunities which few men, I apprehend, have had the advantage of enjoying. If experience, for so long a period of time, does not sanction any pretension, on my part, to have arrived at the truth, I think it may, at least, indulge me in the hope that my opinions, in such matters, are not unworthy of some consideration.

If the elementary principles, which I am about to unfold, prove correct, they will constitute a new demonstration, in addition to the arguments I have already offered, to show that phrenology misleads us with respect to the mind ; while, if, on the other hand, my own ideas happen to be erroneous, it will not be less evident, that the above science throws not the faintest light upon the human intellect.

I will premise the exposition of my elementary principles of the

human mind, with a few observations, upon which I shall expatiate, at some length, in a future letter, if time and circumstances permit.

1. The purpose of intellect is to enable animals to become agents in providing for certain special wants, which are not immediately provided for by the general laws of the universe ; it follows, that the *intellect*, the *mind*, is a supplementary means in the system of the universe. Without intellect, *mind*, no beings could exist but those whose wants are exclusively provided for by universal laws.

2. Nature's means are adequate to her ends ; and, therefore, the quantity of intellect cannot be supposed to be less than what is necessary to supply those wants which are left to be provided for by the beings who experience them.

3. Whatever natural history has done, must be undone and made over anew, if the classification of beings has not been established upon the scale of their wants.

4. For all beings, liable to the same wants, must necessarily be qualified to perform the same acts, and, of course, susceptible of the same *volitions ;* therefore, they must be equally prepared for the same sensations, feelings and perceptions ; that is, they must be constituted in the same manner : such beings belong to the same species.

5. Consequently, all beings belonging to the same species are essentially endued with equal means of intellectual developement.

6. Those means consist in *sensibility* and *consciousness*, in nothing else.

7. *Sensibility* is the property which a creature possesses of FEELING a *change* in its actual existence.

8. *Consciousness* is the property which a creature possesses to *feel its own existence* in such a change.

9. *Consciousness* and *sensibility* are correlative properties, perhaps identical ; at all events, we have no reason to believe that they exist independent of one another ; that one can take place without the other.

10. The act of feeling a change is called a *sensation ;* that of feeling one's existence at such a change, is called a *perception*. Man cannot *feel* without *perceiving ;* he cannot *perceive* when he *feels* not ; therefore, *sensation*, *perception*, are both equally the necessary product of the property of *sensibility*. I do not speak of the one without meaning the other.

11. All beings of the same species are necessarily endued with the same *quantum* of sensibility ; they are susceptible of experiencing the same *sensations* and *perceptions ;* that is, they are equally provided with the same *intellectual* or *mental* faculties.

12. Man's wants, I mean those which he is to provide for, are susceptible of great extent ; so is his intellect. Perhaps his wants are indefinitely multipliable and expansive ; if they are, the expansibility of his intellect is unbounded.

13. All possible differences and intellectual shades, observable among individuals of the same species, are to be traced up to differences and varieties in their respective wants ; but whatever those differences may be between any two individuals, neither is essentially

debarred from experiencing the wants, and possessing the intellect of the other.

Now, leaving the above observations to the reflection and judgment of my readers, I will present, in as concise a manner as possible, an elementary view of the constitution of the *mind*.

1. No subject can be perceived, studied, and known by man, but through the means of its *properties* or *attributes*.

2. We can perceive, study, and know *mind*, only as we perceive, study, and know *matter*.

3. That which surrounds us, and which we call *matter*, is nothing but a concatenation of *attributes*, *properties ;* take these away, and nothing will remain to be perceived, studied or known. Abstract from any object those attributes which constitute it, and that object will be annihilated.

4. But what are those constituent attributes ? I cannot tell. I perceive them ; I observe them in all the various series in which they are combined ; so my neighbour can ; so also can every being belonging to my species ; but neither of us can define them : they are *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable*.

5. Now, my own *mind* is as much within the reach of my perception, as completely within the pale of my observing powers, as exterior objects are ; not one jot more, not one jot less. But, I must be careful not to suffer myself to be deceived by appearances ; still less by *words ;* else, mistaking what is called *ideas*, *thoughts*, *mind*, *memory*, *imagination*, &c. &c. &c., for something besides *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable sensations* or *perceptions*, united in immediate succession, I should fall, with regard to MIND, into the same sort of error with those who, supposing something beyond external attributes, have imagined *matter* to be an entity.

6. But *mind* is not an entity ; mind is *nothing beyond the attributes that constitute it ;* those attributes are *sensation* and *perception*.

7. As each of the exterior *existences*, called *man*, *horse*, *house*, *tree*, *landscape*, *line*, *angle*, &c., or *white*, *black*, *red*, *sour*, *heavy*, *rough*, &c. &c., is nothing except a series of *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable* external attributes ; so every mental appearance, such as man, horse, house, &c. &c., or such as white, red, black, &c. &c., is nothing but a series of *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable perceptions*, each corresponding with an external attribute which has fallen within the grasp of sensibility, and produced its immediate and necessary perception. Thus, when we say that we have *in* our minds, as the term is, the *idea* of a *horse*, for instance, we actually experience a considerable number of *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable* perceptions, the complete series of which constitutes what is called the *idea* of a horse.

8. An IDEA is nothing but a certain concatenation of *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable* perceptions : a *thought* is a certain series of *ideas*.

9. What we call MIND, whether at any particular moment, or throughout man's existence, is a concatenated series of *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable* perceptions, each resulting from an external attribute which has acted upon the sensitive system.

10. A perception, we have already seen, (10) is the consciousness of a sensation, *feeling*, *change*, taking place in the sensitive being.

11. Consciousness, we have seen, (8, 10) is the perception of *self*; it necessarily follows, that every *sensation*, *feeling*, or *change*, which takes place, is immediately and *necessarily* associated, united, blended with the perception of *self*.

12. Not more than ONE *simple*, *indivisible*, *undefinable* sensation and perception can be experienced, in the same *indivisible* moment; for *two changes* in the same indivisible moment is absurd.

13. A sensation or perception has no duration, else it would exist in two moments.

14. A sensation or perception is susceptible of no degree whatever, else it would not be *simple*, *indivisible*.

15. So long as consciousness exists, *there is* perception, *idea*, *thought*, or *mind*, is going on.

16. We have just seen that *one* perception (11) only occupies the mind in the same indivisible moment; consequently, *perceptions* succeed one another.

17. There cannot be any *lapse* between *perceptions*; for we have just seen that, (15) so long as *consciousness* exists, there is perception.

18. Therefore, any actual *feeling* or *change*, felt in the sensitive system; that is, every perception, *immediately succeeds* that which existed before it; that is, its ANTECEDENT; and *immediately precedes* that which is to follow it; that is, its CONSEQUENT.

19. Every act of consciousness is antecedent, or is *consequent*, to every sensation or perception which a man experiences through life. (10) The mystery of memory is easily unravelled after this important truth is known.

20. The human mind is an uninterrupted series of immediate and necessary *antecedents* and *consequents*.

21. We have observed that the external agents (7) which operate upon our sensitive system; that is, the attributes which constitute the world, are *simple*, *indivisible*: it follows, that all possible intercourse, existing between the physical and the intellectual world; between what is called MATTER and MIND, is carried on, on both sides, through *simple*, *indivisible* existences, *one* by *one*, in close, immediate, uninterrupted and necessary succession.

22. Under the guidance of *consciousness*, that is, the *perception* of SELF, we are enabled to class all possible attributes into *two* categories, viz. the *intellectual* or *mental*, and the *physical*, or, in other words, the *internal* and the *external*.

23. What is not *feeling*, *sensation*, *perception*, IS *external*; nothing but *feeling*, *sensation*, *perception*, IS *internal*.

24. No attribute, whether *internal* or *external*, stands alone; that is, no attribute exists without its *antecedent* and its *consequent*.

25. The sensitive system *must* be acted upon, in order that an act of sensibility, that is, a sensation and perception, may take place; consequently, *any internal, must have for its antecedent an external act.*

26. But we have seen that the perception (10) of *self*, is associated with every sensation and perception which takes place; hence, it

follows, that not only every *internal* has *for its immediate antecedent an external;* but also, every *external has for its antecedent an internal;* and what are called *mind* and *matter*, *act and react upon each other*, through their respective *simple*, *indivisible* attributes, in an interminable series of antecedents and consequents. This truth will enable us to obtain a mathematical demonstration of the association of that which is called ideas, and also to account for all aberrations and vicissitudes of what is called mind. But my present limits and purpose will not allow me to expatiate upon the subject. For the present moment, I will merely say, that

27. No *feeling*, that is, no *change*, no sensation, perception, no act of the mind, can take place unless an attribute from *without*, that is, from what is not *mind*, in other words, *an external*, has actually been forced upon the *sensitive system*.

28. Any *external* which can be brought within the grasp of the *sensitive system*, is necessarily an object of the mind.

29. An *external*, which has not been, or cannot be brought within the grasp of sensibility, is no object of the mind.

30. Considering that all *external attributes* are distributed by a series of immediate antecedents and consequents, it necessarily follows that, whenever an external has just fallen within the grasp of perception, its (27) immediate consequent will succeed it, and then the next immediate, and so on, until the whole series of external attributes has been introduced.

31. In such an operation, that is, whenever the introduction of a series takes place, no *consequent* can precede its *antecedent*.

32. The perception of a complete series cannot take place, unless *all* the attributes that constitute it have successively fallen within the grasp of sensibility.

33. A highly sensitive being, such as man is, is incessantly assailed, in every direction, by the external attributes in which he is completely immersed throughout his sensitive existence; still, *one attribute only*, can ever, at the same indivisible moment, act upon his sensibility, and produce perception.(11)

34. But any attribute, constituting a series, actually falling within the grasp of sensibility, will always be immediately followed by its consequent, and the latter by its own, and so on, (29) until the whole series is introduced, *provided a foreign attribute*, that is, an attribute belonging to another series, *be not suddenly forced upon the sensitive system, and thus interrupt the course of the series which is entering*, by the *introduction of a new series*.

35. It is in consequence of the law which binds *antecedents* to their *consequents*, that we experience the perception of external individuals, called *objects*, through their mental correspondents, which we call *ideas*, and, consequently, the perception of *unity*.

36. Notwithstanding the considerable interruption that is incessantly caused by the pressure and intermeddling of foreign attributes which are pouring from all sides upon the sensitive system, still, the latter very seldom gives access to a foreign attribute, until a whole series has been introduced. The *rationale* of this fact, is found in the

stronger affinity and contiguity existing between antecedents and consequents, than in the affinity existing between foreign, distant attributes and sensibility. To this law alone we are indebted, as it has been observed, (29, 34,) for the introduction of individual objects. This principle, which I will satisfactorily illustrate, if I shall ever be at liberty to give to the world my theory of the mind, in a more detailed manner,—this principle, I say, together with that which has been alluded to, (in paragraph 25,) will reveal to the world the whole mystery of the phenomena of memory.

37. It is mathematically demonstrable, that every perception, when reproduced at a future period, will necessarily be followed by its former *antecedent* or *consequent*, either of which, in its turn, will be followed by its respective antecedent or consequent, and so on, necessarily, through the whole series to which the first reproduced attribute belonged; *unless an external foreign* (33) *attribute, suddenly forced upon the sensitive faculty, should break the link, interrupt the succession*, and *thus give entrance to a new series.*

38. Notwithstanding the superiority of the law (35) which connects *antecedents* and *consequents*, and protects the actual entrance of complete series against the rush and inroads of foreign attributes, still, were it not properly balanced by the contrary law which forces those foreign attributes upon the sensitive faculty, we should never have perceived more than one and the same series, that is, one single object; and such a perception would have taken place at the very first moment of our entrance into our sensitive existence, when the perception of a series (object) is especially useless.*

39. On the other hand, were the law of interruption entirely to predominate over the other, as it does in the first moments of our existence, when we are more in want of *attributes*, that is, of the ELEMENTS OF THE WORLD, than of complete series; (objects;) and were we to remain all our lives under the exclusive influence of such a law, our minds would be nothing but an endless succession of unconnected, fleeting, insignificant, uninteresting shadows, passing off before slumbering consciousness, and leaving no traces behind. In such an intellectual condition, if intellectual it can be called, having no perception of objects, we should be deprived of *knowledge*, or, in other words, of *experience.*

40. The two above laws are correlative; that is, one cannot exist without the other. Without either, there would be NO INTELLECT, NO MIND. The first connects; the second interrupts, divides, in order that new connexions may take place. The equipoise of the human intellect is maintained by the respective influence, *duly apportioned*, of these two laws; and such apportionment is determined by accidents and circumstances, and vicissitudes in the physical, as well as in the intellectual system of man and the universe.

41. And thus we see, that in the intellectual, as well as in the physical world, there exists *two opposite forces*, by which the equilibrium is maintained; but that which completes the parity, is, that, as

* New born children do not distinguish objects.

the *quantum* and energy of the centrifugal and centripetal forces, in the physical world, are determined by the masses and distances, so, in the intellectual system, the greater or less influence of the two opposite laws, is defined and determined by the *wants* more or less imperious of the sentient being.

42. Propensities, essential or acquired, tastes, sympathies, antipathies, dispositions, habits, passions, &c. &c., all which I comprehend in the category of *wants*, essential or acquired; all which are graduated upon the indefinitely variegated scale of *pain* and *pleasure*, fix, in every species, and every individual in each species, the *quantum*, *plus* or *minus*, of the one or the other force; and thus determine the constitution and capabilities of the mind; and of course, form those intellectual and moral differences which are observable between different species, as well as between the individuals of each species.

I might carry to a greater length the developement of my theory of the human mind; but, sir, this letter is already too long, and I have sufficiently trespassed upon your patience. I think, however, that the foregoing exposition, attentively read, well understood and meditated upon, can scarcely fail to lead the mind to a sufficient number of corollaries to throw additional light upon intellectual phenomena, and show that phrenology misleads us as to the true path that can give us access to a knowledge of the mind.

With physiologists, I am willing to believe, that the nervous system is the seat of sensibility. I have no objection to admit that the brain is the sanctuary of the mind, and that its amazing convolutions and ramifications, *seen* and *unseen*, are actually necessary instruments to produce perceptions: all this may be perfectly correct for aught that I know; for my exclusive attention having been directed to the *music*, my knowledge of the *instrument* is very limited, and, therefore, I readily confess my ignorance in that respect, while, at the same time, I acknowledge your extensive information and unsurpassed sagacity. Yet, sir, allow me to express my doubts that you, or anybody else, will ever be so fortunate as *to hit upon the precise chord*, the *simple*, *indivisible* chord, which is exclusively provided for such or such simple, indivisible perception; to determine the exact sphere of the *simple, indivisible action* produced by said chord, and to trace out its effect upon the periphery of the brain. Should you ever astonish mankind with those wonderful discoveries, still, they might ask, for what practical truth, respecting the mind, they were indebted to phrenology.

I will now close this long letter, although many things remain that I might say upon the subject. When I first contemplated the present task, I was far from imagining, that it would carry me to such a length; and I sincerely confess that I am now in doubt whether I ought to congratulate myself for having undertaken it; for its performance has, perhaps, placed me under the necessity of entering into a controversy which would ill agree with my health, my professional avocations, and the painful efforts which English composition subjects me to; and, therefore, I would fain dispense with resuming my pen.

After all, why should I write any more upon phrenology? If what I have advanced is correct, it appears to me sufficient; if it is erro-

neous, whatever I could add, being based upon the same principles, would give no additional force to the present strictures ; consequently, reason, as well as the circumstances in which I am placed, bids me drop the subject, and cease writing, unless I be forced to it by the necessity of setting right any false construction that may be put upon my ill expressed ideas, or my motives.

A man, you well know, sir, who toils in the dry field of philosophy, is but scantily provided with those incentives which so effectually stimulate other writers ; and it is not every body that, like you, possesses an inexhaustible energy and perseverance, that need no prompting. Save a few fits of headach, I anticipate no remuneration for my labours, unless, by an effect of that generosity which is the attribute of superior minds, they procure me the invaluable advantage of your esteem.

With the respect due to your high character and virtues,

I remain, sir,

Your obedient servant,

And the sincere admirer of your unmatched talents,

J. MANESCA.

New-York,
No. 20 Reed-street.