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
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OBSERVATIONS
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OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL MEDICAL BOARD,

APPOINTED BY
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
AND
THE RIGHT HON. THE SECRETARY AT WAR,
TO EXAMINE THE STATE OF
The Army Depot Hospital in the Isle of Wight.

INTERSPERSED WITH INSTANCES AND PROOFS OF
GROSS MISREPRESENTATIONS
CONTAINED IN VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS BY DR. JACKSON.

By THOMAS KEATE, Esq. F.R.S.
SURGEON GENERAL TO HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES, &c.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. HATCHARD, 190, PICCADILLY.
1809.

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL MEDICAL BOARD

BY
THOMAS KEATINGE, ESQ. F.R.S.
OF THE
SPECIAL MEDICAL BOARD
OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF MILITARY ENQUIRY
IN THE
MONTH OF DECEMBER 1801
BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
AND THE SECRETARY AT WAR,
TO EXAMINE THE STATE OF THE HOSPITAL
AT THE MILITARY DEPOT IN
THE ISLE OF WIGHT, AND MORE ESPECIALLY
THE SEVERAL MATTERS
REPRESENTED BY THE PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON GENERAL,
IN REGARD
TO THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDICAL PATIENTS
UNDER THE CARE AND
SUPERINTENDANCE OF DR. JACKSON.

Strahan and Preston,
Printers-Street, London.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

IN the 8th Appendix to my Observations on the Fifth Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, I mentioned some of the proceedings of a Special Medical Board appointed in the month of December 1801 by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War, to examine the state of the hospital at the military depot in the Isle of Wight, and more especially "the several matters represented by the Physician and Surgeon General, in regard to the treatment of the medical patients under the care and superintendence of Dr. Jackson."

Soon after the publication of my observations, I heard with surprize and concern that the members of the Special Medical Board supposed themselves to have been aggrieved by my account of their proceedings, and were therefore disposed to publish their former report with other documents and remarks. Believing, however, as I then did, that they had otherwise no particular desire to place themselves conspicuously in public view, I determined, from a regard for truth, as well as a wish to avoid controverfy, to take away even the least possible excuse for their intended publication, so far as depended upon me, by spontaneously correcting any mistake into which I might have fallen; and with this view I, on the 2d of July 1808, wrote and sent to the members of the Special Board, a letter, of which they have published a copy; and therefore I shall here only insert the parts of it more immediately deserving of notice, viz.

B

"Gentlemen,

"When preparing for the press that part of my late publication which relates to your proceedings as a Board, at the Isle of Wight, in December 1861, I found among other papers a memorandum (the original of which I recollected to have seen in the hand-writing of Dr. Hunter), stating the hours of your landing on, and departure from, the Isle of Wight, by which it seems that you had passed only twenty-seven hours on the island; and I found another memorandum, made on what I considered as being good authority, from which it appeared that you had been only "about three hours employed in examining what related to the hospital there, whilst under the care of Dr. Jackson." I am however just informed, and induced to believe, that this last memorandum was not correct, and that you employed more of the time which you passed on the island than is commonly spared from repose, in examining every thing at the depot connected with your mission, and consequently that I committed an error, unintentionally, in mentioning your report as having been "thus hastily made*." My own regard for truth leads me thus spontaneously to make this acknowledgment unconditionally.

"I am told that you are dissatisfied with my having mentioned your inquiry as an "*ex parte*" proceeding. Certainly I should willingly substitute any other term more applicable, if there be any; but when I recollect that no person was present, who might have been able or disposed to contradict, or to explain any thing which Dr. Jackson alleged to you in his justification, I cannot help thinking that you were placed in a situation, where the most wise and upright of men might

* It will be found hereafter, that this concession on my part was not due to the members of the special board; and that even my first supposition of their having employed so much as three hours in the hospital at Parkhurst, was an allowance of time exceeding that which they now appear to have passed in that hospital.

have been induced to make a report more favourable to Dr. Jackson, than they would have made, if those who had a knowledge of facts and inclination to assert them, had been permitted to hear and answer Dr. Jackson. This is my whole meaning in what I have said on this subject: I have never supposed that you were more likely to be misled in this way than any and every other person would be in similar circumstances, and I considered any defects in your report, which might have been thus occasioned, as necessarily arising from the nature and form of your proceeding, and not from any want of sagacity, discretion, or integrity, in any member of your Board."

These acknowledgments extended to every thing which I had then heard of as having occasioned dissatisfaction to the members of the Special Board, and it will be observed, that though I could not with truth retract what I had said of the *ex parte* nature of their proceedings, I notwithstanding gave them full credit for upright intentions. Indeed that aversion from controversy which induced me to leave Dr. Jackson's calumnies so long unanswered, was then so predominant in my mind, that to avoid entering into one with the members of the Special Board, I was disposed to do them much more than justice. They appeared however to be actuated by very different motives, from the answer which I received (dated on the 5th of June) from Sir John Hayes, informing me of his having laid my letter "before the gentlemen to whom it was addressed," and that "they considered the printing of their report as due to the public;" adding, that "if it were my wish that my letter to them should be subjoined they would not object to it."—In reply to this answer from Sir John Hayes, I wrote a second letter, which, as these Gentlemen did not choose to publish it, is here subjoined, viz.

"Army Medical Board Office,
July 5, 1808.

"SIR,

"In reply to the letter with which you have favoured me this day, I beg leave to observe, that as you did not consider your report "as due to the public," when Dr. Jackson published his unfair account of it, in 1803, I do not well understand why it should become so now, by reason of any unintentional mistakes contained in my observations on the subject, especially after I had corrected such mistakes by my letter to you of the 2d instant.

"You are however to judge of the conduct which it may be proper to pursue on this occasion: Should your report be printed, I am disposed to accept your offer of printing my letter with it; being desirous to explain and remove the error into which I had been led respecting the time employed by you at the dépôt hospital; and it will give me great pleasure to find afterwards that no farther explanation is necessary on my part, although, from the imperfect recollection which I now have of that report, I apprehend that this may not be the case. I have the honour to be, &c.

"(Signed) THOS. KEATE."

"Sir J. M. Hayes, Bart."

In giving the intimation which concludes the above letter, I foresaw but a small part of the necessity, which the Special Board have since imposed upon me, of answering their report, &c. After this explanation concerning the facts preceding and immediately connected with the publication in question, I shall proceed to take such notice of it, as a proper regard for truth and my own character seems to require; and having done this, it will, I flatter myself, be seen, that instead of complaining of me in offensive or indecorous language, the members of the Special Board ought to have felt themselves highly gratified and obliged by the reserve, delicacy, moderation, and even indulgence, with which I mentioned their proceedings in my former publication.

An advertisement is prefixed to the proceedings and report of the Special Medical Board, stating that Dr. Jackson and myself had given partial extracts from their report, and that I had made "serious charges either directly or by insinuation, against the Board;" and that the members were therefore desirous of shewing the justice of their proceedings by a publication of them; and that with this desire they had written a letter (of which a copy is given) to the Secretary at War, dated the 21st June 1808, asking permission from the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War "to make public their report, with the documents necessary for its illustration;" which was granted by a letter from the Deputy Secretary at War, dated the 28th June 1808, of which the copy is also printed.

The first part of the proceedings "consists of certain official documents constituting the gentlemen before mentioned a special board for the purposes therein mentioned, and explaining the more immediate causes of their appointment." There are other facts, however, which, though more remote, are indispensably necessary, to enable the reader rightly to understand and judge of these proceedings. I did indeed, in Appendix No. 8. of my former publication, state some of these generally and concisely, omitting others for the sake of brevity; this omission I shall now proceed to supply.

In that Appendix, mention is made of Dr. Jackson's appointment to be physician and head of the hospital of the dépôt at Chatham; and of his taking upon himself that office about the 5th December 1800, together with his applications for the removal of some of the medical officers on duty there, and the appointment of others in their stead, particularly Dr. James Borland, assistant inspector of hospitals*.

* In the same Appendix, I slightly mentioned a description granted upon me by Dr. Borland, in a letter written by him from Ayr, and dated the 13th December 1798, in which, with a view to obtain promotion, he represented himself to be "qualified as a physician and a licentiate of the College of Edin."

I also stated therein the reasons why the Physician General could not give his consent to the appointment of Dr. Borland to act as physician at the dépôt hospital; and that I had communicated these reasons to Dr. Jackson, by my letter of the 1st of January 1801; and, I am now to add, that in consequence of that letter he took the liberty of *preferring a complaint* to the Commander in Chief against the Physician General*, by a letter to Major-General Brownrigg, then military secretary to His Royal Highness, in which, after acknowledging (as he has done in nearly a dozen letters, written at different times,) that I had manifested every disposition to

burgh," though in fact he never had been a licentiate of that College, nor has he become one since the date of that letter, as I am well informed. Besides this deception, Dr. Bancroft, for reasons stated in his last publication, appears to have believed, that Dr. Borland had been guilty of another in pretending to have obtained the degree of Doctor of Medicine in Scotland, and I could not avoid a similar belief, after having seen original letters from at least one medical professor of each of the universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and St. Andrews, and from each of the two colleges of Aberdeen, (the only corporations entitled to confer such degrees in Scotland,) all declaring that they had searched the registers, or records of their respective universities and colleges for many years backwards, without finding the name of James Borland among those on whom the degree of Doctor of Medicine had been conferred. I have, however, now reason to believe that Dr. Borland has lately produced a doctor's diploma from the University of St. Andrews, bearing date in the month of December 1796, when he was and had been for the space of eighteen months in the island of St. Domingo. What testimonials or proofs of Dr. Borland's qualifications procured him this degree, when at so great a distance; or how it happened that Dr. Elliot, Professor of Medicine in the University of St. Andrews, "examined the registers of the graduates in medicine of that university for above twenty years from that date, without finding the name of Dr. James Borland among the number," (as is stated in a letter from that professor, dated the 10th of August 1808,) are questions which I am unable to answer.

* Dr. Jackson, at page 149 of his publication of 1803, has asserted that he was appointed physician to the hospital at Chatham, "by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, contrary to the expectation and wishes of the army medical board." Whether such an assertion, even if true, ought to have been made and published by Dr. Jackson, I submit to the decision of others, observing only, that as the Medical Board were not consulted respecting that appointment, or made acquainted with the probability of it, they had no opportunity of expressing any wish for or against it.

aid his wishes, "and render more effectual the management of the hospital at Chatham," he proceeded to state, that the Physician General had *opposed* his requisition in regard to Dr. Borland; and he, at the same time, grossly misrepresented the ground of that opposition, by declaring, that Dr. Borland's being employed as a physician at Chatham, had been resisted only because he was "*not a regular*, or licentiated physician of the college in London," when, in fact, it was on account of his not being an army physician, nor entitled by law to practise physic in this kingdom.

Dr. Jackson's complaint having been transmitted to the Physician General, through the Secretary at War, on the 9th of January 1801, very satisfactory explanations and reasons were assigned by Sir Lucas Pepys, in his answer of the 12th of that month, for not permitting Dr. Borland to act as a physician at Chatham hospital, and His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief was pleased, soon after, to approve of the Physician General's sending an army physician to the dépôt hospital for that purpose; so that by this decision Dr. Borland's going in *any way to Chatham* appeared to depend, and, I believe, did depend, on the discretion of the army medical board, to whose indulgence, and especially that of the Physician General, Dr. Jackson had very little claim, after his then recent and unwarrantable complaint. But Sir Lucas Pepys had, notwithstanding, the goodness to write to Dr. Jackson a few days after, and to express his wish to give the latter "every accommodation and assistance," adding, "as I find you are anxious to have Mr. Borland with you, it has occurred to me, that, if you approve of it, I would desire Mr. Keate to request His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to let the following arrangement take place at Chatham, viz. that Mr. Borland should be directed to act under your direction in the arrangements and other business of the hospital, of which there must be sufficient to do, and that the care of the *medical patients* should be *entirely trusted to you* and the *staff physician*, Dr. Maclaurin, who will be directed to proceed to

Chatham, in consequence of His Royal Highness's having been pleased to approve of a staff physician being sent to Chatham hospital, for the purpose of assisting you in the treatment of the patients, &c. This will make every thing easy. The rule will not be departed from of medical cases being entrusted to none but physicians. You will have the assistance of Mr. Borland in a variety of other matters, and the staff physician will take a great burthen off your shoulders, too great, indeed, for any man to bear. If you approve of this plan, I will lose no time in recommending what of course you must see will give you ease and comfort, and the rules of the service not be departed from." Dr. Jackson's answer to this kind and conciliating proposal has not been found; perhaps was not preserved by the Physician General; that the former agreed to it is, however, manifest from its having been immediately carried into execution, as well as from his letter to me, dated Chatham the 28th January 1801, in which he mentions his having that morning received the before-mentioned letter from the Physician General, proposing "an accommodation for the medical assistance at Chatham." "It is," added he, "*what I can have no objection to in itself, only if assistant inspector Borland had come here alone, I should have had no difficulty, as he would have done smaller duties. According to the proposition of the Physician General we shall be amply provided at this post. I am perfectly sensible of your desire to procure every possible facility, and have the honour to be,*" &c. The proposal being accepted and agreed to by Dr. Jackson, I, on the very next day, wrote a letter to Dr. Borland as "assistant inspector," directing him to repair to Chatham, and report himself to "Major-General Hewett and Dr. Jackson for duty, under the doctor's direction;" and in notifying to Dr. Jackson my intention to give this order to Dr. Borland, I expressly stated he was "*to act as assistant inspector.*"* After such an appeal to His Royal Highness's Com-

* In confirmation of this account of the conditions upon which Dr. Borland was permitted to do duty at Chatham, I may adduce a letter written a few days

mander in Chief, and a specific agreement made in consequence thereof, under the particular sanction and authority of His Royal Highness, Dr. Jackson was bound, by every honourable and moral principle, as well as by those of military discipline, to have committed the medical care of the sick, or, at least of those for whom he could not personally officiate, to Dr. MacLaurin, and to have scrupulously abstained from employing assistant inspector Borland in doing physician's duty. How imperfectly he adhered to this agreement at first, and how soon he openly resisted it, as well as the authority of the army medical board, and, indeed, of the Commander in Chief, has been, in a great degree, already explained in my Appendix No. 8. The truth is, that soon after Dr. Borland's arrival at Chatham, Dr. Jackson became impatient to carry into execution his *innovating* projects, in regard to the diet and medical treatment of the sick, in which, for the first two months, he had not ventured to make any considerable alterations; he found those medical officers, with whom I had indulged him, disposed to co-operate in all his plans; Dr.

after by Dr. Jackson to Dr. MacLaurin, which is now before me. It is dated "Chatham Barracks, Feb. 4, 1801," and informs Dr. MacLaurin, in answer to a letter written by him on the 2d Feb., that the latter need not put himself to inconvenience by hurrying down to Chatham before he could make suitable arrangements, because, says he, "Dr. Borland arrived here a few days ago, and as he takes part of the duties which intrusted any attendants upon the sick, I now find no difficulty in managing the business as it stands at present; so you may, as far as respects me, arrange your matters at leisure; and as you have not good health, I would further recommend to you to get every thing that can give you comfort before you come here, for there will not be any accommodation for the physician within the garrison, all the apartments being already occupied, and I do not know of any allowances to your rank at this place." There can be no doubt from this letter, and other facts, that, after Dr. Jackson had obtained Dr. Borland, he would have been glad to discourage Dr. MacLaurin from ever coming to Chatham; but he still took care to word his letter, as to induce a belief that Dr. Borland was only employed as his assistant, in the duties of inspection, according to what had been stipulated with the Physician General, and that, by being thus retained, he was enabled, exclusively of Dr. Borland, to do the whole medical duty in Dr. MacLaurin's absence,

Maclaurin, however, (who had been well educated, and was a graduate of Edinburgh, and a licentiate of the London College,) believing them to be pernicious, *confidentially* refused to give them any support. Mr. Dowse also, the apothecary of the hospital, was, from conviction, adverse to profuse bleedings and deficient nourishment in the convalescent wards, of which he had the care; and, therefore, Dr. Jackson resolved to rid himself of both, by some means or other: accordingly he began by intimating, in his letter of the 16th of March, that the service of the hospital might be done by *six* good mates, with an assistant inspector and a staff surgeon, and that the other commissioned staff officers at the hospital might be spared for other services. In answer to this, I wrote him on the 19th of March, that "Dr. Maclaurin and Mr. Dowse would be removed when their services should be required elsewhere." On the 29th of March he gave a more direct and strong intimation respecting Dr. Maclaurin; and, hearing some weeks after of a new regulation concerning recruiting districts, he, on the 18th of April 1801, requested of me, by letter, that Mr. Dowse might be made surgeon to one of these districts*. The latter application was immediately complied with; but to Dr. Maclaurin's removal there were strong objections, which may be readily conceived. Dr. Jackson, however, persisted in renewing his application to obtain his favourite object, and in answer to the last of them, dated the 19th of April, I, on the 22d, wrote to him, that if "Dr. Borland would send a memorial to the Secretary at War, soliciting to be examined according to His Majesty's order of the 12th March 1798, his passing such examination would re-

* Dr. Jackson, with his usual disregard for truth, pretends that he did not object to Mr. Dowse, and that his sole motive for desiring his removal, was a wish to benefit that gentleman by obtaining promotion for him, and he perhaps succeeded in persuading Mr. Dowse to believe this. There was however no promotion in this removal; and Dr. Jackson had expressed himself dissatisfied with Mr. Dowse some months before the regulation took place, as may be proved by several of his letters; indeed that of the 16th of March was written a month at least before he had any knowledge of the regulation in question.

move the objection which then subsisted against withdrawing Dr. Maclaurin from Chatham." On the 27th of April Dr. Jackson wrote to me, acknowledging the receipt of my letter of the 22d, "respecting Dr. Borland's application for an examination through the Secretary at War," and stating, that he could not see the propriety of his applying through that channel for liberty to be admitted to a medical examination, which was formerly ordered by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief†; and he then proceeded to give the following explanation.

* Dr. Jackson here alludes to what occurred respecting Dr. Borland previously to his being ordered to Chatham, and to the arrangement or agreement upon which he was permitted to act there. It was then uncertain in what way it might be proper to allow him to act; but His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, being informed that Dr. Borland had never been examined in regard to his medical qualifications, felt the expediency of not allowing him to do the duty of a physician without having been first properly examined; and by the order of His Royal Highness I wrote to Dr. Jackson on the 19th January 1801, in the following words, viz.—"Sir, I have received His Royal Highness the Duke of York's commands to represent to you that it will be necessary for assistant inspector Borland to pass a medical examination before the Army Medical Board, previously to his acting as physician at Chatham hospital." Dr. Borland however raised objections against this trial of his qualifications; and though he finally appeared to consent to it, and the Medical Board were in daily expectation of his applying either personally or by letter on the subject, it was discovered that he had gone to Chatham, in consequence of my letter to him of the 29th of January, and had thus avoided the proposed examination: and as it had then been settled that he should not be permitted to do physician's duty, the Board allowed him, *as that consideration alone, to remain, and escape the proposed examination.* This is the plain truth; and I will now give Dr. Jackson's statement of it, in the printed letter recently addressed to me, as an illustration of the gross misrepresentations in which he has indulged at almost every page of it.

He states at p. 10. that Dr. Borland, at last consented to the proposed examination, adding that "when he consented, the Board departing from its own proposal, sent him to Chatham to be employed as I (Jackson) thought fit, without admitting him to trial, for the purpose of ascertaining his medical qualifications." After thus falsifying the truth in a manner the most absurd and improbable, by making the Board transgress that very order which they had solicited, he boldly and wickedly adds, "this is the fact; and if so, the Board is responsible for all the evils which have arisen from this gentleman's supposed insufficiency; for it was in the power of Sir Lucas Pepys to try his abilities, and judge of his fitness before he was permitted to act as physician at the King's general hospital."

nation and avowal of his own unjustifiable pretensions on the subject, viz. "I will beg leave, on the present occasion, to say, that I am desirous to accord with the Army Medical Board, in what concerns the management of His Majesty's hospital at Chatham; and as I am desirous to avoid every thing which may throw impediment in the way of public service, I will state, in a few words, what I conceive to be the nature of my office and duties, as it would appear that I do not view them in the same light with the Army Medical Board. I consider myself, then, as physician of Chatham hospital, and consequently consider myself as responsible for the execution of the medical duty; it is a duty which I cannot delegate to any one, *wherever he may be, of whom I have not knowledge, and in whom I have not confidence.* I requested the assistance of assistant inspector Borland, and it was granted:" (solely, however, on the condition of his not doing medical duty.) "I have no occasion," he adds, "for a mere physician, and I should not think myself justifiable in detaining at this hospital a person whose labours I cannot apply to some useful service. I had the honour to state to you sometime ago, that

Besides the facts already mentioned, which abundantly prove that Dr. Borland was not sent to be employed at Chatham as Dr. Jackson "thought fit," he has himself asserted the contrary at page 130 of his publication of 1803, where after mentioning that "it was not thought proper that he (Dr. Borland) should be entrusted in England to prescribe for a sick soldier at the army depot, even under the immediate superintendence of a superior," he adds, "Dr. Borland was sent at last to the depot as assistant inspector, and Dr. Maclaurin as physician." A more complete perversion of truth has perhaps never been exhibited than in this instance. Facts, of which the natural operation would be to establish his own delinquency, are here distorted and falsified, so as apparently to leave him blameless, and also to justify a charge against the Medical Board of having, by a gross neglect of duty, made themselves responsible for all the mischiefs which may have resulted from Dr. Jackson's disobedience in employing Dr. Borland, instead of Dr. Maclaurin, to do the duty of Physician. And after this proof of his own malignity and falsehood, he had the effrontery immediately to address the following words to me, viz. "It is extremely unbecoming, Sir, to follow you through your details, for it does not seem to be in your course to state a single point of fact, without in some way or other perverting its truth."

Dr. Maclaurin's presence at Chatham hospital was superfluous, I will now add, that it is an incumbrance; under these circumstances I do not expect that the Army Medical Board will approve of his being any longer attached to this hospital. I have the honour to be, &c."

Perhaps nothing can better display Dr. Jackson's growing presumption, and total disregard both to military subordination, and to a specific agreement, than the preceding letter. Having obtained the appointment of physician to Chatham hospital, without the usual qualifications, he seems to have thought himself lord paramount in that place; and though Dr. Maclaurin was an army physician, and had been appointed such, after his qualifications were properly ascertained by the president and censors of the College of Physicians, and at a time when Dr. Jackson was only a regimental surgeon; the latter had, in his own opinion, grown to be sufficiently powerful to condemn His Majesty's commission, and to set himself above the Commander in Chief and the Army Medical Board, by excluding Dr. Maclaurin from the duty which they had assigned to him, only because it suited his own (Dr. Jackson's) views, not to give his "confidence" to a man much better qualified than himself; pretending most absurdly, that his responsibility would be endangered by his submission to the will and orders of his superiors, which had been so often and so particularly manifested; and in the same way, that he supposed the withholding of his confidence would deprive Dr. Maclaurin of the rights given to him by the King's commission, he pretends, that by bestowing his confidence * on Dr. Borland, he could transfer those rights

* To manifest the value of Dr. Jackson's confidence in the qualifications of medical men, I need only mention that a certain hospital mate, (whose name it is proper that I should omit,) who stood first upon the list of persons officially and strongly recommended by Dr. Jackson to me for promotion after his return from St. Domingo, (and for whom I had in consequence thereof refused an assistant surgeoncy to a regiment of Dragoons,) on being ordered to the Court of Examiners at the College of Surgeons, was found unable to answer properly to the most easily answerable practical questions in surgery only, and being there re-

to one who was not a physician, and who had been sent to Chatham on the special condition of his not doing medical duty, and who could not be allowed to do it, without transgressing the special order of the Commander in Chief, as signified to Dr. Jackson, by my letter of the 19th January 1801.

Such however was the forbearance, I may say endurance and indulgence of the Army Medical Board, that instead of calling Dr. Jackson to a proper account for these unjustifiable pretensions, they were no otherwise noticed than by my writing to him on the 30th of April 1801, that as he appears "determined to discontinue the services of Dr. Maclaurin, while no other physician was on the spot, I was of opinion, that previously to Dr. Borland's being intrusted with the medical charge of the patients, he should apply in the same manner as the late Dr. Mitchell did, to the Secretary at War, to be examined by the Physician General, assisted by two army physicians; and that a board would be immediately convened for that purpose, after which, if Dr. Borland should be found qualified, there would be no objection to his taking the duty." And it was this letter that produced one from Dr. Borland to me, dated the 1st of May, in which he declined the proposed examination, under certain pretences stated in my Appendix, No. 8., together with the following reasons: "I conceive the rank of assistant inspector of hospitals superior to that of a mere staff physician, who in the course of service naturally becomes my inferior, and receives my orders, when no superior officer is present." In this, however, Dr. Borland has made an unfounded assertion. The rank of assistant inspector, while it subsisted, not having been superior, but similar to that of a staff physician. Upon this subject Mr. Lewis, Deputy Secretary at War, wrote to the Army Medical Board, the 9th of March 1797, as follows:

fuld or referred, was of course not admitted to the usual medical examination by the Army Medical Board. Of this I acquainted Dr. Jackson by a letter dated March 7th 1799.

viz. "I am directed by the Secretary at War to acquaint you, on the authority of the Commander in Chief, that the assistant inspectors of hospitals do not, by virtue of their appointment as such, take rank above the physicians of the army, but are to rank with them according to the dates of their respective commissions." After this Dr. Borland writes, "the various duties of assistant inspector at this hospital and dépôt of recruits, requiring experience of military surgery, and minute acquaintance with other matters relative to soldiers, give me at present abundant employment; but to become a physician, would limit my utility, if usefulness is the result of employment." Here Dr. Borland seems to have endeavoured to persuade me, that he was solely employed at Chatham in performing the duties of an assistant inspector, according to the original condition upon which he had been permitted to go thither; and he seems to think, that, by giving proofs of his being qualified to act as a physician, he should lessen his utility; but this pretence probably will mislead nobody. He had been ordered by the Commander in Chief to undergo a medical examination, without which no one as far as for some years been allowed to become even an hospital mate; but he had opposed this order, and been afterwards suffered to evade it, on the condition of his not acting as a physician. This condition being broken, the special order of the Commander in Chief, of the 19th of January, became imperative, and rendered an examination indispensably necessary: nor could there possibly be any fair or just reason for his declining it, and, at the same time, continuing to act as a physician*.

Dr. Maclaurin had previously written, on the 26th April 1801, to Mr. Ruff, then Inspector of regimental infirmaries, soliciting, as a favour, to be removed from Chatham and

* Dr. Borland concluded his letter of the 1st of May by this final declaration, viz. "If my exertions as assistant inspector be deemed useful at Chatham, I shall continue to act to the best of my abilities for the good of His Majesty's service; but if they are not considered necessary here, I request to be moved." Does not this indicate a wish to go any where rather than be examined?

placed on duty elsewhere; and the next day he, by letter, made a similar application to me; but such was his delicacy towards Dr. Jackson, that he abstained, as he had done in his letter to Mr. Ruth, from making any complaint against, or even mentioning the name of Dr. Jackson; alleging only the state of his health as the motive of his application. Finding, however, by our answers, that his solicitations were not likely to be complied with, he, on the 6th of May, for, I believe, the first time, wrote, and described his situation and his feelings to the Physician General, by a letter, in the following words, viz. "Sir, I address myself to you respecting my situation at the general hospital of this place; by to-morrow's post I will write again, trusting that I shall ever experience that candour and liberality from you I have hitherto received; I ask it only while my conduct entitles me to it."

"You did me the honour of saying when I saw you, that having confidence in me, you had recommended my being placed as physician to the military hospital at Chatham, and had the goodness to explain to me the nature of my duty; I, of course, expected to have been kept in full employment, as a physician; but this is not the case; my wards are nearly empty, and in the course of a few days will be more so, or only one case will probably remain under my care, the others being all in a state of convalescence; upon this I have spoken several times with Dr. Jackson, head of the hospital, particularly this day, in which he has been somewhat explicit; he confessed that his intentions were to fill the wards under my care, only in case of emergency, and the other wards being full."

"It is upon this head I apply to you, Sir, deservedly holding the highest rank in your profession, as well as the office of Physician General to the army; I have to request you will take this affair into your consideration; and I have to state, that my practice has been far from unsuccessful; of the frequent deaths that occur in this hospital, one only has taken place in the patients immediately under my

"care, and of which I have had the treatment from the commencement of disease, (that a case of malignant fever, accompanied with uncommonly putrid symptoms;) the other three were, one case of phthisis pulmonalis; one of hæmoptysis, with a debilitated worn-out constitution, anasarca, &c.; and the other of dropsy, with universal anasarca, and diseased viscera; the whole of these were admitted long previous to my being attached to the hospital, and were considered as left before I saw them; and of their recovery no hopes were or could be entertained."

"The assistant inspector has long done physician's duty; upon this I have remonstrated; Dr. Jackson justifies it, by saying, that there is an order from the War Office to that purport; but of this order I have never heard": at all events, this circum-

* This pretence of an order from the War Office was first advanced by Dr. Jackson in a letter to me of the 28th December 1800, in which he writes, "as I understand that an order exists, or did not long since exist, that assistant inspectors should do duty as physicians when that duty was required of them, I had imagined that no objection would arise in the appointment of Dr. Berland to that office;" and in his letter to Colonel Browning of the 4th January 1801, appealing to the Commander in Chief, against the determination of the Physician General, respecting Dr. Berland, he re-advanced the same pretence in these words, viz. "As I know that a rule exists, or did exist lately, directing assistant inspectors to do the duty of physicians when required, I mentioned Assistant Inspector Berland," &c. Here he made this supposed rule the principal foundation of his complaint. The Physician General however, on the 12th January, in answering Dr. Jackson's letter, denied the existence of any rule which could apply to Dr. Berland, or support him in doing physician's duty; and as Dr. Jackson failed in his appeal to the Commander in Chief, and as His Royal Highness, a few days afterwards, and with a knowledge of these facts in full recollection, was pleased to determine, that Dr. Berland should not be permitted to act as physician at the depot hospital, without having previously passed an examination before the Army Medical Board, Dr. Jackson's pertinacity in alleging this pretended War Office order deserved the severest reprehension. But his doing so accords with a practice for which he has already been censured by others, viz. that of persisting to re-assert such falsehoods as suited his purpose, though previously refuted in the most decisive manner. It is indeed true that assistant inspectors who had been physicians have, as a matter of course, done the duty of physician when necessary; and it did happen that in St. Domingo, when the regular physicians were either dead, or rendered incapable of duty by the diseases of the climate, some medical offi-

stance proves the absolute necessity of a physician being employed here."

"We differ much as to the diet of patients; I give wine somewhat liberally, and put my convalescents upon rather a generous diet; and to this, in a no small measure, do I attribute the speedy recovery of my patients from fever, and my not having had one single instance of relapse hitherto; I mean this plan, in addition to general attention to cleanliness, ventilation, and free air.

"We have, as far as I know, no very contagious disease at present in the hospital."

care promoted to be assistant inspectors were directed to act as physicians on that particular exigency of the service. But there never was, so far as I can discover or recollect, any general order to that effect even on foreign service; and much less in Great Britain where army physicians may always be obtained when wanted. In fact, the general principle of every special order on this subject was stated in my letter of 27th May 1804 to Dr. Franklin, then at Portsmouth on his way to Egypt, in which he was directed to inform Mr. Young (inspector general of hospitals there) that conformably with the orders of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, assistant inspectors were to do medical or surgical duty, according to the commission which they held previously to their being appointed assistant inspectors." Finding however, soon after that all the assistant inspectors then going to Egypt were surgeons, I, on the 23d May, wrote to Mr. Young, communicating the pleasure of His Royal Highness that they should all "act as occasion might require, either as surgeons or assistant inspectors;" not as physicians. But Dr. Jackson, unreasoned either by reason or truth, asserts at page 9 of his last publication, that he "can defend what he did in regard to Assistant Inspector Barland by War Office authority, which is higher than that of the Medical Board, adding, "Mr. Keate cannot be ignorant that it was expressly ordered in an official letter from the Secretary at War, that persons holding the rank of assistant inspectors should positively and directly do the duty of physician in military hospitals." It happens however that I am "ignorant" of all this; and after taking great pains to ascertain the truth, I am convinced that what Dr. Jackson here asserts is a mere fiction. But if it were, on the contrary, a reality, and if such a letter had ever been written by the Secretary at War, its application to Dr. Barland must have been absorbed by the special orders of His Royal Highness of the 19th January, requiring him to undergo an examination before he should be permitted to act at Chatham as a physician. Dr. Jackson's conduct therefore, in disregarding and disobeying this order, was extremely culpable.

"My own health is very indifferent: indeed, I think it more precarious now than ever; but I am desirous to exert myself for the good of His Majesty's service, and I will do so while I am at all able to the task. I am not at present fit for foreign service, but I am equal to much more than what is now entrusted to me; I wish not to eat the bread of idleness; should it meet your approbation, I could wish to be employed in a district as before, or at some encampment during the ensuing summer. I have the honour, &c."

On the 8th of May, Dr. MacLaurin wrote the following supplementary letter, viz. "Sir, I did myself the honor of addressing you on the 6th, and fully purposed to have again written to you yesterday, but really it was not in my power; I beg you to excuse the omission.

"The same conduct has been pursued towards me; the consequences are too obvious to be misunderstood; it must soon follow that I, who was sent down expressly upon your nomination to discharge at least a large share of the duties of physician to the general hospital of this place, shall have nothing to employ me; Dr. Jackson has taken almost the whole of these upon himself; what remains with me is solely the number which occupies one small ward, containing six beds, of which one is empty; I request then you will have the goodness to remove me from this station, or to settle matters that I may be more actively engaged. Can anything be conceived more disrespectful to you, Sir, or to the Army Medical Board, than thus counteracting your orders? the whole appears to me a settled plan; Dr. Jackson had previously stated that a physician was unnecessary to this establishment; yet I found an assistant inspector doing physician's duty, and I had myself in addition the charge of many sick. Surely this proves most clearly the absolute necessity of the attendance of some one qualified for that office.

"During my last conversation with Dr. Jackson, I told him of my intentions of writing to you, and of stating the differences which exist between us; they are not personal, he

said, and that I might act as I pleased; and after my pressing him, he stated the reason of his wishing to leave me as much as possible unemployed, was, that he and I differed much, both in opinion and practice; in particular, that I gave to my patients larger allowances of wine, and a more generous diet, than he approved. I admit this charge, and with real pleasure I told him that my sick were sooner in a state of convalescence; their health, their strength were sooner established; that I had not one single instance of a relapse; and for the validity of this assertion, I appeal confidently to experience; the mortality of this hospital appears to me great, I know not how to explain it; for fortunately we are at present, and have been ever since my arrival, free from any malignant or putrid fever of a contagious nature."

"I have ever been prompted to consider the sufferings of the sick soldier; I have been taught by you, Sir, and by those from whom I received my appointment, to do all in my power to contribute to his comforts, to indulge him, and to attend to the recovery of his health; well am I convinced that the highest powers of this kingdom will approve such conduct. I know that some indulgences are requisite; this is a lesson which I have but too unfortunately learnt from frequent personal illness, and of long continuance. I hope that I have not been unsuccessful. I even think the service has been benefited by these very extras; the advantage is, in my opinion, obviously greater in restoring a man to health by plenty of good nutriment, when the stomach can bear it, and when the appetite demands, than keeping him for successive weeks upon low meagre diet."

"The order, of which I enclose a copy, has been issued this day*. Has Dr. Jackson such a power invested in him? I

* The order here mentioned is that by which Dr. Jackson abrogated or superseded the "Regulations for general military hospitals," which has been established by His Majesty's regulations, and ordered by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, on the 21 March 1800, to be enforced, and at the same time substituted another of his own formation for the use of Chatham garrison hospital, which he caused to be "printed by A. Eberington, Chatham," and

have only to add, that his side of the south hospital is full while mine is kept *purposely* empty; and his convalescents are put under the medical care of Assistant Inspector Borland: when I first came, Dr. Jackson treated the convalescents, and Assistant Inspector Borland the *sick*; they have lately exchanged, to keep out the physician sent by you. I have the honor to be, &c."

To these letters from Dr. Maclaurin the Physician-General returned *no answer*, as appears by one in my possession, from the former to the latter, dated Chatham, May 27, 1801, in which, after some other particulars respecting his situation there, he adds, "I wrote to you more particularly on the 6th and 8th inst., but having received *no answer*, I fear my letters have miscarried." Among the facts stated in this last letter are the following, viz. "My *wards* have been kept purposely empty, not from want of patients, but from a *settled plan* on his (Dr. Jackson's) part, to keep the treatment of patients in his own hands, and those of Assistant Inspector Borland *."

afterwards issued by his sole authority. Probably no man in Dr. Jackson's station ever committed so flagrant an act of insubordination, or encroached so presumptuously on the authority of His Majesty and of the Commander in Chief; but he appears to have been so infatuated by his newly acquired power, that nothing could restrain him in the abuse of it.

I certainly do not mean to say, that general regulations respecting diet and other objects are to be considered as so perfect that no improvement shall be made in them, or that persons properly qualified may not suggest alterations to their superiors; but if self-sufficient, eccentric, and ill-educated adventurers, who do not deign to consult, or ask the consent of, any superior, were permitted to annul established orders, and abridge the sick, or the well of those allowances which were prescribed by the highest authority, all regulations would become no better than waste paper, and the woe of disorders might be expected to follow.

* This curious plan was probably devised by Dr. Jackson, previously to Dr. Maclaurin's arrival at Chatham. The latter was not sent to the depot hospital to discharge the duties of a physician in any particular ward or wards, but to take charge of a considerable portion of the sick generally. But by altering him particular wards at the very beginning, Dr. Jackson prepared for himself the means of soon leaving Dr. Maclaurin without patients, if all other expedients to get him removed should fail.

He adds, "Had I been unsuccessful, had the sick died fast, had I manifested incapacity or inattention, he would have done his duty; but I can conscientiously say, appealing for a confirmation to those who have witnessed my conduct, that the exact reverse is the fact. He obviously treats with contempt your appointment of a physician to the garrison; and as well as that offered to myself, I feel the indignity offered to the Army Medical Board. I request, Sir, that I may not again be placed upon duty with Dr. Jackson or Dr. Borland."

These were, I believe, all the letters written by Dr. Maclaurin to the Physician-General from Chatham, while Dr. Jackson remained there; and it will be seen that the first of them was not written until Dr. Maclaurin had informed Dr. Jackson of his intention to write to Sir Lucas Pepys on the subject of their differences, and until Dr. Jackson had told him "that they were not personal, and that he might act as he pleased."

These facts will convince my readers of the malignity and injustice with which Dr. Jackson has repeatedly stated Dr. Maclaurin to have been placed, and employed at Chatham *as a spy* upon his conduct, and for other unworthy purposes*.

* These statements, founded solely on the letters here adduced, were made when Dr. Jackson knew nothing of their contents, and only discovered their existence from the mention which Dr. Maclaurin chose to make of them in his letter to me of the 8th of June (to be precisely introduced), and which he doubtless would not have made, had he been conscious of the least impropriety in what he had done: and yet, solely on the ground of this mention, Dr. Jackson, in his publication of 1803, p. 151, says, "There is positive proof that the physician to the forces (Dr. Maclaurin) acted the part of a spy or informer to the Physician-General." He makes a similar assertion in his last publication, p. 9, respecting Dr. Maclaurin, adding "his informations tended to criminate my conduct, but on what points I did not precisely learn," and thereby admitting that he had endeavored to fix an odious stigma upon Dr. Maclaurin without even knowing the subject of the letters which were his only ground for doing so. At page 14, of the same publication, alluding to this subject, he says, that while Dr. Maclaurin met with no interruption in the execution of his duty, his communications with the Board were irregular; without stopping to enquire whether this definition of the only time at which Dr. Maclaurin could acquire a right to communicate with the members of the Army Medical Board, be

Few men, perhaps, would have felt more indignation than Dr. Maclaurin at the idea of such an employment; but if he could have been induced to accept it, he probably would at least have made *one* communication to his employer, before he wrote to Mr. Rush and myself, to solicit a removal; and he probably would not have previously given notice to Dr. Jackson of his intention of writing to the Physician-General, much less of the subject of his letter; nor would the latter have discouraged all farther communication, by leaving these letters totally unanswered.

Some days before Dr. Maclaurin's last letter to Sir Lucas Pepys, i. e. on the 20th May 1801, Dr. Jackson made another effort to get the former removed from the dépôt hospital, by writing a letter to me, stating that he could not, "consistently with his views of hospital management, give Dr. Maclaurin any duty." And in my answer, on the 26th of that month, I wrote to him, that I had consulted the Physician-General on the subject of his letter, and that in consequence thereof I requested him "to inform me why Dr. Maclaurin's wards were empty, while his (Dr. Jackson's) were crowded; and when four patients had died in the week, all medical cases?" This answer induced Dr. Jackson to put himself decidedly and avowedly into a state of resistance to the authority, not only of the Medical Board, but of the Commander in Chief, by his reply, dated Chatham barracks, 27th May 1801, in these words, viz. "Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th inst.; and though I have mentioned to you repeatedly that Dr. Maclaurin's preference at Chatham is neither necessary nor useful, I shall now add, for your farther information, that his professional opinions and

accurate or not, it will be sufficient to observe, that he did not communicate any thing to them so long as he met with none of the interruptions (as mentioned); and that he only began to communicate after he had been not only interrupted, but nearly excluded by Dr. Jackson from all duty, and also after he had told the latter of his intention to complain of the treatment he had received.

mine are so different, that as I have adopted, and am desirous to maintain, one plan of management for the hospital, I cannot, consistently with that plan, allot to him any portion of the medical duty; which explains the question concerning which you desire information. I must also, Sir, on this occasion, take the opportunity of observing, that as *I am the physician of the hospital, and do the medical duty myself**, your remark in the latter part of your letter respecting mortality conveys very pointedly an insinuation that I am unfit for that duty, either from ignorance or idleness; if either one or the other be in fact the case, it is fit I be removed," &c.—"The decision," he adds, "of this question will, I presume, depend upon the higher powers; in the mean time, I will beg leave to oblige you, for the information of the Physician-General, that as Dr. Maclaurin's opinions and mine are not of accord, we cannot act together for the public good, and that I must desist giving him any portion of medical duty in the hospital of which I have the direction."

Instead of making a formal complaint against this disrespectful language, and insubordinate conduct, as it would have been most natural and perhaps proper for the Army Medical Board to have done, we continued to exercise our forbearance and patience, culpably I fear, and principally from deference and respect for those who had been induced to honor Dr. Jackson with their good opinions and patronage; an honour of which he ought to have endeavoured to render himself worthy; though it seems only to have rendered him presumptuous and contumacious, as is indeed too often the case with illiberal and uncultivated minds.

* This was notoriously untrue: Dr. Borland having been allowed to take at least a very considerable share "of the medical duty," though he continued to refuse, and though Dr. Jackson encouraged him in refusing to undergo the required examination. Indeed it appears from Dr. Maclaurin's letter to me of the 8th of June 1801, that during Dr. Jackson's then *last* absence, Dr. Borland "was intrusted with the entire medical care of Chatham Hospital."—a most flagrant violation of all order and military discipline; for Dr. Borland was not only precluded from medical duty by the special order of the Commander in

In this state of things, the Army Medical Board resolved to ask the opinion of Major-general Hewett on the subject of Dr. Maclaurin's continuance at the hospital of the depot; and accordingly the Physician-General, with Mr. Rush and myself, addressed a letter to him, dated the 2d of June 1801, stating how much the Board were embarrassed by Dr. Jackson's conduct, and the dangers of which they were apprehensive as likely to result, if they should withdraw from the depot Dr. Maclaurin, a regular and well qualified physician, who had been placed there by order of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief; and requesting to be favoured with General Hewett's opinion, "whether the presence of a physician at Chatham in addition to Dr. Jackson was necessary, or whether he (Major-General Hewett) would be satisfied with Dr. Jackson's having the *sole* care and management of the medical cases?" To this letter Major-General Hewett returned an answer, dated the 9th of June, in which, after mentioning the very moderate medical establishment with which Dr. Mitchell had, previously to his death, provided for the wants of the sick, and his persuasion that Dr. Jackson, (whose care and assiduity he commended,) with the assistance of Dr. Borland, Mr. Warren, and five or six mates, would conduct every thing in a proper manner, he added as his opinion, "that without meaning to doubt the worth and talents of Dr. Maclaurin, it could not be desirable, after what had passed, that he should be continued on the same duty with Dr. Jackson, even if the presence of another physician were considered necessary; but," he added, "I would wish to point out that the necessity of this, and the *real* state of the hospital, and care of the sick, would be better ascertained by the presence and inspection of the mem-

Chief of the 19th of January 1801, but was moreover subordinate in rank and authority to Dr. Maclaurin, who had been an army physician five years before Dr. Borland became even an inferior kind of assistant inspector to the Russian forces in Jersey or Guernsey, with only three-fourths of the usual pay of assistant inspectors.

bers of the Medical Board, than by any correspondence with the general-officer commanding here."

The day preceding that on which this answer came from General Hewett, I received a letter from Dr. Maclaurin, of which the following is a copy, viz.:

(COPY.)

"SIR, *London, June 3, 1801.*

"Dr. Jackson having stated, that he will resist my having any share of duty at Chatham General Hospital, on account of a difference in professional opinions, and treatment of diseases, I have to relate the chief points in which that difference exists.

"It is as to the diet of patients, especially in chronic diseases, and convalescents; for I cannot but object to the low diet as established by his order, and in use in the hospital.

"As to the free use of the lancet; almost the entire of his patients are largely bled, especially in fevers, upon their admission.

"As to the mode of keeping the sick long in a hot bath, and while the body is covered with a most profuse perspiration, the surface running with moisture, an immediate affusion of cold water thrown on the body by buckets full, or the patients immersed in a cold bath.

"As to the very free use, and continuance of strong purges and evacuates, the whole of which is no uncommon practice in that hospital; from such causes recoveries may be more slow, relapses more frequent, with the additional risk of producing diseases of general debility, especially effusions in the chest and anasarca.

"You will recollect, Sir, that I went to Chatham Hospital by your order; the wards to which I have been appointed have been for some time past kept without a renewal of patients, as vacancies occurred, so that they, while the other medical wards are full, were empty; when aware of his plan, I demanded an interview with Dr. Jackson, who then admitted his intention of keeping them so, in which he has since persisted. I reported this in two letters to the Physician General to the Army; the one dated May 6th last, the day on

which the conversation alluded to took place, and on the 8th; in the former, inclosing a diet-table of Chatham Hospital, which differs essentially from that of His Majesty's order: a *third** statement was subsequently made, my sentiments having been previously made known a considerable time since.

"Assistant Inspector Borland is much employed in physician's duty of prescribing for medical patients; for this, Dr. Jackson says, there is an order from the War Office, takes the responsibility upon himself, that he has the power of delegating that duty to him, and that he will continue to employ him therein: during Dr. Jackson's last absence he was entrusted with the entire medical care of Chatham hospital.

"The hospital register and books will shew the general practice in use with the result.

"I assert, that by a liberal attention to the wants of the sick, recoveries will both be more frequent and more speedy, relapses be more rare, the sick cannot, without injury to themselves, of course detriment to the service, be debarred certain indulgences; their comforts cannot be withheld with impunity; by a free diet, and occasional use of wine, and other stimuli, convalescents especially are more speedily restored to health; sick, particularly chronic cases, are enabled to go through disease, their strength is supported, relapses are less common; and I am convinced this will be, upon the whole, the most economical plan to government. By a spare diet, men are kept longer in hospitals, are longer in a state of weakness, of course unfit for service; the mortality will probably be greater, and, independent of the feelings of humanity, it must be recollected that expence is in fact increased; it is more slow perhaps, but more certain; liberal treatment of sick is consistent with the most rigid economy; nor can it be an object to curtail the allowances of pay, and rations to orderly men, nurses, and other servants in attendance on the sick.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"(Signed) JAMES CHICHESTER MACLAURIN."
"Tho. Keate, Esq."

* I. e. That of the 27th of May 1801, mentioned at p. 21.

From the information contained in this letter, joined to the intimation given at the conclusion of General Hewett's, the Army Medical Board determined, that one of its members should visit and inspect the hospital at Chatham; and as this kind of duty had been commonly performed by me, and the Physician General did not, according to the terms of his instructions, then consider it as proper to be undertaken by himself without a particular order for that purpose, I was deputed by my colleagues to visit Chatham and perform the desired inspection; attending particularly to the *medical treatment of the sick* by Dr. Jackson. It was however understood and expressly agreed, that, in regard to *such treatment I was to give no opinion or instruction whatever*; but that on my return to town, I should communicate what I had observed concerning Dr. Jackson's practice as a *physician* to the Physician General, it being peculiarly within the line of his duty and authority to judge and decide on that subject. With this arrangement I went to Chatham, and in the morning of the 15th of June waited on General Hewett at the barracks, where Dr. Jackson soon came, and we proceeded to the hospital, and through its several wards, in which I noticed the cleanliness of the floors, and made enquiries concerning the attendants, nurses, &c.; I also examined the provisions, and on these points expressed myself satisfied. I went next to the apothecary's dispensary, and called for the books, which, on inspection, appeared fully to confirm the account of Dr. Jackson's practice, which had been received a few days before from Dr. MacLaurin, in his letter of the 8th of June, more especially in regard to the employment of frequent and large bleedings, *hot* and *cold* baths, or (as was explained) cold water poured from buckets and large saucers on the sick, immediately after coming out of the hot bath, followed by emetics and strong purgatives, particularly calomel and antimonial powder in large doses. I observed also that three patients had then recently died, in the early stage of fever, and that against the names of two of these the word *delirium* had been written, with this remark, viz.

"on dissection of the brain, *veins full of blood*." I did not then suspect the importance which Dr. Jackson appears to have ignorantly attached to this circumstance, nor the inferences which he drew from it, by not knowing what I believed known to every hospital-mate*; I however made particular enquiries concerning the treatment of these patients, and was told (what indeed the cases confirmed) that they had been copiously bled, put into warm and cold baths, and that emetics had afterwards been administered to them, followed, I think, by doses of calomel and antimonial powder.

I was next conducted to the bathing room, in which I observed several bathing tubs, and was informed by the gentleman who accompanied me (an hospital-mate), that the sick on admission were generally bled, frequently until they fainted, and were then placed in what strictly deserved to be called *hot baths*, covered with blankets to increase the heat, and when faintings or great languor occurred, they were taken out and suddenly plunged into a cold bath, or in its stead were dashed with buckets full of cold water; and that as soon as the patient was put to bed, an emetic was commonly

* Dr. Jackson admits, p. 58. of his last publication, that many of the patients who died at the hospital of the depot at Chatham were dissected or opened by Dr. Moulton, and, I am well informed, that, on a particular occasion, when the latter was employed in this way upon the body of one who had undergone the usual treatment of profuse bleeding, bathing, vomiting, and purging, Dr. Jackson remarked that the *veins were very full*; intimating that he considered this circumstance as a proof of the propriety of his practice of depletion, and adding that the vessels were loaded, and required to have that load removed by bleeding and other evacuations. Little as the ancients knew of anatomy, the constant fullness of the veins and emptiness of the arteries after death had been very early observed by them, and the latter had obtained their name (of Grecian derivation) from that circumstance, being considered as *carriers of air*, or vessels of air, rather than of blood. That any man so presuming as Dr. Jackson should, in this age, have been ignorant of this fact, and should consider himself as warranted to perill in wasting human blood, and, I fear, human life, by a circumstance which occurs indiscriminately in all dead bodies, so long as sufficient blood remains to fill the veins, (while the arteries are empty,) may justly excite astonishment, as well as a severe reprobation of such uncommon and dangerous ignorance.

given, and at night a large dose of calomel, or some other cathartic, frequently combined or accompanied with James's powder. As this accorded with what I had observed in the books, I contented myself with making notes to assist my recollection; and I again expressed my satisfaction with the cleanliness of the wards, the attendance, and the quality of the several articles of diet; but, as had been settled and agreed with my colleagues, I carefully abstained from delivering any opinion whatever concerning the methods of treating the sick employed by Dr. Jackson, and on returning to town reported minutely what I had seen and heard on that subject to the Physician General; and to the Board at their next meeting. It may I think be presumed that my report in addition to Dr. Maclaurin's letter must have raised uneasy apprehensions in the mind of the Physician General respecting the effects of Dr. Jackson's practice; but they probably were not thought sufficient to authorise a positive charge of mal-practice, which, considering its consequences, ought not to be made without very decisive proof; especially as charges of that nature are of all others the most difficult to be supported, though well founded: we felt it therefore to be our duty to take care not to impeach Dr. Jackson's professional character without *very strong* grounds; and there were besides many reasons, some of them originating in motives of delicacy and respect towards those persons who had condescended to honour him with their good opinion, which determined us to do nothing precipitately in a matter of so much difficulty; particularly as the hospital of the *dépôt* was then on the point of being removed to the Isle of Wight. Thus circumstanced and disposed, the Army Medical Board a few days after, received Dr. Jackson's letter of the 21st of June (mentioned in Appendix No. 8.) transmitting the monthly return of the hospital, and acknowledging "the number of deaths to be high;" but endeavouring to account for this great mortality, by allegations which subsequent informations have proved in a considerable degree unfounded.

In that letter he manifests very plainly his persuasion that the Board were far from being satisfied with his methods of treating the sick, though he has since pretended (falsely as will be proved) that I had after my (then recent) inspection, signified an unqualified approbation of every thing which I saw: and foreseeing that probably his explanations would not produce all the effect which he desired, he appeals to his professional character as being before the public, and to General Hewett's good opinion of his diligence, adding, "If the Physician General, to whom the investigation of the proper execution or neglect of medical duties is supposed to belong, can bring forward sufficient evidence to convince the Commander in Chief that I am deficient in capacity or attention for a trust so important," &c. "I have no doubt that he who is studious to promote the good of the army, will speedily replace me by a person better qualified." Dr. Jackson well knew the difficulty which there must be, circumstanced as he then was, in bringing forward the evidence here described, and that he might therefore safely assume the language of self-confidence.

From what I have recently mentioned of the disposition of the Army Medical Board, it may be easily conceived that in answering this letter (which was done on the 4th July), we endeavoured to avoid either a *direct* avowal, or a *disavowal* of our unfavourable apprehensions respecting Dr. Jackson's practice, &c. at Chatham. We acknowledged to have noticed, and to have considered it as our duty to notice, the great mortality there; and that his explanations were only in *part* satisfactory, i. e. "as far as they would go." We also declared, and with truth, that "no imputation had been attempted to be thrown upon his character;" adding, that "if we had witnessed or supposed any impropriety in his conduct, we should not have attacked it by insinuation or uncandid rumours." This, which is the only *equivocal* sentence in our letter, leaving it *doubtful* whether we had, or had not witnessed or supposed impropriety in his conduct, and which being

addressed to Dr. Jackson ought to have been understood by him in the sense *least* favourable to himself, he has seized with his usual dexterity, and perverted into a formal acknowledgment of our having then never even supposed any thing improper in his conduct; and upon this false assumption he has advanced a variety of scandalous imputations, in regard to the motives of our subsequent proceedings. We concluded our letter, by calling on him to declare, "whether, considering the great and constant influx of recruits, the various diseases thereby brought into the garrison and the extent of his duties, the sufferings of many of the patients might not be mitigated, by calling to his aid farther medical assistance?" adding "as it is our duty to give every proper support to the heads of departments, so must it equally be yours to support any gentleman who may be directed to do duty under you, which we trust you will in future do." This admonition however had no effect in Dr. Maclaurin's favour; and such was our indulgence, that Dr. Jackson was suffered to persist in excluding the former from all participation in the medical duties of the hospital, and soon after to remove to the Isle of Wight, with Assistant Inspector Borland and those of the medical assistants whom he selected, leaving the others with Dr. Maclaurin (on the 17th of July) to take care of 44 patients left in the hospital at Chatham, some of them described by Dr. Jackson to be in desperate conditions (besides twelve in the prison ship); of whom one died during the first, and another during the second night, and two others afterwards. But excepting these four already hopeless cases, mortality *stopped* with Dr. Jackson from Chatham hospital; for though Dr. Maclaurin admitted more than one hundred additional sick (none of them slight cases) before the hospital was finally broken up (about the end of September), he did not lose another patient.

After this, very little of importance relating to my present subject occurred until the 14th November 1801, when the Secretary at War, by letter to the Army Medical Board,

referred certain papers transmitted to him through the medium of General Hewett, concerning the alterations made by Dr. Jackson at the dépôt hospital, from the established diet table, and directed us to report our opinion thereof as a "ground for considering the propriety of introducing them into the other general hospitals at home." And as this was a matter of great consequence, we thought it our duty to obtain evidence on the subject from persons who had witnessed the *positive* effects of these alterations, so far as they had been tried at the dépôt hospital, previous to its removal from Chatham. We wished however to take this evidence not *privately*, but in presence of the Secretary at War or his deputy, and at the Army Medical Board; for that purpose Mr. Warner, then principal clerk in the office, wrote to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, who then both lived at or near Brompton in Kent, requesting them to come to London and attend at the *War Office* at a particular hour on a specified day about the beginning of December, and the Physician General and myself (Mr. Rush being confined by illness) went according to that appointment, expecting to meet them there. Mr. Andrews however could not come to town as was desired, and Dr. Morison did not arrive until after the hour was past; so that no meeting took place. But he followed me soon after from the Horse Guards to my own house, and afterwards attended the Board; and as I found that it would be troublesome and difficult to effect the desired meeting by another appointment, at the War Office, he was verbally requested to state in writing what he knew of the subject, on which we were directed to report; a similar request was made (by letter) to Mr. Andrews, and also to Dr. Maclaurin. These requests produced their several letters as published in my former Appendix No. 8, and marked B 1, 2, and 3, which were transmitted to the Secretary at War by his desire, with our own opinions on the subject referred to us, in a letter dated the 10th December (See Appendix No. 1. to this work), signed by the Physician General and myself; our colleague Mr. Rush (who died soon after) being then unable to add his

signature; though he had fully concurred in every thing previously done by us relating to Dr. Jackson*.

On the 18th of December the Secretary at War transmitted our letter, with its inclosures, to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, adding that, "when the Physician and Surgeon

* I flatter myself that no man of candour and integrity will discover any thing in these our endeavours to perform what had been required of the Army Medical Board by the Secretary at War (in his letter of the 14th November), but an honest desire to act conformably to this duty and the public welfare. But Dr. Jackson, with his habitual disregard of truth and fairness has advanced the worst of slanders respecting this part of our conduct. In his publication of 1803, p. 141, he observes that Dr. Macleaurin, Dr. Morison, and Mr. Andrews "appear to have been seduced to give opinion on the subject;" and in his last publication, addressed to me, at page 65, he says, you "chose to employ spies or secret agents to disseminate calumnies; and you, I may say, falsified evidence;" (i. e. hired persons to swear falsely) "to cover the forms of accusation. You know perfectly well," he adds, "that you tampered with different persons who had acted under my orders at Chatham Hospital, and that you obtained written testimony from Dr. Morison and Mr. Stratford after you had an interview with them, I believe, at the Horse Guards. There is no power of compulsion that can acquit you from the charge of attempting to accomplish your purposes by unauthorised and illegal means." Probably no person but Dr. Jackson could have ascribed so much criminality, as is here imputed to the most innocent and well-intentioned transactions. To endeavour to ascertain the truth by demanding information from gentlemen of honourable characters on facts within their knowledge and not within ours, facts of great importance to the public and the sick of the army, and intimately connected with the subject on which we had been required to report our opinions to the Secretary at War, is here made a serious crime by Dr. Jackson, as indeed every thing seems to be in his eye which does not favour his own projects and pretensions. That I ever had any interview with Dr. Morison or Mr. Stratford at the Horse Guards is absolutely false; and so is every insinuation of my having in any manner or on any occasion attempted to influence them or any other person to deviate from the truth on any subject relating to Dr. Jackson; and nothing can more clearly prove that the Physician General and myself had no influence upon Mr. Stratford in regard to his letter than our having made no use of it; for certainly, had we dictated that letter, as Dr. Jackson pretends, we should not have rendered it wholly unfit for what he calls our "purpose." Indeed the letter itself affords evidence of our having asked information from Mr. Stratford fully upon the subject officially referred to us; it begins with these words, viz. "Gentlemen, In answer to the questions you put to me respecting the diet used by Dr. Jackson in His Majesty's late general hospital at Chatham, and desiring my opinion thereupon;" &c. The letter does not contain the slightest intimation of our having enquired, or desired any opinion, relating to any thing beyond the subject of diet; but Mr. Stratford's communications went considerably beyond that subject, and therefore the whole letter was suppressed.

General of the army officially state, that the officer placed at the head of a military hospital has taken upon himself to reduce the sick table established by Your Royal Highness's authority for general use, and when they ascribe to the system pursued in that particular hospital, (however it may produce an apparent saving of money,) the debilitated state of the patients, their frequent relapses, and tedious recoveries, and, above all, the unprecedented number of deaths, I presume to submit my opinion, that, upon such a representation, some further proceedings would always be found expedient, as well from regard to the King's troops as to the character of the individual whose professional practice is impeached; and they seem to be more peculiarly necessary in the instance of so extensive an hospital as that of the Isle Wight." In pursuance of this opinion the Secretary at War suggested "the formation of a board composed of some of the most respectable officers in the medical line of the army, to whom the papers now transmitted and those which were received from General Hewitt may be referred; with orders that the Board should, after a personal investigation on the spot, make their report to your Royal Highness thereupon," &c.

This proposal being approved by the Commander in Chief, and also the medical officers whose names had been submitted by the Secretary at War, as proper to constitute the intended Board, the following letter was written by the latter to Sir John Macnamara Hayes, Bart. viz.:

LETTER from the SECRETARY at WAR to Sir J. M. HAYES, Bart.

"SIR, War Office, Dec. 22d, 1801.

"The Physician and Surgeon General of the army having, in an official letter to me, animadverted in pointed terms on the system pursued in the hospital of the Isle of Wight, in the treatment of the medical patients, their representation has been submitted to the Commander in Chief, with such observations as I thought it my duty to offer to His Royal Highness thereupon; in consequence of which His Royal Highness

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has been pleased to order that an investigation of the subject shall forthwith take place on the spot, by a Board of medical officers, composed of Dr. John Hunter, Dr. Pinckard, Mr. Weir, and yourself.

"For the information of the Board, I send you copies of the letter (with its enclosures) from Sir Lucas Pepys and Mr. Keate; of mine to the Duke of York, and of His Royal Highness's answer; and I am to signify to you His Royal Highness's commands, that you do accordingly proceed with your earliest convenience to the Isle of Wight, where you are diligently to investigate the several matters represented by the Physician and Surgeon General, in regard to the treatment of the medical patients under the care and superintendence of Dr. Jackson; to inspect minutely the hospital itself; to notice whether any, and what objections attach to its situation or construction; and to judge how far any defects therein may be considered among the causes of the sickness and mortality stated to have been unusually prevalent among the troops of the depot in the Isle of Wight.

"After due investigation of the whole, you will be pleased to make a full report thereupon, for His Royal Highness's and my information.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your most obedient humble servant,

"Sir J. M. Hayes, Bart."

"C. YORKE."

Two days after the date of the preceding letter, which is important, as stating the duties to be performed by the Special Board, they acknowledged the receipt of it, and of its inclosures, and informed the Secretary at War, that the animadversions of the Physician and Surgeon General "on Dr. Jackson's treatment of the sick, appeared to have arisen from the increase of mortality in the returns;" adding, "this increased mortality is owing, or supposed to be owing, to the change in the diet-table, and the peculiar medical treatment followed by Dr. Jackson, of which an account is given in the letters from Dr. MacLaurin." And, in order that the Special Board might be enabled "to form a correct judgment on these points," they requested copies of the original diet-table, as established by

authority, and of that which contained Dr. Jackson's alterations, together with "the returns of the sick alluded to." After which, they proceeded to make the following singular proposition to the Secretary at War, viz.: "with regard to the medical treatment followed by Dr. Jackson, we have to observe, that difference of opinion on such a subject can never be allowed to imply criminality. If Dr. Jackson be qualified for the commission he holds, he is entitled to make trial of such means of cure, either in diet or in medicine, as he judges most likely to be successful. If any doubt arise how far his judgment may be influenced by attachment to any particular system or opinion, (such as his treatment by depletion,) we conceive that the only judicious way of deciding upon a point of this kind, is by experience and a fair trial. We do not indeed know of any other. The trial might easily be made. If Dr. Jackson take charge of one half of the patients in the hospital, and the two physicians, (Dr. Sutton and Dr. Rogerfon,) now in the Isle of Wight, take charge of the other half, distinct returns from each will soon demonstrate whether there be any thing in Dr. Jackson's practice that increases the mortality."

By this extraordinary expedient, the Special Board seem to have intended to avoid the first and principal object of their appointment, i. e. that of ascertaining by personal investigation upon the spot, whether, and to what extent, Dr. Jackson's peculiar methods of treating the sick were connected with, or productive of, the increased mortality at the hospital of the depot; and in thus abridging their own trouble and responsibility, they recommended a mode of trial which, if any mischief had resulted, or was likely to result, from Dr. Jackson's modes of practice, might be expected to cost the lives of a considerable number of sick soldiers, who, having no choice in regard

* Notwithstanding this assertion, I am persuaded that unless the sick returns then used in military hospitals, nor any form of return which the Special Board with their utmost ingenuity could have devised, would have failed to demonstrate the degree in which Dr. Jackson's practice was productive of mortality; this could only have been ascertained by the personal observation of competent physicians, not for one hour or two, but continued during at least several weeks.

to their physicians, seemed to be particularly entitled to the humane attention of the Special Board for protection against such innovations as had been ascribed to Dr. Jackson, instead of being continued in subjection to them six or eight months longer, for the purpose of a dangerous experiment. The members of the Special Board begin by a *petitis principiis*; they say "if Dr. Jackson be qualified for the commission he holds, he is entitled to make trial of such means of cure, either in diet or in medicine, as he judges most likely to be successful;" and then, assuming it as a fact that he is so qualified, they proceed to draw their conclusions without appearing to recollect that Dr. Jackson had never passed any examination, or given any testimonial of his qualifications, and that he therefore had none of those presumptions in his favour, which appertain to the regular physicians of the army.

The Special Board, however, appear to infer that, *ex officio*, Dr. Jackson must be "entitled to make trial of such means of cure" as he should think proper, even when these means were contrary to the most generally approved doctrines and practice of medical men. Three of these gentlemen had been examined by the president and censors of the College of Physicians, and they probably must have been convinced that if, when questioned at these examinations concerning the treatment of diseases, they had maintained the propriety of such modes of practice as Dr. Jackson was charged with having commonly and almost indiscriminately employed, their own licences to practice would have been withheld, and, I believe, there is little doubt but the medical professors of every respectable university in Europe would have been equally ready to manifest their disapprobation of such practice. Physic, as an art, has subsisted several thousand years, during which the reasonings and opinions of different practitioners have been transmitted by numerous writers to the present generation, who, profiting by the experience and the intellect of former times, have adopted certain maxims and principles concerning the safest and best methods of treating diseases; and these methods have been generally admitted and approved by universities, medical corporations and societies, as the

most salutary; and it seems probable that the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War were induced to appoint the Special Medical Board from an expectation that, after ascertaining how far Dr. Jackson's methods of treating the sick were truly described by Dr. MacLaurin, they would, by referring to the best established doctrines and opinions on that subject, be able to judge and decide, with some degree of certainty, whether these methods had contributed or not to the unusual mortality at the hospital of the dépôt; and it seems also probable that the Special Board, by disappointing this expectation, and representing the trial propounded by themselves "as the only judicious way of deciding upon a point of this kind," must have given to His Royal Highness and to the Secretary at War a disadvantageous opinion of the extent and value of medical knowledge in general, or, at least, of that portion of it which the members of the Board possessed, either collectively or individually. Not that I think such an opinion would have been just in regard to some at least of the Board, and much less in regard to the state of medical science generally; and, therefore, I am the more surprised at a proposal by which all the benefits of that science were to be discarded, and Dr. Jackson's innovations in the practice of physic placed upon an equality with, and supposed to have as good a chance of being salutary as the most approved methods of treating similar diseases. To me it seems that this subject was not new: that general and profuse bleedings, with sudden transitions from heated to cold water, followed by emetics and cathartics were not of the nature of untried remedies; they had been all employed, (though, perhaps, not in the same order, and on the very same day,) and, having often done harm, had been exploded by *sober reason*, as well as by *wit* and *ridicule* *. But if the case had been different, and if the re-

* In the third volume of "*Mémoires de la Société Royale de Médecine*" of Paris, is a long memoir concerning the vapour-baths of the Russians, written by Mr. Senebier, a physician of celebrity, who resided for several years at the court of St. Petersburg as first Physician of the Emperors. These vapour-baths which are public and are resorted to by the common people, are alone connected with the subject of Dr. Jackson's practice. In baths of that description, it is usual

facts of all former experience had been *obliterated* from the writings and memories of *all mankind*, it seems to me that motives of humanity and prudence should still have induced the Special Board *first* to ascertain, as far as possible by that investigation for which they were especially appointed, what effects, good or bad, had been *already produced* by those particular methods of treating the sick, which Dr. Jackson had then constantly employed during eight or nine months at the dépôt hospital, before they ventured to recommend a *farther* trial of them; for if it could be ascertained that they had already done mischief, it would be a culpable sacrifice of life to advise a prolongation of such practices for the sake of an experiment, which, in that case, would have been *superfluous* as well as mischievous.

It is, indeed, true that Dr. Jackson had designedly, as well as unjustifiably, precluded the possibility of contrasting the effects of his own practice immediately with those of Dr. MacLaurin in the *same hospital*, and at the *same periods*; but some means of comparison were still left, which, though loose and general, would, I think, not have proved useless, if they had been properly employed by the Special Board, in an

For persons when heated and in a profuse perspiration, to run out naked, and throw themselves into the snow or into cold water, or to have bucketfuls of cold water poured over them while standing naked in the only room where the vapour-bath is taken. It is from some (probably imperfect) knowledge of this practice that Dr. Jackson seems to have been led to that part of his treatment of the sick which resembles it: but if he had been well informed, if he had perused the memoirs of M. Sanchez, he would have known that, even among the happy Russians, (brought from infancy to the severities of cold, and to sudden changes from heated rooms to an atmosphere which, in the winter, endangers the life of limbs, as well as of noses and ears,) such transitions often produce great or fatal mischiefs to those whose constitutions are not vigorous, who have weak lungs, who are subject to coughs or to spitting of blood, who are liable to headaches, who are attacked by eruptive or other febrile affections, attended with external inflammation, or by small-pox, measles, or other exanthemata, and also to persons who are in the decline of life. And if such injury arise among those, who, from their birth, were habituated to sudden and violent impressions from heat and cold alternately applied, how much greater evils must result from practices like those employed by Dr. Jackson at the dépôt hospital among the natives of our temperate climate?

investigation on the spot: and even, without such means, it might be supposed that these gentlemen, from their own knowledge of the subject, would have been able to judge *a priori* of the probable consequences of such profuse and debilitating evacuations, as were alleged to have been employed, with very little discrimination, by Dr. Jackson, (particularly in fevers,) so far, at least, as to afford a strong presumption that the evil which would arise from prolonging their use, by the proposed experiments, must greatly overbalance any good likely to result from it. But after all, if a farther trial of such unpromising modes of treating the sick, had been deemed proper, without any previous enquiry concerning the *effects already* produced by them, I cannot help thinking, that the Board, from a desire not to put the lives of sick soldiers to unnecessary hazard, should, at least, have begun their experiment upon a smaller number of sick, and that its effects upon these should have been well ascertained before they condemned one half of the patients of an hospital, so large as that of the dépôt, to remain subject to Dr. Jackson's dangerous practice, for, at least, six months longer. Besides these causes for astonishment, at the recommendation of such an experiment, by gentlemen selected, as I presume, for their medical skill and eminence, there is great room for surprise that it should have been described in such loose terms as those employed by the Special Board, and which only suggest a mere numerical division of the patients: for the Board simply propose, that "Dr. Jackson take charge of *one-half* of the patients, and the two physicians (Dr. Sutton and Dr. Rogerfon) take charge of *the other half*;" and seem thereby to consider an equality in the *number* of patients, but not in the *cases of disease*, as sufficient for a fair experiment; so that, according to this mode of division, the trial would be conclusive, although the patients on one side had only slight affections, while those on the other laboured under severe and dangerous disorders. But if it should even be supposed, that the Special Board meant the cases of disease to be also equally divided between the two parties; their proposal, with this meaning, will, probably, appear, on reflection, to be scarcely more de-

fering of the epithet of "judicious," which they have bestowed on it, than with the other: for every man of medical experience knows, that no two cases of disease are ever met with which can be pronounced completely similar in regard to the number and violence of the concomitant symptoms, or to age, constitution, or those other circumstances which may powerfully influence the death or recovery of the patients; and that no human sagacity can foresee the degree of danger that belongs to every case; and it is, therefore, absolutely impossible to divide a number of sick between two parties with such exactness and impartiality as to allot to each only its just proportion of difficulty and danger; and as the proposed experiment must of necessity have been fallacious and nugatory, unless a perfect equality existed in these respects, I can neither applaud the invention nor the discretion of the Special Board in recommending to the Secretary at War a trial so impracticable, under the notion that it "might easily be made." What opinion the Secretary at War formed of the experiment in question does not appear, though the Special Board declare, that they considered his silence as an indication of his acquiescence with their proposal. But the contrary might, with much greater propriety, have been inferred, especially as his original instructions, for an *investigation upon the spot*, were not rescinded, nor even changed in consequence of their letter. And certainly their appointment could not have been necessary for such an experiment as they had recommended, which, indeed, would have occurred more naturally to, and have better become persons destitute of medical knowledge.

On the 25th December 1801, the deputy Secretary at War transmitted copies of the letter of the 22d of that month, (to Sir John Hayes,) and of its inclosures to me, with a letter, in order that the Physician General and myself might "be made acquainted with the steps that had been taken in consequence of our letter of the 10th December;" and having noticed that part of the letter to Sir John Hayes in which we are stated, by the Secretary at War, to have "animadverted in pointed terms on the system pursued in the hospital of the Isle of Wight in the treatment of the medical patients there," we were convinced that our meaning had been, in a considerable

degree, mistaken, and that it was incumbent on us to offer a farther explanation on the subject, which we did by a letter to the deputy Secretary at War, dated "Upper Brook Street December 18th 1801," in which "we begged leave humbly to represent, for the consideration of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and of the Secretary at War, that it did not occur to us that, in our letter of the 10th instant, we animadverted on the practice of Dr. Jackson, at the Isle of Wight;" adding that "we thought it our duty to represent the great mortality there, and consequently animadverted on the success of the practice;" for "otherwise we must appear to His Royal Highness to prejudge Dr. Jackson, and to pass a censure where, from our not having witnessed or investigated Dr. Jackson's practice, we might do an act of injustice."

Of the letter from which this extract is made, we sent a copy on the 29th December to Sir John Hayes, and the other members of the Special Board, before their departure for the Isle of Wight; and they remark, p. 37, that "the distinction which is offered in this letter of animadverting upon the success of the practice, and not on the practice itself, though it somewhat changed the nature of the charge against Dr. Jackson, as contained in the letter of December 10, 1801, did not call for any alteration in the plan proposed by the Special Board, which was calculated to bring both the merits of the practice and the success of it at once to issue." Here they seem to felicitate themselves on the excellence of their singular plan, as capable of answering two purposes at once; although it could only decide upon the merits of Dr. Jackson's practice, by ascertaining its success, and it is very probable, for the reasons already adduced, that it could not have done even the latter effectually.

We concluded our letter to the Special Board by observing,

* It has been alleged by Dr. Jackson, and even by the members of the Special Board, that this letter contained a partial retraction of what had been stated in our letter of the 10th of December. It is however most certain, that we intended more clearly to explain our meaning in that letter, but not to retract any thing contained in it; and this will, I think, be made evident hereafter.

that "the deaths during the (then) last month of the whole army, both in regimental and general hospitals at home, exclusive of the Isle of Wight general hospital," amounted only to 33 out of 2400 patients; "whereas 39 deaths had occurred in that hospital during the same period out of only 339 patients," being more than one death in nine of the patients under Dr. Jackson's care, while only one died out of 66 under the care of the other medical officers of the army generally; a difference so very extraordinary, as, in our opinion, to deserve particular attention.

To finish this account of the proceedings which occurred before the Special Board quitted London, to begin their inspection at the Isle of Wight, it remains to be mentioned, that on the 10th December the Physician General and myself wrote a separate letter to the Secretary at War, recommending that, in consideration of the extraordinary mortality at the depot hospital, two army physicians should be sent immediately to the Isle of Wight, "to assist Dr. Jackson in taking care of the medical patients in the general hospital there;" and the Secretary at War having signified the Commander in Chief's and his own approbation of that proposal, with directions for carrying it into execution, by his letter to me of the 12th of that month, Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon were immediately appointed to that duty; but on their arrival they were not permitted by Dr. Jackson to enter upon it, although he had been informed of the pleasure of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War on that subject, *in the usual mode*, by my letter to him of the 12th December 1801.

The Special Board, at pages 37, 38, &c. of their publication, profess to give an exact account of their arrival and proceedings at the Isle of Wight; and at p. 72. they say that they had "already stated in what manner *every hour* was employed" during their stay upon that island. I therefore confidently expected that I should be able to ascertain, upon their own authority, how much time they had devoted to each particular object or part of their investigation, and to what extent I had wronged them by stating that they had employed only

"about three hours in examining what related to the hospital." I was however greatly disappointed, after having most attentively read over their narrative; for instead of finding how they had employed "*every hour*," it was absolutely impossible for me to ascertain how they had employed *any one hour*, or how much time they had spent upon any particular object, during their inspection; it was even impossible to discover the time when their investigation began, or when it ended; every thing being left by them in a state of doubt and uncertainty, excepting the *course* of their proceedings, or the *order* in which they went from one place to another. Their narrative however was not faulty, solely on account of these omissions, because it had a direct tendency to mislead; for they state that "*early* on the morning of the 30th of December the Board arrived at the Isle of Wight, and without delay proceeded to an examination of the hospital." I will not here charge the members, as they did me, with "wilful misrepresentation," though I could do it with *as much* truth.—*Early* in the morning among travellers, (and especially those who have travelled all night,) certainly does not mean 10 o'clock, the hour at which the Board is stated to have arrived at the Isle of Wight, by Dr. Hunter, in a note from him to the Physician-General, written on the 22d January 1801, soon after the Board had returned to London, and when the fact, from its recency, must have been clearly recollected; nor can it be true that upon their arrival (at Cowes) they could "*without delay* have proceeded to an examination of the hospital," which was about four miles distant. It is not even credible that they set off *towards* the hospital *without delay*; for to gentlemen who had been several hours in crossing the water, from Southampton to Cowes, in the *cold* morning of the 30th December, a *hot* breakfast would, I am persuaded, have been deemed a necessary provision for the fatigues of their future investigation, after a journey from London during the night. All this with the time necessary to prepare and take breakfast, provide carriages, &c. cannot be supposed

to have employed less than an hour, and as it would require nearly *another* to reach Parkhurst, from the badness of the roads at that season of the year, we might fairly suppose that they did not *begin* their examination of the hospital until about noon. Wishing, however, to state *facts* rather than *probabilities* on this subject, I wrote a letter to Sir John Hayes, requesting information respecting these particulars, and also respecting other parts of their narrative. My letter was dated the 17th of August 1808; but the answer to it, from Sir John Hayes, (dated the 1st of September,) afforded no useful explanation. However by writing *two* other letters, I at length obtained *one* from him, dated the 19th of September, in which he mentions *eleven* o'clock as the hour when their "inspection began at the hospital." How far his memory (for he says no memorandum was taken) enables him, so long afterwards, to state the time correctly, I will not decide. If, contrary to my supposition, the members of the Special Board went from Cowes immediately after landing there, without stopping to breakfast, &c. it may be presumed that they would have reached Parkhurst about eleven o'clock. Dr. Sutton, however, from his best recollection, thinks they could not have arrived until "about mid-day," as I had previously concluded. But though I had particularly requested to know from Sir John Hayes the hour when the Special Board *left* the hospital and proceeded to the barracks, he has *omitted* giving the least intimation respecting it, (as the Board had previously done, in their publication,) and has thus rendered that information which he did give respecting the *time of their arrival* at the hospital completely useless. He has indeed in his letter mentioned that the inspection at the Medina hospital concluded between four and five in the afternoon. But the Medina hospital is at some distance, and being appropriated solely to venereal and surgical cases, what they did there is foreign to my purpose. The space of *three* hours, mentioned in my Appendix, No. 8, was the time which I had supposed to have been employed by the Special Board, in and about the hos-

pital for the *sick* at Parkhurst; and as they had complained of this, as being too little, it certainly would have been natural and proper for them to let the public know how much longer their inspection had lasted at Parkhurst hospital; but they chose rather to leave every thing ambiguous concerning the length of time employed there, or at any other place; telling us only the *causes* of their proceedings. Probably they perceived that if they had done otherwise, the space of four or five hours, divided into *three distinct parts*, with the time necessary to go from the barracks to the Medina hospital, would not afford them so much as three or even two hours for that of Parkhurst; and indeed Mr. Powell, assistant surgeon to the depot hospital, who was on duty there when the Special Board made their inspection, believes that in fact they were less than two hours in that hospital.

I will not however detain my readers by any farther attempt to ascertain *how long* the Special Board remained at the hospital in question, but proceed to enquire *what they did while there*. And here I am sorry that they have furnished me with but very scanty information. They tell us indeed that "Dr. Jackson, who had been apprised of their coming both by the Secretary at War," (and *by themselves*;) "was in readiness to attend them;" that, "they saw every patient in the hospital;" which might be done nearly as men see a regiment under arms, by walking through the wards and perceiving heads and sometimes faces projecting beyond the bed clothes. They add however that "of some of the more *serious* cases they examined the symptoms and enquired into the treatment." This, so far as their examinations and enquiries extended, was acting properly; but unfortunately, though the number of serious cases then in the hospital was great beyond example, and the motives for a minute examination and enquiry were singularly urgent, (no less than *four* patients appearing by the returns to *have died on that very day*) there is but too much reason to believe from the shortness of the time employed, and from the best recollection of a medical gentleman then on duty there,

that a very few cases only were particularly attended to; and of these, that which attracted most notice was the case of Thompson the surgery man, who on the preceding day had by one bleeding, lost 56 ounces of blood according to Dr. Jackson, and 54 according to the prescription book *. But whatever the number of cases examined by the Special Board may have been, their examinations were manifestly such as to throw no light on the subject, nor answer any useful purpose; for they have nowhere given any intimation of any result, inference, or conclusion drawn by them from what they either saw or did in that respect at the hospital, but have

* The case of Thompson has been *once* mentioned by Dr. Jackson in his publication of 1803, p. 44. as it was then to the Special Board, *with great exaltation*, as affording decisive evidence in favour of his practice of bleeding *profusely*. What the man's disorder was appears uncertain, different names having been given to it. We may however presume from its very speedy termination, that whatever the appearances may have been no such serious disease existed as Dr. Jackson would make us believe. Mr. Powell, who saw the case, and was well acquainted with the man, states him to have been very strong and robust, and also very much addicted to the excessive use of opium and ardent spirits; and it seems not improbable that the violent affection of the head and other symptoms which Dr. Jackson considered as indicating so much danger, may have been the effect of drunkenness. By the prescription book, No. 2, of ward No. 1, it appears that Dr. Jackson first ordered bleeding, without any specification of the quantity; with blisters to the forehead, the temples and the breast; and 6 grains of James's powder every four hours. This prescription, inserted among those of the morning, is however marked with a cross as having been cancelled, and another is substituted among those of the evening of the 29th December, containing these words, viz. "Thompson V. S. 54. Tart. Emst. gr. liij. Opii gr. x. Epispast. Pector. Fronti." After this, upon the same evening, another prescription occurs for Thompson, viz. "Pulv. Dov. gr. x. Nitri gr. x. 2 h." On the next day, (that on which the Special Board made their visit to the Hospital,) nothing was ordered for Thompson; the intoxication from spirits or opium having probably gone off. That a man unusually stout, vigorous, and robust, was not killed by the loss of 54, or as Dr. Jackson says, 56 ounces of blood, is not extraordinary, but that any disease existed to require that violent treatment, will never be credible, considering that on the very next day he was so well as to *overeat* nothing. Dr. Moore was unable to inform me what afterwards became of Thompson: but said that on account of his propensity to drunkenness he had been glad to get rid of him.

in their report, as well as in their statement, completely abstained from adducing or employing the results of these examinations and enquiries for the purpose of ascertaining in any degree either the nature or the effects of Dr. Jackson's practice*; and yet if any thing beneficial on that subject could have been effected, by an investigation on the spot, a fairer or better opportunity of doing it has rarely occurred, or one in which the motives for exertion were more urgent. Having however left this question exactly as they found it, a dilemma naturally presents itself, into which the members of the Special Board are necessarily forced. For either an occasion like that which was afforded to them at Parkhurst hospital, might have been so employed as in some degree to ascertain whether Dr. Jackson had or had not been guilty of mal-practice, or it could not have been so employed. If we admit the first of these alternatives, it will then follow, that the Special Board neglected their duty, in not having ascertained something on this subject; but if the latter alternative be true, it must follow that they were very *insincere* and *inexcusable* afterwards in blaming the Physician General and myself for not having previously gone to the Isle of Wight, for that very purpose which they (the Special Board) had not been able to accomplish, and in advising that we should go thither, in case of future doubts, &c. for the like purpose, though they had found it to be unattainable by such means.

The Special Board next tell us that "the articles of diet were submitted to their inspection." This however seems to have been an unnecessary formality: no objection having been made to the quality of these articles, though complaints

* It does not appear from any thing published by the Special Board, nor from the best information which I was able to obtain at Parkhurst, that the members of the Board, whilst at the hospital, opened, or even asked for, so much as one of the prescription books, to ascertain how the few patients had been treated, on whom they bestowed some little attention; nor was it understood at the hospital, so far as I could discover, that the Special Board either pretended or intended to form any judgment on the subject of Dr. Jackson's practice.

had been made against those *abstractions* in regard to *quantity* which were supposed not to have left the sick a sufficiency of nourishment.

After this they declare, for the purpose of contradicting a part of my Appendix No. 8. that Dr. Jackson "was so far from making any attempt to *lead* their judgment, that he did scarcely more than reply to their enquiries." In making this strange declaration, the Special Board must certainly have forgotten what they had, and have till this moment concealed, as far at least as concealment depended on themselves; I mean a written "statement by Dr. Jackson, respecting the hospitals of the army dépôt," containing twenty-six pages in folio, and delivered by him to the members of the Special Board, when they arrived at the Isle of Wight; in which Dr. Jackson appears to have exerted his utmost ingenuity (during the week which had intervened, after he was informed of the appointment of the Special Board, &c.) in preparing a most artful and plausible misrepresentation of facts, not merely to "lead," but grossly to mislead "their judgment;" and in doing this he was not satisfied with endeavouring to refute what had been alleged against himself, in the letter of the Physician and Surgeon General of the 10th of December, and in its inclosures, but he attempted in language the most virulent and disrespectful, to criminate and stigmatize every one who had presumed to deliver an opinion unfavourable to his methods of treating the sick, or to his new diet table. In this statement the Physician and Surgeon General are charged with having, "from an early period," had a "determined purpose of fixing blame on the management of the hospital of the dépôt," and with having for this purpose brought forward "testimonies from prejudiced and influenced, but ill-informed persons." And having at the same time "withheld the testimony of a respectable man, because it did not criminate *." Dr. MacLaurin is therein described as having

* This scandalous misrepresentation relates to Mr. Joseph Dowse, mentioned in Dr. Morison's letter as the commissioned medical officer who attended the

been "at first the *servile* instrument," afterwards "seemingly the directing organ, in this *grand work of crimination*." Dr. Jackson afterwards adds, "from such mutilated, garbled and defiguring evidence, the Physician and Surgeon General appear to have entertained the hopes of fixing a mark of censure upon my conduct: the justice of the Commander in Chief has defeated the *machination*." Besides charges of this aggravated nature against the Physician and Surgeon

convalescents. He was apothecary at the dépôt hospital, when Dr. Jackson first arrived there, but afterwards removed to a recruiting district, as before mentioned, upon a request from Dr. Jackson, in the month of April; and consequently before Dr. Jackson had introduced his new diet table. Mr. Dowse's letter to me, (of which he seems to have sent Dr. Jackson a copy,) was dated "Birmingham, December 7th, 1801;" in it he writes as follows: "when Dr. Jackson first joined the Chatham hospital, he continued me in the hospital No. 3, where I had been doing duty for some time: this hospital was appropriated to the reception of convalescents, from the fourth or medical hospital," and sometimes (when there was a want of other room) to the reception of venereal and surgical cases. He adds, "a few weeks before I left Chatham, one ward was opened (in No. 3,) for contagious acute diseases, small-pox, measles, &c." He adds, that he knows little of the medical treatment in other parts of the hospital.

In regard to the stoppage of wine by Dr. Borland, which Mr. Dowse had ordered for the convalescents (as mentioned by Dr. Morison,) he says it occurred while he was in London for a few days, and is persuaded he must have thought it necessary when he ordered it. Mr. Dowse concludes his letter, by stating that, "in his passage to and from the electrifying room (of which he was in charge) he had to pass through the bathing-room, where, (continues he,) I observed a very liberal use of the lancet; as I did not examine the particular cases, I should be wrong to condemn the practice. I confess it is an instrument I have no partiality for, having practised ten or fifteen years in the West Indies where that instrument is little used. I have the honour to be, &c." Notwithstanding the great delicacy and caution manifested by Mr. Dowse in this letter, it is easy to see that his opinions and observations, as far as he had opportunities of making them, were in accord with those of Dr. MacLaurin and Dr. Morison, and that we could have had no motive for keeping back his letter, but the very proper one of not taking up the time and attention of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War, with a document of so little importance; and nothing but that malignity which is so predominant in Dr. Jackson's mind and writings, could ever have attempted to put any bad construction upon our conduct.

General, insulting expressions are frequently intermixed. And the Physician General in particular is stated to have made a record of his ignorance, &c. (by our letter of the 10th December 1801.)

In the administration of justice it is, I believe, a matter of absolute right and necessity, that those who have advanced a charge against another, should hear or be informed of the allegations and evidence employed by the person accused, for his justification, because these allegations, &c. may be false, and their falsehood may be capable of demonstration by the adverse party if he be made acquainted with them; and if this be matter of right when the person accused merely endeavours to justify himself, it is much more so when he also endeavours to *recriminate*. But to this kind of justice the Special Board were completely inattentive. They not only concealed from the Physician and Surgeon General, and from Dr. MacLaurin, Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, the explanations, denials, assertions, &c. which Dr. Jackson had opposed to their statements, but also those allegations and imputations by which he had endeavoured to impeach their veracity, or charge them with criminality, and which, as appears from the report of the Special Board, were suffered to make injurious impressions upon their minds; which could not have happened, if, according to their manifestly indisputable duty, they had communicated the allegations, &c. in question to those against whom they were directed; and had thus enabled the latter to justify themselves before the Special Board had made their report. But besides all this, it is to be observed that the members of this Board, who were so *morbidly sensible* to the slightest (supposed) deviation from the severity of military discipline, that they could not avoid passing a formal censure upon the Physician and Surgeon General for having asked the opinions of Mr. Andrews, and Dr. Morison on the subject of Dr. Jackson's new diet table, were yet able to receive from the latter, without any apparent disapprobation, and also to conceal

expressions the most *disrespectful* and *insulting* towards his *superiors* the Physician and Surgeon General, and the most subversive of all military subordination. That which was then concealed by the Special Board, even Dr. Jackson "thought it fair and proper" that the Physician General should be informed of, and therefore sent him a copy of it; but not until the 21st of January 1802, when he supposed it would be too late for the Physician and Surgeon General to obviate or remove the effects of this "statement;" as the report of the Special Board had then been not only made, but adopted by the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War, and the conduct of the Physician and Surgeon General had been noticed in terms which led Dr. Jackson to suppose that his triumph was not only complete but *permanent*. Here however the justice of the Commander in Chief upon better information seems to have disappointed Dr. Jackson's expectation.

The Special Board next inform us, "that after examining every ward and apartment in the hospital, and the ground about it, they proceeded to an examination of the barracks, and the ground about these, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Farquhar, the Military Deputy Inspector of the dépôt, who was good enough to conduct them through the barracks, and to answer all their enquiries. He also gave them a letter from General Hewett, who had committed his thoughts to writing, upon several of the matters referred to the Board." Here then was another attempt (in addition to Dr. Jackson's statement of 26 folio pages) "to lead their judgment;" and the Board, with equal candour, took care to conceal it, as they did the statement by Dr. Jackson, though it affected me in a very particular manner. The letter is however now printed with the Report of the Board, and I therefore need only notice those parts of it, which are more immediately connected with my present subject. Alluding to my visit to Chatham, General Hewett observes, that the Surgeon General's arrival was *most properly* unexpected. He

was on the *instant* taken to every ward in the General Hospital; he had an opportunity of seeing and examining most minutely into every circumstance which he required, or could possibly be pointed out to him, and on my then desiring to know, whether any thing was defective in the power of my authority to correct or provide, he declared in the presence of Dr. Jackson and Surgeon Warren, his unqualified satisfaction at every thing he had seen; the diet had made a part of his examination, and in which were many deviations from the printed form, (some of them the consequence of his own recommendation to Dr. Jackson); and neither then nor since, until the arrival of the Secretary at War's letter of the 22d instant, did I ever learn, that the Medical Board had any objection to them; it is certain, that they have been in its possession for many months; and the Medical Board could not be unacquainted with Dr. Jackson's practice at that time, or previous to it, *for it is in print*; I cannot, therefore, but be surprised to find that complaint making a part of the present charge." Here General Hewett declares, that at the conclusion of my inspection, he enquired of me, "whether any thing was *defective in the power of his authority* to correct or provide?" That a question of this import, though perhaps not exactly in these words, was put to me by General Hewett, I believe; and I believe also, that I answered it, by thanking him for his civility; and intimating, either that I had no need of his particular interference, or no need to trouble him; or, perhaps, that I was satisfied with the cleanliness of the wards, &c.: certain I am, however, that I did not express an "unqualified satisfaction at every thing I had seen," not only from what I recollect of my own expressions and ideas at that time, but from my previous agreement with my colleagues, and my determination to abstain from giving any opinion whatever on the subject of Dr. Jackson's practice; and it will not, I believe, appear unlikely that General Hewett should, after an interval of six months, have been unable to recollect my words exactly. It must indeed have

been impossible, especially with my previous determination on the subject, that I could, in answering General Hewett's question, intend to allude to the subject of Dr. Jackson's *medical treatment of the sick*, because that was not "within the power of General Hewett's authority to correct or provide;" and as his question, *according to his own statement*, extended only to such objects, any answer that I gave, even supposing it to have been as indefinite as that which is imputed to me, ought upon every fair method of construction, to be understood as referring solely to his *question*, i. e. to such objects as were within the extent of his "authority to correct or provide." It must have been obvious, that to decide and report on a subject so intricate as the medical treatment of diseases would require considerable time and deliberation, and also that it was my duty previously to make a report, either to the Physician General singly, or to the Army Medical Board collectively; and that I, as Surgeon General, could do nothing on a medical subject, but in conjunction with my colleagues; and General Hewett must have known, that such report when made, would, as *matter of course*, be addressed not to himself, but to the Commander in Chief, and Secretary at War; and I therefore considered General Hewett's question merely as an act of civility, and an offer of his assistance on those points only which were within the extent of his authority; for I could not suppose, nor will even at this time believe, that he intended to question me concerning Dr. Jackson's practice, when I had barely finished my inspection, and consequently before I could have had any time to reflect upon what I had seen. But whatever General Hewett's intentions may have been, he must have mistaken mine in supposing, that my answer was intended to exculpate Dr. Jackson's practice, or to extend beyond the obvious meaning of his own question. And here I must observe, that the letter which Dr. Jackson wrote to the Army Medical Board, only six days after my inspection, and when nothing farther on the subject had passed between us, clearly

manifests, that he was very far from considering the Board as being satisfied in regard to his practice. In that letter he says, "I understand that the mortality of Chatham Hospital has been a subject of *animadversion* with the Army Medical Board, and consequently that the conduct of the head of the department, as responsible for the execution of the medical duties, has not passed without censure." Who after this will believe that I was considered by Dr. Jackson as having expressed complete satisfaction with his modes of treating the sick; and if not so believed by him who was *present* during the whole of my conversation with General Hewett, how could I, with reason, be so considered by the *latter*? There is besides very decisive evidence of the same nature in Dr. Jackson's publication of 1803, at p. 160. where he says, that his alteration in the diet of the *dépôt* hospital "was publicly known to the Surgeon General in the month of June, when he visited the hospital at Chatham; it was then examined by him, and approved; at least *not represented as wrong*, till circumstances connected it with something different, &c." Here then Dr. Jackson admits, that I only approved of his new diet table, *by not representing it as wrong*, and consequently that this is the only way in which I approved of his modes of treating the sick. For General Hewett states my answer to have been general, and to have extended to *every* thing which I had seen; and as I saw full as much of what related to diet, as to what concerned Dr. Jackson's practice, I could not by the *general* answer, which has been ascribed to me, have approved of the practice, without also approving of the changes in diet.

General Hewett next proceeds to observe, that *some* of the many deviations which Dr. Jackson had made from the printed form of the diet table, were adopted in consequence of my own recommendation. Here, however, the General has fallen into another mistake: I had indeed, on the 13th of December 1800, soon after Dr. Jackson's appointment to Chatham Hospital, (when the scarcity of corn was so great,

that persons of the highest rank and distinction were employing means to diminish the consumption of bread,) directed him to consult the medical officers at Chatham Hospital, concerning a substitution of rice and potatoes, instead of one third of the usual allowance of bread, as had been already proposed by me to other General Hospitals. But this proposal was not made with any view to *diminish* the quantity of *nourishment* allowed by the established diet table to the patients, and therefore had no sort of connection with the complaint made against Dr. Jackson's alterations, which originated, not in any substitution of rice and potatoes for bread, but in his abstraction from the proper quantum of nourishment.

General Hewett then states, that until he received the Secretary at War's letter, of the 22d December (1801), he did not know, "that the Medical Board had any objection" to the alterations made by Dr. Jackson in the established diet table, though he considered it as certain, that these alterations must have been "in its possession for many months;" and he concludes, that the Board "could not be unacquainted with Dr. Jackson's practice at that time, or previous to it;" for says he, "it is in print," presuming that the Medical Board must necessarily have read all that *farrago* of obscure and inconsistent repetitions which Dr. Jackson has published at different times, and have thence discovered or deduced what probably is not contained therein; I mean correct notions of his method of treating the sick at Chatham.

At the conclusion of this long letter, General Hewett assigns as his motive for writing it, an apprehension that, "from *indisposition* and *other causes*," he might not be able to see the members of the Board on that day. Fortunately, however, these apprehensions proved to be unfounded, for they tell us, "the General joined them in person," almost immediately, and "before they quitted the ground," on which his letter had been put into their hands.

Considering the nature and great extent of the General's letter, and of Dr. Jackson's "statement," it seems a little ex-

extraordinary that the Special Board should have contradicted, in offensive and angry terms, my assertion that Dr. Jackson had explained every thing as he pleased "without contradiction;" and it is still more extraordinary that they should have represented him as having "done scarcely more than reply to their enquiries." The explanations contained in Dr. Jackson's statement, and General Hewett's letter, doubtless extend to every thing, which either of them (during the week's notice which they had received of the coming of the Special Board) could think of as likely to be useful; and these explanations alone would have justified my assertion on the subject, without the replies which Dr. Jackson made "to their enquiries" during the course of the day. But in addition to these, we are told that in the evening Dr. Jackson again "waited on the Board by appointment, for the purpose of answering such enquiries as they might think necessary to make, whether arising out of their inspection of the hospital, the examination of the books, or other matters." And he, we are told, did not leave them until "*it was late at night.*" The business of answering enquiries, &c., was perhaps in some degree interrupted by the visit from Drs. Sutton and Rogerlon, which Sir John Hayes, in his letter to me of the 19th September 1808, mentions as *unexpected*, they not having been "desired to attend," according to his recollection. Considering, however, that Dr. Jackson had been in readiness to receive the Board at the time of their landing, and had accompanied them during the *whole* of their progress, it may be supposed that though they, by this undesired interruption, were hindered from passing the evening with Dr. Jackson *only*, he still had been indulged with abundant opportunities for explanations, of such a nature, and in such circumstances, as that the wisest and most upright judge that ever existed could have had no security against deception, and but little chance of escaping it. The purity with which justice is administered in England results chiefly from this circumstance, that the judges and jurymen have no *private* interview or communication

with either party; that they hear nothing from one, but in the presence of the other, who, by knowing what is alleged, may answer and refute as much of it as he can with truth. But the Special Medical Board adopted a mode of proceeding which was, I believe, unexampled, and will, I hope, never be imitated, in this country at least,—that of avoiding all communication with those who had either made, or were able to support, charges against Dr. Jackson, and going to and *secluding* themselves with him for a considerable time, when the charges had been a week in his possession; receiving (from him) *private* communications, both *written* and *oral*, not merely for the purpose of his own justification, but of a nature highly recriminating; concealing all these communications from the individuals who were *injured by them*, and whose right it was to have been made acquainted with them (as Dr. Jackson had been made acquainted with every thing alleged against himself); and afterwards, on the ground of such an enquiry, not only acquitting Dr. Jackson, but condemning the Physician General, Dr. MacLaurin, and myself, *all unheard*, and completely ignorant of what had been done. That the members of the Special Board should, in this age and in this country, have compromised themselves by a proceeding so repugnant to the most *established* and *best known* forms and maxims of justice, will at least excite wonder; and it perhaps may be thought still more wonderful, that they should affect or pretend to complain of my having represented their proceedings as "*completely ex parte*," and as being *unsatisfactory*. For even Dr. Jackson, notwithstanding the advantages which he obtained by this conduct of the Special Board, could not refrain from declaring that it was *contrary* to his expectations! that he was disappointed at not finding the Physician and Surgeon General with all their evidence prepared to support the charges they had given against him. See page 25 of his last publication. He adds, "I was even disappointed that the investigation was not more formal than it was."

Having dined, (at the Vine-inn at Cowes,) the Special Board tell us that "at seven o'clock they resumed their business, by examining the hospital books, &c." How they performed this examination (which took place before Dr. Jackson's arrival), will be shewn hereafter.

They add, "it was late at night when Dr. Jackson and the other physicians left them; but of so much importance did they deem the subject upon which they were employed, that they continued in *serious* deliberation until between two and three o'clock in the morning; and a sketch of the following letter was drawn out before the Board broke up, in order that it might be in readiness for the *earliest* post *." By declaring,

* The letter was in these words, viz.

"Sir,

"We have the honour to state, for your information, that we are proceeding with all possible dispatch in the necessary inquiries respecting the several circumstances referred to our consideration by your letter of December 22; but as we find that some days must be occupied in arranging the materials we have collected, so as to enable us to present a full and correct report for the information of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief and yourself, we think it essential to His Majesty's service that we should lose no time in communicating to you our opinion on a point of high importance, and which calls for immediate attention, viz. the over-crowded state of the hospitals; and we are the more desirous to avoid a moment of delay, as this is the principal cause of the increased mortality which has been lately observed among the troops in the Isle of Wight.

"We think it requisite that a part of the sick should be immediately removed, in order to give convenient room for the accommodation and treatment of the numerous cases of disease which are daily brought into the hospitals, and the most ready means of relief that suggests itself to us on this head, is to remove those men who labour under slight complaints, and who may be conveyed without injury, from the Medina hospital, and the hospital at Parkhurst, to the general military hospital at Gosport, where, we understand, there is plenty of room for their accommodation.

"Should this arrangement meet His Royal Highness's and your approbation, we think it advisable that the necessary instructions for carrying it into effect should be forthwith transmitted. We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed).

To the Right Honourable C. Yorke,
Secretary at War, &c. &c.

"J. M. HAYES.

"J. HUNTER.

"J. WALK.

"G. PINCHARD."

as was done in this letter, that "the over-crowded state of the hospitals" had been "a principal cause of the increased mortality lately observed among the troops in the Isle of Wight," the Special Board probably thought they were contributing essentially to Dr. Jackson's exculpation, when in fact they were preferring against him one of the heaviest of charges, i. e. that of having occasioned a great number of deaths by a manifest breach or neglect of duty, in not sending from time to time such of the sick as could not be properly accommodated in the dépôt hospital to that of Gosport, where sufficient preparations had been made for their reception at my desire, as Dr. Jackson well knew, and as can be proved by my correspondence with him and with Mr. Buckle, principal medical officer of the general hospital at Gosport *; and

* When the dépôt hospital was transferred from Chatham to the Isle of Wight, all the sick capable of being removed, were sent by water to the general hospital at Gosport; and Dr. Jackson was informed, that on future occasions he might consider the latter as a resource to the former, whenever it should become too much crowded. And on the 13th of July 1801, three or four days before he gave up the hospital at Chatham to Dr. MacLaurin, Dr. Jackson wrote to me expressing his apprehensions of a want of sufficient accommodation for some time at the Isle of Wight; adding, "for though I am well assured every assistance will be given by Gosport Hospital, yet the distance is too great for the transport of persons who are ill of acute diseases." Here the Doctor completely forgot those extraordinary benefits which he pretends (1803, p. 297.) to have seen twenty years ago, particularly in fevers, from what he calls "effluvia," which he defines to be "the air of transporting sick persons in the open air in carts, carriages, or other conveyances, exposed to all the chances of weather." Supposing however that Dr. Jackson did not believe in what he has so often and so strongly insinuated on this subject, there were so many patients with diseases of another description at the dépôt hospital, who might have been removed to Gosport without danger, that no reason could exist for allowing the sick to accumulate exclusively at Parkhurst: of this indeed he was well convinced; and accordingly in his letter to me from the Isle of Wight, dated the 9th of August 1801, (soon after his arrival there,) he wrote the following lines: viz. "As I found Gosport Hospital full at the time I passed to the Isle of Wight, I have not sent any sick as yet to that place; but if we come to be pressed, we shall be under the necessity of taking that liberty;"—and, on the following day, Dr. Jackson wrote another letter to me, in which are these words: viz. "A transport has just arrived here from Ireland, which recruits; fourteen must be taken into the hospital, and we have as yet only a small part of the Medina military

the Special Board were in fact only losing time by writing to the Secretary at War, instead of making an application *directly* to General Hewett, who was fully competent to effect the desired removals.

After this we are told that at 9 o'clock in the morning of the 31st of December, Drs. Jackson, Rogerfon and Sutton waited upon the Board, to answer their enquiries (though Dr. Sutton, in his letter to me, appears not to recollect that any question was asked of himself or Dr. Rogerfon by the Special Board.) They add, "that Dr. Jackson not objecting to allow the two other Gentlemen, Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon, to take their *share* of the business of the hospital, it was understood that they were immediately to enter on duty." It was doubtless equally obliging and condescending in Dr. Jackson *at last* to acquiesce with the commands of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, after having resisted them during the space of *seventeen days*, in which between twenty and thirty persons had died in the dépôt hospital, and a greater number were apparently brought to a deplorable and irrecoverable state. Of these probably a considerable portion might have been saved had the Army Physicians been permitted *immediately* to "take their share" of the medical duty of the hospital. And with what mild complacency all this is mentioned by the Special Board! We are next told that "after Drs. Rogerfon and Sutton were dismissed, the Board enquired of Dr. Jackson, if he was acquainted with

so that I am afraid we shall be under the necessity of sending a portion of our sick to Gosport." In consequence of this information, I on the very next day wrote to Mr. Buckle, Principal Medical Officer of the hospital at Gosport, directing him "to make as much room as possible, in order to receive the patients" likely to be sent to him by Dr. Jackson from Parkhurst;—and this was done accordingly;—though it appears that Dr. Jackson only sent four patients in all, and at different times, in consequence of this provision. Should he ever reflect on the probable consequences of this neglect, I must suppose that they, to use his own words, "cannot fail to afflict any person who has not lost the sensibilities of a humane mind, or become callous to the duties of a human being."

the contents of their letter of the 24th December to the Secretary at War, in which they had proposed what appeared to them to be the best and fairest method of bringing to issue the question of practice, by instituting a comparison between the success of his treatment of diseases, and that of the other physicians. To this he replied, that he had received a copy of the letter from the Secretary at War."

"The Board expressed to Dr. Jackson the importance which they attached to establishing this comparison; and a rumour having reached them that he intended to resign his appointment at the dépôt, they recommended to him not to do so until the trial had been made." It seems however that the Board knew very little of Dr. Jackson, when they supposed that any sort of persuasion could ever influence him to allow any fair trial and comparison between his practice, and that of any well qualified physician. It was principally to avoid that kind of trial and comparison that he very soon contrived to keep Dr. MacLaurin without any patients at Chatham*, and here (at the Isle of Wight), though Dr. Jackson had only been required to allow the two Army Physicians to *assist* him in taking care of the sick, and though it was understood to be settled between him and the Special Board, that Drs. Rogerfon and Sutton, should *only* take their *share*, of the business of the hospital, (as is also stated in the report afterwards made by the Board to the Secretary at War,) Dr. Jackson on the very next morning

* It ought to be remembered, that if Dr. Jackson had not in this way deprived Dr. MacLaurin of his *share* of the medical duty at Chatham, the experiment which the Special Board so strongly recommended, would have been already made there, as a matter of course, and probably with a saving of lives; for considering how many died while Dr. Jackson engrossed the whole medical duty, and considering that after his departure from Chatham, Dr. MacLaurin admitted above one hundred patients of whom not one died, it may be fairly presumed that if he had taken charge of half of the sick while Dr. Jackson was at Chatham, there would at least have been no increase of mortality, but probably a diminution of it, and the desired experiment would have been made without the risks attending a further continuance of Dr. Jackson's debilitating mode of treating the sick.

thought proper to deliver over the *whole* of the sick to Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon, contrary to his duty, and the orders of his superiors. And for this misconduct he had obviously two motives; first, that (which had influenced his conduct at Chatham) of rendering all comparison between his practice and that of the army physicians impossible; and thus hindering that experiment which the Special Board so strongly recommended to him, and in which they "considered the Secretary at War as acquiescing;"—and, secondly, a wish to throw from himself upon the army physicians the whole odium of the great number of deaths, which he was morally certain (as were the members of the Special Board) must take place in a very short time, from the desperate condition of many of the patients in the hospital*; hoping that by thus transferring to others the blame of deaths, which had become unavoidable under his treatment, the practice of the army physicians might appear even less successful than his own†. The Board then conclude this part of their

* Dr. Jackson, in his publication of 1803, states these *disparate* cases as amounting to fourteen; but from all that I can discover they were more than twice that number. Dr. Sutton, in a letter to me dated Greenwich, September 22, 1803, writes, "I did not take any memorandum of the number of sick (delivered over at Parkhurst hospital on the 21st of January 1803), nor of their condition; but in comparison to the whole, I can safely affirm there were a great many very serious cases, and many in a state of extreme debility; indeed so far reduced as not to have any chance of recovery; such indeed appeared to be the opinion of one of the Special Board; his expression to me (on the morning of the 31st December) was, that 'it was the most sick hospital he had ever seen.'" He adds, "I was much astonished to find that Dr. Jackson, in a publication of his, had stated the probably fatal cases at so low a number, when he delivered up the charge of the sick to the physicians. *This ought long ago to have been contradicted.*" As a confirmation of this it may be added that, on the morning after the sick were thus delivered over, seven were found to be dead; that twenty-four died in the first week, and seventeen in the second; after this, most of Dr. Jackson's bad cases being disposed of, the deaths in the third week were reduced to four.

† After Dr. Jackson had given over the sick of the hospital to the physicians, he prescribed for those who became sick in the barracks, sending the bad cases from time to time into the hospital. In this way, if any comparison were made between his practice and that of the physicians, it must have been all in his favour; for he retained no patient likely to die.

Narrative, by stating, that "no point remained on which they required to satisfy themselves by further investigation upon the spot, they consequently adjourned their meeting to London, and left the island about mid-day, on the 31st December 1801;" having been there *about twenty-six hours*.

It is now expedient that I should recur to the letter written by the Board to the Secretary at War, and dated from the Isle of Wight on the day of their departure, and which, as *matter of course*, would have been dispatched from Cowes, with the mail of that day, *four hours after they had left the island*, and consequently must, and did mislead the Secretary at War, into a belief that they were *then remaining upon the island*, "proceeding with all possible dispatch in the necessary enquiries," &c. Indeed the Deputy Secretary at War appears to have been completely deceived by this proceeding, for he on the first of January wrote an answer to that letter, addressing it to "Sir John Hayes, Bart." &c. at the "Isle of Wight;" and in the body of the letter, mentioned him "and the other members," as *now (then) sitting in the Isle of Wight*, though they probably had all been some time sitting quietly and separately at their own houses in London. Why they chose to lead the Secretary at War into this error, I must leave for their explanation; being unable myself to conceive any other motive for this proceeding, than a wish to have it believed that they had employed more time than they really did at the Isle of Wight, and a reasonable apprehension, that if the truth were known, it would not appear credible, that they had properly fulfilled the purpose for which they were appointed.

After being more than a week in London the Special Board, on the 8th January 1802, presented their report to the Secretary at War; and having lately thought proper, not only to publish it, but to invite the Physician General and myself to enter upon an examination of it, by declaring, (at p. 72.) that if they "were guilty of errors or omissions" our "pointing them out would be *useful*," I cannot resist the desire which I

feel of becoming so by making that examination, especially when I may hope, at the same time, to serve the cause of truth and justice.

In the preamble to their report the Special Board declare that it was made "after inspecting the hospital and barracks at Parkhurst," "and enquiring upon the spot into every circumstance that appeared to be connected with the subject referred" to them. But if they mean by this declaration that they made any sufficient or useful enquiries respecting the nature and effects of Dr. Jackson's practice, I must, for the reasons already mentioned and to be hereafter mentioned, enter my protest against this pretension, as being completely unwarrantable.

The Special Board then proceed to say, "we found the hospitals at Parkhurst, clean and in good order." Here I must observe that Dr. Jackson never was accused, either by the Physician General or myself, of inattention to the cleanliness of the dépôt hospital; and therefore after a week's notice of the intended inspection, it would have been very extraordinary indeed if any want of cleanliness had been observed by the Board.

The following paragraph next occurs in the report, viz. "We found the mortality lately prevailing, to be owing to several diseases, chiefly fevers, dysenteries, inflammation of the lungs, measles and scarlet fever. The dysenteries and many of the fevers, are the effects of the encampment that was established during the autumn, and which remained for a considerable time upon the same ground*. The inflammations of the lungs arise from the present inclement season; the measles are at this time epidemic in the Isle of Wight,

* As there was no cause within my knowledge which could make a long continued encampment upon the same ground necessary at the time here mentioned, may we not conclude that Dr. Jackson neglected his duty by not representing to General Hewitt the probable consequences of such an encampment? With the confidence which that General appears to have reposed in the Doctor, such warning would have undoubtedly proved efficacious.

and are also, as well as the scarlet fever, kept up by personal infection in the dépôt. Those diseases would at any time prove the cause of considerable mortality, but their destructive effects are greatly increased by the foul air of the crowded wards of the hospital, which aggravates all their symptoms, and renders them, though simple and mild on their first admission, in the end malignant and fatal. Considerable sickness has often prevailed in the dépôt, arising out of the nature of the subjects it contained (young and unseasoned recruits): yet the concurrence of all the causes of mortality above stated has probably never happened before; particularly the camp diseases, dysenteries and remittent fevers (called *gastroic* fevers in the returns), and the prevalence of measles, at a season of the year so unfavourable to those attacked by that disease*. In these circumstances, and another, which is by no means to be overlooked, that is, the increased number of men in the dépôt, we think we see causes adequate to the mortality that has taken place, and which will probably continue for some time longer, particularly if the weather prove severe."

Upon this paragraph I must submit a few short remarks. "Mortality" in hospitals is commonly "owing to several diseases," and among those of military hospitals, "fevers and dysenteries" generally predominate, together with inflammations of the lungs, especially in cold weather; so far therefore the report offers us nothing which is either new or instructive. It however superadds two other diseases, viz. measles and scarlet fever, which depended on contagion, and do not always subsist in hospitals. It appears nevertheless from the report which was made by the present Inspector General of Army Hospitals (Mr. Knight) to General Dundas, (after having employed four days in examining the hospital at Parkhurst, a few weeks after the Special Board had left it,) dated Feb-

* This season of the year was the same at the dépôt hospital as at the adjoining house of industry (containing nearly 600 inhabitants), where, as well as in all other parts of the island, the measles were very mild.

ruary 14, 1802, that these contagious diseases had, every where in the Isle of Wight, proved "very mild, except in Parkhurst barracks," (i. e. except under the care and treatment of Dr. Jackson.) Mr. Knight states that in the house of industry (containing 563 inhabitants, and distant from the barracks only about 200 yards," and with the *disadvantage* of being considerably lower) there had been "no prevailing disease or mortality." He adds, that in conversing with most of the professional men of great practice in the Isle of Wight, and this "separately," he obtained "one uniform answer, that the epidemic diseases which had been malignant and fatal among the soldiers, had in the country at large assumed a mild and favourable shape." This difference (he adds) was strongly exemplified in the house of industry, &c."

I will not detain my readers by contending with the Special Board, concerning the causes which they have here so confidently alleged as producing dysenteries, fevers, and inflammations of the lungs; for excepting cases of relapse, I do not mean to render Dr. Jackson accountable for their production. The question therefore is not what occasioned the diseases which occurred among the soldiers in Parkhurst barracks; but what rendered these diseases, when produced, so much more fatal there, than they were in every other part of Great Britain to the whole army collectively? or in other words, how it happened that in the then last month, out of 339 sick soldiers, under the treatment of Dr. Jackson, 39 died, while only 36 died out of 2400 sick, in all the other general and regimental hospitals throughout the kingdom? when more than eight times as many had died in proportion to the numbers under Dr. Jackson's care, as under that of the other medical officers of the army generally, and when it was recollected that his methods of treating the sick were very different from those of other medical officers, strong reasons obviously presented themselves for suspecting that mischievous effects had resulted from his singular practice; and these rea-

sons had undoubtedly occasioned the appointment of the Special Board; but the members of it, instead of attending to this first and principal part of the duty assigned to them, i. e. that of ascertaining how far Dr. Jackson's medical treatment had increased the mortality at Parkhurst, seem to have carefully avoided that subject, and to have exerted all their industry and sagacity in finding out other causes sufficient to account for this greater proportion of deaths; a mode of proceeding which seems to be just as unfair, as it would have been in them to have overlooked all other causes of mortality, and confined their attention solely to Dr. Jackson's supposed malpractice. With all their ingenuity, however, they were able only to discover three causes for the mortality in question. One of these was an increase in the number of men in the depot; but this, though it may have increased the number of sick, will do nothing towards explaining why of those who were sick, eight times as many died under Dr. Jackson's treatment as under that of the other medical officers of the army. A second supposed cause is the severity of the weather. The Special Board observe in a note, p. 56, that "the increased mortality has only taken place since the cold weather commenced." But as the Isle of Wight happens to be one of the most southern and mild parts of Great Britain, is it credible that the cold should there have been greater; and have occasioned a greater proportion of deaths, than in any and every other part of Great Britain? The third cause assigned by the Special Board is, "the foul air of the crowded wards of the hospital," which is represented as aggravating all the symptoms of the several diseases.—That the air in the crowded wards of hospitals may become so unwholesome, as to produce mischief, I am ready to admit; but I cannot admit that the Special Board were able to ascertain or measure the exact extent of this mischief, so as to be entitled to consider and report this as a sufficient cause for the whole of the increased number of deaths, and absolve Dr. Jackson's practice from all blame

and participation in their production *. But whatever mischief the foul air may have done, *he* alone is to be considered as the *author* of it; since it was in his power, and a part of his duty, as I have before explained, to have obviated this cause of mortality, by sending those patients for whom there was not proper room at Parkhurst, *over to the general hospital at Gosport*. So that in thus acquitting Dr. Jackson of the imputation of having increased the number of deaths by *mal-practice*, they necessarily make him guilty of having increased them by a breach or gross neglect of duty. But though the two first of these causes are absolutely foreign and inapplicable to the purpose for which they were adduced, and though the other is *vague*, and at best *very inadequate*, the Special Board profess to think them sufficient, not only to account for "the mortality that has taken place," but to authorize a prediction that it "will probably *continue* for some time longer, particularly if the weather prove severe." In thus becoming *prophets*, to screen Dr. Jackson from the blame of *future* mortality, after having endeavoured to exculpate him from the *past*, the Special Board certainly ran no risk of getting the character of false prophets; for the great number of sick who had been by them left in the hospital, in a state which they considered as little better than death, afforded very sure grounds for their prediction, *whatever weather might follow*. But probably their power of penetrating into futurity would have been less apparent, and Dr. Jackson would have been thought more *culpable*, if they had fairly mentioned the deplorable state of the hospital as the foundation of their prophecy, instead of connecting it with the weather.

From such loose and unsatisfactory premises, however, the Special Board proceed as follows: "The opinion we have

* The supposed causes of disease sometimes prevail without any increase in the usual number and amount of diseases; and at other times the latter are greatly multiplied, while no particular cause can be discovered to account for their production; and therefore the Special Board might have been expected to manifest some diffidence and caution in a matter so difficult and obscure.

stated of the causes of mortality will of *itself* remove much of the suspicion*, if any such existed, of improper practice in the treatment of diseases by Dr. Jackson." "On this subject (they add) we feel called upon to express ourselves hypothetically, because, though the letter of the Physician General and Surgeon General did appear to us, as it seems to have done to you, *to convey some such suspicion*, yet the subsequent letter of those gentlemen, (of which they were so good as to send us a copy,) by *totally disavowing* any such meaning, *leaves no doubt upon that head*." Here is an equivocal mode of expression, which probably misled most of the readers of this report, and perhaps the Commander in Chief, into a belief that no room for doubt remained concerning the propriety of Dr. Jackson's practice; when in fact it must have been the intention of the Special Board to intimate that there was then no doubt remaining of our *never* having suspected him of improper practice; an intimation absolutely erroneous and unwarrantable. Indeed nothing could have been farther from the truth than the supposition that no such suspicion had existed in our minds, or that we had intended in any degree to disavow its continuance by the letter in question; a letter dictated by caution and delicacy, but certainly not with a design to remove or weaken the grounds or motives for an investigation respecting Dr. Jackson's practice, though we certainly wished to render that investigation as *unbiased* as possible: we did not then know that our opinion would have so little influence on the members of the Special Board as it appeared afterwards to have had; and while there was any danger of their being influenced by it, justice to our own character, as well as to Dr. Jackson's, required us not to leave it to be supposed that we had *prejudged* his practice, especially as it had not been personally investigated by the Physician General, to

* Here they only state that their opinion of the causes of mortality will "remove much of the suspicion &c." and they get rid of the remainder by throwing it aside, and forgetting to notice it afterwards; instead of ascertaining whether it had not been occasioned by malpractices in Dr. Jackson.

whom the subject more immediately belonged. Our suspicion of mal-practice in Dr. Jackson had certainly occasioned the appointment of the Special Board to enquire and report concerning the existence of that sort of practice; and if the members believed that in our letter we had either withdrawn all such suspicion, or denied our ever having entertained any, and that we had thereby taken away the original and principal cause for their appointment, it seems extraordinary that they did not suspend their departure from London, and request *new* instructions; and it is still more extraordinary that they should have so earnestly urged Dr. Jackson, upon the morning of their departure from the Isle of Wight, to enter upon the experiment proposed by their letter of the 24th December, in order to decide the merit or demerit of his peculiar methods of treating the sick, if they believed there was no longer any doubt concerning their fitness or expediency.

To me it seems indisputably true, that the members of the Special Board ought to have entered upon a full and fair investigation of Dr. Jackson's practice, or to have *abstained* *wholly* from reporting any opinion concerning it. But instead of doing either, they, while secluding themselves from every one who had impeached the practice of Dr. Jackson, or was disposed to obstruct his complete exculpation, and, without any thing like a fair or useful enquiry, thought proper to introduce into their report passages which led the Commander in Chief (as appears by the Secretary at War's letters to General Hewett, and to the Physician General and myself) to believe "the unanimous opinion of the (Special) Board to have exculpated Dr. Jackson from all improper practice in the treatment of diseases, and in the care of the sick;" and His Royal Highness certainly did not believe that the Board could have ventured to do this, without a full and fair enquiry, which confessedly *did not take place*, and, therefore, the Commander in Chief must have been deceived by this report.

The subject of diet next occurs in the report. "We found," say the Board, "his (Dr. Jackson's) low diet and

middle diet, including the extra articles of wine, tea, porter, &c.," which are directed according to circumstances, to be framed with judgment; but the full diet, we think, ought to be one pound of bread, one pound of meat, and one quart of (small) beer daily, as in the general table of diet; and if any deduction of bread be made, for every ounce taken from the pound, three ounces of potatoes should be allowed. This full diet should extend (they say) to all the servants of the hospital," from whom it had been withheld by Dr. Jackson. To mitigate this censure, however, the members of the Special Board make the following addition, viz. "in giving our opinion against the alteration in the full diet, we think it proper to remark, that we do not impute any part of the relapses or mortality to this alteration, because the mortality has proceeded chiefly from diseases in which such a change of diet could have no bad effect, and because we see the principal cause of relapse to be in the *filth* air of a crowded hospital and barracks, the inclemency of the weather," &c. It is, I think, difficult to read this without perceiving a greater desire to exculpate Dr. Jackson than to ascertain facts by minute and cautious investigation. Is it possible that the Special Board could, by any thing which they did, have made themselves so fully acquainted with the *true state* of those who had died at the dépôt hospital during the preceding eight months, as to be certain that a very reduced portion of nourishment and a deprivation of the exciting and invigorating powers of wine, &c. under the debilitating and exhausting medical treatment

* The extra articles here mentioned probably acquired unmerited importance by force of Dr. Jackson's *ex parte* explanations; for it appears from all the evidence I have been able to collect, that the sick had but little relief from them. A gentleman whom I consider as of strict veracity, and who was a medical attendant at the dépôt hospital, in a letter to me of a recent date, writes as follows: viz. "If I ventured to order a poor fellow just recovering from the effects of bleeding, hot bathing, tartar emetic, and purges, a little extra bread, meat, pudding, or porter, it was generally *franked off* by Dr. Jackson; he adds, 'there was a want of every species of comfort or cordial except drugs;' the cost of which did not appear in the weekly statement of expenditure."

employed by Dr. Jackson had no influence in producing their deaths? or are they quite sure that they know enough of the effects of foul air, &c. to be entitled to assert, that none of the relapses were occasioned by deficient nourishment and support, and that this foul air not only rendered the primary diseases mortal, but also produced the relapses? Dr. Maclaurin, it appears, had not one relapse at Chatham, though the air of his wards was not better probably than those of Dr. Jackson; and it will have been seen, by his letter to the Physician General, that he ascribed this favourable circumstance to the wine and good nourishment with which his patients were indulged.

The Special Board dismissed the subject of *diet*, by professing to believe, that the alterations made by Dr. Jackson "proceeded from the best motives," thinking, perhaps, that a desire to gain reputation, at the expence of the sick, by *ostensible economy*, was a motive of that description, and as a farther justification, they repeat Major-General Hewett's allegation, that "the diminution of bread" was "first tried at the suggestion of the Surgeon General;" omitting to state, that I had recommended an equivalent addition of rice and potatoes to compensate for this diminution.

After this follows what I must consider as an extremely unjustifiable part of their report: "We examined *minutely*," say the Special Board, *the hospital books* in which the medicines ordered for the sick are entered. Such registers we do not think alone sufficient to furnish evidence for giving a judgment on the practice of a physician. For this purpose, indeed, we do not know any other means than those stated in our first letter to you," (i. e. the experiment so often mentioned.) "But the register was sufficient to convince us, that there was *no ground* for the charge contained in Dr. Maclaurin's letter of the *universal and indiscriminate use of blood letting*, and some other remedies therein-mentioned*."

* The Board have here given a very unfair representation of the charges brought by Dr. Maclaurin against Dr. Jackson, apparently to obtain better

Here, it must be remembered, that the letter from Dr. Maclaurin, (see page 6.) alluded to by the Special Board, is that of the 8th of June 1801, which, as it was written before the removal of the *dépôt* hospital and of Dr. Jackson to the Isle of Wight, related solely to his practice at Chatham; and, therefore, the only hospital books which could have afforded any reasonable conviction "that there was no ground for the charge contained in Dr. Maclaurin's letter," must have been those of Chatham Hospital; for the books of the Isle of Wight related only to the practice employed in the latter place, *after* the hospital had been removed from Chatham; and this practice might have been, and probably was, in a considerable degree, changed after such removal. For Dr. Jackson, unless incorrigibly obstinate, might, by that time, have become sensible, in some degree at least, of its impropriety; and undoubtedly the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War must have concluded, that the Special Board, in thus impeaching the veracity and honour of Dr. Maclaurin, (without giving him the least opportunity to justify himself,) had examined the books of Chatham hospital, with so much attention as to ascertain that they did not contain any evidence of what Dr. Maclaurin had alleged in this respect. The truth, however, is, and it will doubtless excite no little astonishment, that these Gentlemen, when they, in this way, stigmatized the character of a respectable physician, had never seen so much as a single leaf of any one of the prescription books of the hospital at Chatham. I was, indeed, led to *suspect* this to be the case, from the tenor of this part of their report, being very confident, from what I saw of the hospital books at Chatham, in June 1801, that no person who had properly examined them, could venture to appeal to them as

ground for contradicting them, and impeaching his veracity. In the letter of the 8th of June, he mentions "*the free use of the lancet*," and adds, that "*almost the entire of the patients are largely bled, especially in fevers, upon their admission*;" and this is all the foundation which the Special Board could have had for alleging that Dr. Maclaurin's letter contained a charge "*of the universal and indiscriminate use of blood letting*."

capable of proving that there was no foundation for the charge contained in Dr. Maclaurin's letter. And under this persuasion, I particularly requested Sir John Hayes, in my letter of the 17th of August last, to inform me, whether the books which the Board examined in the evening (at Cowes) belonged to the hospital, while it was at the Isle of Wight only, or while there and at Chatham also. His answer to this question informed me, that the books examined by the Special Board were the complete books of the depot hospital from its first establishment. But as it had been established a considerable number of years at Chatham, and the books during that time would probably have loaded a cart, I wrote again for farther information, on the 2d of September; and not obtaining it, I made another application on the 17th; and this at last procured me a letter from Sir John Hayes, dated the 19th of September, and containing these words: "The hospital books examined by us, were those in use in the hospital in the Isle of Wight; the books of Chatham Hospital could have been of no use to us." In fact, however*, no other books ought to have been relied on by the Board in opposition to the charge contained in Dr. Maclaurin's letter.

But this is not the worst circumstance attending their censure of Dr. Maclaurin; for even the books of the hospitals in the Isle of Wight, instead of affording support to this attack upon his veracity, contain abundant evidence in Dr. Maclaurin's favour. Having lately made a visit of inspection to the Isle of Wight, I enquired for, and obtained a part of the prescription books of Parkhurst Hospital, during the time when it was under Dr. Jackson's care; and afterwards happening to open the first of a set of these books (amounting to three

* It appears by a letter to me from Dr. Jackson, dated Chatham Hospital, 17th July 1801, that the prescription books there used had been previously sent off with other effects belonging to that hospital, to the Isle of Wight. A particular search has been lately made for those books at Parkhurst hospital by my directions; but as none of them could be found, it remains for Dr. Jackson to explain what became of them.

in numb 7, and all distinguished by the mark of "No. 5.") and beginning the 28th of July 1801, (a few days after Dr. Jackson's arrival at Parkhurst.) I took the trouble of extracting a statement of all the admissions of new patients, as entered in that book *indiscriminately*, from that day, to the 1st of September inclusive; with an account of the remedies prescribed for each of them, *on the day of his admission*. From this statement it appears, that the number of persons whose admissions were so entered, was 166; that of these, upon the days of their respective admissions, 136 were bled; 143 underwent the operation of bathing, most frequently both hot and cold; 100 were vomited; cathartics, commonly strong, and sometimes drastic, were ordered for 99; and 28 were blistered. Hence it results, that nearly five out of six were bled, that more than seven out of eight underwent the operations of bathing; that emetics were ordered to about five out of eight; and that nearly nine out of sixteen were purged, all on the days of their several admissions; and certainly there is nothing in Dr. Maclaurin's letter that could be fairly understood as charging Dr. Jackson with greater uniformity of practice, or more indiscriminate bleeding, bathing, &c. than what took place in these instances. Even Dr. Sangrado's supposed practice was not more sanguinary; for it may be presumed, that among the patients admitted into an hospital, there will be at least one in six so very feeble, that no man, who is not absolutely insane, could think of taking blood from him.

E. g. on the 13th of August six men are entered in the book No. 5. as admitted that day: of these one is stated to be "weak and consumptive," and he escaped the lancet; but the other five were all bled; one of them to the quantity of 42 ounces, another to that of 37 ounces; and the remaining three to that of 25 ounces each. An exact transcript of the treatment prescribed for these six patients is given in Appendix No. 2. It was supposed that the prescription leaf inserted in my former Appendix No. 8. (and which had belonged to

a prescription book at Chatham), might be one of the most unfavourable to Dr. Jackson, but the books of Parkhurst hospital afford scores that are *much worse* *. In a considerable number of instances the *whole* of those admitted, to the amount sometimes of *nine* in a day, were not only ordered to be bled and bathed, but nearly all of them to be also vomited or purged, and frequently both, *all on the same day*; two of these instances which have been exactly transcribed from the prescription book above mentioned will be found in Appendix No. 3. But without going farther backward than two days from that on which the Special Board visited the hospital, they might have found abundant proofs in the prescription books of the accuracy and fairness of Dr. Maclaurin's account of Dr. Jackson's practice. I have not indeed been able to find all the books of the dépôt hospital at the Isle of Wight while Dr. Jackson was there, some of them having been either lost

* This prescription leaf had probably become loose and detached from the book to which it belonged; and seems to have been left behind when the prescription books were packed up by Dr. Jackson's order to be sent from Chatham to the Isle of Wight, and thus to have fallen into the hands of a medical gentleman, who, unsolicited, thought proper to deliver it to the Physician General, as an illustration and proof of the fact of practice which had prevailed at the dépôt under Dr. Jackson's direction; and there was nothing either in the procuring or production of this leaf which could, as he pretends, in the slightest degree wound the moral character of the Physician General or myself; nor has Dr. Jackson any better foundation for pretending, as he does at p. 63. of his last publication, that I endeavoured, by the paper in question, "to make an impression on the public mind that the persons so treated suffered injury, perhaps died in consequence of the treatment." I knew nothing of the results of this treatment, nor where to obtain information respecting them; nor had I time to make any enquiry on the subject, in the very great hurry with which I was compelled to publish my observations. I abstained therefore from giving even the slightest intimation respecting the consequences of those prescriptions, which were written on the paper in question. Dr. Jackson, however, because these men, with their very slight ailments, were not destroyed by the treatment in question, pretends that he will from this, their escape "convince the public of the malignant iniquity of my mind," and also my "superiority, that my endeavours were exerted to deceive them," &c. But whatever conviction he may produce in others respecting me, he will probably leave no room for any one to doubt of his own effrontery and malice.

or carried away; and I cannot therefore state the full number of those who were bled on these days. I find, however, that of the 29 patients stated in the books which I possess, to have been admitted on the 28th, 29th and 30th of December, 22 were bled, several of them very copiously; (one to the amount of 54 ounces at once, and three to 30 ounces each at once;) also that seventeen were bathed. Of those who escaped the last operation, four were denominated cases of scarlatina, four of pneumonia, one of catarrh, and one of simple fever. Of the seven not bled, two were stated to have what is called malignant fever; one, scarlet fever; two, dysentery; one, chronic diarrhea, and one, simple fever. Of these 29 patients, 17 were also vomited, 23 purged, and 22 blistered (often in several places at the same time), and all on the day of admission. Here, for what reason does not appear, there was an increase in the number of those who were blistered, and a diminution of the number bathed. The practice, however, accords very well with the account given of it in Dr. Maclaurin's letter; and the books of the Isle of Wight therefore, even when the Special Board were there, instead of justifying this part of their report, afford complete evidence against it, and in support of Dr. Maclaurin. If more could be wanted, I have it in my possession, having been lately furnished with written information from * gentlemen

* Believing, as I do, that barely telling the truth when unfavourable to Dr. Jackson would by him be deemed an unpardonable offence, I am unwilling to expose these Gentlemen to his resentment by publishing their *several* communications; though I certainly shall not hesitate to call for their evidence in the usual way, if it ever should be wanted in a court of justice to establish any thing stated in my present publication; and, in the mean time, I think it proper to give the following short account of Dr. Jackson's practice at the dépôt hospital, as resulting from, and confirmed by the concurrent written testimony of the six medical Gentlemen who have lately given me information on this subject: viz. Of the patients admitted by Dr. Jackson, commonly four-fifths, and often a much greater proportion were bled, with very little discrimination. For the purpose of this operation they were generally fasted by the side of each other on a long bench, to the number often of twenty and upwards, having each a ligature on one arm; an hospital-mate then took a lancet, and, beginning at one

of unquestionable veracity who were on duty with Dr. Jackson as medical officers at the hospital at Chatham; and from

end of the row, performed the operation of bleeding upon each of these patients in succession, leaving the blood to run into buckets, potters, &c. until he had done with the last; after which, returning to the first patient, (who was by that time commonly thought to have bled sufficiently,) he put an end to their several bleedings successively, in the same order as that in which the veins had been opened. In this way the quantity of blood discharged would, in a considerable degree, depend on the dexterity of the operator, and the number of patients seated on the form; commonly however the quantity drawn amounted to between twenty and thirty ounces, but from the size of the vessels in which the blood was often received, (i. e. pails, buckets, pans, &c.) and from other circumstances, it was often impossible to ascertain the quantity drawn. Frequently indeed when bleeding was ordered no quantity was specified; this Dr. Jackson admits, and attempts to justify his omission, by alleging that he attended personally when the operation was performed; an allegation which is contradicted by those who had the best opportunities of knowing the truth, and who declare that neither Dr. Jackson nor Dr. Barland commonly attended at these bleedings, though they have sometimes presented themselves apparently by accident. Patients were not unfrequently ordered to be bled until they fainted, and this effect sometimes occurred where it had not been prescribed; but the evacuation was not terminated by it, for, upon recovery, the blood was again suffered to run from the vein. The blood from two or three persons was frequently received into the same bucket, and in this way part of it was suffered to run upon the floor, sometimes unavoidably, and sometimes from want of care.

After bleeding, the patients were generally put into bathing tubs, frequently two in one tub, with their heads at opposite ends. These tubs contained water heated to such a degree as the hands could bear without uneasiness. This however must have been not only a very high temperature for the whole body, but a very precarious one; as some persons by habit acquire the power of bearing with their hands a much greater heat than others. The heads of the patients in the bathing tubs were supported by small stools or otherwile, which raised the eyes, nose and mouth above the water, and a blanket or rug was then thrown over the tub, leaving frequently a small opening near the mouth for the patients to breathe. Here they were kept 10, 15, or 20 minutes, till the skin became red and the face flushed; and sometimes until they fainted. They were afterwards commonly removed to an empty tub, where cold water was rapidly thrown over them, several times in succession, from buckets and large sponges; though in some cases it was applied to the body by large sponges; this being done, they were rubbed dry and put to bed, but not to rest; for commonly an emollient or other ointment was then given to them, in order to produce severe vomitings; and as soon as these ceased, they were made to take calomel with antimonial or James's powder in doses of 6, 8, or 10 grains

their unanimous declarations I am warranted in saying that though death has rendered Dr. Maclaurin unable to justify himself, I am able to establish (legally if necessary) by a great abundance of *vivâ voce* evidence all that he ever stated on the subject of Dr. Jackson's practice in any and all the letters written by him on the subject; I mean all those mentioned either in this publication or in my former Appendix No. 8; and having made this declaration, perhaps the members of the Special Board in some leisure moments may reflect, and with compunction, upon the injury which they did to Dr. Maclaurin by their report; and on the painful feelings which that report is known to have excited in his mind, during the progress of a disease which afterwards terminated in his death.

The report next proceeds in these words, viz. "Dr. Jackson farther stated to us, and that upon probable grounds, that Dr. Maclaurin had no adequate means of knowing or judging of his (Dr. Jackson's) practice." This observation by

of each; which of course produced copious evacuations downwards, and often renewed the vomitings; and as if all these evacuations were not sufficient for one day, the patients not unfrequently took large doses of Dover's powder at night, which usually occasioned profuse sweats. Sometimes the patients underwent nearly the same routine of practice the next day, especially when febrile symptoms continued; the bleedings especially were in many cases repeated several times in large quantities. I do not find it ascertained that any of those who fainted in the bathing tubs actually died there, though this event is said to have sometimes happened within a very few hours afterwards. We have indeed Dr. Jackson's own authority for asserting that such fatal consequences were formerly produced by similar treatment under his direction, though they appear not to have taught him either wisdom or caution. In his publication of 1798, at p. 263, he informs us "that four soldiers" ill of what he calls "fever in dysenteric form," "were put into the warm bath, in which they remained from 10 to 15 minutes; taken out they were rubbed dry and laid in a clean blanket; they expressed a sensation of comfort as if in heaven, &c." "they fell asleep, and two of them never awoke." This fatal event, he adds, "was certainly accelerated by the change consequent to the warm bathing," a confession which renders any further observations from me unnecessary.

the Special Board results from Dr. Jackson's *ex parte* communications to them. What he told them in private I know not; but what he wrote and privately delivered to them, may now be ascertained, though not by their help. In that statement he asserts that "though Dr. Maclaurin might have observed on many occasions that men ill of fevers were bled freely, for this (says he) was often done in the bathing room;" "that many of them were immersed in a warm bath, some of them washed with cold water; even that others had buckets of cold water poured upon their heads;" "that emetics, brisk, or, if he pleases, *drastic purgatives*, blisters, &c." "were among the means employed in the cure of fevers;" yet "that, as Dr. Maclaurin never saw the application of these means in individual cases, he will not obtain credit with unprejudiced men, when he asserts that these means were employed indiscriminately." That Dr. Maclaurin however had opportunities of becoming acquainted with Dr. Jackson's methods of treating the sick is demonstrable from the accuracy of his account of them, confirmed by the very respectable testimony which I have lately obtained; and Dr. Jackson himself does in effect admit the resemblance of his practice to Dr. Maclaurin's representation of it, even when he asserts that the latter "never saw the application" of his "means in individual cases;" an assertion utterly incredible, considering that the patients generally underwent what Dr. Jackson calls the *preparatory treatment* of bleeding, hot, and cold bathing, &c. in one common and open room.

Dr. Maclaurin, in his Letter to the Physician General of the 18th January 1802, (which is given in the Appendix, No. 4.) declares this assertion of Dr. Jackson's to be "*false*;" adding, "I in frequent instances saw patients previous to their being placed in the wards, but subsequently to his having prescribed for them; I have been in his wards several times, have seen him examine the sick, and prescribe for them; especially a short time after my arrival at Chatham Barracks; his recollection too fails him, in that he occasionally prescrib-

ed for some patients placed under my care, previous to my seeing them; that I remonstrated against such conduct, declining to take charge of them, unless the treatment remained with me from the first admission, particularly as I disapproved his medical practice; my remonstrance was complied with."

Indeed the sanguinary and violent means employed by Dr. Jackson and his assistant, even for slight disorders, which probably would have quietly terminated by the operations of nature, and a single day's repose, excited not only attention but astonishment, in the medical officers and attendants of the hospital, and also in a considerable part of the *garrison* and of the inhabitants of the town; and some degree of clamour arose in consequence of it, intimations of which were received by the Army Medical Board from various quarters; and nothing can be more unreasonable than to suppose that *facts*, which were the prevailing topic of conversation with so many persons, should have remained unobserved and unknown to Dr. Maclaurin, who had so many motives and opportunities for obtaining information respecting them; and in regard to a particular examination by Dr. Maclaurin of each individual, subjected to the ordinary routine of bleeding, hot and cold bathing, vomiting and purging, upon the same day, there seems to have been no sort of need of it; for the application of these means, with a few very slight variations, (made probably for the sole purpose of producing some little appearance of discrimination,) was so general and constant, that, according to the written declaration of a gentleman of unquestionable veracity, then one of the hospital mates, confirmed by several others of that description, "there was little or no distinction made between the stout, robust, plethoric recruit, just come from the plough, and the weak, debilitated, worn-out soldier, returned from a hot climate, or a long voyage; all of them being treated nearly alike." "Nor was there (he adds) much more attention paid to the discrimination of the disease, than there was to the habit or constitution of the patient: diseases which by other physicians are described and treated very dif-

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ferently, were at Chatham hospital also treated nearly alike.* This appears to have been the practice generally in all the long train of febrile diseases, including the *exanthemata*, particularly small-pox, measles, and scarlatina, which, notwithstanding Dr. Jackson's boasted accuracy of arrangement in the bathing-room, were at first sent into the same wards with idiopathic fevers, after being previously bled, &c.; a practice which, in measles at least, and especially in the early stage, is almost universally considered as highly dangerous. Indeed there was so little either of care or discrimination, that Dr. Jackson, or his assistant, arranged and treated as a case of *propter fever*, that of a man, who after his death was, on being dissected by Dr. Morison, found to have died by fracture of the skull*.

If men acting so strangely can be supposed to have been influenced by any thing which they mistook for *reason* or *principle*, it seems probable that their aim was by violent means to produce strong impressions upon the system or powers of life, hoping thereby to effect sudden and great changes, though without the possibility of knowing whether such changes would prove salutary or pernicious, and yet presuming that to a sick man any change must be beneficial; a very unwarrantable presumption, and fit only for the most unprincipled empirick. In a great majority of the cases treated by these violent means, nature, with a few mild and safe remedies, would doubtless soon have effected a cure, which must often have been rendered difficult, and sometimes impossible, by this debilitating and dangerous treatment, and though, when improperly used, it very often fell short of destroying the patients, they were generally left so much exhausted by it, (without the smallest necessity,) as to render complete recovery, if attainable, very slow, besides inducing frequent relapses, and ultimately occasioning dropsy, &c. In support

* Dr. Morison found a large fracture and depression of the skull above the left ear, with an inflammation of the brain and its membranes, which sufficiently accounted for the appearance of fever; an appearance however which could not have deceived a surgeon who had been properly educated.

of this opinion there is a great variety of evidence; it is, indeed, well known that Dr. Morison, who opened almost all the bodies of those who died at Chatham while he was there, found water collected in the chest, with oedematous legs, in nearly three-fourths of them, after the depleting practice had been introduced. I have, moreover, received strong confirmations of Dr. Maclaurin's assertion respecting "the frivolous cases admitted by Dr. Jackson into the hospital," and by which he lessened comparatively the great mortality attending his practice. One gentleman writes, "I am convinced the sick list contained many men returned ill of fever, in whom it was brought on by the treatment which they underwent: I have known Drs. Jackson and Borland admit persons who had no greater ailment than a little headache, remarking, that if the individual so admitted was not ill at that time, he would be so the next day; and the poor fellow, as a matter of course, being made to undergo bleeding, bathing, and vomiting, &c. it became manifest on the next day that the Doctors had delivered a true prognosis*." However as the patients of the dépôt hospital were commonly young men of so much strength as not to sink under this treatment, (though unnecessarily reduced and debilitated by it,) they in a few days commonly passed into the convalescent wards, and, being ultimately discharged, were, perhaps, considered as living proofs of the propriety of Dr. Jackson's practice: and they always served to lessen the average time which patients remained in the hospital, as well as to diminish the proportion of mortality; two great objects constantly pursued by Dr. Jackson.

The Special Board next say, "We did not receive equal satisfaction to our enquiries why Dr. Maclaurin was not allowed

* These cases were, I presume, similar to those which frequently occur in the books used by Dr. Jackson in the Isle of Wight, and in which the patients are stated to be "feverish." But slight as the disorder appears by this denomination to have been in such instances, the usual practice of bleeding, bathing, vomiting and purging was, very often at least, employed in them as in the cases filled "fever."

to take his proportion of the hospital-duty at Chatham. For, judging as we do, that Dr. Jackson's practice could only be decided upon by fair and full trial, we are equally of opinion, that Dr. Maclaurin's practice was entitled to the same indulgence, (or more properly, justice,) from Dr. Jackson; and that no difference of opinion on points of practice ought to have prevented Dr. Maclaurin from taking his share of the duty."

Here I cannot help noticing the tenderness and reserve with which the Special Board mention a part, and only a part, of Dr. Jackson's complicated and obstinate resistance to the authority of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and the repeated orders of the Army Medical Board; first, in depriving Dr. Maclaurin of all participation in the medical duty which he was sent to perform; and, secondly, in assigning that duty to Dr. Borland, contrary to the positive condition and stipulation on which the latter had been permitted to serve at the depot hospital; and this after he had refused (with Dr. Jackson's approbation and encouragement) to submit to that medical examination which the Commander in Chief had directed him to undergo, previously to his being allowed to perform the duty of a physician. How many lives were lost by this *breach of faith*, as well as of military discipline, cannot be now ascertained.

That part however of Dr. Jackson's disobedience which regards Dr. Borland, is left completely unnoticed by the Special Board: and they even mention that respecting Dr. Maclaurin so slightly, (not as a *positive* misdemeanour, but *negatively*, as *failing to give them equal satisfaction* with some other parts of his conduct,) that no imputation of blame appears to have been understood as conveyed, or *intended* to be conveyed, by their report, in regard to this offensive proceeding; since no notice was afterwards taken of it by the Commander in Chief or Secretary at War, in the opinions delivered by them respecting the several matters contained in that report; and thus Dr. Jackson obtained complete impunity for transactions

which, if they had been fairly represented, must have subjected him to the severe displeasure of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War.

The Special Board next observe, that, "not having the means of investigating *fully* the causes of the misunderstanding between Dr. Jackson and Dr. Maclaurin, from this last gentleman not being on the spot," they "forbear to give any farther opinion upon the subject." This *forbearance to do justice to Dr. Maclaurin*, on account of his "*not being on the spot*," seems not very commendable in the Special Board; considering that they paid no attention to the circumstance of his being *absent*, when they thought proper to *impeach* his veracity unheard, by representing him as the author of a groundless and injurious accusation against Dr. Jackson;—a little more *consistency* of conduct in this respect would certainly have become the members of the Special Board; and as Dr. Maclaurin's absence necessarily created a very serious obstacle to the full and fair investigation of *other* important matters, it must excite no small degree of wonder, that they did not either request his attendance on the spot, or give him an opportunity to support his allegations, and justify himself after their return to London, where he remained during the *whole* time in which their report was in *preparation*.

The Special Board next say, "To our enquiries why Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon had not been employed, Dr. Jackson said, that understanding an inspection of the hospital, and an enquiry into the state of the sick was about to take place, he judged it right that no material alteration should be made, till after that inspection had taken place; *now* he expresses his readiness to give those two physicians, the *care of a proportion* of the sick in the hospital." I have already mentioned, p. 44. that Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon were, on the 12th of December, with the approbation of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War, ordered to the Isle of Wight to take a share of the medical duty at Parkhurst hospital. They went thither accordingly, and reported themselves to Dr. Jackson

on or about the 14th of December 1801; but he rejected their assistance, and even pretended to doubt whether the order which I had notified to him in the usual manner, and such as neither he, nor any other medical officer in the army, had ever before disputed, was really derived from the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War; because it had not been communicated to him through the medium of Major General Hewett; a formality which he had not required in regard to Dr. Borland, or Surgeon Warren, or even Dr. MacLaurin, when they were sent to Chatham hospital, and which he did not require in regard to Dr. Phelan, or the other officers who were sent to do duty at the dépôt hospital subsequently to this event. Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon having informed me of this proceeding, I made a communication of it to the Secretary at War, who was pleased to confirm the original order concerning the two physicians by a letter to Major General Hewett: but about the same time, i. e. on the 23d of December 1801, Dr. Jackson was informed of the proposed enquiry; and then he first contrived the excuse mentioned in the report for continuing to withhold the care of the sick wholly from Drs. Rogerfon and Sutton. This however probably did not express the true motives of his conduct, which doubtless were similar to those that had formerly influenced him in regard to Dr. MacLaurin.

The full extent of mischief resulting from this disobedience, I know not how to calculate; that it must have been great, may be presumed, considering that during the seventeen days in which the two physicians were excluded from taking care of the sick, the number of patients in the dépôt hospital amounted to nearly 350; that among these were many serious and dangerous cases of disease, requiring much greater care and attention than Dr. Jackson could possibly bestow, especially during the week preceding the arrival of the Special Board; in which he must have been employed in making preparations for the expected investigation; and particularly in composing that long statement, (occupying twenty-six

folio pages) which has been already mentioned; and it certainly is not unreasonable to suppose, that some part of the *twelve deaths* which occurred in that week, and the deplorable state to which many of the surviving patients were brought, resulted from the want of proper medical aid, during the time in which these physicians were kept unemployed. It must also be remembered, that during the seventeen days in question, as well as for some time before, the measles were a very prevalent and fatal disease at the dépôt hospital; and that Dr. Jackson (who in his writings *insists so strongly on the necessity of experience*), declared in the statement delivered by him to the Special Board, that in the "treatment of measles and small pox," he "followed the practice of Sydenham *;" "because (he adds), *I had at that time no experience of my own to direct me.*" The time here alluded to, as being that in which, without experience, he thus took upon himself the charge of persons ill of measles and small pox, was that in which he kept Dr. MacLaurin without patients at Chatham; and as he does not appear, from his mode of treating these diseases, to have profited by the experience which he gained there, (whatever lives it may have cost,) we need not wonder that nineteen persons afterwards died of that disease under his care in the dépôt hospital, at the Isle of Wight; and some of them, while Drs. Sutton and Rogerfon were precluded from doing duty. Probably when these facts shall have been duly considered by my readers, they may think that this part of Dr. Jackson's disobedience and insubordination, deserved a very different species of animadversion from that which is here bestowed upon it by the Special Board; and that there was very little propriety in the following sentence

* Though Dr. Jackson pretends to have followed the practice of Sydenham (who practised nearly 150 years ago), there is reason to conclude that in fact he knew as little of Sydenham's practice as of the measles and small pox. Sydenham (whose writings and opinions, promulgated at different times, are not always consistent) nowhere recommends those early and profuse bleedings by which persons attacked by measles appear to have been put into jeopardy under the care of Dr. Jackson.

of their report, viz. " We feel ourselves called upon in justice to say, that Dr. Jackson appeared to us a zealous, diligent, and meritorious servant of the public, and full of *humanity* in the discharge of his duty." How these gentlemen, in the space of a few hours, employed by Dr. Jackson in attending upon themselves, rather than upon the sick, could have ascertained these his high defects, must be left for their explanation; and in regard to the *fullness* of his *humanity*, I beg leave to ask, whether it was demonstrated by his keeping sick men to perish in the crowded wards of Parkhurst hospital, instead of sending them to Gosport; or by depriving them of the benefit of regular and well qualified army physicians, or in abridging the nourishment and comforts allowed to the sick in all other military general hospitals, apparently for the sake of a little *ostentatious* economy, by which he probably expected to increase his own reputation and frequent emoluments; or finally, by his seeming inattention to the dangerous consequences of a long encampment on the same unhealthy ground, at an unreasonable time of the year?

The Special Board then state their observations on the situation and construction of the barracks and hospital. This however is a subject foreign to my purpose, and I will therefore proceed to notice that part of their report in which, forgetting their *duty* and *themselves*, they have thought proper, without either authority or justice, to pass a censure upon the conduct of their military superiors, while unheard.

" We have taken no notice (say they) of two letters, one from Mr. Andrews and another from Mr. Morison, and we wish we could, consistently with *our duty*, entirely pass them over in silence. They contain the observations, we may say criticisms, of those gentlemen upon Dr. Jackson's *practice* *,"

* This is a misrepresentation: Mr. Andrews's letter being confined exclusively to the subject of diet, without any opinion whatever respecting Dr. Jackson's *practice*. Dr. Morison indeed has extended his observations to the treatment of measles and small pox at Chatham; and seems to have been invited to do so by superiority of education, and of knowledge, at least in regard

and they state that they write in compliance with the * *orders* of the Army Medical Board. We cannot help thinking that the Army Medical Board have not sufficiently adverted to the *mischievous* effects of various kinds that *must* † arise from applications to officers in inferior stations, for their opinion and judgment of their superiors; more particularly when the application proceeds from those who have the disposal of ‡ *all* medical promotion in their hands."

The letters of Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, having been transmitted with several others, by the Secretary at War, "for the information of the Board," it was doubtless their duty to *notice* them, on account of the facts contained in them, respecting the effects of Dr. Jackson's alterations in the diet of the sick, and of those stated by Dr. Morison concerning Dr. Jackson's practice in the small pox and measles. But as the Secretary at War knew very well *how* and *from whom* these letters had been obtained, and was fully competent to decide upon the propriety of such applications, there is good reason to conclude that, by making the reference in question, he did not foresee or intend that the Special Board would or should notice the letters under consideration, in the way in

to those diseases of which Dr. Jackson, by his own confession, was in a great degree ignorant; and the charge of which he had for that reason transferred to Dr. Morison.

* Here is another misrepresentation: Mr. Andrews *aloud*, states that he wrote in compliance with the *orders* of the Army Medical Board; Dr. Morison, not being in a situation to receive orders, only *thinks*, that his letter is in answer to " *Regulations* " from the Army Medical Board.

† As nearly seven years have elapsed since the Special Board made this unqualified assertion, it will not be thought unreasonable in me to call on them for a specification of some of the " *mischievous effects*," which are stated as the unavoidable result of our applications to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison; for if they were ever to happen, they probably " *must* " have occurred before this time.

‡ In thus representing *all* medical promotion as being at the disposal of the Army Medical Board, the Special Board give us in name more than we have possessed in reality. Of this I need not adduce proofs; Dr. Jackson having made it his boast,

which they thought proper to do; *affixing at the same time to do it reluctantly.*

But as the Special Board have chosen to animadvert upon the supposed impropriety and mischievous effects of such applications, it becomes me to enquire how far their observation or apprehensions had any reasonable or just foundation; and here I must begin by noticing an error in their description of persons to whom these applications were made. For one of them, Dr. Morison, was not an *officer* in an inferior station, he having more than six months before resigned * his office in order to exercise his profession in civil life. Dr. Jackson therefore was not his superior, nor was there, as far as I can discover, any cause or reason why the Army Medical Board should not apply to him for information on the subjects of his letter, as readily as to any other person equally well acquainted with them. It is true that the other gentleman, Mr. Andrews, had not resigned his office, but having long been established as a practitioner of medicine at Brompton in

* Dr. Jackson, in one of his late publications, says, "Dr. Morison was a good operating surgeon, a good anatomist and dissector, and he had also the diploma of a physician." "He was ordered to Egypt;" "he refused to obey, and was of course struck off the list of hospital mates." The last of these statements is not correct. On the 7th and 8th May 1801, in consequence of Mr. Young's pressing requisition for medical assistance, Dr. Borlase and Mr. Graham, then doing duty under Dr. Jackson, were ordered to Egypt; but Dr. Jackson continued to get them both excused from that service, and he moreover wrote to me on the 13th of that month, stating Dr. Morison to be "the only hospital mate at Chatham who could be considered as disposable for foreign service." This being intimated to Dr. Morison, he came to London, and represented to me that he had entered the service, not with any intention of permanently continuing in it, but for the sake of seeing diseases and their treatment, previously to his settling in civil life, &c. at he had been appointed by Mr. Rush, (then Inspector general of regimental hospitals,) on the express condition of doing duty at the depot hospital only, and had consequently refused promotion in the 60th regiment; and on these grounds he claimed an exemption from going abroad. Finding, however, that from the exigencies of the service I did not think myself at liberty to accede to his claim, he returned to Chatham, and sent his resignation in a letter to me one or two days before he received the order to go on foreign service; which order had been sent to the office-house, where he had lodged in London soon after his leaving it, and was thence forwarded to him at Chatham.

Kent, he was incapable of receiving any "promotion" from the Army Medical Board, had they been disposed to employ it in *pur chasing* opinions unfavourable to Dr. Jackson, as seems to be invidiously and unwarrantably insinuated *. It is moreover to be observed, that though Mr. Andrews had for a few months served under Dr. Jackson, he had ceased to do so for a considerable time, and was never likely to do it again; so that no insubordination could be produced by this application. After these observations respecting the *persons* to whom the application was made, it is proper to consider the nature and purpose of the application itself.

In our letter of the 10th December 1801, to the Secretary at War, mention is made of certain papers which had been referred by him to the Army Medical Board respecting the alterations which Dr. Jackson had introduced at the depot hospital in the diet table established by the Commander in Chief for general use, and requiring us to report our opinion thereof, in order to ascertain whether there was "ground for considering the propriety of introducing them into the other general hospitals at home." Thus required to judge and report upon a matter of great and serious importance to the lives of sick and wounded soldiers, it became necessary to qualify ourselves for this duty, by procuring good information on the subject. Trials had been already made at Chatham as well as the Isle of Wight of, by much, the greater part of these innovations, and it seemed unwise to lose the benefit of those trials in making our report, as we must necessarily have done, if we had not applied to others, for we had never personally witnessed the effects *actually* produced by the reduction of diet

* It is to this insinuation that Dr. Jackson alludes in his letter to Colonel Clutton of the 23d of July 1803, where, while endeavouring to justify himself to the Commander in Chief for his libellous and scandalous publication of 1803, he takes credit to himself for having "abstained from laying before the public some observations of the Special Medical Board, which (says he) are in a manner official, and which may be supposed to bear out the expression" (in his libel) "against which there seems to be the *heavest* complaint." Thus declaring that the *worst* of his calumnies, if not *supposed*, is at least justified by this part of the report of the Special Medical Board.

and extra allowances to the sick, on which we were called upon to decide, and, therefore, could only *reason à priori* upon the probable consequences of such reductions, as upon a mere *abstract* question. Under these circumstances we felt it to be our *indispensable* duty to seek information concerning the effects which had been *already observed*, as proceeding from these alterations, when carried by Dr. Jackson into *actual use* and experiment; and we could only seek it from persons who had served under Dr. Jackson, for he being the official head of the hospital, where alone they had been tried, no other persons could have had sufficient opportunities of seeing and knowing what we desired to learn in this respect. We might, indeed, have applied to the medical officers *then* actually serving under Dr. Jackson at the Isle of Wight, but against such applications several weighty objections presented themselves. By making them we might be chargeable with encouraging insubordination; and the fear of disobliging the chief medical officer might naturally restrain those subordinate to him from any fair unbiassed communication of facts, if contrary to Dr. Jackson's wishes. But such objections did not exist in the case of Mr. Andrews, who was settled in private practice. Nor did they, in any degree, apply to Dr. Morison, who had retired from the army, as was believed, finally. These Gentlemen, moreover, seemed well entitled to confidence. I had long known Mr. Andrews, who became a pupil of St. George's Hospital, in or about the year 1767, while I was house surgeon there; and when illness afterwards compelled me to go into the country, he discharged that duty in my stead. He was afterwards house surgeon at the Lock Hospital for a year and a half, and in this time (as well as before) he attended the courses, &c. of Dr. Wm. Hunter and other lecturers. In August 1769, he passed at Surgeons Hall for a full diploma, and afterwards went into the naval service. In December 1771, he was selected to be surgeon to the Adventure sloop of war, which accompanied Captain Cook in his second voyage of discovery. After re-

turning from that voyage in 1774, he served in different frigates and ships of the line till 1781, and was then appointed surgeon to an hospital ship at Sheerness, in which he continued till the peace of 1783, when he settled in the exercise of his profession at Brompton, executing other duties besides at different times, as that of surgeon to the Catherine yacht for three years, and to the Buckingham prison ship for five. With the advantage of such long and varied services, and of a fair character, it will, I think, be allowed that the Medical Board might reasonably ask and confide in the opinions and information of Mr. Andrews, especially as they were asked only in regard to the effects of Dr. Jackson's *new* diet table, on which we had been required to decide and report.

Dr. Morison (the son of an officer of artillery) had employed five years at Edinburgh, under the particular care and superintendence of Mr. John Bell (whose professional eminence is well known); he was first dresser, and then physician's clerk, at the royal infirmary, and after a regular course of study for eight years at Edinburgh, had obtained the degree of doctor in medicine at the university of that city. Mr. Bell, in a letter written some years ago to the Physician General, says, "Dr. Morison is well acquainted with all parts of his profession;" that he (Mr. Bell) "never knew a young man live during the whole period of his studies with more propriety, nor prosecute them with greater diligence;" "that Dr. Morison is every way worthy of confidence, in his profession and conduct;" and "that there is no man for whose conduct he (Mr. Bell) would more willingly hold himself responsible, however delicate or confidential the situation in which he may be placed." Such were the two gentlemen of whom the Physician General and myself asked, and were blamed for asking, information; though the Special Board even at this time would probably find it difficult to name any others from whom we could have obtained it with so little impropriety, and so much probable advantage to the public.

To admit as an axiom that information or testimony ca-

pable of affecting the character or interest of a *superior*, is never to be fought from an *inferior* officer, is to admit that which would necessarily obstruct and render abortive almost every military enquiry; and more especially one respecting the conduct of the chief officer of a military hospital, in regard to his management of it. And if there ever were cases in which it would be deemed right and proper to recur to inferior officers for information concerning their superior, the present must have been one of those cases; for the information sought, supposing it to prove unfavourable to Dr. Jackson's diet table, (which might not be the case,) would not render him criminal; and there was good reason to expect that if his alterations were found to be hurtful, this discovery would ultimately contribute to save the lives of many of His Majesty's subjects. The calls of humanity, therefore, as well as a regard for the public welfare, imperiously demanded that the Physician General and myself should collect the best information in our power respecting a matter of such importance, on which we were ordered to decide. To have resisted such calls and such motives from delicacy to Dr. Jackson, who had been for months in a state of disobedience to the authority of the Army Medical Board, and even of the Commander in Chief, would, in my opinion, have been an inexcusable neglect of duty; and yet the Special Board thought proper to overlook his misconduct, and at the same time to bend and stretch the rules of military discipline as far as possible, for the purpose of protecting one who had so notoriously disregarded them; and even to invoke on his account a censure from the Commander in Chief upon the Physician General and myself. In regard to the "mischievous effects" which the Special Board were pleased to represent as necessarily arising from our applications, time has proved them to be wholly chimerical; and those who pretended that our patronage would be exerted to reward the communications made to us respecting Dr. Jackson, have found themselves completely in error; no one of those by whom such communi-

cations were made, having been promoted by any interference of the Physician General or myself. Dr. Morison indeed, more than two years after his resignation, changed the objects of his pursuit, and was by the present Inspector General of hospitals re-admitted an hospital mate, in the month of July 1803; and in September following, in consequence of a particular application in his favour from Mr. Knight, he was appointed assistant surgeon to the 10th regiment of light dragoons, in which situation, though *much inferior to his just pretensions*, he still remains, and is now serving with the army in Spain; a strong proof, if any were wanted, that promotion was not the price, or consideration of any information or opinion obtained by us from him respecting Dr. Jackson. I have indeed no reason to believe that either of the persons in question ever imagined that his opinion or information, by being unfavourable to Dr. Jackson, would become more acceptable to the Physician General and myself; nor could they, as I conceive, have done so, otherwise than from that insubordination which he had formerly manifested towards us, or from other indiscretions of his own. We had in fact no wish for any thing but truth in regard to Dr. Jackson; and while this was the case, and while we manifested no bias on the subject, our patronage could have no improper influence upon others, especially as it never had been employed for any unworthy purpose.

Dr. MacLaurin's letter of the 8th of June, was manifestly *his own spontaneous act*, and was very properly written in his own vindication. Dr. Jackson having attempted to justify his disobedience, on the ground of a difference in their professional opinions, and having declared, that on account of that difference he would exclude Dr. MacLaurin from all participation in the duties of the hospital, the latter very naturally and justly deemed it incumbent on him to state "the chief points" of their difference. This communication therefore must have been perfectly blameless. In that which followed (of the 7th of December) Dr. MacLaurin expressly mentions his having only been called upon by the Army Me-

dical Board to state his "opinion respecting a new diet table proposed by Dr. Jackson, head of the General Hospital," "and to report his sentiments as physician to the army." This application the Special Board not only have not ventured to blame, but have strongly disavowed all idea of attaching any blame to it*, though Dr. Maclaurin in military rank was also inferior to Dr. Jackson. The inferiority was less indeed than between Dr. Jackson, and Mr. Andrews or Dr. Morison; but mere difference in the measure or quantity, could not affect the quality or nature of the transaction; and in admitting the propriety of the application to Dr. Maclaurin, the Special Board deprive themselves of all right to object to our applications to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison. Indeed a moment's reflection will shew that, having admitted that we had a right to obtain information and opinions from Dr. Maclaurin, that information and those opinions could not be rendered less deserving of notice, when confirmed by those of Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison: had the latter indeed been in opposition to Dr. Maclaurin's, we might have hesitated; but the contrary being the case, it surely could not be more culpable in us to act upon Dr. Maclaurin's opinions, *thus supported*, than it would have been to have acted upon them alone. Mr. Andrews, in his communication of the 3d December 1801, expressly confines his observations to the differences "respecting the diet allowed to patients with the effects produced, most particularly in the convalescent state;" which effects he, "by doing duty as hospital mate in the general hospital at Chatham barracks for three years, had obtained opportunities of seeing." Here then Mr. Andrews's communications, and our application to him, appear to have been limited entirely to those objects on which we were required to report an opinion, &c. Our application to him

* Major-General Hewitt, in his letter to the Special Board, dated December 30, 1801, says, "as the Medical Board above, I conceive, belongs to the regulations of army hospitals, as far as relates to the medical treatment of the sick; and to them alone must attach responsibility for whatever they are, or can be acquainted with." If this be true, was it not highly incumbent on us to seek information wherever it could be obtained?

therefore was strictly within the line of our duty, and *laudable* instead of blameable. Dr. Morison indeed intimates, that he wrote "in answer to questions" from the Army Medical Board "respecting the diet and medical treatment of the patients in the general military hospital at Chatham during the time in which he did duty there." But as he was then in London, and the application to him was made *void* once at the Army Medical Board, it may be presumed, that he did not distinctly understand, or recollect the questions on which we desired information from him, and which I firmly believe to have related solely to the subject of diet, as those did which we had put to Dr. Maclaurin and Mr. Andrews; for having ourselves no intention to state any opinion, in our letter, respecting Dr. Jackson's practice, it is not likely we should ask such opinions of others. Be that however as it may, Dr. Morison having no longer any connection with the army, was not subordinate to Dr. Jackson, nor amenable to martial law; and the Physician General and myself were as much entitled to ask opinions or information from him on medical subjects with which he was acquainted, as from any medical gentleman who had never borne a military commission; and, therefore, the members of the Special Board had no ground whatever to support them in their attempt to affix blame upon us in regard to our applications to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison.

The Special Board in their report add, "we would recommend that instead of such proceedings (i. e. the application to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison), if the increase of sickness or mortality, or any other causes, shall give rise to suspicion, that the Physician General or the Surgeon General, or both, according to the nature of the case, should themselves investigate the matter on the spot, as the surest means of finding a remedy for the evil." Here the Special Board, supposing that they had previously convicted the Physician General and myself of one misdemeanour, endeavour to charge us with a second, arising from neglect of duty. I have just stated that our applications to Dr. Maclaurin, Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, related to the effects of Dr.

Jackson's alterations in the diet of the sick, which had fallen under their observations, during their actual residence at Chatham for several months; and it is instead of making such applications that we are here required by the Special Board, personally to "investigate the matter on the spot," i. e. to investigate the effects of Dr. Jackson's innovations in the diet of the sick! Did they reflect that to do this, it would be necessary for the Physician General and myself to have opportunities for observing the effects in question from day to day for a considerable length of time? A visit of two or three hours, like theirs to Parkhurst hospital, would in no degree answer the purpose; and would these gentlemen have it believed, that when called on as we were by the Secretary at War, we ought to have deserted our various duties in London, and, without endeavouring to ascertain what had been already observed of the effects of Dr. Jackson's altered diet at Chatham, to have proceeded to the Isle of Wight, and taken up our abode there for weeks or months, before we made any report, in order to see, what probably had been as well seen already by others? If this were their meaning, it may probably be thought that the Special Board must have been much more liberal and careless in regard to *our* time than to *their* own.

Here however it must be observed, that while the Army Medical Board were preparing and enabling themselves to form the best and most certain estimate of the merits or demerits of the alterations made by Dr. Jackson in the established diet table, as they had been ordered to do, the returns from the dépôt hospital week after week presented evidence of such an alarming increase in the mortality *there*, as could not consistently with their duty be suffered to pass without particular notice. General Hewett had, in his letter of the 9th of June, stated, that after what had passed between Dr. MacLaurin and Dr. Jackson, it could not, in his opinion, be desirable, that the former should be continued on the same duty with the latter, and the Board had therefore reluctantly permitted Dr. Jackson to proceed to the Isle of Wight, without

the assistance of any regular physician: and it was known that he there continued to employ Dr. Borland in doing physician's duty, though the latter never had passed any *medical* examination, (not even that now prescribed for hospital mates;) and this was also Dr. Jackson's case. They had both refused or evaded all medical examinations, and yet persisted in prescribing for the sick exclusively of any regular physician. Besides this cause for suspicion and disquieting apprehensions, there were many others arising from the accounts of Dr. Jackson's extraordinary methods of treating the sick, as explained in Dr. MacLaurin's letter of the 8th of June, and my subsequent report in the same month, confirmed as they were by unsolicited information from several other persons*.

Thus circumstanced, the Army Medical Board felt that they could not conscientiously delay any longer calling the attention of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War to this subject, interwoven as it was with that on which they had been required to deliver their opinions. For believing Dr. Jackson's reductions in the usual nourishment and comforts allowed to the sick, by the established diet table, to be in themselves improper, and to have been rendered still more hurtful by the profuse and exhausting evacuations to which the patients were by him subjected at the same time, it seemed probable that some of this mortality had been occasioned by their joint operation, or at least that the frequent relapses and slow recoveries which were complained of, had resulted from them. We endeavoured, however, to invite the attention of our superiors to this subject, without prejudging, or inducing others to prejudice, Dr. Jackson's medical practice; and we intended by what we did to give the Commander in

* A letter written lately by a medical gentleman, who had had opportunities of observing the practice both of Dr. Jackson and of Dr. Mitchell at Chatham, contains the following passages, viz: "With regard to the practice of Dr. Jackson at Chatham, I spoke to Sir Lucas Pepys and Mr. Pugh, and I believe wrote to them as considering it a public duty, and I well recollect that they received the unkind detail with horror."

Chief and Secretary at War a motive and an opportunity for directing an investigation to be made on the spot, either by the Physician General or by other persons. The object most requiring investigation was * the *medical treatment* of the sick at the depot hospital, and this belonged to the Physician General; but he (as has been already stated) did not consider himself as authorized by his instructions to go to the Isle of Wight for that purpose, without being specially ordered to do so by the Commander in Chief; and there was abundant reason for him in the present case to act with extreme delicacy and caution. He was reported not to have approved of Dr. Jackson's appointment, and the latter had taken great pains, and with some success, (though without the least truth,) to make it believed that the Physician General was *inimical* and *unjust* towards him; and it therefore could not be prudent in the former officiously to assume or undertake an investigation on a subject so difficult to be established as that of mal-practice. The propriety or impropriety of Dr. Jackson's various methods of depletion must, as applied to any individual, depend upon his particular state in regard to disease, age, constitution, degree of strength, &c. at the very time when they were prescribed; and this could only be ascertained by personal observation at that very time, or immediately after, and therefore nothing in these respects could be properly decided concerning the *past*; and in regard to the future, it must have been highly improbable that Dr. Jackson would continue to employ the same violent and extreme methods of treating the sick, when under the observation of one whom he considered, or pretended to consider, as hostile to him.—And, as a general question, the Physician

* As I had visited the depot hospital but a few months before, and made such enquiries respecting Dr. Jackson's practice as I then thought necessary, a second visit by me for that particular purpose did not seem likely to produce any material benefit; and as I had travelled more than 800 miles in making similar inspections within the preceding 6 or 7 months, it will not be thought that I should have omitted to visit that hospital again, if I had conceived it to be my duty.

General might reasonably wish that the merits of Dr. Jackson's depleting practices might be decided by persons not suspected of partiality or prejudice. With these motives and considerations, we wrote our letter of the 10th of December, (Mr. Ruth, who had perfectly concurred in opinion with us on the subject, being too ill to add his signature,) and having previously mentioned to the Secretary at War Dr. Maclaurin's two letters, and those from Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morrison, they were inclosed by his order, and designated as No. 1, 2, 3, and 4.—In thus calling the attention of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War to the subjects of these letters, we only did that which it would have been culpable in us to have neglected *, as we were afterwards assured both by His Royal Highness and the Secretary at War; and as in doing this, we gave to our superiors an occasion for requiring the Physician General alone, or with myself, to proceed to the Isle of Wight, or (if it were thought more proper,) to direct others to do so, I am at a loss to conceive how it can have been wrong in us not to have previously done that, without any direction from the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War, which they did not think proper to order us to do, when the occasion was given and suggested to them. And of all persons in the world, the members of the Special Board should have been the *last* to blame the Physician General and myself for not having gone to the Isle of Wight, in order to ascertain the propriety or impropriety of Dr. Jackson's practice, by a personal investigation on the spot: they who,

* The Deputy Secretary at War, in a letter to the Physician and Surgeon General, dated the 4th of January 1802, wrote as follows, viz. "You certainly did no more than your duty in calling the attention of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War to what was passing in the Isle of Wight, whether you meant to confine your animadversions to the success of the practice pursued there or not." And we were soon after told by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, that after the evidence which we had received concerning the transactions at the general hospital at Chatham, we should not have done our duty, had we not submitted that evidence to the consideration of our superiors.

though appointed principally for this very purpose, had declared in their first letter to the Secretary at War, that they knew of no way to do this but by the strange trial formerly mentioned, (a declaration which was afterwards repeated as a part of their report,) and who in fact did nothing capable of throwing the smallest light on the subject during their investigation "on the spot." That persons who are not medical men, and therefore not sensible of the difficulty of deciding a question of mal-practice, (especially in the circumstances which surrounded that of Dr. Jackson,) should suppose that a visit from the Physician and Surgeon General would easily remove all doubt on the subject, can excite no wonder; but that the Special Board should endeavour to lead the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War into this error, after what has been just mentioned, will, I think, astonish all those who are not willing to believe that the former were actuated by sinister motives.

Having, as I hope, very sufficiently vindicated the Physician General and myself from the blame attempted to be thrown upon us by this part of the report, it cannot, I presume, be unreasonable or improper in me to animadvert upon the liberty which the Special Board have thus assumed and exercised.

It will be remembered that these gentlemen were nominated for that appointment by the Secretary at War, as being "officers in the medical line of the army;" and as such they must individually have been subordinate both to the Physician General and the Surgeon General, under whose orders they had all previously served; they could therefore have no right to censure the conduct of their superiors, without special authority from the Commander in Chief or Secretary at War; and by a reference to the letter containing the appointment and instructions of the members of the Special Board, it will be readily perceived that no authority nor pretence for any animadversions from them upon the conduct of the Physician General and myself could be derived from it. They were required to proceed to the Isle of Wight, and there "diligent-

ly to investigate the several matters represented by the Physician and Surgeon General in regard to the treatment of the medical patients under the care and superintendence of Dr. Jackson; to inspect minutely the hospital itself," &c. But the conduct of the Physician General and myself is no where pointed out as a subject for their investigation. The letters of Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison were referred with others to the Special Board for their "information," not for any opinion respecting the manner in which they had been procured, or the propriety of applying for them; of the former the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War already knew as much as the Special Board; and they were much better able to judge of the latter, which, if it had been exceptionable, would only have been so as a deviation from the strict discipline of the army, a subject belonging exclusively to the Commander in Chief, and totally unfit for the cognizance of a medical Board; and therefore, in presuming to charge the Physician General and myself with an offence against discipline, they committed one for which, had they not been on half pay, they might, I believe, have been amenable to a court martial. But this is not all; for in thus usurping jurisdiction and authority over their superiors, and assuming the office of judge, the members of the Special Board seem either to have forgotten, or not to have known the most essential forms and principles of justice. Without informing us that our conduct was to be a matter of enquiry; without recollecting that we might probably have had not only sufficient, but meritorious, reasons and motives for what they perhaps thought blameable, and without giving us the smallest opportunity to explain our motives, and defend our conduct, they in a manner more consonant to the administration of justice in Turkey than in England, proceeded to pass a sentence of condemnation upon us; a sentence which unfortunately was in some degree executed, before we knew, or even suspected, that any question had been agitated relating to our conduct.

After having animadverted, as I hope with moderation, fairness, and justice, upon the report of the Special Board, I am led in the order of events to notice the consequences of it; and I enter upon this part of my undertaking with great reluctance, because it compels me to introduce facts connected with persons, of whom it is my inclination as well as duty always to write, speak, and think with great deference and respect. But unfortunately I cannot help stating, (as both the Special Board and Dr. Jackson have published it,) that the Report, which I believe every reader of candour and discernment will deem to have been highly exceptionable, did, on the 18th of January 1802, obtain the approbation of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and of the Secretary at War, who appear to have been misled by it in various particulars: partly, I presume, from their unsuspecting confidence in the members of the Board, and partly because it related to medical subjects, with which persons in their high stations are rarely, if ever, sufficiently acquainted to detect errors so plausible, and so well disguised in the garb of truth, as those of the Report in question. It may indeed be fairly presumed, that neither His Royal Highness nor the Secretary at War had any suspicion of the manner in which the Special Board had conducted their enquiry; for, with their known love of justice, it seems impossible that they should ever have implicitly sanctioned a proceeding to *completely ex parte*, had they known it to be such; and, upon a foundation so precarious and dangerous, have censured the Physician General and myself, without giving us that which is essential to justice, an opportunity of justifying ourselves. There is, moreover, direct and positive proof in the letters of the Secretary at War, of the erroneous impressions under which both the Commander in Chief and himself had been induced to approve of the Report, and disapprove of the conduct of the Physician General and myself. Mr. Yorke, in his letter to us of the 16th January (inclosing the original Report for our information,) declares, that "His Royal Highness conceives the unanimous opinion of the

Board to have exculpated Dr. Jackson from all *improper practice* in the treatment of diseases, and in the care of the sick." This first and most important deception produced another, by inducing His Royal Highness to conclude, that the Physician General and myself "were not grounded in our representations regarding the hospitals in the Isle of Wight." Had we been heard before this sentence was pronounced upon us, we should have alleged, that our representations had been confined to the subject of Dr. Jackson's innovations in regard to diet, and to the effects supposed to have resulted from them, on which we had been required to report our opinions; and that we had discharged this duty conscientiously to the best of our ability; and as the Special Board, with all their tenderness and indulgence towards Dr. Jackson, had admitted the justice of our objections against a great part of the new diet-table, we probably should have convinced the Commander in Chief that we had been, in a considerable degree at least, "grounded" in our "representations;" even if Dr. MacLaurin's charge of mal-practice, instead of being justifiable, (as it was,) had been without any foundation.

His Royal Highness was moreover induced by the Report "painfully" to declare his opinion, "that, instead of having recourse to *inferior* officers, who had served under Dr. Jackson, for their opinions as to his *practice* and mode of treating the sick, it was our duty to have satisfied ourselves on those points from our own *personal observations*." I have however already proved, as we should have done to His Royal Highness, had the opportunity been allowed before his opinion was thus delivered, that we did not recur to inferior officers, nor, as I believe, to any persons whatever for their opinion, as to Dr. Jackson's *practice* and mode of *treating the sick*; and I cannot help believing, that, if the Commander in Chief had not been deceived in regard to what the Special Board were supposed to have done by their "personal observations" and investigations, if he had known that, in truth, they had ascertained *nothing* by them respecting the propriety or

impropriety of Dr. Jackson's practice, His Royal Highness would have attached less importance to such an inspection as that made by the Special Board; and have been therefore less disposed to blame us for not having gone to the Isle of Wight, previous to our letter of the 10th Dec. 1801.

Soon after the report of the Board, and the opinions of the Commander in Chief and Secretary at War had been thus communicated to the Physician General and myself, we solicited and obtained permission from His Royal Highness to state certain facts and explanations tending to our justification; and although they would doubtless have come with more propriety and efficacy, had we been enabled to state them *before* the report had been approved and adopted, we had some reason to believe from succeeding events, that our appeal to the discernment and justice of His Royal Highness was not made *in vain*.

A communication, similar to that made to the Physician General and myself, was on the same day made by the Secretary at War to General Hewett; and Dr. Jackson seems to have been so far elated by it, as to have expected, and afterwards attempted, to render himself totally independent of the Army Medical Board. This presumption was, however, severely checked by the order which on the 2d of February we were authorized by the Commander in Chief to transmit to Dr. Jackson, and which was transmitted on the 3d, importing, "that the medical patients of the hospital of the depot at the Isle of Wight should continue to be taken care of by the two physicians placed there for that purpose, and that Dr. Borland's longer continuance at the depot was unnecessary." By this order Dr. Jackson says he considered himself as superseded; his office of head of the hospital being thereby rendered "a nominal or insignificant office." "For (adds he) physicians, or persons who have the immediate care of the sick must be supposed to suggest and to direct virtually all the important business which concerns hospitals," and that, as his appointment had "ceased to be honourable or

useful," he "desired leave to resign." It will, however, soon appear that his request was very insincere; that nothing could have been farther from his intentions than a resignation, and consequently that the acceptance of his offer to resign was a severe disappointment and mortification both to his hopes and his vanity. This, indeed, he has plainly avowed at p. 178. of his publication, (of 1803,) adding, that he "had not calculated upon retiring with a mark of reproach;" for such he considered the acceptance of his resignation by the Commander in Chief. The transaction was not, however, so simple or so innocent on Dr. Jackson's part, as he has chosen to describe it; for the letter in which he offered his resignation contained very reprehensible allegations, intended to procure the army physicians to be removed, and himself together with Dr. Borland reinstated in the care of the medical patients at Parkhurst. In that letter, addressed to Colonel Brownrigg, then military secretary to the Commander in Chief, he asserts, "that the medical charge of Parkhurst, since the 1st of January, had been entirely in the hands of the physicians, ordered to the Isle of Wight on that account;" and he adds, (what will probably excite both astonishment and indignation,) that when given up to them "the state of the hospital appeared to be in circumstances as favourable as it had been at any time during the two preceding months." After this gross and injurious misrepresentation, he proceeds to compare the expenditure and the mortality which occurred *before* the time when the sick were delivered over to the army physicians, with what followed this delivery, when, in consequence of the recommendation of the Special Board, his (Jackson's) new diet table had been abolished, so far as related to the full diet, and when the rations to the servants and convalescents were of course increased: here as may be supposed, the advantage, in point of economy, was in his favour; and he endeavoured also to gain credit, at the expense of the army physicians, on the subject of the mortality, which, in consequence of the great number of dying or hopeless patients delivered over to them on the 1st of Jan-

nuary, proved greater during the first fortnight than it had been previously; and here the iniquity of his misrepresentation concerning the state of the hospital on the 1st of January becomes manifest; for instead of charging himself with the deaths which had confessedly become unavoidable under his treatment, he attempted to throw them from himself upon the physicians, and to persuade the Commander in Chief that they had been produced by the difference between their methods of treatment and his own; on this subject he writes to Colonel Brownrigg as follows, "The mode of treatment (under the physicians), I must observe, was *different*; and the *result in the effect is not the same*. It appears," says he, "on the face of the returns; and I add no comment upon it: such comparison is indelicate and offensive. I adduce it with unwillingness, and would have avoided any allusion to it, if the accusation of the Physician General had not obliged me to bring the matter under view in the *only case which offers a fair parallel*." *A fair parallel!* Here I can only see an abuse of terms, preceded by an affectation of delicacy and unwillingness to make that fallacious comparison, which I formerly mentioned as his probable motive for delivering over the *whole* of the sick to the Army Physicians, instead of keeping a *share* of them under his own care, (as was intended by his superiors and particularly by the Special Medical Board,) and thus producing what perhaps might have been called a fair parallel in some respects. I have now before me an exact and authenticated return of the forty-one soldiers who died in the dépôt hospital from the 1st to the 14th January 1862, both days inclusive, with their names, and regiments, and the days of their admissions, and of their deaths. Of these 41, it appears that only *four* were admitted *after* the physicians took charge of the sick, and consequently these were the only ones for whom they can be supposed properly responsible, all the others having been under the care of Dr. Jackson, some of them for as far back as the month of August; and a great proportion of them had diseases of long standing, accompanied with such extreme debility as to have been absolutely desperate for a considerable time: and, of those more recently

admitted, the greater part were in conditions not less dangerous when delivered over by Dr. Jackson: for before midnight of the 1st of January, i. e. within twelve hours or less after the sick had been delivered over, four of the 41 died, and three others were returned dead the next morning, making seven deaths in less than twenty-four hours; which I am confident never had before occurred at the dépôt. These seven must consequently have been in a dying state when delivered over. In addition to these, seventeen others died on and before the 7th of January, making the unexampled number of 24 deaths in one week; to these were added eighteen deaths in the second week; after which, most of the desperate cases delivered over by Dr. Jackson being thus removed, the deaths of the third week were (as already mentioned) reduced to four: Thence to the 4th of March the deaths averaged *seven* in *two* weeks; but in the succeeding four weeks ending on the 1st of April only two died, i. e. one in 14 days.

Of the four soldiers admitted after the sick were delivered over to the Army Physicians, and included among the forty-one who died previous to the 15th of January, one (Timothy Dwaney) died on the day of his admission, and seems likely to have been one of those kept under Dr. Jackson's treatment in the barracks, and to have been *only* sent into the hospital *when dying*, in order that his death might be charged against the Physicians: and another admitted on the 11th of January, who died on the 15th, was probably sent to the hospital in nearly the same state. The other two were admitted on the 3d of January, and of these one lived seven, the other nine days; perhaps therefore these patients may not have been in desperate conditions, when put into the hands of the Army Physicians, though one of them, Joseph Whiting, is liable to be so considered, since he had been for a month in the hospital, (where he had undergone the common depleting treatment under Dr. Jackson,) and had been discharged only a few days, a week at the most, previously to his re-admission, probably in consequence of a relapse. By this statement my readers will perceive how greatly Dr. Jackson falsified the truth in asserting, that the dépôt hospital on the 1st of January, appeared "to be in

circumstances as favourable as it had been at any time during the two preceding months; for within that space there were some weeks in which the whole number of deaths was less than the number left on that day, by Dr. Jackson in *articulo mortis* *. And they will also perceive and reprobate his motives for this gross misrepresentation. He indeed shrunk from trying his skill with that of the Army Physicians, when the Special Board so strongly urged him to it on the 31st of December, probably because he must then have taken a share of the dying patients; but he was very glad, when he had turned all of that description over to the Army Physicians, to make a most unfair comparison of the success of his practice with theirs, under that disadvantage, and most injuriously to call it "a fair parallel." The reader will determine how far a man who is capable of such an artifice can afterwards claim or deserve confidence.

In the same letter Dr. Jackson took the opportunity of employing all his ingenuity in praising Dr. Borland, whose immediate removal to Portsmouth, (which had been ordered the day before the date of this letter,) seems to have thrown him into complete despair, and was probably the most efficient motive for writing it; asserting, that Dr. Borland's "education † had been as good as that of most physicians," and "his experience greater than that of any more physician to the army." To warrant this assertion, we must suppose that the experience alluded to by Dr. Jackson related to matters not appertaining to physicians, and consequently neglected by them.

Having reached the time when Dr. Jackson to his great disappointment and mortification found it expedient to remove from the dépôt hospital, I am relieved from the necessity of taking any farther notice of his conduct there; and most

* See an extract from Dr. Sathon's letter, and other facts relating to this subject at page 64.

† Had Dr. Jackson adduced from this unwarrantable boasting of Dr. Borland's education, I should have been silent on that subject; but this attempt to mislead the Commander in Chief by improper and offensive comparisons ought not to pass unnoticed. Of Dr. Borland's proficiency, as well in

thankful should I have been, could I have escaped the trouble of those animadversions upon it, which occupy a large portion of the preceding pages.

It now therefore only remains for me to notice that part of the publication of the Special Board, to which they have

med-cine as in literature, the books used by him and Dr. Jackson in the life of Wight will afford conclusive evidence. From the prescriptions written in them by the former, the following examples have been copied *literatim*.

"July 18. *Snapon*."

"Ung. Merc. pro Capite."

"Jul. 19. *Davit*."

"Empr. Episp. duss ad cruris internis."

"Jul. 24. *Hayfield*, Post 7-3. ad 3 xij

"Hault. *Æth. Anod.* 31. baris

"1 Pint Rum Punch

"Episp. duss ad cruris internis."

"Jul. 24. *Lesker*."

"Episp. duss applicer.

"ad Temporum."

"Jul. 25. *Kelly*."

"Ungt. Merc. si 3ij

"super femores omni nocte."

"Jul. 30. *Harvey*."

"Imungt. Ungt. Hydr. 3ij

"super abdomen omni nocte."

"Aug. 1. *Crabtree*."

"Abruantur Capilli

"et appl'cator Verdicetorium

"magnum per totam capitem

"1 Pint Porter, 1 Gill Wine.

"Omittr. omnia medicamenta."

"Aug. 6. *Sutton*."

"Calom. gr. v. Æalim

"vespert apud horam sextam

"Sunt. Teles. Arachne gr. viij.

"apud horam decimam gr. viij.

"de cras mane apud horam

"sextam incipit. sumere gr. x.

"omni hora—usque ad

"temporem viderentis."

"Aug. 7. *Sutton*."

"Very slight attack of fever this

"morning."

"Measles shew themselves—uncertain

"whether the re-action of another

"disease upon the system, or the

"power of the cowpox has pro-

"duced effect."

"By this curious observation, Dr. Bor-

"land appears to have believed that

"cows might produce the measles."

I could, were it expedient, easily extend the number of these examples. That they must have fallen under the daily observation of Dr. Jackson cannot be doubted; and we are therefore naturally led to ask, whether he was himself so ignorant as not to be sensible of the evidence which they afford, or so regardless of the truth, and likewise of his duty to the service, as, in defiance of that evidence, to assert what he knew to be false for the purpose of deceiving His Royal Highness?

In regard to the extent of Dr. Jackson's literary acquirements, these books afford little or no evidence, for he has rarely prescribed in them except in the English language. How that was employed by him the following specimens (containing the whole of the prescriptions written by him in one of the last

prefixed the word "*Conclusion*," and which they introduce by observing, that "the weighty part of the charge brought against Dr. Jackson in the letter of the Physician and Surgeon General of the 10th of December 1801, *being abandoned in their letter of the 29th of December* *; and the ground of enquiry as relating to his conduct being thereby limited to the *causes only* of the great mortality: the Special Board being

pital-books, marked No. 3, on two particular days) will show; and they will also show how, by omitting to specify the forms, preparations, quantities, exhibitions, &c. of the medicines, bleedings, &c. prescribed, he might be able to execute his vantage of dispatching a great number of patients in a short time:

Sept. 3.	Maffey. Quaffa.
Flood. Barracks.	Sidley. Quaffa.
Kelly. Warm bath, Dover's powder.	Latur. Bled if not easier.
Leeds. Medina hospital.	Rife. Antimonial anodyne after
Frederick. Goulard lotion to wash.	fals have operated.
Bacly. Volatile tincture of guaiac. Sept. 4.	Kelly. W. bath, Dover's powder
warm bath, volatile liniment for	after
the legs.	Frederick. Continue
Race. Pectoral.	Bacly. Continue
McIntosh. Warm bath, Dover's powder.	Bacon. Bleeding, Pectoral
Mores. Quaffa.	Corp. McIntosh. Emetic
Joyce. Balsam Capivi.	Levin. Cont. cream tart.
Levin. Calomel and jalap.	Latur. Pectoral mixture
Latur. Warm bath, and Dover's	Turney. Bleeding
powder at night.	Rife. Pectoral

* Any one who will attentively and minutely examine our letter of the 10th of Dec. 1801 to the Secretary at War must be convinced, that the Physician General and myself did not therein deliver any opinion concerning what is commonly meant and understood by the words, practice, or medical practice, as employed by Dr. Jackson in the depôt; and that our observations were confined to the effects of his alterations in the established diet-table, and his abstractions from those "articles of comfort and nourishment" which are generally denominated *extras* in the tables, i. e. wine, porter, eggs, &c. &c. Indeed the words, practice, and medical practice, medical treatment, &c. do not once occur in our letter. We did indeed, in the concluding paragraph, refer to the monthly report from hospitals of the foreign corps, (which were also in the list of Wight,) as indicating by a comparison, that the mortality in the latter, "under different diet and treatment," had been much less than in the depôt hospital; but the "reasons" here alluded to, was not medical treatment properly so called; for we had no knowledge of the medical treatment of the sick in the foreign

well aware that great mortality often proceeded from circumstances beyond the controul of the *ablest* medical abilities, were of opinion that they could not better illustrate this matter than by a comparison of the depôt hospital at two different periods; both times of unusual sickness, and the sickness proceeding from nearly the same diseases, viz. from fevers, small pox, measles, and inflammation of the lungs." We are next told that, in conformity with this opinion, "Dr. Mitchell's returns in 1794 were laid before the Special Board by one of the *members* * who had repeatedly visited the hospital at Chatham during that year;" and that by a comparison it appeared "that there had been periods" (rather one period) "of as great sickness and mortality in the depôt as in 1801;" "and this (they say) was all that was meant to be inferred from the returns; for they could not furnish any just grounds of comparison, respecting the professional abilities of Dr. Mitchell and Dr. Jackson, because the epidemics were different both in time and place," &c. Here the Special Board admit that their recurrence to the mortality at Chatham in 1794, and their comparison of it with that of the hospital at Parkhurst in 1801, were useless, for every purpose

hospitals, and therefore could not intend to compare it with that under Jackson, especially when we considered ourselves as but imperfectly acquainted even with the latter. The different "treatment" here meant, was connected or contrasted with that mentioned in the preceding paragraph, viz. the reductions made by Dr. Jackson in "many articles of nourishment and comfort," which had been commonly allowed to the sick. Charges of mal-practice were indeed contained, not in our letter, but in the letters of Drs. Maclean and Morison; which are expressly stated to have been inclosed and forwarded by order of the Secretary at War; and these charges it was not in our power to retract, if we had been disposed to do it; because they neither originated with, nor depended upon us, but upon Drs. Maclean and Morison, and the facts attested by them.

* Of the accuracy of the returns so produced, I can say nothing: of the irregularity of this method of introducing them to the notice of the Special Board, every one acquainted with the usual course of public business is capable of judging.

but that of shewing that there had been *one* period of as great mortality as that of the latter place. This purpose, however, would have been more decisively attained, by their going back at once to the year 1665, in which 100,000 persons are supposed to have died in London, or within the bills of mortality, principally by an epidemic, which, like that at Chatham, was "different both in time and place," from those of the Isle of Wight; I am aware indeed that the principal epidemic of the year 1665 (i. e. the plague) was also different in its nature*, and therefore less proper, as a point of comparison; but it appears to have been so only in *degree*; for in fact the measles and scarlet fever, which were the only epidemics, or prevalent diseases among the inhabitants of the Isle of Wight in 1801, were, as has been already stated on good authority, every where mild and favourable, except in Parkhurst hospital, and therefore were utterly incapable of warranting any such comparison as the Special Board made, or at least of warranting any useful conclusion from it. Under such circumstances, the going backward seven or eight years, to discover and select the period of the greatest mortality that had occurred during the whole time of Dr. Mitchell's residence at Chatham, in order to account for the events of another period, which occurred to Dr. Jackson in the *very first and only* year of his management at the dépôt, is obviously unfair; for who can tell how much greater the mortality might have been, in future years, if Dr. Jackson had remained at the dépôt as long as Dr. Mitchell had? The Special Board however seem by this comparison to have obtained a pretext for avoiding all investigation, respecting either the propriety or the consequences of Dr. Jackson's extraordinary methods of treating the sick.

The mortality of 1794 at Chatham, being thus brought within Dr. Jackson's knowledge, he with his usual art and

* This was the case also between the epidemics of Chatham and the Isle of Wight, for the scarlet fever, which prevailed at the latter in 1801, is not mentioned as being epidemical at Chatham in 1794.

dissimilarity availed himself of it, in his publication of 1803, in such a way that even the Special Board have declared that "it will be difficult to acquit him of a want of candour in the use he has made of it," by unfairly contrasting that mortality "with a period in 1801, which," (to adopt the language of the Special Board) "was *not* unhealthy; and during which, he states the mortality in fevers to have been as 1 in 32; inferring therefrom a superiority in favour of his own practice as 3 to 1." "He also takes another period, of which much the greater part was *healthy*, from July to December 1801, and from that obtains the proportion of 1 in 23, being still more than double that of 1 in 10. But," (say the Board) "in these statements, the fallacy of comparing healthy with unhealthy periods is *not* the *only one*; there is a still greater source of error; for, in the returns of Dr. Jackson, from which the Special Board made their comparison, were comprehended under the general head of *fever*, small pox, measles, scarlet fever, inflammation of the lungs, &c. &c. The Board therefore included the same diseases in making the comparison from Dr. Mitchell's returns of 1794. But if Table V. at the end of Dr. Jackson's book be examined, it will be seen that he makes out the proportion of 1 in 32, and of 1 in 23, from what he calls *continued fever*; leaving out measles, small pox, scarlet fever, pneumonia, and other acute diseases, although these were evidently the *principal causes of mortality*. Here, then, are comparisons formed neither upon periods similar as to health, nor upon the same disorders. From such an use of returns any inference may be deduced at pleasure."

After these animadversions on Dr. Jackson's misrepresentations, intended, perhaps, by the Special Board, as a proof and display of their own impartiality, they apparently endeavour to recompence him by observing that *I* also have attempted, "upon more occasions than one, by a similar use of returns, to shew the inferiority of Dr. Jackson's practice;" and here (by a note) they refer for their justification to the letter which the Physician General and myself wrote to the

Special Board on the 29th of December, mentioning "that the amount of the deaths during the (then) *last* month of the *whole* army, both in regimental and general hospitals at home, exclusive of the Isle of Wight general hospital," was "only 36" out of 2400 patients; "whereas 39 deaths had occurred in that hospital during the *same* period out of only 339 patients;" and they also refer to the comparison in my Appendix No. 8. of the results of Dr. Jackson's practice at Chatham in 1801, with those of his immediate predecessors at the *same* place in the two preceding years; and thus, because I had made these *obviously* natural comparisons, first, of what occurred to the troops on the Isle of Wight, in opposition to every other part of the army in Great Britain, during the very *same* month; and secondly, of what occurred at Chatham under Dr. Jackson, contrasted with what happened there under his immediate predecessors in the *same* place, and at the *nearest* points of time, I am to be accused of unfairness, and my artless comparisons are to be taken as a set-off against Dr. Jackson's premeditated deceptions; and in this way the account is to be balanced.

The Special Board proceed next to observe that "the comparison appears to be equally objectionable, on which Dr. Jackson has endeavoured to establish the superiority of his practice over the physicians who succeeded him at the hospital of the dépôt; and they refer to their prediction that "the mortality would continue some time longer, particularly if the weather proved severe." This prediction they acknowledge to have been intended to secure Dr. Jackson from what they call "undue blame;" and as he could not take the benefit of it, they think it "should be equally extended to those who followed him." I have already expressed my wish that they had candidly avowed the true ground of this prediction, instead of connecting it as they did, in some degree, with the continuance of cold weather.

At p. 71. the Special Board allege "that not one fact or opinion expressed in any of their communications to the Secretary

at War, has been controverted, or shewn to be erroneous." How far this allegation could have been warrantable, subsequently to the publication of my Appendix No. 8. I leave others to judge: certainly a repetition of it never will be justifiable, after the publication of what I am now writing, nor will "the reproach of having made the inspection in so short a time," ever thereafter be deemed, what they are pleased to term, "a high commendation," probably not even by themselves.

In the same page they observe, that "the style of," what they call my, "attack upon the Special Board, is so peculiar, correctness of statement is so completely discarded, and causes of complaint, so entirely devoid of truth and reason, are assumed, that they treat the reader's patience while they examine in detail one or two sentences." After such imputations, unprovoked and unwarranted by any thing which I had previously written, my readers will, I hope, excuse any little asperities of expression which may escape from me in the course of my present performance. The first sentence which the Special Board have selected to be examined "in detail," is that in which I stated their inquiry to have been "made completely *ex parte*;" as the Gentlemen who were to report on the subject had not only been appointed without any reference to the Medical Board, but had avoided all communication with the members of it, as well as with Dr. Mac-laurin, Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison." Here, by a mixture of sophistry and misrepresentation, they endeavour to convict me of, what they term, "singular logic," in having inferred that their enquiry was rendered *ex parte*, by their having been appointed without the concurrence of the Army Medical Board. There is nothing, however, in the sentence to warrant any such construction. My observation respecting their appointment was superfluous indeed, so far as regarded my conclusion that their proceedings had been completely *ex parte*; which conclusion depended on their total want of communication with the Army Medical Board.

and with Dr. Maclaurin, &c. But though superfluous in regard to that conclusion, it was useful, as shewing that the whole business was more completely *ex parte* than it would have been if the Army Medical Board had in any degree participated in the nomination or appointment of the Special Board.—And our not having so participated, could not in any other way have been mentioned so *concisely*, as it was by introducing it into the *same sentence*. To the charge of having “avoided all communication, &c.” the Special Board answer, that they “neither *courted* nor *declined* communication.” But this answer (supposing it to be true) can afford the Special Board no excuse; for when they had determined to extend their jurisdiction, and become judges of the Physician and Surgeon General, and Dr. Maclaurin, they should not have forgotten the first and most indispensable duty of a judge, but should have laid aside their *cynosi*, and have *courted* a communication with those whom they were about to condemn. This indeed they must have known, or they must have been unacquainted even with the most common and notorious principles of English jurisprudence and of natural justice. Not considering ourselves as parties in the business, nor suspecting that our characters or conduct were in danger of being questioned, and much less of being condemned, we had no motive for seeking a communication with the Special Board, as we should have done if their intentions had been communicated to us. On this subject, I beg leave to refer the Special Board to “*that rule of natural reason*,” as Judge Blackstone terms it, which was “expressed by Seneca.”

“*Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera,
Æquum licet statuerit, baud æquus fuit.*”

“A rule (says the learned judge) to which all municipal laws, that are founded on the principles of justice, have strictly conformed; the Roman law requiring a *citation at legi*; and our common law never suffering any fact, either civil or

criminal, to be tried till it has previously *compelled* an appearance by the party concerned.” Comment. &c. vol. iv. p. 283.

Indeed the hearing of a person accused is so absolutely indispensable by the laws of England, that if one indicted and arraigned would not answer, the cause could not be tried, and an inquisition took place to ascertain whether the person accused stood mute by the visitation of God, or his own obstinacy; and in the latter case he was subjected to the “*peine forte et dure*,” or, as it was commonly called, *pressing to death*; an expedient taken away by the statute of the 13th of Geo. III., which enacts that those who may thus stand mute (from obstinacy) shall be *deemed guilty*, and punished as if convicted by the verdict of a jury, &c.” The necessity, however, of citation, and of giving the accused full and fair opportunity of defending himself, is not thereby diminished. The Special Board will therefore, I hope, perceive the *inaptitude* of what they probably deemed a *triumphant* answer to my objection; and that, in usurping a jurisdiction over the Physician General and myself, it was their first duty to have “*courted*” a little communication with us; not indeed by pressing us to death, but by informing us of the faults *imputed* to us, and giving us an opportunity to explain the motives of our conduct; always recollecting that what appeared wrong to themselves, might in fact prove to be right and laudable when properly understood. This little attention to those forms, without which there can be no justice, seems to have been the more necessary in our case, since the charge against us probably originated with the judges themselves, who in instance this appear to have executed two offices, usually deemed incompatible, viz. those of accuser and judge. Nor can any one excuse their misconduct by attributing it to ignorance. For in regard to Dr. Jackson, they were so very sensible of the importance of hearing the party accused, that they heard *no one else*; but when the Physician General and myself were to be condemned, *none* but our *accusers* or *adversaries* appear to have been heard, or in-

formed of what was doing. The Special Board seem indeed to suppose that they can obtain some excuse, by pretending, unwarrantably, at p. 72, that we had, by our letter of the 29th December, completely changed or withdrawn what they call our accusation against Dr. Jackson, and by enquiring "what question could remain for the Special Board to ask us after that communication?" Surely if there was room for an investigation, there must have been room to ask questions.—Certainly we, (the Army Medical Board,) in communicating our own opinion of Dr. Jackson's new diet table, with Dr. MacLaurin's charge of mal-practice, did not mean to render ourselves parties in the business; but we conceived that, if truth and justice were to be obtained by enquiry, such information as we possessed might with propriety have been sought by the Special Board, and that Drs. MacLaurin and Morison might have been allowed an opportunity of justifying their allegations. The Special Board, however, chose to consider and treat us *all* as parties, and to lay us under the disabilities, without any of the privileges, belonging to those who are parties. But wherever the Special Board may have thought of the expediency of hearing us, before they exculpated Dr. Jackson, there can be no excuse for their not doing it, when they changed the subject of their investigation, and proceeded without our knowledge to consider and treat us as culprits; nor will any sophistry justify this part of their conduct.

To my observation, that the Special Board had "passed one night only on the Isle of Wight," &c. they say, "what is it to the purpose, whether we passed one night or one month on the Isle of Wight?" This certainly is a strange question, though asked with an air of triumph. If they did not think it of some importance, whether or not they allowed themselves time enough to perform the duties for which they were appointed, why did they mislead the Secretary at War, by making him believe, that they were sitting as a Board in the Isle of Wight after they had returned to London? They say,

"we did the duty for which our services were commanded." The contrary has however been, I think, clearly demonstrated. They add, "if we were guilty of errors or omissions it would be useful if the Physician or Surgeon General would point them out." I have done so; probably to a greater extent than they wished; and have thus, I hope, rendered myself "useful." They observe moreover, that they "had been much in the habit of inspecting military hospitals." But their habits, had they been of ten times longer duration, could not have enabled them properly to perform the duties assigned by the letter from the Secretary at War, within the time which they passed at the Isle of Wight.

At p. 73, the Special Board notice my allegation, that "Dr. Jackson, after timely notice of their visit, had prepared matters for their inspection;" and they say, that they do not blame him for taking care "to put the hospital in the *best possible order*;" nor did I blame him for doing so; but I thought it quite superfluous in them to mention in their Report the cleanliness, &c. of the hospital, after a week had been given to him for preparation.

Adverting to my assertion, that "Dr. Jackson had explained every thing as he pleased, without contradiction," they say, "this is one of those bold assumptions for which Mr. Keate can have no authority." There is, however, I think, more boldness in this their assertion than in mine. I want no other authority than that of their own statement, aided as it is by that of Dr. Jackson in 26 folio pages. They add, that I seem "wholly to forget, that this part of their business was a matter of inspection, not explanation;" that "the objects of inquiry were under their sight." Were the patients who had been removed from the dépôt hospital during the last twelve months, either by death or recovery, under the sight of the Special Board? Were the latter able to see their several diseases, and those symptoms by which the propriety of Dr. Jackson's methods of treatment could best be ascertained? If there was no "matter for explanation" in the course of their inspection, how came

they to keep Dr. Jackson in attendance upon themselves from the moment of their arrival to the termination of their inspection (whilst more than three hundred sick wanted medical assistance,) and to require his presence again during the whole evening "for the purpose of answering such enquiries as they might think necessary to make arising out of their inspection," &c.?

They next assert, that it was disingenuous in the Army Medical Board to pretend to have been dissatisfied with their report, as having been "*made hastily*," and "because Dr. Jackson was allowed to explain every thing as he pleased;" adding, that "the *real* cause of our dissatisfaction must be obvious to every reader"—If any reader can ascertain what the Special Board would here insinuate to have been the *real* cause of our dissatisfaction, it is more than I can do. If they wish to have it believed that we were displeased, not so much with *their* conduct, as with that of our superiors, subsequently to the report, such insinuation is unjust and mischievous.

At p. 75. after supposing me to have intended to blame them for not calling on me for useful information, they say, that "the result of my inspection had been *formally* communicated to them in General Hewett's letters;" adding, "on this subject, we need only ask one question; Was Mr. Keate prepared to give us a different account of his inspection from that which he gave to General Hewett upon the spot?"—After what I have already stated on this subject, it can hardly be necessary for me to answer such a question.—That they, who were fifteen days in making their report, could suppose, even if I had intended to make one to General Hewett, that I should have been able to do it without one minute for consideration, and that so completely, as to have nothing left to say afterwards, is extremely preposterous. Of General Hewett's formal communication respecting my report, I have already given a just account; and I hope it will teach them, if they should ever again be honoured with a similar appointment, not to prefer and rely upon information taken *ex parte*,

and at *second* hand. General Hewett certainly could not give them what he had never possessed, a knowledge of the *results* of my inspection at Chatham.

After these futile attempts to exculpate themselves, and cast blame upon me, the Special Board say, "It is very unpleasant thus to unravel a *tissue* of *misrepresentations*, and we will not proceed further it." Hitherto, however, the misrepresentation has been all *their own*, and the irksome task of unravelling it has been thrown upon me.

They add, "respecting the charge of overlooking Dr. Borland's insubordination and disobedience," that "it will appear from the documents, that no part of Dr. Borland's conduct was submitted to them." To this I need only answer, that by the same documents it will *more fully* appear, that no part of the conduct of the *Physician General* and myself was submitted to them, though the want of legitimate authority did not restrain them from censuring the conduct of a *Public Board*, to which, had they not been on half-pay, they must have been subordinate. But though the Special Board are so much disposed to exercise severity towards us, even for supposed mistakes, they take little care to avoid committing errors themselves. I said nothing of Dr. Borland's "insubordination and disobedience;" but I blamed them for overlooking the "insubordination and disobedience with which Dr. Jackson had persisted to employ as a *physician* Dr. Borland, a mere surgeon." It was Dr. Jackson's misconduct, therefore, which the Special Board were blamed for overlooking; and they certainly will not pretend that this was not a proper subject for their animadversions*.

The Special Board, with unprovoked asperity, then notice a mistake which I made, (and the *only one yet discovered* by

* The predicament in which a leading member of the Special Board had formerly placed himself by his acts of insubordination towards the Army Medical Board (as will be seen in the letter which the latter Board were under the necessity of addressing to the Commander in Chief in 1794, and which is given in Appendix No. 5.), was perhaps a powerful reason for omitting to notice acts of a similar nature on the part of Dr. Jackson.

them,) in my Appendix No. 8. by joining the name of Dr. Maclaurin with the names of Dr. Morison and Mr. Andrews, and representing the Special Board as having blamed the Physician General and myself [for calling] for information from him, as well as from the others. To explain this mistake I must refer to my letter of the 2d of July, to Sir John Hayes, in which I mentioned that not finding a copy of the report of the Special Board among my papers, the account which I gave of it in my Appendix No. 8. had been taken from Dr. Jackson's publication of 1803, and his address to the editor of the Edinburgh Review in 1804. The latter only contained that part which related to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, and as I only wanted three lines from this part, relating to the supposed "mischievous effects resulting from applications to officers in inferior stations," &c. I barely extracted these lines which were without any names; and when I came afterwards to employ them, I did not recollect that the name of Dr. Maclaurin had not been joined in the report with the names of Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison, as it ought to have been, if the Board intended to act consistently; for Dr. Jackson being head of the hospital, Dr. Maclaurin was his inferior like the others; and though the inferiority was less, there was the very same ground for censuring an application to him, as for censuring the application to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison; and I really believed the Special Board had done so, when I was writing that appendix; nor did I suspect that I had made any mistake on this subject, until after the Special Board had published their proceedings, &c. Why they chose to omit the name of Dr. Maclaurin in making their report I know not, unless it was from a sense of the impropriety of pretending that an army physician was unfit to be consulted on the subject of Dr. Jackson's new diet table, and a willingness to avoid this, even at the risk of forfeiting, as they did, the only ground which they had for censuring our applications to Mr. Andrews and Dr. Morison. But however this may be, the mistake which I committed was

very excusable, because I was not conscious of it; though the Special Board, who are much more in fault than myself on this point, have chosen to call it a "*willful misrepresentation*."

The Special Board conclude their "*conclusion*," by declaring that "if, on being called upon to perform a public duty, they found themselves *compelled* to state circumstances which might bring censure upon individuals, it was an unpleasant part of their task." I have already proved that the *statement* here alluded to was no part of their task, and that, instead of being *compelled*, they were neither authorised nor expected, to animadvert upon the conduct of the Physician General and myself; much less to do it with misrepresentation, and in opposition to every form and principle of justice. And perhaps no one who may read what I have written on this subject, will believe that they were *reluctant* aggressors on that occasion. And though the Commander in Chief was *by surprise* induced to censure a part of our conduct, it will always be to us a sufficient consolation, and justification that he did it, *when we had not been heard by him*, and solely upon the ground of a *fallacious ex parte proceeding*, against which no integrity of conduct could have afforded security.

This their conclusion is terminated by a letter from the Secretary at War to Sir John Hayes, expressing the satisfaction of the Commander in Chief and of himself, with the report of the Special Board, as "*reflecting much credit on the very respectable professional gentlemen*" composing it. Perhaps this compliment and those in a former letter may have operated much more strongly than any thing in my Appendix, to render the Special Board so desirous of drawing the public attention to themselves and their proceedings. Whether they will ultimately applaud their own discretion in doing so, and in both provoking and inviting a detection of their errors and misdemeanours, or whether they will not rather wish that, instead of publishing their report, they had committed it to the flames, are questions which I leave for them to answer.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

IN the preceding pages, I have refuted many of the misrepresentations and calumnies lately published by Dr. Jackson: there are, however, some others which I could not conveniently notice, without departing from the natural course of my observations, and which may be thought to deserve a refutation. Two of these occur in his second letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry.

At the 35th article of my former publication, I adduced Dr. Jackson's evidence of the difficulty of procuring hospital stores for 200 sick at the Cove of Cork, in 1795, and of the impossibility at one time of purchasing a single barrel of rice in the city of Cork, to demonstrate the impropriety of depending upon the chance of obtaining such supplies on the spot, as he had recommended to be done, and thus confute him by his own authority. To evade this confutation, and to gratify his malice towards me, Dr. Jackson has attempted to throw blame on my nephew; with what justice, the following letter will shew.

"SIR, *Curzon Street, January 20, 1809.*

"As you have desired me to put to paper any observations that might occur to me on perusing page 31 of Dr. Jackson's "Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry," wherein my name is mentioned by that gentleman, I now comply with your request.

"To repel the charge of inconsistency made by you against Dr. Jackson, he says, it implies no inconsistency in reality, and in explaining it, it is probable I shall strike upon ground which the Surgeon General would not wish to be touched." If this "ground" has reference to my appointment, I conceive you can feel but little regret at Dr. Jack-

son's mention of it; as, if your wish had been attended to at the time, I should not have gone to Cork as a Deputy Purveyor, but in a surgical capacity, for which I was certainly from education, habit, and inclination, better fitted than for the office of Deputy Purveyor, which was, I well recollect, pressed on me by the late Surgeon General, (Mr. Gunning) contrary to your opinion and advice.

"Dr. Jackson, after truly stating that the division of troops collected at Spike Island, in the autumn of 1795, experienced unusual sickness, and sustained great loss by death, adds, "there were no hospitals on Spike Island; and no hospital stores had yet arrived in the month of October." I am sorry to contradict, but if Dr. Jackson means that there were no regimental hospitals, he is most certainly mistaken. I believe every corps which had been encamped there, previously to embarkation, had an hospital. All the regimental hospitals were, however, abolished, as I have always supposed, by Dr. Jackson; and a general hospital establishment was instituted: three small collier brigs at first, and afterwards three or four other vessels, being appointed for the reception of the sick, and the medical staff officers and hospital mates stationed on board of these vessels. I was placed in one of them *not to provide* for the sick, but to *distribute* what was provided by another, acting as steward rather than purveyor. Meat and bread were, indeed, supplied on my requisition from Cove, according to the diet tables of the different ships.

"Dr. Jackson proceeds, "Mr. Robert Keate, nephew to the Surgeon General, was deputy purveyor, and it is commonly known that the purveyor supplies the wants of hospitals." I have before stated, that I was indebted to Mr. Gunning for my situation as deputy purveyor, and I admit that the purveyor does or did commonly supply the wants of hospitals; how far I was thus concerned will presently appear.

"Dr. Jackson is then pleased to say, "Mr. Robert Keate, I am ready to acknowledge, shewed good disposition, and every desire to do his duty; but he was very young, totally unac-

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quainted with military service, and he certainly had much to do to provide what was required for the use of the sick." For this testimony of a zealous inclination to do my duty I am thankful to Dr. Jackson; it was all that I could evince: for I readily admit that I was young, though not "totally unacquainted with military service," having already been above two years in the service; and I certainly had much to do in the charge of allotment and distribution of the stores required for the use of the sick: but I had in fact very little to do in providing for their wants; and I am surprised that Dr. Jackson should have forgotten that, when he ordered me to Cove about the 18th or 20th of October, he left another deputy purveyor, *my junior*, at Cork, on purpose to be on the spot to make all the necessary purchases of stores for the sick, as well in the articles of bedding and clothing, wines and medicines, as of diet (except meat and bread). Mr. Seares, the gentleman to whom I allude, was to be assisted by a wine merchant of Cork, Mr. Morissy, in all his purchases, as it was conceived that strangers might be imposed upon in that city; and Mr. Morissy was to receive 5 per cent. commission on these purchases for his trouble. This arrangement, if not suggested, was at least sanctioned by Dr. Jackson. I recollect too that Mr. Morissy did charge 5 per cent. commission on the wine supplied by himself; and I believe that, with all my inexperience, I may assume credit, if any be due, for resisting and finally *dismissing* this charge, when his bill was eventually sent to me for payment.

"Dr. Jackson says, his account of the difficulty of procuring hospital stores "was true at the time he wrote to the Surgeon General." I can only say that I never heard of any great difficulty, though the articles of rice, barley, &c. may have been, and I believe, were very dear at that time in Cork.

"Dr. Jackson continues "but at an after period, when the sick were greatly more numerous than they were on the 11th November, and moreover when they were disposed in vari-

ous places in urgent necessity from increasing numbers, I recollect no complaint of want, and heard of no difficulty when the weather permitted boats to pass to and from the ships in harbour, or to the different places where the sick were accommodated on shore," adding "the cause of this change I ascribe to the activity of Mr. Munro, a staff surgeon, who, with the approbation of the General commanding, was ordered to act as purveyor till such time as the expedition should arrive at its destination, where the commissioned purveyor was; the step taken on this occasion was not regular; but it appeared to me to be necessary for the good of the service; it provoked strong expressions of anger from the Surgeon General, who desired that I might request General Whyte to remand Mr. Munro to his surgeon's duty, and leave purveying to the commissioned purveyors; but as I held myself responsible that there should be no difficulty or embarrassment in supplying the sick with what was required for their uses, I persisted, with the General's consent, in continuing Mr. Munro's services in the line of purveyor, till the expedition arrived at Barbadoes, where I was relieved from the responsibility by the presence of Mr. Weir."

"To the activity and integrity of Mr. Munro, I cordially subscribe, though I never saw the necessity of his being appointed purveyor; for the merchants of Cork had had sufficient time to procure supplies from Bristol and other places; and Mr. Seares at Cork had uniformly complied with every requisition I made on him; and when Mr. Munro was appointed, Mr. Seares remained at Cork *wholly unemployed*. This may have been "for the good of the service;" but I remember that the appointment was not supposed to have taken place entirely from that consideration.

"The last part of Dr. Jackson's statement necessary for me to notice is the following: "Such is the fact; if I spoke from wrong information on the 11th of November, that information was derived through Deputy Purveyor Keate." Why

Dr. Jackson should have spoken or written officially on the 11th of November from any information which he had not ascertained to be correct, I do not enquire, but I do positively deny that any information was derived through me, from which he should have so spoken or written; and therefore I say that *such is not the fact*. Dr. Jackson has attempted to throw this imputation on me, by wholly sinking the circumstance of Mr. Seares having been placed by his own orders at Cork (where he remained at, and long after, the time mentioned) and of my being then, and long afterwards, stationed on board of an hospital ship, with *so much to do*, that I had no time to quit it for an hour; all supplies being sent to me regularly from Cork by my senior, Deputy Purveyor Seares, who had procured and forwarded to me whatever was required at Cove, distant, I think, eleven Irish or fourteen English miles from Cork.

"Thus circumstanced, I could have had no personal knowledge of the state of the market at Cork, as Dr. Jackson well knew; and it is therefore absolutely incredible that I could have furnished information to him on that subject, and still more incredible that he should have depended on such information when writing to the heads of his department. It is with great reluctance that I have thus contradicted Dr. Jackson (from whom I formerly received much civility at Cork), and I have only done it to vindicate myself from an unnecessary aspersions. I am, &c.

"(Signed) ROBERT KEATE."

To this letter I have only to add, that with all Mr. Munro's "activity," in addition to other assistance, the prices paid for hospital stores at Cork were such as not to furnish any motive for adopting Dr. Jackson's plan of making *all* purchases on the spot. Of this he seems to have been sensible in the month of January 1796, when the army was in daily expectation of sailing; as appears by a letter in which he then

wrote to me thus viz. "The accounts of the purveying department will run high, but it must be considered that every article has been provided for at least 1000 sick, in a place where every species of imposition is attempted."

Dr. Jackson continues his remarks on the 35th article of my publication as follows, viz. "But, as the Surgeon-General does not think it prudent to trust the supply of hospital stores and medicines to the common market in distant countries, in apprehension that the service may suffer from want, it will not be so easy for him to explain why he refuses to purchase, or allow purchases of stores at a market on the spot, when he has proof that they are as cheap, even cheaper, and of equal good quality as those furnished by contract in London. This question must necessarily attract your notice as Commissioners; because it is important to the public that it be satisfactorily explained. When the army depôt was removed from Chatham to the Isle of Wight in the year 1801, Mr. Keate requested with earnestness that I should draw from the stores at Gosport whatever was wanted for the depôt hospital. I found it more convenient to get what was wanted at Newport, and after making a comparison of prices, I did not find it was more expensive. I therefore, with the consent of General Hewett, under whom I served, adopted that method of supplying the hospital, and I consequently took measures to ensure the best and cheapest market, by laying the contract open to competition. The Surgeon General was disappointed, and he appeared to be highly offended."

Here Dr. Jackson avows, and with apparent exultation, his total disregard and direct opposition to the "request" which he states me to have made to him "with earnestness;" but as my request had been made *officially*, and was, in fact, a *positive injunction*, he was guilty of *disobedience* to the order of his military superior in this instance, as he had been in several other instances. The ground on which he relies to justify his disobedience, is one which might soon introduce the

most serious disorders and evils in the public expenditure, if it were allowed and adopted at discretion. He "found it *more convenient* to buy what was wanted at Newport; and after making a comparison of prices, *he did not find that it was more expensive.*" Dr. Jackson is not the first principal medical officer who has preferred purchasing hospital stores on the spot to receiving supplies of them from the depôts: but as officers of this class cannot have the means of ascertaining the exact cost to government of articles supplied from depôts, the data on which *their* calculations of prices are founded will generally be arbitrary and incorrect, and the results of comparisons so instituted may occasionally be made to suit ostensible rather than real "convenience," especially when the private interests of the calculators shall be concerned, as may often happen. There has certainly been sometimes reason to suspect too much intimacy and collusion between principal medical officers, or officers of the purveying department, and the tradesmen employed by them to supply hospital stores; and these suspicions have been fully confirmed by the fraudulent practices of Dr. Boone, and also of the very person whom Dr. Jackson selected to act as deputy purveyor, immediately under himself, at Parkhurst hospital.

I must further observe, that Dr. Jackson could have had no proper ground for asserting, as he does, that, after "making a comparison of prices, *he did not find that it was more expensive;*" because the prices paid by government for the articles alluded to had never been communicated to him by me, who was, perhaps, the only person competent to furnish them, nor probably by others, and it is, therefore, most likely that he had no accurate data for *one side* of the comparison he pretends to have made; and because the correctness of his data for the *other side* thereof seems to be not less questionable, although these last are, or ought to be, contained in his own accounts. It is well known to be the practice at every military general hospital, (unless special directions have been given to the contrary, which has seldom occurred,) that all

purchases, disbursements, &c. are made *only* by the purveyor or deputy purveyor, to whom money is advanced as may be necessary for these purposes; and to be the duty of the principal medical officer, simply to controul, regulate and authorize (according to certain instructions) the expenditures of the monies, stores, &c. entrusted to the Purveyor or Deputy Purveyor, without being himself at all concerned therein as a public accountant. Dr. Jackson, however, always prone to innovation, thought proper, because he was filled head of the hospital, unnecessarily to superadd to his other functions at the Isle of Wight, that of Purveyor, and procured considerable imposts of public money to be made to himself as an accountant, instead of having them made as usual to the purveying officer. Of the accounts which he rendered in this new capacity, (and which he did not forward till several months after he had quitted the depôt,) he is pleased to speak in the following terms, viz. "The accounts at the Isle of Wight, which were more *correctly digested and better kept* than they were at Cnatham, shew the effect of the arrangement which I then introduced into the depôt hospital:" but notwithstanding this commendation of *his own* accounts, and the declaration subscribed to those accounts *by himself*, viz. "examined and certified to be *just and correct*," Robert Jackson, M.D. head of the hospital, they have been found so confused, and so imperfect from errors of computation, omissions of the actual prices of articles, deficiencies of vouchers, &c. that it has been hitherto impossible for the accountants to whom they have been committed to ascertain any thing concerning his pretensions on the score of economy; and their validity as data for the comparison in question seems therefore to be very doubtful. One of the purchases charged in Dr. Jackson's accounts, viz. 204l. for medicines, is particularly reprehensible, as being a breach of the orders of his superior officer; an injury to the sick, by withholding from them the medicines provided by the Apothecary General, (which are indisputably of the best positive

quality) and employing in their stead the inferior drugs of country apothecaries; and also an unjustifiable infringement of the patent rights of the Apothecary General.

Dr. Jackson next states, that, "as soon as he left the dépôt, the manner of supplying the hospital was changed: the stores were sent from Gosport or from London; and one of the dealers at Newport, viz Mr. Steane, made tenders in consequence to the members of the Army Medical Board, and afterwards to the Secretary at War, of such articles as were comprehended in his trade, at prices *considerably below* the London market." These tenders of Mr. Steane were contained in a letter addressed by him to the Secretary at War, and dated, "Newport, Isle of Wight, July 16, 1803," which Dr. Jackson has published at length at page 34. In this letter the writer states that, upon the removal of the dépôt to the Isle of Wight, he had been allowed to supply the sick "with wine, spirits, porter, and beer," and had done it to the satisfaction of Dr. Jackson; that, by importing his "own spirits, and wines, and rectifying his spirits of wine, and also purchasing a quantity of London porter," he was able "to sell those articles of merchandize at a cheaper rate than they can be procured from London;" and that he felt "it *fore*" that the advantage of supplying these articles should be taken from him; adding, "as I, in common with the other inhabitants of the island, bear a liberal share of the burthens attached to war, I presume, without wishing to offend, I have a right to a share of the advantages arising from the same." To this letter Mr. Steane annexed a statement of his own prices and those of the London market at that time, *as he pretends*; and, in regard to porter, he asserted, that he would "deliver it with a saving of 8s. per hhd. for carriage, and from the same brewer, viz. Felix Calvert and Co., quality the same." This letter being referred to Mr. Knight and myself by the Secretary at War, I, on the 1st of August, wrote to Messrs. Calvert and Co. who had supplied the dépôt hospital with porter, and to Messrs. Allan and Smyth, who had supplied it with wine and spirits,

inclosing to them Mr. Steane's prices, and "requesting to know how they could account for the difference" between his prices and their own. On the day following I received an answer from Messrs. Calvert and Co. informing me, that they were "at a loss to guess how Mr. Steane was enabled to sell their best stout porter at 88s. per hhd.;" that "he paid them the same price as the hospital, and every other part of their trade, without a single exception, viz. 87s. per hhd. (which was the price charged by the whole of the reputable part of the brewery,) besides the expence of freight, of insurance, and of returning the empty casks, which amounted to several shillings." From this statement it was obvious that Mr. Steane must have become a considerable loser by the honest performance of his own proposal, with regard to Messrs. Calvert and Co.'s porter; and the answer from Messrs. Allan and Smyth afforded grounds for a similar conclusion with regard to wine and spirits. These answers I transmitted to the Deputy Secretary at War, with a letter, in which I observed, that upon the terms offered by Mr. Steane, it seemed highly probable, that he must either incur "a great loss, or indemnify himself by an improper alteration of the articles;" and I added, that as "our hospitals had hitherto been supplied with the very best wine, spirits and porter, such as could not be obtained at an inferior price, and as those articles might with reason be conceived to be not less useful to the sick than medicines, and therefore ought to be of the very best quality, I trusted that the Secretary at War would be pleased to approve of their being supplied by the same persons as had hitherto furnished the hospitals with them, so much to my satisfaction, and that of the officers concerned." It could not have escaped the penetration of the Secretary at War that a merchant in the Isle of Wight might be enabled to sell smuggled wine and spirits at a lower price than the regular trade; but it would never be his in-

* That Mr. Steane's trade with the hospital was not a *losing* trade may be suspected from his feeling so "*fore*" at the loss of his "advantages," and his anxiety to regain them.

tention to encourage such breaches of the laws for the sake of a false economy; nor would he desire that the sick in hospitals should be provided with articles of an inferior quality, or that the fair trader should sustain any real loss in his dealings with Government; and, perhaps upon these considerations, he judged it expedient to direct that the hospitals should continue to be supplied with wine, spirits and porter as before. That this decision of the Secretary at War was influenced by my representations is what I do not presume to suppose: but if it was so influenced, I have since had sufficient reason for adhering to the opinion I had formed on the subject; for I have uniformly found on trial, at various visits of inspection to the dépôt hospital, that Mr. Steane's wine, spirits and porter, were of inferior quality to those supplied from London, and have moreover discovered, that the person who acted as Deputy Purveyor, while Mr. Steane furnished the hospital with those articles, was indebted to the latter in the sum of 900*l.* at the time he was removed from that employment.

Having given these explanations concerning the tenders of Mr. Steane, I shall now subjoin Dr. Jackson's comment on the rejection of them, as a proof of his readiness to misrepresent facts for the purpose of aspersing the conduct of the then Secretary at War, a gentleman of the most honourable public and private character, as well as of myself.

"Such is the letter of Mr. Steane. It speaks sufficiently for itself, and, as it appears that twenty-five per cent. on articles of spirits, ten on wine, and about ten on porter, including freight, wharfage and other incidental expences, would have been saved by closing with his proposition, it is somewhat surprizing that the then Secretary at War (I believe Mr. Bragge) should not have attended to it so as to give it effect. The subject was, I believe, considered by him; but the Surgeon General stated that the persons, who had supplied the hospital with the above mentioned articles, had done it to his satisfaction; and he therefore hoped that they would be permitted to continue to do so. This was the purport of his

recommendation, and the effect proves that the Secretary at War acquiesced in it. Whether there may be some who think that the satisfaction of the Surgeon General on this head was purchased at too great expence, I do not take upon myself to determine; the transaction, I may however say, has a strange appearance,—not consonant with the obvious rule of economy."

In a recent publication, entitled "A Letter to Mr. Keate, Surgeon General," and which in malignity greatly surpasses all Dr. Jackson's former libels, he has introduced the subject of a letter written to the Army Medical Board, in December 1801, by Mr. Stratford, now surgeon to the first regiment of Surry militia, (of which I published an extract in my Appendix, No. 8.) and made it the foundation and topic of the most virulent scurrility. He has also, in addition to his own denials, endeavoured to procure evidence from several of the medical officers who were on duty with him at Chatham, to contradict Mr. Stratford's allegations; and in order to compel or induce them to give such evidence, he has stated to them in writing that he was "authorized by the Commander in Chief to call for the evidence upon oath of any person who did duty with him (Jackson) at Chatham hospital;" a statement which must, I think, have been unwarranted, there being, as I am informed, no authority (however exalted) in this kingdom that can legally require individuals to give evidence in that irregular and extra-judicial manner. But notwithstanding this improper use of the name of His Royal Highness, Dr. Jackson found himself unable to procure a contradiction of Mr. Stratford's letter from any of the persons to whom he had applied, excepting Mr. Graham, who, either from the recollection of *past*, or the hope of future favours, seems, in giving that evidence, to have felt a servile and an unworthy solicitude to recommend himself to Dr. Jackson, and to have made assertions on oath which are at variance with the testimony of the other medical officers employed at the dépôt hospital, and even with the assertions and admissions

of Dr. Jackson himself. e.g. To discredit Mr. Stratford's evidence, Mr. Graham, in his affidavit (p. 90), having been questioned respecting the opportunities which the former had had "of seeing the treatment of the sick in the fourth hospital, where all the serious cases of sickness were disposed," answers, "Mr. Stratford had no opportunity whatever in observing either the sickness or the treatment in that hospital, being entirely under the charge of Dr. Borland and myself, acting as his assistant; and no one was permitted to enter those wards unless duly authorized; in such case I attended—the permission obtained was either from Dr. Jackson or Dr. Borland." Now if this account, *on oath*, of the extraordinary and suspicious care said to have been taken at the dépôt hospital to seclude the sick and their treatment from all observation, be true, it will convict Dr. Jackson of two falsehoods; the one is contained in his letter to me of the 27th of May 1801, (see p. 24.) in which, to preclude the idea of Dr. Borland's acting as a physician, he most confidently asserted that he was "the physician of the hospital, and did the duty himself;" whereas Mr. Graham swears that the fourth hospital, containing "all the serious cases of sickness," was "entirely under the charge of Dr. Borland," and of himself (Graham): the other falsehood will be found at p. 143 of Dr. Jackson's publication of 1803, where he makes the following assertion, viz. "It is true the treatment, and the effects of that treatment, in the hospital at Chatham, might have been seen by any one; but it is also true that Dr. Maclean was scarcely ever seen where the acute diseases were:" which of these contradictions is to be believed, I leave others to decide, though I certainly have no doubt on the subject. I will not, however, detain my readers by farther observations respecting particular parts of Mr. Graham's affidavit, having some months ago, in answer to a letter from the Adjutant General on that subject, stated reasons which must necessarily hinder me from giving credit to any evidence which might be obtained from Mr. Graham, and more especially on any matter

connected with Dr. Jackson. This statement I made when it was only in contemplation to take Mr. Graham's affidavit; and the reasons assigned by me were connected with certain fraudulent transactions with which Mr. Graham had been charged at the dépôt hospital. I now abstain from publishing these reasons; but if Mr. Graham should not feel himself obliged by my doing so, he may publish them himself.

In regard to Mr. Stratford's letter, my readers may see that much the greater part of it has been confirmed by other testimony; it was however left in my Appendix, No. 3, to rest entirely on Mr. Stratford's own authority; but after hearing that Dr. Jackson had complained of injury from the publication of it, I wrote to Mr. Stratford, (with whom I had not communicated for several years,) requesting to know whether he had committed any mistake in his account of Dr. Jackson's practice, and expressing a wish that if he should be sensible of any error, it might be candidly acknowledged and corrected. Mr. Stratford came soon after to town and called on me, but did not appear to believe that he had exceeded the truth in that account.

Dr. Borland about the same time undertook, as I am informed, to procure from Mr. Stratford a disavowal of some parts at least of the account in question, and for that purpose employed means of intimidation, which were, as I understand, answered contemptuously.

Having thus, I hope, sufficiently refuted the more considerable of Dr. Jackson's calumnies, my various duties require that I should leave the rest to the judgment of my readers, who will, I am persuaded, form just opinions of them, and of their author, from the malice and falsehoods of which he has been so often and so decidedly convicted. I have in different parts of this publication given what I firmly believe to be a fair account of my transactions with, or relating to, Dr. Jackson; and every thing which he has published contrary to it is, I am persuaded, also contrary to truth.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War, dated December 10th, 1801.

SIR,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th ult. with the inclosed papers, directing us, "after comparing the statement of the expenditure for the hospital in the Isle of Wight, with that for the other general hospitals in this country, to report to you our opinion, whether it would be expedient at present to make any, and what alteration in the system established by Dr. Jackson, or whether Dr. Jackson's regulations appear to have been framed with so due a regard to economy, and to the advantage of the troops, as to afford just ground for considering the propriety of introducing them into the other general hospitals at home."

We have the honour to acquaint you, that we have made the comparative statement of the expenditure for that hospital with that of the other general hospitals at home, but we find, that by far the greater proportion of patients in those hospitals is of a very different description of sick from those formerly at Chatham, and now in the Isle of Wight.

With respect to the question, unconnected with other circumstances, which in the course of this investigation it will be our duty to lay before you, it appears to be, whether a liberal and generous diet is requisite to restore men, who have either been debilitated by disease, or by active debilitating remedies.

It appears, that Dr. Jackson's mode of carrying on the Isle of Wight hospital is an apparent saving of money; but at

the Isle of Wight, and lately at Chatham, we have observed an unprecedented number of deaths, viz. 27 in the last month, and 12 in the last week, frequent relapses and tedious recoveries, with a debilitated state of the patients; therefore, so far from economy being effected, there has been a very serious loss of men, and ultimately a great expenditure; these returns called upon us to recommend that two physicians should be immediately sent to the Isle of Wight.

We now beg leave to revert to the inclosed letters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and this we do in obedience to your commands, when we had the honour of waiting upon you. It appears, therefore, that Dr. Jackson has altered the established diet tables as used in all our hospitals, and sanctioned by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and that he has reduced many other articles of comfort and nourishment.

We have thought it would throw some light on the subject before you, to send the inclosed monthly report of the Foreign Military Hospitals in the Isle of Wight for the month of October last, by which a comparative statement of the mortality in the same place, under different diet and treatment, may be made. Upon the whole, it will appear that Dr. Jackson's system of economy is not to the advantage of the troops, and should not be introduced into our home general hospitals; and, we humbly submit, that it will be necessary to enforce the printed regulations for general hospitals in the Isle of Wight. We have, &c.

The Secretary at War.

(Signed) L. PEPYS.
T. KEATE,

No. II.

Extract from a Prescription-book of the Depot Hospital, marked 5. August 13, 1801.

* Samuel Rogers admitted. Pneumonia.

† V. S. 3 xxx.

Baln. tepid.

Calomel gr. x Pulv. Jacob. gr. vj. stat.

Mist. purg. part. vicib. post.

* Dennis Bryan admitted. Pneumonia.

V. S. xxv.

Baln. tepid.

Calomel gr. x Pulv. Jacob. gr. vj. stat.

Mist. purgans. part. vicib.

Thomas Arberry admitted.

Weak and consumptive.

Hauft. anodyn. æther.

Luke Mahoney admitted. Fever.

V. S. 3 xxv.

Baln. tepid & frigid.

Hauft. emetic.

Mist. purg. post. vel vespere.

Peter Mallone, admitted. Fever.

Medic. ut Mahoney.

Pat. Neil, admitted. fever.

Medic. ut Mahoney.

No. III.

Extract from a Prescription-book, marked 5. August 3, 1801.

John Thompson admitted. Fever.

V. S. 3 xxv.

Baln. tepid & frigid.

H. emetic.

* On the evening of the same day (13th Aug.) the following additional remedies were ordered for Rogers and Bryan, in the same book:

V. S. 3 xij.

Episc. part. aff.

Calom. & P. Jacob. 22 gr. vj.

† In all these prescriptions the letters V. S. signify Venæ Sectio.

L

Wm. Turner, 86th. admitted.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xij.
Natr. Vitr. $\frac{3}{4}$ iss.

Wm. Cameron admitted. Erysipelatous.

V. S. xv.
Natr. Vitr. $\frac{3}{4}$ ij.
Baln.
Vespere.
V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xv.
P. Dover, $\mathcal{O}$ j.

Dennis Carnigan admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xx.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Pulv. Purg. fort.
Vespere.
Calom. et Pulv. Jacob. $\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{a}$ gr. vj.
Nitr. gr. x.

John Smith admitted. Pneumonia.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv. vel ad deliquium.
Baln. tepid.
Natr. Vitr.
Episp. later. dolent.

David Horn admitted. Feverish.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ x.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Pulv. Purgans.

Wm. Greenhalgh admitted.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv.
Haust. emetic.
Baln. tepid & frigid.

Calom. gr. viij. Pulv. Jacob. gr. vj. omn. $\mathfrak{z}$ ia hor.

John Davis admitted. Pneumonia.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv.
Baln. tepid.
Emp. Episp. Pector.
H. Purgans.
Vesp. Calomel & P. Jacob. $\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{a}$ gr. vj. $\mathcal{O}$ jii. gr. ss.

Wm. Morris admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xx.
Brin. tepid & frigid.
Haust. emetic.

Extracted from the same Book. August 17th (1801).

Thomas Welsh admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Haust. emetic.
Calomel gr. xij. Pulv. Jacob. gr. vj. $\mathfrak{z}$ hor.

Wm. Tunberry admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xv.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Mist. purg. part. vicib.

Wm. Powney admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xx.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Haust. emetic.

Richard Dean admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ x.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Mist. Purgans.

David Kewear admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Haust. emetic.
Calomel gr. x. Pulv. Ant. gr. vj. apud horam quin-
tam.

George Maddox admitted. Fever.

V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xvij.
Baln. tepid & frigid.
Haust. emetic.
Vespere.
Calom. gr. x. P. Antim. gr. vj.

M^r Williams admitted. Fever.
 V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xxv.
 Baln. tepid & frigid.
 Calomel gr. x. Pulv. Jacob. gr. v. & rep. post. hor.
 duas.
 Vespere.
 Ol. Ricin. $\frac{3}{4}$ iss.
 Episp. Magn. Ventricu.
 Enema Purgans.
 Baln. tepid.
 Camph. gr. v. Opii gr. ss.
 P. Jacob. gr. vj. M. fumat unum 2d horis.
 Gill wine.*
Richard Walker admitted. Fever.
 V. S. $\frac{3}{4}$ xx.
 Baln. tepid & frigid.
 Haust. emetic.
 Mist. Purgans, part. vicib. vespere.
David Jones admitted. Fever.
 $\frac{3}{4}$ xv.
 Baln. tepid & frig.
 Pulv. Purgans.
 Vespere.
 Ol. Ricin. $\frac{3}{4}$ iss. Tinct. Opii Camph. $\frac{3}{4}$ j.
 Episp. Nuchæ.
 Enema Purgans.
 Camph. gr. v. Opii gr. ss.
 Pulv. Jacob. gr. vj. M. fumat unum 2d horis.
 Gill wine.*

No. IV.

Copy of a Letter from Dr. MacLaurin to the Army Medical Board, dated London, Jan. 28, 1802.

GENTLEMEN,

THE Physician General to His Majesty's forces, having called upon me officially, to reply to certain allegations contained in "Dr. Jackson's statement respecting the hospitals

* The inconsistency of prescribing wine, together with such violent depletions as were ordered in the instances of M^r Williams and Jones, will not escape the notice of medical readers.

of the army dépôt," in which he uses terms the most ungentlemanlike, and unbecoming his, or my station, I request your attention to my reports upon the subjects of the medical treatment at Chatham military hospital, and of his proposed diet tables for the sick at the dépôt of the Isle of Wight, reminding you, that I have not had recourse to any personalty; I have, without reserve certainly, censured the practice, convinced, (my conviction, founded on experience,) that it is extremely dangerous in its effects; but I have avoided the individual.

A difference of opinion, however important, might have been discussed without that laughable petulance which his silly resentment has urged him to employ, no futile argument of his want of candour, a no small proof of a consciousness of his own weakness, and which has not been provoked by any improper language on my part. To me surely, no charge of "fervility" can attach, I am governed by no narrow motives, impelled by no personal dispute with Dr. Jackson, solely by zeal for the public service, by humanity towards the sick, and a most anxious solicitude to conduct myself in a manner most advantageous to those who labour under disease; our difference of opinion is professional only, and need not have excited this habitual feurrility.

Dr. Jackson asserts, "that I never once saw a sick person under his treatment, some few patients in the wards under my care for whom he prescribed, when I found myself at a loss what to do, excepted."

How unhandsome is the account he gives of my asking a consultation with him upon some occasions: I did ask his opinion respecting a few sick, when I hoped it might assist me, or in any way benefit my patients; and have merely to remark, that consultations among physicians are not unusual among the best informed, and the most experienced; to omit any, the most trivial chance of information, (even a consultation with Dr. Jackson), would be culpable: in no instance did Dr. Jackson dissent from me, but coincided as to the means adopted: the insinuation meant is truly contemptible, and the words in which that insinuation is conveyed are highly illiberal, with a no very modest hint of his own superior knowledge.

Dr. Jackson's statement, that I saw no "sick persons under his treatment," is false. I, in frequent instances, saw patients previous to their being placed in the wards, but subsequent to his having prescribed for them; I have been in his wards several times, have seen him examine the sick, and prescribe for them, especially a short time after my arrival at Chatham barracks; his recollection too fails him, in that he occasionally prescribed for some patients placed afterwards under my care, previous to my seeing them; that I remonstrated against such conduct, declining to take charge of them, unless the treatment remained with me from the first admission, particularly as I disapproved his medical practice: my remonstrance was complied with.

I did see "men ill of fevers bled freely," much too freely I thought then, and still think, (it was a pretty regular routine, even in fevers of debility.) I saw too, "men apparently not ill of fevers, bled freely," bled to fainting, lying upon the surgery floor, in a manner equally indecent and alarming; this not an accidental circumstance, but a most frequent occurrence. I did see Dr. Jackson's prescriptions sent to the surgery; in them bleeding is directed, without the quantity of blood to be taken specified, but, of course, left to the discretion of any hospital mate, who happened to be in readiness to operate, and who had not then, nor could have previously had, an opportunity of ascertaining with accuracy the disease.

You must remark the slight, evasive stile, in which Dr. Jackson names his practice of bathing, "every man who came into the hospital was washed clean," (such also was my own uniform practice; such is the general practice in army hospitals, the direction of the Army Medical Board, such is the dictate of common sense, as tending to prevent or remove disease.) "Many were immersed in a warm bath, some were washed with cold water, others had buckets of cold water poured upon their heads;" he might have added, that many were kept in hot water for no small time, frequently three at once in the same bath, covered with a blanket, so that access to air was precluded, and then instantly immersed into a cold bath; this too, not only at the commencement, but at the advanced stages of disease, and repeated: this stands

recorded in the prescription books, if they have been properly kept, and is well known to most of the medical gentlemen of the hospital; a practice widely unlike the very unfair representation given of it.

Let not this be confounded with the affusion of cold water; or even the washing the entire surface of the body, especially in some febrile diseases, with cold water.

Draughts purges were in use most liberally, with large repeated blisters, and emetics, and to this practice was in general added a too low diet, a meagre plan; of their united powers I entertain no doubt. It may be demanded whether I remonstrated with Dr. Jackson upon these subjects, or mentioned my sentiments to any superior power; I did both, as soon as I could make myself sufficiently acquainted with them, and reported to the Army Medical Board early.

Dr. Jackson says, that I "may be allowed like other men to express my opinion of the general principle of practice, which he recommends in the treatment of acute diseases, but this can only be Dr. Maclaurin's opinion, an opinion formed without evidence of trial."

My opinion then is decidedly adverse to this "principle of practice." I view it with detestation, with horror, I most earnestly deprecate its introduction into any hospital whatever, or into use. Dr. Jackson confesses that he recommends it "in the treatment of acute diseases;" he makes no discrimination, he "recommends" it in the treatment of acute diseases, in any, and every one without reference to season, climate, age, sex, or constitution of the patient; he admits his own want of experience as to measles and small pox at Chatham, consequently want of knowledge, yet the treatment of these diseases he kept in his own hands; he states his having followed the practice of Sydenham; it is not always easy to make out from his muddy paragraphs his meaning with precision.

Nor is my opinion formed "without evidence of trial." I had more than sufficient knowledge to put me on my guard. "The principle of practice" is not new; Dr. Jackson has not even the merit of its invention; it was "recommended" before his day, tried and found destructive; but I envy not Dr.

Jackfon the "evidence of trial." I saw too much of it to permit me one moment's hesitation, had I not even known enough of my profession before. I acted differently, different indeed too was the result.

The patients of Chatham General Hospital were, almost beyond comparison, of a different description from those usually received into the army hospitals at home; those of the Isle of Wight probably excepted. The patients of the depôts are almost entirely recruits, young and unbroken by the fatigues of service. Of the general hospitals, the bulk of patients are men enervated by climate, worn down by chronic diseases, and suffering under the mischiefs which frequent campaigns have occasioned, or the effects of wounds received in action. Yet at the depôts the number of deaths much exceeds the proportion of those which occur in the other hospitals in this country, as far as my information is correct. If my statement be erroneous, let it be corrected; if it be just, let it be a subject of investigation most serious; in the interim I affirm, that I very rarely saw disease in any very active form at Chatham Hospital. I have even been astonished at the frivolous cases Dr. Jackfon admitted into the hospital, and told him so; but in this custom he had the advantage of making the number of admissions appear large. After Dr. Jackfon's removal to the Isle of Wight, the charge of Chatham Hospital devolved upon me, with assistants, men to whom I shall ever consider myself as infinitely indebted, as long as professional attention, diligence, and fidelity can have claims; we admitted considerably upwards of one hundred patients; there were many fevers in this number, some cases of measles, small-pox, &c. not one of whom died, nor had we any instances of relapse. Of those left us by Dr. Jackfon several recovered contrary to expectation; which we attributed, in no small measure, to a tolerably liberal use of wine, and a moderately generous diet. Upon the breaking up of the establishment, the few remaining patients were removed to the York Hospital, in a state of convalescence; no slight cases were admitted, they were kept as out-patients. I have a right to report this in justice to those gentlemen with whom I acted; requesting also that a like enquiry may be made as to the result of my attendance while

with Dr. Jackfon. The long, melancholy returns sent from the depôts form, I fear, a mournful contrast to the latter ones of Chatham barracks, notwithstanding "the system of depletion" had its sway; notwithstanding the boasted application by Dr. Jackfon "of the most active remedies in the materia medica among the means employed in the cure of fevers." The proposed diet-tables for the Isle of Wight hospital, those regulators of inanition, are, I hope, abolished. The diet at Chatham was, in my opinion, much too low, yet Dr. Jackfon speaks of removing patients from ward to ward, graduating their diet accordingly, till they arrived on the fullest allowance; even this was much, much indeed too small, especially for convalescents: I saw an order, though it was never regularly inserted in the hospital books, in which it was expressly prohibited to give any extras to convalescents, those of measles and small-pox excepted: the scale of diet intended for the hospital at the Isle of Wight was still more meagre, a mere thermometer of starvation; I hope I have been instrumental, not "servilely," in condemning it for ever. To state my opinion I was called upon officially; I have done it impartially to the utmost of my ability, and conscientiously. I beg to repeat that I am actuated by no personal motives, but entirely by my good wishes for the sick soldier, and the benefit of the service.

"I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

"JAMES CHICHESTER MACLAURIN."

Sir Lucas Pepys, Bart. Physician General, &c.
Thomas Keate, Esq. Surgeon General, London.

No. V.

Copy of an Official Note from the Army Medical Board to Lord Amherst, Commander in Chief, in May 1791.

THE Army Medical Board present their compliments to Lord Amherst, and having received the honour of his Lordship's note relative to the proposed resignation of Dr. Hunter, they conceive it will be necessary to write a short recapitulation of the facts which induced Dr. Hunter to request

leave to resign, before any opinion is given by them on the subject. Information having been sent by the Commander in Chief, and the War Office, that a malignant fever had carried off several of the recruits at Chatham hospital, with orders that some steps to get assistance to that hospital should be taken immediately, the Board referred the business to the Inspector of Regimental Infirmaries, whose office requires him to direct what attendance should be given at the different hospitals. The Inspector of course applied to the physician of the district to go to Chatham, and remain there till the disease was subdued. This passed regularly through the office of the Commander in Chief, and the physician went; but, instead of remaining there to attend the sick, returned to town, made no report to the Inspector, but reported to the Commander in Chief, and the War Office, as if he had been sent to inspect the hospital for future improvement.

The Inspector applied to Dr. Hunter for his report of the sick, and the state of the hospital.—The report was refused, and his authority not acknowledged.

These are the facts which are come to the knowledge of the Army Medical Board.

The Inspector has fully proved from repeated precedents in his letter now before the Commander in Chief, that it is the established practice for the Inspector to have reports made to him from every garrison hospital. Dr. Boone, who is now at Plymouth in attendance on a similar fever in the 40th regiment, has made a regular and satisfactory report to the Inspector of the sick under his care, and remains with them to give all the medical assistance required.

The Board humbly conceive, that the service would suffer materially, if the office of Inspector did not give him controul over the whole medical staff. For the Inspector only can be responsible for the conduct of the hospitals. Should the Inspector attempt to interfere with the practice of any physician in any hospital, he would greatly exceed the limits of his office, but in the present case it is not pretended that he has done any thing more than to request the usual report.

However unpleasant it must be for the Army Medical Board to give any opinion on such a subject, yet as it is brought before them, their duty requires them to declare, that as Dr. Hunter refuses to acknowledge himself bound to pay any attention to the office of Inspector, an office appointed by His Majesty for the express purpose of regulating the conduct of the Hospitals and Regimental Infirmaries, there seems now to be no alternative but for the proposed resignation to be accepted.

THE END,

A
LETTER
TO THE
Commissioners
OF
MILITARY ENQUIRY:

CONTAINING
ANIMADVERSIONS ON SOME PARTS OF THEIR
FIFTH REPORT;
AND
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
ON WHICH
THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF ARMIES OUGHT TO BE
FORMED.

By EDWARD NATHANIEL BANCROFT, M. D.
FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, PHYSICIAN TO HIS
MAJESTY'S SUCCES, AND TO ST. GEORGE'S HOSPITAL.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES,
STRAND.

1808.
W. Flatt, Printer, Old Bailey.

LETTER
Commissioners
MILITARY ENQUIRY
FIFTH REPORT
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE
CAUSES OF THE
DEFEAT OF THE
ARMY IN THE
WAR OF 1804
BY
JAMES WILKINSON
ESQ.
OF THE
BARRISTERS AT LAW
IN THE
MIDDLE TEMPLE
LONDON
PRINTED BY
JOHN JOHNSON
ST. PAULS CHURCH-YARD
1805

LETTER, &c.

GENTLEMEN,

IT was impossible for me to read your last Report, without feeling myself strongly impelled, by a regard for truth, the welfare of the army, and my own profession, to endeavour at least, to correct some parts of it, which seem to be founded in error, and pregnant with dangerous consequences; and it is for this purpose that I now address you publicly, and in my own name, being sensible that by doing it anonymously, I should depart from that respect which is justly due to your distinguished characters, and to the high authority under which you have acted.

To many parts of your Report, I offer no objection, believing indeed that it is generally meritorious wherever you have had a competent knowledge of the subject; and where this has not been the case, I most willingly allow your intentions to have been pure and upright: and if, in the course of my arguments or observations, there should at any time seem to be room for doubt in this respect, in consequence of any inexplicit or incorrect expression, I earnestly intreat that my words may be so construed and understood, as to be made conformable to this declaration,

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and to the sincere respect for you all which it is my wish to manifest on every occasion.

You have indeed candidly admitted in p. 87, of your Report, that "the subject of your enquiry was *new to every member of the commission*," (a circumstance very much to be regretted in my humble opinion), and that notwithstanding your "anxiety to be rightly informed, you may have been misled in your information on some points; and that you may have consequently judged incorrectly of them." That you have been so misled, and that you have erred in your judgments, will I think appear, and to a much greater extent than you imagine, or than you would have been or done, if with less "anxiety" you had sought information *directly*, by regularly examining those who were most able and best disposed to give it impartially. You would then probably have commenced your examinations with unbiassed minds, an advantage of no small importance, in an enquiry so intricate and complicated as that which you were about to undertake. But unfortunately you thought it expedient to *prepare* yourselves by reading some of the publications of a writer, noted for a strong propensity to innovating projects and speculations, as well as for eccentric and peculiar opinions, and who from the course and events of his life, must have adopted lasting prejudices on several of the topics to which that enquiry was directed.

When men read, and only read the books of *one* author, and that on subjects of which they are uninformed, he must indeed be much less expert than Dr. Jackson if he does not persuade them to adopt most of his opinions; and a perusal of the publications to which you have repeatedly and candidly

referred* will readily discover that every part of your report which has appeared to require animadversion from me, must have been produced, in some degree at least, by Dr. Jackson's assertions or suggestions. Whether the legislature intended that you should adopt this method of obtaining information, I will not presume to enquire; though I cannot help thinking that if a report by parliamentary commissioners respecting the value of Dr. Jackson's projects had been desired, it might have been obtained with more advantage and less expence to the public, by the appointment of gentlemen intimately acquainted with medical subjects, and consequently less liable to be misled by plausible declamation, and confident misrepresentation.

One of the first effects produced in your minds, by the reading of Dr. Jackson's books, was a belief that regimental surgeons are alone qualified to discharge the duties of army physicians, and that the latter are consequently useless in armies; or that, if suffered to continue, they ought to be selected exclusively from the *former*. As this is a question of no little importance, it may be proper for me to notice the allegations and arguments by which Dr. Jackson appears to have induced you to adopt his opinion respecting it; an opinion originating perhaps from his own anomalous and irregular progress in life. Mankind are apt to identify themselves with the circumstances, situations,

* These publications (by Dr. Robert Jackson) are, 1st, Remarks on the Constitution of the Medical Department of the British Army, printed in 1803. 2dly, A System of Arrangement for the Medical Department of Armies, printed in 1803. In referring to these publications (as I shall have frequent occasion to do) I shall only note the page and the year in which each was published.

and pursuits to which they have been most habituated, and, from a kind of selfish partiality, to give them a preference over others, of the advantages of which they are ignorant. This observation will often apply to men the most liberally educated, and therefore the least liable to become prejudiced; among these many are observed to prefer, to every other, not only the university, but the particular college of which they had by chance been members, only because they were educated at that college and in that university. In this respect, I must acknowledge that Dr. Jackson has manifested some indulgence to the army physicians; for he does not require that we should all have been educated exactly where, and as he was, and that with little or no science, and "only a small share of professional information," (as he states of himself) we should all adventure to the West Indies, and afterwards to Georgia, and there get attached, "in the lowest medical station," to a British regiment. But he requires, that to become army physicians we should all enter the army in the *lowest* situation, and if, before he had attained any office more elevated, he had been able to leap into that of army physician, as he endeavoured in 1794, we might then, probably, have had his permission to make a similar leap. Failing, however, in that attempt, and being afterwards appointed surgeon to a regiment, he has discovered that regimental surgeons, who had been surgeon's mates, are "the only persons in the nation, possessing practical knowledge of military diseases;" (see publication of 1803, p. viii); that the office of regimental surgeon is "the only station where a correct knowledge of the physician's duty can be acquired;" (id. p. 19), and "that the most useful army physicians

are to be found in the class of regimental surgeons or of staff surgeons, who have risen by a regular gradation," i. e. after being mates and regimental surgeons, id. p. 17.

To illustrate and support this novel doctrine, he pretends that there is something *new* and *peculiar* in the military general hospitals, which the physician who has not been a *regimental surgeon*, and who consequently has not served in regimental hospitals, can never properly learn (1803, p. 9, and 23. — 1805, p. 95.). Yet he tells us, in several parts of the former of these works, that the *regimental* differ from the general hospitals, *only by being "on a smaller scale,"* that in the latter "the circle of action is *only widened*," the principle and manner of acting are not changed," p. 23, and also at p. 9, he says, "the management of a general hospital is a similar though more extensive duty," than the management of "the sick of a regiment." To pretend then that physicians, who have been conversant with *civil* hospitals, cannot make themselves masters of the few circumstances which are peculiar to military hospitals, unless they begin with those among the latter, which are on the *smallest scale*, is as idle and unreasonable as it would be to assert, that a seaman could never learn how to perform his duty on board a ship of the line, without having previously failed in a frigate. The truth is, that general hospitals are not only on a larger scale, but directed by medical officers of superior ranks and abilities, and therefore much more may be learned in them, and in much less time, than in the regimental; and it is a manifest absurdity to suppose that physicians from civil life, with their superior attainments, and their habits of acquiring knowledge, cannot become masters

of every thing peculiar to military hospitals, with greater facility than hospital mates. Even Dr. Jackson has admitted (1803, p. 33) that in acquiring a knowledge of the military discipline, &c. of these hospitals, the "professional studies" of a medical man give him great advantages over other men; for he has been led in his researches, to trace to *their principles*, the powers of action in man, both in body and mind, so that he acquires a facility of arranging correctly and systematically materials which appear, in their external circumstances, to be heterogeneous and discordant."

Another of Dr. Jackson's pretences is, that there is no difference "between the military physician and the military surgeon;" (1805, p. 29) that "the medical art is a *whole*, connected intimately, in all its parts." And that "the *division* of its parts marre the progress of the art, as a science." (1805, p. 94). An assertion which is left not only without any support from him, but which is obviously *contradicted* by reason, by experience and by analogy, in every other art or science; it is even contradicted by what he had previously stated in his work of 1803, p. 29, where he says that "in civil life a division or participation of labour, among physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, is found to be useful." He might also have stated, because it is well known, that in consideration of the limited powers of the human mind, it has been found advantageous to *subdivide these divisions*, and encourage some men to devote their attention and faculties almost exclusively to the diseases of the eyes, other men to those of the ears, &c. and others again to the practice of midwifery. The more ancient Egyptians are said to have had particular physicians for each separate disease; and it is

not improbable that in a great metropolis, where considerable numbers of medical men find employment, almost any one of them, after acquiring sufficient general or preparatory knowledge, might by directing his whole attention and exerting all his faculties upon a particular class of diseases, become much more expert and successful in their treatment, than he otherwise would have been, if his thoughts and senses had been *equally bestowed upon all* the disorders incident to mankind.

Such indeed is the power of truth, that Dr. Jackson has been compelled by it, to manifest his conviction of the reality and propriety of a distinction between physic and surgery, even when he was labouring to prove the contrary—for in recommending the establishment of a medical school for the army, and a gradual promotion of the pupils, *all* under the denominations of battalion assistants, battalion surgeons, and surgeons of regiments or brigades, he directs for the service of the hospitals, that physicians, with peculiar and superior qualifications, shall be selected from the higher class, because, says he, "the consideration and cure of *internal* diseases which fall within the physician's province, are the *more important*, and for the most part, the more numerous class of maladies, which occur in military hospitals."—Hence, he adds, the physician's task is prominent, &c. (1805, p. 418.) But "surgeons of hospitals," he tells us, (1805, p. 30.) "are most suitably taken from the (inferior) class of surgeons of battalions;" because their "*main qualification* consists in matured judgment and *manual dexterity*." And in the preceding page he mentions "the physician's *mental talent*;" and "the surgeon's *manual dexterity*;" *feeling*, (in spite of his own arguments to the contrary) that a

real difference exists, between the former and the latter; and that some men are better adapted by nature, as well as by education, for the one than the other of these professions.

It seems, however, that a contrary opinion had been strongly established in your minds by the reading of Dr. Jackson's publications, previous to the 12th of March, 1807, when you first began to collect *viva voce* evidence, by examining the physician general on oath; and your 11th question to him, (manifestly suggested, like several of the others, by Dr. Jackson's opinions and assertions) was in these words, viz. would not the gentlemen who have acted as surgeons to regiments, and have afterwards served in army hospitals (in both which situations, according to your letter to us, there is greatly more medical, than surgical practice,) be equally, or rather more fit, to be appointed physicians to the army than the persons you have usually recommended? (i. e. those legally authorized to practice physic in England.) To this question Sir Lucas Pepys answered, "I think not, because their education does not lead them to the *knowledge of principles*." An answer which though short, might have given you very important information, if it had been well understood, and well considered by you. For most certainly, without scientific principles, that experience on which Dr. Jackson rests all the pretensions of the regimental surgeons to become army physicians, would prove generally useless, and frequently *deceptive*, at best it could only produce a mechanical or empirical routine of practice, which may perhaps be the "army medical practice," so often mentioned, as a matter of great importance, in your report, and which could not be much better, than the *hospital* practice so facetiously described

by the late Mr. Foote in his *Devil upon Two Sticks*. Whether you deemed this sort of practice adequate to the wants of soldiers, or whether you did not understand, or did not attend to the answer of the physician-general, I know not; but it certainly appears to have been lost upon and among you; for though it is *once barely* stated in your report, you do not appear to have allowed it the smallest weight in opposition to Dr. Jackson's opinion.

Your next or 12th question to the physician-general is, "would not the hope of such promotion act as an useful stimulus to the diligence and good conduct of the inferior officers, in the medical department of the army?" To which he answered "no doubt an *increase of pay* would act as a stimulus, but that should not be obtained at the expence of the lives of the soldiers." This answer appears to have been as much lost upon you as the former, though it might have suggested a mode of encouraging men properly qualified to offer themselves as candidates for the inferior army medical offices, and of rendering them diligent afterwards, without *endangering the lives of soldiers*.

Those who have sufficient learning, (and it requires no small portion) to be able to form adequate conceptions of the various abstruse, and extensive branches of science, which are connected with, and necessary for, the practice of physic and surgery, will readily admit, that the greatest natural endowments, with the utmost industry during a long life, are *not too much* for the safe and beneficial exercise of *only one of these divisions of the healing art*; and that both physicians, and surgeons, are now much better qualified for their respective *distinct professions*, than they could have been if each had equally applied himself not only to his *own*

but to the other's profession. It appears to have been a conviction of this *important truth* that first produced, and has since upheld for ages the *division* in question: a division which has been sanctioned by the experience and approbation of every civilized nation in Europe, and respected even by the most *furious innovators* of the French revolution; who, when they had *overturned the throne and the altar*, and abolished the most venerable establishments of their ancestors, still maintained both in military and civil life, the distinction between physic and surgery; and *invariably placed physicians at the head of the medical departments of the French armies*.^{*} But you, gentlemen, rendered *confident* by a *very little reading* upon a question which was *new to every one of you*, seem to have thought yourselves competent to decide it differently from the rest of mankind; and have ventured to propose a complete abolition of all distinction between physic and surgery, so far at least as regards the British army, and to recommend with a view to their *entire exclusion*, that *no more army physicians should be appointed*; and this recommendation you have endeavoured to support by misrepresentations, innocently made, I am per-

^{*} The French army in Egypt, when I was there in 1801, had for its physician in chief (*médecin en chef*), M. Desgenettes, who was at the head of the medical department: under him were several army physicians (*médecins ordinaires*): M. Larrey being then surgeon in chief (*chirurgien en chef*): and M. Boudet, apothecary in chief (*pharmacien en chef*).—About the same time the French army of the Rhine had for its first physician, and chief medical officer, Joseph Adam Lorentz with the title of "*médecin en chef de l'armée de la république Française sur le Rhin*." Other instances might be adduced but these will suffice.

suaded, and without any suspicion of their being such. One of these (manifestly derived from Dr. Jackson's misinformation) may be found in several parts of your report, where the appointment of regular physicians from civil life is represented by you as *an innovation*; e. g. at page 16, in which you state "that in the medical service of the ordnance there are no physicians; and in the royal navy the physicians hold the highest rank, and are appointed from the surgeons in those services; and this" (you add) "was the practice also, as we understand, in the army medical department, *previous to the formation of the board in 1793*;" and this misrepresentation is not merely stated in your report, but you have incautiously advanced it, when you were interrogating persons under oath, and thus (without any improper intention I believe) encouraged them to suppose that the regimental surgeons had been aggrieved, by this supposed novel practice, of taking army physicians from civil life, instead of promoting regimental surgeons to that office—one instance of this will be sufficient, and it occurs in your second examination of Dr. Borland (p. 160), where your 4th question is stated in these words, viz. "did it appear to you, that the regimental surgeons, who had been appointed before the creation of the medical board in 1793, and who used to succeed to the medical staff appointments in the army, were unequal to the cure of the sick of the army?" Dr. Borland's answer to this question will be noticed in another place. The question itself is here stated only to show the *error* which accompanied your interrogatories, and which was by them probably communicated to some of the witnesses. It remains, however, for me to convince you of this error, and I shall have no difficulty in doing it. The haste indeed with which I

find it necessary to finish my letter, will not allow me to recur to the medical history of the British army, or the biography of all who at different times had been appointed army physicians, for all the facts of which I might otherwise avail myself; a sufficient number of them, however, is known to answer my purpose. From these, it appears that the appointment of surgeons to regiments has been coeval with the formation of regiments: but that of army physicians took place long after, and only upon extraordinary occasions; as when considerable armies or expeditions were to be employed, especially on foreign service, physicians were then attached to one particular army or expedition; and when the service allotted to such army or expedition was finished, the physician or physicians (if more than one) were commonly allowed to retire on half pay, and rarely, if ever, called again into actual service.

The motive for such extraordinary appointments was a conviction of the *expediency* of providing for those particular services, medical assistance *greatly superior* to any which could be expected from the surgeons of regiments and their mates, of whose talents the army was already possessed. This assistance, *superior* to that which *already belonged to the army*, could only be obtained from physicians in civil life; and it was certainly not sought for any where else. A proof of the high estimation in which regular physicians thus employed for military services, were then held, may be found in the great superiority of pay and rank assigned to them. With regard to staff surgeons (who are almost as offensive to Dr. Jackson as regular physicians, he having never been one of them) they were also taken from civil life, for the same reason which

prevailed in the case of physicians.—They were considered as possessing abilities superior to those of the regimental surgeons, and were consequently allowed higher pay and rank, though both were inferior to those of the physicians. In a course of years, some of the regimental surgeons found means to get promotion, and become staff surgeons and physicians, because they either possessed greater abilities than others, or because without greater abilities they had been able to recommend themselves to men in high military stations, who are rarely if ever competent judges of the qualifications of medical men. These instances, however, seldom, if ever, occurred unless vacancies occasioned by *deaths abroad* were to be filled up, and they were few in number, before the year 1790. The physicians employed with the British army on the continent of Europe in and between the years 1742 and 1748 were Dr. Sandilands, Dr. Bailey, Dr. Lawton, Dr. afterwards Sir John Pringle, Dr. afterwards Sir Clifton Wintringham, Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Clephane and Dr. Barker. Of these, the greater part are known to have been regularly educated physicians, and I have no reason to doubt of its having been the case with all of them. During the war which began in 1756 and ended in 1763, the physicians employed with the British forces in Germany and other places, appear to have been Sir Clifton Wintringham, Dr. Conyers, Dr. Mulhet, Dr. Brook, Dr. Brocklesby, Dr. Donald Monro, Dr. Cadogan, Dr. Knox, Dr. George Monro, Dr. Robert Miller, Dr. Turner, Dr. John Armstrong, Dr. Huck Saunders, and Dr. Kennedy. Of these, several were fellows of the college of physicians (as was the case of those in the former war) and I have reason to believe

that excepting one they had been all educated regularly to the profession of physic.

During the American war, no British troops were employed on the continent of Europe. The first and most considerable hospital staff, was that formed in 1776 for the army under General, now Lord Howe, in New York and Pennsylvania. Of this the late Dr. Morris, a fellow of the college of physicians, who had been taken as an army physician immediately from civil life, was the chief, being the senior physician, and also inspector-general of hospitals. Under him were Dr. now Sir Charles Blagden, and Dr. Mervin Nooth: both of them regular physicians. To these were afterwards added, probably by General Howe, two other physicians, viz. Drs. Veale and Bruce, who were, I believe, also taken from civil life.

Another hospital staff, was at the same time formed for the army under General Burgoyne destined for Quebec; and it was formed on similar principles; Dr. Knox an army physician being the chief medical officer; and the staff surgeons appointed both to this army and that under General Howe were also, chiefly if not solely taken, like the physicians, from civil life.

In the year 1780, an army physician being wanted for the hospitals at Jamaica, the government was then so little disposed to look for such an officer among the regimental surgeons, that the college of physicians was requested to nominate a gentleman for that duty, and upon their recommendation Dr. John Hunter was appointed, and is known to have discharged the functions of his appointment with the greatest ability.

After the peace of 1783, no physician to the army was appointed, till a misunderstanding occurred with Spain, relative to the transactions at Nootka Sound,

about the year 1791; when an expedition being projected, Dr. Gregory West, who had formerly served as a staff apothecary in America, was promoted to that situation, on the recommendation of the late Mr. John Hunter, who was then deputy to the surgeon-general, Mr. Adair, and became his successor in the year 1792; Sir Clifton Wintringham the physician-general, being, from great age and infirmities unable to officiate. And this appointment of Dr. West appears to have been the only one, of an army physician, which ever took place in consequence of any nomination made by Mr. Hunter. When he died in Oct. 1793, the late Mr. Gunning became surgeon-general, and Mr. Keate was appointed inspector-general, and from that time until the 15th of January, 1794, when the present physician-general was appointed (on the death of Sir Clifton Wintringham) no person was either nominated or appointed to the office of army physician, who had not been regularly educated as a physician. It appears indeed that only two appointments took place in that short interval, which were that of Dr. Robertson Barclay, and Dr. George Paulet Morris, both fellows of the college of physicians. From this statement of facts you, gentlemen, will readily discover how much you have been misled, in believing and representing "that previous to the formation of the board in 1793," it had been the practice to appoint only surgeons, to be army physicians. For even supposing, contrary to all appearance, that you intended to confine the existence of this practice to the time only when Mr. Hunter directed the army medical department, your representation will even then be found to have had no foundation; because during that time no surgeon was promoted to the office of an army physician; and if you intended to extend it to earlier wars and

periods, no such practice, as I have clearly shewn, ever existed in any of them. You will also perceive how little Dr. Jackson could be warranted by facts in stating, (as he does at p. 15—1803) that Mr. Hunter “naturally concluded that the person who was experienced and able as a *surgeon in a regiment*, would prove capable and useful as a *physician in an hospital*,” since the only person nominated by him for the office of physician, never had been surgeon to a regiment; nor would his duty as a staff apothecary, ever have led him into regimental hospitals, which Dr. Jackson considers as so indispensably necessary for army physicians.

You appear also to have been misled in your representation of the practice of the navy; though perhaps not to the same extent as in that which regards the army. The naval service has indeed many more peculiarities, and differs from civil life in many more circumstances than the land service, and it is therefore possible, that reasons for appointing surgeons to be physicians, might present themselves more obviously in the naval than in the military service. But certainly previously to the year 1805, there was nothing in the regulations, or in the practice of the navy, contrary to the immediate introduction of regular physicians into the sea service; and the only obstacle to it at this time is the order of the 23d of January 1805, which directs that no person shall be appointed physician to the fleet, or to either of the naval hospitals, who has not previously served as surgeon at least five years. This, however, at the utmost is but a *new*, and as yet *unfinished experiment*. Whether it will produce naval physicians superior to Drs. Lind, Blane, and others who were taken immediately from civil life, remains to be decided; and therefore your proposed exclusion of regular physicians from the army, can as yet, derive no support

from the navy; and it is as little susceptible of being supported by any thing in the practice of the ordnance department, which now has for its chief medical officer, Sir J. M. Hayes, who was, for many years, an army physician, without ever having been a regimental surgeon; and you have told us, p. 35. that the late Dr. Brocklesby, a regularly educated physician, and fellow of the college, was, until the time of his death, the chief medical officer of the ordnance. He was, I find, filed in his commission, “Physician General to the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and Corps of Royal Engineers.” Whether any, and what, other persons have held similar situations I have not had time to enquire; nor indeed is it necessary for me to do it; since the support which you endeavour to obtain from the practice of the ordnance department is founded upon the circumstance of their not having employed physicians *except at Woolwich*. But the reason of this is obviously such as cannot suit your purpose, since the detachments of artillery sent on expeditions, are always *much too small* for the services of a physician.

These observations will, I doubt not, appear, even to yourselves, gentlemen, as a sufficient answer to what you have advanced against the use and expediency of army physicians: it becomes me, however, to notice some erroneous *suppositions*, which repeatedly occur in your Report, and which, as they probably influenced you in forming it, may assist in giving it plausibility with others.

One of these is at p. 16 of your Report, where you mention “the manners, the habits, and often the *diseases of the military*” as being “*peculiar*” in a high degree: and again at p. 85, where you mention “the habits and pec-

liar diseases of soldiers," believing, doubtless, that men who enlist as soldiers, thereby *change their physical constitutions*, and become susceptible of diseases which do not exist in *civil life*; or that the causes of disease operate on *soldiers* differently from what they do upon *other men*. How you came to adopt an opinion so destitute of all solid foundation, I will not determine. Certainly you did not find it in the works of Sir John Pringle, or Drs. Cleghorne, Brocklesby, Donald Monro, John Hunter, and others, who have written professedly on the diseases most prevalent in armies; nor can I find it any where distinctly expressed even by Dr. Jackson, though he often mentions "military diseases," and "army diseases." But he tells us at p. 24, 1803, that "army diseases are the same in kind as those which happen in civil life." He chooses, indeed, to add that "the aspect of them, is often more threatening; seeming to demand more promptitude and decision in the application of the means of cure." If, however, this supposed difference, even of aspect, be considered as any thing constant and general, it has no existence but in Dr. Jackson's imagination; and if it had a real existence, the fact would only evince the expediency of employing well-educated physicians, whose experience, enlightened and assisted by scientific principles, would enable them much better to detect any thing fallacious or instructive in the aspect of these diseases, than surgeons could do without science, however experienced.

Another of your groundless suppositions is that which you have expressed in various parts of your report by the words "*army medical practice*." In your two first questions to the physician-general (Sir L. Pepys) you ask what "acquaintance" he had with

"army medical practice" previous to his appointment; and what "acquaintance" he has had with "army hospital practice" subsequently to his appointment, always employing and appropriating these words to convey the supposition of a distinct, constant, uniform, and peculiar system of treatment for sick soldiers, different from that which is used for the rest of mankind; and you seem not only to have no doubt of the real existence of such a *system* of treatment, but to believe that none but regimental surgeons can ever properly become masters of it; and in this persuasion you were pleased to state p. 16, that, "if the denomination and rank of physicians were necessary in the army, there would have been a convenience in selecting them from amongst those regimental and staff surgeons, who possessed actual experience in *army medical practice*, both at home and abroad." Whence you derived the ideas so often expressed in your Report, and which seem to have made such deep impressions on your minds, of the real existence of what you appear to mean by "*army medical practice*" I know not, unless it be from Dr. Jackson, who you say, p. 55, "appears to have had great experience in army medical practice, and to support his opinions by very just reasoning." He indeed sometimes mentions "*military practice*," as he mentions other things, with various meanings, to suit his various purposes. But if by this or any other expression he has led you into this error, it is fair to make him lead you out of it: and therefore I beg you will refer to p. 44 of his Publication of 1803 where you may read as follows, viz. "Physicians and surgeons, the pupils of different schools, possessing different principles and *different views of medical practice*, at the time of admission into the army, give effect when admitted to act,

to the doctrines of the different schools, and thereby introduce variety, even contradiction in the management of the concerns of the sick," and to p. 130, where he says that "fever under one form or other is the most common disease in armies, and it is the disease in the treatment of which men's opinions are the least agreed." A dozen other assertions of similar import may be easily found, but in truth it requires only a very slight exercise of common sense to perceive that no such constant uniformity of practice can exist in armies any more than in civil life; and that, in both, the methods of treating the sick will be as various, as the degrees of intellect, science, and experience among medical men; unless indeed, the authority of certain persons may lately have introduced among regimental hospitals some mechanical unprincipled routine, for which, certainly, army physicians can never be wanted, and in which it may be hoped and expected that they will never participate.

Whatever attention may be paid to other parts of your Report by the legislature and government of our country; they will not, I presume, without full enquiry and consideration, resolve to adopt an *innovation*, of which even Robespierre and his adherents were afraid. And, probably, in making such an enquiry, they may think it expedient to ascertain more accurately than you appear to have done, the true extent of the qualifications and defects of those gentlemen, who are recommended by you, as fit to supersede the army physicians, and in doing this, they may probably recollect that the examinations at the college of surgeons, on which you place so much reliance, *have no relation to the practice of physic*; being wholly and exclusively confined to surgery. And in regard even to this single division of

the healing art, it is well known that the examiners have long and seriously lamented the absolute necessity which they are, and have been frequently, under of *passing, as qualified* for the service of the army and navy, men who are *greatly deficient*, because few who are not so can be induced to present themselves as candidates. It is indeed true, that hospital mates for the service of the army, are now examined by the physician-general, but the same want of candidates properly qualified, compels him also to accept such as he can obtain, though they are often very unlike those whom he would be glad to obtain; and besides all this it is to be recollected that he does not examine even the best of them, with a view to their becoming *army-physicians*, being satisfied if he can find them qualified for the lowest medical station of hospital mate. In confirmation of all this, it may be proper to remind you of what is stated by Dr. Harnes, the commissioner of the Transport Board specially charged with the medical concerns of the navy, in the appendix to your report, p. 178, viz. that "there has been, and still is great difficulty in procuring hospital-mates, and assistant-surgeons, properly qualified for the royal navy; the number at present deficient (he adds) cannot be less than *six hundred*." Equal difficulty has attended the procuring of hospital-mates for the army, and this at one time was so great, (I mean when the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercrombie was preparing for the West Indies), that it was found necessary to advertise in the newspapers, offering at once the highest pay, &c. ever allowed to hospital-mates, and it was also found expedient to accept without any thing like an examination, all who presented themselves to the inspector-general in London, or to Sir J.

M. Hayes at Southampton.* Even Dr. Jackson, (to whose authority I refer so frequently, only because you rely so much upon it) is far from supposing, with all his partiality for surgeons, that they have ever generally given adequate proofs of their *fitness* for that station. He tells us at p. 389 of his Outline of the History and Cure of Fever, that instead of the vague examinations and inadequate proofs of qualifications, upon which young men are appointed to the office of surgeon in armies, *tests* of correct morals, of *actual knowledge*, and more particularly of the capacity of improving in knowledge, ought to be produced openly and publicly, before an office of such importance be bestowed—And as a farther illustration of the consequences of admitting unfit medical persons into the army, Dr. Borland,

* Almost equal difficulty in procuring hospital mates properly qualified, has ever since continued to subsist. The army medical board, in a letter to the deputy-secretary at war, dated March 6th, 1806, and signed by Sir L. Pepys, Mr. Keate, and Mr. Knight, say, "we have met with unexpected difficulties in raising our medical recruits, and if the continental war had proceeded, we should have found ourselves unequal to the necessary supply. The late amelioration of pay has certainly induced a *better description of characters* to enter, but the more extended pay and allowances lately held out to navy-surgeons, have been a great check on our expectations of a more abundant offer of army-candidates," and on the 13th of October, 1807, Mr. Knight being interrogated by the commissioners, (see Report, p. 125.) respecting the continuance of these difficulties, answered, "the same difficulties still exist, and rather in a greater degree than before, as we were unable to furnish more than one third of the requisition for hospital mates for the last expedition under General Beresford."

whose authority is almost as weighty and powerful in your minds, as Dr. Jackson's, and whose prejudices and interests are to the full as strong, both in favour of the surgeons, and in opposition to the physicians, has told you (see p. 159 of your Report,) that in consequence of a prosecution begun by himself, one regimental surgeon had been dismissed the service." That another had "resigned to avoid a court martial," and that in consequence of a report made by him (Dr. B.) when in Jersey, "a surgeon to the forces, and two regimental surgeons were removed from their situations for *inefficiency*." And that "several similar instances" had come within his knowledge. Being afterwards asked (Quest. 8th.) about the competency of the surgeons of the line in general; he answered, "I think they are much improved of late, but still capable of *further improvement*." When such facts are admitted by Dr. Borland, what might not be obtained from persons less partial to the regimental surgeons? But even if there had been no such evidence, it appears to me very unlikely that young men with only the usual and scanty acquisitions of hospital-mates, without proper books or leisure for reading, and with military examples and habits very unfavourable to thought and reflection, could, in a very few years, as you suppose, qualify themselves, so as to become not only *good* surgeons, but also *better* physicians than men who were regularly and liberally educated to *that part only* of the practice of *medicine*, and who, from early youth have been devoted, at a great expence, to the attainment of knowledge from universities, public hospitals, lectures, books, &c.

To borrow the words of Dr. Jackson, "the medical art is an art of tedious acquisition," "so that

the physician can scarcely ever say he has learned his art," (Dedication, 1805) and this may be said with great truth even of physicians living in large towns, in which the opportunities of gaining knowledge from public libraries, learned associations, and great hospitals are daily open to them: yet you appear to think that the *whole of this art* may be acquired with preternatural facility in *regimental* hospitals, where it is certainly no part of the surgeon's duty to *instruct* his assistant, and where, if vanity or idle habits did not indispose the latter to seek instruction, it may frequently happen that the former was either not inclined, or, if inclined, not qualified, to assume so difficult a task.

I am far from thinking that it ever can be proper to exclude either physicians or surgeons from the service of armies, but when I reflect on the much greater proportion of military men, who require aid from the physician, than from the surgeon, I have no hesitation in declaring that the assistance of the latter might be much better dispensed with, than that of the former. It appears at p. 98. of your Report, that you were informed by the physician general that "where one soldier requires the assistance of a surgeon in the line of surgery, ten will require it in medicine." Dr. Brockleby's opinion and statements greatly exceed this: (see *Economical and Medical Observations on the Improvement of Military Hospitals*, printed in 1764.—page 47 and 48.) where he states from his own observations, and the information of regimental surgeons, "that the medical science requisite for a regiment is at least *forty times* necessary to be in some sort practised, for *once* that any particular dexterity in manual operations or surgery is required." And as far as I have been able to

ascertain, the returns of the general hospitals in the West Indies during the late war generally exhibited from 20 to 40 medical for one surgical patient. But as nothing will probably afford so much conviction to your minds as Dr. Jackson's authority, I will again refer to his publication of 1803, p. 15. where, after representing the late Mr. Hunter as remarking "that persons denominated surgeons of regiments act in two capacities," he adds that they do it "*rarely* indeed in the surgical capacity, for there *rarely* is occasion, unless in actual war; *daily* in the medical, for the regiment is scarcely ever without a *sick list*;"—and again at p. 29, 1805, he observes that the duties of medical men in armies "require more frequently the exercise of the physician's mental talent than the surgeon's manual dexterity."

The proportions, in which regiments want medical and surgical aid, will indeed naturally vary according to the climates, and situations in which they are employed and the services, battles, &c. in which they may be engaged. It is however notorious, that even when there is as much of fighting, as commonly occurs in active campaigns, the number of sick will almost invariably much exceed that of wounded—and at other times when there are no wounded, as is most commonly the case, the hospitals contain few cases strictly surgical. It will therefore manifestly follow that great public benefit might be obtained by an arrangement which would give to regiments the aid of regular physicians for all the *medical* patients, by the appointment in future of *regimental physicians*, and of regular surgeons for those only who are properly within the line of surgery, instead of now committing the whole to regimental surgeons, who can never be *duly qualified* to practice the two intricate arts of physic and surgery.

I am next to notice that part of your report which relates to "the army general hospital system." In pursuing your inquiry into this subject you state that you "have collected information from gentlemen of great experience in every branch of army medical practice, and have endeavoured, by an examination and comparison of the accounts of general and regimental hospitals, to judge of the merits of the army medical system."

On reading the first part of the above passage, it was natural to conclude that here at least no such imperfections in the evidence would be found as have been pointed out in your statement concerning the army physicians; for the assertion that you "had collected information from gentlemen of great experience in every branch of army medical practice," implied that you had examined or communicated with all those medical officers, whose professional rank and science, and whose military experience, respectability of character, and, I may add, independence of circumstances, might operate as a security for the accuracy, fairness, and sufficiency of their testimonies respecting the comparative advantages and defects of general and regimental hospitals. But this expectation has been *wholly* disappointed; for the various documents published in the appendix to your Report are proofs that you have omitted asking all those officers of that description who appeared before you (viz. Sir Lucas Pepys, Mr. Keate, Mr. Knight, Sir John Hayes, Mr. Young and Dr. Frank) a single question about the respective or comparative benefits of general and of regimental hospitals: you have likewise omitted making enquiries on these subjects from other gentlemen of the rank of *inspectors*, as Dr. Nooth, Dr. Robertson Barclay, Mr. Weir, and

Dr. Moore; and you have not condescended to summon before you *even one* army physician. From all these sources abundant and valuable information might with certainty have been obtained; but instead of recurring to such authorities you have contented yourselves with the testimonies of two officers, whose evidence ought *prima facie* to have been received with great caution, because both owe their promotions and present employments to those late arrangements in the medical department, which have effected the depression of the army-physicians, and the discontinuance of general hospitals, and are therefore deeply interested in representing these arrangements as the most advantageous to the public. That their testimonies might be partial was thus to be apprehended; and therefore most persons would have thought it prudent in you either not to have demanded, or not to have depended solely upon, them: but as you seem to have predetermined that Dr. Jackson's notions should be the type after which the system of the army medical department should, by your recommendation, be new-modelled, it was only necessary for the attainment of this object to procure a confirmation of those notions; and in selecting Drs. Borland and M'Gregor exclusively out of all the medical officers who were, or might have been, called before you, as the means of that confirmation, you certainly did not make an injudicious choice, their opinions on this subject having been well known a considerable time before. I do not imagine indeed, much less insinuate, that you wished for any evidence or even for any opinions from these gentlemen which did not accord with truth; I only suppose it not unlikely that, being yourselves fully persuaded that Dr. Jackson's projects and assertions were well founded, you might be willing to see them supported by "concurring testimony," and might

not wish to have the subject *perplexed* by contradictory statements.—If the facts, however, which I shall adduce at their proper places, in explanation of the evidence of these gentlemen, be correct, and I have the strongest reason to believe they will prove so, you may perhaps ultimately partake of those regrets which I feel, on account of your having relied so entirely upon it as to neglect all other testimony.

I shall but shortly notice the latter part of what I have lately quoted from your Report, I mean that where you say you “have endeavoured by an examination and comparison of the *accounts* of general and regimental hospitals, to judge of the *merits* of the army medical system.” This certainly appears to me as a very *insufficient* mode of estimating the real merits of any system of *this nature*; there being many considerations belonging to it which can never properly become matters of account; such as the various degrees of superiority in the professional treatment of the sick whereby their recoveries may be accelerated or retarded, and their lives preserved or sacrificed; and also the different degrees of instruction which may be afforded to the younger medical officers, with other circumstances, which cannot be accurately estimated and reduced into pounds, shillings and pence. And if the simple amount of expenditure were to constitute the only criterion for decision, and that arrangement be deemed the *best* which is found to *cost the least*, none could be so good as that which should leave the sick without any assistance, by refusing to disburse one penny for their relief.

On active service, where rapid movements very often decide the issue of battles and the fate of nations, it must be obvious that such movements could never be executed if regiments were to be embarrassed and re-

tarded by the transportation of their sick. An army can only be really prepared for effective service when the regiments composing it are freed from all incumbrances that might impede sudden and expeditious marches: and of all such incumbrances, the sick are, pro tempore, the most burthenfome and useless to the attainment of any object for which those marches are made. Neither will it be deemed advisable that the sick should be removed from place to place and perhaps day after day, even if it were practicable, because they need for their recovery all the quiet, security and comforts which a permanent station can alone supply. For these reasons regiments in the field must separate from, and relieve themselves of their sick; and as in doing this they must retain their own surgeons to assist them if engaged with an enemy, (which is then always to be considered as probable) establishments must be formed for the reception and relief of the sick who are then left behind, without any distinction of their corps; and these are the establishments which the British government has long provided under the name of *general hospitals*. From this view of the exigencies of a campaign, general hospitals seem *indispensably* necessary to an army, while regimental hospitals (wherever they can be established, and this is not always practicable) are to be regarded as, at best, only slight and precarious resources, and objects of but secondary importance; and this is the view which yourselves appear, in the two following extracts from your Report, to have taken of both kinds of establishments; P. 22.

“When troops are engaged on active service abroad, it must, we presume, sometimes happen that the sick and wounded cannot be accommodated with the regiments to which they belong; in such cases, hospitals to which the sick might be generally sent, and medical

aid beyond that which the regimental surgeons could supply must become necessary."

P. 24. "On active service, a distinct medical establishment, which might relieve, in a great degree, the regimental surgeons from all duties except in the field, and whose expenditure was under a separate controul, appears to carry a great convenience with it;"—In opposition, however, to these admissions you at p. 80 of your Report, recommend the entire discontinuance "of the general hospital system," asserting on the alleged opinions of those whom you call "experienced medical officers" (viz. Drs. Borland and M'Gregor) "that it has been attended with the most destructive consequences to the sick soldiers, and that it has produced great expenditure and waste of every kind." As this important measure of inculcating and proscribing establishments which have long existed and been deemed indispensably necessary in this and every other European nation is founded upon the evidence of *these two gentlemen only* (Dr. Jackson's publications excepted), all other testimony appearing to you (as I suppose) either superfluous or suspicious, it becomes expedient for me to examine those parts of their evidence which relate to the present subject; I mean particularly those in which they assert, 1st. that "during the campaigns of 1794 and 1795 on the continent, the mortality was very great in the general hospitals, while it was comparatively small in the regimental." 2dly, That "in consequence of the sick being taken from the regimental and sent into the general hospitals, where they were placed under the care of physicians selected from civil life, the regimental surgeons became less active and disgusted." 3dly, That there is a "great superiority as to the treatment of sick in the regimental over the general hospitals." 4thly, That "many soldiers who

had been sent into general hospitals with slight ailments caught fevers there and perished." 5thly, That "soldiers tarried very long in the general hospitals" and feigning sickness "frequently imposed upon the medical officer of no previous regimental practice," and 6thly, That general hospitals had been attended with great waste and a profusion of expence.

On the first of these points it is to be observed, that the evidence of Dr. Borland, so far as his own experience of general hospitals, at *that time*, was concerned, is in no degree unfavourable to them: he was acquainted with these establishments only during a part of 1793 and a part of 1794, if indeed he as a regimental surgeon's mate, could have been acquainted with them so long; and he admits that in 1793, "though the general hospitals were *loosely* managed," (and it is to be remembered that the loose managers were an old army surgeon, and an old army apothecary, promoted to be physicians) yet "the mortality in them was small"; and of their mortality in 1794 he says nothing. He indeed afterwards draws a melancholy picture of the general hospitals in the year 1795, but he sets out by declaring he does it only from what "he has heard," and it has been to me a matter of no small surprize that this *hearsay* testimony from one who at that time had only served in the lowest medical situations of the army, was listened to, and acted upon, by commissioners who could at any time have commanded the evidence of scores of persons much more competent to give evidence on this subject, from their superior stations and opportunities of *personal observation*.

Dr. M'Gregor indeed, who was surgeon to the 88th regiment, declares from his personal knowledge, that in 1794 and 1795, "the mortality was certainly much greater in the general than in the regimental hospitals:" but

this, supposing it to be true, cannot authorize us to infer that the former are less useful than the latter, because while the most serious and difficult cases are invariably removed into the general hospitals, and only the slighter ailments allowed to remain in the regimental, it may be expected that very few persons will die in the latter, and that a portion of those who are ill of fever in its worst forms, of dysentery, and other dangerous diseases, must be lost, however great may be the skill, care, and comforts provided for their aid. But let it not be supposed that every death reported in the returns of the general hospitals is to be justly attributed to the medical practice which is there employed in the treatment of the sick: it has been too common, as even Dr. Jackson admits, (p. 393 of his *Outline of the History and Cure of Fever*), "not to receive fevers at general hospitals, till advanced in progress, sometimes till near the period of fatal termination: the mortality (he adds) then appears, great and the management of the hospital is blamed where there is *no just cause of blame*;" neither is it rare that regimental surgeons, having patients in their own hospital whose lives they despair of, send them into the general hospitals, sometimes when there is danger of their expiring on the way, in order that their deaths may not happen in the hospital of the regiment, and that the responsibility thereof may attach solely to the officers of the hospital staff. Dr. Jackson mentions (1805, p. 61) the "opening which is given by general hospitals to the regimental surgeon, of removing from under his care such person or persons as seem in his opinion likely to encounter a malady of danger

* By the word "receive" Dr. Jackson means to say that the patients are *not sent* till, &c.; for when *sent* they are always *received*.

or difficulty." "Men (he observes) are naturally disposed to get rid of trouble; and the responsibility of other men's lives bears hard on the consciences of many, particularly the unexperienced; hence (he continues) it is not unnatural to suppose, and the *proof* of the supposition is clear and of frequent occurrence, that if relief from such a load of responsibility exist in the *presence* of a general hospital it will be often resorted to."

If the mortality in the British army in 1794 and 1795 was great to the degree pretended, still it ought not in fairness to be ascribed, as by your Report it seems to be, to the defects alone of the general hospital system. According to Dr. Jackson, who has sketched the medical history of that campaign, "the whole or almost the whole of the British infantry was sickly in the early period of the war" (1803, p. 115); their sickly state was chiefly caused by the contagious fever which they brought with them to the continent from England or Ireland; and the almost unparalleled difficulties and inclemencies of weather, which the troops had to endure, especially during their long retreat through the Netherlands and the Dutch provinces, tended to propagate the contagion widely among them. Under circumstances the most disastrous, the general hospitals could not but partake of the common distress: and though charged with profusion, were sometimes not able to supply their wretched patients with the most ordinary necessities. Take the picture given by Dr. Jackson of that at Dorum, near Bremenlehe, at which he happened to be stationed, and this drawn when the retreat had ceased, when the sick had at length found a resting place, and when circumstances began again to smile. "The barns and houses of this village, were as good as could be expected; clean straw and good

provisions were supplied in abundance; but the ordinary clothing of the soldiers was bad, and bedding was altogether wanting. With difficulty fifty blankets were procured; these afforded only an imperfect relief to two hundred and twenty men, the half of whom at least were covered with rags, incrustated with dirt, and overrun with vermine, emaciated to the last degree of emaciation by dysentery, or rather by fever in dysenteric form; the degree of weakness in many was extreme, some were speechless and insensible, others delirious, &c. *the misery was great and the means of relief were inadequate.*" (Outline of History and Cure of Fever, p. 23.) Whatever regret we must feel for the condition to which the sick were reduced in that unfortunate campaign, it cannot be pretended nor believed that hospitals like that at Dorum are the sort of establishments which the general hospital system was ever designed to form: and I submit to your candour whether those receptacles for sick, in which disease and misery were fortuitously so accumulated, can be adduced with propriety as objections to that system? and if they can, whether events occurring while that system was in its infancy ought to be received as proofs that its former imperfections are none of them removed or capable of being so, and that its advantages have been since neither increased nor extended, and therefore that these are sufficient grounds for abolishing it altogether? Before you determined upon the latter extremity, it would, I think, have been much more prudent in you to have examined the most competent persons as to the defects and advantages of that system at the present time; and if you had then found reason to believe that the latter were greatly overbalanced by the former, to have called together (what perhaps has ne-

ver yet been done) those medical officers who, by their talents and experience, were best qualified for the task of suggesting the best means of removing those defects. Had their endeavours been fruitless in your opinions, you could then have proposed the abolition of that system with the certainty and satisfaction of having zealously and impartially sought the best information, a consolation which I fear will not be admitted to you merely by the recollection that you have perused two of Dr. Jackson's works, and exclusively examined Drs. Borland and M'Gregor on the subjects in question.

The next fact disclosed by the answers of Drs. M'Gregor and Borland to be noticed is, 2dly. That "in consequence of the sick being taken from the regimental and sent into the general hospitals, where they were placed under the care of physicians selected from civil life, the regimental surgeons (whom Dr. Borland considered as at that time equal to their situation,) not being permitted to take care of their own sick, became less active in the service and disgusted," (p. 22 of Rep.)

The occasion of the sick being thus taken from the care of the regimental surgeons is explained by Dr. Jackson; "it was ordered peremptorily in the year 1794, when the British army began its retreat through Holland, that infantry regiments should disencumber themselves of their sick by disposing of them in certain hospitals provided as places of security in the rear." (1805. p. 57.) It must be obvious that such an order as this could only have been issued by the Commander in chief; the object of it sufficiently manifests the great anxiety of His Royal Highness for the relief of the sick and disabled soldiers; and although Dr. Jackson has termed it "a mistaken kindness," it is but fair

to presume that this was the best disposition of the sick which could have been made at that time, and that it could never have been intended to stigmatize the regimental surgeons as not being "equal to their duties." I may observe, however, by the way, that since you deemed it necessary to have proofs of the competency of the gentlemen who held the office of regimental surgeon in that expedition, those officers have reason to lament that you did not procure such proofs from persons really entitled to judge of their competency. Dr. Borland, who alone is called upon by you to exercise the function of censor, was at that time only a surgeon's mate, or an hospital mate, and certainly therefore incapable of forming an exact estimate of the professional attainments of his superiors in years, experience, and rank. Nor will they, perhaps, find much cause of satisfaction at Dr. Borland's encomium, that "they did not appear unequal to the care of the sick, as far as he could judge," (Rep. p. 160.) alloyed as it is by the contradiction contained in his answer to your 8th question (Rep. p. 159.) where, being asked "what his opinion was of the competency of surgeons of the line in general?" he replied that, "he thinks they are much improved of late, but still capable of further improvement." As to the disgust and inactivity produced in regimental surgeons by removing their sick to place them in the general hospitals under the care of regular physicians, I must admit the existence of the fact, since Drs. Borland and M'Gregor have asserted it; but surely no one of those captious gentlemen could ever have seen the time when army physicians and staff surgeons had not been appointed immediately from civil life, (as I have already shown) nor the time when general hospitals had not been established, and

the sick ordered to be conveyed to them under such circumstances as those stated; and therefore no *innovation* was made nor grievance imposed upon them of which they could complain with any reason or propriety. That many of the regimental surgeons, however, possessed such feelings, that they murmured at an order which made the best provision for the sick which circumstances permitted, that they were jealous because their patients were to receive professional attendance, accommodation and comforts superior to those which the regimental hospitals could have furnished, and that they became *less attentive* to the soldiers remaining under their care when they were allowed *more leisure* for the performance of their duty, are charges which I am very unwilling to believe, and which these gentlemen will probably not thank Drs. Borland and M'Gregor for having made, though for the *laudable* purpose of throwing discredit on army-physicians and on general hospitals.

The third allegation is that of "the superiority of regimental over general hospitals in respect of the treatment of the sick," p. 22. of Report. To those who know that the medical officers in general hospitals, to whom the treatment of the sick and wounded is confided, have been promoted to their stations on account of their superior professional knowledge, it will appear no small absurdity to suppose, that the patients in these hospitals are treated by *them* with *less* skill than they would have been in the hospitals of their several regiments, and under the care of their respective surgeons, who are at least believed to possess only an inferior portion of professional knowledge. This paradox is, however, seriously advanced by Dr. M'Gregor, and on his authority as seriously believed by you; though, pro-

bably, a foundation for this belief had previously been laid by Dr. Jackson, who has asserted (1805, p. 59.) that "the average time required for the cure of acute diseases in regimental hospitals, where the surgeon is properly instructed in his art, cannot be supposed to exceed a fortnight, while scarcely a man returns from general hospitals in less than six weeks, few in less than three months." Here I shall only remark that if no equivocation be intended in the terms of "acute disease" and "properly instructed surgeon," but be really meant that diseases of violence and danger, such as fevers, dysenteries, inflammations of the lungs, &c. can be cured, and the patient rendered fit for duty, in a fortnight, upon an average, under any practice or advantages whatever, then Dr. Jackson and the regimental surgeons to whom he alludes, can effect much more than is known to have ever been effected, or than any honest physician will pretend to accomplish. But Dr. McGregor, it seems, has noticed this great superiority in the *regimental* hospital practice over the *general*, both in Flanders and in the West Indies; and since his best opportunities for observing it must have been in the hospital of the regiment to which he was surgeon, viz. the 88th, it is expedient that I should request him to explain by what singular means the greatest mortality from fever among the British troops in Flanders should have happened, as Dr. Jackson inform us, (in his Outline, &c. p. 21) in *that* regiment (the 88th) and in one other, the 80th; and also to explain by what greater singularity of causes "sickness raged with violence and devastation in the (same) 88th regiment during the time it remained in Jersey," previous to its being sent to the continent in 1794, as Dr. Jackson also states

from his own personal observation. (id. p. 5.) There was then no general hospital on that island, and therefore Dr. McGregor had the most favourable opportunity of displaying in *his own* hospital this boasted superiority in the regimental practice, and of proving triumphantly that "the mortality under the *regimental* treatment is trifling." (p. 22. of Report).

The occurrences in the West Indies will be easily explained, but it will be proper that I should first quote your question to Dr. McGregor on this point, together with his answer; both are at p. 185, of Report, and in these words, viz. "whilst you served with the army in the West Indies, had you an opportunity of observing the comparative advantage of taking care of the sick regimentally, instead of sending them to general hospitals?" Answer, "I had; in the island of Grenada, in the year 1796, from the want of a medical staff, the sick and wounded were treated regimentally in the field. Though under many disadvantages, the mortality was trifling, till the return of the army to quarters, when the sick were ordered to general hospitals, and then the mortality was very considerable indeed." Concerning the true import of this answer no difference of opinion can possibly arise; you have properly understood and interpreted it to mean that, whilst Dr. McGregor served in Grenada, the mortality under the *regimental* treatment was trifling, but that when the sick were sent to the *general* hospitals, the mortality became very considerable: or, in other words, that Dr. McGregor, from *personal observation*, had been able to ascertain that under *similar circumstances*, and solely from the *difference of treatment*; a much greater mortality had occurred at Grenada in the *general* than in the *regimental*

hospitals; and you may probably be surprized to learn by the testimony of Dr. M'Gregor himself (given on another occasion, when he had no particular purpose in view to bias his testimony), that there was in reality no room or foundation for any such comparison as is here stated, and that, if there had been any, it could not have fallen under Dr. M'Gregor's observation, as you have naturally been led to suppose, because he was not then in Grenada.

In the year 1804, Dr. M'Gregor published a small volume under the title of "Medical Sketches of the Expedition to Egypt from India. Printed for John Murray, 32, Fleet street," &c. From this work it appears that the 88th, or Dr. M'Gregor's regiment, which made part of the army, employed under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the conquest of St. Lucia during the month of May 1796, was sent with others about the beginning of June to Grenada, where it arrived in two or three days, and was employed in the reduction of that island. According to his *positive* statement, "The 88th regiment continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there," (i. e. until the month of September) "or as long as they remained to the windward side of the island." "This," he adds, "was likewise the case with the 10th, 25th, and other regiments. It was only after our return to St. George's and to Richmond Hill, after we had communication with the 68th regiment and the general hospitals, where the yellow fever had for many months prevailed, that it appeared in the 88th and other corps." See p. 227. Now it is well known that, the windward or eastern parts of the islands in the West Indies are generally the most healthy, and Dr. M'Gregor, in the work before us, naturally and justly ascribed

the absence of disease among the regiments before mentioned solely to the circumstance of their having been stationed in the windward parts of Grenada. He manifestly had not, while writing that work, the least idea of ascribing it to any superiority or difference in the regimental over the general hospital treatment, neither had he then the smallest disposition to suspect that the subsequent mortality arose from any such difference. He was, and perhaps now is, a believer in the contagion of the yellow fever, and it is to that cause alone that he in this work intended to impute the change in question. He is far from alluding in any way whatever to any thing unfavourable in the treatment of the sick in the general hospitals at Grenada: on the contrary, he says, the mortality resulted, not from treatment, but from a "communication with the 68th Reg." (which is totally distinct from treatment) "and the general hospitals," either of which causes, on the supposition of contagion, might prove equally destructive. Those however who do not believe in the contagious quality of the yellow fever, nor in the alledged mischievous effects of general hospitals, will readily account for the increased number of deaths among the regiments in question after their return to St. George's and Richmond Hill in the month of September, by recollecting that those places are surrounded by an abundance of local causes of disease, such as are found to produce the yellow fever in all hot climates at certain seasons of the year; that these regiments arrived at those places from more healthy stations in September, (commonly one of the most sickly months of the year) and also that this was one of the years in which the yellow fever prevailed most fatally in Grenada, occasioning the deaths of those who were attacked by it, whether they were in one kind of hospital or in

another, or in no hospital at all. So much for this part of Dr. McGregor's testimony; of the other part, which regards the extent of his opportunities for personally "observing" what he states to have happened, I must leave him to reconcile some contradictions which seem to me irreconcilable. For he tells us at p. 227 of his Medical Sketches that "on the 15th of July 1796, a detachment of the 88th regiment was embarked at Grenada in the Betsey Transport for England," and that he was one of that detachment. He adds "we embarked 140, and I was most particularly careful not to take any man on board with the slightest appearance of illness." He next says in p. 228, "we sailed from Grenada on the 19th of July," &c. and it appears that he afterwards arrived safely in England. Now as he has told us that the regiment of which he was the surgeon, and the other regiments, "continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there," and that he "embarked for England" within little more than half of that time. I cannot help feeling a considerable degree of curiosity to know by what supernatural means he "had," (as he states) "in the year 1796, an opportunity of observing the comparative advantage of taking care of the sick regimentally instead of sending them to general hospitals." See Report p. 185, and how he was able to know, from personal observation, that, upon "the return of the army to quarters," when he must have been far on his voyage to Europe, "the sick were ordered to be sent to general hospitals, and then the mortality was very considerable indeed," id. p. 185.

But you have not relied solely on Dr. McGregor's evidence respecting the mortality occasioned by general hospitals in the West Indies; for though your second

question to Dr. Borland related solely to the sick on the continent during the years 1794 and 1795, yet he (far from being what the gentlemen of the law denominate an unwilling witness) spontaneously extended his answer to the West Indies, and declared that he had "observed similar advantages to attend the mode of treating the sick in regimental hospitals in preference to that of general hospitals in the West Indies," Report, p. 160. But as this is a very loose and general assertion without any indication of time or place (notwithstanding the Doctor seems to have been well disposed to furnish as many as he could) it is obviously impossible that I should oppose it by adducing opposite proofs, which otherwise I am persuaded would not be difficult. Dr. Borland, however, proceeds immediately after to state that this superiority in the regimental mode of treatment "was particularly marked in the Russian auxiliary army that landed in Guernsey and Jersey in 1799 full of contagion, and which in six months afterwards, when embarked on its return to Russia, numbered 13000 strong and had not 100 sick." Here it fortunately happens that Dr. Borland has told us the time when, and the places where this wonderful proof of the peculiar advantages attending regimental hospitals occurred, and I shall meet this assertion with as much readiness as I should have done that relating to the West Indies, had he given me similar indications.

No one who recollects the dismal accounts of the state of the Russian army at the close of the unfortunate campaign in 1799, and of the great numbers of sick and wounded who were thrown into the hospitals at the Helder, can hear and believe from Dr. Borland that they arrived at Guernsey and Jersey, "full of contagion," and "in six months afterwards had not 100 sick."

or lame, and that this magical restoration of health and of limbs was all produced by "the mode of treating the sick in the regimental hospitals" without feeling the most glowing satisfaction at, and conviction of, its infinite preference over that of the general hospitals. But the *light of truth* will soon dissipate this *mist* of pleasing illusion; and if you, gentlemen, shall be pleased to make *proper* enquiries concerning the transactions in question, you will discover that, while the Russian troops were embarking at the Helder, especial care was taken to separate every man who had any appearance of ailment from those who were in perfect health; and to send the latter only to Guernsey and Jersey, the former being sent to Yarmouth, where, with the exception of one transport which carried her sick to Gosport, they were landed to the number of more than 2000, most truly "full of contagion;" and were afterwards *there received and treated* in the general, not regimental, hospitals.

These hospitals were under the direction of Dr. Scott, whose great ability and indefatigable attentions the Russian army will long remember and testify; and though neither this gentleman nor the staff physicians or surgeons employed on that duty pretend, or are believed by me, to have performed any miracles, such as those effected at Guernsey and Jersey by the *regimental treatment*, yet they were able to cure a very considerable portion of these men, who, when really cured and fit for duty, were sent off in bodies of 150 or 200, by different vessels, to join their own corps in those islands. And I have reason to know that the *fitness* of the men to be sent thither *for effective service* was so scrupulously attended to at Yarmouth, that none of them who were maimed or diseased, so as to be incapable of

serving in any capacity, or to be only capable of garrison service, were permitted to rejoin their comrades, but were at proper opportunities sent back directly to Russia.—It is therefore clear from these facts that all the "contagion" and disease with which the Russian army arrived at Guernsey and Jersey, after a few days passage in clean good transports from Holland, must have been very inconsiderable—and the greatest number of their sick, I am well assured, was trifling. Much, indeed, was said about it at the time; but I pledge myself to you, gentlemen, that I have seen a letter from Dr. Benckhausen (the physician general or physician in chief of that army) written from Jersey, in which he states that he had just returned after visiting the sick in Guernsey—that "more noise was made there with 200 sick, than at Yarmouth with 2000;" and, so far from perceiving those singular advantages which are said to have been wrought by the mode of treating the sick regimentally, he complains much of the miserable accommodations provided for them, and he complains yet more that "the treatment of the sick had been wholly abandoned to the Russian surgeon's mates, who had not the least knowledge of internal diseases." Whether the Russian army was indebted for the recovery of its sick and for its healthy state on leaving Guernsey and Jersey to the wretchedness of their habi-

* "On fait plus de bruit à Guernsey avec 200 malades, qu'à Yarmouth avec 2000."

† On les fait traiter par les sous-chirurgiens Russes, qui n'ont aucune connoissance de maladies internes."

tations and to the ignorance of their surgeon's mates, for these seem to have been the only benefits which the "regimental management" procured for them, or to the original paucity of the number of their sick and to the acknowledged salubrity of those islands, I shall submit to your serious reflection.

After all the imputations contained in your pages against the fatality of *general* hospitals and the encomiums therein bestowed on the Panacean "treatment in *regimental*," one might be led to conclude that at the present time, when the former no longer exist at home (except at Chelsea and in the Isle of Wight, which Mr. Knight states "to be reduced as much as possible," p. 117 of your Report) and their malign influence has therefore nearly ceased, and when the mode of conducting the latter is in full bloom and activity, and receives daily aid from two of your great authorities, the deficiency of the third being (it is presumed, adequately) supplied by the co-operation and superintendence of the present inspector-general of army hospitals, one might, I say, conclude that now at last sickness could prevail in but a slight degree among our troops at home, and death could rarely boast of his triumphs, especially as we are informed by the inspector-general in the "prospectus of his particular duties," (p. 112 of your Report,) that "*he examines the weekly returns made to him by the regimental surgeons, from whence to judge of the propriety of their practice,*" and are likewise informed by his assistant, Dr. Borland, (p. 159 of ditto,) that "*he conducts the correspondence with those surgeons upon medical practice.*" I fear, however, that if any change has been wrought in the mortality among the army at

home, it is not the happy change we must all devoutly wish: for I have been, as I think, well informed that the very last monthly returns of the regimental surgeons in this island (made up to the 20th of March 1808) exhibited the deaths of *between four and five hundred men in the four preceding weeks only*, a degree of mortality which has rarely, if ever, occurred in this kingdom while the general hospitals, with all their alledged mischiefs and abuses, subsisted. Having read so much in your Report of the great "superiority of the regimental over the general hospital treatment," I was anxious to obtain some correct information on the subject, and therefore on the 4th of the present month (April) I applied to the inspector general of army hospitals for "permission to inspect, and to make extracts from, the returns in his office of the sick in the regimental hospitals of this island during the last six months," stating fairly my object, and my intention of addressing to you some observations on your fifth Report. To this letter Mr. Knight returned for answer that "it was *beyond his authority* to give a *fight of*, or to allow extracts from, the office documents I sought." Not satisfied with this answer, I wrote to the Secretary at war, appealing to his superior wisdom and authority, and requesting that Mr. Knight might be directed to grant my application. This request was not complied with, probably for reasons which need not to be stated; but the letter of the Secretary at war, plainly imported that it *had depended solely on Mr. Knight* to grant the permission I desired, and You, with the public, will judge of the motives which led him to refuse it. Perhaps you will think that the causes of a mortality at the rate of from five to six thousand soldiers per annum in this

island alone (*which an army physician is not permitted to make inquiries into*) are deserving of your attention.

The fourth objection urged against the general hospitals on the continent is, "that many soldiers, who had been sent into them with slight ailments, caught fevers there and perished." The truth of this melancholy fact I shall not dispute; but the same has often happened in regimental hospitals, and if the fact itself have any weight as an argument, that weight is perhaps in favour of general hospitals, because, by receiving all the cases of contagious disease, they save great numbers affected with slighter ailments in the former from the danger of infection to which they must otherwise be exposed. The existence of contagious disorders, however, is not necessarily connected with any hospitals, but is an accidental calamity to which all are obnoxious, and which it is, or should be, the duty of the chief medical officer to obviate. It is, therefore, not a fit ground of comparison between the advantages of regimental and those of general hospitals.

The next allegation against general hospitals to be noticed is, "that soldiers tarried very long in them, and the worst characters in the army, *malingers**, found their way into them, and frequently imposed upon medi-

* The term of "*malingering*" is thus defined in page 33 of the Report, viz. "that fraudulent disposition which is sometimes found in soldiers, of procuring themselves to be placed on the sick-list, and of continuing on it longer than is necessary."

cal officers of no previous regimental experience." That such an objection as this should be urged against general hospitals, and as a ground for their abolition, will probably be thought extraordinary by the majority of those who shall read the passage. The obvious purport of it is, to represent the medical officers of them as simpletons, who will believe the existence of disease upon the bare *ipse dixit* of every man who complains of illness, and soldiers as impostors so intelligent, that they can readily assume the morbid appearances and exhibit the genuine character and symptom belonging to the particular disorder with which they pretend to be afflicted, so as to escape detection: but it will not be credited that the physicians and surgeons of general hospitals, who have generally been selected, as I have already said, on account of their superior attainments, should be so ignorant of their profession, and so void of discernment, as to be incapable of distinguishing counterfeited from real ailments; especially after the facility with which Doctor Borland (who is the author of this objection) was able to put an end to the practice of malingering, which, as he tells us, had "become particularly evident at the Gosport general hospital;" for I will not suppose that he could intend to make you believe, that what was so easy to himself must be so very difficult to every one else. Be this, however, as the doctor may please, there is one obvious answer to this objection, which is, that since no patients are admitted into general hospitals who have not been sent thither by the surgeons of the regiments to which they respectively belong, these same malingers must have found means first to impose upon their own surgeons; and their going to the ge-

neral hospitals will at least give the medical officers there a good opportunity of detecting the imposition; which detection would be much less likely to happen while the malingeringer remained under the surgeon who had been thus deceived in the first instance. After all, however, this, were it well founded, would be but a paltry objection, since the whole number of malingeringers in the army probably does not exceed fifty.

In regard to the great expenditure and waste of every kind, which in this and other parts of your Report are ascribed to general hospitals on the authority of Dr. Jackson's publications, and on the testimony of Drs. Borland and McGregor, it may be proper to observe that accurate calculations of the numbers of medical officers, and of the quantities of hospital stores, which may be sufficient, and *only sufficient*, for the wants of armies, especially when on foreign service, and in unwholesome climates, always have been, and always must be, found not only difficult, but *impossible*, to be made. During one half of the year an army, in the West Indies and in other hot countries, may remain healthy; yet before the other half is expired, it may have lost more than half of its original number by sickness. Even Dr. Jackson, who sometimes allows so much truth to escape from his pen as will suffice, if well employed, to correct his misrepresentations, (as nature is said to produce antidotes in the neighbourhood of poisons,) tells us, p. vi. 1803, "that there are instances where the sick list in armies amounts to *one third* of their total force; others where it does not exceed *one fiftieth*, or even *one hundredth* part;" and again at p. 19. 1805, he says "*two thirds* of an army

this (he adds) *is not even rare*." It must therefore be always impossible to *foresee* with any *exactness* the medical wants of an army, so as to adapt the hospital-staff and the hospital-stores to its future exigencies, notwithstanding the parade with which Dr. Jackson pretends to do it, in defiance of common sense, and of the facts admitted by himself. Even if every disease could be foreseen, and also the number of the patients who are to be attacked by it, difficulties would remain on account of the methods of treatment, which differ according to the various opinions and modes of reasoning among medical officers, and render it impossible to foresee with any exactness what medicines would be oftenest required, and in what proportions they would be used. This indeed cannot be done, even by a country apothecary in England; whose little assortment, however carefully provided, will frequently want supplies of some particular articles, while others will remain almost untouched for years.

It being then absolutely impossible, when armies are sent on distant expeditions to unwholesome climates, to foresee the extent of sickness which may prevail, or the quantities and particular sorts of hospital-stores which may be required, true wisdom will direct us to provide *for the worst*, and rather incur a superfluity of expence, than expose soldiers, every one of whom will probably have cost the nation more than £100 sterling, to perish by a deficiency of medical and hospital aids. To do so would be not only the most abominable inhumanity, but the worst species of economy, much worse indeed than manifest prodigality. Let us therefore relinquish all attempts at impracticable exactness and over-nice parsimonious calculation in matters where

sometimes die in foreign parts in the course of one year; error may occasion so much mischief. Even Dr. Jackson readily admits (though you are perhaps tired of being corrected, as well as misled by him,) p. xi. 1803. "That if those comforts and refreshments which money commands, be found to contribute to save the lives of soldiers, or materially accelerate recovery, there is *no economy in limiting quantity*." He says also, "the medical care of sick soldiers is one of the most important concerns of an army: it claims a place of high consideration among the means provided in war, for independently of the kindnesses of humanity and of the gratitude due to those who risk health and life in defence of their country, there is *economy, or greater saving of public money in providing even an expensive medical treatment for sick soldiers*, than in supplying the deficiencies which arise from diseases contracted in service, by a *fresh levy of recruits* on the mass of the people, or at a foreign market."—These observations are equally applicable to that alleged excess or superfluity of hospital-staff officers, upon which Dr. Jackson has expatiated most extravagantly and unjustly; and by so doing, has, as usual, drawn you into a labyrinth of error. It would be a waste of time and labour were I to follow him step by step, in order to detail his misrepresentations: let it suffice for me to do it respecting that particular instance which he appears to have selected, and to place his chief dependance upon, for inculcating the conduct of his majesty's former Ministers and of the army medical board; I mean the hospital-staff assigned to Sir Ralph Abercrombie in 1795. It is well known that the mortality from the yellow fever, was then, and had been for some time, so great in the West

Indies, that the 20,000 men placed under his command for that expedition, were generally considered as chiefly destined to certain death; which was indeed their lamentable fate; and as medical men are even more exposed to mortality from sickness than other parts of the army, it was thought wise and humane to double the number which had been at first allotted for the expedition. Consequently seven physicians, including *three* already in the Leeward islands, were appointed to that service; another, Dr. Gahagan, was added by Sir Ralph Abercrombie, after his arrival in the West Indies, making up the number of 11, as Dr. Jackson has stated, together with 18 staff-surgeons, 6 apothecaries and 100 hospital-mates; and as far as my observation or information could enable me to judge, there was no want of sufficient occupation for the whole number, so long as they lived and were able to do duty. Certainly the physicians had many more patients allotted to them than they could properly attend, for though the number of wounded was not great, the sick became in a little time extremely numerous, while of the eleven physicians, six died in less than six months after the army had arrived in the West Indies, and four others, of which it was my fortune to be one, were rendered for a time incapable of duty by severe attacks of the yellow fever; one only escaping, who had become seasoned to the climate by long residence in the West Indies. It is true that, before the end of the year 1797, so great a part of the army was dead, and the survivors were so far accustomed to the climate, that the commander in chief on that station and Mr. Young, then inspector-general of hospitals, at length consented to allow a part of the medical staff

to return to England; a favour which had till then been refused to myself and others, though solicited on account of bad health; because the wants of the army required the services of all the surviving medical officers, and by referring to the evidence of Mr. Young, (p. 186 of your Report) whom you describe as "a gentleman of almost universal experience in the medical service of the army," it will be found that he is far from thinking there was any excess or superfluity, as you and Dr. Jackson suppose, in the hospital staff now under consideration. For being questioned by you on this subject, he says that a larger staff is necessary in the West Indies than in Europe for obvious reasons, and then adds, that in the instance of Sir R. Abercrombie's expedition he found it necessary to apply for an additional number of mates. But that "in other respects the medical staff of that expedition was sufficient," (only sufficient) "according to the best of his recollection," and yet, regardless of the obvious inference of *this testimony*, you cite with approbation the strange and unwarrantable assertion of Dr. Jackson, p. 75, 1805. that two thirds of this and the St. Domingo "medical staff were idle or but half employed: that when the hospital staff acted, the regimental staff did little or nothing; when the regimental staff did its duty, the hospital staff had only to *amuse itself*, or pursue its private occupations."

As little will any part of Mr. Young's testimony warrant or countenance your *prescription* of general hospitals; the utmost which was stated by him on that point, being only an admission that, *if there were* "one well-qualified surgeon" (a great desideratum undoubtedly) "and two assistants, attached to each re-

giment on foreign service, it would considerably *ease* the general hospital department:" a department which I believe no man in this or any other European nation acquainted with military service abroad on any extended scale, excepting Drs. Jackson, Bolland, and M'Gregor, ever believed that it could be expedient or practicable to abolish.—That abuses may have crept into it, as they have sometimes done into every other human institution, and that it may still be susceptible of considerable improvement, I will readily admit: but I cannot admit that it will ever be proper to discontinue general hospitals, or even to conduct them on that *reduced scale of officers and servants* which you and Dr. Jackson recommend. He had it seems assured Mr. Pitt, "in a letter left at his house in Downing street, that *two thirds of the means* provided for the uses of the army employed on foreign service, especially during the course of the late war, *were* (were) positively superfluous, as exceeding the just wants of

* You have thought proper indeed to infer from this "that a much smaller hospital staff establishment than has been recommended for our expeditions abroad would be sufficient, in his opinion, if proper care was used in appointing well-qualified persons to regimental stations." (p. 23). Here, however, you appear not only to impute great insufficiency to the *present* surgeons, but to attach more meaning to the word "ease" than Mr. Young probably intended; and you afford your readers an additional cause of regret that you should have left yourselves and the public in any doubt respecting the real opinions of "a gentleman of almost universal experience in the medical service of the army" as to the comparative advantages and disadvantages of general and regimental hospitals, by *strangely avoiding to put a single question to him upon that very important subject*, when you were examining him on so many others of less consequence.

the occasion." But Mr. Pitt, accustomed to the visionary projects and pretensions of speculative reformers, "did not deign," as Dr. Jackson tells us, "to acknowledge the letter, even by one of his under secretaries;" and therefore not obtaining any credit or benefit in that quarter, Dr. Jackson resolved to publish his projects and speculations, which seem to have been as unsuccessful with every body else, as with Mr. Pitt (one gentleman only excepted) until they fell into your hands: and the subject being unfortunately *new to every one of you*, they obtained favour and credit in your minds, and I have been thus induced to answer what I should never have thought it proper to notice, had not you, by adopting, given it importance. But that I may not seem to employ general assertions without proofs, let us proceed to particular instances. Dr. Jackson represents the hospital staff provided for Sir Ralph Abercrombie's expedition and for that to St. Domingo, as allotting a physician for every two thousand men, a surgeon or apothecary for every thousand, and a mate for every hundred and sixty!¹⁰ And this hospital staff, he says, "was alone sufficient for the medical care of the whole *division* of the army, *had it all been actually sick at one time!*" See p. 72, 1805. Here in the first place, he strangely supposes, that a sickness, which, at one time, should affect *every other man* in the army, would leave *all the medical officers in good health*; and then, with the benefit of this supposition, he must as extravagantly suppose, that every physician can daily visit eight hundred patients at least; admitting that he shall give over to each surgeon and each apothecary so large a number as 600, to be managed by them exclusively: for in regard to the hospital-mates, they would all find sufficient occupation in preparing the medicines prescribed even for 50, instead of 150, patients,

who would fall to their respective shares. Now supposing the physician to employ but two minutes to ascertain by personal inspection and interrogation, what *ought to be known of each patient*, and to consider what it may be expedient to prescribe for him, and to write or dictate his prescription, which surely is not more than sufficient for the purpose; this allotment of 800 patients, visited but *once* in the day, (though it is usual with army-physicians to visit their patients *twice*) would require 1600 minutes or twenty-six hours and forty minutes (i. e. two hours and 40 minutes more than are contained in the 24 hours,) during which the physician must constantly be on his legs, incessantly exerting all his intellects, in a climate where the powers both of body and mind are notoriously debilitated and soon exhausted; and this, though repeated every day, he thinks "would not have been judged a hard task of duty." To reason with a man, who can suppose that there is either reason or truth in such representations would be like running with him a race of folly; a race which does not terminate at what has been just stated; for according to that economical estimate by which Dr. Jackson endeavoured to recommend himself to Mr. Pitt, six physicians *only* were to be allotted to the staff of an army of 99,000 men, with six surgeons and thirty-six mates. So that supposing what Dr. Jackson represents as happening not unfrequently in some situations, that one third of this army should be sick at one time, and supposing every medical man to preserve both his life and health, by some special interposition of providence, these six physicians would probably have the daily care of at least thirty-two thousand patients, for it is not likely that the surgical cases would exceed 1000; excepting only so far as they might relieve themselves by turning a part of the sick over to the six

surgeons, and to the regimental surgeons. To show that Mr. Pitt judged properly in neglecting such calculations it will be sufficient to state, what I know from experience; that if each physician, instead of having one or more thousands of patients requiring his daily attention, has constantly under his care only one hundred patients, his duty, with the assistance of two or three mates to prepare medicines, will be quite as much as he can fairly and honestly perform: and yet the physicians on the staff of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in the West Indies, were often under the necessity of performing twice and sometimes thrice as much. So little truth is there in Dr. Jackson's assertion "that two thirds of that staff were idle or but half employed," unless he means to confound the dead with the "idle," and the dying with those who are by him represented as "*amusing themselves*."

After these observations in answer to your charge against general hospitals, of waste and profusion, it cannot be necessary for me to say much concerning the new hospitals which were intended to have been established in 1803 under the apprehension of immediate invasion, (see p. 25. of Rep.) It was then believed that the enemy might suddenly land, and even reach the metropolis, and thereby become masters of almost all the drugs, &c. in the kingdom. To obviate some of the evils of this disaster, several depôts of arms, military stores, medicines, provisions, &c. were made in central and interior situations, as well as arrangements for hospitals, where, if such an event had happened, they were most likely to be wanted. The latter were as proper as the former; and it is as unreasonable to complain of the expence of the one as of the other. Neither were brought into *actual service* any more than our volunteers, (who also cost large sums), but it would have

been very unwise to have neglected such precautions, and means of preserving our existence as a nation.

As you have thought proper, in order to support your condemnation of the general hospital system on foreign service, to refer with great commendation to the medical arrangements of the East India company, and to cite particularly the Indian army lately serving in Egypt, as an instance and proof that "the British general hospital establishment is superabundant, if not altogether an unnecessary incumbrance," (p. 23 of your Report) it becomes me to notice this part of your Report. If I have not been greatly misinformed, the hospital concerns of the East India Company abroad are carried on by what are truly contracts, or stipulated allowances at a certain rate per annum for every man in the corps, granted to the surgeons of different corps in their employment, as well king's troops as native; by virtue of which contracts the surgeons respectively engage to provide for all the medical wants of the soldiers of their regiments, as their maintenance and treatment in hospital, &c. "Simplicity" of account is certainly an advantage that must result from an arrangement of this nature, because the whole hospital expenditure of the army may be readily ascertained by calculating the strength of the different corps; and this kind of certainty is perhaps highly prized by the company in their character simply of "United merchants trading to the East Indies:" but I cannot so readily perceive that there will also result from it what you have termed "laudable economy." If the contract be a profitable one to the surgeons, it will be a losing one to the company; and if the bargain be good for the company, it will be bad for the surgeons; and in either of these cases, one or other of which is likely to exist, there can be no "laudable economy." But another and far

more important objection to this kind of arrangement is, that the gains of the surgeon are very often to be made at the expence of the sick soldiers, and that there must always be a temptation to flint the patient, and to substitute inferior articles of nourishment and medicine, which temptation should never be permitted to subsist, considering the frailties of our nature, and the extreme difficulty, nay impossibility, of checking it, even where it is known to operate, in concerns that must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the surgeon himself. Of all the medical establishments for armies, therefore, with which I am acquainted, that of the East India company is, in my opinion, the worst, for the reasons given above. Nor is this establishment entitled, in another respect, to much praise, since it effectually excludes from its service those who have already acquired science (because such men will seldom enter into it as surgeon's mates, which is made a "fine qua non") and is satisfied with receiving young men of slender attainments, trusting to chance for their future acquisition of knowledge, a chance which is not of great value in a climate certainly unfavourable to the development of the energies of the mind, and in a service too in which "promotion goes by seniority" alone, and necessarily without regarding or rewarding individual merit. When I reflect, moreover, on the infinite importance of preserving the lives and the healths of the Governor General, the Commander in chief, and the other distinguished civil and military officers who are employed in the East Indies, I cannot believe that there would be any want of real and "laudable economy" in procuring the best professional abilities for their assistance. But perhaps the time is approaching when the Directors of the company shall take a more enlightened view of the medical exigencies of their servants.

After these general observations on the East Indian hospital department, I beg permission to correct an error into which you have been led, while speaking of that department on the Egyptian expedition in 1801. You have mentioned in terms of applause that the small medical establishment which then belonged to the Indian army ("consisting, with the exception of Dr. McGregor and of a storekeeper, of only the usual regimental medical officers") "were fully competent to the charge of their own sick." (p. 24 of your report.) As, during the expedition, the Indian army was never engaged *actively*, i. e. against the enemy, but was generally kept together in healthy stations, and suffered very little sickness, the regimental surgeons might easily have been "fully competent to the charge of their sick," without furnishing a fair example of the inutility of the general hospital system, which it seems intended that they should do. The truth, however, is, that, moderate as the sickness of that army was in Egypt, the medical establishment in question were not "fully competent to the charge of their own sick" as is stated. Dr. McGregor, on whose statement this assertion of their competency was made, has totally forgotten the diffnity which pervaded the medical officers of the Indian army from the highest to the lowest, when the plague was officially reported by me to exist in one of the regiments composing that army, although that regiment was his own, the 88th; he has forgotten too the embarrassments it created, and the difficulties of procuring any of those gentlemen to assume what he has since termed "*the post of honour*" (p. 107 of his "Medical Sketches"), and the ultimate necessity imposed upon the British "general hospital establishment" (that body which you reprobate on the occasion of this very expedition as a "superabundant and perhaps altogether

unnecessary incumbrance") of taking the *sole* charge of the plague patients of the *East Indian* army."—I do not wish to excite painful recollections in the minds of those who served with this army, and I therefore abstain from mentioning any more of the occurrences of that period, of which Dr. M'Gregor will admit that I had *personal* knowledge. My only object in stating the preceding facts has been to remove your error as to the "full competency" of the Indian medical establishment "to the charge of their own sick."

That you have bestowed praise on "the success of the East Indian system of management" when no praise was due, must, I think, be very evident; and that your praise of its "laudable economy" is at best *gratuitous*, will probably be not less apparent. Men of common minds, before they venture officially to pronounce one establishment to be more economical than another, generally obtain a complete knowledge as well of the actual expenses, as of the advantages of each; and this precaution you have yourselves thought it right to adopt "in pursuing your enquiry into the army general hospital system" (at least in relation to its expenses) "*by an examination and comparison of the accounts of general and regimental hospitals*:" but You, while investigating the comparative merits of the Indian and the British medical departments in Egypt, have omitted, as it appears from your Report, to procure any information whatever of their actual expenditures respectively, and have at once decided that the former of these was most "laudably economical" and the latter "an unnecessary incumbrance," imagining perhaps that a medical establishment must needs cost little or nothing when it had the good fortune to be under the direction of Dr.

M'Gregor, and consequently that in the present case no previous examination of its accounts could be requisite as a basis for your decision. Yet, if the report then current in Egypt be true, the extra allowances which Dr. M'Gregor *received* as head of that department were ample enough to have paid for the employment of a physician or two, of some staff surgeons, &c. and these various officers *might* have rendered services not less important and necessary to the Indian army than Dr. M'Gregor could render by his *single* exertions.

There is one other point in the East Indian medical department to which I must shortly advert. Dr. William Yates, who belongs to that department, states in his examination before you (page 191 of your Report) that "the medical establishment in that service consists of superintending surgeons of divisions, of surgeons, and of assistant surgeons;" and in describing the duties of the superintending surgeons he says, that "they inspect the hospitals within their divisions, and regulate the practice of the surgeons and assistant surgeons." That the power of *regulating the practice* of inferior medical officers should be given to competent persons is undoubtedly very proper; but either Dr. Yates has made a mistake in mentioning that this power exists in the superintending surgeons, or Dr. Yates is *himself* (if I do not mistake the person, and I have no reason to suspect that I do) a proof that *it is not exercised*. I have a book before me entitled "*A View of the Science of Life on the Principles of the late celebrated John Brown, M.D.*" by William Yates and Charles Maclean, with cases in illustration selected from the records of their practice at the general hospital at Calcutta," printed "Philadelphia 1797," and in page 58 of this work I find

" draughts of 500 drops of laudanum* ordered," by Dr. Yates " to be given every hour," and, " glysters with 500 drops of laudanum to be given," also, " every hour," to Francis Lote, a patient under his care in that hospital; and in page 66 of the same work, " 20 grains of calomel with six grains of opium to be given every hour," to another patient of Dr. Yates, Jacob Mayer, at the same time that " two ounces of mercurial ointment (with which *four ounces of calomel* were afterwards mixed) were ordered to be rubbed in," upon him. There are other instances of singular practice in that work; but these will suffice. As this treatment was tolerated by the superintending surgeons and allowed to continue recorded in the hospital books, and has since been published without any disavowal on their part, it must be evident that they could not have had the power " to regulate practice," or else that they did not exercise it. If well educated physicians had been employed by the company, for the duty of that hospital, it is probable that no such treatment would have been recorded.

Having as I trust sufficiently explained the fallacy of the representation on which your charges against the utility of the general hospital system on foreign service has been founded, I must next advert to the utility of that system at home.

Notwithstanding the objections existing in your minds against general hospitals abroad, you have yet found it right to admit the " necessity and convenience" (p. 24.) of " a distinct medical establishment which

* It is mentioned in a note at p. 97 of that work " that the laudanum was weaker, perhaps one third, than what is commonly used in Europe."

might relieve the regimental surgeons from all duties except in the field; but," you add, " the reasons which might be urged in favour of such a measure *on service* do not apply to *our forces at home*." That *these reasons* do not apply to the latter must be obvious, because absolute necessity, which is the chief of them, cannot be pleaded in their behalf, since present experience demonstrates the possibility of dispensing with them, at least with the exception you have mentioned of " hospitals to which the sick of regiments absent on foreign service may be generally sent."—You have, however, admitted with much propriety, p. 21, that the general hospital system " at home" as well as " on service abroad, is to be estimated in respect of its utility in the care of the sick, and of its economy"—and it is in these respects alone that I propose to examine the expediency of establishing general hospitals at home.

It is solely in places, near to which a large body of troops is collected, that these establishments can be necessary, as in the garrisons of Portsmouth and Plymouth, in London, at Deal, Colchester, &c; for where one or more regiments only are quartered, it would be absurd to form general hospitals. Where several regiments then are stationed together, it is probable that their sick will generally amount to a considerable number. The question, therefore, is, whether it is more economical and useful to have all the sick brought together into one large hospital, i. e. a general hospital, or to let them be managed in several smaller ones, i. e. in the hospitals belonging to their respective regiments? That greater economy will result from the former of these plans will scarcely admit of a doubt, it being an axiom, the truth of which is daily proved, and more frequently in this than in any other nation, that

a large establishment may be carried on at less expence of every kind, and with greater perfection, when united into one system, than it could be when subdivided into several similar systems which should all be carried on in separate and distant establishments. How futile the common-place objections to general hospitals are, so far as regards the formation of them at home, is proved by the examples of the great civil hospitals in this and other large towns. The wants of every patient in them are supplied without waste, irregularity or profuse expenditure; but, on the contrary, with excellent order and frugality. Certainly there is no advantage possessed by civil hospitals which may not be possessed in an equal degree by military ones; and the latter have advantages besides, which the former can never enjoy, at least in a similar degree, such as the strong hand of military power to check, correct, and punish abuses, and the high incentive of promotion to the faithful discharge of duty. Yet it is perpetually asserted by certain persons, and the public are called upon to believe implicitly, against experience and common sense, that military general hospitals, notwithstanding all their superior advantages over civil, must always be attended with gross prodigality and mismanagement; and that there can never be honesty and ingenuity enough in their superior officers to obviate

* "The consumption of wine at the York hospital in the year 1799" has been "particularly noticed" in p. 66, of the Report, where it is mentioned that "a pipe of port wine was expended in ten days, and that the same rate of consumption was continued for some time." The commissioners however do not appear to have enquired under what circumstances this

the abuses which depravity or negligence may introduce.

"The magnitude of the establishments attached to general hospitals," is one of the leading "objections" to them which you have stated (p. 24). This objection cannot apply to that part of the establishment which comprises the inferior officers and the servants; because persons of this description must be employed for the service of the sick, wherever they may be accommodated, and it is a part of the axiom above mentioned that this service can be performed by fewer persons in general than in regimental hospitals, and it is therefore only to the *medical* officers required for the treatment of the sick, that your objection can be applied. In answer to it, I may observe that if it be conceded, that in a given number of sick or wounded, more lives will be saved and the cures of the rest will be more speedily effected under the treatment of skill-

quantity was consumed; they would otherwise have discovered that there were at that time (November) in the hospital 500 patients, the greater part of them severely ill of putrid fevers contracted during, or immediately after, the campaign in Holland; and that this enormous consumption is at the average rate of eight gills in ten days, i. e. of four fifths of a gill per diem, an allowance which the commissioners will not consider as very extravagant, if they shall ever happen to be themselves limited to it. The surgeon who stated to the commissioners this consumption of wine, affords the best proof that there was no improper expenditure of it; for he expressly says, p. 229, that "he never had a suspicion that any of this wine was expended otherwise than by the sick, in the hospital;" and his own returns (I am informed) show that he ordered wine to his patient as largely as any of the other medical officers on that duty.

ful, than under that of less skilful persons, which I presume every one will grant, that must be the truest oeconomy (omitting all higher considerations, as of humanity, &c.) which shall provide the best professional talents for the service of the hospitals: and it is most probable that the extra expence to the nation of a proper medical staff to treat the patients in general hospitals would be much more than repaid by the benefits accruing from their judicious practice.

Of the utility of general hospitals at home, (which in truth cannot be separated wholly from "oeconomy") the saving of lives and the acceleration of cure just spoken of, are strong arguments.—Another is that these hospitals under men of real science might easily be rendered excellent schools of medicine, where the young hospital mate might acquire much valuable information, with which he would afterwards, when promoted to be surgeon of a regiment, essentially benefit his country in a multitude of instances; an advantage, the importance of which you have fully admitted in p. 85. of your Report, and which is at present attained in but a very limited and imperfect manner by the plan of rearing medical cadets. Another great advantage which general hospitals are capable of affording, is the instruction of proper persons for the inferior duties of hospitals, as stewards, wardmasters, and other attendants. This class of servants has often been of the worst description on foreign service, and the reason of it is that, as these servants are very seldom sent out from the hospital department, but are usually procured as they happen to be wanted, from the regiments on the same service, by an order of the general commanding, it is very common and natural for the officers who command those regiments to send only such of their men as are of the

least value and use: by which means, the menial service of a general hospital is sometimes performed by drunkards, and other worthless and incorrigible characters, with consequences infinitely injurious, and occasionally fatal, to the sick.—It is, I conceive, not impossible to form and train a corps of useful servants in general hospitals at home, a part of which might always be detached with the medical staff accompanying foreign expeditions, whereby many of those evils and abuses will be prevented, which have been charged unjustly to the medical officer. It is scarcely necessary to mention that the remarks here offered on the expediency of establishing general hospitals in large garrisons at home are equally applicable to their establishment in such garrisons as Gibraltar and Malta.

You may probably think that I have now written enough on the subject of general hospitals, and I shall therefore dismiss it with only one observation, which is that if in truth these hospitals were really productive of all the evils, and the regimental were attended with all the advantages, which you have been led to suppose, it is not credible that this great difference between them would have passed unobserved so many years, and at last have only been discovered by Drs. Jackson, Borland and McGregor; between whom there has long been such a community of ideas and of interests, that the support which they give to each other's opinions may be considered as being, in regard to its *impartiality*, like the testimony of a wife in favour of her husband. And it seems equally incredible that the two latter gentlemen, when they manifested so much readiness, in conformity with Dr. Jackson's notions, to condemn general hospitals, would, had there been any *just* grounds for doing so, have been forced to recur to anonymous hearsay,

or to such statements as those which I flatter myself have been sufficiently exposed and refuted.

The only parts of your Report now remaining for my animadversion are those which relate to the offices of inspector and deputy inspector of hospitals.—Of these (parts) the principal occur at p. 16. and 17. and at p. 86. and are as follows, viz.

“The rank of physician, had it been founded on the experience of the regimental or staff surgeon would not probably have rendered those promoted to it wholly unassisting in operative duties” (i. e. those of the inspectors and deputy inspectors) “as occurs in the case of physicians regularly bred to civil practice; and they might have afforded assistance to the extent at least in which it is now afforded by inspectors and deputy inspectors.” p. 16. You add, p. 17. that “the intention of introducing these classes into the establishment was founded probably on the necessity that they, who had the medical superintendence should be acquainted with the medical practice and economy of the army in all their details; and on the propriety of holding out to the army surgeons, the hope of obtaining that superior rank and pay to which their labours, hazards, and experience entitled them.”

You properly observe, p. 17. that “it is a consequence of the present arrangement, that the appointments made on the recommendation of the junior member of the board supersede in rank those made by the senior; and that they who in civil medical practice are considered as of inferior rank to the physicians, are superior to them in the army.” An inversion of order and propriety, for which it seems you can find no remedy, but that of proscribing all physicians, or at least, all but those who have previously served as regimental surgeons.

You state, p. 86, that “the most questionable part of the system of medical promotion, respects the appointment of inspectors, and deputy inspectors, and principal medical officers. Those valuable and important appointments are not governed by any established rule. The inspector-general under whose patronage the two first are, says, that he always selects those officers from the staff or regimental surgeons; yet, although the pay of the first class is double that of the physicians, and that of the second exceeds it by five shillings per diem, no length of service is requisite to qualify them for the appointment. At the same time, therefore, that the giving of these ranks and pay tends to *degrade the rank of physician in the army*, it cannot be supposed to have operated as an inducement to gentlemen of ability to enter originally into the service, or to continue in it.”—You add “the only justifiable ground, to which we have before alluded, for any of these appointments seems to have been the expediency of superseding the physicians in the general superintendence of the medical concerns of the army service, to which by their rank they would otherwise have been entitled; *because*, being taken from civil life, they could not but have wanted that knowledge which was requisite to the conduct of military hospitals, and the management of sick soldiers.”

Some of the observations in these passages are highly proper. There are others, however, which are, as I think, of a different description, and have manifestly originated in deficient and erroneous information. That you may become sensible of this, I will shortly state the results of my reading and enquiries respecting the opinions and practice which have prevailed in the British army in regard to the exercise of those duties now committed to the officers, denominated inspectors

and deputy inspectors,—duties which appear to have been performed at different periods, and in different places, under various denominations, *but always by army physicians*, where any one of them was employed until the year 1795.

At the time when physicians were first introduced into the army, the education of surgeons was generally so very deficient, compared to what it is now, that they were placed at a much greater distance from the physicians than they have lately been, or than they now ought to be; and with the great superiority of qualifications which physicians in every country in Europe were deemed to possess, (and which they did possess in Great Britain above every other country) and with the great superiority of rank and pay which from the first were assigned to them in the British army, it followed as a matter of course that a physician, wherever he was employed, held the highest station on the hospital staff and exercised the highest medical functions.

This appears to have been the case ever since military physicians were employed in the British army. Indeed when regular armies were to be formed, the necessity of having a chief-officer for its medical department who might superintend the whole, communicate directly with the commander in chief, and under his sanction give the necessary orders, must have been soon discovered; and it would have been highly incongruous and absurd, when the estimation, rank, and pay of army physicians so greatly exceeded those of the surgeons, to have given this pre-eminence to any other than a physician. Where only one army physician, therefore, was employed, he became the chief medical officer as matter of course, and did the duties

now assigned to the inspector of hospitals without any particular appointment. But when a large army was assembled, and several physicians were placed on the hospital staff, one of them was selected to attend the commander in chief, and he commonly received the appointment of physician general, and discharged the higher duties of chief medical officer. In this way the late Sir John Pringle became physician to the Earl of Stair, who first commanded the British army in Germany and the Low Countries in the war which terminated in 1748, and was soon afterwards appointed physician-general. And if I have not been misinformed, the late Sir Clifton Wintringham obtained a similar appointment in the succeeding war.

Dr. Donald Monro in the second edition of his work,* has inserted a chapter respecting "the physical

* See "Observations on the Means of preserving the Health of Soldiers, and of conducting Military Hospitals, in two vols. by Donald Monro, M. D. Physician to his Majesty's Army, and to St. George's Hospital; Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians at London, and of the Royal Society: second edition." In this work after stating that "no person ought to be appointed a physician to the army or military hospitals without previously undergoing the same examination at the college of Physicians, as those do who enter fellows and licentiates of the college, that *none but proper persons may be employed*," he adds (p. 133, vol. 2, that "the direction of all military hospitals ought always to be committed to the physicians, who have the immediate care of hospitals."

"When an army is acting on a continent, and there is a number of hospitals in different places, the physician who attends the Commander in Chief ought to be made physician-general and director of the hospitals, with proper appoint-

officers employed about an hospital" containing directions apparently founded on the usages which had prevailed when he served in Germany and in Great Britain as an army physician, which will be found to confirm the accounts I have just given.

In the succeeding war the physicians, wherever they happened to serve, were allowed the same pre-eminence, though in Europe there was no British army employed, which required any higher appointment than that of an army physician. With this rank only Dr. Donald Monro exercised the functions of inspector or chief medical officer at the large encampment at Coxheath, in 1778 and 1779, as other army physicians did in encampments at Warley common, Winchester, &c. In America, however, large armies were employed, particularly that under General now Lord Howe at New York and Philadelphia; and of that Dr. Morris was both senior physician and chief medical officer with the title of inspector general of hospitals, as has been already mentioned. Dr. Knox, another army physician, being at the same time appointed chief medical officer to the army under General Burgoyne in Canada.

ments; and all orders from head-quarters ought to go immediately through this channel.

"Every other physician at the different hospitals ought to direct every thing about the hospital which he attends, and his orders ought to be punctually obeyed; and he ought to keep up a constant correspondence with the physician-general; acquainting him from time to time with the state of the hospital, and what is wanted for it; and he ought punctually to obey whatever orders he receives from the physician-general." Id.

Dr. Morris returned to England before the end of the war, and was succeeded by Dr. Mervin Nooth, one of the physicians of that staff.

About the same period Dr. Hunter being at Jamaica as an army physician, had the superintendence of the military hospitals there.

At the beginning of the last war, in the year 1793, two physicians who had been promoted, one from the office of staff surgeon, and the other from that of staff apothecary, were placed at the head of the medical department of the British army on the continent; and they were afterwards superseded by Dr. Kennedy, an older army physician, who had not served in any *subordinate* situation, as far at least as I have been able to discover. About the same time an expedition was sent to the West Indies under the late Earl, then Sir Charles, Grey, and of this Dr. Clifton, an army physician, was the chief medical officer.

In 1794, a considerable body of troops was collected at Southampton under the command of the Earl of Moira, and Sir J. M. Hayes was appointed chief of the hospital staff of this army under the title of director of hospitals, a title which had occasionally been conferred on army physicians before, and which had sometimes been improperly assumed by the purveyor of hospitals, as Dr. Monro mentions in the work before cited.

Thus far it appears that physicians had invariably been the chief medical officers. But soon after this a remarkable innovation occurred by the appointment in 1795, of two old army surgeons to be *inspectors general* in the West Indies, viz. Mr. Weir and Mr. Young. It will not I hope be expected that one in my station should be able to explain the motives which occasioned this exception to what had so long been the rule and

usage in regard to such appointments. Reasons for it, however, obviously present themselves, as likely to have hindered the appointment of army physicians to these offices at that time. I have already mentioned that, subsequently to the peace of 1783, and until the time of Mr. Hunter's death, only one army physician (who had been an old staff apothecary) was appointed. At the time to which I allude, this physician had lately served on the continent, as had two other army physicians appointed in the former war. One of these, however, Dr. Kennedy, died almost immediately after his return; and the others were advanced in life, which with other particular reasons doubtless prevented their being thought of for the service assigned for Mr. Weir and Mr. Young; and of the very few who remained of the physicians appointed in former wars, there was not one I believe who had not either been permitted to retire on *permanent* half-pay, or who was not too old, or too infirm, for an expedition to the West Indies. There was, indeed, at that time such a total want of army physicians for service in the West Indies, that every one of those sent thither, either upon the staff of the Windward islands, or upon that of St. Domingo, was appointed purposely for the one or the other of those expeditions, and consequently about the time of, or subsequently to, the appointments of Mr. Weir and Mr. Young. And I have reason to believe that if army physicians of sufficient experience could have been found for the offices conferred upon those gentlemen, a preference would have been given to them. The introduction, therefore, of surgeons into the office of inspector was not as you suppose occasioned by its having been found that the physicians "*wanted that knowledge which was requisite to the conduct of*

military hospitals, and the management of sick soldiers," but because there were at that time no physicians, or at least none who were of any standing, and who had been on foreign service, that could be induced to accept these appointments. That no belief of any such deficiency in army physicians could have then existed must be evident, because subsequently to that time, and indeed until the month of December 1801, (when Mr. Knight was raised from the situation of surgeon to the Coldstream regiment of guards to be inspector of military hospitals) the army physicians taken from civil life continued to share these promotions with the surgeons, (as in the cases of Drs. Robertson Barclay, Moore, and Franck, all of them now inspectors of hospitals,) and they continued also to be intrusted (even when not promoted) with the "*conduct of military hospitals, and the management of sick soldiers,*" without giving room for any suspicion of their being unfit for such trusts. This was the case generally with the physicians on the staff of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, though so recently appointed. It was my lot when I had been only nine months in the service to be placed for some time at the head of the medical department in Barbadoes, where there was then a large establishment. And afterwards when I had recovered from the yellow fever at Martinique, I was placed in the same situation at Grenada, and continued in it until I left the West Indies, performing, I hope, satisfactorily the duties which are now performed by inspectors and deputy inspectors. And in 1798 (immediately after my return from the West Indies,) very considerable bodies of regular troops and militia being collected in different districts of the kingdom under the apprehension of an invasion, an army physician was, according to what had been prac-

tified at Coxheath and Warley common, &c. in the years 1778 and 1779, appointed as the chief medical officer in each of these districts which were sufficiently considerable for such an appointment. That in the eastern district, under the command of General, now Lord Howe, amounted to about 25,000 men, and the duties of chief medical officer and inspector of regimental hospitals were assigned to me, and I had very good reasons to flatter myself that these duties were discharged to the satisfaction of my superiors; as was the case I am persuaded with all the other army physicians so employed; of myself, however, I hope I may be excused for saying, that if Mr. Knight should ever take the trouble of inspecting my letters and returns to the army medical board, he may, I think, find by them that while thus employed in the eastern districts I introduced or enforced such arrangements in the economy and discipline of the regimental hospitals as very much resemble the best of those now existing in this country.

In the following year (1799) I was sent with the British auxiliary army commanded by general Cuyler to Lisbon, where I soon after became the chief officer of the hospital staff (with extra allowances for acting in that capacity) and remained as such until the late Sir Charles Stuart, on being appointed commander in chief in the Mediterranean, made a particular application for my services with those of some other army physicians, upon the staff then forming for him, (which command afterwards devolved on Sir Ralph Abercrombie,) and thereby unintentionally deprived me of that permanent promotion which I then fully expected, and which was given to my successor.

I mention these circumstances, not from motives of

vanity, but to repel the imputation of incapacity which has been, I think most unjustly, thrown upon the army physicians, in opposition to the experience both of the former and the present times.—For though army surgeons had subsequently to 1795, been allowed to participate with the physicians in the higher offices of the hospital staff (and in my opinion properly when adequately qualified) there never had, I believe, existed any suspicion of that sort of deficiency in the latter which you suppose, on the authority of Dr. Jackson, until Mr. Knight's promotion to his present office. And his having made a discovery which had escaped all former observation may certainly be considered as one of the extraordinary events of modern times; considering that Mr. Knight's great experience, services, and hardships had all occurred in London and its neighbourhood, and chiefly, if not solely, in the hospital of the Coldstream regiment of guards; so that the exercise of his military duties had not probably ever led him into a single general hospital or to an acquaintance with a single army physician;—a circumstance which, however it might naturally dispose him to think them both useless, could not assist him in perceiving their several defects. For though the want of knowledge has often been the cause of erroneous prejudices and conclusions, it never has, I believe, in any other instance enabled one to make a discovery of difficulty and importance. Let us, however, if possible, recur to positive facts on this subject, and endeavour to ascertain the duties which properly belong to the offices of inspector and deputy inspector of hospitals, that we may see whether there be any of them which army physicians are not in every respect as well qualified to perform as army surgeons.

At page 112 of your Report we find a long and minute catalogue or "prospectus" delivered to you by Mr. Knight of his own duties as inspector-general; and (p. 113,) that gentleman being afterwards questioned by you concerning "the general duties of the deputy inspectors," he answered, "they are the same as my own, but in a narrower sphere, they act as my deputies." An answer which at best is extremely loose and incorrect, for it never can be the duty of the deputy inspectors "to communicate with, and answer references from, *head-quarters, the war-office, and other departments connected with military concerns.*" "To frame the code of regimental hospital instructions;" "To recommend the contingent allowances to the medical staff of the inspector general's department, &c." "To make a half yearly return of the medical staff of the inspector general's department;"—these and several other parts of his duty, being to be performed only (in London,) at the office of the inspector general, and by himself, or by his *immediate deputy* in that office. Supposing, however, that every one of these duties were to be necessarily discharged by every inspector or deputy inspector, I am confident after full consideration, that there is no one of them, which may not be full as well discharged by army physicians, as by army surgeons, and there are some which the former would probably discharge much better even than the inspector general himself, particularly that of examining "the detailed weekly returns of all regimental hospitals, from whence to judge of the propriety of the practice, and appropriation of diet, &c;" a judgment which, as Mr. Knight is no physician, he cannot be deemed very competent to form.

It will not, I presume, be expected that army phy-

sicians can be much inclined to believe any person who tells them that they are not qualified for duties which they are conscious of having already performed with propriety and benefit to the public; and you will not therefore wonder that, influenced by this sort of incredulity and by a desire to come at the truth, I should nearly two years ago have endeavoured, in a conversation with Mr. Knight, to obtain from him a clear and explicit statement of those particular parts of the inspectorial duty which he considered as too intricate and arduous to be ever learned or performed by army physicians. Whether the task which I thus endeavoured to impose on Mr. Knight was too difficult, or my own conceptions too obtuse and feeble, I know not, but I must declare that all the peculiar qualifications desirable in an inspector, and supposed to be unattainable by army physicians, as far as Mr. Knight's explanations were intelligible to me, extended only to the little details of hospitals, with which regimental surgeons were by him supposed to be more familiarized, the detection of petty impositions or over charges by which a few shillings or pounds might perhaps be annually saved; the keeping of the different instruments and utensils in good order and cleanliness, and an expertness in obviating or frustrating the little tricks of soldiers, and particularly of malingers. Services like these may be useful; but as they only require very inferior talents, they may be properly allotted to inferior officers, who are unfit for higher duties. Men cannot excel in every thing; and he who is great in such little things, will, I am persuaded, generally be little in those which are great. According to my conceptions, the qualifications and duties most desirable and important, in and from the chief medical officer of

an army, are of a much higher order. To assist in maintaining that army in the most efficient state, by preventing as well as by curing sickness among the soldiers, is one of the most important of these duties, and one for which *physicians* are qualified *above all other men* by the means which education has afforded them, of taking comprehensive views of the diseases most frequently prevalent in different climates and situations, of the causes of such diseases, and of the best modes of obviating them, or of counteracting and mitigating their operation when present.

It will be proper, however, that I should take a more particular notice of your opinion of "the expediency of superseding the physicians in the general superintendence of the medical concerns of the army service, to which, by their rank, they would *otherwise* have been entitled; *because*, being taken from *civil* life, *they could not but have wanted* that knowledge which was requisite to the *conduct* of military hospitals, and the *management of sick soldiers*." (p. 86 of Rep.) This opinion you seem to have adopted from p. 398 of Dr. Jackson's work of 1805, where he says, "the office of *medical inspection*, as it now stands in the British army, is of *late creation*. It appears to have originated in the *defects and insufficiencies of college physicians and London surgeons*, who, appointed to medical trust from the walks of civil life, were unexperienced and unacquainted with military things, and as such were reasonably supposed to be at a loss how to act in the perplexing scenes of war. This is at least held in common opinion to be the cause of the appointment of the numerous class of inferior inspectors." I have already stated that no such "defects and insufficiencies" as are here supposed had ever been discovered until after Mr.

Knight's appointment in Dec. 1801, and that, from the limited sphere of his military services and experience, he could not be supposed qualified to appreciate the merits either of army physicians or of general hospitals. But as, by the incongruous distribution of the patronage of the army medical board, the nomination of inspectors and deputy inspectors fell exclusively to him, and as he appears immediately upon his appointment to have resolved to nominate *surgeons only*, and *has in fact never nominated* persons of any other class to *those offices*, and as he afterwards found means to obtain the sanction of his superiors to *this total deviation from former usage*, I must regret that you did not endeavour to procure from him a specific statement of the facts and expedients by which the *deficiencies* of the *present* army physicians *had been ascertained*, before you credited and propagated charges against them obviously improbable and contrary to all preceding experience; and also that you did not allow the physicians any opportunity of vindicating their own competency by other facts. As the case now stands, I have again to combat only general assertions and suppositions, unsupported either by fact or argument, and consequently unworthy of any thing but general contradictions. I readily admit, that persons going from civil to military life have to learn some things which are peculiar to the latter; but this is also the case of ensigns, hospital mates, and staff-surgeons as well as physicians; and it appears extremely absurd to suppose that, of all these, physicians alone, who have previously gained so much knowledge, should lose all capacity of acquiring ideas at the moment of their entrance into the army. Familiarized as they commonly have been, (and to a much greater extent than hospital-mates) to the order, government, æco-

nomy and practice of civil hospitals, the few circumstances in which the military differ from these would, *a priori*, be thought of easy acquisition by them, and *experience has demonstrated*, that physicians have readily become well acquainted with every one of these peculiarities after having been *but a few months* employed in military general hospitals*. It is not, however, con-

*The regimental surgeons who are advocates for Mr. Knight's system of excluding physicians from inspectorial appointments appear all to have been taught to assert as a maxim that no man can be qualified to inspect or judge of the performances of particular duties in others, unless such duties have been already performed by himself; and Mr. Knight being interrogated on this subject states (p. 113 of your Report) that he selects the deputy inspectors "from those (persons) especially, who have done the duties which are to be inspected;" appearing to think this a victorious reason for confining the inspectorial office to surgeons; though it certainly will not serve his purpose if these inspecting surgeons are to be placed over physicians, as Dr. Jackson would have told him, if he had been pleased to look at p. 89, 1805, and to notice this passage, viz. "It is held to be a rule in common life, that the overseer of labourers is more skilful than the labourer himself. If the surgeon be not qualified in knowledge to attain the rank and execute the duty of *army physician*, it is an enigma, difficult to be explained, by what progress of refinement he is rendered capable of directing and instructing those, who are his masters in their art." According to Mr. Knight's doctrine that no man can judge whether duties are well performed by others, unless he has personally performed the same duties himself, it would follow that no officer could judge of the conduct of a common soldier without having himself served in the ranks; and that no gentleman who had not been a menial servant could form any opinion of the talents or defects of those who might be in his service. In saying this I cannot mean to compare hospital mates or any other description of medical men to fer-

tended by me that an army physician ought immediately on his appointment to assume the chief direction of the medical department of an army. Those who have done it must probably at first, have been at some loss in those duties which immediately relate to the military discipline, but it is very easy to place a newly appointed army physician where the presence of one who is older, or of an inspector, may leave him little other duty at first than the care of the sick, and in taking care of them, he will naturally very soon acquire all the knowledge requisite for his future guidance. That there is no mystery in the management of military hospitals, notwithstanding the parade of words with which some persons from selfish motives have chosen to expatiate upon military habits, discipline, &c. has been repeatedly and even very recently demonstrated. I have before mentioned the appointment of Dr. Robertson Barclay about the end of the year 1793 to be an army physician. He certainly was one of those gentlemen, who are by Dr. Jackson denominated "*college physicians*," having been educated at Oxford and admitted to be a fellow of the College of Physicians in London: he was, moreover, one of the physicians of St. George's hospital, and thence he passed directly to Corsica where, as the senior physician to the army, he became at once the chief medical officer. His ability to discharge the duties of that situation soon fell under the observation of the late Sir Charles Stuart, the general there commanding, who, for mental endowments, military science, and strict attention to the welfare, discipline, and duties of those under his command, has

wants or common soldiers. I only wish to show the fallacy of Mr. Knight's argument.

rarely been surpassed: and this distinguished officer was so far from discovering any such "defect or insufficiency," as Dr. Jackson attaches to "a college physician," that shortly afterwards, he warmly and successfully recommended Dr. Robertson Barclay for the appointment of inspector of hospitals; and was so little dissatisfied with the manner in which this inspector performed his duties, that in the year 1800 (when, as I have already said, a new hospital-staff was nominated by him for the army intended to have been placed under his command in the Mediterranean) he solicited and obtained the appointment of another "college physician," to be inspector, viz. Dr. Franck, who had been educated at Cambridge, and is a fellow of the College of Physicians. Of the complete sufficiency of this gentleman, the last army physician promoted to the rank of inspector, no weak evidence is derived from the high esteem in which he was held by Sir Ralph Abercrombie, under whom he served subsequently: the best evidence of it, however, is adduced at this moment by his being just appointed to accompany the expedition about to sail under the command of lieutenant general Sir John Moore, an officer who has given other proofs of being superior to military prejudices, besides this of selecting and applying for a man of education and science to be at the head of his medical-staff; and certainly, if there had been just cause to suspect Dr. Franck's competency, the inspector general of army hospitals would not have failed, from a sense of his duty, to interfere and prevent his present appointment. The fallacy therefore, of your suppositions about "the expediency of superceding the physicians in the superintendence of the medical concerns of the army, because being taken from civil life they must always want

the knowledge requisite to conduct military hospitals and manage sick soldiers," is fully admitted even by the inspector-general, in spite of his extreme predilection for surgical inspectors; consequently to employ more facts and arguments to refute it would be a waste of time. So little indeed is there of the "expediency," which you have been led to believe in thus superceding the physicians, that I do not hesitate in asserting that, according to all the sound maxims of policy and prudence, it is highly expedient that the superintendence of the medical department of an army should never be committed to any one who has not been an army physician, so long as one with the usual qualifications is to be obtained, because in addition to the mere routine of inspecting a regimental hospital and of making out a sick return, there are duties belonging to that superintendence which require a very considerable portion of medical knowledge for their being properly performed. Where surgeons are appointed to be the chief medical officers, generals who may be anxious for the healthiness of the troops under their command, will often consult them on the causes of the most prevalent disorders, and employ them to put a stop to any sickness that may happen to break out among the soldiers. Regimental surgeons will also very often request their advice in difficult cases of disease. And although the inspectors may sometimes on such occasions be conscious of their own deficiency, it cannot be expected that they should frankly confess it, and thereby diminish their own importance and obstruct their future promotion; they will much more naturally hazard opinions and actions, and, with these, the lives which they are designed to preserve. If, as is evident, this must happen, even when the inspectors are most

desirous to avoid encroaching upon the peculiar province of physicians, how much greater mischief is to be apprehended when they seize with eagerness all opportunities of personating the physician—an assumption of character which is now far from being rare. Would that this putting on of the lion's skin were as harmless as that of the fable! but coupled with superior military power, the masquerade becomes formidable, often perhaps fatal. Of the surgical inspectors, some presuming on their authority have dictated even to army physicians, the medicines they should prescribe for their patients; others, (ignorant of the first principles of physic) have issued public orders that the patients in the general hospitals of a particular denomination, for instance, labouring under a certain acute disorder, should all undergo one and the same mode of treatment directed by themselves, without regard to age, differences of symptoms, stages of the disease, &c. and when obliged to confess the failure of the first mode, have proceeded to order another indiscriminate species of treatment, and then a third; and others again have posted through their districts urgently recommending various powerful remedies, such as "a free use of the lancet;" emulating, perhaps, the example of their patron and Magnus Apollo, who is stated* by good authority, to have "proposed" (for the benefit of a certain, and unfortunately of late a numerous, description of sick in the regimental hospitals) "the use of the lancet with a freedom, far beyond what had formerly been thought

* See "An account of the Ophthalmia which has appeared in England since the return of the British army from Egypt, by John Vetch, M.D. assistant surgeon to the 54th regiment," Pages 97 and 100.

of," a freedom (since adopted on such recommendation) that leads to the taking away of 150 ounces of blood or more in the course of a very few days, in cases where the inventor and "proposer" of this practice (which truly deserves its character of "not having been formerly thought of" even by M. Le Sage) will probably find it very difficult to persuade physicians that, if bleeding were requisite, the loss of 20 or at the most 30 ounces might not have sufficed, with other proper means.

Surely if the communication of medical instruction and the taking of decisive measures in embarrassing circumstances which are purely medical, be among the functions of an inspector, and that they are can admit of no doubt, men capable of both should be selected for that appointment, rather than those who are only conversant with the little details of hospitals, and the paltry tricks of the more worthless soldiers. By the latter mode of selection it has happened (as the inspector general can if he pleases testify in one instance at least) that very deficient persons, who could scarcely write even a single line of English correctly, have had the health of considerable armies committed to them! and I certainly have reason to think that at present there is no security against the repetition of similar nominations. While such men as Sir John Pringle, Sir Clifton Wintringham, Dr. Donald Monro, Dr. John Hunter, Dr. Robertson Barclay, and Dr. Franck were serving abroad, the medical staff placed with or under them have felt a confidence that, when these their superiors should happen to be confronted with the most enlightened of foreign physicians, no disparagement of their own estimation abroad would thence ensue, and that the character of the profession at home would not be tarnished. But in some other staffs the feelings of the

medical officers have had little of exultation, when they have known that the men placed over them, among numerous deficiencies, could not speak their native language but in a dialect full of grammatical errors, nor understand a page of any other. That men of this stamp can ever be qualified for the arduous office of superintending the physical welfare of an army will never (though it is pretended) be believed by any reflecting mind. This office requires just and comprehensive views of the causes of health and disease, which can never be imparted but by an enlarged education and much patient investigation in science and in the practice of medicine; and to these military surgeons can rarely pretend. I do not mean to insinuate that there is any person who can with certainty preserve troops in *constant* health, for no absurdity could be greater than this; military positions and events are not always optional, nor can the operations of weather, diet, soil, &c. on the human frame, be prevented at all times; neither can human passions be so entirely subdued as to obviate the excesses of inconsiderate soldiers. All that I intend to affirm is that *sickness never arises without sufficient causes*, and that on service many occasions must happen when the chief medical officer will have it in his power to avoid, and where unavoidable, to moderate the effects of these causes, if he be skilled in the higher branches of medicine, when another chief, deficient in that skill, will be incapable of affording any useful aid, or may even do great mischief. Should a distemper, for instance, break out among troops stationed in a particular place, the physician of science would soon discern whether it proceeded from contagion or from an unhealthy site, and would then be able to extinguish it, by stopping the communication of

the infection in the former case, or by obtaining either a change of quarters or a correction of the local morbid causes in the latter; whereas to the man of inferior knowledge the origin of the sickness would most probably be an impenetrable mystery, and he might remain an idle spectator of the havoc, abandoning the safety of the troops to the chance of accidents, and suffering the disorder to spread uncontrolled, or else he might attribute it to a wrong cause, and perhaps, with the perverse obstinacy which is apt to accompany ignorance, might put in practice those very measures which are most suited to favour its ravages. Let it not be supposed that these are merely idle assertions; since one of the finest armies which England ever sent forth was at a very critical period exposed to extreme hazard from a most fatal disease through the imprudent orders of the Goliath of the surgical inspectors, who was ignorant of the nature of the distemper; and the troops were saved, in all human probability, from destruction, by the firmness of an army physician, who saw the danger, and persevered in pointing it out until measures of safety were taken. But I may hope that examples are not necessary to convince you of the number of lives which a man of superior medical information may by his vigilance and exertions preserve to the state in the course of a campaign, nor of the insignificance even of a very liberal reward, when compared with the political advantages he might procure, or disasters he might prevent, by maintaining the great body of the army in a fit state of health for active service.

I now proceed to another consideration adduced in page 17 of your Report, to explain and justify the practice of excluding physicians from all promotion, viz. "the propriety of holding out to the army surgeons,

the hope of obtaining that superior rank and pay to which their labours, hazards, and experience entitled them." Here one cannot help wondering that your senses should have been all so active and acute in discovering the labours, hazards and experience "of army surgeons, and the propriety of holding out superior rank and pay" as incitements and rewards to these gentlemen; and that you should be *totally insensible* to the at least equal labours, hazards and experience of army physicians, and to the at least equal propriety of allotting similar incitements and rewards to them also. What are we to think of the justice and policy of a system which entitles hospital mates, who have incurred but little expence in their educations, and whose acquirements are but very moderate, to expect that in a few years they may attain rank and pay nearly ten times greater than those assigned them at first, and which at the same time denies to physicians, with their more *extensive* and *expensive* qualifications, the *smallest chance of any improvement in their situations*; and which renders them *stationary for life*, while their inferiors are in succession daily promoted and placed in authority over them? A system which singles out men the most liberally educated, and probably with as nice feelings as any in the army, for a species of humiliation and indignity which is deemed the least tolerable among military men; I mean that of being rendered subordinate to those whom they have been used to command. I have certainly no wish that army surgeons should not be amply rewarded: on the contrary, if my desires or opinion could avail any thing, both would be exerted in their favour; but I would reward them by an increase of pay, &c. according to their deserts and *length of service*; and

not at the expence of the physicians, who are equally entitled to be rewarded also. If surgeons are to be encouraged and remunerated by promoting them to offices, for which, in several instances at least, they have been notoriously unfit,* why should they not also be made field officers, and the captains of companies excluded from all farther promotion?—the injury in this case would be no greater than that which is done to the physicians under the present system. Indeed the injustice and mischief which attend this species of promotion have been felt and avowed even by Dr. Jackson. For though he appears as you properly† observe to have suggested to Mr. Knight the greater part of those opinions respecting general and regimental hospitals upon which the latter has been acting for some time past, the exclusion of physicians from the offices of inspector and deputy inspector, is an extreme measure which Dr. Jackson himself, with all his partialities, cannot help blaming. He wrote indeed under the bias of two errors; one of them was a belief that the appointment of army physicians from civil life at the commencement of the last war was a novel practice, and a grievance to the

* The physician general being asked respecting the consequences of a division of the patronage of the Army medical Board by which the nomination of inspectorial officers had fallen to Mr. Knight, answered on oath that it had been attended with disadvantages; for (adds he) "the consequence has been that persons of inferior medical education have been appointed to situations superseding the authority of the physicians; I allude to the authority of the deputy inspectors." Rept. p. 99.

† See p. 23. of Report.

army surgeons; and the other that the medical board had procured some law* or regulation by which army surgeons were excluded from ever becoming army physicians; an error which is sufficiently refuted by His Majesty's order of the 12th of March 1798; (inserted at p. 96 and 97 of your Report,) and by the subsequent appointments of Drs. Mitchell and Lempriere, two army surgeons, (*and the only ones* who have been willing to undergo the proper examination) to be army physicians. Yet notwithstanding these erroneous impressions, he observes p. 95.—1805, that "the army surgeon is now suddenly elevated to the rank of inspector, to the apparent injury of the physician, however experienced, and however able he may have *proved himself to be* to fill the highest station on the medical staff," and at page 97, he adds "if there was injury affecting the credit and interests of the army surgeons, even error operating against the interests of the army itself, in the early periods of the late war; there is now an additional error, *affecting the interests of the service and direct injury acting against the physician* as excluded from all expectation of promotion to higher rank, however merited by exertion, or however useful the extension of such person's services might be to the public."

It was not with the view and expectation of such treatment that army physicians have been induced to enter the service; my own expectations at least, and those of the other physicians who served with me on the staff of Sir R. Abercrombie in 1795, were very different; we were indeed well apprized of our danger in that expedition; the rarity with which men newly

* See p. 20. of his publication of 1803.

landed from Europe then escaped the yellow fever, the unusual mortality which accompanied its attacks, and the general belief of its contagious nature, were to physicians who expected to meet it at every step, more than sufficient causes of alarm: but we prepared ourselves to suffer whatever might befall us in the execution of our duty, persuaded that those of us who might survive, would at the proper time obtain "that superior rank and pay" which others had attained, and to which you now deem the surgeons alone to be by "their labours, hazards, and experience entitled." This, however, was but an *abortive* expectation; for neither an increase of rank, nor of pay, ever reached any one of the eleven physicians whose misfortune it was to belong to that staff. Six of them died within a few months—four were allowed to return to Europe about the end of the year 1797; and the other, who had been born in the West Indies, and continued there on duty for some time longer, has very lately chosen to resign his commission and relinquish even the poor remuneration of half-pay, after twelve years service, rather than return again to the West Indies and submit to the degradation of becoming subordinate to newly made inspectors or deputy inspectors, who were formerly subordinate to him. Of the four who returned to Europe about the end of 1797, one being far advanced in life, was permitted to retire from the service; the other three (of whom I was one) were in 1800 placed upon the Mediterranean staff, and of these I became in a few months *the only survivor*, not however by *avoiding any species of danger*; for when Dr. Buchan, whose zeal and fortitude in the discharge of his duty cannot be too much applauded, caught the plague in the hospitals appropriated to that disease (of which he

had for some time been in charge) at Aboukir, I did not hesitate to become his successor and to continue in that service until the plague had ceased in the army; though until then no medical officer doing duty in those hospitals had escaped the contagion, and of the twelve who caught it, seven had died. I ought perhaps to apologize for thus mentioning myself and these my unfortunate colleagues; I have done it, not from a wish to have it thought that our services or sufferings were greater than those of other army physicians generally; but because I am better acquainted with the events in which we were personally concerned. I may, however, I hope, be allowed to observe that, if there has been any profusion, as you seem to think, in the expenditure of the army medical department, it has not been occasioned by rewards allotted to the "labours, dangers and experience," of *army physicians*, or at least to those who were employed with me in the West Indies; since while they lived or remained in the service no one of the eleven ever received either rank or pay beyond that originally assigned to us, and I am now the only one of them who retains even these. Such have been Mr. Knight's ideas of the deserts of the army physicians.—Of his own, however, he appears to have taken more enlarged and I suppose more just views; for I am informed that while receiving four pounds fifteen shillings per diem, with forage for four horses (estimated at £60l. per ann.) and an allowance for his table, he thought proper to claim and to receive an addition of five shillings per diem allowed to staff surgeons after a certain length of service, (which I had erroneously supposed* to have been intended for those only who receive no more than the pay of surgeon), which addition seems to have

been completely forgotten* by Mr. Knight in the statement which he has delivered to you of his several kinds of pay and emoluments, as well as in his subsequent examinations. (p. 111, 116, and 117. of Report.) Mr. Knight's enlarged views of Dr. Borland's deserts, you have yourselves noticed in pages 9. and 10. of do.

I know that military officers are in general disposed to think with the surgeons, that the introduction of regularly educated physicians into the army is an injury to the former; and it is not surprising that they should adopt this opinion. Officers of regiments meet and associate daily with their *surgeons*, and but seldom with *army physicians*, who belong to no regiment; and not being judges of medical qualifications, they commonly neither perceive, nor believe, that any difference exists between the attainments of the regimental surgeon and those of the army physician.—Often indeed they suppose the surgeon of their own regiment to be the most able physician in the army; and it is not to be expected that he should endeavour to undeceive them.—With such opinions, and believing that the studies and qualifications of *all* medical men are *alike*, it is most natural that officers who have themselves entered the army as ensigns, should think that all medical men ought to begin as hospital mates, or assistant surgeons. To remove this error, it is to be wished that officers in the army would recollect that physic is a *learned* profession, requiring a great extent and variety of knowledge, which can be no where so properly attained as at universities, and with auxiliary advantages, such as have been described in P. 23 and 24;

* If Mr. Knight should not have recollected this trifle at any subsequent receipt of his pay, he may perhaps thank me for reminding him of it.

that to profit duly by these a great expenditure of time and of money will be necessary; and that men who have incurred that expence will rarely, if ever, condescend to become hospital mates;—because having chosen the profession of physic with different views, nothing but disappointment and distress can be expected to reconcile them to a station so unequal to the habits, prospects and connections with which they will have been familiarized at universities and in other parts of civil life. To expect, therefore, that men who never intended to become surgeons, and who have for that reason gone through a more tedious and expensive course of education, will, after all this, accept the appointment of hospital mate or assistant regimental surgeon, is certainly to expect the greatest of improbabilities; and if it should be once established that all medical men who are to be employed in the army must enter it in that way, no men intending to do so will expend time or money in going to universities, &c. nor will any then offer who are better qualified than hospital mates now are. And as these are notoriously* deficient in science, and the principles by which a physician ought to regulate his practice, and as the army does not afford either the means or the opportunities of gaining that science or those principles, it follows that if such a regulation be adopted, no well educated physicians will hereafter be found in the army, and that officers and soldiers, when sick, will become subject to an empirical routine of treatment, directed by medical

* According to Dr. Jackson (p. 80. 1805.) "a superficial verbal knowledge of the bare signs of things is sufficient to introduce a young man into the list of hospital mates."

officers, under I know not what name, who embracing objects too extensive for their limited faculties, will practice both physic and surgery without being duly qualified for either.

That part of your Report which recommends the suppression of the present army medical board, and the substitution of another, can scarcely be a proper subject for my animadversion. Those who have the power, will best judge of the expediency of making that, or any other change.—I cannot however but observe that your proscription of the physicians has been extended even to the proposed board, and that instead of having one of these for the presiding member, as hitherto has been thought proper, you recommend that a "chairman well acquainted with the details of military service both at home and abroad," should be appointed to it, and that he "should have superior authority." I certainly do not suspect that in predisting the qualifications of this chairman or of the two junior members, you intended to adapt them to any particular persons; but after the opinion which I have already delivered of the importance, and the necessity of preferring men of extensive medical science for the chief medical officers of armies, it will not be expected that I can think a less portion of that science sufficient for the presiding member of a board destined to superintend generally the medical concerns of the whole military establishment of Great Britain, nor does your proposal of a military officer for the chairman of such a board, gain any credit with me from the errors into which you have yourselves fallen with such a chairman.

Having, as I believe, incontrovertibly vindicated the army physicians from every imputation of unfitness or

incompetency for the discharge of their duties, in the direction of military hospitals, and in the care of the sick foldiers; and having also, as I hope, satisfactorily proved that they are pre-eminently qualified for the highest medical offices in the army, and that by former usage they were entitled to expect and did expect future promotion to these offices according to their respective merits, there can, I presume, remain no doubt of the wrong which they have sustained by the preposterous elevation of so many persons who had been subordinate to them, and who were greatly their inferiors in liberal and scientific attainments: and I will therefore only notice the concluding part of your Report on this subject; I mean that at page 86 which is as follows, viz. "without intending, therefore, to impute any want of knowledge, assiduity, or even of experience, to the gentlemen who now hold the rank of physicians in the army (for we have every reason to believe them to be eminently deserving of commendation in all these respects) we cannot but think that this part of the army medical system should be differently arranged. Under this impression, we suggest the propriety of making no new appointment, to the ranks of inspector, physician, or principal medical officer; but that the rank of deputy inspector should be the only intervening rank between the three inspectors of hospitals, whom we have recommended as part of the office establishment, and the surgeons to the forces; and that the rank of deputy inspector should be a promotion from the rank of staff surgeon."

The strange discordance between the first and latter parts of this quotation, will I think, obviously present itself to every reader. That you should declare your belief that those who now hold the rank of army phy-

sicians, are "eminently deserving of commendation, in regard to their knowledge and assiduity, and even experience," and that from such premises, you should infer and recommend the future exclusion of all physicians from the army, must appear most extraordinary, considering that for one officer or soldier who is likely to want the aid of a surgeon, twenty may be expected to want that of the physician; and consequently that of all medical men, the latter must be by much the most useful and necessary for armies; and if they ever should be excluded from the British army, I cannot help thinking that by this exclusion, we shall exhibit a solitary, and to the rest of Europe, an astonishing example of a nation, deliberately prohibiting reason and science in therapeutics, and preferring an uninformed, unprincipled empiricism in the treatment of those who may want medical assistance. That such an example will ever be ordained, either by the legislature or the executive government of our country, I do not believe, and I can only account for your having recommended it, by supposing that in commiseration of the humiliating and mortifying situation to which army physicians have been lately reduced, and of the impossibility, which they are under, of discharging their duties with satisfaction to themselves, or advantage to the public, while every hospital mate is led to consider them as persons devoted to degradation, over whom he may expect in a few years to rise and exult, you may have mercifully wished to relieve their sufferings, by terminating their military existence. If these were your motives, I must, for myself at least, gratefully acknowledge your kindness, since in my opinion, the measure you have proposed would be infinitely better for the physicians, than a continuance in their

present situation. I cannot help thinking, however, that with a very moderate exertion of your inventive powers, much better means might have been discovered both for relieving the physicians, and benefiting the public service, by restoring to them their former rights and pre-eminence, and devising other suitable expedients to encourage and reward army surgeons.

Nothing but the dispersion of my colleagues by the duties assigned to them in different places; and the impossibility of their selecting another advocate, before their proscription, in consequence of your Report, will probably be either decreed or rejected, could have determined me to make this appeal in their behalf. Unoffending and unresisting, they have passively submitted for several years to the pleasure of their superiors, and to the grievances which have been already mentioned, and have moreover patiently seen the pay of every other medical and military officer increased, while their own, though greatly inadequate to their decent support, *remains* as it was fixed probably a century ago, when money was of three times its present value. It is therefore only at the last extremity, when they are in danger of being condemned *unheard* that I venture to appear in their defence, with an inequality of talents, for which the goodness of our cause can alone compensate, and with a very deficient allowance of time; as one month will not have elapsed after your Report came into my possession, before this letter will have been published; during which interval I have been subject to many professional and other interruptions which will I hope obtain some favourable allowance for its many defects.

I have been careful to assert nothing which I did not believe to be true, and I have endeavoured to avoid of-

fence as much as the nature of my undertaking would permit; some degree of warmth, however, and some asperity of expression are, I fear, unavoidable in controversial discussions. Those who write and print at leisure have opportunities, in the hours of calm deliberation, to revise and correct whatever may be amiss; but these opportunities I have not ventured to allow myself, because it was believed that your Report would become the subject of parliamentary consideration immediately after the Easter adjournment, and I therefore resolved to commit my letter to the press *partially*, as fast as I could write it. I mention this as an excuse for some things which I should otherwise have altered, perhaps improved, and as a motive with yourselves and others for granting me that indulgence of which I have need, and which I solicit from all my readers, and particularly from the different descriptions of army surgeons. It has been a difficult, and certainly an unpleasant task for me to enter upon an examination and comparison of their pretensions and qualifications as opposed to those of the physicians; but I hope they will have the justice to remember that this has been made necessary not by any new claim, much less by any *aggression* on the part of the physicians, but solely *by those of the surgeons*; and that this comparison has been delayed until the last hour, and then only made for the purpose of self defence. Of the surgeons in general I profess to think as favourably, and to entertain as much esteem, as they probably do of each other; allowing only for a little of that *esprit de corps*, which probably attaches itself in some degree to all professions though perhaps to none less than to the physicians. I consider the surgeons of Great Britain as excelling those of every other nation in the world, and those of London in particular, as highly distinguish-

ed not only by their professional, and often scientific attainments, but also by their liberal sentiments and accomplishments: and I have never been so absurd as to suppose that they might not become as good physicians, as those among the latter who are regularly educated, if they would employ the same means. But not having done this, having on the contrary pursued a different course and become *good surgeons*, I must for this reason doubt, generally speaking, of their competency as physicians; especially when I consider the limited extent of human intellect, which rarely permits the same individual to be at the same time a good physician and a good surgeon. I confess, however, with pleasure, that some instances have occurred of surgeons, who, by the great liberality of nature and their own uncommon industry, have become, I believe, very good physicians, and I have the satisfaction of numbering some of these among my particular friends. Yet I think that even they might have exceeded their present excellence if they had originally applied themselves only to physic.

You will have too much liberality not to pardon me for having introduced in this letter the above explanation, which I could not but feel due to the surgeons.

I have the honour to be,

with the greatest respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient

and humble servant,

EDW. NATH. BANCROFT.

London, April 26th.

1808.

FINIS.

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A LETTER

TO THE

COMMISSIONERS OF MILITARY ENQUIRY.

IN REPLY TO SOME ANIMADVERSIONS

OF

DR. E. NATHANIEL BANCROFT

ON THEIR FIFTH REPORT.

BY

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&c. &c. &c.

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LETTER,

&c.

GENTLEMEN,

IT was naturally to be expected, that, in the prosecution of your highly important labours, in the course of which you would be called upon to detect abuses long connived at, to attack prejudices inveterate by indulgence, and to expose to public reprobation frauds and speculations long practised on the public; it was naturally, I say, to be expected, that you would encounter much opposition, and that a host of foes from different quarters would be in arms against you. Innocence may escape the shaft of calumny; active virtue never fails to be the object of attack.

Had you commenced your labours in the military department at an earlier period, your task in regard to the medical branch, arduous as it is, would

have been incalculably more difficult; and your report would have excited no common sensation in the public mind. But your investigation began at a time, when, by the indefatigable industry, and incorruptible integrity of one individual, an effectual remedy had been applied to most of the abuses which had previously existed. For, however public opinion may be divided on some points, it is well known, and indeed universally acknowledged by the great body of medical officers, as well as the army at large, that these reforms originated in the judicious and unwearied exertions of the present Inspector General of Hospitals, and the well-digested system which, with the approbation of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, he has arranged and introduced.

By these improvements the service, as well as the public at large, have been greatly benefited, immense retrenchments have been made, the effective strength of the army has been increased, and by a more liberal remuneration being of-

fered, men of superior talent and education have been induced to enter the medical department. Many such will, at present, be found among the regimental medical officers, that class, on whom the care of the army, in respect to health, must at all times chiefly devolve.

That these arrangements, however subservient to the general good, would produce feelings of hostility and resentment in certain individuals, who either felt themselves disappointed, or fancied themselves aggrieved, it is natural to imagine. But private interest coming in competition with public benefit, it will not be questioned, though the decision may be the ground of complaint, which should be preferred.

After my examination before your Board, I had little expectation of being again brought forward: I certainly did not feel any ambition to obtrude myself on public notice; but when character is attacked, silence becomes suspicious---it is even criminal.

In a pamphlet which has lately been published by Dr. Edward Nat. Bancroft, half-pay Physician to the Army, while he animadverts on your report, and arraigns your competency to judge of the subject, he labours industriously to impress you with the conviction, that the evidence given by me is not only inconsistent with fact, but at variance with the opinions, which I had formerly given to the public. Whether this gentleman stands single when he advances these charges, or whether he be linked with a party, of whom he steps forward as the champion, it is not for me to say, nor is it important for me to know. That his mis-statements are gross and numerous, I think I shall most clearly be able to prove.

Before, however, I proceed to the examination of his charges, I deem it a duty which I owe to myself solemnly to declare, that his insinuations respecting my alleged identity of opinions on this or any other subject with those of any other men or set of men, merely

because he is pleased to fancy an identity of interests, are illiberal and unfounded, ---more disgraceful to him than they can be injurious to me. In independence of spirit, if not of fortune, I will not yield to him, or to any man. The evidence, which I delivered at your Board, Gentlemen, was the unbiassed testimony of an humble individual, who, with some portion of medical science, had seen a considerable variety of service.---So far in answer to his very illiberal insinuations respecting the purity of those motives, by which my evidence was dictated. I proceed to examine his charges severally, as they are advanced in the letter.

The first charge insinuated against me, in common with Drs. Jackson and Bolland, is that of partiality. He tells you, that our evidence, *prima facie*, ought to have been received with great caution, because "we owe our promotions
"and present employments to the late
"arrangements in the medical department, and to the present system,
"which (he says) has effected the de-

"pression of army physicians, and the discontinuance of general hospitals." Hence he logically and very liberally infers, that it was to be apprehended, that "our testimonies might be partial." Now Gentlemen, a question naturally occurs, who is this Dr. Bancroft, who so readily impeaches the impartiality of all, who do not think with him? Had he no interest in the old system, or connection with its supporters? Had he no promotion to expect had this system been suffered to continue? Did he feel no disappointment on its subversion? Or were his solicitations under the present system, like Dr. Jackson's letter to Mr. Pitt, as he tells us, neglected and forgotten? Far be it from me, Gentlemen, to impeach the great purity of his motives, when he sat down to address you; but I apprehend, that there are not a few, who will suspect, that they are not quite so disinterested, as he would have you believe.

I informed you, that the mortality in the army on the continent, in 1794 and

1795, was certainly much greater in the general, than in the regimental hospitals. When I delivered this opinion, founded on my own observation, an opinion, which the writer of the letter to you himself does not venture to contradict, it was not my intention to impeach either the talents or the attention of the medical officers in the general hospitals. On this ground, therefore, he might have spared his vindication. It was the system itself of these hospitals, which I blamed, and which I have never ceased to think faulty in all its parts. The theory of Dr. Bancroft will by no means either invalidate my testimony, or explain the facts, which I adduced in evidence. I admit with him, that in general, the majority of the more dangerous cases being taken to the general hospitals, a greater mortality was naturally to be expected in them, than in regimental hospitals. But I assert it as a fact, and I call on him to disprove it, that out of any given number sent to the general hospital, and an equal number in the

same disease, and the same stages of it, retained in the regimental hospitals, a much larger proportion of the former, than of the latter, fell victims to disease. In the years alluded to, some regiments treated their own sick, sending few or none to the general hospitals. Among these, I believe, were the Blues, Buffs, and Greys; and it is a notorious fact, that these regiments lost proportionally fewer men, than any other corps in that army.

But independently of all fact, is it not known that many diseases acquire a malignant form, and that some even are generated by crowding a number of sick into one apartment, or under one roof? Is there a medical man, of any experience in the profession, who will not acknowledge, that this is actually the fact? It is too well established to admit of contradiction; and on this very principle, if I am not misinformed, hospital ships have for some time been discontinued in his Majesty's navy.

To the rash assertion, "that the regi-

"mental surgeons, not rarely send their
"patients into general hospitals, some-
"times when there is danger of their
"expiring on the way, in order that
"their deaths may not happen in the
"hospital of the regiment, and that
"the responsibility thereof may attach
"solely to the officers on the hospital
"staff," I give not the smallest credit. The charge is a libel on the whole body of regimental officers.

In pages 46 and 47 of his letter to you, the writer, after a specimen of pomposity and rhodomontade truly ridiculous, and an affectation of humour for which no man will envy him, proceeds with great formality to adduce a fact, which, I dare say, the Doctor chuckled when he wrote, believing it, I doubt not, to be a decisive blow to his opponents. He tells you, that, notwithstanding the general establishment of regimental hospitals, and, as he poetically observes, "the mode of conducting them being
"in full bloom and activity," the last monthly returns of the regimental sur-

geons, made up to the 20th of March, exhibited the deaths of between 4 and 500 men in the preceding month. No man can deplore this mortality more than I do. But, when it is considered that a great number of men had been, in the beginning of the year, drawn from civil life into the militia, in consequence of a late act of parliament, and that these men having received large bounties, would, while their money lasted, naturally indulge in every species of intemperance; and when it is farther considered, that these men, when they joined, were badly clothed, that the season was extremely unfavourable, and that epidemic diseases of a peculiar cast were generally prevalent, it is not to be wondered, that great numbers were attacked with sickness, and that a more than usual proportion fell victims partly to their own indiscretion, and partly to the causes, which I have now mentioned.

But, Gentlemen, I would ask, were not these causes of the mortality in question known to Dr. Bancroft? If they

were not, he is justly chargeable with a degree of inattention, highly discreditable to him as a medical man. The same source of information, whence, I presume, he derived the knowledge of the fact, would have also acquainted him with the causes of that fact; and I beg leave to say, that when any fact is adduced against any proposition or theory whatever, the previous circumstances should be strictly investigated, otherwise the fact, even if admitted, may not warrant the conclusion. If the causes were known to him, he has by the suppression of these, been guilty of an act of the most culpable disingenuity; and all we can say is, that he suppressed them, only because it suited his purpose. It is likewise, Gentlemen, a circumstance not unworthy of your attention, that during this extreme prevalence of mortality, the sick in my district, and I presume also in others, had the assistance of an *army physician*.

But, as Dr. Bancroft has brought forward this instance of extreme mortality

in regimental hospitals, as an objection to their establishment, it is but fair to hear the return from the general hospital at the Isle of Wight (the only one now existing) for the same period. This return Dr. Bancroft had an easy opportunity of knowing; but, if he did know it, for obvious reasons he thought it prudent to suppress it. It is right, however, that you, Gentlemen, and the public at large should be informed, that while the mortality in the regimental hospitals, great indeed, I must acknowledge, was in the proportion of one out of sixteen, the mortality in the general hospital in the Isle of Wight was not less than one out of ten. What will Dr. Bancroft say of this comparison? *prima facie* at least, it furnishes no ground of triumph to the advocates for general hospitals.*

* That I may not be conceived by this statement, as insinuating a reflection on Drs. Moore and Lempriere, who are in charge of this hospital, I feel it incumbent on me to declare, that I know them to be men of superior talents, great attention, and of no common degree of medical science.

I have said in my evidence, Gentlemen, that in consequence of the sick being removed from the regimental and sent to the general hospitals on the continent, and from the regimental surgeons not being permitted to take care of their own sick, they became less active in the service, and felt disgusted. Now, whether the regimental surgeons will or will not thank me for this statement, (the learned Doctor inclines to the negative) is to me a matter of very little consequence. My statements are not given, to procure the thanks of any party. But this I may venture to say without incurring the charge of illiberality, that the Doctor has probably oftener than once experienced in his own feelings, that physicians are, like poets, an *irritable genus*; and that to remove a patient from under the care of any medical man, and place him under the charge of another, as it generally implies some incompetency in the former, seldom or never fails to excite in his mind dissatisfaction and disgust.

At the period alluded to (1794), the generality of the regimental surgeons were of considerable standing in the service—many of them men, who were looked up to for professional ability, and who, in the estimation of the army in general, were considered as superior to those who were comparatively strangers in the service, and who acted in the general hospitals. In these circumstances, the feelings of the surgeons appear to me to have been very natural. Dr. Bancroft, perhaps, gifted with high superiority of mind, and conscious of his own superlative merit, might not perhaps have felt these painful sensations; but he should have some compassion for the infirmities of those, who have not yet attained his transcendent magnanimity.

The Doctor, in order to controvert my evidence in favour of regimental hospitals, proceeds, in page 38, to observe, that it is expedient he should request me to explain “by what singular means the greatest mortality from fever among the British troops in Flanders should

“have happened, as Dr. Jackson informs us (in his Outline, p. 21), in that regiment (the 88th), and in one other, the 80th; and also to explain, by what greater singularity of causes sickness “ragged with violence and devastation in the (same) 88th regiment, during the time it remained in Jersey, previous to its being sent to the continent in 1794, as Dr. Jackson also states from his own personal observation.” In answer to the question in the first part of this quotation, you, Gentlemen, will be surprised, when I tell you, that Dr. Jackson nowhere makes the assertion imputed to him. Now, Gentlemen, had this writer, who really in every step of his progress betrays either wilful ignorance or a studied desire to mislead by suppression of important facts, taken the trouble to read Dr. Jackson's work with any other view, than to garble and select, as suited his own particular purpose, he would have been at no loss for an answer to the second question in the quotation. Dr. Jackson himself, then likewise a regimen-

tal surgeon in Jersey, tells him the "singular means" by which sickness raged with violence and devastation in other cases, as well as the 88th regiment. In page 5, of the Outline, Dr. Jackson informs him, that "the 88th regiment arrived in Jersey from Ireland, about the beginning of June." He tells him, "that this was a new regiment, and therefore like most other new regiments, was composed of heterogeneous and unsound materials." He tells him also, "that it was sickly when it arrived." Now, surely, after this plain statement of facts, it requires no great portion of sagacity to discover, why sickness was so very prevalent in the 88th regiment;—but the Doctor's discernment is not always in exercise. I now revert to the first part of the quotation, and I must particularly request your attention to the disingenuity of a man, who really seems determined to misrepresent and mislead. He affirms, as he pretends, on the authority of Dr. Jackson, that the greatest mortality from fever among the British troops in Flan-

ders, consisting, I believe, of about 20,000 men, happened in the 80th and 88th regiments. Now, on turning to the page of Dr. Jackson's Outline, to which the writer refers, I find that the Doctor advances no such assertion as is here ascribed to him. He informs us merely of the state of his own regiment, with which, of course, he was intimately acquainted. He tells us, also, the condition of other three regiments, adjacent to his own; with these, however, he acknowledges that he had but an imperfect acquaintance. Of the rest of the army, he professes no knowledge. Where then is the authority for Dr. Bancroft's assertion? Had he told us, that the mortality in the two regiments, the 80th and 88th, was very great, he would have told the truth. Had he told us further, that Dr. Jackson had stated this as a fact, this would have been equally true. But when he tells us, that of all the British troops in Flanders, the greatest mortality prevailed in the above-mentioned regiments, he advances an assertion, for which

Dr. Jackson gives him no authority whatever.

If Dr. Bancroft should contend, that the difference between Dr. Jackson's account and his representation of it is very immaterial: and if he should still wish to know "by what singular means" this very great mortality prevailed in these regiments; in order to gratify his curiosity I have only to remind him, that their sick were sent to the *general hospitals*, his own favourite institution, and then doubtless he will be at no loss to ascertain the real cause.

But, Gentlemen, the candid and learned Doctor has not yet done with his misrepresentations. In pages 39 and 40, he attempts next to prove, that my evidence, respecting the superiority of regimental hospitals in the West Indies, is inconsistent with my own opinion, as published some years ago: and further, that I had no opportunity of observing it, if any such superiority had existed, "*for that I was not then in Grenada.*" These, Gentlemen, are two very serious

charges; the latter imputation is peculiarly enormous. If I *was not* in Grenada, I have published a falsehood: if I *was* in Grenada, Dr. Bancroft asserts a falsehood. Which is the fact, we shall proceed to enquire.

To establish his first charge, that of inconsistency, illiberally insinuating at the same time that I have changed my opinion to promote my interest, he compares the evidence which I gave before you, with a passage in a work, entitled *Medical Sketches*. In answer to your question, "whether I had observed the comparative advantages of the treatment of sick in general and regimental hospitals in the West Indies;" I told you that I had. I told you, "that in the island of Grenada, in the year 1796, from the want of a medical staff, the sick and wounded, while the army continued in the field, were treated regimentially; that though under many disadvantages, the mortality was trifling, till after the return of the army to

“ quarters, when the sick were ordered
 “ to be sent to general hospitals.”

Now, Gentlemen, as I am extremely anxious to set this matter, important as it is to my character, in its true light, you will, I trust, pardon me if I trespass on your patience, by quoting first the whole passage from the Medical Sketches, on which Dr. Baneroff founds his charge of inconsistency; and secondly, the passage from his Letter, in which he endeavours to substantiate that charge. The passage from Medical Sketches is as follows:—

“ In Barbadoes, both in the end of
 “ 1795 and in the beginning of 1796,
 “ the only disease which prevailed was
 “ typhus. The 88th regiment was
 “ healthy at St. Lucia, and continued
 “ pretty healthy at Grenada for three
 “ months after their arrival there, or as
 “ long as they remained to the windward
 “ side of the island. This was likewise
 “ the case with the 10th, 25th, and other
 “ regiments. It was only after our re-

“ turn to St. George's, and to Richmond
 “ Hill, after we had communication with
 “ the 68th regiment and the general hos-
 “ pitals, where the yellow fever had for
 “ many months prevailed, that it ap-
 “ peared in the 88th and in other corps.
 “ Before the appearance of this fever, in
 “ the 88th, as well as in other corps,
 “ dysentery and intermittents prevailed
 “ the most. On the 12th of July 1796,
 “ a detachment of the 88th regiment was
 “ embarked at Grenada in the Betsey
 “ transport for England. We embarked
 “ 140 men; and I was most particularly
 “ careful not to take any man on board
 “ with the slightest appearance of ill-
 “ ness. Every precaution, which re-
 “ garded cleanliness, ventilation, or fu-
 “ migation, was adopted. The remains
 “ of the 8th, 10th, 25th, and other regi-
 “ ments were at the same time embarked
 “ at Grenada for England. From the
 “ time we sailed from Grenada, on the
 “ 19th of July to the 5th of August,
 “ seven days after we sailed from Tor-
 “ tola, (where we had touched for water)

"no case of this fever appeared in the
"Betsey."

You have now before you, Gentlemen, the whole of the materials from whence the writer has constructed his charges. I will now exhibit Dr. Bancroft's proof. Adverting to my answer to your question, respecting the superiority of regimental hospitals, he observes, in page 39 of his Letter, "Concerning the true import of this answer, no difference of opinion can possibly arise; you have properly understood and interpreted it to mean, that, whilst Dr. M'Grigor served in Grenada, the mortality under the regimental treatment was trifling; but that when the sick were sent to the general hospitals, the mortality became very considerable; or, in other words, that Dr. M'Grigor, from personal observation, had been able to ascertain, that under similar circumstances and solely from the difference of treatment, a much greater mortality had occurred in Grenada in the general than in the regimental hos-

pitals; and you may probably be surprised to learn *by the testimony of Dr. M'Grigor himself*, (given on another occasion, when he had no particular purpose in view to bias his testimony) that there was in reality no room or foundation for any such comparison as is here stated; and that, if there had been any, it could not have fallen under Dr. M'Grigor's observation, as you have naturally been led to suppose, because *he was not then in Grenada*.

In the year 1804, Dr. M'Grigor published a small volume under the title of 'Medical Sketches of the Expedition from Egypt to India, published for John Murray, 32, Fleet-street, &c.' From this work it appears, that the 88th, or Dr. M'Grigor's regiment, which made part of the army employed under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the conquest of St. Lucia, during the month of May 1796, was sent with others *about the beginning of June to Grenada*,

“ where it arrived in two or three days,
 “ and was employed in the reduction of
 “ that island.

“ According to his positive statement,
 “ the 88th regiment continued pretty
 “ healthy at Grenada for three months
 “ after their arrival there, (i. e. *until the*
 “ *month of September*) or as long as they
 “ remained to the windward side of the
 “ island.” “ This,” he adds, “ was
 “ likewise the case with the 10th, 25th,
 “ and other regiments. It was *only after*
 “ *our return to St. George's and Richmond*
 “ *hill*, after we had communication with
 “ the 68th regiment and the general hos-
 “ pitals, where the yellow fever had for
 “ many months prevailed, that it *ap-*
 “ *peared in the 88th and other corps,*”
 “ see p. 227. “ Now, it is well known,
 “ that the *windward* or *eastern* parts of
 “ the island in the West Indies are ge-
 “ nerally the most healthy; and Dr.
 “ M'Grigor, in the work before us, na-
 “ turally and justly ascribed the absence
 “ of disease among the regiments before-
 “ mentioned *solely* to the circumstance of

“ their having been *stationed in the wind-*
 “ *ward parts of Grenada*. He manifestly
 “ had not, while writing that work, the
 “ least idea of ascribing it to any supe-
 “ riority or difference in the *regimental*
 “ over the general hospital treatment,
 “ neither had he then the smallest dis-
 “ position to suspect that the subse-
 “ quent mortality arose from any such
 “ difference. He was, and perhaps now
 “ is, a believer in the contagion of the
 “ yellow fever; and it is to *that cause*
 “ *alone* that he in this work intended to
 “ impute the change in question. He
 “ is far from alluding, in any way what-
 “ ever to any thing unfavourable in the
 “ treatment of the sick in the general
 “ hospitals at Grenada: on the contrary,
 “ he says, the mortality resulted, not
 “ from *treatment*, but from a *communica-*
 “ *tion* with the 68th regiment (which is
 “ totally distinct from treatment, and
 “ the *general hospitals*;) “ either of which
 “ causes, on the supposition of conta-
 “ gion, might prove equally destructive.
 “ Those, however, who do not believe

" in the contagious quality of the yellow
 " fever, nor in the alledged mischievous
 " effects of general hospitals, will readily
 " account for the increased number of
 " deaths among the regiments in ques-
 " tion, after their return to St. George's
 " and Richmond hill, in the month of
 " September, by recollecting that those
 " places are surrounded by an abun-
 " dance of local causes of disease, such
 " as are found to produce the yellow fe-
 " ver in all hot climates, at certain sea-
 " sons of the year; these regiments ar-
 " rived at those places from more healthy
 " stations in September, (commonly one
 " of the most sickly months of the year)
 " and also that this was one of the years
 " in which the yellow fever prevailed the
 " most fatally in Grenada, occasioning
 " the deaths of those who were attacked
 " by it, whether they were in one kind
 " of hospital or in another, or in no hos-
 " pital at all. So much for this part of
 " Dr. M'Grigor's testimony: of the
 " other part, which regards the extent
 " of his opportunities for *personally ob-*

" *seeing,* what he states to have hap-
 " pened, I must leave him to reconcile
 " some contradictions which seem to me
 " irreconcilable. For he tells us, at
 " p. 227, of his Medical Sketches, that,
 " ' on the 12th of July 1796, a detach-
 " ment of the 88th regiment was em-
 " barked at Grenada in the Betsey trans-
 " port for England,' and that he was one
 " of that detachment."---He adds, ' we
 " embarked 140, and I was most parti-
 " cularly careful not to take any man
 " on board with the slightest appearance
 " of illness.' He next says, in p. 228,
 " ' we sailed from Grenada on the 19th
 " of July,' &c. and it appears that he
 " afterwards arrived safely in England.
 " Now, as *he has told us* that the regi-
 " ment of which he was the surgeon, and
 " the other regiments, ' continued pretty
 " healthy at Grenada *for three months*
 " *after their arrival there,*' and that he
 " ' embarked for England' within little
 " more than half of that time, I can-
 " not help feeling a considerable degree
 " of curiosity to know by what super-

" natural means he ' had (as he states)
 " in the year 1796, an opportunity of
 " observing the (comparative) advantage
 " of taking care of the sick regimentally,
 " instead of sending them to general
 " hospitals.' See Report, p. 185. And
 " how he was able to know, from *per-*
 " *sonal observation*, that, upon ' the return
 " of the army to *quarters*' when he must
 " have been *far on his voyage to Europe*,
 " ' the sick were ordered to be sent to
 " general hospitals, and then the mor-
 " tality was very considerable indeed.'"
 Ditto, p. 185.

Now, Gentlemen, whoever reads the extract from Medical Sketches with an ordinary degree of attention, cannot fail to perceive that, so far from ascribing the increased mortality of the 88th regiment to their removal from the windward side of the island, there is no cause whatever directly assigned for that mortality. I state merely that, after their removal to St. George's and Richmond-hill, and their communication with the 68th regiment and general hospitals, this

increased mortality commenced. From this statement a candid and impartial reader would have inferred, not surely that I meant to say that the removal was the only cause of this mortality, nor even the principal cause; but that communication with the 68th regiment and the general hospitals contributed much, if not chiefly, to this devastation of human life. The passage is too plain to admit of misconstruction. Intelligible, however, as it is, it did not suit the Doctor's purpose to understand it; for that he might have understood it, I cannot for a moment doubt, without questioning the clearness of his optics or the sanity of his intellects.

Now, Gentlemen, observe, I pray you, the ingenuity of this man. Fearful that, as there are three causes indirectly assigned for the increased mortality of the 88th regiment, the reader might advert to all the three; or, if the Doctor's ill luck should have it so, might lay the chief stress on those two he wished him to overlook, he resorts to an expedient,

by way of argument, which, as far as I know, is completely new in the dialectic art. He instructs his printer to exhibit the two principal causes in the common type, for these he wished to be thrown into the back-ground; and in order to fix the attention of his reader on his own favorite cause, and to give it a degree of prominence, to which it would have no claim, he desires it to be printed in striking italics. That case indeed must be truly wretched, which requires such artifice as this to support it; and its defender must be a miserable logician, who depends on the printer for the strength of his argument.

It did not answer his purpose to have the communication with the general hospitals considered in any degree as a cause of the great mortality; he therefore pitches on the removal as the sole cause, and he even pays me a sort of compliment for having made the discovery, by commending my judgment in forming this opinion. The art here practised deserves a harsher name than I am inclined

to affix to it. In one part indeed of the passage extracted, you will perceive that he *does* mention the communication with general hospitals as one of the causes which I might have had in contemplation; but he mentions it only to insinuate an error, and to impress you with a belief that I now represent the *treatment* in regimental, to be superior to that in general hospitals, and that at the period alluded to I entertained no such opinion. Now, Gentlemen, if you will take the trouble to re-peruse the passage from the Medical Sketches, you cannot fail to perceive, that not a single syllable is said concerning the *treatment* in either of these hospitals---no opinion advanced in regard to their comparative advantages in respect to treatment. Nor have I, on any occasion whatever, expressed any opinion on this point. It is the system itself, and not the practitioners or the treatment that I have uniformly assailed.

But suppose that I had not been at that time so fully convinced of

the superiority of regimental above general hospitals, does it follow, that after an uninterrupted and pretty extensive experience for twelve years, I am to think, in opposition to innumerable facts, as favourably of general hospitals now, as he would persuade you, I did at that time? No man in his senses would entertain such an opinion. Consistency, Gentlemen, does not consist (pardon the pun) in an uniform adherence to the same opinion, either of men or of things, but a steady, zealous, and disinterested pursuit of truth. And I presume to add, that Dr. Bancroft has lived for the last twelve years of his life to very little purpose, if he has not seen reason to alter many of his opinions. If he has not, I am curious to know "by what supernatural means" he was at an early age protected against error, and saved the necessity of gaining wisdom by years. Experience, which, to use an old and vulgar adage, teaches fools, imparts, it would seem, no knowledge to the learned doctor.

But this instance of disingenuity is

perhaps too flimsy to escape the detection even of the most inattentive reader. I must now request your attention to another much less pardonable, because much more criminal; for its manifest purpose is to deceive you, and to involve *me* in the charge of falsehood. He states, that the regiment to which I was then surgeon (the 88th) was sent to Grenada in the beginning of June, and sailed for England on the 19th of July. This too he presumes to state, *on my authority*. He then triumphantly asks, by what means could I, in the short space of a month and a half, learn by observation the superior advantages of regimental hospitals there, and he tells you, "that he feels a considerable degree of curiosity to know, the superior natural means" by which this knowledge was acquired.

Dr. Bancroft, I have no doubt, Gentlemen, is gifted with no common share of curiosity. Had he possessed as much accuracy in his statements, as much candour in the construction of other men's

motives, and as much impartiality in the pursuit of truth, and the investigation of facts, his curiosity, if painfully excited, would have been cheaply gratified, without the fatigue of any elaborate enquiry. But, Sir (pardon me, Gentlemen, if I address myself to him for a moment), where or whence did you learn that I arrived at Grenada in the beginning of June? Who, or what is your authority for this assertion? Who told you this *important* fact, which has excited in your breast so great a degree of curiosity, and on which hangs the whole of your vile argument, and your still more detestable charge. No man, I venture to affirm, ever gave you such information. The discovery is wholly your own. And, Sir, what shall we say of your pretended candour, and respect for truth and character, when we find you either wilfully fabricating, or carelessly assuming dates to suit your own purposes, giving on my authority, a statement which I never warranted, and which is disgracefully incorrect?

I arrived, be it known to you, in Grenada on the 4th of March, and not in June, as you falsely state. And while I thus correct your error, and reprobate the motives, in which it seems to have originated, I blush for the man, who is capable of committing it.

On no better foundation, Gentlemen, than this unpardonable mis-statement, is founded the second charge, which he alleges against me, a charge so abominable to my feelings, that words fail me to chastise it in terms of sufficient sharpness or severity. With a view of discrediting my evidence, and impressing upon the public a belief, that in that evidence I did not scruple to deviate from truth, he asserts, that I was not in Grenada at the time when the 88th regiment became unhealthy; and had therefore no opportunity of making those observations, which in my evidence before you, I professed to have made.

Now, Gentlemen, the fact is, as I have just now stated, that we arrived in

Grenada on the 4th of March---that my stay there was not for *five or six weeks*, as he falsely asserts, but for *four or five months*---that, when the army took the field, I, as senior surgeon, was appointed to the superintendence of all the military hospitals, and that during this period, I had many and various opportunities of observing the superiority of regimental hospitals.* This, Gentlemen, is the fact; and had Dr. Bancroft's mis-statement been made for any other, than the insidious, purpose of wounding my character, vilifying your labours, and misleading the public mind, I should have treated it with that indulgence, which the fallibility of our nature, and the principles of charity, require us to exercise. But, when I contemplate the purpose, which this

* This statement may be corroborated, not only by my own case-books, but also by the testimony of Mr. Bruce, now surgeon to the 88th regiment, and who arrived with me at Grenada at the period alluded to; and if required, likewise by others of the surviving officers who served in Grenada.

statement subverts; when I regard the motives in which it appears to originate; my indignation swells against the audacity of its author: and I am compelled to tell him publicly the most unpleasant of all truths, that, in endeavouring to fix on me the vilest of all charges, he has himself asserted a most palpable falsehood.

It is said in evidence, that many soldiers who had been sent into general hospitals with slight ailments, caught fevers there and died. Dr. Bancroft, though a bold disputant, does not venture to controvert this assertion. But, while he admits the fact, he tells you in the first place, that the same has often happened in regimental hospitals. True, sapient Sir; it is not an uncommon thing for the member of a private family to catch a fever; but does he run the same risk, as a nurse or a servant in a public hospital, even on the most contracted scale? We do not say, that in regimental hospitals patients are absolutely not subject to contagion; but

we affirm, without fear of contradiction; that contagion is much less frequent in regimental than in general hospitals: and this is enough for the purpose of our argument.

He tells you next, p. 48, "that if the fact alluded to in evidence have any weight as an argument, that weight is perhaps in favour of general hospitals, because by receiving all the cases of contagious disease, they save great numbers affected with slighter ailments in the former, from the danger of infection, to which they must be otherwise exposed." This observation would be good for something, if general hospitals were receptacles for contagious diseases only; but the fact is, that patients of all descriptions are admitted into them, and thereby frequently catch those diseases, which may happen to be prevalent in them, at the time of their admission. The observation, therefore, is futile and irrelevant.

He tells you next, "that the existence of contagious disorders is not

"necessarily connected with any hospitals, but is an accidental calamity, to which all are obnoxious." If this observation have any meaning, it must be this, that every man, who is sent to an hospital, does not necessarily catch contagion. This is truly a wonderful discovery, of which the Doctor may claim the sole merit.

It was likewise said in evidence, that soldiers tarried long in general hospitals, and that the worst characters in the army---malingersers---found their way into them, and frequently imposed upon medical officers of no previous regimental experience.* I will not fatigue your attention with quoting from the Doctor's letter a specious sample of *a priori* reasoning, for he alledges no fact to prove the improbability of this statement: it is sufficient to say, that there is not an officer in the army, of whatever description, who cannot attest it from his own experience. And I beg leave to observe, that much greater medical science than

* For a definition of *malingersers* I beg to refer to Dr. Bancroft.

is possessed either by Dr. Bancroft himself, or any of his physicians of "superior attainments," has been imposed upon by the tricks of these malingerers. Of this fact it would be easy to produce the most incontestible evidence. A physician or surgeon, whatever may be his previous "scientific acquirements," or however well "grounded" in the Doctor's "invaluable principles," in order to detect the arts of these malingerers, must have been some time conversant in a military hospital.

But the Doctor, as if aware of the weakness of his argument, perhaps also recollecting that his own skill had been sometimes defeated by the artifices of these malingerers, adduces another, I will not say a better answer to the statement in question. He tells you, that no patients are admitted into general hospitals, who have not been sent thither by the surgeons of their respective regiments; and that these malingerers must therefore have first imposed upon their own surgeons. Unfortunately, however, for the validity of this argument, like some

others of the Doctor's, it is not founded in fact. And it is to me not a little surprising, that Dr. Bancroft, even with *his* slender acquaintance with military hospitals, should advance so unqualified an assertion. Does not the general hospital at the Isle of Wight receive patients, who have not been under the charge of a regimental surgeon? Has not this also frequently been the case with the late general hospital at Gosport? And has it not been more or less the case, wherever a general hospital has existed? General hospitals *were* proverbially the hot beds of malingerers. When he rashly asserts, that the number of malingerers in the whole army does not exceed fifty, the statement must be pronounced by every military man too ridiculous to require refutation.

The sixth and last head of evidence to which the Doctor adverts, is the great waste and profusion of expense, with which the establishment of general hospitals has been attended. By adverting to my evidence, Gentlemen, you will

find, that the question proposed to me on this subject regarded only the general hospitals on the continent, and to this question I gave a specific answer: but that the expense of these establishments *has in general* been unnecessarily great, is one of those facts, which no man acquainted with them will venture to deny. The Doctor, however, labours hard to weaken this fact; and to induce a belief, that the profusion of public money in the medical department has not been greater, than the nature of the service and a due regard to the healths of the men rendered unavoidable. To impress this belief, he brings forward a string of observations, evidently calculated to mislead such of his readers, as are not acquainted with the subject, and to display his own superior tenderness and humanity towards the army. He tells you, that it is impossible to calculate the number of medical officers, and the quantities of hospital stores, which may be necessary, especially on foreign service. He tells you, what no man will deny, that, as we cannot

foresee the possible extent of sickness, true wisdom will direct us to provide for the worst. He tells you also, that we ought rather to incur a superfluity of expense, than suffer men to perish by deficiency of medical aid. All this would be extremely fine and very pertinent, if any retrenchment of expenditure were recommended, which could militate against the health or comfort of the army. All this would be very fine, if the sick soldier either had been, or could have been benefited by this profusion of expenditure. This, however, was not the case: there was a profusion of expense, which could in no respect contribute either to his health or to his comfort. And, before I dismiss this part of the subject, I must take the liberty to observe, that there is something extremely illiberal and insidious in Dr. Bancroft's observations on this point. They are intended evidently to impress the public with a belief, that it is our* wish to circumscribe the com-

* In this charge, he does me the honour to couple me with Drs. Borland and Jackson.

forts of the army, to deny the sick the necessary medicines, and to introduce a system of economy incompatible with the welfare of the troops, and repugnant to the common feelings of humanity. That such, however, can be our intention, no intelligent man will for a moment believe. What rational motive can we have for curtailing the accommodations and comforts of those committed to our charge? Is such a plan subservient to our interests? Would it advance our reputation? Would it be consistent with our duty? In short, will Dr. Bancroft inform us, what motive could prompt us to recommend a system as repugnant to humanity as it is irreconcilable with the acknowledged principles of human action? No man surely can feel a deeper interest in whatever concerns the health and comfort of the soldier, than he who has tented with him in the field, has shared in his hardships, witnessed his deprivations, and has known his services.

The Doctor next asserts, that I affirmed in evidence that the medical esta-

blishment of the Indian army in Egypt was fully competent to the care of their own sick. Here is another of his unaccountable mis-statements. A reference to my evidence will convince any reader, the Doctor himself perhaps excepted, that I made no such assertion. He affirms also, "that the Indian army was generally kept together in healthy stations, and suffered very little sickness." This is equally untrue, unless those stations can be deemed healthy, where plague or ophthalmia were never absent; and where one-fourth of the army was at one time confined by illness. He says, "that I have totally forgotten the dismay, which pervaded the medical officers of the Indian army from the highest to the lowest, when the plague was officially reported by him to exist in one of the regiments composing that army, and though that regiment was my own." I have indeed forgotten it, if that can be forgotten, which never existed.

The plague, Gentlemen, made its first appearance in two hospital servants of

the 88th regiment. Dr. Bancroft was ordered to visit them; he did so, and--- never saw them afterwards. That some apprehensions of the spread of this disease, and its fatal consequences, might have been created by this discovery, is very possible. Should the plague appear in St. George's hospital, I dare say the Doctor would be somewhat alarmed, if not for himself, at least for his patients. But that any sensation, like dismay, was excited, I have no recollection; and I am confident, that no such feeling existed among the medical officers of the Indian army.

He tells you also, "that I have forgotten the embarrassment it (the plague) created, and the difficulties of procuring any of these gentlemen to assume 'the post of honour,' and the ultimate necessity imposed upon the British general hospital establishment, of taking the sole charge of the plague patients of the East Indian army." When first I read this paragraph, I was utterly confounded. I could hardly cre-

dit my own senses. I read it again; and I could not help exclaiming, "the Doctor here outdoes himself!!!" I have already had occasion to expose several of his mis-statements: what character, or what name, shall be attributed to the one which is immediately before us, you yourselves shall be able to judge. As soon as the plague was discovered in the 88th regiment, it became necessary, without delay, to provide one or more receptacles for patients afflicted with this disease; and likewise to appoint medical officers for attending these patients. Now, it is to be observed, that, antecedently to this event, our medical establishment had been strengthened by the accession of some hospital mates, who had been sent out to us by the British government; and when the plague made its first appearance, these Gentlemen were doing duty with us. Immediately on the disease being discovered, Dr. Shapter, then at the head of the staff, assembled the medical officers of the Indian army, and informed them, that the appointments to the pest

houses should be determined by *lot*, that a given number of the first drawn, as circumstances might require, should first take the duty, and that, in case of any of their deaths, the vacant places should be filled, according to the order of the ballot. Agreeably to this arrangement, the names of the medical officers of our army, amounting to about sixteen, with those of the hospital mates already mentioned, belonging to the British establishment, and amounting to five or six, were put into a hat, and drawn by lot in the usual manner. The precise number of each establishment, and the order in which they were drawn, not having the documents in my possession at present, I cannot now with certainty recollect. But to this I pledge myself, that if there be any error in this statement, respecting the former of these two points, the error must be so trifling that it may be deemed evanescent.

Soon afterwards, the plague appearing also in the British army, a part of their staff, in conjunction with the others, was

ordered to attend in the several pest-houses. I mean not to dissemble, that Mr. Price also very early volunteered his valuable services; and that latterly, Dr. Buchan, in a manner the most magnanimous and disinterested, rendered the most essential service to the army, by voluntarily undertaking this most dangerous duty. But it deserves your attention, Gentlemen, that during the whole of this time, the Indian establishment never failed to furnish its full contingent of medical officers. It deserves your attention, that the first medical officer that entered a pest-house, belonged not to the British, but to the Indian establishment. The gentleman I allude to is Mr. Thomas, who, I believe, is now in London. This being the case, I leave it to you to determine, how far Dr. Bancroft is justified in asserting, that the British hospital establishment took the *sole charge* of the plague patients of the Indian army. I leave it to you to estimate the correctness of that man's statements, who has either inadvertently or wilfully advanced

an assertion so totally unfounded. And, is this the man whom, in the prosecution of your important inquiries, it was your duty to consult? Is this he, who vainly enough insinuates his own superior competency to counsel and instruct you? Is this the man who, himself, loaded with errors, arrogantly assumes the province of correcting your's, *proh pudor,--hominis stultitiam.*

I will not fatigue your patience by any animadversions on the observations, which he has offered on the medical establishment of the India Company. I dismiss them with simply remarking, that they are both illiberal and unfounded. The officers of that establishment are men truly respectable, and in evidence of their talents, their zeal for knowledge, and scientific acquirements, I need only appeal to the volumes of the Asiatic Researches. Whatever he himself may feel, I have no hesitation in saying, that to be compared to such men, would reflect no dishonour on Dr. Bancroft.

Before I conclude, Gentlemen, I must once more request your permission to address myself to Dr. Bancroft. You have said, Sir, "that *you* do not wish " to excite painful recollections in the " minds of those who served with the " Indian army, and that *you* therefore " abstain from mentioning any more of " the occurrences of that period," of which you say, "I must admit that *you* " had personal knowledge." Away with such dark and assassin-like insinuations. Speak out like a man. I am fully prepared to meet you. I challenge you to state any one circumstance, which can occasion me the least pain on recollection. And to compel you, if possible, to accept this challenge, I thus publicly declare, that, unless you do speak out, I shall regard you in no better light, than that of a malignant and dastardly assassin.

It would be endless to pursue this writer through all the mis-statements in his letter. I have endeavoured to repel, and I trust successfully, every attack,

which he has made upon myself. I have now only, Gentlemen, to request your forgiveness for having trespassed on your patience, and addressing to you this my hasty production.

I have the honour to be,

with much respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

JAMES M'GRIGOR.

May 30th, 1808.

POSTSCRIPT.

On reviewing my evidence delivered before you, I find only one mistake, which it may be necessary to correct. I stated that the medical staff which came from the Cape of Good Hope to accompany the Indian army, consisted of between twenty and thirty. By this statement, I have since understood, that I have considerably overrated the number. The error, however, no wise affects the general question.

As material documents, I have here added a letter from Mr. Bruce, now surgeon to the 88th regt. relative to the time that regiment was in the island of Grenada; and an abstract of the total sick and deaths of the army in Great Britain, for every month from May 1807 to April 1808. As this return exhibits the sick and deaths in general, as well as in regimental hospitals, with the proportions which they bear to each

other, it will elucidate materially one part of my statement. I obtained this document from the records of the Army Medical Board, in consequence of the orders of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War.

I stated that the medical staff which was sent from the Cape of Good Hope to accompany the expedition, consisted of 11 officers, 100 men, and 1000 mules. I have now ascertained that I have considerably overestimated the number. The exact number, as far as the medical staff is concerned, I have now ascertained to be 11 officers, 100 men, and 1000 mules. I have now ascertained that the medical staff which was sent from the Cape of Good Hope to accompany the expedition, consisted of 11 officers, 100 men, and 1000 mules. I have now ascertained that I have considerably overestimated the number. The exact number, as far as the medical staff is concerned, I have now ascertained to be 11 officers, 100 men, and 1000 mules.

Gravesend, 25th May, 1808.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 22d inst. which, on account of our regiment being now on its march to Essex, only reached me this morning, I beg to inform you that the detachment of the 88th regiment, under the late Major Houstoun, which you, as well as myself, accompanied in the West Indies, embarked at Barbadoes in the *Expedition*, of 44 guns, on the 28th of February, 1796, and landed, together with detachments of the 10th and 25th foot, under Brigadier General Mackenzie, at St. George's, Grenada, on the 4th March following.

The renewal of military operations against the posts in possession of the enemy, in the interior of the island, took place, as far as my memory reaches, on or about the 29th March. But as a reference to the public dispatches on this subject, transmitted to government by Brigadier General Nicholls, who then commanded, is easily practicable, the

matter may be established beyond the possibility of doubt.

The detachment of the 88th, together with part of the 8th and 68th foot, embarked at Grenada, I think, on the 19th, and sailed for St. Kitt's on the 20th July following. I am positive that this embarkation took place later than is stated in your volume, published in 1804. Ample documents are now in my possession, written while I was in the West Indies, which can be produced, if necessary, to substantiate the above statement.

I am,

Sincerely your's,

N. BRUCE,

Surgeon First Batt. 88th Regt.

To Dr. M'GRIGOR,

Deputy Inspector of Hospitals,

British Coffee House, London.

ABSTRACT of the MONTHLY RETURNS
of SICK and DEATHS in the ARMY in
GREAT BRITAIN, from May 1807 to
April 1808.

Date.	In Regimental Hospitals.		In the General Hospital Isle of Wight.	
	Sick	Deaths	Sick	Deaths
May, 1807	4625	130	162	24
June	4185	80	203	10
July	4244	70	173	8
August	3304	84	153	3
September	3818	48	189	4
October	3954	61	221	10
November	4528	95	280	5
December	4997	81	272	12
January, 1808 ..	5255	163	235	12
February	7006	292	256	11
March	7906	411	252	5
April	7763	472	249	25
	61,585	1987	2647	129

Deaths as
1 in 31.

Deaths as
1 in 20½.

Average Strength of the Army in
Great Britain } 110,000 men.

ANALYSIS OF THE MORTALITY DURING
 THE YEAR 1867, IN THE
 DISTRICT OF ST. MARTIN, PARIS.

Date	No. of Deaths	No. of Burials	No. of Intments
1867, 1st Jan.	10	10	10
2nd	12	12	12
3rd	15	15	15
4th	18	18	18
5th	20	20	20
6th	22	22	22
7th	25	25	25
8th	28	28	28
9th	30	30	30
10th	32	32	32
11th	35	35	35
12th	38	38	38
13th	40	40	40
14th	42	42	42
15th	45	45	45
16th	48	48	48
17th	50	50	50
18th	52	52	52
19th	55	55	55
20th	58	58	58
21st	60	60	60
22nd	62	62	62
23rd	65	65	65
24th	68	68	68
25th	70	70	70
26th	72	72	72
27th	75	75	75
28th	78	78	78
29th	80	80	80
30th	82	82	82
31st	85	85	85
Total	2000	2000	2000

Printed by C. Squire, Printer,
 Fournival's Inn Court.

AN
 EXPOSURE AND REFUTATION,
 &c. &c.

4

AN
EXPOSURE AND REFUTATION

OF
VARIOUS MISREPRESENTATIONS

PUBLISHED BY

DR. M'GRIGOR AND DR. JACKSON,

IN THEIR SEPARATE LETTERS

TO THE

Commissioners of Military Enquiry ;

INTERSPERSED WITH FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
MILITARY HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ARMIES.

By EDWARD NATHANIEL BANCROFT, M.D.
FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS,
PHYSICIAN TO HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES, AND
TO ST. GEORGE'S HOSPITAL.

LONDON :

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES,

STRAND.

1808.

W. Flint, Printer, Old Bailey.

ADVERTISEMENT.

As the name of Dr. M'Gregor was mentioned in my Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, and as doubts may arise whether Dr. M'Grigor, whose name occurs frequently in my present publication, be the same individual, I think it necessary to obviate such doubts, by stating that I formerly spelt the name as I found it spelt by himself in a volume of which he was the author, and which was published in the year 1804, under the title of " Medical Sketches, &c.;" concluding that, as children are commonly taught the orthography of their own names, soon after they *begin* to read and write, the *author* of a medical work could not have been deficient in the earliest part of childish learning;

and therefore that the substitution of the vowel *i* for the vowel *e* which I found in that author's name, as printed in the Fifth Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, must have been an error of the press, or of the Secretary to the Commissioners. It appears, however, that I have erred in this conclusion, and that Dr. M'Grigor had not in the year 1804, learned, or decided upon, what he now employs as the orthography of his name, which I have for this time adopted, hoping that he will henceforth adhere to it, and that I may not have any thing more to *learn* or *unlearn* on this subject.

In the same Letter I connected the title of *Doctor* to the name of *Borland*; but as the distinction of *Mr.* will be found in conjunction with that name, in this publication, and as doubts may arise whether one and the same person be meant in both publications, I think it proper to remove such doubts by an affirmative declaration; and to state that my reasons for now withholding the title of *Doctor* from him may be found at p. 81 of this work.

I have divided the following pages into two parts, placing my answer to Dr. M'Grigor's Letter in the first, because it was nearly finished before I saw Dr. Jackson's Letter, which is therefore made the subject of the second part beginning at page 73.

AN
EXPOSURE AND REFUTATION, &c.

PART THE FIRST,

RELATING TO THE LETTER OF DR. M'GRIGOR.

IN the Letter which I published lately, and addressed to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, I found it necessary to notice some parts of the evidence given to them by Dr. M'Grigor, as being in direct contradiction to what he had published in the year 1804, or to facts within my own knowledge. In discharging this duty, I, for many reasons, considered Dr. M'Grigor as having forfeited all claim to indulgence from me; but respect for the public, and regard for my own character, determined me to avoid all offensive expressions, as far as I could, without depriving my arguments and objections of their proper force and effect: and I did hope, if Dr. M'Grigor should attempt to exculpate himself or retaliate on me, that he would in some degree imitate this example. But instead of doing so he has published a libel, abounding in scurrility as well as slanders, to an extent that has rarely disgraced the press in this country, at least in modern times. To punish this offence, I had, with the advice of counsel, determined on an application to the Court of

King's Bench, for leave to prosecute by information; but being afterwards told that in seeking legal redress it would be required of me to abstain from any such vindication of my character, as that which I have now undertaken, I thought it better to abandon all thoughts of a criminal prosecution, than to leave Dr. M'Grigor's libel unrefuted, considering how many persons are disposed to believe that a writer must have reason and truth on his side, when like Dr. M'Grigor he has in almost every page the effrontery to charge others with error and falsehood.

Some time before the publication of Dr. M'Grigor's Reply, I was informed of his having applied to the Secretary at War, for leave to inspect the returns and correspondence in the office of the Army Medical Board, under the pretence of seeking evidence to justify himself against what he thought proper to call my gross misrepresentations; and that, his application having been referred to the discretion of the Board, they desired him to specify the particular returns, which were by him supposed to contain matters conducive to his own vindication; but that, instead of pointing out papers of that description, he had specified others which obviously could have no relation to himself, but which he erroneously thought likely to contain something capable of being employed in a personal attack upon me.* An attempt of this kind

* The document which as I am told Dr. M'Grigor was most anxious to obtain, is the report of a Medical Board which was assembled at my solicitation about the beginning of November, 1796, at Martinico, to decide upon the expediency of my returning to Europe for the restoration of my health, after a very severe attack of the yellow fever. As this report could not be found in the office, I shall subjoin a copy of it,

however gave me no concern, confident as I was that my character would be found irreproachable, and that I might safely despise all that my enemies could possibly say of me with *truth*, though perhaps not all that some of them might venture to say of me upon *sath*.

That Dr. M'Grigor must have completely failed in his endeavour to find matter for scandal to be employed against me, will be evident to those who may read his publication, and perhaps the feelings produced by this disappointment may have impelled him to endeavour to supply his want of scandalous anecdotes by a redundancy of virulent words.

The observations contained in Dr. M'Grigor's first three pages are so loose, groundless, and unconnected with me, that I shall only notice what he says of "the indefatigable industry, and incorruptible integrity of one individual," by whom, according to Dr. M'Grigor, many abuses have been effectually remedied and many reforms

and leave Dr. M'Grigor to employ it as he may think proper: it is in these words, "We have carefully examined into the state of health of Dr. Bancroft, Physician to the Forces, and are unanimously of opinion that considering the healthy season of the year is approaching, there is every reason to expect his recovery in this country, and that therefore it is not *absolutely* necessary he should return to Europe, particularly as he would be exposed in his present *weak state* to a winter passage." Signed, W. Fowle, and W. Franklin, Physicians to the Forces, Alexander Thompson, Garrison Surgeon, and J. M'Neil, Surgeon to the Forces." Although the gentlemen who signed the above report thought that there was every reason to expect I should recover my health in the West Indies, I held a different opinion both before and after their report. I continued however in that country for nine months, making the experiment, after which, finding my health very little improved, I requested and obtained leave to return to Europe.

produced. I have no wish to insinuate any thing against the integrity or the industry of the gentleman who is the object of these encomiums, but unless Dr. M'Grigor has attempted *without success* to corrupt his integrity by offers so great that no greater can ever be made, or unless he knows that this has been attempted unsuccessfully by some other person (which I do not believe,) it must be evident that he can have no sufficient authority for this sort of *adulation*, which would better become a sycophant than one who like Dr. M'Grigor (at p. 5.) pretends that, "in independence of spirit he will not yield to any man;" and it may be presumed that Mr. Knight has been very little gratified by an unnecessary piece of flattery to himself, which was probably made to insinuate some injurious suspicion respecting his colleagues; for he will doubtless be ready to admit that their integrity has not been found hitherto more corruptible than his own. As to the abuses here said to have been remedied, and the reforms said to have been produced, there may be other persons not less judicious than Dr. M'Grigor, who believe that those terms of "reforms" and "abuses," are, in several instances at least, applied to wrong objects, and that an interchange might often be made of them with much propriety. The late Mr. Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, has said with great truth that "a spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views," and I regret that I cannot account with more justice for some late innovations in the Medical Department of the army, nor for those which Dr. Jackson has been for several years so eager to introduce therein. See Burke's Works, vol. 3, 4to. p. 59.

In his fourth page, Dr. M'Grigor makes me the immediate object of his animadversion, and to evince his

candour, endeavours to represent it as problematical whether I stood "single" in writing my Letter to the Commissioners, or was not "linked with a party," of whom I had stepped "forward as the champion;" and this notwithstanding my public declaration on this subject. In his next page he reproaches me in rude terms for having noticed that general connection of interests, views, opinions, &c. between himself, Dr. Jackson, and Mr. Borland, which has been notorious for a considerable time, and which no man can doubt who is properly informed on this subject.

In p. 6. he proceeds to ask if I had "no interest in the old system? no promotion to expect had this system been suffered to continue?" questions like these were certainly neither necessary nor proper, my motives having been fairly stated at the commencement of my Letter. I pretended to no impartiality on the subject, but complained of grievances suffered by the army physicians generally; and endeavoured by reason and truth to demonstrate the expediency of redressing those grievances. I acknowledged myself as a party in this matter; but I stated Mr. Borland and Dr. M'Grigor to be opposite parties, and to have been actuated by motives and prejudices from which witnesses ought to be exempt, and I therefore contended (p. 27.) that "their testimonies ought either not to have been demanded or not to have been depended upon solely by the Commissioners," to the exclusion not only of every army physician, but, on certain important points, of every other person, even the most experienced and impartial.

In p. 7. Dr. M'Grigor admits that "the majority of the more dangerous cases being taken to the general hospitals a greater mortality was naturally to be expected in them than in the regimental hospitals;" but

" asserts it as a fact," and, " calls on me to disprove it, that out of any given number sent to the general hospitals, and an equal number in the same disease and the same stages of it, retained in the regimental hospitals, a much larger proportion of the former, than of the latter fell victims to disease." Strong assertions like these are easily made even against all probability; but men who have a proper regard for truth will avoid making them on subjects of so much importance, without being able themselves to adduce sufficient affirmative evidence, instead of calling on others to disprove them by negative, and in this case impossible evidence; for certainly nothing like a fair trial has ever been made to warrant any decisive conclusion on this subject, much less one so improbable as that medical men who are imperfectly qualified, should have more success in their practice than those of a contrary description; and they will *à fortiori* avoid (while speaking under the obligation of an oath) all attempts to influence gentlemen prosecuting an important enquiry under the authority of Parliament, by such assertions as those which Dr. McGrigor allowed himself to make, respecting the alleged difference between the general and regimental hospitals in Flanders and Holland in 1794, and 1795, and in Grenada in 1796; and for which it seems absolutely impossible that he could have had any reasonable foundation. (5th Rep. p. 184. Qu. 16. 18. 25.) Before a man can decide justly concerning the comparative merits of the two species of Hospitals under consideration or of any other two objects, he must be well acquainted with both; but it does not appear that Dr. McGrigor ever had any proper opportunity of becoming acquainted with general hospitals, for he entered the army in 1794 as a regimental surgeon, by purchase, and continued to be a regi-

mental surgeon till 1805, since which time, as a deputy inspector, he has been employed, as he had been in his former capacity, *exclusively* in regimental hospitals; and (as Mr. Keate mentions in p. 11. of his Observations on the 5th Report) " has never in the whole course of his service been called upon to do *one day's duty in general hospitals.*" By this partial acquaintance with the former species of hospitals *only*, he may well be supposed to have adopted groundless prejudices in their favour, and must from his ignorance of the latter, be deemed incompetent to judge comparatively of their advantages and disadvantages. There was indeed no room for making any comparison between the former and latter, even by the most experienced medical man in the army, at either of the places mentioned in Dr. McGrigor's evidence, because there was no similarity in the state and condition of the general and the regimental hospitals, or of the patients placed in them respectively, nor was there leisure or opportunity in Flanders or Holland for observing with any sort of attention and accuracy the events which actually occurred in either. To ascertain experimentally the advantages or disadvantages of one species of hospital over the other, as connected with the mortality in each, *both* must be placed in equal circumstances in regard to their situation, construction, &c. and the patients should have similar diseases in each, and be received under the care of the medical officers in exactly the same stage of each disease.*

* That part of my present publication which relates to Dr. McGrigor was written though not printed before I had seen Dr. Jackson's Letter to the Commissioners, in which at p. 25, may be found a statement of those circumstances and conditions which he considers as necessary to the making of a fair comparative trial for ascertaining the merit or demerit of his own methods of

They should also be of similar ages, constitutions, habits, &c. (things almost impossible though of essential importance,) and when in these and all other respects the two species of hospitals were made equal, or the inequalities balanced by other circumstances, tranquillity and leisure for careful observation as well as for the treatment of the sick would be indispensably necessary, not only for one set of trials, but for several repetitions of such sets, before any conclusion could be safely drawn; and therefore no credit is due to the opinions given by Dr. M'Grigor of the supposed disadvantages of general hospitals on the continent in 1794 and 1795, during the hurry of a difficult retreat, when the sick were exposed to a multitude of disadvantages and unavoidable privations; when there was neither leisure nor opportunity for observation, and more especially by a regimental surgeon; when in fact there often were properly no regimental hospitals to serve as a point of comparison, &c. and yet treating the sick, as opposed to those of the physicians general, &c. in an experiment which he pretends to be desirous of undertaking for that purpose. I shall hereafter notice this proposal of an experiment so far as it regards Dr. Jackson, but in the mean time by looking at the page I have mentioned the reader may satisfy himself that neither Dr. M'Grigor nor Mr. Borland were ever in situations where any such equality of circumstances and conditions existed, as Dr. Jackson deems absolutely necessary before any conclusion could be drawn on subjects like those on which they pretend to give evidence, i. e. about the comparative merits of general and regimental hospitals. He will see also that Dr. Jackson asserts that with the greatest possible equality it is necessary that the experiment be continued for "twelve months," though Mr. Borland and Dr. M'Grigor's observations (if any can be said to have been made in Flanders by men of whom one saw only regimental and the other only general Hospitals) did not last more than about half the time.

such is Dr. M'Grigor's confidence that he has not hesitated when under oath to declare "that the mortality was certainly much greater in proportion in the general than in the regimental hospitals, and the expences of the latter very moderate;" though in candour he ought to have acknowledged himself incompetent to form any conclusion from the transactions of those years, especially as he had then just entered the army, and had but a very slight knowledge even of regimental hospitals.

I had stated in p. 46 and 47 of my Letter, that after all the imputed fatality of the treatment in general hospitals, and the encomiums on the Panacean treatment in the regimental, contained in the 5th Report, it was natural to conclude that at the present time, when the mode of conducting the latter species of hospitals is supposed to be brought to great perfection, the mortality in them ought to be very inconsiderable; especially as it is the duty of the Inspector general of army hospitals "to judge of the propriety of the practice of regimental surgeons; and of his assistant, Mr. Borland, to conduct the correspondence with those surgeons upon *medical practice*;" that if any change, however, had been wrought in the mortality among the army at home, it was not I feared the happy change we must all devoutly wish, because the very last monthly returns (those made up to the 20th March 1808) had exhibited the deaths of between 4 and 500 men in the four preceding weeks, a degree of mortality which had then never occurred in this kingdom, while the general hospitals with all their alleged mischiefs and abuses subsisted; that, anxious to obtain some correct information concerning the causes of this mortality, and the pretended superiority of the regimental over the general hospital treatment, I had applied to the

Inspector General for "permission to inspect, and to make extracts from the returns in his office of the sick in the regimental hospitals of this island during the last six months;" and that Mr. Knight had refused my request, saying "that it was beyond his authority to give a sight of, or to allow extracts from, the office documents I sought;" although it appeared from a subsequent letter written to me by the Deputy Secretary of war, that it had depended solely on Mr. Knight* to grant the permission I desired. In answer to this part of my letter, Dr. M'Grigor adduces as causes of the great mortality to which it alludes, sources of disease, most of which had occurred in the preceding years, and which at all events operated as much to the disadvantage of the general as of the regimental hospitals, and he also gratuitously asserts that epidemic diseases of a peculiar cast were generally prevalent, an assertion which since the time of Sydenham, who set the fashion, has been repeated, probably, several times every year, by writers, who desire to gain credit for observing what their cotemporaries have not observed, and who, like Sydenham, were little acquainted with the observations of their predecessors. He then states, (totally forgetting that I had made every exertion in my power to obtain information, and that Mr. Knight had withheld it from me) "that if the causes (of that mortality) were known to me, I have by suppression of them, been guilty of the most culpable dissimulation, and all that others can say is that I suppressed them only because it suited my purpose." After this very unjust im-

* It appears that Mr. Knight could afterwards readily give to Dr. M'Grigor the use of the official documents he had refused the sight of to me, with that of many others.

putation he proceeds thus: "but as Dr. Bancroft has brought forward this instance of extreme mortality in regimental hospitals, as an objection to their establishment, it is but fair to hear the return from the general hospital at the Isle of Wight (the only one now existing) for the same period. This return Dr. Bancroft had an easy opportunity of knowing; but if he did know it, for obvious reasons he thought it prudent to suppress it. It is right, however, that you, gentlemen, and the public at large should be informed, that while the mortality in the regimental hospitals, great indeed I must acknowledge, was in the proportion of one out of sixteen, the mortality in the general hospital in the Isle of Wight, was not less than one out of ten." That, far from having "an easy opportunity of seeing the return in question," I had no opportunity at all, has been already shewn, and this fact therefore would suffice to remove from me all suspicion of having suppressed it, if the return were not itself, (as will presently be seen,) of such a nature that I should have been much more inclined, had I been acquainted with its contents, to produce than to conceal it. But it is worthy of remark in this place, that Dr. M'Grigor who so readily accuses me of the "most culpable dissimulation" in suppressing documents, and who ought therefore to have carefully guarded himself against a similar fault, has nevertheless, for the purpose of deception, committed that very fault; for although, in order to supply the deficiency with which he charges me, he professes to adduce "the return from the general hospital at the Isle of Wight for the same period," i.e. for the month ending on the 20th of March, and to contrast the mortality therein, yet he has substituted in its place the return for the succeeding month. Had Dr. M'Grigor stated the real mortality in the general

hospital for the period to which he should have confined himself, consistently with fairness and his own professions, he must have admitted that it was much less than that in the regimental hospitals; since it appears from the tables which he has published at the end of his letter, that but five patients died in the former out of 252, while 411 died in the latter out of 7,906, which is a mortality of only about twenty in 1000 in the general hospitals, but of fifty-two in 1000 in the regimental; the proportion being as, 19,8, to 51,9. But he wished to represent the respective mortality in those hospitals in a ratio opposite to the above, and therefore he makes no mention in his observations upon this subject of the greater mortality in the regimental hospitals during the *same* period, but adduces that of the *subsequent* month, by which he makes it appear that "while the mortality in the regimental hospitals was in the proportion of one out of sixteen, it was not less than one out of ten in the Isle of Wight general hospital." As Dr. M'Grigor, when he has brought his argument to this point, exclaims with much exultation, "what will Dr. Bancroft say of this comparison? *prima facie* at least it furnishes no ground of triumph to the advocates for general hospitals," I shall not hesitate to mention what I have to say of it, nor even to accept, as the ground for my reply, that which he has himself chosen for me, I mean the increased mortality at the army dépôt-hospital (as the general hospital in the Isle of Wight is usually called) during the month ending on the 20th of April, 1808. I shall only beg permission to premise some explanations concerning the nature of the cases usually received into regimental and into general hospitals, and also concerning some peculiarities of the dépôt-hospital, because without

a knowledge of these the question would be very imperfectly decided.

Among the patients received into regimental hospitals there are usually many whose affections are of short duration, or void of danger, as patients with the itch, punished men, slight venereal cases, &c. by which the number of the sick is increased, while the proportion of deaths is diminished: but cases of this description are not received into the dépôt-hospital, grave cases only being admitted; among which the risk of mortality is of course considerable. Subject therefore to an allowance for the many slight cases above mentioned, the proportion of the number of deaths in regimental hospitals to the number of sick in these, seems to be a just criterion of the success of the medical treatment employed by the regimental surgeons, provided that general hospitals do not exist in their neighbourhood, into which the more dangerous cases of illness may be removed, (as is commonly done) but that the sick remain entirely under the care of their respective surgeons from the commencement to the termination of their disorders; and as there are now only two general hospitals in England, and as these cannot relieve the regimental hospitals of more than a very small part of such dangerous cases, I am willing to consider the table of mortality in the regimental hospitals, given by Dr. M'Grigor from official documents at the end of his book, as affording a fair criterion of the treatment in them. With regard, however, to general hospitals it will be shewn that, although a small mortality in them may be regarded as a strong presumptive evidence of the judicious treatment of the patients under cure in them, yet the converse of the proposition is by no means true, i. e. it is not true that a great mortality in general hos-

pitals is an argument against the propriety of the medical practice therein. This is explained by the state in which patients are sent into these hospitals, whose diseases often have already proceeded to an incurable stage, and who, as will be proved, have sometimes but a few hours to live, after being admitted. I have said in p. 32 of my Letter, "neither is it rare that regimental surgeons, having patients in their own hospitals whose lives they despair of, send them into the general hospitals, sometimes when there is danger of their expiring on the way, in order that their deaths may not happen in the hospital of the regiment, and that the responsibility thereof may attach solely to the officers of the hospital staff;" and although I had myself had abundant experience of the truth of this statement, yet being aware how disagreeable the mention of such a truth would prove to regimental surgeons like Dr. M'Grigor, I had willingly, in order to confirm my statement, quoted the testimony of Dr. Jackson on this subject, who, from having himself been surgeon of a regiment, and having often stood forth as the advocate of regimental surgeons, was not likely to be suspected of advancing any assertions to their prejudice, without sufficient foundation. Dr. M'Grigor, however, in noticing the above passage has entirely passed over the corroborating evidence of Dr. Jackson, and treating the fact as if it were unknown, and as if the truth of it rested only upon my authority, indulges himself with calling it "a rash assertion," to which "he gives not the smallest credit," declaring "the charge a libel on the whole body of regimental officers." For the correctness of my statement I may appeal with confidence to every medical officer, besides Dr. Jackson, who has served even for a short time in general hospitals. Several staff and regimental medical officers with whom

I have conversed since the publication of my Letter, have frankly owned that they have sometimes sent their sick into general hospitals in the manner stated. I have a letter before me from Dr. Roberts, who was till lately physician to the army, and served several years in the West Indies during the last war, in which, speaking of the state in which patients were sent to the general hospital at St. George's in Grenada, while he had the superintendence of them, and while Dr. M'Grigor was there, he says that "they were brought frequently in *articulo mortis*, many dying *in transitu* from the bier to the bed." As occurrences of this kind have been so numerous, it is surprising that Dr. M'Grigor, who pretends to a complete knowledge of all the circumstances incidental to general hospitals, should venture to deny them; and his denial seems the more extraordinary, because several instances of them are mentioned (as will presently be shewn) in those very "returns from the general hospital of the Isle of Wight" to 20th April 1808, from which he has calculated the mortality therein as being in the proportion of one out of ten patients, and which he must be supposed to have seen before he could be enabled to make that calculation.

But of all the general hospitals, which are now, or have at any time been established in any part of the world, for the sick of the British army, there is no one which is less proper than this of the depot at the Isle of Wight, to be made the subject of a comparison with Regimental hospitals, for the purpose of establishing the just proportion which the mortality happening in the latter bears to that happening in general hospitals. This unfitness for comparison arises from two causes which do not belong in common to general hospitals, but are peculiar to the depot hospital. The first of these peculi-

arities is, that the last mentioned hospital is principally destined to receive the sick of the *depôt*; and as its garrison chiefly consists of recruits and volunteers, who in general are extremely ignorant or negligent of the means of preserving their healths, and who often have but just received their bounty money, and not being under the usual controul while it lasts, indulge every intemperate passion; or of soldiers who have been invalided on account of age or infirmities; it is evident that such subjects cannot fail to be more liable to sickness, and also to be liable to sickness in a severer degree than the soldiers of regiments, who, besides being disciplined, have almost always been selected as robust and healthy; since all others are either rejected at first from the regiments, or discarded or invalided, when they become unfit afterwards for active service: and it is likewise evident, for the same reason, that the sick in the *Depôt* hospital are patients of a description much less favourable to successful treatment than those who commonly fall under regimental practice. It is further to be remarked that of those sick recruits, or invalids, the *worst cases only* are in general admitted into the hospital, the rest (who if they were with the regiment, would most of them be received into the regimental hospitals, and who commonly amount to about sixty) being for want of room in the hospital, kept and treated in the barracks, or at the out posts, and being in fact considered as not belonging to the *depôt* hospital, and accordingly not included in the sick returns of that hospital. The other peculiarity is that all descriptions of sick are admitted into the *depôt* hospital in all stages of disease, and at all periods, from Ireland, Guernsey and Jersey, from every foreign station, and from the shipping at Spithead, Cowes, and Ryde, there being at this time no other general hospital established on any part of the coast

to receive patients arriving from those stations; and it is of essential importance to remark that the chief mortality at the *depôt* hospital occurs, not among the sick who have been sent from the adjoining barracks, but among those sent from the shipping, &c. of whom, most of the cases of acute disease are brought in too advanced a stage, and most of those of chronic disease have been previously discharged from hospitals abroad as worn out by pulmonary consumption, dysentery, visceral obstructions, or scrophulous, cancerous or syphilitic affections; and being considered as generally incurable, have been sent home to linger out the remaining few weeks or months of their lives in the hospital at the Isle of Wight.

After this explanation it must be unfair and indeed absurd to compare the *depôt* hospital with regimental hospitals, and still more so to found the comparison wholly upon the numbers of the sick and of the dead in these two species of establishments, between which there is so great a dissimilarity in the description of the sick admitted into each. The reader will therefore be able to estimate justly the candour of Dr. M'Grigor in bringing into comparison hospitals which are destined for such different purposes.

The table which I now subjoin will exhibit the number of patients who died in the *depôt* hospital, during the month ending on the twentieth of April, (which Dr. M'Grigor unfairly substituted for that of March) and also their diseases, the length of time they had been in the hospital previously to their deaths, the places whence they were sent, and the disorder which terminated their lives. For the accuracy of this table I can pledge myself, as it is founded upon, and a great part of it copied verbatim from, authentic documents.

Men's Names.	Days on which they died.	Where received.	Disease.	Remarks.
John Phillips	25th March	As an out-post	Inflammation of the brain.	Received in the last stage of the disorder
William Pugh	30th ditto	As an out-post	Inflammation of the lungs.	Ditto died in a few hours after admission
Henry Taylor	Ditto	Parkhurst Barracks	Ditto	
John King	Ditto	Seabourn	Ditto	
George Warden	31st ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Died before he was regularly admitted
Kenith Korb	3d ditto	A transport at Cove	Inflammation of the lungs	Received in the last stage of the disorder
Thomas Rosb	5th ditto	Seabourn	Inflammation of the lungs	Received in the last stage of the disorder
George Grist	6th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
John Lewis	11th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
Robert Edwards	12th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
Robert White	13th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
Robert Edwards	14th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
James Ferris	15th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
Patrick Conolly	16th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
William London	17th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
James Warden	18th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
James Warden	19th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
Patrick Young	20th ditto	Ditto	Ditto	
William Wall	21st ditto	Ditto	Ditto	

N. B. Dr. McGee has stated the number of deaths in the Depot Hospital during the month to have been 55; but it is presumed that this has been an error in the transcribing copyist, the total number being 54 as exhibited above, and the number stated in the official return being only 53, one of the men, John King, having died before he was regularly admitted, on which account he could not with propriety be included in that return.

By the foregoing table it will be perceived that of the twenty-four patients who died in the depot hospital during the month ending on the 20th April, only five had been sent from the barracks at Parkhurst, to which it is attached, the remainder having been received from other quarters, viz. fourteen from distant out-posts, and five from transports; also that of these twenty-four, not less than one half died within three days from the time of their admission, viz. Phillips, Fair, King, Ellis, Ramshaw, Grist, Beadle, Warden, London, Watson, Taylor, and Robson, which interval it will doubtless be allowed is in general much too short to afford any probable chance of success from the treatment of men sent under so many disadvantages, and in so advanced a stage of their disorders; and it will farther be perceived that of these twelve not fewer than six (those whose names are the first mentioned) died on the very day they were admitted, and three others on the day following their admission: these facts, while they prove how little the mortality happening in a general hospital can be deemed a proof of improper medical practice therein, will also fully confirm my statement concerning the hopeless condition in which patients are often received into general hospitals.

It will likewise be observed that there were thirteen of those twenty-four patients who are stated to have died of pneumonia, and that ten of the thirteen were sent from the outposts; and it is proper to mention some particulars concerning these last. The barracks at Parkhurst, which generally contain about 1700 men, being insufficient for the accommodation of all the recruits, invalids, &c. constituting the garrison of the depot, the remainder of the men, who amounted, during the period in question,

on an average to about 1600, were quartered at Sandown and other outposts, where they were lodged principally in ill-constructed barns, many of them standing in exposed situations and near swampy grounds, buildings which were certainly very little adapted for the prevention of disease, especially during a season unusually inclement. In these miserable quarters the men were extremely crowded; they were also placed at a distance from their officers, and they had besides an easy access to spirituous liquors; and under these circumstances they readily contracted and communicated disease. Dispersed too in detached and distant buildings, many men were attacked, especially by the prevailing disorder, pneumonia, and were left through their own negligence, or that of the non-commissioned officers, several days before they were reported ill to the medical officers; moreover, as there was neither hospital accommodation, nor the other means at the outposts, which were requisite for the suitable treatment of the more severe cases, it became necessary to remove them to the dépôt hospital, and during this removal their affections were aggravated by exposure in very unfortunate weather, by the motion of the carriages, and by the loss of some valuable time in their treatment; nor were these all the causes which operated against their recovery, for it is stated in the official returns, "that upon an anatomical examination of many of those cases of pneumonia, it was ascertained that there had been an affection of the lungs of long standing, which owing to the severity of the weather, was rapidly brought to a fatal conclusion," and this is a consideration which for reasons already mentioned, cannot be offered in behalf of the majority of cases of pneumonia which proved fatal in the regimental hospitals during the same season.

After these explanations it will perhaps be thought that enough has been said to remove the unjust impression, which Dr. M'Grigor endeavoured to fix in the minds of his readers, concerning the treatment of the sick in the Isle of Wight hospital, by adducing the monthly return of the 20th April which he well knew would be remarkably unfavourable in appearance to that establishment. But although no fair comparison can be instituted between hospitals so dissimilar in the most important points as that of the dépôt and those of regiments, I shall beg permission, in order to place things in a more just light than that in which they must be placed if only their respective returns for a single month be compared together, to lay before the reader a table containing the numbers of the sick and the dead in both species of hospitals during the two months which preceded and those which followed the month of April selected by Dr. M'Grigor, as those numbers were stated in the monthly returns presented by the army medical board to the commander in chief, with the correction already noticed of twenty-four instead of twenty-five deaths in the dépôt hospital during the month ending the 20th April.

Periods of the returns.	In regim. hosp.		In dépôt hosp.	
	Sick.	Dead.	Sick.	D. #4
For the month ending on the 20th February	7006	292	256	11
Do. 20th March	7966	411	258	5
Do. 20th April	7763	472	249	24
Do. 20th May	6738	351	223	7
D. 20th June	6055	140	223	5

Total during the five months 36063 1566 1203 52

By making an average of the numbers in the above

columns, and comparing their respective results, it will be found that the proportion of the deaths to the sick is the same in both species of hospitals, (viz. forty-three deaths out of one thousand sick) with the very slight difference of one in two hundred and sixty deaths, which however is in favour of the dépôt hospital. But although the mortality thus appears equal, yet on considering the dissimilarity of the circumstances under which it took place in each, on recollecting that in the dépôt hospital none but serious cases of disease are admitted, and that of these a considerable number are sent either in a dying or an incurable state, and that in the regimental hospitals, on the contrary, the sick list is swelled by numerous slight cases, and the patients are almost uniformly received and treated at the very commencement of their disorders, the reader will probably feel it but reasonable and just to conclude that the important comparative disadvantages attending the former, could not have been counterbalanced, nor the proportion of deaths in it have been prevented from greatly surpassing that in the latter, otherwise than by the more proper treatment which the sick in the dépôt hospital received; and for this they have been indebted to the superior professional ability of its* medical officers, and to the benefits of the general

* Dr. M'Grigor thought it "incumbent on him," when making his very unfair statement of the mortality in the dépôt hospital during the month ending on the 30th of April, "to declare that he knows Drs. Moore and Lempriere, who are in charge of this hospital, to be men of superior talents, great attention, and of no common degree of medical science." If he had however sincerely intended to do justice to these two officers, he would either have obtained from comparing establishments so different from each other, or in making the comparison, he would

hospital system;" a system which the commissioners of military enquiry, misled by a few interested individuals, have represented as injurious to the service and fit to be abolished.

It will probably be objected that five months are too short a space for such a comparison as I have made, and I do not mean to maintain the contrary, but besides the difficulty of fixing upon any period which shall be free from objection, I have not the requisite means of making a proper comparison for a long term, having been refused by Mr. Knight *even the sight* of the official returns in his possession. Dr. M'Grigor has perhaps intended to employ, as the basis of such a comparison, the space of twelve months, viz. from May 1807 to April 1808, for which he has given at the end of his publication the monthly numbers of the sick, and the deaths, in the regimental hospitals, and in the Isle of Wight general hospital respectively, taken as he states from "the monthly returns of sick and deaths in the army of Great Britain." According to his table it appears that during those twelve months the sum of the sick in regimental hospitals was 61,585, of whom 1,987 died, and that the sum of the sick in the dépôt hospital was 2,647 of whom 129 died, and from these sums he calculates the proportion of mortality to have

have explained the principal differences between them, so as to create no unjust impressions on the subject, and to leave the merits of these gentlemen to rest on their real grounds. But he has equally neglected each of these alternatives, because he had no such intentions; and the sole object of his insidious compliment was to persuade the reader that the mortality in general hospitals, must always greatly exceed that in regimental, since it did so in the dépôt hospital, under physicians of such "superior talents," &c.

been as one in thirty-one in the former and as one in twenty and a half in the latter. On the accuracy of his numbers, I cannot entirely depend, because I find that he has erred in stating the deaths of the dépôt hospital to have amounted only to 129, although in reality they amounted to 137, during the period which I presume him to have meant, viz. from the 21st April 1807, to 20th April 1808 inclusive. I therefore conceive that the proportion of the mortality is actually as one in nineteen, supposing the sum of the sick to have been what he states, 2,647; to the correctness of which I however cannot speak. But admitting his other calculations to be just, and the mortality in the regimental hospitals to have been only one in thirty-one, or thirty-two in 1000, while in the dépôt hospital it was one in nineteen, or fifty-two in 1000, (which is certainly a proportion very dissimilar from that afforded by the returns of the five months lately given), the reader will not, I am persuaded, think that this result can materially invalidate the observations just made in regard to the superior treatment of the patients in the latter establishment, when he is informed that of the 37 patients who died therein during the interval specified, a very small part, not exceeding twenty-five nor perhaps twenty, had been sent from Parkhurst barracks; that many of the remainder had been received in a *dying state*, like a great part of those admitted in the month of April, and that not fewer than *sixty-seven of those men died of pulmonary consumption*, nearly the whole of whom came from foreign stations, and were brought in the confirmed or incurable stage of this malady: for certainly the dépôt hospital will not be deemed chargeable with a mortality which was the unavoidable consequence of

such causes, operating upon subjects removed beyond any possible controul of its medical officers.

Such are the remarks which, in compliance with the call made on me by Dr. M'Grigor, it has seemed necessary to submit concerning the Isle of Wight hospital; and to these I shall only add a few others, which the importance of this subject to the welfare of the sick soldier demands. On referring to the extract from Dr. M'Grigor's book at the beginning of this section, it will be seen that when he adduced the return of that hospital to compare it with the returns of the regimental hospitals, he spoke of the former as being "the only general hospital now existing" in this country. In saying this he has added one more to his already too numerous mis-statements; there being another, the York hospital at Chelsea, which if he had been at all desirous of a fair comparison of mortality, between a general hospital, and the regimental hospitals, was much more fit to be made the subject of that comparison than the dépôt hospital, because it was much less liable to those casualties of *foreign* origin which are the chief means of increasing the offensive number of the deaths in the latter establishment. But a fair comparison was not his aim; and therefore he, who is so forward to accuse me of having suppressed the sick returns for April, which in fact were not made out, and consequently not in existence when the last sheet of my letter was actually in the press, has avoided all mention of the York hospital, although it is strictly for every purpose of comparison a *general* hospital, since it is constantly receiving sick soldiers from all regiments, and is attended by an army physician, by staff-surgeons, a staff apothecary, and hospital mates, as is usual with other general hospitals, circumstances of which Dr. M'Grigor could not possibly

be ignorant, especially as the York hospital is now under the immediate superintendence of Mr. Knight, in whose office he was furnished with all the returns and information it afforded. This hospital has, it is true, recently undergone some change in a part of its establishment, and has been placed, probably by way of experiment, on what is improperly called the regimental plan, i. e. on a reduced scale of officers and servants, &c. a plan which at first struck almost every person acquainted with general hospitals as full of inconvenience, and which I understand every day's experience has since shown to be in a great measure impracticable, as well as inadequate to the ends for which general hospitals were designed; but this change has not in any respect altered its original object and nature, for it has continued to receive sick soldiers generally, and to be attended by nearly the same staff officers and the same servants as before; and it is therefore in every just sense of the word as truly a general hospital as formerly, and as such ought to have been at least comprehended, if not solely introduced into Dr. M'Grigor's comparison. It was not, however, a fair but a specious comparison which he desired to submit to his reader; and with this motive he did not scruple to suppress the return of the York hospital that he might be enabled to state, as the result of his plausible comparison for April, "that while the mortality in the regimental hospitals, great indeed he must acknowledge, was in the proportion of one out of 16, that in the general hospital in the Isle of Wight was not less than 1 out of 10;" whereas, if he had candidly noticed the other return, he would have been under the mortifying necessity of adding that in the general hospital at Chelsea the mortality was in the proportion of 1 out of 119, i. e. was seven times and an half less than

in his favourite regimental hospitals. Not wishing however to take any undue advantage of the return of a single month, I shall here give the numbers of the sick and the deaths in the York hospital for the five months ending on the 20th of June 1808, that they may be compared with those already adduced for the same periods.

Period of the returns.	In York gen. hosp.	
	Sick.	Dead.
For the month ending on the 20th February	134	2
Do. 20th March	104	2
Do. 20th April	119	1
Do. 20th May	127	6
Do. 20th June	102	3
Total number during the five months	586	14

By reducing the above numbers to the same ratio as those of the former table, it will be found that the proportion of mortality in the York Hospital during these five months was only as 24 deaths in 1000, while in the other Hospitals it was as 43 in 1000, or in other words that it was in the former, compared with the latter, rather less than in the small proportion of 4 to 7. Moreover, as I felt it right to notice the proportion of mortality in the latter hospitals during the 12 months ending on the 20th April 1808, as adduced by Dr. M'Grigor, I think it equally right to state that also in the York hospital during the same space. The aggregate of the numbers of the sick therein as mentioned in the monthly returns for that period amounts to 1062; and the aggregate of the deaths to 13; which sums, being reduced to the same ratio with the former numbers, give the proportion of mortality as 12 in 1000 in the York hospital, while it was as 32 in 1000, in the regimental hospitals. Hence it results that al-

though the York hospital, like other *general* hospitals, receives principally grave cases of disease, and is therefore under great disadvantage in this respect when compared with the regimental hospitals, in which numerous slight cases are always to be found, the mortality in it is to that in the regimental hospitals, as only three to eight. These numbers and proportions, therefore, if they should not be thought to decide completely the question at issue, will at least point out the degree of credit due to Dr. M^cGrigor's assertion that, "out of any given number sent to the general hospital, and an equal number in the same disease and the same stages of it, retained in the regimental hospitals, a *much larger* proportion of the former than of the latter fell victims to disease." (page 7 of his Letter); and they may farther indicate the essential services which well appointed general hospitals are capable of rendering to the army. The very unfair mode too in which Dr. M^cGrigor has proceeded in his endeavour to represent general hospitals as pernicious and unnecessary, will probably be deemed an argument that he was unable to arraign those establishments upon any liberal and just grounds, notwithstanding all the official facilities which he received for that purpose.

In p. 13. Dr. M^cGrigor endeavours, but without success, to excuse himself for having advanced a very disgraceful charge against the regimental surgeons who served in the British army on the continent in the years 1794 and 1795, i. e. that of having neglected their duty and become careless about the sick of their regiments, because these latter had been sent to general hospitals, according to the invariable usage, not only of British, but of other European armies, in similar circumstances:

to account for this alleged misconduct he represents medical men as being of an "irritable genus" and thinks *this* to be a sufficient reason for "dissatisfaction and disgust," in the regimental surgeons, on account of the customary and at that time necessary removal of their sick to the general hospitals; a removal which even Dr. Jackson represents them as being sometimes improperly desirous of promoting in order to rid themselves of the trouble and responsibility of keeping the sick under their own care. (1805. p. 61.)

At p. 14. he asserts that in 1794 "the generality of regimental surgeons were of considerable standing in the service, and many of them were looked up to for professional ability, &c." Of the truth of this observation regarding their length of service, he might have given himself as an instance, having first entered the army in that very year; and of their professional ability an account may be found in the *Observations* lately published by the Surgeon-general, p. 18.

In p. 15. he charges me with having misrepresented (at page 38 of my Letter) the account given by Dr. Jackson of the mortality from fever in the 88th regiment during the campaign of 1794 in Flanders, and having thus "betrayed either wilful ignorance, or a studied desire to mislead," &c. To ascertain the injustice of this charge, let it be remembered that Dr. Jackson in the chapter to which I referred (without pretending to state his precise words) had undertaken to give "a short history of the origin and progress of contagious fever, as it appeared in different divisions of the British army," &c.; and at p. 21, he had mentioned very particularly the mortality occasioned by this fever in the 80th and 88th regiments, adding that "it was exceedingly great;"

and as he no where else mentions any other regiment in which it appears to have been so great, I naturally considered him as representing this to be the greatest mortality which occurred in the British army at that time; and I have as yet no reason to suspect that I was mistaken, since even Dr. M'Grigor, with all his alacrity to contradict, has not ventured to mention any other regiment in which the mortality was so great as in the 80th and 88th; and I know that a very general belief exists in the army that the 88th regiment was particularly unfortunate in respect of great and almost constant sickness during the last war; i. e. while Dr. M'Grigor was surgeon to that regiment. But even by the least favourable construction, the utmost difference between Dr. Jackson's statement and mine is only that which may be supposed to exist between the "greatest mortality," (which expression does not, like Dr. Jackson's, necessarily imply that the deaths were very numerous) and a degree of mortality which was "exceedingly great;" and of this difference Dr. M'Grigor is at full liberty to avail himself.

I come now to one of the most libellous parts of Dr. M'Grigor's pamphlet, I mean that which relates to the transactions at Grenada in the year 1796; and here I must beg my readers to recollect that the 88th regiment, was one of those which embarked and sailed for the West Indies about the end of the year 1795, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and which were ordered first to Barbadoes, (as the place of rendezvous) where the greatest part of this force arrived, and sailed again on the 23rd of April 1796, against the island of St. Lucia, which capitulated on the 25th May following. After this capture, the British army, excepting the troops left to occupy the various posts in St. Lucia, was divided

into two parts, of which one was sent to St. Vincent's, and the other to Grenada; and both sailed from St. Lucia for their respective destinations on the 3rd and 4th of June. I accompanied the division which went with Sir R. Abercrombie to St. Vincent's. The other, as appears by his dispatch dated St. Vincent's the 22nd June, landed at Palmiste near Gouyave (in Grenada) where the enemy had their principal posts, on or about the 5th of June.

After this explanatory statement I beg leave to quote three short passages from p. 227, 8, of Dr. M'Grigor's "Medical Sketches."

"In Barbadoes, both in the end of 1795, and in the beginning of 1796, the only disease which prevailed was typhus. The 88th regiment was healthy at St. Lucia, and continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there, or as long as they remained to the windward side of the island. This was likewise the case with the 10th, 25th; and other regiments. It was only after our return to St. George's, and to Richmond Hill, after we had communication with the 68th regiment and the general hospitals, where the yellow fever had for many months prevailed, that it appeared in the 88th and in the other corps."

"On the 12th July 1796, a detachment of the 88th regiment was embarked at Grenada, in the Betsey transport, for England. We embarked one hundred and forty."

"We sailed from Grenada on the 19th of July."

As I had served at the reduction of St. Lucia and was acquainted with all the facts I have just extracted from Sir R. Abercrombie's dispatches, I naturally concluded, after reading the first of the passages above quoted, which was clearly intended by Dr. M'Grigor to describe the state of

health of his regiment in its progress from island to island, in the West Indies, that the 88th regiment must have been in St. Lucia (as indeed a part of it was) and that it had proceeded thence to Grenada, (as the part just mentioned did proceed) with the division which was sent thither a few days after the surrender of St. Lucia, and arrived in Grenada on or about the 5th June; and as Dr. M'Grigor had stated positively that the 88th regiment "continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there," it necessarily followed (supposing his foregoing statement to be true) that the 88th regiment must have "continued to be pretty healthy," until about the 5th of September; and as he had mentioned in the two last of his passages quoted, that he embarked for England on the 12th of July, and sailed from Grenada on the 19th of that month, in the Betsey transport, it also followed as another necessary consequence, that he must have left that island nearly seven weeks before the sickness and mortality occurred, which in his evidence, he declared he had observed personally at Grenada. Dr. M'Grigor every where in his publication of 1804, mentioned the 88th in such a manner as to lead me to a belief that the whole of it had reached Barbadoes, and gone thence with the army under Sir R. Abercrombie to St. Lucia, and afterwards to Grenada with the 27th and 57th, and other regiments sent to that island, after the capitulation of St. Lucia. I have, however, lately and with some difficulty ascertained that a considerable part of the 88th regiment (under lieutenant-colonel, now major-general Beresford) which embarked and sailed with Sir R. Abercrombie in 1795, did not finally proceed to the West Indies, having been driven back to England a second time and suffered to remain behind;

and that, of the detachments which did reach Barbadoes, one of about 145 men under Major Houston was sent thence (with Dr. M'Grigor) directly to Grenada, where it arrived on the 4th March, 1796; that two other detachments, including the grenadier company, and amounting to about 160 men, were employed under Sir R. Abercrombie at the capture of St. Lucia, and sent afterwards from that island to Grenada (with the 27th, 57th, and other regiments) where they landed about the 5th of June; and as this part of the regiment appears to have exceeded in number the detachment sent to Grenada in March, I conclude it must be that which Dr. M'Grigor mentioned and understood to be the "regiment" when he observed in his Medical Sketches that the "88th regiment was healthy at St. Lucia, and continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there;" for certainly no other part of the 88th regiment was ever at St. Lucia during or before the year 1796, nor has been there since. Now if these two companies or detachments were what he understood and designated as "the regiment" at St. Lucia, they must or ought to have been what he called the regiment, when he stated it to have continued healthy for three months after their arrival at Grenada, from St. Lucia; and therefore my whole calculation, and every conclusion depending upon it, were strictly just *so far as his own account*, on which I solely relied, was true, and the contradiction between his publication of 1804, and his evidence as given to the commissioners in 1807, still subsists undiminished. Astonished by this contradiction and yet willing to believe that one of Dr. M'Grigor's accounts was true, I gave a preference to that published by him in 1804, as being by much the more copious and circumstantial, and

as having been written without any apparent motive for deviating from the truth. It seems, however, from recent information, that I was misled by trusting to this account, and that the sickness mentioned by Dr. M'Grigor had nearly attained its greatest elevation, at St. George's, about the time of his departure from Grenada, though this was not the case in some other parts of the island, particularly *la Gouave*, where it greatly increased in the month of August. My error, however, in this respect, must be ascribed solely to Dr. M'Grigor's erroneous statement on which I relied exclusively; indeed I did not pretend to have any other than his own authority, and avowedly contented myself with opposing the statement in question to the testimony given by him to the commissioners: for I did not personally reach Grenada until February, 1797. Instead therefore of blaming me, it is incumbent on Dr. M'Grigor to atone to the public for his misrepresentation on this subject, and in an especial manner to atone to myself, for the groundless, and most offensive imputations of falsehood, &c. which he has endeavoured to fix upon me, at p. 37. of his Letter to the Commissioners, solely on account of this error produced by his own misrepresentation.

I am now therefore to admit that Dr. M'Grigor was in Grenada during a considerable part of the sickness which occurred there in 1796; but this admission will not affect anything else mentioned in my Letter to the Commissioners concerning the contradiction subsisting between his testimony as given to them, and the statement published by him in 1804, respecting the transactions at Grenada in 1796. To demonstrate this contradiction I beg leave first to transcribe the account given by the commissioners (at p. 22.) of the testimony delivered at their board by

Dr. M'Grigor, viz. "Dr. M'Grigor has noticed in the West Indies, as well as in Flanders, the superiority of the regimental over the general hospitals, in respect of the treatment of the sick; for whilst he served as a regimental surgeon in Grenada in 1796, the mortality under the regimental treatment was trifling; but when, on the return of the army to *Martinique*,* the sick were sent to the general hospitals, the mortality became very considerable." To prove that this pretended superiority of the regimental over the general hospitals was not believed by Dr. M'Grigor at the time when he published his Medical Sketches, (i. e. in 1804 when the transactions at Grenada must have been more within his recollection than in 1807,) I adduced in my Letter to the Commissioners the following extract from Dr. M'Grigor's publication, viz. "The 88th regiment continued pretty healthy at Grenada for three months after their arrival there, or as long as they remained to the windward-side of the island. This was likewise the case with the 10th, 25th, and other regiments. It was only after our return to St. George's and to Richmond-hill, after we had communication with the 68th regiment and the general hospitals, where the yellow fever had for many months prevailed, that it appeared in the 88th, and in the other corps." I next pointed out the manifest discordance between this latter statement, and the evidence which its author gave before the commissioners; and this I did in the following terms. "Now it is well known that the *windward* or *eastern* parts of the islands in the West Indies, are generally the *most healthy*, and Dr. M'Grigor in the work before

* Here the commissioners have erroneously substituted *Martinique* for *St. George's*, the chief town in Grenada.

us, naturally and justly ascribed the absence of disease among the regiments before mentioned *solely* to the circumstance of their having been stationed in the windward parts of Grenada. He manifestly had not, while writing that work, the least idea of ascribing it to any superiority or difference in the *regimental* over the *general hospital treatment*; neither had he then the smallest disposition to suspect that the subsequent mortality arose from any such difference. He was, and perhaps now is, a believer in the contagion of the yellow fever, and it is to *that cause alone* that he, in this work, intended to impute the change in question. He is far from alluding in any way whatever to any thing unfavourable in the treatment of the sick in the general hospitals at Grenada; on the contrary, he says, the mortality resulted, not from *treatment* but from a "*communication with the 68th regiment (which is totally distinct from treatment)*" and the *general hospitals*." This I believed, and still believe to be a fair comment on Dr. McGrigor's text. He particularly connects the continuance of *health* in the different corps with their continuance at "the windward side of the island," making the former to depend on the latter, as *cause and effect*; and in conformity with his notions of the contagious quality of the yellow fever, he considers their subsequent sickness as an effect of their removal to St. George's and Richmond Hill, which produced their communication with the 68th regiment, and with the general hospitals, for communication alone would not create disease where contagion did not exist. This clear and intelligible language, Dr. McGrigor has chosen to perplex by a mass of absurdity and contradiction interposed, as the cuttle-fish interjects its atramental secretion, to produce obscurity and to render itself invisible. He charges me

with commenting on his statement in a disingenuous manner, endeavouring "to impress the commissioners with a belief that he *now* represents the *treatment* in regimental to be superior to that in general hospitals, and that he, *at the period alluded to*, entertained no such opinion."—Made sensible by my comment of the inconsistency between his book and his evidence, and anxious to elude it, Dr. McGrigor tells the commissioners that "if they will take the trouble to re-peruse the passage from his Medical Sketches, they cannot fail to perceive that not a single syllable is said concerning the *treatment* in either of these hospitals—no opinion advanced in regard to their comparative advantages in respect of treatment." By this true, though inconsiderate declaration, he unintentionally confirms the accuracy of what I had stated to be his opinions while writing that work, and then he has the confidence to make the following assertion, "nor have I, on *any occasion whatever*, expressed any opinion on *this* point. It is the *system itself*" (meaning the system on which general hospitals are established or conducted) "and not the practitioners or the *treatment* that I have uniformly affirmed."* In this assertion Dr. McGrigor advances an

* Besides the acknowledgement which these words convey, Dr. McGrigor has thought it proper to state in p. 7. of his Letter that "it was not his intention to impeach either the talents or the attention of the medical officers in the general hospitals." He may perhaps after reading my publication, have repented of having advanced so untenable and incredible an opinion as that the sick should have worse medical treatment under physicians and surgeons with superior qualifications in general hospitals, than under the regimental surgeons, and may therefore wish to have it believed that he only objected to the "*system itself*" and not "the practitioners or the *treatment*;" though I confess myself unable to comprehend what he means by a system for hospitals which has no connection with "the

heavy accusation against the commissioners; for they have certainly stated in the passage already quoted from p. 20, of the Fifth Report, that Dr. M'Grigor had "noticed" in various places "the superiority of the regimental over the general hospitals in respect of treatment of the sick;" and he now declares positively in the face of the commissioners, that "he has not on any occasion whatever expressed any opinion on the comparative advantages of these two kinds of hospitals in respect of treatment;" he must therefore be regarded as publicly accusing them of no less than perverting his true meaning and conveying a misrepresentation of his sentiments on an important subject to the foot of the throne, and to both houses of parliament. But although the commissioners have on several occasions misinterpreted the evidence of some of the witnesses examined by them, as has been shewn by Mr. Keate and myself in our late publications, I am happy in believing them to be blameless in the point on which they are now at issue with Dr. M'Grigor. They had indeed imbibed from Dr. Jackson and others very erroneous notions about "army diseases" and "army medical practice" and they had imagined that these diseases and this practice could not be properly understood and conducted in any but regimental hospitals; and it was with these impressions on their minds, and with the expectation of obtaining a full confirmation of them from Dr. M'Grigor and Mr. Borland, that they put to the former the 25th question in

practitioners or the treatment of the sick." But whatever may be the motive which led to these acknowledgements as acts of justice, I am not disposed to take any advantage from them; for as imputations coming from Dr. M'Grigor could give no serious concern to the medical officers of general hospitals, so his recantations can afford no gratification.

Appendix, No. 30, and to the latter the 6th question in App. No. 23. A. Having therefore the treatment of the sick in view, while examining those officers, they necessarily referred the answers given to their questions to such treatment alone, and have naturally and properly reported them in that sense. If it be vexing for the commissioners to be now arraigned in this public manner by onewhom they have cherished and over-valued, it will at least be consoling to them that his charge may easily be repelled by merely quoting his own words against himself.—Dr. M'Grigor in p. 19. of his Letter professing to give the question which the commissioners had put to him on this particular subject writes thus; "In answer to your question 'whether I had observed the comparative advantages of the treatment of the sick in general and regimental hospitals in the West Indies,' I told you that I had." Now it will be perceived that he has here mis-quoted their question; for he substitutes the words "the treatment of the sick" instead of the words which they had used i. e. "taking care of the sick regimentally" (which last words might admit in some degree of the equivocation to which Dr. M'Grigor has recourse,) and by this simple substitution he has unwittingly proved that he understood the question in the sense of the commissioners, i. e. as relating purely to "the treatment of the sick," and has convicted himself of prevarication and marked disrespect towards gentlemen acting under the high authority of Parliament.

Besides the disagreement already noticed between Dr. M'Grigor's testimony as delivered to the Commissioners, and his account of the sickness and mortality in Grenada as published by him in the year 1804, I had alleged at p. 40 of my Letter, "that there was in reality no room of foundation for any such comparison," as Dr. M'Grigor

pretended to have made between the general and the regimental hospitals in that island. In opposition to this, after mentioning his arrival at Grenada on the 4th of March, he asserts p. 36. that "when the army took the field, (which was near the end of that month,) he "as senior surgeon was appointed to the *superintendence of all the military hospitals*; and that during this period he had many and various opportunities of observing the superiority of regimental hospitals." But instead of giving any instances or explanation to render the truth of this naked assertion probable or in any degree credible, he proceeds, p. 36 and 37, to employ vehement and opprobrious language as a means of supplying his absolute want of either fact or argument to establish his assertions. I will not here retaliate by charging him with *positive* falsehood, but I must say that I cannot discover any appearance or possibility of truth in either the former or latter of these statements. At the time when he pretends to have been appointed to superintend all the *military hospitals*, Mr. Horne was garrison surgeon at Grenada, and as such he must have been superior to every regimental surgeon; *he*, therefore, and not Dr. M'Grigor must have had the direction of all the military hospitals, until the arrival of Dr. Riollay, (physician to the forces,) who reached Grenada I believe in about a fortnight after, and brought with him a staff-surgeon and an apothecary, with several hospital mates; and these were soon followed by Dr. Roberts, another army physician, (who reached Grenada on the 14th May,) attended also by a staff-surgeon, an apothecary and hospital mates; so that during a considerable part of the time mentioned by Dr. M'Grigor, there were in Grenada at least *seven* medical officers, who were his superiors, and Dr. Roberts particularly mentions in a

letter to me, dated the 10th of June last, that previous to his arrival, Mr. Horne the garrison surgeon, had, in the exercise of his official duties, made several visits to *La Baye*, where Dr. M'Grigor was employed (at the windward part of the island), and where during these visits he must have superseded Dr. M'Grigor in the alleged superintendence even of the field hospitals, (such as they were) at that place; and Dr. M'Grigor will therefore probably find it difficult to persuade any one who reads this statement, of his having in the year 1796 been the superintendent or director of *all* the military hospitals at Grenada. In regard to Dr. M'Grigor's "many and various opportunities of observing the superiority of regimental hospitals" at Grenada, he has not condescended to give us the least information; a circumstance which to every reflecting mind will appear to warrant conclusions very unfavourable to his veracity. Dr. M'Grigor had particularly selected Grenada as one of two places in which the pretended superiority of regimental hospitals had been decisively manifested to his observation and experience; and it therefore was a duty which he owed to truth and to his own character, when his assertions on this subject were publicly disputed by me, to have stated the principal facts and reasons which had convinced him of the superiority in question; for his own private conviction, were it ever so sincere, could afford no evidence to others; because men are often found to reason ill, and to believe what is not true, either from a particular mental bias, or prejudice, or from defect of intellect, or from not knowing how to reason properly; and on a matter of so much importance, it might be justly expected and required of Dr. M'Grigor, that he should fairly communicate, and enable others to

examine and appreciate, the facts and reasons whence he had deduced his conclusions in favour of regimental hospitals; and I cannot help thinking that he would have done so, if he had believed them capable of bearing examination, and of warranting his conclusions. In such circumstances it cannot be incumbent on me to disprove by *negative* evidence, an assertion which Dr. M'Grigor ought to have supported by *affirmative* or positive testimony; I will however readily undertake to demonstrate the utter impossibility of Dr. M'Grigor's having had "many and various opportunities as he pretends, of observing the comparative advantage of taking care of the sick regimentally, *instead of sending them to general hospitals.*" I have already mentioned at p. 7, that to observe and ascertain the advantages of one species of hospital as compared with another, *both* ought to be placed exactly in similar circumstances with patients of the same ages, constitution, and in the same stages of the same diseases; and that the observer ought to have had frequent and *equal* opportunities of accurately observing both, with various other requisites there described. But certainly nothing like this occurred in Grenada.—Whilst Dr. M'Grigor with his little detachment of 145 men was in the field at the windward part of the island, he was too remote to see or know what occurred in the only general hospitals of the island, i. e. those which were at or adjoining to the town of St. George, and which differed in *every respect* as much as possible from the tents or huts in which alone the sick under Dr. M'Grigor's care or observation were accommodated; the latter were in a comparatively cool and healthy part of the island, whilst the general hospitals, though large and commodious were placed in very in-

salubrious situations; their diseases also were very dissimilar, especially in regard to the yellow fever, which prevailed at St. George's, and in the general hospital, but had not appeared in that part of the island where Dr. M'Grigor was stationed. Yet even in that healthy situation, and with only that trifling mortality which he mentions in his evidence to the commissioners, he thought proper, as I am well informed, to send a considerable number of men of his detachment, and I believe all those that were dangerously ill, to the general hospitals of Mount Cardigan and St. George's; a proceeding utterly inexcusable if he then believed in the alleged superiority of the regimental hospitals, and repugnant also to his evidence, as stated in the Report of the Commissioners; in which he represents the sick as having been treated regimentally while the army continued in the field, and as having *only* been sent to general hospitals when the army returned to quarters. It must be evident, therefore, for many reasons that while the army *kept the field* Dr. M'Grigor could not have had the smallest opportunity of ascertaining by any comparative observations the alleged advantages of regimental over general hospitals. And after the troops returned to quarters, about the end of June, there was if possible even less opportunity; for then, as he tells us, the sick generally were ordered to the general hospitals, and the 88th certainly had no regimental hospital to serve as a point of comparison, which was the case also with other regiments, though not perhaps with every one; but if any of them did establish regimental hospitals, after returning to quarters, this could have happened only a few days before the time when, as Dr. M'Grigor informs us, he embarked for England; and even during

this interval (*much too short for any useful comparison*) Dr. M'Grigor does not appear to have done duty in any regimental hospital, and he certainly did not in any general.

In giving his evidence to the commissioners, Dr. M'Grigor declared that when the sick were ordered to general hospitals after the return of the army to quarters, "then the mortality was very considerable indeed." This, supposing the assertion to be true, would prove nothing in favour of the regimental hospitals, because the yellow fever, which had not appeared among the troops in the field was then prevalent at St. George's, and in the neighbouring forts; and it is well known that a large portion of those who are attacked by *this* fever die of it, whether in hospitals or private houses. But even this last assertion of Dr. M'Grigor, so far as regards his own regiment at least, is denied by Dr. Roberts, who in his letter of the 10th of June, states from the official documents in his possession, that the number of sick of the 88th, who were admitted into the general hospital at St. George's after his arrival there, amounted to eighty-one; "and of these," says he, "seventy-two were returned cured." Whence it appears that the mortality was in the ratio of only one in nine patients, and this, where the yellow fever prevails, is a very moderate proportion. He adds, that during the same period "the 68th regiment (accused unjustly by Dr. M'Grigor of infecting the 88th) sent into the general hospital (for it had literally no regimental hospital) fifty men, of whom forty-three returned cured." Probably these facts and observations will be deemed more than sufficient to refute this part of Dr. M'Grigor's testimony, and therefore I shall abandon the subject and leave him to *reflect* upon

it, and upon the reputation which this, with other assertions on oath, are likely to procure for him; and proceed to entertain my readers with an extraordinary though not solitary, instance of Dr. M'Grigor's dexterity in fabricating untruths, and attributing them to me, in order to procure a pretext for charging me with falsehood.

The fabrication to which I now allude is that wherein he charges me with having in my letter to the commissioners, asserted that his first arrival at Grenada was only in the month of June and not in March 1796, as it appears to have been. The fact however is, that I did not in that letter mention or even hint at the time when I supposed or understood him to have arrived there; I stated on his own authority the time when he left Grenada, but took no notice of that at which I conceived him to have arrived. I was indeed so completely reserved on this subject, that if he had been an indigenous production of that island, and had started up like a toadstool in some uncultivated part of it, he would have found nothing mentioned to the contrary in my letter; yet upon this gratuitous assumption of my having asserted that he had arrived at Grenada in the month of June he addresses me in p. 34 in an *apostrophe*! which as a specimen and illustration of his regard for truth, decency of style, and good manners, I shall subjoin in a note,* not choosing to

* "But, Sir (pardon me, gentlemen, if I address myself to him for a moment) where or whence did you learn that I arrived at Grenada in the beginning of June? Who, or what, is your authority for this assertion? who told you this *important fact*, which has excited in your breast so great a degree of curiosity, and on which hangs the whole of your argument, and your still more detestable charge. No man, I venture to affirm, ever gave you such information. The discovery is wholly

admit such language into my text. Again at p. 36 Dr. M^cGrigor fabricates another falsehood for the sake of imputing it to me, and pretends that I, (in my Letter to the Commissioners) had falsely asserted that his stay in Grenada was only "for five or six weeks;" though in this, as in the former case, I neither asserted, nor intimated, any thing on the subject; and then after vehemently contradicting this (his own) fabricated misrepresentation, he indulges himself, in another effusion of outrageous language which is also subjoined in a note*. I must leave my readers to judge of the deserts of a man, who without provocation, truth, or reason, can condescend to employ such language; my own opinion of his deserts will be

your own, and, Sir, what shall we say of your pretended candour, and respect for truth and character, when we find you either wilfully fabricating, or carelessly assuming dates to suit your own purposes, giving on my authority a statement which I never warranted, and which is disgracefully incorrect?

"I arrived, be it known to you, in Grenada on the 4th of March, and not in June, as you falsely state, and while I thus correct your error, and reprobate the motives in which it seems to have originated, I blush for the man who is capable of committing it."

* "Now, gentlemen, the fact is, that my stay there was not for five or six weeks, as he falsely asserts, but for four or five months; and had Dr. Bancroft's misstatement been made for any other than the infamous purpose of wounding my character, vilifying your labours, and misleading the public mind, I should have treated it with that indulgence, which the fallibility of our nature, and the principles of charity require us to exercise. But when I contemplate the purpose, which this statement subverses; when I regard the motives in which it appears to originate; my indignation swells against the audacity of its author; and I am compelled to tell him publicly the most unpleasant of all truths, that in endeavouring to fix on me, the vilest of all charges, he has himself asserted a most palpable falsehood."

found at the conclusion of this part of my present publication.

To exhaust the patience of my reader as little as possible, I shall pass over nearly seven pages of Dr. M^cGrigor's letter, containing what he probably supposed to be argument, but nothing which requires particular notice from me, (or which it can be expedient for me to discuss with such an opponent) and shall proceed to examine those statements by which he has endeavoured to retaliate for my animadversions on his evidence concerning the detachment of the East Indian army which served in Egypt in 1801. At page 61 of my Letter to the Commissioners I had requested "permission to correct an error into which they had been led" while speaking of that detachment. "You have mentioned," said I to these gentlemen, "in terms of applause that the small medical establishment which then belonged to the Indian army (consisting with the exception of Dr. M^cGrigor and a store-keeper, of only the usual regimental medical officers) "were fully competent to the charge of their own sick," page 24 of your Report. These which are the precise words of the Report I had quoted as such, distinguishing them by inverted commas as is usual, without enquiring how far they were in strict conformity with Dr. M^cGrigor's evidence. He however seizes this as another opportunity of fabricating untruths for the purpose of ascribing them to me, as he did in the other instances just adduced. "The doctor next asserts" (says he in page 44) "that I affirmed in evidence that the medical establishment of the Indian army in Egypt was fully competent to the care of their own sick. Here (he adds) is another of his unaccountable misstatements. A reference to my evidence will convince any reader, the

doctor himself perhaps excepted, that I made no such assertion." Whether or not Dr. McGrigor's evidence exactly warranted the account which the Commissioners have given of it is a point which he may contest with them if he pleases; but it is at least clear that, had truth been of any importance to him, he would not have charged me with a misstatement, which, if it exist, is foreign to me, and belongs wholly to them; for I gave the precise words of the Commissioners as being *their own words*, and not as being the words of Dr. McGrigor. I cannot however avoid here expressing my opinion that the Commissioners were sufficiently warranted, by his evidence, in their account of it; for Dr. McGrigor, after having stated that when the hospital staff, (which was sent from England by the Cape of Good Hope and had been attached to the Indian army for a few months,) was removed from the Indian, and remanded to the British, army, he "resumed the superintendence of the medical department of the Indian army, the regimental surgeons taking care of their own sick *as before*," informed the Commissioners, in answer to their 24th question, that, "from the experience which he had of this system," (i. e. the system on which the medical department of the East India Company's army is conducted,) "during his service with the Indian army, he was of opinion, if a *similar* system was adopted generally in the British army when on foreign stations, that it would be beneficial to the public;" only "making provision for an extraordinary number of wounded men" and as it would have been absurd to suppose that he could have recommended the adoption of that system unless he had been persuaded that the medical department provided by it were adequate to their duties, the Commissioners might have concluded from his former answer, that the small medical establishment

of the Indian army in Egypt *which had no wounded*, were "fully competent to the charge of their own sick."

It is curious to observe the facility with which Dr. McGrigor and his co-adjutors abjure their own statements when proved to be incorrect, and thereby furnish grounds for charging the Commissioners with having misrepresented their assertions, notwithstanding the professions of esteem that have been publicly interchanged between these gentlemen. But the mode in which Dr. McGrigor endeavours to palliate a singular deviation from truth, in a part of his evidence connected with the present subject, is particularly worthy of notice, and is likely to excite in the mind of the reader other emotions besides curiosity. He was eager to disparage the existing medical system of the army, to inculcate the then medical board, (of which Mr. Knight was not a member at that time) and to impress the Commissioners with an high notion of his "experienced and judicious management of the medical department" in Egypt, (in which last object he appears to have succeeded to his wishes) by bringing that system into contrast with the system of the East Indian army, upon his own representations; and when the Commissioners put to him their 20th question, viz. "When you was at the head of the medical staff of the Indian army *sent from Bombay* to Egypt in 1801, what was the medical establishment belonging to *that army*?" he took this occasion (treading in the footsteps of Mr. Borland, see p. 43 of my Letter,) to wander from the subject, which related simply to the army *sent from Bombay*, and to obtrude into his answer an account of a medical staff belonging to *another* force which had been *sent from England* under Sir Samuel Auchmuty; and it is the misrepresentation of facts contained in that account which he attempts to palliate,

as I am about to explain. His words are these, viz., "About a month after our landing at Koffeir," (which happened in June, 1801,) "we were joined by a complete medical establishment, amounting to between twenty and thirty in number, sent from England by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, who took the charge of the medical department of our army." Now the official documents published by Mr. Keate (in p. 39 of his Observations on the Fifth Report,) prove that, instead of being "complete," this staff was incomplete, from having no army physician in it; and that, instead of "amounting to between twenty and thirty persons in number," "it consisted in all," says Mr. Keate, "of but eight persons, viz. one inspector, one purveyor, one surgeon, one apothecary, three hospital mates, and a purveyor's clerk." Dr. McGrigor afterwards tells the Commissioners that "with this staff there was sent out a very large quantity of medical and purveyor's stores, including much wine, sent out in two transports;" whereas the quantity of those stores was very small, for it was but one year's supply for a force of only 2500, that force being one of the weakest expeditions in point of number that are usually sent from this country, and the stores being the least quantity which could with propriety be sent with troops going on a secret service to some part of the East, which was all the information that was communicated on the subject to those who provided the staff and the stores. Instead moreover of "much wine" being included in those stores, "there does not appear," says Mr. Keate, "to have been a single bottle of wine sent from this country;" and instead of the stores having been "sent out in two transports," they were shipped on board of three transports, "not on account of their bulk," as Mr.

Keate informs us, "but for greater safety." By these extracts from Dr. McGrigor's evidence, and the authentic explanations given with them, it will be thought difficult to compress a greater variety or mass of misrepresentation in fewer words, and ingenuity will probably be racked in vain to discover any reasonable excuse for it. Had the statement been made *undisguisedly*, and upon information derived from others, and supposed to be correct, it would still not have been pardonable, because it was made *on oath*, and no one can be warranted in asserting any thing on oath of which he is not morally certain. But even this weak apology cannot be offered in behalf of Dr. McGrigor, who made his statement under circumstances very different from these; for there are positive proofs of his having had direct personal communication with, and therefore knowledge of, six out of the eight persons composing the staff sent from England, viz. the inspector, Dr. Shapter, under whose orders he acted for several months; the purveyor and the apothecary, from both of whom he received for the use of the Indian army the stores and medicines they had in their charge; and the three hospital mates, whom he retained for the Indian service; and there are besides the strongest grounds for presuming that during the march of the army across the Desert of Arabia and their progress down the Nile, (where he acknowledges, in p. xii. of the Introduction to his Medical Sketches, to have received from this British staff "very ready accommodation on every occasion, compliance with every request for assistance, and many things of which an army that had traversed an immense desert was necessarily destitute," and also during their subsequent connection at Rosetta, he must have had frequent communication with the other two, viz.

the staff-surgeon, and the purveyor's clerk, who was charged with the delivery of the stores. It is thus not credible that after an intercourse of at least three months duration, he could have been ignorant that the exact number of the staff in question amounted to eight persons only; yet he did not hesitate to declare on oath that they "amounted to between twenty and thirty;" and having made so serious and lamentable a misstatement, he now comes forward* with the most perfect indifference to fact, in p. 53 of his Letter, "by this statement I have since understood that I have considerably over-rated the number. The error however no wise affects the general question." What Dr. M'Grigor means by a "general question" which is no wise affected by his misrepresentations, I am at a loss to guess. It is clear that the Commissioners availed themselves of the very "circumstances" he had stated about the "complete staff sent out from England," &c. believing them to be true, and em-

* This is not a solitary instance of Dr. M'Grigor's acknowledging with apparent unconcern that his evidence on oath is incorrect, after his error had been discovered and pointed out to him. He found it necessary to write a letter to the Commissioners for the purpose of correcting a very injurious, and as he admits, "a very material" misstatement in his answer to their 4th question to him, which letter is printed in Appendix No. 30. A. Upon this occasion at least he ought cautiously to have adhered to truth; yet he had the assurance to tell the Commissioners in his Letter that "the present magazines of surgical instruments at Porchester, Isle of Wight, and York Hospital are sufficient for all the armies in Europe for a century," which is a gross exaggeration; for if the war shall continue for two or three years longer, these magazines will probably be found so insufficient for the British army alone, that new supplies of those articles will be required.

ployed them as proofs that "the general hospital establishment, including the large quantities of wine, medicines and purveyor's stores belonging to it which usually accompany our foreign expeditions, is *superabundant*, if not altogether an *unnecessary incumbrance*;" (see p. 23 of their Report,) and that if they had been acquainted with the facts such as they were in reality, that erroneous and dangerous proposition would have been without support, and they would consequently never have adopted it. In my mind the real and the only question then before the Commissioners was, whether that establishment was necessary, or whether our soldiers should not in future be sent on expeditions, (the brave army in Portugal, for instance, which has just added so splendid a trophy to the military glory of our nation,) without that medical assistance, and those means of relief, which had hitherto been uniformly found absolutely requisite for the salvation of the greater part of the sick and the wounded, when ever the troops had been employed on active service against the enemy? and I therefore consider Dr. M'Grigor's present attempt to palliate his mischievous offence against truth, by pretending that his statement did not affect that highly important question, as so deep an aggravation of that offence, that I cannot help thinking with Mr. Keate on this subject, "that it will never be possible for me to place confidence in the testimony of one who, after such an injurious and extraordinary misstatement, can manifest so much confidence and so little concern."

In order to remove the erroneous belief which the commissioners had adopted concerning the "full competency" of the original medical establishment of the Indian army to the care of their own sick, I made a few ob-

servations in my Letter which I beg leave to transcribe and insert in this place, viz. "As, during the expedition, the Indian army was never engaged *actively*, i. e. against the enemy, but was generally kept together in healthy stations, and suffered very little sickness, the regimental surgeons might easily have been "fully competent to the charge of their sick," without furnishing a fair example of the inutility of the general hospital system, which it seems intended that they should do. The truth is, however, that, moderate as the sickness of that army was in Egypt, the medical establishment in question were not "fully competent to the charge of their own sick" as is stated. Dr. M'Grigor, on whose statement this assertion of their competency was made, has totally forgotten the dismay which pervaded the medical officers of the Indian army from the *highest* to the lowest, when the plague was officially reported by me to exist in one of the regiments composing that army, although that regiment was his own, the 88th; he has forgotten too the embarrassments it created, and the difficulties of procuring any of those gentlemen to assume what he has since termed "*the post of honour*" (p. 107. of his Medical Sketches), and the ultimate necessity imposed upon the British 'general hospital establishment' (that body which you reprobate on the occasion of this very expedition as a 'superabundant and perhaps altogether unnecessary incumbrance') of taking the sole charge of the plague-patients of the *East Indian* army." Having made these observations I concluded with the following paragraph: "I do not wish to excite painful recollections in the minds of those who served with this army, and I therefore abstain from mentioning any more of the occurrences of that period, of which Dr. M'Grigor will admit that I had *personal* knowledge. My

only object in stating the preceding facts has been to remove your error as to the "full competency" of the Indian medical establishment "to the charge of their own sick."

The explanations which I shall presently offer will prove, as I confidently believe, that these observations are temperate, considering all the circumstances, and also correct in every respect: Dr. M'Grigor, however, has been extremely exasperated at them, and he controverts them by some assertions which are too singular to be passed over; and when he notices the concluding paragraph, with an utter disregard for the customary modes of disputation, he indulges himself in an exclamation* which is subjoined, and which probably few persons will regard as the language of conscious approbation. If any candid reader will be pleased to peruse with attention the passage against which this offensive language was directed, he will, I am persuaded, perceive that it simply expresses my ability to state some occurrences connected with the commencement of the plague in the Indian army, which I thought likely to excite emotions of pain in those who served with that army, and my intention to say nothing on the subject from respect for their feelings; and he will also perceive that it cannot fairly be construed as conveying censure on any individual, much less as containing any "assassin-like insinuations." Virulent language from Dr. M'Grigor I know how to despise; but

* "Away with such dark and assassin-like insinuations. Speak out like a man. I am fully prepared to meet you. I challenge you to state any one circumstance which can occasion me the least pain on recollection; and to compel you, if possible to accept this challenge, I thus publicly declare, that unless you do speak out I shall regard you in no better light, than that of a malignant and dastardly assassin." p. 51.

decent regard for the opinion of others makes it necessary for me to prove, by relating the occurrences to which I then alluded, that I did really suppress facts of painful recollection. I do not however mean to accept the challenge which my opponent gives me "to state any one circumstance which can occasion him the *least* pain on recollection," for if I ever supposed him possessed of humane and virtuous sensibilities, and therefore liable to be afflicted at the remembrance of what happened in Egypt, I can no longer entertain that supposition, when I find that neither the detection nor the recollection of his having made a false and injurious statement on oath, have apparently occasioned the smallest shame or compunction in his mind. It is possible, however, that what I am going to relate may create unpleasant sensations in the minds of some persons of humanity and honour; and if this, which I am far from intending, should happen, I hope these persons will reflect that what I am about to state is extorted from me under the penalty of being considered as "a malignant and dastardly assassin."

The first appearance of the plague in the Indian army was in two black servants of Dr. M'Grigor's regimental hospital, one of whom communicated the disease within a few hours after being infected to the other, who slept by his side. The date of its appearance was, at the latest, the 14th September 1801, because the public orders issued on that day by Major-general Baird, who commanded the Indian army, state that "one of the followers of the army is supposed to have imbibed the infection," i. e. of the plague: I think it, however, very probable from various circumstances that this intimation was not given till the day after the disease was discovered, and that the real date of that event is the 13th Sept.; but having at pre-

sent no decisive proof of this, I shall assume it to have been the 14th; although the concession of a day in the date will be found of some consequence. I had stated in my letter that it was by me that the existence of the disorder was officially reported; and Dr. M'Grigor, in noticing this part, gives a very unfair account of the transaction, viz. "Dr. Bancroft was ordered to visit those patients; he did so, and—never saw them afterwards." The obvious meaning of this passage is that I was *ordered to attend them* in my professional capacity, that I saw them once, and that I disobeyed my *order* and neglected my duty, by not visiting them again. What degree of truth or liberality exists in this account will be easily perceived from the simple statement of the facts which I shall now give. Having come to breakfast with Dr. Franck, (who was the head of the British Medical Staff in Rosetta) I found Dr. M'Grigor in his room, and was told by Dr. Franck that Dr. M'Grigor had that morning observed two patients in his regimental hospital labouring under severe and unusual symptoms, which he apprehended might be those of the plague, and had called on him to request that some medical officer of the British Staff who was acquainted with that disorder, (none of the medical officers of the Indian army having yet seen it) might examine those patients, to ascertain whether they had the plague or not; and he concluded by expressing a wish that, as I had very recently been in charge of the plague patients at Aboukir, I would see the suspected men. With this wish of Dr. Franck I of course readily complied, immediately after breakfast. That I was simply *requested* to visit them, and not *ordered*, as Dr. M'Grigor pretends, will require little argument to prove. The Indian army was distinct from the British; each had its own establishment for the busi-

ness of every department; and the latter army abstained from interfering in the concerns of the former, especially in its medical concerns. It is therefore very unlikely that, under these circumstances, a physician of the one army should have been *ordered* to do any part of the medical duty of the other; and it is yet more unlikely that the usual etiquette would have been broken through, for the purpose of obliging that physician to perform a duty which would not have belonged to him in his own army, i. e. to attend two patients who were *not soldiers*, but followers of the army, and taken from the lowest cast in India. Were it however admitted, though contrary to fact, that I had been "*ordered to visit them*," the sole intention of that order could only have been that I should determine what was their malady; and as I determined that point in *one* visit, I had then completely performed the duty assigned to me, and *all* that Dr. M'Grigor *had solicited*: I am therefore certain that every other person, if standing in the situation of the Doctor, would have done me the justice, when mentioning the transaction, to acknowledge that I had executed all that had been required of me: but Dr. M'Grigor, whose notions of justice and gratitude seem peculiar to himself, has chosen to pervert facts, that he might insinuate against me a dereliction of my duty, in omitting to visit *his* patients afterwards.

But to resume my narrative. I accompanied Dr. M'Grigor to his hospital, where I found the two blacks lying close together on a raised floor in a small room serving as an anti-chamber and passage from the stairs to a large room in the back part of the house, in which the sick of the 88th regiment were lying. I ascended the steps of this raised floor, went to the men, and examined them,

Dr. M'Grigor remaining during that time at *some distance* and near the door; and having satisfied myself of their situation, I rejoined him, stating that one of the patients, who had complained of illness the night before, certainly had the plague, and that, although I could not then pronounce the other to have it, I had no doubt of his being infected, and thought it highly probable, from the state in which he was, that the distinguishing symptoms of the plague would appear on him (as they did) in a few hours. Dr. M'Grigor is very unwilling to admit that a sensation like dismay was excited in any of the medical officers of the Indian army by the discovery of the existence of the plague in their army; and he observes that "should the plague appear in St. George's hospital" (of which I have the honour to be one of the physicians) "he dares to say the doctor," (meaning me) "would be somewhat alarmed, if not for himself, at least for his patients." However true this observation might prove in the case supposed, I cannot discover that it is applicable to the case of Dr. M'Grigor in his hospital at Rosetta; for though I did see alarm depicted upon his countenance, and heard several expressions of concern, apparently very sincere, on my announcing to him the state of his two black servants, I have no recollection that those expressions related in any respect to the pitiable condition of his patients, or to any thing but *himself*: all that I remember him to have then expressed, as we left the room and were descending the stairs, was, that he felt very unwell, that his legs were so feeble as to be scarcely able to support him in going down stairs, and that he had great pain in the upper part of one thigh, near the groin. (which is the common seat of the pestilential tumours called buboes;) he mentioned too, with unfeigned regret that he had the

night before touched, and felt the pulse of, the patient whom I had declared to have the plague, and confessed his apprehensions of being already infected in consequence of that contact: and he finally begged me to walk with him to Dr. Shapter, who lived at a short distance, and to mention to him what I had seen, and what measures I should advise to be taken. To this I consented, and as soon as we had reached Dr. Shapter's, Dr. M^cGrigor said he was exhausted and ill, and told a servant to bring him some wine and water, with which he refreshed himself. Soon after Dr. Shapter entered, when I related the state in which I had found the two men, and recommended that they should be *immediately* removed to a building a little way out of Rosetta, which had been lately used as a pest-hospital for our army, and that several other suitable precautions should *instantly* be adopted with regard to the rest of the black servants, and such men of the 88th regiment as might have had any communication with them. Dr. Shapter lost no time in going to the Indian camp, which was not far to the south of Rosetta, and acquainting General Baird with all that he had heard from me. Presently the General came into the town; and on receiving a message signifying that he desired to see me, I went to meet him, and found him in one of the squares or market-places (bazars) attended by Dr. Shapter, and several other officers of his staff. Here I repeated to him nearly what I had already told Dr. Shapter, and represented in the strongest terms the necessity of an *immediate* separation of the infected and suspected persons from each other and from the sound. When I had done this, an officer high in rank, prompted no doubt by an ill-timed sentiment of humanity, said, alluding to the two patients I had seen, "Poor Devils! if, after all, they should not have

the plague on them now, they will be sure to catch it at the pest-house, or to die there of fright," or words to this effect. Surprized as I was at such a remark in opposition to the opinion I had just delivered, I nevertheless endeavoured to show that the disease of one at least of the patients was *certain* beyond all doubt, and to convince the officers present of the mischief that would ensue if the separation which I had proposed was not made *immediately*. With this our conversation ended; but my remonstrances against delay had very little weight at that time; for it was not till *two* days after, (although Dr. M^cGrigor has chosen to state that it was "*immediately* on the disease being discovered,") that measures were taken for providing a receptacle for the plague patients and a medical officer to attend them, as will be seen by the following public order issued by General Baird, viz. "Camp, Rosetta, 16th Sept. 1831. All the assistant surgeons of the army are to assemble at Dr. Shapter's at sunset this evening to draw lots who is to remain at the pest-house *ordered* to be established *to-day*." In consequence of this order the assistant surgeons assembled at Dr. Shapter's, and the lot No. 1, which determined the officer who should first go into the pest-house, fell to Mr. Thomas. But it was not till *the following day* that the patients were removed into the pest-house; Mr. Thomas followed them in the evening of that day, and found, on taking possession of his new habitation, that neither medicines nor food had been provided, and that there was not even a candle to enable him to see what condition his patients were in, or how he could relieve them.

It thus appears from the best authority, that no less than *three days* (and I rather believe *four*) elapsed before the infected patients were removed into the pest-house,

although the removal ought not to have been delayed even one hour. Had the separation been made as I advised, and as humanity and common sense dictated, I have good reason to believe that the contagion would have spread no farther than the first two patients, excepting perhaps to Mr. Thomas or others who might have caught it by attending them in the pest-hospital: but by the delay and, I am sorry to say, the negligence with which the business was conducted, in disregard of my advice, the plague was communicated to, as I have been told, twelve or thirteen of the black servants, almost every one of whom, and probably all, died, and to more than twenty soldiers of the 88th regiment who were in the hospital at the time, of whom, "it appears from a private register kept by the adjutant of that regiment that fourteen died in the ensuing six weeks." Not less inexcusable than this delay was the unprovided state of the pest-house when the patients were first sent into it, although a very sufficient time had elapsed for supplying it with every article of necessity. But the deficiencies in the supplies to that establishment did not terminate here; for under the "management" of Dr. M'Grigor, who resumed the direction of the medical department of the Indian army very soon afterwards, (on the 6th October) and whose management the commissioners, from the want of better information, have represented as so "experienced and judicious," they seem to have continued, not for some days nor weeks, but for some months. To the truth of this statement I could adduce evidence; but the testimony of Dr. M'Grigor himself, (transcribed from page 134 of his Medical Sketches) will best prove it. "The medical gentlemen in the pest-houses," he tells us, "laboured under

so many disadvantages that, for the most part, there was *but little* to be expected from *any mode of treatment*! he tells us also that "in December, (1801) January, February, and March (1802) the patients suffered *so much* from the extreme severity of the weather, that in *some instances* it was *not easy* to determine whether a patient *died* from cold or from the plague." It was thus not enough that these unfortunate people had to combat with the plague—but the pest-houses were fixed in marshy spots, where many of those who survived that disease were seized with intermittent fevers, and then they were suffered "in some instances" at least, to perish by cold!

These are some of the circumstances relative to the occurrence of the plague in the Indian army, with which I was well acquainted, and which I abstained from mentioning, because I believed that they could not be mentioned without exciting "painful recollections in the minds of those who served with that army." I will, however, dwell no longer on this afflicting subject, but proceed to show that I had sufficient grounds for asserting that, on the appearance of the plague in the Indian army, "embarrassments and difficulties" did occur in procuring any of its medical officers to assume what Dr. M'Grigor has since termed "the post of honour," i. e. the care of the plague patients, which in his statements and encomiums on the Indian medical system he had totally forgotten.

While the plague had existed in the British army, from May to August previous to the period in question, there were, if I have been rightly informed, thirteen or fourteen medical officers appointed to the service of the pest-hospitals, twelve to those of Aboukir, and one or two to that of Rosetta, of whom seven died at the former place, and one, I think, at the latter; and of

these officers I have never heard, nor do I believe, that any one signified a desire to be excused from that service, when he received the order to enter upon it from the inspector general of hospitals, who nominated them at his own discretion: but without making the smallest difficulty, they all performed the duty successively assigned to them, unawed by the imminent danger to which they well knew they must be exposed, and aware besides that no addition whatever would be made to their usual emoluments as a reward for their perilous services. These events could scarcely have been unknown to the medical officers of the Indian army; and they afforded to them examples worthy of imitation when a pest-hospital was to be established for the reception of their own sick. It will however be readily believed that some insuperable "difficulties" must have ensued "in procuring any of those officers" to attend their plague patients by those means which had proved efficacious with us, since it was found necessary to recur to the *drawing of lots*, a mode of deciding one's fate, which, like the decimation of the Romans, is never resorted to in armies but upon the most awful occasions or for the most terrific purposes. This expedient, therefore, will probably be deemed a sufficient proof of the existence of the "dismay and embarrassment" in question among the *inferior* medical officers of the Indian army; and there is proof equally convincing of the existence of them among their *superiors* the surgeons. For when it was thought essential, within a few days after establishing the pest-house, that the charge and superintendence of it should be committed to an officer of higher rank than an assistant surgeon, those superior medical officers did not assemble to determine by *lot* who

among themselves should take that charge, although they had seen their assistant surgeons compelled to do so; but they procured, as I was informed, representations in their favour to be made to General Baird, who, finding that he could obtain no one of *his own* medical staff, was prevailed upon to invite some officer from the *British* staff to assume that duty, and, as an inducement, to promise to the individual who should undertake it, in addition to his present pay and allowances, the emoluments* belonging, upon the Indian establishment, to the rank next above his own, which emoluments it is generally known were considerable; and it was upon this invitation that Mr. John Price, then deputy purveyor, and now surgeon to the forces, tendered his services to General Baird, and by his desire soon after entered upon that charge, which he fulfilled with a firmness and zeal that has obtained for him the unqualified admiration of the army at large. It was upon a similar invitation afterwards, when Mr. Price was attacked by the plague, that his place was supplied by another stranger to the Indian army, Dr. Whyte, an unfortunate medical adventurer,

* These were at least the terms which I understood, as well as many other persons, at Rosetta, to have been offered by General Baird, and I have no reason to doubt of their being the terms which were really intended, and afterwards granted, as I know from a statement by Mr. Price himself, that "the allowances ordered to him by General Baird were much greater than those which belonged to *his own* rank in the Indian army." Here it is but justice to Mr. Price to state, that having had the pleasure of being much in his company at the time of these transactions, I am fully persuaded that the pecuniary advantages held out by General Baird were among the least of the inducements by which that gentleman was actuated in proposing himself for the duty of the pest-hospital.

who had come, I believe, from Smyrna, to seek employment with our troops. As General Baird would not have been less generous towards his own officers than he showed himself towards strangers, there were the incentives not only of a rare and courageous emulation, but of a great profit, to stimulate the surgeons of the Indian army to volunteer for the charge of the pest-house; and it is therefore difficult to explain, upon any other ground than that of "dismay" among them, the reason of their shrinking from a duty which was wholly their own, and of their anxiety to have it transferred to the British staff. To Dr. McGrigor personally there was an additional incentive, that of attending the men of *his own* regiment who were daily seized, and dying, with the plague, which, were we to give credit to his own declarations, we should suppose in him to have been operating *very strongly*. "No man surely," (says he in page 44 of his Letter) can feel a deeper interest in whatever concerns the *health* and comfort of the soldier than *he* who has tented with him in the field, has shared in his hardships, witnessed his deprivations, and has known his services." Upon this interesting subject Dr. Jackson also testifies (in page 61 of the publication which is to be noticed in the subsequent part of this work) "that there are no circumstances which will render a good man" (in the situation of surgeon to a regiment) "inactive or indifferent to the discharge of a duty so nearly connected with his heart as the care of a sick soldier," and, "that as a regimental surgeon often forms an attachment to the soldiers of the corps in which he serves, he feels regret when such of them as may be sick are removed from under his own protection:" and we have moreover the evidence on oath of Dr. McGrigor and Mr. Borland, which states positively

that besides regret, regimental surgeons, or such at least as resemble themselves, are very apt to feel great *disgust* when their patients are taken from under *their own* care to be sent to a general hospital (which the pest-house unquestionably was, because it was destined to receive the plague-patients of the Indian army generally) and that they are then also apt to grow very inactive, so as to neglect those patients who happen to be still left under their charge. Now, therefore, as Dr. McGrigor had been surgeon to the 88th regiment from the time it was raised, had accompanied them in several voyages, had often "tented with them," partaken of a vast number of "their hardships," and ought to have been well acquainted with "their services," it seems at first impossible to limit in our minds within any ordinary bounds the force of the "attachment" he must have conceived for his regimental comrades, who were seized with the plague, or the "depth" of the "interest" which he took "in the concerns of their health and comfort;" but we should at least suppose that he must have been extremely impatient of all other medical assistance, and have manifested the utmost eagerness to administer *in person* to their wants. The fact however is, that he from magnanimity, or "dismay," resisted the powerful allurements which the charge of the plague hospital spread before him, and stifling the "regret" and the "disgust" he must have felt, he did endure that others should perform *his own duty*, evincing on this occasion, a tender solicitude for his patients, very similar to that which he had displayed at Grenada in July 1796, when he embarked* with 140

* One cannot well conceive that the crew of a ship could in any case have a fairer prospect of all arriving safely at their

men in the Betsey (transport to return to England; upon which occasion he set the novel, and precious example of a regimental surgeon's separating himself *voluntarily* from *his own sick*, and selecting as the only *proper* companions of his voyage those foldiers of his regiment who were in *perfect health*. "I was most particularly careful" says he in p. 227 of his Medical Sketches, "not to take any man on board with the slightest appearance of illness."

There is in this part of Dr. McGrigor's letter a sentence which I shall notice briefly, because it contains either a misrepresentation or an unfair ambiguity: it is as follows, viz. "It deserves your attention that the *first* medical officer that entered a pest-house belonged not to the *British*, but to the *Indian* establishment." If he intended to say what this unqualified sentence implies, he has mis-stated the fact, because, as I have before related, thirteen or fourteen medical officers of the *British* staff had already served in the plague hospitals, one of whom had quitted only ten days or a fortnight before, the very pest-house which was afterwards occupied by the sick of the Indian army. But if he meant that the medical officer who *first* did duty in the *Indian* pest-house belonged to the *Indian* service, (which however is not the proper sense of his words) he can only be considered as stating

destination than that of the Betsey, in which "the most particular care" was taken "by an experienced and judicious manager" to exclude from the vessel every one who was not in perfect health; such however are the peculiar advantages afforded by "the regimental treatment" in the hands of Dr. McGrigor, that, as he informs us himself, in page 230 of his Medical Sketches, of the 140 persons so embarked, twenty died on the passage being 1 in 7 of the whole number; whereas of the sick only of his regiment who were sent to the reprobated general hospital in Grenada there died but 1 in 9, see page 44 of this publication.

what ought to have happened in the proper order of things, that a certain medical duty, appertaining solely to the Indian army, was first executed by one of the officers of that army; and admitting his statement thus interpreted to be true, I may observe in answer, that the *first* medical officer who volunteered for the charge of the *Indian* plague-hospital belonged not to the *Indian*, but to the *British* department.

The last of Dr. McGrigor's contradictions which remains to be explained, is that which denies my statement of the *British* hospital staff having "ultimately taken the *sole* charge of the plague patients of the East India army." This statement was founded on information which I had formerly received from respectable sources, the purport of which was that when the head quarters of both the *British* and the *Indian* army were fixed in Alexandria, the lazaretto in that town was appropriated to the reception of the plague patients, from the two armies; and that, although the Indian army did for a time furnish a proportion of the medical officers required for the service of the lazaretto, yet latterly there was no medical officer of the Indian department serving in the lazaretto, while it still contained plague patients from the Indian army, so that, as I have said, "a necessity was ultimately imposed on the *British* hospital staff of taking the sole charge of those patients." In consequence of Dr. McGrigor's contradiction, I have made enquiries on this subject, the result of which justifies my statement: of the information I have obtained in its support, it will suffice to adduce the following short passage extracted from an official document written by Mr. Price, surgeon to the forces, of which I have been permitted to make a copy: viz. "at last when the plague patients of the united armies were sent to the lazaretto at Alex-

andria, it did happen that no medical officer of the Indian army was doing duty with me."

I have now reached the end of Dr. M'Grigor's pamphlet, after an attentive examination of every part which required notice or explanation from me; and although he has ventured to say, alluding to my Letter to the Commissioners, that "in every step of my progress I had betrayed either wilful ignorance, or a studied desire to mislead," I trust that I have been able to satisfy every impartial reader, that of all the passages of that letter controverted by Dr. M'Grigor, there is but a single one which is erroneous, viz. that at page 42, which supposes him to "have been far on his voyage to Europe," when the great mortality occurred, which he pretended to have observed personally in the general hospitals of Grenada; and that I was unavoidably led into this error by Dr. M'Grigor himself, to whose former publication I had given a credit of which it was not worthy.

To his letter, Dr. M'Grigor has added a postscript to acknowledge, and by acknowledging to extenuate, his gross misrepresentation upon oath, of the number, &c. of the hospital staff sent from England by the Cape of Good Hope, to co-operate with the East Indian army in Egypt as before mentioned. The surgeon general had then recently called him to an account for that very serious offence against the truth, and expecting to be arraigned for it, as he was* in the "Observations," soon after pub-

* See Mr. Keate's "Observations on the Report of the Commissioners," &c. pages 39, 40, 41, and 42, and Appendix, No. 10.

lished by Mr. Keate. Dr. M'Grigor seems to have supposed, that by taking the lead, and being the first to mention the subject, and at the same time mentioning it as a *trivial* mistake, he might obviate the impressions which that offence would naturally produce. That he will not thus escape due reprobation, I am well convinced; nor do I believe that any reader of discernment and of honourable feeling will overlook or forgive the placid and calm indifference, with which Dr. M'Grigor mentions and contemplates the falsehoods asserted by himself under the obligations of an oath, when in the very same publication he endeavours to overwhelm me by a mass of the most vehement abuse for mistakes or misrepresentations, which I had not committed, but which he had chosen to fabricate and impute to me. This abuse and its author I have thought proper to despise; being persuaded that unmerited imputations of falsehood from one who has sworn falsely, and who, after being detected, exhibits no appearance either of *shame* or *sorrow*, can never disgrace me, though it must reduce him far below all notice as a gentleman.—I have sufficiently proved my readiness to expose my life when it became me to do so in the line of my duty, and that which I have not scrupled to risk for the relief of even strangers, I probably may be induced to hazard for the preservation of my honour when necessary; but I have not supposed, or discovered that any of my friends suppose, such necessity to have resulted from the groundless imputations of Dr. M'Grigor.

I have thus far thought it proper for the reasons already mentioned to vindicate myself in this mode; believing however that it can never be my duty to maintain a farther contention with such an antagonist, I have

determined either to overlook with silent contempt any misrepresentations or calumnies which he may publish hereafter, or if that should be impossible, to refer them to the cognizance of a tribunal which will be competent to punish as well as notice such misdemeanours.

END OF PART I.

EXPOSURE AND REPUTATION, &c.

PART THE SECOND.

RELATING TO THE LETTER OF DR. JACKSON.

AS Dr. Jackson had made himself conspicuous no less for pertinacity, than for indiscretion, I naturally expected when writing my Letter to the Commissioners of military enquiry, that he would attempt to exonerate himself from the imputation of having misled them, in many parts of their Fifth Report: and I also expected from what I had known of his conduct to others, that such an attempt would be made the vehicle of ill-natured personalities regarding me, less outrageous perhaps than those of Dr. M'Grigor, but equally numerous and groundless. These expectations Dr. Jackson has lately fulfilled by his Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, which by its sterility, and frivolity, will demonstrate to his readers the very little which he can allege either for himself or against me.

That Dr. Jackson's *reading* has been extremely deficient must have been perceived by all who are acquainted with his *writings*, and therefore it would not have been surprising that he should as he does at p. 1. fancy himself the only person in the nation who has written on me-

dical arrangements for armies, had I not at p. 24 and 73 of my Letter to the Commissioners (which he pretends to have read) mentioned the titles of two works, written by two army physicians, (Dr. Brocklesby, and Dr. Donald Monro,) professedly on that subject, which might have cured him both of the error and vanity of believing himself to be either the first or the only writer concerning army medical arrangements.

At p. 2, he declares that he will maintain as "true in the face of the world those things which he has stated positively to be matter of fact;" it will soon be seen how far he fulfils this engagement. At p. 3, Dr. Jackson admits that if either the Commissioners or himself have fallen into error, "it ought to be corrected," but he adds "that the person who has assumed the office of censor, on this occasion, unless we are to consider him as a person supernaturally endowed, cannot be supposed to be well qualified for the undertaking." "Dr. Bancroft (says he,) was a very young man, not exceeding twenty-two, when he obtained his rank among the army-physicians in the year 1795." This assertion is incorrect. I was more than twenty-two when I obtained the degree of bachelor of physic at Cambridge in June 1794, and I was not made an army physician until more than fifteen months afterwards, of which a great part was passed at Edinburgh. But if it had been true that I was only twenty-two in the year 1795, it does not follow that I should continue to be of that age thirteen years after, nor that thirteen years acquaintance with the army abroad and at home might not qualify me to detect and expose important errors, in the Fifth Report of the military Commissioners. He goes on to assert that "since my appointment in 1795, my duties like those of other army physicians being confined to the *wards of hospitals*

only, the sphere of my observations in matters which relate to the general business of the medical department could not in the nature of things be extensive, had I even served longer than I have served, and been more zealous than I am known to have been." Here is wilful misrepresentation, followed by an illiberal insinuation. It is impossible for Dr. Jackson not to have known or been convinced that my duties had been no more confined to the wards of hospitals than his own. I had mentioned in my Letter, various times and places at which I performed the duties of an inspector or chief medical officer, and particularly in the Eastern district in 1798 and 1799 with the army under Lord Howe, which for its number and the distinguished rank and character of its officers far exceeded any army in which Dr. Jackson ever performed the like duties; and in regard to my zeal for the service, which Dr. Jackson seems disposed to question, I can assert without the fear of contradiction that until after my return from Egypt scarcely one physician in the army had during an equal space of time been engaged more constantly; and not one in a greater variety of the most dangerous services than I had been. That this has not been the case lately I avow without hesitation. An attack of fever rendered it impossible for me to proceed upon the Copenhagen expedition, as I had fully intended: though I must confess that my zeal has not been increased by the treatment to which the physicians of the army have been subjected since Mr. Knight's accession to his present office, nor by seeing thirty or more medical officers, with inferior qualifications, who either were not in the army when I entered it, or were in stations subordinate to mine, promoted over me, solely, as I presume, because I was an army physician.

At p. 4. Dr. Jackson proceeds to repeat that "those who are acquainted with my history will not perhaps be disposed to consider me as well qualified for the office (of censor) I have assumed, even though supported by the great learning of the Physician general and armed by a degree of Doctor from the university of Cambridge." How little Dr. Jackson knows of my history will immediately appear, though certainly it might have been easily known, because it has been accompanied with no obscurity, nor with any event which required concealment. After this he asserts gratuitously that I have been deficient in experience and in candour, and that "presumptuous in my professional rank," "and irritated by disappointment that my class has not in the arrangement projected by the Commissioners, been placed on the pinnacle of medical power, I have forgotten the decorum of a gentleman's language," adding that "though a regular physician of the British army, I have indulged as freely in misrepresentation and abuse, as if I had addressed the American congress." To these serious charges it is unnecessary for me to reply, since Dr. Jackson has not been able to adduce in support of them a single passage from my Letter to the Commissioners of military enquiry; and those who have read it, and are qualified to judge of it, will, I flatter myself, acquit me of the charge of having any where deviated from the language of a scholar and a gentleman. As I had been born in the county of Middlesex, and never had addressed the American congress, nor been in any part of America until I went to the West Indies as a physician to the *British* army in 1796, Dr. Jackson's allusion to that congress was perfectly unintelligible to me for some time. At length, however, I

discovered that in the fulness of the knowledge which he supposes himself to have obtained of my history, he had believed, and he may still believe, that I was born within the United States of the other hemisphere, and that in this belief he was led to take this opportunity of indulging his ill-temper towards me.

He afterwards observes that if I do not *respect* the Commissioners "who are constituted judges on a subject of great national concern," he has no right to expect that I should act with candour towards him. That I have not failed in due respect to the Commissioners is what I both hope and believe, though I certainly never supposed them to have been "constituted judges;" I considered them as having been appointed to make enquiries, and to *report* the results of their enquiries, and I thought that even in doing this, they had not acted with sufficient candour and impartiality. But if I had considered them as *judges*, my animadversions upon their *injudicial* mode of proceeding would probably have been, and very deservedly, more severe.

At p. 5. Dr. Jackson accuses me of having "so mixed and garbled his words, that without reference to his own text, he should sometimes scarcely know himself what he means." He cannot however justly charge me with having ever quoted his words falsely, or altered their proper meaning by the use which I have made of them. He appears indeed on many occasions when writing, not to recollect what he had written a few pages before, and among the endless repetitions with which his publications abound, contradictory or incongruous assertions and opinions frequently occur. These, when it suited my purpose, I have selected and contrasted, making them *nullify* and *stultify* each other,

and have thus it seems succeeded in rendering him sensible of the inconsistencies which had previously escaped his own observation.

At p. 6. Dr. Jackson gives an imperfect account of what he denominates "the regular physicians of the British army," and then at p. 7. attempts to describe the "Half-regulars," "consisting (as he says), of persons who have studied medicine, or who have obtained a diploma at a Scotch or Irish university, and who have afterwards been licensed to exercise their art on paying a sum of money to the college in Warwick Lane." But here, as well as on all other occasions where Dr. Jackson writes about universities or colleges, he discovers a great want of information. Licenses from the London College of Physicians are not obtained by *paying a sum of money* without examination; they are granted to persons who have previously studied two years at some regular university, and who at three several examinations afterwards shall satisfy the *censors* of their fitness to be licensed; or when a license *extra urbem* is wanted, the grant is made to persons who give the required proof of their fitness at an examination before the president and three of the elect. The mention which Dr. Jackson here makes of an "Irish university," only demonstrates his usual ignorance of these matters. The degree of doctor in physic cannot be obtained at Trinity College, Dublin, (the only Irish university), until after the same length of time and of residence, and with the same exercises, which are required at the English universities, and therefore gentlemen who have obtained that degree in Dublin, are readily admitted *ad eundem* either at Oxford or Cambridge, and may then after passing the usual examinations, be elected candidates, and

afterwards *Fellows*, not *Licentiates*, of the London College, as Dr. Jackson supposes.

He adds "the other class, and it constitutes the great body of army medical officers, is comprehended under the denomination of regimental surgeons." "The subjects of this class," (says he,) are often *obscure in their rise, and irregular in their progress*; they trust or pretend to trust to no other qualification, except possession of the knowledge of their profession, which is the art of curing diseases, by the speediest and safest means, without licence according to the statute of Henry the Eighth. The regimental surgeon may cure a disease, a fever for instance, as safely and more speedily than the regular physician; he is notwithstanding precluded from bearing the name, and ostensibly from assuming the physician's office in the British army." Unfortunately for Dr. Jackson this description of the regimental surgeon will suit the veriest quack in this or any other country; for there is not one of them who does not pretend to trust to the like qualification, and to be able "to cure a disease, a fever for instance, as safely and more speedily than the regular physician," and it certainly is possible that a bold, though ignorant, empirick may sometimes happen to employ a more efficacious remedy for a particular disease than a physician of great knowledge, as a random shot may accidentally hit nearer than one aimed by the best marksman: but this would not induce a wise man to prefer a quack to a well educated physician, because though the former might chance to do good, there would always be great danger of mischief from his uninformed, unprincipled attempts to cure diseases, of which he may be, and probably is, in a great degree ignorant. At present mankind are so well convinced of the usefulness of science, and so well acquainted

with the ways and means by which it is *alone* attainable, that few will give credit to the pretensions of one whose "obscure origin and irregular progress" have not afforded him the necessary means, or led him to the proper places, of instruction. Knowledge is not now believed to be ever supernaturally communicated; and there will therefore always be a much greater probability of its having been acquired by a man who, from early childhood was destined for a learned profession, and whose parents, without compelling or allowing him to waste any part of his youth in laborious or worse occupations, had placed him in the best schools and universities, with all the means of obtaining that variety and extent of science, by which regularly educated physicians are generally distinguished.

Neither is Dr. Jackson accurate in his definition of himself and his irregular associates; the "*obscurity*" which he mentions as attached to their *origin* extends also to their *progress*, which is often *obscure* as well as irregular; and this is the most objectionable part of their history: for in regard to the origin even of the most presumptuous of these gentlemen, I shall never mention it as a matter of reproach; and have therefore no anxiety to ascertain if one of them be the son of a miller, and another the son of a baker: but in regard to their *progress* it is desirable to know how many years the former passed in his father's mill, and the latter at his father's oven, or in carrying out bread to his father's customers; because these and other laborious occupations, however useful in themselves, are not likely to afford the knowledge, habits, and manners, most suitable for a learned profession. It is also of some importance to be able to ascertain the ways and means by which these supposed miller's and baker's sons afterwards acquired the very limited portion of

medical knowledge with which they entered the army, as regimental surgeon's mates, in order that some judgment may be formed whether its defects were of such a nature as might be supplied or removed by those means which a military life can afford; and when these gentlemen, claiming to be the champions of the surgeons, afterwards become too proud to bear the name of surgeon, and assuming the title of *Doctor*, boast of their possessing a "*physician's diploma*," it might be well if the *obscurity* attending their progress were so far dispelled as that one could ascertain whether these supposed Doctors have really obtained Doctors' degrees, and if so, whence they were obtained. It may, perhaps, seem ill-natured to suspect that any one who calls himself a Doctor has not a right to do so; and therefore I never did allow myself to entertain, and much less to express, any such suspicion, until I found it mentioned in Appendix, No. 8, of Mr. Keate's Observations, that Mr. Borland had, in a letter to the surgeon-general, dated the 13th December 1798, stated himself to be "then qualified as a physician and a *Licentiate* of the College of Edinburgh," (making these qualifications the *grounds for soliciting employment*;) and until I had carefully and repeatedly looked for the name of Dr. Borland without finding it in the lists of the Fellows and *Licentiates* of the College of Physicians at Edinburgh of that and of all the succeeding years. I have since ascertained that Mr. Borland has never been a *licentiate* of that college; and as it is natural to suppose that a man who has been capable of imposture in one instance may be so in another, I was thence led to suspect that his degree of doctor might be as fictitious as his licence from Edinburgh, and to make enquiries on the subject; in consequence of which I am enabled to state on what I

consider undoubted authority, that no doctor's degree in medicine has been given to any one bearing the name of *James Borland* by any university or college in Scotland, at least not since Mr. Borland, inspector of hospitals, has been of an age to receive such degree, unless, which is not probable, he should have obtained one within a few weeks. As Mr. Borland seems to have first advanced his pretension to academical honors while he was at Ayr in 1798, I naturally concluded that his doctor's diploma, if he possessed one, must have been obtained from some university in Scotland, especially as I knew of no other university where he could have obtained it at all, without going to some foreign country, where, from the places and services in which he had been employed, it was not credible that he could have been. I therefore concluded that he was no better intitled to be considered as a doctor in physic than as a licentiate of Edinburgh.—Wishing, however, to avoid all possibility of doing him injustice, I wrote to him a letter in the following words: viz.

"Sir, As I shall have occasion to introduce your name in a work which I am on the point of sending to the press, and as I wish to mention you with every proper distinction, I request you to inform me whether or no I am to consider you as having obtained a degree of doctor of medicine, and from what university. I am, &c."

When writing this letter I supposed that if Mr. Borland possessed no degree, he would, under some pretence, evade giving me an answer; but that if he had in reality obtained one, he would be glad of an opportunity of mentioning the place whence it had been obtained, and of removing all doubt on the subject, for he must have been sensible, that after the detection which had been

made in regard to his pretended *licence* from Edinburgh,* such doubts must naturally obtrude themselves upon any man of common reflection, and that it would therefore ill become him to *affect* to take offence at their existence, or at any enquiry on the subject. As I had expected, it has happened that I have received no answer to my letter; and I therefore conclude, without any hesitation, that Mr. James Borland is not a doctor in physic or medicine, and that I am bound to withhold from him the appellation of *doctor*. I have not withheld the appellation from the author, Robert Jackson, whose work I am now refuting, although, for many reasons, I am very far from being convinced that he is entitled to it.

Dr. Jackson in some of his former publications had loudly complained of a supposed rule or "law" by

* How Dr. Borland came to think of stating himself to be a *licentiate* of Edinburgh, is best known to himself. That celebrated "irregular" Dr. Laist appears to have been informed by "Sawney M'Gregor the pedlar," "as how he might have a licence from Edinburgh, to practise, on paying for it!" Whether Mr. Borland obtained similar information from Sawney, or from one of Sawney's relations, I know not; nor do I wish to make an odious comparison by introducing Dr. Laist on this occasion. I feel, indeed, that I barely do justice to his memory by admitting the candour and honesty with which he appears to have acted in the steps taken by him for the purpose of obtaining a licence; for though he had heard of Edinburgh, and from its distance might also have imposed himself upon others as a licentiate of its college, yet, disdaining such imposition, he came to town and enquired the way to Warwick-lane, saying, "I want a diploma," and after unreservedly stating his former occupations, submitted to an examination without reluctance or evasion. His methods of treating the sick had, indeed, some novelty, but I must declare that I would rather submit to them, than to those which Mr. Borland is understood to have employed at Chatham.

which surgeons were precluded from even the possibility of becoming army physicians; and being persuaded that he really believed in the existence of such a law, I took the trouble at p. 94 of my Letter to the Commissioners, to explain and correct this mistake. But it appeared soon after, by Mr. Keate's publication, that Dr. Jackson had been several years well acquainted with his Majesty's order of the 12th of March, 1798, for enabling army surgeons to become army physicians by undergoing a suitable examination. Regardless, however, of this order, and of my former statement respecting it, Dr. Jackson has (at p. 8.) again (according to his usual practice) repeated his misrepresentation, concerning this supposed law, and ascribed it to the Physician-general; probably because, according to the arrangement of his ideas on the subject, he finds it convenient to suppose and pretend that the surgeons have been treated unjustly; though, excepting the short interval when Mr. Hunter held the office of Surgeon-general, there never was a time when army surgeons in Great Britain could, if duly qualified, so easily become army physicians as at present. It is indeed true, that on foreign service, when an army physician died, the commander in chief was sometimes allowed to fill up the vacancy, without waiting for any appointment or instruction from Great Britain; which (besides a regard for patronage) the exigencies of the service might require him to do; and in such cases, physicians not being at hand, surgeons were commonly promoted. But I have not been able to discover a single instance, in which a surgeon was appointed in Great Britain to be an army physician, excepting those nominated by Mr. Hunter. What he did in this respect, was therefore an *innovation*. What Mr. Gunning and Mr. Keate did previous to Sir Clifton Winttingham's death,

was a return to the former practice, as described by Dr. Donald Monro, to which the present Physician-general has adhered; and, therefore, the Commissioners were *egregiously misled* on this subject by Dr. Jackson.

In the same page Dr. Jackson pretends not to understand the answer given by the Physician-general to the Commissioners, importing his belief that army surgeons are less fit than regularly educated physicians, to be appointed physicians to his Majesty's forces, because the education of the former "does not lead them to a knowledge of principles:" and he (Dr. Jackson) adds, that this answer either "means nothing, or it means, that medical science can be learned according to principle, only at privileged places, though it be known to every one that there was not, when this rule was enacted, a regular medical school at either Oxford or Cambridge; not even a public hospital where the student had the opportunity of verifying the truth of his principle, by application in practice." Here, as in other parts of Dr. Jackson's pamphlet, is a mixture of misstatements and absurdity. The time at which there was not a regular medical school at Oxford or Cambridge, is stated to be that at which a certain rule, *that never existed*, was enacted; and this also is the time when, according to Dr. Jackson, there was not either at Oxford or Cambridge, "a public hospital." He might in this way have said that at the time when that which never has existed began to exist, there was not even a university at Oxford or Cambridge. But if Dr. Jackson means to speak of things within the memory of man, he betrays extreme ignorance in not knowing that contrary to his assertion there is, and for nearly fifty years has been, a public hospital, which bears the name of Dr. Radcliff, at Oxford, and another, bearing the

name of Dr. *Addenbrake*, at Cambridge, which began to be built in 1753, and was opened for the reception of patients in 1766; at the latter of which I found, with others of my cotemporaries who studied medicine, "an opportunity of verifying the truth of my principle by application in practice." The boldness with which he asserts that which is untrue is deserving of notice: he scorns to qualify his statements by saying, that he has heard, or has reason to believe, that things are as he represents them, but at once hazards the most positive assertions, and thus says that it is "known to every one," that there was not (about fifteen years ago), "a public hospital at Oxford or Cambridge," although it is a matter of public notoriety, that there had long been one in each of those towns: and if Dr. Jackson is so little disposed to take the trouble of informing himself correctly on points which may be so easily ascertained as the existence of an hospital at Oxford or Cambridge, can it be believed, that he writes with any proper solicitude for truth, or anxiety to avoid misleading his reader? In saying that there is no regular medical school at Oxford or Cambridge, Dr. Jackson can only mean, I presume, that some of the medical professors there, do not read public lectures: but the physicians who graduate at these universities, know how to supply that and every other defect; and probably there is not one among them who did not previously make himself a pupil to some of the London hospitals, as well as to the best medical lectures in the metropolis, and many of them have moreover resorted not only to Edinburgh, but to various parts of Europe, for the chance of farther improvement. And though it be true that the English universities are not the only, nor perhaps the very best places for gaining *mere* medical knowledge, there are always strong grounds

of presumption in favour of those physicians who obtain medical honors at either of them. They must at least have been for a great length of time, and probably from early infancy, placed in the way of being liberally educated; and ten years must have elapsed after admission before they can be created doctors; during which time they must have had the means and opportunities of gaining knowledge in great extent and variety. Their moral conduct also must during this long interval have been liable to frequent observation, and as any serious deviation from propriety and rectitude of behaviour, would produce expulsion, there must always be much greater certainty in regard both to the character and qualifications of persons educated and graduated at an English university, than there can be in regard to those whose "origin, according to Dr. Jackson, is obscure, and whose progress has been irregular;" and *obscure* also. I do not mean here to detract from the merits of those gentlemen who have been liberally educated at other universities, or even at places which are not universities, some of whom by greater application and perhaps by superior intellect, have amply compensated for any difference in the places of their education; I wish only to explain the nature of the education, which the physicians who have graduated at the English universities have undergone, and which is perpetually misrepresented by *irregulars* like Dr. Jackson, and to leave others to decide, which system of medical education is in general to be preferred.

At p. 9. Dr. Jackson states that a young man, "who knows Greek and Latin, mathematics and logic, as well as a Cambridge student, for instance as well as Dr. Bancroft himself, and who attends the same course of lectures, and walks the same hospitals, and at the same time,

in London or at Edinburgh as Dr. B. does," is excluded from becoming an army physician because he has not "kept his terms," at one of the English universities. It is impossible however, that Dr. Jackson should not know better what qualifications are necessary in the person who wishes to become an army-physician. None has ever been required by the physician-general, but those which are required by the law of the land of every person practising physic in England. If the laws be defective, let them be amended, but until they are amended it may be presumed that the legislature does not think they need amendment, and therefore it is proper that they should be obeyed; and while even the poor sick who solicit charitable relief from the public hospitals in London, are allowed the assistance of physicians legally entitled to practice, can it be reasonable not to make at least an equally good provision for the more serious cases of sickness, which occur in the military general hospitals among those who are employed to defend our country. If the person who is supposed by Dr. Jackson to have attended the same courses of lectures, and to have walked the same hospitals with me in London, and at Edinburgh, has duly profited by these opportunities of instruction, let him *prove it*, by submitting to the usual examinations, and obtaining the necessary licence to practice physic; and when he has done this, he may in his turn become an army physician.

At p. 10. Dr. Jackson mentions my having "appeared at the Cove of Cork in the year 1796, on my passage to the West Indies." I was unfortunately compelled to appear *there*, after having quitted two several hospital ships which had been disabled by storms from performing the voyage, and after having narrowly escaped ship-

wreck on the south-west coast of Ireland, and this fact, of no importance to the public, is here introduced by Dr. Jackson, for the sake of again indulging his propensity to detract from every one who has been educated either at Oxford or Cambridge; for the sight or recollection of one so educated, seems to provoke his animosity nearly in the same manner as a bit of scarlet cloth does that of a turkey cock. "There were then (he adds) on the medical staff at that place, young men destined for the same service, of riper years, and I have reason to believe *not inferior in classical education to the Doctor*; men who had attended more lectures, walked more hospitals than the Doctor from his years could be supposed to have done; nay, some of them had been entrusted with the care of sick men, yet they were ignorant and inferior in his estimation, and incapable according to the regulations of Sir Lucas Pepys, of prescribing for a patient." Here Dr. Jackson manifests the impotency, as well as the activity, of his ill-will towards me. Probably those who may know that besides other advantages, I had that of being the pupil of Dr. Parr and Dr. Charles Burney, may think it superfluous in me even to notice an observation upon my classical education, from one so deficient in that respect as Dr. Jackson. That he could have no "*reason to believe*," what he pretends is most certain, not only because he was not qualified to form a judgment upon this subject, but because I never gave him the least opportunity. I had previously heard something of Dr. Jackson, and been taught not to cast pearls before swine. Of the young men, who according to Dr. Jackson, had attended more lectures and walked more hospitals than myself, I do not know enough to contradict, though I do not believe, his assertion. Be that, however, as it

may, I flatter myself, that I had done enough in this way to qualify me for taking care of sick men, especially as I have never learned that my treatment of them was thought to be less successful than the treatment of other army physicians. What hospital or what lectures Dr. Jackson had attended when he migrated for the chance of being allowed to take on himself "the care of sick men," I have not been able to discover, and this is one of the evils resulting from the *obscurity as well as irregularity of his progress*.

At p. 14 Dr. Jackson repeats his misrepresentation respecting the supposed appointment of a "young man of 22, who had never treated diseases, &c." to be an army physician, and which has been already sufficiently noticed. He afterwards *proceeds to frame* what he thinks a most embarrassing dilemma, and fancies himself able to drive the Physician-general into it. This dilemma is founded upon the Physician-general's having declared, that, in his opinion regimental surgeons were less fit for the office of army-physician, than persons regularly educated as physicians. "This," says Dr. Jackson, must in fact either be regarded as a calumny on the whole body of the class (of regimental surgeons), or it reproaches himself with a dereliction of his duty in having permitted their work of destruction, (i. e. their practice in regimental hospitals), to go on so long without remonstrance on his part." To detect and refute this poor, yet malevolent sophistry requires less ability than patience. Would any reasonable and candid mind ever conceive, because the Physician-general has stated one description of men to be better qualified for the medical treatment of the sick than regimental surgeons, and therefore more proper to act as army physicians in gene-

ral hospitals, to which the *worst cases* of sickness are commonly sent, that to prove his sincerity and obviate the charge of calumny, he must exert himself in getting the regimental surgeons discarded from the army, and regular physicians appointed in their stead?

It accords with the course and intentions of nature, that men and things in this world should possess various qualities and qualifications, of which the best are not the most numerous, and therefore not attainable by every body. It might be desirable that the sick in country towns and in regimental hospitals, should have the assistance of the most able physicians, of those for example, who are at the height of their profession in this metropolis; but physicians so qualified are not sufficiently numerous, even if the increased expence did not constitute an insuperable objection. It is, indeed, not without great difficulty that the army can be provided with the scanty number of medical officers which now belong to it, and it is highly perverse, absurd, and malicious to pretend that the Physician-general, however convinced he may be, that the regimental surgeons are inferior to regular physicians, as *practitioners of physic*, is bound to waste his influence and efforts for the chimerical and impracticable purpose of getting physicians with the very best qualifications appointed to perform the duties of regimental surgeons, a class of men with whose appointment or dismissal he has in fact no concern whatever. Dr. Jackson might with full as much reason accuse the legislature of calumniating the regimental surgeons by requiring, as a legal title to practice physic in civil life, certain qualifications which they do not commonly possess, though they are permitted to take care of the sick in regimental hospitals.

At p. 17, Dr. Jackson, finding himself at a loss for facts and arguments, makes a curious attempt to oppose my former reasoning in favour of the regular physicians, by contrasting them, *not* with the surgeons as they *now* exist in the army, but with certain imaginary beings intended to be produced according to the *Utopian* project contained in his publication of 1805: by this comparison of realities on one side, and non-realities on the other, his readers are to be "enabled to judge of the pretensions of the regulars and irregulars, that is of the college physician, and regimental surgeon aspiring to be army physicians."

The project in question, as here republished, is so impracticable that I shall not waste my time by examining it in detail—If men could be obtained with the qualifications which he supposes (and which vastly exceed those which were possessed by Dr. Jackson himself, or any of his confederates when they entered the service) and they would condescend to become candidates for his "army medical school," a great part of the difficulty might be removed; but of this there is no hope, considering how little success has attended Mr. Knight's establishment for medical cadets, and the impossibility of obtaining sufficient numbers of hospital mates who, with qualifications very inferior to those required by Dr. Jackson for his school, are at once made commissioned officers *without going to school*. And after all, such candidates, if they could be found, would seldom become men of science in the army, whatever experience they might acquire in the ordinary practice of physic. Feeling, however, that this fallacious comparison of "college physicians" with the imaginary beings intended to be produced in his army medical school, may not prove satisfactory, Dr. Jackson proceeds at p. 25. to propose another method of

deciding the question by a species of trial so preposterous that one can hardly believe him serious (though he pretends to be so) in proposing it.

"Let a division of the army (says he) the largest collected at one place in Great Britain, and one moreover stationed at the *least healthy position* in the island, be divided into two equal parts. That the condition of the parts may be as nearly alike as possible, let the half of the several regiments of which the force is composed be thrown into one division, the other half into the other,—the companies taken from right to left alternately; and that there be no advantage or disadvantage on either part on the head of discipline and economy, let the troops remain in their barracks or tents in the same manner as they were formerly, only let the sick of one division be committed to the care of regular physicians, that of the other to a person who has served as regimental surgeon. As the troops thus committed to medical experiment are equal in number, so they are supposed to be equal in all things which relate to their health, the hospitals as nearly so as possible; but though the extent and external form of the hospitals be the same, it is allowed, that the persons to whom the medical care is committed, make such arrangements in the interior as may best correspond with their views of successful practice." Matters being thus arranged, Dr. Jackson proposes that the Physician-general as "chief of the regulars, and officially the first medical person in the kingdom" shall come forward as their champion; and on the other side Dr. Jackson, being as he justly observes "constitutionally more adventurous than wife," voluntarily offers himself "for combat" as champion of the regimental surgeons. "Indeed, says he, I claim it as my right. I am, I believe, the oldest inspector of hospi-

tals possessing a physician's diploma" (meaning, perhaps, a degree, if indeed he possesses one, from St. Andrew's or Aberdeen, where degrees are granted to persons who never saw, nor ever were seen at either place) "and a physician's commission," (obtained it appears without the knowledge of the army medical board, and without his having undergone the slightest examination) "who has acted as a regimental surgeon." "I am also" (he adds with great truth), "notorious among the irregulars, &c." After thus describing himself and the grounds of his own claim to be the champion of the irregulars, he boasts of his ability not only to perform the duty of a physician *better* than the Physician general, but to perform *much more of it*, and therefore offers the latter "two physicians, viz. Dr. Bancroft, and any one he pleases, to assist in the execution of a duty which I (adds he) as an irregular, profess to perform singly even without a clerk to write my prescriptions."

Believing Dr. Jackson to be, according to his own account of himself, "constitutionally more adventurous than wife," I at first thought it not very improbable that he might have been really in earnest, when this strange proposal was made, and I allowed myself to form conjectures respecting the ways in which he might have expected to dispatch his part of the business, so much more expeditiously than regular physicians: I had not however proceeded far in these conjectures (the results of which will be given in another place) before I was convinced that, with all his rashness, he had never been so indiscreet and extravagant as either to expect or hope that this proposal would be adopted.

It is indeed truly ridiculous to suppose, that, in a time of active war like the present, his Majesty's ministers

could ever be induced to station "a division of the army, the largest collected at any one place in Great Britain, at the *least healthy* position in the island," and inhumanly to retain so large a body of men in this *most untobolesome* situation, for the space of "twelve months," (for he says "the question cannot be properly decided in less," in order to give him (Dr. Jackson) an opportunity of again practising those strange modes of treating sick soldiers, which were followed by such extraordinary mortality at Chatham, and in the Isle of Wight, while he and Mr. Borland were placed there.

Dr. Jackson, with all his apparent simplicity, knows as well as any other man how to practise simulation and stratagem: that he has* practised both in proposing the comparative trial above-mentioned, will be manifest by the following transaction, of which an account has been lately published by Sir John M. Hayes, Dr. Hunter, Mr. Weir, and Dr. Pinckard, who were appointed a special medical board in December, 1801, to investigate Dr. Jackson's conduct at the depot hospital in the Isle of Wight. When these gentlemen were preparing to go to the Isle of Wight, they wrote a letter to the Secretary at war, dated the 24th of that month, in which, after mentioning the medical treatment stated to be employed

* Another instance of this species of knowledge has very recently occurred in his application for a court-martial upon himself, in consequence of Mr. Keate's late publication, when he knew well that having been on half-pay more than twice three years, it was impossible he could be tried by martial law for any action of his life. He thought, however, that by seeming to be ignorant of this immunity, and anxious for the trial of his conduct, he might make others believe that he was confident of being able to justify himself.

by Dr. Jackson, they said "if any doubt arise how far his judgment may be influenced by attachment to any particular system or opinions, (such as his treatment by depletion), we conceive that the only judicious way of deciding upon a point of this kind, is by experience and fair trial. We do not indeed know of any other. If Dr. Jackson take charge of one half of the patients in the hospital, and the two physicians, (Dr. Sutton and Dr. Rogerfon) now in the Isle of Wight, take charge of the other half, distinct returns from each will soon demonstrate whether there be any thing in Dr. Jackson's practice that occasions the mortality." Soon after writing the letter, of which the preceding is an extract, these gentlemen went to the Isle of Wight, and having finished their examinations at that place, they enquired of Dr. Jackson if he was acquainted with the contents of their letter of the 24th December, to the Secretary at war, "in which they had proposed what appeared to them to be the fairest and best method of bringing to issue the question of practice, by instituting a comparison between the success of his treatment of diseases, and that of other physicians. To this he replied that he had received a copy of the letter from the Secretary at war. The board then expressed to Dr. Jackson the importance which they attached to establishing this comparison, and a rumour having reached them that he intended to resign his appointment at the dépôt, they recommended to him not to do so until the trial had been made." In fairness to Dr. Jackson, they represented to him, as I have been well informed, that his practice had been considered in a great degree singular, and suspected at least of doing harm; that a resignation under the ex-

isting circumstances, would probably leave unfavourable impressions respecting his conduct; and that in their judgment, the only way by which he could justify himself, was by continuing for *six months longer at least* at the dépôt hospital, and immediately instituting the trial they had proposed. Finding, however, that Dr. Jackson did not incline to make it, one of the board who had on many occasions manifested his desire to serve him, called him aside, and on the ground of former friendship, renewed in pressing terms the advice previously given; but Dr. Jackson, notwithstanding these urgent recommendations, did not choose to enter upon any such trial, though the special board considered the Secretary at war as having consented to it, and though as *head* of the hospital, he had the option and power of doing so whenever he pleased, and would in that character have been able at least to do *full justice to himself in the division of the patients*. As Dr. Jackson at that time, and in opposition to such respectable advice, shrunk from a trial of his skill, and of his *peculiar methods of treating the sick*, when it could have been made without any addition of expence, so easily, and under circumstances the most favourable to himself, nobody will believe that in making his last proposal (expensive, impracticable, and mischievous as it must prove) he could have either expected or desired that it should be adopted, or that it was any thing else than a contrivance to gain unmerited credit by fallacious appearances.

At the bottom of p. 29, Dr. Jackson makes it a question, or matter of doubt, whether my "thirst for rank and pay be satiable." Of the propriety of raising such a doubt concerning one who has been thirteen years in the army, without any addition to his original rank and pay,

while so many officers have been promoted over him from subordinate stations, let others judge; and let them also judge of the *decency* of such a doubt, in one, who within little more than two months after becoming a regimental surgeon, not only solicited *importunately* to be promoted to the rank of an army-physician, but also to be allowed to *sell the surgeoncy which he had not purchased*, though he has thought proper publicly to boast (1803, p. 113) of his having "fought employment in the army, to the neglect of personal interest."

At p. 30 and 31, Dr. Jackson endeavours to elude the argument which I had employed to demonstrate the benefit resulting from the divisions between physic, surgery, and pharmacy, (on account of the limited extent of human life and of human intellect) and contends that if a physician after prescribing a remedy for one "ill of fever" compound it himself, or see it compounded by another, administer it with his own hand, or see it administered by his servant, the duty will be done in a more conscientious manner, and the effect will be more certain, than if he merely write the prescription." He pretends also, that it will be administered with *less delay*. But all this is completely fallacious, unless the apothecary be a man so faithful or negligent as to be wholly unfit for his situation: and in respect to the *time* which one patient might gain by thus obtaining his medicines prepared and administered by the hands of his physician, it could only be gained with a loss of much more, taken from the other patients who might be equally in need of the same physician's advice and assistance, even if the physician were followed by a waggon, or cart containing all the medicines likely to be wanted in the course of his daily practice: for by stopping to mix and administer what the first patient might require,

he would be so much longer in getting to the second, and still longer in getting to the third, who might suffer materially by these delays; and the evil would be still greater, if instead of employing the waggon or cart, the physician were to return to his own home, and come a second time to each patient, with the remedy to be administered.

Dr. Jackson says, p. 32, that the distinction between physic and pharmacy, is only acted upon in rich countries, among rich people, and in great and opulent cities. This may be true, but does it follow that, because small towns and villages cannot afford subsistence to a physician, surgeon, and apothecary, and are therefore obliged to employ one person in these several capacities, that large cities, which have no such inability or deficiency, should do the like? If the poor cannot have the best medical and the best surgical advice or assistance, i.e. the advice and assistance of persons who have devoted their whole attention to *one branch* only of the healing art, is it a reason for the rich to be satisfied with one, who by dividing his attention among different objects, knows none of them sufficiently?

At p. 33, he endeavours to support his project of confounding all distinction between the different branches of medicine, by alleging that the late Emperor Joseph "instituted schools for the education of his medical servants; but in doing this he confounded the parts"—"not conceiving that a regimental surgeon can *never* be duly qualified to practice the two intricate arts of physic and surgery." Nor have I ever conceived this; though I have conceived, and shall, I believe, always maintain, that an individual who devotes his attention more immediately to one of them, will practice it better than he would, by

by dividing it equally between both. I am not, however, sufficiently acquainted with the facts or motives respecting the Emperor Joseph's methods of providing medical officers for his armies, to discuss this point accurately; but supposing they were such as Dr. Jackson has stated them, (though his statements are so seldom correct, that I can give no credit to any which rest on his own authority) the ill success that attended, I believe, every one of the eccentric projects of that Sovereign, must render his opinions of no value, on the present subject at least, of which he was perhaps as little qualified to judge as the Commissioners of military enquiry. One thing at least is certain, that as the sick in armies greatly exceed the wounded in number, persons possessing that knowledge of diseases which peculiarly belongs to the physician, must be of high importance in every army, and there can be no use, as far as I am able to perceive, in calling those who possess this knowledge by the name of *surgeon*, as the Emperor Joseph is said by Dr. Jackson to have done.

At p. 35, Dr. Jackson, after admitting that several of the army physicians during the American war were appointed to be such immediately from civil life (which was in fact the case of *all* who were appointed in Great Britain) alleges that the British Commander in chief in America had during that war, "the power of making a regimental surgeon an army physician by general order." That this was done in a few instances, with staff surgeons at least, I believe; and it could not well be avoided; because persons regularly educated as physicians were not to be found when and where it was necessary to make such appointments.—But when Dr. Jackson endeavours to illustrate this practice by saying that it was done in the same "manner as a regimental surgeon may be thrust

into the college at Warwick-lane by *mandamus*", he betrays as usual complete ignorance of the subject.—No person can be thrust into the college of Physicians by *mandamus*; doctors' degrees are under certain restrictions obtained at one of the English Universities by *mandamus*; but having been obtained without the customary exercises, residence, &c. they confer no more right of admission into the college of physicians than Dr. Jackson's degree, should he be found to possess one, from St. Andrew's or Aberdeen. Even the most regular degree from Oxford or Cambridge, gives no right of admission into the college of physicians, without the usual examination and the usual approbation; nor can any man become a fellow without two elections, first as a candidate, or licentiate, and secondly as a fellow; so that it is pure absurdity in Dr. Jackson to talk of thrusting a regimental surgeon "into the college of Warwick-lane by *mandamus*."

At p. 36 Dr. Jackson, mentioning the time when Mr. Hunter became Surgeon-general, says, "a regulation was then formed, and it was I *presume* sanctioned by the highest authority, that no person should be placed in the station of army-physician, who had not previously borne a medical commission, that is, been staff-surgeon, regimental surgeon, or apothecary to the forces." Here, as in other places, Dr. Jackson is by much too *presumptuous*. No such regulation as is here supposed was ever sanctioned by "the highest authority;" on the contrary that authority was exerted immediately after Mr. Hunter's death in forming the new board, which has proved so offensive to Dr. Jackson. Mr. Hunter, indeed, from particular circumstances, was not well acquainted with, or likely to appreciate fully, the advantages of a regular university edu-

education, especially as with superior natural endowments and great industry he had deservedly acquired pre-eminence without such advantages: he had moreover observed that the army produced its own generals, and supposed that it might also produce its own physicians; though it is now well ascertained that generals as well as physicians are capable of being much improved by some of those scientific attainments which the army does not afford. Conforming himself however to this opinion, he adopted a system of promoting medical men in the army according to seniority. He indeed did not live long enough to see the effects of his system illustrated by the conduct of ******, but he is known to have discovered at least some of its defects, by the insufficiency of other persons who had been made either staff surgeons or physicians on his system. And though his experience of it had lasted but a very short time, there is good authority for believing that previous to his death he had nearly resolved to adopt a new system; and to appoint as an army physician one gentleman at least who was appointed to that office from civil life, very soon after Mr. Hunter's death.

I have already observed that Dr. Jackson chooses to believe that from Mr. Hunter's short-lived practice the surgeons have acquired a perpetual and exclusive right to be made army-physicians, and that, by laying aside Mr. Hunter's innovation and returning to former usage, a serious injury has been done to them.

Dr. Jackson's account, p. 39, of his mode of applying to the Physician-general for the office of an army-physician is somewhat ludicrous. I observed to him, says Dr. Jackson "that I had never acted in any other capacity in England but that of a physician, and that he might

know I was a physician, by a *book* which I had written on the fevers of Jamaica, &c.:" whether this new way of proving himself to be a physician was unsatisfactory to the Physician-general (who had taken the law of the land for his guide respecting the qualifications of army-physicians) or whether having read the book in question he had discovered those defects which afterwards induced Dr. Jackson to supersede and make an *outright* of it (by his publication of 1798) I know not; but it seems that the Physician-general at last became *impatient*, perhaps a little indignant, at Dr. Jackson's persevering importunities. And Dr. Jackson in his turn as he tells us, became *indignant* also; and after taking "leave of Sir Lucas," went directly to Lord Amherst "with the intention of resigning the surgeoncy of the buffs;" but he took wit in his anger, upon hearing that this regiment was ordered to Jersey, whence he afterwards accompanied it to Bergen-op-Zoom in August 1794, and "in March 1795, says he, I was thrust in among the physicians of the army, by an order of his Royal Highness Field Marshal Duke of York, *en condition* * that I submitted to examination

* This important condition Dr. Jackson forgot ever to fulfil; like his friend Mr. Borland he doubtless professed great readiness while abroad to give satisfactory evidence of his qualifications for the desired office, by undergoing the usual examination when he should return; but being once returned, that readiness disappeared; and he thought it safer to relinquish all pretension to the office, than undertake to prove himself qualified for it; accordingly, though thrust into the place of physician for a few weeks, he allowed himself to be thrust out of it, and only obtained a physician's commission without any examination, and without the knowledge of the Physician-general, *more than five years afterwards*. Indeed Dr. Jackson and Mr. Borland, either from constitutional bashfulness, or too humble an opi-

by the college of physicians when the circumstances of the service permitted me to return to England."

At p. 42, Dr. Jackson charges me with having represented the Commissioners of military enquiry "as predetermined judges, packing their jury, &c." by examining those persons only (on the subject of general hospitals) who were likely to confirm them in their pre-conceived opinions." What I wrote on that subject (and which I have now no reason to alter,) may be found in my own publication,—not in Dr. Jackson's. I certainly thought, and still think full as much as I expressed on that subject; and I shall be much surprised if the Commissioners themselves should even attempt to justify their strange selection of evidence. I probably offered the best possible excuse for it, but Dr. Jackson offers none, though he endeavours to help them out of their embarrassment respecting general hospitals, where (as commonly happens with men who are misled) they have gone deeper into error than their leader.—Of this, indeed, Dr. Jackson modestly informs them at p. 44, where, after stating his own amended opinion, he says, "this I conceive to be your opinion.—I do not say that regimental hospitals are alone sufficient, and that general hospitals should be entirely abolished;" "I only say (adds Dr. Jackson) that the latter are not necessary or useful in times of peace, or in garrisons and stationary quarters even in the enemy's territory." All this however is very far short of what the Commissioners had supposed to be Dr. Jackson's opinion, and it leaves them a great deal to retract

tion of themselves, have always shrunk from every approach towards an examination, though at other times they certainly do not appear deficient in self-confidence.

or correct. Dr. Jackson then admits that "no experiment has been made with the direct view of determining the relative advantages or disadvantages" of the general and the regimental hospitals. But he thinks that "many facts have arisen in the course of military service, which give countenance to the vulgar opinion that the result or recovery of health in armies is more fortunate in the regimental infirmary than in the general hospital;" and, "if the fact be true," he thinks "there are reasons which may be thought sufficient to account for it, without ascribing want of skill to the hospital physician or extraordinary skill to the regimental surgeon." "The regimental hospital, says he, is destined for the early reception of sick; and here notwithstanding the smaller skill of the surgeon, the effect is more fortunate than in general hospitals, when the disease is so far advanced, as not to be easily arrested, or where it is so complicated in its nature, by a combination of artificial causes, as to mock the skill of the more learned and regular physician." Here it will be perceived that the doctor again leaves his disciples the Commissioners in a forlorn condition, by abandoning all pretension on the part of the regimental surgeons to any superiority in skill over the physicians; indeed the terms "army diseases," and "army medical practice," which occur so often in the report of the Commissioners, and were thought by them to mean something which gave the regimental surgeons infinite advantage over regular physicians, are not I believe once mentioned by Dr. Jackson in this last publication,—nor I believe in Dr. M'Grigor's, both having probably been made ashamed of these expressions by my Letter to the Commissioners, &c.

In addition to the advantage which the regimental surgeon has of prescribing for the sick at the commencement of the disease, Dr. Jackson relies very much on the greater purity of air which he supposes to exist in small regimental hospitals, above that which is commonly found in the larger and more crowded general hospitals. As an illustration of this he recurs at p. 49, as he had often done before, not to the well-conducted York hospital at Chelsea and the depôt at the Isle of Wight, &c. but to those which were on the continent in the autumn of 1794, and early part of 1795, and which were not under the direction of the army medical board, nor adequate to the numbers of the sick. "The bad cases, he says, were not here selected for the general hospitals, as is customary on some occasions; the order went to direct that every person who was incapable of marching in the line should be sent off, in the event of moving. In hospitals so oppressed by multitude, as was the case in this instance, infections were engendered and their virulence was augmented to the highest possible degree of accumulation," &c. The disease thus produced, he adds, "was malignant and so concentrated in force that the superior skill of the regular physician, was not sufficient to produce a return so favourable as the feeble means of the uneducated surgeon at the regimental infirmary." Whether mere accumulation can engender a contagious fever, where no contagion exists, is a question which I mean to discuss in another work. That accumulation will rapidly propagate and augment the virulence of febrile contagion when once introduced, I am ready to admit; but I do not admit that accumulation or crowding is an evil necessarily connected with general hospitals. To avoid it we need only multiply their number and increase their size according to the numbers

of sick. If when unusual sickness rages in an army, the regimental hospitals can escape this accumulation, it is to the general hospitals that they owe this boasted exemption, which they would be unable to preserve if the latter were abolished.

"When the troops landed in St. Domingo (says Dr. Jackson, p. 50.) in the year 1796, the sick were thrown into general hospitals, and the mortality was prodigious. The hospitals were here as clean as hospitals could be made, and comforts were procured for the sick in abundance; but emanations from a mass of men brought together into small space, though the disease was not infectious, seemed to deprive the air of its salubrious quality. This I conclude to have been the case from the difference of effect observed where the sick were spread about in smaller parties, though they remained under the same or a similar treatment." It seems to me that Dr. Jackson is not entitled to the praise of candour for the manner in which he mentions the mortality among the troops in the general hospitals at St. Domingo, which is intended to persuade his readers that it was occasioned by the general hospitals: whereas the fever which principally occasioned the mortality in question, notoriously proves fatal to persons arriving in the West Indies from colder climates during the hottest months of the year, whether they are in hospitals or in private houses. I do not mean to say that air may not be vitiated for the purposes of respiration by excessive crowding, but I believe it is now well ascertained that this happens much less frequently, and to a much smaller extent even in cold countries and seasons, than was generally supposed, and that in hot climates, such deteriorations of the atmospheric air rarely, if ever, exists; because human habitations are there contrived with so ma-

ny apertures to promote the free circulation of air that, unless unusual means be employed to produce a stagnation of it, none will take place. More than twenty-five years ago Dr. Ingenhouz, to his great surprise, found that the air, which had been collected in the worst and most crowded wards in the Hotel Dieu at Paris, and brought well secluded or secured in bottles to the house which my father then occupied in the highest part of Passy, and there tried in a fine clear day by all the known tests, proved to be scarcely if at all different from the air of that salubrious village, either in its proportion of oxygen, or its action upon lime water, &c. This trial was made in the presence of several members of the royal academy of sciences, with the late Duke de la Rochefoucault and other philosophical persons. Similar experiments were afterwards made and with the like success by Fontana, with the air of the Hotel Dieu at Paris; also by Seguin with that of other hospitals, the wards of which had been shut up closely, so as to be rendered offensively foetid; and lately by Humboldt and Gay de Lussac, with the worst part of the air of a crowded theatre, in which the deficiency of oxygen was so little as not to deserve consideration.

It is difficult to understand and therefore to controvert what Dr. Jackson says of "the difference of effect observed when the sick were spread about in smaller parties." That many small posts and detachments of the British army at St. Domingo were placed at interior and more elevated stations, and were therefore less sickly is I believe well known, and that the sick at these posts recovered in greater proportion might reasonably be expected, without attributing any thing to the circumstance of being less crowded.—If Dr. Jackson means any thing

else, and especially if he means that the sick spread about in smaller parties were in regimental hospitals, or under regimental treatment, I have his own authority for contesting any such belief. In a letter written by him to Mr. Weir, dated Port au Prince, Oct. 15th, 1796, he says "There is at present considerable sickness in the garrison, and the general hospital is too crowded. I had intended to have enlarged it, or formed regimental hospitals, but there is difficulty in finding proper houses. All the sick at present are sent to the general hospital. The surgeons of regiments have in general little to do, except to dress sore legs, which is almost the only description of people kept in what are called regimental hospitals." I adduce this extract to prove that there was no opportunity of making any such comparative estimate between the general and regimental hospitals in St. Domingo as has been alledged, especially by Mr. Borland, whose evidence on this subject, as far as relates to the West Indies, must have been founded (if it had any foundation at all) upon what he saw at St. Domingo; which, however, does not, either before or after the date of Dr. Jackson's letter, appear to have been capable of warranting any such conclusion as he chose to draw from it.

Dr. Jackson, indeed, tells us that when he became the senior medical officer at St. Domingo, after the departure of Mr. Weir, i. e. in September 1797, he broke up the establishment of general hospitals at Port au Prince and "placed the sick in the hands of the regimental surgeons, taking care that the hospitals were well equipped, and that all the comforts which sick men require were amply provided and duly supplied. The effect (he adds) was decidedly more fortunate." And this he ascribed "to the arrangement, not to the greater ability of the medical officer." It was prudent in him not to ascribe any thing

in this instance "to the great ability of the medical officer," i. e. the regimental surgeon, considering that in a former Letter, i. e. 15th October, 1796, he had declared these gentlemen to be "ignorant of the nature and treatment of the diseases of the country," because they were only employed "to dress fore legs." Probably, however, the true cause of any favourable change, supposing one to have taken place, after Mr. Weir's departure, was the approach of the cool *healthy* season, which continued until about the time when Dr. Jackson quitted St. Domingo (in the month of May, 1798,) added to the *seasoning* which almost all the troops at that island had previously gained, and to the almost total cessation of that species of warfare which makes general hospitals necessary; for though a general hospital still subsisted at the Mole, and also at Jeremie, we are no where told that there was any greater mortality at these places than in the regimental hospitals at Port au Prince; but if the contrary had happened, nothing could have been concluded with certainty from that circumstance, because one sea-coast town in the West Indies is often sickly while others are healthy, and in another season it is healthy when others are the reverse.

Though Dr. McGrigor thought proper to disclaim all community of ideas and opinions with Dr. Jackson, both have employed the very same arguments and misrepresentations concerning the mortality which I mentioned to have occurred in the regimental hospitals of this Kingdom, according to the returns of last March; and Dr. Jackson pretends as Dr. McGrigor had done, that "the returns of the general hospital at the Isle of Wight during the same period," were still less favourable than the aggregate returns of regimental hospitals, through Great Britain. Having in the former part of this publication,

p. 5, &c. sufficiently exposed the deceptions which Dr. McGrigor attempted on this point, and done justice to the hospital of the Isle of Wight, I need only notice the scurrility which Dr. Jackson has superadded to his misrepresentations on this subject, and maliciously employed against me, only because I had simply stated the fact, as indicated by the returns for the month of March, and mentioned my having been denied by the Inspector general the means of enquiring into the cause of it. A charge or insinuation of this nature (says Dr. Jackson) "is serious in itself; and if wantonly made it calls for reprehension, even for *punishment*; for it diminishes the confidence of the military in the ability of their officers, and as such it is injurious to the prosperity of the country." To diminish confidence, when it is well founded and well placed, is I acknowledge highly improper,—but I believe no wise man will think it expedient to repose a blind confidence in new modes of treating sick soldiers when directed by such men as Mr. Borland, and accompanied by such extraordinary mortality. After attempting, like Dr. McGrigor, to account for the very extraordinary number of deaths in the regimental hospitals, in February, March, and April last, by such inadequate causes as the "volunteering from the militia into the regulars," and the drafting into "the militia by ballot," Dr. Jackson adds, "but before Dr. Bancroft or the Physician-general, whose orator Dr. Bancroft appears to be, can pretend to judge the question like men of science, it behoves them to obtain detailed returns of regimental and general hospitals, even of the hospitals instituted for the poor sick in London and elsewhere; and when they have done this, it is necessary that they compare the whole, and estimate the mortality in each class of disease, in each of these esta-

blishments." How greatly ought we to lament that Dr. Jackson had not *strongly inculcated this lesson of caution* upon the minds of his friends Mr. Borland and Dr. M'Grigor, *before* they went to be examined at the office of military enquiry; perhaps he might then have deterred them from making *upon oath* those assertions by which the Commissioners were *mistled*, respecting the comparative advantages and disadvantages of general and of regimental hospitals, in *places*, and *at times*, when there were no proper means for any thing like a fair comparison; scarcely indeed for any comparison whatever.

At p. 61, Dr. Jackson attempts, though in vain, to extricate Mr. Borland from the charge of having calumniated the regimental surgeons on the continent, by declaring that they had become discontented and careless of the sick in consequence of the appointment "of persons from civil life to the situations of staff physicians and surgeons," though it has been proved by Mr. Keate that *no such appointments had then taken place on the continent*. Dr. Jackson admits "that there are no circumstances which will render a good man inactive or indifferent to the discharge of a duty so nearly connected with his heart as the care of a sick soldier." This being true, it follows either that the surgeons in question were not good men, or that Mr. Borland has slandered them by representing them as having become inactive and careless in regard to this endearing duty, even when nothing unusual, unreasonable, or improper had occurred to render them dissatisfied. And yet Dr. Jackson fancies he can relieve Mr. Borland from this perplexing dilemma, by affecting to expatiate upon the "attachment which, he says, the regimental surgeon often forms to the soldiers of the corps in which he serves." But does such attachment shew itself

in this way, and render the surgeon careless of the lives of those to whom he is so much attached? That Dr. M'Grigor might have become discontented and negligent of his duty on the continent, and that he might have endeavoured to render others so, I can readily believe, after reading his evidence on this subject; but that this was true of the regimental surgeons generally, I am neither able nor willing to believe; for though I do not (like Drs. Jackson and M'Grigor, and Mr. Borland) pretend to be their champion, I hope I shall always be ready to do them justice, which has not I believe always been done to them by those who have so officiously stood forward as their leaders and patrons.

At p. 62, Dr. Jackson again reverts to his favourite topic, and endeavours to prove that diseases are cured more speedily in regimental than general hospitals, and to do this he preposterously recurs to the accounts which he published in 1803 of the average time taken for the cure of patients, not in *regimental* hospitals, but in the *general* hospitals of Chatham and the Isle of Wight, which he states to have been twenty days at the former, and twenty-three days at the latter, and from these instances of speedy cures, performed not in *regimental* but in *general hospitals*, he most absurdly infers that speedier cures may be made in the former than in the latter. To diminish, however, the absurdity of this reasoning Dr. Jackson tells us that these general hospitals approached nearer than others to the regimental, in their "economy and discipline." They had moreover the benefit of his own skill, with that of Mr. Borland. But of the real value of his cures we may judge by looking at Dr. MacLaurin's last letter, as published by the Surgeon-general (appendix No. 8) where he writes "I affirm that I very rarely saw disease

in any very active form at Chatham hospital. I have even been astonished at the frivolous cases Dr. Jackson admitted into the hospital, and told him so; but in this custom he had the advantage of making the number of admissions appear large." It might have been added also that he had the advantage of making the cures appear on the average more speedy, as well as that of making them bear a greater proportion to the number of deaths. But though in this way he contrived to admit more patients than his predecessor Dr. Mitchell, he also contrived to lose a much greater proportion of them by death. It appears from a statement made by Dr. Maclaurin (whom from personal acquaintance and the general opinion of those who knew him, I consider as a gentleman of unquestionable veracity and honor) and preserved in his own hand-writing, that in the space of six months, Dr. Mitchell admitted at Chatham hospital 1809 individuals, of whom fifty-six died, and that Dr. Jackson in the like space admitted 1906, of whom ninety-three died, making the deaths under Dr. Mitchell amount to thirty-one in 1000, and those of Dr. Jackson to 49 in 1000, a melancholy difference considering "the frivolous cases," which Dr. Jackson is said to have admitted. I am, indeed, informed that at the *dépôt* (Chatham) Dr. Jackson sometimes singled out men telling them from their looks or other circumstances, that they were ill, and though they declared the contrary, he constrained them to go into the hospital, where these unlucky men, if able to bear Mr. Borland's "V. S., W. & C. B." (meaning venæ section, warm and cold bathing,) with their usual accompaniments, emetics, purgatives, and blisters, were in a few days considered as convalescents; and in this way it was pretended, and perhaps even believed by Dr. Jackson, that fevers were,

to adopt his own expression, "cut off abruptly at their on-set;" though it was neither certain, nor in many cases even probable, that any thing like regular fever would have occurred, if the poor sufferers had been left to themselves. So much for the speedy cures performed by Dr. Jackson, and for his vain pretension, at page 64, that by their help he has established his "position against general hospitals;" and, for which he once more admits (at p. 60) "that *bad* cases of disease only" are "usually selected." That regimental surgeons, who (like Dr. Jackson) commonly admit into their infirmaries slight cases of disease, (sending the "*bad*" to general hospitals) should be able to discharge their patients in less time than the physicians and surgeons of general hospitals can discharge those whose diseases are more difficult and dangerous, is what may be confidently expected, and even required, without affording room for the smallest imputation upon the latter; and all discussions on this subject (which seems to occupy Dr. Jackson's sleeping and waking thoughts, almost exclusively) are in truth superfluous, considering that even *he from whom they originate*, has now admitted the impossibility of not recurring to general hospitals on active service. I say nothing of his having disclaimed all belief of any superiority in the treatment of the sick by regimental surgeons. Had he done otherwise, and pretended to believe such superiority, he would have manifested either singular effrontery or extreme ignorance. General hospitals being then indispensably necessary, at least when armies take the field, nothing remains but to correct their defects as much as possible, especially that excessive crowding from which almost all the complaints against them seem to have originated.

I am at a loss to conceive why Dr. Jackson has thought proper to state, p. 64, as an objection to general hospitals, that "there exists no motive in his (the regimental surgeon's) mind, on account of connection with other branches of the *trade*, which induces him to temporize or proceed slowly in his course." Does Dr. Jackson believe that staff-physicians and staff-surgeons in general hospitals are not as much exempt from such motives as regimental surgeons, and that it is equally their interest to cut the disease short?

At p. 64, 5, &c. Dr. Jackson labours to justify Mr. Borland's evidence respecting the sick of the Russian army, sent from Holland to Guernsey and Jersey in 1799. "Dr. Borland, (says he), was attached to the Russian auxiliary troops, as an assistant inspector of hospitals, and as such he must be supposed to have known the state of their health, for he was present with them in the island of Jersey. He testified upon oath that they were sickly, and that the sickness was contagious fever. When a person speaks upon oath he does not speak inadvertently, and being *on the spot*, he does not speak without knowledge of the fact.* When any

* Dr. M'Grigor was "*on the spot*" when Dr. Shapter with seven other persons (who alone constituted the hospital staff sent from this country for the Indian army under General Baird) landed at Coffey in June 1801, and received from him the charge of the medical concerns of that army, then on its way to Egypt; and Dr. M'Grigor continued more than three months in subordination to Dr. Shapter and in almost daily communication with him and the other individuals composing this staff, with every one of whom it is impossible not to believe that he must have been personally well acquainted; and therefore when he spoke

one, whoever he may be, endeavours to invalidate such testimony and solemn affirmation, with no better authori-

of their number to the Commissioners on oath, it must be believed, according to the words of Dr. Jackson, that he did "*not speak inadvertently nor without knowledge of the fact*;" and yet, when it suited his purpose to inculpate the Medical Board by charging them with profusion, in sending out superfluous medical officers and hospital stores, this same Dr. M'Grigor declared with "*solemn affirmation*," that Dr. Shapter's staff of eight individuals only, amounted to between twenty and thirty. This may serve to show how far a man's having been "*on the spot*" entitles him to implicit belief, even when on oath; and how far Dr. Jackson can be entitled to insult me for having exercised a reasonable and proper caution in forming my opinions. Mr. Borland also (for whose sake this insulting language was employed) thought proper to declare on oath at the Board of the Commissioners (See their Report p. 159.) that he had then i.e. on the 5th May 1807, served fifteen years in the medical department of the army, "seven of which (adds he) I have been upon foreign service;" and in making out *this* seven years, he mentions his service in Flanders in the year 1793, where, as his appointment only took place on the last day of August, he could not have gone until some time in September of that year, and by the Surgeon-general's statement it appears that he returned to England in February following, or at latest very early in March; the amount therefore of this foreign service was about five months, certainly not more than six. He adds that he next served "*in the West Indies to the latter end of 1798*"—which latter end clearly means the months of November or December in that year.—It appears however, by the Surgeon-general's statement that on the first of August 1798, Mr. Borland was in London and wrote a letter to the Medical Board to solicit promotion, and as he must previously have landed at some out port, and perhaps did not get to London, and begin his solicitations for promotion for some weeks after landing, his arrival may fairly be considered as having taken place at least as early as the middle of July; instead of November or December—Now as it can be proved that he did not sail for the West Indies, until some time in May, and probably not till late in June 1794, the amount of his foreign service on that expedition cannot have exceeded four years, and one or two months, which

ty than vague report, or fanciful presumption, I cannot resist saying that the sentiment of honour does not reside in him; and in the present instance you may be disposed to think with me, that Dr. Bancroft, instead of bringing discredit on Dr. Borland, proclaims his own want of principle, in attaching to an oath no greater value than it bears with the Transatlantics* in a custom-house." If Dr. Jackson before he made this discharge of ill-natured scurrility had foreseen that Mr. Keate would have published those facts which are stated in his 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 88th, and 108th, pages respecting Mr. Borland's *testimony* as delivered to the Commissioners of military enquiry, and at pages 39, 40, 41, and 42 respecting that of Dr. McGrigor, I am confident he would rather have trodden upon burning coals, than have mentioned their names when about to expatiate upon the cautious regard to truth which men are supposed to exercise in speaking under the obligation of an oath; and I am also persuaded that he would have taken great care not to provoke any reply from me by accusing me of want of principle and of

with the five or six months in Flanders, may at the very utmost extend to four years, and from six to eight months. Besides this he was two or three months in Holland in 1799; and this added to the former periods constitutes the whole of Mr. Borland's *foreign service*, and falls short of even *five* instead of *seven* years. He was indeed a few months at Guernsey and Jersey in 1800, but employment in those islands is never understood in the army nor allowed to be *foreign service*. These facts and some others stated by the Surgeon-general, may serve as instances of the accuracy of the declarations made by Mr. Borland, "*with solemn asseveration*."

* I have already mentioned (p. 76.) Dr. Jackson's belief that I was born in America—an error which has here led him to endeavour to stigmatize those whom he calls "*transatlantics*" thinking that he could thereby gratify his spleen against me.

being without "sentiment of honour," because I did not give implicit belief to Mr. Borland's evidence. As the matter now stands, he has placed his friend in a cruel predicament, by reminding them of what they *ought to have done on that solemn occasion*, and at the same time rendering it expedient for me in my own justification to show how *egregiously* they have *failed* in that respect, by referring to the Surgeon-general's account of their conduct.

Dr. Jackson admits, concerning the Russians in Holland, that both "those who were wounded, and those sick who were already collected into hospitals, were embarked at the Helder and sent to Yarmouth;" which is a fact that no one could have suspected from reading Mr. Borland's evidence to the Commissioners; in which he chose not to notice this most important circumstance, but to state that "the *Russian army*" had "landed in Guernsey and Jersey in 1799 *full of contagion*;" an expression which could only have been proper if the whole 2500 sick and wounded who were sent to be taken care of in the general hospitals at Yarmouth, Gosport &c. had been actually landed in Guernsey, and Jersey. That an army relieved from all its wounded and from all the sick, or at least all who were considered as such, and sent from Holland to the healthy islands of Guernsey and Jersey, with no service or duty to perform, but that of *keeping themselves well*, should at the end of six months have only had 100 sick, is nothing wonderful, or capable of proving any sort of superiority in regimental hospitals, as Mr. Borland pretends. On the contrary, the 2000 sick sent to and successfully treated in the general hospitals at Yarmouth, would afford much better evidence in favour of the latter, though Dr. Scott has never boasted of his services in

regard to these. It would have been well for Dr. Jackson, when he undertook to vindicate Mr. Borland's testimony concerning the great sickness among the Russian soldiers in Jersey and Guernsey, and the superior benefits which according to that testimony, these soldiers derived from being treated in *regimental* hospitals, if he had recollected his own preceding accounts of this matter. In his publication of 1803, p. 172, he ascribes the restoration of health to those of the Russians who were sick in Guernsey and Jersey, not to regimental hospitals, nor regimental treatment, but to their own rigid observance of Lent. "During that period, says he, sickness abated, and the hospitals became thin:"—he adds, "if Lent had lasted the whole year, there were grounds to suppose that the hospitals might have been entirely broken up." In his letter to the Commissioners, Dr. Jackson asserts that a great part of the Russian troops did not reach Jersey and Guernsey until January, and as Lent began in the following month, and rendered "the hospitals thin," there seems to be no appearance of the very great sickness mentioned by Mr. Borland, nor any sort of room for those conclusions by which he endeavoured to persuade the Commissioners of the pretended superiority of regimental hospitals.

At p. 67, Dr. Jackson returns to the subject of infection as propagated in general hospitals, and seems really to know little or nothing of the instructions framed by the army medical board, approved by His Majesty, and ordered to be enforced by the Commander in chief on the 31st of March, 1800, in which all the means hitherto considered as most efficacious are prescribed "to prevent the origin, and check the progress of infection." He

owns that infectious diseases "appear occasionally in regimental as well as in general hospitals," but he thinks the patients are not so well arranged in the latter from "an error in management;" which "is not easily avoided by persons who are little acquainted with principles of organization,"* and these persons "are regular physicians taken from civil life." What Dr. Jackson here means, (for I am willing to believe he means some thing) by principles of organization, I know not; but I am fully persuaded that though "regular physicians taken from civil life" are not drill serjeants, they generally possess all the knowledge necessary to discriminate diseases, and arrange them with propriety, so as to obviate the propagation of contagion, full as well as Dr. Jackson, or any of his associates; and it betrays no little presumption in him even to hint the contrary.

At p. 68, Dr. Jackson recurs to the subject of *malingerers*. I had truly said in my Letter to the Commis-

* The strange modes of expression adopted by Dr. Jackson on many occasions, have been already noticed by several writers. The late Dr. Currie (p. 381 of his Medical Reports, 3d edition) says, "if I were to enter into any thing like controversy with this singular reasoner, (Dr. Jackson) I should soon find myself involved in that obscurity with which his *cabalistical phraseology* invests every medical subject on which he treats."

The Edinburgh Review for 1804, vol. 4th, p. 184, in noticing Dr. Jackson's publication of 1803, observes that he "has framed a phraseology to describe the actions of the living system, which in ridiculous absurdity far eclipses all former attempts of a similar description, and bids defiance in extravagancy to the thapsodies of Paracelsus, or the reveries of that enthusiast Van Helmont. Of this jumble of theories, this mixture of languages, and confusion of tongues, it is difficult to give any regular and precise account, &c."

sioners, that in what are strictly and properly called general hospitals, where the sick, or those supposed to be so, are sent in by regimental surgeons, the malingerer must have imposed upon his surgeon before he could reach the general hospital.* To evade this Dr. Jackson now says that the soldier being sick when sent by his surgeon to the general hospital, and being there cured, he afterwards becomes a malingeringer, by feigning disease when none exists; and that his cunning is "often an over match for the regular physician's penetration." One cannot refrain from noticing the modesty of this *irregular* in supposing that the regular physician after curing a disease should alone want sufficient penetration to discover the cure, or to perceive any change from the morbid appearances and symptoms which had formerly existed. He evidently forgets that it was one of his irregular fraternity, I mean Dr. Laft, who could only "know

* Dr. Jackson and Mr. Borland by profusely bleeding the sick, then almost parboiling them in hot baths, and afterwards suddenly chilling them by cold water, with other depleting and violent remedies seem to have effectually cured this species of malingering at Chatham while they troubled the hospital there. I have lately seen a letter dated the 26th of July, 1803, and written by a gentleman who is now settled as a physician in a large town in the north of England, and was formerly employed at Chatham hospital under both Dr. Mitchell and Dr. Jackson, in which, after mentioning the terror that Dr. Jackson's practice and its attendant mortality had excited, he declares that the soldiers in the barracks when taken ill and visited by the assistants of the hospital "not unfrequently *imposed*" that they might not be carried into it, "as they felt assured they must die there." "An Englishman (he adds) seldom assumes a humiliating posture, but English soldiers have *solicited* exemption from the hospital at Chatham on their knees."

when a patient's ill, by his complaining he is not well." The regulars pretend to have means of knowing this, and I am persuaded they are means to the full as certain, though *less violent* than those which have been sometimes employed without success by the irregulars.

At p. 69, Dr. Jackson attempts to maintain "that general hospitals have been attended with great waste and profusion of expence." In addition to what I formerly published on this subject, I need now only refer to different parts of Mr. Keate's Observations, which contain facts more than sufficient to prove that though general hospitals have not always been conducted in the most perfect and the most economical manner, there is nothing to hinder their being so conducted, as to produce no greater expence than the regimental, regard being had to the amount of comforts and the value of medical and surgical skill in each.

To prove that "the medical staff appointed for Sir Ralph Abercrombie's expedition (to the West Indies) in 1795, was excessive, Dr. Jackson compares it with that of the Russian auxiliary army, sent to Holland in 1799, which, though destined to act in a climate so much more healthy than the West Indies, was so inadequately provided with medical officers, even for European service, that after nearly 2500 sick and wounded had been sent to British general hospitals, the army, exempted from all military operation in the healthy islands of Jersey and Guernsey, still wanted the assistance of such eminent practitioners as Dr. Jackson and Mr. Borland, and (which probably was not of less use) that of the garrison surgeons of those islands. Dr. Jackson is very unfortunate in choosing his proofs and illustrations.

At page 73, Dr. Jackson urges the Commissioners of

Military Enquiry, to undertake an investigation for ascertaining "the maximum of duty, that is the greatest number of sick or wounded, for whom a physician or surgeon can be supposed to do the needful;" and for this purpose he, with his usual kindness, offers them his assistance, without seeming to recollect that, after having been so often misled by him, the Commissioners may now hesitate about availing themselves of it. He then proceeds to fix the time which physicians, surgeons, and mates ought daily to employ in attending their patients, and this he states to be eight hours in the day, five in the forenoon, and three in the afternoon. The portion of time for daily labour being thus settled, he proposes that the Commissioners should "summon a committee of medical officers" to ascertain the number of patients which may be properly allotted to each physician and surgeon; and, to render this number the greater, he proposes to place them in a particular manner. "If," says he, "the sick be classed *scientifically*, and arranged in their wards according to the *characters of diseases*, and their *conditions*: viz. *progress towards recovery or death*, a physician will be enabled to execute his medical duty with more facility, and with better effect for 100 sick, than he could for 30 of the same description if they be thrown together promiscuously;" and then he tells us, what I do not believe, that by means of this classification, with the help of one assistant, and a dispenser of medicines, he preferred for 300 patients daily at the depot in the Isle of Wight, during the months of September and October, 1801. When the proposed committee shall have enabled the commissioners to fix definitively the number of sick and wounded for whom each medical officer is capable of performing the necessary duties, and thus "to lay the

basis of a permanent system of medical discipline for the national military force," he advises them "to call for regular returns of the sick troops serving on different stations, at home or abroad, for instance, the West Indies, Cape of Good Hope, Malta, &c. accompanied with returns of the medical officers, general and regimental, allotted for their care," "in order to ascertain whether or not the medical staff exceeds the just proportion," and thus to see if they have constantly been fully employed; always supposing that no allowance ought to be made for the uncertain increase of sickness among the troops, or the sickness and death of the medical officers themselves; and forgetting that by their distribution at different stations and islands, it may not be always practicable to proportion the medical officers with exactness to the supposed number of sick at each of them, because a medical man cannot conveniently be split into fractional parts. He afterwards acknowledges "that *most* medical men in England will be disposed to consider his estimate of the medical staff."

* Upon this and other occasions, Dr. Jackson appears to suppose that when "the whole of an army is in the sick *hospital*," all the medical officers are to continue in *perfect health*; yet it happened in the West Indies in 1796, that a larger proportion of the hospital-staff became sick and died than of the rest of the army, probably by reason of their duties requiring them to be where there was most disease, i. e. in the most unhealthy quarters.

Dr. Roberts, who lately resigned the office of physician to his Majesty's forces, in writing to me concerning Dr. Jackson's extravagant assertion, that the hospital-staff of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's army had nothing to do but to amuse themselves, mentions that in the year 1796, while the sickness was at its height in Grenada, he there "for some time visited twice in the day 300 patients, ill of fever." This I believe was not

as too low," and says he has made it only on "an implied condition," which "does not exist as things are, i. e. that every medical officer, not simply the physician, is competent to the treatment of common diseases, that he is energetic in action, and zealous in disposition; that the sick are classed in wards or apartments according to the nature of diseases and their conditions; and further that the remedies are administered immediately, and under the eye of the person who prescribes." After premising these conditions, (most of them either unattainable or improper) he again recurs to his former assertion "that the medical-staff appointed for the expedition to the Cape of Good Hope and the West Indies, in the year 1795, were so excessive, that if it had happened "that the whole army was in the sick list at one time, the hospital-staff alone might be deemed equal to the duty of prescribing for this entire force." But unless Mr. Young and Mr. Weir, the

a solitary case. More than 300 patients were under my care at one time, of whom a great number had fevers.

If there was a superfluity of hospital staff-officers any where during the last war, it could only have been at the Cape of Good Hope, as far as I can discover. In that part of Africa, British troops had never been before employed, and the extent of sickness to which they might be subject, was unknown, nor could the resistance with which they might be opposed, be previously ascertained. Fortunately this was but small; few of the troops were wounded, and the others enjoyed unusual health. But while so much uncertainty existed in regard to those events, it was more prudent to err by sending a superfluity than a deficiency of medical officers. Dr. Jackson is well acquainted with these circumstances; and it is easy to understand *quo animo*, he recurs in every publication to the excess of the medical-staff at the Cape of Good Hope.

two chief medical officers in the West Indies, and indeed many others, were guilty of the most palpable misrepresentations and impositions in their frequent and urgent requisitions for additional medical assistance, Dr. Jackson must be liable to the charge of having in this instance advanced a most groundless and injurious accusation. I have in pages 56 and 57 of my Letter to the Commissioners, given my opinion on this subject, which was afterwards so completely confirmed by the decisive and irrefragable evidence published by the Surgeon-general, (see Article No. XII. of his Observations) that it is unnecessary to bestow any farther notice on this absurd exaggeration of Dr. Jackson. He seems to be actuated by an inordinate desire to attract notice, and supposing himself best able to do it by intermeddling with the arrangements of the medical department of the army, he keeps his wits perpetually at work to discover and suggest some innovation or project which may carry the appearance of saving money, however impracticable or fallacious; well knowing that his chimerical schemes are not likely to be ever brought to any trial capable of demonstrating their fallacy; and that, unless this can be done, he may gain applause for zeal, knowledge, &c. In regard to what he pretends to have done at St. Domingo after Mr. Weir's departure, I need only observe that the small number of troops then remaining, had nearly all become seasoned to the climate; that the winter or healthy season was approaching; that active military operations were almost at an end; and that the evacuation of the island soon after took place.

With respect to Dr. Jackson's method of arranging the sick in wards, first according to the forms and charac-

ters of the several diseases, and afterwards according to the progress which they appear to be making towards death or recovery, so that all the wards may be occupied by patients under similar diseases and in similar conditions of recovery, or of approach to death I am confident that it never took place in the dépôt hospital at the Isle of Wight, at least to any considerable extent, and indeed that no existing hospitals can afford a sufficient variety of wards for that mode of arrangement, of which however he has given a fuller explanation in his publication of 1805, between pages 196 and 215; beginning with the new patient, when first placed "in the receiving room," where he "is correctly examined by the physician or regimental surgeon; the nature of the malady is *precisely ascertained*, and notice given to the proper servants to prepare the bed." Here it suits Dr. Jackson's purpose to represent it as an easy matter *always*, and on the very first admission of a patient, to "*ascertain precisely the nature of his disease*:" but when he formerly wanted the assistance of Mr. Borland at Chatham hospital, it suited his purpose to give a very different and truer account of this matter, in a letter dated the 4th January, 1801, to Colonel Brownrigg, in which he described the patients of the hospital as consisting chiefly, either of persons labouring "under dangerous diseases which require frequent visits during the day, or diseases of such complicated nature as to require long and careful examinations before the nature of the maladies can be clearly discovered." So much for the facility and certainty with which patients upon their first admission can be immediately and precisely arranged in wards according to their several diseases. Dr. Jackson next proceeds to what he calls the "*preparatory process*," of "copious, or what is deemed by most persons

to be *profuse*, bleeding," with "bathing whether warm, or cold, or alternate," which operations are to take place in the receiving room. Of these the late Dr. MacLaurin, Dr. Morrison, Mr. Stratford, &c. gave accounts (published in the Observations of Mr. Keate, appendix, No. 8.) which seems to me to be in a great degree confirmed by Dr. Jackson himself. "*The preparatory process*," says he, "of bleeding, purifying the skin, and bathing the body, being conducted in the manner stated, carried to the useful point of execution, the patient furnished with a clean shirt, &c. is conveyed with care to the bed allotted for him, in his proper ward," and "so disposed in his place as to undergo with the least possible inconvenience the remainder of the medical discipline," &c. which generally consists for the day of admission, of a vomit or a strong purge, or both, in addition to the "preparatory profuse bleeding, and warm and cold bathing," before-mentioned.

Among the advantages to be obtained by Dr. Jackson's method of arranging the sick, he mentions "*a facility of prescribing*" as the most undeniable, for, as "diseases of a similar nature are classed together in the same ward, it is known, says he, that remedies required for the cure of such diseases are of a similar kind;" and this naturally suggests the practicability of *prescribing for a whole ward at once*, and of thus realizing and converting into sober truth what Foote imagined and exhibited on the stage as a fit subject for wit and ridicule; and it is probably by this mode of prescribing that Dr. Jackson intended (at least if he was sincere in his proposal) to undertake singly the care and treatment of as many patients as the Physician general, assisted by two army physicians. It may also be recollected that Dr. Jackson offered to perform this

duty "without the assistance even of a *clerk* to write his prescriptions," and at first I was at a loss to conceive how the clerk would be rendered unnecessary; but it has since occurred to me as practicable from the uniformity of Dr. Jackson's modes of treatment; and I think it likely that it was his design to order certain initials to be painted or inscribed on the door of each room or ward, signifying the different means which were to be employed generally for the patients in that particular room, e. g. those initials which occurred so frequently in the prescription books of the *dépôt* hospitals when, under the management of himself and Mr. Borland, "V. S. W. and C. B." meaning, venesection, warm and cold bath. By this ingenious device no clerk would be wanted, and certainly the physician might dispatch in a very little time a very large number of patients.

As to the almost daily removals of the patients to new wards, new beds, new attendants, &c. these are not free from considerable objections, even when the progress of the patients leads them towards recovery; and certainly sick persons who are getting better generally discover it by their own feelings without this kind of information; but when "the *rhythm* of movement," to use a favourite expression of Dr. Jackson, impelled them in a contrary direction, (which is stated to have often occurred to those under his care) the effects of this kind of removal upon the imaginations and apprehensions of the poor patients would doubtless prove highly mischievous. How melancholy and distressing must be the feelings of those who are not insensible, and who find themselves separated from their companions and placed in wards known to be appropriated to the dying, or to those in imminent danger of death! surely this is not the way, nor are these

the proper means, to render its approaches comfortable, and strew flowers along the paths which lead to the grave.

At page 82, Dr. Jackson brings forward what Dr. McGrigor had meditated, i. e. an assertion that I was detained at "the post of honour" (in the West Indies) against my will; and this he does solely because in a state of extreme debility when beginning to recover from a severe attack of the yellow fever at Martinique, I applied, as many others did, for leave to return to Europe, to recover my health (See the note, page 2.) By employing such effusions of ill nature, Dr. Jackson plainly discovers how much it abounds in him, and how desirous he is to injure my reputation; he discovers also how destitute he is of facts for the accomplishment of this desire.

At p. 84, Dr. Jackson recurs to the supposed discontinuance of the general hospital system at the Cape of Good Hope, and afterwards proceeds to the West Indies, where he says there is but one general hospital, and one physician, and that "the regimental staff is not insufficient in number, or wanting in skill to do the duty of its office." But all this is fallacious, because the British troops in the West Indies are now, and for several years have been employed only in garrison duty.—No attack has been made upon the enemy, and the superiority of the British navy has made it impossible for him to attack any British possession; and it is not pretended that in such circumstances general hospitals are indispensably necessary; they having been provided and intended for a different state of things. But after these assertions and arguments (abundantly refuted as I trust) Dr. Jackson appears to flatter himself with a belief of his having demonstrated his assertion, that either the regimental or the

General hospital staff was unnecessary on the expedition to the West Indies, in 1796, and that the Commissioners will "have the satisfaction of seeing that they have not incurred an error in transcribing it." The Commissioners however, will, probably, now have acquired too much prudence to indulge themselves in this deceitful and short-lived species of satisfaction.

What Dr. Jackson says at p. 84, and 85, of the expenditure of the dépôt hospital, and the waste of drugs and unnecessary provision of surgical instruments during the late war, has been so efficaciously refuted by the Surgeon general that any thing more on the subject would be superfluous.

After having led the Commissioners of military enquiry thus far, and taught them how they are to *think* as well as to *act*, Dr. Jackson in return for all their docility proposes most unhandsonely to *cast them off*, as unfit for his purpose, and to submit the whole matter "to the decision of a board or commission, which confronts evidence, and is at the same time competent to *judge* the question *on all its points*. Such a board, he adds, "must comprehend military experience, *medical knowledge*, and mercantile information," and he afterwards states his reasons for thinking each of these kinds of knowledge to be *essential* to the decision of this matter. I had in my Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry attributed their errors chiefly to the circumstance of their being completely destitute of medical knowledge, which Dr. Jackson also thinks to be indispensably necessary, and therefore wishes for men better qualified;* but when

* Whether the commissioners have been disgusted by Dr. Jackson's ungrateful return to their complaisance and docility,

I consider how much these appointments have already cost the public, and how little real benefit has resulted from them, I do not feel much anxiety for another Board, even with the improvement suggested by Dr. Jackson.

I have thus followed Dr. Jackson through a series of repetitions in which ideas formerly promulgated by him at different times, and in different forms, have been reproduced, with little or no variety, but that which results from their combination with new and injurious misrepresentations; and my refutation has therefore often unavoidably taken the form of a Commentary. It will however I hope appear, that I have sufficiently answered and repelled his arguments, assertions, and derogatory imputations; and that I have fully established every position advanced in my Letter to the Commissioners, which was controverted by him. On several important points indeed Dr. Jackson has not ventured to give the Commissioners any support, particularly on that of excluding physicians from the army; and on the peculiarities which they were pleased to suppose in *army diseases*, and *army medical practice*, so often mentioned in their report as matters of great importance; and he has expressly disclaimed all belief, in their novel and improbable notion, that

or whether they have been persuaded by my letter, and the publications of the Surgeon-general and Mr. Calvert Clarke, that their report is *incurably* defective I will not venture to conjecture. But I may be allowed to mention (what I believe to be true) that they have lately declined an invitation, given to them from a most respectable quarter, to *revise* their report, doubtless with a view to its amendment; for no one I presume could intend or desire that they should render it worse by a revival.

army physicians, are less competent to the treatment of sick soldiers than regimental surgeons.

Dr. Jackson has also obtained, even from the least endeavour to justify, or countenance the practice of the present Inspector general of army hospitals, in withholding from army physicians, all promotion to the offices of inspector, and deputy inspector of hospitals; and it may be hoped that a practice which is confessedly destitute of foundation in reason or justice, and so injurious both to individuals and the public service will be discontinued.

I will now take my leave of Dr. Jackson, and as I hope for ever. It became me perhaps *once* to meet him in this way; but I fully intend to do it no more: unless he should, in some future publication regarding me, pay more attention to truth, than I can expect, or than he appears to have done in any thing (which I have seen) proceeding from him for several years. I have other and better occupations than controversial writing; and I would gladly even forget those by whom it has been forced upon me.

I am sorry however that I cannot conclude without once more mentioning the name of Mr. Borland. I was informed some time since of his having soon after the publication of my Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, written and sent to His Royal Highness the Commander in chief, to the Secretary at war, and I believe to some or all of His Majesty's Ministers, a series of remarks upon that letter, in which my name was very improperly mentioned; and wishing that my refutation of the publications of Dr. McGrigor and Dr. Jackson might be extended to Mr. Borland's Remarks also, if worthy of my notice, and that I might thus at once silence all my antagonists, or at least rid myself of all necessity for farther controversy with them, I wrote in July last, to Mr. Borland, mention-

ing the information I had received, and requesting a copy of his Remarks; and at the same time I fairly explained my motive for asking it, adding that I hoped he had not written any thing respecting me, which he wished to conceal from me. My application, however, proved fruitless; for though he pretended in his answer, that he had no wish to conceal what he had written, he refused to make me acquainted with it, and this without alleging any other intelligible reason, than that he was "an officer, on full pay," and that I was not then "a public servant;" meaning probably that I was not like him on full pay; which whether true or not, must as I think have been a matter absolutely indifferent and foreign to my application. Being however thus deprived of the opportunity of knowing and answering what Mr. Borland has written concerning me, I must here express my hope that his *concealed* imputations, of whatever nature they may have been, will not be permitted to gain credit in the minds of his readers, by continuing unrefuted. When an individual endeavours by private statements or allegations, either to criminate others or justify himself against charges *fairly*, and *publicly advanced*, he at least contrives and secures to himself the opportunity of employing gross misrepresentations uncontradicted; and there must always be strong reason to suspect that he has done this, if when called upon, he manifests by his conduct, that he is afraid or ashamed to discover and avow his statements and allegations. Had Mr. Borland acted with becoming candour in regard to my application, he would have been treated with more lenity in the preceding pages.

FINIS.

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A LETTER

TO THE

COMMISSIONERS OF MILITARY ENQUIRY:

containing

Animadversions on some Parts of their FIFTH REPORT;
and an Examination of the Principles on which the Medical
Department of Armies ought to be formed.

By ROBERT JACKSON, M.D.

W. FLINT, Printer, Old Bailey.

LETTER

TO

MR. KEATE,

SURGEON-GENERAL TO THE FORCES.

BY ROBERT JACKSON, M.D.

LONDON:

SOLD BY J. MURRAY, FLEET STREET.

1808.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following letter has been forced from me through necessity. The language of it, I am sensible, is sometimes indecorous as language addressed to gentlemen; and, as such, it would be inadmissible if the military courts were open to me. But, as these are shut by the circumstances in which I am placed, and, as my character has been attacked insidiously and in a manner singularly aggravating, while I publicly executed my professional duties, I have no remedy of redress left, except the full and open mode of refutation through the press which I have now gone into. It may, perhaps, appear to some that I speak insubordinately in thus addressing persons of superior official rank to myself; but the mode of proceeding,

ceeding, which the physician general and surgeon general adopted with regard to me, has completely absolved me from whatever official connexion might be otherwise supposed to exist between us. Released therefore from all official restraint, I speak without reserve—fearful only of offending the Truth.

LETTER

LETTER, &c.

SIR,

IN my letter to the military commissioners, dated July 30th, I trust I proved to their, and even to your own fullest conviction that the objections, which you make to my statements and opinions respecting the Medical Department of the army, are only subterfuges—not refutations, either in fact or argument, of what I advance on that subject. That task I considered as an official discharge of duty, and I hope I have fully acquitted it. It now remains for me to address a few words to yourself on your own account, your particular attention to me having also made this necessary. I shall endeavour to be short; for, as there can be no courteous intercourse between you and me, the sooner our business is ended the better. If you have misstated any thing through ignorance, I shall not charge it against you; but if you, wittingly and wilfully, misrepresent the truth, you must not take it amiss, or consider it as insubordinate, because you are surgeon general, that I freely and fully expose it. You hold an official situation of some importance in the army; I have also been in the public service, and, though not now employed, I am not interdicted by the laws of the land from speaking truth which may benefit the public; and I cannot, I believe, benefit the public more effectually than by exhibiting a true picture of yourself, who

are one of its confidential servants. If your conduct has been correct, you will meet with the approbation of your superiors, and retain their confidence; if otherwise, you may be degraded, perhaps dismissed from your office; and, if you be such as I state you to be, there will not be much cause to mourn your loss.

You pretend to give some account of me in your observations on the fifth report of the military commissioners; and, as you have not been very scrupulously correct in stating the fact on many points of that history, it is my duty to furnish you with better information. If you be disposed to doubt the authenticity of the statements which I make, I shall be ready at any time to confront evidence that I may prove the truth in trial; but I will not, from henceforth, waste time in noticing your calumnies. Indeed I could not have done it now on any other consideration, but that you are surgeon general of the British army, and that I myself have held responsible appointments in the British service; in consequence of which it is necessary that our official conduct be exposed to the public for judgment, for you decline submitting it to a military tribunal where alone it could be properly judged.

You state in No. VIII. of your Appendix, "*that I served as surgeon's mate to the late 71st regiment in North America, that I obtained an ensigncy before the end of the war, and that I was in fact half pay ensign in October 1793.*" This is true; and there is nothing of reproach in it. I was ensign on half pay in 1793; but I was a physician by profession, I was known then in the medical world as such; and, without arrogating unduly to myself, I think I may say that the rank of army physician at that time was no promotion to a person who stood on the ground on which I stood: it certainly held out no prospect of pecuniary gain, for the income, arising from the exercise of my profession

profession in a respectable neighbourhood where I bore a fair reputation, was equal if not superior to the appointment of physician to the forces. But, as I have mentioned on other occasions that the investigation of fever was a subject which occupied my attention, and, as I knew I should have a better opportunity of prosecuting my views in the army than in civil life, I offered to serve as army physician with the troops which were collecting for an expedition destined for the West Indies, in the month of September 1793. Mr. Hunter was then surgeon general: I was not eligible to the physician's rank according to his rule; for I had never borne a medical commission,—consequently my offer was not accepted. My purpose, in offering service, was principally a professional pursuit; I therefore presented myself again as ready to take the surgeoncy of a regiment destined for the West Indies, on the condition of being appointed physician on the first proper occasion. This was sinking rank and foregoing emolument for the sake of a professional object. The Buff was offered and accepted: the half pay of ensign was sunk; and, thus sunk, it was a price or equivalent for the surgeoncy obtained: hence it cannot, as you infer, be said in strict propriety that I received the surgeon's commission for nothing. The destination of the Buff was changed: it did not go to the West Indies with Sir Charles Grey as was intended, and I was disappointed. You were then inspector of regimental infirmaries, and I recollect to have written to you, stating that I would willingly exchange with the surgeon of any of the regiments actually going with Sir Charles Grey's expedition.—You returned for answer that you did not know of any surgeon who was disposed to exchange; but you observed to me that, if I would resign the surgeoncy of the Buff, you would recommend me for hospital mate, and assign me a station

in the West Indies. This I declined. You observe however that you offered me the surgeoncy of the 10th regiment of foot, which was then in Jamaica. Of this I have not the most distant recollection; but, if the offer had been made, as you state, I certainly should not have accepted it, as my object lay in the scene of war—not in a peaceable garrison. To this you add that I manifested dissatisfaction in a very few weeks, and applied for leave to sell the commission of surgeon to the 3d regiment or Buff. I do not possess the form of application to which you allude; but I am confident, from what I know of myself, that you have not represented it fairly. I probably stated to Lord Amherst, (for I have no copy of the letter and do not recollect the circumstances), that I accepted the surgeoncy of the Buff that I might thereby, according to the then existing regulation of the service, become eligible to the office of army physician, and consequently that I might then obtain that appointment. If this condition was not to be fulfilled, and particularly as the Buff was not then in orders for foreign service, it is likely I signified my intention of retiring from the army, and that I desired leave to sell the commission of surgeon, or to obtain an ensigncy for sale, as an equivalent for the half pay which I had given up by accepting a medical appointment. This implied no favour or indulgence; it was in fact no more than what, in fair reason and justice, I had a right to expect. You remark however that, by your letter to Lord Amherst on this subject, you first incurred *my displeasure*. That could not be; for your answer was never communicated to me, and I did not know that such an answer, or such a letter existed until I saw it in the Appendix to the observations which you have just now published. The flippancy of the style shews plainly that you were young in office, and somewhat petulant in spirit;

spirit; but it could not irritate me, for it did not come to my knowledge.

In proceeding with your history of me you observe that "*I found means to ingratiate myself greatly with some of my military superiors on the Continent.*" By the manner in what you express yourself, you seem to insinuate that I employed unworthy means. It happens fortunately in this case that my character is generally known in the army, and that no insinuations from the pen of Mr. Keate will be permitted to make impression on it. I have maintained a correct moral conduct through life, and I am, from natural inclination, attentive to the duties of my profession. By these means I obtained, and I continued to preserve the good opinion of all the military officers under whom I ever served; nor am I conscious that I owe promotion to any other cause. It was known in the army in 1794 that I accepted the surgeoncy of the Buff that I might be eligible to the rank of physician; and it was also known, and it ought not to be concealed from the public that, because I had become a regimental surgeon, I was thereby, according to the regulation of the Medical Board, disqualified from attaining the physician's rank, or executing the physician's duty in a military hospital. This seems incongruous with common sense; and so perhaps it was considered by the higher powers, for you know yourself that one of the early acts of His Royal Highness, Field Marshal Duke of York, after he assumed the office of Commander in Chief in 1795, went to enforce my appointment in the army as physician, on the condition of my submitting to the examination of the London College when the circumstances of the service permitted my return to England. I was thus appointed acting army physician by the authority of His Royal Highness; but I was then considered only as acting.

The examinations, on which the confirmation of the appointment depended, had not yet taken place, when I was left as head of the hospital staff which remained on the continent with the cavalry. Dr. Kennedy, who had served as inspector of hospitals with the continental army, died in the mean time, and I was appointed to succeed him. This was not effected by my own contrivance as you seem to insinuate; for, I do not believe that I knew of Dr. Kennedy's death, when I saw my name in the Gazette as his successor. It was the act of His Royal Highness, the Commander in Chief, and His Royal Highness must be supposed to have had grounds on which to rest his official act. That the Medical Board opposed it, and remonstrated against it, is, I believe, true; and, as the Board did not communicate with me during the time I remained on the continent, as head of the hospital staff, it did not appear to acknowledge the validity of my appointment. You here, as one of the number, shewed resentment; whether you fulfilled your duty to your Sovereign and the public by so doing, I leave others to judge.

You pretend to give an account of me, but you do not give a complete one, there being a material part of my history which you pass over without notice, or which you designedly obscure. You know that I was inspector of hospitals in 1795, and you know that, called from thence in September for other service, I accompanied the expedition which was sent to the West-Indies under the command of General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and that I did so with the rank of assistant inspector. This you must know was optional with myself. It never would have been required of me, consistently with the rules of service, to become assistant inspector from inspector of full rank had I not chosen so to do. This however I did;

did; and you may know that I did so for the sake of prosecuting my professional study. I said then, and so did others, that I was treated unfairly in being denied the rank of army physician, for that was the condition under which I entered the service, or accepted a surgeoncy; but you probably know that I never solicited rank or emolument, either directly or indirectly, after I attained that step; you even I presume know that I declined accepting the rank of inspector general when it was within my reach. I must also tell you, if you do not know it, that I have ever offered my services to the public whenever I thought they would be useful, but that I never solicited appointments for the sake of their advantages, and that what you now say, viz. "*that I succeeded in getting appointed, without knowledge of the Army Medical Board, physician and head of the hospital for the dépôt at Chatham,*" is not correctly said, if you mean thereby that any application was made on my part for that situation. I in fact, not only made no application for it, but I had no knowledge of the death of Dr. Mitchell, (for I was at a distance from London,) till I had intimation that the Commander in Chief had nominated me to the succession; and I have thus reason to think that this act, which was so grievous to the Medical Board, and which was not desired by me, was entirely the act of His Royal Highness, the Duke of York.

You must be sensible, Sir, in your own mind that you do not state facts correctly, and that you are wrong in what you say with regard to the changes and causes of change which took place among the medical officers who were attached to Chatham hospital at the time I entered upon duty at that place. I mentioned to you verbally, for I saw you in London some time after I had made myself acquainted with things at Chatham, that I was

desirous of having a surgeon at the dépôt, whom I knew to be a good operating surgeon.—To this you readily assented, and charged yourself with giving it effect. The apothecary was removed some time after,—not from objection on my part, but on account of a regulation which took place in the month of March or April, in consequence of which persons of military experience, viz. surgeons or apothecaries, were to be stationed in recruiting districts for the examination of recruits, instead of hospital mates who were found not to be competent to the duty. Mr. Dowse, the apothecary, was removed to a recruiting district in consequence of this regulation; and I hoped that the removal would have proved an advantage to him, for I considered it as promotion; and he deserved promotion, if humanity, worth, and integrity have any claim. He had besides served His Majesty long, and I should have been glad if Chatham could have afforded him something more comfortable than what he possessed; but he was not stationed at Chatham in charge of apothecary's stores, and he did not in fact execute the apothecary's duty. That, as you know, had been placed in the hands of one of the hospital mates with an extra allowance for supposed extra trouble. Besides a surgeon of my own choice, I also wished to have a medical officer of intelligence and activity to assist in executing the medical duties at the dépôt, for these seemed to be extensive and of a varied nature.—I mentioned to you that I was desirous Dr. Borland should be attached to this duty. He had a physician's diploma, and he had at the same time the rank of assistant inspector of hospitals, which according to a War Office letter entitled him to act as physician in His Majesty's hospitals.* He had been

* The surgeon general observes that the *Special Board*, appointed to enquire

been with me in St. Domingo as surgeon to the forces, and in Jersey as assistant inspector of hospitals for the Russian auxiliaries; so that I was well acquainted with his

enquire into the management of the hospital in the Isle of Wight, blamed me for depriving Dr. MacLaurin of that participation in the treatment of the sick, which the (Medical) Board intended, and expressly directed that he should have; but that it took no notice of the insubordination and disobedience with which I had persisted to employ as a physician Dr. Borland, a novice surgeon, who had never been in any way examined respecting his knowledge of physic, not even when he was made an hospital mate." It is plain, from what the surgeon general himself has put before the public, that Dr. MacLaurin acted the part of a secret informer for the Army Medical Board. His informations tended to criminate my conduct; but on what points I did not precisely learn. As I hate altercation, and as I did not choose to be disturbed in the execution of my office, I made such arrangement of the sick that Dr. MacLaurin's duty as a physician ceased. I informed Mr. Keate himself, in the presence of General Hewett, that it should not again commence while I remained at Chatham; nay further, I informed the Board officially by letter, consequent to their letter of the 4th of July which will appear at its place, that, if ever the circumstances of the dépôt hospital should render the presence of a regular physician necessary, Dr. MacLaurin was a person that I could not receive. This was plain and open language; and if it be deemed refractory, it was the duty of the physician general and surgeon general to have chastised it at the time. But, while the facts which I have now stated will probably be considered as a sufficient justification of what I did with regard to Dr. MacLaurin, I may also defend what I did with regard to assistant inspector Borland by War Office authority, which is higher than that of the Medical Board. Mr. Keate cannot be ignorant that it was expressly ordered, in an official letter from the Secretary at War, that persons holding the rank of assistant inspector should positively and directly do the duty of physician in military hospitals; and he must also know that Dr. John Wright and Dr. Theodore Gordon were appointed assistant inspectors of hospitals at St. Domingo under that condition, and expressly for that purpose; the regular physicians, according to Mr. Weir's representation, not having been found sufficiently effective for medical duty in that climate. This order of the War Office was not, so far as I know, formally revoked; and if not revoked, it must be supposed to have been in force in 1801: hence, in giving medical duty to a com-

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his intelligence, and could depend on his zeal and activity. Dr. Borland's appointment I believe you yourself would not have opposed; but it appears that it was objected to on the part of the physician general, who recommended a regular physician for the Chatham hospital duty. To the physician named for this service I had no objection on his own account, for I had no knowledge of him; but I thought that Dr. Borland, as having a general acquaintance with military affairs, would be more useful than a person from civil life, who was a mere physician. I therefore still persisted in expecting that he would be attached to the dépôt; and thence it was proposed that, as he would in all probability do physician's duty, he should submit to a medical examination previously to his attachment. This, he at first thought unnecessary, as he deemed himself entitled to act as physician in virtue of the War-Office authority:—he however at last consented, and, when he consented, the Board, departing from its own proposal, sent him to Chatham to be employed as I thought fit, without admitting him to trial for the purpose of ascertaining his medical qualification. This is the fact; and, if so, the Board is responsible for all the evils which have arisen from this gentleman's supposed insufficiency, for it was in the power of Sir Lucas Pepys to try his abilities and judge his fitness before he was permitted to act as army physician at the King's general hospitals.

It is extremely irksome, Sir, to follow you through

missioned assistant inspector of hospitals, I obeyed the just authority; for all orders to me, as head of the dépôt hospital, could only in strict propriety be received through a military channel.—Mr. Keate knew the truth on this subject; but the disguise suited his purpose, and he knows, from his experience of mankind, that disguise is more attractive and captivating than simple truth.

your

your details, for it does not seem to be in your nature to state a single point of fact without, in some way or other, perverting its truth. You say "*I had gone to Chatham with the purpose of making considerable innovations in the diet and treatment of the sick according to my own peculiar notions, and that I had by my sole authority, superseded the diet tables for military hospitals established by His Majesty's regulations, and introduced another which appeared insufficient for the proper nourishment of the patients.*"* You further remark "that Dr. Maclaurin, after remonstrating with me on this subject, as well as on my extraordinary and violent methods of treating the sick, made a formal representation to the Board on these matters on the 8th of June, 1801." You have here, Sir, brought yourself and the Board into an awkward dilemma, for you have developed a secret, though undesignedly, that Dr. Maclaurin was your agent, sent to Chatham to bring about a purpose more strictly perhaps for the physician general than yourself. I would be glad, if I could get quit of the subject without mentioning Dr. Maclaurin's name as he is not living to answer for himself; but, as that cannot be done, it is necessary to say in the first place that Dr. Maclaurin made none of those remonstrances to me to which you allude. If he had, any body, who knows the army, must know that I could not have avoided putting him under arrest; for remonstrances, such as you insinuate, are perfectly irregular, subversive of all discipline and good order, such as obtains among king's officers on service. You must be sensible yourself, as well as your colleague, that Dr. Maclaurin was not entitled, in virtue of his commission of physician, to remonstrate with me on the management

* See Table of Diets.

of

View of Diets of British Hospitals.

[illegible]

N. R. It may be seen from a comparative view of the above scales of diet that the diet table introduced by me into the depot hospital is not a starving diet, if that, now sanctioned by the members of the Medical Board and adopted in all the hospitals, be sufficient. The extra diet was ordered according to the wants of the individual case—and the diet given at the depot appears, by the extra table, to have been very considerable.

View of Diets used in Foreign Hospitals.

[illegible]

N. B. Upon a comparative view of diet tables, British and Foreign, I do not think that even the physician general and surgeon general themselves will be able to convince any one that I had reduced the hospital diet to too low a scale; particularly as I admitted a great variety of extra for those who, in any epidemic or other outbreak, could not be allowed to change from the ordinary form.

of Chatham hospital. The right of medical remonstrance and controul belonged to the Medical Board alone; and, though Dr. Maclaurin was certainly the Board's agent, he was not announced to me and acknowledged by me as its deputy. He did not complain as a physician that any thing was withheld from him which he required for the cure of those sick who were placed under his care; and, while he met with no interruption in the execution of his duty, his communications with the Board were irregular; and he, I maintain, had no right to animadvert on my general arrangements.—So much for Dr. Maclaurin in the first instance. I admit in the second that I introduced alterations into the diet tables of the sick and convalescent; for it was my inclination, and I believed it to be my duty, to do every thing for the good of the soldier and the public. The propriety of these alterations were however to be judged by the Medical Board—not by Dr. Maclaurin. You yourself were, I believe, informed of the most material of them; in fact, you must have known of them all. You saw the hospital yourself; you examined every thing in it, particularly the diet tables, the manner of exhibiting the expenditures, the order, economy and arrangement of the sick in their wards, and you gave your unqualified approbation to every thing you saw, in the presence of General Hewett, Mr. Warren, and some others.

In regard to the subject of hospital diet, I must here remind you and your colleague that you do not appear to be sufficiently instructed in the knowledge that is necessary for the just execution of your office; for you formed a table diet for hospitals without knowing the diet allowed for the duty soldier in barracks. The rate of diet which I allow is calculated on a lower scale than that which was adopted in British hospitals in 1801; but
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it appears to me to be a diet, not less full, perhaps more acceptable, as will be seen by a comparison of the different diet tables annexed, than that which has been since approved and sanctioned by all the members of the Medical Board, and which is now adopted in all the British military hospitals, general as well as regimental, throughout the kingdom. The rate of diet, which you established for British military hospitals when you entered upon your office, was fixed apparently without knowledge of the highest quantity of meat which was allowed to a soldier in barracks; for had you known this simple fact, (and the Army Medical Board ought not to have been unacquainted with it,) you would, I presume, have spared your reprehension of my alterations, for they are in part adopted in your last regulations. No man of common understanding supposes that a convalescent man, one for instance who is confined within the walls of an hospital, requires more animal food for his support and sustenance than a soldier who is employed in active service in the field; yet the full diet of British military general hospitals comprehended, in the year 1801, a full pound of beef, while the highest barrack allowance was, as it still is, only three quarters of a pound. This seems an absurdity; and I suppose it proceeded from ignorance. You have now corrected it; but it is probable that my innovations led you to consider the case, and to discover the error. The full diet of British hospitals is now reduced to the measure of the barrack allowance; but, if you compare your hospital diet with that of other military powers on the Continent, you will probably find that you are still too high. The most of these place it lower than the ration of the barracks: This you may see in the table annexed; but setting this aside, I must further add that, if you take the trouble to watch the sick and convalescent

valescent at their meals, you will not fail to observe that what I allotted to the different classes of hospital patients, at Chatham and in the Isle of Wight, is as much as can be fairly and properly consumed. Of this I am well assured from correct observation; but, while I say so, I must also inform you, and you I presume know it already, that no officer,—surgeon or physician who acted under my orders, was ever restrained in ordering, as extra, any kind or quantity of diet or refreshment which he thought necessary or essential for the recovery of the patient.—If Dr. Maclaurin had been so restrained, he would have had reason to complain and to remonstrate; but, as the case actually was I do not see on what foundation his cause of complaint rests, for it was not with him, but with me to form arrangements and superintend the execution of all the duties at Chatham hospital, whether medical or surgical. I was head of Chatham hospital by commission; and, if I was thought not to be qualified for the duties of that station, it belonged to the Medical Board, and more expressly to the physician general to ascertain the fact by his own inspection and observation. He was in fact invited so to do by Major General Hewett, and even by myself in a letter dated the 21st of June; in which I professed myself ready to resign the situation which I held at the army depôt, if evidence was produced that I was unfit for so great a trust. The physician general, who, according to medical etiquette, is the only person of the Board who could be permitted to try and ascertain my qualifications as a physician, declined to satisfy himself on this head; and, in so doing, I think, I may be allowed to say that he shrunk from his public duty; and I may further add that the Board, possessed of those informations which the surgeon general now produces, but which he, with the other members of the Board,

Board, then denied to exist, commits himself to speak against the testimony of facts. A letter from the Board, dated the 4th of July in answer to mine of the 21st of June, both of which I shall here subjoin for the sake of refreshing your memory, seems to say "*that you had not witnessed, or supposed any impropriety in my conduct.*" It is unfortunate for you that this letter has been preserved; for, though the language of it is equivocal, it must still be held to contain an acquittal from all the reports and insinuations that had been made by your agents at Chatham respecting my improper treatment of the sick. As the depôt was totally removed from Chatham in a few days after the date of this letter, you condemn yourself to something worse than ignorance, when you recur to the errors and mismanagement which took place at Chatham hospital between December 1800, and July 1801. You approved of the hospital economy and management verbally when you made your visit in the month of June; and, as a member of the Board, you must be supposed to have done away all surmises and suspicions existing against my professional conduct by your official signature in the letter of the 4th of July.

Copy of a Letter dated at Chatham, June 21, 1801.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE transmitted the monthly return of Chatham hospital as usual, and I observe that the list of deaths is rather high. As I understand that the mortality at Chatham hospital has been a subject of animadversion with the Army Medical Board, and consequently that the conduct of the head of the department, as responsible for the execution of the medical duties, has not

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passed without censure, I think it proper to give you some information upon the subject which may serve to correct your opinions. In the first place, the number of recruits which have passed through Chatham garrison these last six or eight months greatly exceeds the proportion of former periods,—and the sickness it is presumed bears proportion to the number of recruits. I thus believe there has been more sickness, I mean real sickness in Chatham garrison these last eight months than there ordinarily was in preceding periods; and, though the return of persons borne upon the hospital establishment has been materially diminished, the cause is not a diminution of real sickness, but of a different arrangement. Formerly there appeared to be a great proportion of invalids waiting for their discharge who lived upon the hospital, and all recruits who were affected with itch were considered as patients and borne upon the hospital books. This would add a third to the number of persons admitted upon the hospital returns; so that no fair conclusion can be drawn, in this case, from a comparison of numbers.—I mention this fact that the Army Medical Board may not be drawn into error by recurring to a fallacious argument.

I am aware that pains have been taken to give a bad impression of the medical management of Chatham hospital; but, as my professional principles are before the public, and, as the military officer under whom I serve may be supposed to have some knowledge of the punctuality of execution, I leave them to themselves. If the physician general, to whom the investigation of this matter must be supposed to belong, can bring forward sufficient evidence to convince the Commander in Chief that I am deficient in capacity for so important a duty as the medical charge of the recruiting depôt, or that I am

wanting

wanting in diligence, I have no doubt that His Royal Highness, who is desirous to consult the good of the army, will have no hesitation in replacing me by a person better qualified. No man ought to occupy an important public situation who does not deserve confidence; and I will add for my own part, that I should be unwilling to retain it for an hour after confidence is diminished.

(Signed)

ROBERT JACKSON.

N. B. I cannot pretend to say that this letter is a verbatim copy of that sent to the Board on the 21st of June; for it is taken from a loose scroll, the substance is however correct, if the expression should vary.

COPY.

Upper Brook-Street, July 4, 1801.

SIR,

WE have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st ult. with the monthly return of sick in Chatham hospital, to which we deem it necessary to say a few words in reply: with regard to the observations you make, on the notice taken by us, of the great mortality in that hospital, we must beg leave to say that no imputation has been attempted to be thrown upon your character: you will admit that it was a circumstance which demanded our most serious consideration, and which had we passed over silently, would have proved an inattention to the most important part of our duty, wholly inexcusable. Your explanation of the cause, viz. the increased number of recruits that pass through the depôt; and the reason you at the same time give for the sick list not being increased, although the serious cases are more numerous, are satisfactory as far as they go; but we must

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observe

observe that it was the former circumstance induced the surgeon general to suppose further medical aid was necessary in the hospital; and, if the slight cases are not admitted to be borne upon the hospital establishment, they must nevertheless require medical assistance.

It is as much our inclination as it is our duty to support the heads of establishments, in our department, in the due execution of their offices; and in justice to the public, to us, and to yourself, you cannot for a moment think, that had we witnessed, or supposed any impropriety in your conduct, we should have attacked it by insinuations or uncandid rumours: but, placed in the important situation you are, and enjoying confidence which we can have no motive for wishing to shake, we submit, if it is not incumbent on you explicitly to say, whether considering the great and constant influx of recruits, the various diseases thereby brought into the garrison, and the extent of your duties, the sufferings of many of the patients might not in some cases be mitigated, by calling to your aid further medical assistance: and as it is our duty to give every proper support to the heads of departments, so must it equally be yours, to support any gentleman, who may be directed to do duty under you, which we trust you will in future do.

We are,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

L. PEPYS.

T. KEATE.

JOHN RUSH.

The army depôt, as I observed above, was totally removed from Chatham early in July, and you had yourself, a short time previously to this, expressed your satisfaction, in the presence of General Hewett and others, at all the changes

changes and alterations which had been adopted in the hospital; nay, even on the 4th of July, the Board, in its collective capacity, does not pretend to maintain that there existed any error in the mode of treating the sick. If you and your colleagues had at any time believed the reports which had been made to you by Dr. Maclaurin, you now disavowed them. You soon however appear to have changed your minds; for you penned your accusation on the 10th of December, and you there rest principally on Dr. Maclaurin's evidence, which could not extend beyond the garrison at Chatham. You thus commit yourselves to unworthy equivocation; for it is proved by the letter from the Board of the 4th of July, and, by your own express declaration to General Hewett, that my professional conduct, while the depôt remained at Chatham, was absolved from blame. It is manifest from the sequel, that you had harboured a purpose of malice in your mind which you then concealed, or rather disingenuously denied to exist. If you look at the case yourself, you will not I presume maintain that you acted openly and honourably, or in a manner becoming the surgeon general of the British army.

It appears you had been called upon by the Secretary at War, some time after the depôt was removed from Chatham, to give your opinion whether or not the plan which I had adopted for conducting the hospital business at the army depôt, was such as might be adopted for the other hospitals in Britain with advantage. Your letter to the Secretary at War shews that you were alarmed and irritated at the idea of introducing economy into the British hospitals; and, as you could not directly argue against economy, you waved the question by criminating my professional character. You know the means which you employed to effect this purpose. I shall notice them by and bye; in the mean time I shall state the charges which you

made against me, together with their refutation and the decision of the Commander in Chief thereon.

Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War, dated December 20th, 1801.

SIR,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th ult. with the inclosed papers, directing us, "after comparing the statement of the expenditure for the hospital in the Isle of Wight, with that for other general hospitals in this country, to report to you our opinion whether it would be expedient at present to make any, and what alteration in the system established by Dr. Jackson, or whether Dr. Jackson's regulations appear to have been framed with so due a regard to economy, and to the advantage of the troops, as to afford just ground for considering the propriety of introducing them into other general hospitals at home."

We have the honor to acquaint you, that we have made the comparative statement of the expenditure for that hospital with that of the other general hospitals at home, but we find, that, by far the greater proportion of patients in those hospitals, is of a very different description of sick from those formerly at Chatham, and now in the Isle of Wight.

With respect to the question unconnected with other circumstances, which in the course of this investigation it will be our duty to lay before you, it appears to be, whether a liberal and generous diet is requisite to restore men, who have either been debilitated by disease, or by active debilitating remedies.

It appears that Dr. Jackson's mode of carrying on the Isle of Wight hospital is an apparent saving of money; but

but at the Isle of Wight, and lately at Chatham, we have observed an unprecedented number of deaths: viz. 27 in the last month, and 12 in the last week, frequent relapses, and tedious recoveries, with a debilitated state of the patients; therefore, so far from economy being effected, there has been a very serious loss of men, and ultimately a very great expenditure; these returns called upon us to recommend that two physicians should be immediately sent to the Isle of Wight.

We now beg leave to refer to the inclosed letters, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and this we do in obedience to your commands, when we had the honor of waiting upon you. It appears therefore, that Dr. Jackson has altered the established diet tables as used in all our hospitals, and sanctioned by his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and that he has reduced many other articles of comfort and nourishment.

We have thought it would throw some light on the subject before you, to send you the enclosed monthly report of the foreign military hospitals at the Isle of Wight for the month of October last, by which a comparative statement of the mortality in the same place, under different diet and treatment, may be made. Upon the whole it will appear that Dr. Jackson's system of economy is not to the advantage of the troops, and should not be introduced into our home general hospitals; and we humbly submit, that it will be necessary to enforce the printed regulations for general hospitals in the Isle of Wight.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

L. PEPYS.

T. KEATE.

The charges here made are serious in their nature; and His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, in concurrence with the Secretary at War, judged it expedient that they should be investigated by a board of medical officers, who were competent to judge the case and ascertain the truth of the fact in all its relations; for it was highly important to His Majesty's service that it should be fully and fairly investigated, and known. You then, as may be seen by the following letter of the 28th of December, withdrew or modified your charges. The enquiry notwithstanding took place; though it may be concluded, from the following letter, that you would not have been displeased if it had been suspended.

COPY.

Letter from the Physician and Surgeon General to the Deputy Secretary at War.

" Upper Brook-Street, 28th Dec. 1801.

" SIR,

" WE have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th inst. and we beg leave humbly to represent, for the consideration of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and of the Secretary at War, that it does not occur to us, that in our letter of the 10th inst. we *animadverted on the practice of Dr. Jackson*, at the Isle of Wight; but we thought it our duty to represent the great mortality there, and consequently animadverted on the *success* of the practice; or otherwise we must appear to His Royal Highness to prejudge Dr. Jackson, and to pass a censure where, from our not having witnessed and investigated Dr. Jackson's practice, we might

might do an act of injustice; we hope you will pardon the liberty we have taken in referring to the above expression in your letter, and we humbly conceive that the Secretary at War will not disapprove of this explanation.

" We have the honor, &c. &c. &c.

" M. Lewis, Esq.
&c. &c. &c.

L. PEPYS.
T. KEATE."

The enquiry which had been ordered took place, and you say now it was made "*completely ex parte*." The special Board applied for leave to publish its proceedings on this subject, and obtained it. You were, as I have been informed, desirous the publication of the report should be withheld: it has however appeared, and, with it, your own letter retracting your remarks respecting the conduct of that board. But that you may see that the investigation was not *ex parte*; at least that there was no desire on my part to shrink from any scrutiny that should be instituted, I shall subjoin a letter from General Hewett to Sir John M. Hayes, who was president of the board. This is sufficient to shew that the Board was invited on the part of the general to make the fullest investigation into the subject; and, I, for my own part, aver that I was disappointed, when I did not find yourself and the physician general with all your evidence in the Isle of Wight, prepared to support the charges you had given in against me. —I was even disappointed that the investigation was not more formal than it was.

Isle

" Isle of Wight, Dec. 30th, 1804.

" Sir,

" ON the 23d inst. I received the notification of the Secretary at War, of your intended arrival at this dépôt, and yesterday's post brought me the papers marked 1, 2, 3, 4, all of which have been in your possession; as they contain imputations on the professional skill and practice of Dr. Jackson, accompanied with assertions that the sick under his care have been treated with *foul inhumanity*, I consider it a duty I owe the Doctor's character to state to you the regulations which govern the duties of this dépôt, (and which I herewith enclose, No. 9,) have been in force ever since I have been with it. They will furnish you with the most satisfactory evidence the inquiry can receive.

" With respect to the medical treatment of the sick, I cannot be supposed capable of forming any opinion, much less should I think of offering one; yet whilst I continue to place in Dr. Jackson's hands, my life and the lives of my family, my belief that his skill is equal to his assiduity cannot be doubted, and I shall always feel a pleasure in gratefully declaring my conviction, that his judgment and attention have been the means of rescuing many of us from serious disorders; but, though I readily acknowledge my ignorance of the cure of disease, I have been too long in the habit of observing the causes which produce it in soldiers, to feel any hesitation in pointing out what I conceive to be the occasion of its increase in Parkhurst barracks. Among the first of these may be reckoned the low situation of the barracks and hospital, the extreme bad nature of the soil on which they

they stand,—a clay so tenacious as to retain on its surface every drop of water which falls on it, and incapable of draining or improvement; the barracks (which are besides defective in general arrangement and construction) are in consequence unavoidably covered with mud and dirt, and filled with damp and unwholesome air; the hospital partakes in a great degree of these disadvantages, though every precaution is used to mitigate them, as Dr. Jackson will more clearly point out; it is extremely crowded, so much so, that the worst cases only can be received into it; and when convalescent, the men cannot be dismissed early, for if permitted to go out into the damp and wet which surround them, a relapse and death are generally the consequence; rooms in barracks have been allotted for the slighter cases and convalescent men; but, as these open immediately to the external air, and have their gable ends pointed to the south, and are destitute of colonades, pavement, or flags for dry exercise, partaking of all the disadvantages of a camp, which they resemble more than a barrack, they are in the highest degree unfavourable for recovery. To these causes may be added the assembling so very numerous a collection of men of every bad description from jails, crowded transports, foreign climates and foreign service; they are unavoidably mixed with young recruits of the fullest habits of health, and the latent infection brought by these people appears too late to prevent its being communicated: thus disease spreads rapidly; for the number of men placed in the sleeping rooms must evidently tend to promote contagion.

" From the failure of one of the two pumps in the barracks, water has been brought from the river; this too may be unwholesome.

" In visiting the hospital, which I have always done at uncertain

uncertain times, I have constantly witnessed the utmost order and cleanliness. I am always ready to listen to every complaint the soldier may wish to prefer; and, previous to his leaving the dépôt, every one is called upon to state to the officer who receives him, whether he has any cause of complaint, and the officer is required to sign a certificate that he has none, otherwise the man is detained and the grievance fully redressed. Not the slightest has ever reached me against Dr. Jackson, or any of his staff, either directly, or through Colonel Farquhar, who has the immediate command of the interior management of this dépôt, or by any other channel; and this proves I think incontestibly, that the men do not consider themselves as inhumanly treated; and I firmly believe that could I descend to canvas opinion, or solicit complaint from them, I should meet only expressions of thankfulness for Dr. Jackson's kind and anxious solicitude for their health and welfare:—on this subject however, you shall have the most ample means of information; every staff officer and every soldier shall be at your command for examination; and if you can point out any other mode of enquiry, it shall be readily open to you, for I wish to challenge inspection into every the most minute point which can bear on the subject which brings you here, and which I consider as embracing the means of preventing, as well as checking diseases, or I should not have troubled you or myself with this detail.

“ It may be right for me here to observe on the letter marked No. 1, that it gave occasion to an address from the Medical Board to me, when at Chatham, No. 12: and on my giving an answer, the copy of which is herewith inclosed, No. 10, it produced a visit from the surgeon general, whose arrival was most properly unexpected; he was on the instant taken to every ward in the general hospital,

hospital, he had an opportunity of seeing and examining most minutely into every circumstance which he required or could possibly be pointed out to him; and on my then desiring to know, whether any thing was defective, and in the power of my authority to correct or provide, he declared in the presence of Dr. Jackson, and Surgeon Warren, his unqualified satisfaction at every thing he had seen; the diet made part of his examination, and in which were many deviations from the printed form (some of them the consequence of his own recommendation to Dr. Jackson); and neither then nor since, until the arrival of the Secretary at War's letter of the 22d inst. did I ever learn that the Medical Board had any objection to them; it is certain that they have been in its possession for many months, and the Medical Board could not be unacquainted with Dr. Jackson's practice at that time or previous to it, for it is in print; I cannot therefore but be surprized to find that complaint making a part of the present charge.

“ The irregular mode in which the business of the hospital was carried on, after its arrival in this island, was owing to circumstances not in our power to prevent, and which are stated in my letter to the War office, No. 11, so long ago as the 1st of November. Dr. Jackson will explain to you better than I can do the difficulties he had to encounter, previous to that period; I mention it only to shew that it was necessity, not choice, which occasioned any transaction to take place not strictly conformable with his usual mode of proceeding, and no blame can attach to him, as he never concealed any thing that was done or doing, but on the contrary produced it for public examination, and approval or rejection.

“ I have perhaps gone to a length on this subject which may be thought unnecessary; for to the Medical Board alone, I conceive, belongs the regulation of the

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army hospitals as far as relates to the medical treatment of the sick, and to them alone must attach responsibility, for whatever they are or can be acquainted with. Mr. Keate's approbation on a former occasion, and the subsequent silence of the Board, certainly implied an acquiescence in Dr. Jackson's practice.

"Among the other remedies which may occur to you for giving a temporary melioration to the state of the barracks, the increasing the allowance of coals for the sitting rooms during the wet and winter months, and the use of stoves for drying the air of the sleeping rooms in the day, may not be unworthy your consideration.

"Doubtful, from indisposition and other causes, of being able to see you this day, I have committed to paper what I should otherwise have said, and have the honor to remain,

"Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

"S. HEWETT, M. G."

"J. M. Hayes, Bart.

&c. &c. &c.

You observe further in No. VIII. of your appendix that, in consequence of this enquiry, viz. the enquiry of the special Board, the Medical Board was authorized by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, to write, and on the 3d of February did write to me, directing me to deliver over the medical patients to the care of two army physicians who had been sent thither for that purpose, and to confine myself to the duties of inspection. The medical care of the sick I must here inform you, though you knew it before, had been in the hands of the army physicians alluded to from the 1st of January 1802, the day after the hospital was inspected by the special

special board. As you affirm with much assurance that I was superseded from medical duty, in consequence of the enquiry that was instituted at the Isle of Wight, I must here beg leave to state the case as it really is. The report of the Board is now before the public. Whether any besides yourself and your colleague will venture to draw such a conclusion from that report as you draw, I much doubt. But, as the report itself might not be decisive, as not being official, I shall here in addition to its testimony, with the arguments of which you are now acquainted, subjoin the letter of the Secretary at War to Major General Hewett, containing the pleasure of the Commander in Chief on that subject. It will there appear, who are the persons that, in His Royal Highness's opinion, had done their duty or were held fit to do it.

"War Office, January 16th, 1802.

"Sir,

"I HAVE the honor to inclose for your information a copy of the report of the special Board of Medical Officers appointed to investigate the several circumstances lately represented by the physician and surgeon general, relative to the sick in the military hospitals in the Isle of Wight, and to acquaint you that His Royal Highness has perused this report with great satisfaction, as containing a clear and able statement of the causes of diseases prevalent among the troops in the Isle of Wight, of the several matters connected with the treatment of the sick and the local situation of the barracks and hospitals, and as reflecting much credit on the very respectable professional gentlemen employed on this special service.

"His Royal Highness conceives the unanimous opinion of

of the Board to have exculpated Dr. Jackson from all improper practice in the treatment of diseases, and in the care of the sick, and is gratified, in seeing that an opportunity has been given to that most zealous officer, of proving his fitness for the important situation in which he is placed. In making known to you these His Royal Highness's gracious sentiments, I am at the same time desired to request, that Dr. Jackson's attention may be particularly directed to the observance of what is pointed out in the report relative to the scale of full diet in the hospitals under his charge, and I shall take care to instruct the barrack master general to proceed without delay in taking such measures as may be necessary for remedying the several inconveniencies and defects of the hospitals and grounds contiguous, in conformity to the suggestions contained in the report; to the accomplishment of which you will be pleased to give every requisite assistance. The Commander in Chief has further, although with regret, declared his opinion, that the physician and surgeon general were not grounded in their representations regarding the hospitals in the Isle of Wight, and that, instead of having recourse to inferior officers who had served under Dr. Jackson for their opinion as to his practice and mode of treating the sick, it was their duty to have satisfied themselves on those points from their own personal observation; and it has been signified to the whole of the army Medical Board, to be his Royal Highness's express desire that, on all future occasions of extraordinary mortality in the hospitals at home, or in cases where there may be ground to imagine that full justice is not done to the sick, they shall without delay repair to the places where such circumstances may be thought to exist, in order to examine personally into the causes of the unusual mortality

mortality or sickness, to correct abuses, and to give advice where it shall seem to be necessary.

I have, &c. &c.

(Signed) C. YORKE.

*Major General Hewett,
&c. &c. &c.
Isle of Wight.*

Such is the expression of the Commander in Chief's sentiments on this enquiry. I cannot admit the existence of any thing so injurious to His Royal Highness's consistency as to suppose that I was superseded from medical duty in consequence of the enquiry; for, after perusing the report of the special Board, His Royal Highness expressed his complete satisfaction and testified his approbation in pointed terms, reprimanding yourself and the physician general in language so severe that, had not the sweets of power been stronger with you than the sentiment of honour, you could not have remained in office. It is notwithstanding true as you state that I was superseded from physician's duty on the 3d of February, and, as such, it is true that I desired to resign the entire appointment at the dépôt, though the office was reduced to a sinecure, and yet continued to bring its emolument. You know the cause through which the supersession was effected better than I do; but it is plain it was not in consequence of the enquiry; and here I must inform you, if you do not already know it, that I requested to be exempted from official communication with yourself, who were the corresponding member of the Board. I thought then, (and I cannot yet think otherwise,) that you acted insidiously, and, in my opinion, so dishonourably in the transactions which related to the dépôt hospitals that, rather than hold official intercourse

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with you, I should have given up the best appointment in the gift of the crown. Such desire of exemption was perhaps deemed insubordinate: it was not admitted, and whether through this, or through any other cause of calumny, you and the physician general obtained authority to sanction the order that I should cease to act as physician at the army depôt, I do not pretend to know. If you gained one point, and it was probably conceded without the consequence of being foreseen, you were aware that your purpose was accomplished. You knew perhaps that I had more pride than wisdom, that is, that preferring the opinion of honour to the actual receipt of pay, I would not remain in the public service with any the slightest mark of degradation attaching to my character.—Having premised this much, I shall now give a detailed statement of the charges made by you against my professional proceeding, with their special refutation supported by evidence; so that the public may see, and, seeing clearly, may judge truly whether I was superseded on good grounds or not.

The first charge is *unprecedented mortality*—and this we shall first examine. You observe that the *special Board, with my help found various causes of disease and mortality at the Isle of Wight, though they were nearly such as applied to all general and regimental hospitals in Great Britain, in which no similar mortality had occurred.* You said on the 10th of December, 1801, *that by far the greater proportion of patients in the general hospitals is of a very different description from those formerly at Chatham, and now in the Isle of Wight.* You now appear to have changed your opinion, because the change suits your purpose. The causes of the prevailing sickness are explained in General Hewett's letter, and the forms of that sickness are described in the report of the special Board. These authorities will
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be deemed to be of more authenticity than that of yourself and the physician general: for, as neither of you ever were at the army depôt in the Isle of Wight, you never saw the diseases which prevailed in the hospital at that place, and you thus could not, as you yourselves confess in your letter of the 28th of December, accurately judge the case. You likewise add *"that in regard to the hospital at Chatham, if the mortality under Dr. Mitchell and Dr. Rogerson in the year 1799 and 1800, had been compared with that under me in 1801, the result would have been as two to one in favour of the former."* As I do not at present possess the hospital returns of Chatham for the period stated, I do not know how far your assertion is correct or otherwise. You however know that the general hospital returns, prior to the 1st of March 1801, presented no data through which any one could form a correct opinion of effect. They marked no specified discrimination of diseases; consequently no just estimate could be formed of the success or want of success of practice by the inspection of the returns of the early period. In the year 1799 and 1800, itched men, punished men, and invalids waiting for discharge, were borne upon the hospital list. If a thousand persons were admitted into the hospital as infected with itch in the course of one year, not one of them would be expected to die; yet, as they stand in the list of dismissions, the physician assumes credit for cures in the aggregate list of diseases on their account. In the year 1801, no itched men were admitted upon the hospital books, not even punished men, or mere invalids waiting for discharge; consequently there was no one on the list who was not actually ill. This would of itself produce a very considerable effect at a depôt of recruits and invalids; for recruits, as you know, are often itched, and invalids, as those know who
p 2 have

have been at the dépôt, are often detained for some length of time before their accounts can be settled and their discharge obtained. But, besides, what I have now mentioned as augmenting number without increasing danger, small-pox and measles were epidemic to a considerable extent during this period, and every man of experience knows that the dangers of small-pox and measles in a crowded garrison are great. Inflammation of the lungs, or pneumonic fever also prevailed for some months; and pneumonia is known to be a fatal disease where its first days are neglected;—and this was sometimes the case from the dispersion of the dépôt subjects, or the manner in which the recruits were conveyed to the garrison. These circumstances which I have now stated could not fail to produce a difference in effect; but I cannot pretend to estimate what it was as I have not an opportunity of consulting the detailed returns. I shall therefore content myself with exhibiting a view of the hospital at the Isle of Wight, as it is against that hospital only that your charges can be supposed to lie; for you yourself individually in presence of General Hewett, and the Board, in its collective capacity, by its letter of the 4th of July given above, absolved me from all suspicion of treating the sick improperly at Clatham.

You remark that the mortality at the Isle of Wight increased beyond all example, soon after my arrival there; viz. from four, which was the number of deaths in August, to nine in September, thirteen in October, twenty-seven in November, and thirty-nine in December. Had you been disposed to carry on the climax, which in fair justice you ought to have done, you would have added fifty in January, when the care of the sick was in the hands of regular physicians. But that you may see the real state of the case, and that the public may judge it,

I shall

I shall place before you and them an abstract view of the cures or dismissals in every four weeks, with the deaths and relative proportion of deaths in each.

Cures or Dismissals.	Deaths.	Proportion.	Cures or Dismissals.	Deaths.	Proportion.
July 85	5	1 in 28	1802. Jan. 180	50	1 in 3½
Aug. 294	3	1 98	Feb. 165	16	1 10
Sept. 334	15	1 23	March 151	4	1 39
Oct. 225	18	1 13	April 108	6	1 18
Nov. 286	26	1 11			
Dec. 423	48	1 9 nearly (5 weeks)			

Total proportion of deaths during the above period one in fifteen.

Total proportion of deaths during the above period, when the medical care of the sick was in the hands of regular physicians, one in eight.*

It may be seen by the hospital returns which were published in 1803, and which I hold to be authentic till they be proved to be otherwise, that the sickness decreased in January, and that measles, the most mortal disease at the dépôt, soon disappeared entirely. The accommodation in barracks was now also improved, for

* It is proper to observe in this place that, on the 1st of January 1802, there were 14 persons in the hospital, who, according to my own calculation, I did not expect to recover. If this number be deducted from the deaths which happened in the first four weeks of January, the proportion of deaths in that month is as one in five; if it be added to the month of December, it is as one in seven; the balance is still in favour of the former period without assuming credit for 50 or 60 convalescents, which is a fair claim, and which would raise the proportion in the one to eight, and sink it in the other to three. Upon the whole, the proportion of deaths with the deduction in the latter case, and without credit assumed in the former for those who had passed the dangers of the disease, stands thus, viz. as 1 in 9 in one, and as 1 in 13 in the other.

room was left for alterations to take place in consequence of the customary embarkation of troops for India. The hospital likewise soon became equal to its purposes by the diminished number of the sick, so that every case which required hospital treatment, was received into hospital in the latter period; while, in the former, those cases only could be received which threatened to be dangerous, and still the wards were crowded. There was for some time not fewer than 600 persons on the sick list at the depôt, and there was not proper accommodation for half the number: hence when I look back on all the difficulties with which I was surrounded, I have satisfaction in seeing that the loss was not greater than it was; and here I owe a gratitude to those who acted with me, for they assisted me zealously.

That which I have now stated, and which I hold to be correct, shews how the case stands generally; but, as you seem to allude to my extraordinary and violent method of treating the sick, more especially I presume such as stand in the febrile class, I beg leave to draw your attention to this point, and I do this more particularly as the special Board, appointed to enquire into my practice at the Isle of Wight, mentioned a fact which might be deemed grounds for making a comparison, as to effect, on this part of the subject. It is stated in a note, subjoined to that report, that mortality from fever in the hospital at Chatham, during a period of six months in the year 1794, bore the proportion of one in ten; that, in the last months of the year 1801, when the mortality was as you say, unprecedented, it was one in eleven. This is true in itself; but, as we have it in our power, it is fit that we compare effect in the hospital at Chatham with itself, and in the Isle of Wight with itself also, and that we

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make the period of time as nearly equal as we can in all, for, as even the most ignorant of us know, there is often more mortality in the same hospital in one month than in four others put together. If this be admitted, and it is perfectly fair that it should, I proceed to observe that, from the 1st of March 1801 to the 10th of July following, while the depôt remained at Chatham, the mortality from fever stands as one in thirty-two nearly. And further that, when the same depôt was established in the Isle of Wight, it stands, from the 18th of July to the 31st of December, as one in twenty-three; or as one in twenty by adding to the list of dead five others who were in desperate circumstances on the 31st, and who actually died in the course of a few days. From the 1st of January, 1802, when, as you know the medical charge of the sick was in other hands, it stands as one in six in the returns; or deducting the five alluded to, as one in seven.

It is with extreme reluctance, Sir, that I descend to such comparison; but as you have forced me to it, it is due to truth that I make it fairly. There is in fact a difference; but it is not where you place it. The case is now at issue; and if you do not disprove, by confronted evidence, the statement which I have here made, you stand convicted, together with the physician general, of endeavouring in 1801 to impose a falsehood on the Commander in Chief; which you now endeavour to impose upon the public for a purpose of mere calumny, as it has nothing to do with your justification in the view of the commissioners.*

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* The special Board, appointed to enquire into the management of the depôt hospital in the year 1801, having observed, in a postscript which they added to their report published in the year 1808, that the statements which I exhibit of the sick returns do not furnish

The next point in your charge, viz. *frequent relapse*, cannot be brought to so clear a decision as the preceding;

to make a fair comparison of the fact, I thought it necessary to address the following letter to that Board, which the public will, I trust, consider as a full explanation of the case.

London, No. 3, Pantion Square, July 28, 1808.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE received a copy of your report, and I observe with pain that you impute to me want of candour in the use which I made of the statement given by you of the mortality at Chatham hospital, under the management of Dr. Mitchell in the year 1794. I referred to that return, because you stated a point of fact on its authority, and I did not conceive that there was any thing unfair or improper in the manner in which I presented it. You will admit yourselves that, if comparison be instituted, (and I was forced to comparison) we must endeavour to make the conditions equal,—as far as we can. We therefore naturally refer to results in hospitals which were established at the same place, and which received subjects of the same description. We also endeavour to form opinion of results during an equal, or nearly equal portion of time, and, if possible, during the same season of the year. This is plain; and for this reason I placed Chatham against Chatham; and, as six months in the year 1794 was the period noticed by you, four and a half, that is, from the 1st of March 1801, to the 10th of July following, when the dépôt was removed to the Isle of Wight, was the period which I set against it. I did not however select it as a healthy one, but as one that furnished a distinct view of an effect. You know yourselves that, prior to the 1st of March, 1801, there was no specification of character among acute diseases in the general hospital returns; consequently, no just estimate of effect could be formed from their inspection. I constructed a return for Chatham hospital, which I adopted on the 1st of March, 1801; and, for that reason, I only refer to the hospital returns posterior to that date.

The period of six months in 1794, to which you allude, was, you observe,

ing; for there is no column in the return for the insertion of the number of those who relapse, after a certain progress

observe, a period of unusual sickness and mortality; and you seem to infer that the period of four months and a half in 1801, was not unhealthy. I cannot pretend to judge of the difference, for I do not know the character of the sickness that prevailed at Chatham in 1794 otherwise than by what you say of it. I may however remark that we rarely see an epidemic sickness exceed three months in duration, without change or abatement; and unless the sickness at Chatham in 1794 arose from infection produced by accumulation of troops, (and that applied to the garrison in 1801 as strongly as it did in 1794,) I cannot suppose, according to the usual course of epidemics, that the whole period was unhealthy. But be this as it may, the returns published by me in 1803, shew that small pox, measles, and pneumonia, or inflammation of the lungs were epidemic in the period you deem not unhealthy; and, as you may perceive by the same returns that 1452 persons, out of about 2000 or 2500 soldiers who belonged to the dépôt, passed through the hospital in four months and a half, and that 635 of these stand under the head of continued or proper fever, while there are 875 upon the whole in the febrile class, you will not, I conclude after this information, maintain that the troops in garrison were healthy.

You observe further that I assumed another period of hospital returns at the Isle of Wight, of which much the greater part was healthy, viz. from July to December. The fact is this. I presented the returns of the hospital from the time it was established in the Isle of Wight, to the time that I ceased to act as physician; and I gave the proportion of deaths in the whole period—not in the period merely, when the disease was most fatal, as seems to have been done in your note. This is fair; for you know, as well as I do, that it sometimes happens that more persons die in the same hospital in one month than in four others: And, if six months be taken as a period of comparison in one case, the same, or nearly the same ought to be taken in the other. You say much the greater part of the period was healthy; but, if you inspect the returns, you will observe that, though there was no great mortality till the month of November, there was great sickness in October: And, if 1677 persons, out of about

gress in recovery. The fact could only be known and judged by those who were on the spot; and, as you yourself

about 3000 or 3500 troops, passed through the hospital in five months and a half, while serious cases only were admitted, (for there was want of room) it cannot well be said that the garrison had even been generally healthy. Of these 1677 hospital cases, 775 were fevers properly so called, 1222 stand in the febrile class.

The hospital returns, for the period from the 1st of January 1802 to the 30th of April following, are also placed under view in the publication alluded to; and, as you see by the returns that the admissions into hospital increased in October, so you see by the same returns that they decreased after the first week in January. I gave the detail of the returns as long as I had any knowledge of the state of the hospital; and I gave the proportion of deaths in the whole period. In this period, viz. four months, 604 persons only passed through the hospital; of whom 152 stand in the column of proper fever, 324 in the class of acute disease. You see then that I have not, as you seem to infer, formed a comparison upon periods which are not similar as to health. For, though I do not know the state of health at Chatham in 1794, I knew it at the Isle of Wight till the end of April, and you see plainly that there was less sickness in February, March, and April, than there had been for some time at the depot. The cause is obvious; the garrison was thin, for the war was suspended; consequently the influx of recruits was diminished.

You infer further that I form comparisons not upon the same disorders. I am sorry I may appear to have done so; but I was led to the mistake by your own report; for I believed that you had applied the term fever, in Dr. Mitchell's returns, to that form of disease usually so called by medical writers. I did not then know that it included small-pox, measles, scarlet fever, inflammation of the lungs, &c. If comparisons be made on such general grounds, there cannot be any thing precise in the result, for every varied form of disease has some difference in the ordinary proportion of its mortality. I shall however submit the case to your consideration even under this view.—At Chatham, in a period of six months in the year 1794, the mortality from fever, comprehending I presume all

yourself were only once at Chatham, and that for a few hours; and, as neither yourself nor the physician-general were

all forms of acute disease, was one in ten, as stated in the note to your report. At Chatham, during four months and a half of the year 1801, the mortality, including all forms of acute disease as low in the return as dysentery, was one in nineteen. At the Isle of Wight, from July to December 1801, the mortality, including all forms of acute disease, was one in fourteen nearly. At the Isle of Wight, from the 1st of January 1802, to the 30th of April following, the number of deaths, including the same forms as the preceding, was in the proportion of one in four and three quarters. It stands so on the face of the return; but as there were twelve persons, in hospital on the 1st of January in the febrile class, who were likely to die, and who actually did die, I deduct these from the mortality in the latter period and add them to that in the preceding. The number of deaths stands then with the addition in one case, as one in twelve; and with the deduction in the other, as one in six: Such is the comparison according to your own rule—I hope you will find it correct.

I may not perhaps, Gentlemen, conceive your meaning aright; but the language in the conclusion added to your report seems to imply that the returns alluded to, or the statements I have made tend to mask the real state of the case, and to mislead the opinion of the public. If this be your meaning, I must take the liberty of saying that, whatever respect I ought to have for your character as a Board, and whatever esteem I may possess for you as individuals, I cannot permit myself to submit to it. I placed the returns before the public as a document for the purpose of vindicating my professional character from the unfounded and injurious aspersions that had been cast upon it by the physician general and surgeon general of the army, aspersions, which were propagated widely by their emissaries, and which were not contradicted by your report as it was not made public. I was, or had been a public servant, and I could not, in the opinion of my friends, avoid doing what I did. If I have done it inaccurately, I am culpable; if correctly, I have done no more than acquit myself of my duty. I am sorry that, in doing this, I should have seemed to you to make an improper

were once at the dépôt in the Isle of Wight during the period alluded to, your opinion on this head can only be regarded as the voice of persons whom you had employed, or influenced to speak as you desired. Your agents, in this case, were Dr. Maclaurin, Mr. Andrews, and Dr. Morrison. I might perhaps say, and it would not be difficult to prove, that these persons were not well acquainted with the state of the hospital, or the garrison at Chatham; but, as they gave their opinion, not on the fact which they actually saw, but presumptively on a consequence which they imagined might happen, viz. that full diet would be the means of preventing relapse, they betray such ignorance of the laws of animal economy that their testimony, if it departs from the positive and demonstrated fact, can obtain no credit. The physician-general, whom we must suppose to be a most learned and experienced physician, ought not to have suffered this misinformation to pass undetected. It now recurs upon himself, and the promulgation of it may shake his professional credit; for, even the most illiterate of the vulgar know that a full allowance of food is a frequent cause of relapse; and hence every wise and considerate physician, both of ancient and modern times, enjoins a measured diet, even a spare one, or such as is called abstemious for persons recovering from acute disease. I shall therefore, say no more on this head, but that the chiefs of the medical department of the army were very incautious, in committing their official judgment to the direction of Dr. Maclaurin, and Dr. Morrison's theoretic-

proper use of informations contained in your report; I was indeed wrong to touch the report without your permission, and the more so, as it was not necessary, the decision of the Commander in Chief thereon, which was communicated to me officially, being sufficient for my purpose, &c. &c.

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cal opinions, and that they proved themselves to be very ignorant of the laws which govern the animal system in health and in disease, when they admitted this position among the number of their charges, as resting on the grounds stated.

The next clause, viz. *tedious recovery*, is easily ascertained. The date of admission into the hospital, of dismissal to the barracks for duty, or of death, when that takes place, is correctly registered at the army dépôt. This affords means of obtaining a positive testimony of the duration of every disease in hospital which exceeds a duration of three days. It was necessary that I should have knowledge of it; I therefore requested that an abstract might be made for me from the stoppage account, which is in possession of the paymaster: and the following is the result, viz. average duration from the 25th July to the 13th December 1800, at Chatham, prior to my management 34 days; from the 1st March to the 10th June, at the same place, under my management, 20 days; from the 18th July to the 31st December, at the Isle of Wight, under my management, 23 days; from the 1st January 1802, to the 30th April, also at the Isle of Wight, but under other management, 45 days. This abstract was made by one of the clerks, and I believe made faithfully:—it refutes the charge completely; and it is hereby proved that you spoke at random, or that you fabricated a report, with the assistance of Dr. Maclaurin and Dr. Morrison, in the view of effecting a malicious purpose; for the statement departs so far from the truth that the error cannot be supposed to have arisen in consequence of official enquiry.

The *debilitated state of the patients* forms another point in your accusation, and you have made it with equal rashness and confidence as you made the others: Neither

Neither yourself, nor the physician general could be supposed to have any knowledge of it from your own observation; for neither of you ever saw the soldiers of the army depôt. It is a point which can only be judged by those who inspect and examine; and, as it can be seen and judged by others besides men of the medical profession, you ought to have been particularly well assured of the ability and integrity of those on whose judgment you relied on a question so important to yourself as well as the public; for, if you were led into error, you might probably be brought into disgrace. Dr. Maclaurin, Dr. Morrison and Mr. Andrews are your guides and authorities on this head; and there were perhaps no three persons attached to Chatham hospital who knew less of the garrison than they did. General Hewett's letter to Sir J. M. Hayes, inserted above, will do much more than refute this article of your charge; but, that I might give the refutation a form still more precise, I called for a certificate from Lieutenant Jarvis, as he was then adjutant at the depôt, and as such was the person to whom the recovered men were delivered when they were dismissed from hospital. I now transcribe it for your information: it is of some authority, as it is the certificate of a person who knows what he says, and who speaks without prepossession.

(Copy.)

CERTIFICATE.

Army Depôt, 16th Feb. 1805.

I HEREBY certify that, from the time Dr. Jackson came to be head of the military hospital at Chatham, and all the time he remained at the army depôt, according to the best of my knowledge, the sick he dismissed

dismissed from the hospital, to do their duty, were, to all appearance, in as good a state of health, and as strong as they usually came out of hospital both before and after Dr. Jackson's having the depot.

(Signed) GEO. JARVIS,
Lieut. and Adjutant.

Such is the refutation of the charges which the physician-general and yourself brought against me in the year 1801. It appears to myself to be demonstrative, and I believe it will appear in the same light to every person who admits the documents on which it rests to be authentic. It belongs to you and the physician-general to prove that they are otherwise; but, in attempting to do this, you must bear in mind that evidence must be confronted: the subterfuges and loose opinions by which you pretend that you have refuted some other of my statements will not here avail; they will neither satisfy me, nor will they, I presume, gain credit with the public.

As I hold my justification to be complete, I should leave the matter as it now stands if you were a private individual; but, as you and the physician-general are chiefs in the medical department of the army, and, as the medical department is a very extensive one, not an unimportant one, and often a complicated one, I consider it to be a duty which I owe to the public to investigate and expose the character of the means which you employed to effect your purposes on this occasion; for it is not improbable but that you may again employ similar ones, on other occasions, to effect other injurious purposes to individuals, and thus to occasion detriment to his Majesty's service. Have you not procured opinions to effect a premeditated purpose, and procured them, after an unusual manner, from persons who may be supposed to have been

been under influence? I shall state a few particulars of the history of your agents: their testimony, as you see, has been refuted by evidence that must be held to be decisive; they notwithstanding appear to have received their rewards.

I pass over Dr. Maclaurin with little remark, although he was principal in your cause. The reason is obvious: he is not living; I therefore spare him, and you would yourself perhaps have acted kindly towards his memory, if you had not exposed his posthumous works to the public eye. Your second, Mr. Andrews, a practising surgeon in Rochester, had been employed for some time at Chatham hospital as an acting mate. I placed him, soon after my arrival at Chatham, in the medical charge of the prison ship and the invalids at Up-Nore Castle, which was a day duty only; for I had soon occasion to witness his unfitness to administer to the sick in the evenings. Hence, as he did no regular duty in the hospital from the date of that appointment, which was early in 1801, his means of knowing the state of the sick of the garrison could not be supposed to be the best. He was, notwithstanding, invited by the physician-general and yourself, to give his testimony with regard to the economy of that hospital, and the effects of that economy upon the sick; and, as his opinion seems to be such as had been solicited, he appears to have been rewarded for his opinion, for he was made hospital-mate for Chatham new hospital, in 1803, at a time when it had not received any patients, and when there was not any prospect of its soon receiving any. How this will be explained I know not; but it is presumed that the Lords of the Treasury when they know the fact, (and there are probably many analogous,) will call upon the Medical Board to shew, by what authority, a practising surgeon is appointed acting hospital-

hospital-mate to a King's hospital which has no patients; or to shew under what form of certificate he receives, or can receive acting pay, when no act is done, or to be done by him.

The other, Dr. Morrison, who was a regular mate, was solely attached to the duty of the hospital, and acted under the apothecary who had care of the convalescents. Dr. Morrison was a good operating surgeon, a good anatomist and dissector, and he also had the diploma of physician; but these specious qualifications did not preserve him from leading the Board into error. He was ordered to Egypt (I believe in April), under an exigence of service. He refused to obey, and was of course struck off the list of hospital mates at Chatham. In the month of December he was called to town, consulted by the physician-general and yourself, and, after having been as I should suppose instructed in the case, was invited to add a written testimony in support of the accusation which you gave in on the tenth of that month. The reduction of the scale of diet was the ground on which you appear to have built your hopes of success in establishing censure; and Dr. Morrison, as a disciple of Dr. Brown, was ready to support you on this point from a principle of theory. But, as my table of diet was on written record, there was no occasion for Dr. Morrison's authentication, and, as the effects which he ascribed to it and to the medical treatment, are proved by the demonstrative evidence of the pay-list and adjutant's certificate to be unfounded, the Dr.'s testimony recoils upon himself. Dr. Morrison had been dismissed from the list of hospital mates, as refusing service in Egypt. Mr. Keate offered to reinstate him if I would recommend. This I declined, because I did not value a man who was disposed to refuse service on account of its difficulties and dangers. The Dr. was thus disappointed,

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and perhaps chagrined. His interview with the physicians-general and yourself, some time afterwards, appears however to have smoothed all the difficulties; for he was replaced, without my recommendation, and soon after appointed assistant surgeon to the 10th Light Dragoons, the highest rank he could have expected to attain, if, instead of refusing service, he had served well and willingly throughout.

The last of your authorities is Mr. Stratford, a person, who will, in my opinion, bring you into difficulty, and cover you with disgrace. You style him hospital-mate; but I do not believe that, according to your own definition, you will be able to give him a claim to that denomination. You say that a *candidate must evince a certain portion of medical knowledge before he can obtain the appointment of hospital mate*; and this of course must be evinced in trial by verbal examination, or actual experiment in practice. Now you know, as well as I do, that Mr. Stratford had not passed any examination while at Chatham hospital, and that he was not then qualified to pass any, so that he could not be constituted regular hospital-mate. I found Mr. Stratford at Chatham in December; or he came there soon after, I do not recollect which. He had received little or no professional education; but he appeared to be diligent, and desirous to learn. He was employed to superintend the care of the itched men, and he also did occasional duty in the surgical wards; but he did not enter the south hospital, on duty, where subjects under acute disease were principally disposed. It is however probable that he was sometimes employed by Mr. Powell, Mr. Graham, or Mr. Eggleton, to assist in bleeding, or in administering medicines, for those persons who had been sent from the inspection-room to the surgery to submit to the necessary treatment, and thence

return

return to their apartments in the barracks. This duty of administration was committed to Mr. Powell, occasionally to Mr. Eggleton, but principally to Mr. Graham, who were responsible hospital assistants. What Mr. Stratford did in this case must have thus been done in aid to others; and it appears, by his own confession, to have been so bunglingly done that it is not reasonable to suppose he would be often called upon to do it.

What I have now stated was the extent of Mr. Stratford's duty at Chatham hospital, as may be authenticated by every person who served at that hospital. You recollect, Sir, I presume, that an order was given early in 1801, (I do not remember the precise date), that no persons should be employed at the King's hospitals who were not qualified, that is, who had not passed the customary examinations required of hospital-mates. Mr. Stratford was not qualified; and he in consequence was sent to London for the purpose of complying with the order. He returned again, but he returned without notification of having been tried and passed; and, in obedience to the order, I did not afterwards admit him to do duty in the hospital, even to superintend the care of the itched men. He still however remained at Chatham, though he was not returned in the hospital list during the time I remained at that place. Between forty and fifty persons, principally belonging to troops in the garrison, were left at Chatham hospital when the dépôt was transferred to the Isle of Wight. Dr. MacLaurin took charge of them; and Mr. Stratford was noticed soon after as one of his mates. As Mr. Stratford must have been introduced into the hospital without qualification, you may perhaps find it difficult to shew grounds for setting aside the Commander in Chief's order on his account, as there certainly at this time existed no pressing necessity to jus-

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tify you in dispensing with a general rule of the service; for I left only between forty and fifty persons on the sick list; and there were two mates to administer for them—Andrews and Congreve. Mr. Stratford was thus brought into the hospital irregularly, and for a purpose, not from a necessity; and if it should further appear, that he received pay during the time he did no duty, and when he was not returned in the hospital list, (and the books of the hospital-agent may be called for to shew whether this is or is not the fact), it is plain that he must have received it without a ticket of ostensible service; and, in such case, the Medical Board may be supposed to have exceeded its authority, in bestowing public money without value or certificate of work actually done by an acting mate, that is, by a person not bearing appointment by warrant or commission.

It may seem invidious that I should notice matters of so mean a nature as that which I have now mentioned; but, in mean transactions, even though they be publicones, we cannot expect to find employed other than mean instruments. Besides the suspicion that Mr. Stratford received hospital mate's pay for a period when he did no duty; consequently when he could obtain no certificate of service, and when he had no qualification entitling him to be admitted into the list of hospital mates, he appears also to have engaged Mr. Keate's support and protection for a transaction which is not defensible in itself, and which is not usual in the army. Mr. Stratford had been employed while receiving hospital mate's pay to prepare medicines for a sick officer. This he did under the direction of Mr. Warren, the depôt surgeon: he visited the officer occasionally, probably attended him assiduously; and he subsequently in August, after the depôt was removed to the Isle of Wight, demanded ten guineas as compensation

tion for attendance and price of medicines. The officer, who considered Mr. Stratford as hospital mate, and the medicines which he received from him as principally supplied from the King's stores, wrote to Dr. Borland requesting to know what he was to do in the case. Dr. Borland being absent, I opened the letter and stated the transaction to Mr. Keate, expressing my opinion at the same time in strong terms of reprobation of Mr. Stratford's conduct. The term which I applied to him raised his indignation and increased his irritation so much that, forgetting decency and regard for truth, he forged calumnies and poured them forth so abundantly that he was graciously received by the Medical Board, as he promised to be a fit instrument for the purpose which the Board then meditated to bring forward.* The absurdity of the assertions

* Mr. Stratford stood for some time in the list of hospital mates at Chatham hospital. I was stiled head of this hospital, and I held it to be my duty that no person should be suffered to follow practices, such as that I have noticed, and which was imputed to Stratford at an establishment of which I was chief. I therefore, stating the transaction to Mr. Keate, and certainly offended that the Medical Department of the army should be so disgraced, applied the name of vagabond to Stratford, and observed that it was strange that he, (whom I knew not to be qualified) should be employed at the King's hospital. This, being communicated to Mr. Stratford, produced a long justification from himself, with a letter of high encomium from Dr. Maclaurin and a solicitation of the surgeon general's protection, accompanied by a certificate from an apothecary at Rochester, stating that Mr. Stratford had purchased medicines at his shop, or words to that effect, for the use of the sick officer alluded to. These papers having been submitted to the Commander in Chief through Mr. Keate, His Royal Highness signified his surprise that I should have expressed myself in the manner I did with regard to Mr. Stratford, without understanding the circumstances of the case. In consequence of this communication I

assertions did not seem to diminish their credit with the physician general and surgeon general of the forces. The surgeon general thus gives an extract from his letter, stating, that "*when the men were admitted into the hospital, they were conducted to a wash-house, containing the warm and cold bath, they were instantly bled to the quantity of from 16 to 20 ounces without consulting the state of the constitution, symptoms of disease, age, or infirmity; they were, on rising from fainting, which generally occurred in consequence of the loss of so much blood, plunged into a warm bath, in numbers from 4 to 6 together, and confined in by blankets fastened over the machine till almost suffocated; from hence they were dashed into cold baths and continued till apparently lifeless; immediately after coming out of the cold bath, a strong emetic was administered which usually operated very severely, and they were carried to bed in this deplora-*

transmitted the officer's letter to the Horse Guards, accompanied with certificates from Mr. Warren, Mr. Graham and the head surgery man, testifying that Mr. Stratford was ordered to prepare medicines and to visit the officer alluded to by Mr. Warren, and that he actually did prepare the medicines so ordered in the King's surgery. These papers being submitted to His Royal Highness, and the circumstances of the case being thereby understood, it was emphatically expressed through Colonel Mathews, (who then officiated as military secretary), that the case was changed *indeed* from what it had been represented to be; and further that the papers were ordered to be sent to the surgeon general for his information. The information might be supposed to imply some degree of reprimand of the surgeon general; and he thus became united with Mr. Stratford in one common cause. Who forged the falsehoods and calumnies which appeared before the public consequent to this, I do not correctly know; but Stratford was one of the principal agents who propagated them through London in the following winter, and he exerted himself in this duty with great effect.

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ble state, not being able to walk, and a dose of eight grains of calomel and six of James's powder were given as a purge, which always occasioned spasms, with great debility, and a train of other distressing symptoms, for the relief of which they were bled and blistered from head to foot; they were bled a fourth and fifth time in the space of 30 hours, and usually lost from 60 to 70 ounces of blood in that time."

The practice here described is absurd and contradictory with itself. If your discernment, and the discernment of the physician-general could not detect its inconsistency, scarcely any other person of common sense and the smallest medical experience will be at a loss to discover its folly. It will hardly be credited that a person who has practised physic for near forty years, who has seen as much as most physicians in England, and who has written books on the subject of his profession, which are generally regarded as accurate in matter of fact, should not have learned to discriminate one disease from another with so much skill as Mr. Stratford, who never walked an hospital, and who appeared not even to have then attended the reading of any course of medical lecture. But if you yourself, or any other of your friends, choose to adhere to Stratford's testimony on this point, you will find difficulty, I believe, in persuading even the most credulous to acquiesce in the following, viz. that six of his Majesty's sick soldiers were put at once into the same bathing tub, which the surgeon-general himself must know did not exceed six feet in length and three in width. This is a question of measurement, and no person will, I presume, now that the dimensions are known, maintain that such a bathing tub was capable of containing even three. I have described, on various occasions, the manner in

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which

which I conduct the alternate applications of warm and cold water to the surface of the febrile subject. I therefore need not add any thing in refutation of Stratford's statements on this head, farther than to observe, that the subsequent practice or mode of treatment, such as Stratford describes it, could not be supposed by any one to be the practice of a rational man, or that it would be cheerfully submitted to and thankfully acknowledged by the sick. Now it is known to be a truth by every person who did duty at the dépôt, whether military or medical, that the soldiers were uniformly thankful for the kindness with which they were treated when sick. There is thus a strong presumption that the statement, here made, had no just foundation in fact. But if your discernment was not sufficiently acute to discover its foolishness and inconsistency; yet, had you inspected the register of cases, or hospital books, you would have found out that it was positively false; and had you done this, you would have avoided the disgrace of being deceived; if I am not to understand that the deception is your own, and intended to operate your own purpose on the ignorant and credulous.

Mr. Stratford adds, in another paragraph, that twelve or fourteen persons were bled in a morning by him, and that he had often been obliged to open six veins in one subject, to get the requisite quantity. That twelve or fourteen persons were bled in the surgery in a morning, is very probable; for, there were a great number of persons thus treated and sent to their barracks as out patients; but, though Mr. Stratford was probably employed sometimes to bleed, he must have only been so employed as assisting Mr. Powell, or Mr. Graham; consequently as acting under their eye. Nothing was allowed to depend on his judgment; for if true, according to his own confession,

confession, that he had often to open six veins in one subject to get the quantity of blood required, it is plain he was not qualified for the office; and, if such was his inexpertness, I conclude he was not often called upon to execute even this simple operation.

Mr. Stratford further asserts, that more instances than one have occurred in his presence, where the men have expired in the act of bleeding, and these men he had assisted in opening for our information; when the consequences of that treatment proved fatal, the chest was usually full of water, and tendency to anasarca prevailed in the habit, and no other marks of disease could be discovered. I may observe, in the first place, that the assertion here made disproves itself by its inconsistency as a medical fact. Persons who are at all acquainted with diseases, and with appearances on dissection after death, know perfectly well that effusion of water into the chest does not follow excessive bleeding; on the contrary, it is known that such effusions are ordinarily the consequences of inflammation, or other obstructions to circulation through the thoracic viscera; and that when they do take place, they are ordinarily ascribed to the want of bleeding, at least of bleeding to the proper extent—not to its excess: Hence, as the assertion is false in itself, it is made not only in ignorance of, but contrary to the nature of things. The latter part of the paragraph, with regard to the appearances of anasarca supposed to be a consequence of this practice, is disproved by reference to the hospital returns. From the 1st March to the 10th June (see Publication, 1803) there stand on the returns only seven cases of dropsy: of these one died. But, though the consequences here assigned do not belong to the effect of the means supposed to have been employed; yet, if the fact itself had taken place, (of which my recollection or memorandums do not furnish

nish a single instance) Mr. Stratford could not be supposed to have known it from his own observation; for no persons died in the surgery, and Mr. Stratford did no duty in the sick wards. I do not recollect to have seen him even once in the wards of the South hospital, so that I must consider his assertion of the fact of persons dying in the act of bleeding as an impudent falsehood; and I hold it to be equally false that he was employed to open dead bodies. All the dissections were made in my own presence: many of them by Dr. Morrison; Stratford never acted;—I do not know that he ever looked on.

There is another point which you state as being in evidence, and probably resting on the same authority, viz. *that the blood has been suffered to run from the vein on the pavement, without any vessel to receive it, by which the quantity might be judged of.* This is another assertion of yours which disproves itself by its absurdity. If you had said that the blood of the whole had been allowed to flow into the same bucket, some persons might have believed you; but, when you say it was allowed to flow upon the pavement, while there were an abundance of vessels at command to receive it, is what no man of common sense will credit; for, the removing of it afterwards would have given much more trouble to the servants than the trouble of receiving it into vessels, had there even been nothing revolting in the appearance of a floor deluged with human blood.

As your charges, drawn from the informations of Dr. Maclaurin, Dr. Morrison, and Mr. Andrews, are refuted by evidence which I hold to be demonstrative; viz. *unprecedented mortality*, by a comparison of returns at different periods; *frequent relapse*, by total want of evidence of the fact, and inconsistency of the common operation of the cause assigned with the fact itself; *tedious*
recovery,

recovery, by abstract from the stoppage account giving a direct contrary result, and *debilitated state of the patients*, disproved by General Hewett's testimony, and the more direct certificate of Lieut. (now Captain) Jarvis, Adjutant at the army depôt in 1801; so Mr. Stratford's evidence, "*no part of which you and the other members of the Board saw cause to distrust,*" but much of which is so absolutely irreconcilable with common sense as to be refuted by its own absurdity, would have been completely set aside by counter testimony, had you permitted the case to be tried before a military court; for there Mr. Stratford would have been confronted with Mr. Powell, Mr. Graham, and Mr. Eggleton, who were hospital mates at Chatham at the same time with Mr. Stratford, who had the charge of the surgery and that division of the hospital where those patients to whom Mr. Stratford must be supposed to allude were disposed, and consequently treated.* But to refute this charge, it was not even necessary to have recourse to such evidence; for the means placed within your own power, particularly the register of cases, are sufficient to shew that it was equally false as foolish. Here however you have shewn, as on other occasions, that, though a servant placed in a situation of trust, you are not scrupulously devoted to the investigation of truth. Mr. Stratford, with your help I presume, for he had several interviews with you, forged clumsy and inconsistent calumnies; and you yourself now give them utterance, hoping to impose them as truth on the credulous public. In this instance, however, I believe you will not succeed; for the statement, notwithstanding all the aid you have given in dressing it up, has scarcely a semblance of probability for its support. It is inconsistent; yet, if you do not esta-

* See Certificates at the end.

blish its truth in open trial, you are sensible of the ground on which you stand; and you must be sensible, that whatever offices you may continue to hold, you cannot possess public confidence while suspicions are so much against your sincerity.

I cannot dismiss the subject without adverting to the original paper as you call it, or prescription purloined from the hospital surgery, bearing date the 27th of May.

Copy of the purloined Prescription.

South Hospital, May 27.

Regt.

51	6	John Bateman, - fever,	V. S. W. & C. B. Emetic, purging powder.
73	6	Edward Lacey, - fever,	V. S. W. & C. B. Emetic.
76		Serjeant Frazer, - fever,	Pneumonic tendency.
76	11	Samuel Hinch, - feverish,	V. S. W. & C. B. Purgine powder, blister to neck.
78	9	Murdoch McKeever, cynanche tonsillaris.	Purgine powder, lin. to the throat.
61	11	Charles Armstrong, feverish,	V. S. Large purging powder, nasal.
19	11	Charles Moore, - fever,	V. S. W. & C. B. Emetic, purging powder.

N. B. V. S. means bleeding. W. & C. B. warm and cold bathing.

The means by which you obtained this document, on which you place such dependence for proof of your assertions, must have been unfair; as the act shews the purpose, which you and the other members of the Medical Board harboured in your minds at the time you professed candour and fair dealing. It seems incredible; and in fact would not be believed by men of an upright and honorable way of thinking, without the evidence which I now shew, that the physician general and surgeon general of the

the British Army, who had in their power to command all the books at Chatham hospital, should resort to the mean expedient of procuring, or receiving clandestinely a mutilated paper from an obscure individual, and that they should treasure it up for a mischievous purpose at some after period. If this paper was before you soon after its date, and it is probable that it was for you were then taking your informations, it is strange that you should have so far committed yourself by the letter of disavowal of the 4th of July as you appear to have done. You have here, by reference to this paper, severely wounded the moral character of yourself and the physician general; and you perfectly destroy the confidence which a medical officer might be supposed to place in the heads of the medical department of the army. No one, from henceforth, can believe himself in security when he executes his duty: for no one knows, but that those who are acting under his orders, are placed as spies upon his conduct by the members of the Board. With regard to myself there was nothing to be concealed from a spy: the hospital was open to every one through the orderly mate, and I should have been glad that the physician general and yourself had accompanied me in all my visits, so that you might have seen, in their full extent, all the operations, all the neglects and violences which were practised upon His Majesty's sick soldiers. It is not therefore the informations with which a spy could furnish you that I regard; it is the principle which authorises such act that I detest; and by the exercise of which the higher powers will, I presume, see that you have compromised the respect which is, or ought to be due to the character of the chiefs of the medical department of the army.—Having premised this remark on the principle, I shall now make a few observations on the paper itself, which

which will prove that you yourself, and even the physician general, if he was privy to your views, know little or nothing of diseases, or of the best and most effectual manner of treating them. That you may understand the case rightly, I observe in the first place that I bleed, even largely, in the commencement of many forms of fever,—and further that I do not prescribe the quantity in a prescription book. I attend when the operation is performed, and I direct that the arm be tied up when the effect for which I order the remedy is attained, but not before. When I ordered an hospital patient who presented himself in the inspection room to be bled, I met him again in the receiving room, saw him and watched him under the operation. Dr. Borland I believe generally did the same. I employ warm and cold bathing alternately in certain conditions of febrile disease; and, as I have fully explained on different occasions the view with which I do this and the manner of doing it, it is not necessary to say any more upon the subject. If you, and the physician general do not understand it, the fault is not mine: there are many who do; and, if you were acquainted with the records of the medical art as you ought to be, you would not say that it is a singular, at least an injurious practice. Emetics and purgatives I employ in the early stages of fever, and even blisters on some occasions, especially after evacuation: so do many others who wish to restore health speedily, and I had no interest to induce me to protract the duration of the disease, for the attendance gave me trouble and brought me no gain. You say the use of the lancet was indiscriminate: the disease, as you see by the paper alluded to, was the same: the subjects were of the same class, and no one, except a person present, could say whether or not the practice was indiscriminate, that is, whether it was employed without consideration

consideration of circumstances or not. *Bateman* and *Moore* were treated precisely in the same manner, that is, bled, bathed, vomited and afterwards purged; *Lacey* was bled, bathed and vomited; *Hinch* bled, bathed, purged, with a blister to the neck; *Armstrong* bled, purged freely; *M'Kever*, not bled, a purge was given, —with a liniment to the throat: the *serjeant*, I conclude, was sent to his ward to be again examined before any thing was ordered for him, as the case was probably doubtful. You thus see, Sir, that there was discrimination; for the disease, though radically the same, was of different shades, or degrees of force: that the discrimination was right, is proved by the result,* but you appear to exhibit the prescriptions alluded to, with a view to make the impression on the public mind, that the persons so treated suffered injury, perhaps died in consequence of the treatment. It behoved you, in consideration of your own character, to have ascertained the point of fact before you presented the case to the public in this form. You otherwise present a loose calumny, instead of a truth. If you had found the case upon enquiry to be, as you would seem to insinuate it was, it would then have been your duty, or the duty of the physician-general to have brought it forward in an open, manly, and serious manner. As you have therefore neglected to produce this necessary piece of information, which candour required, and which your official duty in a manner obliged you to produce, I have done it for you by applying to the pay-master at the army dépôt. The extract will not gratify yourself and the physician-general; but it will convince the public of the malignant iniquity of your mind, and perhaps it may convince your

* See Extract of Letter from Mr. Knyvett, p. 64.

superiors that your endeavours were exerted to deceive them, not to inform them truly of the fact.

Extract of a Letter from Henry Knyvett, Esq. Chief District Pay-master, Isle of Wight.

SIR,

I HAVE referred to the accounts of the late Colonel Barker, and the result is as follows:

Regt.

- 51 John Bateman - In hospital from 30th May to 3th June, 1801. Embarked for India, 14th February, 1802.
- 73 Edward Lacey - In hospital from 28th to 29th May, 1801. Embarked, &c. &c.
- 76 Serjeant Frazer - No such man.
- 76 Samuel Hinch - In hospital from 30th May to 3th June, 1801. Marched to Portsmouth.
- 73 Murdoch M'Kever - In hospital from 19th to 24th April, 1801, and again from 30th May to 4th September. Went on furlough to Scotland, and there discharged.
- 61 Charles Armstrong - In hospital from 8th to 11th August, 1801. Embarked for India, 18th February, 1802.
- 19 Charles Moore - In hospital from 30th May to 3th June, 1801. Embarked for India, 9th June, 1802.

(Signed) H. KNYVETT.

N. B. The date of the paper is May 27th; but few of the patients appear on the hospital books till three days thereafter. This is explained by a knowledge of the regulation which was in force at the depôt, viz. that a patient did not enter upon the hospital books till the provisions he brought with him were consumed; and, as provisions

were issued for troops in barracks for periods of three days, it happened in many cases that patients were admitted, cured and dismissed from hospital without appearing on hospital books at all. This must have been the case with Serjeant Frazer and Charles Armstrong, in his first illness. It is worthy of remark that M'Kever, the person who was not bled, had a tedious disease. He was left under the care of Dr. Maclaurin when the depôt was transferred to the Isle of Wight, went to Scotland on furlough, and was there discharged,—(I presume as not having recovered his health).

I have thus, Sir, noticed the principal circumstances which relate to the transactions which took place at the army depôt in the year 1801; and, if you review them as they now stand, I am convinced that both yourself and the physician-general will feel compunction at your proceedings, for they have no example among honorable men, and they could scarcely be credited to have proceeded from men possessing official trust in the British nation. It was in your power, and it was in fact comprehended in your duty, to have ascertained your opinions by open means,—and you were invited by myself so to do. You notwithstanding chose to employ spies or secret agents to disseminate calumnies; and you, I may say, suborned evidence to cover the forms of accusation. You know perfectly well that you tampered with different persons who had acted under my orders at Chatham hospital; and that you obtained written testimony from Dr. Morrison and Mr. Stratford, after you had an interview with them,—I believe, at the Horse Guards. There is no power of sophistry that can acquit you from the charge of attempting to accomplish your purposes by unauthorised and illegal means; your defence must rest on the utility produced

produced by your irregular act; but that utility must be proved before a competent tribunal, before you are acquitted of wicked design. I have adduced such evidence on this head, as, I doubt not will convince the public; and even yourself that, while your charges are totally unfounded in fact, no benefit would have resulted from the means you proposed to apply in remedy of the supposed evils. The charges were fabricated without evidence; and they were fabricated so unskilfully that no one, who attends to the routine of cause and effect, can avoid discovering that many of them are absurd in their own nature and inconsistent with themselves; while all of them are capable of being proved or refuted by evidence of which any person of common sense may judge.—I have now stated the case, and I again repeat and insist that you are called upon, by the view in which I have put it, to substantiate proof in public trial of the points which you have alleged against my professional character. If you do not attempt it, you lie under the imputation of propagating premeditated calumnies, and of endeavouring to give official covering to falsehoods which are injurious to me, and which may be detrimental to the public service.

There is another point connected with this subject which I cannot pass without notice, but the reprehension of which I must leave to higher powers. You preferred an accusation against me in 1801, on account of the system of management introduced by me into the hospitals at the army dépôt. This was inquired into, said to be unfounded, and you and the physician-general were reprimanded by the Commander in Chief as having acted contrary to your duty, inasmuch as you preferred ungrounded charges, or took your informations to support your charges in an improper manner. You then bowed in
submission

submission to his Royal Highness's decision—and you remained in office. You now, in the year 1808, give publicity to your refuted accusation; and you do this for an obvious purpose of calumny, as it furnishes no justification of your conduct in the view of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry. It is, I believe, an acknowledged rule of the service that any one, who, in preferring accusations, recurs to charges that have been already decided on, and particularly to charges which have been decided on by the Commander in Chief, is liable to be cashiered, as guilty of contumacy. This rule you have transgressed, and you have transgressed it without useful cause, that is, without shewing argument that the past decision was wrong. You restate the charges with no other support than a letter of the 28th of January, 1802, by the deceased Dr. MacLaurin, which cannot be held as evidence, and the statements of Mr. Stratford, which you know to be false, and which you say *the public may disbelieve, if it please*. To restate charges which had been pronounced by the Commander in Chief to be unfounded; and to do this without new and substantial evidence, or evidence which you pledge yourself to maintain, seems to be so directly an insult to military authority, that it is difficult to suppose that such an outrage should have proceeded from the surgeon-general of the army. If it escape punishment, we must conclude that the medical officers of the army are not under military controul; that is, not comprehended within the regulations of the military code, or amenable to its laws.

I have now, Sir, nearly closed my account with you, sorry that it has run to such a length. I must however, before I finally dismiss the subject, take the liberty of observing that you do not say correctly, at page 29, "*that the physician general and yourself never thought*
proper

proper before to notice my publications." In making this assertion, you commit yourself to contradiction, you even compromise the name of Sir Lucas Pepys, who is physician general of the army and president of the college of physicians; a person, who, standing in the highest official station among physicians, necessarily attracts the public eye, and who must thus be supposed to be far removed from any thing like mean equivocation. Hence I am forced to conclude that you have not acted fairly by him in this particular; for a letter dated the 11th of July, 1803, signed L. Pepys, and T. Keate, was on that, or the following day presented to the Commander in Chief, complaining, that you and he were injured in your characters, and vilified in the public eye by my remarks on the constitution of the medical department of the British army, published in 1803. A copy of your letter was transmitted to me on the 19th of that month; and you will see by my answer to Colonel Clinton, dated the 23d, a copy of which was, I presume, sent to you for your information, that you might have had the opportunity of vindicating your injured character in any court the Commander in Chief thought fit to appoint to judge the case. This however you declined, trusting, for the accomplishment of your purposes, to means less hazardous in experiment than open trial. If the letter of the 11th of July, 1803, signed L. Pepys and T. Keate, be a true letter,—and not a forgery, your assertion, at page 29 of your observations lately published, is a denial of your own signature given in 1803.—I here subjoin a copy of the letter, with a copy of my reply thereto.

COPY.

COPY.

Horse Guards, 19th July, 1803.

SIR,

I HAVE received the Commander in Chief's commands to transmit herewith for your information, copy of a letter addressed to him by the physician general and surgeon general of the forces,—and to acquaint you that, in consequence of what is therein stated, His Royal Highness has felt it incumbent on him to recommend your being suspended from the situation of inspector general of hospitals to the royal army of reserve, to which you were recently appointed, until you shall either have substantiated the charges you have published against your superior officers, or shall have explained to their satisfaction the parts of your late publication alluded to in their letter.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) W. H. CLINTON.

*Dr. Jackson,
 &c. &c. &c.*

COPY.

Upper Brook Street, 11th July, 1803.

SIR,

WHEN we had the honour to wait on Your Royal Highness on Friday last,—we received Your Royal Highness's commands to state, in an official letter, the matter then submitted to Your Royal Highness.

We then humbly solicited Your Royal Highness's protection,

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tection, and requested that justice might be done to our characters attacked in the execution of our office.

We were a few days ago informed that Dr. Jackson, late of Chatham hospital, had written a book containing violent abuse of us.* We disregarded this at first, as it is easy to abuse, and few in any office escape it: but on being urged to look into it, we found the passages we had the honour to shew to Your Royal Highness.

The first is in page 141, and is as follows: "Even these persons, Dr. Maclaurin, Morrison, and Andrews, who appear to have been suborned to give opinion on the subject," &c. &c. The true meaning of the word subornation, is by Johnson defined to be the crime of inducing any one to do a bad action.

The second is in page 165, and is as follows: "The manner was cowardly, contemptible in all its steps."

The third is in page 168, and is as follows: "Those who assert without knowledge are ready to disavow without shame."

We need not trouble Your Royal Highness with more;—indeed the whole publication may be considered not only as a libel on us, but on Your Royal Highness's administration of the medical department of the army, and even of government itself in the constitution of the Army Medical Board, every rule and order of which Board have received the sanction of the highest authority.

We trust we need not state that Your Royal Highness told us, that from the evidence we received of the conduct of the general hospital at Chatham, we should not have

* A copy of the book was sent to the Medical Board Office in Berkeley Street, as soon as it was published; at least two months before this date.

done

done our duty, if we had not submitted that evidence to Your Royal Highness.*

It appears to us to be the highest want of subordination in Dr. Jackson after what had past, to vilify us in the present publication; but he is not contented with attacking us; for Mr. Knight, then not in office, does not escape his censure; he speaks of him as having had no experience, but what being surgeon to a regiment of guards gave him, and then adds in page 13, "The present inspector general was about six weeks in Holland in 1799, in the family of the Commander in Chief."

We abstain from troubling Your Royal Highness with more, or making any comment on the above, as with perfect reliance on Your Royal Highness's wise attention to subordination and strict justice to those who are injured, we leave the whole matter to such decision.

We have the honor to be

With all possible respect,

Your Royal Highness's

Most obedient and devoted humble servants,

(Signed) L. PEPYS.

T. KEATE.

Bath, 23d July, 1803.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, which having been sent to Exeter, where I was supposed to be, did not reach me till yesterday in the evening:—I lose no

* The physician general and surgeon general were reprimanded severely for their conduct on the subject of Chatham hospital. See Secretary at War's letter in this publication.

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time

time in making the necessary reply ; so that the business, —the subject of the letter, may be brought to a speedy issue.

I must beg leave to observe in the first place that the publication of the book, or rather of the third part of the book which contains the offensive and indecorous passages alluded to in the letter of the physician and surgeon general, was commanded by an imperious necessity. I held for some time an important office at the army depôt,—and I need scarcely notice that my conduct, in the management of that office, was arraigned by the physician and surgeon general in the month of December, 1801, after a mode unusual in military service, and in a manner particularly aggravating and insulting. The matter was ordered to be investigated; and, as the subject was professional, a Board of Medical Officers was specially appointed for the purpose of the investigation. The points in accusation were not substantiated; on the contrary, the acquittal was complete; and, as the accusation had been made without grounds, the accusers were reprimanded by high authority. This, I had thought to be sufficient in vindication of my character; but evil report travels fast, and farther than good report. I had scarcely retired from public service, when rumour found its way to the ear of almost every person who knew me, or who had heard of my name, setting forth that I was dismissed from the superintendence of the hospitals at the army depôt, on account of unsuccessful practice and bad administration of the duties entrusted to me: Informations of this nature were conveyed to me through different channels; but conscious that the assertion was not true, I disregarded them, till they were repeated so often, and with such force as compelled me to publish a statement of the case for the satisfaction of my friends

who

who were near, and the information of those who were at a distance.

I was relieved from duty in the beginning of April, and I did not begin to write the work, which I have now published, till the latter end of October,—a fact which may be considered as proof that I had no intention of originally publishing upon the subject:—The following extract of a letter from a physician in London, (a man of some eminence and well acquainted with medical news), to one of his correspondents, Dr. William Robertson of Bath, shews that I had strong cause for what I have done.

“*Extract*”—“I have read both Dr. Jackson's publications, and I long held them and him in much esteem; but after hearing of his bad success at *Chatham*, I certainly considered him as injudicious, rash and so prejudiced by his own ideas and opinions, as to go beyond all the rules of common prudence, insensible to the loss of men, which was continually happening, so as at length to occasion an outcry among the attendants, and at length an enquiry at the Isle of Wight, which occasioned his removal, though long a great favourite with the Duke of York: He was accused of indiscriminate and profuse bleeding, and bathing, and starving the soldiers as to cordials and strengthening nourishment.” Such assertions and opinions, which prevailed in London and were propagated to remote parts, may be allowed, not only to have justified, but to have commanded such an explanation as that I have given. I held a public trust, and I owed it to the public to vindicate my public conduct. I owed it to myself to vindicate my professional and private character from reproach. A father's character is the inheritance of his children: it is the sole inheritance of mine; and it is my duty to transmit it to them, not only without blemish, but without the suspicion of blame.

I must

I must not permit myself to encroach upon the time of the Commander in Chief; and therefore I only beg leave to observe that I am ready to support, in any court His Royal Highness may be pleased to appoint, the truth of the general positions advanced in my publication; or, to defend in particular those points, which have been singled out as offensive by the physician general and surgeon general of the army.

As to the first specific charge, I must take the liberty to observe that, as I am neither a lawyer nor a lexicographer, I cannot be certain that I am technically correct in my application of the word *suborned*; but I understood, and still understand—that to suborn, is to procure evidence to another's prejudice by secret or indirect means. On that ground, I used the word; and on that ground I rest my cause. Dr. Maclaurin, I have to remark was placed at Chatham hospital to act under my orders; and, while so acting, he appears, by a letter dated the 8th of June, 1801, (a copy of which is in my possession), to have had secret communications and correspondences with the physician general on hospital management and medical practice, tending to crimination. Such communications and correspondences cannot be deemed regular; for I was then the head of the hospital, the person with whom the physician general was expected to communicate officially on the subject of medical duties. It can only be matter of opinion, whether or not there was such collusion of design between the physician general and the staff physician as marks the act of subornation; but the fact of correspondence, such as it proved to be, marks an act on the part of the physician general of encouraging and fomenting insubordination in Dr. Maclaurin, an officer placed under my command: This is the fact, as it relates to Dr. Maclaurin, and which is proved

proved by his letter of date the 8th of June. The other persons, Andrews and Morrison, may be supposed to have stood in situations liable to be influenced. The one was placed by the surgeon general in a situation of advantage,—out of the rules of regular service; the other had been dismissed from the list of hospital mates, as refusing to go to Egypt when so ordered. I cannot say positively what he expected from the surgeon general; but the surgeon general whispered me, at the time he made his visit to Chatham, that he would get him re-instated if I would recommend it. A person, who refuses arduous and honourable service, is not a person whose services I value; I therefore declined it.

Such was the condition and character of the persons called upon, by the physician and surgeon general, to give evidence, or opinion of my medical practice and economical management. It has already been proved, and it shall be proved more fully if required, that the opinions were wrong: in fact, they had little chance of being right; for the persons who gave them had no opportunities, or very circumscribed ones of knowing my practice at Chatham:—not one of them had, at any time, appeared in the Isle of Wight, and no testimony was brought from the Isle of Wight where the errors were supposed to be most flagrant. But, whatever might have been the motives, and whatever might have been the extent of collusion between the physician and surgeon general on the one part, and Dr. Maclaurin, Dr. Morrison and Andrews on the other, it will scarcely be doubted that the purpose and design of the one party was known to the other, for the evidence was in unison. That the subject was understood amongst them, may be inferred from the following circumstance: Information, on the subject of hospital management, was required from Apothecary

Apothecary Dowse, then a district surgeon, but who had been at Chatham during the winter 1801. Mr. Dowse probably did not know fully the intentions; but, what is more certainly true, Mr. Dowse, who is a man of a singularly pure mind, did not know to fashion his opinion by the times: his report was discordant; it was therefore rejected from the band of materials No. 1, 2, 3, 4, alluded to in the letter, the materials on which was grounded the accusation made by the physician general and surgeon general, dated on the 10th of December, 1801.

This is fact, and it appears by this that evidence of a criminating nature was sought for by secret and under-hand means, and obtained from incompetent persons.—Such seems to have been the opinion of the Board, specially appointed to investigate the subject, viz. *Extract*—“We have taken no notice of two letters, one from Mr. Andrews, and another from Mr. Morrison, and we wish we could, consistently with our duty, pass them over in silence. They contain the observations, we may say criticisms of these gentlemen, upon Dr. Jackson's practice, and they state, that they write in compliance with the orders of the Army Medical Board. We cannot help thinking, that the Army Medical Board have not sufficiently adverted to the mischievous effects of various kinds, that must arise from application to officers in inferior stations, for their opinion and judgment of their superiors, more particularly, when the application proceeds from those who have the disposal of all medical promotion in their hands.” But farther, it is proper to be stated in the present case that, at a period after the accusations of the physician and surgeon-general, respecting the management of the hospitals in the Isle of Wight had been pronounced to be ungrounded, and that the Army Medical Board had been enjoined by high authority, on occasions

casions similar to that alluded to, not to have recourse to the information of inferior officers, and consequently incompetent judges as furnishing evidence on which to form opinion, Assistant Surgeon Powell, one of the assistants in the Isle of Wight, being in London on business, was invited to meet the physician-general and surgeon-general at the office in Berkley-street; where, having made his appearance, his opinions were solicited as to my mode of treating diseases, and managing hospitals. This could not be considered as a fair mode of proceeding at any time: it had just been forbidden by his Royal Highness, the Commander in Chief, in an official communication.

It is known that it is in the power of the physician-general to command, in a public and open manner, every evidence which relates to the subject of hospital management and hospital practice; yet, while possessed of this power, a measure was adopted by the Board of getting detached papers clandestinely conveyed to the office in Berkley-street; papers, which, thus garbled, were made use of to form judgment on my mode of treating diseases. This may be thought to be an act of subornation, for it was done privately and with a purpose of injury: who were the persons suborned I know not; the papers, so procured, were produced as evidence of barbarous practice by the heads of the medical department.

The next passage selected, viz.—“The manner was cowardly, contemptible in all its steps,” must be taken with its context: It is found at page 165. viz. “Such is the accusation contained in the letter of the physician and surgeon-general. The motive which prompted these gentlemen to adopt such a mode of crimination, rests in their own breasts—they are left in possession of the comforts of it. If the design was good, it is warrantable to

say,

say, that the manner was cowardly—contemptible in all its steps. Had not the author (myself) been informed, that an impression has gone abroad and gained belief, that the interests of the British army have suffered by the manner in which the hospital of the army dépôt was carried on during his (my) management, he (I) could not have been induced to notice it. Such impression might be injurious to the public service, and on that account such a mode has been reluctantly adopted. The documents annexed are official and authentic—they will shew where the truth lies."

This explains much.—When it is understood that it is not only in the power, but that it is the express duty of the Army Medical Board to examine the management of hospitals in Britain; and, that this is to be done in an open and public manner, it must appear strange that a work of such importance should be attempted to be done by proxy; that is, by secret informations from persons serving in inferior stations, and necessarily supposed to be incompetent judges to form opinions on the conduct of their superiors. But when such informations, obtained clandestinely, as appears by Dr. Maclaurin's letter dated the 8th of June, were obtained and transmitted to the Army Medical Board; and when these informations are denied to exist, as is inferred from passages in the letter of the Army Medical Board, dated the 4th of July, and inserted in the present Publication, viz.—"We must beg leave to say, that no imputation has been attempted to be thrown on your character." And again, in the same letter:—"In justice to the public, to us and to yourself, you cannot, for a moment think, that had we witnessed or supposed any impropriety in your conduct, we should have attacked it by insinuations and uncandid rumours; but, placed in the important situation you are, and

and enjoying confidence, which we can have no motive to shake,* &c. &c." the term, alluded to, may be thought by most persons to be capable of justification: nay, farther, when it is understood that the information which was obtained previous to June, was denied to exist in July, and that it was afterwards made use of, when an apparent opportunity offered of its contributing to operate the destruction of the public and private character of an individual, a harsher expression, than that here made use of, might probably have been employed without violating the propriety of language.

The next passage—"Those, who assert without knowledge, are ready to disavow without shame,"—is a general remark relating to cause and action as mutual consequences. The physician and surgeon-general have applied it to themselves; and there are sufficient materials at hand to confirm the application. The letter of the physician and surgeon-general, dated 10th December, most expressly insinuates blame. A letter, dated the 28th December, was written by these gentlemen, and is stated by the Special Board, (to which a copy of it was sent), to have totally disavowed such meaning.† But if blame had been in any manner attached to the management of the hospital at Chatham, and it appears the object was in a certain degree attempted, it was disavowed in a letter, dated the 4th July, about the time the dépôt was removed from that place.

I am sorry I have been obliged to go so much into detail; but, the question so nearly concerns the tenderest subject which belongs to a man that I hope for indulgence. In answer to the general assertion of the libellous nature of the publication, and want of subordina-

* See the letter, p. 19, 20.

† See letter, p. 24.

tion in its author—a few words will suffice. I acknowledge the physician and surgeon-general to be my superiors in official rank when I act in His Majesty's service; but, while my superiors in that particular, I must beg leave to add that these gentlemen did not observe the usual official form of proceeding in criminating my conduct; consequently I might be supposed to shew less official respect in establishing my defence than would otherwise be due to their station. Attacked clandestinely, judged by incompetent evidence, and condemned without trial, (for I was superseded abruptly in my medical duties), I may be allowed to defend myself. The points of accusation were certainly of a serious nature: they were investigated, and stated to be unfounded: * the acquittal was known to few; the accusation, with a grievous load of calumnies, was spread wide. It is only from the physician-general, the surgeon-general and persons in their confidence, that the calumnies could be supposed to flow; for the physician-general and surgeon-general are the source. It was my duty to refute them. I did so; but, in refuting a calumny, I trust it cannot be proved that I have written a libel. I have gone no further than the point of refutation; but I intended to go fully to the point. I have added remarks in some instances upon causes and actions, as they arose strongly from the case; but I have done less than I might have done, for I abstained from laying before the public some observations of the Special Medical Board, which are, in a manner official, and which may be supposed to bear out the expression against which there seems to be the heaviest complaint. My character has been grievously traduced, as appears by the facts which I have exhibited and

* See p. 31, 32.

which

which I pledge myself to prove publicly. I acknowledge no act of insubordination to the authenticated authority * of the Army Medical Board, while I continued in actual service, according to the situation in which I stood relatively with that Board; nor am I aware of irregularities or innovations in my system of management, except such as add to the comforts of his Majesty's sick soldiers, or as husband the public money in procuring the means of relief: and, whatever may be the opinion of the physician-general and surgeon-general on my conduct, and on the work which I lately published, that work will not, I presume, be considered as libellous by others. I have given information on the subject which has been the study of my life; on a subject, in which I have cause to think I have attained some knowledge, and of the application of which I have had opportunities of giving some proofs which may be deemed demonstrative. This, instead of being a bad action, I had believed to be the duty of a good subject; for, if I had even thought that I possessed means capable of benefiting the health of the British army, I should have held myself culpable, if I had not made them known, though less important and less fully established than they are.

I have trespassed long; but I shall only add that the zeal and diligence with which I have served on all occasions have brought me, in various instances, the Commander in Chief's approbation. While these continue, with truth and honor as a guide for my conduct, I presume I may calculate with confidence on his Royal High-

* All orders respecting the management of the dépôt hospitals supposed to be communicated to me through the commandant of the dépôt; and when so communicated, they were scrupulously obeyed.

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ness's

ness's protection. Were I conscious that the former had slackened, or that the latter were tarnished,—as I should cease to deserve it, I would be ashamed to solicit it.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

And most humble Servant,

(Signed) R. JACKSON, M.D.

Colonel Clinton, &c. &c. &c.

Like a man in the act of drowning, you catch at every thing within your reach, however dangerous to your safety; and, among others, you have, unluckily for yourself, laid hold of Mr. Purveyor Whyte, as an illustration and corresponding example of what may be expected from my resentment. I did not mean to associate you with Mr. Whyte; but, as you have chosen the place for yourself, I shall use no violence in removing you from it. As you have, in some measure, made Mr. Whyte's case your own, and shewn exultation in the opinion of the court, I must permit you to enjoy it; as I am precluded from adverting to the circumstances of the case, which are now perfectly well known to the members of the court, and even others who were present at the trial. The case was a plain one; but I was little acquainted with the manner of courts martial, and did not manage the business well; otherwise I might have made it so plain that no man of common sense could have mistaken it. If you, or Mr. Whyte be inclined to move it again, or any thing else that relates to Mr. Whyte's conduct in St. Domingo, it will give me particular satisfaction to meet you.

At present I shall only observe, that as the extra judicial part of the sentence was a grievance, and an injury,

I conceived

I conceived that it was left open to me even consistently with the rules of military discipline, to submit a statement of the proceeding to the consideration of the Commander in Chief. This I did; and His Royal Highness, who probably saw that I was not skilful to conduct a prosecution, did not I presume, discover any marks of malice or censurable resentment in my conduct, otherwise he would not have expressed himself so graciously as he did in the following communication.

Horse Guards, 8th Aug. 1798.

SIR,

I have had the honor to lay your letter of the 3d inst. with its inclosures (now returned) before the Commander in Chief, and have it in command to acquaint you, that the manner in which the opinion of the court martial is worded, that tried Mr. Purveyor Whyte in St. Domingo, cannot alter the very favourable impression His Royal Highness entertains of your general conduct and the merits of your services.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) ROB. BROWNING.

Robert Jackson, Esq.

&c. &c. &c.

I now, Sir, take my leave of you and this irksome business, and I shall not again occupy my time with the subject, unless you choose to submit the case in question to the decision of a military court, where it can only be competently judged. You have poured forth calumnies against my professional character without necessity and without

measure; but you have contrived them so unskilfully that they disprove themselves, and threaten to recoil upon yourself with destructive force. Whether the outrage which you have thus committed against military usage will affect your official existence or not, I do not presume to determine; but I think I may venture to say that the exposure, which you have now made of yourself will prevent any one from henceforth placing confidence in your word or deed.

ROBERT JACKSON, M. D.

London, Aug. 18th, 1808.

QUERIES

QUERIES

PUT TO

MR. GRAHAM,

APOTHECARY TO THE FORCES,

AND ANSWERED UPON OATH.*

STATEMENT.

MR. STRATFORD states that when the men were admitted into the hospital they were conducted to a wash-house, containing warm and cold baths, they were instantly bled to the quantity of from 16 to 20 ounces without consulting the state of the constitution, symptoms of disease, age or infirmity; and they were on reviving from fainting, which generally occurred in consequence of the loss of so much blood, plunged into a warm bath, in numbers of four to six together, and confined in by blankets fastened over the machine till almost suffocated, from hence they were dashed into cold baths, and continued till apparently lifeless; immediately after coming out of the cold bath, a strong emetic was administered, which usually operated very severely, and they were carried to bed in this deplorable state, not being able to walk, and a dose of eight grains of calomel and

* I obtained the Commander in Chief's permission to call for the deposition of any person who served at the dépôt hospital at the time alluded to: the above gentleman had the best opportunity of knowing the truth, as being constantly with hospital sick, I therefore put the following questions to him through John Saumarez, Esq. garrison surgeon for the island of Guernsey, and Mr. Graham's immediate commanding officer.

six of James's powders was given as a purge which always occasioned spasms, with great debility, and a train of other distressing symptoms, for the relief of which they were again bled, and blistered from head to foot; they were bled a fourth and a fifth time, in the space of thirty hours, and usually lost from 60 to 70 ounces of blood in that time.

Quere.—"Is this a true description of the treatment of the sick at Chatham hospital during the time you acted as resident mate, which was the time to which Mr. Stratford must allude?"

Answer.—"The patients admitted into Chatham hospital were invariably inspected and selected by Dr. Jackson himself, at a room set apart for that particular purpose, which inspection took place during the performance of the duty assigned to Dr. Borland in the south hospital, and myself acting as his assistant. After which, those men so selected as fit objects for hospital treatment, were again examined and passed into a bathing room, also set apart for this especial purpose—where the different processes of cure commenced. It was sometimes usual to bleed them previous to their being cleansed, and sometimes in the bath itself; and in many cases, after having been thus purified, in bed. Cold water was adhibited by a large sponge, or in the form of shower bath, and in some cases by pouring cold water over their heads: The effects produced by this mode of treatment were astonishingly rapid. Men frequently and daily expressed their ardent wishes to return to their barracks, feeling perfectly well—but this was never allowed, until the cure was ascertained to be fully confirmed:

After being thus properly cleansed, furnished with clean

clean linen, a flannel gown, night cap, and slippers, their beds being equally adjusted with every comfort, they walked to their wards without hesitation, where, being so accommodated, an emetic was generally administered to the fever patients of a certain type, but of no violent composition, being a solution of emetic tartar, and given according to the powers of the patient. The bleeding in the bathing room was always attended to, either by Dr. Borland or Dr. Jackson, chiefly the latter; and the quantity taken away was measured by the effect produced, and all practice in the bathing room was immediately registered upon the books. The patients so bled, were almost all fever cases, and the first impression was generally found sufficient; in the evening, a dose of calomel and Dr. James's powder was usually given according to the regulated prescription entered in the hospital books, which was five grains of each. I never observed, and I believe no one else besides Mr. Stratford, that this bolus produced spasms, it never failed to produce a contrary effect, by a determination to the skin, most gratefully pleasing to the patient, although evacuations were generally procured by it; I never witnessed debility to arise from this practice, and it cannot be doubted that there was any, when these very patients, on the third day, passed into a convalescent ward: I have further to add, that during my continuance as resident orderly mate at Chatham hospital, I never witnessed or saw four or six men put into a bathing machine together, but I have seen one man deliberately washed in an open bathing tub, and on some occasions, a blanket or rug placed across the tub over his feet, which I supposed was to condense the vapour arising from the heated fluid; this was only used to patients from the wards, and never to those admitted;

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I cannot take upon me to say, that I did not, by order, bleed a man twice, but it must have been in a very few, I mean, fever cases. Blisters were used but not above one at a time in common; when matters did not go on to fulfil former expectations, I have seen three at a time, which are the most that falls within my recollection; and with the modified camphorated bolus on the second day, tonics afterwards, was the general mode of practice in use, from which the most beneficial effects resulted.

STATEMENT.—Mr. Stratford further states, "that he was frequently directed to bleed from 12 to 14 patients of a morning without knowing the cause of disease; and in many of those orders no quantity was expressed, and he was left to bleed at discretion as he thought proper; but with verbal orders never to take less than from 12 to 20 ounces from each patient, and that he was frequently obliged to open six veins in one subject to get the quantity required.

Quere.—By whose orders did Mr. Stratford bleed these persons, as the treatment of the out-patients belonged to you and Mr. Powell? and did you continue to employ him, after you found him so inexpert at bleeding?

Answer.—Mr. Stratford was rejected, and, as such, an unqualified mate acting at Chatham hospital, and in the surgery where the out-patients were attended to, has occasionally at my request bled one or two in a morning, but never more, and only this for a few days; for the moment I paid attention to his mode of bleeding, (being more like a farrier than a regular bred practitioner) he was desired to desist, as the
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mens' arms which came in contact with his lancet, never failed to fester, and produced discontent amongst the men—with a remark, "why did I not bleed them myself." Colonel Kent's servant in particular—which added to what I have said above, and feeling myself awkwardly situated, lest this complaint should be made known to Dr. Jackson, I assumed my entire duty, and from that time, I am confident, he never bled another patient for me.

STATEMENT.—Mr. Stratford states, "That more instances than one occurred in his presence, where men have expired in the act of bleeding."

Quere.—Do you recollect any instance of this, not only in Mr. Stratford's presence, but during the time of your attachment to the hospital, under Dr. Jackson's direction?

Answer.—If a man expired from bleeding, not only in the South Hospital, but the entire building of hospitals, it was my duty to know it, and not only to know it, but to report it instantly. I have occasion therefore to say, that Mr. Stratford has permitted himself to utter what he cannot substantiate, as no such circumstance ever took place under Dr. Jackson's direction.

Quere.—Was blood suffered to run from the vein on the pavement, without any vessel to receive it? Was it the practice to do so, or did you ever see an instance of it?

Answer.—Bleeding was generally and carefully conducted, and due quantities observed, according to instructions or personal attentions either of Dr. Borland or Dr. Jackson; and the object attained, for which the vein

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was opened, a proper pressure was applied. A few drops may have escaped the bleeding porringer on the vein being first opened; but the blood so taken in a porringer was preserved for future inspection, and was not allowed to flow upon the pavement, none having been ordered to be so bled, as has been before stated. I never saw it, nor did I ever hear before that any other person had seen it.

Quere.—What opportunities had Mr. Stratford of seeing the treatment of the sick in the south hospital, where all the serious cases of sickness were disposed, as he was not ostensibly attached to that duty?

Answer.—Mr. Stratford had no opportunity whatever in observing either the sickness or treatment in that hospital, being entirely under the charge of Dr. Borland, and myself acting as his assistant; and no one was permitted to enter those wards unless duly authorised; in such case I attended—the permission obtained, was either from Dr. Jackson or Dr. Borland.

Quere.—Did you ever see Dr. Maclaurin in the sick wards of the south hospital when I was present; or do you recollect to have ever seen me prescribe for patients in Dr. Maclaurin's presence?

Answer.—I never saw Dr. Maclaurin in the south hospital sick wards when Dr. Jackson prescribed; but I have fatal recollection that Dr. Jackson prescribed to three men in Dr. Maclaurin's presence, being called upon so to do, and the went too faithfully justified Dr. Jackson's prediction, and this was at a period when Dr. Maclaurin lost confidence in himself, which can be proved if Chatham books are preserved; and to one man in particular, labouring under *pervigilium*, to promote


mote encreased activity, stimulants in the form of wine and brandy, in large quantities were administered. The man died!


This deponent William Graham, Esq. apothecary to the forces, voluntarily maketh oath that the above answers to the queries are to the best of his knowledge and belief correct and true.—To each query, &c.

WILLIAM GRAHAM, M. D.
Apothecary to the Forces.

Guernsey, 6th August, 1808.

Sworn before us the Lieut. Bailiff
and Jurats of the Royal Court
of Guernsey, where stamps are
not used, this 6th day of August,
1808.
ELEAZER LE MARCHANT, LL. Bf.
PETER DE JERSEY.
JOHN TUPPER.





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