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THE

SCIENTIFIC BASES OF FAITH.

THE

SCIENTIFIC BASES OF FAITH.

BY

JOSEPH JOHN MURPHY,

Author of "Habit and Intelligence."

"The laws of nature cannot account for their own origin."

JOHN STUART MILL.

London:

MACMILLAN AND CO.

1873.

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PREFACE.

THE present work was promised in the preface of my work on "Habit and Intelligence," which was published in the summer of 1869. When that preface was written, I hoped to publish the present work at the end of 1870: but it has been delayed by my feeling it a duty to take an active part in the re-organization of the Church of Ireland after its disestablishment: and I have not the power which I admire in some men of getting rapidly through a great quantity of work.

The only words of explanation or defence which I design to prefix to this book concern the way in which I have treated the authority of the Holy Scriptures: for it is possible that some whom I may hope to influence might otherwise be repelled by what they may think inconsistent if not insincere language on that subject. As this work is not a treatise on the historical authorities of revelation, the preface is the best place to meet such objections.

It may be said that I am inconsistent, and have treated the Scriptures in a way contrary to the principles on which evidence ought to be dealt with, by admitting their evidence as valid in some places and not in others:—admitting the discourses of Christ, for instance, as not only genuine

but authoritative, while denying the authenticity of any part of the history previous to Abraham, and questioning the doctrine of a personal tempter. My reply is that I have no general theory to maintain on the subject of the authority of the Scriptures, and that concerning their credibility on particular questions I have come to the conclusions which I hold, by applying the ordinary principles of evidence.

It is first to be observed that the expression *authority of a Book*, and still more *inspiration of a Book*, though I do not call them inaccurate, are elliptical expressions. Authority, which in this sense is the right to be believed, and the Divine inspiration which gives authority, are not attributes of books, but of men: and there is no ground whatever for supposing that the writings of a Prophet or an Apostle are more inspired or of higher authority than his spoken words.

Inspiration and authority admit of degrees: and there is no reason for thinking that all the many writers whose works the Church regards as Holy Scripture are of equal inspiration and of equal authority. The facts are altogether opposed to such a theory. What man, unless he had a theory to support, could compare the inspiration of the Proverbs of Solomon with that of the Psalms of David?

There is no proof that the Holy Scriptures are inspired throughout, and there is no proof that they are the only inspired documents in the world. It is *à priori* utterly improbable that any purely historical book, such as the Chronicles or the Book of Ezra, should be inspired, because the writing of history is a strictly human work, and it cannot be supposed that God would inspire men to do what they could do without special inspiration. "God

has not wrought miracles for nought."[1] And conversely, there are documents outside the Scriptures which bear marks of Divine inspiration. Any theory must be wrong which would deny inspiration to the Collects of the Church, or which would refuse to place the inspiration of the *Te Deum*, which is a Christian hymn of the fourth century, on a level with that of the *Venite*, which is a Hebrew psalm. If there were really a sharp and impassable line of distinction between inspired and uninspired writings, we may be sure that the Scriptures would have settled their own canon. But so far is this from being the case, that the idea of a canon of Scripture does not appear to have been formed until after the age of inspiration had ceased.

If inspiration admits of degrees, and if it is not to be expected on subjects with which the unassisted intellect of man is quite competent to deal, we must admit the further conclusion that inspiration is no guarantee against error. A Prophet or an Apostle may have the fullest inspiration concerning Divine things, while he may share the errors of other men on history and science. This, which is mere common sense, is of course opposed to the theory of what is called the "plenary inspiration"—that is to say, the miraculously guaranteed infallibility—of the Holy Scriptures:—a theory which grew up in an age when inspiration was dead and criticism not yet born, and has been perpetuated not because it is felt to be true, but as a controversial defence against error.

In most cases we have scarcely any data for forming an opinion on the character, the genuineness, and the trustworthiness of a book, except what are contained in the book itself. This is approximately true of nearly all

[1] "Deus non fecit miracula frustra."

ancient books, and is absolutely true of such books as the Pentateuch and the Homeric poems, which are each the only literary monument of an age.

All this may be summed up in the somewhat commonplace axioms, that in general, and especially when we have to do with ancient history, we can know nothing concerning any book, except by means of an examination of the book itself: and that inspiration cannot be defined and ought not to be taken for granted, but, if it is to be believed in, must prove itself. If this is true, it follows, or rather it is a statement of the same truth in other words, that the authenticity of any particular portion of the Scriptures is a question for historical criticism, and its inspiration a question for the spiritual instinct. On this last subject let me not be misunderstood:—I do not say that every man must decide for himself unassisted what books he is to regard as containing the teaching of the Spirit of God: on the contrary, the authority of the Church, like the inspiration of the Scriptures, is real though undefinable.[1] But though there is inspiration in the Scriptures, it is superstition to think that they are inspired throughout, or that they are in any way exempt from criticism; and though the Church has authority, it is superstition to think that any age can be deprived of its right to reconsider that on which a former age has pronounced its decision.

When we critically examine such a vast mass of documents as the Holy Scriptures, we must expect to find, and we do find, that the various documents are trustworthy in various degrees, and that the same document may be trustworthy in different degrees on different subjects. Thus the New Testament is much more trustworthy than the

[1] See page 174.

Old; and the Scriptures are in general more trustworthy on moral and spiritual questions than on historical ones, and not trustworthy at all on questions which border on science. Supposing their inspiration to be real, this is what might have been expected; and it is either stupidity or unfair controversial hostility to treat their historical errors and what appears to us their childlike ignorance of science, as if it had the slightest tendency to disprove their spiritual inspiration. We ought never to forget this simple and obvious critical canon, that if a writer is honest (and in primitive literature there is seldom any ground for suspecting conscious dishonesty) he will presumably know more about the subject which he professes to teach than about any other; and errors on other subjects ought not to injure his authority on the subject which he professes to understand. In a word, the scientific ignorance of the Biblical writers and their historical errors do not cloud their spiritual inspiration; and their inspiration must be perceived by its own light.

I am aware that these remarks do not by any means exhaust the question. They are not meant to be a full defence of my position, but only a statement of it. I am also aware that they are in no degree original; but there may be many readers to whom they will not be commonplaces; and I am desirous that no one who loves truth may be repelled from the reading of this work by any initial difficulties.

Old Forge, Dunmurry, Co. Antrim,
15*th October*, 1872.

CORRECTION.

On pages 110 and 111 the discovery of conical polarization is attributed to Prof. M'Cullagh. This is a mistake. It is due to a still more illustrious Irishman, namely Sir William Rowan Hamilton, the inventor of the calculus of quaternions. See Lloyd's "Wave Theory of Light," page 174 *et seq.*

ERRATA.

Page 258, line 4, for *influence* read *inference*.
Page 334, commencement of paragraph, for *one* read *our*.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE reader who glances at the title of this book may probably suppose that it is one more attempt at what is called "harmonizing Scripture with Science;" that is to say, trying by how little distortion of the sense of Scripture, and by how little misrepresentation of the facts of Science, the narratives of the Old Testament may be made to coincide with the facts disclosed by scientific research. It is best to state at the outset, that I have no such purpose. I believe that no such harmonizing is either necessary or possible; and if it were to be effected, it would raise far greater difficulties than it would solve; for it would be one of the greatest conceivable difficulties in the way of understanding, or believing, a Divine revelation, if it were made to appear that the Inspiring Spirit had begun His work by communicating truths of merely physical science.

It is not possible to harmonize the words of Scripture with the facts of Science; nor is it to be desired.

But not only do I admit that no such "harmonizing" as this is either needful or possible; I admit also that when we begin to investigate the mutual relations of Religion and Science, the first fact which meets us is this, that every science has prospered only when it has been freed from the influence of theological teachers. It was the dream of the scholastic philosophy—and a magnificent dream it was—that all science, physical, mental, and moral, should be deduced from theology; or, to use less abstract language, that man's knowledge of the universe should be deduced

Science prospers only when free from theological control.

from his knowledge of the God who created it and appointed its laws. But never was any dream more completely contradicted by the waking reality. No science has made greater discoveries than Chemistry, and it was obviously necessary from the very first to place Chemistry on some other than a theological basis. Astronomy and Geology also did not start on their career of progress until they had escaped from theological control; and we may now say the same of the sciences of Life, of Mind, and of Language. This is not such a state of things as a believer in revealed religion might have expected, and perhaps reasonably expected. But it is as certain as history and philosophy can make it, that Science is absolutely independent of Theology.

Many infer that Science and Faith have no connection whatever.

It is now impossible for any educated man to deny this truth; and the educated men of this generation appear very generally to go on to the further conclusion, that the things of Science and the things of Faith have no points of contact, and have absolutely nothing to do with each other. This conclusion is probably the more readily acquiesced in, because it affords a basis for a treaty of peace between what are regarded as the rival claims of Religion and of Science. Religious men and scientific men have often proposed a treaty of peace on this simple basis, that each of the two should leave the province of the other alone. But it is, in the nature of things, impossible for such a treaty to be permanently observed; and the attempt to observe it will continue only so long as neither party is quite in earnest. For, however unanswerable may be the proof that science has not, and cannot have, a theological basis; yet no one who is really in earnest can rest in this conclusion as final. Every religious man believes that God is in all His creation; he may therefore reasonably expect that those discoveries which reveal the structure of the universe, and the processes by which it has assumed its present form, will throw a reflected light, not perhaps on the Divine Nature, but on the Divine Government; and if he is unable to see any such connection between the things

Proposed treaty of peace on this basis.

Why this is impossible to be kept.

Probability of a connection from the religious point of view,

of Science and those of Faith, his natural inference will be, not that there is no such connection, but that it is yet to be discovered. And every student of science knows that all scientific progress discloses new and unexpected relations between branches of science that formerly appeared to be altogether unconnected; and why should he expect Religion to be alone an exception? Whether the student of science is a believer or an unbeliever in religion—or, to use language which is less liable to the charge of ambiguity, whether he believes theology to be true or false—he ought to expect to find such a connection. If he believes it to be true, he ought to expect that the truths of Science and the truths of Faith will have much light to cast on each other; if, on the contrary, he believes it to be false, or at least uncertain, his most logical conclusion will be, not that science has no bearing on theology, but that science will be found full of proofs of the untruth, or of the uncertainty, of theology.

and from the scientific.

It may be said that the existence of any such connection is only a presumption, which, however plausible, has been disproved by the actual progress of knowledge.

I admit that it is only a presumption, which the progress of knowledge might conceivably disprove. But even if no such connection does exist, it is too early in the history of science for us to rest in any such negative conclusion as final. And it can scarcely be conceived as possible that the vast change—we may say transformation—which the last two generations have effected in all our ideas concerning the universe in which we live and of which we are a part, can remain without any effect in colouring our thoughts concerning the things of Faith. Such an effect may be very indirect, and yet not the less real and unmistakeable. Butler's "Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature," contains few, if any, distinct allusions to the physical philosophy of Bacon or to the metaphysics of Locke, yet the whole work is coloured by the style of thought to which Bacon and Locke gave origin; and it could not have been written as it stands in any age previous to that of Locke.

It is too early to pronounce it impossible.

The transformation of scientific ideas must colour religious ones.

Butler's Analogy:

influence of Bacon and Locke in it.

If such a work is written in this or in any future age, it will, in the same way, be coloured by the new aspect which physical philosophy has assumed in the present century. The least that the present generation has to do, in order to do justice to the subject of the relation of Science to Religion, is to adapt Butler's mode of reasoning to the present state of science. This, I say, is the very least we have to do; I believe we have to do much more.

We have at the least to adapt its reasoning to our science.

I hope and believe, that when the world is older, and when the mutual relations of all branches of knowledge are as well understood as are now, for instance, the relations of chemistry to the theory of electricity, the scientific progress, which began by rejecting religion as the basis of science, will finally accept religion as not indeed the basis, but the summit and crown. Of course it would be impossible to justify this belief in a single paragraph. It is the purpose of this whole book to endeavour to justify it.

Religion will be ultimately recognized as not the basis of Science, but the crown.

It is necessary here to explain the words used. When I speak of science, I mean, not physical science only, but all those sciences, physical, mental, moral, political, and historical, which disclose the constitution of that universe in which we live and of which we form a part. And when I speak of this as forming a basis for religion, I mean a logical basis, somewhat in the same way that Mathematics is the logical basis of the dynamical sciences; or that the sciences of inorganic matter, collectively, form a basis for the science of Life. Such a relation of Religion to Science, if it can be established, will be in accordance with the analogy of the relation of the sciences among themselves, among which the higher is always based on the lower; or, to use unmetaphorical language, the higher presupposes the lower. Thus Life presupposes Matter, and is based on it; Mind presupposes unconscious Life, and is based on it. So, as I believe, are the truths of Religion based on those of Science; or to use language which gives my meaning better, the knowledge of the Supernatural has its logical basis in the knowledge of the Natural.

Sense in which Science can be a basis for Religion.

The lower is always the basis of the higher: Matter of Life, and Life of Mind.

It is a very obvious, and at first sight a conclusive,

objection to this view, that in point of historical fact Religion is older than Science. How can the newer be the basis of the older? The answer to this objection is given by the history of science, which shows that when one science is the logical basis of another, their logical relation does not become manifest until both are far advanced.[1] The sciences of Matter, that is to say Physics and Chemistry, logically form the basis of the science of Life, or Biology; but historically, we know that systematic Zoology, which is an important branch of Biology, was commenced by Aristotle, before either Physics or Chemistry had an existence; and I believe I am correct in saying that Biology was first placed on its true physico-chemical basis by the establishment of Liebig's chemical theories of nutrition and respiration, not more than a generation ago. The study of most of the sciences was begun independently and in isolation from other sciences—were it not so, a beginning could scarcely have been made at all; and the perception of the relations of each separate science to the rest is not an original condition of its commencement, but a late result of its progress.

Objection that Religion is older than Science. Answer, that the relation of two sciences is not manifest till both are advanced.

It is needful here to guard against a very probable misconception. I have said that I believe it possible to place religion on a scientific *basis*. But if this is true it does not follow that science contains the *germ* of religion. These expressions are metaphorical, and need to be explained; and they may be best explained by the analogy just referred to, of the relation of the laws of Life to those of Matter. Life presupposes Matter; that is to say, there cannot be Life unless there is Matter to be vitalized, and the laws of Life to a certain extent imply those of Matter, and cannot be stated without presupposing them. But the converse is not true: there can be Matter without Life, and the laws of Matter do not in any degree presuppose the laws of Life. Thus Matter constitutes a *basis* for Life, and the sciences of Matter constitute the basis for the sciences of Life; but the *germ* of Life is not to be found in Matter; the vital forces

Science is the *basis* of Religion, but does not contain its *germ*.

Illustration from the relation of Matter to Life.

[1] See the Chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the History of Science (Chapter 44).

are not resultants from the physical ones, and the properties of living things are not deducible from the properties of dead matter. As I conceive it, the relation of Religion to Science is of this kind: Science is the *basis* of Religion, because supernatural truths imply natural ones, and cannot be stated without presupposing them. But Science does not contain the *germ* of Religion; on the contrary, the peculiar truths of Religion are, as I believe, incapable of being discovered by man for himself, and have been communicated to mankind in an altogether peculiar manner, by Revelation.

The peculiar truths of Religion are known only by Revelation.

For this reason there is, and ever must be, a contrast between Science and Religion. The contrast consists in this, that man finds the facts of Science for himself, but those of Religion are revealed. But this contrast ought not to imply antagonism. There is a similar contrast between the abstract sciences of logic and mathematics on the one side, and the physical sciences on the other; the contrast consists in this, that the data of the abstract sciences are self-evident, while those of the physical ones have to be sought out by a laborious process of observation and experiment. But this is a contrast which implies no antagonism; on the contrary, the physical sciences are in a great degree based on the mathematical. The mutual relation of Science and Religion ought to be just the same. The antagonism between Science and Religion themselves is purely imaginary. The antagonism between the men who study and teach Science, and the men who study and teach Religion, is, unfortunately, sometimes real, though it is the fashion to exaggerate it: but, in so far as it is real, it is a mere accident of the present time, which will disappear, and indeed is already visibly disappearing.

Contrast of Science and Religion.

Similar contrast of the abstract and the physical sciences.

This involves no antagonism.

The antagonism of science and religion is imaginary; that of their teachers is but temporary.

Let me repeat, that the purpose of this book is not to mediate between parties. I do not aim at "harmonizing" Faith with Science, for they need no harmonizing; nor at reconciling their respective votaries, whom time and the increase of knowledge are rapidly reconciling. What I aim at, is to show their logical connection in thought, and their organic connection as parts of the same divinely constituted order of things. To do this must be the work,

I aim not at harmonizing or reconciling, but at showing logical and organic connection.

not of the Introduction but of the whole book. I will, however, remark here, that the fundamental conceptions of Science and of Faith, far from being opposed, are identical. The fundamental conception of both is that of a system of truths which man has not made and cannot alter, but which it is his privilege to understand. And from this identity of fundamental conception it follows, that the religious and the scientific spirits, when they are both in their purity, are very closely akin. Love of truth, intellectual humility, and intellectual independence, are at once religious virtues, and virtues which are involved in scientific habits of mind.

Common fundamental conception of Science and Faith.

Similarity of religious and scientific spirits.

By the love of truth I mean something different from mere veracity. I mean that higher kind of truthfulness which consists "not merely in making our words conform to our opinions, but in endeavouring to make our opinions conform to truth."[1] This love of truth for its own sake is self-evidently a scientific virtue. Science has no object except the discovery of truth; and the man who does not value truth, or who values it for any reason except that it is true, is no genuine votary of science. Now, this love of truth for its own sake is equally a religious virtue. This may be denied: it may be said that the purpose of Religion is not knowledge, but life; and consequently, that in Religion knowledge of truth is not an end in itself, as it is in Science, but only a means to an end. I reply, that this is a misrepresentation, and a caricature, of the true and Christian doctrine concerning Faith. It is a result of that kind of logic which endeavours to be precise and is inaccurate—which endeavours to be subtle and is clumsy. It is a misrepresentation, I say, to call the knowledge of what God has to teach a mere *means* of life, or to call assent to any doctrine, however true, a *condition* of life. On the contrary, to know what God has to teach is to be in the way of life, and to know God *is* life. This is the teaching of Christ.[2]

Love of truth,

the same in Religion and in Science.

[1] I quote these words from some discourse by the Rev. F. Robertson of Brighton.

[2] "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3).

Intellectual humility.

Intellectual humility is also a religious virtue as well as a scientific one. By intellectual humility, I mean a readiness to admit an error when we find ourselves in error; a willingness to confess our ignorance when we are ignorant; and a disposition not to make our own notions the tests of truth, but to remember that the standard of truth is outside of ourselves. The same is true of the virtue of intellectual independence. Without it, scientific progress and religious progress would be alike impossible. Neither the scientific reformation of Copernicus and Galileo, nor the religious reformation of Luther, would have been possible without men who had the independence of mind which could think, doubt, and believe against the pressure of the opinion of a hostile majority.

Intellectual independence.

But though the intellectual humility which can bear to confess ignorance or error, the intellectual independence which can endure and overcome all opposition to the search after truth, and the love of truth for its own sake which is the foundation of the other two—though these are eminently religious virtues, it can scarcely be said that they are, in the present age at least, at all specially characteristic of religious men. The love of truth is probably more common in England and Germany now than it ever was in any country before; but this is to be attributed altogether to the growth of the scientific spirit—that spirit which seeks after knowledge as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some other end. And it is not too much to hope that the scientific spirit may before long put new life into theology. Since the subsidence of the Reformation, nearly all the best intellect of Europe has been drawn away from theology; but I hope and believe that this separation between the highest intellects, and the highest subjects on which intellect can be employed, is already tending to disappear.

The scientific spirit may regenerate theology.

Various effects of science in modifying our conceptions of the universe, moral as well as physical.

Before going any further, let us consider the various ways in which science has changed and is changing our habitual thoughts respecting the entire universe, moral as well as physical, in which we live and of which we are a part.

Possibility of natural science.

The first lesson of natural science, and in a purely intellectual sense the most important of all, is that natural science is possible. To us, this appears self-evident—it appears like asserting that thought is possible. But it was not so at first. The possibility of natural science implies, and indeed means, the existence of an order in nature which we are able to discover and understand. It needs an effort of thought for us to imagine a time when this conception was unknown; but history makes it certain, and an effort of thought will make it intelligible, that such a conception was unknown to the early generations of mankind. Instead of power acting under invariable laws, they saw in nature—in the heavens, the air, the ocean, and the earth—the action not of one Power but of many, and not of law but of caprice. Very slowly was a truer set of conceptions substituted. The first discovery which tended in any great degree to substitute the idea of a reign of law for that of a reign of caprice, was probably the discovery that the eclipses of the sun and moon came in regular course and could be predicted; but it was not for ages afterwards that men learned to understand that such phenomena as lightning, storms, and earthquakes, which most completely set man's powers of prediction at defiance, are also beyond doubt the results of forces that act according to regular law. This is to us a commonplace, but it will not produce on our minds the effect which is properly due to it unless we remember that it was not always a commonplace; that for our familiar knowledge of this truth we have to thank the meditations and the toils of many a

Discovery of an order in the universe.

> "Spirit yearning in desire
> To follow knowledge, like a sinking star,
> Beyond the utmost verge of human thought."[1]

The truth that in nature there is an intelligible order—a Cosmos—is thus the first revelation of science; and in knowing this, we have the conception of science as possible and attainable. In a word, the first revelation of science is its own existence.

[1] Tennyson's *Ulysses*.

But more is implied in this than the mere existence of regularity in nature. The truth that this regularity, this reign of law, is not self-evident but is capable of being discovered, implies the possibility of scientific discovery; and it implies also that nature, when scientifically explored, proves to be at least in some degree unlike what it appears to our merely spontaneous perceptions. The most striking instance of this truth is that afforded by the discoveries of astronomy—that the earth, which appears to be flat and motionless, is really spherical and in motion; that the sun and many of the stars are larger than the earth. These truths, addressing the understanding and the imagination at once, have taught us, more effectually than would be possible by any other means, that "things are not what they seem."

Astronomical discoveries.

Things are not what they seem.

There is another way in which the discoveries of astronomy have modified, or at least may modify, profoundly our conceptions of the universe, not only physical but spiritual. Astronomy has taught us that this earth of ours is not, as men at first naturally thought, the geometrical centre of the universe—that it is one of many planets revolving round the sun, and that the sun is but one of an almost infinite number of stars with which the depths of space are strewn, every one of which may have its own attendant planets. It shows marvellous stupidity that this conception of the universe should ever have been thought irreligious. It not only magnifies the Creator's glory, but to my mind it lessens the weight of the moral perplexities of this earth, to

Our earth is one of many worlds.

"Look up through night:—the world is wide;"[1]

to remember that the same laws of matter and force are at work in our planet and in every one of

"Yonder hundred million spheres;"[2]

and to think it possible that many of the worlds above and around us are portions not only of the same material

Moral bearing of this truth.

[1] Tennyson's *Two Voices*. [2] The same.

universe, but also of the same moral and spiritual universe with our own world; and that as the laws of life are the same in organisms of every species, so the same mental, moral, and spiritual laws may be working in many worlds to different results in each, and all of them admirable.

It has not had the influence it merits.

This conception has not taken hold of men's imaginations as it deserves to do. This, however, may be on account of the general assent to the dogma of the Fall, which has made men think of the moral administration of this world as of something altogether abnormal. But the more recent progress of science has made it no longer possible to believe in the Fall as an historical event. We may see in it the expression of a truth belonging to a higher order than that of nature or history or external fact; but as history we now see it to be untrue.

This may be due to the dogma of the Fall, which is now no longer credible.

Science has become historical.

Science has become historical.[1] A very great part of our modern science is occupied with tracing the actual history of change and development. This is most conspicuously true of geology, but geology is only one of a series of chapters of historical science, or scientific history, which we are slowly but surely deciphering. The first of these chapters is the nebular, or condensation, theory of the origin of the universe, which shows how all the suns with their planets have probably come into existence by the slow condensation of a nebula. Geology, which tells of the process by which the earth's surface has received its present character, is the second of the series. The third is the history of the evolution of living forms—tracing the process by which the most highly organized vegetable and animal species have been derived by descent with modification from the first vitalized but unorganized germ which was endowed with the marvellous powers of life. And, lastly, the history of the evolution of human society, with its languages, its arts, and its political systems.

The nebular theory.

Geology.

The evolution of living forms,

and of human society.

Continuity of all history.

These histories—which may briefly be called the Cosmogonic, the Geological, the Biological, and the Human—are each continuous in itself, and all continuous with one

[1] See the Introduction to "Habit and Intelligence."

another. Science shows no change in the laws of nature since the first beginning of things. It seems most probable that the origin of life was due to no physical or chemical action, but to a direct exertion of the same Creative Power which at the beginning gave origin to the world of matter and force: and in the same way the spiritual nature of man is not a mere development of the mental nature of the animals from which his bodily frame is descended, but has been directly imparted by the Divine Spirit. But these, through fresh actions of direct Creative Power, introducing new forces into the universe, have introduced those new forces without altering the laws under which the previously existing forces acted, and without breaking the continuity of the formative history of the universe, any more than the continuity of the formative history of a coral reef is broken by the arrival of the first seed which is washed on it by the waves and gives origin to the vegetation that covers it in after years.

All evidence is against a Fall.

Now in this history of the universe and of man, the outlines of which we have deciphered, there is no evidence of a Paradisal state or of a Fall from original perfection ; but, on the contrary, the most conclusive evidence that all the analogies of nature are against any such theory ; and that death is not a consequence of sin, but a universal and necessary concomitant and condition of life. And the further back we search in human history—not written history, which could not possibly begin until man's intellectual development had made considerable progress, but in prehistoric annals and in the indications of primitive thought yielded by language—the further back, I say, we search in the earliest vestiges of the history of mankind, the less we shall see that can be mistaken for the ruins of an angelic nature, and the more nearly will man appear to approach in character to the animals.[1]

In another and a totally different way the progress of science is profoundly modifying our conceptions of the spiritual world and its relation to the world of matter.

[1] See especially Sir John Lubbock's "Prehistoric Times," and "Origin of Civilization and Primitive Condition of Man."

We do not know what matter is, and we do not know what mind is; nor is it possible that science can ever teach us. But we have learned to look on both matter and mind in a different way from that in which we used to do; the old opposition between matter and mind, though it has not disappeared and never can disappear, has changed its form, and is now seen to be less profound than it formerly appeared to be. This change is due to two causes: it is due on the one side to our increased knowledge of the subjects of the strictly physical sciences, that is to say of force and matter; and on the other, to our increased knowledge of the mind and of its relation to the bodily organism.

Science has changed our ideas of the relation between matter and mind.

Two causes of this.

As regards the former of these two causes—namely, our changed conceptions of matter. In what may be called the metaphysical physics of the last century, as in our spontaneous thoughts about matter, the chief emphasis was laid on its passive properties of impenetrability, extension, and inertia. But we now know that Force, or to speak more accurately, Energy[1]—ἐνεργεῖα—has as real and as indestructible an existence as matter. The world of matter—the merely physical world, not to speak of life and mind—is a world of matter *and energy;* and any conception of it is imperfect and untrue which does not give the same prominence to the existence and the indestructibility of the one as of the other.

Prominence now given to dynamic conceptions in physical science.

Now, matter is altogether outside of our consciousness; but energy, or force, is not so. We are conscious of our own will as a force; and we have no consciousness, and strictly speaking no conception, of force except that which is derived from our own will. And as will is mental, a relation is thus established, at least in thought, between the internal world of mind and the external world of matter and force or energy.

I do not say that this conception has been first introduced or made possible by the scientific discoveries of recent times. On the contrary, it was always capable

These are not altogether new but

[1] For the distinction between Force and Energy, see Note at end of Introduction.

are more obvious now than formerly.

of proof by metaphysical analysis, that matter is only explicable as a function of Force, and Force only explicable as a function of conscious Mind and Will. But the prominence given by modern science to dynamical views of the physical world has made such conceptions as these much more obvious and much more impressive than they were formerly.

Progress of mental science.

While the progress of the purely physical sciences has thus increased the prominence, in our ideas of the material world, of the conception of force, which is essentially a mental or spiritual conception, the progress of mental science has tended in another and a much more direct way to break down the distinction between the worlds of matter and of mind. This has been done chiefly by making it more obvious than ever, that there is no scientific basis for the old belief in a distinct mental *substance*. The only answer that science has to give to any question concerning the nature of mind, is that the mental functions—consciousness, thought, and will—are concomitants of the internal action of the brain. Mind can only be defined as conscious life; mind is the name we give to the conscious action of the nervous system.[1] And it is utterly impossible to state with any precision where the unconscious functions end and the conscious ones begin. Conscious and unconscious life, mental and bodily action, are inextricably mixed up together; the conscious or mental life is but an outgrowth, or higher development, of the unconscious or bodily life; and the highest psychological science does not enable us to conceive of the existence of mind apart from the bodily organism. No doubt we may think of the mind apart from the body, but this is a mere abstraction of the intellect, like speaking of force apart from matter. But it would not be true to infer that the tendency of modern science is towards materialism; for, as we have seen above, if science tends to identify mind with the functions of the body, it tends on the other hand to give a

Psychology gives no ground for the belief in a distinct mental substance; but shows mind as a concomitant of nervous action.

[1] This is not strictly accurate, for there is thought which is not conscious. See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapters 28 and 29.

spiritual character to all our ideas of the material universe, by reason of the prominence with which it puts forward the conception of force; and force can only be thought of as spiritual.

Summary.

To sum up what has been said on the subject of the various ways in which science has modified, and is modifying, our conceptions of both the physical and the spiritual universe.

We have learned—first and most important lesson of all—that there is a Cosmos; that is to say, an intelligible order of nature; and that consequently a science of natural things is possible and attainable.

Astronomy has taught us that "things are not what they seem"—that the entire relation of the earth to the heavens is such as to contradict our spontaneous belief.

The same science has shown us that this earth of ours, in a physical sense, is one among many worlds; and if this is true in a physical sense, it is probably true in a spiritual sense also.

Astronomy, geology, and the science of life, all unite to show that the history of the universe, from its first creation till now, has been a continuous history.

Geology and the science of life also show that all evidence, both direct and analogical, is opposed to the idea of a fall from an original Paradisal state; and they prove the notion of physical death being the consequence of sin to be but a dream.

Lastly, psychology has shown that mind is but a concomitant of nervous action, and that it is impossible to draw any line of separation between the mental and the bodily functions; while dynamical physics have shown that force, or energy, is as real and as indestructible as matter, and that matter is capable of being understood only as a function of force; thus suggesting a spiritual conception of the universe of matter.

The subject of the mutual relation of the worlds of matter and of mind is to be considered at greater length in the next two chapters.

NOTE.

Explanation of the word Energy as distinguished from Force.

ENERGY, as a scientific term, is a word which is not easy to define in familiar language. It is not synonymous with force. Force is that which produces motion, and equal forces are those which are capable of neutralizing each other when acting in opposite directions; as in the case of two weights which balance each other at the opposite ends of a lever. But force can act only when it has space to act through: the ocean, for instance, presses on its bed with a force proportionate to the depth, but that force has no space through which to act. Energy is due to the action of force through space, and the quantity of energy is due to the intensity of the force which produces the energy, multiplied into the space through which that force acts. Consequently no energy is due to such a force as the pressure of the ocean on its bed; but to the position of the water in a mill-pond a quantity of energy is due, proportionate to the weight of the water multiplied into the height through which it can fall. The energy due to the position of the water in the mill-pond is potential energy: the energy due to the motion of the falling water or of the machinery which it sets in motion, is actual energy. The quantity of actual energy, or energy of motion, of a moving body, is proportionate to the mass of the body multiplied into the height from which it would have to fall in order to acquire its velocity.

As now defined, no law of conservation applies to force; but the law of the conservation of energy is strictly true. Energy is incapable of being either produced or destroyed, but it is constantly changing its form. Heat, electricity, and light, are forms of energy. It often appears to be destroyed, as when a moving body comes to rest, but it is in reality only transformed, generally into heat.

For more detailed information on this subject, see the first six chapters of *Habit and Intelligence*, especially the first chapter.

CHAPTER I.

METAPHYSICAL AND POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

THE hope expressed in the Introduction, that some of the best intellect of Europe is now turning once more in the direction of theology, will appear baseless to those disciples of the so-called Positive Philosophy who believe that it is destined to supersede all others. The Positive Philosophy.

Of course I do not deny, what is indeed an obvious fact, the great prevalence of what is called by the inappropriate name of the Positive Philosophy. It may perhaps be truly called the dominant philosophy of the present age; but that which is the dominant philosophy of the present will not necessarily be the dominant philosophy of the future. I believe that it does not embody the deepest intellectual tendencies of the present age, and that the reaction against it has already begun.

I must justify what I have said above, as to the inappropriateness of the term *positive* when applied to the philosophy of Comte. Without meaning to prejudge any question as to its merits, I say that it would be far more accurate to call it *negative*. By this remark I do not mean that it is a philosophy of mere denial, or that it contains nothing of any real value; far from it—such a condemnation would be totally untrue. To Comte's philosophy may be applied the saying that philosophical systems are generally right in what they affirm, but wrong in what they deny.[1] But in Comte's system, unfortunately, the negative Better called negative.

[1] This saying is, I believe, usually attributed either to Cousin or to Coleridge, but it has been taken with but little change from Pascal. "Tous

or denying part, which as I believe is false and worthless, comes at the beginning and is the most conspicuous part.

Comte's fundamental dogma, that all knowledge is only phenomenal.

His fundamental dogma (in using the word *dogma* I think I do him no injustice) is this: that we can know nothing but phenomena, and the laws of the resemblances, co-existences, and successions of phenomena; and that consequently all knowledge of the real nature of things, their origin, and their purpose, must be for ever inaccessible to us.

Inference that theology and metaphysics are impossible.

It follows by necessary logical consequence from this fundamental assumption, or rather it is a translation of the same from philosophical into common language, that no such thing is possible as either metaphysical or theological knowledge—that we may know the bare facts of nature and of mind, and may systematize our knowledge of these facts into sciences, but can never penetrate to the knowledge of any invisible underlying reality, and can never ascend to the knowledge of any Being that is above nature. Comte was far too consistent a reasoner to miss this inference, or to endeavour to evade it. Nothing is more prominent in his writings than the emphatic and reiterated denial of the possibility of any knowledge that transcends mere phenomena, and the assertion of the utter worthlessness of all systems of metaphysics and of theology.

Revelation possibly consistent with Comte's dogma.

I ought to remark in order to do justice to the present subject, though it may not be quite relevant here, that although Comte's philosophical system totally excludes all natural theology, it is not so evident that it excludes theology on a basis of revelation.

So far there is nothing original in the philosophy of Comte; it is only a more systematic and more unflinchingly logical statement of the results previously arrived at by Hume. What is really original with Comte, is the application of this view of the nature and the limitations of our knowledge to the explanation of religious and philosophical history.

leurs principes sont vrais : des Pyrrhoniens, des Stoiques, des athées, etc. Mais leurs conclusions sont fausses, parce que les principes opposés sont vrais aussi." — *Pensées de Pascal*, Fangère's edition, vol. ii. p. 92.

All religion and all philosophy, according to him, have their origin in the desire to explain the universe; and for the purpose of such explanation, three kinds of conceptions are possible to the mind, and have been habitually formed, though only one of the three is of any real worth. The first of these is what Comte calls the theological, but it would be not only more reverential but more accurate to call it mythological. To this class of hypothetical conceptions belong, to quote the instances which most readily occur, such notions as that the flashes of the lightning are the darts of Jove, and that the eruptions of Etna are produced by the struggles of the imprisoned Titan. But such notions as these are possible only to a childlike ignorance of the laws of nature. Slowly, but gradually and surely, the discovery is made, that the phenomena of nature conform to law; and once this lesson is learned, the mythological explanation is perceived to be untrue, or at least insufficient, and a scientific explanation is sought for.

Statement of his view. Religion and Philosophy are attempts to explain the universe. Three kinds of attempted explanations: theological or mythological.

But the scientific explanation is at first sought in the wrong direction. The first attempt at a scientific explanation, according to Comte, has always been metaphysical: that is to say, as he explains the word metaphysics, the first attempt was to ascertain the *essence* of the thing under investigation; from which essence, were it known, it was supposed that the properties of the thing might be deduced. When stated thus barely, it appears to us moderns scarcely credible that such a conception of the nature of science, or such a conception of what constitutes explanation, should ever have entered into the mind of any sane man. It is, however, not the less true that the history of philosophy is full of this error. "No one, unless entirely ignorant of the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for realities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the Middle Ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas of Plato,"[1] which were in fact nothing

metaphysical.

[1] These words are quoted from an article on Comte's Philosophy in the *Westminster Review* for April 1865, signed J. S. M. (evidently John

but general names (that is to say, the names of classes or of attributes) mistaken for transcendental realities; or, in other words, for imaginary essences of things, which were supposed to have some kind of existence apart from the things themselves.[1] It was to ethical subjects that Plato chiefly applied this conception, but the same mistake of abstractions for realities affected purely physical science also. A curious relic of this is still preserved in the language of the chemistry of commerce (though not in that of scientific chemistry), where the word essence, which originally denoted a purely abstract and metaphysical conception, has come to mean something capable of being put in a bottle for sale.[2] And there is a good instance of the same error in the celebrated argument that the mind must be always thinking, even during sleep, because it is its *essence* to think. Put *differentia*, or *distinguishing property*. instead of *essence*, and the argument will be seen to be worthless.

As scientific facts became more familiar and scientific conceptions grew clearer, it was at last gradually discovered that the explanation of phenomena by referring them to the essences of things was really no explanation at all. It became obvious, for instance, that to say "opium produces sleep because it has a certain soporific virtue," is nothing more than to say opium produces sleep because it produces sleep. When thus mythological explanations prove to be inconsistent with the facts, and metaphysical ones prove to be not untrue but unmeaning, all that is of any real worth remains; the early errors which stood in the way of true scientific conceptions have been got rid of, and men are for the first time set face to face with the problems of Inductive Science; that is to say, the study of the facts of nature, and of what-

and inductive.

Stuart Mill), which is a marvel of condensation and lucidity, and contains all on the subject that any one need care to know who is not a regular student of philosophy.

[1] It ought perhaps to be mentioned that, although Locke used the *word* Idea, he only meant by it a mental conception.

[2] I take this illustration from the article in the *Westminster Review* already quoted.

ever may be legitimately generalized or inferred from those facts.

These have been successively developed.

Thus man's conception of the universe in general, and every branch of science in particular (logic and mathematics excepted), has passed through three distinct stages of development: first, the Mythological; second, the Metaphysical; third, the Positive as it is called by Comte, or the Inductive as I prefer to call it.

Difficulty of proving such an historical theory from the indefiniteness of the facts.

If this historical generalization is true, it is evidently of very great interest and value. It is, however, difficult to give satisfactory proof of any theory of the kind, in consequence of a sort of obscurity which is almost peculiar to historical science. There is no obscurity about the fundamental conceptions, and the facts are accessible and abundant, but they are very indefinite. The difficulty consists in deciding how each fact is to be classed; in deciding, for instance, whether any particular scientific theory ought to be called metaphysical or inductive. For this reason, a large proportion of such questions must ever remain what are vaguely called "matters of opinion"—that is to say, questions where an approximation to a true solution is possible, but where there is no absolute criterion of certainty, either demonstrative or experimental. Nevertheless I think that, on the whole, this historical theory of Comte's is made out.

It does not consist with the plan of this work to say any more about this theory, regarded as an historical one. I go on to consider its logical foundation; and this is not affected by any doubt as to whether the theory can be historically proved; for, whether it is true or not that the three orders of conceptions—the theological or mythological, the metaphysical, and the inductive—have been evolved in the order enumerated, it is certain and obvious that these three modes of thought have been, and are, widely spread among men; and that they are *in some degree* mutually exclusive; so that where one of the three is absolutely dominant, there is no room for either of the other two. But if Comte's historical theory were

The three modes of philosophizing are in some degree mutually exclusive.

as fully proved as the law of gravitation, this would not make it less necessary—on the contrary, it would make it more necessary—to study the logical basis of this historical law, the meaning of the three modes of thought enumerated above, and the nature of their relations to each other. Now it is obvious that any relation of contrast can be between two terms only. There are two such relations to be considered: the contrast between Theology and Science, and that between Metaphysical and Inductive Science. Comte answered the questions involved in these relations very summarily indeed; saying that Theology is false, but Science is true; and that Metaphysics is worthless, but the Positive, or Inductive, method leads to true results.

Contrast of theology and science, and of metaphysical and inductive science.

Comte rejected theology and metaphysics, because only inductive science throws light on the facts of the universe.

It was not in virtue of any imaginary demonstration that Comte arrived at these conclusions. His contempt for all metaphysical methods of reasoning was too consistent to permit him to make use of metaphysical reasons even against metaphysics and theology. His argument, expressed or implied throughout his whole philosophy, is this: The purpose of all philosophy is to enable us to understand the facts of the universe in which we live, and of which we are part. The unvarying experience of the whole history of philosophy shows that Theology and Metaphysics are worthless for this purpose, and that Inductive Science alone avails. Theology and Metaphysics ought therefore to be cast aside, and only Inductive Science retained.

Syllogistic statement of his argument.

This argument is syllogistic. It may be stated in the form of a regular syllogism, thus:—

All philosophy which throws no light on the facts of nature is worthless.

Theology and metaphysics throw no light on the facts of nature.

Therefore theology and metaphysics are worthless.

Now, a syllogistic argument may be controverted by denying either of the two premises. The conclusion does not hold unless both the premises are true. In this case I admit one of the premises, but I do not admit the other.

I admit that theology and metaphysics throw no light on the facts of nature, and do not help us to understand them; but I do not admit that all philosophy is worthless except in so far as it throws light on the facts of nature.

I admit one premise, but deny the other.

Let me first speak of theology. In the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter, and in the Introduction, I have emphatically stated my conviction that theology cannot be a basis for physical science. In this I agree with Comte; and I may have used language that looks like the language of one of his disciples. I have stated, not as a concession to an opponent, but as a fundamental datum of my own system, that it is impossible to reason downwards from God to nature. The laws of nature are the same to us, whether or not we believe in a God who appointed them; belief in God does not enable us any better to understand the laws of Matter, of Force, and of Life. But though this is true, it does not in any degree prove that theology is false and worthless; it does not even prove that theology has no points of contact with physical science. We cannot reason downwards from God to nature, but it is the chief purpose of this work to show how we may reason upwards from nature to God. If, however, it could be shown that theology and physical science have no points of contact, and threw no light whatever on each other, this would not, so far as I can see, necessarily prove theology to be false; and if theology is true—or, to use what is really more appropriate language, if there is a God and we live under His government—the knowledge of these truths is not worthless but infinitely important.

We cannot reason from God to nature, but we may reason from nature to God.

If theology is true, it is all-important.

On the subject of theology it is not necessary to say any more at present. We go on to consider the relation of metaphysics to inductive science. It is necessary first to explain the terms that are to be used.

In speaking of Inductive Science, I use the expression in exactly the sense in which Comte speaks of Positive Science (except that Positive Science includes Mathematics, which is not inductive[1]). Inductive Science may

Inductive Science is the same as Positive

[1] See Note A at end of chapter.

Science, except that mathematics is not inductive: it begins from observation; it includes mental science,

be defined as science whereof the data are observed facts, and which consists in nothing but the results of such observation, with whatever may be legitimately generalized and inferred therefrom. As thus defined, Inductive Science includes mental science as well as physical; for mental science is based on the observed facts of mind, exactly as physical science is based on the observed facts of the world of matter; and the circumstance that the methods of observation in the two cases are quite different, does not make any important difference in the significance of the facts when ascertained, or in the method of reasoning from them. And, as thus defined, inductive science includes the science of language, and the historical and political sciences, in so far as these latter can as yet be called sciences at all.[1]

and the science of language and of history.

When inductive science has received this very extensive definition, it will be natural to ask: Leaving Theology provisionally out of the question, does not my definition include all science whatever, except only mathematics and formal logic? and if so, what room is left for metaphysics, as in any sense a distinct subject of inquiry? The answer to this involves the definition of metaphysics.

What is the province of metaphysics?

I agree with Comte in regarding Metaphysics as rather a method of philosophizing than a branch of science. But I do not agree with him as to its proper definition. As already stated, Comte regards Metaphysics as the inquiry after the essences of things. I think, on the contrary, that it is no part of true metaphysical theory, but only the crudest form of metaphysical error, to think that we can possibly discover any "essence of a thing" from which the properties of the thing can be deduced. I propose to define Metaphysics thus: That while the Inductive method begins from the facts of Observation, the Metaphysical method begins from the facts of Consciousness; or, to state the same in other words, that the data of inductive science are external to the mind, and the data of metaphysics are within the mind itself. It needs no proof

Metaphysics defined. Inductive Science begins from Observation, Metaphysics from Consciousness.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 207.

that the facts and laws of Matter, Force, and Life, which constitute the data of the physical sciences, are external to the mind. They are known by observation only, and could not possibly become known by any interrogation of consciousness.[1] But, on the contrary, such truths as those of our Personality, Freedom, and Responsibility, belong to the opposite category; they are known only as revelations of consciousness, and could not possibly become known by observation, or by any reasoning based on observation.

They are opposite

The two methods, the Inductive and the Metaphysical, are thus opposite; but though they are opposite, I do not agree with Comte in regarding them as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are mutually supplementary. Each can do what the other cannot do; just as mathematical methods and experimental methods deal with different classes of problems, and neither can in general solve the problems of the other. It necessarily leads to error when an attempt is made either to apply the inductive method to the solution of what are properly metaphysical problems, or to apply the metaphysical method to the solution of what are properly inductive problems. The whole philosophy of antiquity and of the Middle Ages was vitiated by the attempt to apply metaphysical methods to what are properly inductive problems; and though Descartes was free from any belief in the "essences of things," yet he introduced metaphysical methods in another form into what ought to have been the province of purely inductive science. He formulized his error in the axiom that whatever can be clearly conceived by the mind is true: by true, meaning correspondent with some reality of the universe. This is a metaphysical error—indeed, it may be called the summary of all that class of error which consists in the application of metaphysical methods to what are properly inductive problems—because it consists in beginning from data of consciousness, which is the essentially metaphysical method, instead of beginning from data of observation, which is the inductive method. Such

and mutually supplementary. Their problems are different.

Metaphysical error of Descartes, that what is clearly conceived is true.

[1] See Note B at end of chapter.

mistakes are not likely to be made now, and if Descartes were to live in the present state of science he certainly would not fall into them. But the converse error is equally possible, and is far oftener met with now: I mean the employment of inductive methods to solve questions which really belong to metaphysics; such as, to quote the best example I can think of, Mr. Buckle's attempt to disprove the purely metaphysical doctrine of the freedom of the will by means of that law, or rather fact, of averages, which is shown by statistical evidence.

Converse error of applying inductive methods to metaphysical questions.

Mr. Buckle on moral freedom.

The inductive tendency, to begin from data of observation, and the metaphysical tendency, to begin from data of consciousness, have always divided, and probably will always continue to divide, the world of thought. In ancient Greece, the Eleatic school of philosophy was avowedly metaphysical; the Ionian school was, or at least endeavoured to be, inductive, though no doubt much metaphysical error was mixed up with its physics. At a later period, Plato was metaphysical and Aristotle essentially inductive. It is a saying ascribed to Friedrich Schlegel, that every one who thinks on philosophical subjects at all is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian; by which is evidently meant, in my language, either a metaphysical or an inductive thinker.

Metaphysical and Inductive philosophy in ancient Greece.

Eleatics and Ionians.

Plato and Aristotle.

The metaphysical doctrine, in its most extreme and exaggerated form, has been admirably expressed by Browning in the person of his Paracelsus:—

Quotation from Browning's Paracelsus.

> "There is an inmost centre in us all
> Where truth abides in fulness: and To Know
> Rather consists in opening out a way
> Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,
> Than in effecting entrance for a light
> Supposed to be without."

Enough has been now said of metaphysical errors, and of what the metaphysical method is unable to do; and we come to the question, What are the problems that properly belong to metaphysical science, and what is it able to achieve? We know what the problems of inductive science are, and we know what problems it has solved:

What are the metaphysical problems?

it has made known the laws of Matter and of Force; it has measured the heights of heaven and the speed of light, and has restored to knowledge the geological history of the earth; but what problems comparable to these has metaphysical science solved, or even stated?

They are distinct from the inductive ones.

In answer to this question it is to be observed, that the inductive and the metaphysical problems are totally unlike in kind. The problems of inductive science are, briefly, to ascertain the laws of nature; or, in more precise and technical language, to ascertain the resemblances, co-existences, and sequences of phenomena; and its greatest achievements consist in reducing a vast variety of phenomena under a few simple laws. The greatest single achievement that inductive science has ever made, is the explanation of the planetary motions by the perfectly simple laws of motion and gravitation; and probably the next in importance to this, is the explanation of the laws of heat as being the laws of motion on an atomic scale. We may conceive of the problems of inductive science as a set of equations for solution; and of its results as the discovery of the roots, or simplest possible terms, of those equations. Thus in astronomy, the roots, or simplest terms, of the equations are the laws of motion and gravitation; in chemistry, the roots are the combining equivalents of the simple substances, and the laws of their combinations. Now, no one can be further than I am from any desire to disparage such results as these, or the labours by which they have been arrived at; but I say, and in this I do not express any mere opinion—I say what every one must agree to who is able to understand the subject—that there is a further set of questions which inductive science is utterly unable to answer. When the roots of an algebraic equation are found, they still in many cases need interpretation.[1] An equation may be so far solved as to be reduced to its roots or simplest terms, while yet those terms remain uninterpreted, though the value of

The inductive problems are to ascertain the laws of nature.

The problems of metaphysics may be regarded as equations, and its results as the discovery of their roots.

Roots may be found, while their interpretation remains unknown.

[1] I use the word interpretation throughout in its mathematical sense. It may be defined as stating the meaning of a term in terms (or in language) whereof the meaning is already known.

each of them may be expressed in terms of the others; but it is obviously no interpretation of a term to state its value in other terms which themselves need interpretation.

The solutions of inductive science are of this kind.

Now, it is only such solutions as this that inductive science is able to give of the equations in which we may conceive its problems to be expressed; the roots that it discovers are of unknown interpretation, and are capable of being expressed only in other terms which are also of unknown interpretation.

To interpret the roots is the work of Metaphysics.

It is here the problems of metaphysics arise. To state the relation of metaphysical to inductive science in the fewest words:—It is the work of inductive science to find the roots of the equations in which its problems may be expressed; it is the work of metaphysics to interpret those roots.

To those readers who are familiar with metaphysical speculation, this statement of the metaphysical problem will probably appear a mere truism, though somewhat strangely expressed; but to those who are not so, it will need illustration; and perhaps the most intelligible illustration is that afforded by chemistry. Most of the properties of chemical substances consist in their relations to other substances, and cannot be stated without reference to those others; and it is impossible to state the properties of any substance without taking the properties of other substances as known. This indeed is true of all chemical properties as distinguished from physical ones. Thus if mercury, for instance, were the only substance in the universe, it would still have the physical properties of assuming the solid, the liquid, and the vaporous states at varying temperatures; but it would be impossible to speak of it as having chemical properties, because chemical properties consist exclusively in the power of forming combinations with other substances. In a word, the properties of one substance cannot be described without those of others being implied—the properties of no substance can be described alone.

Illustration from Chemistry.

This, which is true when we attempt to define those properties of the various kinds of matter which constitute

the subjects of chemical science, is also true when we attempt to define the functions of the material world in the most general terms. The most general terms in which it is possible to speak of the material world, are those of Matter and Force; and the terms Matter and Force, from the point of view of Inductive Science, are capable of interpretation only in terms of each other. It is self-evident that Force can only be interpreted as a function of Matter; or, to use less technical language, Force is a term which has no meaning except in relation to Matter; and a little consideration will show that the converse is equally true—that is to say, Matter is a term which has no meaning except in relation to Force. For, excepting form and position in space, the only properties of matter which are universal are Resistance, or the power of resisting force; Inertia and Elasticity, which are capacities for being acted on by force; and Gravity, which is itself a force.

Matter and Force are explicable by Inductive Science only in terms of each other.

Thus in answer to the questions, What is Force? and What is Matter? Inductive Science can only reply that Matter is a function of Force, and Force is a function of Matter. The final, or simplest terms, remain uninterpreted; their values are assigned only in terms of each other, but not in terms of known interpretation. Now it is exactly at this point where the inductive problems end, that the metaphysical ones begin. It is the problem of metaphysics—not the only metaphysical problem, but the primary and elementary one—to find the interpretation of those simplest terms which inductive science is unable to interpret—that is to say, to assign them a meaning in terms whereof the meaning is known.

Metaphysics has to interpret them as functions of known terms.

It is merely repeating the same thing, in perhaps more intelligible language, to say, that the problem of Inductive Science is to ascertain the *laws* of nature; and the problem of Metaphysics, to ascertain the *underlying reality*. Of course, the word Nature, when used in this sense, includes the world of Mind as well as that of Matter.

Inductive Science inquires into the laws of nature, Metaphysics into the underlying reality.

But when we say that the final and simplest terms in which inductive science is able to state the facts and laws of nature are such as to need interpretation, we must not

Space and Time.

forget two remarkable exceptions. Space and Time are final terms, not capable of expression by inductive science as functions of any simpler terms than themselves, and, as I think, not needing interpretation. The metaphysical peculiarity of Space and Time, as distinguished from all other objects of thought, consists in this, that they alone among the final terms in which Inductive Science expresses the facts and the laws of nature, are not capable of interpretation in terms of anything but themselves. The sole difficulty in the interpretation of these two terms, which has been the subject of so much controversy, consists in this, that there is nothing that needs interpretation.[1]

Thus inductive science arrives at Space and Time as final terms of which the interpretation is known; and arrives also at such final terms as Matter and Force, which it cannot interpret, though it can express each in terms of the other. I now go on to speak of a set of terms, which, in the equations of inductive science, are not final terms but initial ones. I mean simple sensations.

Sensations can only be known directly.

It is not by science that the nature of sensations is or can be known. If any one either feels or remembers any sensation, he knows what it is; if he neither feels nor remembers any sensation like it, no science can explain to him what it is.

Science can tell, not what they are, but how they are produced.

Yet inductive science has very much information to give us about sensations; not about what they are, but about the conditions under which they are produced. There are two distinct, highly elaborate, and refined sciences, of each of which the subject-matter consists, almost exclusively, in the physical conditions under which the sensations of a single sense are produced:

Optics and Acoustics.

these are Optics, or the science of Light, and Acoustics, or the science of Sound. Beginning also from sensations, but working in a different direction, inductive science traces

[1] This conclusion, however, does not solve all the questions connected with the relation of the mind to Space and Time. On the subject of this relation, see "Habit and Intelligence," Chap. 37, where the question is treated not from a metaphysical but from an inductive point of view.

the laws according to which nervous currents give rise to sensations; and this subject occupies a large and important chapter in the science of physiology. Thus the sensation of sight is a function of luminous undulations, and of the nervous currents which they excite in the nerves of vision; and the sensation of sound is a function of sonorous vibrations, and of the currents which they excite in the nerves of hearing. But what are sonorous vibrations and luminous undulations? Sonorous vibrations are mostly formed in air, and of the existence of air we have independent proof. But luminous undulations are formed in a medium, the existence of which we infer only from the fact that the undulations are formed in it. Of the existence and of the properties of the undulations, the principal evidence is of course derived from their power to excite the sensation of light, though there is some independent evidence on the subject, derived from the properties of radiant heat.[1] But let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we knew nothing whatever about luminous undulations except as the excitors of the sensations of light and colour; of what interpretation would the term luminous undulations in that case be capable? It is evident that it could be interpreted only in terms of the sensation of light. We cannot tell what the luminiferous medium is, except by saying that the luminous undulations are formed in it; nor could we in the supposed case tell what the undulations are, except by saying that they produce the sensation of light when they fall on the retina. It is true we have measured the lengths of the undulations, and have estimated the number of them that fall in a second; but to measure and count things is not to know what they are; nor do we tell what light is by saying that it is an undulatory motion, when we are utterly unable to say what it is that is moved. All these terms—luminous undulations, the laws of their action, and the medium in which they are formed—may indeed be explained in terms of each other; but they admit of

The sensations of light and sound are functions of physical circumstances.

Luminous undulations interpretable only in terms of the sensation of light.

[1] The distinction between light and radiant heat is, however, not fundamental. See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 29.

interpretation only as functions of the sensation of light; which, being a sensation, is a term of known meaning, and neither needs interpretation nor admits of it.

I have taken an illustration from light and luminous undulations, because that subject is intelligible without being too familiar. Familiarity is often an obstacle to real knowledge; and this is perhaps especially true of metaphysics, which begins, according to my definition, not from observation but from consciousness, and aims not at discovering new facts but at analysing old ones. But what is true of luminous undulations is true of every fact and law of the material universe. When we analyse our conception of matter—including under this term, of course, not only tangible things, but light, sound, force, and whatever belongs to the material universe—when we analyse our conception of matter to the utmost, I say, we find it capable of interpretation only in terms of our sensations. To use Mr. Mill's felicitous expression, we know matter only as a "permanent possibility of sensation;" and as sensation belongs to the mind, it follows that we are able to interpret the material universe only as a function of the mind. This is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley; and is the greatest discovery ever made in metaphysics, at least before the time of Kant.

Matter is interpretable only in terms of sensation.

Berkeley.

I must however say here, although it is anticipating my argument, that I do not regard this conclusion as exhausting the question of the nature of matter. I do not think, with Mill, that when we have called matter a "permanent possibility of sensation," we have said all that is to be known on the subject. There are further questions concerning the nature of matter which are to be discussed in a future chapter.

This does not exhaust the question.

It is to be observed that such words as light and sound have in common language a double meaning; signifying either the sensations so called, or the physical causes of the sensations. Thus it would be consistent with usage to say, either "Light is a sensation," or "Light consists of undulations;" and to say, either "Sound is a sensation," or "Sound consists of vibrations." For common purposes

Double meaning of light and sound.

this does not cause any confusion, but for perfect scientific accuracy the two meanings must be discriminated. The wave-like motions of light and sound are distinguished from the sensations of light and sound, as cause from effect; and not only so, but the effects are totally unlike the causes; and it must ever remain inexplicable how the effects are produced by the causes. We may indeed conceive, by the aid of physical analogies, how the wave-like motions of light and sound set nervous currents in motion. But how nervous currents produce sensation—or, what is the same question, how it is that organic tissues become sentient—this is the mystery; if we could solve this, we should have solved the mystery of the connection of mind with matter.

Cause of sensation inexplicable.

From the Inductive point of view, beginning from Observation, a sensation is a function of the very complex physical circumstances that produce it; but from the Metaphysical point of view, beginning from Consciousness, a sensation is nothing but a sensation: the word sensation is a term that needs no interpretation, and admits of none. Again, from the Inductive point of view, light, sound, nervous currents, and all the other physical causes of sensation, are functions of matter and force; but from the Metaphysical point of view, light, sound, matter, force, and all else that belongs to the material universe, are capable of interpretation only in terms of sensation; and sensation belongs to mind; that which feels, is mind.

Sensation from the Inductive and from the Metaphysical points of view.

Physical facts from the same two points of view.

We have till now spoken only of the study of the material world, with those sensations of light and sound and the other external senses, which in one sense belong to the body, and in another sense to the mind. But in the study of Psychology, or the science of Mind as distinguished from the mere external senses, the same two points of view occur as in the study of the sciences of Matter: namely, the Inductive point of view, or that of Observation; and the Metaphysical, or that of Consciousness. Inductive Psychology begins with sensation and the consciousness of sensation, just as physical science begins with the elementary properties of matter and the laws of force: it

Mind from the same two points of view.

Inductive Psychology.

goes on to trace the laws according to which sensations give rise to consciousness; how such consciousness is reproduced in memory, and modified in imagination and in thought; and, finally, what elements, if any, there are in thought which are not, directly or indirectly, derived from sensation or in some other way from the organic life; and if there are such elements—if, for instance, there is something in the moral sense which inductive science cannot thus explain—it simply stands over as an inexplicable fact; just as the characteristic facts of chemistry are inexplicable in the sense of not being resolvable into the elementary laws of matter and motion. But, in so far as the facts of Mind are explicable by tracing them back to their roots in the unconscious life or in mere bodily sensation, to that extent is Psychology a purely inductive science, and only a branch, though the highest branch, of the science of life: it explains sensation as a concomitant of the action of nervous currents on the ganglia of sense, and it explains consciousness and thought as being, in all probability, concomitants of the action of similar currents though in different nerves;[1] and it tells nothing of Mind as having any existence apart from these nervous currents. But in the science of Mind as in the sciences of Matter, when Inductive Science, beginning from Observation, has expressed the laws of the phenomena in the simplest possible terms, it is the function of Metaphysics, beginning from Consciousness, to interpret the terms; for, though it may be important to know that mental action depends on the agency of nervous currents, this truth gives us no information as to what Mind is. But Metaphysics, or the philosophy of Consciousness, interprets Mind—meaning by Mind, that which has thoughts and sensations—as the only conceivable reality in the universe: Matter, as stated already, it interprets in terms of sensation. Metaphysics also affirms the truth of our Personality; and, with this, of our Freedom and Responsibility, concerning which Induc-

Metaphysical Psychology:

it affirms Personality, Free-

[1] See the Chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the Physiology of Mind (Chapter 29).

tive science is silent; and further, the Moral Sense, which a sound Inductive Psychology sets aside as simply inexplicable,[1] is interpreted by the metaphysics of Consciousness as the most important fact of our being, and that which alone explains for what purpose we have been created.

dom, and Responsibility. The Moral Sense.

I do not intend at present to pursue the subjects suggested in the last paragraph. I go back to the questions more nearly connected with physical science.

From the two contrasted points of view which I have endeavoured to explain, the problem of the relation of Mind to Matter, though not solved, has changed its form. It is perfectly certain that inductive psychology gives no hint of any mental *substance* as distinguished from the material substance of the brain: nor, I think, does metaphysical psychology affirm the existence of any such substance. Inductive science makes known the existence of a world of matter, which in the brain of man attains to feeling and thought: but inductive science cannot interpret the term Matter:—in other words, it cannot tell what matter is. Metaphysics comes in here, and tells us that, *so far as matter is capable of interpretation at all*, it is to be interpreted in terms of sensation, and is only known to us as a "permanent possibility of sensation." The question is therefore not, as it used to be stated, how two substances of such utterly unlike properties as those of Matter and Mind can be united; but, how the same thing can have both physical and mental functions—how the universe can be at once material and spiritual. The problem is no doubt an insoluble one, but it is worth while to have it correctly stated.

Relation of Mind to Matter:—the form of the question has been changed.

To ask, "What is it that thinks? the brain, or something over and above the brain, called the Mind?" is very much as if we were to ask, "What is it in the magnet that attracts? the iron, or the magnetic energy taken up into it?" Both of these questions are to be answered in the same way. That which attracts, is the magnetised iron; that which thinks, is the vitalised brain.

Illustration from the magnet.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 32 (The Grounds of the Moral Nature). See also Chapter 3 of this work.

Why men believe in distinct substances of mind and matter.

But why is it that men so very generally believe in distinct substances of mind and of matter? It is nothing more than a case of that metaphysical error which consists in mistaking abstractions for realities, and fancying that wherever there is a general or abstract name, there must be some reality corresponding. The necessities of language demand distinct names for body and mind, and generally for functions, properties, and actions belonging to the physical and the mental orders; and before thought has learned to correct its own errors, this inevitably leads to the inference that these distinct names are the names of distinct substances.

Summary. Contrasted results of Inductive and Metaphysical science.

The principal conclusions of this chapter may be thus summed up:—Inductive science is not exclusively physical, and Metaphysical science is not exclusively mental; on the contrary, they both regard the whole world of matter and mind, though from opposite points of view. Inductive science begins from Observation, and reveals a world of matter, with mind as one of its functions; Metaphysical science begins from Consciousness, and reveals a world of mind or spirit, with matter as one of its functions.

Both are true.

If it is asked which of the two conclusions is true, I reply, Both. Like the discoverer of electro-magnetism, I am at once a materialist and a spiritualist.[1]

It is a mere statement of fact to say that these two opposite points of view from which to contemplate the world of existing things, are both of them possible and real ones—namely, the Inductive point of view or that of Observation, and the Metaphysical point of view or that of Consciousness. But though unquestionably true, and indeed self-evident when properly stated, it is not a truth that lies on the surface of thought; on the contrary, the full truth on this subject, that these two points of view and these two methods of investigation, though opposite to each other, are both equally legitimate, each for its own problems,—this truth is not yet generally recognized in all its clearness.

[1] This expression occurs in one of Oersted's dialogues, but it is obviously the avowal of his own belief.

The further question now arises, Why are these two points of view different? Why are the methods of investigation that begin with Observation and with Consciousness diverse and opposite, instead of being identical, as they appeared to the first childlike thoughts of early philosophy?

Why are the points of view of Observation and of Consciousness different?

The reason of this diversity is to be found in our position in the universe of existing things. The centre of our consciousness does not coincide with the true centre of the universe of things: and as in astronomy the true point of view was first attained when man ceased to regard the earth where he dwelt as the centre of the astronomical universe, so in philosophy, which is that science whereof the object is knowledge, the true point of view was first attained when man learned that he must begin the investigation of nature, not from his own consciousness, but with the study of those subjects which are the remotest from his own consciousness—namely, with Geometry and the sciences that treat of the substances and forces of the inorganic world.[1] It was by the attainment of this point of view that the Inductive method, as distinguished from the Metaphysical one, was constituted, and Inductive Science made possible.

Because the centre of our consciousness does not coincide with that of the universe.

But though it is true of *our* consciousness that its centre does not coincide with the centre of the universe of things, yet we cannot assert the same of *all* consciousness. It is necessarily true of a consciousness developed as ours is. Our consciousness is developed out of our sensations; and our sensations are not a function of the universe of matter as such, but on the contrary are comparatively rare and intermittent results of natural forces acting under very peculiar conditions. But to Him who sees all things, and sees them as they are, the distinction between the points of view of Observation and of Consciousness has no existence. And for anything we know to the contrary, there may be created intelligences, finite like ours, but, unlike ours, not developed out of sensation; which understand the nature of things by direct insight, and for which consequently the points of view of Observation and of Consciousness are the same.

Our consciousness is developed out of sensation.

But with the Divine consciousness it is otherwise.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 225.

To what purpose are these inquiries?

It may have been asked, long before the argument has got thus far, To what purpose are these disquisitions?

To such an objection it is not enough to answer, that every possible inquiry is worth thinking out; for it is easy to conceive of inquiries which would not be worth the trouble of thinking out. If it were quite certain that any line of inquiry could not lead to any increase of knowledge concerning human life or concerning the universe in which we live, it would be unjustifiable waste of time and labour to pursue such an inquiry. This case is not an inconceivable one. It is perhaps possible that an algebraic calculus might be invented wherein none of the symbols should be capable of interpretation; so that the reasonings, though correct according to the laws of logic and algebra, would be incapable of throwing light on any of the facts of the universe. The study of such a calculus would be justly stigmatised as mere trifling. Now, wherein are the reasonings and the results of metaphysics any better than this? All metaphysical theories, even though true, are in the narrow sense of the word unpractical. It may be true that matter is capable of interpretation only as a function of mind, and that consequently the universe of matter is spiritual; but this has no bearing on any question of mechanics or chemistry. It may be true that in morality and the moral sense there is something transcendental—something belonging to a higher kind of knowledge than any knowledge which is inferred from data of observation and experience; but whether this is true or not, the only criterion of moral right and wrong is that which is technically called the utilitarian one; in other words, those actions are morally right, and those characters are morally good, which tend to the promotion of the general happiness. And it may be true that the will is free; but (as Bishop Butler has shown[1]) whether we hold the opinion of necessity or that of freedom, the effect on the actions of any reasonable man will be exactly the same; and the laws of the formation of character, and the art of education which is founded on those

In what sense metaphysics is unpractical.

[1] "Analogy of Religion," Part I. chap. 6.

laws, are the same, whether the will has any real freedom or not.

All this is true, yet it does not follow that metaphysical study is in any true sense unpractical and worthless. I defer any consideration of its theological bearings to a future chapter; but I will remark here, that nothing is in any true sense unpractical, or in any possible sense worthless, which has any bearing on the formation of character. The formation of noble human characters is a work of a higher kind than any increase of knowledge by inductive methods, or any increase of that power which comes of increased knowledge:—the formation of noble human characters is the highest work that man or, so far as we know, that God, can be engaged in. It is true that we can be taught to shape our conduct only by that knowledge of the world around us, and by that knowledge of ourselves, which is given by inductive methods; and in that sense induction alone is practical; but our metaphysical knowledge, or metaphysical belief, may have an importance of a different and a higher kind, in the formation of our characters. The belief that the material universe is truly spiritual has no bearing when we have a chemical theory to work out or an engineering difficulty to overcome, but it may make a profound difference in the feelings with which we look on the ocean, the mountains, and the stars. Our belief as to the nature and ground of moral right and wrong cannot supply us with practical rules of conduct; but it may make a total difference in the feelings with which we regard moral right and wrong, whether we believe that actions are beneficial because they are right, or only right because they are beneficial. And our belief as to the freedom, or self-determining power, of the will, has no bearing on any question of education; but it may make a profound difference in the feelings with which we think of our own past actions, whether we believe that we are what circumstances have made us, or that we have, within the narrow limits of our nature, exercised a real power of moulding the circumstances.

Its value in the formation of character.

Thus while Induction has the noble office of yielding knowledge of the universe, and guiding action, Metaphysics has the yet nobler office of ministering to the formation of character.

NOTE A.

It might perhaps appear a deficiency in this work if, while I state my views on the relation of the Inductive and the Metaphysical sciences to each other, I were to say nothing on their relation to Logic and Mathematics.

Relation of Logic and Mathematics to the Inductive and Metaphysical sciences.

Logic and Mathematics are *formal* sciences; that is to say, their subject-matter consists in abstractions. Metaphysics and the inductive, or physical, sciences, on the contrary, are *real* sciences; that is to say, their subject-matter consists in things which have existence in the universe of matter and mind.[1] We may then classify the sciences thus :—

Classification of the Sciences.

Formal sciences	Logic.
	Mathematics.
Real sciences	The Inductive Sciences.
	Metaphysics.

Another classification, however, is perhaps better.

The first and most fundamental division of the sciences is that into abstract logic on the one side, and the applications of logic on the other. Every possible science comes under one of these two heads ;—every science other than logic consists in the application of logic to some particular class of subjects.[2] And logic, while it cannot be classed either as an inductive or as a metaphysical science, belongs to both the inductive and the metaphysical series ; for its data are at once external to the mind like those of physical science, and internal to the mind like those of metaphysics; in other words, they are at once laws of the external universe and laws of thought.

Position of Logic.

Position of Mathematics.

But mathematics? The axioms of mathematics are no doubt like those of logic, not only laws of the external universe, but

[1] It is said in popular language, that the subjects of metaphysics are in a high degree abstract; but this only means that they require a high degree of mental abstraction to grasp them.

[2] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 202.

also laws of thought; but mathematics is associated not with metaphysics, but with the inductive sciences, because its subject-matters, that is to say the properties of time and space, are thought of as external to the mind.

On this basis we may classify the sciences as follows :—

Logic { Abstract. / Applied to data { external to the mind { Logic. / Mathematics. / Inductive Science.[1] } / internal to the mind } Metaphysics. }

Alternative classification.

Position of Ethics and Psychology.

Ethics, or the theory of the moral sense, belongs to Psychology, and, as such, is partly inductive and partly metaphysical. It may be thought a proof of inaccuracy in this classification, that Psychology is placed in this double position. It is not so, however. Psychology is, as a matter of fact, capable of being studied either from the Inductive or from the Metaphysical point of view; and there is no more error or confusion in recognizing this, than in recognizing the fact that the theory of spectrum analysis belongs at once to Optics and to Chemistry.[2]

NOTE B.

Apparent contradiction explained.

It may be thought a contradiction to say in one place that "force is only explicable as a function of conscious mind and will" (p. 14); and elsewhere that the facts and laws of force, which constitute the data of dynamical science, are external to the mind (p. 25). There is, however, no real contradiction : it is only a case of looking at the same subject from two opposite points of view successively. Force is a fact of consciousness whenever we are conscious of our own mental activity; but the law of the equality of action and re-action, the law of the conservation of energy, and all the other physical laws of force, are external to the mind in the sense that they are known by observation only, and could not conceivably be made known by any interrogation of consciousness.

[1] For the classification of the inductive sciences, see "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 43.

[2] See the same chapter, p. 199.

CHAPTER II.

THE METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

THOUGH the proper purpose of the preceding chapter is only to define the province of Metaphysics, and to state its most important problems, it has been impossible to avoid in some degree anticipating the subjects of future chapters, and stating, or at least indicating, my own conclusions as to the true solution of those problems.

Problem of the underlying reality of the physical world,

The first of these problems is that of the underlying reality, or what, using a mathematical expression, I have called the interpretation, of the physical world; and I have declared my agreement with the doctrine of Berkeley and Mill, that the material universe is known to us only as consisting of "permanent possibilities of sensation;" or, in other words, that all our conceptions and all our knowledge of material things are ultimately resolvable into the knowledge that they have the properties of being able to excite certain sensations in us.

But it is impossible to rest in this conclusion as exhausting the subject. It may be all that we can know; but if so, there must be something that we cannot know. We may have run out all our sounding-line, but let us not therefore think that we have touched the bottom of the ocean.

To put the question in a form which will address not only the understanding but also the imagination:—We who see and feel the world of matter around us are the latest and highest product of that world. But we know that the world of matter existed before it had given origin to sentient beings like us to see and feel it. During those

vast periods of cosmic time, which perhaps were in magnitude to the geological periods what the geological are to the historical, while the original nebula was condensing into worlds and before those worlds were sufficiently consolidated or sufficiently cooled down to support life on their surfaces; how can it be said that the universe of matter consisted in "permanent possibilities of sensation," when as yet there were no beings in which any sensations could be excited? *To us*, things have no reality except as they are perceived, or capable of being perceived. As Berkeley has tersely put it, "their Esse is Percipi." But what was the underlying reality of things when as yet there were none to perceive them? This is identical with the question, what is the underlying reality, or the interpretation, of things in themselves, apart from being perceived? Mill's reply is, that substance, or what I have called underlying reality, has no meaning at all; and that not only matter is known to us as a permanent possibility of sensation, but that it is nothing else, and has no other meaning. This doctrine is perhaps impossible to refute in any direct way, but it involves the consequence that during the period when there were no sentient beings in the universe of matter, that universe had no true existence except in relation to those sentient beings which were to come into existence afterwards; and that if the universe of matter had never become the home of any sentient beings, it would not have had any existence at all.

apart from our perceptions of it.

Mill's reply:

why unsatisfactory.

Berkeley's reply to the same question is, that even when material things are not perceived by us or by beings like us, they are still at all times the objects of the Divine perception. This is at least not absurd, but it appears to assume that the Divine perceptions are of the same nature as ours; and this is not only unproved and incapable of being proved, but appears very unlikely; for our powers of perception are developed out of our powers of sensation, but none of the Divine powers are so developed, or developed at all.

Berkeley's reply:

why unsatisfactory.

To the question, What is the underlying reality of things considered in themselves? there is then no answer

No full reply is possible.

except this, that we do not and cannot know. So that we end where we began. But we do not end *as* we began; for we have learned this, that there is that which we do not and cannot know.

Another line of inquiry.

There is, however, another line of inquiry on this subject which does not lead to so purely negative a result.

Statical and dynamical properties of matter.

When we consider the nature of matter as made known to us, not by the results of the most refined physical science but simply by our unaided senses, we recognize two distinct sets of properties in matter, which may, from our present point of view, be defined with sufficient accuracy as the statical and the dynamical: meaning by the statical properties, those of position, extension, form, and impenetrability; and by the dynamical, such properties as those of inertia, or the capacity of being acted on by force; and weight, or gravity, which is itself a force.

The statical were formerly most attended to. The dynamical are now seen to be as important.

The statical properties are the most conspicuous ones, and it appears to have been chiefly on them that attention was concentrated during the metaphysical controversies of the eighteenth century. But the physical science of the present century has brought the dynamical properties of matter into greater prominence than the statical; and this change appears destined to work, perhaps almost unconsciously, a profound change in metaphysical conceptions as regards the external world, the mind, and their relation to each other.

The statical have no analogies with mind:

The statical properties of matter present no analogies whatever with any of the properties of mind; and so long as the attention of philosophers was chiefly directed to them, it was inevitable that, to those who agreed with the common sense of mankind in admitting the reality of a material world at all, the nature of its relation to the mind appeared to be a perfectly insoluble mystery.

but the dynamical have:

Force is a fact of both matter and mind.

But the dynamical properties of matter do present analogies, or rather one all-comprehending analogy, with the properties and functions of mind. Force, or causation, is a fact of the worlds of matter and of mind alike. In becoming conscious of its own activity, as distinguished from merely passive feeling, as for instance in directing

thought by an impulse of the will, the mind becomes conscious of itself as a force; and it is not mere sequence, but force, which is the essential point in the idea of causation. We also discover, as often as we move any object with our hands, that our will is capable of exerting force on the world of matter around us; and as often as we feel the weight of a stone or the pressure of a wind, we discover that the world of matter is capable of exerting similar forces on us. This is the analysis of the facts which the mind spontaneously makes at the very dawn of intelligence, and it is confirmed by the highest science; which shows that vital energy does not differ in any fundamental way from mechanical, thermal, or chemical energy, but that all are capable of mutual transformation—that our minds are links in that chain, or rather network, of cause and effect, which is co-extensive with the universe; and that force, or causation, is a fact of the physical world which has become conscious of itself in the brain of man. Thus force, acting under the law of cause and effect, is the one reality which is common to the worlds of matter and of mind.

The most important points of this are too obvious to have escaped the acute metaphysicians of the eighteenth century, but its true bearing could not be seen until now. The old metaphysical theory of the distinctness of the substances of matter and mind has been broken down by the establishment of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as the true basis of mental science: while the advance of science in another direction, namely the dynamical, has revealed force,—or, to speak more correctly, energy,[1]—as a reality of the universe, co-extensive with matter, and equally indestructible; so that no physical action, such as motion or chemical change, can take place without a transformation of energy; and we have every reason to believe that the same is true of mental actions also; of feeling, thought, and will. Life is a process, and mind belongs to life. The energy trans-

Force is co-extensive with matter, and as indestructible.

[1] For the meaning of this word as distinguished from Force, see Note to Introduction.

formed by us, whether in motion or in thought, is obtained by the oxidation of our food; and this again is but the transformed energy of the sunbeams that fell, during growth, on the vegetables which have supplied us with food.[1] All consciousness is a concomitant of the transformation of energy in the brain: this energy is not created at the moment when it becomes conscious; on the contrary, it is the same energy which has been flowing and reflowing, changing its form but never either coming into existence or passing out of existence, ever since the first creation of things. Energy, of which the motion of the planets and the heat of the sun are forms, may, without any violent metaphor, be called the life of the universe; and it is this same life that circulates in us, as the life both of the body and of the mind. This is no metaphysical dream: it is scientific truth, discovered and proved by that inductive method which is based on the observation of external facts.

The forces of the universe circulate in our bodily and mental life.

What then? Because the force that becomes conscious in mind is the same force that was previously unconscious in the world of ordinary matter, shall we say that mind is proved to be material? Shall we not rather say, and with much profounder truth, that the forces which animate the world of matter are proved to be spiritual? Neither inductive science, beginning from observation, nor metaphysical philosophy, beginning from consciousness, reveals any distinction of substance—any absolutely fundamental distinction—between matter and mind. Inductive science reveals mind as merely the brain at work:—it reveals thought, feeling, and will as mere concomitants of the transformation of energy in the brain. But metaphysical philosophy reveals force as a fact of mind, and therefore spiritual. Observation tells us nothing whatever of what force is; it only tells what are some of the effects of force. But consciousness directly reveals force to us in the form of our own mental activity. Consciousness does not indeed interpret force in terms of anything simpler or better known

Is mind then material? Physical forces rather are spiritual.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 9 (The Dynamics of Life).

than itself; but it makes force known, like sensation, as a primary fact of consciousness—not indeed admitting of interpretation, but not needing it. In a word, the mind is a force which has become conscious; consciousness is spiritual; therefore force, in the form in which alone we have any direct knowledge of it, is spiritual.

The conception of matter is resolvable into that of force.

Further; it has always been evident to those who are capable of metaphysical analysis, that every conception and every definition of matter is resolvable into the conception of force; in other words, that matter can be conceived or defined only as something that exerts force. The new dynamical views of nature have no doubt set this truth in a more striking and impressive light than formerly, but it may be shown from the most common and familiar data. Inertia, resistance, and weight, are the most familiar of the properties of matter, and they are all explicable only in terms of force. Inertia is a passive dynamical property. Weight is a force. Resistance is a kind of force, made known in resisting other forces. Impenetrability depends on resistance; and so does extension, or the occupation of space by matter; for matter occupies space only in virtue of resistant force, which consists in the power of preventing any other matter from occupying the same space.

Thus matter can be described only in terms of force, and can be thought of only as a function of force; and force is capable of being conceived of only as spiritual. From these two propositions it follows that matter can only be conceived of as spiritual; and we have arrived, though by a different route, at a parallel conclusion to that of the preceding chapter concerning the nature of matter.

Matter is consequently spiritual.

Conclusions of the preceding chapter and of this.

We have concluded in the preceding chapter that, from one point of view, matter can be described only in terms of our sensations; and sensation is spiritual. And we have concluded in this chapter that, from another point of view, matter can be described only in terms of force; and our only conception of force is derived from the consciousness of our own mental activity, which is spiritual.

It may be said that this speculation as to the nature of

force, and the nature of the material world from the point of view of force, is utterly inconclusive. I admit it. I admit that the question, What is the underlying reality of force, independently of our consciousness of it? is as completely incapable of solution as the parallel question, What is the underlying reality of the entire material world, independently of our perceptions of it? For if we ask, What is force? it is no reply to say, Force is that which is accompanied with consciousness when it is exerted in a particular way in the brain; any more than it would be a reply to say, Force is that which causes a stone to fall or a fire to burn. But the foregoing argument is true so far as it goes. It does not tell us what force is in itself, but it does tell us how alone we are able to conceive of force; namely, as manifested in our mental activity: just as the argument of the preceding chapter showed how alone we are able to conceive of the entire universe of matter; namely, as consisting of permanent possibilities of sensation; though it threw no light whatever on the underlying reality of the material world.

The question, What is force? is still insoluble.

The truth of the identity of the conscious forces of the mind with the unconscious forces of nature is no barren truth. It is at once the explanation and the justification of that feeling of delight in the sights and sympathy with the forces of nature, which is quite distinct from delight in beauty of form and colour, though often blended with it:—that

Sympathy with nature.

> "Sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."

Quotation from Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey."

To men who feel this delight and this sympathy with nature, it may often come as a chill rebuke to think, "That on which we gaze is but matter; and our feelings of awe, of sympathy, and of delight, are without any foundation except one of illusion." But in this case, as in many others, first thoughts are best, instinct is truer than

reason, and the poet is right. Those forces which have their dwelling in

> "The light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky,"

are the same with those which have their dwelling "in the mind of man." We are a part of that world on which we gaze; the currents of its forces flow through our hearts and our brains; and our delight in their visible manifestations is a half-unconscious recognition of this truth, just as our delight in visual proportion and in the harmonies of music is a half-unconscious recognition of the admirableness of measure, harmony, and proportion.

But though the identification of physical and mental force does not tell what force is, it enables us to make a guess concerning its nature and origin which is at least worth considering.

Had the universe a beginning?

Had the world of matter and force in which we live a beginning? This question, whether it is capable of being answered by us or not, is a question of fact which could not conceivably be solved by *a priori* metaphysical reasoning, but may conceivably be solved by evidence or reasoning from evidence.[1]

The affirmative and negative answers equally inconceivable.

Either the universe is from everlasting, or it had an absolute beginning in time. Both of these alternatives are inconceivable;—it is equally impossible to conceive of a universe as existing from everlasting, and of a universe brought into existence out of nothing. Yet one of them must be true. Metaphysical reasoning will bring us no further. But physical reasoning—inductive science—does bring us further, and shows that the alternative of an absolute beginning in time is the true one. The nebular or condensation theory of the formation of the universe is in the highest degree probable; and granting its truth, the whole history of the universe is a history of the aggregation of matter. If so, at the beginning there was no aggregation; all matter was in a state as diffused as that

The affirmative is proved by inductive science. The nebular theory.

[1] The physical reasoning that follows is stated more fully in "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 6.

of water in a cloud. Such must have been the state of things at a time, which, however long ago, was not infinitely remote; and that state of things cannot have existed for an infinite or for any relatively long period, because the gravitative force of its parts would, at any time that it was in action, begin to produce aggregation.

But the truth of the conclusion that the universe must have had an absolute beginning, does not depend for its proof on the truth of the nebular theory. The argument may be thus stated in a less hypothetical form. In virtue of the laws of force, the stock of motive power in the universe must be constantly undergoing exhaustion, being transformed into heat; heat tends to diffusion, and when diffused is incapable of being reconcentrated into motive power by any means whatever. This process, which is called the "dissipation of energy," has been constantly going on from the first beginning of things; but it cannot have been going on through actually infinite time, because if it were so, an infinite quantity of motive power must have been expended and destroyed in every finite part of the universe; and the laws of force exclude the possibility of any such infinite supply of motive power.

"Dissipation of energy."

If it is urged that the laws of nature may have been changed, we reply that there is no evidence whatever of this, and it appears unlikely, though we cannot assert that it is impossible. But such a change, no less than the calling of a world into existence out of nothing, would be the absolute origin of an order of things.

A change in the laws of nature would be an absolute beginning.

There has then been an origin of the order of nature, outside of the existing laws of nature. To quote the words of the greatest living master of the purely inductive philosophy, "the laws of nature cannot account for their own origin."[1] What then has their origin been?

Question of the origin of the universe.

If this question can be answered at all, it can be answered in only one way. We are able to conceive of force, or causation, only by the analogy of our own mental activity. The only form in which it is possible for us to

[1] Mill's review on Comte (*Westminster Review*, April 1865).

conceive of a truly originating and determining force, is that of a Will; and the only Will of which we are able to conceive is one which, like our own, is directed by Intelligence towards a purpose. Either then we must conclude that the origin and ground of all things is a Self-existing and Self-determining Intelligent Will; or we must give the question up as one that lies beyond the power of our understanding to answer. At the present stage of the argument it is not maintained that the doctrine of a Self-existent Intelligent Will—or, to use commoner language, the doctrine of a God in the Biblical sense—has been proved. But it has been shown to be at least admissible; and not only so, but the only admissible conclusion, unless we are to give up the possibility of any conclusion whatever.

If any answer is possible, it must be that it is of God.

We have now seen that a combination of the two methods, the inductive and the metaphysical, has brought us to conclusions which must not only modify but transform the old conceptions of the mutual relations of the physical world and the mental. The most refined physical science has combined with metaphysics to resolve our conception of matter into that of force; while metaphysics has shown that force can only be conceived of as spiritual; so that matter, of which we used to think chiefly as inert and impenetrable, proves to be a manifestation of spiritual force. At the same time, the world of mind, of which we used to think as the opposite of the world of matter, proves to be part of the same universe: mental action differs from physical, only as the conscious manifestation of force differs from the unconscious manifestation of the same. All this is no dream; it is scientific truth.

Summary.

But is that other and further conclusion a dream which has been suggested above as possible; the conclusion, namely, that the powers of matter and of mind alike are the result and expression of a Living Will?—and if a Living Will, then also an Intelligent Will; and if an Intelligent Will, then also a Holy Will. For, if we ascribe Intelligence to a Self-existing Being at all, we cannot believe such Intelligence to be less than infinite; and infinite Intelligence, or in other words infinite Knowledge, must include perfect

Belief in Divine Creator.

knowledge of good and evil, and therefore perfect Holiness. If all nature is transfigured to our mental vision by regarding it as a manifestation of Force, how much more will it be glorified if we regard that force as directed by infinite Intelligence and perfect Holiness!

CHAPTER III.

THE MEANING OF THE MORAL SENSE.

FROM the subject with which the preceding chapter has been concluded, the most obvious transition would be to the question of the freedom of the will. But that question cannot be adequately discussed unless we first discuss the question of the meaning of the Moral Sense.

Two distinct questions: What is Duty? and What is Conscience?

It is necessary to begin this inquiry by stating a distinction which is often overlooked. The question, What is duty? and the question, What is conscience? are distinct questions. In other words, the question of the objective criterion of right and wrong is distinct from the question of the nature and ground of our judgments when we approve the right and condemn the wrong. Or, to put it more concisely, the *moral law* is not a synonymous expression with the *moral sense*. The answer to one of these questions is not necessarily involved in the answer to the other; and it is possible for controversialists to be agreed as to the one while they are at issue as to the other.

Deontology.

Ethics.

The science which is concerned with the inquiry of what classes of actions are right and what classes are wrong, may be conveniently called Deontology, or the science of Duty. That which is concerned with the inquiry concerning the nature of conscience may be conveniently called Ethics, or the science of Character. Deontology is most nearly connected with Jurisprudence, or the science of the formal and technical rights and duties of men towards each other in society; and with Political Economy, or the science of the material well-being of human societies.

Ethics in this sense is, on the contrary, most nearly connected with Psychology, or the science of Mind, of which indeed it is a part.

These may be treated inductively. Further metaphysical question.

Deontology and Ethics are sciences which admit of being treated inductively. But beyond the inquiries that belong to those sciences, is the question whether the laws of duty and the laws of conscience have any ground and root in the uncreated nature of things. On this subject the inductive method cannot conceivably throw any light, but metaphysics possibly may. This, however, is anticipating the order of the argument.

The morality of actions is tested by their tendency. But this will not explain the moral sense.

I agree with Mill and the rest of the Utilitarians, that the only possible test of the rightness or wrongness of actions, or rather of classes of actions, consists in their calculable consequences, or in other words their tendency.[1] But I do not agree with them that this truth affords an explanation of the nature of the intellectual judgments and the moral feelings with which we regard right or wrong actions. In a word, I agree with their Deontology, but I differ from their Ethics.

Utilitarian or experience theory of the moral sense.

The Utilitarian theory of the moral sense may thus be briefly stated: Ever since man became a social and moral being, both observation and reasoning have constantly shown that some classes of actions—as for instance speaking truth—tend on the whole to promote the happiness of mankind; and that the opposite classes of actions—as for instance speaking falsehood—tend on the whole to injure the happiness of mankind. In virtue of the law of the association of ideas, or, to use a less technical expression, the law of mental habit,[2] the one class of actions, being associated in constant experience and in habitual thought with what is productive of happiness, become themselves the objects of approbation; and the other class, being associated in the same way with what is destructive of happiness, become themselves the objects of condemna-

[1] See Note at end of chapter.

[2] The law of the association of ideas, which is justly regarded as a fundamental law of mind, is only a case of the law of habit. See "Habit and Intelligence," Preface and vol. ii. pp. 48, 49.

tion. This theory is to be taken with Herbert Spencer's modification, or rather extension, of the entire association theory: namely, that every mental tendency accumulates by hereditary transmission; so that mental tendencies which have been formed by habitual association in the parent may become congenital in the offspring; and, as a case of this law, such moral sentiments as the love of truth and the hatred of falsehood, though originally formed by the habitual association due to experience, may have become congenital in the most highly cultivated races of men.

Origin of the love of money by association.

It may assist in understanding this theory to be reminded that such is, beyond all doubt, the way in which the love of money has come into being. The love of money, unlike the love of food, cannot be a primary feeling, because money, unlike food, is not a desirable thing in itself; it is desirable only on account of the desirable things that may be obtained by its means. The love of money is a secondary feeling, produced by association with the thought of the desirable things which it is able to purchase. But when the love of money has once been formed, it is exactly like a primary feeling; and it may not improbably have become hereditary in some classes of society among the civilized races of men.

In criticising the attempt to account for the origin of the moral sense by this theory, it is obvious that there is no possibility of applying the method either of demonstration or of experiment. The only available method in such an inquiry is first to ascertain whether the alleged causes exist; and then, if they exist, whether they are adequate to produce the effect. This method however is by no means confined to psychological questions; it is the only one which is applicable to a vast variety of questions in physical science, including most geological ones, and nearly all those concerning the origin of species.

The only test of such a theory is whether the alleged causes exist and are adequate.

In the present case there is no doubt that the alleged causes exist; there is no doubt whatever of the law of the habitual association of ideas, nor of the law of the hereditary transmission of mental tendencies. But it is not so

In this case the causes exist, but it is not certain that they

are adequate.

certain that these causes are adequate to account for the origin of so peculiar a mental fact as the moral sense. Of course it is not denied that the laws of habitual association, and the law of the hereditary transmission of tendencies, act in every mental function and in all formation of character. But it does not follow that those laws alone will suffice to explain every mental function and all formation of character. The question is an analogous one to that of the nature of the vegetative life. It is certain that the vegetative or formative life acts in conjunction with, and through, the chemical forces ; but it does not follow that this life is in any sense a mere resultant from the chemical forces.[1] Just so, it is certain that intelligence, and the moral sense, which is a particular manifestation of intelligence, are developed under the laws of habitual association and hereditary transmission ; but it does not follow that intelligence and the moral sense are mere resultants from those laws. This analogy, however, is not itself an argument, though it may assist us in understanding the arguments.

Analogy to the question of the nature of life.

Utilitarian and Ethical theories.

The theory which refers all the complex facts of the moral sense to association with pleasure and pain, is that which is usually called the Utilitarian theory. The theory which, on the contrary, maintains the existence of an element in morals not derived from the sense of pleasure and pain may be called the Ethical theory.

It is to be observed that what any theory of the moral sense has to give an account of, is not only our judgments and our feelings respecting actions, but also our judgments and our feelings respecting character. The moral aspects of character constitute the subject-matter of the science of Ethics, as the moral aspects of action constitute the subject-matter of the science of Deontology. These are merely the definitions of the subject, and do not prejudge any of its conclusions.

Ethics treats of character, Deontology of actions.

The question under discussion may now be stated with more definiteness than hitherto :—Is the sense of happiness or pleasure, with the correlative sense of pain, acting

The question stated.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 8 (The Chemistry of Life). See also the Appendix to the same work.

through the habitual association of ideas, adequate to account for our moral judgments and feelings respecting actions and character? Or, in other words: Does the moral sense present the characteristics that it would present, if it had been formed out of no other materials than the sense of pleasure and pain, and by no other process than the association of ideas? If it can be shown that the moral sense is in some important respects quite unlike any thing that could possibly be produced by association with the ideas of pleasure and pain, it follows that the utilitarian theory is, not indeed totally false, but altogether inadequate; and that some form of the ethical theory must be true.

The charge of selfishness against the utilitarian theory is unjust;

Before going any further, it is right to admit that the oft-repeated charge of selfish tendency against the utilitarian theory of the moral sense is unfounded and unjust. If the utilitarian theory is true, all right and wrong are ultimately resolvable into tendency to produce happiness or pain; if the ethical theory is true, the ideas of right and wrong contain an element which is not so resolvable; —one or the other of these rival theories must be true;— but whichever opinion we adopt, the truths are not only obvious but fundamental, that selfishness and cruelty are vices, and their opposites, unselfishness and kindness, are virtues. On the ethical theory, we believe this because the conscience of mankind declares it; on the utilitarian theory, it follows from the very definitions of the theory, according to which that which consciously and of purpose tends to promote happiness is virtue. This definition of virtue, and the utilitarian theory founded thereon, are quite adequate as a basis for benevolence; but it may be maintained, and as I think truly, that they are unfavourable to moral elevation.

but it is unfavourable to moral elevation.

It is not false but insufficient.

Of course no one says that it is *false* to define virtue as that which purposely tends to promote happiness; but those who maintain the ethical theory of morals think it *insufficient*. It is now time to give the grounds of this opinion.

On the utilitarian theory,

If the utilitarian theory is true, happiness is the only thing which is an absolute end, or in other words an end in itself;

happiness is the only absolute end; on the Ethical, goodness is one also.

moral goodness is good only because it is a means to the end of happiness. If, on the contrary, the ethical theory is true, happiness is no doubt an end in itself—all sentient beings, from insects upwards, are agreed on this;[1] but it is not the only end; right deeds ought to be done and the formation of noble character ought to be aimed at, not only because they tend to promote happiness, though they do tend to promote happiness, but also, and chiefly, because they are good in themselves independently of consequences. These are not merely logical inferences from the rival theories; they are statements of the theories, in different language from that used before. Now, which is true? Is moral goodness good in itself, or good only on account of the happiness it produces or tends to produce? This question can be decided only by an appeal to the common sense, the real belief of mankind; in other words, by an appeal to the moral sense itself when properly analysed.

The question is to be decided by the moral sense itself.

On the utilitarian theory, moral admiration ought to resemble the admiration of *useful* things;

What, then, is the moral sense *like?* If the utilitarian theory were true, and if moral good were good only because of the happiness which it produces, we should regard good actions and noble characters with feelings similar to those with which we regard other agents and agencies which tend to produce happiness. Now it is not to be denied that a very large amount of real happiness, though not of a high kind, is due to such agencies as those of productive gardens, convenient houses, good roads and railways, and efficient tools and appliances of all kinds. These things are good because they minister to happiness; or, if happiness is too high a word, at least to comfort and enjoyment. Let us call these, generically, useful things. If then worthy actions and noble characters are good only because they minister to happiness, they are good only for the same reason that useful things are good: namely, because both minister to happiness alike; and the emotions excited

[1] Ascetics may have maintained that happiness ought not to be sought, because it can never be sought without injury to what is of more importance than happiness. This is intelligible though wrong. But it is not possible for any sentient being to doubt that happiness is desirable in itself. As Coleridge somewhere says, "It is not possible for us to deny our nature as sentient beings."

by worthy actions and noble characters ought to be similar to those excited by useful things. But this is not the case; on the contrary, the emotions excited by moral worth have nothing in common with those excited by useful things; while they have very much in common with the emotions excited by the sight of beauty. This is a familiar fact of consciousness, and is witnessed to by our habitual language; in which we apply such words as *beautiful*, which primarily belongs to visual objects, to the moral nature of characters and of actions; and apply to visual objects such words as *noble* and *lovely*, which primarily belong to characters. This, however, must not be over-stated, as if the moral sense were nothing more than the sense of a higher kind of beauty than any which can be seen with the eyes. The moral sense is this, but it is also much more. It might be nothing more than this, to beings who should look on actions and on character as mere spectators; but such an attitude is impossible to us; we have to act as well as to criticise; and to us, as beings capable of action, the moral sense is more than merely a power to discern excellence; it is a law of obligation, an imperative command.

but it does resemble the admiration of *beautiful* things.

In reply to the argument drawn from the un-utilitarian nature of the sense of beauty, it may be urged that the sense of beauty itself is capable of explanation on utilitarian principles; or, in more familiar language, that the sense of beauty is itself capable of being resolved into the sense of enjoyment. If this means that the beautiful is the useful (and this has been maintained), the assertion is a mere absurdity; were it so, spades and millstones would be among the most beautiful of all objects,[1] and there would be more beauty in a kitchen-garden than in a flower-garden. But when it is said that the sense of beauty may be explained on merely utilitarian principles, it is more probably meant that beauty gives pleasure in the beholding; and that the definition of beauty is that it is what gives pleasure in the beholding. This is true so far as it goes, but it does not exhaust the subject;

The beautiful is not the useful.

[1] This remark is made in Ruskin's "Modern Painters," vol. ii.

for, if the merely utilitarian theory of beauty were true, few things would give more pleasure in the beholding than a kitchen-garden. What then do we mean when we attribute beauty to the objects of sight and sound and thought, and not to those objects which minister to the enjoyments of the lower senses?

Beauty is that which gives a peculiar and elevated pleasure.

What we mean is, that the pleasures of sight, of sound, and of thought, have a character of superior dignity of nature to the pleasures of mere sense. Beauty is not identical with that which gives pleasure; beauty gives a peculiar and elevated kind of pleasure.

Mill distinguishes pleasures as higher and lower.

Mill in his work on "Utilitarianism," admits, or rather places in the front of his theory, this distinction of pleasures one from the other as higher and lower, worthier and less worthy. Unquestionably this distinction is true; the moral sense of mankind does unquestionably make it; but what does it mean, and how have we come by it? The distinction between pleasures as more or less *intense* is a matter of course; but if the whole of our moral nature is ultimately resolvable into the sense of pleasure and pain, how do we learn to distinguish one pleasure from another as more or less *worthy?* This can be done only on ethical grounds; and Mill, by adopting this distinction, has really surrendered the purely utilitarian character of his system, and has taken the first step to a purely and avowedly ethical system of morals. For if it is admitted that one pleasure may excel another not in intensity but in the purely ethical property of being higher or lower, more worthy or less worthy, so that the pleasures of sight and sound are higher than those of mere sense, the pleasures of thought higher than those of sight and sound, and the pleasure of a self-approving conscience higher than all the rest; so that, to use Mill's expression, a little of one of the higher pleasures is worth as much as a great quantity of one of the lower; where is the inconsistency of thinking that objects are worthy to be sought, and that deeds ought to be done, without any reference to enjoyment or happiness at all? There is no more logical difficulty in admitting the most fully matured and thorough-

This admits an ethical principle and surrenders the utilitarian.

going ethical system of morals, than in admitting the ethical element in Mr. Mill's partial and hesitating way.[1]

The value of the pleasure of self-approbation does not depend on duration.

Concerning the pleasure of a self-approving conscience (though pleasure is a totally inadequate word), there is this remarkable fact to be observed; that, unlike all pleasures of a lower kind, its value does not in any way depend on its duration. In the case of the pleasures of taste, or sight, or sound, the value of any pleasure of given intensity is proportionate to the duration; that is to say (supposing, what is not practically the case, that the capacity for enjoyment continues unchanged), the pleasure of hearing music, for instance, during two hours, is twice as great, and worth twice as much, as that of hearing it during one hour; and this is self-evidently true of all pleasures which are nothing but pleasures, even though of a high kind. But it is not true of that *blessedness* (to use a higher word than that which denotes the highest of mere pleasures), it is not true, I say, of that blessedness which springs out of a good conscience. To a man who, like Leonidas, or Decius, or the martyrs of Christ, goes to certain death in order to perform a duty, the approbation of his conscience in the moment of death is as blessed and as precious as if he had a long life left to enjoy the remembrance of his heroism. This faithfulness unto death, this martyrdom to duty, is shown by an abundance of historical instances to be capable of existing independently of any belief in immortality.

Blessedness.

Martyrdom to duty.

I will here anticipate the argument of this work. If we had served for a whole life long a perfectly good Being whose form we had never seen, nor heard his voice; and if we were to hear at last his voice saying, "Well done, good and faithful servant! thou hast been faithful over a few things; thy services are accepted and thy sins forgiven; now lie down for an eternal sleep:" this would be reward enough for a life of self-sacrifice.

But the truth that men are capable of caring, and do

[1] This inconsistency of Mr. Mill's theory has been pointed out by Mr. Lecky in the Introduction to his "History of European Morals."

care, for other ends than happiness, may be proved by an appeal to much commoner facts than these. Men care for what will be thought of them after death, although they know that such an agency can have no effect on their happiness. This feeling has beyond doubt been a motive power of sensible magnitude in history; posthumous fame has a wonderful charm for many of the strongest minds.

Care for the dead:

Moreover, men care for the dead—for dead bodies; they care for the disposal of the bodies of their friends who have died, and for the disposal of their own bodies after death. This feeling is probably connected, as Vico thought, with a sort of blind instinct of immortality; but it has no connection with the hope of happiness in a future state; for whatever may have been the fancies of Homeric Greeks, or whatever may be those of modern Hindoos, as to the effect of the funeral rites on the soul of the departed, this has totally passed out of the belief of modern Europeans, among whom, nevertheless, the sense of reverence for the dead is strong; and it is often strongest with individuals or with nations—as, for instance, the Chinese—among whom the sense of immortality is weak or absent. This reverence for the dead is one of the most remarkable of all human instincts; it is certainly more general, and probably older, than that belief in immortality with which it has become entwined; and it is in no way capable of being resolved into the love of happiness. Its great philosophical importance was clearly seen by Vico, but it is doubtful whether succeeding writers have recognized it so fully.

not resolvable into love of happiness.

Let us return to the subject of the characteristics of the moral sense.

Rationality of the moral sense.

One of the most remarkable of these is its rationality or reasonableness. Now if the utilitarian theory were true, the moral sense would not be the eminently rational thing that it is; it would have only a habitual basis. This, it must be admitted, is not self-evident; and utilitarians will probably say that the reverse is true, and that it is the utilitarian theory alone which can place morals on a rational basis by showing that right is right because

it tends to produce happiness; while the ethical theory, by giving no reason for the distinction between right and wrong, makes morals irrational.

It is not denied by any that the moral sense *is* rational; the question under discussion is, whether the ground of that rationality is utilitarian or ethical. Now if the utilitarian theory is true, the origin and the justification of the moral sense, or the love of what is morally good, are exactly parallel to the origin and the justification of the love of money. As money is good because it is able to procure enjoyment, and the love of money is generated by habitual association in the mind with the enjoyments it procures, until, by the force of habit, money comes to be loved and sought for its own sake, without a thought of the enjoyments it is able to procure, and even after the power of enjoyment has been lost; so, according to the utilitarian theory, moral excellence is good because it tends to produce happiness, and the love of moral excellence is generated by habitual association in the mind with the happiness it tends to produce, until, by the force of habit, duty comes to be done and holiness comes to be sought for their own sake, without a thought of any happiness that they are to bring, and even at the conscious and deliberate sacrifice of happiness. Now is there really any such parallel? So far from it that the notion is refuted by the bare statement. The love of money is due to mere habitual association; and when, from the force of habit, the pursuit of money is carried on at the sacrifice of happiness, the common sense of mankind recognizes that this is a sacrifice of the end to the means, and calls such conduct irrational and foolish. But when, on the contrary, whether from the force of habit or from a higher because consciously intelligent principle, duty is done and holiness is sought at the sacrifice of happiness, the common sense of mankind recognizes that this is a sacrifice of a lower end to a higher one, and calls such conduct rational and wise.

On the utilitarian theory, the love of moral good is like the love of money.

Actual contrast between the two.

It is no answer to this argument to urge that the sacrifice of happiness to duty is really a sacrifice of selfish

happiness to the general happiness. This is not by any means invariably true; the definition of moral good, according to the utilitarian theory—the criterion of moral good, as I admit—is not that it produces happiness necessarily and in every instance, but that on the whole it tends to do so. Now a theory of morals is utterly worthless and does not deserve the name, unless it provides for those cases, exceptional no doubt but still numerous, in which the doing of duty, so far as it is possible to judge from the circumstances, will not bring happiness either to the doer or to any one else, but the reverse; and on the utilitarian theory that moral goodness is good only because its tendency is to produce happiness, it would be impossible to resist the conclusion—which is moreover the *easiest* one—that in those exceptional cases where this tendency appears to be reversed, the law of duty is reversed with it. This is exactly that kind of exception which tests the rule. Now when the rule is thus tested, what does the conscience of mankind declare? It declares that the law of duty is not altered by altered circumstances. It declares that

Utilitarianism will not justify the sacrifice of happiness to duty.

> "Because right is right, to follow right
> Is wisdom in the scorn of consequence." [1]

But utilitarianism would make this to be not wisdom but folly: it is difficult to see how utilitarianism can ever "scorn consequence," because it teaches that the calculable consequences of actions not only *test* the moral character of the actions, which I admit as a generally applicable rule, but *constitute* it, which all who maintain the ethical theory deny.[2]

Case of the virtue of kindness.

These remarks will not apply without modification to such virtues as kindness, which are constituted as virtues by the fact that they tend, or rather that they *are intended*, to produce happiness. But they fully apply to

[1] Tennyson's *Œnone*.

[2] The foregoing remarks on the rationality of the moral sense have been suggested by an article in *Macmillan's Magazine* for July 1869, by R. H. Hutton, entitled "A questionable Parentage for Morals." The "questionable parentage" is that according to the utilitarian theory, as modified by Spencer's theory (which, as a statement of fact, is true) of the hereditary transmission of mental influences.

the virtues of truthfulness and justice, which, although they do beyond doubt tend to produce happiness, yet according to the ethical theory are virtues, and are recognized as virtues, independently of that tendency.

This truth, of the eminently rational character of the moral sense, is capable of being applied in a way that will at once test the soundness of the foregoing conclusions, and carry the argument further.

Belief based on experience may be changed by experience.

When belief is based on experience, it is capable of being modified or reversed by further experience. Thus, to quote the most obvious instance, the belief in the fixity of the earth, which was based on an obvious though erroneous interpretation of the commonest facts, has been overthrown by a more accurate interpretation of the facts, and has given place to the belief in its motion; or, to mention an instance which is perhaps more to the purpose, the belief in the unchangeableness of species is rapidly giving way, under the influence of increased biological knowledge, to the belief in their mutability. The truth that all belief which is based on experience is in its nature liable to modification is so obvious and so generally recognized, that it is needless to insist on it at length; but it is important here to remark that this truth is most freely recognized by the most cultivated minds, and those which best understand the grounds of belief. Even our natural belief in the necessary and unchangeable character of the properties of space and time may, in the opinion of many of the best intellects from Kant onwards, be true only of the universe in which we live and of which we are a part; and it is possible to believe, though it is not possible to conceive (that is to say, not possible to represent to oneself in imagination), that there may be orders of being which do not exist under the conditions of space and time.

This is most recognized by the most cultivated minds.

This is not true of belief in logical axioms,

But there are other beliefs, concerning which we can neither conceive nor believe that they are capable of change by any change in the nature of our experience. No one, for instance, really believes that there can be in any circumstances, or in any world, any exception to that first principle of logic that a contradiction cannot be true; or,

in other words, that the same proposition cannot be at once true and false.

Now, to which of these two classes of our beliefs does the belief in moral truth belong? Is it one of the beliefs which are capable of a total change in consequence of a change in our experience, or one of those which are not so changeable? Unquestionably it belongs to the unchangeable class.

nor in moral principles.

The minds which have attained to the highest degree of culture are those which find it easiest to recognize the essential changeableness of all beliefs that rest on a basis of experience; or, to use familiar language, it is the most cultivated minds which are the most free from prejudice or prejudgment; but it is also the most cultivated minds which have the strongest conviction of the absolute unchangeableness of moral law, and its validity for all beings whatever that have intelligence enough to understand it. This conviction scarcely exists in children and in uncultivated men; their notion of moral law is usually that it is the arbitrary command of a Being of superior power; and this barbaric conception is an actually influential one in the Christian Church to this day. But in men who have attained to moral intelligence, the belief in the unchangeableness of moral law has such absolute supremacy, that no reasonable man would hesitate to stake his everlasting happiness on the truth, that even though the existing cosmos should pass out of being and be replaced by another,[1] and even though we should acquire new and unimagined powers, and be able to know God even as we are known by God;[2] yet, if there is a moral government of the universe at all, that government will prove to be good and not evil; if there is a spiritual world at all, its foundations will prove to be laid in right and not in wrong.

Belief in the unchangeableness of moral truth is weak in the ignorant, strong in the cultivated.

We believe it of a future life.

Now this belief, profound and unchangeable as it is, has no basis whatever in either logic or experience. It has

This has no basis in logic,

[1] "Heaven and earth shall pass away," said Christ, "but my words shall not pass away." That is to say, the existing cosmos, spiritual as well as physical, shall pass out of being, but the principles of justice and mercy shall remain.

[2] "Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known" (St. Paul).

no basis in logic; for logical proof consists in this, that the truth to be proved cannot be denied without either contradicting some other truth previously admitted, or making a statement that shall contradict itself. But the truth of the unchangeable and eternal character of moral law is not capable of logical proof in either of these two ways; it is not capable of being deduced from any other truth, and it may be contradicted without any self-contradiction; for, profound as is the absurdity, there would be no self-contradiction, and no impossibility to the imagination, in imagining the Ruler of the universe to be an evil being. Nor has this belief any basis in experience; we have no such experience of the righteousness of the government of this world that we should feel any strong confidence of meeting with righteousness in another. The hope of a future world where righteousness shall reign has a different, even an opposite, basis to that of experience.

nor in experience.

> "We trust that God is love indeed,
> And love Creation's final law,
> Though nature, red in tooth and claw
> With ravin, shricks against our creed." [1]

We thus see a remarkable double contrast between moral and physical beliefs: namely, that with advancing mental culture, physical beliefs become more liable to change on the discovery of new evidence, while moral beliefs become more steadfast; and that it is impossible to believe moral law to be reversed though easy to conceive it in imagination, while on the contrary it is easier to believe than to conceive of a fundamental change in physical law: as when we believe, without being able to conceive, that there may be intelligences to which the properties of space and time appear different from what they do to us.[2]

Double contrast of moral and physical beliefs.

[1] "Who trusted God was love indeed,
And love Creation's final law,
Though nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravin, shrieked against his creed."

TENNYSON'S *In Memoriam*.

[2] "I see no absurdity in thinking that the number of dimensions in space may be not three but infinite; only that the universe to which we belong

What then is the ground and origin of this belief in moral law as binding on us, and not on us only, but on all intelligent beings in the universe? The only answer is that as space and time are facts of the physical universe, and are forms of our thought because we are a part of the physical universe;[1] so moral law is a law of the spiritual universe, and has become identified with our mental being because we are a part of the spiritual universe. But the truths of the spiritual universe are more universal than those of the physical universe. We may hereafter attain to a state of being where we shall transcend space and time, but we shall never transcend holiness.

We believe in moral law because we are part of the spiritual universe.

The argument against the absolute nature of morality from the fact that men differ so much about it, is scarcely worthy of notice. Truth is not the less true because men's powers of perceiving it differ indefinitely. Nor does it follow, because man has been late in attaining to moral intelligence, that moral principles are therefore not primary and underived. The saying of Aristotle is often true, that what is first in the logical order is last in the order of discovery.[2]

Happiness is not the ground of goodness, though its result.

We therefore conclude that moral excellence has a value of its own, independently of its effects on happiness. Instead of saying, "Moral goodness is that which tends to promote happiness," we ought to say rather, "The universe is so constituted that moral goodness tends to promote happiness."

Objection answered.

If it is said that the results of the two theories, the utilitarian and the ethical, coincide in all but exceptional cases, I reply that it is the exceptional cases which test a principle; and I have already stated the reasons for concluding that while the utilitarian theory provides well enough for those cases in which the general tendency is fulfilled for virtue to promote happiness, it does not and

is capable of motion in but three of the dimensions; so that we have experience of but three, and cannot form a conception of any more."—*Habit and Intelligence*, vol. ii. p. 215, note.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapters 37 and 38.

[2] "Πρῶτον μὲν αἰτίῃ, ἔσχατον δ' εὑρήσεις."

cannot provide for those exceptional and therefore testing cases where, because right is right, it is wisdom and virtue to follow right in scorn of consequence.

Results of the two theories in the spiritual region.

But even if it were true that the results of the two theories perfectly coincided in that terrestrial region of which alone we have experience, they still would not coincide in the spiritual and heavenly region; for in this latter the utilitarian theory gives no result whatever; being avowedly based on experience only, it cannot possibly give any result in a region that transcends all experience. Just as in mathematics, two formulæ may within moderate limits give results that shall not sensibly differ, and yet beyond those limits may give totally different results.

Illustration from mathematics.

Effect of the two theories on the formation of character.

Further, if it could be shown that the Utilitarian and the Ethical theories of morals gave exactly the same results in deontology, it would not necessarily follow that they gave the same in ethics. To use less technical language: if the rival theories give origin to the same rules of duty, they may yet widely differ in their effect on the formation of character; if they agree as to the deeds which they enjoin, they yet may cause the same deeds to be done from very different motives. It is true that honesty is the best policy; and this purely utilitarian axiom may no doubt have caused honest deeds to be done, but it can never have really made a man honest. Mere calculation of consequences and tendencies, even though it may be unselfish calculation,—that is to say, even though it may take all the consequences to others into account, as well as to oneself,—any such calculation is a wretched basis for the love of holiness and the fear and hatred of sin. The love of holiness and the hatred of sin will have one character if we think of holiness as conformity to the uncreated law of the universe and to the will of its Author, and of sin as the violation thereof; and they will have another and quite a different character if we think of holiness as merely that disposition which has the strongest tendency to promote happiness, even though it be happiness

of the highest kind; and of sin as something which is hateful because it is in the highest degree destructive of happiness.

Independent value of holiness.

It would be blessed to cultivate a self-forgetting temper, even though there were no kingdom of heaven to enter. It would be blessed to mourn for one's own sins and for the sins of mankind, even though the mourners were never to be comforted. It would be blessed to be gentle and forgiving, even though the prospect of the gentle and forgiving inheriting the earth were always as hopeless as it appeared to be on the evening when Christ was taken down from the cross. It would be blessed to hunger and thirst after righteousness, even though such hunger and thirst were never to be satisfied. It would be blessed to be merciful, even though the merciful should not themselves obtain mercy. It would be blessed to be pure in heart, even though there were no God for the pure in heart to see. It would be blessed to be a peacemaker, even though there were no God to be called the Father of the peacemakers. It would be blessed to endure persecution for the sake of righteousness, even though the kingdom of heaven should prove a dream.

NOTE.

THE SINFULNESS OF SUICIDE.

Why suicide is condemned by utilitarianism.

It has been said that the question of the lawfulness or sinfulness of suicide is the difficulty—the *crux*—of moral theories; and it may appear that the theory which tests the morality of actions exclusively by their effect on happiness—that is to say, the utilitarian theory—cannot absolutely forbid suicide, but on the contrary tends rather to enjoin it on those whose life, from disease, has become a hopeless burthen to themselves and to those around them; and even to justify putting them to death if they insist on living as long as they can. The Utilitarian theory, however, when properly understood, condemns such

actions. It tests the morality of any action not by immediate results, but by general tendency. Now if the prevailing morality of any age or country were to sanction suicide or murder as a means of ridding the world of the burthen of infirm old persons, hopeless invalids, or sickly children, it is impossible to deny that a great amount of misery would be prevented; but the loss would be infinitely greater than the gain; for such morality would be in the highest degree unfavourable to the formation of that most precious and lovely kind of character which delights in ministering to the aged, the sick, and the helpless; and would thus poison happiness at its source.

Christian condemnation of suicide.

But though suicide is thus condemned by utilitarian reasoning, it does not follow that it is discouraged by the tendencies of utilitarian morality. The strong condemnation of suicide which is universal in Christian society is due neither to any calculation of its effect on happiness, for such considerations are not really influential, nor to any command of Christ, for none such is on record; but to the sense which Christianity has succeeded in implanting of responsibility and loyalty to a personal though invisible Ruler, who has assigned to each man his several duty, whether to work or to wait, whether to act or to endure. But if that sense ever loses strength and gives place to Stoical loyalty to an impersonal moral law and an impersonal order of the universe, then, even if morality is otherwise uninjured,—a most improbable supposition,—the Christian feeling on the subject of suicide will disappear, and we shall learn to look on it with the eyes of the ancient Romans or of the modern Chinese.

It is sometimes said that suicide is the worst of sins, because it leaves no possibility of subsequent repentance. But if it were proved to be true that repentance is impossible in a future life, this would not make suicide a sin if it were otherwise sinless.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

AT the close of the chapter on the Metaphysical Interpretation of Nature,[1] we have seen that if the origin and ground of the universe is capable of being understood by our faculties at all, it can be understood only as the result and expression of a Self-existent and Intelligent Will. No other solution of the problem is possible; the alternative is between accepting this solution and despairing of any solution whatever.

Our idea of Will is given by our consciousness.

The suggestion of a Will as the origin and ground of the universe leads us directly to the subject of the Will in man and its freedom; for our idea of Will is obviously derived solely from our consciousness of our own voluntary powers. But inasmuch as the idea of Freedom is profoundly, though not very obviously, connected with that of Morality, it has been necessary to discuss the meaning of the Moral Sense before coming to the subject of the Freedom of the Will.[2]

Will is a case of Causation.

It will be denied by none, that Will is a case of Causation; that is to say, the action of the Will is the action of a particular kind of cause, or of a cause acting under particular conditions.

What is Causation?

But what is Causation? and how have we got the idea of a Cause?

Inductive science alone cannot answer this.

I maintain that this question cannot be fully answered from any data afforded by inductive science alone. As defined from the point of view of inductive science, causation is nothing more than "invariable and unconditional

[1] Chapter 2.

[2] See the preceding chapter.

sequence :" thus when we say, for instance, that fire is the cause of heat, the only meaning that inductive science can assign to these words is that fire emits heat, and nothing more than the fire is needed in order to have heat.

It defines causes as only conditions, and the law of universal causation as synonymous with the uniformity of nature.

From this point of view the causes of a thing or of an event are nothing more than the conditions on which its production depends; there is no real distinction between causes and conditions; and the law of universal causation —the law that whatever has a beginning has a cause—is identical and synonymous with the law of the uniformity of the course of nature : it means only that every event so depends on preceding events, that where the preceding events, or causes, are known, it is always possible, provided that our knowledge is sufficient, to predict the consequent events, or effects. This is what Mill, in his Logic, has advanced as a complete account of causation. Mill, however, though the best and the best known expositor of this doctrine, is not its author.

This law of the uniformity of the course of nature, or, in other words, the law that the same antecedents are always followed by the same consequents, is unquestionably true of the entire world of matter; and moreover, it is all that needs to be admitted for the purposes of physical science; but it is not a full account of our idea of causation. Metaphysics has something more to say on the subject. Consciousness makes known, within the sphere of consciousness itself, a relation of cause and effect which is not capable of being resolved into mere "invariable and unconditional sequence." We know that fire is the cause of heat, because we have observed that fire emits heat, and that nothing more than the fire itself is needed in order to have heat. Thus the law that fire is the cause of heat is inferred, or rather generalized, from a multitude of instances. But this is obviously not the case when the relation of cause and effect occurs within the sphere of consciousness. If we hear good news and it causes joy; if we hear sound reasoning and it causes conviction; or if we mentally determine to act and the determination causes action;—in all these cases our knowledge of causation

From the inductive point of view, causation is known by generalization; from the metaphysical, it is known by consciousness of mental process.

is obviously no mere generalization from a number of instances: causation is in these cases directly made known in the act of causation, and could not be made more clearly or certainly known by a thousand instances than it is by one. It is made known by direct cognition, just as time is made known by direct cognition when we become conscious of feelings succeeding one another in time; and the relation of cause and effect, thus learned, is as elementary, and as incapable of being resolved into any other relation, as that of succession in time, or that of likeness and unlikeness; relations which are admitted by all to be absolutely elementary. And having thus learned the fact and acquired the conception of causation by direct consciousness, we apply the conception analogically to the external world, and conclude that the relation of fire to heat is one of causation, similar to those relations of causation of which we have direct consciousness.

Thus the fact of causation—that is to say, the fact of one event depending on another, as in the case of the emission of heat depending on the lighting of a fire—is made known both by that experience of the external world which we derive from observation, and by that experience of the mind which we derive from consciousness; but observation makes known the mere fact, while consciousness makes the fact intelligible.

It may be said that the fact of action being caused by mental determination—in a word, the fact of voluntary determination, or Will—is a fact of a different kind from that of good news causing joy, or sound reasoning causing conviction. This may be so; but all that we need insist on at the present stage of the argument is, that all these are cases of causation; which will not be denied.

Further question: What is the connection between the fact of Causation and the law of Uniformity?

But this does not exhaust the subject. The question remains:—What is the connection between the fact of causation as made known by direct consciousness, and the law of the uniformity of causation as generalized from observation? What is the relation between the fact of causation of which we become conscious because it takes place within the sphere of consciousness, as when good news

causes joy; and the law that all causes act with perfect uniformity, so that an exactly similar cause is always followed by an exactly similar effect? The two are not identical in the mere statement:—causation as made known by direct consciousness is not a belief at all, but only a conception:—and the question may thus be stated: Does the *conception* of causation as made known by consciousness, involve the *belief* that causation acts according to invariable law? This question is left not only unanswered but unasked by Mill and his school, who simply ignore what consciousness has to tell of causation, and when they speak of causation, mean only (to use Mill's own definition) "invariable and unconditional sequence."

Belief in the uniformity of nature is due to experience.

Mill, however, is right in maintaining that our belief in the uniformity of causation is not *à priori* but due to experience. It is true we have an instinctive confidence that the future will resemble the past; that the present order of things will continue to go on; that our experience of what we know will prove on the whole to be a trustworthy guide among things of which we have not yet had experience. This confidence is not due to experience; on the contrary, it anticipates experience, and is often apparently contradicted thereby.[1] But this is very far short of a scientific conviction of the uniformity of the order of nature. A scientific man believes that the order of things is constant, and that the same cause will in the future produce the same effects which it has produced in the past; but what an unscientific man believes is that the order of things is constant; that some causes or agents have been shown by the experience of the past to act regularly, and others to act irregularly; and that the same may be expected to continue in the future. Ask

[1] "The foremost rank among the intuitive tendencies involved in belief is to be assigned to *the natural trust that we have in the continuance of the present state of things*, or the disposition to go on as we have begun. This is a sort of law of perseverance in the human mind, like the first law of motion in mechanics. Our first experiences are to us decisive; and we go on under them to all lengths, being arrested only by some failure or contradiction."— BAIN'S *The Emotions and the Will*, 2nd edition, p. 537. The italics are the author's.

an unscientific man, for instance, whether he believes that the same bullet discharged with perfect accuracy at the same mark out of the same gun will always hit precisely the same point, and he will answer—Yes. But ask him if he believes that the same die, if thrown in exactly the same way on the same surface, would always fall with the same side up, he will most probably answer—No. And yet it is quite certain that he is wrong; and that the effect follows the cause with a sequence which is as rigid in the one case as in the other, only less traceable.

We thus see that, so far as the unanalysed evidence of instinctive belief has any weight, the belief in the absolute uniformity of causation is not intuitive, but is an attainment of science.

It is not specially connected with the idea of causation.

Further: the belief in the uniformity of the order of things, both that indefinite expectation of the future continuing to resemble the past which man has in common with animals, and that belief in the absolute uniformity of the action of all physical causes which is an attainment of science, is not in any close way connected with the conception of causation. The laws of causation, that is to say the laws according to which natural agencies produce their results, are what Mill has happily termed "uniformities of succession;" and it is only these uniformities that belong to causation. But there are also, to use another of Mill's admirably chosen expressions, "uniformities of co-existence" which are not cases of causation, and yet belong to the general uniformity of the order of nature. The general statement of all uniformities of succession is that the same causes are followed by the same effects; the general statement of all uniformities of co-existence is that the same properties are always accompanied by the same properties: as, for instance, when a chemical test indicates the presence of iron, we infer that the substance present has all the properties of iron. This is a uniformity of co-existence; it has nothing to do with succession, and is consequently not a case of causation according to Mill's definition of causation.

Uniformities of succession and of co-existence.

We thus conclude:

Summary.

1. That the law of the uniformity of causation is not an ultimate law, but is only one half of the law of the uniformity of nature; the law of the uniformities of co-existence being the other half.

2. That the law of the uniformity of causation is not an intuitive truth, but is a discovery of science: and

3. That the law of the uniformity of causation is not implied in the fact of causation as made known in consciousness.

The school of Mill will not deny that our belief in the uniformity of nature is a result of experience alone, for this doctrine is a prominent one in their system. But perhaps they will say that causation which does not act according to a uniform law is a contradiction; that a uniformly acting cause is the only possible definition of a cause. This throws us back on the question with which we began:—namely, What does Consciousness tell us about Causation?

Agency a better word than *Causation* for the present purpose.

The word Causation has been so appropriated by Mill and his school to mean merely uniform sequence, that in speaking of the testimony of consciousness on the subject it is better to drop the word Causation and substitute the word Agency; and to say that when we are conscious of such a fact as that of good news producing joy, we are conscious of the relation (not of Causation, but) of Agency between the good news and the feeling of joy which it produces. Instead, then, of repeating the axiom that whatever had a beginning had a cause, let us say that all action presupposes an agent. This, like the truth of the infinity of time and space, is a truth of reason asserted in consciousness; observation has nothing to do with making it known; were it possible to believe that there might be action without an agent, no observation could prove that belief to be wrong. Observation can only inform us of actions; it is reason, speaking in consciousness, that refers the actions to agents. Thus when I myself act, I am conscious of myself as an agent; when I become aware of any action which is not my own, I refer it to an agent outside of myself.

Reason asserts that Action implies an Agent,

but it tells nothing of the uniformity of causation.

But the axiom that where there is action there must be an agent, tells nothing about the uniformity of causation; in other words, while it asserts that every action must be due to some agent, it does not assert that the same agent, under the same circumstances, must always of necessity act in the same way.[1]

The effect of a cause acting on the mind from without is capable of being predicted.

It may be said in reply to this, that in the instance already mentioned, of good news being the cause or agent that produces joy, the agent does act under a necessary law; for given the news, the character of the person who hears it, and the manner which his circumstances are affected by what he hears, it would be possible to predict the effect of the news on his mind with the same kind of certainty with which the action of a physical agent can be predicted. This is true, but it does not exhaust the question. In this case the mind is passive; not itself acting, but acted on. But in voluntary determinations, in which the mind is not acted on but active, is it certain that the action always takes place according to a necessary law? Is it certain that in all cases of voluntary determination the mind so acts according to law that it would be possible to a person who knew all the data to predict the result with unerring accuracy?

But is the same true of voluntary determination?

The certainty or necessity of an event is due to the action of the agent that produces the event being determined by antecedent circumstances. Thus the place where a projectile shall strike is determined by the size, form, and properties of the gun, the force of the charge of powder, the form and weight of the projectile, the direction and force of the wind, and, most important of all, the way in which the gun is pointed. The same is true in all cases of physical causation whatever; the immediate agent never determines its own action; its action is determined for it by the previous events which are the causes of the action; in other words, the same or an exactly similar agent, under the same circumstances, will always act in the same manner. This is the statement of the law of the uniformity of

[1] See Note A at end of chapter.

causation. But we have already seen that this is not a truth of the reason; it is known by experience only; and the truth of a conclusion from experience can never be free from all possibility of limitation or exception.

The uniformity of causation is known by experience only.

The question we have now to discuss is whether there is such an exception to the ordinary law of causation in the action of the human will; or, in other words, whether the mind of man, unlike all other agents of which we have any direct knowledge, is in some degree capable of determining its own action, instead of being determined in its action by external causes.

Is the will of man an exception?

It must be admitted that the belief in any truly self-determining power in the will of man is contrary to the most obvious view of all the analogies of the universe. Nowhere in the world of matter, and nowhere, so far as appears, in the animal world, is there any such power of self-determination; every action of every agent is determined not by the agent itself but by previously acting causes. But such obvious analogies may very easily mislead. If a Being with powers of perception like our own were to come near to our universe out of infinite space, it would at first see nothing of the worlds of which the universe is composed except the light of the stars and their motions; and it would infer, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that all matter was exactly alike; but a closer view would show this conclusion to be wrong. Our imaginary Being would then think that though there were indeed many kinds of elementary matter, yet they all acted according to tolerably simple physical and chemical laws. But this also would be wrong; and a nearer view would show the exception that exists in the case of living beings. He would still, however, think that the law of uniform causation was absolutely universal, and that in this universe there was no such thing as an agent capable of true self-determination; but supposing that he had faculties for metaphysical as well as for physical research, might not he find an exception here also in the will of man?

Obvious analogies are against this:

but they mislead.

Illustration.

Life is an exception to the universality of physico-chemical laws; why not will to the uniformity of causation?

Further, it is certain that a self-determining agent

does exist. Every event in the universe of matter is determined by the events which precede it, but physical reasonings make it certain that this chain of causes and effects cannot have been of absolutely endless length through past time.[1] There must have been a first link in the chain; there must have been a first act of causation; and this act must have been determined not by any previous act of causation when as yet there was none, but by the free self-determining power of the Agent. The first act of causation we call Creation; the freely Self-determining Agent we call God.[2] Now if this self-determining power exists in God, the Author of the universe, is there any absurdity in thinking that it may reappear in Man, the highest product of the universe?

The Creator has self-determining power: may not this reappear in Man?

It is not to be denied that there is a mystery about Freedom which there is not about Necessity. It is not to be denied that it is easier to understand how the action of an agent may be determined by previous causes, than to understand how the agent may determine its own action. But if we were to admit the theory of universal necessity, or in other words the doctrine that every action of every agent is absolutely determined by previous causes, this would not solve but would only shift or transform the difficulty of believing in the existence of a Self-determining Agent. For either the Agent in the first act of Causation was free and self-determined, or there has been an infinite chain of cause and effect reaching from a past eternity. Both of these two hypotheses are inconceivable by our understanding, yet either the one or the other must be true. Metaphysics brings us thus far, and gives no hint of any answer to the question which of these two hypotheses is the true one. But, as we have seen already, there is evidence from physical science which proves that the chain of cause and effect cannot have been of absolutely infinite length; consequently the other alternative must be true: namely, that there has been an absolute beginning.

Freedom is more mysterious than Necessity.

But the doctrine of Necessity only changes, not solves, the difficulty.

[1] See p. 49. See also "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 6.

[2] See the concluding paragraphs of Chapter 2.

Verbal ambiguity cleared up.

It may be needful here to clear up a verbal ambiguity as to what is meant when we speak of an action being determined, not by previous causes, but by the agent itself. It is evident that the nature of the agent is one of those causes which determine its action; thus when carbon burns in oxygen, the act of combustion is determined by the nature of the carbon and the oxygen. But this is not a case of self-determination; for the carbon and the oxygen have not endowed themselves with the power of burning, nor is it at their choice whether to burn or not to burn. Their properties have been determined not *by* them, but *for* them; their properties are part of that chain of necessary causation wherein the entire universe of matter is held, and their actions consequently, though determined by *their nature*, are not determined by *themselves*. Now in discussing the question of the freedom, or self-determining power, of Man, we do not raise the question whether our actions are in any degree determined by our characters and the motives that act thereon, in the same sense in which the burning of carbon is determined by its combustible nature and by the flame that sets it on fire; for no one doubts that our actions are so determined. The question is, Whether this determination is absolutely rigid; whether, supposing the character given, the action is, as in physical causation, in all cases so determined by the motives acting on the will that if we knew all the circumstances it would be possible to predict the man's final determination? or has the will of Man, like the will of God, a power to determine its own action independently of motives acting on it, transcending the relation of invariable and unconditional sequence, and setting prediction at defiance?

The question stated.

The will of man is not an originating cause. The question is whether it is able to alter the direction of causation.

It must here be observed that no one supposes the will of Man to be like that of God, an absolute Cause, or origin of a chain of causation. The most which is claimed for it is, that it is capable of *altering* the direction of the chain of cause and effect, by acting, "not *in* the line of causation, but *upon* it."

Or, to put the question in another form: Self-determination of the Will is a higher thing than determination by

Self-determination is higher than determination by motives, and is developed out of it.

motives, just as the rational powers of the mind are higher than the irrational powers of the mind and of the body. The rational powers of thought are developed later than the irrational powers of habit and memory, and are developed out of them; so, the power of voluntary self-determination is developed later than the power of acting under the determination of a motive, and is developed out of it; that is to say, if we had not first acquired the power to act under the determination of motives, we could never have acquired the voluntary power which, as I maintain, is above motives and controls their action. As in thought there is an element of intelligence not derived from habit and memory, though working in conjunction with habit and memory; and as in organization there is a principle of life not derived from the physical and chemical forces, though working through the physical and chemical forces;[1] so is there, in the highest voluntary determination, a force which implies the existence of motives, and yet is not under their absolute control.

Can the will do anything more than weigh motive

No one will deny that the will is a self-acting machine for weighing motives one against the other; the question is whether it is only this, or this and something more.

I say weighing motives *one against the other*, because those who believe in the free self-determination of the will are all agreed that we become conscious of freedom, and consequently become really free, only through the conflict of motives. Freedom would be unthought of, and consequently impossible, if we had never been under the influence of more than one motive at a time.

Freedom begins with the conflict of motives.

Summary.

So far, the arguments may be summed up as follows:—

Reason, speaking through consciousness, asserts that where there is action there must be an agent; but it makes no assertion as to whether the agent must necessarily act as determined by previous causes, including its own nature among those causes; or whether an agent may be capable of free self-determination in its actions. There is thus no conclusive *à priori* argument either for or against, and the question is so far left open. The possibility of free self-determination is shown by the truth that the first creative

The *à priori* arguments on both sides are indecisive;

[1] For a discussion of this set of subjects, see "Habit and Intelligence."

act of causation must have been freely self-determined. But on the other hand it is certain that rigid necessity is universal in the world which we know by observation; and the burden of proof consequently lies on those who would make the will of man to be in any degree an exception to the law. But this presumption in favour of the universality of the law of necessity is in its nature a mere presumption which may be totally set aside by contrary facts. As already remarked, to a being ignorant of our universe, and seeing it from a distance, there would be a presumption against the existence of anything like life; but life does exist, though the amount of vitalized matter in the universe is infinitesimally small when compared with that which is not vitalized. So it is with freedom. The sphere of freedom is infinitesimally small in comparison with the sphere of necessity which surrounds it. The sphere of necessity includes not only the entire universe of matter, but the habitual life of man, as distinguished from his truly voluntary life; and not only so, but it includes all cases of action where the conflict of motives does not arise. It is probable indeed that the greater part of mankind pass through life without ever making a single determination which is in the highest sense voluntary. The question is, not whether free self-determination is the rule in human action, for it is quite certain that it is not; but, whether such a power exists as it were in reserve. And against this there is no strong presumption; for, as the domain of life is infinitesimally small as compared with that of matter, and yet, so far as we can make out the purpose of creation, matter appears to exist for the sake of life; so the domain of freedom is infinitesimally small as compared with that of necessity, and yet it may be chiefly for the purpose of ministering to the life of morally free beings like ourselves that the vast network of physical law and the immense chain of necessary causation have been created.

but the burden of proof is on the advocates of freedom.

The proportion of life to matter is infinitesimal, and so is the proportion of the sphere of freedom to that of necessity.

Matter exists for the sake of life, and so necessary law may exist for the sake of free beings.

Having now got rid of all *à priori* presumptions, let us proceed to consider this question of the freedom of the will on its own grounds.

Argument for necessity

The argument most commonly used in favour of the doctrine of universal necessity is that observation shows the actions of men to be in fact determined by their characters and by circumstances, so that they are capable of being predicted. There is no doubt whatever of the general truth of this; those who know a man best are best able to predict how he will act in any given circumstances.

from statistical regularity,

This argument is put in a very strong light, though nothing is really added to its logical force,[1] by the fact that human actions of all kinds which admit of being registered and made the subject of statistics, conform to a law of averages; —not only such involuntary actions as death, but, quite as much, such voluntary actions as marriage. After what has been said on the smallness of the sphere of free self-determination,

inconclusive.

this argument will not appear of much weight. The statistical regularity of such actions as marriage is not absolute; it is only approximate, and is always liable to small fluctuations which do not admit of being reduced to law; and so long as there are any fluctuations at all, even though they be of infinitesimal magnitude as compared with the total, statistical regularity does not exclude all room for freedom.

May not many freedoms make one necessity?

But further: does the law, or rather fact, of the statistical regularity of such voluntary actions as marriage bear on the question at all? May not many freedoms make one approximate necessity, in somewhat the same way that many contingencies make one approximate certainty—the truth on which the possibility of insurance is founded?[2] I

[1] One of the strangest logical blunders ever made by an able man was that of Mr. Buckle in his notion that it is possible for statistics to throw light on the laws of human nature. He has himself unconsciously left on record the answer to this by pointing out, in some magazine article to which I have not the reference, that causes must be studied in themselves, and not in their resultant effects. He is here speaking of physical science, but of course the same is true of mental science. To explain by an instance what is meant:—Atmospheric phenomena depend almost entirely on the properties of gases and vapours and the laws of heat and evaporation: but those properties and laws could never be made known by any examination of atmospheric phenomena as recorded in meteorological registers: they must be experimentally studied by themselves.

[2] Something like this appears to be the meaning of those words of Christ, "It must be that offences come; but woe unto him through whom they come."

make this suggestion without offering any decided opinion on the subject.

Let us now turn to the other side of the question.

Argument from consciousness, on the side of freedom, inconclusive.

The argument most commonly used in favour of the doctrine of freedom is that we are conscious of freedom. This is a presumption, no doubt, but only a presumption. Consciousness may give a certainty of what we are doing or of what we have done; but any assertion of consciousness as to what we may possibly do is inconclusive until we prove the truth of the assertion by doing it; and any assertion of consciousness as to what we might have done but have not done, is altogether inconclusive.

The direct argument in favour of the doctrine of freedom derived from consciousness therefore breaks down, as well as the direct argument against it derived from observation. But an indirect argument remains. The feeling of responsibility is unmeaning unless it presupposes the reality of freedom.

In the foregoing chapter I have stated my reasons for believing that the Moral Sense, or the sense of sin and holiness, is an ultimate fact of our nature, not resolvable into any other. But however well this truth may be established, it does not exhaust the question of the nature and meaning of the Moral Sense.

Guilt and Merit, not identical with Sin and Holiness.

The opposition of Guilt and Merit is not identical with the opposition of Sin and Holiness: all guilt involves sin, but all sin does not involve guilt; all merit involves holiness, though it may not be of a high kind, but all holiness does not involve merit. This distinction is recognized by the conscience of mankind, though it be clearly expressed but seldom. We think of holiness as admirable, and of sin as detestable; attributes which holiness and sin share with beauty and ugliness in insentient beings, which can have no moral nature, good or bad. But merit and guilt are also thought of as not only admirable and detestable, but also as praiseworthy and blameworthy; qualities which it would be unmeaning to attribute to insentient beings. All sin is moral disease and needs healing, *σωτηρία*, but only guilt needs forgiveness: all sin is a proper object of punishment, when

punishment is needful either to eradicate or to heal it, but only guilt is a proper object of anger. Tendencies to sin, like any other habitual tendencies, are capable of becoming hereditary, but guilt is always and necessarily personal.

Ground of the distinction. Guilt is voluntary sin.

Now, what is the ground for this distinction? It is, that guilt is sin of the will; voluntary sin. When sin is not voluntary—that is to say, when it is the result of bad education or of congenital, perhaps hereditary, evil nature—it may be in the highest degree detestable, but no guilt attaches to it, and it is not blameworthy. This truth may perhaps be seldom clearly expressed, yet it is strongly felt by the conscience of mankind:—the enlightened conscience, while condemning the sin as worthy of all abhorrence, is able to make a distinction between the sin and the sinner, and to judge that in so far as the sinner and his sin are the mere creatures of circumstance, he deserves no blame and no anger, and has incurred no guilt.

The distinction is made by consciousness.

How have we learned to make this distinction? Not by observation, for observation has nothing to tell on such subjects, but by consciousness; by the feeling of self-condemnation. This is more than self-disapprobation. When,

Self-disapprobation and self-condemnation.

in thinking of a past sin, we conclude, "My action was wrong, but in my state of ignorance and weakness it was impossible that I could have acted in any other way," there may be the most crushing sense of self-disapprobation and of sinfulness, but there is none of self-condemnation or of guilt. But if we conclude, "I might have acted right and did act wrong," this is the sense of self-condemnation and of guilt, in addition to the sense of self-disapprobation and of sinfulness.

It may be said in reply to this, that sinfulness is primarily an attribute of character, and guilt of actions. This is mainly true, but it does not affect the truth of the distinction drawn above. Guilt does not attach to actions, however sinful, when they are not truly voluntary; and guilt and blame do attach to characters when they have been formed by the persons that possess the characters.

On this ground I conclude

It is on this ground, and on this alone, that I conclude moral freedom to be a reality. Without it, the sense of

responsibility and of guilt appear unintelligible, if not indeed false;—the sense of responsibility for future and present actions, and the sense of guilt incurred by past actions, would be either false or unmeaning if we were not really free to do the right or the wrong: free, that is, not only in the negative sense of being externally unconstrained, but in the positive sense of having an internal power which is not absolutely determined by motives. It is in my view more credible that the will of man should be a partial exception to the otherwise universal law of necessary causation, and that the mystery of free self-determination should be true, than that the highest utterance of the highest of man's faculties—namely the moral sense—should be based on a fallacy or a confusion.

moral freedom to be a reality.

It is not to be denied that the inquiry of this chapter is in the narrow sense of the word altogether unpractical; for, as Bishop Butler has shown,[1] and as all men of sense are agreed, the effect on action of the belief in freedom and of the belief in necessity ought to be exactly the same. But their effects on the formation of character will not be the same; and the formation of character is the most important of all conceivable purposes. In the formation of character few things are more important than a sense of responsibility—not only legal responsibility to an external authority, but moral responsibility to the internal authority of conscience. Now, if we have no real power of self-determination, or, in other words, if moral freedom is an illusion, what does moral responsibility mean? and how can we evade the conclusion that the feeling of self-condemnation, or, as we call it when in great strength, remorse, is due to an unhealthy stimulation of the conscience at the expense of the understanding, and is what no reasonable being ought to give place to? If on the contrary moral freedom is a reality, then self-condemnation and remorse for sin are in the highest degree reasonable. It is easy to see that the effect of the belief in necessity and of the belief in freedom must in this respect be very different; and it is not

Sense in which the question of freedom is unpractical.

Effect of belief on this subject on the formation of character.

[1] "Analogy of Religion," Part i. Chapter 6.

difficult to judge which of the two will be most favourable to the formation of noble, virtuous, and holy character.

Rational conceptions of the universe are possible only to a religious philosophy.

It is only when viewed in the light of its Divine origin that it is possible to attain to any such really rational conceptions of the universe as ought to be satisfying to rational beings. Merely inductive science confesses its own weakness by raising questions which it is unable to answer. Inductive science reveals force as the one fundamental reality of the physical universe, and discovers a chain of causation extending to the present from a very remote though not infinitely remote beginning; but having established these facts, it leaves them without

Force,

interpretation; and then the philosophy which I have endeavoured to expound in the preceding chapters comes in and interprets physical force as the result and expression of Divine power, and the origin of the universe as the

Intelligence, Consciousness,

action of Divine will. Likewise observation and consciousness jointly make known the existence of consciousness and intelligence in the world of living beings, and of the moral sense in man; facts which, as I have endeavoured to show in the preceding chapters of this work, and also in my work on *Habit and Intelligence*, do not admit of being resolved into anything other than themselves, and cannot be interpreted by inductive science at all: but in the philosophy which I regard as true, the consciousness and intelligence of created beings are interpreted as results of the Divine knowledge and wisdom reappearing in the higher ranks of the Divine creation. Finally, the moral

and Freedom are divine.

freedom of the human will, which to inductive science appears unreal, or if real, then unintelligible, is interpreted by the same philosophy as the result of the Divine freedom reappearing in the highest being in this universe.

NOTE A.

SINCE writing the foregoing chapter, I have met with the following passages from Newman's "Grammar of Assent," which state with admirable clearness the distinction between the

physical fact of the uniformity of the order of nature and the metaphysical truth of the universality of causation—or, as I have expressed it, the truth that action necessarily implies an agent :—

Quotations from Newman's "Grammar of Assent."

"Since causation implies a sequence of acts in our own case, and our doing is always posterior, never contemporaneous or prior, to our willing, therefore, when we witness invariable antecedents and consequents, we call the former the cause of the latter (though intelligence is absent) from the analogy of external appearances. At length we go on to confuse causation with order : and because we happen to have made a successful analysis of some complicated assemblage of phenomena which experience has brought before us in the visible scene of things, and have reduced them to a tolerable dependence on each other, we call the ultimate points of the analysis, and the hypothetical facts in which the whole mass of phenomena is gathered up, by the name of causes, whereas they are only the formula under which these phenomena are conveniently represented."—P. 64.

"There are philosophers who go further, and teach not only a general but a necessary uniformity in the action of the laws of nature, holding that everything is by law, and exceptions impossible ; but I do not see on what ground of experience they take up this position. Experience, rather, is adverse to such a doctrine ; for what concrete fact exactly repeats itself?"—P. 67.

"But it may be urged, if a thing happens once, it must happen always : for what is to hinder it? Nay, on the contrary, Why, because one particle of matter has a certain property, should all particles have the same? Why, because particles have instanced the property a thousand times, should the thousand and first instance it also? It is *primâ facie* unaccountable that an accident should happen twice, not to speak of its happening always. If we expect a thing to happen twice, it is because we think it is not an accident, but has a cause. What has brought about a thing once may bring it about twice. What is to hinder its happening? rather, What is to make it happen? Here we are thrown back from the question of order to that of causation."—P. 69.

NOTE B.

God's Omnipotence does not exclude

If it is urged that the omnipotence of God leaves no room for the freedom of the creature, I reply, that if God is not physical but Spiritual Omnipotence—if He is a freely self-

freedom; nor does His Foreknowledge.

determining agent—He is able to leave room for freedom in His creatures, and to communicate to them a portion of His own power of self-determination.

Nor does the truth of the foreknowledge of God exclude the reality of man's freedom. God does not exist under the conditions of time: "He does not *fore*see: He *sees*." On this subject I subjoin a poem of my own, not previously published.

ETERNITY.

Poem—Eternity.

Eternity is not, as men believe,
Before and after us, an endless line.
No, 'tis a circle, infinitely great,
All the circumference with creations thronged:
God at the centre dwells, beholding all.
And as we move in this eternal round,
The finite portion which alone we see
Behind us, is the past: what lies before
We call the future. But to Him who dwells
Far at the centre, equally remote
From every point of the circumference,
Both are alike, the future and the past.

CHAPTER V.

THE BASES OF KNOWLEDGE.

IN the three preceding chapters we have considered the three most important special questions of metaphysics; namely, the Metaphysical Interpretation of Nature, the Ground of the Moral Sense, and the Freedom of the Will. It is the plan of this work to ascend from the commonest facts of observation and of consciousness to the highest spiritual truths; and consequently, before we go on to the properly theological questions, it is necessary to consider the nature of Faith and its possibility.

Faith is the proof of things not seen.

The word Faith is here used in its customary sense of *the proof* (ἔλεγχος) *of things not seen;*[1] or, as it may be paraphrased in philosophical language, *certitude concerning matters in which verification is unattainable.*[2]

Example: belief in a future life.

We know that such certitude is possible. We know, as a fact, that many men feel the most unquestioning certitude of the reality of a future life—a certitude which proves its reality by influencing their character and their conduct; although such a belief does not admit of verification of any ordinary kind. Were it nothing more, the existence of such a belief would be a psychological fact of the highest interest and importance. But we have now to discuss, not the psychological character of such a belief, but the question whether it has any rational basis. It is the purpose

[1] Epistle to the Hebrews, xi. 1.

[2] *Certitude* is distinguished from *certainty* as subjective from objective. "Certitude is a state of mind: certainty is a quality of propositions." (Newman's "Grammar of Assent.")

of this work to show that faith has such a rational or scientific basis.

It is best to say here, that in using such expressions as these I do not mean to prejudge any of the questions which are associated with that very indefinite word Rationalism. When I say that anything is rational, I only mean, according to the ordinary usage of our language, that it is worthy to be believed; and in this sense no one will admit that his belief is irrational.

Paradoxical nature of Faith.

It is *primâ facie* a paradox to say that belief, so strong as to amount to certitude, may exist without the possibility of verification, and may yet be in the highest degree reasonable. This paradox, however, is what I undertake to defend; and my defence of it consists primarily in this, that the paradox, the difficulty, and the apparent contradiction involved in such faith, are only the extreme forms of what are involved in all belief whatever respecting existing things external to our own consciousness.

Defence of the paradox.

The capacity for belief is an ultimate fact.

Belief—not particular beliefs, but the general power and tendency to form beliefs—is an ultimate fact of mind, not resolvable into "association of ideas," or into anything other than itself. This is virtually admitted even by those who endeavour to resolve all the facts of mind into the "association of ideas."[1]

Belief is of something external to consciousness.

Belief is defined always to have reference to something not present to the immediate consciousness — something past, or future, or external. We are immediately conscious of our actual present feelings; and we are immediately conscious of self as having the feelings. But immediate consciousness ends here. We have no immediate consciousness—that is to say, in the usual sense of the word, no consciousness at all—of anything past, future, or absent; and though we usually say that we are conscious of the objects which we perceive, yet perception is really an inference from sensation—an inference which is made too spontaneously, too rapidly, and too surely, for us to

[1] See the quotation from Bain, p. 75, note.

be conscious of the process.[1] Thus the sphere of our immediate consciousness is very small; it is but the centre of the sphere of our knowledge, which latter extends around it in every direction. We know that of which we are immediately conscious; but we know very much more of which we are not immediately conscious. Now, within the sphere of consciousness there is no room for the exercise of belief; but there is necessarily an element of belief in all knowledge that transcends immediate consciousness. There is no difficulty whatever as to the knowledge of what lies within the sphere of consciousness —within that sphere knowledge and consciousness are identical. But how is knowledge possible—or, to put the question in other words, how is belief to be justified—in the region of that knowledge which is external to any immediate consciousness? All knowledge begins from experience; but how is it that we are able to reason, and to reason truly, from the data of experience to conclusions respecting matters of which we have no experience? We believe in the earth's motion; this belief ultimately rests on data of experience; but the earth's motion is certainly not itself a fact of experience. The same is true of the geological history of the earth, of the existence of luminous undulations, and of the whole of that marvellous world of truths of the intellect, as distinguished from truths of merely sensible perception, which has been opened to us by science. In order to appreciate the purely *rational* (as distinguished from merely *perceptive*) character of scientific truth, we must reflect that very many—may we not say all?—of the most characteristic truths of science are known by thought only, and could not conceivably be objects of perception; such as—to mention one of the simplest possible instances —the law of the inverse square. We may thus say of science, as we have said of faith, that it is *the proof of things not seen.*

Science also is the proof of things not seen.

"True," it will be said, "science is the *proof* of things

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 36.

not seen; but faith has been defined as the *certitude* of things *not verified.* There are various kinds of verification: sight is one, demonstration is another; but some kind of verification we must have for whatever we are asked to believe, unless we are to give up our claim to be called reasonable beings."

Demand for verification.

There may be proof which cannot be reduced to scientific form.

In reply to this two remarks are to be made. In the first place, as there are various kinds of verification, so it is not *primâ facie* irrational to think that there may be reasonable grounds for certitude which nevertheless do not admit of being reduced to rigidly scientific form; just as proof may be as good as demonstration, though it may not be capable of being put into a demonstrative form. We shall have to speak of this farther on. But further: scientific verification rests on assumptions which are themselves unverified and incapable of being verified. Let not this be misunderstood: I do not desire to disparage scientific certainty:—if the assumptions, or postulates, on which verification rests do not admit of verification, neither do they need it.

Verification rests on assumptions that neither need nor admit of verification.

We have now to examine what these postulates are; and this is the same thing as examining the fundamental postulates of all thought; for the fundamental postulates of all thought are the same: if a postulate is true in science it cannot be untrue elsewhere.

Natural beliefs.

The fundamental postulates of all thought consist in certain *natural beliefs,* to use Reid's expression, which neither need proof nor admit of it. These are implied and involved in every act of belief, and consequently in all knowledge that transcends immediate consciousness; and, as we shall see further on, they are not capable of being generated by any mere "association of ideas." They are of various kinds. One of them is the belief in the fundamental axiom of logic, that a contradiction cannot be true; and similar to this are the beliefs in the infinite extent and uniform properties of space and time, which are the fundamental truths of mathematical science. These beliefs may be said to contain their own justification: they not only are certainly true, but they are not conceivably

Logical and mathematical beliefs are self-justified,

untrue; and consequently, though the recognition of their truth is belief, in the sense of being a recognition of something as true which is not within the sphere of immediate consciousness, yet it is perhaps not to be regarded as in any degree approaching to the nature of faith.

and do not approach to faith.

But this remark applies only to our belief in the principles of the abstract sciences. It does not apply to the belief and knowledge that we have respecting anything that has existence. All recollection of the past, and all expectation of the future, involve belief which is in some degree of the nature of faith. And if this is true of the memory of the past and the expectation of the future, it is also true of the perception of that which is external to us; for, without going into the question of the nature of our idea of substance, it is obvious that merely momentary impressions on the sight or on any other sense, unconnected with any memory of the past or any expectation of the future, could not give origin to the belief in an external world.

Belief in the past, the future, and the external, approaches to faith.

Let us speak first of memory.

The knowledge that memory gives, is knowledge to the truth of which no witness is borne by immediate consciousness; and such knowledge consequently implies belief—the belief in the trustworthiness of memory: in other words, the belief that our recollections correspond to past realities. This belief is instinctive. It is an ultimate fact of mind,[1] additional to, and distinct from, the mere capacity for feeling.

Belief in the trustworthiness of memory.

But the belief that a recollection corresponds with a past reality implies more than the belief itself. It is impossible to say, "I had a feeling an hour ago which I have now no longer," without implying that "I, who had a feeling an hour ago which I have no longer, am nevertheless the same person." Thus the truth of our own personal identity through time and change is made known to us. It is made known to us in memory; but it is an ultimate truth; and unless we instinctively believed it, we

Belief in personal identity involved in this,

[1] "Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate." (Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy.)

could have no sense of any past reality to which memory bears witness.[1] These two truths, of the trustworthiness of memory in bearing witness to past realities, and our own personal identity through time and change, each involves and implies the truth of the other.

and made known by consciousness only.

The truth of our personal identity is a purely metaphysical truth: that is to say, it is borne witness to by consciousness only, and is in no sense a fact of observation. We could not if we would get rid of all the metaphysical elements of our thoughts; and the belief in this metaphysical truth of our continued personal identity underlies our entire mental life from the earliest dawn of consciousness.

Belief in the uniformity of the order of nature.

The next of the natural beliefs of which we have to speak is connected rather with the external world than with the world of consciousness. I mean our spontaneous confidence in the order of nature. This is not only, as it is usually stated, an expectation that the future will continue to resemble the past. It has not necessarily anything to do with past or future. It is, that similar consequents will always be found to follow similar antecedents, and that similar circumstances will always be found to accompany similar circumstances. All reasoning whatever respecting that which has actual existence, as distinguished from the abstractions of logic and mathematics, is based on this belief:—whether the subject of the reasoning is future, as in astronomical predictions: past, as in the questions of geology: present in time though out of sight, as when we reason concerning the constitution of the centre of the earth: or inaccessible to sense though accessible to reason, as when we reason concerning the laws of force or the nature of luminous waves.

All reasoning respecting that which has existence implies this.

It does not refer only to the future.

It is not due to experience.

This belief in the uniformity of the order of nature is an ultimate fact of mind. It is not produced by experience; on the contrary, it anticipates experience.[2]

It is thought by many that this belief in the uniformity of the order of nature is a mere consequence of experience

[1] See the Essay on Personal Identity appended to Butler's "Analogy of Religion."

[2] See the quotation from Bain, p. 75, note.

producing mental habit.[1] We are accustomed to find the order of nature uniform, and we therefore expect always to find it so. But this is no explanation at all. The question is, how we are able to reason from known things to unknown things; why we believe, and believe truly, that the data of our experience are applicable to the solution of questions respecting things of which, by the terms of the case, we have not yet any experience: and the answer is, that we believe in the accustomed order of nature obtaining among things of which we have no experience, because we are familiar with it among those of which we have experience. Surely this is no explanation. Mental habit, or, what is the same thing, the association of ideas, cannot generate belief; it may, no doubt, determine particular beliefs, but it cannot originate the tendency and the power to believe: just as all force acts under the laws of motion, yet the laws of motion will not account for the origin of force. Mental habit will account for the association between the thoughts of two things, but it will not account for the belief that the things are themselves invariably or generally associated, because it will not account for the sense of reality external to the mind. Suppose for instance that lightning has been in our experience followed by thunder so often that we always think of thunder when we see lightning. This is a case of association of ideas: experience, acting through the law of habit, is adequate to account for it; but how can this account for the belief that lightning will be followed by thunder? Mere habit cannot account for the step from thoughts to things—for the association of ideas to the belief in the association of the corresponding things.[2]

Association of ideas alone cannot produce belief.

If it is asked, whether we should have this spontaneous expectation of finding uniformity in the order of nature if the order of nature were not really uniform? I reply that the mind is part of the order of nature, and has been

Should we expect to find nature uniform if it were not so?

[1] Or what is technically called the "association of ideas." The association of ideas takes place by reason of habit, and it is only a case of the law of habit. See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 31.

[2] See Note A at end of preceding chapter. See also Note at end of this Chapter.

developed in accordance therewith :—the mind, like everything else that lives, is of necessity developed in accordance with the laws of that nature which surrounds it: the uniformity of nature, like the infinity of space and time, is a fact of the universe which has become conscious of itself in the brain of man. But if the order of nature were not uniform, we should not expect to find it uniform: because the mind, being a part of that order, would have received a different development from that which it actually has received.

In that case the mind would have been developed under different laws.

We consequently conclude that the belief in the veracity of memory and the belief in the uniformity of the order of nature, though they receive confirmation at every moment of our waking lives, are not in their origin due to experience, but to the spontaneous tendencies of the mind. This, it must be understood, is not because experience is *insufficient* to produce *these* beliefs, but because experience alone cannot of itself produce any belief whatever.

Belief cannot originate in experience.

It has been already remarked that the spontaneous belief in the elementary truths of logic and mathematics carries its own justification with it, and is consequently not of the nature of faith. But the same is not true of the spontaneous belief in the veracity of memory and in the uniformity of the order of nature. The two kinds of belief differ fundamentally. The belief in the truths of logic and mathematics is a *rational* belief; those truths cannot be imagined not to be true. The belief in the trustworthiness of memory and the belief in the uniformity of nature, on the contrary, are not in the highest sense of the word rational: they do not carry their own justification with them; and though their truth cannot be doubted, they may be imagined to be untrue. That is to say, it is impossible to imagine that a contradiction is true, or that time or space has a limit: but it is possible to imagine that memory is an illusion, and everything to which it bears witness unreal: or that the uniformity of nature will be suddenly interrupted, so that the past will be utterly unlike the future, and all experience will be inapplicable. Further: the former class of beliefs, the logical and the

The beliefs in the veracity of memory and in the order of nature do not justify themselves.

They may be imagined untrue.

mathematical, are *absolute* beliefs: the latter class, on the contrary, the belief in the veracity of memory and in the uniformity of nature, are not absolute but only *preponderant*. That is to say, we believe that the axioms of logic and mathematics are true without any possible exception: but we do not so believe in the other class of truths: we believe in the veracity of memory as a general truth, for if we did not we should not believe in the reality of the past: but we distrust memory in particular cases. So with the belief in the uniformity of nature: we feel no practical doubt of it, yet we cannot say that there is anything impossible in its coming to an end: and no one can say that he feels any strong confidence in the present laws of nature continuing to be in force for a thousand millions of years to come.

They are not absolute, only preponderant.

Thus the two beliefs on which the whole of our external life rests: namely the belief that memory is trustworthy, or in other words that experience is *true:* and the belief that the order of things is and will be uniform, or in other words that experience is *applicable:* are both of them without logical justification, because they might be denied without contradicting any necessary law of thought: and without the possibility of verification of any other kind, because if any one were to declare his belief that all memory was an illusion, or that the laws of nature might not improbably be totally changed the next moment, there is no possible proof, whether of the demonstrative or of the experimental kind, by which he could be shown to be wrong. Many apparent proofs might be offered, but they would really assume the truth of the beliefs which they would appear to prove. Everything in science and everything in ordinary life is verified by the assumption that those two natural beliefs are true; but they are themselves unverified. All proof, all knowledge, ultimately rest on faith. Science and faith are equally "the proof of things unseen:" things past, things future, things absent, and things invisible though present.

They are consequently without verification,

yet on them all verifica-

As Pascal pointed out long ago,[1] consistent scepticism

[1] See his fragment on Dogmatism and Scepticism (*Pensées de Pascal.*

Consistent scepticism is impossible.

is impossible. No one can prove his elementary natural beliefs, and yet no one can doubt their truth. Consistent and absolute scepticism would not require the denial of the immediate dicta of consciousness:—that is to say, it would not require us to deny that we exist, and that we have feelings. Nor would it, perhaps, require us to deny the dicta of our *logical* intelligence:—that is to say, it would not require us to question the self-evident truths of logic and mathematics. But it would require us to question the affirmations of that instinctive intelligence for which we can find no logical basis:—it would consequently require us to question the general trustworthiness of memory, and the confidence that we feel in the order of nature. And, as already remarked, it is obvious that the belief in an external world must be given up with the belief in the perpetuity of the order of nature: for we could have no knowledge of an external world if our knowledge were limited to the present moment—if memory gave no trustworthy information of the past, and we could not look forward to the future.

Argument for Scepticism, that we are fallible, and cannot be sure of anything.

The sceptical argument is, that these natural beliefs have no logical basis. But it is capable of being put in a stronger form than this mere brief statement. It may be stated in the following *argumentum ad hominem*:—"You admit that you are fallible: how then can you be certain of the truth of anything whatever? You cannot be wrong, it is true, as to the fact of your own existence and your own sensations: and perhaps—though this is a great concession from the sceptical side—you have a right to believe in the dicta of the logical intelligence. But a being like you, who by his own confession is very liable to error, has at least no right to believe anything which has not and cannot have logical proof."

Reply, that natural beliefs belong not to the

It may be said in reply to this, that the beliefs in question are not those of an individual but of mankind. But this, though true, is not, logically considered, a reply to the sceptical argument: for, as already shown, the existence of

Faugère's edition, vol. ii. p. 100). The entire argument of this chapter and of the two following has been suggested by that fragment.

a world external to our own consciousness, and consequently the existence of our fellow-men, who are a part of that external world, could not be made known to us if we did not take for granted the trustworthiness of memory and the order of nature. The mere momentary sight of one of our fellow-men, unconnected with anything in memory, would be nothing more than an impression on the sense of sight. And, what is more immediately to the purpose of the present argument, it may be urged by the advocate on the side of scepticism that the belief of all mankind can add nothing to the force of one's own belief: for if I believe that other men are right, I still only trust to my own belief that they are so: the strength of my belief that all men are right, cannot transcend the strength of my belief in the trustworthiness of my own faculties which conclude that they are right.

individual, but to the race.

Objection, that to trust other men is to trust our own judgment of their trustworthiness.

On logical grounds this appears to be unanswerable, and yet we instinctively feel that it is wrong. For when one man agrees with all or nearly all the rest of mankind, and another dissents and sets up his own opinion against that of the rest: we do not say that each trusts his own judgment alike: we say that the dissentient trusts his own judgment in a way in which the other does not: and though it is possible that the man may ultimately prove to be in the right whose opinion is against that of the world, as Copernicus proved to be, yet we instinctively feel that the presumption is against the dissentient; that the burden of proof rests on him; and that his trust in his own judgment, though it may possibly be justified, needs justification.

This is not the fact.

The ground of this spontaneous and irresistible conviction is, that our natural beliefs do not belong to the individual but to the race. We think with a wider and consequently a surer mind than each man's own. Intelligence is primarily unconscious and impersonal; it is not Intelligence but Consciousness and Will that specially belong to the personality of the individual. Modern psychology has shown that Consciousness is not co-extensive with Intelligence; that the conscious intelligence of the mind has its root in the unconscious life, and in most if not in all

We think with the intelligence not of the individual but of the race.

cases retains an unconscious element.[1] Thus we think with the intelligence not only of the individual but of the race: and the certainty of our beliefs is not limited by the power of the individual mind.[2] This, as now stated, may appear paradoxical, but it is no more than the rational foundation for what we mean when we say that our belief is not our own private belief, but is common to all men.

Mysticism.

Of course this will be objected to as mystical. Any theory will be called mystical that lays a strong emphasis on that element in thought which at once underlies and transcends the individual consciousness. It is not worth while to discuss the question whether this use of the word mysticism is accurate. But there is no tenable medium between this, and pure rationalism ending in pure scepticism: for any theory that ignores this unconscious element must base all knowledge on the conscious logical intelligence of the individual; and if our knowledge cannot transcend both our immediate consciousness and our logical intelligence, then, as we have seen, we can believe in neither the trustworthiness of memory nor in the order of nature, and absolute scepticism is inevitable.

But absolute scepticism is impossible: we must believe whether we will or not. It is not possible for any sceptical arguments to shake our confidence in the trustworthiness of our natural beliefs, regarded as practical guides. That is to say, practical scepticism is impossible: but speculative scepticism is not so. By speculative scepticism is meant the doctrine that our natural beliefs are true for our own intelligence only: (the intelligence not of the individual merely but of the race:) but that absolute truth—that is to say, truth which is true independently of the constitution of any particular intelligence—is unattainable by us, and may possibly have no existence.

Practical scepticism is impossible, but speculative scepticism is not so.

This doctrine is obviously quite untouched by either of the two arguments just used:—it is untouched by the argument either of the universality or of the necessity of our

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 27.

[2] I suppose that something like this must have been Coleridge's meaning when he spoke of "the impersonal character of Reason."

natural beliefs :—that is to say, by the argument that they belong to mankind, or by the argument that we cannot get rid of them if we would. The reply from the sceptical side is obvious. "They are no doubt true for our intelligence, and they are laws of our nature: but what ground have we, or can we have, for believing that they are true irrespectively of our intelligence, or that they correspond with any reality in the external world?"

Statement of the argument for the latter.

This is the view of Kant. It is really speculative scepticism, though it is usually called Idealism. The force of the argument will chiefly depend on our view of the nature of the mind. It appears to be the commonest view, that though the mind comes as it were into contact with the external world in sensation and perception, yet in thought it is absolutely shut in and isolated. This is a fundamental postulate of the psychology of Kant, according to which Space, Time, and Causation are not facts of the universe but only forms of our own thinking faculty, under which we are compelled by our mental constitution to perceive and to think of things and events; but which have not, or at least may possibly not have, any reality external to our own minds. Logical disproof of this is no doubt impossible, but all the progress that psychology has made since Kant's time tends to a different conclusion. Modern psychology is teaching us that the mind is not something isolated in the midst of the universe of matter which surrounds it, but is a part and a product of that universe: and that the laws of mind are so only because they were laws of the universe before they became laws of mind. That is to say, the laws of logic: the universal and necessary character of Space, Time, and I would add Causation: the uniformity of the order of nature, and that power of impressions to perpetuate themselves, which when it takes place in consciousness constitutes memory: —all these are facts of the universe, of which we are conscious because we are conscious portions of the universe.[1]

Kant's so-called Idealism.

The mind in thought is not isolated from the universe.

The laws of mind are so because they are laws of the universe.

This conclusion, it is true, does not admit of logical proof. I have endeavoured to show that every belief

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapters 37 and 38.

This cannot be proved: but it harmonizes and rationalizes our knowledge.

which takes the order of nature for granted, involves an unproved and unverified assumption. But the conclusion now stated has this in its favour, that it harmonizes our knowledge with itself and gives it a rational basis. It harmonizes our knowledge with itself by abolishing that fundamental discord which both scepticism and idealism—at least the idealism of Kant—introduce into our conceptions. The discord is introduced by teaching that our natural and inevitable conceptions of things do not correspond with any reality of the things themselves; and it is abolished by teaching the opposite doctrine, stated above, that our spontaneous conceptions do correspond with the reality of the things, because the mind derives its laws from that universe of things whereof it is a part. And at the same time it gives our knowledge a rational basis:—in other words, a true basis in the reality of things.

We end the inquiry where we began, but not as we began.

The conclusion now stated is no new discovery: it is the natural and spontaneous belief of mankind:—philosophy has only enabled us to give it expression. So that here, as in other metaphysical inquiries, we end where we began. But we do not end *as* we began. If I have made my meaning intelligible, I have shown (to use somewhat inappropriate expressions where our language has no perfectly appropriate ones) that there is something transcendent, wonderful, and almost mysterious in the most common and commonplace thought and belief. There is something transcendent and wonderful in the facts that our knowledge transcends our immediate consciousness: and that it is possible to reason, and to reason truly, from data of experience to conclusions which transcend experience. "The process of induction includes a mysterious step by which we pass from particulars to generals, of which step the reason always seems to be inadequately rendered by any words which we can use."[1]

Transcendent element in thought and belief.

It is needful to guard against a misconception as to what has been said respecting the absence of logical proof for many things which we most surely believe. If we were

[1] Whewell's "Philosophy of Discovery," p. 284.

to demand logical proof before we believe anything, we should be unable to believe in either the reality of the past or the probability of the order of nature continuing in the future. But though our belief in these has no *logical* basis, it has, as I have been arguing, a *rational* basis: that is to say, a basis in the reality of things. Logical demonstration is not the only basis of certainty. This is perfectly well understood in physical science, in which mathematical proof (which is proof of the logical kind [1]) and experimental proof, though different, are recognized as of equal validity. No proposition can be true which is *contradicted* by logical proof: but a proposition may be true *independently* of logical proof. Because many true beliefs are independent of logic, it does not follow that the logical intelligence is untrustworthy, but only that its sphere is limited.

The logical intelligence is not untrustworthy but limited.

To sum up the conclusions of this chapter:

Summary.

There are three distinct bases of knowledge:—

Three bases of knowledge.

1. Immediate consciousness: that is to say consciousness of one's own feelings and of oneself as having the feelings. Here knowledge does not transcend consciousness: consciousness and knowledge are here identical, and there is no room for belief.

Immediate consciousness.

2. Logical intelligence: that is to say, the intuitive knowledge of what cannot be denied without contradiction. To the logical intelligence belongs the knowledge of the elementary principles of logic: and, I would add, the knowledge of the universal and necessary character of space, time, and causation: but the argument is in no way affected if these are to be classed rather with the instinctive intelligence. The knowledge of the truths of the logical intelligence transcends immediate consciousness, and thus contains an element of belief: but as those truths cannot

Logical intelligence.

[1] This must however be understood with the qualification, that the ultimate data of our mathematical reasonings in physical science, such as the laws of motion and gravitation, are not logical axioms but only experimental facts of the highest generality. But, once these data are established, the mathematical deductions from them have the nature of logical proof.

be believed nor even imagined to be untrue, there is no room in believing them for anything approaching to faith.

Instinctive intelligence.

3. Instinctive intelligence: that is to say, the intuitive knowledge of what transcends immediate consciousness, and is not known by anything resembling a logical process. To the instinctive intelligence belong the belief in the veracity of memory and consequently in the reality of the past; and the confidence that the order of nature will go on in future. These transcend immediate consciousness, and consequently contain an element of belief: they are independent of logic, for they might be denied without self-contradiction, and they may be imagined to be untrue: they have not the absolute certainty of logical conclusions, but only a preponderant probability which is however practically equivalent to certainty. In such belief, there is consequently an element of faith: that is to say, trust in what is unseen and unverified.

My theory is due to the physiological school of psychology.

The doctrine that our primary conceptions and beliefs correspond with the facts of the universe because the mind is a part and a product of the universe, is due to that psychological school which bases psychology on physiology, and regards mind as the result of nervous action. These theories are often regarded as materialistic. It is not worth while to discuss the merely verbal question whether this application of the word materialism is accurate. I have already declared myself to be at once a materialist and a spiritualist.[1] But it is worth while to remark that the theory here expounded is a far better basis for faith than the idealism of Kant can be. If space and time and other fundamental conceptions are only forms of thought with which nothing in the universe around us necessarily corresponds, then they are, or may be, unreal: and absolute truth—that is to say, truth which is true independently of the constitution of any particular intelligence—is unattainable by us, and perhaps has no existence. But if it is true, as I maintain, that these conceptions were facts of nature before they became forms of thought,

It is a better basis for faith than the rival idealist theory.

[1] Page 36.

and are forms of thought because they are facts of nature, then it follows that the forms of thought correspond with the facts of external nature: we know things as they are: our knowledge of the universe, though very limited, is real so far as it extends. So that the idealistic theory, according to which our necessary forms of thought belong to the mind alone, notwithstanding its vast pretensions leads by a direct and logical path to total theoretical scepticism: while the opposite theory, according to which the mind derives its forms from the external world, though it may be despised as being materialistic, is a possible basis for faith.

NOTE.

On the subject of the ground of our confidence in the order of nature, I extract the following from Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles.

Extract from Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles.

"Let us imagine the occurrence of a particular physical phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single occurrence we should have but the very faintest expectation of another. If it did occur again once or twice, so far from counting on another recurrence, a cessation would come as the more natural event to us. But let it occur a hundred times, and we should feel no hesitation in inviting persons from a distance to see it: and if it occurred every day for years, its recurrence would then be a certainty to us, its cessation a marvel. But what has taken place in the interim to produce this total change in our belief? From the mere repetition do we know anything more about its cause? No. Then what have we got besides the past repetition itself? Nothing. Why then are we so certain of its *future* repetition? All we can say is that the known casts its shadow before: we project into unborn time the existing types, and the secret skill of nature intercepts the darkness of the future by ever suspending before our eyes, as it were in a mirror, a reflexion of the past. We really look at a blank before us, but the mind, full of the scene behind, sees it again in front.

"Or is it to give a reason why we believe that the order of nature will be like what it has been, to say that we do not know

of this constancy of nature at first, but that we get to know it by *experience?* What do we mean by knowing from experience? We cannot mean that the future facts of nature have fallen within our experience or under our cognizance; for that would be to say that a future fact is a past fact. We can only mean, then, that from our past experience of the facts of nature, we form our *expectation* of the future: which is the same as saying that we believe the future will be like the past: but to say this is not to give a reason for this belief, but only to state it.

"Or do we think it giving a reason for our confidence in the future to say that though 'no man has had experience of what *is* future, every man has had experience of what *was* future?' This is a true assertion, but it does not help us at all out of the present difficulty, because the confidence of which we speak relates not to what *was* future, but to what *is* future. It is true indeed that what *is* future becomes at every step of our advance what *was* future: but that which is now *still* future is not the least altered by that circumstance: it is as invisible, as unknown, and as unexplored as if not one single moment of the past had preceded it, and as if it were the very beginning and the very starting-point of nature."—P. 36.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MEANING OF FAITH.

IN the preceding chapter, Faith has been defined as certitude in those matters in which verification is unattainable: and we have seen that there is at least an approach to faith in our ordinary knowledge; because, while we verify all particular facts by the assumption that the past is a reality and that the order of nature is uniform, these assumptions are themselves incapable of verification. Thus there is no approach to faith in our belief that a contradiction cannot be true, or that two right lines cannot enclose an area: but there is an approach to faith in our belief in the facts of physical science and of history, and in all mere facts whatever other than our own bodily and mental feelings.

If then no belief as to matters of fact admits of what is strictly verification, what is the distinction between faith and ordinary certitude? Has not any such distinction been overthrown?

I reply, that the common sense of mankind does regard the assumptions of the reality of the past and the uniformity of the order of things as sufficient grounds of verification, equally with the self-evident principles of logic and mathematics. That is to say, the common sense of mankind regards evidence, when sufficient, as equivalent to demonstration, though distinct from it. In such matters common sense is right:—there is no appeal beyond it. Sound metaphysics cannot contradict common sense: I have laid emphasis on the non-demonstrative nature of

Evidence without demonstration may be as good as demonstration.

our ordinary beliefs, not for the purpose of calling their certainty in question, but for the purpose of showing that the common sense of mankind gives the stamp of certitude to beliefs which are verified by means distinct from demonstration: and verification which is not demonstrative suggests, though it does not prove, the possibility of reasonable certitude without verification:—in other words, the possibility and the reasonableness of Faith.

This suggests that there may be reasonable certitude without verification:

I define Faith as certitude without verification: not certitude without proof. The distinction is important. Verification is not original proof, but corroborative proof. Proof in science is frequently deductive, sometimes mathematical in form, while the corroborative verification is experimental. Thus the entire science of physical astronomy has been worked out by deductive reasoning in mathematical form, and verified by observation. The same is true of pure mathematics. It is true that we habitually take the results of mathematical calculation as true without demanding further verification: we do not require to test them by counting or measuring. But this is only because experience assures us of their trustworthiness. If the whole algebraic calculus had been invented before any part of it was applied to actual use, a reasonable man would not have been justified in feeling absolutely certain of the truth of its results until they had been tested and verified. This however is not because of anything uncertain in mathematical truth: it is only the limitation of our powers that makes it necessary to verify by trial the results of reasoning.

though not without proof.

Relation of verification to original proof.

Its position in mathematics.

Now certitude following on proof, but waiting for verification, is faith. This is no arbitrary definition nor questionable inference: it is consistent with the ordinary usage of the word. We habitually speak of faith in moral, or philosophical, or political principles. There is no impropriety in speaking of that faith in the conclusions of a sound philosophy which led Adam Smith to see the wisdom of perfectly free trade, at a time when the means of verifying the theory scarcely existed. And it would be no misuse of the word to speak of the faith of Prof. M'Cullagh

Relation of faith to proof.

Faith in principles.

Instances free trade

in the process of mathematical reasoning, when he made what is perhaps the most remarkable prediction recorded in the history of science:—namely, that a ray of light, passing through a biaxial crystal in a particular direction, would be refracted into an infinite number of rays forming a hollow cone. This was totally unlike anything previously known to experience, yet on trial the prediction proved to be true. conical refraction.

Faith is not an inferior degree of certitude: the certitude of faith may be perfect. Where faith differs from ordinary or scientific certitude is not in being in any degree weaker, but in being associated with some degree of effort and trial. The expressions "effort of faith" and "trial of faith" are familiar: and it is obvious that they could not without absurdity be applied to ordinary certitude: but it may be said with perfect accuracy that it needed an effort of faith in Adam Smith and the rest of the early political economists, firmly to believe in the benefits of free trade when as yet free trade was almost untried: or that it needed an effort of faith in Prof. M'Cullagh to believe (if he did believe with any firm belief) in conical refraction before it was verified by experiment. But so soon as there was sufficient experimental verification in these cases, belief ceased to need an effort, and there was no longer any room for faith. Effort of faith.

The discovery of conical refraction is an instance of a theoretical deduction being at once verified by a single conclusive experiment. In most cases of scientific discovery, however, the verification is not so immediate, and not of a nature so directly to compel belief. In the case of all the great discoveries, indeed, such as the astronomical theories of Copernicus and Newton, the undulatory theory of light, and the thermo-dynamic theory, the verification did not consist in a single decisive observation or experiment, but in a cumulation of proof, partly deductive and partly experimental, showing that the theory was consistent with the general laws of nature, and was the only possible explanation of the facts.

All experimental verification consists in showing the

Unobvious verification.

harmony between theory and fact. But even when it is complete it may not be obvious. In the case of conical refraction it was perfectly obvious: it was performed to the eye: a ring of light was seen on the white paper where single refraction would have given one spot of light, and double refraction would have given two. But such perfect obviousness in the verification is rather the exception than the rule: the motion of the earth in her orbit, for instance, cannot be thus shown to the eye; and when, as in this case, the true theory contradicts spontaneous belief and common opinion, and the verification, though perfect for the understanding, is incapable of becoming obvious to the sight, a time may elapse, and no doubt did elapse, during which an effort of faith was needed, even by scientifically-instructed men, in order to believe what was nevertheless proved to their minds. Such certitude was not certitude without verification, and consequently it was not faith according to the definition already offered: but it was certitude without visual verification; it was held in opposition to spontaneous belief, to common opinion, and to habit: and consequently, though its logical basis was different, its moral nature was that of faith.[1] But the proper region of faith, as already defined, is not where verification is expected though unattained: it is where verification is by the nature of the case unattainable.

Faith was needed to believe in the earth's motion when the proof was new.

In what sense science rests on faith.

It may be added, that verification, and consequently science, ultimately rest on faith: for, as we have seen, verification rests on postulates which cannot themselves be verified. This is true, but only in a purely logical sense; in an ethical sense, or in other words as bearing on the formation of character, it is not true: for no effort of faith, and consequently no faith at all in an ethical sense, is needed in order to believe in the reality of the past and in the uniformity of the order of nature.

Science and faith are from the same root.

But though science and faith in their developed state exclude each other as occupying different regions, yet they spring from the same root and are identical at their origin. They both begin from the knowledge, whether instinctive

[1] See Note at end of chapter.

or acquired, that there is an order in nature:—that things and qualities co-exist, and events succeed one another, in a definite order. The first step in conscious science consists in learning such facts as that stones are heavy, that day and night follow each other, and that water freezes in cold weather. The first step in conscious faith consists in learning that our fellow human beings are trustworthy, and in trusting them.

Their root in the instinctive life.

I here speak of conscious knowledge and conscious faith. But the acquisition of conscious knowledge would be impossible if we did not begin our mental life with an unconscious knowledge of those truths of the reality of the past and the constancy of the order of nature, which are not learned by experience but presupposed in experience: and it is scarcely possible to doubt that in like manner the impulse to trust precedes any experimental discovery of trustworthiness in our fellow human beings:—that the trust of children in their parents, especially, is instinctive, and does not wait for experimental proofs before it comes into existence.

In their rudimentary form, they are shared by animals.

Science and Faith, in this rudimentary form, are neither of them peculiar to man: they are shared by man with the more intelligent of the animals. Animals observe the co-existences of things and the successions of events: and this is the root of science. Animals trust in one another: young animals, especially, trust in their parents: and this is the root of faith.

Faith in man.

But though the instinctive trust of animals and of human beings in their fellows and in their parents is the root and germ of faith, it has not yet acquired the distinctive characteristic of faith: it does not transcend the possibility of verification. It anticipates verification, but does not transcend it: on the contrary, it receives verification every day. Faith begins when we trust, with perfect certitude, that one whom we have found to be trustworthy till now will continue to be so, not only under circumstances similar to those under which we have seen him tried, but under all possible circumstances.

Faith expects and anticipates verification.

It may be said that this is a case in which verification is not impossible. This is true; but it is a case in which we often have to act without waiting for verification:—we often have to decide whether we will act on the belief in a man's trustworthiness in totally untried circumstances. To do this is to act in faith. Faith acts without verification: not however independently of it, but in anticipation of it: the highest religious faith hopes to be ultimately verified, but only in a future life.

As already remarked, it is correct to speak of faith in principles: it is at least akin to faith to believe that a principle will continue to be found true under untried circumstances. But the chief object of faith is personal character. Now it is to be observed that conclusions of the judgment respecting personal character, whether or not they take the form of faith, not only are capable of anticipating verification, but are in a great degree independent of formal proof of any kind. This, which is really true of judgments concerning character, is apparently, but only apparently, true of judgments of many other kinds. Thus a sailor may be able to make a tolerably accurate prediction about the weather, and may yet be unable to state his reasons for it. This is partly because he has not the habit of reasoning in words, but partly also, and chiefly, because the experience from which he judges consists of a vast number of observations which cannot be called to remembrance separately. In like manner we may have perfect and legitimate certitude respecting our judgment of a man's character, while yet we are not only unable to give reasons for our judgment which are satisfying to another, but unable to state such reasons, even to ourselves, as ought to be satisfying to a reasonable man. This is no doubt partly, as in the case of the weather-wise sailor, because the data of our conclusion are immensely numerous, and are imperfectly remembered. But there is another reason, which is peculiar to judgments respecting ethical and moral questions. In physical as in mathematical reasoning, what is demonstration to one mind is demonstration to all normally constituted minds: and proof,

Ethical judgments are independent of formal proof.

The same is apparently true of other judgments.

Difference of the cases.

though it may not be of a demonstrative nature, is proof to all minds alike which are able to understand it. But in our judgments respecting character, there is this additional reason for the impossibility of always stating the grounds of a conclusion: that *there is not* always *any common measure between minds.*[1] What is proof to one is not always proof to another. My reasons for a particular judgment respecting character may be incapable of explanation to another, not because I am unable to put them into words, but because he is unable to understand them.

In ethical judgments, there is not always any common measure for minds.

We have been speaking of judgments respecting character. But the same is true of what are in the special sense moral judgments. Here also there is not always any common measure between minds. Thus, if one man says that the moral ideal of Christ's Sermon on the Mount is the highest ideal ever thought of, and so admirable that the presumption will be in favour of Christ if he asserts that he is a teacher specially sent from God: and another says that it is a lower ideal than that of Plutarch's heroes: between two such minds there is no common measure of belief, and it is impossible for either to prove himself in the right.

The same is true of moral judgments.

It may not be self-evident that there is any common measure for belief for all minds in mathematical and physical questions which there is not for ethical and moral ones. But it may be shown by the following instances. If we find a man who does not believe in the high antiquity of the earth, or the undulatory theory of light, or any other well-established truth of science, we reason by laying the proofs before him. But if we find a man who does not recognize the transcendent excellence of the moral ideal taught by Christ, we cannot so reason, because there are no proofs to show. It is impossible—impossible, that is to say, in the sense of involving a contradiction—that the excellence of a moral ideal should be proved by either demonstration or experiment. If any one denies it, the only possible way to set him right is so to train his intellectual vision that he shall be able to see it. Truth, in such matters, is

Proof in morals is impossible.

[1] The words in italics are from Newman's "Grammar of Assent.

All depends on insight.

"not to be proved but seen."[1] "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," said Christ: not meaning that the sight of God is assigned as a reward for purity of heart, but that the pure in heart shall be able to see God:—that purity confers insight, not as an arbitrary reward but as a necessary consequence.

Questions as to the trustworthiness of insight.

But is certitude reasonable when it depends on individual insight, and admits neither of *à priori* proof nor of *à posteriori* verification?

On this subject, as on all others, the ultimate appeal is to the common sense of mankind: and this answers in the affirmative.

In the first place, as has been remarked in treating of the meaning of the moral sense, the belief is universal that if there is a moral government of the universe at all, it will prove to be a righteous government. This is totally without proof or verification, yet no belief is more deeply seated or more ineradicable.[2]

But this is a belief which belongs not to any individual man but to the human race: and is certitude ever to be justified when it is only the unproved and unverified belief of the individual?

To this I reply, that the common sense of mankind does not recognize one individual as necessarily equal to another, but recognizes on the contrary a difference between men, one being wiser than another:—this difference is great on all subjects, and practically infinite on ethical and moral ones: so that in proportion as a man is wise and good he is capable of attaining to ethical and moral certitude for himself; and, instead of taking his belief from the mass of mankind, is able to instruct them as to what they ought to believe.

Logical difficulty.

But it may be said that there is no possible way of knowing whether any man is wise except by the wisdom of the conclusions he arrives at: and these can be judged of only by his equals or superiors in wisdom: so that the truth, unquestionable as it is, of one man's superiority in wisdom to another, is of no use for guidance: for he who is

[1] Matthew Arnold.

[2] See p. 66.

able to judge of another's wisdom, may as well judge questions directly for himself. It is reasoning in a circle to judge that a man is wise because he concludes and acts wisely, and at the same time to judge that his conclusions and actions are probably right because he is a wise man.

This looks unanswerable, but practically it is not true. We shall have to consider this subject in the next chapter.

NOTE.

THE following passages are extracted from Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles.

Extracts from Mozley's Lectures on Miracles.

"When reason, even in ordinary life or in physical inquiry, is placed under circumstances at all analogous to those of religion, reason becomes, as a consequence of that situation, a kind of faith. We have a very different way of yielding to reasons in common life, according as the conclusions to which they lead accord with or diverge from the type of custom. We accept them as a matter of course in the former case; it requires an effort to accept them and place dependence on them in the latter: which dependence upon them in the latter case therefore is a kind of faith. Indeed the remark may be made that a kind of faith appears to be necessary for practical confidence in any reasoning whatever and any premises, when we are thrown back upon ourselves and do not act mechanically in concert with others. And we frequently see persons who, when they are in possession of the best arguments, and, what is more, understand those arguments, are still shaken by almost any opposition, because they want the faculty to trust an argument when they have got one." —P. 102.

"Faith, then, is *unverified* reason: reason which has not yet received the verification of the final test, but is still expectant." —P. 104.

CHAPTER VII.

THE POSSIBILITY OF FAITH.

THE conclusions arrived at in the two preceding chapters may be thus summed up :—

Summary of two preceding chapters.

All knowledge and belief respecting the external world is verified by the assumptions that the past is a reality, and that the order of nature is constant: but these assumptions are incapable of proof, and are believed only in consequence of an irresistible natural tendency to believe them. In a logical sense, there is consequently an approach to faith in our ordinary knowledge. But in an ethical sense, that is to say in its bearing on the formation of character, this is not the case: for faith involves trial and effort, and no effort is needed in order to believe in the reality of the past and in the order of nature, and in all the special facts which are verified by these two general assumptions. But the fact that the largest part of our knowledge is verified by assumptions which cannot be proved, suggests that it may be reasonable to feel perfect certitude in cases where nothing approaching to ordinary scientific verification is possible. Such certitude as this is Faith. Science is thus verified belief, and Faith is belief awaiting verification. They both originate in the discovery of the facts of the world around us. The root of science is knowledge of such common facts of nature as the succession of day and night. The root of faith is trust in our parents and in our fellow-men, founded either on the instinctive belief or on the acquired knowledge that they are trustworthy. But so long as we only trust others in the same circumstances

in which we are accustomed to find them trustworthy, our trust is only a particular case of confidence in the order of things. That which is properly called faith arises when we trust another under such untried circumstances that his continued trustworthiness, though it may be a matter of reasonable certitude, cannot be known as a matter of verified knowledge. The chief objects of science are the facts and laws of the universe. Laws and principles may also be objects of faith: but, as a matter of fact, the chief object of faith is personal character: in its lower developments the characters of human beings, in its highest development the character of God. The faith is instinctive in man though altogether without verification, that if there is any moral government of the universe, it must be a righteous and not an unrighteous government.

Faith is not lowered by referring it to its root in the instinctive trust of man in man.

Let it not be said that the idea of faith is lowered by referring it to so lowly a root as the instinctive trust of human beings in their parents and in each other. It is by means of the justice, the mercy, and the truth of man, imperfect as these are, that it becomes possible for us to believe in the justice, the mercy, and the truth of God: it is by having fathers that we understand what is meant when God is called our Father: and it is by having faith in man that we learn to have faith in God.

The objects of our faith are generally superior beings to ourselves.

It has been remarked above, that as a matter of fact, the objects of faith are in most cases personal beings: and it is equally true that, probably in most cases, and certainly in all those cases in which the influence of faith is strongest, the objects of faith are beings whom we feel to be in some way superior to ourselves. This, it is obvious, is necessarily the case when its parents are the objects of the faith of a child: for the parents are stronger and wiser than the child. It is no doubt possible for trust in an equal to rise to faith, but more commonly such trust is rather of the nature of verified knowledge.

Although there is such a thing as moral science, and it would be absurd to deny its importance, yet our moral nature belongs on the whole not to the region of science but to that of faith: and, as has just been remarked, the

faith which is the most important to it is faith not in equals but in superiors. In other words, the formation of human character, in so far as it is due to any higher influences than those of mere habit and imitation, is much more the result of faith than of science :—it is due in but a slight degree to any influences of a kind that can be expressed in formulæ; it is mainly due to the personal influence of higher, or at least stronger and more developed, characters revealing themselves to lower, weaker, and less developed ones, and becoming the objects of their faith. Now as the formation of character, which is thus effected mainly by faith, is, without exaggeration, infinitely more important than the acquisition of verified knowledge and of the power that such knowledge confers, I adhere to St. Paul's doctrine of Justification by Faith, in preference to Professor Huxley's of Justification by Verification.

Formation of character is mainly due to the influences of higher natures acting through faith.

Justification by faith rather than by verification.

But in considering the influence of such faith in the formation of character, we have to consider the logical difficulty which has been suggested at the end of the preceding chapter. The question was there asked, how is it possible for one man to judge of another's wisdom, so as to trust in it, unless he is the equal of him of whose wisdom he is judging? It may be said that we judge by results :—that those men are regarded as the wisest who prove their wisdom by their actions, and that the wisdom of an action is proved by the event. Such an answer would be intelligible, but it would not be consistent with fact. As a matter of fact, it is not thus that we judge of character: and, especially, it is not thus that we judge of those characters which impress themselves on us. To mention the highest instance of all: By what means has Christ impressed his character so wonderfully on men? Not by rising from the dead, though this was the experimental verification of his claims as a teacher and a ruler of men: but by the impression of superhuman wisdom and goodness which was made by his words and his life. The truth is, as stated in the preceding chapter, that in moral questions and questions concerning our estimate of character, it may be not only possible but in the highest degree

Logical difficulty as to the possibility of faith.

We do not judge of character by results.

reasonable to feel certitude where there is neither verification nor any kind of proof that is necessarily capable of being made intelligible to another mind: and this is true not only of our power of estimating characters which are on the level of our own or beneath it, but also of those which are above it. It may be, and I think it is, impossible to give any logical explanation of the way in which such certitude is formed: but it is a fact that such certitude is formed, and it is impossible to doubt that it is justifiable. To doubt its justifiableness would be to doubt whether a child or a man has any right to be influenced for good by a father or a friend whose character is only partially intelligible to him, but is felt and recognized with the certitude of faith as being worthy of all reverence and trust.

Certitude is possible respecting the character of superior as well as equal natures to our own.

In saying that no logical account can be given of such certitude as this, it is not meant to imply that it is in any sense contrary to logic, but only that logic has nothing to do with it. But this is not peculiar to faith. I have already endeavoured to show that it is impossible to give any logical account of such common, natural, and universal beliefs as those in the reality of the past and the uniformity of the order of nature.[1]

Such certitude is reasonable, though without logical basis.

The logical difficulty now stated, applying to all knowledge of a superior Being by an inferior one, applies with special force to the possibility of religious knowledge: that is to say, to the possibility of our knowing the greatest of all Beings. As applied to religion it may be thus stated:—

"How is any worship possible which is not idolatry? We may no doubt bend the knee to an invisible God: we have got beyond the idolatry of mere sense. But how can we ever get beyond the idolatry of the intellect? 'God made man in His own image,' said the earliest of religious historians. Is not this an inversion of the true statement? Is not every God that man ever has worshipped or can worship made by the worshipper in his own image? When all that is impure and unworthy in religion has been cast aside, and when we have learned to ascribe all holiness to

Logical difficulty about knowing God.

How can an object of worship be anything but the ideal of the worshipper?

[1] See page 95 *et seq.*

our God, still, what is, or what can be, our God, except our own ideal of holiness invested with personality ?

> 'What find I in the highest place
> But mine own phantom chanting hymns ? '[1]

How can God reveal himself ?

"Supposing God to make a revelation to man, still He could not reveal Himself to man : He might give us information of the utmost importance for us to possess, and He might promulgate laws with supernatural sanctions : but He could reveal Himself—that is to say, His own character—only so far as we have capacity to receive such a revelation, and our capacity to receive a revelation of spiritual truth cannot transcend the height of our own spiritual ideal. Any higher revelation would be no revelation to us, because we should be without a faculty for understanding it. A revelation of God, then, is impossible. We may call that which we worship God, but the God of our worship can never be higher than the ideal which our own minds construct : as every eye sees its own rainbow, so every soul sees and worships its own God. To say that it is otherwise, is to say that we are able to believe, to know, and to worship where we have no faculties that could enable us to believe, to know, and to worship."

This argument is not new, but I have stated it as strongly as I can, and more strongly than I have ever seen it stated. I think it is an argument which has some real effect on the minds of men in this age : and if it is untrue, the more clearly it is stated the better, in order that it may be the more thoroughly refuted.

Reply : the objection is refuted by facts.

My reply to it is that it is inconsistent with fact. Explain the fact how we may, it is a fact that a higher nature may reveal itself to a lower one, and may be to that lower nature something more than a mere personification of the highest ideal which the latter is able to form. The power of the lower nature to appreciate the wisdom or the holiness of the higher, is not, in point of fact, limited by the wisdom and holiness, or the want of them, in the lower nature. A dog's master may be more to the dog than the personification of its highest ideal : a child's father may be

[1] Tennyson's *In Memoriam.*

more to the child than the personification of its highest ideal: and "the savage, who can do little else, can wonder and worship and enthusiastically obey. He who cannot know what is right can know that some one else knows; he who has no law may still have a master; he who is incapable of justice may be capable of fidelity."[1] As stated before, this is probably incapable of logical explanation, but it is true. If it is thus possible among finite natures for the higher to be revealed to the lower and for the lower to have faith in the higher, why should it not be possible for God to reveal not only His purposes but His character—that is to say, to reveal Himself—to His intelligent creatures, so as to become infinitely more to them than the mere personification of their highest ideal: and that they may have a faith in Him infinitely transcending all mere results of their own thoughts, and raising them in the scale of being far above any ideal which they could have thought out for themselves?

Quotation from "Ecce Homo."

Analogy is in favour of the possibility of a revelation of God to man.

The logical difficulty about the possibility of faith which has been already stated, may be stated again in a somewhat different form. "No structure whereof the parts are all mutually dependent, can be stronger than its weakest part: and hence it follows that one's faith in another cannot be stronger than one's faith in oneself: for, if I am to believe that another is trustworthy, I must first believe that I am competent to form a judgment of his trustworthiness: and if my trust in the trustworthiness of any Being whatever is to be absolute, it can be so only by my regarding my own judgment, in trusting to Him, as infallible. But I well know that, like all men, I am very fallible. It is absurd to say that 'he who does not know what is right may know that some one else knows,' for he could not be sure of this unless he was morally the equal of the person whom he trusts, and if he were so there would be no need for faith."

Re-statement of the difficulty: How is faith possible?

This is the same argument as that stated at the end of the preceding chapter. The only possible reply to it, so

[1] "Ecce Homo," p. 63.

Reply, that it is in fact possible.

far as I see, is that already given: namely, that the fact is not so: that the certitude of our faith is not limited by our confidence in our own powers. No reasoning can explain how this can be: but it is not an isolated fact: it is only another and a higher form of that inexplicable power by virtue of which we believe, and believe truly, in the reality of the past and in the uniformity of nature, without proof and independently of verification.

Faith is only a higher form of the power of ordinary belief.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE LIMITS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

THE purpose of the foregoing three chapters has been to show the reasonableness of Faith in matters that transcend the region of our experience, where consequently verification is impossible. The purpose of this chapter is to show the possibility of knowledge in the same sphere. The former conclusion no doubt implies the latter :—Faith is reasonable only in a sphere where knowledge is possible. But for the purpose of this work the two inquiries have to be kept distinct.

The present question is, under what conditions and within what limits knowledge is possible.

Relativity of knowledge.

"All knowledge is relative." This is generally assented to as an important and fundamental truth: but it is understood in so many different ways, that nothing but confusion would be the result of simply stating it as an axiom without explanation or comment.

Knowledge is relative to the mind which knows.

This is merely an identical proposition.

This axiom is sometimes understood only to mean, that all knowledge is relative to the mind which knows: or, in less technical language, that it is possible for us to know only that which we have a faculty for knowing. This is unquestionably true, not of man only but of all Beings whatever, created and uncreated alike :[1] but it is so purely an identical proposition that we cannot but wonder how it could ever come to be paraded as a discovery. Though a mere commonplace, however, it ought to be always borne in mind :—and it would be well if those who are fondest

[1] This remark is made in Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.

of reminding us that we can know only in so far as we have a faculty for knowing, and think only in so far as we have a faculty for thinking, would also bear in mind that we can believe only in so far as we have a faculty for believing, and love only in so far as we have a faculty for loving.

But there is another sense in which the axiom that all knowledge is relative is no merely identical proposition, but a really important truth. The true meaning of the axiom that all knowledge is relative, is that *only relations can be the objects of knowledge*. We can know the relations of things, but not things apart from their relations. We can know the properties of things, but not the substance of the things apart from their properties. We can understand action, but not the agent apart from its actions.

Only relations are objects of knowledge.

It is to be observed that property and action are but particular cases of relation. It is to be observed also that when we speak of things, of substances, and of agents, we include in these categories all that exists, whether mind or matter.

Definitions.

We can understand relations, properties, and actions:—but what are the things related? What are the substances that have properties? and what are the agents that act? We have no faculties that could enable us to answer these questions. Only this we know, that there is something which we cannot know.[1] We know things only as related to each other, yet things are more than the mere terms of relations. We only know agents as acting, yet an agent is more than a mere possibility of action. We only know substances as having properties, yet a substance is more than a mere bundle of properties. Thus we have run out the entire length of the sounding-line of our understanding, and have not touched the bottom. There is an insoluble mystery at the ground of all Being whatever, spiritual as well as material, finite as well as infinite. It is impossible to deny the existence of such a mystery unless we agree with Hegel that nothing exists except relations.

We understand things only as related.

Insoluble mystery at the ground of all Being.

[1] See the chapter on the Metaphysical Interpretation of Nature (Chapter 2).

But though we only know things as related, substances as having properties, and agents as acting: it is equally true that we know, as a truth made known by reason in consciousness, that relations imply things related, property implies substance, and action implies an agent. What then is meant by saying that only relations are the objects of knowledge? In what sense do we know, or understand, relations, properties, and actions, rather than things related, substances, and agents? If we know that the existence of the one implies that of the other, in what sense do we affirm that the one are the objects of knowledge rather than the other? Question.

The answer to this question is that it is possible for relations, properties, and actions, to be so detached, or isolated, in thought, as to become the objects of thought and knowledge by themselves. The possibility of mathematical science, or of any abstract thought whatever, depends on this. We think of the relations and forget the things related: we think of the properties and forget the substances: we think of the actions and forget the agents. But the converse of this is impossible: if we try to detach in thought things from their relations, substances from properties, and agents from action, we shall find there is nothing that we can think of. To express this more briefly, let us speak of relation, property, and action under the single category of relation:—then we arrive at this statement:—We know that relation implies Being, and that Being implies relation: but beyond this bare affirmation, it is only relations that are the objects of thought and knowledge. Reply.

The saying has also obtained currency that "all knowledge is only phenomenal." If this saying means that only relations can be the objects of knowledge, it is true: but it is not true in its most obvious sense. It is not true that we know nothing but phenomena: on the contrary, the highest knowledge is that which most completely transcends mere phenomena. In the logical order of inductive science, which however does not always coincide with the historical order of discovery, the first grade of scientific knowledge consists in the generalization and

Saying that knowledge is only phenomenal.

In the obvious sense, this is not true: the highest knowledge transcends phenomena most.

classification of observed facts. The second consists in the discovery of truths which might conceivably be facts of observation, but are not so, in consequence of the limitation of our powers of sense: to this grade belongs such knowledge as that of the size and form of the earth, and the lengths of the waves of sound and light. The third consists of knowledge which could not conceivably be the result of mere observation, though it may be expressed in language or algebra; such as the law of gravitative force in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance.

This is equally true of metaphysical knowledge.

It is the same with metaphysical knowledge: that knowledge is the highest which most completely transcends mere sense. All knowledge, inductive and metaphysical alike, begins from sensation, though mere sensation is not knowledge. Knowledge begins when we discover the truth of our personal identity through the changing series of our sensations, and discover at the same time the existence of a world of things external to ourselves. We share this grade of knowledge with the animals, yet it constitutes the first step in both inductive and metaphysical science.

Origin of metaphysical and of inductive knowledge.

The spontaneous knowledge of personal identity is the first step in metaphysical science, and the spontaneous knowledge of an external world is the first step in inductive science. The highest step in inductive science consists in the knowledge of truths which could not conceivably be evident to sense; and the highest step in metaphysical science consists in the knowledge, or faith, that the moral law is unconditional and universal, not in this present state of being only but in all possible states.

Quotation from Kant.

"Two things there are," said Kant, "which, the oftener and the more stedfastly we consider, fill the mind with an ever new, and ever rising admiration and reverence,—the starry heavens above, the moral law within.

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"The one departs from the place it occupies in the outer world of sense: expands, beyond the limits of imagination, the connexion of my being with worlds rising above

worlds, and systems blending with systems: and protends it also to the illimitable times of their periodic movement, to its commencement and continuance. The other departs from my invisible self, my personality: and represents me in a world truly infinite indeed, but whose infinity is to be fathomed only by the intellect;—with which also my connexion, unlike the fortuitous relation I stand in to the world of sense, I am compelled to recognize as necessary and universal."[1]

Question of the possibility of a revelation.

It is now time to consider the question of the possibility of religious knowledge being communicated to Man. This question is not to be settled by a mere statement of the Omnipotence of God:—the question is not whether it is possible for God to make a revelation of Himself, but whether it is possible for Man to receive it. God could not reveal Himself to cattle: not because of any deficiency of power in Him to make the revelation, but because of deficiency of capacity in them to receive it. (He could no doubt confer on them a nature capable of receiving it, but then they would be cattle no longer.) Now the question is, to put it as briefly and intelligibly as possible, whether Man in his present state of being has a nature which is capable of knowing God.

Can Man know God, supposing a revelation of God?

It is necessary here to distinguish two questions which are often confounded. The right meaning of the question whether Man can know God, is this: Supposing God to reveal Himself to Man, is Man able to recognize the revelation and accept it as such? This question I answer in the affirmative. But it is often understood to mean: Has Man the power of knowing God independently of revelation? and this I answer in the negative.

Objections from our finite nature and

Before going any further, we must consider the following objections to the possibility of any real knowledge of God:—We, and all that belongs to us, are finite, and how can we know Him who is infinite? Our knowledge is exclusively relative, and how can we know Him who is absolute? I

[1] The above quotation is made from Sir Wm. Hamilton's Essay on the Study of Mathematics as an Exercise of Mind.

our exclusively relative knowledge.

regard these difficulties as utterly baseless, or rather unmeaning, but they are occupying men's thoughts too much to be set aside summarily.

Meaning of the word Absolute.

What is the meaning of the word Absolute? What is meant by calling God The Absolute? The word Absolute is opposed to the word Relative:—but in what sense is it opposed? Our language, and probably all languages, in the variety and accuracy of its terms falls far short of the requirements of thought. Is the absolute opposed to the relative as *excluding* it, or as *implying* it? Examples from the world of material things will serve as well as any other to illustrate this distinction. An acid and an alkali are opposed as *excluding* each other, because they cannot exist together: if they come into atomic contact, they neutralize and destroy each other. The two poles of a magnet, on the contrary, are opposed as *implying* each other: neither pole can be isolated, and if the magnet is broken in two, each part presents the two poles. Now, does the absolute exclude relation or imply relation? Certainly the latter. An absolute excluding relation would be as unmeaning as a substance without properties, or an agent incapable of action. If Absolute Being is understood to mean Being which excludes relation to other beings, there is no such thing as Absolute Being in the entire universe. The Creator is in relation to all created beings, and all created beings are in relation to the Creator.

It is *the ground of relation.*

The true meaning of Absolute is *not that which is out of relation,* but *that which is the ground of relation.* Thus, the relation of succession implies time;—time is absolute, and is the ground of the relation of succession. The relations of position imply space:—space is absolute, and is the ground of the relations of position. In like manner, the existence of finite beings having a beginning in time implies the existence of an infinite Being without beginning in time: —in other words, of a Self-Existent Creator. If the word Absolute as applied to God is not utterly unmeaning, it is only an inaccurate and misleading synonym for Self-Existent.

Applied to God, it means Self-Existent.

The objection to the possibility of Man having knowledge of Divine things, grounded on the fact that Man's knowledge is relative while God is absolute, is thus seen to be baseless. It is true that God is Absolute, that is to say Self-Existent, and that we cannot know the Self-Existent Creator as He is. But it is equally true that we know not the lowliest of God's creatures as it is. We know nothing, neither ourselves nor anything else, in its inmost, ultimate being;—Self-Existent Being is no doubt totally incomprehensible to us, but created being is equally so: and any objection on this ground to the possibility of our understanding Divine things, is equally applicable to the possibility of our understanding the worlds of nature and of mind. In all *real* knowledge whatever, as distinguished from *formal:* that is to say in all knowledge of that which has existence,—all knowledge of nature, of man, and of God, as opposed to the abstractions of logic and of mathematics,—we are ultimately brought up against a mystery which we have no power to penetrate. But this does not prevent our knowledge from being valid and true so far as it goes.

The objection that the Absolute cannot be known applies to all *real* knowledge alike, though not to *formal*.

But God is infinite: and how can finite beings like us know Him who is infinite?

Objection from our finite nature.

The reply to this objection is analogous to the reply to the former one. It is true that we cannot know the Infinite Being as He is in His inmost nature: but it is equally true that we cannot know our own inmost nature, or that of any other finite being. "All our knowledge is relative:" we know not the inmost nature, the ultimate essence, of any being whatever: we can only know its relations, its properties, and its actions. But as we are totally ignorant of the ultimate essence of any being, finite as well as infinite: so we are capable of receiving true knowledge of the attributes, the relations, and the actions of Beings, infinite as well as finite. *In so far as knowledge is otherwise possible,* the infinitude of its object causes no impossibility. In mathematics the truth of this is undisputed, and there is no proof whatever that it is otherwise in metaphysics. It is a vulgar error to think

Reply.

that we, being finite, can know the finite and cannot know the Infinite: or, in other words, that the distinction between what we can know and what we cannot know coincides with the distinction between the finite and the infinite. The distinction between what we can know and what we cannot know, and the distinction between the finite and the infinite, do not coincide but intersect. All that we can know—all knowledge possible to us—belongs to the category of attributes, relations, and actions, and these are equally objects of knowledge whether they are on a scale of finite or of infinite magnitude: but the ultimate essence of any being whatever lies beyond the boundary of our knowledge, whether our own being or any other, whether finite or infinite. Mystery begins, not where the finite ends and the Infinite begins, but where we come to the ultimate ground of any being whatever, whether finite or infinite, whether greater or smaller than ourselves.

Mystery begins not with the Infinite, but with the ground of being.

All this, in my opinion, admits of no reasonable doubt: but as it is controverted, I go on to inquire what is meant by knowledge when it is said that the Infinite cannot become an object of knowledge to us. Things, or to use a better word, Beings, are not in themselves objects of our knowledge; but, to use an appropriate though colloquial expression, we can know *about* Beings.[1] In what then does our knowledge about a Being consist? Knowledge about a Being consists in true belief, on sufficient grounds, respecting that Being: and the test of such knowledge is to be able to make true assertions respecting it. Knowledge of one's own self no doubt goes deeper than this, for it consists in immediate consciousness. But all knowledge that one can possibly have of any other Beings than one's own self, including the knowledge of the existence of one's fellow-men, consists in nothing more than true belief and the power of making true assertions respecting them: for all our knowledge of other beings than ourselves, whether material beings or spiritual, whether finite or infinite, does not consist in immediate consciousness, but is mediate or inferential knowledge.

In what our knowledge of a Being consists.

[1] See Note B at end of chapter.

Confusion of thought with imagination.

The misconception that the Infinite, as such, is beyond the region of our possible knowledge, has most probably been produced by confounding thought with imagination:— that is to say, confounding the power of drawing true inferences and making true assertions about a Being, with the power of making a mental representation of that Being to oneself.

Mathematical infinities.

It is impossible to imagine anything of infinite magnitude, but this does not prevent us from making infinite magnitudes objects of thought, and reasoning about them to true results. We see in mathematical calculations that symbols which represent infinite magnitudes, or the relations between them and other magnitudes whether finite or infinite, are equally manageable, and operations on them give equally true results, with those symbols which have none but a finite meaning. The reason why we are unable to imagine infinite magnitude is that we are ourselves finite. But there is no difficulty in conceiving a nature physically infinite, though of a mental constitution like ours;—such a being would be as easily able to imagine infinite magnitudes as we are to imagine finite ones, but this would not give it any higher *kind* of knowledge than what we are able to attain to: and infinity would be the same to its thought as to ours, though different to its imagination. But it is not necessary that an object of thought should be a possible object of imagination at all. Negative numbers and imaginary quantities cannot be represented to oneself in imagination, and could not be though the power of the imagination were increased to infinity: and yet they are objects of reasoning.

Case of an infinite being with mind like ours.

Negative and imaginary numbers.

Large finite magnitudes are unimaginable,

Further: it is misleading to say that *infinity* is unimaginable, as if all finite magnitudes were imaginable. All magnitudes are unimaginable which are of an order greatly exceeding those with which our senses make us familiar. Such a magnitude as the distance of Sirius, for instance, is quite as unimaginable as the absolute infinity of space.[1] And not only so, but infinitesimal or

[1] For many mathematical purposes also, very large magnitudes are said to be indistinguishable from infinity. This may seem logically anomalous;

and so are infinitesimals.

very small magnitudes are equally unimaginable with infinite or very great ones. If such a number as the tenth power of ten is unimaginable by reason of its greatness, such a fraction as one divided by the tenth power of ten is equally unimaginable by reason of its smallness: and neither case has anything whatever to do with the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature by us.

The Divine Nature is incomprehensible because it is unlike ours in kind.

It is no doubt true that the Divine Nature is incomprehensible by us, in a higher sense than the same is true of our own nature. But this is not because of the infinite greatness of the Divine Nature: it is because of a difference of kind, independent of the difference of magnitude. Were a human nature magnified to infinity, but with its powers of perception, thought, and imagination unchanged in kind, it would be as intelligible to us as are the finite human natures that we know; and the change of magnitude would not make it better able to know the Divine Nature. The superior mysteriousness of the Divine Nature is, at least in part, due to this, that our consciousness and our knowledge are developed out of our bodily sensations, and we are consequently unable to form the most distantly approximate conception of any Being whose consciousness and knowledge, like those of God, are not developed out of such a germ, or developed at all. But it is not in the least unlikely that there may be created and finite beings which have consciousness and knowledge of a totally different origin from ours: and if so, their being finite will not make their nature conceivable by us.

When the subject is thus cleared of its confusions, we find this very simple and elementary truth, not indeed now first discovered, but cleared of obscurity and mystification: that is to say, that fundamental truth in morals is independent of magnitude, and that we are as well able to recognize it on an infinite as on a finite scale. As in mathematics, lines which are parallel in a finite distance

Fundamental truth in morals is true on

for if the largest finite magnitude is subtracted from a really infinite one, infinity is still left. But when we say that a finite magnitude is practically indistinguishable from infinity, I apprehend the real meaning of this is that its reciprocal is indistinguishable from nothing.

continue parallel though prolonged to an infinite distance: so in morals, such elementary principles as those of truth, justice, and mercy are laws for all intelligent Beings, Infinite as well as finite. all scales alike.

We now see what to think of the saying that it is not for man to "measure the infinite morality of God." *Infinite morality* is in itself an unmeaning expression, but what is meant is either *perfect holiness on an infinite scale*, or, what means nearly the same, the *principles of the moral government of the infinite universe*. It ought to be observed —for though this is, or ought to be, axiomatic, it is a subject on which confusion is common—that the conception of perfect is altogether distinct from the conceptions of infinite and absolute, and is one which presents no difficulty whatever either to thought or imagination. That which is absolute, as has been argued above, is known to exist as the ground of relation, but, unlike the relation, it cannot be made an object of thought. The conception of the absolute baffles thought:

That which is infinite, as has been argued above, may become an object of thought as easily as that which is finite, but it cannot be made an object to the imagination:—in other words, the mind is unable to picture to itself anything which is infinite. But there is no corresponding limitation of our powers when we try to think of that which is perfect. The conception of the perfect baffles neither thought nor imagination. Perfect truth is one of the most intelligible of all conceptions, and every one who knows a little mathematics has received at least some perfect truth into his mind. A perfectly straight line or a perfect circle or sphere are not only easily conceived, but more easily conceived than imperfect examples of the same: and perfect purity in substances, such as air or water, is at least as easy to conceive as impurity.[1] The same is true of our conceptions of moral nature. Beings who are able, as we are, to that of the infinite baffles imagination: that of the perfect baffles neither.

[1] Purity may be regarded as a magnitude, the highest possible valu of which is unity. If water, for instance, is perfectly pure, its purity is to be represented by 1: if it is impure to the extent of containing one part in a thousand of foreign matter, its purity is to be represented by ·999. The impurity is thus unity minus the purity, the purity is unity minus t impurity, and the sum of the purity and the impurity is unity.

Perfect holiness is conceivable.

conceive of purity of moral nature at all, are able to conceive of a moral nature in a state of perfect purity as easily as in a state of imperfect purity: and perfect purity of the moral nature is synonymous with perfect holiness.

Objection, that men's conceptions of holiness differ.

It may be objected to this, that men's conceptions of holiness, unlike their conceptions of lines, circles, and spheres, are very diverse. To take what is by no means an extreme instance, the Stoical and the Christian conceptions of holiness are in some respects very unlike. This is true, but it is not true to the extent that would be required in order to overthrow the present argument. If it could be shown that men of different races, or men under varying systems of culture, had developed moral natures so radically unlike that the ideas of the one were incapable of translation into the language of the other, the argument would be at least plausible, that the moral sense of man is worthless except as a guide in the particular circumstances of his own age and country, and *à fortiori* worthless as a guide to supersensual and spiritual truth. But such is not the fact: the moral nature of mankind, like the bodily nature, is everywhere fundamentally the same. The diversities by which this truth is so much disguised are due in part to differences in moral development, chiefly arising from historical circumstances: in part also to the fact that the moral and mental nature of man, as of all animals that show any mental nature, are more variable and more plastic than the bodily nature,[1] and partly for that reason—in man at least, for on this subject we have no evidence as to the animals—more liable to morbid perversions.

Reply, that they do not differ fundamentally.

Confusion of *perfect* with *infinite*.

Like all confusions of words, the confusion between *infinite* and *perfect* has given rise to confusion of thought. It has been gravely argued that every finite being must, as such, be imperfect, and must therefore, if it has a moral nature, be liable to sin:[2] as if it were beyond the possibilities of nature, and beyond the power of God, that a finite being should be perfect within the limits of its own finite nature.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 198.

[2] See note C at end of chapter.

The holiness of God transcends but does not contradict our conceptions.

Of course it is not asserted that our understanding of the perfect holiness of the Infinite God is, or can be, other than very imperfect and inadequate. God's holiness no doubt *infinitely transcends* our conceptions, but it does not therefore *contradict* them: and to say that principles which would be unholy in the finite sphere of earth can be holy in the infinite sphere of Heaven, is the same kind of absurdity as to say that it is possible for lines which are parallel in finite space to meet or to diverge in infinite space. We have a right to affirm that the principles of moral law are valid for all Beings, infinite as well as finite, who have intelligence enough to understand them. This, it is true, cannot be proved, but, as already pointed out, it is the deepest of all beliefs.[1] It is no objection to this, that no *law of obligation* can be conceived as applying to God. When moral law applies to ourselves, it is no doubt usually conceived under the form of a law of obligation, but it is not always so. Many good actions are done, not under any sense of external law either compelling or requiring, but because it is the agent's nature to do them. This indeed is what constitutes holiness as distinguished from virtue:—a man who habitually acts aright from a consciousness of duty, or moral law, is virtuous but not holy. Now the practice is so universal in Christian theology as to need no formal statement, of ascribing to God not virtue but holiness:—and this is the expression of a deeply rooted and profoundly true belief, that the moral law is not something external to the Divine Nature, as it always is in a great degree to ours: but is part of the Divine Nature, and determines the Divine actions.

Distinction between holiness and virtue.

In saying that the moral law which we recognize as such is essentially the same as that which is part of the Divine Nature,—or, to speak more familiar language, that the deepest truths and the highest laws are the same on earth and in Heaven,—it is of course not meant that only those actions are right for God which would be right for man. To mention an obvious instance:—man has certain rights to life and property as against other men, but not as against

Actions may be right for God which are not so for man.

[1] See the chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense (Chapter 3).

God: and consequently if one man takes away the life or property of another, except under strictly defined conditions, he does a wrong: but if God, in the course of His providential government, takes away life or property, He does no wrong. But this distinction between Divine and human rights is not absolute: on the contrary, it may be right that life or property should be taken away under lawful human authority, when the same action would be wrong if done without authority.

This does not apply to truth and falsehood.

But there is one branch of the moral law which presents probably the simplest case of all, and on which all men who believe in a God are practically agreed. This is the law of truthfulness. Every one admits that God is above the law which enjoins men to respect the lives and properties of one another. But no one will—no one *dares*—assert that God is above the law of truthfulness. It is maintained by some Calvinists that moral distinctions have no meaning for God; that the only meaning of right is that which God pleases to command, and that it is possible for Him to repeal or to reverse the entire moral law by mere decree. This, though absurdly and revoltingly untrue, is intelligible and consistent. It is maintained by others who do not call themselves Calvinists, especially by Dean Mansel, that though God has a moral nature, to which the moral law as we understand it bears some sort of relation; yet, because God is infinite while we are finite, and because He is absolute while our knowledge is relative, therefore we are unable to tell what kinds of actions are to be expected from the perfectly righteous God, or to assert anything concerning the Divine Righteousness except only that it exists. This has little more than the shadow of a meaning: for it is impossible to attach a meaning to a Divine Righteousness which may, for anything we know to the contrary, be capable of manifesting itself in actions that the highest human righteousness would not approve. Such language is as self-contradictory as it would be to speak of two right lines which may possibly enclose an area. But what I wish to lay emphasis on is this, that such a doctrine cuts up Faith by the roots. If those who

Theory of some Calvinists.

Of Dean Mansel.

say and think that all our human ideas of morality, at their highest and purest, form no basis whereon to reason upwards to the moral principles which we may reasonably expect to find in the Divine Government of the universe;— if those, I say, who think thus, were to draw the legitimate conclusions of their premises, they would be at a loss to know whether God's veracity could be trusted: and whether the revelation which, as they believe and I believe, God has made to man, is a deception on God's part or not. Most men will think it a sufficient reply to this, that such a supposition would be blasphemous:—that is to say, one from which the moral nature instinctively revolts:—and I agree with them. But if it would be blasphemous to think that God is not truthful as men understand truthfulness, how is it otherwise to think that God is not just as men understand justice, and not merciful as men understand mercy?

These would logically prove that we have no reason to trust the Divine veracity.

This may be called a mere *argumentum ad hominem*. No doubt it is so: but this expression is ambiguous. A valid *argumentum ad hominem* addressed only to an individual, is valid for that individual only: but a valid *argumentum ad hominem* addressed to mankind, is valid for mankind.

Validity of an *argumentum ad hominem*.

As already remarked,[1] the power of knowing is distinct from the power of imagining. We cannot imagine either extremely large or extremely small magnitudes, whether of space or of time: but we can make them objects of thought, and reason to true results about them.

We can know where we cannot imagine.

But though infinite space and time are unimaginable, it does not follow that they are incomprehensible. In my opinion the peculiarity which distinguishes space and time from all other objects of thought is that there is nothing about them needing explanation—nothing that we do not understand.[2] I speak of space and time regarded purely as objects of thought:—the question of their relation to the mind is a different one, belonging not to Metaphysics but to Inductive Psychology.[3]

By incomprehensible, I mean needing an explanation,

[1] Page 133. [2] Page 29.

[3] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 37 ("The Relation of the Mind to Space and Time").

Definition of *incomprehensible:*

which explanation we are incompetent to find:—raising a question to which our powers are unable to find an answer. All existence is incomprehensible: we can neither explain our own existence nor the existence of so much as a pebble. (Time and space are defined as having being but not existence.) Concerning the inmost being—or, in the technical language of metaphysics, the Substance or Noumenon—of anything that has existence, we know and can know nothing. As already stated,[1] it is only relations that can be the objects of our knowledge:—it is only relations that we can understand.

But it is not all kinds of relations that we can understand. Such relations as those of succession in time and relative position in space, are perfectly comprehensible: as indeed are all those classes of relations with which mathematics and abstract logic have to do. But other classes of relations are equally incomprehensible with the inmost being of things:—the relation between the body and the mind is totally incomprehensible: and it is equally so whether we adopt the hypothesis of two distinct but intimately united substances, or that which has been almost proved by our modern physiological psychology, of one substance with both physical and mental properties.[2] The best word in our language for this incomprehensibility of relations, is mystery. Creation—that is to say the relation between the Self-Existent Being and all other existences—is mysterious: and no Pantheistic theory can deprive it of its mysteriousness:—a truth which Pantheists will probably be the first to admit.

of *mysterious:*

A mystery does not necessarily imply any apparent contradiction. When it does contain an apparent contradiction, it is best called an anomaly. An anomaly is defined as an insoluble apparent contradiction. The greatest of all anomalies is the existence of evil in a Divinely created universe.

of *anomalous.*

These words have a meaning relative only to us.

These words have a meaning relative only to our powers. To Omniscience nothing is incomprehensible, nothing is mysterious, nothing is anomalous.

[1] Page 126.

[2] Page 34.

NOTE A.

MANSEL'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.

Mansel on the Limits of Religious Thought.

It will be perceived that the reasoning of the foregoing chapter is directed against Dean Mansel's Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought. The aim of that work is thus stated by its author in the preface to the third edition :—

"When therefore a critic objects to the present argument that . . . . 'the argument places all religions and philosophies on precisely the same level:'—he merely charges it with accomplishing the very purpose which it was intended to accomplish."

His inconsistencies.

But he is either unable or afraid to carry his principles to their legitimate consequences. Thus (besides taking the Divine veracity for granted, which on his own principles I maintain that he has no right to do[1]) he makes the following admission :—

"The evidence derived from the internal character of a religion, whatever may be its value within its proper limits, is, as regards the Divine origin of the religion, purely negative. It may prove in certain cases (though even here the argument requires much caution in its employment) that a religion *has not* come from God : but it is in no case sufficient to prove that it *has* come from Him."—P. 238.

This may be true; but it contradicts the former quotation, and surrenders the entire theory which the work is written to maintain.—If it is true that "the evidence derived from the internal character of a religion may prove in certain cases that it has not come from God," no argument can be sound that "places all religions and philosophies" (independently of the miraculous sanctions of revelation) "on precisely the same level."

[1] Page 139.

NOTE B.

THE following is the commencement of the chapter on Probability in De Morgan's "Formal Logic:"—

Quotation from De Morgan's "Formal Logic."

"The most difficult inquiry which any one can propose to himself is to find out what a thing *is:* in all probability we do not know what we are talking about when we ask such a question. The philosophers of the Middle Ages were much concerned with the *is*, or *essence*, of things: they argued to their own minds, with great justice, that if they could only find out what a thing is, they should find out all about it: they tried, and failed. Their successors for the most part have inverted the proposition: and have satisfied themselves that the only way of finding what a thing is, lies in finding what we can about it: that modes of relation and connexion are all we can know of the essence of anything."

NOTE C.

Mansel on the mystery of evil.

"THIS mystery [of evil], vast and inscrutable as it is, is but one aspect of a more general problem: it is but the moral form of the ever-recurring secret of the Infinite. How the Infinite and the Finite, in any form of antagonism or any other relation, can exist together: how infinite power can co-exist with finite activity: how infinite wisdom can co-exist with finite contingency: *how infinite goodness can co-exist with finite evil:* how the Infinite can exist in any manner without exhausting the universe of reality:—this is the riddle which Infinite Wisdom alone can solve." (Mansel's Bampton Lectures, p. 223. The italics are mine.) Now, the Existence of God is at least as mysterious as the co-existence of the Infinite and the finite:—in untechnical language, the Existence of God is at least as mysterious as the fact of creation: so that if the reasoning of the above-quoted passage were worth anything, it would prove that the mystery of evil is no deeper than the mystery which surrounds all Being whatever, and is only a particular case thereof. This really appears to be Dean Mansel's view. If

this is true, the existence of evil ought not to perplex us at all, and all the passionate pleadings of David, Asaph, and Job are founded on a misconception. The fact is that the word mystery is used ambiguously. Pure mystery—the mystery of existence and of creation—does not *perplex*. That mystery of evil which perplexes us ought rather to be called an *anomaly*.

The expression "how infinite goodness can co-exist with finite evil" is wrong from Dean Mansel's point of view. It ought to be "how infinite goodness can co-exist with *infinite* evil:" for Dean Mansel believes that sin, remorse, and anguish are never to cease, that all enemies are not to be abolished, and that Christ is never to gather together all things in one.

CHAPTER IX.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A REVELATION.

IN the preceding chapter I have endeavoured to show that there is nothing in the nature and conditions of our knowledge which makes a knowledge of God necessarily impossible to us. In the present chapter we have to consider the same question but from a different point of view.

Results of preceding chapter.

I have stated in the preceding chapter what I believe to be the truth contained in the current philosophical phrases that "all our knowledge is relative," and that "our knowledge is only phenomenal:"—the truth, namely, that only relations can be objects of knowledge. But I have at the same time argued that this limitation of our knowledge does not prevent the Infinite and Uncreated from being an object of our knowledge, in the same sense in which finite and created things may be so: and I have now to argue against the parallel objection to the possibility of our knowing God, drawn from the exclusively phenomenal nature of our knowledge.

This objection is easily stated. "We only know, and we only can know, the *phenomena* of things, or their modes of appearance to us: we cannot know their *noumena*, or what they are in themselves. But all inquiries about the origin of things and about the Creative purpose of the universe transcend the merely phenomenal region to which our knowledge must ever be confined, and are attempts to ascend into that noumenal region where all successful inquiry is for ever impossible to such faculties as ours. Knowledge, properly so called, of Divine things is thus

Anti-theological argument from the exclusively phenomenal nature of our knowledge.

impossible: if religion is possible at all, it is so on a basis not of reason or of science but of faith."

The distinction between the scientific and the theological regions of thought is groundless.

It is denied by none that religion does belong to faith: but it is the purpose of the present work to show that faith is not, as is so often thought, separated from reason and opposed to it:—that, on the contrary, faith has a rational and scientific basis: and that there is no ground for the imagined distinction between the scientific and the theological regions of thought, as if the one were accessible and the other not so, or as if they were accessible by means of different mental faculties.

We have seen in the preceding chapter, that "it is not true that we know nothing but phenomena; on the contrary, the highest knowledge is that which most completely transcends mere phenomena." The highest science "consists of knowledge which could not conceivably be the result of mere observation, though it may be expressed in language or algebra: such as the law of gravitative force in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance."[1] In the obvious sense of the words, this is an unquestionable truth: and if the saying that our knowledge is exclusively phenomenal is not a manifest absurdity, it must mean that we can know nothing of things except their phenomena, *and whatever may be legitimately inferred from the phenomena*. This is a qualification of the statement which the most extreme phenomenalist cannot reject, unless he is willing to avow that he will reject legitimate inferences: and as no one will avow this, the question is raised, What classes of inferences from phenomena are legitimate? Can we reason from phenomena to that which transcends phenomena?

How we must qualify the axiom of the phenomenal nature of all knowledge.

There is an ambiguity in the word *phenomena* which must be guarded against. In ordinary usage it means facts of observation only. Now in this sense it is not true that our knowledge consists exclusively in phenomena: it is not even true that it begins exclusively from phenomena. The facts of consciousness are as important and as primary as the facts of observation:—the fact of our

Ambiguity of the word *phenomena*.

[1] Pp. 127, 128.

personal identity through time and change is as important a fact, and as much a primary element of our knowledge, as the fact of the existence of an external world.

Ground of belief in material substance.

It has been stated in a previous chapter, as a truth of reason made known in consciousness, that where there is action there must be an agent.[1] This axiom includes the axioms that where there is a property there must be a substance, and where there is an effect there must be a cause. The existence of an external world is an inference from this axiom: our sensations make us aware of actions which have not their source within our consciousness, such as the blowing of wind and the falling of rain: and our intelligence refers these to agents to which collectively we give the name of the external world. The axiom that where there is action there must be an agent is in my opinion the fundamental axiom of metaphysics, holding in that science the same place which the axiom of the impossibility of a contradiction holds in logic. The external world, or the world of matter, has thus an existence independently of our perceptions of it: though we are unable to say *what* it is in the external world that exists independently of any sensations or perceptions of ours.

Mill's denial of it.

The accuracy of this analysis of the subject, however, is not undisputed. Mr. Mill says not only that matter is known to us as a "permanent possibility of sensation," which of course is true: but that we have no reason to think that matter is anything more than this: or, as he elsewhere expresses the same conclusion in more technical though not more accurate language, "the non-ego may be nothing more than a form under which we represent to ourselves the possible modifications of the ego."[2] I have argued against this conclusion, and in favour of the reality of material Substance, in the Chapter on the Metaphysical Interpretation of Nature:[3] but as the validity of the belief in Substance, Causation, and Agency is disputed, while no one disputes the validity of the belief in the constancy of the order of nature,

[1] Page 77.

[2] See Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy." The "ego" and the "non-ego" are Germanisms for "self" and "the external world."

[3] Chapter 2.

or in the reality of the past and in our continuing personal identity through time and change, I have endeavoured, so far as possible, to base the reasoning of the preceding three chapters exclusively on the undisputed beliefs.

When it is maintained that, in the world of matter, action gives us no valid reason to infer the existence of an agent (and this seems to be implied in Mill's saying that we cannot affirm matter to be anything more than a permanent possibility of sensation), we may think this absurd, but we must admit that there is no logical argument and no experimental test by which it can be disproved. It may thus appear that the question has come to a logical dead-lock: the one party maintaining and the other party denying the validity of such reasoning, with no possible criterion by which to decide between them. But I hope to show that such is not really the case, and that there is a way out of the dead-lock.

Logical proof is impossible.

The argument against the possibility of attaining to a knowledge of God from the assumed impossibility of getting beyond merely phenomenal knowledge, if it is valid at all, is valid not only against any knowledge of God by inference from the common facts of the physical and moral world, but also against the reception of any knowledge of God by revelation. If it is said that God has sent a message to us by prophets and spoken to us in Christ, the truth of the statement is not to us a phenomenal fact, neither is it a truth of immediate consciousness: if we believe it, we can believe it only as an inference. The words in which the revelation is announced are phenomenal facts: the Divine origin and character of the revelation is a question belonging to a region which transcends that of mere phenomena: and, according to the doctrine which I am combatting, it is impossible to reason from phenomenal data to conclusions belonging to the extra-phenomenal region.

Argument that it is impossible to receive knowledge of God by revelation.

Nor is the argument altered if we believe that the claims of a revelation have been authenticated by miracles. A miracle—that is to say an interruption of the order of nature—is a phenomenal fact: it claims to be such: but if it

even though authenticated by miracles.

is true that we cannot legitimately reason from any phenomenal fact to that which is beyond phenomena, it is only asserting a particular case of this general principle to assert that a miracle, no matter how well proved or how wonderful, can give no information about a supersensible world. This is the form which is now assumed by the argument against revelation, or at least against the miraculous element in revelation. In the last century the objection was that no conceivable evidence would be strong enough to prove the fact of a miracle. If I understand aright the deepest thoughts of my contemporaries, this is now seen to be altogether untrue. The objection now is that a miracle, though it might conceivably be proved, would itself prove nothing.

Reply. We are able to infer from data of perception truths which are not facts of perception.

In answer to this kind of argument it has been already remarked that we are able to infer from facts of perception truths which are not, and in some cases could not conceivably be, facts of perception themselves. The facts of geological history are not facts of our perception, because we were not present to perceive them: nor is the existence of luminous undulations, because they are inaccessible to our perceptions: nor is the law of attractive force in the ratio of the inverse square of the distance, which indeed could not conceivably be an object of perception at all. If we can thus infer from the facts of perception other truths which are not and cannot be facts of perception, and therefore in the most obvious sense of the word are not phenomenal facts, where is the impossibility of inferring, from such a phenomenal fact as a miracle, a conclusion as to its being the means of authenticating a message from God?

Objection: the inferences are truths of the same order as the data:

The reply to this will probably be something like what follows:—"The facts of the physical world which we infer, are facts of the same order as those which we perceive. Perception is indeed only an inference from sensation.[1] The facts of geological history which we infer, are facts of the same order as the similar facts of physical geography which we see. Luminous undulations are facts

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 36.

of the same order as waves of water. And the law of the inverse square, though it is not a fact of the same order as any mere fact of perception, is not a new fact in addition to those which perception makes known:—it is nothing more than the law according to which the facts of perception occur. But any fact involving a revelation from God would be a fact of a different order from any fact of the sensible world, and, as such, could not be legitimately inferred from any such facts. It makes no difference if the visible facts are miraculous. The true meaning of miraculous is its etymological meaning, namely marvellous: and an event is marvellous only because it is exceptional. A miraculous cure would prove no more than a natural cure: a resurrection would prove no more than life: indeed less: for all that any fact can prove, relates to other facts connected with it in the same order: but a miracle, by its definition, is isolated from all other facts."

while a fact concerning God would be of a different order from any sensible data, miraculous or not.

My answer to this is that the argument assumes what it has no right to assume without proof. It assumes that reasoning is possible in particular directions and not in others. It assumes that thought lies in distinct planes, and that it is impossible to reason legitimately from data in one plane to conclusions in another:—impossible to reason from data of the world of sense to conclusions respecting a world which transcends that of sense. This kind of assumption has a certain plausibility, but it is scarcely possible to conceive that its truth could be either proved or disproved by any *à priori* reasoning. It is a question for trial. If we reason from data of sense to conclusions transcending sense, and if the universal and instinctive judgment of mankind, to which, when properly analysed, the final appeal lies in all philosophical questions, decides that the conclusions are sufficiently verified, then the assumption in question will be disproved. Now, there is such a way of testing its truth. The existence of a mind in another man is not to me a truth of immediate consciousness, but is known by inference. We know nothing of the minds of our fellow-men except what we infer from their actions, their words, and the expression of their countenances. These are data

Reply: we have no right to assume that conclusions must be of the same order as their data.

belonging to the world of sense, mere facts of perception, and yet we are able to draw inferences from them concerning objects which are totally unlike them. That is to say, mind and character are totally unlike action, speech, and expression, and yet we are able to reason truly from the data afforded by action, speech, and expression to the facts of mind and character. It is not needful for the present argument to explain how it is, that both man and the animals, from the earliest dawn of consciousness, learn to recognize a personality like their own in their fellow-beings. It may be questioned whether this is to be accounted for without postulating the existence of a higher kind of instinctive intelligence than that which is needed for the recognition of an external world.[1] But however this may be, the fact that we are able to reason, and to reason truly, from the merely phenomenal facts of action, speech, and expression to their causes in the facts of mind and character which are not merely phenomenal, is an experimental disproof of the doctrine that the inferences which may be drawn from any set of phenomenal facts must be of the same order with the facts themselves.

We infer mind and character from action, speech, and expression: here the data and the inference are of different orders.

Now if, from data to be found in the physical and the moral world, or from data to be made known by Divine words and actions in revelation, we draw inferences as to the being and the character of God, these will be inferences of exactly the same kind as those which we draw from the words and actions of a man as to the existence and the character of the mind in that man: though our knowledge of God transcends our knowledge of each other, in the same way that the highest scientific knowledge of the physical world transcends that merely perceptive knowledge thereof which we share with the lower animals.

Parallel reasoning from sensible data to the Divine being and character.

The argument of this chapter may be thus briefly summed up:—

Summary. It is a fundamental axiom that all action presupposes an agent. We are consequently able, when the data are sufficient, to reason from actions which are known to us

[1] See Note at end of chapter.

by mere sensible perception to agents which are not and cannot become the objects of mere sensible perception. To speak more concisely and technically, we are able to reason from phenomena to that which is extra-phenomenal. If it is said that matter is nothing more than an assemblage of phenomena, or in other words nothing more than a possibility of sensation; and that material substance is a word which has no meaning except to express the permanence of that possibility; this perhaps cannot be disproved: but even if it were granted of matter, it is not true of mind.[1] The minds of other men are not phenomena—that is to say not objects of perception—to us: yet, explain the process as we may, we are able to reason, and to reason truly, from the phenomena of actions, words, voice, and expression to inferences concerning the facts of character, which are not phenomenal, and are facts of a different order from the phenomenal facts from which they are inferred. When it is thus possible to reason from the phenomenal facts of human action to the facts of character behind the phenomena, there is no *à priori* logical impossibility in reasoning from phenomenal facts, whether natural or miraculous, to a Divine origin and ground of those facts.

Reply to objection

If it is urged that mental character is nothing more than permanence of the type of mental phenomena, I reply that a man's actions are indeed only phenomena to other men, but his consciousness cannot be a phenomenon to another man: yet we no more doubt the existence of consciousness in other men than in ourselves.

[1] Mill in his "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy" defines matter as nothing more than a "permanent possibility of sensation:" but he goes on to say that it would not be an adequate definition to call mind a permanent liability to sensation. He makes however no attempt to explain how it is that we learn the existence of mind in our fellow-men: and I maintain that his philosophy is unable to explain this.

NOTE.

THE following is extracted from Newman's "Grammar of Assent," p. 107 :—

Extract from Newman's "Grammar of Assent."

"This instinct of the mind, recognizing an external Master in the dictate of conscience, and imaging the thought of Him in the definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to that other law of not only human but of brute nature by which the presence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of the visible world. Is it by sense or by reason that brutes understand the real unities, material and spiritual, which are signified by the lights and shadows, the brilliant ever-changing kaleidoscope, as it may be called, which plays upon their retina? Not by reason, for they have not reason: not by sense, because they are transcending sense: therefore it is an instinct. This faculty on the part of brutes, unless we were used to it, would strike us as a great mystery. It is one peculiarity of animal natures to be susceptible of phenomena through the channels of sense: it is another to have in those sensible phenomena a perception of the individuals to which certain groups of them belong. This perception of individual things is given to brutes in large measure, and that apparently from the moment of birth. It is by no mere physical instinct, such as that which leads him to his mother for milk, that the new-dropped lamb recognizes each of his fellow lambkins as a whole, consisting of many parts bound up in one, and before he is an hour old makes experience of his and their rival individualities. And much more distinctly do the horse and the dog recognize even the personality of their masters. How are we to explain this apprehension of things which are one and individual in the midst of a world of pluralities and transmutations, whether in the case of brutes or of children? But until we account for the knowledge which an infant has of his mother or his nurse, what reason have we to take exception at the doctrine, as strange and difficult, that in the dictate of conscience, without previous experience or analogical reasoning, he is able gradually to perceive the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign?"

CHAPTER X.

THE PROOF OF A REVELATION.

WE have seen in the foregoing chapters, that man is capable of faith; and that, so far as the argument has yet reached, there is no reason to think it impossible that God should so reveal Himself as to become an object of faith to man. In this chapter we have to consider under what conditions an alleged revelation from God ought to be accepted as credible and authentic.

It is necessary to begin with some remarks on the general theory of proof. What follows on that subject makes no claim to originality, but it has to be stated in order to make the succeeding reasonings intelligible.

Man in general needs verification in order to believe with confidence.

It may be stated as a general though not an absolutely invariable truth, that the thinking powers of man are so constituted as not to be independent of verification. That is to say, we are not in general able to believe with any strong confidence either in propositions as self-evident or in the conclusions of reasoning, until we have corroborative proof. It must be understood that this is not asserted of such simple and elementary truths as the axioms of logic and mathematics. But it is universally admitted with respect to the inductive sciences. The perfection of proof is not attained in any inductive, or physical, science, until the deductions of theory are verified by observation or experiment, and the facts of observation or experiment interpreted as deductions from theory.[1] Thus,

What constitutes verification in physical science.

[1] "The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science [such as astronomy or optics] is not the *à priori* reasoning, but the consilience between its results and those of observation *à posteriori*." (Mill's Logic, vol. ii. p. 563.)

M'Cullagh's mathematical deduction about conical refraction was confirmed by experiment;[1] and Kepler's laws of the planetary motions were interpreted by Newton as deductions from the laws of motion and gravitation. These two instances differ only in the subordinate circumstance that in the first-mentioned case the theoretical deduction came before the ascertainment of the fact by observation, while in the other case it came afterwards.

It is needed because of the feebleness of our powers.

There are two causes of the necessity for verifying our reasonings on the subjects of the inductive sciences :—the feebleness of our reasoning powers, and the feebleness of our observing powers. In consequence of the feebleness of our observing powers, we can seldom be certain that we know all the facts of a case, and our reasoning can lead to a true conclusion only on condition that no material fact has been omitted from the premises. And in consequence of the feebleness of our reasoning powers, we cannot always be certain of arriving at a true conclusion, even from premises in which there is nothing in any degree inaccurate or deficient.

Both of these sources of error occur in the inductive sciences :—error is possible in them either from wrong data or from inaccurate reasoning. In pure or abstract mathematics it is only the latter source that occurs ; there is no danger of wrong data, but there is a possibility of inaccurate reasoning. Consequently mathematical reasoning needs verification, like reasoning in any other branch of science ; and our confidence in the results of mathematical reasoning, as of any other reasoning, rests not on the reasoning alone, but on the agreement between the results of the reasoning and those of the observations whereby it is verified. It is true that we trust in the results of mathematical reasoning without thinking it needful to verify them by counting or measuring in each individual case. But though our confidence in the individual applications of mathematical reasoning is thus independent of verification, the same is not true of the entire science of mathematics. That is to say, we believe in the trustworthiness of mathe-

In what sense mathematical reasoning needs verification.

[1] Page 111.

matical reasoning, not without verification, but because it has been amply verified already :—because all experience shows that it is trustworthy. But when mathematical reasoning in its higher branches is applied for the first time to a new subject, or applied in an original manner, we do not always feel confidence in its results until they have been verified by trial, lest some inaccurate assumption may have got into the reasoning unawares. And, to suppose a case which involves no absurdity though it is impossible with beings of merely human powers, if the whole algebraic calculus had been invented before any part of it was brought into actual use, we could not have accepted its results as certainly trustworthy without waiting for verification.[1] This, however, is not because there is anything contingent in the nature of mathematical truth ; it is only because of deficiency of force in our intellects. In the inductive sciences, on the contrary, the necessity for verification is not a mere concession to the feebleness of our reasoning powers :—were our intellects incapable of error, it would still be needful to verify the results of reasoning on physical subjects by comparison with observed fact ;—for though in the supposed case there could be no error of reasoning, yet the conclusion might be wrong in consequence of inaccurate or insufficient data.

Difference between mathematical and physical data.

But though the mathematical and the inductive sciences agree in the necessity for their conclusions to be verified, they are contrasted as to the nature of their fundamental principles. The fundamental principles of the inductive sciences are facts which are known to be facts only because they have been found to be so in all cases without a single exception ; such as (to mention those which in simplicity and generality most nearly resemble mathematical axioms) the laws of motion and gravitation. The fundamental principles of mathematical science, on the contrary (and the same is true of those of logic), are not known by generalization from a multitude of instances : they are seen to be true in the contemplation of a single instance,

Mathematical and logical axioms.

[1] Page 110.

with a certainty to which nothing could be added by the experience of any additional number of instances, however great. The truths that a contradiction cannot be true, that the whole is greater than its part, and that two right lines cannot enclose an area, are seen to be true the moment they are understood, and are not made more certain by the observation of a thousand instances than of one.[1] Confidence in the results of mathematical reasoning, as we have seen, depends on verification; but this, though true of the results, is not true of the axioms.

Peculiarity of the fundamental axiom of metaphysics.

To the axioms of mathematics and logic I would add what I regard as the fundamental axiom of metaphysics, namely that every action presupposes an agent.[2] This axiom, like those of logic and mathematics, needs no confirmation from experience; but, unlike them, it admits of none. Were it possible for any one to think that a contradiction may be true, that a part may be equal to the whole, or that two straight lines may enclose an area, he would be set right by experience every hour of his life. But were any one to think that action is no proof of the existence of an agent, and to think it possible, (which would be the logical consequence of such a doubt,) that the human beings around him had no real existence,[3] no possible experience could set him right. The belief in such axioms as that all action presupposes an agent, is (to use, I believe, Coleridge's expression) "not the result of experience but implied in experience."

Summary.

We therefore conclude that the fundamental principles of the abstract sciences, that is to say the sciences of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics, differ from those of the inductive or physical sciences in this, that those of the abstract sciences are seen to be true in the mere statement, while those of the physical sciences are learned by a slow process of generalization from a multitude of instances. And we conclude also that verification is

[1] On the subject of our intuitive knowledge of the truth that two right lines cannot enclose an area, see "Habit and Intelligence," Note to Chapter 36.

[2] Page 77.

[3] On the subject of the recognition of a mind in our fellow-men, see page 150.

needed for the results of both mathematical and physical science; but that it is needed in mathematics only because of the feebleness of our reasoning powers, which leaves a possibility of some error having got into the reasoning unawares; while in physical science it is needed not only because we may have made errors in the reasoning, but because we seldom can be quite sure that our knowledge of the data is complete.

Having made this statement of the theory of proof in mathematical and physical science, we go on to consider the theory of proof in the sciences of morals and theology.

Morality, like mathematics, is true independently of verification, yet receives verification.

We have seen that the truths of mathematical science are true independently of verification; and yet they are constantly receiving verification. The same holds of the truths of moral science. Their experimental verification is, that the world of human life is so constituted as on the whole to reward with happiness the observance of moral law, and to punish with unhappiness its violation. It has been shown in the chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense[1] with, in my opinion, as near an approach to demonstration as the subject admits of, that the moral sense is not *grounded* on the experience of the tendency of morality to produce happiness. But it is certain that the dicta of the moral sense are *confirmed* by the experience that such is its tendency: and though, with the moral training which we have received through past centuries, and with the moral intelligence to which that training has enabled us to attain, we are able to see the universal and necessary character of morality for all beings who have intelligence enough to understand it: yet we are so constituted that in moral as in mathematical truth, we are unable to be independent of verification. Were the world in which we live so constituted that we could not discern the faintest tendency in the nature of things to reward virtue and to punish vice, although moral distinctions would in themselves be still what they are, we can scarcely think that our power to recognize them would

[1] Chapter 3.

ever have been developed. The case imagined is probably an impossible one, but there is no doubt an approach to it in the lives of many unhappily circumstanced human beings.

Thus the truths of both mathematics and morals are true independently of verification, though our certainty of them is strengthened by it: while our knowledge of the truths of physical science depends altogether on verification.

In physics the possibility of verification constitutes the law.

This however is not a full statement of the difference. In the physical sciences the possibility of verification *constitutes* the truth of a law:—that is to say, a physical law, such as the law of gravitation, is a law only because it is always found to be true: the law means that the fact is always so, and has no other meaning. A mathematical law, on the contrary, is a law not only because it is always found to be true, but because its untruth would be impossible in the sense in which a contradiction is impossible. In a word, mathematical truth is seen to be such by its own light, but with the truths of the physical, or experimental, sciences it is otherwise. In this character, moral truth resembles mathematical.

Relation of mathematics to physics, parallel to that of morals to theology.

Now, the relation of mathematical science to the experimental facts of the natural world is paralleled by the relation of the self-evident truths of moral science to the theological truths made known by revelation. The analogy, it is true, is not perfect, but it will prove equally instructive where it holds and where it fails.

Mathematics has no information to give about real existence. Mathematics cannot tell us whether anything exists or moves in the universe. But supposing anything to exist and its form to be ascertained, mathematics can tell all its properties in so far as they depend on its form: and supposing two or more motions to be given, mathematics can tell what their resultant will be. So with moral science: it has no information to give about real existence: it cannot tell whether, in any other worlds than our own, there are beings who have moral intelligence: it cannot tell *à priori* whether there is any moral government of the universe. But it does assert that moral law is binding on every Being in the entire universe who has intelligence

enough to understand it: and it does assert that if there is a moral government of the universe at all, that government must be a righteous one.[1] In physical science, experimental facts are interpreted and made intelligible by their agreement with mathematical theory: so in theology, a revelation is made credible and significant by its agreement with moral theory.

But in physical science facts are not proved to be facts by their agreement with theory: they must be proved to be facts by observation and experiment. So in theology it does not suffice for proof that a religion is so accordant with the highest and purest morality that it is worthy to have come from God: it must also have experimental proof: and this must consist in miracle of some kind: either in that display of supernatural power which is usually called miracle, or in that display of supernatural knowledge which is called prophecy.

Where the analogy fails.

But, as stated above, the analogy is incomplete: and the contrast between the two cases is as instructive as the analogy. In physical science, the ultimate appeal is to observed fact: if theory is contradicted by fact, the theory must be wrong.[2] But in theology, the opposite is true: the ultimate appeal is to moral principles, and if an alleged revelation from God contains anything that contradicts morality, it ought to be condemned as no genuine revelation. It is impossible that the Divine origin of a revelation should have the direct and immediate certainty of an observed fact. A miracle may be an observed fact: (I maintain that it has been so:) but a fact, alone and apart from all other facts, proves nothing beyond itself. The Divine authorship of a miracle is not an observed fact: it is an inference: and it is not an inference from the miracle alone, regarded as a mere display of power: but from the fact of the miracle combined with the moral character shown in the miracle itself, and the moral character of the teaching whereby it is accompanied.

In physics the ultimate appeal is to experimental fact: in theology, it is to moral principles.

[1] Page 66.

[2] Supposing, of course, that the facts have been correctly noted. But this is by no means to be taken for granted; on the contrary, accurate observation is at least as difficult as correct reasoning.

But if an alleged revelation contains anything which the highest and purest morality refuses to recognize as worthy to come from God, no weight of miraculous evidence could prove that it has come from God. Miraculous evidence in such a case would not be insufficient so much as irrelevant. Were a revelation to be, attested by unmistakeable miracles, and yet to contain immoral doctrines, the inference ought to be not that the miracles and the doctrines had both come from God, but that they had both come from a supernatural but evil power. I do not admit the possibility of such a case: but the conclusion that such a revelation ought to be regarded as coming not from God but from the Devil, is in accordance with the teaching of the New Testament. Christ is recorded to have said that men might show signs and wonders, and yet be prophets of falsehood: and Saint Paul wrote to his converts the warning, "Though we, or a messenger from Heaven, preach any other Gospel than that which ye have received, let him be accursed."

The New Testament on this subject.

Summary. In a word, Miracles are not experimental proofs of holiness:—holiness must be its own proof: it cannot be proved by anything but itself. What miracles prove is supernatural power:—a revelation attested by miracles must be of supernatural origin: and if this is proved, its moral character must decide whether or not it is Divine.[1]

It is now necessary to reply to objections which may be made from opposite sides to this view of the subject. It may be thought by some, that when once a revelation is recognized as supernatural, it ought to be accepted as Divine: and that it is presumptuous in man to scrutinize its claims any further. Those who think so are probably believers in Christ, and endeavour to adopt and represent His teaching: and to them the sayings quoted above from the New Testament ought to be a sufficient reply. The view here stated of the place of miracles as evidence of the Divine origin of a revelation is that of Christ, so far as we can learn His view of the subject from scattered

Christ's view of this subject.

[1] See Note A at end of chapter.

hints. He never wrought a miracle in order to compel belief: and when brought before Herod, He refused to prove His power by working a miracle. The immediate motive of not one of His miracles was self-assertion: of nearly all it was benevolence. They were matters of notoriety: but He rebuked the craving for signs and wonders, and desired to be received as a divinely commissioned teacher by reason not of His miracles, but of His teaching: He desired that it should be recognized as Divine by its own light, not accepted on the strength of any corroborative proof. "Why do ye not even of yourselves judge that which is right?" The teaching in His view was the primary matter, the miracles only secondary: the miracles were corroborative proofs of such cogency as infinitely to aggravate the guilt of rejecting the teaching, but they were not the ground on which the teaching was to be received. "If I had not done among them the works which no other man did, they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin." He spoke almost with contempt of a faith which had no better foundation than miracles. "If ye believe not me, believe the works."

But this would be an imperfect statement if we were to overlook the fact, that Christ attached more importance to His miracles as evidences of goodness than of power. On one occasion, when asked whether He was indeed that Christ for whom the best men of Israel were looking, He replied by enumerating His works: giving sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, and life to the dead: but ended with the climax, "glad tidings are proclaimed to the poor."

The other class of objections is from the opposite side, namely from those who either doubt the reality of miracles or disparage their importance. The simplest form of such objections may be thus expressed:—

Objection to miracles that they are useless, and lower the character of revelation.

"It is admitted that holiness must prove itself, and cannot be proved by anything else. If the teaching of any one who makes claim to have a revelation from God is holy, it proves itself as Divine: if it is not holy, no evidence, miraculous or any other, can prove it to be Divine. Miraculous evidence rather detracts from the

purity and dignity of a revelation, by offering proof to the eye where all that ought to be sought for is proof to the soul. If the miracles of Christ are so entwined with His teaching that they must be believed, still they are not grounds of belief, but only results and objects of belief. The miracles cannot prove the doctrine: if they can be proved at all, they must be proved by the doctrine."

This argument rests on a mere confusion, a mere misconception of the proper function of miraculous evidence: but it has too much weight with the present generation to be dismissed summarily.

Reply: the purpose of Christ's miracles is not to prove that His doctrine is worthy to come from God, but that it has come from Him.

It is quite true that holiness could not conceivably be proved by any evidence whatever. But the purpose of Christ's miracles is not to prove that His doctrine is worthy to have come from God, for this neither needs proof nor admits of it: but to prove that in point of fact it has come from God: and this could not be proved beyond doubt without miracles. If any one of Christ's hearers were to have thought: "No doubt His doctrine is worthy to have come from God. But has it really come from God? When He speaks of a Heavenly Father, of judgment, of forgiveness, and of eternal life, does He speak of what He knows, or is it only that He has brooded over these thoughts till they have become real to His imagination?"—to such questions as these the miracles of Christ would have been the answer, and the only possible answer that could have been perfectly conclusive. Christ did not undertake to prove the excellence of holiness: He assumed this to be true without needing any proof. What He undertook to prove was that the principles of holiness which He taught are those on which His Heavenly Father governs the universe, and that where these principles of government are not made manifest and acted on now they shall be hereafter. It needs no miraculous revelation to know that holiness is excellent, and that moral law is binding on all intelligent Beings in the universe: but it does need a miraculous revelation to teach us that holiness shall yet be triumphant and dominant, and that every violation of moral law shall be avenged.

The question whether the doctrine is supposed to prove the reality of the miracles, or the miracles to prove the truth of the doctrine, is really unmeaning:—as unmeaning as would be the parallel question, whether in astronomy or any other mathematico-physical science, the mathematics prove the accuracy of the observations or the observations prove the soundness of the mathematics. Each primarily rests on its own foundation, and each secondarily confirms the other. In the mathematico-physical sciences this is the relation between the mathematical element of our knowledge and that derived from observation: in theology this is the relation between the moral and the miraculous elements.

No improbability in miracles.

If the foregoing is admitted as sound, it will be seen that there is nothing anomalous in miracles, and no *à priori* presumption against them, provided only that they are wrought for a worthy purpose. That is to say, if there is a God who is able to reveal Himself to us: if we are capable of receiving a revelation of Him: and if miracles are, I do not say the means of such a revelation being made, but a necessary condition of its being fully authenticated: then the presumption is rather in favour of the reality of miracles than against it.

Position of those who believe in a personal God, yet reject miracle.

I know there are men who cannot see this. I do not speak of those who deny or doubt the being of a Personal God: they are consistent in denying the *à priori* probability of any such Divine interference with the ordinary course of nature as constitutes a miracle. But there are men who believe, not only in a personal God, but in the possibility of man's holding communion with God: and consequently in the reality, the duty, and the blessing of prayer: who nevertheless reject all that is miraculous, and consequently reject revelation in the ordinary or Biblical sense. Such men probably come much nearer to the spirit of Christ than do those, if indeed there are any such in this age, who infer Christ's holiness from His power, and believe in Him on the evidence of His mighty works alone. But their position, in believing in a God who can be known by men, and yet rejecting the corroborative

proof which miracles are capable of giving, is logically quite untenable. Suppose, what is certainly no impossible case, that a European in Central Asia or Western China were to tell a native of the country about some of our scientific theories, with their practical results: and were to receive for reply:—"I have no difficulty in believing in the thermo-dynamic theory, but you must not ask me to believe in the marvels of the steam-engine: I have no difficulty in believing in the theory of electric currents, but you must not ask me to believe in the marvels of the telegraph:" what inference would be possible, except that in assenting to the theoretical part of the European's statements he only gave an unintelligent assent to that which he did not understand? Yet how does this differ from the logic of those who admit the theoretical part of theology, namely the power, the wisdom, and the holiness of God, and the possibility of His being known by man, and yet deny the possibility of the corroborative proof of miracle?

Ideas of an imaginary Asiatic on science.

I do not however mean that those against whom the present arguments are directed, are such imbecile reasoners as our imaginary Asiatic. If I understand them, they will probably reply that the experimental facts of the steam-engine and the telegraph belong to the same order with the theoretical truths of thermo-dynamic and electrical science; while physical miracles, being merely physical facts, do not belong to the same order with justice, mercy, and holiness. In so far as this is a merely logical or metaphysical difficulty, the reply to it has been stated already:[1] namely, that whenever we reason from human action to human character, we reason from facts belonging to the physical or phenomenal order to truths of a different order. Actions, which are visible, may reveal character and purpose, which are invisible. This is true of man, and why should it be less true of God? No doubt, mere power cannot prove holiness. I have stated this already, not as a concession to an opponent but as an axiom of my own system: and it is conclusive against

Objection, that physical miracles belong to a different order from holiness.

Reply, that actions may reveal character.

[1] Page 148, *et seq.*

those who maintain as a doctrine of revelation, anything which is rejected by the moral sense. But it has no weight against the miracles of Christ. It has been already remarked that Christ appears to have attached importance to His own miracles much more as proofs of benevolence than as proofs of power. Their function as evidence was not to prove power, for power cannot prove holiness, and holiness is the all-important matter: nor was it to prove holiness, for holiness cannot be proved—it can be seen only by its own light: but to prove that power and holiness were united in His person; that the revelation to mankind which He professed to have, not only deserved to be from God but was really from God.

Purpose of Christ's miracles, neither to prove power nor holiness, but to prove their union.

There is another argument against the miraculous element in religion which is more a matter of feeling than of reasoning, but ought nevertheless to be stated and replied to. It may be thus stated:—"Miraculous evidence is *unsuitable* to religion. Religion has to do with eternal truths: truths which were true before the foundations of the universe were laid, and will be true after the stars are burnt out: but miracles are, avowedly and by their definition, transitory and exceptional facts. Christ's parables are eminently rational, illustrating as they do the principles of the spiritual world by the ordinary course of the natural world. But proof of the laws of the spiritual world must be sought in those facts in the natural world which approach most nearly to the spiritual: that is to say in the facts of Force, of Life, and of Mind, and in every thing which yields any indication of a Creative Purpose. To prove religion by miracles is proving the eternal by the transitory, and the fundamental by the exceptional."

Objection, that the exceptional is unsuitable as proof of the permanent and fundamental.

My reply to this is, that while it would be wrong to underrate the importance of those proofs of the Divine Character and the Divine Government which are to be found in the ordinary constitution of the world as known to us, there is nevertheless no absurdity in thinking that we can learn fundamental and eternal truths from temporary manifestations of those truths. In natural science

we have to study the ordinary constitution of nature:—the motions of the planets, the changes of the weather, and the mutual positions of rock-strata:—but it is not the less necessary to study facts which, though they are produced according to strictly natural laws, are not to be found in the ordinary course of nature, but owe their existence to the experimentalist. It is by means of these latter—by means of the knowledge derived from the study of facts which never occur except when they are produced by the experimentalist for his own purposes—that the ordinary constitution of nature has been scientifically explained. This is true even of astronomy: the first step, and an all-important one, towards the elucidation of the "mechanism of the heavens" consisted in Galileo's experimental proof of the law of the velocity of falling bodies.[1] And it is still more obviously true of our knowledge of such phenomena as those of evaporation and rain, which have been explained by means of experimental research, but could not have been explained by means of any amount of observation of the facts as they occur in nature.

Reply: in natural science the ordinary constitution of nature is explained by means of experimental facts which are called into existence for the purpose.

Now, as observation of the facts which belong to the ordinary constitution of nature, and experimental investigation of facts which do not occur in the ordinary constitution of nature, are both necessary, and equally necessary, in physical science: so I maintain that knowledge of the facts of the ordinary world of matter, life, and mind in which we live, and knowledge derived from the exceptional facts of miracles, are alike and equally necessary in theology.

Were a philosopher of Greece in its pre-Socratic period—an Anaxagoras or a Heraclitus—to come to life among us and become acquainted with the results of our science, his first commentary on them would perhaps be something like this:—"Not even in my native language can I find words to express my admiration of your astronomy and

Imaginary ideas of an ancient

[1] It is true that falling bodies are to be seen in the ordinary course of nature. But Galileo's observations on the fall of heavy bodies from the Leaning Tower of Pisa were not the less experiments: for the Leaning Tower was chosen by Galileo, and indeed looks as if it might have been constructed, specially for the purpose.

your geology. But it is otherwise with your chemistry and optics, and the sciences of electricity and heat. Astronomy and geology reveal to us the constitution of the universe : but I do not see the value of sciences which deal not with the broad facts of nature, but chiefly with facts which are called into existence in the laboratory by the experimentalist." To this the reply would be:—"Until you have become familiar with scientific ideas and methods, you will not be able to understand in what sense it is that a fact which has been witnessed only once is as important as one which is witnessed every day. But for that purpose which alone you know how to value, namely for the understanding of the universe, the study of those facts which are produced only in the laboratory of the experimentalist is as important as the study of the facts which are set before us in the universe. The nature of lightning has been made known only by means of laboratory experiments on electricity. The same is true of heat. And in order to learn the nature of light we must break up its rays with the prism and split them by means of doubly refracting crystals."

Greek philosopher on modern science.

Now, the mental attitude of this imaginary Greek with respect to science is analogous to the attitude with respect to theology of those who believe in a personal God and yet deny or undervalue miraculous evidence. And the reply to both is the same. It is consistent with the ways of nature and of God that the highest truths should not be self-evident, and that universal truths should be proved or interpreted by means of unusual facts. The parallel is perfect for the present purpose. In science, it is an axiom that every individual fact is a result of general laws; and in theology it is equally true, as Pascal remarked long ago, that "If God has acted once, He exists eternally."

NOTE A.

THE following is part of a letter from Dr. Arnold of Rugby to the Rev. Dr. Hawkins :—

Quotation from Arnold of Rugby.

"You complain of those persons who judge of a revelation not by its evidence but by its substance. It has always seemed to me that its substance is a most essential part of its evidence: and that miracles wrought in favour of what was foolish or wicked would only prove Manicheeism. We are so perfectly ignorant of the unseen world that the character of any supernatural power can be only judged of by the moral character of the statements which it sanctions: thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God or from the devil. If his father tells a child something which seems to him monstrous, faith requires him to submit his own judgment, because he knows his father's person, and is sure therefore that his father tells it him. But we cannot thus know God, and can only recognize His voice by the words spoken being in agreement with an idea of His moral nature."—STANLEY'S *Life of Arnold*, vol. ii. p. 227.

NOTE B.

THE MORALITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Secondary importance of the subject.

IN the present state of English thought, it is impossible to mention the subject of morality in relation to revelation without suggesting the controversy on the morality of the Old Testament. This is unfortunate, because it is not well to begin with the difficulties of a subject. The subject, however, is not of first-rate importance. If we accept the Old Testament as part of our creed, we do so because it is believed to be entwined with Christianity, and because any difficulties that it may contain are of an order of magnitude which is not to be weighed in the balance against the overwhelming proof of Christianity.

The historical questions of the Old Testament ought to be regarded as open.

It is, however, my opinion that faith in Christ is logically consistent with almost any opinion on the subject of the relation of the Divine to the human element in the Old Testament. This is no doubt opposed to the general belief of the Christian Church, but it is the opinion of a growing minority. The entire subject is practically a new one. There was no possibility of approaching it with the least hope of attaining to any result of

value so long as men were sharply divided into "believers" in every statement of the Bible, including Balaam's conversation with his ass, and "unbelievers" in all, even the resurrection of Christ.

Present state of the historical question.

All who are competent to form an opinion on the subject are probably now agreed on these two points:—that there is in the Bible nothing which can be relied on as historical previous to Abraham: and that from Abraham onwards there is a thread of true history. But the separation of this from all legendary elements is a most difficult task, for which the time is perhaps not yet come.

The morality of the Old Testament is not heathen.

Concerning the morality of the Old Testament, we have to remark that it does not by any means stand on the same level with that of the heathen systems to which the religion of the Old Testament is opposed. They consecrated impurity; and when a religion does this, it cannot possibly have any claim to be received as Divine; if it has miraculous evidence in its favour, the miracles ought to be regarded as not Divine but diabolical. But the morality of the Old Testament is not of this kind; it is not perverted but only imperfect. When we are asked to believe that God at one time, and only for a time, gave an express sanction to the imperfect morality of a barbarous age, it appears to be asserting what we have no right to assert, if we say that this is absolutely incredible and incapable of being proved by any evidence whatever. But the farther the morality of such a system from the ideal and perfect morality of Christ, and the more agreeable it is to the primitive and unenlightened mind of man, the stronger is the presumption against its being in any way sanctioned by God, and the greater ought to be the weight of miraculous evidence to outweigh such presumption. It needs no very strong confirmation from miraculous evidence to make us believe that the injunction to love our enemies comes from God; it would need very strong confirmation to make us believe that God commanded the Israelites to exterminate their enemies, which they were no doubt ready enough to do of their own accord; and yet the miraculous evidence for Judaism is by no means so well attested as that for Christianity.

Presumption against its having any Divine sanction.

Its practical effect.

Whatever may be thought of Bishop Colenso's historical criticism, he only speaks common sense when he says that the Old Testament ought not to be put in the hands of newly

converted barbarians. And much may be said in favour of the opinion that the acceptance of the Old Testament in mass by the Christian Church has been a great misfortune for mankind.

What may be called the orthodox or Scriptural view of the question is well stated in the following passage from Butler's *Analogy of Religion* (Part II., Chapter 3) :—but the concluding sentences betray the weakness of the case as clearly as the opening ones show its strength.

Quotation from Butler.

"There are some particular precepts in Scripture given to particular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action : and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really have been so : which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty : the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing of an external action : for instance, taking away the life or property of any. For men have no right to either life or property but what arises solely from the grant of God ; when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either ; and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts which without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts which require, not vicious actions but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts ; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences : *i.e.* from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes : and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against revelation : but against the whole notion of

religion as a trial: and against the general constitution of nature."

I shall have to say in a future chapter what I think of this favourite theory of Butler's, that revelation may be reasonably expected to reproduce the difficulties and anomalies of the order of nature. But to confine the present remarks to the point now under discussion: Butler is certainly right in saying that it is possible for God to make an action right by commanding it, which would be wrong were it not so commanded. Thus a Divine command would be a moral justification for taking life or property, but it would not be a moral justification for impurity or falsehood. If the command to exterminate the Canaanites was associated with a revelation of moral purity and spiritual truth: and if the Israelites were in such a state of moral development that it was no injury to their moral nature to be made the executioners of such a command: it would certainly be right for them to obey it. But the reasoning is much less satisfactory where Butler goes on to say that such commands, supposing them to be Divine, present no difficulty except what arises from their liability to perversion as examples. Whatever has been written, says Saint Paul, has been written for our instruction: and it is surely a strong presumption against the Divine origin of a command if its most natural and obvious—may we not say its legitimate?—effect on those who read of it is what Butler is compelled to denounce as a perversion:—if it has to be recorded with the warning, Go and do not thou likewise.

Where Butler is right.

Where he is wrong.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

AFTER what has been said in the preceding chapter, and in the chapters on the Meaning and the Possibility of Faith,[1] the position and use of authority in religion will present no difficulty. It will, however, be well explicitly to state it.

Two meanings of the word Authority.

We must bear in mind that the word Authority has acquired two meanings. It means, according to the context, either the right to be *obeyed*, or the right to be *believed*.[2] In the present inquiry we have to do with the latter sense only—with the relation of Authority to Belief. In this sense Authority may be defined as that which is the legitimate object of Faith. Authority and Faith are thus correlatives.

Two opposite views of authority in religion.

It may assist us in understanding this subject if we begin by mentioning two opinions thereon, which are the opposite of each other as to practical result, though they spring from the same or very nearly the same logical root.

The one practically denies that such authority is possible.

One of these is, that when we believe, or put faith in, an authority, we really rely on our own judgment; because, if we trust the authority of another, we can only trust our own judgment in deciding that such authority is trustworthy. If this argument is sound, authority is impossible: we can trust another only in so far as we trust ourselves: it is self-contradiction to say that we can possibly trust another any farther. And if Authority is impossible, Faith

[1] Chapters 6 and 7.

[2] This remark is made somewhere by Archbishop Whately.

is equally so. An authority which attracts and commands faith is impossible because unmeaning: and the only authority which is possible in matters of belief is that which a man may have among his equals who have ascertained that his knowledge is greater than theirs, and have found by experience that his predictions have been fulfilled in a larger proportion of cases. But in the chapter on the Possibility of Faith[1] we have seen that, inexplicable as it may be to the merely logical understanding, it is possible for a superior Being to become an Authority, and an object of Faith, to an inferior one: and this, not by reason of superior knowledge, which the inferior being may be unable to test: but because of a power which consists in superiority of nature: a power which is not chiefly felt in the communication of knowledge, but controls the judgment and the will, and yet develops the power of both so as ultimately to educate them into the exercise of true freedom. Authority is possible, and Faith is possible:—these are not two assertions, but opposite sides of the same.

Reply to this.

The other erroneous view of which we have to speak, is that in religion there can be no authority short of an infallible one: that an authority which may possibly err is no suitable object of faith, and no authority in any true sense: that, consequently, if we admit the principle of authority at all, the only consistent course is to follow blindly whatever authority we have decided to believe, and abide by its decisions, however revolting they may be to the reason and the moral sense.

The other, that there can be no religious authority which is not infallible.

It will be observed that these two conclusions—that which denies all authority and that which asserts that authority must be infallible—though opposite, may be deduced from the same premises. Let a man be convinced that an authority which does not claim infallibility is a contradiction, and that the criticism of an independent judgment is so inconsistent with faith that the two cannot co-exist, but one must destroy the other; and it will depend rather on mental habit and temperament than on reasoning whether he will reject authority

The two are from the same logical root.

[1] Chapter 7.

altogether or bow down before some supposed infallible authority, either that of a Church or of a Book.

Reply to the second.

If on the contrary the ground of Authority and Faith is in the power of a superior nature over an inferior one, and the capacity of the inferior nature to recognize that superiority and to be raised in the intellectual and moral scale by recognizing it, then it is possible for authority, even in religious matters, to exist without being infallible, and for a faith to exist which does not destroy but rather quickens the power of independent judgment.

What has been said about the relation of Faith to Authority must be understood with a qualification which is now to be stated. The only authorities with which we have to concern ourselves are the Christian Church and the Holy Scriptures. The authority of the Scriptures is in reality the authority of Christ and His Apostles; and to this is to be applied without any qualification what has been said about the root of authority in superiority of nature. Christ's nature is higher than ours; and, though this is not true of the Apostles, yet they were more fully inspired by the Spirit of God and of Christ than it has been necessary for any to be in times subsequent to theirs.

Authority of the Church.

Its ground.

But a somewhat different rationale must be given of the authority of the Church. The Church does not think with a *higher* mind than ours: it would be a contradiction to say that it did, for we are the Church: the Church consists of all who believe in Christ. But the Church thinks with a *wider* mind than any individual,[1] simply because it consists of all. The Authority of the Church is the expression of the truth, that where men are approximately unanimous they are probably right: and that this probability increases with time, which eliminates the accidental circumstances that may warp the judgment of a single generation. Thus, granting the truth of Christianity, the truth of the Nicene exposition of Christianity derives immensely strong confirmation from the fact of its being assented to by the entire Church, with very insignificant exceptions, through all subsequent ages.[2]

[1] Page 101, *et seq.*

[2] See Note at end of chapter.

I do not however mean that any purely naturalistic and rationalistic explanation of history can be adequate, any more than an atheistic account of nature.

Quotation from Wordsworth.

> "In the unreasoning progress of the world
> A wiser spirit is at work for us,
> A better mind than ours."

We have next to inquire into the conditions and limitations under which authority exists.

Axioms. Holiness is unchangeable,

It is to be regarded as axiomatic that the distinction between moral good and evil is unchangeable, being grounded in the uncreated nature of things. This subject has been fully discussed in the chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense,[1] and the arguments need not be repeated here.

and is the end of religion.

It is also to be regarded as axiomatic that the purpose of a revelation is to enable those who are instructed by it to increase in holiness. This will not be contested by any who are able to understand the meaning of words. Forgiveness, salvation, the favour of God, light, eternal life, and all other blessings which are hoped for through the agency of revelation, are either synonyms for holiness, or its conditions, or its results. A religious faith, or a faith towards God, implies, and begins from, a desire for holiness: and it consists in trusting to the guidance of One who is able to enable us to attain to holiness. If this is true, it follows that faith exists under the condition that any teaching must be rejected which defeats the purpose of all religion, and tends in a direction opposed to holiness. This is not a limitation of faith. Faith exists in order to guide us into holiness, and it is not a limitation of faith if it must not deny its own nature. If that in which we have trusted as a guide into truth and holiness—say the Church or the Holy Scriptures—teaches anything which the conscience rejects as unholy, it is not unbelief, or want of faith, to refuse to believe it: on the contrary it is the highest faith—faith in the highest axioms of religion by which all must be tested; namely that, whatever appearances may

Any doctrine must be untrue if it contradicts either of these.

[1] Chapter 3.

be to the contrary, God is righteous and holy, and holiness and righteousness cannot change their meanings.

Trial of faith

What then? Is there no such thing as trial of faith? Are we to trust and to follow our authority only so long as it teaches nothing but what we are prepared to receive, and to abandon it when it ceases to be plausible and to agree with our previous opinions and expectations? This is not my meaning. It would be unwise so to treat the authority of merely human teachers. Not Christ alone, but every teacher who aims at anything more than merely storing the pupil's mind with information, has often to say, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but you cannot bear them now." "Whither I go thou canst not follow me now, but thou shalt follow me afterwards." It might no doubt have been otherwise. Christ might have taught religion as Euclid has taught geometry: that is to say in a form in which everything is self-evident as soon as it is fully presented to the mind, and there is no demand, and no room, for the exercise of faith. But it would be contrary to every analogy of the world in which we live, if that which is intended to mould our moral nature were to be taught in such a way as to demand no effort and no trial of faith. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life," was the conclusion of the disciple Peter at a time when he was in utter perplexity as to Christ's meaning. The forming of such a resolution was at that time no doubt more beneficial to Peter's moral nature than any intellectual comprehension of Christ's meaning could have been; and such moral lessons would be excluded if it were possible for us to learn religion as we learn geometry or any other subject in which every step is clear. If all were perfectly clear, the great moral lesson and discipline of trust would be lost: and there would be no place, or at least there would be much less room than there actually is, for that influence of a higher nature on a lower one which, as we have seen, is the most important of all agencies in the formation of character. Were we beings of pure intellect, it would be well for us to walk by sight rather than by faith:—faith indeed, as I understand the word, would be impossible to

is needed by our moral nature.

Saint Peter's answer.

We are not beings of pure intellect, to walk by sight.

such beings :—but for beings like what we are, whose minds are inexplicable by any principles of mere logic, and who have a moral nature which is of more importance than all else, it is better—it is needful—to walk by faith rather than by sight.

But though a child's faith in his teacher is right and necessary, and though he must be content to believe much on his teacher's bare word of which he does not yet see the proof; yet if his teacher tells him anything that is plainly self-contradictory, it is his duty to disbelieve it: for nothing can be more certain than the impossibility of a contradiction: it is not a single doctrine to be believed, but an axiom lying at the base of all belief: if any one were to question it, he would assail not an individual object of belief, but belief itself: not a single truth, but the possibility of anything being true. Just so, the fundamental axioms of religion are that holiness cannot change its nature, and that holiness is the end of religion: and if we are desired in the name of faith to believe anything that contradicts these, we ought to refuse to believe. Holiness is the end, Authority and Faith are the means; and to believe at the bidding of Authority anything that contradicts Holiness, is sacrificing the end to the means. If it could be shown that the clauses about the Persons of the Godhead in the so-called Athanasian Creed had the authority of Christ, every one who believes in Christ ought to conclude that the doctrine of that Creed is true, and will be made clear to us in another state of being if not in this: just as we believe a human teacher when he assures us of the truth of something which we are as yet unable to understand. But when Christ's authority is claimed for a doctrine that contradicts the fundamental axioms of righteousness, such as the possibility of Eternal Righteousness accepting the sufferings of the innocent as an expiation of the sins of the guilty; or for a doctrine whereof the natural and legitimate effect is to make those who believe it selfish and cruel, such as the doctrine of everlasting torments: the conclusion ought to be, not that holiness has changed its meaning or that a true faith has

Authority ought to be disbelieved if it teaches anything self-contradictory,

or contrary to holiness.

Examples: vicarious punishment:

everlasting torments.

become the minister of unholiness, but that either Christ is wrong, or, what is a much less violent supposition, that He has been misunderstood.

But I maintain that Christ has in no case demanded our assent either to what is simply unintelligible, or to what is contrary to the fundamental principles of righteousness, or to what tends to injure the moral nature of those who believe it: Christ does no doubt make demands on our faith and obedience, but they are not of such a nature as to defeat the purpose of faith and obedience. The demands He makes on our faith are of two kinds, which may be called the theoretical and the practical. By the theoretical demands on our faith I mean, above all, the demand to believe the doctrine of the Incarnation, which the understanding of man cannot fully grasp, but can recognize as worthy to have come from God. And by the practical demand I mean the demand that we should endeavour to conform to a moral ideal not only higher in degree but in some respects different in kind from any that would naturally commend itself to men.

Christ's demands on our faith.

The doctrine of the Incarnation.

Christ's morality.

Let us imagine the result of these demands on the faith in an individual case. Suppose a man who is morally irreproachable, pure, "just, generous, and humane:" richly endowed with all the culture that England or Germany has to give: but without faith: utterly devoid of a childlike spirit, and, so far as he believes in anything, believing only in culture. Love of culture and desire of varied knowledge attract him to the New Testament, and there he reads of an ethical theory unlike his own: a theory according to which culture is no guarantee for wisdom, and faith is the best foundation for virtue. He reads that those who are poor in culture may be rich in faith, and that a childlike spirit is that which God will most willingly receive. He has only half-believed in a God; he reads the demand for entire faith in Christ. His thoughts have been all of earth, though the best of earth: he learns as he reads to see all things in the light of Heaven. His morality has been but a refined, self-respecting, Goethean kind of selfishness, though capable of self-sacrifice to

Imaginary individual case.

the demands of duty, or, what to him means almost the same, the claims of self-respect:—he learns to see that self-renunciation is better than even the least debasing selfishness, and that it is better to live in order to please God than even for self-approval. He has been a Stoic, and has endeavoured to despise his enemies too heartily for any harsher feeling: he learns from Christ that it is better to love them. On all points he recognizes the superiority of Christ's ideal, and endeavours to conform his life and his thoughts to it. This is not attained without effort and conflict. As each question arises between his old moral and religious opinions and those which he is learning from Christ, the old at first resist the new, and the victory is gained not by anything of the nature of argument or logical proof, but by the attractive force of Christ's character. He is not always able to see the truth of Christ's moral doctrines at once; but he is so impressed with the excellence of the character of Christ as to yield to His guidance in the faith that what is not clear now will be clear hereafter. Were Christ to teach any doctrine or any precept contrary to intuitive and elementary morality, it would be His duty to reject it. But this is never the case:—when Christ's moral ideal appears most opposed to his, he does not cease to feel it possible that it will ultimately prove to be in harmony with his deepest intuitions, though transcending them. He has been accustomed to laugh at Tertullian's paradox, "Believe that thou mayest understand:" but he now finds in his own experience that it contains a truth, and that faith may grow into knowledge.

Now this is what Christ means by Faith. Not inferring holiness from power, for Christ always speaks of holiness as capable of being proved only by itself: not believing on the demand of authority in anything unmeaning or unholy, for Christ always speaks of His own teaching as reasonable: but feeling, recognizing, and yielding to the moral and spiritual superiority of Christ.

But I fear this is not what the majority of Christ's followers mean by faith. The current reply to all objec-

tions brought against the rationality or morality of any alleged doctrine of religion is that it must be true because it is asserted by adequate authority:—whether that of the Church or that of the Bible. Were it not for the importance of the subject, such a reply as this would be almost a justification to objectors for going no further, and concluding that there is nothing to be said in defence of Christianity. And those who are inclined to use such a way of, as they may think, silencing objections, ought to be reminded that Christ and His Apostles did not so speak, but defended their doctrines as being reasonable and worthy to be believed on their merits:—and further, that the tendency of such a reply is to cut up Faith by the roots: for the only possible root of faith in a revelation consists in our instinctive trust in the truthfulness of God: but if we are asked to believe anything from which our moral nature revolts, and we are assured that it is vouched for by God as true, it is answer enough to say that if God is not holy as we understand holiness, we cannot be sure that He is truthful as we understand truth. But we do believe that God is true as we understand truth, and we have the same right to believe that He is holy as we understand holiness.[1]

Prevalent error as to the claims of authority.

NOTE.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH.

The authority of the Church is that of common consent.

THE authority of the Church is the authority of common consent. The weight which is reasonably due to such authority is of course different according to the kind of case to which it is applied. In some cases it is perfectly conclusive. To mention what is perhaps the strongest case that could be mentioned: the founders of the modern Church of Scotland

[1] Page 138, *et seq.*

maintained that the Presbyterian form of Church government was not only the best for Scotland at that time, which may have been true; but that it had been established by the Apostles and was obligatory on every Christian Church. Now, even if the case which they attempted to make out of the Apostolic writings had been a plausible one, it would still be altogether incredible that the entire Christian Church, governing itself as we know it did with very little centralization, had in the age following that of the Apostles unanimously gone wrong by establishing episcopacy in defiance of their traditions.

Instances of its force: Church government:

The same principle is applicable to the doctrines of the Quakers about the Sacraments. It is *primâ facie* impossible that the entire Christian Church from the earliest ages, orthodox and heretical, Eastern and Western, Catholic and Protestant, should have agreed in misunderstanding Christ's language on that subject until the truth was rediscovered in the seventeenth century by George Fox and Robert Barclay.

the Sacraments:

This principle is also to some extent applicable to that subject of the union of the Church with the State which merits and occupies so much thought in our time. The common consent of all Christendom is in favour of such union. This is not conclusive as to the duty, or practicability, of maintaining it under the circumstances of the present. But it is conclusive against the doctrine that the union of the Church with the State is wrong in itself. Wherever a nation has become Christian, the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the State has never been a question, but has been always effected almost unconsciously, and as a matter of course; and it is not credible that all Christian nations should have unanimously gone wrong on the same subject and in the same direction.[1]

the union of Church and State.

Like all other true principles, this of universal consent is often misapplied. But the commonest way in which it is misapplied consists in error as to the fact—in believing that universal consent exists where it does not. Thus, it is constantly asserted that before the Reformation the common consent of Christendom was all in favour of the Papal system: yet such is not the fact; the Eastern Churches, which have always rejected that system, are the half of Christendom, and a little historical knowledge is sufficient to show that they have deviated from the primitive forms much less than the Papal

Errors are often made as to the fact of general consent.

Instances: the claims of Romanism

[1] This however is inapplicable to the late Established Church of Ireland, which was unlike anything else in the world.

and of Calvinism.

Church has done. And the belief is very general among the English-speaking nations, that Calvinism is orthodox Christianity :—that is to say the system which is sanctioned by the general consent of the Christian Church :—yet this is an error as to fact, due to limited historical knowledge.

Where such authority is conclusive.

It is altogether a different question how far the authority of universal or general consent is conclusive. On that class of subjects which belong to history and politics rather than to philosophy and theology, like those instanced of the institution of the Sacraments, the constitution of the Church, and the union of the Church with the State, such authority is all but conclusive. But

Where it leaves questions open to reconsideration.

it is otherwise with those properly theological questions which are associated with philosophy rather than with history. The almost universal consent of the Church to the Nicene exposition of Christian theology has no doubt immense weight, but it cannot be held to foreclose the right of each succeeding generation to reconsider the problems of theology for itself. This must be maintained in the interest not only of freedom but of faith ; for if we do not consider such problems for ourselves, but accept the Nicene Creed or any other old solution of the problems without examination or inquiry, we shall lose the power of attaching any meaning to either the problems or the solutions. Every generation must interpret Divine truth for itself in its own language : if this is not attempted, religious thought will become stagnant and dead. And it is never to be regarded as impossible that the generation which makes this attempt may see some aspect of Divine truth more clearly than it has been seen by former generations. It is one purpose of the present work to show how we have in some respects a clearer understanding of God's moral government of the universe than any former generation has enjoyed. The belief that such an advance in knowledge may be and has been attained, has nothing in common with a contemptuous rejection of the results of the past.

CHAPTER XII.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

IN the foregoing chapters it has been stated as axiomatic, that no revelation ought to be accepted as true and Divine unless it is accordant with the self-evident principles of morality and holiness, and naturally tends to promote morality and holiness in those who accept it. In other words, a religion ought not to be believed unless it is right both in its Morality and its Ethics.

By the Morality of a religion I mean its ground in uncreated and unchangeable holiness. By its Ethics, I mean its tendencies as affecting the formation of character. The doctrine of Justification by Faith belongs to the ethics of the Christian religion.

Justification by Faith defined.

If Justification by Faith is to receive a definition consistent with true principles of ethics; if it is one of the most profound of truths and not one of the most absurd and pernicious of falsehoods: it must mean the renovation of man's character as the natural consequence of a true and purifying faith, and God's acceptance of him on that ground. The question was at one time keenly discussed, whether works or faith is the ground of justification. From our point of view the question presents no difficulty. That which is all-important in itself, and in God's sight, is not actions but character:—actions, in themselves and in God's sight, are important only either as manifesting character, or as forming it. This will scarcely be denied: but if it is admitted, the question arises, what is there in

How is it characteristic of Christianity?

the doctrine of Justification by Faith that is in any way characteristic of Christianity? Is it not a commonplace of ethical science?

Christ made new applications of old truths rather than discovered new ones.

I reply, that in this, as in the rest of His system, Christ's originality consisted rather in the use He made of old truths than in the discovery of new ones. In Morality, it may be true, though I think it an exaggerated statement, that Christ discovered no new principles and uttered no new precepts;[1] but He certainly invented a new type of moral excellence. In Ethics it is the same. Mankind can never have been altogether ignorant of the importance of belief and the power of personal influence in the formation of character: but Christ was the first who founded a vast system of ethics on these truths. No one before Him could have uttered those wonderful words, "Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness to the truth." Love of truth was a virtue not unknown to the ancient world, but the idea of reigning in men's hearts by the power of truth was thought of by none before Christ. The ethical systems of the ancient world were all based on a totally distinct principle from this, namely that of habit and education. Habits are best formed by education, and the legislators and moralists of the ancient world—not only practical legislators like Moses, but speculative moralists like Plato—aimed at controlling education and practically continuing it through life: and for this purpose they thought it a matter of course to use coercive power. The wisdom of the ancient world on this subject was summed up in the Aristotelian theory of virtue as a habit of the soul formed by doing virtuous actions. This was a theory of Justification by Works.[2] It was perfectly true and right so far as it went. Virtue is formed by constantly doing virtuous actions and thinking virtuous thoughts. A habit of virtue

Originality of the idea of reigning by the power of truth.

The ancient ethical systems were based on habit and education, and enforced by coercive power.

Justification by works.

[1] Christ said, *Love your enemies.* I do not believe that any one had previously got beyond not hating them.

[2] This is not the sense in which St. James uses the term. See Note at end of chapter.

is ample security for virtue:—a habit of virtue *is* virtue. But habit alone originates nothing. Habit means only the tendency of impressions and actions to perpetuate and repeat themselves: the law of habit is like the first law of motion, which accounts for the continuance of a motion once set going, but not for the motive power that sets it going. Every legislator, moralist, and educator must necessarily take the law of habit for granted: Christ did so without wasting any words on it. That which was original in His system was the discovery of a new motive power in morals: and the motive power was His own character.[1] Belief in the truths He taught and faith in Himself, constituted His plan for influencing mankind.

Christ's discovery was a moral motive power: and the motive power was His own character.

These agencies, it is obvious, are of such a nature that they can act only through man's consciousness: and their action is quite different from that method which parents practise and the legislators before Christ desired to practise, of using coercive power in order to ensure the formation of habits of right action from the earliest age, so that their formation may begin before the dawn of consciousness and be in a great degree independent of it. It is not that this method is wrong. In a perfect education this method of the unconscious formation of habits would come first, and would be afterwards, not indeed superseded, but supplemented, by the other method of the influence of character. According to St. Paul, the Divine plan of the education of mankind has included these two elements: first, Law with its coercive power; afterwards those agencies springing from the character of Christ which are variously termed Faith, Grace, and the Gospel. The Law of Moses, he says, was a schoolmaster to bring to Christ.

But though these two distinct influences are both Divine, and both form necessary parts of the education of mankind, yet for the influence of character to act in its highest purity and perfection it appears to be necessary that the person whose character is to be an influence should not at the same time act by means of coercive power. Christ acted on this principle. He believed—truly as I

[1] On this subject, see "Ecce Homo."

This excluded the use of coercive power by Him.

think—that He might have wielded coercive power: that all the armies of Heaven were at His command: but He renounced such powers, lest they should interfere with the purity, and consequently the thoroughness, of His work in men's souls.

His anticipation of modern ethical discovery.

It is worth noticing that Christ hereby anticipated the only great ethical discovery of modern times, namely the duty of toleration and the unwisdom and sinfulness of persecution. So unprepared was mankind to learn this truth, not only in the time of Christ but for more than a thousand years after, that Bossuet, in the seventeenth century, was able to say with little if any exaggeration, that the duty of persecuting heretics had never been questioned by any except those who were heretics themselves.

It is obvious that the abandonment of coercive power by Christ was not only a characteristic but a fundamental part of His plan. It appears probable that the occasion on which He decided to abandon it was that crisis in His life which His biographers call His temptation by Satan. They have narrated the temptation probably in almost the words in which Christ narrated it to them, but evidently without understanding what they heard. It must have been totally unintelligible to that age: but we, with our many generations of Christian culture, may perhaps dimly understand it.

The Temptation of Christ.

It may be, according to the ingenious conjecture of the author of "Ecce Homo," that Christ had not been previously aware of His miraculous powers. This however is and must remain uncertain: but the fact is historical, that immediately after His public recognition as the Messiah by John the Baptist, He retired for many days into the desert and there passed through a mysterious mental conflict. He certainly had no doubts about His being the Messiah, the Saviour: the conflict that arose in His mind was, as we may conjecture, about the way in which He would carry His mission into effect. His purpose was the *salvation of mankind:* the establishment of a reign of truth, justice, and mercy, throughout the

Subject of His mental conflict.

world: and the means to this end which He commanded were nothing less than Omnipotence. Before Him—not at the end of a long series of labours, but within His immediate grasp—rose a vision of universal monarchy: of such power as Cyrus, Alexander, or Cæsar never dreamed of, to be gained without shedding a drop of blood, and employed in realizing the Prophets' and the Psalmist's descriptions of the happiness of mankind under the reign of the Messiah, when war should cease, and all rulers should be just. It does not appear that power for its own sake had any attraction for Christ; but to His infinite love for mankind and His infinite capacity for sympathy with those who suffered sorrow and wrong, the thought of the use He could make of such power must have been all but irresistibly attractive. Moreover, it was a course that presented no difficulties whatever. He could not doubt His own perfect fitness for the possession of such power: He could not doubt that His wisdom equalled His benevolence. All opposition would have vanished away at the first display of a power that could call down fire from heaven, or move mountains into the sea: and He would have earned the enthusiastic applause of the mass of mankind, Gentiles as well as Jews, at Rome as at Jerusalem. Why should He have hesitated one moment? Why should not infinite power be used for purposes worthy of infinite wisdom and Divine love? The best man is he who is readiest to use what powers he has for the benefit of mankind.

Impulse to use miraculous power to establish a kingdom and reign in righteousness.

No barrier stood between Christ and the immediate fulfilment of the Psalmist's prophecy:—

"He shall judge the poor of the people; He shall save the children of the needy, and shall break in pieces the oppressor. He shall come down like rain upon the mown grass: as showers that water the earth. In His days shall the righteous flourish, and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth. He shall deliver the needy when he crieth: the poor also, and him that hath no helper. He shall spare the poor and needy, and shall save the souls of the needy. He shall redeem their souls from deceit and

Quotation from the 72nd Psalm.

violence, and precious shall their blood be in His sight. His name shall endure for ever; His name shall be continued as long as the sun: and men shall be blessed in Him: all generations shall call Him blessed."

We can understand the tears of disappointed patriotism which Christ shed over that Jerusalem which would not be saved: and those who have ever felt the burden and the shame of sins the guilt of which they did not share, may dimly imagine the nature, though not the intensity, of that agony in Gethsemane when Christ appears to have been almost crushed to death by the thought of the sins of mankind. But the intensity and the nature of His mental struggle in the desert are alike beyond our imagination. On the one side was set before Him the realization, without pain or effort, of the brightest visions of Prophet or Psalmist: on the other, the prospect of being misunderstood by those whom He loved, and rejected by those whom He came to save: a martyr's death for Himself and destruction for Jerusalem: failures and persecutions for His Church, and the world for an indefinitely long time practically unconverted to Christianity.

He hesitated long; He passed through a conflict in comparison with which that of Gethsemane perhaps was but slight. But He decided at last, and during His subsequent career never swerved from His decision, that the desire to take the easier course was a temptation of the evil principle: that the purity and thoroughness of His work in men's souls would be marred if He were to rule by any other power than that of His character, or to be a king except by bearing witness to the truth: and that He would not endeavour to justify His people in any other way than by Faith.

Two uses of knowledge: to guide action and to mould character.

At the close of the first chapter of this work, we have seen that knowledge has two distinct functions in relation to human life: the one, to provide us with practical rules of action; the other, to influence character. Mathematical and physical science are of endless utility in furnishing rules of action:—metaphysical doctrine cannot furnish

rules of action, but may be of great value in that which is infinitely more important, namely the formation of character.

Now, with which of these two is religious knowledge to be associated? Does it act for men's good by supplying them with practical rules? or do its truths act in the direct formation of character in those minds which receive them? This question is nearly the same as the question whether justification is to be the effect of works or of faith. Justification by works means the formation of virtuous and holy character by the observance of the practical rules of virtue and holiness, until such observance becomes a habit of the soul. If this is to be the method of justification, then the doctrines of religion are practical rules of action like those which we learn from science for the business of life, and their action on character is but indirect. Justification by faith, on the contrary, means the formation of virtuous and holy character as the direct effect of religious faith and knowledge on the mind: and if this is to be the method, then the doctrines of religion are not mere practical rules, but have a higher kind of importance for man than any merely practical rules can have: in this respect resembling metaphysical truth rather than physical.

Religious knowledge acts in the latter way.

If we are right that religious truth does not essentially consist in rules of conduct, but is meant to act directly on the soul by its force as truth, it follows that in theology there is no foundation for the distinction between "speculative" or absolute truth, and "regulative" or practical truth.[1] Religious truth must be recognized as speculatively, that is to say absolutely, true, before it can have any regulative or practical power. If justification were by works:—in other words, if God, acting through Christ, were to aim at influencing the conduct first, and the character only through the conduct:—the ground of any religious doctrine or precept in absolute truth would have only a speculative or scientific interest. But justification is by faith:—that

Consequently there is in theology no distinction between speculative and regulative truth.

Dean Mansel's doctrine.

[1] The doctrine here combatted, that religious truth as made known to us in revelation is not speculatively but only regulatively true, is that of Dean Mansel's Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought.

is to say, God seeks to mould human character according to His will, directly by the influence of religious truth upon it, not indirectly through the actions:—and for this purpose it is necessary that the truths to be believed should be recognized as simply and absolutely true. If we simply, sincerely, and with all our hearts believe that God loves the just, the merciful, and the pure, and that He is angry with the wicked, such a belief can scarcely fail to influence the character. But if when we thus believe in God's love and His anger we believe in them only as "regulative" truths: that is to say if we only believe that it will fare with the good and the bad as if God's love and anger were realities, but that we know not and have not any need to know what that is in the Divine character which produces such effects: then such merely regulative belief can legitimately have none but merely regulative results: it may serve perfectly well to guide conduct, but it can have no direct effect in moulding character. Or, to mention a much stronger instance: we are told by that Apostle who appears to have caught the most of Christ's spirit, that *God is love*. This truth has no merely regulative force whatever: in other words, it has no right to influence conduct except by influencing character: the Apostle who wrote those words would have been the last to encourage weak or vicious acquiescence in evil, in the hope that God's love would make all right at last. It has on the contrary the right and the power to influence character more profoundly than any other truth that can be known to us. But if it is to influence character, it must be believed simply and absolutely: it can have no effect at all, "regulative" or any other, if it is believed to be true indeed, but only in some sense which cannot be made intelligible to us.

It is impossible to act on the truth of religion without sincerely believing it.

It is further to be remarked that the doctrine of Justification by Faith, in the sense of renovation of character as the consequence of belief, altogether excludes the possibility of making trial of the truth of religion, or provisionally acting on it as if it were true. Pascal, Butler, and a crowd of men inferior to them, have used the argument, not in favour of the

truth of Christianity but in favour of the wisdom of acting on the hypothesis of its truth, that it is the safe side to take, and would be so even if the truth of Christianity, so far from being all but demonstrated, were a mere possibility: because, if Christianity is true, the importance of the future life is infinite, while in any case the importance of the present life is but finite: and it is wise to take precautions, though it may be at great expense and sacrifice, against even a possibility of infinite loss. This would be good advice were it not that it is impossible to follow it. It would be possible if Christianity consisted in external actions, and if justification were by works. But justification is by faith, and Christianity primarily consists in a belief which is to mould the character. We can *act* provisionally: we can act on the supposition that a hypothesis is true while yet the probabilities in its favour are uncertain: but we cannot so *believe*. We may insure our houses against possible fires, but we cannot pray to a possible God. "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." The recognition of a possibility which it would be imprudent to leave out of account, has ethically nothing whatever in common with the faith which is to mould the character and purify the heart.

In this chapter and in the preceding ones it has been argued that faith is reasonable for such a nature as that of man. Some more remarks remain to be made on the subject.

Faith is opposed to sensible perception, and so is Science.

"We walk by faith, not by sight." Faith is opposed to sight, in other words to merely sensible knowledge, as the higher is opposed to the lower. But this is true of Faith in no other sense than that in which it is true of Science. By science we understand many things which are apparently contradicted by sight, such as, to mention the most obvious instance, the motion of the earth. Both Science and Faith are opposed to merely sensible perception, as transcending it: but as Science transcends sensible perception, so Faith transcends Science. Faith is thus not out of harmony with our lower mental nature, but is a legitimate

and harmonious development of it. The analogy and close connexion between Science and Faith has been treated of already[1] in speaking of human powers: in this chapter we are speaking of that Divine Government under which human powers are to be matured; and it is to be remarked here that the scientific education and the moral education which man receives under the circumstances of the world in which he lives run parallel to each other, and are both of such a nature as to test and exercise what at least nearly approaches to faith. In morals the way of duty is in general and in the long run the way of happiness, but it could not be travelled if we were constantly to pursue obvious visible happiness. In the same way, science confers power over nature, but the highest science would have been for ever unattained if men had been constantly aiming at obvious utilities:—the first great step in the advance of science was taken by the ancient Greeks in founding the science of Mathematics, at a time when the future utility of mathematics could not possibly have been foreseen.[2] The Power that rules the world leads us through unknown paths, and does not permit us to see our way clearly until after it has been travelled. Our intellectual as well as our moral life is one of probation and trial.

Resemblance between man's scientific and his moral education.

NOTE.

MEANING OF THE WORD JUSTIFICATION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Harmony between St. Paul and St. James.

BETWEEN the teaching of St. Paul and that of St. James on the subject of Justification, there is no real difference. St. Paul would have heartily agreed, not as a concession to an opponent but as expressing his own doctrine, that "as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead

[1] See the chapters on the Bases of Knowledge and the Meaning of Faith (Chapters 5 and 6).

[2] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 44.

also;" not meaning that faith is the body of which good works are the animating principle, for this would be almost an inversion of the true metaphor: but that a faith which is inactive and does not manifest itself in works is like a body without any animating principle—a lifeless carcase.

Meaning of an expression of St. James.

There is however a verbal contradiction where St. Paul says that "a man is justified by faith without the works of the law:" and St. James says that "by works a man is justified and not by faith only." But the contradiction is verbal only, for the term Justification is used by the two Apostles in slightly different senses. With St. Paul it means *the process whereby a man is made righteous who was not so before:* with St. James it means *the process whereby a man is proved and declared righteous who is so already.* In fewer words:—with St. Paul to justify means *to make righteous:* with St. James it means *to prove righteous.* The doctrine of both may be condensed into the following statement:—*We are to be* made *righteous as the consequence of faith, and* proved *righteous by the evidence of works.*

Verbal contradiction between the two.

Meaning of the word Justification with St. Paul and St. James.

Summary of the doctrine of both.

It may be however that the mention of the case of Abraham by St. James is intended to express the truth that works not only prove righteousness but confirm and strengthen it. His words on the subject are (I quote from the notes to Alford's Greek Testament):—"Thou seest that faith wrought with his works, and by works faith was made complete" (ἐτελειώθη). The obvious meaning of this is that faith is strengthened and perfected by the doing of righteous actions: there is no doubt that this is true, and the only reason, though a weighty one, against supposing it to be the intended meaning of the passage is that there is nothing in the context to suggest it. If such is the meaning of this oft-quoted passage of St. James, it is the same which is expressed with greater profundity and subtlety by St. Paul:—"We glory in tribulations also; knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope: and hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us." (Romans v. 3—5.)

Possible extension of the meaning of St. James.

I need not spend any time in refuting the wretched fiction of an "imputed righteousness" by which God is by some supposed to account men as righteous who are not so. This is too irrational, and we may add too immoral, to be believed on any evidence whatever: and it is not the doctrine of the New Testament: on

The doctrine of imputed righteousness irrational, and

contrary to the New Testament.

the contrary, the consistent teaching of the New Testament is that "whatsoever a man soweth the same shall he reap," and that "all men shall be judged according to their works." It is impossible that a God of truth and holiness can account any one as righteous except by making him righteous.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PROOF OF DEITY FROM POWER.

THE foregoing chapters have been chiefly occupied with considering the subject of man's capacities for religious knowledge. We have now to look beyond ourselves, and search for indications of Divine Cause, Order, and Purpose in the world around us:—not forgetting however that we ourselves are part of that world in which we live.

Apparent variety in the universe, affirmed by science.

What strikes the understanding most in looking on the visible universe is its vast variety:—the unlikeness to each other of the several things of which it is composed. And the first result of scientific examination is to show that this diversity is not merely superficial; that the diversity is not merely in the visible objects of nature, but in the agencies by which those objects are formed and acted on. Thus, chemical research, so far from diminishing, has greatly multiplied the number of known elementary substances: and biological science has failed, and must ever fail, to explain the vital forces as resultants from the physical and chemical ones.

Instinct of unity.

But the intellect cannot rest in this result as final. There is a rational instinct which, wherever there is plurality or diversity, makes us believe that there must be unity behind it.

Pre-Socratic philosophy.

The philosophies of pre-Socratic Greece were for the most part—notably those of Thales and Heraclitus—naïve and almost childlike attempts, made in a half-poetic spirit, to seize on and express the unity of things by a single effort of the understanding and the

imagination. They failed, but bequeathed to the world the impulse they gave to thought: and however much our methods may differ from theirs, yet their aim—the discovery of unity behind the plurality and diversity of things, and of real order under their apparent disorder—is and must ever be the chief aim of all science. The greatest achievements of science have been in these directions: proving unity between what appeared diverse, as between terrestrial gravitation and celestial attraction, or between motion and heat: and reducing to order the apparent chaos of geological phenomena.

Discovery of unity the aim of science.

But if it were possible to carry this process as far as we can conceive: if it were possible, as perhaps it may be hereafter, to reduce all the chemical elements to one:[1] and if it were possible, as it never will be, to explain life as a resultant from the physical and chemical properties of matter: it would still be demonstrably impossible that any merely physical science should ever penetrate to the unity which is behind all diversity. For that unity cannot itself be merely physical:—out of a merely physical unity, diversity could never evolve itself. If, as I believe, the theory of evolution is true: that is to say, if it is true that whatever exists has been formed out of pre-existing materials by a natural process which tends to differentiation or the production of diversities: it still remains true that the first differentiation, or impulse to change, must have come from without, and not from the spontaneous action of matter on itself. It may be true, and I believe it is true, that the entire universe of matter, in so far as its phenomena are not due to the laws of life, has assumed its present form as the result of the condensation of a nebula. Countless differentiations have arisen during the condensation: star differs from star, the planets differ from the sun and from each other, land differs from sea, climate differs from climate, and one rock-formation differs from another. The nebula, at the moment when its condensation commenced, must have been almost infinitely less complex

Physical science can never penetrate to the ultimate unity.

Proof of this. The nebular theory.

[1] Physical and chemical science, however, appear at present to be opposed to any such expectation. See Note A at end of chapter.

than is now the universe which has been evolved out of it. But it cannot have been absolutely without differentiations:—it cannot have been absolutely simple. It must have deviated either from the simplest form, namely the spherical, or from perfect uniformity of substance, or both: for had it been perfectly spherical in form and homogeneous in substance and density, no rotation would ever have begun,[1] and the nebula would have condensed not into a multitude of stars and planets but into a single mass. Moreover, in any such nebula there is at least an original differentiation implied between the nebula itself and the vacant external space. Were all space filled with matter of whatever degree of density or rarity, all forces, gravitative or any other, with which the matter was endowed, would act in all directions alike, and would consequently produce no result. It is not needful to express this truth in the language of the nebular theory, which is still perhaps in some degree hypothetical. It is true independently of any hypothesis, that no motion whatever can arise from the mutual action of the parts of an infinite mass of homogeneous matter: and that no rotatory motion, either of the whole or of any part, can arise from the mutual action of the parts of a finite mass of homogeneous matter if spherical in form.

Proof in less hypothetical language.

We thus see that the unity which we seek behind the diversities of the visible world cannot be physical, because out of merely physical unity the diversity of things could not have been evolved. There must have been a primary differentiation, not involved in the laws of matter as such.

[1] "It follows from the law of the conservation of rotation, that if the nebula has no initial rotation, no mutual actions of its parts can cause the nebula, or the sum-total of the bodies formed out of it, to rotate. But the nebulous mass out of which the solar system has condensed was in all probability only an infinitesimally small part of the original nebula. The first condensation of a nebulous mass produces not globular but very irregular forms: we see these in those parts of the original nebula that still remain as nebulæ. The motions due to the mutual attractions of irregular forms will be very complex; we may safely assert that most of them if not all will be partly rotatory, and the law of the conservation of rotation will be satisfied by the rotations in opposite directions compensating each other, so that their algebraic sum will be nothing." (Habit and Intelligence, vol. i. pp. 65, 66.)

Simple naked materialistic atheism—that is to say the system which would resolve all into the laws of mere matter—is thus shown to be scientifically false: and this from data afforded by the sciences of matter alone, without referring to those of life and mind. The ultimate unity must be spiritual, in the sense at least of not being material.

It will be perceived that the foregoing argument has been stated in a physical and almost mathematical form. It may however be more satisfactory to state what is fundamentally the same argument in a more metaphysical and more general form. "The laws of nature," to use Mill's words, "cannot account for their own origin:"[1] and the laws of nature are many: they can never be accounted for as various results of a single law. It is not a possibility which human science can never hope to prove true: it is a demonstrable impossibility, that all the complex laws and varied phenomena of the world of matter, not to speak of the infinitely more varied and complex phenomena of life and mind, should be results of a single law. If this statement is contested as to purely material laws, though it cannot be reasonably contested even of them, it is at least incontestable as regards the relation between physical and mental laws. It cannot be maintained with the slightest semblance of an approach to truth, that the law in virtue of which all matter gravitates, and the law in virtue of which nervous tissue alone of all matter feels and thinks, are cases of the same law.[2] The unity which we seek in the laws of nature is no merely physical law like gravitation: it is not in, but behind, the laws of nature.

Proof in more general form.

[1] Mill's review on Comte (*Westminster Review*, April 1865).

[2] There is a possible misconception which ought to be guarded against here. It may be said in reply to the alleged impossibility of reducing physical and mental facts under the same law, that science has shown heat, which is a sensation, to be identical with motion, which is a physical fact. The reply to this is that heat, in the sense in which it is identified with motion, is a purely physical function of matter, having among other properties the power of producing the sensation called heat. But the sensation of heat is no more identical with the molecular motion called heat, than the sensation of sweetness is identical with sugar. See pp. 32, 33.

The truth that wherever there is plurality or diversity there must be unity hidden in or behind it, appears to be a truth of the reason, not a mere generalization from experience. The belief in this truth no doubt receives confirmation from experience, but its strength and depth are much greater than experience can account for. There is not the unvarying experience in its favour which there is for the law of gravitation; and yet no one who has attained to scientific intelligence can doubt that the law of gravitation may possibly be true for one part of the universe only, but that the law of unity behind diversity is true of all Being whatever.

The belief in fundamental unity is *à priori*.

The same may be said of the axiom of Causation: that is to say the axiom that whatever has a beginning has a cause, or, what is nearly identical with this, the axiom that wherever there is action there must be an agent. The identity of meaning between these two axioms will become more obvious when they are stated thus:—Wherever there is action there is agency: wherever there is origin there is causation. The *à priori* nature of this truth and its independence of experience, has been argued in the beginning of the chapter on the Freedom of the Will.[1]

Universality of Causation.

The axiom of Causation stands in the closest connexion with the axiom of Unity. They are not identical in the mere statement: but the intellectual instinct which seeks for unity wherever it sees diversity, is obviously identical with that which seeks for a cause wherever it sees an effect. The axiom of Causation, indeed, appears to be that case of the axiom of Unity which applies to successive events:—in other words, the relation of Unity as between successive events is called Causation.[2]

The axiom of Causation is a case of that of Unity.

The axiom of Causation, no less than the general axiom of Unity, leads directly and almost immediately to a question which cannot be answered from any data afforded by merely physical science. Physical science reveals causes,

The ultimate Cause, like the ultimate Unity, transcends Nature.

[1] Chapter 4.

[2] This appears to be nearly identical with Sir William Hamilton's view. See Note B at end of chapter.

but all the causes which it reveals are also effects : that is to say, it shows how one action is determined by another action which precedes it : but this latter has been determined again by another preceding one :—physical science cannot ascend to any absolutely originating cause : yet it proves that there must be such a cause ; for, as we have seen in a previous chapter, science makes it certain that the universe has had a beginning in time.[1] Thus, while the axiom of Unity proves that the universe has a principle of unity transcending physical law, the axiom of Causation proves that it has a Cause transcending physical causation.

These two conclusions are not identical.

These two conclusions are not identical, though in the statement they may appear so. The truth that the universe must have had a beginning in time is a truth of purely physical science, deduced from the laws of thermodynamics, and not known until the present age. The truth that there is a principle of unity behind all visible diversity and all natural law, on the contrary, is as much a metaphysical as a physical truth ; it is quite independent of any demonstration of physical science, and would not have been disproved or shaken if the succession of causes and effects in the universe had been proved to be without sign of beginning or end. The ancient Stoics believed in an infinite chain of causes and effects, without beginning and without end : at the same time, they believed in an invisible Unity transcending all visible diversity ; and so far as it is possible for man to see, there is no inconsistency whatever between the two beliefs.[2]

The argument from Causation was always probable, and is now scientifically certain.

It is not meant that the argument from Causation depends for its existence on the discovery as a truth of physical science that the universe must have had a beginning in time. The hypothesis that

> "Nature is but the name for an effect
> Whose cause is God"

was always a probable one : but it had, at least on its own ground, no scientific certainty until the discovery mentioned

[1] See p. 49. See also the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the motive powers of the Universe (Chapter 6).

[2] On this subject see the poem on Eternity, p. 90.

above had been made. The argument from the axiom of Unity, on the contrary, was always sound: it was always scientifically certain that the universe had a principle of unity transcending natural law: but it is only this recent discovery which has proved with the same degree of scientific certainty that the principle of unity is an absolutely originating Cause.

Nor is it meant that the truths of Natural Theology have been now for the first time placed on a satisfactory foundation. They depend on several distinct but converging lines of proof: and the effect of the discovery just mentioned is only to strengthen one of these.

What is the nature of the Absolute Cause?

But what is the nature of that universal and self-existent Principle of Unity which thus transcends all natural law? what is the nature of that universal originating Cause which is not itself an effect, thus transcending all physical causation? If no more is to be said on the subject, we must conclude that this Principle, this Cause, is "unknown and unknowable;" and if we call the unknown and unknowable by the name of God, the use of that Name will not give us any more light, and the meaning of the words will be in no way altered.

It can be conceived of only as a Will, guided by Intelligence: and if intelligent, then holy.

But more is to be said on the subject. At the close of the chapter on the Metaphysical Interpretation of Nature,[1] we have seen that "the only form in which it is possible for us to conceive of a truly originating and determining force [or Cause] is that of a Will: and the only Will of which we are able to conceive is one which, like our own, is guided by Intelligence towards a Purpose."[2] "And if an Intelligent Will, then also a Holy Will: for, if we ascribe intelligence to a Self-existent Being at all, we cannot believe the Intelligence to be less than infinite: and infinite Intelligence, or in other words infinite Knowledge, must include perfect knowledge of good and evil, and therefore perfect Holiness."[3] Between this conception and that of an unknown and unknowable Principle of Unity, or First Cause, or Ground of Being, there is all the

[1] Chapter 2. [2] Page 50. [3] Page 51.

difference between moral Theism and unmoral Pantheism.

Theism and Pantheism: their effects on character.

In the chapters on Faith I have spoken of the power which the belief in a holy God may have, and ought to have, in moulding the character. But the recognition of a mere First Cause, of which nothing is asserted except that it is self-existent and infinite, is very different from this. Such recognition does no doubt tend to produce that feeling of mystery and awe with which we approach the unknown and the infinite: and this feeling is an important element in character: it is the source of our sense of the sublime, and of all the deepest feelings with which we look on the external world. But, in the peculiar and highest sense of the word, it has scarcely any *moral* significance:—that is to say, it does not connect itself with the conscience. The belief in a God who is a Holy Will, on the contrary, not only excites all those feelings of awe, of mystery, and of sublimity which attach themselves to an Infinite First Cause; but it also connects those feelings with the moral elements of our nature. In a word, Pantheism—for so we may without injustice call the belief in an unknown first cause or ground of Being, of which nothing is asserted except that it transcends nature

Pantheism promotes reverence only:

—Pantheism, I say, ministers only to the feeling of reverence: but Theism, or the belief in a God of Will, Intelligence, and Holiness, ministers not only to the feeling of

Theism ministers also to the moral sense.

reverence, but also directly to the moral nature. We have seen that faith in a superior Being, and above all faith in God, is the most powerful means of moral growth: but an unknown cause and ground of Being, concerning which we do not know whether it has any moral nature or not, cannot be an object of that Faith which is able to mould the moral nature anew.

Summary.

Thus we see that the only conception which we are able to form of the Self-Existent Cause and Ground of all Being is that it is an Intelligent and Holy Will: and moreover that the belief in this is in the highest degree favourable to our moral nature.

Theism adds to without

As the words are here defined, Theism does not contradict anything in Pantheism, but only adds to it.

They both agree that the cause and ground of all Being is self-existent, transcending merely physical law, and inscrutable as to its essence by any faculties of ours: Pantheism says no more: but Theism goes on to maintain that this Self-Existent Being acts by Will, and that this Will is guided by Intelligence and Holiness.

contradicting Pantheism.

It is to be here observed that Theism is not an alternative or a rival to some other hypothesis: it is the only possible answer, or attempt at an answer, to the questions which we cannot but ask concerning the nature of the Self-Existent. Either Theism is the answer to those questions, in so far as they are capable of being answered to such faculties as ours, or no answer at all is possible; for Pantheism does not offer any answer.

If the answer of Theism is not accepted, these questions must remain without answer.

It is not asserted that what has been said in this chapter constitutes a demonstration of Theism:—it is little more than a presumption which is sufficient to make us seek for confirmatory reasons.

NOTE A.

THE UNALTERABLENESS OF CHEMICAL ELEMENTS.

The following remarkable passage is from Dr. Clark Maxwell's address as President of the Mathematical and Physical Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1870:—

"The dimensions of our earth, and the time of its rotation, though, relatively to our present means of comparison, very permanent, are not so by any physical necessity. The earth might contract by cooling, or it might be enlarged by a layer of meteorites falling on it, or its rate of revolution might slowly slacken [as a result of tidal friction],[1] and yet it would continue to be as much a

Extract from Dr. Clark Maxwell's address to the Mathematical

1 Something appears to be omitted in the printed report, and I have inserted the words marked [thus]. The effect of a layer of meteorites falling on the earth would also be to slacken its rotation.

and Physical Section of the British Association, 1870.

planet as before. But a molecule, say of hydrogen, if either its mass or its time of vibration were to be altered in the least, would no longer be a molecule of hydrogen. If, then, we wish to obtain standards of length, time and mass which shall be absolutely permanent, we must seek them not in the dimensions, or the motion, or the mass of our planet, but in the wave-length, the period of vibration, and the absolute mass of these imperishable and unalterable and absolutely similar molecules.

"When we find that here and in the starry heavens there are innumerable multitudes of little bodies of exactly the same mass, so many and no more to the grain; and vibrating in exactly the same time, so many and no more to the second: and when we reflect that no power in nature can now alter in the least either the mass or the period of any one of them: we seem to have advanced along the path of natural knowledge to one of those points at which we must accept the guidance of that faith by which we understand 'that which is seen was not made of things which do appear.'"—*Transactions of the Sections*, p. 7.

No one has a better right than Dr. Clark Maxwell to be heard on such a subject. Nevertheless I have not made any use of this argument in the foregoing chapter, because I am not convinced that it is a proved impossibility for what we now call different chemical elements to be shown to be really different states of one universal element. Perhaps Helmholtz's speculations on the nature of the ultimate atoms of matter, as being vortexes formed in an ethereal fluid which fills all space, may be found to point to such a conclusion.

NOTE B.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON ON CAUSATION.

THE following passage is extracted from Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. page 377 :—

Extract from Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics.

"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify? If we analyse our thought we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance, had previously an existence under a prior form.

We are utterly unable to realize in thought the possibility of the complement of existence being either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something, or on the other hand something becoming nothing. When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself: we view the Creator as the Cause of the universe. 'Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti,' expresses, in its purest form, the whole intellectual phenomenon of Causality."

Criticism on it.

This, it appears to me, is fundamentally true; but its expression is deficient in both accuracy and generality. Causation has to do primarily not with things but with actions:—the *cause of a thing* is an elliptical expression for the *cause of the event which has given origin to the thing.* The axiom that "everything must have a cause," or, as it is better expressed, "whatever has a beginning has a cause," is only a case of the wider axiom that "all action implies an agent."

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROOF OF DEITY FROM INTELLIGENCE AND DESIGN.

WE have seen in the foregoing chapter that the mere existence of the universe proves the existence of a self-existent Cause or Principle of Being transcending the visible world, and suggests that this Cause may be a Will. Further proof of the intelligent and moral nature of this Cause must be sought in the special facts of the universe, using the word universe in its widest sense, to include moral facts as well as physical, and revealed truth as well as natural.

We have first to consider the argument from Design.

Argument from Design.

This argument is inductive: it assumes no metaphysical postulate except that fundamental one which is assumed in all reasoning whatever concerning anything which has existence, namely the axiom that where there is action there must be an agent.[1] The axiom that where there is design there must be a designer, is only a particular case of this. There is no metaphysical difficulty in the argument from Design; indeed, it is a perfectly parallel one to the argument from Causation. If visible existence implies an invisible and supernatural Ground of Existence, visible design equally implies an invisible Designer. Whatever weakness there is in the argument from Design does not arise from any metaphysical question as to its relevancy, supposing the fact of design to be established: but from the want of clearness in the

Nature of its difficulties.

[1] Page 77.

indications of design, and the difficulty of determining its purpose.

What has here been said is not undisputed: indeed, it has become almost a point of philosophical orthodoxy to deny the relevancy of the argument on metaphysical grounds: to maintain that no reasoning can be valid from any marks of design in nature to a Designer transcending nature. It is difficult to see how this can be shown, except from the postulate that no reasoning is possible from data of the world of sense to conclusions transcending all merely sensible knowledge. I have argued against any such postulate in the chapter on the Possibility of a Revelation,[1] showing how it is contradicted by the commonest facts of belief. If this postulate is true, all theological reasoning whatever is invalid, whether on a basis of nature or of revelation: the argument from Causation is as worthless as that from Design. But if it is untrue, and if we may reason, as we have done in the foregoing chapter, from the visible and natural to the invisible and supernatural, the argument from design is a possible one.

The metaphysical objection to it is equally valid against all theological reasoning.

It is sometimes urged (and this is logically quite distinct from the metaphysical objection just mentioned), —it is sometimes urged that the argument from design is worthless, because resting on a defective analogy from human design. A watch, to refer to Paley's celebrated statement of the argument, is a work of human design, constructed by human hands out of previously existing materials. But the universe is not constructed, it is evolved: the same is true of all living beings, and it is from the structure of living beings that the strongest proofs of design are drawn. The physical universe has condensed out of a nebula; and the complex organisms of living beings have arisen by successive differentiations out of perfectly simple forms. It is argued that this process is too unlike any thing in human art for any valid reasoning to be based on the analogy between them.

Objection that the analogy from human design is defective, because the works of man are constructed, and those of nature are evolved.

[1] See especially p. 149.

Reply: the truth that design proves a designer is not a generalization from experience but a truth of the reason.

I reply that the analogy would indeed be worthless if the truth that design implies a designer were a mere generalized truth of observation:—that is to say, if we had no reason for believing it to be so, except that we have always found it to be so. But this is not the case. We may no doubt be mistaken in thinking that we see design: this is a question to be decided by careful examination of facts and accurate inductive reasoning. Darwin's entire theory of the origin of species, against which I have argued at length in my work on *Habit and Intelligence*, is an attempt to prove that the appearances of design in the organic creation are illusory. But when the existence of design is proved, the inference of the existence of a Designer is inevitable. In other words, when we perceive adaptation to a purpose, the inference is inevitable that the adaptation is intended. The certainty of this truth is altogether independent of the number of instances.[1] We believe it, not as we believe that all matter gravitates, because we have always found it to be so: but as we believe that parallel lines will continue parallel to infinity, because it cannot be otherwise.

To reason from design in human works, such as machinery and architecture, to design in the Divine works, is not strictly speaking analogical reasoning:—that is to say, the analogy is not the ground of the reasoning. If it were, the form of the reasoning would be this:—"What is true of the works of man is true also of the works of nature: in the works of man, design implies an intelligent designer; therefore the same is true of the works of nature." But this is evidently no true statement of the argument. We believe that design must everywhere

[1] The following is part of a note by Bishop Butler to his sermon on the Ignorance of Man, quoted by Bishop Fitzgerald in his edition of Butler's Analogy, p. 149:—

"The pillars of a building appear beautiful, but their being likewise its support does not destroy that beauty: there still remains a reason to believe that the architect intended the beautiful appearance, after we have found out the purpose, support. *It would be reasonable for a man, of himself, to think thus upon the first piece of architecture he ever saw.*"

The italics are mine. I have also substituted *purpose* for the very odd word *reference*, which is used throughout the passage in the sense of *relation*.

imply an intelligent designer, not because we find it to be so in the works of man, but because we perceive that it must be so: and those examples of human ingenuity and skill on which so much emphasis is laid, do not in any degree constitute the data of the argument:—they are only illustrations by means of which we learn to understand it. Had we not become familiar with design as a proof of human intelligence, it is probable that we should never have learned to regard design as a proof of Divine Intelligence: yet the analogy in this case no more constitutes the proof, than the parables of the New Testament constitute the proof of the spiritual truths which nevertheless they illustrate.

Instances of human skill are not proofs but only illustrations.

Thus the works of human art are not experimental proofs, but only illustrations, of the truth that design implies a Designer: and their value as illustrations is in no way affected by the fact that they are put together, or constructed, while the works of nature are evolved.

Summary.

But further: there are works of human art which, like those of nature, are rather evolved than constructed: I mean such works as poetry and music, which are not the work of the hands and are not put together out of pre-existing materials, but are formed within the mind. This case is really not exceptional but typical: for that which is contributed by intelligence to such a work of art as a piece of architecture or machinery is neither the materials nor the labour which puts the materials together, but the design: and the design manifests intelligence equally, whether it is ever executed or not: indeed, the action of pure intelligence ends where the action of labour on the materials begins.

Works of art which are evolved within the mind.

What has been said of those works which are evolved altogether within the mind is of course true only of those which are really original, owing everything to the mind's independent action, and nothing to the materials accumulated in the memory. In one sense it is no doubt true that everything in mental work is due to the materials accumulated in the memory: for the mind has no really creative power: it can only combine and re-combine. But

this, so far from vitiating, completes the analogy with organic evolution: for evolution is not creation:—matter is neither produced nor destroyed:—evolution is only combination and re-combination.

We now go on to consider the question what traces there are of Divine purpose in the universe.

Universal order in creation.

In the structure of the physical universe, we are first impressed, and never cease to be impressed, with the universal prevalence of order. To many minds it appears that order and harmony alone are sufficient proofs of a creating and guiding Intelligence, and that no special or detailed proofs of purpose are needed. To beings of a higher mental nature than ours, this might perhaps be sufficient: but we must reason from a human standpoint; and from this it will appear that many of the most remarkable of nature's harmonies are shown by science not to be proofs of intelligent purpose, but results following by mathematical consequence from perfectly simple laws of force. Thus, the spherical form of a raindrop is perfectly symmetrical, and symmetry is a kind, though one of the lowest kinds, of order and harmony: and it is due, not to any special design, but to the mathematical laws which must necessarily be obeyed by the capillary attraction of the molecules of water on each other, or by any attractive force whatever which acts alike in all directions. The spherical forms of the earth and other planets and stars are due to the same law.

Spherical form of raindrops and of planets.

Purpose served by the form of the earth.

It may be said that the spherical form of the earth at least, and probably of other planets, serves a most important purpose: because if the form of the earth were any other than what it is, the atmosphere would not be equally spread over it, and it would consequently be much less suited than it actually is to be a habitation for living beings. And it may be further urged that the perfect simplicity of the means whereby the spherical form of the earth is obtained, is really a higher proof of Creative Wisdom than if the same result were obtained by means of complex adaptations. This may be true. But though

the heavens and the earth declare the glory of God, they declare it unmistakeably only to those who believe in God already. If the existence of design is proved, or believed independently of proof, the simplicity of the means whereby the end is attained heightens, it is true, our idea of the wisdom of the Designer: but at the same time it makes the existence of design more difficult to prove. The spherical form of the earth does no doubt serve the purpose stated, but we cannot infer design from this when its form, so far as it is possible for us to see, could not have been otherwise. Design is not proved by acting right where there is no choice, but by choosing the best among an indefinite number of practicable courses.

We cannot infer design from this.

I say, *so far as it is possible for us to see*: not only because our knowledge is limited, but because we are ignorant of its limits. We reason, and we can scarcely avoid reasoning, as if the properties of space and time—in other words, the laws of mathematics—bore the same relation to Creative Power and Creative Intelligence which they bear to our power and our intelligence. But this may not be the fact: space and time, with their laws, may be created, like matter with its laws. This can neither be proved nor disproved: but if it could be proved true, much might probably appear the result of design which now appears the result only of mathematical necessity: or rather, mathematical necessity, instead of excluding design, might appear to be its most perfect proof.

The problem might be altered if we knew the relation of space and time to the Creator.

An instance of natural symmetry may be mentioned here, which more than almost any other is isolated in fact, and is therefore suitable for isolating in thought. I refer to the hexagonal columns formed in basalt. The basalt has split up into these columns by contracting as it cooled from its original molten state. The hexagonal form of the columns is of course determined by the position of the cracks that separate them, and this is a mathematical consequence of the principle of least action: for it is a mathematical truth that the total amount of resistance overcome in opening the cracks was less in consequence of their forming hexagons than it would have been if they

Hexagons of basalt.

had run into any other form. Now here is an instance of real though imperfect harmony (for the hexagons are seldom perfect) whereof we know the mathematical reason, and for which it appears impossible to assign any purpose whatever. Does this prove design and intelligence? The only answer that human faculties can give is that it proves no intelligence except in the mind which understands the mode of its formation. And this is but one instance of many: indeed, all inorganic nature is full of harmonies which we perceive to be the necessary results of mathematical and mechanical laws, and which are without any purpose that human faculties can trace. To this class belong the curved surfaces of waves, the blue veins of glacier ice, and the markings of agate, besides the spherical form of raindrops and the hexagonal columns of basalt already mentioned: probably also the symmetrical forms produced by crystallization, though we know scarcely anything of the causes to which these are due.

Other harmonies without apparent purpose.

We thus conclude that Divine Intelligence is not to be discovered by such faculties as ours in these simple and isolated harmonies.

Organic adaptations.

But what are we to say of organic adaptations? of the fin to water, of the wing to air, of the ear to sound, and of the eye to light? These are mentioned only as conspicuous instances of that wondrous system of adaptation of means to ends which runs through all organic nature: —adaptation of all the parts of each organism to each other, and of the entire organism to the conditions of its life and to the medium in which it lives. Do not such adaptations as these prove a Divine Intelligence? This was the strong point of Paley and his school. I regard the argument as still fundamentally sound, though it needs much modification in the statement since the establishment of the theory of evolution: that is to say, the doctrine that all living forms have been derived, by descent with gradual modification, from one or a few simple original germs.

The argument from design is sound, but needs modification to suit the evolution theory.

The soundness of the "argument from design" has probably been obscured to the minds of at least the English-

speaking portion of mankind by the use of the misleading expression *final cause* in the sense of *Creative Purpose*. This expression is doubly inaccurate: creative purposes, as manifested in organic adaptations, are not *causes* in the sense to which the word cause is now restricted, but belong to another class of relations, not setting aside the ordinary law of physical causation but working through it: and they are not final, for they are not ultimate ends but only ends which are also means.[1] As Kant has acutely remarked, in an organism all the parts are mutually means and ends: that is to say, all the parts minister each to all the rest. Thus, in the case of one of the higher animals, the organs of sense enable it to perceive its food and its enemies: the limbs, the jaws, and the muscular system enable it to secure its food and to avoid its enemies, and the brain guides the muscles in doing so: the digestive system enables its food to nourish it, the circulatory system distributes the nourishment through the entire body, and the nervous system enables every part of the organism to act in harmony with every other part. The entire organism ministers to the life of every organ, and every organ ministers to the life of the entire organism. But if we ask what *absolute* end is attained by this wondrous play of means and *relative* ends, physical science gives no answer. Purely physical science reveals in nature neither an absolute Cause nor an absolute Purpose.

Inaccuracy of the term *final cause*.

The question whether there are in nature any adaptations of means to purpose which cannot be accounted for as cases of ordinary physical causation, in the present state of biological science,[2] is identical with the question whether Darwin's explanation of the origin of species is sufficient to account for the facts

Is there anything in organic adaptation beyond the law of causation?

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 10, especially pp. 121, 122. The expression *final cause* is no doubt Aristotle's, but in the present state of science it would tend to accuracy to discontinue it, and use the word cause in the sense only of what is called by Aristotle *efficient cause*, and in modern language generally *physical cause*, or *cause* simply. Aristotle also speaks of *formal* and *material* causes, but these expressions have totally dropped out of use.

[2] Biology, the science of life, from βίος, life.

of organization. "It would be impossible for any man of the slightest intelligence simply to deny the existence of the most wonderful special adaptations in the organic creation. But though not a plausible doctrine it is an arguable one, and has been argued with great knowledge and great ability by Darwin in his *Origin of Species* and by Spencer in his *Principles of Biology*, that the laws of cause and effect are adequate to account for all these: that the adaptation of the eye to light, for instance, has been *produced* by the direct and indirect action of light on countless generations of living beings."[1] This question is one on which metaphysics can throw no light: it must be decided by the logic of inductive science. It is however much too large a question to be considered here, even in the briefest summary of the arguments. I will only mention the very remarkable truth, that as we ascend from inorganic nature to organic, from vegetable life to animal, and from the lower to the higher grades of animals, the relation of cause and effect becomes less traceable, while that of means and purpose becomes more so. Nowhere in the entire creation is purpose so evident as in the organs of special sense, the eye and the ear of the higher animals: and nowhere is it so difficult (I would say utterly impossible) to assign any physical cause for the facts, as when we inquire by what agency those wonderful organs have been formed. This truth affords at least a presumption, though it is not by itself a proof, that the relation of means and purpose is not capable of being resolved into that of cause and effect. I have considered this entire question at length in my work on *Habit and Intelligence*, and have there stated reasons which appear to amount as nearly to demonstration as the subject admits of, that neither "natural selection" nor any other physical cause or combination of physical causes can account for the facts of organic adaptation; and that they must be due to a guiding Intelligence.[2]

This is a question for inductive science.

Purpose is most evident where cause is least so.

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 120.

[2] On this subject see also "The Genesis of Species," by St. George

But what is this guiding, organizing Intelligence? Is it Divine? There are very serious difficulties in the way of thinking that it is. In the second volume of *Habit and Intelligence* I have argued that the intelligence which becomes conscious in the brain of man and the higher animals is fundamentally identical with the unconscious intelligence which guides the formation of the organism. Instinct constitutes a link of transition between the two: —not such instinct as that of the dog or the elephant, which does not appear to differ from man's reasoning power in any important particular: but such as the cell-building instinct of the bee, which cannot be attributed to knowledge of the geometry of the hexagon. "This view has the great advantage of including instinctive intelligence as a case of the same general principle with all other intelligence. It leaves instinct mysterious indeed, but not more mysterious than all life, and not anomalous, as it was under the old view:"[1] which, making the intelligence that organizes the body to be Divine, and the intelligence of the mind to be human and altogether distinct, left no room for the middle region of instinct:—and hence the marvellous character with which instinct is generally invested.

Organizing Intelligence is not Divine, but is fundamentally identical with mental and instinctive intelligence.

This view of the nature of the organizing intelligence will be new to most English readers, but I believe it is familiar among the Germans. The following remarks will serve to show that it is consistent with itself:—

"Energy, like matter, has been created. Energy (or force) is an effect of Divine power: but there is not a fresh exercise of Divine power whenever a stone falls or a fire burns. So with intelligence. All intelligence is a result of Divine wisdom, but there is not a fresh determination of Divine thought needed for every new adaptation in organic structure, or for every new thought in the brain of man." "The Creator has not separately organized every structure, but has endowed vitalized matter with [un-

Mivart, a work published since "Habit and Intelligence," and taking much the same view of this question. Mr. Mivart has the advantage, which I have not, of being a most accomplished practical naturalist.

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 6. See the whole of Chapter 27, from which the passage quoted above is taken.

conscious] intelligence, under the guidance of which it organizes itself."[1]

Reasons in favour of this view.

The view here stated has "the advantage of removing certain very serious difficulties connected with the Divine Purpose of Creation. I refer especially to the existence of such animals as parasitic worms, which are as well adapted as any others to their mode of life, but have probably no sensation and certainly no consciousness, and inflict pain, disease, and death on animals that possess both sensation and consciousness. On the theory of the independent creation of every separate species, these can only be regarded as instruments of torture devised by Creative Wisdom. But if we believe that they are descended from species which were not parasitic, and have become self-adapted to their new habitats, their existence ceases to be anything more than a particular case of the question why pain and disease are permitted at all. The same remark applies to what have been called unnatural, but would better be called immoral instincts: such as the working bees slaughtering the drones after they have fertilized the queen; the female spider endeavouring to devour the male as soon as she is fertilized; and the young cuckoo throwing the original tenants out of the nest to perish. It is surely easier to believe these instincts to be very peculiar and abnormal results of vital intelligence, than to believe each of them to be a special Providential endowment."[2]

The argument from Design ought to be called the argument from Intelligence.

At the present stage of the inquiry, the so-called argument from Design must change its name, and be called the argument from Intelligence. It has been admitted that physical science reveals no absolute purpose in creation. But it does reveal the presence of Intelligence:—unconscious organizing intelligence, conscious mental intelligence, and instinctive, or unconscious motor, intelligence intermediate between the two: and I believe it shows conclusively that intelligence, in all these its manifestations, is an ultimate primary fact, not to be explained as a

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 8. [2] Ibid. pp. 6, 7.

resultant from any unintelligent forces.[1] The argument from Intelligence is simply this: *As we reason from the forces of the universe to a powerful Creator* (this is no more than a statement in other words of the argument from Causation), *so we may reason from the intelligence manifested in the universe to an intelligent Creator.*[2] In other words:—As the finite forces of the universe, and the causes which are effects of other causes, suggest an infinite self-existent Cause: so the purposes in the organic creation which are only means to other purposes, suggest an absolute Divine Purpose.

Statement of it.

Suggestion of an absolute purpose in creation.

We may well believe that the Creative Intelligence which can give to living matter the power to organize itself, to develop instincts where they are needed, and finally to develop self-conscious thought in the brain of man, must be of an infinitely higher nature than the Creative Intelligence which was formerly supposed to have in six days constructed the universe and all the living beings contained in it, as a man might construct a machine.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence." In the first volume the point is argued with respect to organizing intelligence as against Darwin and Spencer: in the second, it is argued with respect to mental intelligence as against those psychological writers, of whom Mill and Bain are the chief, who endeavour to reduce the thinking power to a mere resultant from the laws of the association of ideas.

[2] It is sometimes said that the Hebrews had no metaphysical ideas, but this argument is used by the Psalmist. "He that planteth the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see?" (Psalm xciv. 9.) The purpose of the Psalmist however is not metaphysical but moral:—it is to remind evil-doers that their doings are not hidden from God.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PROOF OF DEITY FROM CONSCIENCE.

IN the previous two chapters it has been argued that the power manifested in the universe tends to show the existence of a God of Power and Will: and that the intelligence manifested in organic adaptations and in the mind of man tends to show the existence of a God of Wisdom. It is remarkable that these two proofs are co-extensive neither with infinity nor with each other. Divine Power is not shown, at least not to our understandings, in vacant space: it is shown only in actually existing things, and these fill an almost infinitesimally small portion of the celestial spaces. And Divine Intelligence, or Wisdom, is shown with perfect clearness only in the organic or vital part of the creation, which bears to the entire quantity of matter a proportion perhaps even smaller than that of matter to vacant space. It is nevertheless regarded as axiomatic that if any Divine attribute is proved to exist at all, it is proved to be infinite. This is purely an *à priori* truth, and could not conceivably be made known by observation or proved by inductive reasoning. The forces of the universe show vast power in the Author of the universe, but they do not prove that Power to be infinite: the intelligence manifested in the phenomena of life and mind show vast intelligence in the Author of life, but they do not show that Intelligence to be infinite. Mere observation can only prove that the Power and the Intelligence so manifested are too vast to be measured by us: their absolute infinity is a deduction from the axiom

The proofs of God from Power and from Intelligence are co-extensive neither with infinity nor with each other.

The Divine Infinity is an *à priori* truth.

that *the Self-Existent can have no limits*—a truth which neither needs proof nor admits of it.

Proof of God from Conscience.

We now go on to consider a third proof, or at least suggestion, of the Being and Nature of God, which is of more practical if not more theoretical value than all others, and yet is made known within a more limited sphere than either of those we have been considering. I mean the proof from Conscience. The proof from Power is made manifest wherever there is Being; the proof from Intelligence, wherever there is either organic or mental life: but the proof from Conscience is manifested only in the mind and the life of Man.

It is needless to repeat here the arguments of the chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense.[1] We need only remark that Conscience, or the Moral Sense, alone in the universe as known to us, "has an authority which does not consist in power." Conscience is identified with what is deepest in our nature, and yet it speaks to us with a voice which we recognize as not our own. What and whose voice is it? If the forces of the world around us are inferred to be the manifestation of the Creator's Will, is not the inference equally sound that the voice of Conscience within us is the expression of the Creator's Authority? and that the terrors of conscience are a well-founded and reasonable fear, not of the natural consequences only of sin, but of a supernatural and Divine vengeance?

It is not demonstrative.

This argument cannot be put into a demonstrative form. It will weigh with some minds and not with others. But it is necessary fairly to state what may be urged against it.

Argument against it, that moral law is not grounded in Will but transcends it.

We have already seen that the Moral Sense, in enjoining the observance of the Moral Law, bears witness to the truth that Moral Law transcends all, even Divine, will. The Moral Sense testifies that it is not possible even for God to repeal or reverse the moral law by mere decree.[2] If then the authority of the moral law does not consist or originate in Will, why should we suppose the voice of Conscience to be the voice of a Will or personal Authority? Why should we suppose Con-

[1] Chapter 3. [2] Pp. 138, 139.

science to be anything more than the voice of impersonal reason when it speaks on the subject of Duty?

Reply, that conscience speaks with a command.

I reply that the argument from Conscience, taken alone, is confessedly not a demonstration but only a suggestion. Such arguments can only be stated and left to enforce themselves. But there is this important and obvious unlikeness between the impersonal reason which declares logical, mathematical, and metaphysical truth, and the conscience which enforces duty; namely, that conscience, unlike impersonal abstract reason, speaks with a command. Reason speaks in the indicative mood, Conscience in the imperative: the intuitions of the Reason do not come into consciousness as if made known by a voice, but rather as knowledge comes through the eye, and do not suggest Personality in their origin. A voice of command, on the contrary, at least suggests Personality in its origin.[1]

Moral law belongs to our nature because we are part of the spiritual universe.

But whatever this argument may be good for, it remains equally true that moral law belongs to the spiritual universe, and has become identified with our mental nature because we are part of the spiritual universe: just as space and time are facts of the physical universe, and are forms of our thought because we are part of the physical universe.[2]

The extent to which the being of a God is proved or confirmed by the facts of the physical and moral universe is to form part of the subject of the following chapters.

The argument from conscience has the most effect on men.

Ancient Israelite belief in God.

Whatever may be the logical value of the proof of a God from conscience, it is certainly the proof which has had the greatest effect on mankind. "The heavens declare the glory of God," but they declare it only to those who believe in God already. To the Israelite of old it appeared self-evidently and irresistibly true, that all force is the expression of Self-existent Will: that Self-existent Will must be also infinite Intelligence, and that infinite Intelligence must be also perfect Holiness. To those who can so believe, everything echoes this truth, everything shines with God's glory: it streams most abundantly from the

[1] See Note at end of chapter. [2] Page 68.

heavens only because the heavens are far off and yet surround us; it shines most brightly in the sun only because the sun is the brightest of all things.[1] But to us moderns these indications of Deity appear rather as suggestions of what may possibly prove true, than as self-proving truths. They are not sufficient by themselves: the proof of God and of a spiritual world which is to satisfy us must consist in a number of different but converging lines of proof.

It is probable, however, that the difference in this respect between the ancient Israelites and ourselves is more in expression than in thought. It is most probable that, to all men alike, the revelation whereby alone they have really come to know anything of God is not made in nature but in conscience; and that with the Israelite of old as with us, the Divine light which streamed on his soul from the heavens was really the reflected light of conscience, though he might mistake its origin.

In this chapter and the two preceding ones, we have successively considered the three primary reasons which we have, independently of Revelation, for believing in God: namely, the arguments from the power displayed in nature, from the intelligence manifested in nature and in the mind of man, and from conscience. (It is only in a

[1] To our minds it is chiefly the starry heavens that are recalled by the familiar yet sublime saying that "the heavens declare the glory of God." But in the 19th Psalm the glory of God is associated chiefly with the sun. I subjoin the first six verses of the Psalm in Perowne's translation.

"The heavens are telling the glory of God:
And the work of His hands doth the firmament declare.
Day unto day poureth forth speech,
And night unto night revealeth knowledge.
There is no speech and no words,
Their voice is not heard:
Through the whole earth hath their line gone forth,
And their words unto the end of the world.
For the sun hath He set a tabernacle in them:
And He is like a bridegroom that goeth forth out of his chamber:
He rejoiceth as a mighty man to run his course.
From one end of the heaven is his going forth,
And his circuit as far as the other ends thereof,
Neither is there anything hid from his heat."

technical sense that these can be called *arguments*. They are, properly, means whereby knowledge flows in on the mind.)

The religious instinct

It has appeared to many thinkers that the Being of God is a subject on which all argument, or presentation of reasons, is superfluous:—that the existence in man of a religious instinct, or instinct of worship, independent of all conscious reasoning, is proof enough, and the only satisfactory proof, of the existence of its Object.

is an argument for the existence of its Object:

I do not mean to question that the existence of the religious instinct is itself a reason for believing in the existence of its Object. It would be contrary to all the analogies of creation if there were such a sense without an object:—it would be like an eye in a world of darkness. But I cannot agree that this exhausts the subject.

The mere existence of the religious instinct cannot supersede all other reasons for belief, unless it is shown to be a primary element of our nature, incapable of being resolved into any other: and this does not appear to be the case. Unlike the moral sense, the religious sense appears not to be a faculty anticipating and transcending all reasons for belief, but only a capacity for being acted on by reasons almost unconsciously, and in a way of which it is unable to give an account even to itself. In this mode of action there is nothing exceptional: it is thus that for the most part we are impressed and influenced by human character.[1] It is obvious that the existence of a capacity for being impressed by reasons in a peculiar manner cannot supersede the necessity of investigating the reasons that so impress it.

but it cannot supersede the necessity of further reasons for belief.

But further: if it were proved to be true that the religious sense, like the moral sense, is absolute, laying down its dicta *d priori* and in anticipation of proof: it would still be not the less necessary to inquire what facts and reasons there are in the external universe corresponding with this tendency of the mind:—just as in morals it is true independently of any confirmatory proof that truthfulness

[1] See the concluding paragraphs of the chapter on the Possibility of Faith (Chapter 7).

is a duty, but this does not make it the less desirable to be able to perceive that the constitution of society is necessarily such as to make truthfulness conduce to happiness.

NOTE.

THOMAS ERSKINE ON THE CONSCIENCE.

THE following extracts are from "The Spiritual Order and other Papers selected from the manuscripts of the late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen." Edinburgh, 1871.

Revelation in conscience of Divine purpose

"When I attentively consider what is going on in my conscience, the chief thing forced on my notice is that I find myself face to face with a purpose—not my own, for I am often conscious of resisting it—but which dominates me and makes itself felt as ever present, as the very root and reason of my being."—Page 47.

and character.

"This consciousness of a purpose concerning me that I should be a good man—right, true, and unselfish—is the first firm footing I have in the region of religious thought: for I cannot dissociate the idea of a purpose from that of a Purposer, and I cannot but identify this Purposer with the Author of my being and the Being of all beings; and further, I cannot but regard His purpose towards me as the unmistakeable indication of His own character."—Page 48.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

Analogy of the order of this work to the procedure of science.

IN the physical sciences, the logical order of procedure is first to study natural laws isolated, apart, and in themselves: and afterwards their resultant effects in the world of things.[1] Such an order is pursued, or at least attempted, in this work. In the preceding three chapters we have considered the separate truths of the Divine Nature:—the Divine Will, Wisdom, and Righteousness as made known respectively by Power, Intelligence, and Conscience;—and we have next to consider the manifestations of the Divine Character in the actual order of the universe.

The physical and spiritual order constitute one universe.

We speak of the physical and spiritual order as constituting one universe, in the same sense in which the laws of inorganic matter and of life both belong to one natural world.

But before considering the manifestations of the Divine Character in the structure of the universe, we must inquire what that structure is.

The simplest laws and properties are the most general.

The most important fact respecting the structure of the universe is that the simplest laws, properties, and forces are those which are the most widely and the most constantly in action. Thus the properties of space and time are simpler than those of matter and force, and they are universal in extent; whereas matter, so far from being universal in extent, occupies a comparatively very small proportion of space. And among the forces with which

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. pp. 209, 210.

matter is endowed, gravitation, which is the simplest, is the only one which is always in action: the molecular and chemical forces, which are much more complex, act only under favourable conditions, but gravitation never ceases to act. Finally, life, which is the most complex of all modes of activity, is also the most special and the least generally manifested:—that is to say, only a very small proportion of matter is endowed with life:—and among living beings, mind, which depends on the most complex nervous organization, is manifested only in certain classes, and is developed in any high degree in Man alone. Life also is of later origin than matter, and mind than unconscious life.

It appears to be necessary to the harmonious activity of the forces of the universe, that the stars and planets should be separated by vast vacant spaces. It is equally necessary as a condition of life, that living beings should be surrounded by vast masses of unorganized mattter. And mind is the highest development of a vast complication of vital powers, the greater part of which never become conscious, though in the closest organic connection with the conscious mind.[1]

Consequently the highest products are the least abundant.

"Thus in both space and time the most complex properties are the least widely distributed and the least constantly in action. Now, as the highest results are the results of the most complex properties and forces, it follows from the necessity of the case that the highest natural products are comparatively small in quantity: and this we have seen to be the fact: the highest products come at the end of long ages of preparation, and are then less abundant than the lower products. Life is a late and comparatively scanty work of creation, and mind is a later and scantier product still."[2]

This is recognized as right by the artistic sense,

"It is one of the many remarkable harmonies between the mind of man and the universe of which it is the noblest product, that this distribution of the products of nature, both in space and in time, is that which appears

[1] On this subject see the second volume of "Habit and Intelligence."

[2] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 216.

beautiful to the artistic sense. We recognize it as a maxim in art that the highest beauty should be introduced in relatively small quantity: thus in architecture, which is perhaps the best instance, such parts as cornices and capitals, which are at once small and conspicuous, can scarcely be too richly ornamented: but the effect would be very bad if the ornament which suits a cornice were spread over a wall, or if that which suits a capital were continued down the shaft of the column. In all art whatever the effect of an equal distribution of beauty over every part is not good. In all art whatever any part of a composition which rises above the general level of the whole in dignity or beauty will add dignity or beauty to the whole, provided that it is properly placed: while if any part sinks below the general level, it lowers the character of the whole. These principles are applicable alike to those arts which address themselves to the eye and those which address themselves to the ear. But in the latter—that is to say, in poetry and music, in which the parts of a composition are not simultaneous but successive—this further maxim is to be observed, that the highest beauty not only ought to be small in quantity, but ought to come last: and every previous part of the composition ought to lead up to it. In thus arranging his work, the artist without knowing it follows the example of nature." [1]

Series of functions in nature increasing in complexity as they decrease in generality.

To return from this digression:—We thus see in nature a series of laws and properties, progressively increasing in complexity, while at the same time they decrease in generality. The members of the series may be thus enumerated:—

1. Space and Time.

2. Matter with its forces. The properties of matter are further distinguished as—

(*a*) Common to all matter and always in operation; as gravitation and the general laws of force.

(*b*) Special to particular kinds of matter; as chemical properties.

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 217.

3. Life: which is further distinguished as—
   (*a*) Organic or vegetative life.
   (*b*) Animal, nervous, or sentient life.
   (*c*) Mental or conscious life.[1]

Variety increases with complexity.

It is also to be observed, that as nature increases in complexity from one member of the series to the next, it also increases in variety. This is for the very simple reason, that complexity gives scope and occasion for variety. Thus, space and time are absolutely uniform, but matter is various in the chemical properties of its different kinds, and the variety of the forms of life is almost infinite: so that nature may be compared to a tree, "expanding from the whole into the parts," to use Schiller's expression, and constantly branching out into increasing complexity, multiplicity, and variety.

Variety appears to be a purpose in nature.

Variety, indeed, appears to be sought in nature as an end, for its own sake. Vital development, in ascending from one grade to another, ascends not in one straight line but in diverging lines: so that the highest forms of a comparatively low type—in other words, the highest species of a comparatively low class—may be more highly organized than the lower forms of a higher type: just as the highest twigs of a low branch may be higher than the lower twigs of a higher branch.

Illustrations of this inorganic classification.

Thus, animals are on the whole much more highly organized than vegetables, but animals have not been developed out of vegetables:—they have been both developed out of originally vitalized matter, which contained potentially the germs of both. This, it is true, is not proved, though everything tends to prove it. But, independently of any theory of evolution, it is certain that the lowest animals and the lowest vegetables do not greatly differ: and that the difference increases as we trace them higher in their respective scales. This is an instance of a law which is general throughout the organic world, that groups which are in any degree akin are united to each other rather by their lower than by their higher members. The true form

[1] This idea of a series of sciences is taken from Comte's "Positive Philosophy." For the same series in a more detailed form see "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 208.

of all organic classification is that of a tree, having many summits though of unequal height. Thus, in the animal kingdom the three highest classes, developed along three distinct lines of descent or rather ascent, are the Articulata, culminating in the winged insects; the Mollusca, culminating in the Cephalopods (cuttle-fish and nautilus); and the Vertebrata, culminating in Man. Among all these, Man is by far the highest species, and the Vertebrate is the highest type: yet, according to the great comparative physiologist Von Bär,[1] a bee, which is one of the highest of the Articulata, is more highly organized than a fish, which belongs to the lowest class of Vertebrates.

Different kinds of excellence are in some degree incompatible.

In speaking of variety as an end in nature, we ought to remark that it appears to be in many cases, if not generally, impossible for different kinds of excellence to be produced together. Thus, a plant cannot attain at the same time to the greatest productiveness of both leaves and flowers.

We have seen that there is in nature a scale, or series, of decreasing generality and increasing complexity and variety. We now go on to speak of a different set of relations between the members of the series.

Each member of the series is dependent on the preceding one.

Each member of the series is dependent on the one which goes before it (that is to say, on the one which is simpler and more general than itself), but independent of that which comes after it. Mind is dependent on animal or nervous life, without which it cannot exist: animal life depends on vegetative or nutritive life: and all life depends on matter. The chemical, electrical, and thermal properties of matter depend on the general laws of force, and could not be stated in language without implying those laws: and the laws of force cannot be stated without implying those of space: —thus, for instance, it would be impossible to state the law of the parallelogram of forces unless the properties of the parallelogram were taken as known. But, as we have seen, this dependence is not reciprocal. Space and time may exist independently of matter and motion; the

[1] Quoted in Darwin's "Origin of Species," 4th edition, p. 404.

laws of force and the mechanical properties of matter do not imply chemical laws: matter may exist without life: vegetative life may exist without animal or sentient life, and sentient life may exist, and apparently does exist in entire classes of animals, without developing into consciousness or mind.

From this point of view the series may be compared to a building of many stories, each dependent for support on that below it, and each independent of that above it.

We have seen that the relation of dependence of one group of properties, or one function, on another, obtains both in inorganic matter and in life. But when we come to vital functions, we find a different though parallel relation, unlike any in the inorganic world: that is to say, the subordination of one function to another; the higher function working through the lower, and the lower ministering to the higher. Thus the mind uses the body as its instrument, or rather as its organ:—the mind works through the animal system, or in other words through the nervous and muscular life. The animal life works through, and by means of, the nutritive life, which supplies it with the energy that is to be transformed in muscular, and doubtless also in nervous action:[1] and the nutritive system works through the chemical forces, not neutralizing them, not setting them aside or suspending their operation, but controlling them and causing them to produce results in assimilation, secretion, and other transformations of matter within the organism which they could not have effected without the dominating agency of life.[2]

In the organic world one function works through another.

The physical and chemical forces are immensely more powerful than the vital ones, though the vital forces are able to control and guide the chemical. This truth may be illustrated by the relation of the engine-driver to the engine which he is able to guide, though the steam power of the engine is incomparably greater than the muscular power of the man.

Illustration of the engine and its driver.

[1] See the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the Dynamics of Life (Chapter 9).

[2] On this entire subject, see "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 13 (Organic Subordination) and Chapter 43 (the Classification of the Sciences).

Argument against life being a resultant from physical forces.

We may also remark by the way, that in the fact of this very remarkable relation between functions—the one working through the other—being confined to life and never found in unorganized matter, there is an argument against the probability of the properties and functions which constitute life being mere resultants from those of matter.

Summary.

To sum up the results of the preceding paragraphs:—

There is in nature a gradation from that which is general, simple, and uniform, to that which is special, complex, and manifold. At the one end of the scale are Space and Time, which are universal, perfectly simple in their elementary properties, and absolutely uniform. The gradation is through the various properties of Matter and Force: and at the opposite end is Life, the laws and phenomena of which are in the highest degree special, complex, and varied. Each member of the series is dependent on that which precedes it, but independent of that which follows it. Thus, Mind is dependent on unconscious Life, and cannot exist without it: Life is in the same sense dependent on Matter, and Matter on Space. But Space can exist without Matter, Matter without Life, and Life without Mind.

Life subordinates the powers of inorganic matter to itself, and works through them. A similar relation exists between the different grades of life: the mind works through the animal or nervo-muscular life, and the animal life through the vegetative life.

The highest products are those which depend on the most complex organization. The animal (or nervous and muscular) life is higher than the vegetative or nutritive life, and it depends on a higher organization than any which is found where there is no nervous life. The mental life is the highest of all, and it depends on the most complex nervous organization.

The highest products are the rarest. Mind is less abundant than life, and life than matter. This order of things is recognized as right by the artistic sense.

Disturbance of harmony.

But the possibility of a disturbance of the order is involved in this constitution of things. We have seen that the higher forces control the lower so as to work through them, and the lower ministers to the higher:—life controls matter, and matter ministers to life:—and yet the forces of matter are more powerful than those of life, and act more constantly and on a larger scale. This state of things is in but an unstable equilibrium, and is in fact often subverted. Life often loses its control over the chemical forces, and the result of this is disease and death.—Not that death, as such, ought to be regarded as a violation of the harmony of things. Death is a necessary condition of life, and it is a morbid feeling, though one which has a deep root in our spiritual nature, which regards death as the consequence of sin. But disease is a violation of the harmony of things, and is not a necessary condition of life. Disease appears in many if not in all cases to arise, if not to consist, in a revolt of the lower forces against the higher ones. Sometimes the chemical forces appear to revolt against and to overpower the vital ones. Sometimes the lowest of the formative functions of the living organism, namely the formation of cells, overpowers the healthy growth and renewal of tissue, and finally destroys its structure: this is what takes place in such diseases as cancer; and, according to a high authority, this is the nature of all acute inflammatory disease.[1] Sometimes the higher forms of life are destroyed by lower forms which become parasitic upon them; this occurs in entozootic disease; and if the "germ theory of disease" is true, contagious diseases generally are the result of an agency of this kind.[2]

Disease arising in a revolt of the lower forces against the higher.

[1] Beale's edition of "Todd and Bowman's Physiology," pt. i. p. 93, *et seq.*

[2] "There are numerous diseases of men and animals that are demonstrably the products of parasitic life, and such disease may take the most terrible epidemic forms, as is the case of the silkworms of France in our day. . . . But this is by no means all. Besides these universally admitted cases, there is the broad theory now broached and daily growing in strength and clearness—daily, indeed, gaining more and more of assent from the most successful workers and profound thinkers of the medical profession itself—the theory, namely, that contagious disease generally is of this parasitic character." (From a lecture by Dr. Tyndall at the Royal Institution, 9th June, 1871, as reported in *Nature* of 15th June.)

A similar destruction of harmony occurs also between the different grades of vital function, and within the mind itself. Thus, in paralytic disease the mind loses, to a greater or less extent, the power of controlling the body: in insanity, the reason loses its power of control over the lower mental functions. Moral evil, or sin, is a violation of harmony of the same kind: consisting primarily in the ascendancy of desires which ought to be subordinate, over conscience which ought to be supreme.

Moral evil.

Disease in human society.

Something like this occurs also in the organism of human society. The purpose of society is to secure, so far as possible, the happiness and virtue of its members: merely physical prosperity and wealth are good only in so far as they are means to these ends. But there is a constant danger of mistaking the means for the ends:—there is a constant danger of happiness and virtue being overpowered in the struggle for merely material wealth. This is true not of individuals only, but of entire societies: as the higher organic functions may be overpowered by the growth of mere cells, so the highest, that is to say the moral, life of a community may be overpowered by its lower, that is to say its industrial life. Thus, we have reason to fear that the recent vast increase of material wealth in the greater part of the civilized world has caused a decline of morality: and that the extension of manufacturing industry is injuring society in a way for which no merely material prosperity can compensate, by destroying domestic life.

But independently of such discords as disease, insanity, and sin, which arise within living beings, there are many cases in which the action of the inorganic world, instead of being ministerial to life, becomes destructive of it. I mean in such agencies as storms, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. And, independently of actually destructive agencies like these, the inorganic forces minister to life much less perfectly than they might do, even under the existing laws of nature. The earth's fair face is marred with burning deserts and frozen deserts: and these are no part of the necessary order of things:—without imagining

Storms, volcanoes, and earthquakes.

Deserts.

one of nature's laws to be altered, it is easy to imagine such a distribution of land and sea that there should be neither burning deserts nor frozen deserts, that many climates should be improved without any being injured, and that the earth should be a habitation, and probably a far pleasanter habitation, for a much greater number of living beings than at present.[1] If we regard the universe as a work of art, it will be seen that the deserts which mar the surface of the earth are parts which in beauty sink below the general level, and consequently, as remarked above, lower the character of the entire work.[2] And their only effect on human life is to make it more difficult.

The beauty of the world is not so distributed as to be of the greatest possible service to man.

Nature also ministers less effectually than it might do to the sense of beauty in man. The highest beauty of the earth does not lie "around our paths,"[3] but is to be sought on the summits of mountains and in their far-off recesses, where those who would enjoy it must climb for it. The benefit of this is obvious in relation to human character: if the highest beauty were "around our paths," we should probably be unable to appreciate it. It is good for us that there should be, as there is in the country and as there might be in cities, a moderate degree of beauty around our daily paths; and that there should be a higher degree to be enjoyed when we have been invigorated by climbing for it among mountains. But, though the actual distribution of beauty over the earth is in this way suited to man's nature, it has no appearance of being distributed with any special design. It is found in the most wonderful abundance over great part of Western and Southern Europe, but in Eastern Europe there is very little of it. And what is perhaps the most magnificent scene in the world has been beheld by human eyes but once:—namely, Mounts Erebus and Terror, in the Antarctic Continent:—two mountains rising out of a blue ocean to a height equal to that of Etna above the Mediterranean or Mont Blanc above the

Mounts Erebus and Terror.

[1] See Note A at end of chapter. [2] See page 226.

[3] "There's beauty all around our paths, if but our watchful eyes
Can trace it 'mid familiar things, and through their lowly guise."
MRS. HEMANS.

Valley of Chamouni, clothed with snow from base to summit except where black volcanic rocks break through.[1]

Life is adapted to the inorganic world rather than the converse.

This is but a simple case of the general relation. Life and mind are adapted to the inorganic world rather than the inorganic world to life and mind. It seems—and this in my opinion is not metaphorically but literally true[2]—that the laws and properties of inorganic matter and its forces have been first laid down, and that life and mind have adapted themselves to these. The adaptation is not always, perhaps never, absolutely perfect. The vegetable and animal species which inhabit a country in a state of nature are not always those which are best suited to its soil and climate. This truth, which is perhaps contrary to the general belief, is proved by the fact that in some cases the native inhabitants of a country have been to a great extent superseded by species introduced by man.[3] This is a truth of the same kind as what has been stated already, that the actual distribution of land and sea is not such as to produce the climates which would be the most favourable to life.

The changes of the inorganic world disregard life.

Though the laws and properties of matter constitute a preparation for life, yet the revolutions of the world of inorganic matter go on with total disregard of the life which the earth sustains on its surface:—storms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions are sufficient instances of this.

The preparation for life in matter consists in general laws, not in special facts.

In a word, the adaptation of the inorganic world to life is not special but only general. Life is prepared for by the properties of light and heat, and of the chemical elements which are built up into organic compounds: but not by their distribution in the universe as to time and place. Life is ministered to by air, water, and earth: but to the upheavals and subsidences of the land, and to the currents of the atmosphere and the waters, it is totally indifferent whether their effect is favourable or destructive.

Total effect of physical

Geological and climatic change on the whole, however, promote that progress from lower to higher

[1] See Ross's Antarctic Voyage.

[2] See "Habit and Intelligence" on this class of subjects.

[3] This process is now going on in New Zealand. See Darwin's "Origin of Species," 4th edition, pp. 242, 405.

orders of life which is shown by the geological history of the world :[1]—not because each change is separately favourable, for it is as likely to be the reverse: but because change promotes variation, and variation is the necessary condition of natural selection.[2]

change in promoting vital progress.

A somewhat similar relation to this exists between what may be called, by an expression which is scarcely metaphorical, the organic and the inorganic forces in human society. There are organic, organizing laws in society. We speak without a metaphor of the social organism. The family is held together by organic laws. By organic laws the family grows into a tribe, and the tribe into a nation: and tribes and nations are enabled to assimilate foreign elements of population to themselves. By organic laws also wealth increases, and knowledge increases and diffuses itself: and, finally, by organic laws nations grow in freedom and in the power of self-government. But there are other forces in human society which cannot be identified with laws, because they appear to be altogether lawless and inorganic, especially those which come forth in wars. Such forces have often shown themselves in their immediate operation to be purely disorganizing and destructive, and have been to the life of nations what storms and earthquakes are to animal and vegetable life: and no theory of Providential optimism, endeavouring to prove that every separate historical event is specially so ordered as to produce the greatest possible good, will stand before the slightest comparison with the actual facts of history. Political revolutions do however on the whole tend to promote human progress, though in a very different way from that of special Providential adaptations: for change of circumstances stimulates inventiveness and promotes change of character: and thus new types of character arise, the best of which are in the long run perpetuated by a process of natural selection, and become dominant:[3] while the destruction of old culture, and the

Analogy to this in the political world.

Natural selection in history.

[1] See Note B at end of chapter.

[2] See "Habit and Intelligence," especially Chapters 16 and 24.

[3] See the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on Natural Selection in History (Chapter 41).

ruin, it may be, of old types of character, give the new ones room to spread.

Want of harmony between mental faculties.

It is also to be observed that the harmony between the various functions of man's mental nature is far from perfect. I do not now speak of anything arising out of the sinfulness of man's nature, or anything analogous to disease. In the animal or vegetable organism every organ and every function is in general almost perfectly adapted to all the rest; when it is not so, we call the deviation a monstrosity. This is probably due to the fact that variation is for the most part a slow process, and injurious variations are kept down by the operation of natural selection. But this is not true of the mental functions: for their variations are so great and so rapid that natural selection is unable to hold them in any effectual control. In this there is nothing to be regretted:—on the contrary, were it not for the unusual variability and plasticity of his mental powers, man would be still a beast, or at most a savage. But from this variability it comes, that those powers which need each other's assistance are often not developed in any high degree together. How often are we compelled to remark that uncommon abilities are useless for want of common sense, and inventive powers useless for want of industry to work out the details on which success in invention depends!

> "What hand and brain went ever paired?
> What heart alike conceived and dared?" [1]

To sum up what has been said concerning the failures of harmony and the destructive agencies in creation:—

Summary.

The inorganic world has not been adapted to life:—life has been adapted and is always adapting itself to the inorganic world; but the adaptation is perhaps never quite perfect.

The adaptation of living beings to the inorganic world is not special but general. That is to say, the properties of living beings are adapted to those of matter, heat, and

[1] Browning's "The Last Ride Together."

light, but not to the actual arrangements of things—not, for instance, to the climates which are the result of the distribution of land and sea. These actual climates consequently are not the most favourable to life which are possible under the existing laws of nature : and the living population of any region is not necessarily that which is the best adapted to its climate and soil. Storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and the revolutions of the geological world go on without any regard to the life which they may destroy. Nevertheless the total effect of this class of agencies is to further organic progress by promoting variation and natural selection among variations.

The same principles apply to human history. Wars and revolutionary changes which at first sight appear to be purely destructive, may ultimately promote progress by giving occasion for the origin of new types of character and culture, and making room for them to develop and spread.

The vital forces control the inorganic ones and work through them : and the mind controls the bodily life and works through it. But this subordination of the lower to the higher is liable to be overthrown : and the result of this is disease. The same is true of the social organism : the industrial functions of society, which ought to be subordinate, may so overpower its moral life as to produce a diseased state.

Two observations remain to be made, both of them in the highest degree significant, yet pointing in opposite directions and apparently almost contradictiing each other.

The greatest beauty is lavished on the smallest things.

One of these is, that the greatest richness of beauty appears to be lavished on the minutest things. This is a consequence of the fact that the highest laws are the most special in their operation, and are manifested on the smallest scale. Many of the greater works of nature appear almost chaotic :—there is no order or regularity in the magnificent confusion of volcanic eruptions or of iceberg-drifts : but there is regularity and a high degree of beauty in the hexagonal crystals of snow, in the structures

of the seed-vessel of a moss, and in the sculpture of a microscopic shell. Thus the Diatomaceæ, a group of lowly microscopic organisms of vegetable nature, "have shells of pure silex, and these, each after its own kind, are all covered with the most elaborate ornament, striated, or fluted, or punctured, or dotted, in patterns which are mere patterns, but patterns of perfect and sometimes of most complex beauty. In the same drop of moisture there may be some dozen or twenty forms, each with its own distinctive pattern."[1]

But of all forces, those which are the highest and which act on the most limited scale are the forces that become conscious in mind: and mind is highly developed in man alone. All nature leads up to Man: Man stands at its summit. Yet, though the highest, Man is the most imperfect being in the universe: the one who falls the farthest short of his ideal perfection. We see a higher kind of perfection in flowers and in insects than in any of nature's mightier works: and we might not unreasonably have expected to find higher perfection still in the mind of man. But so far is this from being the case, that man's spiritual nature has till now appeared to the most thoughtful men to be a ruin.

Imperfection of Man.

The universe as known to us may thus be compared to some vast temple, of magnificent design and rich ornament, but partly unfinished and partly defaced: and with the central shrine the most imperfect of all, though showing traces of a design which would have been the noblest in the whole structure if it had been rightly executed. There is nothing new in this view of the universe: on the contrary, the idea that the universe is a ruin has weighed on the thoughts of mankind for thousands of years, expressing itself in that legend of the Fall which men have felt to be so profoundly appropriate that they have mistaken it for historical truth: though it would really not lighten but deepen the moral perplexity of the subject, if it were true that the world had been created perfect and reduced to the state of a ruin a few days after. But those who

Legend of the Fall.

[1] "The Reign of Law," by the Duke of Argyll, p. 199.

understand and accept the doctrine of Evolution, know that what has been mistaken for evidence of ruin is really only imperfection.

NOTE A.

THE EFFECT OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND SEA ON CLIMATE.

THE climate of any place is the resultant effect of a great complexity of causes, and is affected in several different ways by the distribution of land and water.

Effect of masses of ice on climate.

Climate is injuriously affected by whatever produces an accumulation of masses of ice, especially when these float down as icebergs into lower latitudes and cool the air. Icebergs appear never to originate in the freezing of the sea, but to be always formed in contact with land. The icebergs of the Greenland seas are broken-off fragments of glaciers which descend from the land into the sea:—the floating ice of the seas north of Russia appears to come from the mouths of the Siberian rivers.

Possible improvement of climate by changes in the Polar regions:

The climate of some regions of the earth would be much improved if Greenland and all other lands that give origin to glacier-icebergs were to sink beneath the sea, and if the forms of the Asiatic and North American continents were so changed that no large rivers should flow into the Polar Ocean. The effect of these changes would be that there would be scarcely any floating ice anywhere: the region about the mouth of the St. Lawrence would be immensely improved in climate; the climate of Iceland would be almost temperate: the ocean would probably be navigable to the poles, and the fisheries there would be accessible.

by submergence of burning deserts:

At the other extreme of climate, the improvement would be great if all burning deserts were to sink down and be replaced by seas. Instead of the parching winds of the desert, moisture-bearing and refreshing sea-breezes would then be borne to the neighbouring lands. It is true that the submergence of the African desert would injure, by cooling, the climate of Europe, but this might be counteracted by supposing all Europe moved some degrees to the southward. Room would be left for this in consequence of the African desert being replaced by a sea, which would be an extension of the Mediterranean.

by change in the position of the Asiatic continent.

The rigour of the climate of Northern Asia would be greatly mitigated, without probably any other climate being injured, if the entire Asiatic continent were moved some degrees southwards.

Room for new continents in the Pacific Ocean.

It may also be remarked, that in the vast regions now occupied by the Pacific Ocean there is room for entire continents to arise, and to be clothed with herbage and trees and inhabited by animals and by men.

The purpose of creation is not the maximum of human comfort.

No one who has studied physical geography and climate as a science will see anything strange in this note. But to those who cling to the idea that everything in nature is perfect and does not admit of improvement, I repeat, what has been sufficiently implied in the preceding chapter, that my purpose is not to find fault with the arrangements of the universe, but to show that the purpose of those arrangements, whatever it may be, is something else than the greatest possible amount of comfort to man.

NOTE B.

ORGANIC PROGRESS IN GEOLOGICAL HISTORY.

Organic progress is general though not universal.

Instances.

GEOLOGISTS and naturalists appear to be now tolerably well agreed that geological history shows organic progress on the whole :— that is to say, that higher and higher forms have been constantly appearing. Organic progress is however not a universal law, but only a general one, and may possibly be subject to real exceptions. But there are apparent exceptions which are not real. Thus the two orders of Reptiles which may probably be regarded as the highest—namely, the Pterodactyles and the Dinosaurians—have ceased to exist. This at first sight seems like retrogression, but it really belongs to progress, because these two orders have been superseded by more highly organized types adapted to their respective modes of life : Pterodactyles by Birds and Dinosaurians by Mammals.

The Enaliosaurians or marine Reptiles have also perished, giving place to the Cetaceans or marine Mammals : and, what is as remarkable an instance of organic progress as any, the Brachiopods, a class of bivalve shell-fish, have been in a great degree superseded by the Lamellibranchiates, a class also of bivalves and adapted to similar conditions of life, but very different in struc-

ture.[1] There are probably instances of real retrogression, but certainly they are not comparable for magnitude and importance to the instances of progress mentioned above.

It may be worth while to mention that in none of these cases is the group which has succeeded to another descended from that to which it has succeeded. Lamellibranchiates cannot be descended from Brachiopods, nor Birds from Pterodactyles, nor Cetaceans from Enaliosaurians. The origin of the class of Mammals is an obscure question, as no known group, either living or fossil, appears to be intermediate between Mammals and any other class. The Ornithorhynchus certainly has affinities with Birds, and the Armadillo probably with Reptiles: but it appears impossible that anything nearly resembling either of those two forms can have been the origin of the entire class of Mammalia. The Dinosaurians do not appear to have any special affinities with them. The affinities of the Dinosaurians, strangely enough, seem to be rather with Birds.[2]

These are not cases of the descent of one order from another.

[1] Perhaps, however, this can scarcely be yet regarded as proved. See the discussion of Mr. Lobley's paper on British fossil Lamellibranchiata in the Proceedings of the Geological Society, 24th May, 1871.

[2] "There can be no doubt that the hind quarters of the Dinosauria wonderfully approached those of Birds in their general structure, and therefore that these extinct reptiles were more closely allied to Birds than any which now live." (Huxley, Proceedings of the Royal Institution, 7th Feb. 1868; and quoted in his paper on "Dinosauria and Birds" in the Proceedings of the Geological Society, 10th Nov. 1869. See the whole of the latter paper; also one on the "Classification of Dinosauria," by the same author, in the Proceedings of the same Society, 24th Nov. 1869.)

CHAPTER XVII.

THE DIVINE PURPOSE OF CREATION.

THE question whether any Divine purpose is discoverable in creation is one which cannot be answered *à priori*. The only possible way of proving that it can be discovered, is to discover it. There is, however, an *à priori* objection to the probability of our discovering any such purpose, which it is worth while to answer. I mean the objection that this earth is so small a part of the universe, and its inhabitants so insignificant, that we cannot believe either that the earth is an object of special care on the part of the Creator, or that its inhabitants can attain to any knowledge of His plans and purposes. So long as it was believed that the earth on which we live was the actual geometrical centre of the universe, and that the sun, the moon, and the stars existed for no purpose except to give it light, there was no difficulty to the imagination in believing that the human inhabitants of the earth were the chief purpose of creation and the chief objects of the Creator's care.[1] But now we know our earth to be only

Objection, that we are too insignificant to be the special objects of the Creator's care.

[1] We can scarcely think that the persecutors of Galileo were alarmed at the merely verbal contradiction of his astronomical doctrines to the saying of the Psalmist, that God has "laid the foundation of the earth that it should not be removed for ever." The question of the motion of the earth was most probably only the immediate issue on which much wider and more important questions depended. The questions really at issue were whether the old theological notions of the universe, which were supposed to be deduced from Scripture, were true; whether the earth, where God had been made manifest in the flesh, was the actual geometrical centre of the universe: and whether there was a definite place above the visible heavens where God might be supposed to have His dwelling.

one among an unknown number of worlds, and analogy makes it probable that many of these are peopled by sentient and intelligent beings like ourselves: and can we any longer believe, as our unscientific forefathers believed, that we, the inhabitants of a single planet, are cared for by the Creator as children by their father?

This objection is one which addresses the sensuous imagination only: the reason is totally unaffected by it. The vastness of the universe and the multitude of worlds confound and oppress the imagination, and may so dazzle the reason as to prevent it from seeing the true bearing of the facts. But the undazzled reason is able to see that

This addresses the imagination.

> "Nought is great and nought is small
> To the soul that maketh all." [1]

The feeling that what is small is insignificant, naturally belongs to finite beings like us whose powers of perception depend on the magnitude of the objects: but to Him who is infinite the great and the small are alike, and it is as easy to guide the evolution of a thousand millions of worlds as of one.

Reply: what is small is not insignificant to the Infinite God.

This reply is sufficient, but there is another, which addresses itself to the imagination as well as to the reason, and thus meets the objection on its own ground. The objection which has been raised by the telescope is answered by the microscope.[2] While the telescope has exalted our conceptions of the vastness of the universe and the greatness of the Creator's power, the microscope has in the same degree exalted our conceptions of the minute perfection of the universe and the thoroughness of the Creator's care. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, it is on the minutest things the greatest beauty is often lavished. This is perhaps no reason for expecting that man is to be a special object of the Creator's care, but it is a conclusive reply to any argument founded on man's insignificance against such an expectation.

The telescope and the microscope.

[1] "There is no great and no small
To the soul that maketh all."—EMERSON.

[2] See Chalmers's Astronomical Discourses, where this idea is wrought out.

When a Divine purpose in nature is spoken of, it appears to be usually taken for granted that this purpose must be something beyond visible nature, in the sense in which a mechanical or engineering construction is not its own purpose, but has a purpose beyond itself. This, however, is not self-evident. It is at least conceivable that the universe has not been made like a work of mechanical art, for the sake of some end to be attained, but like a work of fine art, for the sake of its own interest and beauty: and such a view is supported by what we have seen in the preceding chapter, that variety appears to be an end in organic nature. This hypothesis, however, does not on the whole appear to be consistent with the facts. Were it true that the universe is a work of Divine art, framed, like works of human art, not for any purpose beyond itself but solely for its own sake, we surely should not find the strange and perplexing fact that Man, who is the highest work of creation, to which all nature leads up, is also the most imperfect being in the universe.

Hypothesis that the purpose of creation is rather like that of a work of art than a mechanical work.

Objection to this.

It is not at all improbable that there may be many distinct purposes in creation: and if this is the case, some of these may probably be discoverable by us and others not so. From what has been said in the foregoing paragraph, it appears most probable that the purposes which we are able to discern with most clearness will be special ends like those of a work of mechanical art. If this is so, we can scarcely doubt that they have relation to the sentient and conscious beings whereof the universe is the habitation.

There may be many Creative purposes.

Those discoverable by us probably have relation to sentient beings.

When we see all lower grades of being ministering to animal life, the idea is suggested that the ultimate purpose of creation is the happiness of sentient beings. But this is contradicted by facts :—by the facts of disease, and still more by those of the moral and social life of man. In consequence of the vast development of conscious mind in man, he incomparably excels all other animals in his capacity for happiness: and, for the same reason, in his capacity for pain. If then happiness is the chief purpose of creation,

Suggestion that happiness is the purpose, disproved by facts.

man's happiness ought to be equal to his capacity for happiness: or if not quite equal, the actual happiness enjoyed ought to fall short of the capacity for it only enough to serve as a stimulus to exertion and growth: and to fluctuate only enough to make happiness felt by contrast. It needs not much eloquence to tell how far this is from the reality. I fully believe that the sum total of happiness among mankind exceeds that of misery; but the mere fact that this should ever have been regarded as doubtful is proof enough that if happiness is the purpose of creation, creation is a failure.

Pain tends to its own extinction.

In reasoning from the facts of creation to the purposes manifested therein, we ought not to forget that all disease and pain tend to destroy life, and thus to cut off their own source, like a fire burning itself out. Against this however must be set the equally unquestionable truth, that the capacity for physical pain is very much greater than that for physical enjoyment. (The physiological ground of this fact is that moderate stimulation of the nerves of sensation is pleasurable, and extreme stimulation painful. It follows from this, that painful stimulation is capable of being carried much farther than pleasurable stimulation.) But the capacity for mental pleasure and that for mental pain appear to be about equal.

The capacity for physical pain exceeds that for physical enjoyment.

Physiological ground of this fact.

Happiness, however, is not the only nor the highest conceivable purpose of creation. We have seen in a former chapter[1] that the voice of mankind recognizes moral goodness—the doing of right actions and the formation of noble character—as an absolute purpose, worthy to be sought for its own sake, and so much higher than any other that all others ought to be postponed and sacrificed to it. It is therefore conceivable that the chief purpose of creation is not happiness, but virtue: the truth of this hypothesis, as of the former one, must be tested by its agreement with fact: but at first sight the facts appear to contradict it. Man is the only animal that admits of any

Suggestion that the ultimate purpose may be virtue.

[1] The chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense (Chapter 3).

Objection to this from man's sinfulness.

high moral development: and so far is man's moral nature from being what it would be if such a hypothesis were obviously true, that to many profound observers and thinkers man has appeared to be under the dominion, not of a wise and holy Creator, but of a power of evil.

Nevertheless this view of the defeat and failure of any moral purpose in the universe may prove to be superficial and misleading. If the purpose of creation is to produce the highest possible average of human virtue, then creation is a failure. But if it is *not to produce the highest possible average of virtue, but to make possible the production of virtue of the highest type*, then the purpose of creation has been attained. The highest conceivable type of character has once been realized in Christ: and it has been aspired after with varying success, and attained in various degrees, by an unknown number of His followers. It does not disprove the argument that none except Christ has been perfect. If we admit that the purpose of creation is not the highest average of virtue but the highest possibilities of virtue, there will be no farther difficulty in admitting that the partial attainment of a very high type of excellence is a worthier purpose than the perfect attainment of a lower type, not only for the man who aims at it but for the God who has endowed him with moral power and intelligence for so doing:—that a very imperfect though true Christian is a higher product of creation and a nobler work of God than the most nearly perfect character ever produced by classical heathendom. To state this truth more concisely:—*the purpose of creation*, in so far as it is discoverable by us, *is not so much the highest attainment, as attainment in the highest class.* This will scarcely be disputed. It is a commonplace of ethics, that what ennobles man is not so much the attainment of excellence as the struggle to attain it.

The purpose is not the most virtue but the highest virtue.

Partial attainment of a high type of virtue is worthier than perfect attainment of a lower type.

It must be admitted that the truth of these conclusions is by no means self-evident. They are, however, to be justified by their consistency with what we know of the constitution of the universe. We have seen in the preceding chapter that the highest, and what we naturally and

These assumptions are consistent with the constitution of things,

necessarily call the most valuable, products of creation, are the least in quantity:—life is less abundant than matter, sentient life is less abundant than merely vegetative life; conscious life, or mind, is yet more limited; and moral life, so far as we know, is developed in Man alone.[1] These facts suggest that in the Creator's view a little of a higher kind of product is of more value than very much of a lower kind: thus, one being which enjoys sentient happiness is worth more than a world of unconscious matter: one being whose happiness has a moral basis is worth more than a world of mere animals: one man who is capable of self-denying virtue is of more value than a world of merely innocent beings like good children: one man who is capable of self-devoting virtue is worth more than a world of men whose virtue does not go beyond mere self-denial: and one man who has attained to a high degree of the kind of virtue taught by Christ is of more value than a whole world peopled by men who had attained to an equally high degree of the virtues cultivated by the highest of the heathen nations.

and interpret the facts of that constitution.

There is nothing improbable in this hypothesis: and it is so consistent with the facts of the universe, that if it were required in order to make the facts intelligible, and to frame a consistent theory of creative purpose, there would be no extravagance in assuming it to be absolutely and universally true. But we do not need to assume so much.

"Look up thro' night: the world is wide."

There may be differences of moral government in different planets.

It may be that among the many planets in the universe, some support on their surfaces the greatest possible amount of merely sentient or animal happiness: others, the greatest possible amount of that happiness which has a moral basis: and others, the greatest possible amount of self-denying virtue. Others again may have their moral administration so framed as to afford the highest possibilities for self-

[1] I say *developed* in Man alone, though its germ, which consists in the maternal and social instincts, is general among the more intelligent animals.

devoting virtue of the heathen kind: and it may be that in not one of

"Yonder hundred million spheres"

have such possibilities of development in the highest moral type been opened to its inhabitants as those which are opened to us by the revelation of Christ. It is not asserted that these are facts: they are offered only as conjectures: but the possibility that they may be true lightens the moral perplexities of our world.[1]

Variety is a purpose in the moral as in the organic world.

The conclusion that the purpose of creation is the production of virtue of the highest type, must be in some degree qualified. We have seen in the foregoing chapter, that in the organic world variety appears to be an end in itself, and that all kinds of excellence cannot be combined in one. The same appears to be true in the moral world. There are many admirable types of human character which, under the limitations of our nature, are apparently incapable of being realized in the same individual. To mention one of the most elementary instances, the types of excellence in man and in woman are different, and cannot be realized together. And the Divine government of the world has provided for the production of different types of excellence in human character at different historical periods. The highest character that could be formed before the revelation of immortality was different from the highest that has been formed since: it did not differ merely as a less perfect specimen differs from a more perfect one —it was of a different type: a lower one no doubt, but capable of a perfection of its own, distinct from the perfection of the higher type, and not included in it.

This may be the reason of what has often appeared perplexing, namely why the revelation of immortality was delayed so long. And this principle may perhaps account for much which is otherwise unintelligible in the Providential government of the world.

Summary.

We thus conclude that *the purpose of creation*, so far as it is discoverable by man, *is not uniform excellence nor the*

[1] See page 10.

highest possible average of excellence, but the production of the highest and most varied types of excellence. I believe it can be shown that this truth affords a key whereby to interpret, not indeed minutely but in a broad and general way, the Divine purposes in both the natural and the spiritual world.

Suggestion that the purpose of creation is to give the greatest reward to virtue,

It is, as we have seen already, sufficiently obvious that the greatest possible amount of mere happiness is not the purpose of creation. But it is a more plausible hypothesis that its purpose is to give the greatest possible reward to virtue: and this may at first sight appear a sufficient solution of the problem, at least if we leave out of account those deeper moral perplexities which arise from human sinfulness. Nature is so constituted as to give an ample reward to man's industry, patience, and skill: and no one who believes in a Divine purpose at all can doubt that this result is designed.

Further, men not only sow and reap for themselves, but they can and do improve the inheritance of those who are to come after them: and it is obviously part of the Divine plan to give occasion not only for the industry which works for itself, but also for that less selfish and nobler industry which works for posterity.

contradicted by the facts that the reward is often lost, and is unfairly distributed.

But this is not a full account of the matter. The tendency of industry and perseverance to earn a reward is only a general tendency which is liable to be defeated in particular cases: the reward of industry is often destroyed by unavoidable misfortune. Further: though the tendency of such virtues as these is to earn a reward, it can scarcely be maintained even as an approximate truth that the highest degree of them earns the greatest reward. I do not now speak of the unselfish virtues: if they obtain no reward, they have sought for none: I speak of those virtues whereof the natural and legitimate reward is comfort, competence, and wealth: and of these it cannot be maintained that the reward varies in any sort of proportion to the virtue. What is called mere chance—that is to say, extraneous circumstances impossible to foresee—goes for very much in the distribution of such rewards.

These failures of justice are necessary to the production of a higher kind of virtue.

But these failures of justice in nature are the necessary condition of the production of another and a higher kind of virtue. A state of things in which the class of virtues that we may call industrial was always certain of its reward, would no doubt be a good school of industry and perseverance, but it would have no tendency to produce the far higher virtues of resignation to misfortune and faith in justice to be revealed. In this last remark the subject of a future life is anticipated. We return to the merely physical constitution of nature.

Sometimes Nature does not minister to man at all.

So far, we see that the discords of nature, which mar happiness, nevertheless minister to the development of virtue. But this is not always true: at least, we cannot always see its truth. If nature is to serve man at all, either by ministering to his happiness or his virtue, it must in the first place repay his industry and supply his wants. But nature does not do this everywhere. Uninhabitable deserts minister to man's life in no sense whatever: and concerning them we can arrive only at the very vague and somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion, that it is right for the habitation of morally imperfect beings to be itself imperfect.

Pain and ruin are not misunderstood harmonies.

All this however is a very incomplete answer to the question, why pain and ruin are permitted at all in a universe which is of Divine creation and under Divine government. It is simply and absurdly contrary to fact to call these "misunderstood harmonies." It would be equally true, and would indeed be only stating the self-contradiction without disguise, to call pain misunderstood pleasure. It is true indeed, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter, that destructive agencies minister on the whole to progress in the worlds both of organic life and of human society. But though the difficulty is lightened by this consideration, it is only diminished in magnitude: it is left as totally unsolved as before. The question remains, why an all-powerful and all-wise Creator has not attained the same results exclusively by the action of that orderly principle of organic evolution which, as we have reason to believe, is actually at work in the world of life

and mind,[1] without needing that process of "natural selection among spontaneous variations" by which organic progress is no doubt attained, but only by the destruction of the weakest. Might not this enormous waste have been avoided? And might not human progress have been attained without the frightful suffering produced by human strife?

Appearance of needless waste and suffering.

This is only a statement in modern language of a particular case of the old question why evil is permitted to exist in a Divine universe. The question can never be completely solved, but neither is it altogether insoluble. Moral questions are not capable of the same kind of determinate solution as mathematical ones, and moral perplexities admit of degrees of light and darkness.

Question why evil is permitted.

As regards man, the question admits of at least a partial answer. Suffering and sin are permitted because there are virtues which could not be developed in their absence. This answer is no doubt old and commonplace, but if there is a moral government of the world at all, it is true. It would be impossible in the sense of involving a contradiction, and would consequently be impossible to Omnipotence, that the virtue which endures suffering and conquers sin should be produced in a sinless world.

Answer, that there are virtues which could not be developed without it.

We do not assert that these remarks exhaust the subject. It remains unexplained why animals and very young children, which have no moral nature that can be developed or strengthened by the conflict with suffering, should nevertheless be exposed to suffering: and the fact of what is called original sin—that is to say, sinful tendencies in human nature manifesting themselves before the will has attained to any true freedom—is perhaps equally unaccountable and certainly far more deeply perplexing. But the greatest of all evils is guilt, or voluntary sin:[2] yet this is at the same time the most explicable: for it would be an impossibility of the nature of a contradiction, that there should be room for the production of the kind of virtue which consists in the self-determination of a free will towards righteousness and holiness, without the possibility

Original sin and voluntary guilt.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence." [2] See page 85, *et seq.*

The highest degree of evil is the least inexplicable.

of sin and guilt. Thus the highest degree of evil is the least inexplicable: and when we see this to be the case, the effect on our minds ought to be almost the same as if the entire mystery were solved.

We now go on to consider in fuller detail the subject of man's life regarded as a school of the highest virtue.

Injustice at the root of the social relation.

We must remark at the outset, that there is an injustice at the very root of the social relation.—This will appear a startling expression, but it ought not to be thought more so than the generally admitted truth that there is sinfulness at the root of human nature.—The injustice consists in this, that the innocent suffer for the sins of the guilty. This is no merely accidental result: it is part of the plan. Every human being is no doubt primarily entrusted with his own welfare:—the justice of this is obvious: indeed, it is the very definition of justice. But each is also, to a very large extent, entrusted with the welfare of others: and it is a consequence of this that one may suffer for the sins of another. We cannot imagine this consequence to be avoided while the conditions of the case remain what they are, without implying a contradiction in terms. But this injustice is permitted in order to the attainment of a higher kind of righteousness:—it is only in a world of mutually dependent beings that the social virtues can exist. There may be creatures which are entrusted each with its own welfare alone, and which nevertheless attain to a degree of virtue and holiness inconceivable by us: but it must be virtue and holiness of a kind unlike ours: for nearly all human virtue arises, directly or indirectly, out of the social relation, and could not without a contradiction be imagined to exist independently thereof.

We have remarked that virtue is often frustrated of its reward. It could not be otherwise in a world of sinful beings who are in a great degree dependent on each other for welfare and happiness: for the virtue of one may be defeated of its purpose by the sin of another. The tendency of virtue however is on the whole to triumph: in other words, there is in the actual order of things a

Tendency of virtue to ultimate

tendency for justice to be done, which, though often defeated, is sufficiently evident to warrant us in believing that its triumph would be perfect if time enough were allowed for its principles to work themselves out to their legitimate results.[1] This condition of sufficient time, however, is not afforded in our mortal life: nor would it be possible for us, under any imaginable conditions, to calculate how much time would be required for the purpose. Consequently ethical laws—that is to say, the laws governing the consequences of action, especially in the formation of character—are laws of tendency only: unlike moral laws, or laws of duty, which are absolute. Thus, the tendency of falsehood is injurious to happiness: but it is never possible to tell how much injury any particular falsehood will do: though, when stated as a law of tendency, this law is as certain as gravitation.[2] The Divine purpose in leaving this law only a law of tendency, however, will at the present stage of the argument appear obvious. Were the world so constituted that every action produced to the doer its legitimate result whether of reward or of punishment immediately, there would be no room whatever for virtue. Were the result absolutely certain, and certain to be attained in a calculable and moderately short time, such as a lifetime, the world would be much more favourable than it is to the development of ordinary, prudential, self-denying virtue, but it would give little or no room for the far higher virtues of heroism and self-devotion.

success, if sufficient time is allowed.

Ethical laws are laws of tendency only.

Purpose of this.

We have traced the discords of the universe first in the natural world and afterwards in the world of human society: and it now remains to show the operation of the same principle in the soul of man.

Duty, as we have seen, is absolute: the moral law demands obedience. But before we can obey a command, we must know what it is: and sometimes two duties are, or appear to be, in conflict. How are we to decide which of the two is to yield to the other?

Conflict of duties.

[1] See the chapter in Butler's Analogy on the Moral Government of God, where this idea is most ably wrought out.

[2] See "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 229, for some remarks connecting this subject with the laws of life.

There is not always any criterion whereby to decide. This truth is probably connected with the truth that ethical laws are laws of tendency only, and cannot be verified in individual cases: and as infinite time would allow ethical laws to work out their results in every case, so infinite wisdom would no doubt be able to discover a resultant between conflicting duties. It is however true for us, that when duties come into collision there is often no resultant discoverable by such faculties as ours: neither is cancelled, and yet only one can be obeyed.—The possibility of always discovering such a resultant is the fundamental false postulate of casuistry.—Thus, was Falkland right in siding with the king, or Hampden in siding with the Parliament? Was Johnston right in fighting for the Union, or Lee in fighting for his State? No answer is possible, except that all were right if they acted according to the best light they had. It is this collision of duties, or rather of moral claims, which constitutes the tragic as distinguished from the merely painful element in human life.

Often no resultant is possible.

Casuistry.

Historical instances.

It is probable, however, that the deepest tragedies are never witnessed and never written. The principles which are applicable to conduct are equally applicable to belief. If—to suppose a case the like of which is constantly occurring around us—two men, both of them totally without critical power, are taught a religious system which contains the truths of God and immortality, of certain judgment and possible forgiveness, of Christ as the Saviour: but together with these contains also such contradictions as that the Epistles of St. Paul are authoritative, and that the command to observe the Sabbath is still binding:—that those who are to become fit for the Kingdom of Heaven must become like little children, and that the human nature with which every child is born into the world deserves God's wrath and damnation:—that God is just, and that He can take the sufferings of the innocent as an expiation for the sins of the guilty:—that sympathy with all mankind is a Christian virtue, and that the only hope taught by Christianity consists in separating our eternal destiny from

Application of the same principle to belief.

that of the mass of mankind:—that deep, even painful, compassion for suffering and sin are part of the Christian character, and that Christianity forbids a hope or a wish for the deliverance of those whom God's unexplained decree has sentenced to incurable sin and unending misery:—that every good gift is Divine, and that good works which do not arise from conscious faith in Christ are of the nature of sin:—that Christ's yoke is easy and His burthen light, and that part of it consists in being required to believe that for the greater part of mankind it would have been better not to be created:—that hope is a Christian grace, and that Christianity requires us to regard the lot of our human brothers with despair:—that God is love, and that He has based the universe on a torture-chamber. Both are ignorant how to separate the wheat from the chaff in such a system, and are practically compelled to believe either all or none. One of the two cannot, or dares not, live without an object of conscious faith: he accepts the entire system, and endeavours, perhaps with success, to shut his eyes to its contradictions. The other cannot and dares not palter with conscience by endeavouring to believe contradictions, even in order to attain to faith in God: and he remains without any faith except that righteousness is equally righteous and sin is equally sinful whether we are mortal or immortal, and that if there is a moral government of the world at all it will prove to be a righteous one. Which of these two is in the right? Absolutely, neither: for it is not well to believe contradictions, and it is not well to be without conscious faith in God. But, relatively speaking, both are right if they have decided each in the best way that he knew how to decide. I will, however, state my own belief, that, provided always he does not make want of faith a pretext or an occasion of sin, the man is most worthy of eternal life who refuses, even from the highest motives, to palter with truth by endeavouring to believe contradictions. It is difficult if not impossible to explain how such moral trials as these are to serve the ends of virtue and holiness. Virtue is no doubt easier, and the average of virtue will be higher,

Peculiar kinds of virtue arise out of the conflict of duties.

where the path of duty is manifest. But all who really believe in virtue will probably agree in believing, though actual proof may be unattainable, that the trials which arise out of the conflict of opposing claims of duty may be the occasion of the development of other and in some respects higher kinds of virtue than any which can be produced where no such conflict can arise.

To sum up the most important results of the present chapter:—

Summary.

If the purpose of creation is either the greatest possible amount of happiness or the highest possible average of virtue, creation is a failure. But the fact that the highest products of creation are always the least abundant,—unorganized matter being more abundant than life, vegetative life more abundant than animal, and merely animal life more abundant than mind,—suggests that the purpose of creation is not the greatest quantity but the highest kind of excellence:—so that one being of a high type of excellence is more valuable in the Divine sight than an indefinite number of a lower type. An inferior degree of attainment in a high type appears also to be more valuable than a higher degree of attainment in a lower type. These are the purposes of creation, and have been attained.

The facts of the organic world appear to show that variety is sought in creation for its own sake. The same is true of the moral world, which is so ordered as to give occasion for the production not only of the highest virtue but of virtue of varied types. The attainment of all kinds of excellence in the same being at once appears to be in the nature of things impossible.

Suffering, injustice, moral perplexity, and sin are permitted for the purpose of developing the virtue which resists and overcomes them. Injustice is rendered possible by the fact that our happiness is to a great extent placed in each other's power: but this is permitted in order to give occasion for the virtue of unselfishness. Virtue is often disappointed of its just reward, but this is permitted in order to give occasion to the virtues of patience, resig-

nation, and self-devotion. The path of duty is often uncertain, and though this is unfavourable to the production of a high average of virtue, it tends to produce special and high kinds of virtue.

Reply to arguments against Christianity from its apparent failure.

In the truths here stated we have a reply to all arguments against the Divine origin of Christianity from its apparent failure to influence mankind. The assertion that Christianity has not kept its original promise, is simply contrary to fact:—Christ did not promise to His disciples that they should conquer the world: on the contrary, He warned them that the entire history of the Church until His coming again should be a course of trial: and that *because iniquity should abound* (meaning apparently within the Church itself), *the love of many should wax cold*.[1] Christianity has no doubt raised the moral principles acted on by civilized mankind: but though this is an encouragement to us, it is not the primary purpose of Christianity, and ought not to be put forward as the chief ground of our faith.

Practical importance of the subject.

These truths are not merely speculative: they are of the highest practical importance: and there never was a time when it was more needful to bear them in mind than now. In the present state of the moral and political world, the most thoughtful men are the oftenest tempted to conclude that the doctrine of Justification by Faith—that is to say the entire ethical system whereof Christ is the founder[2]—is disproved by facts, because in general those who believe are nothing the better, and those who disbelieve are nothing the worse. Unless we are to be morally thoughtless, it is impossible for us to be unmoved by such suggestions. But they are meant for our trial, and, as such, they are part of that order of things which is designed to make possible the production of high and varied types of virtue. With whatever force they may tend to discourage our aspirations after virtue, the reply to such objections is logically complete: for the soundness or goodness of an ethical system must be tested by

Ethical systems must be

[1] Matt. xxiv. 12. [2] Chapter 12.

tested by tendencies, not results.

its natural and legitimate tendency rather than by its visible results:—if its general tendency is obviously to promote virtue and holiness, and if notwithstanding it appears in practice not to promote them, the influence ought to be not that ethical theory is untrustworthy, but that there must be some cause at work which interferes with the legitimate tendencies of the system.

How ethical principles are to be experimentally verified.

I do not deny that the experimental verification of ethical principles is both possible and important:—it is both possible and important to perceive the nature and the worth of ethical principles, not only in their abstract form, but in their actual operation in moulding character. But if the connexion between the belief and the character which it helps to mould is to be in any degree instructive, it must be understood and perceived, not merely inferred from the kind of facts which statistics may prove. The knowledge, by actual acquaintance, of a single character which Christianity has made pure and unselfish, not only has but ought to have more influence in making us recognize and understand the effect of Christianity in promoting purity and unselfishness, than any possible amount of merely historical and statistical information about the social morality and the charitable institutions which have been developed in a Christian atmosphere; even supposing such facts, especially with respect to purity, to be more satisfactory than they are. Of the effect of the knowledge of character in moulding character, I have spoken at greater length in the chapter on Justification by Faith. Historical evidence on such subjects is however not to be despised, though it can never be of first-rate importance.

Summary.

In a word, the sufficient reply to all intellectual difficulties and all moral perplexities arising from the apparent failure of Christianity to attain its purpose, is that nature declares the purpose of creation not to be high average excellence but the attainment of the highest excellence by a few: and that Christ confirms this. *Many*, He says, *are called, but few chosen.*

But it may be said that this reply, while answering one

objection, raises another which is fatal. If we believe this, how is the highest virtue to be possible? If the only final reward for which the highest virtue can hope is to consist in separating its lot from that of the human race and attaining to an exclusive salvation, will not the natural and legitimate tendency of such a belief be to make unselfish virtue impossible?

Objection that the doctrine here stated tends to selfishness.

I reply, that it would be so if the doctrine here stated as to Creative Purpose were the entire truth. But it is not so. The attainment of excellence by a few, though it is the Creator's primary purpose, is not His only nor His ultimate purpose. According to Christ and His Apostles, though few are saved at first, salvation will ultimately be general. Christ, by being lifted up on the cross, will draw all men to Him:[1] and all enemies shall be abolished.[2] We shall have to say more on this subject in the chapter on Nature and Grace. This is also the reply to an objection to Christianity which is, I think, felt more widely than expressed: namely, that any moral agency, especially if it has the vast pretensions of Christianity, ought to attempt to benefit not a few but all: and consequently ought to act not as Christianity seeks to do, on the individual, but on the masses of mankind. The reply to this is that Christianity does promise the ultimate salvation of all:—it no doubt begins by acting on the individual, but by so doing it takes the best way to benefit the masses in the long run. The full proof of this is reserved for the time when salvation, which under the present dispensation is only individual, has become universal: but historical and ethical science confirm the truth of the principle that if men are to be made better and happier they must be acted on through their beliefs: and this action must begin, not with the mass but with the individual:—if the mass is to be benefited at all, it must be by benefiting individuals first.

Reply, that it is not the entire truth: salvation will finally be general.

Objection to Christianity that it does not act on the mass.

Reply, that it acts on the mass through the individual.

The objectors of whom I have now spoken probably deny Christianity as an authoritative system of truth. But the same reply is to be made to others who would

[1] John xii. 32. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 24—26.

Tendency to lower Christianity into a system of ordinances, in order to benefit the masses.

be the last to deny its authority in words. Among the teachers of religion and the administrators of ecclesiastical systems there is a constant and not an ignoble temptation to lower, I do not say the moral standard, but the intellectual character of Christianity. Christianity teaches men to come to God as children in a spirit of freedom, and its tendency is to educate them into fitness for such freedom: but its ministers too often dread freedom for the people, and for the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free endeavour to substitute a new yoke of ordinances. Their hope is by thus lowering the character of Christianity to make it more widely effective. Thus, in one Church they enforce the confessional, and in others asceticism and the observance of the Sabbath. It is an utter misconception to think that all ecclesiastical corruptions are due to the desire of the clergy for power. A very great part of them are due to the honest and not unfounded belief that the people over whom they have to rule are unfit for freedom and responsibility: and they have been seconded by the people themselves, who often prefer bondage: for unfortunately the natural belief that men will of themselves prefer freedom to bondage and knowledge to ignorance is by no means universally true. The answer to those who thus attempt to lower Christianity is the same as the answer to those mentioned above who would set it aside. Christ's plan is in the first place to confer spiritual benefit on individuals, and only through them to benefit the mass: and those who in Christ's name set aside His plan in favour of one of their own will certainly prove to be in the wrong. This is not matter of faith only, but in a great degree also of observation: for historical evidence shows that such attempts, however well meant they may be, tend to lower the moral standard of Christianity as well as its intellectual character.

Objection to signs and to philosophy.

The same principle affords the reply to another kind of objection to Christianity which appears to be widely felt. The Jews of the Apostolic age sought a sign, and the Greeks philosophy. There is a disposition now to reject both, and to think that religion ought to address the moral

and spiritual sense alone. With regard to signs, I have stated my reasons for thinking that a religion ought to have miraculous proofs.[1] But as regards the philosophy of Christianity, that is to say its transcendental doctrines, it may possibly be true, though it is by no means certain, that a religion addressing itself to the moral nature only, and not at all, or as little as possible, to the intellect, would be more widely and immediately beneficial than such a religion as Christianity, which makes vast demands on theoretical faith as well as on practical obedience. But if the purpose of Christianity is, in the first instance, not the most virtue but the highest virtue, it is obviously right that it should address itself to the whole of man's nature, intellectual as well as moral: and above all to that highest reason wherein moral and intellectual perceptions coincide.

It is right that religion should make demands on faith as well as obedience.

[1] See the chapter on the Proof of a Revelation (Chapter 10).

CHAPTER XVIII.

ORIGINAL SIN.

IN strictness of logical arrangement, the present chapter ought to be a note to the preceding one: but the great importance of the subject induces me to make it a distinct chapter.

Original sin defined.

We have defined Original Sin as "sinful tendencies in human nature manifesting themselves before the will has attained to any true freedom."[1]

Two errors:

There are two errors on this subject which must be mentioned.

that original sin is a theological dogma;

One of these consists in regarding the recognition of original sin as a theological dogma.—It is not a revealed doctrine but an observed fact: a fact of all human experience, and witnessed to as strongly by classical as by Biblical writers, as strongly by heathens and atheists as by Christians. It is no doubt true that religious men dwell more than others on the fact of man's sinfulness, but this is because they alone are able to see its importance. Sin appears in darker and therefore in truer colours in proportion as our conception of holiness becomes brighter. A man's religion may make an infinite difference in his way of feeling towards sin; but if he recognizes the facts of experience without endeavouring to explain them away, it can make no difference in his recognition of the fact of human sinfulness. The Biblical writers do not dogmatize about it, but take it as an indisputable fact:—a fact which it would be as

[1] Page 251.

irrational and as unmeaning to call in question as the facts of disease and death. This would probably be generally understood, were it not for the narrative of the Fall, which is obviously an allegorical legend, having been mistaken for history and erected into a dogma. It is often implied that those who deny the historical character of the narrative in the Book of Genesis of the introduction of sin into the world thereby deny the fact of original sin, but this is the same kind of misconception as if it were to be thought that those who deny the scientific character of the account of the Creation in the same book thereby deny the existence of the visible universe.

and that dependence on God belongs to the sinful nature.

The other error consists in confounding weakness, unworthiness, and insufficiency, with sinfulness. We know that "we are unable of ourselves to do any good thing." We are forcibly reminded of this whenever we become conscious of sin, but this inability is not itself any proof of the sinfulness of our nature, because we share it with all created beings, and even with Christ.[1] He, though He claimed to be co-eternal with the Father, yet declared that *of His own self He could do nothing.*

How far the moral difficulty of the subject is soluble.

We have seen that the purpose of God in permitting the existence of sin is to make provision for the development of that virtue which contends against it. At the same time we have admitted that this, though an adequate explanation of the fact of sin arising out of the self-determinations of a free will, does not fully account for the manifestation of sinful tendencies before the will has attained to freedom. But though the only possible explanation is thus inadequate, we cannot doubt that it indicates the direction in which the solution of the difficulty would be found if our knowledge and our powers were greater, and in which we shall find it when we have attained to know even as we are known. This, so far as I am able to see, is all that can be said on the theological side of the subject.

[1] "We are dependent creatures, not self-existent or self-sufficing: but there is nothing degrading in this dependence, for we share it with the Eternal Son." (From "The Spiritual Order and other Papers," by the late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, p. 235.)

I speak of the subject psychologically.

The object of the present chapter, however, is to approach the subject on the psychological side, and to show, as a matter of phenomenal fact, the way in which the sinful nature of man is developed.

Sin begins with self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness defined.

The first manifestations of the sinful nature come with the dawn of self-consciousness, and appear to depend thereon. *Self-consciousness* is not a mere synonym of *consciousness*. The first or primary consciousness is consciousness of sensation: self-consciousness is secondary, and may be defined as consciousness of consciousness. Thought is generally though not always conscious,[1] but it is not necessarily self-conscious:—thought becomes self-conscious when it becomes its own object, that is to say when we think about thinking. Pleasure and pain are not necessarily self-conscious, though they tend to become so: nor is there necessarily any self-consciousness in the desire of immediately attainable pleasure, or the dread of immediately threatening pain: (feelings which the higher animals appear to have in equal intensity with ourselves:) but all brooding over recollected or anticipated pleasure or pain is self-conscious. Self-consciousness appears to have the closest connexion with that power of directing thought at will, whereon depends the power of forming abstractions and of abstract reasoning; and these latter are the distinctive characteristics of man's intellect as compared with that of the animals.[2] But while self-consciousness and the power of directing thought at will are on the one side the source of all high intellectual and moral developments, they give on the other side entrance to all error and sin. The fundamental law whereon the development of original sin depends, is this:—that *any function is liable to be in some degree deranged by the direction thereto of self-consciousness*, so as to make it an object of thought. This law has its root in the organic life, farther down than the first development of a moral nature;—thus, the act of breathing is disturbed and becomes irregular if we think about it:—and I believe it is an admitted fact that the

Self-consciousness deranges even the bodily functions:

[1] Concerning unconscious thought, see "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 27.

[2] Same, p. 164.

bodily health is injured by making it the object of constant thought. And if this is true of the bodily functions, it is much more so of the mental ones, which are more susceptible of modification as the result of circumstances, and more liable to spontaneous variations, than the bodily functions: and for those reasons more liable to morbid perversions. much more the mental.

The quadrumana (apes and monkeys), which of all animals approach the nearest to Man in their bodily structure, are according to Darwin those which most nearly resemble him in their mental character also:[1] and the well-known mischievousness of monkeys, so like that of self-willed children, appears to be a dawning of the same sinful nature which is more fully developed in mankind. Mental nature of monkeys.

It is often said that in nature all is beautiful, but in the actions and works of man all is perverse: but this is greatly exaggerated. There are moral anomalies even in the animal world: I do not now speak of monkeys, which probably have a dawning self-consciousness, but of insects, which show no signs thereof:[2] and though there is much deliberate perverseness in human actions, yet it cannot be true that all human works are perverse, unless it is true that all works of inventive (as distinguished from imitative) art are ugly: and no one will seriously maintain this. The difference between the works of nature and those of man in this respect is one of degree: but it is, notwithstanding, enormous. It is not true, as was formerly believed, that the contrast is between Divine and human works. The intelligence which becomes conscious in the brain of the higher animals and conscious of itself in the brain of man, is the same with that which guides the formation of the vegetable and animal organisms, and acts in the wonderful instincts of insects.[3] Intelligence is an attribute of all life. The contrast between the works of nature and those of man, is that between intelligence acting unconsciously and consciously:—unconsciously in nature, consciously in the mind. In organic and instinctive life, intelligence acts unconsciously, and for the most Contrast between unconscious intelligence in nature and conscious intelligence in Man.

[1] See Darwin on the Origin of Man.

[2] Page 216.

[3] Page 215.

part harmoniously and rightly: in mental life self-consciousness has been awakened, and the first effect of this is to set intelligence wrong, causing it to produce ugliness in art, systematic error in science, perversity in conduct, and sin in morals.

Contrast between natural beauty and human art.

The contrast will become most clearly visible by comparing the forms of the organic creation with those of the human arts whereof the object is beauty.[1] As a rule, though not without exceptions, everything in the organic world is beautiful: and there are structures whereof the purpose appears to be beauty, just as in the decorative arts of man: I mean such structures as the tail-feathers of the peacock, the crests of many kinds of humming-birds, and the extraordinary developments of ornamental feathers in the various birds of Paradise. The purpose of these has been attained: they are beautiful. How different is human art! Men spontaneously admire beauty: a delicate discrimination of its refinements is perhaps always the result either of culture or of some peculiarly happy organization: but in a child before the dawn of self-consciousness the sense of beauty is healthy in so far as it exists at all. But art cannot arise in this absence of self-consciousness: before there can be art, the attention must be voluntarily and consciously directed to beauty as an object of thought: and the sense of beauty, thus becoming an object of self-consciousness, is at least in danger of being perverted. I do not now speak of the hideous idols which are still worshipped: these are perhaps in all cases symbolic, and though they are even a stronger instance of the sinfulness of man's nature than purely artistic monstrosities, they are not quite so direct a proof. I speak of such customs as that of tattooing, which according to some travellers is really ornamental on the back and round the waist, but must be hideous on the face: and the still more unac-

Savage perversities in ornament.

[1] If any one says that there is no standard of beauty; that the facts mentioned here prove that there is none: and that beauty and ugliness are only names for what we like and dislike: I reply that, independently of any other arguments, the unquestionable fact that there is a science of musical harmony affords a presumption almost amounting to certainty that there must be equally assured principles of the harmonies of form and colour.

countable perversity among some savages, of flattening the heads of their children by bandages. It is not always easy to ascertain how far unnatural practices of this class are due to a perverted sense of beauty, and how far merely to morbid instincts. Mr. Wallace, the eminent naturalist who has explored the Malay Archipelago, remarks that the practice of shaving some part of either the head or the face is so general among mankind that it must be due to an instinct: if so, the instinct must be a morbid one: and there is perhaps some reason for thinking that the practice of compressing the waist, which is so common among European women and not unknown among European men, is not altogether due to a perverted sense of beauty and refinement, but becomes an easily acquired morbid instinct.

Morbid instincts.

There are other perversities of practice which cannot be due to perversions of the sense of beauty: among which may be mentioned the custom, which I believe is, or was, widely spread among barbarous races, of cutting the flesh so as to make the blood flow, in real or pretended paroxysms of joy or sorrow.[1] Kindred with these are practices of mutilation; the best known of which, though by no means the only one, is the painful and revolting rite of circumcision.[2] Many savage perversities of practice may no doubt be explained as results of intellectual error. We shall have to speak of this subject further on. But this is certainly not true of all. It would appear indeed as if those practices which are most irrational and unnatural are the sign and expression of a lawless revolt against nature of that power in man which afterwards attains to true freedom and self-government.[3]

Other perversities of practice.

Thought is a function which is eminently liable to be deranged by making it the subject of self-consciousness. This may be instanced in its simplest form by the well-known fact that by letting the mind dwell for some time on the most familiar word, it will come to seem strange and unmeaning. Reasoning is generally sound so long as it is unaccompanied with self-consciousness. It is

Derangement of thought by self-consciousness.

[1] See 1 Kings xviii. 28.

[2] See Note A at end of chapter.

[3] See Note B at end of chapter.

thus that animals think. Thought in that unconscious and spontaneous state is able to reach but a little way, but so far as it goes it is mostly right and true. It must attain to self-consciousness before it can attain to any high development: but the first results of self-conscious thought consist in its following logic at the expense of reason and truth, and in being enslaved by language, which ought to have been its servant.

It is by reason of the disturbing effect of self-consciousness on thought that men often find it easier to believe truly and to act rightly than to state accurately the reasons for their belief and their actions. Every one has heard of the advice of the lawyer to his friend who had to act as a judge without knowing anything of law. "Decide according to your common sense, and you will be right: but give no reasons, or you will be wrong." It is no doubt necessary that the grounds of belief should be analysed: but it is not necessary that every man should do this for himself. In other words, logic and philosophy must be studied, but it is not needful that they should be studied by all. And if young men are taught that they have no right to believe or to do anything which they cannot justify in words, the effect will be to make them not truthful and accurate thinkers, but plausible talkers.

But the most remarkable errors of self-conscious thought belong to a more primitive mental state than ours, and are to be found in those early systems of thought where religion and philosophy are not yet separated. All mythology belongs to this class of error. Mythology, says Max Müller, is a disease of language: that is to say, it is produced by the power of language on the mind in causing it to mistake words for things and metaphors for facts. To mention a single instance:—what a world of misconception has been caused by the notion that chance, which is really nothing more than a name for the impossibility of certainty, must, because it has a name, have actual existence and be an agent: and, with the Romans, even a Deity! (Fortuna.)[1] But, as Mr. Tylor has remarked in his work

Mythology, how produced.

Instance: deification of chance.

[1] This instance is mentioned by Archbishop Whately: I think not by Müller.

on Primitive Culture, mythology in this sense of the word is probably a secondary formation:—that which is most probably the first stratum of superstition consists of what he calls Animism, or the theory which ascribes life and soul to all things.[1] This idea is worked out by savages into a complete philosophy of the universe, in a way which is perfectly logical, that is to say consistent with itself: but utterly irrational, that is to say inconsistent with the truth of things. In the instincts of animals there is no conscious reasoning, but they are perfectly rational, that is to say adapted to the nature of the world around: it is the introduction of consciousness into reasoning which is the source of error among men. One of the most curious instances of this clinging to logic in defiance of reason is the very general practice of supplying the dead with food and other articles for their use in the spirit-world. This is consistent and logical: the spirits of the dead are supposed to use the spirits or ghosts of the food, clothing, and weapons left in their graves: for the Animistic faith, or philosophy, of primitive man recognizes a spirit in everything, animate and inanimate alike. But the strangest, and to our ideas the most unintelligible, instances of the irrational logic of primitive thought probably belong rather to custom and law than to religion or philosophy. One of these is stated in Note C at the end of this chapter.

Animism.

Primitive philosophy is logical but irrational.

But the most direct effect of self-consciousness in producing sinful tendencies is probably when it is directed to the appetites. When the pleasures of eating and drinking become the subjects of self-consciousness, so as to be thought of when they are not present, the effect is a temptation to excess. The love of stimulants appears to be in some way connected with this, though I do not mean that their use is sinful when in moderation. It is remarkable and perhaps significant that the quadrumana, which are

Effect of self-consciousness on the appetites.

[1] This doctrine is what Comte calls Fetichism—a very inappropriate name. Animism is a much better word. Comte's theory that this was the earliest religious or philosophical doctrine among men is amply confirmed by Mr. Tylor's researches.

the animals most nearly resembling Man, are also the only animals which easily acquire a liking for tobacco and alcoholic drinks.[1]

The direction of self-consciousness to the relation between the sexes is however the strongest instance of all. On the one side, it gives origin to that love which, when pure, is the source of half the happiness of life and of more than half its charm: on the other, to all impurity.

The allegorical myth of the Fall.

It is this which has impressed the minds of the authors of that profound myth of the Fall of Man which is preserved in the Book of Genesis. That myth is an allegory of the entrance of the sinful nature into the human world through the awakening of self-consciousness, and its first consequences in the destruction of childlike innocence and the arising of bodily shame. But this was not a fall from a higher state, unless it is to be called a fall for the child to grow into the man. The awakening of self-consciousness was not a fall from a higher state, but an advance towards it. If the narrative of the Fall has any historical basis, it indicates that crisis in the history of Man when he attained to sufficient self-consciousness to become conscious of sin and to transmit traditional history to posterity. If this is so, its significance is historical as well as allegorical, and it is with profound truth that it has been placed at the beginning of the most venerable of all histories. But this is only a speculation, and not improbably a baseless one. The allegorical meaning, on the contrary, is obvious and lies on the surface.

Its possible historical meaning.

Nor can it be true that God commanded man not to eat the fruit of knowledge: man's mind is made for knowledge, and God never created faculties which He did not mean to be used. Nor was it thus that Man became subject to death: on the contrary, he was mortal from the first: death is a universal and necessary condition of life.

The myth of the Fall further asserts that sin is not an indigenous product of this world of ours, but has come to it from without. This can neither be proved nor disproved: but if it were proved to be true, the moral per-

[1] See Darwin on the Origin of Man.

plexities connected with the subject would be in no degree lightened, and the question why evil is permitted to exist in a Divine universe would be no nearer solution: just as Sir William Thomson's conjecture that the first vitalized germ may have been brought to our planet by a meteoric stone would not, even if it were proved, bring us one step nearer to an explanation of the origin of life.

The personality of the Tempter is incapable of proof or disproof.

The Hebrew account of the introduction of sin into the world appears also to imply the doctrine, which is so prominent in the later Scriptures, of the personality of the Tempter. This also can neither be proved nor disproved, but it appears to be a totally unnecessary hypothesis. I do not mean to deny that we have to contend against the world, the flesh, *and the Devil:* on the contrary, the last of these three names has a profounder signification if we thereby understand an impersonal principle of evil than if we take it to mean a personal tempter. If the Devil is a person, then the world and the flesh are his instruments of temptation, and he uses, or at least may be believed to use, no other. But as I understand the words, the flesh means the tendency to prefer the lower part of our own nature to the higher: the world means the tendency to set our affections on visible and temporary things in preference to invisible and eternal: and the Devil means the tendency to those sins which have their source and seat in the inmost soul. Hence the meaning of the proverbial expression that "pride is the sin of devils."

The Devil means the principle of purely spiritual evil, as distinguished from the world and the flesh.

Christ overcame all the three.

Christ resisted and overcame all these forms of temptation. His temptation of the flesh was the natural desire to make an unworthy use of His miraculous powers by turning stones into bread in order to satisfy His hunger: for it would be a mistake to think that every temptation of the flesh must be a temptation to an act which is in itself sinful. His temptation of the world was that which is recorded by His biographers as a temptation to receive as His own all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, on condition of paying homage to Satan: which was probably an impulse to use His miraculous power in order to carry out His plans for the good of

mankind by force.[1] His temptation of the Devil, in the sense in which the Devil is distinguished from the world and the flesh, was probably that which is described as an impulse to throw Himself down from a pinnacle in the expectation of being borne up in safety by angels. This appears to have been a desire for some tangible miracle, not for the purpose of display, (there is no suggestion of this,) but in order to confirm to His own soul the truth that He was the Son of God and the Saviour of the world: —a desire to walk by sight rather than by faith. So perfect was His victory over all these various forms of temptation that the struggle was forgotten. He afterwards said to His disciples, "Ye are they who have been with me in my temptations:" forgetting at the moment that He had faced and overcome the chief of them alone.

NOTE A.

THE MUTILATIONS OF SAVAGES.

Mutilations are sometimes sacrifices.

MUTILATIONS, according to Mr. Tylor, are in some cases practised with the idea of making a sacrifice of the part cut off: but he does not maintain that this is true of all. He says of one case, among the Mandan Indians of North America:—

Instance among the Mandans.

"In the Mandan ceremonies of initiation into manhood, when the youth at last hung senseless, and, as they called it, lifeless, by the cords made fast to splints through his flesh, he was let down, and coming to himself crawled on hands and feet round the medicine-lodge to where an old Indian sat with a hatchet in his hand and an old buffalo-skull before him: then the youth, holding up the little finger of his left hand to the Great Spirit, offered it as a sacrifice, and it was chopped off, and sometimes the forefinger afterwards, upon the skull."—*Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 363.

After mentioning other customs of similar significance in various parts of the world, Mr. Tylor says:—

This explanation does not

"These various rites of finger-cutting, hair-cutting, and blood-letting, have required mention from the special point of

[1] Page 186, *et seq.*

view of their connexion with sacrifice. They belong to an extensive series of practices, due to various and often obscure motives, which come under the general heading of ceremonial mutilations."—*Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 365.

appear applicable to all.

I quote some more facts of the same class from Sir John Lubbock:—

"Some of the African tribes chip their teeth in various manners, each community having a fashion of its own. The Nyambanas, a division of the Kaffirs, are characterized by a row of artificial pimples or warts, about the size of a pea, and extending from the upper part of the forehead to the tip of the nose. Of these they are proud. Some of the Buchapins, who have distinguished themselves in battle, are allowed the privilege of marking their thigh with a long scar, which is rendered indelible and of a bluish colour by means of wood ashes rubbed into the fresh wound. In Australia, Captain King saw a native ornamented with horizontal scars which extended across the upper part of the chest. They were at least an inch in diameter and protruded half an inch from the body. In some parts of Australia, and in Tasmania, all the men have a tooth knocked out in a very clumsy and painful manner.

* * * * * *

The native women in New South Wales used to tie a string tightly round the little finger, and wear it until the finger rotted off."—*Prehistoric Times*, pp. 485, 486.

Some of these practices are evidently due to a misdirected love of ornament, but it is difficult to see that the two mutilations last mentioned can be due either to that cause or to any notion of sacrifice.

NOTE B.

THE "SPECTATOR" ON SAVAGE CUSTOMS.

THE following extracts are from the review of Sir John Lubbock's "Prehistoric Times" in the *Spectator* of 4th December, 1869. I omit a good deal for the sake of condensation, but quote the reviewer's words without alteration.

"The point which strikes us as most remarkable in the new and extended matter on the customs of modern savages, is the accumulated evidence Sir John Lubbock has brought to bear on the

The capriciousness of savage customs.

apparent arbitrariness and caprice in the morals and customs of savage tribes. It would seem as if we beheld in the moral restrictions laid down by these different tribes, a number of purely accidental variations entirely without any rational or natural root, nay, in some cases almost the opposite of natural: arbitrary social or moral experiments tried as it were in the dark, and yet often commanding all the authority of what we regard as morality. Thus among the Fijians brothers and sisters, first cousins, fathers and sons-in-law, mothers and daughters-in-law, are severally forbidden to speak to each other or to eat from the same dish. The Society Islanders think it a shame to eat together. They go off to eat, each in solitude, and say they do this because it is right.

Instances.

"Among a tribe in Eastern Africa the bitterest insult is to charge anyone with cutting his upper teeth first.

Tattooing. Distortion. Mutilation.

"Add to this curious list of what we may call superfluous thwartings of nature, that it is all but universal among savages to have extremely painful processes performed by way of either tattooing the skin, or distorting the natural shape of some parts or features, or clipping off the little finger, or knocking out a couple of teeth, and we have a truly remarkable pile of evidence to prove the unnatural caprices of savage manners and morals.

These, being injurious, cannot be accounted for by the Darwinian theory.

"That kind of phenomenon, and still more the propitiation of arbitrary and capricious unseen powers, is at once strictly speaking human, and yet disadvantageous to the physical well-being of the creatures who exhibit it. Surely we see here something which is outside the scope and capacity of the Darwinian theory altogether; something which betokens the germs of a spiritual nature persisting in blind attempts to impose on itself an arbitrary law, in spite of the fact that it is not in any sense conducive to the physical prosperity of the being in question to do so. The more strictly unnatural, the less in harmony with true nature, these strange superstitions and customs of savages are, the more remarkable they are as indications of some confused but positive element in man that will assert itself, even though it be to his physical loss that it does so. Sir John Lubbock narrates a curious criticism of a Kandyan on the habits of the Veddahs in keeping true to one wife till death. That, said the Kandyan, was a brutal kind of practice, exactly like the practice of the monkeys. Here is a case then where the higher modern civilization has recurred to nature—the nature even of the higher brutes—and turned against the customary

Ideas of a Kandyan on marriage.

caprice of savage man,[1] and so recurred because it is in the highest sense to the true advantage of man. How then are we to explain the intermediate stage of savage arbitrariness and caprice? Certainly not at least as an improvement on the brute. We suspect that the Darwinian theory is pushed too hard when it is used to explain even the intellectual advance of man beyond the brutes. But even if it succeeds there, it will not apply at all to the first rude development of a sense of law and of liberty, and of the wild beliefs and social customs which thence result. Here we certainly seem to have elementary faculties groping for the light, and injuring our physical being very seriously in these elementary conditions, though destined to serve it very greatly in the end."

Savage capriciousness appears to show the first movings of a spiritual nature.

NOTE C.

CUSTOM OF THE "COUVADE."

I MENTION that extraordinary custom called the *Couvade*, not that I think it has any special connexion with original sin, but as the best instance that I can find of the tendency which is peculiar to man, and characteristic chiefly of savage and barbarous man, to be consistent and logical at the expense of reason. The following account of it is from the Introduction to Sir John Lubbock's "Origin of Civilization:"—

"Another curious custom is that known in Bearn [in the South of France] under the name of La Couvade. Probably every Englishman who had not studied other races would assume as a matter of course that on the birth of a child the mother would be put to bed and nursed. But this is not the case. In many races the father and not the mother is doctored when a baby is born. Yet though this custom seems so ludicrous to us, it is very widely distributed. . . . ."

Description of the Couvade.

"In Guiana," Mr. Brett observes,[2] ". . . on the birth of a child, the ancient Indian etiquette requires the father to take to

[1] The reviewer appears to be here under a mistake as to a fact. The Veddahs are savages: the Kandyans, according to the usual criteria, are comparatively civilized. (Both inhabit Ceylon.) This however does not affect his argument, which turns on the fact that the highest civilization has returned to monogamy.

[2] Brett's "Indian Tribes of Guiana," p. 355.

his hammock, where he remains some days as if he were sick, and receives the congratulations and condolence of his friends. An instance of this custom came under my own observation: where the man, in robust health and excellent condition, without a single bodily ailment, was lying in his hammock in the most provoking manner, and carefully and respectfully attended to by the women, while the mother of the new-born infant was cooking, none apparently regarding her."

Belief whereon it is grounded.

Sir John Lubbock goes on to mention his opinion that the ground of this custom is the belief, which he states on the authority of Lafitau [1] to be that of the Caribs and Abipons, that the child would be injured if the father were to do any hard work, or were not properly cared for.

Probable origin of this belief.

But what can be the origin of this idea, so contrary not only to actual fact, but to all the appearances of the case? An explanation of this has been offered—by Sir John Lubbock himself in another place if I remember aright—which appears to be the true one. Among the most primitive races, before marriage became an institution, kindred was recognized through the mother only: a child was kindred to its mother and its mother's relatives, but not to its father or its father's relatives. There are many relics of this state of things among barbarous nations, in which it is not uncommon for succession to property and to family names to be in the female line only. The introduction of marriage gave the father rights over his children, and led to the introduction of kindred and succession through the male line only: a state of things which we find in the early Roman law. Thus the father took what had been the mother's place in the family: the feeling arose that the child was more nearly related to the father than the mother, and thence the inference that for the child's sake it was more needful at its birth to take care of the father than of the mother.

The trial of Orestes.

"How completely the idea of relationship through the father, when once recognized, might replace that through the mother, we may see in the very curious trial of Orestes. Agamemnon, having been murdered by his wife Clytemnestra, was avenged by their son Orestes, who killed his mother for the murder of his father. For this act he was prosecuted before the tribunal of the Gods by the Erinnyes, whose function it was to punish those who shed the blood of relatives. In his defence, Orestes asks them why they did not punish Clytemnestra for the murder of Agamemnon: and when they reply that marriage does not

[1] "Mœurs des Sauvages Americains," vol. i. p. 259.

constitute blood relationship—'She was not the kindred of the man whom she slew'—he pleads that by the same rule they cannot touch him, because a man is a relation to his father, but not to his mother. This view, which appears to us so unnatural, was supported by Apollo and Minerva, and, being adopted by the majority of the Gods, led to the acquittal of Orestes."—Sir John Lubbock's *Origin of Civilization*, p. 112.

CHAPTER XIX.

NATURE AND THE RELIGIOUS SENSE.

The truth that the highest products of nature are the least abundant, and the higher forces liable to be impeded by the lower,

WE have seen in the preceding two chapters, that though nature abounds in suggestions of a Divine Creator and Ruler of the universe, yet when we seek for confirmation of these suggestions we are met by the facts that the highest and most precious products of nature are the latest to be produced and the least abundant: that the lowest forces are the most constantly and the most widely acting—the forces of matter more so than those of life, and the forces of unconscious life more so than those of mind: and that the lower forces often impede the action of the higher ones, producing disease.

Universal and commonplace as are these truths, they do not appear to be by any means instinctively recognized. When their recognition is forced on the mind, it affects different orders of mind differently.

as regarded by the scientific mind,

The man of science knows that it is his duty to endeavour to "see things as they are," and he at once makes these truths part of his system: and if the discovery that the laws of force, which are the lowest and least organic of all laws, are those which act on the widest scale, controlling and in a sense including all others—if this discovery ever brings to his lips an exclamation of disappointment, "Is this all? Beyond this is there nothing?" the answer soon comes, "Yes, this is all: beyond this is nothing; but within this is everything: the laws of the celestial motions, of sound, light, heat, electricity, and magnetism, and in a sense even those of

chemical and vital action, are all induced within the laws of force." We work inwards from the circumference, not outwards from the centre: the widest knowledge is the first to be obtained. Thus, in the exploration of the earth, science early reached the exterior limit of the subject, when the earth was measured and circumnavigated; but this only traced the outline to be filled up by the survey of every coast, river, and mountain in the world: and this, if it were complete, would be in its turn only an outline to be filled up by geological exploration. As in a picture, completion does not consist in covering a larger surface, but in filling in with more detail.

by the artistic or poetical mind,

The artist has in his youth dreamed of art and poetry as a power in the world: and it is a bitter disappointment when he finds that the most beautiful things in the world are not the strongest, but rather the reverse. But it is his nature to adapt himself to the world around him; the fact that the highest excellence is least in quantity commends itself to his artistic sense; and he soon learns to work with no more thought of moving the world than the heath or the harebell has of moving the rock on which it grows: thinking it enough if he can adorn the world.

and by the religious mind.

But the religious man makes the same discovery with different feelings. He instinctively feels that the higher forces ought to control the lower, and yet he finds that they do not. He has dreamed in his youth of a philosophy wherein, as in the scheme of the scholastic philosophers, theology should be the dominant science, and the knowledge of the universe should be based on the knowledge of God. But this dream is dispelled, and he awakens to find that, instead of theology, the dominant sciences are mathematics and dynamics, that is to say the sciences of magnitude and of force: he finds that the universe is dominated by those lower forces, especially gravitation, which act according to mathematical laws, and which show in their operation no clear proof of a guiding Intelligence. He sees the whole universe full of the sublimity of vastness and of power, the splendour of light, the magnificence of colour, and the beauty that arises from

the realization of mathematical law in actual form: but in the vaster phenomena of nature he sees no unmistakeable trace of intelligent purpose. The vastness of creation and the unintelligent might of its inorganic forces weighs on his mind; but he finds

"The countercharm of space and hollow sky" [1]

in those works of nature where power is scarcely displayed at all though beauty is lavished: in the crystals of snow, in flowers and winged insects and other living things:—and above all in the mind of man: which contains a principle transcending all merely vital principles, as they transcend all merely physical forces: namely, the moral sense, or conscience. Here, alone in the universe, does he find "an authority the essence of which does not consist in power," and a law which is not the less a law though it may be habitually disobeyed. This is the highest principle in the universe; it ought to rule—to be absolutely dominant—in its own human world: yet it does not so rule. The moral nature of man, like his bodily nature, becomes diseased: —as the chemical forces and the lower vital ones revolt against the higher vital forces and produce disease, so the lower mental forces—the selfish and animal desires—revolt against the conscience and produce sin.

The religious instinct feels that this ought not so to be: —that the lower vital forces ought to be under the control of the higher: especially and above all, that the entire nature of man ought to be under the control of conscience. And, finding in nature no hope of deliverance from sin, it looks for deliverance to that God of Power, Wisdom, and Holiness whom it believes to be the Author and the Lawgiver of Nature.

Origin of the religious sense,

Religion has been defined as "morality tinged with emotion." [2] This definition is inadequate, but it truly indicates how religion has its origin. So long as morality is merely recognized as having a right to be obeyed, as it was by the Stoics, it may never give rise to any truly religious feeling. But when the contrast between the

[1] Tennyson's "Maud." [2] Matthew Arnold.

obedience to which conscience has a right, and the disobedience with which it is treated in fact, becomes so painful that a cry—it may be of despair or it may be of hope—goes up to Heaven in appeal against the sin and for help, there is the germ of religious feeling: but it is not yet religion, for desire is not attainment. "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness," said Christ, "for they shall be filled:" but hunger and thirst are not their own satisfaction. To say that morality is religion, or that it can be a substitute for religion, is to offer hunger and thirst as an answer to the cry for meat and drink.

in a cry for deliverance from sin.

CHAPTER XX.

IMMORTALITY.

Origin of the religious sense in a longing for deliverance.

WE have seen that the religious sense is in its origin a longing for deliverance. We can scarcely say that it is at first a hungering and thirsting after righteousness. The Psalmist no doubt exclaims, "My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God:" but he oftener expresses a feeling which was probably much earlier developed in the soul of man, of desire for a deliverer from the wrongs and oppressions of the world. A Deliverer was sought first in the strife with external enemies, and not till afterwards in the strife with those enemies which make the soul their battle-ground. There is little doubt that this is the true account of the origin of the religious sense as developed in the history of mankind: but it is not the only possible way in which it might have been developed, and it is probable that in individual cases it may be developed independently of the sense of conflict. A man "hungers and thirsts after righteousness," aspiring towards holiness and perfection in his life and in his heart: and, feeling that he can by himself attain to it very imperfectly if at all, he raises his voice in a cry for help.

Will the deliverance be in this life or another?

Thus man learns to aspire after justice without and righteousness within: after justice between man and man and righteousness in the individual soul: and the very act of aspiring—the very strength of the aspiration—suggests that it may and shall have a perfect fulfilment and satisfaction. But where? Can it be in this life?

The course of this world is not such as to give any hope of a reign of perfect justice: the character of man, with all its vast possibilities of good, does not give any hope of such purity and perfection as will alone satisfy its aspirations. Can there be another life where all shall be fulfilled?

Possible origin of the belief in immortality in mere savage superstition.

It may be true that the belief in a life after death has a much humbler origin than this, and had at first no ethical significance whatever. It may be true that the suggestions of immortality were not originally made by the conscience but borrowed by the conscience from the imagination:— that they came from the strange phenomena of dreams, in which the mind seems to leave the body and to assume an independent existence.[1] But if it is true that the thought of immortality was not originally suggested by the moral sense, it is still one of the most obvious of historical facts that the moral sense has fastened on that thought and given it significance: and that many of the most thoughtful men, who reject and despise all superstitions about dreams and ghosts, do nevertheless cherish the belief in immortality as that which alone answers the aspiration after justice and holiness. There is perhaps nothing wonderful in the fact that savages, who are so ready to believe in the objective reality of whatever is suggested to their imagination or their fears, should believe in ghosts and in a spirit-world. But the fact that the belief in a spirit-world and in immortality exists in full force, though not universally, among civilized and scientifically taught men, is wonderful, seeing that this belief is opposed to all the obvious analogies of nature, and is confessedly without evidence of any ordinary kind. Were it nothing more, this would be at least a very noteworthy psychological fact.

If so, it not the less owes its significance to the moral sense.

Wonderfulness of such a belief.

Let us however seek for reasons in its favour. The vast importance of the subject, the way in which the belief has entwined itself with the moral sense, and the ethical grounds on which it is avowedly held, entitle it at

[1] See Mr. Tylor's work on "Primitive Culture" for this subject.

least to a respectful consideration: the obvious analogies which are opposed to it may be fallacious, and there may be evidence in its favour of an unusual kind.

Three threads of relation in physical science: Cause, Resemblance, Purpose.

There are in physical science three principles of logical relation which run through it like guiding threads. These are the relation of cause and effect: the relation of resemblance and difference: and the relation of means and purpose. For brevity let us call these Cause, Resemblance, and Purpose.[1] We go on to try what reasons are to be found under each of these three heads for believing in immortality.

Let us consider first the subject of Cause.

Causation

All the most obvious arguments from physical causation are opposed to any belief in immortality. It is true that physical science shows not only matter but force (or, more accurately, energy[2]) to be indestructible: and it has been argued that the same must be true of the spiritual nature of man. This analogy, however, is altogether erroneous. Energy cannot be destroyed, but any form of energy may be transformed into any other form:—heat into electricity, for instance, or electricity into heat:—and we have every reason to believe that the energy whereby living beings carry on the vital processes in which their life consists—in a word, vital energy—is a form of energy like heat and electricity, and capable of transformation into them. Life is obviously not immortal, for things which had been living cease to live: the matter of which their visible substance was made mingles with the dust or with the air, and the energy by which it was animated assumes some other form, probably that of heat.[3] Matter and energy are no doubt indestructible, but their combinations are transient, whether in a cloud, in a wave, or in a living organism. What is true of unconscious life is equally true of mind: mind is but conscious life, and modern physiology and psychology

gives no reason to think that life

or mind is immortal.

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 115.

[2] See Note to Introduction.

[3] See the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the Dynamics of Life (Chapter 9).

have shown that mental no less than bodily action depends on the nerves.

But there is a reason in favour of immortality yielded by the law of causation, which, if it is not conclusive as argument, has at least great force as suggestion.

The moral sense is not exclusively utilitarian.

However we explain the moral sense, it is beyond doubt one of the most remarkable characteristics of man. In the chapter on the Meaning of the Moral Sense,[1] we have seen what appear to be conclusive reasons for believing that it has not an exclusively utilitarian significance, and consequently cannot have an exclusively utilitarian origin:—in other words, that it does not approve and disapprove with exclusive reference to the tendencies of actions or classes of actions to affect happiness beneficially or injuriously, and consequently cannot have been originally produced, though it may have been indefinitely strengthened, by the habitual experience of such tendencies. We have also seen that the faith which we so confidently feel in the righteousness of the supernatural government of the universe, if any such government exists at all, is a faith transcending experience and independent of evidence, and pointing to a source higher than anything in the world of matter and life. What then is the origin of the moral sense, with this wonderful power of developing into a faith which presses forward to eternal things?

What is its origin?

The answer to this question is that the properties, whether bodily or mental, of every living being, have relation to the order of things in the midst of which it has been developed. Thus, space and time are forms of our thought because we are developed in the midst of a universe which exists under the conditions of space and time:—they are facts of the mind because they first were facts of nature. This is true, whether our knowledge of space and time is a mere result of experience or a result of intelligence transcending and anticipating experience though deriving confirmation from it. So, moral law belongs to the spiritual universe, and has become identified

It is from that spiritual

[1] Chapter 3.

universe whereof we are part.

with our mental being because we are a part of the spiritual universe. It must be admitted that the parallelism is far from complete. We can in some degree trace the process whereby we learn the properties of time and space. We perceive time by becoming conscious of the succession of events: we perceive space by moving about in it, and by becoming aware of the simultaneous existence of separated objects: but there is no similar way in which the realities of the spiritual universe can become objects of perception. In our moral and spiritual life "we walk by faith, not by sight." But must it ever be so? The physical world—the universe of matter, existing under the laws of space and time—is known to us. Mathematical and physical laws work themselves out to their results in the universe of matter: and are moral laws not to have a universe in which to work out their results? or are they laws of obligation and nothing more, with no reward for their observance, no punishment for their violation, and no means of making themselves ultimately and universally recognized and obeyed? It is not maintained that the argument is in any degree conclusive, but it has great force as a suggestion. It may be thus stated:—We have one set of powers which find their use and their justification in the world that exists in space and time: and another—namely the moral nature—which does indeed find its employment in the world that we live in, but does not find its perfect justification in any world yet known to us: and the inference is that such a world must exist, and may possibly be revealed to us. The antecedent probability of its being revealed is to be considered when we come to the subject of Purpose as a thread of relation in the universe. It is obvious that if there is to be such a revelation of a spiritual world, in which moral law shall justify itself as completely as mathematical law justifies itself in the world of matter existing in space, such revelation must contain a revelation of a future life, and only in that life can be completed.

Probability that moral laws, like mathematical, have a world wherein to work themselves out.

Resemblance.

The next thread of relation which we have to consider is that of Resemblance: and we now go on to inquire

what analogies of immortality are to be found in the facts of the natural world. The most obvious of these are the germination of the seed, which Saint Paul, in what is probably the most eloquent passage in all literature, has compared to the Resurrection: and the escape of the butterfly from its chrysalis-skin, with other and higher powers than what it possessed when a larva, which has often been compared to the "putting on of immortality" by the soul after death. These two analogies are almost the same, being both taken from the facts of vital development. The analogy of the wingless larva changing into a winged insect tends to make it, not perhaps more credible but certainly more imaginable, that we are larvæ:—that as some insects never acquire wings but remain all their lives without any metamorphosis, while others acquire wings at their last metamorphosis,[1] so no animal acquires an immortal nature except man alone.

Natural analogies of immortality.

Germination.

Insect metamorphosis.

We may be larvæ.

It is an obvious objection to this, that the analogy, if it has any relevancy at all, tells not for but against immortality: for a Resurrection is nothing if it is not the entrance to immortal life: and the plant which develops out of the seed, and the butterfly into which the larva is transformed, are neither of them immortal; on the contrary, the plant gives birth to new seeds, the winged insect gives birth to new larvæ, and both die. This is true, and it deprives the analogy of any value as evidence. But the analogy is notwithstanding a much better and closer one than those were aware of who first saw it. They no doubt believed, as the greater part of mankind still believe, that the process of birth, reproduction, and death, goes on in an unending circle: but we have seen convincing reasons for believing that it is not so: that there is organic evolution and progress, so that every living being does not always produce seed or young after its kind, but all forms of life have ultimately sprung from simple germs, and winged orders of insects are descended from wingless ones.

The theory of evolution makes the analogy better than it formerly appeared.

[1] All winged insects acquire their wings by metamorphosis, though some undergo more metamorphosis than others:—no insect leaves the egg with wings.

I do not attach much importance to these analogies: nevertheless I think it worth while to state them at length; partly because they have greatly influenced the imagination of men, and partly because it is not impossible that a future generation may attach more importance to them than we are inclined to do.

What is the nature of immortal life?

The question may be asked, what we suppose to be the nature and the properties of immortal life. "How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" I will not follow St. Paul in calling this question a foolish one, but his reply to it is sufficient.

We do not know, because it is beyond our experience.

We cannot tell what its nature is, because it is altogether outside our present experience; but that is no reason for thinking its existence impossible, for we have no reason to think that our experience is any measure of the Creator's resources. Space and time give no suggestion of the properties of matter and force; the universal properties of matter, such as inertia and gravitation, give no suggestion of magnetism or any other polar force: the polar forces give no suggestion of life, and vegetative life gives no suggestion of consciousness.

It may differ from the nature which we know, only as life from matter.

So it may be when immortal life is attained: a new state of being may be attained, of which our present experience contains no suggestion, yet differing from that nature which we know and whereof we are a part, only as one grade of being in that nature differs from another: and as matter and force are a preparation for organic life, so may organic and mental life be a preparation for spiritual and immortal life: and the whole world of matter and life may be a preparation for the order of things in which immortal life is to be revealed.

We do not suppose immortal life to be developed out of the present life by any natural agency. It must be a new creation—a new result of the same Power that created the world of matter. This appears to be true of merely physical life:—the question is no doubt a controverted one, but the most probable opinion appears to be that life is not a resultant from any physical and chemical forces, but had its origin in the direct action of Creative Power. But whether this is true of physical life or not, it is

certainly true of immortal life. Those who believe in immortal life at all, instinctively recognize this truth. Mankind habitually unite the conception of immortality with that of a personal God: immortality is generally doubted and denied by Pantheists, that is to say by those who believe in no God beyond the universe of matter and mind: and it is generally believed in by Theists, that is to say by those who believe in a Divine Will and Wisdom existing before and independently of all their manifestations in creation. This is profoundly consistent. In one sense no doubt a future life must be conceived of as a continuation of the present: but it can be originated only by Creative Power, and only a God of Will can create.

Connexion of the belief in immortality with that in a personal God.

The third thread of relation which we have to consider is that of Purpose. From this point of view the analogies are much closer and more satisfactory than from that of Resemblance.

Purpose.

In the chapter on the Divine Purpose of Creation,[1] we have seen that if the purpose of creation is discoverable by us at all, the only possible solution of the problem is this:—that human virtue has for its own sake an absolute value in the Divine sight: and that in the administration of this planet at least, the chief Divine purpose is to render possible the production, in however small a quantity, of the highest virtue.

But to this view it is an obvious objection, and, though not conclusive, a formidable objection, that the purpose has not been attained:—that the highest virtue attained by man is too imperfect to be a conceivable purpose for creation.

Objection that the end is not sufficiently attained.

> "A life,
> With large results so little rife,
> Though bearable, seems hardly worth
> This pomp of worlds, this pain of birth."

Quotation from Matthew Arnold's "Resignation."

Christ alone was perfect: but He came into the world

[1] Chapter 17.

"not to be ministered unto but to minister:" and can we believe that the purpose of His life has been attained by the very imperfect virtue and holiness which the best of His followers have learned from Him? We have no doubt seen that imperfect attainment of a high type of excellence appears to have a greater value in the Creator's sight than perfect attainment of a lower type. But this is no argument against the expectation of a future, immortal life: on the contrary, it rather strengthens it. If God has placed before us the highest possible type of character as an ideal, and enabled us to aspire after it and to attain it in a very imperfect degree, and if He is pleased with the result, is it not reasonable to hope that He will continue and complete the work?

Probability that the end will be fully attained in a future life.

Such thoughts as these, drawn from the sense of incompleteness in human character and destiny, are the most practically influential, and also in my opinion the strongest, of all arguments in favour of immortality. We are sinful, and yet we aspire after holiness. We have capacities for happiness which are seldom filled. We see that the world is full of injustice, and yet we have instinctive faith that there must be justice with God. The very fact that men—and not the weakest men but the strongest and best—are capable of aspiring with confident faith to a future life where all wrong shall be redressed and all sin healed, and where they who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled, appears to be a pledge that such aspiration shall be satisfied.

Aspiration after immortality.

Poetical quotation.

"For surely there is hope to find
Wherever there is power to seek:
And we could never think or speak
Of light, had we from birth been blind.

Man, like the brutes, yields up his breath:
Yet not like them: they never think,
While pausing on destruction's brink,
Of life unquenchable by death.

Must he but share the reptile's grave
Who gazed on beauty with delight,
Who longed for knowledge, fought for right,
And died his fatherland to save?"

It appears impossible that God should have created man with an instinct which is destined never to be satisfied. In the world of life, every function is adapted to the order of things around: and can the moral and spiritual nature of man be alone an exception?

Suggestion of a future life from premature death.

One of the facts which has probably the most influence in exciting the hope of a future life is that of premature death. Death is not in itself an evil: it is part of the order of nature: but premature death is an evil, like disease.—It is remarkable that all those whom Christ and His Apostles are recorded to have raised from the dead appear not to have been past the prime of life.[1]—If death always came as the result of slow decay, there would be much less than there actually is to suggest a future life. The present life would appear complete without it. Perhaps among

Christ's miracles of raising the dead.

"Yonder hundred million spheres"

there may be worlds where disease and premature death are unknown, and decay is watched and death is awaited with no feeling much sadder than that with which we regard the reddening and the fall of leaves in autumn. But whatever may be the serene happiness of life in such a world, it must contain far fewer suggestions than ours of a future life. Premature death,—the ending of a life in the midst of its work, or before its work is well begun,—suggests the hope that the broken thread will yet be taken up, and the work resumed. This may be worth little as argument, but it is immensely valuable as suggestion.

Argument for immortality from the incompleteness of the present order of things.

The confident aspiration after completion and perfection has never been so forcibly expressed as in the following remarkable passage by St. Paul:—

[1] Only five such instances are recorded, besides the resurrection of Christ Himself. Jairus's daughter was a child of twelve. The son of the widow of Nain is described as a young man. Of the age of Lazarus we have no definite mention, but he appears to have been an unmarried man, living with his sisters, and there is nothing to make us think that he was advanced in life: it is moreover a plausible conjecture that the reason his resurrection is not mentioned in the first three Gospels is that he was still living when they were written and circulated, and it is not likely this was for many years after the ascension of Christ. Eutychus is mentioned as a young man. And Dorcas was at least not too old for a life of active usefulness.

St. Paul on this subject.

"The patient expectation of the creation waits for the revelation of the sons of God. For the creation was made subject to vanity, (not willingly but on account of Him who subjected it) in hope, because the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans together and travails together up to this time. But not only the creation but even ourselves, possessing the first-fruit of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, awaiting the fulness of our adoption, the redemption of our body. For in hope were we saved."[1]

I subjoin an explanatory paraphrase of this passage by Dr. Vaughan:[2]

Dr. Vaughan's paraphrase of St. Paul.

"The whole creation, even in its irrational, if not inanimate, portion, gives signs as of expectation, of longing, of a sense of want and imperfection, to be satisfied only in those 'times of refreshing'[3] which shall accompany the public recognition of the true sons of God. The whole earth in its present state: the world of nature, so full of imperfection, suffering, and decay, and yet under the government of a perfect God: seems to indicate not the need only but the certainty of a future 'restitution of all things'[4] when, above all else, the veil which at present hides the true character and destiny of God's servants shall be removed ('the revelation of the sons of God') and He will own and bless them as His."

In this passage, together with the hope for the completion of the present most imperfect state of things, St. Paul perhaps alludes to the Hebrew idea of a Fall of Man from a state of original perfection, involving all nature in the ruin. We can no longer believe this:—we have learned to believe that the evidences of imperfection around us and within us are proofs not of ruin but of incompleteness. But none the less does the belief in a Fall testify to the

The imperfection of nature is proof not of ruin but of incompleteness.

[1] Epistle to the Romans, chapter viii. 19—24. The translation is taken from the notes to Alford's Greek Testament, and is much more accurate than that in the Authorized Version.

[2] From the notes to his Greek edition of the Epistle to the Romans.

[3] Acts iii. 19. [4] Acts iii. 21.

strength of the aspiration after renewal. It is a hope of the future, mistaken for a reminiscence of the past:—a light of dawn, mistaken for a light of sunset. The ground for expecting an ultimate renewal and completion of all things, however, is rather strengthened than weakened when we have awakened out of the dream of a fall from an original state of perfection.

But if nature appears to point to

Quotation from "In Memoriam."

> "One far-off Divine event,
> To which the whole creation moves,"

it is also true that, as St. Paul teaches in this passage, "the world of nature, so full of imperfection, suffering, and decay," appears to be labouring to that event with patient endurance and expectation. The idea that happiness is the dominant expression of nature is perhaps natural to those who see nothing of nature except in a summer's holiday, but not to those who are equally familiar with its autumnal and wintry aspects.

Quotation from Matthew Arnold's "Resignation."

> "That general life which does not cease,
> Whose secret is not joy but peace:
> That life whose dumb wish is not missed
> If birth proceeds, if things subsist:
> The life of plants, and stones, and rain:
> * * * * *
> * * the mute turf we tread,
> The solemn hills around us spread,
> The stream that falls incessantly,
> The strange-scrawled rocks, the lonely sky,
> If I might lend their life a voice,
> Seem to bear rather than rejoice."

And the same effect, not of exultation but rather of weariness, is produced on the mind by the thought of the routine of nature: the succession of the seasons and of birth and death. "One generation passeth away and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever. The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about into the north: it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to its circuits. All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not

Quotation from Ecclesiastes.

full: unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again. All things are full of labour: man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing."[1] So said the author of Ecclesiastes:—he was a Sadducee, and did not go beyond the conclusion that "all is vanity." But St. Paul, while recognizing the fact that creation has been made subject to "vanity," that is to say to a routine of apparently purposeless labour and change, does not end here, but appears to make this very fact a reason for expecting a deliverance.

It is not true however, at least it is not the whole truth, that all things are condemned to a constant round of unprogressive and purposeless labour. There is evolution: there is progress. The original nebula has condensed into suns and planets, and the originally vitalized germs have developed into all the wondrous organisms of vegetables, of animals, and of Man. But it is not the less true that "all is vanity" if there is nothing higher than merely physical nature. The old notion that nature moves in an endless routine without sign of a beginning or of an end, is now known to be untrue. The physical universe must have had a beginning:—whether it will have an end we do not know, but we know that the laws of nature forbid the present order of things to last for an indefinitely long time: either the heat of the sun and the stars will be exhausted, and all nature will end in cold, darkness, and death; or fresh supplies of heat will be produced without end by the collision of stars and planets in an infinite universe. We cannot know which of these two alternatives is true, for we cannot know all the data for solving the question:—especially, we cannot know whether the universe is truly infinite or not:—but one of the two must be true, unless the laws of nature are to be changed by Creative Power. In neither case will the present order of things be permanent: for if the sun's heat is to be renewed at all, it can be renewed only by such a catastrophe as will overturn the equilibrium of the solar system, and

[1] Ecclesiastes, chapter i. 4—8.

in all probability destroy life on the earth.[1] Thus, whether the course of nature is to end in universal death, or to go on through endless change without any necessary tendency to the production of anything higher, in either case from a merely physical point of view it remains true that "all is vanity."

On any merely physical theory the universe appears to be created in vain.

Notwithstanding, nature contains suggestions of something higher and more satisfying than this. The patient labour of nature is so far in vain that it produces no permanent, no everlasting results: for life ends in death, species perish as well as individuals, and, as we have seen, even worlds are mortal: but nature is constantly labouring to ascend, and frequently though not permanently succeeding. It is very remarkable how this truth is recognized in the unconscious metaphorical language of mankind. *Higher* appears to be a synonymous expression for *more excellent*, in the languages at least of all men who have made enough of intellectual and spiritual progress to connect the thought of Deity with that of Heaven: and this shows the universal feeling that excellence must be striven for, and that progress is labour. At the same time, the unsatisfied longing and the unsuccessful toil of nature suggest the hope of an ultimate, infinite satisfaction: while the relation of the world of life to that of matter dimly suggests the form in which this satisfaction may be attained. For as matter is a preparation for life, and yet life is not a mere resultant from the properties of matter but appears to be a new creation: so the whole universe of matter and life as known to us, may be a preparation for that immortal, eternal life which is to be revealed.

Suggestions of something better.

In all languages, *higher* means *more excellent*.

As matter is a preparation for life, so all nature may be for eternal life.

We thus conclude, that the purpose of creation, so far as we can discover it, is to make possible to man the highest moral and spiritual development: but that the attainment of this is only begun in the present life, and needs another life for its completion.

Summary.

There is an objection to this view, which is to be considered in the following chapter.

[1] For the reasoning on which these conclusions are based, see the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on the Motive Powers of the Universe (Chapter 6).

CHAPTER XXI.

STOICISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

AT the present stage of the argument we assume it as a fundamental axiom that virtue and holiness have an absolute value, independently of their tendency to produce happiness. It is also taken as proved that, at least in so far as it affects us, the purpose of creation is to make the highest virtue and holiness possible to man.

We also assume, what will be denied by none, that the tendency of virtue is to promote the happiness both of the virtuous person and of those who come within the circle of his influence.

Stoical objection to immortality, that a reward lowers the character of virtue.

The objection to the doctrine of immortality which we have now to consider may be called the Stoical objection. It may be thus stated :—"Immortality offers a reward to virtue : now the highest virtue is disinterested, seeking no reward, and the offer of a reward tends to mar the purity of virtue." This argument is not to be despised or set aside summarily : on the contrary, it contains an important truth.

How far this is true.

There is a virtue which works for reward—reward in the sense of wages : the wages, of course, consisting in happiness. Such virtue is real so far as it goes :—there is real virtue in the prudence which foregoes present temporary enjoyment for the sake of more lasting future happiness. But such virtue as this cannot be of the highest kind : the highest virtue is that which does right because it is right. Consequently, if we are to aim at an ethical system which is to produce the highest possible kind of virtue, we must

not base virtue on the hope of happiness. And I admit that a doctrine of immortality which should be merely co-extensive and identical with the doctrine of "future rewards and punishments," though it would no doubt tend to improve the average of morality among those believing it, would not tend, and might even be unfavourable, to that higher morality which demands no reward. Such a doctrine would consequently be condemned by the principle which we have seen to be the key to the purposes of the universe in so far as they are decipherable :—namely that the Divine purpose is not the greatest quantity but the highest degree of excellence.

Reply:

But the doctrine of immortality is not identical with any mere doctrine of reward in the sense of wages. The highest virtue does not work for wages, but it does work for reward :—for the reward which consists in the approval of a good conscience, if for no other. And it has been remarked in a former chapter, that the approval of God, made known in the moment of death, would be reward enough for a life of self-sacrifice.[1] Such rewards as these supply motives which increase the force of virtue without in any degree diminishing its purity. The ethical law whereon this distinction depends may be thus stated :—

the objection is not true when the reward is the necessary consequence of virtue.

The character of virtue is lowered by aiming at any reward which is accidentally or arbitrarily attached to it, but not by aiming at a reward which flows from it naturally and necessarily. The blessedness which consists in a good conscience and in the approval of God and of those men whose approval is best worth having, is not an arbitrary but a necessary reward. We recognize the same distinction also in a lower region. Thus, human love gains in intensity without losing in purity or elevation, and without contracting any taint of selfishness, by the thought of the happiness which is to be the result of union with the person loved: but if the reward sought consisted not in union with its object but in wealth or any other collateral benefit, love would no longer be love. So with virtue. If it is practised only because a reward has been assigned

The same is true of human love.

[1] Page 61.

to it by the decree of the Providential government of the universe, I do not say that virtue is no longer virtue, but it is virtue of the lowest or merely prudential kind. The only high virtue, as well as the only real love, is that which is capable of disinterestedness: the only high virtue is that which is grounded in the recognition of virtue as right and desirable for its own sake, and which would be practised even if were certain to receive no reward. If we do not thus recognize the desirableness of virtue for its own sake, we do not know what virtue means. But when we know this, we have next to learn that the universe is so constituted, not by any arbitrary decree but by the necessary law of its being, that virtue tends to earn a reward. Were it not so, virtue would be in danger of dying of despair; for human nature is so constituted as to need the stimulus of hope.

Virtue needs the stimulus of hope.

I do not, however, deny the possibility of virtue existing without any such stimulus. An elaborate and not unsuccessful attempt was once made to cultivate virtue in a climate whence hope was almost excluded: in an age when faith was dead, patriotism scarcely possible, and science not yet born. The result was Stoicism. It was a true and distinct form of virtue, inferior no doubt to the Christian, but not included therein: and as such, if the conclusions of the preceding chapter are true, it had an independent value in the Creator's sight.

Stoicism was virtue cultivated without hope.

It had an independent value.

But we, knowing that the tendency of virtue is to earn a reward, are able to look forward to a future life where the hindrances shall be removed which in this life prevent the full operation of those ethical laws that tend to give its reward to virtue. This hope gives the needed stimulus, without lowering the character of virtue by any selfish taint. It would so lower it if the reward were to be mere wages, connected with virtue only as money is connected with a labourer's service to his employer: but virtue is to be its own reward: which it cannot always be in this life, else this life would not be the place of trial that it is.

It is however a very inadequate statement of the truth to say that virtue will be its own reward. The reward

will consist not only in that internal peace and happiness which virtue brings, but also in the approval of God and of all good men: and moreover in seeing the wrongs and oppressions of the earth righted, in seeing justice and mercy triumph, in seeing the mourners comforted, in learning to understand the enigmas of Divine Providence and the perplexities of human character,[1] and finally in seeing and sharing the final victory and consummation when *all enemies shall be abolished.*[2] I do not speak of the delight of continuing our earthly studies and resuming interrupted friendships, because I wish to speak of nothing that can be thought merely fanciful. But the highest reward of all will be the gradual though perhaps rapid growth in virtue and knowledge, until we attain to see God face to face, and to know Him as well as He knows us.[3] I do not say that such a degree of attainment as this is necessarily implied in the doctrine of immortality, but Saint Paul hoped for it, and it cannot be beyond the power of God to grant.—It is no adequate statement to say that such hopes as these do not diminish the purity of virtue: they indefinitely increase its purity by increasing its elevation.

Nature of the future reward: not only in approval of conscience but in seeing the triumph of right,

and in seeing and knowing God.

This doctrine is that which is taught by Christ. In the passage with which the compiler of the First Gospel has commenced his record of Christ's teaching,[4] we are told what kinds of character deserve to be emphatically called *blessed,* and what are the rewards that they earn. They are blessed who cultivate a self-forgetting temper, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. They are blessed who mourn for their own sins and those of mankind, for

Christ's teaching on this subject.

[1] "Hier warten schrecken auf den Bösen,
Und Freuden auf den Redlichen.
Des Herzens Krümmen werdest du entblösen,
Der vorsicht Räthsel werdest du mir lösen,
Und Rechnung halten mit dem Leidenden.
Hier öffne sich die Heimath dem Verbannten,
Hier endige des Dulders Dornenbahn."
SCHILLER'S *Resignation.*

[2] St. Paul, 1st Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter xv. 24—26.

[3] Same, chapter xiii. 12.

[4] There can be no reasonable doubt that the compiler of the first Gospel understood Christ's teaching and has represented it truly. But his arrangement of the discourses appears to be rather artistic than historical.

they shall be comforted by knowing that their own sins and those of mankind are forgiven, healed, and abolished. They are blessed who are gentle and forgiving, for they shall inherit the earth; not by dominating over it, which they do not wish for, but by seeing it accept their principles. They are blessed who hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled. They are blessed who are merciful, for they shall obtain mercy: and mercy for such beings as we are must primarily consist in the forgiveness and the healing of sin.[1] They are blessed who are pure in heart, for they shall acquire the power of seeing God. They are blessed who are peacemakers, for they are the true children of God, and shall be recognized as such. They are blessed who endure persecution for the sake of righteousness, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.

Now the various rewards promised in this wonderful passage are not arbitrarily assigned to the characters which earn them, but naturally arise out of the characters. This is too obvious to need comment, except in the commencing and the concluding clauses, where the Kingdom of Heaven is promised as a reward. This expression does not explain itself, and it might mean only the right to sit on thrones, to command armies, and to raise and spend taxes. But if we read those two clauses in a way which is consistent at once with the rest of the passage and with the use of the expression *Kingdom of Heaven* in the rest of His discourses, we shall find that with Christ those who are said to enter and to possess the kingdom of heaven are those who, when a kingdom of truth, purity, and justice is revealed and becomes dominant, will not feel in it as strangers or as vanquished enemies but as citizens. Those whose hearts and lives are right in the sight of God are by that fact already citizens of His kingdom, and Christ gives to those who accept Him the blessedness of knowing that they are

Citizenship in the Kingdom of Heaven.

[1] I may be here charged with self-contradiction in saying in one place that salvation is universal, and in another that mercy is a privilege. I do believe in the universality of salvation, but not so as to place all on an equality. I shall have to speak of this subject in a future chapter.

so. Christ always speaks of the kingdom of heaven as already in the world, dependent on a future revelation for its full development and completion no doubt, but not for its existence. If there is a God, all beings who have intelligence that can recognize Him are His children, and those who do His will are so in an especial sense. This, according to Christ, is sufficient proof of immortality, for "God is not the God of the dead but of the living:"[1] but the Patriarchs and the early Israelites knew that God existed and was their Father, long before they had any conscious belief in immortality.

Is loyalty to a personal God better than to an impersonal law?

This brings us to another question, akin to the former one. We have been considering whether virtue is the better for being nourished by hope. We have next to ask the kindred question whether loyalty to a personal God of righteousness is better and nobler than loyalty to a mere impersonal law of righteousness. This, like the former, is an ethical question: that is to say, it is to be decided by an appeal to the facts of human nature and human life. In our time, belief in a personal God is almost always accompanied by a belief in a personal immortality: but it was not always so: in ancient Israel a personal God was known long before immortality was revealed. The Stoical loyalty to an impersonal law of righteousness without hope of eternal reward had probably its highest expression in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: the Israelite loyalty to a personal God of righteousness without hope of eternal reward, had its highest expression in the Ninetieth Psalm, which is traditionally and perhaps truly ascribed to Moses: and how far superior is the Israelite to the Stoic! The Israelite never separated in thought a righteous Law from a righteous Will: he could not conceive them apart: but he recognized with his whole heart that most fundamental and vital of all truths, that righteousness is such by reason of its own nature and not by reason of any mere decree, even though a Divine decree: while the faith that a holy Will coincided with the righteous Law deepened his reverence for both. But if

Faith of ancient Israel,

contrasted with Stoicism.

[1] Matthew xxii. 32.

Degeneration of the faith in a righteous God.

the faith that *God's will is righteous* degenerates into the mere belief that *righteousness is what God wills*:—in other words, if men cease, as they sometimes have ceased, to recognize in righteousness anything more than God's arbitrary decree:—such a belief is morally inferior to Stoicism; and it will not be strange if God in His Providence withdraws the knowledge of His Name and His Power from such a people, and leaves them without a religion to find a basis for morality where they can.

To sum up the results now arrived at:

Summary.

Virtue of any high kind must be capable of doing right without hope of reward. The thought of reward lowers virtue if the reward is attached to virtue by accident or by mere decree; but virtue is exalted and purified by the hope of rewards arising out of its own nature.

Righteousness must be recognized as such independently of any mere decree, even a Divine decree. But loyalty to a Law of righteousness is strengthened, exalted, and purified, when it is no longer loyalty to a mere impersonal Law, but to a righteous Will whereof the Law is the expression.

The same principles are true of punishment as of reward.

We have spoken till now only of reward: but the same is conversely true of punishment. Sin must be recognized as hateful not on account of its consequences but for its own sake: but it is also true that the tendency of sin is to produce misery, not by reason of any arbitrary decree but by necessary law: and it will certainly be more likely to produce a hatred of sin if we believe that it will continue to bear its bitter fruit for an unknown time, perhaps for ever, than if we look forward at the end of this short life to an eternal sleep, where the wise man shall be as the fool, and the wicked as the just.

CHAPTER XXII.

NATURE AND GRACE.

THE subject of the present chapter is resumed from the end of that on the Divine Purpose of Creation.[1] It is necessary to begin by a fuller statement of part of the argument of that chapter.

Belief ought to influence character.

I have first however to remark that our belief respecting God's purpose in creating us must influence, and ought to influence, the formation of our characters. If then it were proved that the natural and legitimate effect of any doctrine on the formation of character must be injurious, the right inference would be that such a doctrine cannot be true. If the legitimate effect of the discovery and the belief of truth were really injurious to the moral nature, it is difficult to see how we could avoid the atheistic conclusion that the universe is without any Divine government at all.

If the legitimate effect of a belief is injurious, it cannot be true.

High excellence is the purpose of creation, yet it is rare.

We have seen in the chapter referred to, that the Divine Purpose of Creation, as far as it is indicated in the ways of nature, is not to produce uniform excellence or the highest possible average of excellence, but to make possible the production of excellence of the highest type. And we know as a matter of fact, that any high degree of excellence is comparatively rare.

If this is true and discoverable, it must be part of the Divine purpose that we should discover it and believe it. But will not the tendency of our knowing this purpose be to frustrate it? To beings like us, whose virtue has its root and germ in the social relations, will it not be a dis-

Objection to this, that it

[1] Chapter 17.

tends to promote selfishness.

couragement and a weight dragging us back in our strife towards virtue and holiness, if we are taught by the indications written in nature by the God of nature that we strive on our own behalf alone; that the greater part of our fellowmen are not to share the reward after which we aspire, and that we must separate our hopes from theirs? It is no reply to say that the highest virtue is unselfish, and consists in the endeavour to share our happiness and our hopes with others. This is true, and it is this which constitutes the difficulty. We have seen that human virtue needs the stimulus of hope:[1] and hope is needed not only for ourselves but for others: unselfish loving virtue is scarcely possible without hope for the objects of its love. If then the only doctrine to be believed concerning the Divine purpose in creation is that general excellence is not aimed at but only a high degree of excellence to be attained by a few, it appears impossible to avoid the inference that the knowledge of this purpose will tend to frustrate it by engendering an unsympathising and selfish spirit.

Love needs the stimulus of hope for its objects.

The above-stated doctrine is true in the world of nature, but not in that of grace.

But this doctrine, though true, is not the entire truth. It is true in the present life, but it will not be true in the immortal life to be revealed. It is true of this world in which we live, where God, though present, is concealed as with a cloud of thick darkness: but it will not be true of that world where God will be all in all. It is true in that administration of justice which alone is revealed in the world of nature and natural law: it is not true in that administration of mercy which is revealed in the grace of God, wherein there will be not only justice for all but also mercy for all:—first universal justice and afterwards universal mercy. So that those who stedfastly and patiently aim at virtue shall not only attain it, with the blessedness that belongs to it, for themselves: but, if they know the entire truth, they shall be encouraged by the knowledge that they do not gain a selfish victory to be enjoyed alone: but that at the consummation of

There will be mercy for all.

"That one far-off Divine event
To which the whole creation moves"

[1] Page 298.

all enemies shall be abolished, and the victory shall be shared with our whole race.

Thus the order of things which is revealed to us in nature and in grace is in all respects adapted to make possible the production of virtue of the highest type. We have seen that the constitution of the world of nature, under which there is a tendency for virtue to gain its reward but the tendency is not certain to work out its result in any calculable time, gives room for the development of heroism and self-devotion. But these do not constitute the whole of the highest virtue. The highest virtue not only dares all things and endures all things, but hopes all things and loves all men. And in order to make such hope and such love possible, that dispensation of grace is revealed wherein we are assured that they shall not be disappointed:—that after justice has triumphed in the defeat and punishment of sin, grace will triumph in its destruction.

This belief is favourable not only to heroism and self-devotion, but also to hope and love.

We now go on to consider the character of Grace and its relation to Nature: or, what is practically synonymous with this, the character of Mercy and its relation to Justice.

We have seen in a former chapter[1] that justice has a natural tendency to execute itself: and that consequently, if there is a future life so as to give indefinite time, we cannot doubt that there will be a constantly increasing approximation to a perfect administration of justice, giving to each as he deserves. This does not imply any need for Divine intervention: it is the result of a purely natural and self-executing process, such as a Pantheist might believe in. We may thus say, not as a definition of the word but as an assertion of fact, that justice is natural law among beings which have a moral nature.

Justice is natural law among beings having a moral nature.

The punishment of sin, under any possible system of natural self-executing law, is both inevitable and right. All are agreed on this, that punishment is the natural and just result of sin: but men are by no means agreed as to the further question, what is the natural and just result

[1] Page 253.

Error of thinking that punishment can expiate sin.

of punishment. It is one of the commonest of all errors, and though altogether inconsistent with the teaching of Christ and His Apostles, has deeply affected the Christianity of Christendom, to think that sin and punishment are to be set one against the other, so that the punishment may be a compensation, or expiation, or atonement, for the sin. This is an utter misconception. Morally, it involves a totally inadequate conception of the evil of sin. Intellectually, it is based on misleading analogies from the world of nature and ordinary life. By doing an injury to a fellow-man we become bound if possible to make satisfaction: by committing sin we become liable to punishment. Satisfaction cancels the injury: (I speak of course of cases where satisfaction is possible in the etymological sense of *sufficient* amends :) and will not punishment in the same way make satisfaction for sin? Thus men reason, as if our actions were something apart from ourselves: not understanding that the evil and the punishment of sin consist in their effect on the nature of the sinner. Sin is a part of the nature of the sinner so long as it is not repented of, and it is to the sinful nature that punishment attaches. By injuring a fellow-man, though it may be by mere inadvertence, we become liable to the consequences: by committing sin we become liable to the consequences also. The consequences which are liable to be enforced against the wrong-doer, regarding the wrong merely as injury, consist in being required to make amends: the consequences which, possibly in this life and certainly in the life to come, will enforce themselves against the sinner, consist in punishment. But the resemblance between the two cases goes no further than this. The violation of order which consists in doing an injury is healed by reparation but the violation of order which consists in sin is not healed by punishment.

Misleading analogy.

Punishment does not heal sin,

The true analogy to that liability to punishment which is the consequence of sin, is the liability to pain which is the consequence of disease. The pain does not heal the disease, nor can the punishment heal the sin. Pain is the consequence of a diseased state of the body, and punish-

as pain does not heal disease.

ment is the consequence of that diseased state of the spiritual nature which is produced by sin and which consists in sinfulness. The effect can be removed only by removing the cause. If the bodily disease is removed, the bodily pain ceases: if the spiritual disease of sin is removed, the spiritual punishment ceases: and until then, nothing can have any tendency to make it cease. Duration of punishment has nothing to do with the matter. There is no force in the objection that a finite sin cannot be justly punished through infinite time. The magnitude of the punishment is no doubt proportioned to the magnitude of the sin. But the magnitude of a sin is distinct from its duration. If the sinful nature has continued to engender and to bear its punishment for a thousand years, it does not thereby become the less justly and necessarily liable to continuing punishment so long as it remains unchanged. This is not because every sin is infinite;—that is a doctrine for fanatics:—but because, though we can scarcely avoid speaking and thinking of periods of duration in connexion with this subject, yet the relation between sin and punishment is in no sense a function of time: and because punishment, regarded merely as pain, has no tendency to heal or to expiate sin.

The duration of punishment is not a difficulty.

What sin needs is to be healed: if this is attained, no expiation is needed: if this is not attained, no expiation is possible. This is the teaching of Christ. It is useless to quote isolated passages on such a subject:—the teaching of the New Testament is so wrapped up in parable and metaphor that its mere words are often misleading. But this fact is significant if not conclusive, that the Greek words *σώζω* and *σωτηρία* mean *to heal* and *healing* as well as *to save* and *salvation*, and are translated in both ways in the English Bible.[1] In Christ's view, salvation from the power of sin is not the deliverance from an enemy without, but the healing of a disease within.

Expiation is needless if sin is healed, impossible until then.

The New Testament teaches that salvation is healing.

The healing of sin is called repentance. To repent of sin is to be healed of the sinful nature. Let not this be misunderstood:—the consequences of sinful acts may long

The healing of sin is repentance.

[1] See Note A at end of chapter.

Permanence of the consequences of sin.

outlast repentance, and it is not certain that they will be altogether obliterated in any state of being whatever. Every action probably has its effect on the habitual tendencies of the agent: and when sinful tendencies have become in any degree habitual, the habitual tendency is not at once destroyed by repentance, but may continue throughout life as a cause of weakness, loss, and pain: and it is not certain that it will be otherwise while eternity lasts. "What a man soweth, that must he also reap:" in other words, retribution is inevitable. This is only justice. It is the fundamental law of the moral world, and holds therein a place analogous to that of the laws of motion in the world of matter. But if justice requires that he who sows sin must reap punishment, it equally requires that he who sows repentance shall reap restoration: and there is no self-contradiction in saying that the same man may be reaping both at the same time. This is not a mere inference as to what may be hereafter: it is a fact of experience in the present life. A man may feel bitter regret for past sin, and yet rejoice that he has turned away from it. And, to return to the analogy of health and disease, a man may have permanently weakened his constitution by excess, and yet, by abandoning the habit of excess before it is altogether too late, may save his life and become able to use and in some degree to enjoy it. Even so, justice does not ensure that the injury which sin has done to the sinner shall be altogether annulled on repentance: but it does ensure that he who repents shall be permitted to begin a career of restoration: and though while eternity lasts we may be the poorer in spiritual riches and the lower in the scale of being for every sinful act we have ever committed, yet justice ensures that a repented sin shall in no case be an open fountain of evil but only a healed though scarred wound:—not a ruinous loss, but only such a loss as the loser may write off and yet remain solvent. And in that state wherein "all enemies shall be destroyed," it will continue, if at all, not as positive pain, disease, or sin, but only as negative loss, or diminution of power and happiness. So far as we are able to see, how-

Restoration on repentance is ensured by justice.

We may reap the fruits of both sin and repentance at the same time.

ever, every action having any moral character will leave its trace on the nature and the destiny of the doer while he continues to exist:—bad actions and good, sin and repentance alike:—all combining to produce a resultant effect wherein the separate effect of none is cancelled. It is well to repent, but it would have been better not to sin. I do not however insist on the perpetual continuance of the consequences of sin as if I thought it as well established a truth as the certainty of restoration on repentance.

Perpetuity of the consequences of sin.

It may however be true, as has been said by that sincere follower of Christ Martin Luther, that there are cases where it may be good for a man to have sinned. This is partly because the commission of actual sin may reveal the sinfulness of a man's nature to himself, producing that consciousness of sin without which repentance is scarcely possible; and partly because the struggle against felt and known sin may evoke spiritual power which would otherwise have remained dormant. But though this is probably true, we have no reason whatever to think that events will be so guided by Divine Providence as to make every sin productive of a higher good to us than if we had not so sinned. Were it so, our state of moral trial would be an illusion: and *God cannot lie;*[1] this is the axiom on which all faith depends.[2] God is teaching us in many ways, chiefly through the conscience: and the lessons of conscience would be neutralized and destroyed if it were true or credible that the sense of responsibility and freedom with which He has endowed us did not testify of any reality, but were only a benevolent illusion. In matters affecting the conscience, we have seen that the "regulative" value of belief, that is to say its power to mould the character and to influence the life, depends on its being recognized as "speculative" or absolute truth.[3] It is no doubt true that the possibility of sin—the possibility of our abusing our freedom—has been permitted in order to give occasion for the development of virtue and holiness

Possible beneficial effects of sin.

It is not true that every sin will ultimately tend to holiness.

[1] Ὁ ἀψευδὴς Θεός. Titus i. 2.

[2] Page 139. [3] Page 189, *et seq.*

in contending against it. Virtue is possible only where there is temptation to sin. But it does not follow that virtue will be advanced, either in the present state of being or in any other, by yielding to the temptation:—on the contrary, virtue consists in resisting it.

Sins of calculation must be purely evil in their consequences.

Further: if our spiritual advancement may in an indirect manner be furthered even by our sins, this can be true only of sins of weakness or of impulse, not of sins of calculation. If a man were to commit sin on a calculation that it would ultimately benefit his spiritual nature, we may be certain that it would be defeated and disappointed by the natural operation of justice. Moreover, though sin may possibly, though by no means certainly, have an *indirectly* beneficial effect, I cannot but think that every sin we have ever committed will have a *directly* injurious effect while our existence lasts.

Summary.

What has now been said may thus be briefly summed up:—Granting the reality of a future life, we cannot doubt that the operation of those natural laws which tend to do justice even in this life will produce, if not perfect justice, at least an ever-increasing approximation to it. Justice requires that sin shall be followed by punishment, and repentance by restoration: these two consequences do not necessarily exclude each other, but may combine to produce a resultant effect. Punishment as such, however, has no power to expiate sin: but if sin is repented of, it is thereby healed, and no expiation is needed.[1]

Will punishment destroy sin by destroying the sinner?

But though the expiation of sin is impossible, may not punishment get rid of sin by destroying the sin and the sinner together? This hypothesis is consistent with all the analogies of that world of nature in which we live. Sin is a disease, and punishment is pain: and the tendency of both disease and pain is to destroy life. Moreover, all the extremest punishments inflicted by natural justice are destructive. "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." The simplest and most impressive instance of this is the almost universal practice of mankind in in-

The analogy of nature.

[1] See Note B at end of chapter.

flicting death as the punishment of the worst crimes: for, as Butler has truly remarked, the order of political society, wherein crime is punished, is part of the order of nature.[1] The analogy of nature is altogether opposed to the doctrine of endless existence in suffering: on the contrary, it supports the belief that the ultimate effect of sin which is not repented and healed will be to destroy the existence of the sinner. It is however uncertain how far such analogies are to be trusted. Butler's work on the "Analogy of Religion to the Constitution of Nature," derives all its argumentative value and convincing force from the fact that the analogies, on which it lays so great and so just a stress, between the Divine administration of justice, towards which we see an approximation in the present world, and the more perfect administration of Divine justice in a future life whereof religion has to speak, are not mere analogies which might conceivably prove to be inapplicable, but resemblances which those who believe in a God at all must expect to hold between all parts of the Divine administration, in virtue of that truth which is the fundamental axiom of all faith, namely that if there is any Divine Government whatever it is consistent and right.[2] But as the laws of geometry must be the same in every world situated in space, while there may be worlds beyond our stellar system and invisible by our most powerful telescopes, where the laws of chemistry and even of gravitation may be different from those known to us: so the moral bases of the Divine Government must be the same in any future life as in the present, while yet the biological, mental, and social laws through which the moral government of this world is administered may be altogether changed. I do not say that there will be such a change: I only say we cannot assert that there will not be; and that consequently no analogy derived from the present world and applied to that which is to come can be conclusive, unless it has a basis in the unchangeable

is in favour of this view,

and opposed to endless suffering;

[1] "Civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too: and some of these punishments are capital: as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal."—BUTLER'S *Analogy*, Bishop Fitzgerald's edition, p. 49.

[2] Page 66.

but it is untrustworthy because it has not a properly moral basis.

principles of morality. Otherwise it only affords a presumption of uncertain value. For this reason the truth, unquestionable as it is, that in the present world punishment tends to the destruction of the sinner's existence, affords no certain ground from which to reason concerning the world to come; for it is only a physical truth, made known by experience like those of chemistry: while the truth that sin tends to be followed by punishment is a moral truth, and, like the truths of geometry, must be true everywhere.

The reality of a future life is a question of fact: but if it is real, we see, at the point to which the argument has now reached, a certainty of the punishment of sin, without any certainty of its extinction. But we now come to the question:—Although it is true that punishment, regarded merely as pain, has no tendency to expiate sin, yet may it not have a necessary tendency, by its action on the character, to produce repentance? We can often discern such a tendency in this life: and if it is discernible in this life at all, will it not become a universal law in the next, where indefinite time will be given for laws to work out their results? even as the tendency of justice to triumph is in this life only a tendency which is often defeated, and yet we cannot doubt that it will be the universal law of the future life.

Does not punishment tend to produce repentance?

This question as to the effect of punishment in producing repentance is not to be answered by any *à priori* reasoning. It is to be decided by an appeal to the facts of human nature. Now it is not only true but familiar, that repentance is far more likely to be effected when a man has to endure disappointment and sorrow, than when he is permitted to go on in a career of sin unchecked. But this is very far from proving that punishment has any necessary tendency to produce repentance: and there are so many men whom sorrow only hardens and embitters that it is impossible to assert the existence of any such tendency even as a general law. Further, it may be that in a future life the effect, not so much of punishment as of the removal of all uncertainty as to the nature and con-

This cannot be asserted generally.

Possible difficulty of repentance in a future life.

sequences of actions, may be to produce a fixity of character which will almost infinitely increase the difficulty of repentance. This cannot be proved or put into logical form: but it has perhaps been one of the principal reasons why many of the noblest minds of Christendom have acquiesced in the horrible and debasing belief in an endless existence in torment. Moreover, Christ and His Apostles, who as I believe had access to sources of knowledge concerning the spiritual world which are not open to us, though teaching the doctrine of a final general restoration, have said nothing which implies that punishment and suffering have of themselves any necessary tendency to produce repentance and restoration.

Connexion of this with the belief in everlasting torment.

God might no doubt have given such a nature to man that punishment would have been certain always to produce repentance at last. Had this been the case, there would have been no need for a dispensation of grace as distinguished from the dispensation of nature and justice. Justice, as we have seen, is natural law among moral natures, and consequently the dispensation of nature, under which we live in common with the whole creation, contains a dispensation of justice. If the punishment of sin, which is part of this dispensation, were sufficient of itself to effect repentance and restoration, this would make the dispensation of justice at the same time a dispensation of grace:—no other would be needed, for the only purposes of grace are to destroy sin and to produce holiness. But the facts are not so: the dispensation of justice is not also one of grace, though grace is capable of being, and has been, engrafted on it. We are in some degree able to understand the Divine purpose in so ordering the laws of human nature that justice is not alone sufficient to ensure repentance with its results of grace, mercy, and restoration. We cannot doubt, unless we deny any Divine purpose whatever, that sin has been permitted in order that righteousness may be perfected and manifested in conquering the sin: and if this is so, it will appear consistent with the rest of the Divine Government as known to us, that it should be possible to gain the victory over

The dispensation of grace is distinct from that of nature and law.

Purpose of this.

sin only by those means whereby righteousness is manifested in its most perfect form: namely by the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ.

It appears to many that restoration is sufficiently easy if it is a necessary consequence of repentance. It is true, as we have seen, that restoration is always certain on repentance: and it appears to many that a dispensation of grace is thus sufficiently provided for, and that nothing more is needed. Others draw an opposite conclusion from the same premises, thinking that it would be dangerous laxity to offer restoration on condition of repentance alone, and that Divine justice must demand something more in the way of expiation. Both are wrong: and the error of both consists in not considering how immensely difficult true repentance is, consisting as it does in the commencement of a renewal of the entire moral nature. The difficulty is not to know how repentance is to be efficacious, for there was never any reasonable doubt of its efficacy:—restoration on repentance is a matter of course under any just government:—the difficulty is to know how it is to be possible.

The difficulty is not how repentance is to be efficacious, but how it is to be possible.

Under a system of mere self-executing moral law there is no certainty of repentance being possible. But though it is true that we live under such a system, it is not the whole truth. To quote an expression from Dr. Macleod Campbell's work on the Atonement, we live not only under a reign of Law but in the Kingdom of God. In speaking of the reign of Law without reference to the Lawgiver, and of the Divine Government without reference to the Governor, I have spoken as a Pantheist:—that is to say one who recognizes an order of nature, moral as well as physical, without a personal God:—and this I can do without representing anything falsely, because Pantheism is not a whole falsehood, but a half-truth. But let God be recognized in His personality as the Creator and Lawgiver of all things, and we shall at once see hope of a dispensation of grace. If there is a God, we live in a Kingdom of God: that is to say He governs the universe which He has made, and the laws in virtue whereof there is an ever-increasing approximation to the rendering of perfect justice

We live in a kingdom of God as well as under a reign of Law.

to all are the expression of His righteous will: and though His righteous laws may be separated in thought from His righteous will and holy character, yet they are never so separated in fact. It may appear on a cursory view of the question that the distinction is not a practical one:—that when the righteousness of the laws under which we are to live for ever is assured, it is of no importance that we should believe them to be the expression of a righteous Will. But this would be a wrong conclusion. The difference is infinite. To a system of mere law, even though perfectly righteous law, it is a matter of indifference whether those who live under it are righteous or not. The punishment of disobedience is certain, and the law is equally fulfilled whether by obedience or by the punishment of disobedience. An impersonal system can ensure punishment to all who sin and restoration to all who repent; but a mere system, however righteous, cannot form a wish or a desire for righteousness. But from an impersonal righteous system let us appeal to a personal God of righteousness, and we shall see this to be totally changed. A righteous person must desire to meet with righteousness in others. He will no doubt desire that sin should be punished, but he must desire rather that it should be healed. This is true of all righteous beings, and is true of each in proportion as he is righteous. But it is true of God in a higher degree than of any other: not only because His righteousness is perfect, but because He is the Creator, and as such has an interest in His creatures. If we believe that God is good, we must believe that He desires to find, or to produce, goodness in all beings which have, or are capable of acquiring, a moral nature: if we believe that God is our Creator, we must believe that He has created us for righteousness, not for sin: for happiness, not for suffering. We believe this not only because we believe in His mercy, but because we believe in His justice. It would be not only unmerciful but unjust to create beings with a capacity for righteousness and happiness, and then to place them in circumstances where no fate is possible to them but one of sin and misery. Justice and mercy, indeed, are here one.

To impersonal law it is indifferent whether its subjects are righteous:

not so to God.

God must desire righteousness in His creatures.

Mercy in the Creator is one with justice.

Meaning of the name of Father as applied to God.

God is our Father. Though He is so by the fact of creation, yet the name Father means more than Creator. He is the Creator of all that exists, but the Father of those beings only who have the capacity of developing a moral nature, and consequently of knowing Him. He is our Father, not only as having created us, but as caring for us, and desiring to be known to us.[1] Thus the Kingdom of God is necessarily a dispensation of grace. The purpose of Divine grace is not to make sin less deadly, or to separate punishment from sin, for this is impossible: nor to ensure that restoration will certainly follow on repentance, for this is a matter of course, even under a dispensation of mere law: but to lead men to repent of their sins, and to acquire such a character as will make them worthy and loyal citizens of the Kingdom of God.[2]

The purpose of grace is to lead to repentance.

Punishment is easier to believe in than forgiveness.

We thus see that for justice to be done, nothing more is necessary than to leave the course of things to itself: but grace needs a Divine intervention. Hence it is that when a man has attained to an adequate sense of sin, punishment appears to him a matter of course, like the result of a natural law: the demand on his faith is to believe in forgiveness. The framers of our creeds have placed in them the words "I believe in the forgiveness of sins":—it was taken for granted that none who believed in a future life could doubt the punishment of sins, but to believe in their forgiveness was regarded as needing some effort of faith. The difficulty of believing that forgiveness is possible, is obviously a result of the consciousness of the immense difficulty of repentance:—a difficulty which Christ came into the world solely to overcome.

Anger and forgiveness belong to personal beings only.

Further: an impersonal system, though it may ensure restoration on repentance, cannot be angry, and cannot forgive. Anger and forgiveness belong to personal Beings only. A just Being will always forgive on repentance. Forgiveness is the withdrawal of anger, and it would be unjust to be any longer angry with a sinner who has repented. Forgiveness, when it comes at all, is absolute and perfect. But forgiveness does not imply perfect restora-

Forgiveness is

[1] See Note B at end of chapter.

[2] Ibid.

tion. Restoration, unlike forgiveness, is a progressive process, and may perhaps never be perfect. In other words, it is not certain that he who commits a sin and afterwards repents of it, will ever, in any state of being, be as rich in spiritual blessings as if he had not committed it at all. Forgiveness is the first step to restoration; but it is more than merely this: it has a value and a blessing of its own. Had the prodigal in Christ's parable fallen dead of fatigue and hunger at the moment when his father first embraced him, although his restoration to his place in his father's house would not have been begun, yet he would have died with the blessing of his father's forgiveness.

absolute: restoration is progressive.

Forgiveness has a value independent of consequences.

The prodigal son.

And on the other side, though the distinction between holiness and sin is not constituted by any will, even that of God, and though the punishment of sin may be effected by self-executing impersonal law without any Divine interposition being needed, yet the sense of the Divine anger will in itself, and independently of any of its consequences, be no doubt the severest part of the punishment of sin, in that world where all self-deception will be at an end, and "from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he thinketh that he hath."[1] But, though the severest part of the punishment of sin, this is the only part of which we can say with perfect confidence that it will be absolutely and at once removed on repentance. And when we are assured of God's forgiveness, the remaining natural consequences of sin, though I cannot think they will ever be otherwise than injurious, will appear endurable: especially as forgiveness is the entrance to ever progressive restoration and advancement.

God's anger, independently of consequences, will be the severest part of the punishment of sin.

But it will be removed on repentance, and the rest will be endurable.

We have seen that justice, or righteousness, is natural law among beings who have a moral nature: and in the same way, grace is righteousness in beings who have free personality. That is to say, among beings who have a

Grace is righteousness among free personal beings.

[1] Luke vii. 18, marginal reading. The saying that "from him who hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath" occurs in other parts of Christ's discourses, and was probably a proverb of the time: the above-quoted variation on it, "even that which he seemeth to have" or "thinketh that he hath," is evidently meant to show the true spiritual force of the saying.

moral nature, impersonal natural law will of itself do justice or work righteousness; but this will not necessarily go beyond the rendering to every man according to his work: if the work has been evil, righteousness will be fulfilled in his punishment. But when free personal beings are righteous, their righteousness will not be satisfied with the mere defeat and punishment of sin: they must desire its destruction. The eye of righteousness is offended not only by sin being unchecked and triumphant, but by its existence. And of all ways by which sin may conceivably be destroyed, that which a righteous Being will most desire is by the repentance of the sinner. I do not say, for I do not believe, that the restoration of the sinner through repentance is the only purpose at which righteousness ought to aim. It is well in itself, and is to be desired independently of consequences, that sin should be punished. It is well in itself, and is to be desired independently of consequences, that sin should be destroyed, by the destruction of the sinner's existence if necessary. But it is better and more to be desired that sin should be destroyed by the repentance and conversion of the sinner.

Righteous beings will desire not only the punishment, but the destruction of sin: and this if possible by the repentance of the sinner.

The punishment of sin is justice: its destruction is grace. Any Being who is righteous must be also gracious, or merciful, because righteousness is not only angry with sin but hates it, and desires its destruction.—Hatred goes farther than anger: anger desires to punish, but hatred desires to destroy.[1]

A perfectly righteous Being must be merciful, because He must desire that all other beings were righteous, and to attain this is the highest mercy. And conversely, a perfectly merciful Being must be righteous, because that which mercy, or grace, desires is the highest welfare of all, and this can be attained only through righteousness.

Justice and mercy imply each other,

The truth that justice and mercy are from the same root in the Divine nature, appears to be obscured in modern Christendom, where mercy is too often thought of as opposed to justice, and needing some artificial reconciliation with it. But it was understood in Israel of old. "To

and are from the same root.

[1] This distinction, I believe, is made by Aristotle.

Thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy, for Thou renderest to every man according to his work,"[1] said the Psalmist:—that is to say, "Because justice is Thine, therefore is mercy Thine also." The truth is not that mercy and grace may possibly be harmonized with righteousness, but that in virtue of uncreated law grace springs out of righteousness.—Even so, we have often found in the history of science that what were supposed to be distinct and unconnected laws are really results of the same principle. Thus, the laws of heat have been shown to be results of the laws of motion.

Analogy from science.

Grace is a higher principle than justice, even as free righteous personality, wherein, as we have seen, grace has the ground of its being, is higher than impersonal righteous law. But here, as in the world of nature, the lower law will make itself obeyed first. Thus, life is higher than matter, but the forces of matter—the thermal, chemical, and other inorganic forces—control the vital ones.[2] The laws of mere matter make themselves obeyed at all events, and those of life are able to make themselves obeyed only on condition of the laws of matter being first satisfied. Thus, if the inorganic conditions under which a living being, whether animal or vegetable, is endeavouring to exist, are unfavourable: if for instance there is too much or too little heat or moisture: the inorganic laws and forces will be obeyed, and if the living being which has the conditions of its existence in them cannot accommodate itself to them it must perish. So in the spiritual world. Justice, which is the lower principle, must and will be satisfied at all events: grace, which is the higher, can be enforced only on condition of justice being first satisfied. And further: as the vital forces work through the inorganic ones, so grace works only through justice:—it cannot set justice aside. Forgiveness of an unrepented sin would be as contrary to mercy as to justice. Grace, or mercy, desires the welfare of its objects: and we have every reason to believe that until repentance is attained, this is better promoted by punishing than by forgiving.

Grace is higher than justice, but justice must be obeyed first.

Analogy of the vital and inorganic forces.

Grace works through justice.

[1] Psalm lxii. 12.

[2] See the chapter in "Habit and Intelligence" on Organic Subordination (Chapter 13).

Grace is a higher development of justice, and has been developed later.

Grace is a higher development of justice or righteousness. It would no doubt be absurd to speak of development in the Divine Mind, though we have a right to assert that even from the Divine point of view it is a more excellent thing to destroy sin by healing it than merely to punish it. But in the mind of man it is a historical fact that the sense of grace has been a later development than that of justice: and this is in accordance with the natural law that the highest developments are the latest. It was a constant perplexity to the Israelite of old that the workers of iniquity should be triumphant:—this complaint is repeated in a hundred forms in the Psalms of David and Asaph:—but he was reassured by being taught to believe that it was only for a time. "The upright shall have dominion over them in the morning."[1] This satisfied his sense of right: the further question why iniquity should exist at all, even though defeated and punished, did not occur to him as a perplexity. With the modern Christian it is far otherwise: the doctrine of his creed is familiar and fundamental, that justice will be done in a future life, so that the triumph of iniquity shall come to an end and shall be followed by retribution. This belief, to which Judaism attained slowly and with difficulty, is the starting-point of Christianity. But to the state of spiritual advancement to which the Christian has now attained, he longs not only for justice but for grace:—not only for the defeat of sin but for its destruction:—his perplexity is that iniquity should exist. And in this case the answer is the same as of old: it is permitted but for a time. "All enemies shall be abolished: and the last that shall be abolished is death" (that is to say, the collective consequences of sin:) "that God may be all in all."[2] It is evident that God could not be all in all if sin and suffering were to continue to exist.

Perplexities of the Israelite

and of the Christian.

The answer to both: all that is contrary to either justice or grace is but for a time.

But it is not certain that the destruction of sin will in all cases be brought about by repentance and healing. Christ, who understands the subject as we do not, has spoken of a sin which "hath never forgiveness, neither in

In some cases, sin may be destroyed only by

[1] Psalm xlix. 14.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 24, 28.

this world nor in the next."[1] God is just, and we may be certain that if there is any sin which He cannot forgive, it can only be because the sin so passes into the character that the sinner cannot repent. The sin which Christ so denounced was that which He called *the sin against the Holy Spirit:* it consisted not in mere careless rejection of His claims, but in the fixed hostility to truth and goodness which gave symbolic expression to itself in saying that He was in league with the powers of evil. But the sin which thus cannot be destroyed by healing may be destroyed by destroying the existence of the sinner.

the extinction of the sinner.

The sin against the Holy Spirit.

This solution of the difficulty is advanced only as an inference: and in such matters no inference, however obvious or however close to the data, ought to be accepted as equally certain with the primary truths either of conscience or of revelation. But it is an inference which appears to meet all the difficulties of the case, and to be free from objections. Natural conscience contradicts the notion that any can be left in endless misery, which would be the necessary consequence of endless existence in unforgiven sin. Christ tells us that there are sins which are incapable of being abolished by God's forgiveness: and St. Paul, speaking with Christ's authority, says that all enemies (whereof sin is the chief) shall be abolished, that God may be all in all:—these two statements may be reconciled by supposing that the sin will be abolished by the extinction of the sinner, and so far as I see they can be reconciled in no other way. There is no physical or metaphysical difficulty in the way of believing this: He who has created may annihilate: nor need we suppose a special interposition for the purpose: all may be done in the course of natural law.

This is also thoroughly consistent with our highest instinctive feelings of justice and mercy. We approve of the punishment of iniquity, and we rejoice in its defeat: we think the infliction of any degree of suffering lawful which is needed in order to its defeat and overthrow: and it may be that far greater suffering will be needed when

[1] Matt. xii. 32.

these are delayed until the future life, than when they are effected in this. But once they are effected, our conscience does not approve the infliction of further pain merely for the sake of punishment: and if further punishment is needed as a remedial process, though we can approve it we should think it inhuman to rejoice at it. In other words, we rejoice at punishment—or at least we approve our own feelings in rejoicing at it—only in so far as it is visibly the legitimate result of the sin, and consists in its defeat. Thus, to mention an historical instance: we can rejoice at the fate of the first of the Bonapartes, ending his life as a prisoner on an extinct volcano in the midst of the ocean, with the vulture of his own disappointed ambition to tear his heart: and it would be foolish sentimentality to waste any compassion on the sorrows of his captivity: but on the contrary it would be inhuman cruelty to exult over the cancer which destroyed his life. The same is true conversely, as applied to rewards. A reward which arises naturally out of virtue is far more satisfying to the moral sense than one which comes accidentally or is arbitrarily given. Thus, a good man will desire the natural reward of kindness, which is love and gratitude, when he would reject the offer of a reward in money with scorn.

We approve of punishment only so far as necessary for the defeat or cure of sin.

Similar feeling as to rewards.

In the administration of human justice we act on the principle just stated, namely that punishment ought to go so far as is needful for the utter defeat of sin, but no farther. Thus, when we think it right to inflict the punishment of death, which is the nearest approach to the extinction of being, and the most appropriate symbol thereof, that man can inflict, we should condemn any proposal to aggravate by torture the horror of such a death: and the conduct of those mediæval executioners who kept the flesh of their victims bathed in oil in order to preserve its sensitiveness to pain while burning under the fire, appears to us neither human nor Divine but fiendish. We ought not to attribute to our heavenly Father principles of action of which we should be ashamed in ourselves. We are His children, and He intends that we should understand and

approve the principles of His government. We may confidently trust He will do what the principles of grace, which are those of righteousness, demand: namely that where sin is curable He will heal it, and where it is incurable He will destroy the sin and the sinner together.

The destruction of sin in the future life will be a painful process.

We know however that even in this life repentance is always difficult and painful: and there are many of Christ's sayings which seem to indicate that it will be much more so in a future life:—that a period of anguish beyond what is the lot of man in the present life awaits all those who pass into the future world with unrepented and unforgiven sins. The judgments of the world to come are constantly spoken of by Christ under the image of fire, which is declared to be unquenchable: and with this, in one well-known passage, is connected that of an undying worm.[1] By the worm is meant the natural consequences of sin: by the fire, the Divine anger against it. "God is a consuming fire."[2] Under these metaphors a process is evi-

[1] Mark ix. 43, *et seq.* The allusion is to the concluding passage of Isaiah:—"And they shall go forth, and look upon the carcases of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." This is not a denunciation of torment, but of what many men fear as much or more, namely the ignominious exposure and destruction of bodies after death.

[2] Deut. iv. 24, quoted in Hebrews xii. 29. I quote, from Lowth's translation, Isaiah xxxiii. 11, 16, where the same image occurs:—

"Ye shall conceive chaff: ye shall bring forth stubble:
And My Spirit like fire shall consume you.
And the peoples shall be burned as the lime is burned:
As the thorns are cut up and consumed in the fire.
Hear, O ye that are afar off, My doings:
And acknowledge, O ye that are near, My power.
The sinners in Zion are struck with dread:
Terror hath seized the hypocrites.
Who among us can abide this consuming fire?
Who among us can abide these continued burnings?
He who walketh in perfect righteousness, and speaketh right things:
Who detesteth the lucre of oppression:
Who shaketh his hands from bribery:
Who stoppeth his ears from the proposal of bloodshed:
Who shutteth his eyes against the appearance of evil:
His dwelling shall be in the high places:
The strongholds of the rocks shall be his lofty fortress:
His head shall be duly furnished: his waters shall not fail."

See "The Devouring Fire" in Bishop Colenso's Natal Sermons.

dently suggested which is at once painful and destructive. It must be painful, for not even Divine grace can be expected to separate suffering from sin: only children and those who have become childlike can hope to enter into eternal life without a painful struggle, either in this world or in the next: and as for those who do not finally attain to eternal life at all, we cannot suppose that they pass out of existence with less suffering than those who are finally purified and made fit for eternal life. But painful as the process must be whereby sin is to be destroyed, we have yet the blessing of knowing that it *is* destructive, and consequently will come to an end with that which it is to destroy. The worm will never die until it has eaten all that there is for it to eat: the fire will never be quenched, but it will cease to burn when there is nothing left for it to consume. Either the sin and the sinner shall be destroyed together, or the sin shall be destroyed so that the sinner shall arise out of the fire purified. In no case are we to think of any creature of God without hope.

Being destructive, it will come to an end.

There are however sayings of Christ and of Saint Paul which appear to point to the ultimate salvation of all without the destruction of any. Thus, Christ said, "I, if I be lifted up [on the cross], will draw all men unto me."[1] And Saint Paul says, "God has shut up all unto unbelief [or disobedience,[2]] that He might have mercy upon all."[3] The question, whether there are any for whom no salvation from sin is possible without the extinction of their existence, may thus, so far as I see, be left undecided.

Suggestions in the New Testament of the salvation of all.

To sum up what has been said on the subject of Grace and its relation to Nature and Justice.

Summary.

A system of self-executing natural law is sufficient to provide for justice, and justice requires not only that sin shall be punished but that a repentant sinner shall be

[1] John xii. 32.

[2] The word ἀπείθεια, which the English version here translates by *unbelief*, occurs five times in the Epistles of Saint Paul, not including the Epistle to the Hebrews: it is twice translated by *unbelief* and three times by *disobedience*.

[3] Epistle to the Romans, xi. 32.

assured of restoration. But this is not enough for the purposes of grace: it does not meet the difficulty how repentance is to be possible. To human nature, repentance is in general infinitely difficult: but, as Christ has said, "Things which are impossible with men are possible with God." If we appeal from an impersonal system of law to a personal God, we shall see hope of a dispensation of grace. To impersonal law it matters nothing whether righteousness is observed or violated: its justice is equally satisfied by the observance of righteousness or by the punishment of its violation. But with a righteous personal Being it is otherwise. Such a Being must no doubt desire the punishment of sin, but must rather desire its extinction. A righteous Law may be satisfied with punishment, but a righteous Being can be satisfied only with righteousness. This is *d fortiori* true of God, not only because He is perfectly righteous, but because as Creator He has a Father's interest in His creatures.

Being just, God must be angry with sin, and the consciousness of His anger, apart from any consequences, will probably be the severest of the punishments of the future life. But being just He will also forgive on repentance. And being righteous He will introduce a dispensation of grace whereby sin will be destroyed by leading men to repentance.

Justice is the defeat and punishment of sin: Grace is its destruction. Grace thus includes justice, and is a higher manifestation thereof. Grace is the Christian problem, as justice was the Jewish. The perplexity of the Israelite was that iniquity should *triumph*: that of the Christian is that it should *exist*. And the reply to both is the same: —it is but for a time: God is just and He will defeat it; He is gracious and He will destroy it.

It is better that sin should be destroyed by the repentance than by the destruction of the sinner: and where repentance is possible, it will be attained: but where sin has passed too deeply into character to be repented of, its extinction will be attained by the destruction of the sinner.

Repentance is a painful process even in this life, and the words of Christ appear to indicate that it will be much more so in a future life. And we cannot suppose that the destruction of sin by the destruction of the sinner will be less painful than its destruction by his repentance.

The punishments inflicted by God are at once retributive and remedial. Punishment is at once the natural expression of anger against sin, and the means of its destruction, either by leading to repentance or by destroying the sinner. It is incredible that a righteous and therefore gracious God should inflict punishment merely as vengeance, without reference to its effect on the sinner.[1] At the same time we feel, independently of Christ's threatenings, that even Divine grace cannot separate punishment from sin.

Punishment alone, however, does not appear to have any necessary tendency to produce repentance. If it had, no dispensation of grace would be needed beyond the dispensation of nature and self-executing law, to which punishment belongs. The dispensation of grace which Christ has introduced is not a part of nature, but a new and distinct result of the free action of that Divine Power and Creative Will which have given origin to nature and appointed its order. By this means a far higher righteousness is manifested in Christ than could have been manifested by any administration of grace through the laws of nature.

The relation of grace to nature is prefigured by that of life to matter.

The relation of the dispensation of Grace to that of Nature is prefigured by the relation of life to matter and its forces. In both cases the higher principle presupposes the lower, and can only work through it: and the laws of the lower principle will be satisfied first. In both cases, also, the higher principle is a new creation, and not a mere result of the laws of the lower one. Life is not a result of the laws of matter, but a new creation: and though grace springs from the same root in the Divine Mind as justice, yet the dispensation of grace is a result not of those laws

[1] See Note B next page.

which make the order of nature a dispensation of justice, but of the immediate action of the gracious Will and creative Power of God.

We shall have to consider the laws of the dispensation of grace in a future chapter. I will only remark here that in consequence of the supernatural character of grace, being a new creative act and not a result of the laws of nature, it follows that it can be made known to us only by means of a special communication from God, that is to say by revelation.

Being a new creation, grace can be known only by revelation.

NOTE A.

THE LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY CHRIST.

It may be said that Christ spoke Hebrew, so that we have in the Greek of the Evangelists only a translation, and possibly an inadequate translation, of His words. I do not agree with this: I agree with those who believe that Christ habitually spoke Greek. The occurrence of occasional Hebrew words in the recorded sayings of Christ can scarcely be accounted for except by supposing that among the Jews of Palestine Hebrew was preserved as a sacred language and used on solemn occasions—perhaps in the synagogues—while Greek was the language of common life. This may be illustrated by the fact that Hebrew expressions—"Abba" and "Maran-atha"—occur in Saint Paul's Greek epistles. It is also obvious from Acts xxii. 2, that the Jews at Jerusalem expected Saint Paul to address them in Greek, and would have understood him in that language, though they were agreeably surprised to hear him speak in Hebrew.

Reason for thinking that Christ usually spoke Greek.

NOTE B.

THOMAS ERSKINE ON GRACE AND JUSTICE.

The following extracts are from "The Spiritual Order and other Papers selected from the Manuscripts of the late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen."

In God mercy and justice are one.

"In God mercy and justice are one and the same thing. His justice never demands punishment for its own sake, and can be satisfied with nothing but righteousness: and His mercy seeks the highest good of man, which certainly is righteousness, and will therefore use any means, however painful, to produce it in him."—Page 72.

Punishment consistent with forgiveness.

"Forgiveness in its deepest sense does not mean deliverance from a penalty or the reversal of a sentence; it means the continuance of a fatherly purpose of final good, *even through the infliction of the penalty and the execution of the sentence.*"—Page 140. [The italics are Erskine's.]

This definition of forgiveness is different from mine, which is *the withdrawal of anger*:[1] but the difference, I am certain, is verbal only.

God's righteousness as a Father.

"Christianity reveals God as a Father whose purpose is to train His children into a participation of the spirit and character of His Son. The justification therefore or vindication of His dealing towards us is not in the assurance that the claims of justice have been satisfied before He shows mercy, but in the discovery of this gracious purpose in those dealings, and in their fitness to accomplish it: just as the righteousness of an earthly father consists in his purpose to make his children righteous, and cannot be conceived of as separate from it, and the indication of his righteousness is the discovery of this purpose in all his conduct towards them."—Page 151.

Punishment no cure for sin.

"No suffering of a penalty due to sin either by ourselves or by another in our place can put sin away, for sin is a spiritual thing and can only be put away by a return to righteousness."—Page 153.

The purpose of grace.

"The object of grace is not to change the nature of sin, or of its service, or of its wages, but to induce you to choose another master. The evil of sin does not consist in its producing misery or death, but in its essential contradiction to rightness."—Page 190.

The purpose of punishment.

"A righteousness which does not seek to make others righteous is not really righteousness. If we saw a father punishing his child, and when we asked him what effect he expected to produce, he were to answer, 'I don't think of that, I only think of what he has deserved,' should we not at once say that he was neither a loving father nor a righteous man? So long as I believe that God's condemnation of sin is not connected with this purpose, and that He punishes me merely because I deserve

[1] Page 316.

it, it is impossible to trust Him: but when I understand that His condemnation contains within it an unchangeable purpose to draw me out of my sin, I can accept His condemnation and bless Him for it. It seems to me that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is just the full and living manifestation of this purpose, —that it means this or nothing."—Page 242.

Punishment is irreversible.

"The sentence of sorrow and death *is not to be set aside, but passed through;* and the foregone sins, though pretermitted and passed over,—that is, not regarded by God as reasons for abandoning His purpose of training us in righteousness,—must yet receive their penalty."—Page 252. [The italics are Erskine's.]

Erskine's merits.

I do not know any writings whatever that represent the principles of grace, which are those of the New Testament, so clearly as Thomas Erskine's.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LEGAL AND EVANGELICAL RELIGION.

THE full-length title of Butler's great work is "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature." The expression "constitution and course" is somewhat pleonastic: there is nothing in the idea which the single word "constitution" does not express. But the meaning of the expressions "natural" and "revealed" as applied to religion is worthy of a careful examination.

Meaning of *natural religion.*

It appears to have been Butler's opinion, in common with the majority of his contemporaries who believed in religion at all, that, up to a certain point, man is able to discover the truths of religion—that is to say the nature of God and the moral government of the world—by means of his unassisted faculties, in the same way that he can discover the truths of science: but that beyond that point any further knowledge must be communicated, if at all, by revelation. Religion up to that point was called natural: and natural religion was held to include not only the belief in a Divine Creator and Ruler, but in a future life wherein perfect justice is to be administered.

Its doctrines are consistent with the facts of the world.

The existence of God being taken as unquestionably true, the first part of the *Analogy* is employed in showing the consistency of the visible facts of the world of human life with the chief doctrine which Natural Religion has to establish, namely that the Creator of the world is also its Moral Governor: and that we live under a moral administration in this life, or, to use Butler's strange but impressive

phrase, that we are *in a state of religion:* and that whatever in this administration is unintelligible or imperfect will have all its deficiencies supplied in the life to come. Or, in fewer words, that the analogies of the present life are in favour of the belief in a perfect administration of justice and a righteous retribution in a future life. This conclusion has been stated at greater length, though without any attempt to reproduce the details of Butler's arguments, in the chapters of this work on the Divine Purpose of Creation and on Immortality.[1] His argument is quite satisfactory on its own postulates. If there is a God, and if man is immortal, the conclusion stated above is so probable that even without direct evidence it ought to be accepted by reasonable men as certainly true.

The existence of God is assumed by Butler without attempt at proof. Though the *Analogy* is constructive in its form, it is controversial in its purpose, which is to give proofs of the moral government of God to those who deny or doubt His moral government while acknowledging His existence and creative power. The immortality of man, on the contrary, is not assumed: the work opens with an attempt to show arguments in its favour from the analogy of nature. But unfortunately these arguments—the arguments, that is to say, for the natural immortality of the soul—are utterly worthless. It has been admitted in the chapter on Immortality in the present work,—and on grounds of mere controversial prudence, even independently of our supreme loyalty to truth, the admission ought to be made frankly,—that the analogies of mere nature are opposed to the doctrine of immortality.[2]

Purpose of Butler's *Analogy.*

> "From earth we come, to earth return :
> Whatever has been born must die."

If we of this generation are to believe in a future life, we must agree, not with the metaphysical and quasi-scientific arguments of philosophers who maintain the natural immortality of the soul, but with the faith of the writers of the New Testament, who taught that *God will raise the*

[1] Chapters 17 and 20.

[2] Page 284.

Immortality can be certain only by revelation.

dead: and it is difficult to see how this can be made certain except by evidence derived from revelation. The philosophical system of natural religion therefore breaks down at the foundation.

Do I then conclude that the first part of the Analogy is worthless? By no means. It does not establish, independently of revelation, a system of natural religion, with its cardinal doctrine of the rendering of justice to all in a future life: but it does prove that the analogies of nature are in favour of any revelation which contains that doctrine. Almost all facts, as distinguished from *à priori* truths, are believed not on demonstrative but on cumulative evidence: the question of a future state of retribution is one of fact, and Butler has established that argument in its favour which consists in its harmony with the facts of the present life.

Value of the *Analogy*.

Natural religion, as we have seen, in Butler's system includes the doctrines of immortality and retribution:—revealed religion is a name for the more distinctive doctrines of Christianity. If what has been said is true, this distinction is invalid; as Coleridge somewhere says, "the expression *revealed religion* is a pleonasm: there is no religion except that which is revealed." But the error which Butler has committed in making it goes no farther than the title-page. The true distinction is not that of *natural* and *revealed* but that of *legal* and *evangelical*:—legal religion being the right name for that which Butler calls natural, and evangelical for that which he calls revealed. The distinction between legal and evangelical religion has been sufficiently indicated in the preceding chapter:—legal religion being the position wherein we stand in virtue of God's justice, and evangelical religion that whereinto we are brought by His grace.

All religion is revealed.

The true distinction is Legal and Evangelical.

Definitions.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that justice is natural law among beings having a moral nature.[1] In this sense, the religion of mere justice is natural religion: but this was not the meaning of natural religion with Butler and his contemporaries: what they understood by that

[1] Page 305.

expression was so much of religion as man can learn without revelation.

The designation of Butler's scheme of religious philosophy ought then to be *the analogy of religion, legal and evangelical, to the constitution of nature.* But does this give altogether a true meaning? Does this double analogy really exist? If justice is natural law among beings having a moral nature, there is the closest analogy between the constitution of nature and merely legal religion:—legal religion is only the extension of natural justice into a future life. I have endeavoured to state this view fully in the preceding chapter. But is the same true of evangelical religion? Have the doctrines of divine grace any similar support in the analogies of nature? I trow not. Nature at least anticipates and foreshadows the revelation of divine justice, but it has no revelation of mercy. The contrast which the constitution of nature presents to divine grace or evangelical religion is as strong as the analogy which it presents to divine justice or legal religion.

Legal religion has an analogy with nature.

Evangelical religion is contrasted with nature.

> "We trust that God is love indeed,
> And love Creation's final law,
> Though Nature, red in tooth and claw,
> With ravin, shrieks against our creed."[1]

On this subject Butler has gone wrong at starting. He quotes Origen to the effect that "he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature;" and I fear that by the present generation this shallow and false saying is frequently supposed to contain the whole of Butler's philosophy. We must examine its claim to our assent.

Butler's initial error, that revelation should reproduce the difficulties of nature.

We who believe the world of nature to be the work of a righteous and holy God find notwithstanding that it is full of perplexities and anomalies. We trust in God not because of these difficulties but notwithstanding them, and

[1] "Who trusted God was love indeed,
And love Creation's final law,
Though Nature, red in tooth and claw,
With ravin, shriek'd against his creed."

TENNYSON'S *In Memoriam.*

we seek a revelation of God's purpose which shall clear them up: and the deeper is this instinctive faith, the stronger will be our hope of such a revelation. On this subject see almost every page of the Book of Psalms, which Luther called a miniature Bible. It is better understood in that morning twilight of religious knowledge than in the full and sometimes dazzling light of the New Testament. What sort of a reply is it to this longing of instinctive faith, to say that revelation (for "the Scriptures" is here a mere synonym for revelation) does not clear up the difficulties of nature but reproduces them? As we have seen,[1] the perplexity of the Israelite of old was that God should permit iniquity to prosper. God did not reply by justifying Himself:—in the Book of Job He expressly refused to do so:[2]—the reply which He gave, and which satisfied His faithful servants in that age, was that it should not be so always. But what sort of a reply would it have been to tell them that revelation does not clear up the difficulties of nature but reproduces them, and it *shall* be so always? Their faith was never mocked with such a reply: but now that the moral perplexity of the world has changed its form, and the question is no longer why God should permit sin to prosper, but why He should permit it to exist, we are met with this reply:—we are told that revelation does not clear up the difficulties of nature but reproduces them, and it shall be so always.

One case however is not altogether parallel to that of the Israelite. Before immortality was made fully known, a revelation from heaven declaring that the injustice of the world should never be set right would no doubt have destroyed hope, but it would otherwise have left things as it found them. But it is not so with us who believe in immortality. A declaration that sin shall never cease to exist does not leave the perplexity of the existence of sin untouched; on the contrary, it aggravates it infinitely. I

[1] Page 320.

[2] I do not enter on the question of the inspiration of the Scriptures. None who believe in God can doubt that they are given by Him for our instruction, and that whatever light was formerly shed on the life of the Israelite, or is shed on our life now, by such books as Job and the Psalms, is light from God.

use the word *infinitely* in its proper mathematical sense:—whatever perplexity is due to the existence of sin in finite time is multiplied to infinity if it is to exist for ever. When we are told—as we are told—that the continuance of sin, and therefore of misery, for ever, is only a reproduction of the moral perplexities of nature, our reply is: It is a reproduction of the same perplexity, but magnified to infinity: and this, when we hoped that it would be cleared away as the perplexity of the Israelite has been!

Dean Mansel on the same argument.

The difficulty, we are told, is not that evil should exist for ever, but that it should exist at all: or, in other words, *When God tolerates the existence of iniquity now, why should He not tolerate it for ever?* With this argument such writers as Dean Mansel think to silence those who hope that Christ will ultimately not only subdue but destroy all enemies.[1] But if they perceived its logical consequences they might well fear to use it. They are not atheists, and they do not mean to be sceptics, but this is the stock argument of the sceptic and the atheist, which has been reproduced in every possible conscious and unconscious form ever since the light of God first shone in a darkness which refused to understand it. Its true character will be shown by changing a single word. *When God tolerates the triumph of iniquity now, why should He not tolerate it for ever?* We are told by the Psalmist that there were men in his time who so reasoned; but they had not the perverse acuteness of our modern logicians who use what is essentially the same argument, and fancy that it is on the side of God and of righteousness. They said, *God doth not regard it:* or, more simply and consistently, *There is no God.* More consistently, I say: for atheism is the legitimate result of all systems which deny that God will both defeat sin and destroy it: whether they are avowedly impious, like the unbelief of evil-doers in ancient Israel, or ostensibly pious, seeking to build a structure of religious orthodoxy on a foundation of moral scepticism, like the theory of Dean Mansel.[2] If such systems are sound, and if

Unbelief among the ancient Israelites.

The argument is as good

[1] See Note C to Chapter 8. See also Note at end of present chapter.

[2] See Note at end of chapter.

against Divine justice as against Divine mercy.

God's temporary toleration of the existence of evil, whether triumphant in this world or defeated and suffering in the world to come, is any pledge that he will continue to tolerate it for ever, then the instinctive hope of the noblest among mankind, which appears so impressively in the Psalms and in the prophetical writings, for a salvation to be revealed by the righteous God, gives no ground for believing that such hopes have any foundation: for if the hope which we cherish for the destruction of evil is illusory, why should the hope of Psalmist and Prophet for its defeat prove to be better founded?

Summary.

In a word:—If the instinctive hope of universal divine mercy is unfounded, the instinctive hope of universal divine justice rests on no better foundation.

In what sense this is a mere *argumentum ad hominem.*

It may be said that this is a mere *argumentum ad hominem.* This is perfectly true. It is a mere *argumentum ad hominem,* addressed to all those who sympathise with the faith of the Psalmist in a divine justice to be revealed:—a faith which may be called instinctive, because it is not founded on the revelation but anticipates it.

Argument for the universality of mercy from instinctive moral feeling.

But there is an argument in favour of believing in the universality of divine mercy which is in no sense a mere *argumentum ad hominem.* We are so constituted that we are able to think of suffering or of any other evil as endurable if we know that it is but temporary, but not if it is to be everlasting. Whatever is the metaphysical value of the argument that what God tolerates now He may tolerate for ever, it is thus contradicted, or rather rejected, by the moral instincts of man: and our moral instincts must correspond, however distantly, with some reality in the moral order of the universe. To deny that there is any such correspondence would be to say of God, that He is found capable of creating organs of sight in a world of darkness: and of us, that faith is impossible, because we have no power to distinguish righteousness that we might believe in it.

The dogma of everlasting misery—in other words, of sin which is never to be either healed by the sinner's repent-

ance or destroyed by his extinction—is a contradiction of mercy: but it is not altogether a contradiction of justice: for, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, though inconsistent with the character of a just and righteous God, it would be at least a possible result of a perfectly just system of impersonal self-executing law. But justice as well as mercy is contradicted by other applications of the theory that revelation may be expected not to clear up but only to reproduce the perplexities of the world of nature. Thus it is said that the doctrine of original sin, misinterpreted as a dogma of hereditary guilt, is consistent with the visible fact that sinful tendencies in character, like all other tendencies, often become hereditary: and that the dogma of what is called the "election of grace,"[1] in the sense of mere arbitrariness in the bestowal of spiritual favours by God, is consistent with the visible fact of the unequal distribution of temporal blessings. We may grant the premises, which are too obvious to be denied, without accepting the conclusion. It is no doubt part of the order of nature that children suffer for the sins of their parents, and that blessings are very unequally distributed. But it is not legitimate to reason from such instances as these to the world transcending nature whereof revelation speaks. That revelation is a revelation of grace. These moral anomalies of nature, on the contrary, so far from belonging to the world of grace or containing any anticipation thereof, do not even approach to justice. Like all evil, they are permitted for a time in order to give occasion for the development of virtue which would otherwise be undeveloped for want of exercise; but they belong neither to that Divine system of justice towards which nature makes only an approximation, nor to that Divine system of grace which transcends nature altogether, but to that unmoral system of nature which joins with man in groaning for deliverance.[2]

The dogmas of original sin and of election.

These remarks are emphatically applicable to that oft-quoted passage where Butler compares the waste of souls

[1] This expression is Saint Paul's. Romans xi. 5.

[2] Page 292.

Butler's comparison of the waste of souls to that of seeds.

in the spiritual world to the waste of seeds in the world of nature.[1] The waste of seeds in the world of nature is not now so unaccountable a part of the divine method as it appeared to be in Butler's time: for it has been shown by Darwin in his *Origin of Species* that the production of a much greater number of germs than can possibly be matured is a necessary condition of organic progress by means of "natural selection among spontaneous variations."[2] And we have seen that similar agencies are at work in human society, and promote historical progress.[3] But these are not analogies which we ought to expect to see followed out in the spiritual world. They belong not to the kingdom of the personal God, which is a kingdom of grace, but to the reign of merely natural law. That natural system whereof the waste of seeds is a part, is, as Darwin has shown, a system of competition wherein progress is secured by the strong surviving and the weak perishing. But though competition is good in its place, and is, within limits, good in human society, it is primarily an unmoral agency:—not contrary to morality, but belonging to a region below it. The unconscious struggle for existence wherein ichthyosauri have been superseded by whales and pterodactyles by birds,[4] is neither moral nor immoral but unmoral. In human history, however, strife and competition become a moral agency, by reason of the tendency of such moral qualities as fidelity and self-devotion to ensure victory to their possessors. But the highest virtues do not and cannot enter into competition:—in competition each individual, tribe, or nation strives for itself, but the highest virtues are unselfish and self-sacrificing:—and competition is no longer a moral agency but on the contrary destructive of morality when it is introduced

Reply: the waste of seeds belongs to unmoral nature,

and the analogies of the moral creation are opposed to it.

[1] "Analogy," page 105 (Bishop Fitzgerald's edition).

[2] The reasoning on which this conclusion depends is stated at length in "Habit and Intelligence." I have shown in that work that I am very far from thinking Darwin's theory a complete account of the origin of species and of organic progress, but it is impossible to doubt that the cause mentioned in the text is an actually operative one.

[3] Page 235.

[4] See Note B to Chapter 16.

into a higher and more sacred region than that which properly belongs to it. Family life, which is the nearest approach to the kingdom of God which the world of nature contains, so far from being based on competition would be destroyed by it: and the more highly man's moral nature is developed, the less exclusively does human society recognize as its law the Darwinian principle of the right of the strongest to prevail, and the more does it recognize the rights of the weak. In other words; in the moral progress of man that principle of action under which nature destroys the superfluous seeds, is gradually and partially rejected in favour of the right of all who are born, to live and to enjoy life so far as their powers will permit. The Darwinian principle of competition, if it were applied to what is properly the domain of morality, would condemn to destruction the infirm, the maimed, the blind, the dumb, the mentally weak, and all who are unable to hold their ground in the battle of life. The highest human morality on the contrary protects them and endeavours to secure what enjoyment of life is possible to them:—and the successful attempts which scientific philanthropy has made to alleviate the afflictions of their lot rank among the most admirable of human achievements. And every recognition of the duty of society to save the destitute from perishing is a declaration of the insufficiency for the guidance of human society of that principle of mere competition which, unchecked, would permit the destitute to perish.

Family life.

Christian philanthropy.

If it is urged that these principles of action belong specially to Christian philanthropy, and are thus chiefly due not to any spontaneous development of human morality but to an impulse from without: I reply that I am inclined to agree with this, and it strengthens my argument: for we may reason with more confidence from the divinely human morality of Christ than from the highest merely human morality to the moral principles of the spiritual world. It remains true however that family life, which, equally with Christian philanthropy, rejects and supersedes competition, is purely natural. So far from being the result of any special and direct revelation of God's purpose, it has

its beginning in the animal world, and is thus older than the origin of the spiritual nature in man.

Now, if we adopt Butler's view (as it will be seen that I do) in regarding the moral order of human society as part of the same system of nature to which matter and life belong: it will be seen that the principle in virtue whereof so many seeds are consigned to destruction in apparent waste, or the Darwinian principle as we may now call it, though it belongs to the order of nature, has in its beginning no trace of any moral character: and though it ultimately becomes an agency of moral progress, yet it is only capable of becoming an agency of justice:—not of mercy or grace, unless we call it mercy to end the existence of the weak and the diseased:—and it is set aside by the highest human morality, especially by that which we have learned from Christ. From this it will be evident that the analogy of nature, when rightly understood, does not support but opposes the belief that the Author of nature, who is also the God of mercy, will deal with beings who are sentient, and have at least a capacity for morality, as He deals with seeds:—for we may reasonably expect the analogies of the spiritual world not to be with those principles which have their origin in the unmoral part of the administration of the world of nature, and are rejected by nature's highest morality: but with those which belong to that part thereof which alone is essentially moral, namely the life of the family: the relation of parent and child, and that of brother and brother. The principle of competition, and the Darwinian law of progress by the destruction of the weak, belong on the contrary to that order of nature which, though it is not evil, yet seems to aspire and to groan after something better than itself.

The Darwinian principle in nature and in morals.

The analogy of the spiritual world will be with the moral rather than with the unmoral part of nature.

In conclusion it is to be observed that though legal and evangelical religion—that is to say, our relation to Divine justice and to Divine mercy—may be separated in thought, they cannot be separated in fact: for neither can have its

Legal and evangelical religion cannot be separated.

perfect action without the other, and they both have their root in the nature of God.

NOTE.

MANSEL ON THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL.

THE following is extracted from Dean Mansel's Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought, page 222.

Extract from Mansel's Bampton Lectures.

"It is urged that evil cannot for ever be triumphant against God. As if the whole mystery of iniquity were contained in the words *for ever!* The real riddle of existence—the problem which confounds all philosophy,—aye and all religion too, so far as religion is a thing of man's reason,—is the fact that evil exists *at all:* not that it exists for a longer or shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise and powerful and holy *now?* and does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to become more holy, more powerful, more wise hereafter: and must evil be annihilated to make room for His perfections to expand? Does the infinity of His eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against this immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface."

His inconsistency.

Only a few lines further on, however, Mansel denies that evil is a mystery in any other sense than all existence, whether created or uncreated, is a mystery. (See Note C to Chapter 8.) If this is true, the highest religious philosophy coincides with fetish-worship and polytheism, which expect evil as easily as good, sinfulness as easily as holiness, from the objects of their worship. The feeling that evil is not only a mystery but an anomaly,[1] is however too deeply implanted in us by centuries of Christian culture to be conjured away by any philosophy, however ingenious.

Compare the following passage, quoted with approval by

[1] For the distinction between *mystery* and *anomaly* see pp. 140, 143.

Müller on the same subject.

Mansel from Müller.[1] "Es scheint nach der Bemerkung von der wir eben ausgingen undenkbar, dass die Weltentwickelung mit einem *unaufgelösten Zwiespalt* abschliesse, dass der Gegensatz gegen den göttlichen Willen in dem Willen irgend eines Geschöpfes sich behaupte. Diesen Knoten löst indessen zunächst schon ein richtiger Begriff der *Strafe*. Der Gegensatz gegen den göttlichen Willen behauptet sich eben nicht, sondern ist ein schlechterdings überwundener, wenn der ganze Zustand der Wesen, in denen er ist, Strafzustand ist, so dass das Gebundene Böse dem reinen Einklang der zum göttlichen Reiche verklärten Welt durchaus nicht mehr zu stören vermag."

Moral position of his theory.

The "right conception of punishment" here stated amounts to this:—"The mystery of evil is solved. It is not to exist for ever: for sin will be punished, and sin when punished is evil no longer." This theory is not mere nonsense, and it is perfectly intelligible: but it goes back from the moral position of the Christian who desires the extinction of sin, to that of the Israelite who was satisfied with its defeat and punishment. This however is not all: for, by dogmatically denying the extinction of sin and punishment, it assumes a repulsive and anti-Christian character, unlike anything in the Psalms, where punishment in a future state is not thought of.

Legitimate result of Mansel's doctrine.

Were I convinced of Mansel's doctrine that the only discoverable truth concerning evil is that it will last for ever, the necessary inference for me would be pure moral atheism: that is to say, the conclusion that righteousness is not a fundamental law of the universe at all.

Mansel, so far as I am aware, is the first writer who has systematized the tendency to lay a foundation of pure scepticism for a superstructure of orthodoxy: but there is too much of it in Butler, and in a profounder thinker than Butler, namely Pascal: though Victor Cousin, in his celebrated essay on the Scepticism of Pascal, has greatly exaggerated this. Mansel is avowedly Butler's disciple.—Had Butler read Pascal's *Thoughts*? —and did Pascal unconsciously acquire the habit of assuming sceptical premisses for orthodox conclusions from the casuistical writers whom, in his *Letters*, he refuted by exposing?

Mansel, Butler, Pascal, and the Casuists.

[1] Notes to Mansel's Bampton Lectures, p. 409.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO RELIGION.

WE have now done with the scientific *bases* of faith. But before we go on to the superstructure, which is the Faith itself, that is to say to Religion as made known by Revelation, the question occurs :—After all that has been said of the relation of Religion to Science, what is to be said of its relation to History ?

It may be said in reply, that Science is a mere synonym for Knowledge, and that consequently it includes History.

If this is only a verbal definition, there is nothing to be said against it, except that it is always best, for the sake of accuracy, to keep the meanings of words distinct. But if it is meant that all knowledge, historical knowledge included, is capable of being brought under scientific formulæ, then I altogether disagree with this. Common sense and usage are right in opposing history and literature to science. The essential matter in science is for knowledge to be reasoned and formulised, and a fact that will not fit into any formula stands over till the right formula is found. But in history and literature the essential matter is the display of human character : and this fascinates us most, and gives the highest instruction, when it defies all formulæ most completely. It is true that such a thing is possible as a science of history : but it can never be anything more than a science of general tendencies : and between understanding these and really knowing history,

History is not part of science.

there is the same difference that there is between understanding psychology as a science and understanding human nature.[1] Science and History are thus the two great divisions of human knowledge: though, like the various branches of science, they have manifold connexions with each other.[2]

Religion must be in closer connexion with history than with science.

We cannot doubt that all things in creation, notwithstanding the diversities of their laws, form one connected system: and if so, Religion, or the revealed knowledge of God, must be in connexion with both Science and History, which are the chief divisions of the natural knowledge which we acquire for ourselves. But of the two, Religion will probably be found in closer connexion with History than with Science: for Religion addresses itself to the capacity for faith, and History addresses itself to that power of understanding human character by sympathy and insight, in a way transcending logic and incapable of being reduced to formulæ, which, as we have seen, is a rudimentary form of faith.[3]

Further: if a system of religion is to be revealed:—in other words, if it is God's purpose to give us more definite knowledge of Himself and His ways than is given by nature and by conscience, and thereby to act on our minds for our spiritual improvement:—it appears probable that the Divine system for so acting on mankind will be shown in operation in actual instances at definite times and places in history. It cannot be otherwise if religion is to act on us through our sympathies:—the indefinite revelation of God in nature addresses the intellect, and the indefinite revelation of God in conscience addresses the moral sense: but if God is to be revealed in any more definite and personal manner, so as to address the affections, this, so far as we can judge, can only be done in the same way that the affections are addressed by human beings: that is to say, God will address our affections by letting His

A revelation addressed to the affections must be historical.

[1] "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 218.

[2] On the connexions between Science and History, see the Introduction to "Habit and Intelligence."

[3] See the chapter on the Meaning of Faith (Chapter 6).

Character be seen in action: and action belongs to History.

For anything that we can know *à priori*, however, it is uncertain whether God's revelation of Himself will be of this kind, or will consist only in a communication of knowledge. But the analogies of nature are in favour of our expecting a revelation which shall be not only addressed to the understanding in the communication of knowledge, but addressed also to the sympathies and affections by the manifestation of character in action. I do not mean that the analogies of nature directly suggest this: but we have seen, in speaking of the Structure of the Universe and the Divine Purpose of Creation,[1] that all nature, including the world of human life, suggests that the Creator's purpose is the production of the highest kind of excellence: and it is obvious that a revelation which addresses the affections as well as the understanding must be more favourable to the production of the highest excellence than one which addresses the understanding alone.

But even if the revelation is to consist of nothing more than a communication of knowledge over and above that which has been communicated in nature and in conscience, we cannot see any way in which such knowledge can be given except at definite times and places, and consequently in History.

The manner in which this has been expressed is perhaps new, but the ideas are old. I do not know whether any book has been published with the title of "The Historical Bases of Faith," but such a title would suggest no ideas which are not familiar.

These ideas are not new.

We thus conclude that a revelation from God is likely to be not isolated from all other knowledge, but entwined with History as well as capable of being logically based on Science.

Summary.

[1] See Chapters 16 and 17.

CHAPTER XXV.

RECAPITULATION OF THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS.

BEFORE we speak of the distinctive doctrines of the Christian Faith as made known in Revelation, it will be well to recapitulate the suggestions and foreshadowings thereof which we have found in Nature: omitting however all that is not of first-rate importance, and all that consists of replies to difficulties and objections.

Nature suggests, without proving, God and immortality.

It is the purpose of the present work to show that although no system of merely natural religion is possible: that is to say, although God and Immortality, with the doctrines of Divine Justice and Divine Grace, cannot be certainly known from nature: yet they are so strongly suggested in nature as to give great *à priori* probability to the claims of a revelation which speaks as with the authority of God in order to make them known. I am consequently opposed not only to the Materialism, or Positivism as it is now called, which, from finding that God is not made known by the ordinary methods of either demonstrative or inductive science, concludes that not even His existence can be made known at all: but also to the Deism which regards the indefinite revelation of God in the universe as sufficient, and admits no more definite revelation of Him in history: and to the Mysticism, or Transcendentalism as it is now called, which regards the indefinite revelation of God in man's conscience and spiritual nature as sufficient, and admits no more definite revelation of Him in history.

I am opposed to Deism and mystical Transcendentalism as well as to materialistic positivism.

The alleged opposition between

The alleged opposition between Theology and Science which is so often assumed as if it were axiomatic, really rests on a form of *petitio principii* resembling that which

Bentham called a "question-begging appellative." "Not theological but scientific;" "not scientific but theological." It is thus taken for granted that a scientific conception cannot be theological, and that a theological conception cannot be scientific. If this is true it ought to be proved: it cannot be axiomatic. It would be as reasonable to assume that science and history are altogether distinct and have no points of contact. History can never be merely a branch of science, yet its points of contact with science are constantly multiplying: so, as I maintain, theology is much more than a mere branch of science, yet it has many points of contact with science, and is capable, up to a certain point, of being treated scientifically.

Theology and Science is a *petitio principii.*

The answer to this will probably be, that the truth in such matters is to be known not by reasoning but by trial: and that all experience shows that science and history have much light to throw on each other; while the same experience shows that the data of science are not to be sought in theology.

I reply that this is true: the *data* of science are not to be sought in theology. But may not the *conclusions* of Science point to theology? It is the purpose of the present work to show that they do.

See Introduction.

We have had first to decide what, and how much, we mean by Science. Is all possible knowledge of general truths included in Inductive, or what is now called Positive, Science? We have answered this question in the negative. We have seen that metaphysical science is as legitimate and as true as inductive science, though it deals with a different set of problems. They both alike regard the entire world of being, mental as well as physical, but from opposite points of view: Inductive Science begins from data of Observation, and Metaphysical Science from data of Consciousness: in other words, the data of Inductive Science are external to the conscious mind, and those of Metaphysics are internal to it. The problems of Inductive Science regard the *laws* of matter and mind: the problems of Metaphysics regard their *underlying reality.* That science which is to be a

See Chapter 1.

Science here includes metaphysics as well as inductive science.

basis for faith must include Inductive and Metaphysical science alike:—that is to say, all science which has existing things for its object, though not the abstract sciences of Mathematics and formal Logic; for these latter, to our present capacities for knowledge, do not appear to have any bearing on theology.

We have subsequently considered man's powers of knowing and of believing, that is to say his capacity for Knowledge and for Faith: and we have found that Inductive and Metaphysical Science have alike their origin from the earliest dawn of conscious thought:—Inductive Science begins when we discover the existence of an external world, and Metaphysics when we become conscious of personal identity continuing through time and change. We have found also that Faith, as well as Science, has its origin from the earliest dawn of thought, and before the awakening of self-consciousness:—Science begins with the instinctive belief in the uniformity of the order of nature, and the discovery of such commonplace truths as that stones are heavy and fire hot: and Faith begins with the instinctive trust of children in their parents.

Origin of inductive and metaphysical science,

and of faith.

See Chapter 6.

We have seen moreover that the practical importance of Inductive Science is chiefly in guiding action, while the importance of Metaphysical Science is chiefly in forming character. The latter is still more eminently true of Faith, especially in its highest development, that is to say of religious faith. To speak in the language of the so-called Positive Philosophy, the function of the latest developed of the three possible systems of philosophy, namely Positive or Inductive Science, is to make known the laws of the universe wherein we live, and to guide action; while the function of the two older systems, namely the Metaphysical and the Theological, which were cast aside as worthless by the systematizer of the so-called Positive Philosophy because they throw no light on the laws of the visible universe, is the yet more important one of moulding character.

Their respective functions:

that of inductive science is to make known the laws of the universe: that of metaphysics and of faith is to mould character. *See Chapter* 1.

The possibility, and the value, of inductive science is questioned by none: but many follow Comte in rejecting

metaphysics. Now, what is meant by rejecting metaphysics? If it means that the questions of metaphysics cannot be solved, or that they are not worth trying to solve, this is intelligible, though I do not agree with it. But if it is said that they are not real questions, capable at least of being stated for solution, this is not so much untrue as unmeaning. The questions of the underlying reality of the universe of matter: the ground of our personal identity through time and change: the meaning of the law of causation: the freedom of man's will: the ground of our sense of the unalterably binding nature of moral law:—these, which are the principal questions of metaphysics, are questions which cannot but be asked, and, if they are to be solved at all, must be solved from other data than those of inductive science. It cannot be a matter of indifference to the formation of our characters how these questions are answered.

The questions of metaphysics are real, whether capable of solution or not.

We have next inquired separately into the most important of these questions, namely the metaphysical interpretation of nature, the ground of the moral sense, and the freedom of the will. In answer to the first of these, we have found that there is no ground for believing Matter and Mind or Spirit to differ in their essence: and that while Inductive Science, reasoning from data of Observation, reveals a world of matter whereof mind is one of the functions, Metaphysics, reasoning from data of Consciousness, reveals a world of spirit whereof matter is one of the functions: so that we recognize the deepest realities of the universe as not material but spiritual. In reply to the question as to the ground of the moral sense, we have seen that moral law is not the result of any mere calculation of consequences, but is a system of truth co-eternal with the Uncreated Source of the universe. And in reply to the question as to the freedom of man's will, we have seen that Conscience appears to affirm, while neither Inductive nor Metaphysical science denies, that our actions and our characters are not the mere result of circumstance, and that we have, though within very narrow limits, true moral freedom and power of self-determination.

Spiritual nature of the universe. *See Chapter* 2.

Ground of the moral sense in uncreated law. *See Chapter* 3.

Freedom of the Will. *See Chapter* 4.

The logical possibility and the psychological ground of faith have next been considered. Science—inductive science at least—consists of verified knowledge. Faith, on the contrary—I here speak of fully developed or religious faith—transcends the possibility of verification. It may therefore seem that faith is by its own confession unreasonable. But in reply to this we have seen that all knowledge concerning that which has existence—in other words, all knowledge except that of abstract logic and mathematics—ultimately rests on postulates which cannot be verified, and which are reasonably accepted as true without verification. These are the axioms of the general trustworthiness of memory, and the probability that the course of nature has been, is, and will be uniform:—or in other words that experience is *true*, and that it is *applicable*. These postulates cannot be proved: for were any one to assert that all to which memory bears witness is a dream, and that it is an even probability whether the course of nature shall be totally changed to-morrow, he could not be proved to be wrong. In the ethical sense however—that is to say as affecting the formation of character—there is no difference between such instinctive belief as this and the belief which is founded on proof.

See Chapter 6.

Reasonableness of faith.

See Chapter 5.

Its ethical value.

The peculiar ethical value of faith begins when we trust, with perfect confidence though without any possibility of our confidence being at present experimentally verified, in another, whether human or Divine or "human and Divine,"[1] whom nevertheless we feel to be too high above ourselves thoroughly to understand. Such faith cannot be reduced to formulæ or justified by logic, but it is able to justify itself: and such faith is the highest and most powerful of all agencies for moulding the character. The reasonableness of the doctrine of Justification by Faith, and its suitableness to a religion which aims at moulding human character anew, is thus shown, not by reasoning but by an appeal to facts.

See Chapter 7.

[1] "Thou seemest human and Divine,
The highest, holiest Manhood Thou."
TENNYSON'S *In Memoriam*.

Having vindicated the reality of Metaphysics and the reasonableness of Faith, we have gone on to consider the suggestions of God and Immortality which are to be found in the worlds of Nature and Mind.

Behind nature there must be an invisible ground of being and principle of unity: (*See Chapter* 13:)

We find in the first place, that the laws of nature cannot account for themselves. Behind visible nature there must be an invisible ground of Being. Moreover, nature is manifold: its laws are many, and cannot be reduced to one all-comprehending law: yet reason affirms that where there is diversity there must be a principle of unity behind it. The ultimate Self-Existent Unity whence the manifoldness of nature is derived, is consequently not in nature but behind and above it.

and this must be infinite. (*See page* 219.)

We are also certain that the invisible, ultimate ground of Being must be infinite: in other words, that the Self-Existent must be without limit. This is purely a truth of the reason, which is not and cannot be confirmed by observation: for no observation possible to us could ascertain whether even the visible universe has limits: much less could observation obtain knowledge of that which transcends the region of sense and is known by reason alone.

As yet we have asserted nothing concerning the Ground of Being and Principle of Unity, except the attributes of Self-Existence and Infinity. Our investigation next goes on to consider its nature.

While Inductive Science, reasoning from data found by observation, reveals a world of matter, whereof mind is one of the functions: Metaphysics, reasoning from data found in consciousness, reveals a spiritual world, whereof matter is one of the functions. Matter, whether from a metaphysical or from an inductive point of view, is known only as a function of force, and can be described only in terms of force. In other words, the universe is nothing but a manifestation of force. Force is known to us by immediate consciousness as a function of our own mind and will:—that is to say, the mind, acting in will, is conscious of itself as a force:—and we are able to conceive of force in no other way: the only conception of force which we are able to frame is that of voluntary force, or

Suggestion that the forces of the uni-

verse may be the expression of will. *See Chapters* 1 *and* 13.

the exertion of will. Either the force manifested in the universe is the force of a Creative Will, or we are able to form no conception of it whatever. It is not asserted that the existence of a Creative Will is proved by this argument:—it is only made conceivably capable of proof.

This is strengthened by the discovery that the universe had a beginning. *See p.* 49.

But what greatly strengthens the presumption in favour of the forces of the universe being not the forces of mere dead mechanism but the result and expression of a Living Will, is the truth now made known by inductive science, that the universe must have had a beginning in time. There must therefore have been an origin of the order of nature, outside of the existing laws of nature: and the only way in which we can conceive that origin, is that it is due to the determination of a Will, guided, as our own will is, by Intelligence towards a purpose.

But though we can conceive of no other answer to the question of the origin of the Universe, this answer is not thereby conclusively proved to be true. We must seek for other suggestions.

Moral law is part of the Divine nature.

If Creative Power is Intelligent Will, such Intelligence must be infinite: and infinite Intelligence, or in other words infinite knowledge, must include perfect knowledge of good and evil. And if the Self-Existent Being is an Infinite Intelligence—in other words, if there is a Divine Mind—all necessary truth, including the laws of Holiness or Morality, must form part of the constitution of that Mind. It is now generally recognized by all who believe, under whatever modification, in any Divine light for man, that the clearest streams of that light flow not through visible nature but through conscience. It is not too much to say that, excepting those axioms of logic and metaphysics which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, the only absolutely unquestionable and unalterable ground for certainty is in the conscience or moral sense. All else is, or may be, subject to change. The laws of nature had a beginning and may have an end. Time and space may be only forms of our own thought, though I do not myself agree with this opinion. But holiness cannot change its nature. Moral truth is true, and moral law is binding, for

Conscience, not nature, is the chief source of the knowledge of God.

The only absolute ground of certainty is in the moral sense.

all beings in the universe who have intelligence enough to understand it: and though there is much in the facts of the moral world which, taken alone, tends to oppose the belief in any Divine administration of justice, yet we are instinctively certain that if there is any moral order of the universe at all it will prove to be a righteous one. These truths are incapable of proof, but they need no proof: they shine by their own light. It is these truths only that make it possible for us to have any intelligent belief in a future life: for in the future life all must be so unlike our experience of the present, that we cannot be certain of any laws holding true there which we have found to be true here, except only those of morality. And it is these truths only that make it possible for us to receive a revelation as coming from God: for the fundamental postulate of any possible revelation is that God is true: this cannot be proved by revelation but is implied in it, and is known by us as an axiom of the moral sense.

See Chapter 3.

It has been already implied, but it ought to be expressly stated, that I attach no value to that argument for the Being of God which consists in the assumption that Moral Law implies a Moral Lawgiver. My argument is inconsistent with this: for I regard moral law as uncreated, and having its foundations deeper than any *determination* of Divine Will, though not deeper than the Divine Will in the sense in which this is identical with the Divine Nature. If moral law depended, like the law of gravitation, on a mere determination of Divine Will, it would be possible for God to make good and evil change their natures by a mere decree: and no one really believes this: for, though some Calvinists may think it pious to maintain this in words, yet they would deny, as earnestly and as sincerely as those who maintain a sounder theory, the possibility of God ceasing to be true.

Moral law is uncreated.

But though the existence of moral law and its unalterableness do not directly and of themselves prove the Being of God, yet they make it capable of being proved by other means. Conscience "has an authority which does not consist in power." It speaks with a command: and if the forces of external nature are the expression of Divine Will,

See Chapter 15.

is not the voice of conscience the expression of Divine Authority? Conscience is reason applied to moral subjects. But is it not more than this? Were it no more, it could speak in the indicative mood only: but it does speak in the imperative. Were it to address us with a mere *statement* of law, it would tell nothing of God. But it does address us as the expression of a Will which commands and constrains.

The force of the argument from conscience depends on the mind whereto it is addressed.

For the appreciation of such an argument as this, "there is no common measure" for all minds:[1] its force will depend on the mind to which it is addressed. To those whose conception of moral law, or duty, is identical with that of self-respect, it will appear worthless: and it will appear in the same light to those who think of moral goodness as only a peculiar and higher kind of beauty. But those who have attained to Kant's conception of moral law as a command which gives no account of itself, are not far from recognizing it as the voice of God. And it is fully so recognized by another class of minds: I mean those who know, whether by experience or by spiritual instinct, that faith is the best foundation for virtue: that the highest and holiest character is that which listens to the voice of conscience as to the expression of the Divine Will, and regards that Will as the Will at once of a Sovereign who has a right to be loyally obeyed, and of a Father who gives the power to obey. The kind of excellence which belongs to this character is what is called in the language of Christianity *the righteousness which is by faith.* It is that whereof Christ set the example: though He, being alone among men sinless, might have chosen to be self-sufficing, if such a position were suitable to any except the only Underived Being. To say that this kind of excellence is the highest type of human character, is only to say that the Christian character is higher than the Stoical, and humility better than pride.[2]

Faith in God is good for man; and that which is good for the moral nature cannot be false.

Now, faith is impossible without an object:—impossible, that is to say, in the sense of involving a contradiction. "He that cometh to God must believe that He is."[3] If

[1] See page 115. [2] See Note A at end of chapter.
[3] Epistle to the Hebrews, xi. 6.

then faith in God is the best foundation for virtue, such faith must be either true or false. If it is true, then there is a God whose character consists in holiness, and who is the source of both our physical and our spiritual life. But if it is not true, then we must accept the conclusion that an untrue hypothesis is more favourable to our moral nature than a true one: or, what is nearly the same, that it is good for us to hold with a steadfast and yet passionate "emotion of conviction" to a belief, of the truth of which we have no valid assurance:—to deceive ourselves by treating an unsupported hypothesis as an established truth. Such a conclusion is refuted by the mere statement. To believe that falsehood can be better for us than truth, or self-deception than the sincerity of the inmost soul, is almost if not quite as contrary to reason as it would be to believe that the foundations of the universe were laid in moral wrong. Though this argument may be clearly stated but seldom, it has probably more real practical force in producing faith than all others put together.

Special value of this argument for the scientific spirit.

The argument of the foregoing paragraph comes with peculiar force as an *argumentum ad hominem* to those who share the scientific spirit that desires to attain truth for its own sake without regard to consequences, which is the peculiar moral excellence of the present age. To them we say:—Your faith in truth, your hope for it, your love for it, are virtues which justify themselves. But if we assert that they are virtues, we thereby assert that virtue is possible: and it would be a fantastic paradox to maintain that they are the only virtues. Now, though the love of truth needs no argument to justify it, does not the recognition of it as a virtue imply that the attainment of the highest truth cannot be unfavourable, and will most probably be favourable, to the highest virtue? Moreover, whatever you believe or disbelieve, you at least believe in a cosmos, or reign of law. Is it credible that there should be no moral cosmos? Yet the moral world would be no cosmos but a chaos if it were true or possible that faith is the best foundation for virtue, and yet is based on what may possibly prove to be a falsehood.

The direct proof of Deity from conscience, namely the recognition of the voice of conscience as the voice of One who is our Creator and Lord, is a proof only to some minds. It is thus not demonstrative, and it cannot be called scientific. To some it has no force: to others—notably to Erskine of Linlathen, whose words on the subject have been already quoted[1]—it is proof enough to build a faith on which shall dominate the entire life. But the indirect proof, namely the truth that the virtue which is based on faith in God is the highest virtue, is capable of being understood by any man who has attained to moral intelligence at all, and is thus scientific in form, whether or not it is demonstrative in degree.

This proof is scientific in form.

This argument may be opposed by denying the relevancy of any argument at all on the subject. I do not see however how its possible relevancy can be denied except by those who deny the existence of any moral cosmos whatever, and who see no impossibility in the foundations of the universe being laid in wrong. If anyone really thinks so, it is as useless to reason with him as with one who should deny the fundamental axioms of logic or mathematics. But the reply to the argument now stated will more probably be that faith, though good in its place, is only fit to be the support of an immature virtue: and that a higher morality than the Christian will probably be evolved when man's moral nature has attained to maturity, and after the belief in God and immortality has died out. A future age will probably regard as the strangest of all the dreams of our own this fantastic paradox, which asserts that it is best for man's nature to look up into "space and hollow sky," and recognize no holier Being in the universe than himself: that it is better for us to recognize neither Divine Justice nor Divine Grace:—neither a Heavenly Judge who threatens us when we do wrong, nor a Heavenly Father who desires to lead and guide us aright.

Its relevancy can be denied only by denying the existence of a moral cosmos.

This remark, however, is scarcely just to what may be called the ethical school of religious unbelief. That

[1] Page 223.

school is a reaction of the Stoical feeling that virtue is lowered by seeking a reward, against the religious system which sets forth the hope of reward and the fear of punishment as the ground of virtue. Were this really the question as between Christianity and Stoicism—were it true that while Stoicism teaches us to follow virtue because it is right, Christianity bases moral obligation on selfish hope and fear—I should have no hesitation in concluding that the Stoical ideal of virtue is higher than the Christian, and in consequently preferring Stoicism to Christianity. But this is not a true statement of the question. Christianity does teach us to seek a reward, but not a selfish reward :—it teaches us to seek that reward which consists in knowing that our sins are forgiven and feeling that they are healed : in knowing that God accepts our services; in the approval of our own conscience, and the approval of God. The hope of such rewards as these not only strengthens virtue, but increases its purity by increasing its elevation.

The Stoical argument.

Reply to it *See Chapter* 21.

We have now considered the proofs, or at least suggestions, of Deity drawn respectively from Power and from Conscience : that is to say, the probability that the physical universe has been created and is impelled by a Living Will, and that the moral universe is governed by a Holy Will. The former of these two has been advanced as, when standing alone, only a probable conjecture : the proof of the latter appears to be almost conclusive. Whatever may be the strength of either or of both, however, they give strength to each other. It is a well-known principle of reasoning, applicable alike in science and in the ordinary business of life, that probabilities which may separately be very slight gather strength by accumulating, until a sufficient number of them becomes as good as demonstration. It is to be observed also, that assent to each of these separate arguments does not constitute a new demand on our faith : on the contrary, if we think it probable that the Origin of all things is a Living Will, it will also appear probable that this Will is intelligent : and as infinite Intelligence must

Cumulative nature of proof.

include perfect moral knowledge, it will appear a necessary consequence that the Intelligent Creative Will is also a Holy Will. The separate and subsequent arguments from Conscience and from Intelligence only confirm this anticipation without demanding any new postulates.

We now go on to the argument from Intelligence and Design.

Proof of Deity from Intelligence. *See Chapter* 14.

We find intelligence in the mind of man. We also find design in organic adaptations, such as, to mention the strongest instances, the adaptation of the ear to sound and of the eye to light. Adaptation, or design, is a proof of purpose, and a purpose can be formed only by an Intelligence. It appears most probable that the intelligence which organizes the body is not directly and immediately Divine, any more than the intelligence of man's mind. But, as all the intelligence known to us, both mental intelligence and organizing intelligence, must have had an origin, and therefore a cause: and as the effect cannot transcend the cause, we infer that Intelligence must be an attribute of the Creator. In a word:—as we reason from the forces of the universe to a powerful Creator, so we may reason from the intelligence manifested in organization and in mind to an intelligent Creator.

See page 215.

See page 217.

Problem of the purpose of creation.

If the Creator is intelligent, creation must have a purpose: and we have next to inquire what that purpose is. If however we fail in the attempt to discover any definite purpose in creation, this does not prove that no such purpose exists: it may prove only the limitation of our powers.

The organic creation, as we have seen, is full of adaptations of means to purposes: but none of these appear to be ultimate, absolute purposes. The eye is adapted to light and the ear to sound, and so on throughout organic nature: but all the ends thus attained are themselves means to other ends. As Kant has remarked, in organization all the parts are mutually means and ends. Merely physical science gives no answer to the question, what is the absolute end or purpose of creation: for the suggestion that it is the greatest possible happiness of sentient beings, though obvious and superficially plausible, is completely

See Chapter 14.

refuted by a slight examination of the facts of nature, and still more of those of human life.

Science tells only of causes which are also effects and purposes which are means to other purposes.

The questions of Cause and Purpose as regards creation are exactly parallel to each other. Physical science has much to tell of causes, but they are causes which are also effects: and of purposes, but they are purposes which are also means to other purposes. The nature of the absolute, originating Cause, and of the absolute, ultimate Purpose of creation, are questions which science asks without being able to answer. But, though utterly unable to solve the question of Creative purpose, science may give valuable hints towards its solution.

It is the religious instinct which regards evil as an anomaly.

It ought to be observed that we regard evil in the universe as an anomaly, solely because we instinctively seek for a Divine Purpose in the universe. If absolute atheism were the true creed and if the universe were purposeless, there would be no reason for expecting good rather than evil: and it is very remarkable how modern writers (Herbert Spencer for instance) who in words deny the possibility of our discovering the purpose of the universe, or whether it has any purpose at all, nevertheless use the old language which regards evil as an anomaly. Such language testifies to the depth of the religious instinct which regards the universe as the creation of a Father who may be reasonably expected to give good gifts to His children.

The anomaly is capable of partial solution.

It is not asserted that the anomaly of evil in a Divinely created universe is capable of being altogether solved. Moral perplexities admit of degrees of light and darkness, and it ought to be enough for faith, besides being a gain to science, if we are put on what is evidently the right track for solution. Moreover, the highest form of evil is the most explicable. The greatest of all evils is guilt, or voluntary sin: but it would be an impossibility of the nature of a contradiction, that there should be room for the production of that highest kind of virtue which consists in the self-determination of a free will towards holiness, without the possibility of sin and guilt.

The greatest evil is the most explicable.

See page 251.

In examining the facts of the universe with the view

See Chapter 16.

of finding suggestions of a Divine Purpose, we find that the lower functions of nature minister to the higher:—matter to life, and merely organic life to mind. We find that variety appears to be aimed at for its own sake, as an absolute purpose: and this appears to be true in the moral world as well as in that of nature. We also find,—what is far more important,—that the highest perfection is comparatively rare, and is manifested on a small scale. Thus, the greatest wealth of beauty is lavished on the smallest things. Life, which is a higher product of creative power than mere matter, is much less abundant: and there is a degree of perfection manifested in snow-crystals, in the structures of microscopic plants, and in the sculpture of microscopic shells, which we do not find in nature's mightier works. It is recognized as right by the artistic sense, that the lower functions should thus minister to the higher, and that the highest perfection should be least in quantity: and were everything in nature consistent with these principles, probably no perplexity would ever have been felt on the subject of Creative Purpose. But this is far from being the case. The lower functions minister very imperfectly to the higher ones: matter does minister to life, but the great extent of the earth's surface which is occupied by burning and by frozen deserts, shows that matter ministers to life much less perfectly than it might do under the existing laws of nature: and sometimes, as in storms and volcanic eruptions, the forces of matter, instead of being ministerial to life, become destructive: and life itself is capable of becoming diseased. Moreover, from the fact which is so conspicuous in the organic world, that the minutest care and the completest *finish* (in the artistic sense) are in general bestowed not on the vastest but on the highest works of nature, we might expect the mental and moral nature of man, which is the highest of nature's products, to be also that wherein the highest perfection should be manifested. But so far is this from being the case, that man's spiritual nature is extensively diseased, and has till now appeared to the most thoughtful men to be a ruin.

The lower functions minister to the higher.

Variety is an absolute end.

High perfection is rare, and the smallest things are the most highly finished.

Imperfection of the natural world.

Imperfection of man.

"The universe as known to us may thus be compared to some vast temple, of magnificent design and rich ornament, but partly unfinished and partly defaced; and with the central shrine the most imperfect of all, though showing traces of design which would have been the noblest in the whole structure if it had been rightly executed." *Page* 238.

Consequently the purpose of creation can be neither the greatest possible quantity of happiness nor the highest possible average of virtue. But if the purpose of creation is to produce not the highest average of virtue but virtue of the highest and most varied types:—and, especially, not the most perfect attainment so much as attainment in the highest class;—then this purpose has been attained. The belief that such actually is the purpose of creation is consistent with the fact that the highest and most valuable products of nature are least in quantity:—life being less abundant than matter, and mind less abundant than life:—and this conclusion gives us the means whereby we may at least approach to the solution of the most important of the perplexing problems belonging to the Divine purposes in creation.

The purpose of creation cannot be the highest average of virtue, but it may be virtue of the highest type. *See Chapter* 17.

There are two objections to this view. In the first place, it is difficult to believe that the very imperfect virtue which has been attained by even the best men can be of sufficient value in the Creator's sight to be the ultimate purpose of creation. It is however a possible reply to this, that the earth is only one of an unknown number of planets, and that there may be more perfect attainment of excellence in others than in this. If variety in the types of excellence is part of the creative purpose, it is not necessary to prove that the moral administration of this planet is that which produces, or is intended to produce, the highest possible excellence; it will be enough if we can perceive that the sinfulness of human nature and the moral trials of human life are the conditions, and perhaps the necessary conditions, of the development of a kind of virtue which could be developed only in such a world as ours.

The Creator seeks variety in the moral creation, and our moral world is only one among many.

The other objection to the view here stated is that it is self-refuting and suicidal. How can it be favourable to

The belief in an excellence which is not meant to be shared with mankind must tend to selfishness. *See Chapters* 17 *and* 23.

the highest virtue—how can it favour any but a selfish type of virtue—to believe that the entire moral administration of the universe, or at least of this planet, exists for the purpose of enabling a few to attain to a degree of virtue which the majority of their fellow-men are not to share? Such a belief may be consistent with the most exalted virtue of the heroic type, but it must tend to engender an unsympathizing and selfish spirit, and must therefore be hostile to that highest of all kinds of excellence which has been invented by Christ. We have seen reason to believe that the purpose of creation is to make the highest virtue possible: yet we now see that our understanding the purpose tends to defeat the purpose.

We cannot, on any hypothesis, rest in this as our final conclusion. If there is a moral cosmos, it is as unbelievable as if it contained a contradiction: if there is no moral cosmos, all such inquiries are futile because the postulate of them all is untrue. Nevertheless the reasoning which has brought us to this apparent dead-lock is sound; and the way out of the dead-lock is by the doctrines of Immortality and of a final general restoration:—the doctrine of a future life where not only justice but grace shall be fulfilled.

Escape from this in the doctrine of a general restoration.

It is not to be denied that the obvious analogies of nature are opposed to the belief in immortality. But this is only saying in other words that immortality is altogether outside of our present experience: and there is no reason in this for thinking it impossible, because it would be absurd to believe that our experience is any measure of the Creator's resources. Space and time give no suggestion of matter: inertia and gravitation give no suggestion of the forces which produce crystallization: crystallization gives no suggestion of life, and vegetative life gives no suggestion of consciousness. Even so, immortal life may differ from that nature which is known to us, only as one grade in that nature differs from another: and as matter and force prepare for life and mind, and lead up to them, so the whole world of matter and life may be a preparation for the spiritual world wherein immortal life is to dwell.

Nature may prepare for immortality as matter does for life *See page* 288.

The really strong argument for immortality, however, is the sense of an uncompleted purpose in nature and in human life. The formation of noble human character is the highest purpose of which it is possible for us to know anything: and when this has been striven for in the present life with real though very imperfect success, is it not reasonable to believe that God will resume and carry forward the work in a future life? We have seen that the tendency of such a faith as this is to benefit the moral nature: both for the general reason that virtue needs the stimulus of hope, and for the special reason that only thus can those who aspire after virtue believe that the mass of their fellow-men are destined to be sharers in their attainment.

Argument for immortality from the sense of incompleteness. *See Chapter* 20.

Moreover, we feel that moral laws are as real as mathematical ones. Space and time have become forms of our thought because we belong to a physical universe which exists under their conditions:[1] and morality has become a law of our thought because we belong to a spiritual universe whereof it is the law. Mathematical laws work out their results in the physical universe: and are not moral laws to have a universe wherein to work out their results? This is only a statement in modern language of the old argument for immortality from the instinctive hope of the ultimate manifestation of Eternal Justice—and, I will add, of Eternal Mercy.

Argument that moral law must have a world wherein to work out results.

The moral world is so constituted that justice has a natural tendency to execute itself: and consequently if there is a future life so as to give indefinite time, we cannot doubt that there will be a constantly increasing approximation to a perfect administration of justice, so as to give to each as he deserves. This may be the result of a purely natural and self-executing process without any special Divine intervention. We may thus say, not as a definition of the word but as a statement of fact, that justice is natural law among beings which have a moral nature.

Justice in the natural world. *See page* 305.

It is also true, and in the same sense, that grace is justice; or righteousness, among beings who have free personality. Justice may be the attribute of a system, but Grace can

Justice and grace. *See page* 317.

[1] See "Habit and Intelligence," especially Chapter 37.

only belong to a Person. A just system is satisfied with rewarding and punishing, but a righteous Person must desire that others were righteous:—to desire this is to desire their highest welfare, and this is consequently the definition of Grace. Justice aims at punishing sin, but Grace aims at destroying it; and if there is a righteous and therefore gracious God, we cannot reasonably doubt that He will ultimately destroy all sin; by healing it through repentance where this is possible, and by extinguishing the sinner's existence where the sin has become too closely identified with his nature to admit of repentance. Thus there will first be universal justice and afterwards universal mercy. And as punishment has no necessary tendency to produce repentance, the dispensation of mercy, or grace, will not be a mere result of the dispensation of justice, but must, so far as it is possible for us to judge from the data before us, be due to a distinct agency, which we cannot discover for ourselves though it may possibly be made known to us by revelation.

Universal justice and universal mercy. *See Chapter* 22.

Hope of a revelation.

See page 326.

We might no doubt have been endowed by our Creator with such a nature that punishment should have been sufficient to heal sin by ensuring repentance. Had it been so, the dispensation of justice, which belongs to nature, would have been also a dispensation of grace, and no distinct dispensation of grace would have been needed: but this, so far as we can see, would have afforded no occasion for the manifestation of that highest righteousness which has been manifested in Christ.

We have seen that if there is to be a Divine revelation to man at all, there is an *à priori* probability of its being made through history. It appears inconceivable that a definite revelation, as distinguished from the indefinite revelation of God in nature and in conscience, can be made in any other way, at least if it is to address not only the intellect by the communication of knowledge, but the affections by letting the Divine character be seen in action: and it appears *à priori* probable that religion will be more closely connected with history than with science, because religion addresses itself to the capacity for faith, and history,

The revelation will probably be made through history. *See Chapte* 24.

in so far as it is distinct from science and incapable of being brought under its formulæ, addresses itself to the power of understanding human character by sympathy and insight, in a way transcending logic and akin to faith.

Legal and Evangelical religion: their analogies with nature.

The Divine administration of justice is called Legal Religion: that of grace is called Evangelical Religion. Legal Religion is the extension into a future state of that justice which, as we have seen, has a natural tendency to execute itself in the present world of human life. Nature—understanding nature in Butler's sense, as including the world of human life—has analogies with religion chiefly on the legal side: nature has a revelation of justice, but none of mercy. That is to say, there are very strong indications in nature of the probability of justice being hereafter dominant, but none of mercy being so. Nature does however contain one immensely important foreshadowing of Divine grace: that is to say in domestic life: in the relation of parent and child, of brother and brother, and of husband and wife: relations which are not based on justice but on love.

Proof of revelation by miracle.

See Chapter 10.

We have seen also that miracles, or supernatural signs, appear to be an indispensable condition, not indeed of a revelation being made but of its being proved. If the Originating Cause of the universe is a living Will,—and we have seen this to be a probable hypothesis altogether independently of revelation,—there is no impossibility in this Will, on particular occasions, setting aside the laws which it has itself appointed for the guidance of the universe. Of course it is not credible that this should be done without an adequate purpose: but we may well believe that the revelation of God to the only being in this world who is capable of attaining to moral life, is an adequate purpose for working a miracle.

Miracles however do not prove holiness: holiness must be its own proof: it cannot be proved by anything but itself. What miracles prove is supernatural power. A revelation accompanied and attested by miracles must be

of supernatural origin:—its moral character alone can decide whether it is Divine.

Moral truth, like mathematical truth, is seen to be such by its own light. A law of either mathematics or morals, when its truth is seen, is seen to be true with a clearness and certainty to which nothing can be added.[1] But mathematics alone can give no information beyond itself:—it can give no information about real existence. So with moral science: it cannot tell whether, in any other worlds than our own, there are beings with moral intelligence; it cannot tell, in the absence of evidence, whether there is any moral government of the universe: but it does assert that moral law is binding on every Being in the entire universe who has intelligence enough to understand it: and it does assert that if there is any moral government of the universe at all, that government must be righteous.

Relation of mathematical to experimental science, parallel to that of morals to theology.

The relation between the truths of mathematical and physical science is parallel to the relation between morality and the truths of the spiritual world made known by revelation. In physical science experimental facts are interpreted and made intelligible by their agreement with mathematical theory:—in theology, a revelation is made credible and significant by its agreement with moral theory. But in physical science, facts are not proved to be facts by their accordance with theory: they must be ascertained by observation and experiment. So, in theology it does not suffice for proof that a religion is so accordant with the highest morality that it is worthy to have come from God: it must also have experimental proof: and this can only consist in miracle of some kind: either in that display of superhuman power which is usually called miracle, or in that display of supernatural knowledge which is called prophecy.

Where the analogy is reversed.

But the parallelism, like most analogies, is true only up to a certain point; beyond it there is a contrast instead of a resemblance. In physical science the ultimate appeal is to observed fact; if theory is contradicted by fact, the

[1] See Note B at the end of this chapter.

theory must be wrong. But in theology the opposite is true: the ultimate appeal is to moral principles: and if a revelation were to be attested by unquestionable miracles, and yet to contain doctrines opposed to morality, or doctrines whereof the legitimate influence in the formation of character must be injurious, the right inference would be that the miracles and the doctrines alike were not from God, but from an evil though supernatural power.

In physics the ultimate appeal is to fact: in theology, it is to moral principles.

Revelation by means of miracle is a condescension to the weakness of man's faculties for knowledge. We can imagine beings who should be able to perceive all spiritual truth by direct perception. But we are so constituted that we need to learn by indirect ways, and to have the results of theory verified by experiment. This however is not a special characteristic of our knowledge of spiritual things; it also belongs to our knowledge of natural things, for which experimental verification is as needful as theoretical reasoning.

All verification is a condescension to our weakness.

It is not however doing full justice to the Christian theory of miracles to call them mere experimental proofs. The miracles of Christ, being mostly works of mercy and having all of them a moral character, are not only proofs but illustrations, and as it were specimens, of that Kingdom of Heaven, or dispensation of justice and mercy, which He came to make known.

The Christian miracles are not only proofs but illustrations.

To conclude:—A religious philosophy can scarcely lay too much emphasis on the truth, that the highest knowledge is not the result of experience but of intuition. It is by intuition, or rational instinct, that we know such truths as the existence of a Principle of Unity behind the diversity of visible things: that this Principle of Unity must be a Self-existent Being, and that the Self-Existent Being must be infinite. And it is by intuition, or moral instinct, that we know such truths as the uncreated and unchangeable nature of moral law, and trust with certainty that if there is any moral administration of the universe at all, that administration must be righteous. We cannot doubt these truths, and yet, in our present state of being, they do not

The highest knowledge is the result of intuition.

admit of verification by experience :—any apparent verification really takes them for granted.

Practical inference from this.

From this theoretical truth, a practical truth of the first importance follows. Nothing which is proved by a fundamental axiom can be more certain than that axiom. Now, it is by the axiom that God cannot be untrue or unrighteous that all other truths of religion are proved: for if this were doubtful, we could not put faith in God. Consequently, any dogma of religion which contradicts this instinctive belief in the Divine Goodness ought to be rejected, just as we would reject any logical argument which would land us in a denial of the fundamental axiom of logic, that the same proposition cannot be at once true and false.

Distinction between the Reason and the Understanding.

Its ground.

The power whereby we know those elementary and yet supersensual truths spoken of in the two paragraphs immediately preceding, is totally distinct from the power whereby we reason from data afforded by sensible perception to conclusions of the same order with their data. To use Kant's distinction, the former power is the *reason*, the latter is the *understanding*. The understanding belongs to us as beings who are developed in space and time: the reason, or the intuitive faculty as I prefer to call it, belongs to us as members of the spiritual and Divine universe.[1] We have a capacity for knowing natural things, because we are part of the world of nature: we have a capacity for knowing Divine things, because we are of God.

Accordance of this with inductive science.

It may be said that this recognition of an intuitive power in the mind, distinct from and transcending sensation, is contrary to a sound inductive philosophy. I reply that, on the contrary, it is required by inductive philosophy: for a sound inductive philosophy cannot refuse to take account of all truth of whatever kind. Mr. Mill states as the chief question of psychology, whether there are any mental facts which cannot be derived from impressions of

[1] Concerning the mental nature which would be the result of a well-developed understanding without any trace of the intuitive faculty, see Browning's "Caliban upon Setebos." That poem is probably the most wonderful study of imaginary psychology ever produced. Beside it, Shakespeare's Caliban is a slight sketch, and Swift's Houyhyms a mere daub.

sense working through the laws of what in his language is called the association of ideas, in mine mental habit. I accept this statement of the problem; I admit that the study of Mind must begin from that of sensation.[1] But we have found that a strictly inductive study of Mind shows that there are elements in our mental nature which cannot be thus accounted for: and these are not merely residual phenomena, but elements involved in all, even the simplest and earliest, mental activity. The laws of mental habit, or association, alone, will not account for the simplest act of belief: neither for the sense of personal identity through time and change, and the belief in the veracity of memory which is inseparable from this: nor for the belief that action implies an agent, which is the ground of our recognition of an external world. And *à fortiori* the laws of association are insufficient to account for our capacity for faith in superior natures, for our belief in moral law as universally and unalterably binding, and our hope, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, of justice and mercy from the Ruler of the Universe.

NOTE A.

THE following admirable passage is the conclusion of an essay on "the Atheistic explanation of religion," in Mr. Hutton's "Essays Theological and Literary" (Strahan, 1871).

R. H. Hutton on the testimony of the moral nature to God.

"A great discoverer or a great genius in purely human arts is a man who, after he has learned all he can, shows a deep self-reliance and an imperious audacity in making new combinations and in striking out new enterprises. In such arts a man who jealously restrained his own impulses of self-confidence would be at once felt to be second-rate,—to be a copyist. How is it that by the universal assent of mankind this is otherwise in relation to moral excellence; that the ideal character—the character which we even regard as morally the most original, that is, as embodying the most of true creative genius—is of the opposite type? How

[1] See the second vol. of "Habit and Intelligence."

is it that humility, or the habit of waiting to be ruled by some power that is acknowledged to be often mortifying to self—not enterprise or the ambition of boldly striking out the path most in harmony with previous theory and experience—is regarded as affording the highest type of moral excellence? If a real revealing character draws men on, in proportion as they have faith and trust, this is natural enough; but if spiritual progress is all self-caused, and our religion is only the high-tide mark of our self-attained practice, it would seem that a certain boldness and self-dependence and natural arbitrariness would be the best means of access to new and better standards of moral conception. Yet it is the very basis of a religious character, and of the very essence of that prophetic power which has most influenced the fate of men; it is even the essence of such characters as Socrates no less than that of Christ, to be utterly dependent on guidance from within.[1] It is no accident that the highest and finest minds are essentially of the leaning type, and marked chiefly by humility. This truly indicates that those learn most of moral truth who are most willing to be passive in the hands of God. Were God only the glorified image of man, those who had the greatest amount of intrinsic self-reliance and inborn impetuous impulse would be as much leaders in the spiritual and moral as they are in the secular world."

NOTE B.

THE CERTAINTY OF GEOMETRICAL AXIOMS.

In the foregoing chapter, and in several other places in this work, I have spoken of the fundamental principles of geometry as absolutely certain. As this is not undisputed, I design to make a few remarks here on the nature of their certainty.

Our knowledge of space comes at first through the senses.

It is generally agreed that our first conceptions of space come through the senses of sight and touch, including the sense of motion in that of touch: and that without the action of these senses the mind could not form any conception of space: though a mind acted on through the sense of hearing

[1] Is not *within* an error of the pen for *above*? Those who are *self*-dependent are surely dependent on guidance from *within*. Mr. Hutton's expression is however too common a one in this sense to be misleading.

alone might develop a reasoning faculty like ours. But now that we have learned the properties of space, has our knowledge thereof any necessary character, like our knowledge of the truth that the same proposition cannot be at once true and false? or is it only experimental knowledge of the widest generality, like the laws of motion and gravitation?

When found, is it necessary knowledge?

I reply to this, that our knowledge of three dimensions in space appears to be purely experimental. We are constituted to exist and to move in space of three dimensions, and no more: consequently we have experience of these, we have discovered them, and we know them. But this fact in no way excludes the possibility that there may be a fourth dimension, or an infinite number of dimensions:—it only shows us to be so constituted that we cannot have experience of more than three; and we cannot imagine anything fundamentally different from our experience. To mention a case where it might be supposed that the imagination was much less fettered by its conditions, we cannot imagine a colour which shall be totally unlike either white or some one of the colours of the spectrum. And if we had experience of only two dimensions in space—that is to say, if our bodies were plane surfaces without thickness, and our motions confined to a plane—it would be as impossible for us to conceive of a third dimension as it is under our actual conditions for us to conceive of a fourth.

Our knowledge of three dimensions is purely experimental.

There may be any number of dimensions in space.

But though it is thus quite credible that our knowledge of the properties of space may be only an infinitely small fraction of what may be known to beings of higher faculties than ours, yet so far as it exists it is perfectly true and trustworthy. Once the properties of straight lines are given, we see that they are necessarily true, and true to infinity: and to believe that lines which are parallel at all may possibly converge or diverge after being prolonged to a very great distance, would be the same kind of absurdity, if not indeed a case of the absurdity, of thinking that two contradictory propositions may both be true.

But so far as it exists our knowledge of the properties of space is trustworthy.

It will be seen that I agree both with those who regard our conception of space as the result of experience, and with those who regard it as a form of thought. It is a result of the experience of the race which has become a form of thought for the individual. This view is Herbert Spencer's. It will be found to reconcile and combine what is true in both of the opposing views mentioned above.

Our conception of space is a result of experience which has become a form of thought.

The view which I have adopted implies the objective reality of space:—our conception of space could not be the result of

Space is objectively real.

experience if space had not existed before we had experience of it.[1] And if space had no objective reality, the question whether there may possibly be more than three dimensions in space would have no meaning.

But if it is granted that our conception of space is in its origin a result of experience, the question arises whether in this case, as in so many others, the results of our experience are not subject to the possibility of being modified by a wider experience. May it not be that the law of parallel lines continuing parallel however far they may be prolonged, is only approximately true: and that, although we know it to be sensibly true of all distances which have yet been measured, yet it may prove not to be sensibly true of such distances as those which separate us from the farthest of the visible stars? This speculation has been seriously advanced by Helmholtz.[2] Though it is not conceivable, that is to say not capable of being represented in imagination, its possibility may be thus shown:—Let us suppose a race of beings having mental faculties like ours, but with bodies extended in two dimensions only and without thickness, and capable of horizontal motion only and not of vertical. It is evident that their conception of space would be limited to horizontal extension, and that the only geometrical science they could work out would be plane geometry. Suppose that the surface they inhabited was however not a plane but a sphere, so large that only measurements on the largest possible scale could detect any deviation from the laws of parallel lines and plane figures: and suppose such deviation to be established by measurement;—this would be a fact in their experience exactly similar to what it would be in ours if we were to find the law of parallel lines apparently untrue when measured on the vastest celestial spaces. Further, we may imagine such a race ascertaining the deviation from parallelism at various distances with sufficient accuracy to found a science of spherical geometry: and their theory of spherical geometry might be practically confirmed by the sphere being

Are our ideas of space absolutely or only approximately true?

Case of an imaginary world.

[1] I am aware that Bain holds, not only that we acquire our conception of space solely by means of motion, which is a tenable opinion though I do not agree with it (see "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 36), but that space, or extension, has no meaning except the possibility of motion. This appears to involve the absurdity that we create space by our experience of it.

[2] See his article in the *Academy* of 12th February, 1870, and the reply to it by Mr. Stanley Jevons in *Nature* of 19th October, 1871. What follows in the text, except the final paragraph, is a reproduction of Mr. Jevons's views, which I adopt.

travelled round, so that what was supposed to be a straight line should be experimentally proved to return into itself again. These facts would compel the mathematicians of such a world to recognize the existence of a third dimension in space as made known by the results of experience, though as inconceivable by their imaginations as a fourth dimension is by ours.

But though their intuitive notions of the properties of straight lines would thus be found in practice to need correction, would it follow that they were in any degree untrue? Certainly not. Such a discovery would prove, not that the theory of parallel straight lines is untrue, but that no perfectly straight lines could be drawn in such a world. And if such a discovery is ever made respecting the space in which our worlds exist and move, the inference ought to be, not that the theory of parallels is untrue, for this is not more credible than the truth of two contradictory propositions, but that the space wherein we exist is space in which perfectly straight lines cannot be drawn: and, probably, that it is slightly bent in relation to a fourth dimension of which we have no knowledge whatever at present.

Truths which cannot be denied without contradiction.

I do not however regard the axioms that the equals of equals are equal, and that the whole is greater than its part, as subject to any possible corrections whatever. They are to be classed with the truths of logic, which cannot be denied without self-contradiction. And to this category belong the truths of arithmetic with its extensions in algebra:—they cannot be denied without a fallacy of the nature of a contradiction: though it may often be difficult to make this evident.[1]

[1] See the paragraphs on "Verbal Truth" in Francis W. Newman's "Fragments on Logic" published in his "Miscellanies."

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE DISTINCTIVE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY.

WE have seen in the preceding chapters that the facts of the external and of the internal world—of Nature and of Conscience—suggest the probability that the world has been created and is governed by a God of infinite Power, Wisdom, and Holiness: and that there will be for us a future life wherein His Wisdom and Holiness will be visibly justified by working out their legitimate results. But it is not asserted that these suggestions amount to proof. To beings of keener intelligence than ours they might be sufficient, but we are so constituted that we cannot trust to reasoning, however cogent, without confirmatory proof or verification.[1] We therefore await a revelation whereby God will prove to us what Nature only suggests.

We await a revelation, to confirm what nature and conscience suggest.

One purpose of revelation is thus to confirm what nature and reason suggest: and according to what may be called the Unitarian account of Christianity, this is its sole purpose. But according to the Christianity of the New Testament, of the Creeds, and of the Church, revelation has a further purpose; namely, to make known to us truths concerning the Divine Being and the Divine Government higher than any which nature suggests as probable.

Further purpose of Christian revelation.

These characteristic truths of Christianity are what are called, in the technical language of theology, the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement.

The Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement.

I know it will be said that these, so far from belonging to a higher revelation of truth than the elementary doc-

[1] See the chapter on the Proof of a Revelation (Chapter 10).

trines of God and Immortality, are really derived from heathenism :—that the Trinity has its source in polytheism, the Incarnation in mythology, and the Atonement in immoral superstitions about buying off the anger of an offended Deity. It would be easy to reply, that those features of heathenism which appear like distorted fragments of Christian doctrine with all their spiritual significance either destroyed or turned into evil, are really corruptions of truth revealed to man at the beginning of history: but I do not make use of this plausible and fascinating argument, because I am convinced it is untrue. The more closely we examine the origin of religions, not only in the comparative mythology which we can study in the literatures of Greece and India but also in the religious ideas of savages who have no literature, the more clearly we see that every religion (omitting, of course, revealed religion) is naturalistic in its origin, and that those features which bear so strange a likeness to distorted and debased fragments of Christianity are of later development. On this subject I have no theory to offer, though I do not say that no theory is possible. I can no more suggest any reason why heathen religions should spontaneously assume such forms, than why crystalline growths should mimic vegetable forms. But in the latter case the obvious explanation, that there is no fundamental distinction between the crystal and the plant, would be untrue; and it would be equally untrue, though equally plausible to a superficial glance, to say that the distinctive doctrines of Christianity have been derived from heathenism. In the next chapter I shall offer historical proofs that the entire system of Christianity is really the work of Jesus of Nazareth. But independently of these, it is historically impossible that a system whereof the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement are characteristic doctrines, could have grown up by any natural process in the arid soil and sultry climate of the Judaism of the first century.[1]

Opinion that these doctrines are of heathen origin,

historically untenable.

[1] See on this subject "The Jesus of the Evangelists: His historical Character vindicated; or, an Examination of the internal Evidence for Our

Misrepresentation of the doctrine of the Trinity in the so-called Athanasian Creed.

I speak of the doctrine of the Trinity in order to mark my adherence to the fundamental principles believed by the Church. But the true meaning of that doctrine has been obscured by the statement of it wherewith we are familiar in the erroneously so-called Athanasian Creed, which makes it appear a mere statement of metaphysical propositions, some of them perhaps without any assignable meaning, and all of them as remote as possible from any practical effect on human life, whether in the guiding of action or in the formation of character. This, however, altogether misrepresents the true significance of the doctrine. Christ has not demanded our acceptance of any dogma merely as dogma, or as a mere test of faith. The doctrine of the Trinity, properly understood, is an eminently practical doctrine. We have seen in a former chapter,[1] that between the allegiance of the Stoic to an impersonal Law of duty, and that of the Israelite to a personal God, there is an almost infinite practical difference: not in guiding action, for when both were equally ignorant of immortality the direct effect of both in guiding action was nearly the same: but in the formation of character. And there is a difference of the same kind between faith in the solitary unincarnate Deity of Unitarianism, and the faith of the Church in the Father and in the Son.

Practical importance of the doctrine.

Unitarianism and the faith of the Church.

Belief in the Divine Father means belief in a Divine Will which is the source of all being, and in a Divine Holiness on the principles whereof, all appearances notwithstanding, the moral universe is governed. We have seen that nature, including the moral nature or conscience, suggests this belief, and it is confirmed by revelation. But, beyond this, revelation tells of a Divine Son. This doctrine is scarcely suggested by nature, but it is confirmed by conscience. The historical authorities for this as a doctrine of revelation are to be stated in the

The Divine Son.

Lord's Divine mission:" by the Rev. C. A. Row, A.M. (Williams and Norgate; 1868). This work has attracted much less attention than it deserves.

[1] Page 301.

following chapter, but this is the place for showing how our moral nature responds to it, and declares it to be a doctrine of eminently practical worth in forming character.

If we are not merely Pantheists, recognizing an unknown and unknowable Ground of Being, but Theists believing in a God of Will, Intelligence, and Holiness:—in other words, if we believe in God as our Father:—we must believe that whatever moral goodness there is in us has its source in God: not in His Will only but in His Nature. Now, if all the goodness of created beings thus has its source in the Divine Nature, must not its prototype be there also? Yet if the Unitarian doctrine is true—if God is solitary Omnipotence and unincarnate Wisdom and Holiness—there is nothing in His goodness which can be the prototype of ours. For human goodness is essentially filial, consisting in obedience: and this is most eminently true of that highest *righteousness which is by faith*. Can such goodness have any prototype in the Nature of the Uncreated Ruler? Yet is it credible that the highest type of human goodness is that which is most visibly remote from any possible prototype in the Divine? It may be said that the righteousness which is by faith is conceivable only of morally or intellectually imperfect beings; but there is surely no difficulty, even independently of the instance given to us in Christ, in conceiving of beings who are absolutely perfect with a perfection which has its root in obedience.

Without this belief we find no prototype for human goodness in the Divine,

Further: if *love is the fulfilling of the law*—in other words, if love is the sum of morality—must it not be true that the Divine Nature, which is holiness, is also love? Yet if God is solitary Omnipotence, though He may be a loving Being—though He may love His creatures and create them in order to love them—yet if He has to create in order that He may have something to love, how can love belong to His inmost nature? "There is a goodness in trust, as there is a goodness in trustworthiness: there is a goodness in receiving, as there is a goodness in giving: there is a goodness in obeying rightly, as

and we cannot see how God can be love.

Erskine of Linlathen on this subject.

there is a goodness in ruling rightly. Most assuredly these are both forms of goodness, but shall we say that they both exist in God? Shall we say that obedience and submission and gratitude and trustful dependence can be predicated of Him, or shall we say that though these qualities are good in the creature, they are inconsistent with the Sovereignty of the Creator?"[1] "The idea of God as comprehending both the active and the passive of all goodness, distinguished by the personalities of Father and Son, but united in one common Spirit, seems to me to give the perfect conception of love and of blessedness in love."[2]

"If there be really in the Divine Nature an only begotten Son, one with the Father, who is also the Beginning or Head of the spiritual creation, the necessary inference is that the relations of fatherhood and sonship are the fundamental principles which regulate and harmonize that creation."[3] In other words, if God is love in His inmost Being, before all creation, we must believe that He is love—Fatherly love—in relation to those creatures of His who have attained, or are capable of attaining, to moral intelligence.

The Divine Son is the Head of the spiritual creation.

R. H. Hutton on this subject.

If there is a Divine Son, He must be, to repeat the expression used above, "the Beginning and Head of the spiritual creation:" that is to say, all goodness in every creature must have not only its prototype but its source in Him. "I do not think that, as a matter of fact, the faith in an Eternal Father can be adequately realized without the faith in an Eternal Son, or that, even if it could, it would fully answer the conscious wants of our hearts. We need the inspiration and present help of a present filial will. We cannot conceive the Father as sharing in that dependent attitude of spirit which is our principal spiritual want. It is a Father's perfection to originate, a Son's to receive. We crave sympathy and aid in this receptive life. We need the will to be good as

[1] The Spiritual Order and other papers, selected from the MSS. of the late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, page 34.

[2] Same, page 37. [3] Same, page 243.

sons, and to this the vivid faith in the help of a true Son is, I think, essential. Such a revelation alone makes humility Divine rather than human: eternal instead of temporary and finite: such a revelation alone refers the origin of self-sacrifice to heaven rather than earth. And to make humility and self-sacrifice of essentially human birth is false to our own moral experience. We feel, we know, that those highest human virtues, humility and self-sacrifice, are not original and indigenous in man, but are grafted on him from above. This faith, that from the life of the Son of God is derived all the health and true perfection of humanity, is the one teaching which robs Stoicism, Asceticism, Unitarian and Roman Catholic good works, and the rest, of their unhealthy element of pride, by teaching us that, in some real sense, every pure feeling in man, everything really noble, even self-sacrifice itself, comes from above: that even the humility of the child of God is lent us by Him who lived eternally in the Father's will before He took upon Himself our human life."[1]

The belief in the Divine Son insufficient for beings like us.

The belief in a Divine Son of God might be sufficient for our spiritual nature if we were sinless beings, though finite and needing education and development. But being sinful, and therefore needing not only education and growth in knowledge because we are children, but also, and chiefly, salvation or healing[2] because we are sinners, how are we practically brought any nearer to God by recognizing as the Head of the spiritual creation One who, though a Son like ourselves, and as such dependent on His Father, does not share our ignorance, our weakness, and our sin? And what avails it to be assured that in the truest sense *God's inmost nature is love*, while we feel that we are not worthy of His love? The belief in the Divine Son may suffice to bridge over the chasm, and to establish sympathy, between the Self-Existent God and the creature; but the initial difficulty, and that which we

[1] R. H. Hutton's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.

[2] See page 307.

feel as the really important one, is the question how sympathy is to be established between Him who is above not only sin but temptation, and us who are beset with them round about:—between Him who "cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities," and us who feel our infirmities constantly, and often feel nothing else? The Divine Son may mediate between the Self-Existent God and the creature, but who can bridge over the chasm which separates the Infinitely Holy from the unholy? This question becomes more difficult the deeper our sense of holiness becomes: and the only reply to it which can be suggested by merely natural religion or by Unitarian Christianity, is that God may feel "some painless sympathy with pain," [1] and some sinless pity for sin. But the reply given by the Christian revelation is that the Divine Son of God, who is the Head of the spiritual creation and object of our worship, has put on our nature, and has in that nature endured our sorrows and overcome our temptations. Thus has sympathy been established between the Divine and the human:—thus alone, we may infer, was the establishment of such sympathy possible even to God. Believing thus in the Incarnation, we see that God, who is love in His inmost nature before and independently of all creation, is the same in this His self-manifestation to us: and as the doctrine of the Divine Son of God teaches that humility is Divine, so the doctrine of the Incarnation teaches that self-sacrifice is Divine also.

The Incarnation.

This is also the reply to an objection which strikes at the root of all devotion, and, though it may have found expression but seldom, must, I think, have influenced many. I mean the thought that because God is infinite in power and incapable of suffering, therefore His gifts have cost Him nothing—that He gives

A difficulty which it meets.

"Like wealthy men who care not how they give." [2]

It is easier for Him to say, "Let there be light," than for me to light a candle: it is easier for Him to save a nation from destruction than for me to lift up a

[1] Tennyson's *In Memoriam*. [2] Tennyson's *Tithonus*.

child who has fallen down. Is not then all gratitude to God misplaced? How can we feel gratitude to One who neither has made nor can make any sacrifice for us? Such a suspicion is enough to paralyse all devotion. Yet on the postulates of the Jewish or Unitarian creed it is unanswerable. I do not see how a pious Israelite, or a pious Unitarian, could treat it except by shrinking from it with horror as from the suggestion of an evil spirit. The only reply which can satisfy both the reason and the conscience is that the fact is not as stated:—that the Son of God is also the Son of Man, and has sacrificed Himself for us.

Summary. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity—that is to say the doctrine of the distinct personalities of the Father and the Son, though united in one Spirit—teaches that God is love: and the doctrine of the Incarnation teaches that His love has manifested itself to us in self-sacrifice.

Objection. It may be urged in answer to this, that the belief in these doctrines cannot be more necessary to us than it was to those early Israelites before the Prophetic period, whose thoughts of God are preserved in the Psalms. They knew little of the Son of God and nothing of the Incarnation, and consequently stood on the level of what is now called Unitarianism: yet their lofty devotion is generally felt to be scarcely approachable by us; and may not the creed of simple monotheism which was sufficient for their souls be sufficient also for ours?

Reply. We reply, that it is by no means certain how far the exaltation of the religious poetry of the early Israelites is to be taken as a proof that their religious position was really in any way equal to that which Christ has opened to us. The historical question however is needless for us to discuss. The entire period before that of the Prophets was one of religious childhood, and the question whether the man, as compared with the child, has gained or lost in purity and happiness, is utterly irrelevant to the question what the man ought to believe and to do. I do not admit that we, from our manhood of Christianity, ought to look

back on the childhood of early Judaism with any regret whatever: but those who look back on childhood with the bitterest regret are also the most deeply conscious that "nothing can bring back that hour," and that the attempt to return to it would be only insincerity and weakness. The man would starve on the knowledge whereon the child revelled and throve. Our position is the same with respect to the distinctive doctrines of Christianity—the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement—as with respect to the belief in immortality. We see in the career of Moses and in the Ninetieth Psalm—whether that Psalm is truly ascribed to Moses or not—that the most exalted piety was once compatible with ignorance of immortality; but it is so no longer, now that our souls have become maturer and that immortality has been authoritatively revealed; and the same is true of all those doctrines of Christianity which were not revealed to Israel of old. We cannot go back to the position of the child by refusing the privileges of the man; and by refusing to recognize the blessings made known in the Christian revelation, we do not place ourselves in the position of those who never knew of those blessings.

The Incarnation and the Atonement both include the entire life of Christ.

By the Incarnation we mean the Son of God becoming the Son of Man so as to share in man's sorrows and man's mortality. It thus means more than the birth of Christ: it includes His entire human life and death. And in like manner the Atonement, even in the most limited sense of the word, means more than the death of Christ: it means the work which began at His birth and was only "finished" on the cross.

A manifestation of love can scarcely be genuine unless it has some purpose other than manifesting itself.

We have spoken of the Incarnation as a manifestation of the self-sacrificing love of God. But we can scarcely believe in the sincerity of any sacrifice if it is made only for the sake of its own manifestation. It is admirable to be willing to die "in some good cause, not in one's own," but it would be not martyrdom to duty but criminal folly for a soldier to throw himself on hostile bayonets

merely in order to show his willingness to die: and though Christ, unlike us, had authority over His own life,[1] yet the entire moral effect of the love which has commanded His self-sacrifice would be destroyed if we were to believe that the sacrifice was made for no other purpose than to manifest the love. It is no reply to this to say that we do not know enough of the Divine character to judge what may be expected in a revelation. Revelation is, no doubt, supernatural, in that it transcends the laws, or rather the forces and agencies, of nature: but it must conform to ethical laws, that is to say to the laws of the human character which it seeks to mould; and no ethical law is more certain than this, that a sacrifice has no moral value which is made only for the purpose of displaying itself.

The sacrifice of Christ has been made not as a mere display of love, but for atonement, by making repentance possible and giving a new nature.

The self-sacrifice of Christ, however, though the highest possible display of love, has not been made for the sake of the display, but for the purpose of atonement:—that is to say not expiation, which is neither possible nor necessary,[2] but reconciliation:[3]—for the purpose of reconciling us to God. Reconciliation is a necessary result of forgiveness, and forgiveness is, and always was, a matter of course on repentance; but how is repentance, or conversion, or change of character (*μετανοία*) to be possible? *With men this is impossible, but not with God: for with God all things are possible.* It is a fact of human experience that the highest

[1] "I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have authority (*ἐξουσίαν*) to lay it down, and I have authority to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father." (John x. 17, 18.)

[2] Page 307.

[3] The meaning of Romans v. 11 is obscured to English readers through translating *καταλλαγή* *atonement*, though the same word is everywhere else translated *reconciliation*, and the verb whereof it is a derivative, *καταλλάσσω*, is everywhere translated *to reconcile*. The error is made worse by translating *καταλλάσσω* *to reconcile*, and *καταλλαγή* *atonement* in two successive verses, the 10th and 11th. The following translation of those two is from the notes to Alford's Greek Testament:—

"For if, being enemies, we were reconciled to God by means of the death of His Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved by means of His life. But not only so, but making our boast in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received (our) reconciliation (to God)."

and peculiarly Christian virtues, that is to say humility, disinterested and self-sacrificing love for those who have no claim on our love except that they like ourselves are children of Godthough erring and prodigal children, and that readiness to forgive others on which Christ so forcibly insists as the condition of ourselves receiving forgiveness, —it is, I say, a fact of experience that such virtues as these are not native to the mind of man, but need to be engrafted on it. Those who have learned to prize and to aspire after these virtues see no paradox but an evident truth in the words of Christ to Nicodemus, *Ye must be born anew;* and it ought not to appear strange if we are told that God has set up a special supernatural means, over and above His ordinary natural government of the world, for communicating this grace to man:—that the administration of Grace is distinct from Nature, and supernatural.

Incarnation and Atonement are different aspects of the same truth.

The Atonement is the means of grace thus provided. I do not speak of the Incarnation as one act and the Atonement as another:—they are one and the same Divine act, which in itself is called the Incarnation, and in its results is called the Atonement. The act of the Son of God in becoming a partaker of our nature, is the Incarnation: the result of this act, in making us partakers of the Divine nature, is the Atonement or Reconciliation; though these latter two words are both of them inadequate.

But how does the Incarnation of the Divine Son of God tend to give a new nature to us? What is the link of causation between the two?

We cannot explain the process of Atonement,

We do not know. But it is *primâ facie* impossible that we should know. All that relates to life and mind is in some degree mysterious. It is conceivably possible, though it is not to be hoped for, that we should understand all dynamics, all chemistry, and all physiology: but even if we had this knowledge, a mystery would still remain probably about the relation between life and matter, and certainly about that between consciousness and organization. If these are inexplicable, it cannot be expected that the relation between the human life of Christ and our spiritual life should be otherwise. But though the con-

nexion, as one of cause and effect, is thus unknown, we can see the ethical fitness of this doctrine of the Atonement:—we can see the moral beauty and glory of a Divine example of self-sacrifice, and its legitimate effect in *purifying by faith* the moral nature of those who accept it and believe in it. And understanding this, we can believe the doctrine taught by Christ and His Apostles, that (to use a Hebrew phrase) *without shedding of blood is no remission of sin:* in other words, that it was impossible, even to the Son of God, to heal and abolish sin except by fighting against it and suffering in the fight.

but we can see its moral fitness.

In the chapter on Justification by Faith[1] we have spoken only of those influences of the Divine character on the human which come through the consciousness, though they transcend logic. We now speak of an influence which does not come through the consciousness at all. Of course the two influences—that which comes through conscious faith, and that which comes as it were organically from the life of Christ—co-operate and cannot be separated, any more than we can separate the elements in a child's character which he has inherited from his father from those which are due to his father's influence and example. This illustration, however, is imperfect. The elements in character derived by inheritance and those acquired by example and education are distinct from each other, though we are not always able to distinguish between them: but it is not so with Christ's influence on us and our faith in Christ. All that is good in man—at least, all that is higher than merely natural spontaneous goodness—is due to Christ: and those who believe in Him and obey Him co-operate with Him in the work of their own spiritual education and growth. But we have no reason to think that Christ's power over the human spirit is altogether dependent on this conscious co-operation. Cornelius, who is mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles as one who worshipped God and led a life worthy of his faith before he knew Christ by name, is certainly not an exceptional but a typical instance. Those are no doubt most blessed who co-operate with

Relation of the Atonement to Faith.

Influence of Christ independently of human consciousness of it.

[1] Chapter 12.

Christ by conscious faith in Him: but He may be acting on the spirit of man in countless instances where He is unknown, and even where He is resisted. The Evangelist John goes so far as to say that *the true Light,* which he identifies with the Son of God, *lighteth every man that cometh into the world:* a statement which I fully believe, with the qualification that those who pass through this life without any Divine light (and how fearfully numerous they must be!) shall have it in the life to come. Christ has a proclamation to make to those who have not in this life escaped from the prison of their own ignorance.[1] To limit the action of Christ on the spirit of man to this life, and to those cases where His action is recognized by conscious faith, although I fear this is the view of most of those who are called orthodox Christians, is logically not far from regarding Christ as a mere teacher; for a teacher, as such, can exert influence only through the consciousness: but He who came *to give life* may communicate it through channels unknown to consciousness.

Objection to these doctrines from their strangeness.

It is a natural objection to this doctrine of the Incarnation and the Atonement, that it is so strange as to stagger belief. I reply, that what is strange is the existence of sin: we should not have expected to find sin—at least original sin, or sinfulness of nature prior to any determination of will[2]—in a Divinely created and Divinely governed universe; but when so great an anomaly is found, it ought not to appear any further difficulty that Divine Wisdom should use means for its cure which to us appear anomalous.

Reply, that the real anomaly is sin.

This is merely a *primâ facie,* though true, reply to a *primâ facie* and plausible objection. We have to consider on what evidence these doctrines rest: and there is no possible evidence of any ordinary or direct kind for such doctrines as these. Moral truth shines by its own light. The Resurrection of Christ was a fact of observation, and is an experimental proof that immortality is at least pos-

[1] See the First Epistle of Peter, iii. 19.

[2] Page 251.

sible. But no evidence, in the usual sense of the word, would be relevant to the proof of what is strictly theological truth. *No man hath seen God*, and the truth that the Eternal Son of God was incarnate in Christ, and that His human life is the root and source of our spiritual life, could not conceivably be visible truths. The doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, which are the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, are consequently in an eminent sense truths of faith and not of sight.

Twofold evidence for the doctrines: Christ's authority, and their own character.

The evidence for these, as for all religious doctrines, is twofold:—they are declared true by sufficient authority, and they are suited to our moral and spiritual nature. The argument from their suitableness to our nature has been stated already. The authority on which they are stated is that of Christ, who has shown His Divine power by working miracles, especially by rising from the dead, and has established His right to be heard as a spiritual authority by His matchless moral wisdom. In the Sermon on the Mount He has told us of what are comparatively "earthly things," that is to say, truths of morality and ethics, which we are able to verify: in the discourses preserved by St. John, and in the writings of His Apostle St. Paul, He has told us of "heavenly things," that is to say, matters pertaining to theology, which we have no power directly to verify.[1] On earthly things we have found that we may trust to His wisdom:—to use familiar though appropriate language, we find that His character inspires confidence:—and we therefore infer that on heavenly things He is equally trustworthy.

Christ's authority both miraculous and moral.

In a word: We believe in the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, both because they are asserted by Christ, whose miraculous power and moral wisdom give Him authority, and because they find a response in our spiritual nature, which declares that when they are received into the mind by believing them, their legitimate tendency is

1 "If I have told you of earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things?" (John iii. 12.)

to produce holiness:—and the spiritual world would be no cosmos but a chaos if that theological system which more than any other tends to holiness were untrue.

It is not meant that these remarks contain an adequate statement of the reasons which ought to determine the formation of Christian faith. We have seen in the chapters on Faith, that such reasons are in their nature incapable of being reduced to logical form. All faith belongs to personality:—that is to say, all faith is the act of a personal being:—and in its higher developments it has a Person also for its object. In all personality there is something transcending logic. In the chapters referred to I have endeavoured—truly, I hope and believe, though most inadequately—to show by what kind of personal influence faith is generated: and if it is said that what I have written there and here is not convincing, I reply that it is not possible for reasoning and exposition to produce faith as they produce scientific conviction. All they can do is to show that faith is reasonable, and consistent with the facts of nature and of mind. In other words, they may provide a lifeless and inorganic, though perhaps necessary, scientific *basis* for faith:—they have no power to produce its living *germ*.

Faith cannot be reduced to logic, because it belongs to personality.

The remark that in personality there is something transcending all logic, contains the reply to the only formidable objection to the distinctive doctrines of Christianity: the objection, namely, that the Incarnation is impossible in the sense of containing a contradiction:—that the idea of a Divine Person putting on human conditions contains the same kind of logical or metaphysical absurdity as if we were to speak of God being at the same time something else than God. In reply to this, I do not deny that the doctrine is strange, startling, even staggering: and of course I admit that the Incarnation or any other doctrine would be disproved if it were shown to contain any impossibility of the nature of a contradiction. But I say that we are too ignorant of the Divine Nature to be competent to make any such assertion. Moreover, we know

Metaphysical objection that the Incarnation implies a contradiction.

what personality is, only from the experience of our own: and all that we know and all that we cannot know of it tends to show that there is not necessarily anything impossible in a Divine Person putting on the conditions of humanity. Wherein consists personality, and the continuance of personality through time and change? We do not and cannot know. This is the mystery, transcending logic, whereby personality is surrounded. We can answer only by negatives. It does not consist in the consciousness of itself:—in other words, it does not consist in memory:—for we are the same persons that we were in the years which we have forgotten, and we shall not cease to be the same if through age or disease we forget all.[1] Nor does it consist in the character, for this is subject to change within indefinite limits: nor in the powers of the mind, for they are capable of almost indefinite growth and development, and are liable again to decay. If then human personality consists, so far as we can perceive, simply in itself, and may continue unchanged through the greatest changes in the mental faculties, how can we assert that the same is impossible to a Divine Personality? Wonderful as it is, and surpassing human knowledge, where is the contradiction in saying that the Eternal Son of God once gave up, not His essential Deity (for this would be parting with His Personality, and would be a contradiction), but the *form of God*[2] and the *glory which He had with the Father before the world was*, and entered into the lowliest conditions of our human nature?

Reply, that we do not know wherein personal identity consists: but it is compatible with the greatest changes in powers and in character.

"When we note how little the powers which we ourselves possess, and which seem to belong to us, are iden-

R. H. Hutton on this subject.

[1] What is here said about personal identity may be called mystical, but it is maintained by one of the least mystical of writers: I mean Bishop Butler, in the Essay on Personal Identity appended to the Analogy of Religion, where it is supported by arguments which to me appear conclusive.

[2] "Christ Jesus, who, subsisting in the form of God, deemed not His equality with God a matter for grasping: but emptied Himself by taking the form of a servant." (Philippians ii. 6, 7.) The translation is from the notes to Alford's Greek Testament.

tified with our personality—how by a stroke of paralysis, for example, a man of genius is stripped of all the richest qualities of mind and reduced to a poor solitary *ego*, or if that be not so, how he lives in two worlds, in one of which he is a feeble, helpless, isolated will, and in the other, if there be another in which he is still his old self, a man of genius still—when we note this it seems to me to be simply the most presumptuous of all presumptuous assumptions to deny that the Son of God might have really become what He seemed to be, a finite being, a Jew with Jewish thoughts and prepossessions, and liable to all the intellectual errors which distinguished the world in which He lived. If there is an indestructible moral individuality which constitutes self, which is the same when wielding the largest powers and when it sits alone at the dark centre—which, for anything I know, may even live under a double set of conditions at the same time—I can see no metaphysical contradiction in an Incarnation."[1]

Summary. To conclude :—We do not know in what personality consists, and therefore cannot know *d priori* whether an Incarnation is possible. But being thus ignorant, we can believe it when it is declared by the authority of Christ, and answered and confirmed by our moral and spiritual sense.

My obligations to Erskine. I ought to state that what has been said in the present chapter on the doctrine of the Trinity merely reproduces the views of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen.

[1] R. H. Hutton's Essays, vol. i. page 260.

CHAPTER XXVII.

PAUL AND JOHN ON THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

The distinctive doctrines of Christianity stand or fall with the veracity of the Gospel of St. John.

IT is generally perceived that the truth of those distinctive doctrines of Christian theology which have been briefly stated in the preceding chapter must stand or fall with the authenticity and trustworthiness of the Gospel of St. John. Accordingly, all who deny the truth of those doctrines, if they have any sense of the importance of historical criticism, are compelled to get rid of the authority of that Gospel by some means or other. One hypothesis is that the Gospel ascribed to St. John is not the work of an Apostle at all, but is a spurious work of later date: this is the opinion of many of the Germans. Another, which is that of Renan and Francis Newman, is that the Fourth Gospel is really the work of the Beloved Disciple, but is not a trustworthy history: and that the discourses of Christ which it professes to record are nothing more than the Apostle's own fancies, which, in the old age of a life spent in religious brooding, he mistook for the remembrance of what he had heard from his Master.

The first three Evangelists record the very words of Christ:

It is not to be denied that a case of some apparent plausibility may be made for either of these two hypotheses: and it must be conceded that the records preserved by St. John do not appear to contain the *ipsissima verba*—the very words—of Christ: while it is scarcely possible to doubt that His *ipsissima verba* are preserved in the parables recorded by the first three Evangelists, and probably also in the Sermon on the

Mount. This is proved as to the parables by the obvious facts that all the parables are in the same style, and are manifestly the work of one mind: while they cannot be the work of any one of the Evangelists; for then we should find the same parable copied from one of the Gospels to another, which is not the case.[1] And the fact that the parables recorded by each of the first three Evangelists have little or no distinctive style, shows that they have not been altered in the reporting.

not so St. John.

In the Gospel of St. John the case is different. The style of Christ's discourses as recorded there is quite unlike that of the parables, being much more diffuse, and full of repetitions, which however are not unmeaning, but add emphasis and weight: but the style is sufficiently different to make it obvious that St. John has not recorded the discourses as actually spoken, but has put their substance into his own language.

The discourses of Christ as recorded by St. John differ from those recorded by the other three Evangelists not only in style but in subject. The parables, and the Sermon on the Mount, have for their chief subjects the legislation and administration of that *Kingdom of Heaven* which Christ came to establish. The chief subjects of the Fourth Gospel, on the contrary, are theological. In the discourses there preserved, Christ speaks chiefly of the dignity and glory of His own Person, and of His relation with the Father. There is thus a difference, both in style and subject, between the discourses of Christ as recorded by St. John, and those recorded by the other three Evangelists: and this no doubt gives a superficial plausibility to the belief that the Fourth Gospel, whether it is the work of St. John or not, contains no trustworthy account of Christ's teaching.

St. John's Gospel is the specially theological one.

The general belief of the Christian Church has always been that, for whatever reason, the first three Evangelists

[1] It is obvious that Matthew and Luke have written independently of each other: and the same is to be said of Luke and Mark. It may not be quite so obvious of Matthew and Mark, but I am convinced that a careful examination will show it to be equally true of them.

did not attempt to give a complete account of the teaching of Christ: and that St. John, writing many years after them, gave in his Gospel an account of a part of that teaching, different from what had been already recorded by the other three, but equally important and even more characteristic. This belief is here adopted and defended. If anything new is advanced on this subject, it is not a new theory, but only new arguments in defence of an old theory.

The only objection to this view which appears to me to have the slightest weight, is the difficulty of understanding why that side of Christ's teaching which St. John has recorded was left for him to record:—why the first three Evangelists did not record it. Perhaps no satisfactory answer to this question is now possible. But an unsolved difficulty is not necessarily a conclusive objection, or an objection at all. In dealing with questions of historical criticism, we are under a constant temptation to assume that all the data for a solution are, if not known, at least within the sphere of our possible knowledge: yet this is often contrary to fact: it is not always true even of contemporary history, and much less of such a history as that of the New Testament, the only authorities for which are contained within a very limited set of books, whereof the authors, moreover, lived in an intellectual world unlike ours.

The first three Gospels agree with the fourth.

It ought however to be added that not only there is no contradiction between the Gospel of St. John and the other three, but, as we shall see, there are coincidences between the teaching of Christ as recorded by these different authorities of such a kind as to confirm the testimony of both.

We now approach the chief subject of this chapter: namely, the relation of the teaching of St. John to that of St. Paul.

It is a universally recognized principle that "the testimony of two men is true." That is to say, if two witnesses agree in the details of their testimony, their agreement makes their testimony entitled to belief, independently of the trustworthiness of each of the witnesses

separately. But this is due to the independence of the two testimonies. If the one only repeats what he has heard from the other, the value of the testimony due to the agreement of two independent witnesses disappears.

Paul and John are two independent witnesses.

The chief purpose of the present chapter is to show that St. John and St. Paul are two such independent witnesses.

Theory that the distinctive doctrines of Christianity originated with St. Paul,

Vast as has been the influence of St. Paul, it suits the purpose of the opponents of historical Christianity to exaggerate its extent. Thus Comte says that St. Paul is "the real author of what is improperly called Christianity:" and although there may not be many who would adopt this expression, yet it appears to be a prevalent notion amongst those who reject the doctrines which have been stated in the preceding chapter as distinctive of Christianity, that the Church has really learned them not from Christ and the Twelve but from St. Paul. Now, the Gospel of St. John is the refutation of this theory. Paul and John are both of them witnesses to the peculiar doctrinal system of Christianity: they agree in every particular of that system: and they are shown to be independent witnesses by the fact that while they state the same doctrine they state it in totally different language. This fact has not, so far as I am aware, been insisted on with the emphasis which it deserves. When properly examined, it will be found to amount to nothing less than proof of the genuineness and trustworthiness of the Gospel of St. John.

refuted by the Gospel of St. John.

Paul and John state the same doctrines in different language.

If the Fourth Gospel were a work of later date, it would contain St. Paul's expressions.

If the Fourth Gospel is really a spurious work of a later period, it must be the work of some one who desired to put the doctrines of St. Paul into circulation under the name of the Beloved Disciple. But in that case the author could not have avoided borrowing much of St. Paul's language along with his doctrines. I do not mean imitating his style: there would be no motive for this: but it would be scarcely possible to reproduce a great and coherent system of thought like St. Paul's without adopting any of what may be called the technical language of his theology, or using so much as a single illustration or a single form of expression which is borrowed from him.

The Epistles of St. John stand with his Gospel.

And the probability will appear still greater if we remember that any hypothesis which is to account for the origin of the Gospel of St. John must account also for the origin of the Epistles which bear the same name, and are written in the same very peculiar style.

The theory that the Gospel of St. John is genuine but not trustworthy will not account for St. Paul's agreement with it,

The difficulty is not quite the same, but it is equally great as regards the Gospel, though not as regards the Epistles, if we suppose, with Renan, that the Fourth Gospel is really the work of the Beloved Disciple, and yet does not contain a trustworthy account of Christ's teaching: for if this were true, there would be no way of accounting for the fact that two men so utterly unlike as John and Paul in character, education, and in literary style, have taught precisely the same doctrine in totally different words.

nor will the theory that Christianity was a spontaneous product of the Jewish mind.

The same argument is valid against the theory that the theological system taught by Paul and John is less original than is generally believed, consisting of a set of ideas which were floating in the Jewish mind at that period, and were elaborated and systematized by the Apostles in connexion with the Person of Christ. This theory is contradicted by the most conclusive historical evidence.[1] But, leaving all external evidence aside, it is inconsistent with the evidence contained in the writings of the Apostles themselves. For when two men in the same age, and belonging to the same school of thought, write fully and systematically for the purpose of teaching the same doctrine, they will be certain, however unlike their styles may be, to use very many of the same expressions: not by reason of borrowing from each other, but because men write in the language which is spoken by the men around them. It is scarcely possible to conceive of a case where this is not so, except when a new terminology has been purposely introduced, either from the love of novelty or from the love of system: but none of the Apostles were the men to do this.

But all becomes intelligible and consistent if we believe

[1] See "The Jesus of the Evangelists" by the Rev. C. A. Row, referred to in the note at the foot of page 375.

The Apostles' own account of the source of their doctrines.

the account of the origin of their doctrines which Paul and John themselves have given us. They say that they learned Christian doctrine independently of each other, but from the same Divine source:—John from God in Christ, and Paul from God the Holy Spirit. This explains the facts presented by their writings: and no other theory explains them.

Summary.

If we had not the writings of Paul, it might be maintained with some appearance of plausibility that those of John contained only the writer's own fancies. If we had not the writings of John, the same might with as much plausibility be maintained regarding those of Paul. If Paul and John had taught the same doctrine in the same language, we might think that they had learned it, either the one from the other, or both from their contemporaries. But when we find that they both teach the same system of doctrine in totally different language, the only inference is, as already stated, that they were both Divinely taught.

It is necessary to prove the assertion that Paul and John teach the same doctrine though in different language. This shall be done by placing parallel passages from the writings of the two Apostles in parallel columns. A mere selection from the evidence is however all that can be given in this way: and though I shall endeavour to select the strongest points of the evidence, yet these cannot show its full strength, because no selection can give the force which is derived from the fact that all the evidence is on the same side, and that on what are properly theological subjects Paul and John are each throughout consistent not only with himself but with the other.

I must however first give a summary of the theological doctrine of Paul and John, in more detail than the statement of the distinctive doctrines of Christianity in the foregoing chapter, and also keeping nearer to the language of the Apostles. Their doctrine is briefly as follows:—

Jesus Christ, the historical Founder of Christianity, is Divine. The name of God is applied to Him. He existed

Summary of the teaching of Paul and John as to the Person of Christ.

before all creation, and was the agent of creation. In His relation to God the Father, He is sometimes called the Son, sometimes the Word, and sometimes the Image (εἰκών or likeness[1]) of God. He is, and has been from the beginning, the object of His Father's love.

The Son took our human nature upon Himself in the person of Jesus Christ, and submitted to death. His humiliation, first in His incarnation and afterwards in His death, was not only apparent but real. It was His own voluntary act, though done in obedience to the will of His Father. But even in His state of voluntary humiliation, He never ceased to be equal to the Father in dignity of nature: He claimed the rank of Deity, and was associated with the Father on terms of equality: and at His resurrection and ascension He became not only in right but in fact supreme over the whole creation.

Jesus Christ is the only mediator between God and man. Through Him alone we have access to the Father, and through Him alone does the grace of God descend to us. He is sometimes mentioned as the medium through whom the Father's grace comes to man, sometimes as Himself the source of grace. He is the source of spiritual life to man. He is the object of our faith, and those who believe and trust in Him are justified before God: so that justification follows not on any works that a man does or can do, but on his faith in Christ.

Christ by His death made a propitiatory sacrifice or atonement for the sins of mankind. His death was thus necessary to our spiritual and eternal life. But in another sense His life is the source of ours:—that is to say, the life which began at His birth, revived at His resurrection, and is continued eternally in heaven. Those who believe in Him become children of God, in a higher sense than that of children by creation. They become united with Christ in a sense which can be made intelligible only by such illustrations as the union of a vine-branch with the vine, or putting on Christ as a garment. In being united with Christ they become united with God and sharers in

[1] 2 Corinthians iv. 4, and Colossians i. 15.

the privileges of Christ: while they become at the same time spiritually united with each other in Christ. Christ is the Giver of the Holy Spirit, which is also called the Spirit of Christ: and Christ's actions are identified with those of the Holy Spirit.

Those who are Christ's shall, at His coming in glory, be visibly transformed into His likeness as He now is in heaven.

The Apostolic doctrine of atonement.

In speaking of the death of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice, I simply quote the words of the Apostles:—ἱλασμός[1] and ἱλαστήριον[2] can have no other meaning:—and the words of John the Baptist which John the Evangelist has adopted, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world!" beyond doubt refer to the paschal lamb. It is needless, and perhaps impossible, for us to ascertain how much of the heathen and Jewish notion of atonement *in the sense of expiation* lingered in the minds of the Apostles. Their language, in so far as it is coloured by that notion, is impossible for us to adopt with perfect sincerity. It is however very vague, and I am convinced that its meaning comes much nearer to the doctrine of atonement *in the sense of reconciliation* which I have endeavoured to state in the preceding chapter, than to the theory of Christ expiating our sins by suffering the punishment due to them. Moreover it is profoundly true, independently of any heathen or Jewish notion about expiatory sacrifice, that *without shedding of blood is no remission of sin*:—in other words, that even to the Sinless One it was impossible to heal our sins and reconcile us with God, without Himself, in the strife against sin, suffering even unto death.

But it may be said that the presence of any element whatever in their religious system which is not derived from the Spirit of God is enough to vitiate the Divine authority of the whole. I utterly reject such an inference. We know nothing of revelation and inspiration *à priori*: all that we know of them is known inductively, that is to

[1] First Epistle of John, ii. 2 and iv. 10. [2] Romans iii. 25.

say by the examination of facts: and such examination shows that the Divine light is never quite uncoloured by the human medium through which it reaches us. There is however no *d priori* improbability in this: it is altogether consistent with the Divine way of making the revelation through history.

Detailed proof of the agreement of John and Paul.

In the following statement of parallel passages, the quotations from the Gospel and the First Epistle of John are indicated by the words "Gospel" and "Epistle."

Words and sentences quoted differently from the Authorized Version are marked [thus].

The references to Alford are to his notes on the Greek Testament.

I do not quote from the anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews, because I am convinced that, though of the Apostolic age and rightly placed in the Canon of Scripture, it is not the work of St. Paul.

St. John.	St. Paul.
The word was God. (Gospel i. 1.)	Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever. (Romans ix. 5.)
No man hath ascended up into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man who is in heaven. (Gospel iii. 13.)	To know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled [even to] all the fulness of God. (Ephesians iii. 19. *Alford.*)
Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed. (Gospel xx. 28, 29.)	[Christ Jesus, who, subsisting in the form of God, deemed not His equality with God a matter for grasping.] (Philippians ii. 5. *Alford.*)

Deity of Christ.

	St. John.	St. Paul.
		Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. (Romans x. 13.) (Paul here quotes from Joel ii. 32.)
		But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption: that, according as it is written, He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. (1 Corinthians i. 30, 31.) (Paul here quotes from Jeremiah ix. 24. In both of these quotations he applies to Christ expressions which in the places from which they are quoted apply to Jehovah. See Liddon's Bampton Lectures, 2nd edition, p. 328.)
Pre-existence of Christ.	In the beginning was the Word. (Gospel i. 1.)	He is before (πρό) all things. (Colossians i. 17.) (With Paul πρό always means before in time.)
	What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before? (Gospel vi. 62.)	
	Before Abraham [was born] I am. (Gospel viii. 58.) (This passage is greatly weakened in the Authorized	

ST. JOHN.

Version by translating ἐγένετο *was* instead of *was born*.)

Now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. (Gospel xvii. 5.)

All things were made [through] him, and without him was not anything made that was made. (Gospel i. 3.)

The Father loveth the Son. (Gospel iii. 35.)

Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world. (Gospel xvii. 24.)

ST. PAUL.

Christ the Creator.

To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we [unto] him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, [through] whom are all things, and we [through] him. (1 Corinthians viii. 6.)

[In] him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers: all things were created [through] him, and for him; and he is before all things, and [in] him all things consist. (Colossians i. 16, 17.)

The love of the Father to the Son.

He hath made us accepted in the Beloved. (Ephesians i. 6.)

Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness,

	ST. JOHN.	ST. PAUL.
		and hath translated us into the kingdom of [the Son of His love]. (Colossians i. 13.)
Incarnation of the pre-existent Word.	The word [became] (ἐγένετο) flesh. (Gospel i. 14.)	In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. (Colossians ii. 9.)
	That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life. (Epistle i. 1.)	[Confessedly great is the mystery of piety: — who was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the spirit, was seen by angels, was preached among the nations, was believed on in the world, was received up into glory.] (1 Timothy iii. 16. *Alford.*)
	Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God. (Epistle iv. 2, 3.)	
Christ associated with God on terms of equality.	He said also that God was his Father, making himself equal with God. (Gospel v. 18.)	Grace to you and peace from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. (Romans i. 7.)
	That all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father. (Gospel v. 23.)	(This formula, with very little variation, is repeated at the beginning of every one of St. Paul's epistles, not counting that to the Hebrews as his.)
	This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God	The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of

ST. JOHN.

may be glorified thereby. (Gospel xi. 4.)

Now is the Son of Man glorified, and God is glorified in him. (Gospel xiii. 31.)

[Believe in God and also believe in me.] (Gospel xiv. 1. *Alford.*)

I am in the Father and the Father in me. (Gospel xiv. 10.)

If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him. (Gospel xiv. 23.)

Glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee. (Gospel xvii. 1.)

This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. (Gospel xvii. 3.)

All mine are thine, and thine are mine. (Gospel xvii. 10.)

(These pronouns are neuters: the meaning conse-

ST. PAUL.

God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. (2 Corinthians xiii. 14.)

Being not without law to God but under the law to Christ. (1 Corinthians ix. 21.)

Casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ. (2 Corinthians x. 5.)

Paul, an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father. (Galatians i. 1.)

The kingdom of Christ and of God. (Ephesians v. 5.)

After that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his own mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost which he has shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour. (Titus iii. 4, 6.)

(Note the parallelism of

	St. John.	St. Paul.
	quently is, "All my possessions are thine, and all thy possessions are mine.")	the expressions "God our Saviour" and "Christ our Saviour." *Alford.*)
	Ye also shall continue in the Son and in the Father. (Epistle ii. 24.)	Now [may our God and Father himself] and our Lord Jesus Christ direct our way unto you. (1 Thessalonians iii. 11.)
Christ identified with God.	They shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my Father's hand. My Father, who gave them me, is greater than all, and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. I and my Father are one. (Gospel x. 28–30.)	Now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God even our Father, which hath loved us and hath given us [eternal] consolation and good hope through grace, comfort your hearts and stablish you in every good word and work. (2 Thessalonians ii. 16, 17.)
	He that seeth me seeth him that sent me. (Gospel xii. 45.)	(In this and in the preceding quotation, "God our Father" and "the Lord Jesus Christ" are so united together as to be followed by a singular verb: as if we were to say in English, "God and Christ *directs:*" "God and Christ *comforts.*" *Alford.*)
	If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also: and from henceforth ye know him and have seen him. (Gospel xiv. 7.)	
Christ's voluntary humiliation.	I lay down my life that I may take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. This commandment	Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his

St. John.

have I received of my Father. (Gospel x. 17, 18.)

He that cometh from above is above all: he that is of the earth is earthly, and speaketh of the earth: he that cometh from heaven is above all. (Gospel iii. 31.)

The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand. (Gospel iii. 35.)

If ye ask anything in my name, I will do it. (Gospel xiv. 14.)

St. Paul.

poverty might be rich. (2 Corinthians viii. 9.)

Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who, [subsisting in the form of God, deemed not his equality with God a matter for grasping: but emptied himself by taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men: and when he was found in habit as a man he humbled himself, becoming obedient to death, and that the death of the cross.] (Philippians ii. 5–8. *Alford.*)

Christ's present power and glory.

To this end Christ both died and rose and revived, that he might be the Lord both of the dead and of the living. (Romans xiv. 9.)

He must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet. (1 Corinthians xv. 25.)

That in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and

	ST. JOHN.	ST. PAUL.
	All things that the Father hath are mine. (Gospel xvi. 15.)	which are on earth. (Ephesians i. 10.)
		And set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world but also in that which is to come: and hath put all things under his feet. (Ephesians i. 21, 22.)
		He that descended is the same also that ascended far above all heavens, that he might fill all things. (Ephesians iv. 10.)
		That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth: and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. (Philippians ii. 10, 11.)
Christ the way of access to the Father.	No man cometh unto the Father but [through] me. (Gospel xiv. 6.)	The love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. (Romans viii. 39.)
	Verily, verily, I say unto	Through him we both

St. John.	St. Paul.
you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you. (Gospel xvi. 23.)	have access by one Spirit unto the Father. (Ephesians ii. 18.)
Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father. (Epistle ii. 23.)	There is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. (1 Timothy ii. 5.)
	God, who hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works but according to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began: but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel. (2 Timothy i. 8-10.)
The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came [through] Jesus Christ. (Gospel i. 17.)	The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. (Romans xvi. 24.) Christ the fountain of grace.
Many believed on his name. (Gospel ii. 23.) (Compare the use of the expression "the name of God" in the Old Testament.)	Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. (Romans x. 4.) Christ the object of faith.
	I determined not to know

St. John.	St. Paul.
	anything among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified. (1 Corinthians ii. 2.)
	Other foundation can no man lay than that [which] is laid, which is Jesus Christ. (1 Corinthians iii. 11.)
	Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake. (Philippians i. 29.)
Justification by faith in Christ. As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life. For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have [eternal] life. (Gospel iii. 14–16.)	But now the righteousness of God without [the help of] the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets: even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe. (Romans iii. 21, 22. *Alford.*)
Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath [eternal] life. (Gospel vi. 47.)	That he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus. (Romans iii. 26.)
He that believeth on me, though he were dead, yet shall he live. (Gospel xi. 25.)	To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. (Romans iv. 5.)

ST. JOHN.

These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God: and that believing ye might have life through his name. (Gospel xx. 31.)

ST. PAUL.

Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; [through] whom also we have access into this grace wherein we stand. (Romans v. 1, 2.)

The word of faith which we preach, that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. (Romans x. 8, 9.)

Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law but [through] the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ that we might be justified by the faith of Christ and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. (Galatians ii. 16.)

By grace are ye saved through faith: and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. (Ephesians ii. 8, 9.)

Not having mine own

ST. JOHN.	ST. PAUL.
	righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith. (Philippians iii. 9.)
	Herein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith. (Romans i. 17.)
	A man is justified by faith without the [works] of the law. (Romans iii. 28.)
	Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: [on the contrary,] we establish the law. (Romans iii. 31.)
	We are saved by hope. (Romans viii. 24.)
	By faith ye stand. (2 Corinthians i. 24.)
	We walk by faith, not by sight. (2 Corinthians v. 7.)
Atonement made by Christ. Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world. (Gospel i. 29.)	Justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through
The bread which I will	

ST. JOHN.

give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. (Gospel vi. 51.)

The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin. (Epistle i. 7.)

He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world. (Epistle ii. 2.)

He was manifested [that he might] take away our sins. (Epistle iii. 5. *Alford.*)

This is he that came by water and blood, even Jesus Christ: not by water only, but by water and blood. (Epistle v. 6.)

ST. PAUL.

faith, in his blood. (Romans iii. 24, 25.)

(The last words of this passage mean, "through faith, and in his blood." The expression, "faith in his blood," is altogether inaccurate. See Alford's note on this passage.)

Being justified [in] his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. (Romans v. 9.)

Christ our passover is sacrificed for us. (1 Corinthians v. 7.)

Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. (Galatians iii. 13.)

We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins. (Ephesians i. 7.)

It pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell: and, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself: by him, I say, whether

	St. John.	St. Paul.
		they be things on earth or things in heaven. And you that were alienated in your minds by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death. (Colossians i. 19, 20.)
Christ's death necessary for our life.	Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. (Gospel xii. 24.)	The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ [died without cause]. (Galatians ii. 20, 21. *Alford.*)
Christ's human life the source of spiritual life to us.	Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood dwelleth in me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live [through] the Father:	If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God [through] the death of his Son: much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved [in] his life. (Romans v. 10.)

St. John.	St. Paul.
so he that eateth me, even he shall live [through] me. This is the bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever. (Gospel vi. 53–58.)	
As many as received him, to them gave he power to become [children] of God, even to them that believe on his Name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. (Gospel i. 12, 13.)	Ye have received the spirit of adoption [as sons], whereby we cry Abba, [that is to say] Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are children of God. (Romans viii. 15, 16.) Adoption of Christ's people as children of God.
Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God. (Epistle v. 1.)	Whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. (Romans viii. 29.)
I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing. (Gospel xv. 5.)	If we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this also, that our old man is crucified with him. (Romans vi. 5, 6.) Union of Christ's people with Him.
Whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of	In that he died, he died unto sin once [for all]: but

St. John.	St. Paul.
God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him. (Epistle ii. 5.)	in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God [in] Jesus Christ our Lord. (Romans vi. 10, 11.)
Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not. (Epistle iii. 6.)	If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also [give life to] your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. (Romans viii. 11.)
	Heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ: if so be that we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified together. (Romans viii. 17.)
	Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? (1 Corinthians vi. 15.)
	Know ye not of your own selves how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates? (2 Corinthians xiii. 5.)
	I am crucified with Christ: [but it is no longer I that live, but Christ that] liveth in me. (Galatians ii. 20. *Alford.*)

St. John.	St. Paul.	
	As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. (Galatians iii. 27.)	
	Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him. (Colossians ii. 12.)	
Ye shall know that I am in the Father, and ye in me and I in you. (Gospel xiv. 20.)	All [things] are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ's is God's. (1 Corinthians iii. 22, 23.)	Our relation to Christ like His to the Father.
As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you: continue ye in my love. If ye keep my commandments ye shall abide in my love, even as I have kept the Father's commandments and abide in his love. (Gospel xv. 9, 10.)		
I will pray the Father and he shall send you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever: even the Spirit of truth. (Gospel xiv. 16, 17.)	Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts. (Galatians iv. 6.)	Christ the giver of the Holy Spirit.
The Comforter, the Holy [Spirit], whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things. (Gospel xiv. 26.)		

St. John.	St. Paul.
When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father. (Gospel xv. 26.)	
If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you: but if I depart I will send him unto you. (Gospel xvi. 7.)	
Christ identified with the Holy Spirit. I will not leave you [orphans]: I will come unto you. (Gospel xiv. 18. *Alford.*)	Ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. [But] if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. (Romans viii. 9, 10.)
If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. (Epistle ii. 1.) (The word παράκλητος here applied to the Son and translated Advocate, is the same which in the Gospel of John is applied to the Holy Spirit and translated Comforter.)	("Observe here that *the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ,* and *Christ,* are all used of the Holy Spirit indwelling in the Christian." *Alford.*)
	The first man Adam was made a living soul: the last Adam was made a [life-giving] Spirit. (1 Corinthians xv. 45.)
	That Christ may dwell in

ST. JOHN.

ST. PAUL.

your hearts by faith. (Ephesians iii. 17.)

That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou [hast given] me I have given them: that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect [into] one. (Gospel xvii. 21—23.)

We being many are one body in Christ. (Romans xii. 5.)

The union of Christ's people with each other in Him.

Ye are all one in Christ Jesus. (Galatians iii. 28.)

It doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him: for we shall see him as he is. (Epistle iii. 2.)

The Lord Jesus Christ who shall [transform the body of our humiliation so as to be conformed to the body of his glory]. (Philippians iii. 21. *Alford.*)

Transformation of Christ's people into His likeness at His coming again.

[Ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is our life, shall be manifested, then shall ye also with him be manifested in glory.] (Colossians iii. 3, 4. *Alford.*)

In conclusion, I shall quote passages from the first three Gospels which, not by implication but expressly,[1] assert

Agreement of the other

[1] On the *implied* agreement between the first three Gospels and that of St. John, see Canon Liddon's Bampton Lectures on our Lord's Divinity.

Evangelists with St. John.

doctrines respecting the Person of Christ identical with those of John and Paul.

Christ associated with God on terms of equality.

"All things are delivered unto me of my Father, and no [one] knoweth the Son but the Father: neither knoweth any [one] the Father [but] the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." (Matthew xi. 27, and Luke x. 22.)

Christ's present power and glory.

"All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them [into] the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy [Spirit]: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." (Matthew xxviii. 18—20.)

Christ identified with the Holy Spirit.

"I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist." (Luke xxi. 15.)

The perfect identity of doctrine between the Apostles Paul and John is in some degree obscured by the very circumstance—namely, their total difference in expression—which, as I have endeavoured to show, gives to that identity of doctrine its importance as proof of the trustworthiness of both. Although these reasonings are critical, they do not need any erudition in order to appreciate them. No evidence has been used in this chapter except that which is contained within the books of the New Testament.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE.

The instinctive hope for both justice and mercy

WE have seen in the preceding chapters that the instinctive moral and spiritual sense of man hopes and longs for a revelation of Divine justice and mercy, and can be satisfied with nothing short of their perfect fulfilment: —the perfect fulfilment of justice in the defeat of sin, and of mercy in its destruction, involving also the extinction of all suffering, "and all that is at war with bliss."

But how can justice and mercy be fulfilled together? how can God be just, and yet at the same time justify a sinner? The clearer is our sense of holiness, the more deeply is this perplexity felt: and by the highest moral intelligence it is recognized as the only possible answer, that the sinner must by repentance cease to be a sinner. On repentance he is certain to be forgiven and justified. But the more clearly this is seen, the more clearly is it also understood that such repentance as can alone satisfy Divine Justice and Divine Mercy is impossible to man:— that such repentance implies being *born anew*, and that this is possible only on condition of being *born from above*.[1] But because this is impossible to man, God has provided a supernatural means whereby it may be effected, namely through the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ:—a means whereof the operation is no doubt altogether inexplicable and mysterious, but not more mysterious, though a higher mystery, than the facts of life, and the develop-

can be fulfilled only by the extinction of sin.

Only Divine power can effect this.

It is done through Christ.

[1] The word ἄνωθεν has these two meanings. See the Gospel of St. John ii. 3 and 31.

ment of consciousness, reason, and morality. In other words, the spiritual life which comes from above through Christ is not more inexplicable than the natural life which comes through physical channels:—the truth that we shall bear the image of the Heavenly, the Lord from heaven, is not more mysterious than the truth that we actually bear the image of our earthly ancestors.[1] All is mysterious alike: the difference is only between the familiar and the unfamiliar; between the earthly fact which is a matter of common experience, and the heavenly truth which is to be fully verified only in the future life.

Connexion between Regeneration and Resurrection, denied by Unitarian theology and Pelagian ethics.

It may be said that I have here confounded together two things which have only a metaphorical analogy: the spiritual life communicated to us by Christ in this present state of existence, and the immortal life to be given to us at the Resurrection. I reply that on the postulates of Unitarian theology and Pelagian ethics these are quite distinct, but the Christianity of the New Testament identifies them as two aspects of the same truth. It is with perfect consistency that the theology of Unitarianism, which denies the Eternal Son of God and His Incarnation, has been constantly associated with the ethics of Pelagianism, which teaches that man is self-sufficing, and is, or may become, a child of God in the highest sense without the mediation of the Eternal Son become incarnate. But the theology and the ethics of the New Testament and of the Church teach that the Eternal Son has taken on Himself our nature and shared our lot: that through His human life alone can we now begin to be partakers of the Divine or spiritual life: and that the work which is thus begun in the secrecy of the individual soul, out of sight and almost out of consciousness, will in the future life be visibly completed by the formation of such an organization as will be needed for the purified and regenerated spirit. In other words, the imparting of that spiritual life whereby we are to become *partakers of the Divine Nature*,[2]

[1] See the First Epistle to the Corinthians xv. 49.

[2] Second Epistle of Peter i. 4. I am of course aware that the authen-

is spoken of in the New Testament as the beginning of the process whereby, after the end of the present life, eternal life is to be conferred : which process has already produced the visible first-fruit of its results in the resurrection of Christ.

It is of course impossible to bring scientific proof of such a doctrine as this, except in so far as the resurrection and ascension of Christ, regarded as well-attested historical facts, are of the nature of experimental proof. But Christian doctrine, though on its theological side it does not come into direct contact with science, has on its ethical side far more agreement with the most recent results of physiology and psychology than with the metaphysical theories of the eighteenth century. The older theories taught that the mind, or spirit, is isolated in the midst of a universe of matter; and that consciousness is co-extensive with mind: but we have learned to understand that the mind is a part and a product of the world of matter, force, and life which surrounds it;[1] and that, so far from consciousness being co-extensive with mind, there are conscious and unconscious mental actions, insensibly graduating into each other: so that only part, and perhaps a comparatively small part, of the whole of the mental actions becomes conscious.[2] The older theories formed a philosophical groundwork for Pelagian ethics, and consequently, perhaps we may add without injustice, for that Unitarian theology which naturally unites with those ethics. When the soul was believed to be isolated, it was a natural inference that it might be, and ought to be, self-sufficing : and when consciousness was believed to be co-extensive with the soul, it was a natural inference that no spiritual influence could reach it except through the avenues of consciousness, in the way of instruction and example. But now, when we have learned that the soul is not isolated but is only a

Harmony of Christian ethics with modern physiological psychology.

ticity of this epistle is very doubtful, but the expression quoted in the text is not much stronger than the habitual language of St. Paul. It is moreover a plausible conjecture that the first fourteen verses of this epistle are the genuine work of the Apostle, while the rest is spurious.

[1] Page 103.

[2] See the second volume of "Habit and Intelligence."

particular set of the functions of the bodily life: and that influences inherited from our remotest ancestors meet in us, so that we think not only with our individual mind, but with that of the race:[1] it no longer appears contrary to the analogies of the universe as known to us that we should be *born anew* by the implanting of a nature not derived from any earthly ancestor, but from Christ. And now that we find consciousness not to be co-extensive with the soul, it no longer appears anomalous that such a nature should be implanted and nourished by a process which transcends any immediate consciousness;—which is known only by its effects, and will be made fully known only in the future life.

Consistency of the Resurrection with the laws of vital development.

Further: the expectation that this new nature will be fully developed in the future life is in harmony with what we have learned of the laws of vital development. St. Paul's illustration of the resurrection from the germination of the seed, which has so vividly affected the imagination of men, is more appropriate than he was aware of. Organization is not the cause but the effect of life. Life, in producing organization, works from within outwards, and from the invisible to the visible. The vital germ is not a miniature of the mature organism, but only a minute unorganized mass, having however a power, which no physics or chemistry can ever explain, of organizing itself and thus developing into the mature organism. So it will be in the future life, if the Church is right in believing that St. Paul spoke as the Spirit of God gave him knowledge. As the germ of the mortal life, which we inherit from the earthly ancestors whose image we bear, has developed into our present bodily organism, so shall the germ of life spiritual, eternal, and Divine which Christ implants here in those who do not reject His grace, be developed, under the kindlier influences of the future state, into the perfect "spiritual body" (to use a most inadequate expression where human language has no adequate one) which is to be created in *the image of the Heavenly.*

[1] Page 101.

I do not feel able to form any opinion as to the value of this analogy. But it certainly is not misleading. If it has any real value, future generations will recognize it: if not, it will simply go for nothing.

It is necessary to justify by quotations the assertion made above, that the writers of the New Testament identify the spiritual life which Christ communicates to us here with the fully developed eternal life which He attained at His resurrection, and which we hope to attain. This conception is so alien from our customary habits of thought, that perhaps many who believe, on the authority of Christ and His Apostles, in the doctrines both of Regeneration and Resurrection, may not have perceived their connexion, or rather their identity.

St. Paul says:—

"Ourselves also, who have received the Spirit for the first fruits [of our inheritance], even we ourselves are groaning inwardly, longing for the adoption which shall ransom our body from its bondage."[1] Epistle to the Romans viii. 23.

In this passage "the *first fruit of the Spirit* is the indwelling and influences of the Holy Spirit here, as an earnest of the full harvest of His complete possession of us, spirit and flesh and soul, hereafter. That this is the meaning seems evident from the analogy of St. Paul's imagery respecting the Holy Spirit."[2]

St. Paul says again:—

"That you may know . . . . how surpassing is the power which He has shown toward us who believe: [for He hath dealt with us] in the strength of that might wherewith He wrought in Christ when He raised Him from the dead, and set Him at His own right hand in the heavens. . . . . And you likewise He raised from death to life when you were dead in transgressions and sins, ... and were by nature the children of wrath, no less than others. But God, who is rich in mercy, because of the great love wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead Epistle to the Ephesians i. 18—ii. 6.

[1] This quotation is from Conybeare's translation. (Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul.)

[2] From Alford's note on the passage.

in sin called us to share the life of Christ—(by grace you are saved)—and in Christ Jesus He raised us up with Him from the dead, and seated us with Him in the heavens."[1]

The following, though from a different Epistle, contains the same idea, and indeed seems like a continuation of the same passage :—

Epistle to the Colossians iii. 1—4.

"If then ye were raised up together with Christ [at your baptism], seek the things above where Christ dwells, seated on the right hand of God. Care for the things above, not the things on the earth. For ye died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. When Christ shall be manifested, who is our life, then shall ye also with Him be manifested in glory."[2]

Christ, as reported by St. John, identifies in the same way the spiritual life which He gives now with the life which is to be eternal in the resurrection. The following are His words :—

Gospel of St. John v. 24—29.

"Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word and believeth on Him that sent Me, hath eternal life, and shall not come into judgment, but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son also to have life in Himself: and hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of Man. Marvel not at this ; for the hour cometh in which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice and shall come forth: they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment."[3]

When Christ, in this remarkable passage, says that the hour not only cometh soon but is come already when the dead shall hear His voice and shall live, this can only

[1] The quotation is made from Conybeare's translation.

[2] The quotation is made from the Notes to Alford's Greek Testament. I have substituted the word *dwells* for *is :* a change which is supported by Alford's note, though he does not suggest the word.

[3] The quotation is from the Authorized Version, with a few verbal changes which do not alter the sense.

refer to the resurrection from a death of sin: for the general resurrection of the dead, though it is coming, is not yet come. But in the next clause He speaks of the general resurrection of the dead as a fact of the same kind with the resurrection of the soul from a death of sin, and effected by the same agency, namely *the voice of the Son of God.*

Is the resurrection to condemnation reconcilable with the doctrine here maintained?

In this passage, however, mention is made of a resurrection which is not unto life but unto judgment or condemnation. Is this reconcilable with the doctrine, which nevertheless appears to be clearly taught in this passage as well as in those quoted from St. Paul, that the present resurrection from sin to holiness and the future resurrection to a future life, are changes of the same kind and due to the same agency? I think it is so reconcilable. Perhaps indeed the difficulty is altogether due to that narrow and false notion which regards justice and mercy as opposed, and will be removed when we perfectly attain to the wider and truer view wherefrom they are seen to be fundamentally one, having their root in a Divine Righteousness which is capable of being satisfied only by producing righteousness in the creature. Christ, because He is the Son of Man as well as the Son of God, has been made the Minister both of justice and of mercy or grace:—in other words, He is at once Judge and Saviour. He could not be the Saviour were He not also the Judge: that is to say, He could not heal sin unless He had power to condemn it. God, sending His Son in the likeness of our sinful flesh, has in the flesh condemned sin to destruction:[1] and its destruction is at once perfect justice and perfect mercy. The Incarnation and Atonement of Christ, or in other words His human life, is the means whereby, through a process altogether mysterious to us, man has not

The difficulty arises from the false notion that justice and mercy are opposed.

Christ could not be the Saviour were he not also the Judge.

[1] "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God [has done: that is to say,] sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, [He has] condemned [and sentenced to death] sin in the flesh." (Epistle to the Romans viii. 3.) I quote the Authorized Version, but insert the words marked [thus]. See Vaughan's note on the passage, and also Alford's. It is obvious that *to condemn* must in this passage mean more than merely *to find guilty*, for this latter is precisely what the law *can* do.

only been placed in a new relation to God, but has received a new nature and new possibilities of development. By this means he has become immortal: but this is an immortality of true life only for those who have become worthy of the grace of Christ by accepting it, whether consciously or unconsciously,[1] and by acting accordingly: to the rest the future life is a *resurrection of judgment* or *condemnation*. There is, or ought to be, no difficulty in understanding how the Saviour can condemn: the difficulty is to believe that His condemnation should not be sufficient ultimately to destroy and extinguish all sin, and with sin all suffering. We have however seen reason, not only from conscience and moral instinct but from the revelation of Christ as recorded in the New Testament, to believe in the ultimate universality of salvation:—to believe that the sinner shall be ultimately saved through the condemnation of the sin.[2] We shall consider the testimony of the New Testament on this subject more closely in the following chapter.

[1] Page 385.

[2] The chapters on Nature and Grace and on Legal and Evangelical Religion (Chapters 22 and 23).

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF A FINAL GENERAL RESTORATION.

WE have spoken in previous chapters[1] of the necessity of believing in the ultimate universal triumph of Divine Mercy as well as of Divine Justice: and this on the two distinct grounds, that it is demanded by our belief in the perfection of the Divine Character, and is needed in order to produce the highest degree of holiness in us. The purpose of the present chapter is to show that such is the doctrine of the New Testament.

The blessedness promised in the New Testament is not happiness but life, which is eternal.

It is remarkable that the blessedness promised in the future state is not generally spoken of as *happiness*, but as *life*. Happiness, considered alone, is nothing more than sustained enjoyment: and this is too low a conception to be identified with the blessedness which God has promised to those who love Him. That blessedness, though it includes happiness, does not consist in happiness, but in life: and the life is declared to be eternal.

Death on the contrary is not called eternal.

Now the opposite of life is death, and we might consequently expect to find the opposite of eternal life called eternal death: but this is not the case: on the contrary, the expression eternal death does not once occur in the New Testament.[2] This omission will appear significant

[1] Chapters 22 (Nature and Grace) and 23 (Legal and Evangelical Religion).

[2] This has been strangely overlooked by Maurice in the admirable chapter on Eternal Life and Eternal Death, with which his volume of Theological Essays concludes.

when we consider that there are several passages where it seems to be demanded for the symmetry of the sentence, and would certainly increase its impressiveness. I quote what is perhaps the chief instance of this :—

Epistle to the Romans vi. 21–23.

"What fruit had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is *death*. But now being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end *eternal life*. For the *wages* of *sin* is *death*, but the *gift* of *God* is *eternal life*, through Jesus Christ our Lord."[1]

A threefold contrast is here indicated: *wages* and *gift*, *sin* and *God*, *death* not necessarily eternal and *eternal life*. It seems impossible to understand why St. Paul should have avoided the use of so appropriate, so impressive, and so self-suggesting an expression as eternal death would have been in such a place as this, had he believed the meaning it conveyed to be true.

No doubt a single negative instance is seldom conclusive: and for that reason I go on to quote others. In the next quotation, as in the former, death is mentioned, but not eternal death.

Epistle to the Romans v. 21.

"That as sin hath reigned unto *death*, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto *eternal life* by Jesus Christ our Lord."

But though the death spoken of in these two passages is not eternal, it certainly is more than the mere death of the body: it is the result and punishment of sin in the future state. The saying that *the wages of sin is death* means very much more than if the Apostle had merely said, what is however true, that the tendency of sin is to shorten our allotted threescore and ten years.

St. Paul says again :—

Epistle to the Romans ii. 5–10.

"But after thy hardness and impenitent heart thou treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who

[1] Our translators in this passage, as in the much worse case of Matthew xxv. 46, have translated *αἰώνιος* by *everlasting* in one place and by *eternal* in the other.

by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, *eternal life:* but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth but obey unrighteousness, *indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish,* upon every soul of man that doeth evil: but glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good."

"He that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap *corruption:* but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap *eternal life.*" Epistle to the Galatians vi. 8.

But though the New Testament never speaks of eternal death, it does contain what have at first sight the appearance of equivalent expressions. St. Paul speaks of eternal destruction,[1] and Christ of eternal punishment.[2] These expressions occur each of them once, and only once: and though they must be allowed their legitimate meaning, and, I fully believe, represent realities, yet they cannot neutralize the significance of the constant and marked omission of any mention of eternal death.

It may be urged however that eternal punishment is a stronger and more terrible denunciation than eternal death: for the most obvious meaning of eternal death, or eternal destruction, is the final extinction of being, but the most obvious meaning of eternal punishment is never-ending conscious existence in torment. But before we conclude that this doctrine is really part of Christ's teaching, we ought carefully to examine the meaning of Christ's account of the future judgment, and the light thrown on it by the rest of His discourses.

In the "Parable of Judgment," as the passage under discussion has been well called, there is no special emphasis on the word eternal. Those who heard it were already familiar with the idea of future judgment; the purpose of Christ was to state on what principles the judgment is to Christ's Parable of Judgment (Matthew xxv. 31, 46) teaches eternal life for the merciful,

[1] Ὄλεθρος αἰώνιος (2 Thessalonians i. 9).

[2] Κόλασις αἰώνιος (Matthew xxv. 46). Etymologically, κόλασις means correction or chastisement: but it appears to have lost this meaning in the Greek of the New Testament. The word occurs only twice in the New Testament: Matthew xxv. 46, where it is translated *punishment*, and the First Epistle of John iv. 18, where it is translated *torment*.

and eternal punishment for the unmerciful, whether they know Christ or not.

be. The merciful shall be rewarded not only with mercy but with eternal life, and the unmerciful punished in eternal fire: and those who have been merciful or unmerciful without a thought of Christ, perhaps without having heard His name, shall be rewarded or punished as if they had done such deeds to Christ.

This separation cannot be literally true, because none are all good or all bad.

Now, if this final and absolute separation between the good and the bad, who are here identified with the merciful and the unmerciful, were to be understood literally, it would be necessary to maintain that every man is either altogether good or altogether bad. But this is notoriously not the fact: human character is mixed: none are altogether good, and perhaps none are altogether bad. It is therefore impossible that the "Parable of Judgment" can be intended as the description of an event. Like the rest of that series of parables at the end of which it has been placed by the compiler of the first Gospel,[1] it represents not any actual event, but principles of the Divine administration: and it is meant to teach that every man shall be an inheritor of life for ever in so far as he has done good and shown mercy, and an inheritor of wrath for ever in so far as he has been wicked and unmerciful.

Reward and punishment will be proportional to deeds.

If this is called an attempt to explain away the obvious sense of the passage, I reply that the obvious, or rather the superficial, sense cannot be the true one, because it would imply what is not the fact, namely that men are either altogether good or altogether bad.

It may be said in reply to this, that though all human character is mixed, yet forgiveness is certain on repentance: that the blessed, who inherit eternal life, are those who have attained to forgiveness, and the cursed, who inherit eternal fire, are those who have died with their sins unforgiven.

Christ here says nothing of forgiveness.

I have stated already[2] that I believe in the certainty of forgiveness on repentance: but this, though it is true and is taught by Christ, is not the doctrine of the passage

[1] See Note 4 on page 299.

[2] See Chapter 22 (Nature and Grace).

under discussion. If Christ had meant the forgiven and the unforgiven, there is no reason why He should have, instead, spoken of the merciful and the unmerciful. Throughout the New Testament wherever men are described as brought up in the future life before the Judge for eternal judgment, we are always told that the judgment shall be according to their works: there is no suggestion of its being according to their repentance or their faith, or of any distinction between the forgiven and the unforgiven. Its constant language is that *they who have done good shall arise to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil to the resurrection of judgment.* Repentance and faith, and the forgiveness which is certain to follow on these, are constantly insisted on, but never in immediate connexion with eternal judgment. If we were to take the "Parable of Judgment" as containing all that is to be taught on the subject, we should have to believe that human character is either unmixed good or unmixed evil, which is contrary to fact: and that there is no forgiveness, which is contrary to Christ's most characteristic teaching. The doctrine of the "Parable of Judgment" is that retribution is inevitable: it makes no mention of the possibility of repentance and forgiveness. Yet the doctrine of forgiveness is as true as the doctrine of retribution: and if the "Parable of Judgment" does not contradict the possibility of repentance and forgiveness in this present life, why should it be understood to deny their possibility in the life to come? This is the question at issue.

Judgment by works is the doctrine of the New Testament.

Gospel of St. John v. 29.

The answer will be, that the use of the word eternal as applied to future life and future punishment declares the future state to be fixed and unchangeable. I reply, that the future state is no doubt unchangeable in the same sense that the present state is so. Every action passes into character; the consequences of actions can never be evaded or cancelled: and the doctrine of eternal punishment means that this law is never to be abolished. But we find that in the present life the certainty of retribution is consistent with the possibility of forgiveness: and there is no reason for thinking that it will be otherwise in the future life. In

Eternal punishment means that the law of retribution is never to be reversed.

But in the future life, as in the present, this may be com-

patible with forgiveness.

a previous chapter[1] I have spoken at greater length on the possible co-existence of retribution and forgiveness.

Future punishment is spoken of as fire. Fire is primarily destructive.

We have next to observe the imagery used in the New Testament when speaking of future punishment. When imagery is used at all, it is almost always taken from fire. Now the primary property of fire, and that which the mention of fire suggests, is to destroy: its property of causing intense pain is but secondary. Were pain the essential matter, there is no reason why fire should be the only image used:[2] the scourge and the cross were more familiar to the inhabitants of the Roman Empire in the time of Christ.

In the following passage the idea of pain, or torment, does not occur: the idea is partly that of destruction, partly that of cleansing. The words are ascribed to John the Baptist, but we are safe in attributing to them equal authority with those of Christ.

Matthew iii. 10–12.

"Now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the *fire*. I indeed baptize you in water unto repentance, but He that cometh after me is mightier than I: . . . . He shall baptize you in the Holy Spirit and in *fire:* whose winnowing-fan is in His hand, and He will thoroughly cleanse His threshing-floor, and gather His wheat into the garner: but will burn up the chaff with unquenchable *fire*."

Fire as a symbol of purification.

In this passage fire is mentioned three times: the first and the third time as an agent of destruction, and the second time as an agent of purification; for purification is what baptism symbolizes. These two symbolical meanings of fire are obviously closely connected: indeed they merge into one in that saying of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that *God is a consuming fire*.[3] All the

[1] Page 308.

[2] Unless "outer darkness" can be called an image. There is, however, one passage where Christ speaks of future punishment under the image of scourging. But in this there is nothing to suggest that the punishment is to be endless; on the contrary, the mention of *many* and *few stripes* suggests the contrary. See Luke xii. 47, 48.

[3] Hebrews xii. 29. See page 323, note.

symbolical meanings of fire in the New Testament stand indeed in close connexion with each other. Torment does not appear to be the exclusive idea anywhere, except perhaps in the so-called Revelation of St. John, which certainly cannot be rated as of equal authority with the Gospels and Epistles: but it does enter into the "Parable of Judgment:" and Christ expressly associates it with the idea of destruction in the parable of the tares. "As therefore the tares are gathered and burned in the fire, so shall it be at the conclusion of this age. The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that offend and them who do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth."

Revelation xiv. 10, 11, and xx. 10.

Matthew xiii. 40–42.

In another remarkable passage, fire is associated with the idea, not of pain, but of disgrace. "Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." What is here suggested is not death by fire, but the ignominious exposure and destruction of bodies after death. These expressions come very near to a suggestion of eternal death: but, as has been remarked in a previous chapter,[1] it is a perfectly legitimate and indeed the most natural interpretation, that the worm will never die until it has devoured all that there is for it to devour, and the fire will never go out until it has consumed all that there is for it to consume. If so, the teaching of this passage is the same as that of another saying of Christ—"Thou shalt by no means come out thence till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing."

Mark ix. 44, 48.

Matthew v. 26.

Summary.

We therefore conclude that as no one is either altogether good or altogether bad, there is no such thing to be looked for as either absolute acquittal or absolute condemnation in the future judgment: and that the doctrine of eternal judgment means the continuance and the confirmation in eternity of the law which we know to be in force now, that the effects of actions cannot be evaded: but that every one must reap what he has sown, both in kind and in quantity. "He that soweth to his flesh shall of the

Galatians vi. 8.

[1] Page 324.

flesh reap corruption, but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap eternal life." "He that soweth sparingly shall reap sparingly, and he that soweth bountifully shall reap bountifully." And we further conclude that the fire which symbolizes the Divine anger against sin is in the first place and before all else destructive; and that punishment, considered as pain, is only a secondary though a real effect. If then the effect of God's anger is destructive of sin, it affords a ground not of despair but of hope.

Corinthians ix. 6.

All this appears certain, and is indeed the only tenable interpretation of Christ's language on the subject. But what is it that we are to hope for? Is it for the destruction of sin, so that the sinner may be capable of repentance, forgiveness, and restoration? or can we hope only for the destruction of the sin and the sinner together? Is it true, as Christendom so generally believes, that Christ has expressly excluded the possibility of restoration in a future life? The law of retribution is at the foundation of the moral cosmos, and Christ's "Parable of Judgment" asserts that it will not be reversed but confirmed in the future life. But this law does not exclude repentance and restoration in the present life, and, in the "Parable of Judgment" taken alone, there is nothing that declares them impossible in the future life. There is however another saying of Christ which appears to assert that eternal judgment excludes the possibility of future forgiveness. "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath not forgiveness for ever, but is guilty of an eternal sin:"[1] or, as His words are reported by another Evangelist, "shall not be forgiven, neither in this age nor in that which is to come." Few questions have been more debated than the meaning of the sin against the Holy Spirit. In my opinion it is simply sin against light:—not indifference but hostility to light:—and the reason why it cannot be

Mark iii. 29.

Matthew xii. 32.

The sin against the Holy Spirit.

[1] Ἁμαρτήματος (sin), not κρίσεως (judgment), is regarded by Alford as the true reading. It is a strange expression, but I agree with Alford (the remark is not in the note on this passage) that a strange expression is less likely to have been substituted by the copyist for a common one than the converse, and is therefore more likely to be genuine. This, I believe, is the general opinion of the best commentators.

forgiven is that it enters too deeply into character to be repented. But whatever may be thought of these explanations, the saying of Christ now quoted does not appear to throw any light on the eternal punishment denounced in the "Parable of Judgment" against the unmerciful; for the sin against the Holy Spirit, whatever it may be, is certainly not identical with unmercifulness. It may no doubt be said that all sins are unpardonable in the future life, and that the peculiarity of the sin against the Holy Spirit consists only in being unpardonable now. But this is quite different from what is taught by Christ: for, by speaking of a sin which cannot be forgiven in the age to come, He clearly implies that there are sins which can be forgiven in the age to come. I do not deny the difficulty—perhaps we may say the impossibility—of piecing together a perfectly consistent theory of future life and future judgment out of Christ's scattered sayings. Christ's way of teaching is to insist strongly on one truth at a time, and to leave the reconciliation of apparently conflicting truths to take care of itself: and if we follow His teaching in the spirit wherein He means it to be followed, we shall no doubt endeavour to reconcile what appears conflicting: but if we fail in doing so to the satisfaction of our own intellects, we shall accept the failure as a "trial of our faith," and cling to each separate truth; especially to the two great truths that God's justice is certain and that His mercy is infinite. It may perhaps be said that in thus resignedly accepting apparent inconsistencies, I am applying different principles to the interpretation of the words of Christ from those which I would apply to those of any other, and thereby surrender those rational principles which ostensibly lie at the base of the present work. I reply that I do not thus give up the use of my understanding when the most important sayings ever uttered are to be understood:—I apply, though in a higher degree, to the words of Christ the same principles which I should apply to the words of any man whom I perceived to have spiritual truth to communicate. To mention the names of those writers outside of the Holy

Difficulty of reconciling all Christ's sayings.

Reasonableness of accepting apparent inconsistencies.

Scriptures from whom I have learned the most:—were I to find in the writings of Pascal, or of Coleridge, or of Maurice, or of Thomas Erskine, statements of doctrine each of which separately appeared to express some one aspect of truth, and which I was yet unable to harmonize into logical consistency: my inference would not be that my teacher is inconsistent with himself and therefore either partly or altogether wrong:—it would be that the principles which I do not know how to harmonize are nevertheless most probably profoundly consistent with each other, and that as I grow in understanding and insight, either in this life or in another, I may hope to see their harmony. And this, which I should think probably true of such men as those I have named, I think certainly true of Christ. It is no paradox but a sober truth, that those who have the widest and deepest insight are those who oftenest express what appear self-contradictions to men of narrower and shallower understandings, who are unable to perceive their real harmony. For an instance of this, we need not go beyond the subject of the present chapter. Men have perplexed themselves for ages to reconcile God's justice with His mercy: and now a clearer insight is beginning to teach us that they need no reconciliation, because in God they are one.[1]

General statement of Christ's teaching on the subject.

To return from this digression:—On the whole, the most consistent account of Christ's doctrine appears to be this:—that retribution is certain, universal, and eternal, but not so as to exclude the possibility of repentance and forgiveness, except in the case of those who have committed the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit: that for those who have not thus sinned unto death, restoration will be attainable in the future life: and that for those who do not finally attain to forgiveness and eternal life, the end will be the total destruction and extinction of their being. It appears, however, to be everywhere implied that all who pass out of this life without attaining to forgiveness, whether their ultimate destiny is to be restoration or extinction, must pass through a period of deeper suffering than falls to man's lot in this life.

[1] Page 315.

There are two other passages in the discourses of Christ which appear to support the opinion that repentance and restoration are possible in the future life. One of these is that already referred to, where He says, "Thou shalt by no means come out [of prison] till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing." This at least suggests salvation in a future state. It is no doubt a possible view that this idea is suggested only in order to be contradicted: that the intended meaning is that the imprisonment must be perpetual because the debt can never be paid. This interpretation does no violence to either sense or grammar, but it is utterly unlike the style of Christ:—it makes the saying in question to be one of cruel sneering irony, almost as unlike to Christ's most passionate denunciations as to His tenderest mercy. Its obvious and I believe its real meaning is that salvation will be possible in the future life, but on harder terms than in the present.

Matthew v. 26.

Suggestion of future deliverance from prison.

The other passage is the parable, or rather apologue, of the rich man and Lazarus. It is impossible to believe that the conversation across the gulf between the rich man and Abraham can be intended as a representation of any unseen reality:—were this credible in itself, it would still be incredible that Christ would have made such a revelation in a speech addressed not to His disciples, but to the Pharisees. But what is significant is that the rich man, though suffering the eternal punishment due to those who have seen their fellow-men sick, hungry, and naked, and refused to minister to their wants, yet so far retains that natural affection out of which all the sympathetic virtues are developed, that he wishes to save his five brothers from sharing in his punishment: and conscience refuses to believe that moral restoration can be hopeless while this is left. I do not say that Christ has in these words made anything that can be called a revelation, but these, like all His sayings, are suggestive to those who can understand them.

Luke xvi. 19.

It ought also to be mentioned that the Authorized Version is altogether inaccurate in representing Christ as asserting that the mass of mankind are not to be finally saved.

Matthew vii. 13, 14.

Correctly translated, He declares that "wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be who *are going in* thereat: because strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be who *are finding* it." This has nothing to do with men's final doom, or their state through the "ages of ages," but it tells what the state of the men of Israel in the first century appeared to Him who knew what was in man. I fear it is true still, even in those nations which enjoy the most Christian culture: but if it has in any degree ceased to be true, Christ's words are not thereby discredited.

Christ makes no assertion as to the final destiny of the majority.

Indefiniteness of the word eternal.

It is a further fact which modifies all the foregoing considerations, that the word eternal is of indefinite meaning. Αἰώνιος, *eternal*, is derived from αἰών, *an age*. Αἰών means a long period, but not necessarily of endless length: on the contrary, it is in many places with perfect accuracy translated *world*. "The harvest is the end of the world."[1] And though the expression εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα means "for an indefinite time," and is usually translated "for ever," yet it does not imply absolutely endless time. St. Paul says that, rather than cause a brother to offend, he would abstain from eating flesh *for ever* (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα).[2] This cannot mean in a future life, and our translators have with perfect accuracy rendered it *while the world standeth*. Similarly ἀπ' αἰῶνος is correctly translated not "from all eternity," but "since the world began."[3] When absolutely endless time appears to be meant, the words used are *for ever and ever*—εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, literally *for the ages of ages*:—an expression which may be paraphrased "for periods which are to ages as ages are to years." This expression however is applied to future punishment in no part of the New Testament except the so-called Revelation of St. John, though it is applied in the Epistles to the Divine power and glory.

The indefiniteness of meaning that belongs to αἰών, an age, belongs in exactly the same way to its derivative αἰώνιος, eternal. Twice in the New Testament *eternal*

[1] Matthew xiii. 39. [2] 1 Corinthians viii. 13.
[3] Luke i. 70 and Acts iii. 21.

times are mentioned with the meaning not of time without beginning or end, but of the ages in which the created universe has its existence.[1] If it be not too late in the history of our language to coin such a word, the most appropriate translation of *αἰώνιος* is *agelong*.

Analogy in the use of the word Heaven.

Eternal is in the manner of its use an analogous word to *Heaven*. *Eternal*, in its primary meaning, is not equivalent to *everlasting*, but only to *agelong*; but without losing this, it has acquired a secondary and more exalted meaning in which it is applied to the Godhead. Heaven, in like manner, originally means the visible vault of the sky where the birds fly about. Thus Christ speaks of the birds of heaven.[2] But, without losing this, it has acquired the secondary and more exalted meaning of the spiritual and unseen world as opposed to the visible world.[3]

Eternal must mean the same applied to punishment as to life.

It may however be urged against the possibility of the word *eternal*, as applied to punishment, being understood in any other sense than *never-ending*, that Christ asserts punishment to be eternal in the same sense in which He asserts life to be eternal. This is true:— words have no meaning if this can be explained away.

Possibility that both punishment and life are to end in some higher glory.

But it is an admissible hypothesis that neither eternal punishment nor eternal life is absolutely endless: that each is a process, punishment being a process of destruction, and life of creation or evolution; and that both are to end and be merged in some higher and as yet unimaginable glory at "the times of the restitution of all things,"[4] when "all enemies shall be abolished."[5]

The Synoptic Gospels contain no promise of final restoration.

All the sayings of Christ yet quoted are from the Synoptic Gospels, and it is not denied that those Gospels contain no promise of a final general restoration: all we can say is that they do not contradict it. But the fourth

[1] Κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου, literally *according to the revelation of the mystery kept secret from eternal times:* Epistle to the Romans xvi. 25. Πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων, literally *before eternal times:* Second Epistle to Timothy i. 9. This latter is exactly equivalent to the expression of a modern English poet, "before the beginning of years."

[2] Matthew vi. 26, and several other places. The Authorized Version translates this expression, with perfect accuracy, by *the birds of the air*.

[3] See Note at end of chapter.

[4] Acts iii. 21.

[5] First Epistle to the Corinthians xv. 24, 26.

Gospel and the Epistles are very different, and we now go on to quote their testimony on the subject.

In the fourth Gospel there are none of the threatenings of future eternal punishment which are so remarkable in the others. This however has not only the inconclusiveness which generally belongs to negative evidence;—it may be accounted for by the obvious fact that St. John has omitted those parts of Christ's life and teaching which had been previously treated of sufficiently by the other Evangelists. But it contains one remarkable assertion of universal salvation. "I, if I be lifted up from the earth" [on the cross] said Christ, "will draw all men unto myself." This is as clear a statement of the universality of salvation as any in the other Gospels of the eternity of punishment. It is however to be admitted that, as there is no special emphasis on the word *eternal* in the "Parable of Judgment," so there is no special emphasis on the word *all* in the passage now under consideration.

Gospel of St. John xii. 32.

It is in the Epistles of St. Paul that we find the strongest and clearest assertions of the ultimate universality of salvation. But before proving this assertion by quoting passages, we must consider what may at first sight appear a serious difficulty, though not a conclusive objection. If the ultimate annihilation of evil, involving a final restoration and universal salvation, is a doctrine of Christianity, it must be a fundamental doctrine: and why therefore has it not been stated with more prominence by Christ, instead of leaving the unambiguous and emphatic declaration of it to St. Paul? I reply that if, as I have endeavoured to show,[1] universal justice and universal mercy are both of them equally characteristic of the Divine government, it is equally true that mercy must come after justice, and must be based on justice and be developed out of it. We therefore cannot think it strange if the eternal justice of God should have been earlier revealed than His eternal mercy:—or, in other words, that the unchangeableness and universality of the law of retribution should have been made known first, and after-

St. Paul asserts universal salvation the most clearly.

Why has Christ not stated it with more prominence?

Reply, that justice must be revealed before mercy.

[1] See Chapter 22 (Nature and Grace).

wards the unchangeableness and universality of the law of mercy. The law of justice was revealed in all its terrors by Christ: the law of mercy, involving a final restoration, was, so far as we know, first revealed in all its clearness and fulness after Christ's ascension through St. Paul.

Moreover, besides the general principle that the revelation of justice ought to come first, there is another special reason why the revelation of universal mercy was delayed. Christ's teaching was nearly all spoken before His death, and the thought of His death appears to have been habitually present with Him. The shadow of the Cross is discernible over nearly all His life and teaching. But this, though characteristic of Christ's teaching as a fact of history, is not characteristic of Christianity as a system of doctrine. The Cross has been endured and overcome, the stone has been rolled back, Christ has gone up where He was before and is seated at the right hand of God, and the Church lives not in the shadow of death but in the light of the Resurrection. Revelation itself has caught the tinge of this new gladness, and in the utterances of St. Paul it glows as it never did before with far-reaching and unquenchable hope.

Besides, the shadow of the Cross was over Christ's teaching; but it is now removed.

But Christ, I may be reminded, was more than man: and could His life be more darkened by the shadow of the Cross than was St. Paul's by what he described as a daily martyrdom?[1] I reply that it was because Christ was more than man—because of His superhuman power of sympathy—that the shadow of the Cross was so dark. The "sorrow even unto death" at Gethsemane was not an isolated incident in His life: it was the fulness of that grief which He had felt before when He wept over the city which would not be saved, and which haunted Him throughout His whole career when He was compelled to marvel at men's want of faith and hardness of heart. Had it been only for Himself that He feared the suffering and the shame of the Cross, He could have borne it as many of His own martyrs have since done. But the sorrow which crushed Him down was not for Himself. He was the Son of Man and the Judge of Man who had

Why Christ so felt it.

[1] See his First Epistle to the Corinthians xv. 31, and many other passages.

come in the flesh in order to condemn to death the sin of mankind and to destroy it: and before He could do this it was needful that He who alone was sinless should, in some mysterious way, feel and bear the weight of sin as no other has borne it, at least on this side of the grave.

We find that no sooner had the Apostles begun to declare the Gospel of Christ after His resurrection and ascension, than the doctrine of a final restoration became prominent in their teaching. St. Peter spoke of "Jesus Christ, whom the heavens must receive until the times of restoration of all things, whereof God hath spoken by the mouth of all His holy prophets since the world began."

St. Peter on a final restoration. Acts iii. 20, 21.

St. Paul on the same subject.

But it is St. Paul who speaks with most clearness on the subject; and we now go on to quote his words.

The first passage in chronological order, and perhaps the most striking of all, is in that wonderful prophecy which has become associated with all our thoughts of the Resurrection.

First Epistle to the Corinthians xv. 20–28.

"Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of all who sleep. For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection from the dead. For as in Adam all men die, so in Christ shall all be raised to life. But each in his own order: Christ the first-fruits: afterwards they who are Christ's at His appearing: finally the end shall come when He shall have given up the kingdom to God His Father, having destroyed all other dominion, authority, and power. For He must reign 'till He hath put all enemies under his feet.' 'And last of His enemies, death also shall be destroyed.' For 'He hath put all things under His feet.' But in that saying 'all things are put under Him,' it is manifest that God is excepted, who put all things under Him. And when all things are made subject to Him, then shall the Son also subject Himself to Him who made them subject, that God may be all in all."[2]

[1] Page 425.

[2] The translation is Conybeare's. This passage is greatly injured in the Authorized Version by translating καταργεῖν in one place by *put down* and in another place by *destroy*. *Abolish* would perhaps be better than either. Dean Stanley, in his edition of the Epistles to the Corinthians, translates it by *make to vanish away*.

It would be difficult for language to assert more clearly the universality of salvation. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be raised to life." "God shall be all in all." It must be remembered that in the language of the New Testament the future state of punishment is never called life: it is called condemnation, or punishment, or death, and is always opposed to life. "They who have done good shall arise to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment" [or condemnation]. The unmerciful "shall go into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life." "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life."

Gospel of St. John v. 29.

Matthew xxv. 46.

Romans vi. 23.

But how is universal salvation to be reconciled with the justice of God, which must condemn the unrighteous? This is answered in the next clause of St. Paul's account of the Resurrection. Christianity does not annul law but on the contrary establishes it:[1] moral distinctions are not to be abolished, and each shall remain in his own order: as those who have sowed the most shall reap the most, so those who have sowed first shall reap first. Christ has already risen, the first-fruits of the Resurrection, "the first-born from the dead, that in all things he might have the pre-eminence." Those who in the present life through faith in Christ have become His, shall attain to the resurrection to life at His promised appearing. Afterwards—it may be long ages after—the end shall be, when all the enemies of Christ shall be destroyed:—chief among them sin, and last of them the results of sin, which are collectively called death; and then, death being abolished, those who up to that time have been held in the bondage of corruption and in the prison of death shall also share in the resurrection to eternal life.

Colossians i. 18.

The eternal, or age-long, punishment of the wicked which Christ has denounced, will continue, or at least may possibly continue, until the final abolition of death. More than this is not implied in the words of Christ:—the word which we translate eternal does not mean more than this.

[1] Epistle to the Romans iii. 31.

Dean Stanley remarks on the passage from St. Paul now under discussion:—

Quotation from Dean Stanley.

"The especial object of introducing in this place the destruction of power and authority is for the sake of showing that Death, the king of the human race, will be destroyed in their destruction. The general notion is, that when all the sins and evils, for the restraint and punishment of which power and authority exist, shall have been pulled down, then all power and authority, even that of Christ Himself, shall end, and fear of "the Lord" shall be swallowed up in love of "the Father." [1]

The next passage to be quoted from St. Paul is from the Epistle to the Romans. I divide it into five short paragraphs, whereof each one contains a separate assertion of the universality of salvation.

Epistle to the Romans v. 12–21.

"This therefore is like the case when through one man [Adam] sin entered into the world, and by sin death: and so death spread to all mankind, because all committed sin. For before the Law was given [by Moses] there was sin in the world: but sin is not reckoned against the sinner when there is no law [forbidding it:] nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sin [not being the breach of law] did not resemble the sin of Adam. Now Adam is an image of Him that was to come. But far greater is the gift than was the transgression: for if, by the sin of the one man, [Adam,] death came upon the many, much more in the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, has the freeness of God's bounty overflowed into the many.

"Moreover the boon [of God] exceeds the fruit of Adam's sin: for the doom came, not of one offence, a sentence of condemnation: but the gift comes, out of many offences, a sentence of acquittal.

"For if the reign of death was established by the one man, [Adam,] through the sin of him alone: far more shall the reign of life be established in those who receive

[1] From the Notes to Dean Stanley's edition of the Epistles to the Corinthians.

the overflowing fulness of the free gift of righteousness, by the one man, Jesus Christ. Therefore, as the fruit of one offence reached to all men, and brought upon them condemnation, [the sentence of death:] so likewise the fruit of one acquittal shall reach to all, and shall bring justification, the source of life.

"For as, by the disobedience of the one, the many were made sinners: so by the obedience of the one, the many shall be made righteous.[1]

"And the law was added that sin might abound: but where sin abounded, the gift of grace has abounded beyond [the outbreak of sin:] that as sin has reigned in death, so grace might reign through righteousness unto life eternal, by the work of Jesus Christ our Lord."[2]

It would be difficult to assert in clearer language or with more emphatic reiteration that God's grace is co-extensive with man's need, and more abundant than man's sin.

The next passage to be quoted is from the same Epistle, but on a different subject: namely the future of that

[1] The note on this verse, by which Alford endeavours to escape the nference of the universality of salvation, deserves to be quoted.

"In order to make the comparison more strict, the *all* who have been made sinners are weakened to the indefinite *the many*, the *many* who be made righteous are enlarged to the indefinite *the many*. Thus shall a common term of quantity is found for both; the one extending to its largest numerical interpretation, the other restricted to its smallest."

That is to say, the same expression "the many" (*οἱ πολλοί*), when repeated in a short antithetical sentence, is to be understood in two different senses. If such a principle of interpretation were to be attempted in the construction of a binding agreement, it would give rise to a perfectly just charge of dishonesty. I have no doubt that Alford would have treated with the contempt it deserves, the notion that when Christ speaks of the eternal life of the merciful and the eternal punishment of the unmerciful, the word eternal can have two different meanings.

[2] The translation is Conybeare's. The only peculiarity which appears to call for remark is the translation in the 18th verse of *δικαίωμα* by *acquittal*. On this the translator has the following note:—

"We take *δικαίωμα* here in the same sense as in verse 16, because, first it is difficult to suppose the same word used in the very same passage in two such different meanings as *recte factum* and *decretum absolutorium*, which Wahl and most of the commentators suppose it to be; and, secondly, because otherwise it is necessary to take *ἑνός* differently in the two parallel phrases *δι' ἑνὸς δικαιώματος* and *δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος* (masculine in the one and neuter in the other), which is unnatural."

Israelite nation which St. Paul, like his Lord Jesus Christ, never ceased to love with the love of a patriot.

St. Paul on the future of Israel. Epistle to the Romans xi. 25–36.

"I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery, lest you should be wise in your own conceits, that blindness is fallen upon a part of Israel, until the full body of the Gentiles shall have come in. And so all Israel shall be saved, as it is written, 'Out of Zion shall come the Deliverer, and He shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. And this is my covenant with them,' 'when I shall take away their sins.' In respect of the glad tidings, [that it might be borne to the Gentiles,] they are God's enemies for your sakes: but in respect of God's choice, they are beloved for their fathers' sakes: for no change of purpose can annul God's gifts and call. And as in times past you were yourselves disobedient to God, but have now received mercy upon their disobedience: so in this present time they have been disobedient, that upon your obtaining mercy they likewise might obtain mercy. For God has shut up all together under disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all. O depth of the bounty, and the wisdom, and the knowledge of God: how unfathomable are His judgments, and how unsearchable his paths! yea, 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?' or 'Who hath first given unto God, that he should receive a recompense?' for from Him is the beginning, and by Him the life, and in Him the end, of all things. Unto Him be glory for ever. Amen."[1]

It is true that the Apostle is not here speaking of individuals but of the race. But he speaks of the destiny of the race in a way which would have been impossible if he had not believed that the salvation of the race would involve the salvation of the individuals composing it. If this is not so:—if the passage quoted is only a prediction of the happiness of a future generation of Israelites, without reference to the present generation:—the sayings "God has shut up all together under disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all," "and so all Israel shall be saved," become unmeaning; or if they have any meaning it is

[1] The translation is Conybeare's.

only this very forced and unnatural one, that God has shut up together under disobedience the whole of this generation of Israelites, that He might have mercy upon the whole of some future generation, whereof all shall be saved.

It will scarcely be urged as an objection to this view, that the passage under consideration speaks of Israel only, and not of the Gentiles. Whatever may still be the fancies of some of the Rabbinical Jews, no one who calls himself a Christian believes that Israel has any eternal blessings which are not equally shared with Gentiles.

The next passage we have to quote is from the Epistle to the Colossians.

"In [Christ] God was pleased that the whole fulness [of God] should dwell, and by Him to reconcile again all things to Him, having made peace by means of the blood of His cross,—through Him,—whether the things on the earth or the things in the heavens." [1] Epistle to the Colossians i. 19, 20.

It will be said here that the Apostle, while predicting the ultimate perfect reconciliation to God of all His creatures in heaven and in earth, makes no mention of those in hell. But this objection arises from a way of using the words which is different from that of the New Testament. The modern division of the universe into heaven, earth, and hell, is not to be found in the New Testament, nor is hell opposed to heaven as it has come to be in modern language. *Heaven and earth*, in the sense of *things spiritual and things visible*, is the expression generally used for the entire universe.[2] If we adhere to the usage of the words which has become customary, and understand "heaven and earth" to mean heaven and earth but not hell, we shall get no meaning whatever out of the passage: for if heaven means a world of sinless purity, what need has it of reconciliation? On this subject Alford quotes the sayings that "the heavens are not clean in God's sight," and "His angels He charged with folly:" [3]—statements which have no authority except

[1] The translation is from Alford's notes.

[2] See note at end of chapter. [3] Job xv. 15 and iv. 18.

The theology of Eliphaz.

that of Job's friend and "comforter" Eliphaz the Temanite, who was ultimately proved so totally in the wrong about earthly and human things, that his testimony respecting heavenly and angelic things is worth no more than that of any other Arab.

The only possible meaning of the passage under consideration is therefore that Christ, when He destroys all enemies, will reconcile to God all the dwellers in both the visible and the spiritual worlds:—not only sinful men but rebellious angels, if such beings really exist.

The same doctrine is taught in the following words from another of St. Paul's epistles:—

Epistle to the Ephesians i. 10.

"That in the dispensation of the fulness of times He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth." [1]

The word here translated "to gather together in one" (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*) occurs in only one other place in the New Testament, namely the following:—

Epistle to the Romans xiii. 9.

"For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is *briefly comprehended* in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

The victory of Christ over all evil is also clearly implied in the following words from the Epistle to the Philippians:—

Epistle to the Philippians iii. 20, 21.

"Our citizenship is in heaven: from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change the body of our humiliation, that it may be fashioned like unto the body of His glory, according to the working whereby He is able to subdue all things unto Himself."

What is meant by Christ subduing all things unto Him-

[1] For the force of the metaphor of *gathering together*, see Christ's words:—"Other sheep I have which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice: and there shall be one flock and one shepherd."—Gospel of St. John x. 16.

self? This expression, taken alone, might mean no more than crushing and punishing His enemies. But it is stated immediately before, that the energy (ἐνέργεια) whereby He is able to subdue all things, is the same whereby He will give us a spiritual and incorruptible body in exchange for the earthly and mortal bodies which we have now. The prophecy of this passage is therefore the same as that of the passage already quoted from the First Epistle to the Corinthians: namely, that the power which at Christ's coming will raise up to eternal life those who have become His, will not end there, but will gain the same kind of victory over all enemies, subduing all to His will by making their wills conform to His.

Our next quotation is from one of the great Apostle's latest writings:—

"We both labour and suffer reproach because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of those who believe." First Epistle to Timothy iv. 10.

It is not easy to understand why St. Paul should have written this if he had meant that God saves those who believe and condemns those who do not believe. The doctrine of this passage is the same as that of the previously quoted passage on the Resurrection in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. All are to be saved, but those shall be saved first whose hearts have been purified in the present life by faith in Christ, so that they shall be Christ's at His coming.

We have next to quote, from what is probably the latest of all the Apostle's writings which have been preserved,[1] the very same expression about *the abolition of death* wherewith our chain of quotations began:—

"Be thou partaker of the afflictions of the Gospel according to the power of God, who hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began, but is now Second Epistle to Timothy i. 8, 9.

[1] Conybeare and Howson place the Second Epistle to Timothy at the end, as being the latest written.

made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel."

The *abolition of death* is the same expression which is used in the description of the Resurrection in the First Epistle to the Corinthians: though this is obscured to the English reader by the word καταργεῖν being translated by *destroy* in one place and *abolish* in the other.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches on this subject the same doctrine as St. Paul, and almost in the same words:—

Epistle to the Hebrews ii. 14, 15.

"Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, [Christ] also Himself likewise took part of the same, that through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage."

This is exactly the same that St. Paul teaches in the account of the Resurrection in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. To say that Christ will destroy him who has the power of death, namely the devil, is equivalent to saying that Christ will destroy all enemies, and death among them. It is worthy of remark that the word translated *destroy* is the same in both passages, namely καταργεῖν, which does not mean to ruin, but to abolish, annul, or deprive of power.

Finally, we have to quote those two remarkable expressions of St. Peter's, which, though we cannot infer from them what was the Apostle's belief respecting the future destiny of mankind, prove at least that he did not believe in the impossibility of Divine mercy reaching man in a future life:—

1 Peter iii. 18, 20.

"Christ also suffered for sins once, a just person on behalf of unjust persons, that He might bring us near to God: put to death indeed in the flesh but made alive again in the spirit: in which he also went and preached to the spirits in prison, which were once disobedient, when the long-suffering of God was waiting in the days of Noah while the ark was being prepared."

"—— who shall render account to Him who is ready to judge living and dead. For to this end to dead men also was the Gospel preached, that they might indeed be judged according to men as regards the flesh, but might live on according to God as regards the spirit."[1] 1 Peter iv. 5, 6.

We thus see that the revelation made to us by Christ and His Apostles agrees with the instinctive hopes of the enlightened reason and conscience in affirming that God will yet extinguish all sin and suffering. But if this appears to be revealed in the New Testament, the question naturally arises why the Christian Church, Eastern and Western, Romanist and Reformed, has so generally believed the contrary, namely that there is a future state of suffering which is absolutely hopeless:—suffering which neither destroys nor is destroyed, which is to end neither by the healing of the disease nor by the extinction of the sufferer's existence? Is not the mere fact that so fearful a belief has held its ground, not only among the ignorant but among students of the Holy Scriptures, sufficient proof that it must be the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures?

Why has not the doctrine of a final restoration been generally believed?

To many this will appear conclusive, yet it is no proof, only a presumption which has no weight whatever against real proof on the other side. I do not disregard the authority of the Church, which is the authority of Christian tradition.[2] But there are some things which no weight of authority could conceivably prove, and among others it could not conceivably prove that words do not mean what according to the laws of logic and language they must mean. It is not so much insufficient as irrelevant to quote authority in order to prove that when St. Paul declares that all enemies shall be abolished and God shall be all in all, he means that sin and suffering shall be perpetuated, and the enemy of God shall have never-ending dominion over the greater part, or any part, of the human race.

Tradition affords only a presumption.

[1] The translations are from Alford's notes.

[2] See Preface, and also Note to Chapter 11.

The question however is worth asking, why the doctrine of St. Paul on this subject has till now remained literally unseen by the vast majority of those who have read his works with reverential attention: and if the answer is unsatisfactory, this is not because it is insufficient or doubtful, but because it appears superficial and commonplace. The men who have formed and guided religious opinion have been unwilling to see the meaning of St. Paul's words, because they have feared to relax the efficacy of law by teaching or sanctioning any doctrine which appears to mitigate the terrors of the judgment to come: and men are in general certain not to see what they do not wish or expect to see. We know the bitter and true epigram on the Bible—

Men do not see what they do not wish to see.

> "This is the book where each his doctrine seeks;
> And this the book where each his doctrine finds."

But why have the mass of men, as distinguished from the leaders of ecclesiastical opinion, not seen the fact for themselves so soon as they have got the New Testament into their hands? The reply to this is that the vast majority of men, though perfectly well able to learn from the living teacher, are utterly unable to learn from books. The book is nothing but an instrument in the teacher's hands, and says whatever he pleases to make it say. Were any proof of this needed, it would be afforded by Scotch Sabbatarianism. We have in that case seen an entire nation taught to read, and taught to make a merit of being familiar with the words of Holy Scripture: and we have seen them believe the assertion of their teachers that the Mosaic distinction of days is retained under Christianity, notwithstanding that the New Testament declares it to be abolished in language whereof nothing could add to the distinctness.[1] It is not that their teachers are

Men's dependence on their teachers.

Sabbatarianism.

[1] See especially the following passages:—Galatians iv. 10, 11: Romans xiv. 5, 6: Colossians ii. 16, 17. And, what is as much to the purpose as any direct assertion, the New Testament contains no command to observe the Sabbath, and no denunciation of the imaginary sin of "Sabbath-breaking." In such a case, negative evidence is equivalent to positive evidence.

insincere. They honestly believe that a Pharisaic Sabbath is morally and spiritually beneficial. In this case, as in the case of St. Paul's teaching of a final restoration, they fear to see the real meaning of the New Testament, and consequently do not see it.

The doctrine of everlasting torment is not part of the Catholic faith.

The fact, however, is significant, that though the doctrine of a final restoration has from the time of the Apostles till now been maintained by few except isolated thinkers like Origen, or Erigena, or Jeremy Taylor, who moreover have generally been suspected of heresy, yet the opposite doctrine of everlasting torment has not become an article of Catholic faith. It is no doubt a dogma of the Calvinistic churches, but the notion that Calvinism is Christian orthodoxy is almost as far from historical truth as the notion that the Pope's infallibility is a doctrine of the Primitive Church. If we can anywhere in history discern that men have been restrained and guided by a higher wisdom than their own, it is in the Primitive Church being prevented from making the dogma of everlasting torment an article of faith.

Divine guidance shown in this.

But to return to the question why men have believed such a doctrine. The resemblance between the belief in the permanent obligation of the Sabbath and the belief in never-ending sin and suffering fails in this most material point, that respecting the former there is neither logical nor moral difficulty: the only objection to it is that, as a matter of fact, the New Testament declares the Sabbath to be abolished:—had the same authority declared the Sabbath to be retained, there would have been neither logical nor moral difficulty about it, and it would have been our duty to obey. But respecting the doctrine of never-ending torment it is far otherwise. Reason and conscience alike revolt against it: and to a future age it will be one of the most inexplicable enigmas of history, that men under such a burthen could ever be unfeignedly thankful and serenely happy, and speak without conscious hypocrisy of the blessing of life and the goodness of God, and not rather think in their secret hearts that God was an enemy and life a curse.

Difficulty of understanding why this belief does not destroy thankfulness and happiness.

Yet, however perplexing it may be to explain, the fact is unquestionable that men have retained and do retain a spirit of serene, thankful, and happy trust in God under this burthen. The obvious explanation of the fact is that it is due partly to stupidity and partly to selfishness:—stupidity in not realizing in the imagination what has been assented to by the understanding: and selfishness in not caring for a doom from which each individual hopes to escape. This explanation is no doubt true in a great degree, but it is not the entire truth; it does not state all the causes of the fact. The causes already mentioned are discreditable to human nature, but there is another which is honourable at once to human nature and to Christianity. Christianity is eminently the religion of purity:—purity is as characteristic of Christianity as mercy:—and the tendency of purity is to produce serenity and happiness. This is a fact of experience, having its ground not in logic but in physiology.

This is partly due to stupidity and selfishness,

but partly to the purity that Christianity teaches.

Moreover, the imagination is protected against this doctrine by its very horribleness. The thought of pain of endless duration and unimaginable intensity so baffles the imagination that it fails to make the impression on the mind which is legitimately due to it: and thus it is capable of being assented to by the understanding as an article of belief, while it does not influence the imagination, and consequently does not injure the soul:—as drops of water glide silently off iron at a white heat, which at a dull red heat would hiss and splutter.

The horror of the doctrine protects the imagination against it.

Both the imagination and the conscience of the present generation are however excited on the subject in a greater degree than ever has been before: and they can no more be charmed back into their old quiescence than the man can become a child. When we not only see but feel what it means to assert that for every soul who is born into the world there is a possibility of never-ending torment, we perceive that if this is Christian it is the characteristic doctrine of Christianity, and if this is true it is the fundamental fact of life. When this is not only assented to by the understanding but realized in imagination,

serenity, happiness, and thankfulness become impossible: it appears better that we had not been born, and that the world had not been created.

The reply to this will probably be, that though the inference may be logically irresistible yet in fact no one draws it. If this were true, it would only prove men's weakness of imagination. But it is not true: I speak of what I know. This however is a subject whereon evidence is scarcely attainable: for those whose imaginations are poisoned and whose lives are blighted by their belief in this doctrine are the least likely to make their thoughts known. We shall never know how many have suffered life-long unhappiness from this doctrine, and how many it has repelled from God, until the day when the sea of oblivion gives up the dead memories that are in it. It is moreover impossible that any one who has the spirit of Christ can really acquiesce contentedly in such a doctrine, however he may endeavour to do so. This may be shown by a test which may almost be called experimental. If the Christian who has the most confident hope of everlasting blessedness were to receive permission by renouncing his blessedness to save a fellow being from everlasting misery, and let both be annihilated together, would he accept the offer? If he would not, we may safely conclude that he has not the spirit of Christ.

We cannot have evidence of its actual effects.

No one who has the spirit of Christ can really acquiesce contentedly in it.

Besides, paradoxical as it may seem, there appears to be reason for believing that the doctrine in question has lowered men's sense of the hatefulness of sin. Their attention has been so fixed on the danger of sin that they have lost sight of its disgracefulness. This is the tendency of the most prominent religious teaching among us, and though I have no special knowledge of the subject, I have little doubt that the wisest ministers of religion will confirm from their own experience the statement that an adequate sense of the disgracefulness of sin is scarcely to be found.

But to my mind a yet more conclusive proof that the doctrine in question cannot be of God, is that its legitimate effect is to strengthen the worst tendencies of human

Its legitimate effect is to strengthen

what is worst in human nature.

nature, the tendencies to selfishness and cruelty. The hope of a salvation wherefrom the mass of their fellow-men are to be excluded must tend to make men selfish, and the thought of everlasting torment inflicted by the God in whose Name all holiness is gathered up must tend to make them cruel. It will be said that facts contradict this, and that as a matter of fact the belief in everlasting torment does co-exist with unselfishness and mercy. No doubt: but it will not be maintained that the unselfishness and the mercy have been produced by that belief: on the contrary, if they belong to *the righteousness which is by faith* they have been produced by those parts of the Christian faith whereto the doctrine we are now discussing is most alien: by the belief in the mercy of God and the self-sacrificing, reconciling love of Christ.

Merely historical or statistical evidence on ethical questions can never be of first-rate importance.[1] Nevertheless history may be reasonably expected to show a connexion between men's theory and their practice, and in this particular case the connexion can be shown with tolerable distinctness. Christianity is eminently the religion of mercy: and in one respect this has been most clearly shown in Christian history. Mercy, in the sense of kindness to the poor and the helpless, is characteristic not only of the theory of Christianity but of the habitual practice of Christian society: this has been so conspicuously true ever since Christianity became a force in the world, as to constitute one of the most remarkable contrasts between heathen antiquity and Christendom: and there is not the smallest doubt that this co-existence of Christian practice with Christian profession is a case not of mere coincidence but of causation. But Christendom has for the most part attached far too exclusive an importance to this one manifestation of the virtue of mercy, as is unconsciously shown by the curious way in which the meaning of the word *charity*, which properly means the highest and purest love, has in the habitual language of Christian nations become contracted to the

[1] See page 258.

sense of mere almsgiving.[1] But while Christendom from the first thus cultivated the virtue of almsgiving and liberality, another equally important manifestation of the Christian grace of mercy was neglected for more than fifteen hundred years. Mercy as opposed to cruelty was not, as a matter of historical fact, at all distinctive of Christian nations until after the commencement of those philosophical and political movements of modern times which have been generally anathematized by those who profess to speak in the name of Christian churches. The atrocious cruelty of the punishments which were inflicted by law and sanctioned by opinion in the Roman Empire was a disgrace to mankind: the introduction of Christianity made no substantial change,[2] nor did the Reformation: and on the Continent of Europe at least (for it was otherwise in England) the abolition of torture in the administration of justice, and of aggravated cruelty in the infliction of death, was not the work of those who professed to act in the name of Christ, but belonged to that intellectual movement whereof Voltaire was a prophet and Rousseau an apostle.

The indifference to cruelty which Christendom inherited from heathenism was cured by unbelieving philosophy.

Now, what is the reason of this strange and sad anomaly? Why has Christianity in so important a case as this shown itself false to its own principles? Why has Christianity left to an unbelieving philosophy the glory of applying Christian principles in action, and of effecting changes in opinion and law which constitute, perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most incontestable, moral advance which the nations of the European Continent have made since the close of the Reformation? If it is said that this change is due to the indirect, unavowed, and unconscious influence of Christianity, I reply that this may be true—I believe

[1] On the other hand, its use in the sense of mere toleration is quite as great a perversion from its true meaning. The almsgiving which is regarded as having some virtue apart from any motive in love, and the toleration which is based not on love but on indifference, are equally remote from the charity of Christ.

[2] It is true that Constantine forbade the punishment of the cross, but this was rather from a religious feeling than from humanity.

it is true—but it is irrelevant: it does not answer the question why those who professed to act in the name of Christ permitted this glory, which ought to have been theirs, to be appropriated by an unbelieving philosophy?

Connexion of this reform with disbelief in everlasting torment.

It is an obvious answer, and I believe the true answer, to this question, that the moral change whereof we are speaking stands in the closest connexion with the growing disbelief in the doctrine of everlasting torment, to which the Churches adhered while it was rejected or ignored by philosophy. It is difficult to understand how any one who really believes in that doctrine can abhor the sin of cruelty as it deserves to be abhorred. There is profound consistency in the form in which it is said the victims of the Inquisition were sentenced to death:—"that through temporal fire they may pass into eternal fire."

Practical importance of the question of future punishment.

I am convinced that this, more than any other, is the question of life or death for Christianity. New dogmas are not now to be thought of outside the Church of Rome, and the ultimate extinction of sin and suffering will certainly not be made a dogma. But if this belief is not to be tolerated—if the Christianity of the Reformed Churches is to be tied down to the Calvinistic dogmas that all enemies are not to be destroyed, and that Christ has no message to proclaim to the spirits in prison—then Christianity has no future before it. It has borne the load of these doctrines till now, though suffering grievously from the strain: but it can bear them no longer. If this question is not at least left open by the Reformed Churches, a revolt against Christianity will come not from what is worst but from what is best in human nature, and it will be rejected by the moral sense of mankind. With the Christianity of the New Testament all belief in a personal God and in immortality will disappear: and men will be left to find or make the best basis for moral life that they can, in Pantheistic philosophy and in either Stoical or Utilitarian ethics.

It is strangely inconsistent for any one who calls himself a disciple of Christ to object to the doctrine of a final

restoration as being "latitudinarian," or as implying a low conception of sin and holiness. The Pharisees of old seem to have altogether disbelieved in the possibility of repentance and forgiveness: and when Christ offered forgiveness and called men to repentance, they consistently regarded Him as a subverter of moral distinctions. But their position was practically tenable only by men who had a low conception of holiness:—when men's conception of holiness is raised so as to convict them all as sinners, they instinctively seek forgiveness:—and Christ shows the Divineness of His character and of His system most of all in this, that they combine the deepest abhorrence of sin with the deepest pity for the sinner. But if we believe in the forgiveness of sins at all, how is it more "latitudinarian," or how does it show a lower sense of sin and holiness, to believe in it as the universal law of God's moral government, than merely to recognize it as a partial fact of this present life?

Absurdity of thinking that the doctine of a final restoration is opposed to a high standard of holiness.

Further: all who believe in Christ's Atonement are agreed that it shows, in their strongest colours, at once the beauty of holiness and the hatefulness of sin: and are these less clearly shown if the Atonement is to be universal in its effects than if it is only partial? Does holiness appear less lovely if its triumph is to be perfect? and does sin appear less hateful if God will not tolerate its existence for ever?

As stated before, the chief reason that men who believe in Christ reject the doctrine of a general restoration is the fear that any relaxation of the terrors of the law would be a relaxation of moral sanctions: and it has been said by a writer whose great knowledge of men ought to have made such a remark impossible from him, that the growing revolt against the dogma of everlasting torment proceeds from men who are personally conscious of wickedness and do not wish to believe in its consequences. It is needless to dwell on the absurdity of supposing that such feelings are necessarily selfish—that no one can fear torment except for himself. The writer I speak of has, I am certain, far too much of the spirit of Christ for this one hasty contro-

Fear that it tends to relax the force of moral law.

Injustice of thinking that the revolt against the dogma of everlasting torment is selfish.

The deterrent power of punishment depends not on severity but certainty.

versial saying to be a fair specimen of his mind. But it is equally absurd to speak as if a punishment must be infinite if it is to be dreaded. No truth in political ethics is better established than this, that the deterrent effect of punishment scarcely depends at all on its severity, but almost exclusively on its certainty. Whether the purpose of a religion is to deter as efficiently as possible from sinful actions, or to make the highest holiness attainable, the doctrine whereby the end in view can best be attained is not that which is taught by Calvinism, of an infinite punishment which may be easily escaped: but the doctrine of St. Paul, that we shall be rewarded and punished according to, and in proportion to, the good and evil that we have done. "He that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption, and he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap eternal life." "He that soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly, and he that soweth bountifully shall also reap bountifully." And if men are to be deterred from sinful actions, they ought especially to be taught what nature teaches and the words of revelation now quoted confirm, that although repentance cancels sin and ensures reconciliation with God, yet it does not obliterate the injury which the sin has done to the sinner's own nature. This will last for an indefinite time, and perhaps for ever. In other words, nothing can prevent retribution from being universal and eternal: and though repentance obtains forgiveness for the sin, it does not earn back the reward which has been forfeited. If any man's work does not stand the test of that fire whereby Christ will burn up the chaff, though he may himself be saved through the flames yet he shall suffer eternal loss.[1]

Galatians vi. 8.

2 Corinthians ix. 6.

Testimony of conscience.

This is perhaps contrary to the general belief of at least Protestant Christendom, but, what is of far more importance, it is confirmed by the conscience of man. No man who really repents of a sin can at the same time really believe that his repentance makes the sin as though it had not been. So to believe would be self-contradiction:

[1] See the First Epistle to the Corinthians iii. 12—15.

for he who repents feels sorrow for the sin (though this is not a complete definition of repentance:) but if he believed that the sin was undone and made as though it had not been, there would be no room in his mind for sorrow.

But how is retribution compatible with forgiveness and restoration? how is justice compatible with mercy?

I reply, that the enlightened reason and conscience affirm both. They affirm that if there is a moral and spiritual cosmos, its law must be retribution: if there is a personal God, they affirm that He must be ready to forgive and to be reconciled on repentance, and must desire to draw men to Himself that they may repent and be reconciled. Viewed separately, each of these truths appears self-evidently certain: and it is worth observing that whatever discordance and contradiction may appear to be between them is in no way similar to the discordance between the results of sight and of faith, because these two truths are both witnessed to by the same spiritual faculty, the moral reason. We ought to believe both: and if we do not know how to harmonize them, we ought not to deny or explain away one in order to make room for the other, but to trust that they do not really contradict each other, and that in a future life, if not in this, we may hope to see and comprehend their perfect consistency. This ought to be no insurmountable trial of faith. It is surely easier to believe this, than to believe that *God is love* and yet prepares everlasting torment for His creatures.

Justice and mercy are both affirmed by conscience, and must both be true,

whether we can harmonize them or not.

I maintain however that we may see it now. The two truths of justice or retribution on the one hand, and mercy, forgiveness, and restoration on the other, are united in the truth which Christ has taught so impressively in the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard,[1] that He to whom all judgment is committed will accept us neither according to the works we have done nor according to the creed we have believed, but according to what we are. In this truth is gathered up all that is true in the doctrines both of Justification by Works and Justification by Faith: for both our actions and our belief help

Attempt to harmonize them.

We shall be accepted not according to what we have done or believed, but according to what we are.

[1] Matthew xx. 1.

to make us what we are: and good works which neither proceed from a right character nor tend to form it, are, in Apostolic language, as emphatically *dead* as a true faith which does not influence the life.[1] From the truth that our Judge will accept us according to what we are, or in other words from the law of Divine justice, follow the two connected principles of retribution and forgiveness: for to accept a sinner according to what he is means to punish, and to accept a repentant sinner according to what he is means to forgive. But further:—because God is not only just as the administrator of a just law, but is also a righteous Person, He desires to make His creatures righteous, and has therefore provided in Christ an Atonement, or means of reconciliation, whereby we may acquire a nature that will enable us to come to Him. On this subject we need not repeat what has been said in the Chapter on the Distinctive Doctrines of Christianity.[2]

From this follow retribution and forgiveness.

Atonement.

We thus see that justice and mercy, punishment and forgiveness, Law and Gospel, have their root and ground together alike in the Righteousness of God: and if this is true there ought to be no difficulty in believing that they are perfectly compatible and consistent with each other, and may co-operate to one common purpose, namely to the *destruction of all enemies*, whereof sin is the chief, *that God may be all in all*.[3] Anger need not destroy love, and mercy may demand punishment. "Forgiveness in its deepest sense does not mean deliverance from a penalty or the reversal of a sentence: it means the continuance of a fatherly purpose of final good, *even through the infliction of the penalty and the execution of the sentence*."[4] I do not mean that every one who has ever sinned will be in a

Quotation from Erskine.

[1] For the expression *dead works*, see the Epistle to the Hebrews ix. 14. For *dead faith*, see the Epistle of James ii. 17, 20, with the remarks on it in the Note to Chapter 12.

[2] Chapter 26. [3] First Epistle to the Corinthians xv. 24—28.

[4] Thomas Erskine, quoted on page 328. It is to be observed that Erskine's sense of the word forgiveness is somewhat different from mine. With him it is the fatherly purpose of final good. With me it is the withdrawal of anger, which (speaking under the forms of time, which are the condition of our thoughts though not of God's) takes place on repentance, when the attainment of that fatherly purpose is begun.

state of suffering until the final consummation of all things. Christ promises an immediate entrance into bliss to those who depart from this life in a state of reconciliation with God. But there are degrees in blessedness, and the promises and threatenings of Christ and His Apostles agree with nature and conscience in affirming that during the ages, perhaps immeasurably long, which are to elapse before the consummation of all things and the destruction of all enemies, those who are as yet unforgiven and unreconciled will be lower in their misery, and those who are forgiven and reconciled will be lower in their happiness, for every sinful deed that either has ever committed: so that the law of retribution will not cease to be in force, even for those who are reconciled. And here we may remark that hope and fear are words without meaning if such a doctrine of future punishment as this is not enough to deter from sin.

Permanence of the consequences of sin.

It is needless to form any conclusion on the question whether this will be continued, not indeed positively as pain, but negatively as diminution of happiness, into the "new heavens and new earth" which are to be after sin, death, and all other enemies have been abolished.

Further questions.

Further:—are there any who will not share in the final blessedness, for whom the only salvation from sin and suffering will be the extinction of consciousness and the annihilation of being? I have already stated my belief that nature and conscience make this probable, and that Christ's words confirm it.[1] But when I find such a writer as Thomas Erskine expressing his hope that even Judas may yet be restored to the place from which he fell,[2] I admit that in believing in the final exclusion of any from salvation I may be in error from deficiency of faith in God.

Summary.

What Christendom has been generally taught is that there shall be justice for some and mercy for others. What I believe is that there shall be justice for all and mercy for

[1] Page 321.

[2] See "The Spiritual Order and other Papers," page 252.

all :—first universal justice and afterwards universal mercy. Such a belief as this—a belief in both justice and mercy, and in the universality of both—is more favourable than any other to the only legitimate end and aim of all religion, namely the attainment of holiness.

NOTE.

MEANING OF THE WORD HEAVEN IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Heaven in the Epistles means the spiritual world as opposed to the visible.

The word heaven in the New Testament sometimes means the immediate dwelling-place of God, as in the invocation "Our Father who art in heaven." But also, especially in the Epistles, it means the spiritual world as opposed to the visible: and when used in this sense it does not connote the idea of perfect purity and bliss. See especially the following passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, though almost certainly not by St. Paul, is certainly by a contemporary and probably by a friend of his, and may safely be quoted on the Apostolic use of words :—

Epistle to the Hebrews xii. 26, 27.

"Whose voice then [at Sinai] shook the earth : but now He hath promised saying, Yet once more only will I shake not the earth alone but also heaven. And this 'yet once more only' signifieth the removal of those things that are shaken, as being perishable, that the things unshaken may remain unmoveable."[1]

See also the following passage from the same Epistle, where the Apostolic author is speaking of the animal sacrifices of Judaism :—

Same, ix. 23.

"It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these."

In both of these passages, *heavenly* is obviously a synonym for *spiritual :* and it is also obvious that *the heavens* cannot here mean any place or state of perfect purity and bliss, because in such a world there would be no need of purification.[2]

[1] The translation is Conybeare's.

[2] See page 447.

St. Paul uses the words in the same sense, as in the following passage:—"By Him were all things created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and invisible." "Visible and invisible" appears to be here synonymous with "in heaven and on earth." But the use of the word *heaven* and its derivatives whereof we are now speaking is most remarkable in the following passage:— Epistle to the Colossians i. 16.

"Our wrestling is not against blood and flesh, but against the governments, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this [state of] darkness, against the spiritual armies of wickedness in the heavenly places."[1] Epistle to the Ephesians vi. 12.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter,[2] the writers of the New Testament do not, like the moderns, divide the universe into heaven, earth, and hell. In one passage a threefold division is made, but the third place is not hell in the sense of eternal fire; it is hades, the abode of the dead. "That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, and those in earth, and those under the earth" (*καταχθονίων*). This passage may be thus paraphrased:—"That Jesus might be Lord both of heaven and earth, and of both the dead and the living." Compare the expression "For this cause Christ lived and died and rose to life again, that He might be the Lord both of the dead and of the living." Epistle to the Philippians ii. 10. Epistle to the Romans xiv. 9.

[1] The translation is Alford's. [2] Page 447.

CONCLUSION.

IT will probably be said that I have after all failed to prove my case: that I have not placed faith on a scientific basis. If it is meant that I have not shown any way of making faith scientific, this is true: faith cannot be scientific;—were it so it would cease to be faith. In all faith there is a personal element,[1] and there is something in personality that transcends logic. It is thus essential to the nature of faith that it should rest on proof which is not demonstrative but moral, and rather allied to intuition than to anything that can be reduced to scientific form.

In what sense I assert a scientific basis of faith.

But I have aimed at much less than this. To recur to an analogy already mentioned, though it is and will ever remain impossible to explain the laws of life as resultants from the properties of matter, yet it is possible to show how the properties of matter constitute a basis and a preparation for life:—and I have endeavoured to show that, in a similar sense, the world of nature and mind as made known by science constitutes a basis and a preparation for that highest moral and spiritual life of man which is evoked by the self-revelation of God: though they do not contain data wherefrom God and immortality can be proved without such revelation.

Relation of Life to Matter,

But when I express my opinion, as I have done several times throughout this work, that the laws and properties of life are not resultants from those of matter, and that life

[1] See the Chapter on the Possibility of Faith (Chapter 7).

must have been at the beginning a distinct and special result of creative power, I do not wish to be misunderstood as if I thought that this doctrine formed any necessary part of the scientific bases of faith. Such questions belong altogether to science, and not to metaphysical but to inductive science. They have not ceased to be open questions, and I do not by any means deny the possibility of Dr. Bastian or some other experimentalist showing it as a highly probable conclusion of inductive science, that life was not a distinct creation at some inconceivably remote time, but is every day in process of evolution out of dead matter:—or, in other words, that as amorphous matter under favouring conditions spontaneously becomes crystalline, so dead matter under favouring conditions spontaneously becomes alive without any need of previously vitalized germs. If this proves to be true, it will profoundly change our conceptions of the nature and the powers of matter:—it will compel us to believe that life is not superinduced on matter, but is the result of properties which are latent in matter—at least in some chemical substances—until favouring circumstances call them into action. But this will leave the "proof of Deity from Intelligence"[1] altogether untouched: and respecting Intelligence as a fact of nature the only change in our statements will be, that where we have declared Intelligence to be co-extensive with Life but clearly manifested only in the higher organisms, we must in future add that Intelligence is potentially an attribute of Matter, though it becomes actual only in Life.

and of Intelligence to both.

There is another possible misconception of my meaning which must be anticipated. It may be said that there is throughout this work a confusion between the scientific and the moral elements in thought, which has been especially betrayed in arguing in favour of the truth of doctrines because it is good for our moral nature to believe them.

I reply to this, that, whatever may be thought of the argument, it does not rest upon any confusion, but on the

Connexion between the truth

[1] See Chapter 14.

of a doctrine and its moral tendency.

deliberate belief that the moral tendency of any doctrine concerning the things of the spiritual world does constitute a valid reason for believing or disbelieving it. If there is a moral cosmos at all, it appears impossible that it should be otherwise:—if there is any moral cosmos, it appears axiomatic that there must be a connexion between believing truly and acting rightly. It is worth remarking that such a connexion is practically acknowledged by some who draw from it the reverse of what I think the true conclusion, and maintain the fantastic paradox that it is better for men to believe that they die and are extinguished for ever. Were there no such connexion between intellectual truth and moral goodness, it is difficult to see how the disinterested desire to obtain truth could be morally admirable. And *à fortiori*, if the laws of the universe have been appointed by a personal God whose nature is Wisdom and Holiness, it is impossible to doubt the connexion between the truth of a doctrine and its tendency to confer moral benefit on those who believe it.

Misapplication of this to be guarded against.

But this is a kind of argument which is easily misapplied: and its misapplications have probably produced a prejudice against the argument itself. There is, however, a criterion whereby to distinguish between its legitimate use and its misapplications. The argument in favour of the truth of a doctrine from its moral value is legitimate if the question of its moral value is directly referred to the simple tendencies of the mind: otherwise it is worthless. Thus, there is a presumption—only a presumption, it is true, till it is otherwise verified, but still a strong presumption—in favour of immortality being true, because the belief in immortality has a legitimate tendency to ennoble the character:—to make us better citizens of the universe and better children of God. But it is absurd to argue that the Pope must be infallible, because the Church needs an infallible head: or that the Holy Scriptures must be exempt from error, because it would be dangerous to the Christian faith to admit that it could be otherwise: or that the command to observe the Sabbath

must be still in force, because a weekly day of rest is a beneficial institution (though this last-mentioned reason is true).

Application of the principle to prayer.

The connexion between the truth of a doctrine and its moral tendency is a principle which is eminently applicable to the question of the efficacy, or, as I prefer to say, the possibility, of prayer. It is good for our nature to believe that *God is love*:—to be able to look up into "space and hollow sky," and to believe that, with all our weakness, our sorrows, and our sins, we are still the objects of an infinite sympathy. If we believe in God's sympathy, it is only natural to look to Him for help: and if any one who believes in this has learned from a science which is falsely so called that the moral as well as the physical world is so bound in iron chains of necessary causation that prayer is useless, it will still be natural for such a man consciously, and perhaps in language, to express to his God his sorrows, his perplexities, and his temptations, in the same spirit wherein he might ask sympathy of a human friend who already knew them all and could do nothing to relieve them. Morally, this would have much of the nature of prayer. But prayer is not condemned to such impotence as this. It is a fact of experience that prayer is able to calm the mind, to lighten perplexity and sorrow, and to give strength against temptation. Nor is there any metaphysical difficulty in understanding how this can be. If, as I have maintained, the will has true freedom and self-determination,[1] we are free to pray and God is free to answer our prayers. If on the contrary the freedom of the will is an illusion, it may be plausibly and perhaps truly argued that our prayers and the answers to them are alike instances of the law of necessary cause and effect acting in the spiritual world.

It may be said in reply to this, that the fact of prayer having such effects, so far from proving that God hears and answers prayer, does not even prove the existence of a God, but may be accounted for on purely natural prin-

[1] See Chapter 4.

ciples. It may be said that so far from prayer needing a God to answer it, it answers itself in the natural course of things:—that calmness, serenity, and strength are by the laws of the mind a natural and necessary result of the prayer for them, united with the confident expectation that it will be granted. On its own postulates I do not see that this admits of any reply: and I consequently admit that the willingness of God to answer prayer does not admit of scientific proof. But let us consider what is involved in the attempt to explain the efficacy of prayer by purely natural principles. If such an explanation is believed, prayer becomes impossible: for prayer, by its definition, is a call for sympathy and help to a Being in whom we trust that He is able and willing to answer it, and it will become impossible if we believe that the answer is nothing more than its own echo, and independent of any action of Him to whom the prayer is made. On this hypothesis, prayer is an illusion, though a beneficial illusion, practised by the soul upon itself, and it is better not to be undeceived. This is to me incredible. I believe that prayer not only answers itself but is heard and answered by God, because we perceive that such a belief naturally and necessarily, under the laws of mind, must tend to holiness, and I cannot think it possible that such a belief is founded in illusion.

Further, if we believe in a God who cares for us, there is nothing irrational in believing in a providential Divine guidance in our own individual lives, and in the history of nations and of mankind: though the evidence of such guidance can never be so formulized under the law of probabilities as to become scientific.

The supernatural is a reality of the universe,

It may be said that I have not overcome "that last infirmity of the intellect, the love of the supernatural." I reply that though we may exclude the supernatural from our thoughts, it remains a reality. "The laws of nature cannot account for their own origin:" if nature had an origin at all and was not from eternity, its origin must have been supernatural: and science has now made it

certain that nature must have had an origin and a commencement in time.[1] Nature thus leads to the supernatural, and it is a mere question of fact whether the same supernatural Creative Power which gave origin to the universe at first has again intervened to add to the work. The manifest imperfection of the moral world affords a presumption in favour of such being the case.

but it may easily be excluded from thought.

But though science recognizes the existence of that for which it cannot account, and the reality of the supernatural is thus shown to be a truth of science, yet men find no difficulty in excluding it from their thoughts, and living a mental life without reference to anything higher or more mysterious than nature and its laws:—a mental life from which the thoughts of God and the resurrection are excluded: or, if the names are retained, God is only a name for "the stream of tendency whereby all things strive to fulfil the law of their being," and no resurrection is hoped for except a present resurrection from the death of sin to a life of holiness. This tendency to ignore the supernatural, and thus renounce and make impossible that life of faith which is the highest life whereof man is capable, is a temptation whereby man has always been and will always be assailed: but there appear to be reasons in the present state of the world which make this temptation unusually strong, not indeed to the mass of mankind but to many of the highest minds. There never was an age when the external life which we live in the world was so interesting, and so able to absorb all the thoughts of the mind and all the energies of the soul, leaving no place and no feeling of need for thoughts of the unseen. There never was a time when physical science filled men's minds and moulded their thoughts as it is doing now: and though it is, as I have maintained throughout this work, utterly irrational to deny or ignore faith in the name of science, yet it is possible, and it appears to be true, that many minds are so occupied with science and its methods that faith and its claims cannot make themselves listened to:—the marvellous

Present temptations to do so.

[1] Page 49.

success of the methods of inductive science within its own proper domain has led naturally, though unreasonably, to the conclusion that those methods are applicable to all subjects whatever, and that there is no room left for faith. At no previous historical period, at least since the age of Grecian independence and glory, has the temptation been so strong for the mind of man to seek all the springs of its life in itself and in the world around, and to deny or ignore any possible knowledge of a God who has created all things, who has revealed Himself, who sympathises with His creatures and hears their prayers. The world which is around us and whereof we form a part is alive with change and progress, not of science only, but of the arts, and of political and social life: the very air feels electric with intellectual power: and the effect of all this on many of the more superficial minds appears to be unfavourable to that sense of dependence which, if it is not the germ of faith, is the soil wherein faith grows.

Revival of Stoical ethics.

It is remarkable that the ethics of Stoicism should be revived in the present age, under circumstances the very opposite of those wherein the classical Stoicism had its origin. Stoicism is essentially an attempt to nourish moral life on nothing but the moral instincts, without a utilitarian basis, and without assistance from faith. This was attempted in the darkness of classical heathenism, at a time when hope had almost faded out of the minds of men, and nothing was left to fall back on but the simple moral instincts: and it is revived now, in the light of Christianity and in an age which beyond almost all previous ages abounds in hopefulness, apparently because men fancy that they have outgrown the need of faith, and have learned to stand alone.[1] We must wish all success to men who endeavour to cultivate holiness in whatever soil: but it is my belief that the

[1] Comte and the Positivists are essentially Stoics. Mill is a Stoic in spirit, though he endeavours to work out a utilitarian theory of morals. But the most remarkable words wherewith I am acquainted which derive their inspiration from the new Stoicism are Matthew Arnold's, especially his "St. Paul and Protestantism," wherein he speaks with admirable eloquence and evident sincerity of the death to sin and the resurrection to righteousness, while utterly ignoring immortality, and acknowledging no

morality of this new Stoicism, which in some cases appears so lovely, is really the result of that Christianity of the Church which Stoicism ignores: and if it has not perished as flowers perish when separated from their root, it is only because it has not yet had time to wither.

Every age has its own blessings and its own trials, and the tendency to ignore the supernatural is one of the moral trials of this age. But the causes of this tendency will not continue: they will wear themselves out. The feeling that scientific methods have a right to cover the entire field of thought and to exclude faith, is due to the comparative novelty of inductive science as a power in the world of intellect, and will disappear when scientific methods become perfectly familiar, and when there has been time for the relations of science to faith to be thoroughly thought out. And it appears impossible that the present marvellously rapid rate of progress in either science or politics can be maintained for an indefinite time. That ennui of a stationary civilization, which is expressed with such mournful force in the Book of Ecclesiastes, will again settle down on the noblest minds. It will then be felt as it is not felt now, that the only cure for this is to *set the affections on things above, not on things on the earth.* Christ appears to teach that the last trial which is to assail His Church will be the tendency to fall asleep from the absence of any peculiar trial, or of any visible or tangible enemy to contend with: and in that age it will be more evident than it is in this, that the most blessed, if not the only blessed, are those who keep their lamps burning with faith in Christ and hope of immortality.

The present tendencies will not continue.

I wish here to make some remarks on those questions of theology whereon I have expressed opinions different from those generally received among us. Concerning the

My differences from received doctrines.

God except "the stream of tendency whereby all things strive to ful the law of their being." See also his lines in "Obermann once more:"—

"Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Must labour; must resign
His all too human creeds, and scan
Simply the way Divine."

final extinction of sin and suffering, I have no doubt whatever as to either the truth of the doctrine or its infinite importance. But concerning the continued injurious effect of sin in the future life even after forgiveness, though I believe in this I do not insist on it as being equally established with the doctrine of forgiveness and restoration. And, similarly, though I think it absolutely certain that Christ lived and died and rose again in order to bring us to God as reconciled children; and though I cannot believe that any expiation for sin is either possible or necessary, except what is implied in forgiveness, repentance, and healing; yet I do not deny that those passages of the Holy Scriptures which speak of expiatory sacrifice may perhaps contain a meaning which I have failed to grasp.

Conclusion.

I have now concluded a work which is the result of many years of thought. I have no doubt of the general truth of its conclusions, though there are probably errors in detail, and my estimates of the mutual bearing and the relative importance of the several truths will no doubt be found to need correction. I now offer it to the world in full confidence of the substantial truth of what Lord Bacon said long ago, that though a little philosophy (or rather a superficial and one-sided philosophy) may lead a man to atheism, yet a deeper and wider knowledge will bring him back to faith in God.

THE END.

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